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APP acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada, through the Publications Assistance Program (PAP), toward our mailing costs.
Imagine that a publisher has asked you to compile an anthology of European philosophical works — subject to three conditions: (i) even if by different hands, the works must have been written within a relatively short span of years, say eighty; (ii) they must depict the same philosophic landscape; and (iii) they must be important. What will you opt for? Odds are that you will pick the stretch that goes from 1637 to 1714 — from the *Discourse on Method* to the *Monadology*. Or else, the one that goes from 1690 to (around) 1770 — from the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* to the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. In each of these spans, works were composed that are canonical for our discipline; written by non-academic philosophers, therefore uncluttered and clear; and also, many of them quite short, hence readily anthologizable. If furthermore, as was the case for Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins in the two volumes that I am reviewing, you have been given ample space — 300-400 large two-column pages, small print — the question that remains will be: what to include, and what to omit?

Let me begin with the 1637-1714 volume — Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz: the editorial choices made here certainly deserve mention. Take Descartes. The *Meditations* are there of course, complete. Not so, however, for the *Discourse*: missing are Part Three (the 'morale prouisoire') and Part Six (where Descartes discusses among other things how to conduct scientific research — for example: it is much safer to rely on paid underlings than on gentlemen friends). Entirely missing, too, are the *Passions* and Descartes’ account of générosité — a first intimation of what we now call ‘self-respect’. Also left out is the correspondence: the well-known letters, for example, to Elizabeth or Regius about the union of mind and body; or to Christina about love. You might reply that this is an anthology, and there isn’t room for everything. Of course. But then consider what the editors did find room for in the Descartes section. They inserted Part One of the *Principles* — a rather arid rerun of the *Meditations*; and an even more arid digest, the formulation of them *more geometrico* at the end of the *Second Replies*. And for good measure, they added the beginning of Spinoza’s *Descartes’ Principles* — again a digest, again *more geometrico*.

I have dwelt at some length on the Descartes section, because what happens there also happens in the rest of the two volumes; the same
principles of selection are at work. It looks very much as though for Ariew and Watkins the core of seventeenth/eighteenth-century philosophy, or at any rate what is most worth anthologizing, is, first, metaphysics — how God acts in the world, what substances there are, what is time or space or matter — ; and second, what we now call epistemology — the nature of ideas, of knowledge, of perception; can we be certain of anything? can scepticism be refuted? What does not fit into that mold is left out. This astringent outlook has its most bizarre consequence in what they select from Spinoza. Included are the first two parts of the Ethics and the end of Part Five — the utterly abstract texts about God, Nature, mind and body. Left out is the centre of the book, about mental conflict, about feelings and desires and emotions — moral psychology, as we might call it. It’s as though one read Spinoza’s Ethics without reading Spinoza’s ethics. Or take Hume, in the 1690-1770 volume. One of course expects the first Inquiry to be there, and so it is. But what of the Treatise? Again the same two basic options confronted the editors: go for Book One, which (as we know) is a richer and more subtle version of the Inquiry; or insert at least some extracts from books Two and Three, enabling the reader to find out about Hume’s views on (say) love, pride and justice. I leave you to guess which option Ariew and Watkins went for.

Still, if you think that M-and-E is the nee plus ultra of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these are very good anthologies. They are thorough compendiums of texts from the Big Six on the topics that have been selected as important; they are graced with short but useful introductions and notes; and they also contain interesting texts from other thinkers. For example, we are offered the famous passage from the Assayer where Galileo writes that ‘if ears, tongues, and noses be taken away, the number, shape, and motion of bodies would remain, but not their tastes, sounds, and odours’. Offered too, Pascal’s Wager — not at all an easy piece to read. Let me close this review by saying a few words about another of these ‘associated’ texts, an extract from the article on Pyrrho in Bayle’s Dictionary. As he considers how crushing is the doubt involved in the supposition that God might forever be deceiving us, Bayle writes:

I would have you observe that the more you raise the rights of God to the privilege of acting contrary to our ideas, the more you destroy the only means left to you to prove that there are bodies, namely, that God does not deceive us and that he would be doing so if the corporeal world did not exist. To show people a thing which does not exist outside their minds would be deceitful; but they will answer you, distinguo — “I distinguish”; if a prince did so, concedo — “I grant it”; if God did it, nego — “I deny it”; for the rights of God are quite different from the rights of kings.

What wonderful lines! But will their import be truly grasped by someone who doesn’t appreciate that in Europe, for perhaps three-quarters of a century at the time when Bayle is writing, deceit has been viewed as the violation of a certain right of the person who is made to have a false belief — the right to
‘freedom of judgement’, to speak à la Grotius? So that the nego of Bayle’s pyrrhonist simply reflects the common (though, as it happens, anti-Leibnizian) view that God’s creatures hold no rights against Him: if He so creates them that they believe in a corporeal world when in fact there is none, this cannot be counted as deceit. Are there not perhaps some lessons to be learned from this text: that M-and-E is not such an autonomous land of ideas? that it may be greatly affected by seemingly foreign intrusions, like thoughts about morals and rights? and that these intrusions are perhaps all the more likely in the seventeenth and eighteenth century — the era when rights and their language was born?

André Gombay
University of Toronto

Gaston Bachelard
The Dialectic of Duration.
Trans. Mary McAllester Jones.
Pp. viii + 155.

Henri Bergson
Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe.
Pp. xxi + 208.
US$35.00. ISBN 1-903083-01-X.

Bachelard and Bergson are known to varying degrees outside the discipline of philosophy, and their more popular works have an enduring influence on academic disciplines such as Geography, Design, Architecture, Drama and others. Bachelard in particular has ensured his reputation amongst a diverse range of scholars through The Poetics of Space, but his other works drift in and out of print. Bergson, currently undergoing a resurgence of interest in cultural studies and being ‘rediscovered’ by philosophy as if some wayward child, has a reputation for wide-ranging books that have an engaging, understandable style, and for clarifying philosophical issues to a wide readership. These two works however will show just how much they contributed to specific scientific debate, Bergson through his extended analysis of Einsteinian space-time, which caused controversy in his day with physicists and
other philosophers, and Bachelard through his influential popularisation of rhythm analysis and his critique of Bergsonian duration. Bergson is correct when he states in his Preface: ‘No question has been more neglected by philosophers than time’ (xxviii), and these two Clinamen imprints will go some way to rectify this paucity.

As Bachelard himself reveals, The Dialectic of Duration is ‘an introduction to the philosophy of repose’ (17). Repose is different from inaction, however, and central to Bachelard’s argument is the positing of a fundamental rhythm, a dialectic, between durations. He notes the multifarious lacunae in duration and therefore the problem of our ‘psychic continuity’ (19) in time. This therefore becomes a critique of Bergsonian space-time, of Bergson’s assumed continuity of duration (in Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory) and his crude binary distinction between intuition and intellect. Bachelard goes even further in his attack on Bergson by identifying an homogeneity in Bergson’s notion of duration, to the point at which Bachelard remarks: ‘Of Bergsonism we accept everything but continuity’ (29), signalling a radical break with Bergson’s notion of duration and an attempt to posit a ‘discontinuous Bergsonism’ (29) that takes account of the lacunae of time in experience.

Bachelard is here putting forward the notion of the constructed nature of our experience of continuity in time and by so doing allowing a heterogeneity of duration, activating a rhythm that operates between creation and destruction, between work and repose. ‘Duration needs alterity for it to appear continuous,’ he argues on p. 65; and the constructed nature of our experience of continuity is something that relies on an oscillation, a dialectic, of our psychological experience of duration. Our acts, these decisions, these instants, are ‘fleshed out and filled later’ (89) into a narrative of continuity. Rather than be alarmed by the dialectic that operates to further continuity, Bachelard instead sees the role of thought and reverie to ‘ease disquiet’ and to ‘grant us true repose’ (104). Like music, reverie is something discontinuous and melodic. But it is the metaphor of rhythm that allows heterogeneity, through ‘a relativism of rhythmic superimpositions’ (129).

However, it is the last chapter on ‘Rhythm analysis’ that departs furthest from a hard-nosed critique of Bergsonism in order to extemporise on ideas of poetic rhythm, breaking away from the strict measurement of time and looking instead at breathing, vibration, energy and the like. Bachelard had established earlier that rhythm was central as a metaphor of the dialectical philosophy of duration. But here he discusses in a more speculative and wide-ranging manner ideas on therapeutic rhythm, on rhythm analysis as opposed to psychoanalysis, and on emotional rhythm with only the briefest allusions to modern science. While fascinating to read, these ideas seem far too brief and ill considered, and would have benefited instead from a book-length treatment. This would have allowed a more explicit definition of a ‘philosophy of repose’, something that unfortunately remains elusive throughout the text. Whereas the majority of this book is tightly-written and well argued, the last two chapters seem to be the type of speculative meta-
physics that departs from this; as if Bachelard gets his own personal dialectic from engaging in debate with Bergson, but is more adrift subsequently. Enjoyable as it is, the book is not quite a ‘philosophy of repose’ and not quite a phenomenology of time, but somewhere in-between.

Bergson’s *Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe*, a translation of *Durée et Simultanéité* (1968), is an altogether more substantial work, although ultimately less engaging. A tolerance of mathematics is necessary in its use of equations and various calculations, and shows just how far Bergson participated in scientific debates with physicists and philosophers at the time. This is reflected not just in the use of differential equations and calculations which litter the pages throughout the text, but also in the nine appendices which look at the Bergsonian influence on the scientific community, and include responses by the physicist Andre Metz, a dialogue with Einstein, and evidence of ruffled feathers for the physicist Jean Becquerel.

In a controversial move, Bergson in this work goes against his own work on time, most notably in *Matter and Memory*, where he argues for a plurality of differently rhythmed durations. In this book he contends that there is a single time which encompasses and encloses them. This time is ‘real’ (51); it is not the same as absolute, universal, quantifiable time, but it unifies all the psychologically experienced times of various observers at different places with their own mathematical notations. And it makes the time of Einstein and his fellow physicists only one amongst the many times that are able to co-exist according to their own systems of reference. Before he reaches this point, Bergson uses results of the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1881 which showed that, if the speed of light $c$ was constant, then a stationary observer and a moving traveller would undergo different times, but those times could be mapped onto each other in mathematical notation using the Lorentz equations. The equations are present and all worked out in the text, breaking up the narrative to tell presumably the same story, but difficult to follow for the non-specialist; a lot therefore has to be taken on trust. For example, Bergson claims that one of the problems of taking up a conception of space-time that Minkowski and later Einstein popularised is that there are a number of questionable phenomena, or a ‘skewed vision’ (78), in which an observer from one system $S$ is popularly thought to be able to see into the future of another system $S'$. Bergson tries to show that actually it is a ‘phenomenon of mental optics,’ that what is seen is actually ‘skewed in time’ (78); and that this is a ‘phantasmal image’ (82) of the physicist’s assumed framework. Bergson tries to establish from this that the idea of a single time in which these distortions take place makes it more intelligible.

Likewise, the Michelson-Morley experiment shows that motion of a system causes three effects: the transverse effect (expansion of time), the longitudinal effect (the breaking up of simultaneity in favour of succession), and the two-fold transverse-longitudinal effect (the Lorentz contraction). The chapter on four-dimensional space-time attempts to explain through the introduction of time into the equations that the Lorentz transformations are
corrected for, but that in so doing the notion of \textit{becoming} is eliminated in favour of static, scientific, pinpointing measuring. There are sections of dialogue interspersed through the book which help to explain the argument thus far. In one of these moments Bergson takes on the persona of a three-dimensional person talking to an inhabitant of a two-dimensional world, and it is here he best paraphrases the whole project; rather than argue for multiple durations he proclaims: 'Time is what is most "real" ... it is action itself' (111). It is in such patches of dialogue that all the equations and argument with the physicists becomes clearer, and gives narrative drive to what seems at times a dry metaphysics of time. This makes the appeal of the work more broad, and so of interest to newly emerging sub-disciplines such as time geography and the sociology of time, as well as to more mainstream time and space metaphysics.

\textbf{Mark Paterson}

\textit{(School of Geographical Sciences)}

University of Bristol

\textbf{Norberto Bobbio}

\textit{In Praise of Meekness: Essays on Ethics and Politics.}

Trans. Teresa Chataway.


Pp. xiv + 186.

US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-2308-5);


This collection of thirteen essays, written over a period of two decades, seeks to locate meekness in both moral and political philosophy. Bobbio makes no bones about the fact that he has a particular affection for meekness, which he understands as a 'weak' and 'feminine' virtue (he is aware of the ire that may be provoked by the latter adjective). However, he is equally clear that he does not want the weakness of meekness to be misunderstood: meekness is not the same as retiring shyness for him, and one of the aims of the book is to defend the tolerance of others, personally and intellectually, that comes with meekness from charges of being tantamount to relativism or scepticism.

So what does Bobbio understand by meekness? The first two essays are largely devoted to this question. Frustratingly, the answer is clearest when expressed negatively. Meekness is 'not to be confused with either submissiveness or docility' (4); nor is it an inclination towards mercy, nor affability. It is the opposite of haughtiness, arrogance and aggression. It is, rather, a
virtue to be found in ‘private, insignificant or inconspicuous individuals ... who will never become rulers’ (26), the antithesis of Hegelian heroism. This does not mean, though, that meekness is submissiveness: it does not yield. Accordingly, meekness is also an apolitical virtue, since politics — even democratic politics — is predicated on a competitiveness that meekness shuns, unwilling to enter into the dialectic of being either victor or vanquished.

Bobbio’s approach to politics is informed by the idea that it is in the thrall of the hypothetical imperative and reasons of state; as such, it occupies a sphere different from that of morals, which are concerned with principle above all. Nevertheless, the gulf need not be unbridgeable. Bobbio’s suggestion is that ‘even if the perfect solution of politics through morals is impossible ... democracy is the political system that allows for the closest encounter between the needs of morals and those of politics’ (84). Inclusive and tolerant, democracy is about as meek, and as close to morals, as politics can get.

For Bobbio’s tolerance echoes Mill’s: it is a ‘recognition of equal rights for opposing theories, and therefore of the right to err’ (133). By contrast, the negative tolerance of the sceptic is deemed simply to be the flip-side of the intolerance of the fanatic, and equally exclusive. This, then, continues the theme of a meekness that is not submissive and does not yield, but which is equally unwilling to impose itself. It is a gift which demands no reciprocal (32) — perhaps there is a hint, or a parallel, with Leévinas’ philosophy here. It is in meek tolerance that liberty is best protected, even though it expects no tolerance from others; meek liberty is therefore expansive, but always threatened. Nevertheless, the alternative is a cosseted liberty that cannot evolve and is not truly liberal: intolerance of the intolerant may be politically expedient, but it is ethically reprehensible. Therefore the true liberal, Bobbio implies, ought to be meek.

There is a further defence of a toleration that is not sceptical in the claim that ‘our reason is not a beacon, but a small lamp’ (174). While faith attempts to illuminate but dazzles, scepticism denies the possibility of illumination; both leave one blinded, and it is from this blindness that intolerance emerges. Reason informed by meekness, though, suspects the possibility of error, but it does not turn sceptically against itself, and this is protection enough against relativism.

It seems to be that Bobbio thinks that the strength — if he’ll excuse the slip — of meekness as a virtue is its inherent privacy; it does not concern itself with the outlook of the rest of the world. Hence its tolerance is critical but inherent. Yet a morality that makes a virtue of not universalising itself does not convince; worse, it suggests moral toothlessness. For it is difficult to see how Bobbio’s moral privacy is anything more than isolationism. In taking up a critique of a will for power which he sees as informing the slaughterhouse of history, Bobbio simply leaves himself open to a Zaratustrian charge of otherworldliness (the meek are described as ‘cheerful because they are inwardly convinced that the world to which they aspire is better than the one they are forced to inhabit’ [31]).
Bobbio prefers Kant's statesman to Hegel's hero; he prioritises morals over politics. But surely any attempt to convince anyone else of the virtues of tolerance must fall flat, for any such an attempt must be made publicly, hence politically — and not, *ex hypothesi*, meekly. But, of course, these problems are pertinent *just because* they arise from the clash of morals and politics to which Bobbio seeks to alert us. The success of this book is the ease and clarity with which it forces these difficult issues into the open.

Iain Brassington
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Tony Coates, ed.
*International Justice.*
Pp. 302.
US$79.95. ISBN 1-84014-945-0.

Brian Orend
Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University

Since the Vietnam War, prominent Anglo-American philosophers have turned their attention to international justice. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the moral possibilities and imperatives of international affairs have become a concern at the mainstream of political science. These two books reflect the remarkable convergence of interest in the morality of international affairs in philosophy and political science. Additionally, they both treat international justice from an explicitly cosmopolitan orientation.

Orend's book is a restatement of just war (*JW*) theory from a Kantian point of view. He gives an account of Kant's theory of justice and its international application, labeling it 'Kantian internationalism'. The heart of this perspective is a justified list of rights and duties for states and individuals designed to support the rational autonomy of individuals. Orend's argument is that Kant contributes substantially and provocatively to the JW tradition of moral theory and practice. Of what does the Kantian contribution consist? How does it add to our existing understanding of the ethics of war and peace? Orend claims at least the following three virtues of Kant's just war thinking: (1) It places human rights at the centre of JW theory, thereby placing the resort
to violence within a more ‘principled’ framework. (2) It offers a convincing refutation of the two main alternative approaches to the morality of war, political realism and pacifism. Kantian internationalism contains the moral resources to address realism’s concern with the threats to communal integrity posed by interstate anarchy. It also demonstrates the moral necessity of war in the light of the threats posed to human rights by aggression and domestic anarchy, a necessity that most forms of pacifism fail to confront. (3) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Orend demonstrates that Kantian internationalism adds a crucial category of principles to JW theory regarding the termination of war (Jus post Bellum). Kant’s philosophy can make up for the traditional silence of JW theory on the principles that ought to govern the cessation of hostilities and the ensuing conditions of peace.

*War and International Justice* is well organized and up to date with reasonably detailed case studies of conflicts like the Persian Gulf War and the genocide in Rwanda. The author is to be commended for making a good case for the continuing relevance of JW theory in today’s world. The theory can provide reasonable normative standards to hold governments accountable for their actions and omissions. This is especially so in light of the human rights commitments that states have made, in addition to the incredible, technologically sophisticated destructive capabilities that these states now possess. Ensuring that human rights and state power fit together in the ways Orend suggests possible is clearly an important task for philosophy.

The main shortcoming of Orend’s enterprise stems from the way in which he constructs the main tenets of Kantian internationalism. Kant and Kantianism are not one in the same; great care needs to be made in critically distinguishing Kant’s texts from the various particular doctrines that can be plausibly based on his legacy. Although Orend admits there are tensions (between, say, conservatism and liberalism) in Kant’s political theory, he often fails to provide sufficient and compelling textual evidence to legitimize his use of the Kantian label. This is a problem only because Orend fails to recognize existing disagreement among contemporary Kantians on the issue of intervention for the sake of human rights. It has been remarked that Kant could not have fathomed genocide as state policy, and thus had little to say on the moral exceptions to state sovereignty. Given how robustly Kant defends the sovereign state and non-interventionism, the onus is on Orend to refute today’s more cautious, conservative, and non-interventionist Kantian scholars like Pierre Laberge and Otfried Höffe.

*International Justice* is a collection of essays first presented at the 25th Annual Conference of the UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy at the University of Reading in April 1998. As Coates acknowledges, ‘most of the contributions belong to the liberal-cosmopolitan tradition of thought, though a tradition that is broadly enough defined to leave ample room for disagreement and argument’ (1). Although not all of the authors attempt to reach a consensus, most chapters in this volume engage with some of the two most pressing issues facing cosmopolitan political and international theory: how to reconcile obligations to humanity with national identity and cultural
pluralism; and how to implement institutional change at the international level that would enhance human rights and fulfill human needs.

The lead essay by Brian Barry, ‘Is there a right to development?’, is the 1998 Austin Lecture. Barry argues from a cosmopolitan ‘impartalist’ perspective against the 1986 United Nations General Assembly Resolution declaring a right to development for states. Rather than empowering individuals and upholding their human rights, a right to development claimed by states will only lead to more power for elites in the developing world. The more general point Barry makes is that collective and minority rights are always flawed when they are unconditionally entrenched. Collective rights will pose unacceptable dangers to individuals unless they are clearly subordinated to human rights.

Chris Brown examines the reasons why international justice has not been taken seriously in the development of International Relations as a separate discipline in political science after World War II. He argues that the failure of international institutions to prevent major war created a deep-seated skepticism in cosmopolitanism. Even today many cosmopolitans view their project as a ‘moral’ critique and not necessarily a plan for ‘institutional’ reform. Brown concludes: ‘... today’s international political theorists ought to be more willing to emulate the spirit of the old prewar reformers, more willing to engage with issues of institutional design and, therefore, more willing to engage head-on with today’s realists’ (41).

The bulk of the remaining eleven chapters engage heavily in the debates between cosmopolitans and communitarians. Unhappily, there is too little that is fresh or new in most of the essays; many of the authors re-visit, criticize and refine certain concepts or problems within the thought of philosophers such as David Miller, Thomas Pogge, and John Rawls. The better of these chapters stimulate further thought by asking provocative questions about identity and change in world politics. For example, Peter Jones’ chapter title asks: ‘International Justice — Amongst Who?’ and makes a useful distinction between corporate and collective actors. A corporate conception of, for example, states, give these actors greater discretion in deciding how to implement the results of international redistribution. By contrast, a collective view of moral agents gives individuals within states a moral identity on the world stage; it thus gives the international community a right to judge how states redistribute internationally channeled resources to citizens.

Finally, International Justice contains the work of political scientists who examine the way images or models of justice operate in concrete case studies of world politics. For example, Cecilia Albin and Rama Mani bring together theory and practice by demonstrating how different actors are motivated by, and respond to, the idea of justice. Albin examines the way in which implicit assumptions about fairness have animated international negotiations on acid rain. Mani claims that successful post-conflict peacebuilding requires that we pay attention to three forms of justice: legal, rectificatory, and distributive. From these essays, it is clear that international political science
has gained important and substantive explanatory powers from cosmopolitan social and political philosophy.

Antonio Franceschet  
(Department of Political Science)  
Acadia University

Miguel de Beistegui and  
Simon Sparks, eds.  
*Philosophy and Tragedy.*  
US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-19141-6);  

This collection of eleven papers examines an interesting constellation of questions regarding the engagement of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophy with ancient Greek tragedy. Within this thematic the essays are fairly diverse in topic and style, but they nonetheless form a useful and coherent volume.

The two papers on Hegel and tragedy make for the best pairing of the volume, since one argues for the centrality of the tragic and the other for the centrality of the comic in Hegel’s thought. Miguel de Beistegui’s ‘Hegel: or the Tragedy of Thinking’ traces the role of the tragic, in particular its relationship to ethical reconciliation and destiny, from Hegel’s early theological writings through the article on natural law, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right*. De Beistegui argues that tragedy sustains Hegelian thought inasmuch as that thought is the movement of negativity on the course of reconciliation and destiny. Gasché’s ‘Self-dissolving Seriousness: On the Comic in the Hegelian Concept of Tragedy’ is in some respects the most provocative article in this collection, because it draws tragedy very close to comedy and thus hints at the undermining of the theme of the volume itself. Gasché shows that for Hegel both comedy and tragedy involve the dissolution of divine substance, as manifested by a comic hero’s futile and petty one-sidedness. The dissolution of substance into one-sidedness is the condition of tragedy for Hegel, as well as the essence of comedy; indeed the principle of substance’s self-dissolution is, in Gasché’s argument, the condition not only of tragedy but of dialectic itself.

The Hölderlin section of the volume comprises four papers; here Hölderlin’s enigmatic claim that tragedy is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition is a principal theme, most particularly in Jean-François Courtine’s ‘Of Tragic
Metaphor’, in which Courtine analyzes Hölderlin’s passage through and break with German Idealism, focusing on the relation between a tragedy’s parts and its unity. David Farrell Krell’s ‘A Small Number of Houses: Notes on Aristotle’s Peri Poetikes and Hölderlin’s “Anmerkungen”’ suggests first how one might read Aristotle as a tragic philosopher, using the Poetics to read the Nicomachean Ethics, and includes an intriguing preliminary list of elements that could be seen as tragic in Aristotle’s Organon and Physics. Krell then considers how one could read Hölderlin as an Aristotelian with regard to tragedy, before surveying an array of mythological betrayals and disasters, both divine and human, along with their roots in Dionysian treachery. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s paper on ‘Hölderlin’s Theatre’ provides an interesting counterpart to Krell, insofar as Lacoue-Labarthe takes a contrasting approach to Hölderlin’s views on the relationship of philosophy to tragedy and on the position of Aristotle in those views. Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that Hölderlin’s turn from his Empedocles to translations of Sophocles represents not only a pragmatic turn to potentially more lucrative work, but, more significantly, constitutes a return to the theatricality that Empedocles lacked. Françoise Dastur’s contribution on ‘Tragedy and Speculation’ examines Hölderlin’s speculative theory of tragedy and his Empedocles as a figure for the speculative thinker. The fact that Hölderlin gave up on his Empedocles, and hence abandoned his writing of a modern tragedy, is characterized as a reflection of the failure of the speculative drive to live up to the requirements of modernity.

The Nietzsche section is perhaps most disparate in tone and content. Gunter Figal’s ‘Aesthetically Limited Reason: On Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy’ treats in a nearly recondite fashion Nietzsche’s ‘tragedy of the aesthetic’ (142). Figal suggests that the strife in tragedy of being and becoming, of Apollinian and Dionysian, is bound up with a structure of representation and appearance that is not peculiar to aesthetic experience, but rather ‘[t]hrough the cunning of aesthetic presentation the essence of presentation in general first appears’ (149). Walter Brogan’s ‘Zarathustra: The Tragic Figure of the Last Philosopher’ initially attempts to argue the thesis that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is itself the rebirth of tragedy after the death of God, namely as the overcoming of Socratism and the undergoing of refragmentation and moreover of the fragmentary nature of being itself. Brogan shows, however, that this argument in fact fails and that with Part IV of Thus Spoke Zarathustra something else may be at stake, i.e. an overcoming of tragedy in comedy.

The Heidegger and Benjamin sections of the book, because they each contain only one essay, are somewhat out of balance with the multi-article sections on Hegel, Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Will McNeill’s contribution takes as its departure the significance for Heidegger of the tragedies of Sophocles, specifically as they are said to enact and accomplish human dwelling, and to do so in a way that Aristotle’s works on ethics cannot. In this regard, poeitzing is, according to Heidegger and to Aristotle himself in the Poetics, a philosophical activity because it enacts the human encounter
with the divine and with destiny, rather than recounting it in a historical or scientific fashion.

Simon Sparks' 'Fatalities: Freedom and the Question of Language in Walter Benjamin's Reading of Tragedy' argues that for Benjamin myth neither precedes truth nor is opposed to it; rather, Greek tragedy occupies a site of 'essential turning' (195) between myth and truth as the enactment of the confrontation between them. According to Sparks, philosophy could itself be seen in Benjamin as another site of 'epochal confrontation' (198), inasmuch as Benjamin views Socrates' death as the death of tragedy itself, although this death of tragedy is not itself to be seen as tragic. In his final sections Sparks considers Benjamin's intertwining of sacrifice, fate and the origins of language in his Origin of the German Mourning Play.

The last paper in the volume, which claims to be a reading of Blanchot's Le Dernier Mot but begins with a condensed set of references to nearly all the philosophers treated in the volume, stands out as an odd contribution. This text, 'Aphasia: or the Last Word' by Marc Froment-Meurice, was apparently substituted for a paper of his on Antigone that may perhaps have provided a better fit with the other essays in the volume.

This collection will clearly be of great interest to readers specializing in German Idealism, twentieth-century German philosophy, and Greek tragedy. It merits in addition a broader range of readers, including those concerned generally with nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy; the relationship between literature, drama and philosophy; and the intersections of philosophy with questions of performance, enactment and theatricality.

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Comme son titre l'indique, *Kant actuel: Hommage à Pierre Laberge* répond à une double intention. D'une part, ce livre est un hommage posthume à Pierre Laberge. Éminent spécialiste de la philosophie pratique de Kant, Pierre Laberge est également reconnu pour ses articles sur les œuvres de Kant dans l'*Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, ainsi que pour l'organisation du deuxième Congrès international de la Société d'études kantiennes intitulé *Kant dans les traditions anglo-américaine et continentale* (Ottawa 1995). D'autre part, ce livre est un hommage à Kant et à l'actualité de sa pensée. Qu'il s'agisse de l'éthique de la discussion, de la théorie de la justice, de la philosophie des relations internationales, du problème des arguments dits 'transcendantaux' ou de l'expérience esthétique, la pensée de Kant est aujourd'hui, sans conteste, incontournable. En bref, *Kant actuel* est une nouvelle contribution à ce débat philosophique contemporain et, à l'évidence, une nouvelle preuve de l'actualité de la pensée de Kant.

Fidèle à l'esprit du congrès organisé par Pierre Laberge, *Kant actuel* est un collectif bilingue — français-anglais — qui se veut le lieu d'une médiation entre chercheurs analystes et non analystes, anglo-américains et continentaux. Le premier article de ce collectif est consacré à l'œuvre de Pierre Laberge (François Marty). Les quatorze articles subséquents sont, quant à eux, dédiés à l'œuvre de Kant. Ces articles, qui portent sur différents aspects de la philosophie kantienne, sont regroupés sous les chapitres Éthique, Esthétique, Philosophie politique, Philosophie théorique, et Anthropologie et axiologie. Les auteurs de ces articles sont pour la plupart des spécialistes de la philosophie kantienne et des chercheurs de renom. Le dernier article fait figure d'exception et porte sur le néo-kantien Wilhelm Windelband (Denis Dumas). Conformément à la division analystes/ non analystes, certains de ces articles traitent de l'œuvre de Kant dans son rapport avec le débat contemporain; d'autres, au contraire, se penchent essentiellement sur le corpus kantien. Il ne sera fait allusion ici qu'à certains de ces articles.

Alain Renaut introduit la problématique du livre dans 'Présences contemporaines du kantisme.' Renaut explique dans ce texte pourquoi la philosophie pratique de Kant est aujourd'hui d'actualité et profite de l'occasion pour clarifier certains malentendus. Selon Habermas et Apel, le kantisme est une philosophie de la conscience. L'intersubjectivité y est construite à partir de la subjectivité, plutôt que vice versa, et voilà pourquoi cette philosophie est périmée. Selon Renaut, cette interprétation relève d'un malentendu puisque le sujet kantien a la capacité de déterminer ce qui dans la représentation est valable non seulement pour moi, mais également pour tous. Il affirme, de
plus, que le rapport de soi à soi est par ailleurs un moment inéluctable de toute forme d'éthique — y compris l'éthique de la discussion.


Daniel Dumouchel analyse dans ‘Kant et la “part subjective” de la moralité’ les rapports étroits et complexes entre l'esthétique et la moralité dans la philosophie de Kant. Plus précisément, Dumouchel tente d'établir si la sensibilité peut anticiper et faciliter la réceptivité morale. Quoique l'approche de Dumouchel consiste à reconstruire la logique interne du corpus kantien, son texte traite de manière implicite ces questions d'actualité: la philosophie kantienne est-elle trop rigoriste ? Quel rôle jouent les dispositions psychologiques et les émotions dans le développement de l'agent moral? Cette problématique de la philosophie kantienne demeure selon Dumouchel ouverte aux interprétations. Karl Ameriks offre un nouveau défense de son interprétation ‘objective’ et ‘conceptuelle’ de l'esthétique de Kant dans ‘Taste, Conceptuality, and Objectivity’. Ameriks répond plus précisément aux récentes objections de Paul Guyer qui, comme la plupart des commentateurs, met l'emphasis sur les aspects subjectifs et intuitifs de l'esthétique de Kant.

Otfrid Höffe traite à l'instar de Renaut la critique de Habermas et Apel à l'endroit de Kant, soit le prétendu solipsisme de la subjectivité kantienne. L'approche de Höffe est cependant distincte. Celui-ci tente de montrer que la raison kantienne possède un caractère républicain, c'est-à-dire que 'penser en se mettant à la place de tout autre être humain' est la destination propre de l'être humain, par le moyen d'une lecture 'politique' de la *Critique de la raison pure*. Onora O'Neill maintient dans ‘Kant and the Social Contract Tradition’ que Kant n'appartient pas à la tradition du contrat social. Selon O'Neill, Kant adopte comme principe de justification des constitutions et des lois non pas le consentement actuel ou hypothétique, mais le consentement universel possible. Kant, en d'autres mots, met l'accent sur les conditions de possibilité nécessaires à une constitution républicaine ou à un consentement universel. Et c'est précisément parce qu'il adopte une telle position que Kant est en mesure d'éviter les difficultés auxquelles se confrontent la théorie du contrat social et le contractualisme contemporain.

Claude Piché examine le sens exact ainsi que le rôle du concept d'analogie dans les principes de la relation tel qu'il apparaît dans l'Analytique transcendante de la *Critique de la raison pure*. À l'opposé de Paul Guyer et Norman Kemp Smith, Piché maintient que le recours à l'analogie pour les catégories de la relation n'est pas un anachronisme. Il suffit, pour le montrer, de définir
le pôle de référence de l’analogie adéquatement. Une lecture littérale des Analogies de l’expérience montre d’après Piché que le point de référence ultime de l’analogie n’est pas le concept pur de l’entendement, mais la pure forme du temps.

*Kant actuel: Hommage à Pierre Laberge* démontre l’actualité de tout le corpus kantien et répond donc d’une intention louable: celle d’unir dans un même lieu divers domaines de connaissance. Ce collectif, de plus, rassemble des chercheurs analystes et non analystes, anglo-амéricains et continentaux. Ce type de dialogue entre les deux traditions philosophiques est peu commun et mérite d’être salué. Enfin et surtout, *Kant actuel* clarifie un certain nombre de malentendus — pour employer l’expression de Renaut — et contribue ainsi à l’avancement des recherches kantiennes. Une question s’impose toutefois: à quel lecteur s’adresse ce livre? Étant donné l’ére de spécialisation dans laquelle nous vivons, les éditeurs de ce collectif auraient sans doute dû sacrifier en partie cette diversité au profit d’une plus grande cohérence interne. Et cela pour le bénéfice du lecteur actuel!

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**Gregory Fried**

*Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics.*

Pp. xvi + 302.  

*Heidegger’s Polemos* is one of several recent works that has helped to nudge us beyond the merely polemical to and fro of *l’affaire Heidegger* and its North American aftermath toward a more nuanced appreciation of Heidegger’s thought and its political entanglements. As the title suggests, Fried’s subject is the organizational role that polemos plays throughout Heidegger’s philosophical development, from the analytic of Dasein to his later diagnoses of Western nihilism in its modern, technomorphic configuration. Moreover, given the intimacy of the polemos theme to political questions, Fried is able to make considerable sense of Heidegger’s ontological politics by tracking his various translations of polemos and the interpretations he assigns to Heraclitus’ Fragment 53 at different stages of his philosophical life. This is a bold and intriguing project; the results, however, are at times uneven.

Fried’s study appropriately begins by attempting to make sense of Fragment 53: ‘War is both father of all and king of all: it reveals the gods on the
one hand and humans on the other, makes slaves on the one hand, the free
on the other' (21). Fried then provides a helpful overview of the more
authoritative interpretations of the fragment (Kahn, Kirk, Marcovich) in
order to juxtapose Heidegger's more unorthodox reading. Whereas the stand­
ard versions of Heraclitus discern either a social/political or a cosmologi­
cal/metaphysical meaning, Heidegger's own readings of the text, predictably,
uncover an ontological dimension that Western metaphysics has concealed
since the time of Plato.

One difficulty is determining exactly when Heidegger's engagement with
the fragment began. In 1933 Heidegger informs Carl Schmitt that he has
long had a worked out interpretation, but it is not until Heidegger's 1933-34
lectures on Hölderlin that such an interpretation is published. According to
Fried, Heidegger's fascination with polemos flowed from his desire to find 'a
new language for political community' (29), a language appropriate to the
crisis of Western nihilism. But the political community in which Heidegger
lived and worked perhaps motivated him to find a new language to render
polemos itself. Indeed, the initial translation of polemos as Kampf is aban ­
donned in favour of the less politically charged Auseinandersetzung (confron­
tation) — a change made without explanation in Heidegger's very next work,
Introduction to Metaphysics. Much of the rest of the book is thus devoted to
tracing both Heidegger's explicit claims about polemos and the implicit roles
these claims play in broader Heideggerian themes, including the relationship
between Dasein and Being, and the ontological conceptions of history and
politics that Heidegger develops from Being and Time onward into the 1930s.
But there is an inkling of overstatement in all of this, born, perhaps, from a
desire to find polemos in too many places. We learn, for example, that 'truth
is polemos' (17), 'Dasein is a polemos' (47), 'Ereignis is polemos' (130), and
even phenomenology 'is simply another, earlier name for what we shall grasp
as the polemos between Dasein and Being' (45). In fact, the Kehre itself can
only be understood in terms of polemos, again because the very relation
between Dasein and Being must be understood polemically. What, in Heideg­
ger, is not polemos?

Beyond the almost dizzying ubiquity of polemos from start to finish, there
are many very fine analyses to be found here. In the chapter, 'Polemos as
Da-Sein', for example, once beyond the inevitable summaries of by now
familiar sections of Being and Time, we are treated to some of the most
rigorous work yet published on 'On the Origin of the Work of Art', and
certainly to one of the clearest accounts of Heidegger's distinction between
the Sein of the early phenomenology and the Seyn of the 1930s. Heidegger's
political crisis is also handled with great philosophical care. Instead of
reducing Heidegger's political reflections to the ontic din of his times, Fried
properly considers Heidegger's 'politics' in relation 'to the horizons of intelli­
gibility, the play of the unconcealment and concealment of truth' (138).
Fried's mastery of Heidegger's mid-1930s work is particularly evident in his
reading of political founding in Introduction to Metaphysics and his treat­
ment of Heidegger's shifting concern from the 'communication and struggle'
of individual Dasein in Being and Time to the 'international' scale of polemos resulting from the Volk's Auseinandersetzung with what is foreign. It is good to see this focus on what I would call the 'communitarian turn' in Heidegger's middle period, but Fried could go further to distinguish, for instance, the 'leap ahead' of positive solicitude from Heidegger's ontologically understood Führerprinzip of the 'Rectoral Address'. In this text, despite the rhetoric of resisting leadership, it appears that the German Volk's 'historical mission' has already been decided, in which case Heidegger's own ontological leadership is in danger of collapsing into the 'leaping in' of domination which Being and Time rightly consigns to inauthenticity.

While largely well written, Fried occasionally returns us to the bad old days of Heidegger scholarship when the commentary often sycophantically aped Heidegger's inimitable prose. For example: 'The other inception is a repetitive retrieval of the first inception of the history of thinking, and so of the Being of the West — Being here understood as the Seyn of the polemical truth in which beings come to presence for Dasein in the strife of Earth and World, a strife in which Dasein plays its sacrificial role in the turning' (128). This is perhaps the most offending sentence, but the discussion of the notoriously obscure Contributions to Philosophy can be very heavy going. It is surprising, consequently, when the final chapter offers not only a change in subject matter, but also a change — initially at least — in philosophical tone. Before opening into a wide-ranging debate about Derrida and postmodern politics, we are treated to a whirlwind tour of the postmodern scene, complete with obvious, entry-level nods toward all the main players. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, but it is jarring when a technical work on Heidegger momentarily lapses into a primer for an undergraduate theory class. Fortunately, the tour is brief, and the Deleuzes, Blooms and Vattimos are quickly left in the wake of some very fine scholarship.

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We begin as realists,' says Mark Gardiner, 'and this is enough to lend a certain presumption in its favour' (4). But if the burden of proof lies on the shoulders of the anti-realist, she may be tempted to object that the burden of charity lies on the shoulders of the realist — that since her task is by nature the harder one, the realist ought to be gracious enough to try to understand it. This is a burden that Gardiner shoulders gladly, presenting us with thorough and meticulous accounts of the views of Michael Dummett (Chapters 1-4) and Hilary Putnam (Chapters 5-8), doing his best to display the attractiveness of their respective positions in a way that either should count as fair, before subjecting those positions to equally meticulous criticism.

Gardiner's task is entirely negative. He aims to show that a realist's 'recognition-transcendent ... notion of truth' (5) is not threatened by Dummett's contention that a theory of meaning must mesh with a theory of understanding and that Putnam is simply wrong to suppose that an ideal theory must be true, that we cannot be 'fundamentally mistaken about the nature of "reality", and that we cannot make sense of there being a unique and privileged description or theory of "reality"' (5).

Simply for having the tenacity to wade through the heavy seas of Dummett's prose Gardiner deserves some kind of medal. He is also to be commended for the clear account that he manages to give, though a few sign-posts would help in his discussion of intuitionism and our inferential practices in Chapter 2. Gardiner distills the issues that preoccupy Dummett into four theses (which I distill a little further): (A) the meaning of a sentence is given by its assertibility conditions; (B) an adequate theory of meaning must harmonize with an adequate theory of understanding; (C) an adequate theory of understanding roots understanding in the ability to recognize assertibility conditions; and (D) the semantic realist permits recognition-transcendent assertibility conditions (24). Dummett's position, says Gardiner, is that (C) and (D) are incompatible and that (D) must be rejected. A realist truth-conditional theory of meaning cannot account for understanding, and so, we should be anti-realists. For this conclusion Dummett presents two major arguments. The Acquisition Argument claims that insofar as realists are committed to there being recognition-transcendent truth-conditions, they cannot account for our capacity to understand sentences by recognizing the conditions under which they are rightly assertible. The Manifestation Argument concedes that we may have some realist conception of truth, but denies that we can manifest the capacity to distinguish between occasions on which recognition-transcendent truth-conditions obtain and occasions on which they do not, just because those conditions transcend our capacities to recognize them.
Gardiner argues that neither of these arguments succeeds. The Acquisition Argument fails because it depends on empiricist dogma about the learnability of concepts (29); because having the concept of a recognizable state of affairs entails having the concept of an unrecognizable state of affairs, from which we can generate a realist conception of truth (31); and because it is parasitic on the Manifestation Argument, which also fails. The Manifestation Argument fails because the anti-realist conflates the recognition-transcendence of truth-conditions with their unrecognizability.

Gardiner's treatment of Putnam is also careful, and he offers decisive criticisms of the Putnam he describes. Putnam's model-theoretic argument for the indeterminacy of reference fails because it presupposes the unintelligible notion of an ideal theory; because, as David Lewis argued, Putnam simply assumes that constraints other than theoretical and operational ones cannot fix reference; and because, as Lewis also argued, Putnam presupposes that we can determinately refer in a metalanguage to our object-language terms and to the relation of reference. Putnam's claim that I cannot be a brain in a vat fails because it turns on the question-begging equation of truth with correct assertibility. And Putnam's contention that there can be rival, non-equivalent descriptions of the world simply begs the question either by identifying truth with empirical adequacy or by assuming that 'The world is,' not 'populated with self-identifying objects' (142).

Most of Gardiner's arguments succeed splendidly. But there is room for protest. For example, why shouldn't Dummett — taking a leaf from Putnam — argue that there is a connection between recognition-transcendence and unrecognizability to be found in the metaphysical realist's commitment to the explanatory possibility of skeptical doubt? Why can't Putnam ground the occasional truth of 'I am not speaking' (187f.) in my ability correctly to assert later, 'I was not speaking', without relinquishing the claim that because I cannot correctly assert that I am a brain in a vat, it is not true that I am a brain in a vat? In presenting his 'Second Argument from Equivalence' (214f.), why shouldn't Putnam simply avail himself of traditional arguments for nominalism in order to undermine the thesis that 'The world is populated with self-identifying objects' (142)?

But in the end both Dummett and Putnam are guilty in Gardiner's eyes of a fallacious Village Anti-Realism: we can never get outside our own representations to compare those representations with the world itself; therefore, the truth of our representations must consist in something other than a relation between those representations and the world itself (220f.). And this makes me want to fault Gardiner for failing to pursue the ways in which at least Putnam's views have been constantly evolving since the time of _Reason, Truth and History_ (1981). That sort of examination would reveal, I think, that Putnam's model-theoretic argument is best thought of as an argument (i) that casts skeptical doubt (as Lewis rightly noticed) on our knowledge of reference, given traditional correspondence-theories of truth, rather than on the determinacy of reference itself; (ii) which (as Lewis also noticed) does not rely on the notion of an ideal theory, despite Putnam's
formulations; (iii) which finds fault with the very enterprise of trying to 
*explain* reference and truth, on grounds that such an approach automatically 
opens the door to skeptical worries by treating reference as an identifiable 
phenomenon about which we can entertain rival hypotheses. Such an exami-
nation would further find Putnam renouncing the equivalence of truth and 
ideal justification, repudiating the equivalence of ideal justification with 
warrant by an ideal theory and moving away from representationalism 
altogether. It would see the brains-in-a-vat argument as an attempt to 
illustrate the difference between metaphysical realism and pragmatic real-
ism, by emphasizing the metaphysical realist's commitment to the skeptical 
possibility that our being brains in a vat would *explain* our experience, not 
as a question-begging attempt to refute either metaphysical realism or 
skepticism. And the view that this examination would reveal would not be a 
form of anti-realism at all — but neither would it be the metaphysical realism 
that Putnam criticizes.

Gardiner, perhaps, should not be scolded for not having written another 
book. But the University of Toronto Press is to be scolded for producing a 
volume with no parenthetical references and a consequent glut of endnote-
children far-removed from their textual parents. There are a few typos that 
stand out: 'Put[n]a[m]s' name is systematically misspelled on the header 
adorning some forty pages; 'althetic' and 'althetic' (but, thankfully, not 
'athletic') appear for 'alethic' (221), and the book ends, not with a whimper, 
but a bang from some booming 'cannons of rationality' (223). Some stylistic 
and editorial oddities might also have been smothered at birth — the use of 
‘they’ as a singular pronoun, and an awkward conceit that treats Putnam the 
Elder as younger than Putnam the Younger.

— Enough nitpicking! The compulsive debate between realists and anti-
realists is prone to obscurity. A reading of Gardiner’s book would help to clear 
things up.

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Nigel C. Gibson, ed.
*Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue.*
Pp. 400.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-57392-708-2);

Judging by the comments on the back cover, one of Nigel Gibson’s aims in editing *Rethinking Fanon* was to establish Frantz Fanon as a major thinker of our time. This task was accomplished long before the appearance of Gibson’s reader. Fanon’s reputation as an indispensable contemporary thinker has been accomplished by a series of activists and intellectuals worldwide over the past forty years. In the context of the Anglo-American academy, Fanon’s stature is evident by virtue of his influence upon most of the major figures in contemporary cultural and political theory, e.g. Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Judith Butler, Gayatri Spivak, Paul Gilroy and Edward Said.

Some of these voices, and others, have been carefully assembled in Gibson’s collection. The book begins with an introductory essay by Gibson; it is then split into four sections — Politics and Revolution; Cultural Criticism; Fanon, Gender and National Consciousness; and Fanon’s Quest for a New Humanism. The book pulls together several major pieces written about Fanon from a variety of locations: inside and outside the academy; inside and outside the West; and also provides an excerpt from Immanuel Hansen’s biography of Fanon. Given that the book is a wide-ranging portrait of Fanon and the critical reception of his work since his tragic and untimely death in 1961, it is an excellent teaching tool. Gibson chronicles the shift in understanding Fanon from where he was hailed as the icon of decolonization movements in North America, Africa and the Caribbean, to the point where he is now an indispensable figure in the culturally globalized world for addressing questions of culture, neo-colonialism and identity. Thus, for students of philosophy and the humanities, the reader offers an interesting history of cultural and political theory in the last half of the twentieth century, given that Fanon’s early readers saw him through Third Worldism, Existentialism, Marxism and Humanism, and that latter readers have seen him through the major insurrectionary intellectual traditions of the past twenty years — Post-Structuralism, Post-Colonial Studies, Feminism by Women of Colour, Gay and Lesbian Studies, and Black Cultural Studies.

Yet while the book is comprehensive, there are absences. The first glaring exclusion (is true of not only Gibson’s work but of all the work in the Fanon renaissance — here I am speaking of the following four works, all of which appeared in 1996: the collection edited by Lewis Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. White entitled *Fanon: A Critical Reader* (Blackwell); Alan Read’s edited *The Fact of Blackness: Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation* (Bay Press); Ato Sekyi-Otu’s *Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience* (Harvard) — excluding Ato Sekyi-Otu and Tsenay Serequeberhan. The
exclusion is of Patrick Taylor's *The Narrative of Liberation*. Taylor's work is a sensitive and original attempt to think through the question of Fanon's relevance to popular cultural narratives in the Caribbean, including Negritude and Anansi stories. Taylor's book is not mentioned in the bibliography, nor is it excerpted, as Gibson could have done. Second, while the second section of the book documents the post-colonial 'return' to Fanon in the late 1980s (including Bhabha, Sa'id, Henry Louis Gates and Benita Parry), Gibson omitted one of the period's key pieces, Cedric Robinson's response to Gates, entitled 'The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon', which appeared in *Race and Class* in 1993 (Volume 35, no. 1).

However, perhaps the most glaring exclusion is in the realm of sexuality. While the book includes Diana Fuss' 'Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification', which includes some discussion of the homophobic logic of Fanon's theories of identification and subjectivity, a more sustained discussion of the sexual politics in Fanon and of black cultural politics would have enhanced the reader tremendously. This is the case not only if we consider Kobena Mercer's controversial claim that (1996: 128) 'sexuality is a key issue in black sexual politics'; it is important if we consider the recent outburst of literature, film and criticism attempting to portray black queer life. The numerous artists and film makers — including Keith Piper, Cheryl Dunye and Marlon Riggs — who have made forays into this domain have irrevocably shifted the terrain of black visual culture and the portrayal of black life throughout the Black Atlantic. To this end, Gibson could have included some work on Fanon by those engaged in the project of queer theory — such as Darieck Scott, Isaac Julien, or Jonathan Dollimore.

Despite these exclusions, the book is a fine collection and provides the reader with enough tools to begin to address the question of Fanon's legacy and the various positions that have been taken in regard to his life and work. However, the success of Gibson's reader, and that of the Fanon renaissance, is paradoxical. This is so for two reasons. The first has to do with the anxiety about Fanon's inclusion into a canon of Western philosophy. Such an anxiety, which partially motivates Gibson, is understandable given the racist exclusion and denigration of black thinkers in general. However, the difficulty with this position is that it does not allow us a chance to read black philosophers as humans. It forces us to read them as icons, thereby preventing a fair understanding of their fallibility, ambiguities and their shortcomings. This is ultimately a masculinist position, and the cost of such a position is a narrowing of the vocabulary with which we can discuss black philosophy and black life. This is why the debate on Fanon is often a binary one that pits the activist Fanon against the postmodern Fanon. While there are a number of problems with such a manicheanism, one of the primary ones is that it enables a glossing over of issues related to gender and sexuality and a re-entrenchment of dominant narratives.

Following from and related to the first paradox of the success of the Fanon renaissance is the fact that the quest to prove what Fanon said and meant about a number of things is now at an end, given that all of the major positions
have been staked out. Here, I am paraphrasing the anthropologist David Scott (1999), who suggests that we are in the era of 'criticism after postcoloniality'. And as a result, the work of Fanon, whose name is so synonymous with post-colonial and post-independence life in much of the black Atlantic, needs to be put into new conversations. The time for post-Fanonian studies is clearly upon us. This is indeed a challenge. Would Fanon have had it any other way?

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Laurence Goldstein  
*Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought.*  

Goldstein attempts to provide philosophers with a thorough account of the development of Wittgenstein's thought in the principal areas in which he worked. He claims that while much has been written on the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein's early work and his late work, 'there is still no proper appreciation of how and why his ideas changed as they did' (vii). In order to address this issue, Goldstein blends discussions of Wittgenstein's philosophical writing with examinations of biographical information and asks '... whether understanding the man's personality can help us understand his philosophy ...' (2). Given the amount of space devoted to the analysis of biographical information, Goldstein seems to be of the opinion that the study of Wittgenstein's life can at least shed some light on his philosophical writing. The book then, takes us through Wittgenstein's life and explains what Wittgenstein was doing before, after, and during the writing of his major works. In addition, Goldstein devotes considerable attention to the philosophical context in which Wittgenstein was working, and claims that it is necessary to have an understanding of this context in order to properly assess Wittgenstein's work (8).

Goldstein attempts to explain the issues that he deals with at a level that is appropriate for both philosophers and non-philosophers. He claims that he
sees the book as providing non-philosophers with an account of how Wittgenstein's work is relevant to fields other than philosophy. Goldstein's general line is that while Wittgenstein refrained from offering philosophical theorizing, he '... supplies us with the tools for enlightened constructive work outside philosophy ...' (viii). Goldstein offers various suggestions concerning the relevant aspects of Wittgenstein's work to linguistics and psychology. Non-philosophers will find the information that Goldstein provides on the philosophical background, against which Wittgenstein's work should be understood, particularly helpful.

Goldstein's knowledge of the body of Wittgenstein's work is impressive and he does an excellent job of explaining transitions in Wittgenstein's thought and comparing not only *Philosophical Investigations* to the *Tractatus* but discussing many of Wittgenstein's other works, notebooks, lectures, and personal letters as well. (Some readers may be put off by Goldstein's reliance on unpublished work in order to inform interpretations of the texts Wittgenstein saw fit to publish.) On the side of biographical information, Goldstein does a good job of pulling together relevant aspects of most of the work that has been done in the area. The combination of philosophy and biographical work make the text both readable and interesting.

In terms of Wittgenstein scholarship, Goldstein does not offer much that is new in the way of textual interpretation or evaluation, except in the area of philosophy of mathematics. Goldstein argues that Wittgenstein's work in the philosophy of mathematics has not been given proper attention, and points out that while Wittgenstein spent at least half of his 'transitional' and 'late' periods focusing on the philosophy of math, many students of Wittgenstein largely ignore this work. While examining and defending many of Wittgenstein's positions in this area, Goldstein argues, in particular, for the claim that Wittgenstein, at all periods in the development of his views, held that contradictions are not false (148). Goldstein argues, further, that Wittgenstein defended this position with the claim that both tautologies and contradictions are essentially different from other statements, in that tautologies and contradictions carry no information and thus cannot be said to be either true or false.

The interpretation for which Goldstein is arguing is not standard. (Peter Geach, for example argues that it is a mistake to attribute such a doctrine to Wittgenstein.) But, Goldstein provides convincing textual support for his interpretive position and refers to numerous claims in the *Tractatus* that all statements have a sense and that tautologies and contradictions do not have a sense. Goldstein then traces Wittgenstein's claims concerning contradictions throughout the rest of his life and argues that Wittgenstein continued to hold this view, or one similar to it. For serious scholars of Wittgenstein, this may be the most interesting section of the book.

In addition to understanding Wittgenstein's views through the study of his philosophical writings, exploring the relationship between Wittgenstein's life and work is one of Goldstein's goals. While Goldstein pulls together interesting pieces of information from various biographies of Wittgenstein,
he does not convincingly demonstrate that there are connections between Wittgenstein's life and the philosophical positions Wittgenstein supported. Goldstein does a good job of showing how personal aspects of Wittgenstein's life led the man to work extremely hard, often as a product of holding himself to very high standards and feeling guilty if he failed to meet such standards. In addition, Goldstein argues that Wittgenstein did, eventually, find a kind of peace for himself. But, this does not tell us how, for example, those biographical facts led Wittgenstein to his views on private language or the position he might have held concerning the falsity of contradictions. Such biographical information it turns out, does not seem to be particularly helpful in attempting to determine what Wittgenstein's position actually was on any particular philosophical issue. It is not clear exactly why one would expect that it should.

Overall, the book presents an interesting attempt to combine biographical, historical, and philosophical work. It succeeds in tracing the changes in Wittgenstein's positions in several areas and it provides a clear picture of his views with enough background information to be approachable by non-philosophers. The presentation of Wittgenstein's philosophy is strengthened by Goldstein's ability to use diverse aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical writing to shed light on some of the positions that are more difficult to clarify. The biographical information Goldstein provides is well researched and adds flavor to the book. The combination provides a good presentation of Wittgenstein's life and work for non-philosophers and will be interesting especially to students of Wittgenstein who know his work but have not studied his life.

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Michael Hymers

*Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses.*
Pp. xi + 228.

*Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses* [PEN] is a wide-ranging book devoted to championing a 'modest realism' about the ontological status of human minds *vis à vis* the world they inhabit, and decrying the futility of two contrasting immodest 'isms' on this score: metaphysical realism on the one side, and relativism on the other. Hymers thinks that philosophers need to be liberated from fruitless and indeed, witness the book's title,
neurotic controversies about knowledge. The Ur-debate here is that between skepticism and cognitivism, between doubters and affirmers of the possibility of legitimating our tendency to think that we know a lot about ourselves and the world. Typically, the parties to these controversies turn out, on Hymers' diagnosis, to be wedded in one way or another to metaphysical realism, or relativism, or even both (as in the claim that 'by applying the metaphysical realist's conception of objectivity and mind-independence to conceptual schemes, conceptual relativism reifies cultures and languages' [123]).

The book contains eight chapters, four cardinal tenets and three principal themes. The three themes are: knowledge of the external world, the topic of chapters one through four (entitled, in order, 'The "External" World', 'Internal Relations', 'Truth and Reference', and 'Renouncing All Theory'); knowledge of other cultures, explored in chapters five and six, 'Conceptual Schemes', and 'The Ethical-Political Argument'; and knowledge of our own minds, the concern of chapters seven and eight, 'Realism and Self-Knowledge', and 'Self-Knowledge and Self-Unity'. The cardinal tenets, all introduced, elaborated, and defended in the book's first half, are: (1) the sufficiency of modest realism (and its consequent superiority to metaphysical realism), (2) the need for therapy rather than theory as regards the treatment of traditionally central questions of metaphysics and epistemology, (3) the consequent need in these areas of philosophy for the provision of local perspicuous descriptions of practices, rather than global explanations of 'naturally' unified phenomena, and (4) the paradigmatically internal, rather than external relation of mind to world.

The second half of PEN has much to recommend it. Hymers' five-page discussion of the main ideas of Jacques Lacan in chapter eight is a model of sympathetic exposition and intelligent critique, while chapter seven's discussion of self-knowledge is richly suggestive and generally helpful. In it, Hymers' distinguishes a base-level self-knowledge, which consists, not in an epistemic achievement, but in 'the mastery of a technique' (161), that of 'giving] linguistic expression to one's attitudes' (169), from a more exigent 'Socratic' level, which does require 'a kind of investigation into one's attitudes' and is generally a hard-won epistemic accomplishment.

The first half of the book can be recommended too, though less, in my view, for its insights and truths, than for its capacity to provoke fruitful correction and disagreement. Since the subsequent chapters tend, not so much to clarify or elaborate modest realism, as to take it for granted and apply it to new topics, we are tacitly invited to take the success of the book as a whole to depend on the cogency of the first four chapters. Since I find that some of the more useful points made there are detachable from the book's overall architectonic, I am pleased not to have to accept this invitation. For example, the sound observation that Lacan is wrong to infer from the contentious yet arguable premiss that signification is determined, not by 'ostensive definition or teaching', but by 'the holistic interconnection of particular signifiers' (177), the much more radical and utterly implausible conclusion that 'the world of
words ... creates the world of things' (179, quoting Lacan) seems not to have anything in particular to do with modest realism.

Hymers thinks of his realism as 'modest' because it is committed ontologically to nothing more than the platitudes: (1) the world could — and once did, and probably will again — exist in the absence of human beings, and (2) we humans are prone to error. The position becomes a good deal more ambitious, and runs into serious trouble, when we add cardinal tenet four, the thesis that minds are paradigmatically related internall to the independent world. How the independence of world from mind is possible if the relation between the two is internal is not explained; more than this, it is an integral part of the view that this matter can't possibly be explained, since the attempt to provide an explanation would bear witness to a misguided incursion of theory construction into a realm where therapy alone is à propos (see cardinal tenet two). According to Hymers, we don't need to explain the fundamental, or paradigmatic, relation of mind to world by means of scientific or philosophical hypotheses, we need only describe it perspicuously (see cardinal tenet three), and we do this best with the aid of a non-idealist conception of internal relations and a non-reductionist view of reference as a paradigmatically internal relation.

The argument of PEN's first half seems to me to founder on an uncritically foundationalist view of the structure of explanation, according to which 'it is a methodological constraint on explanatory investigation [that] I must provisionally regard the explanandum as already known and the explanans as — to begin — unknown' (83-4). This principle is either innocuous or indefensible. Putting Susan Haack's analogy of the pursuit of human knowledge to the solving of a gigantic crossword to use, it can be granted that we must have some idea of what the clue is before we can begin working on possible answers, but this yields only the innocuous version of the principle, which is much weaker than what Hymers relies on, namely the view that my confidence in having arrived at the right answer cannot exceed my confidence that I have understood the clue. Cryptic crossword aficionados regularly violate this principle, being much more certain that they have found the answer than they are about how the clue must be taken in order to fit with that answer.

In short, a bold, densely packed, flawed book, which might well have been better as two books, one providing a fuller treatment of the anti-theoretical modest realism of the first half, and another doing the same for the consequences of that view for the understanding of cultures and selves.

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In this ambitious book Johnson attempts to review the history of the informal logic movement, introduce and defend his own conception of both argument and informal logic, and provide a research programme for the study of both argument and reasoning more generally. The good news is that Johnson's account of argument is interesting and his arguments for it generally persuasive. The bad news is that the reader must work hard to extract both the account and the arguments from the survey of the views of others that forms the main bulk of the book.

Johnson's account of argument is developed on the basis of one central methodological principle — in order to understand what an argument is we must begin by asking what purposes arguments serve. Discriminating between arguments and non-arguments, and between good arguments and bad arguments, requires a conception of the function of the practice of arguing. This methodology, dubbed the pragmatic approach, leads Johnson to offer the following account of argument: 'an argument is a type of discourse or text ... in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that support it. In addition to this illative core, an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical obligations' (168).

It is the second part of an argument — the dialectical tier — that really sets Johnson's theory apart. In his view an argument cannot fulfil its purpose — namely to persuade on rational grounds — unless it is patently obvious to the participants (both audience and arguer) that the process of arguing is characterized by rational inquiry. In other words, it is not sufficient for the practice of argument to be rational. It must also appear to be rational. In the dialectical tier the arguer considers objections and criticisms, and she must do this even when she knows those criticisms to be ill founded. This is essential to maintaining the appearance as well as the substance of rationality. It is by considering both well-known objections and any other possible objections that occur to her that the arguer makes her commitment to rationality manifest to the audience.

One consequence of this emphasis on the dialectical tier is that on Johnson's view the old philosopher's chestnut — All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal. — is not an argument at all. It is, he concedes, an example of an implication, and such an implication could (though needn't) play the role of the illative core of an argument. However without any attempt to provide a dialectical tier we do not have an argument — at best we have a kind of protoargument, though Johnson argues that the
project of providing an account of argument is best served by making a clear distinction between implications (which are characterized by formal deductive logic) inferences (which are characterized by inductive logic), and arguments, which are the product of the practice of argumentation. Both implications and inferences may play a role in the illative core of an argument, but the illative core may also be something entirely different (an analogy, for example). Furthermore, implications and inferences play an important role in proofs and scientific theorizing, two activities which Johnson takes to be importantly different from argument.

Johnson also presents a theory of appraisal for arguments. The criteria for the illative core are that the premises be acceptable, true, relevant to the conclusion, and sufficient to support the conclusion. For the dialectical tier Johnson suggests the criteria be that it anticipates objections to premises and the conclusion, that it effectively addresses competing positions, and that it anticipates charges that the conclusion has counter-intuitive consequences. Johnson’s presentation of the theory of appraisal for the illative core includes useful and extensive discussion of various competing positions as well as the history and motivation of the various criteria. Those involved in the informal logic movement may be particularly interested in his arguments in favour of including both truth and acceptability as requirements for the premises.

As mentioned earlier, both the details of Johnson’s theory and the arguments for it are spread throughout the book, which makes it very difficult for the reader to focus on them — one tends to get bogged down in the details of his critique of one or the other of the competing views. The cynical reader might well conclude that Johnson is in the grip of his own theory, and has paid rather too much attention to the dialectical tier. One function of this tier is to fulfill the arguer’s obligation to discuss and diffuse objections to her argument. The objections she must consider include the standard objections (TSOs) that the audience can be expected to be familiar with, but also any objections that the audience might expect her to deal with, even if they are not TSOs, and any other objections that she knows her argument can handle. Johnson follows this prescription to the letter in his own writing, taking up objections to each portion of his view as it is introduced, with the result that one never really sees the theory as a whole. This situation is perhaps aggravated by the fact that so much of Johnson’s discussion is programmatic — as he himself admits his view will need considerable development before it can be a genuine contender in the field. (Of course, one might make a similar comment about any of the other accounts of argument discussed by Johnson.) I suggest the following friendly emendation to Johnson’s theory of appraisal for arguments — the dialectical tier must not be presented in such a way as to obscure the illative core, as this reduces the appearance of rationality.

In addition to advancing the theory of argument outlined above, Manifest Rationality also contains an extensive discussion of the role and nature of informal logic as a distinct area of inquiry. A good deal of this discussion is
devoted to two issues: what makes informal logic informal, and what makes informal logic logic. What makes informal logic informal in Johnson’s view is that it abandons the notion that analysis of the syntactical form of sentences is relevant to either understanding the structure of arguments or the evaluation of arguments. What makes it logic, rather than rhetoric or psychology, is that informal logic is concerned with ‘developing the criteria or standards for use in the evaluation and criticism of arguments’ (291). Informal logic has a unique role to play in the study of argumentation because its focus is on evaluating the product (i.e., an argument) and determining which arguments we should be persuaded by rather than studying either the process of developing arguments or which arguments we are actually convinced by.

Johnson’s third concern in this book is with the future of the informal logic movement — what should the research programme for the study of argument be? Johnson suggests that the theory of argument is currently hampered by the lack of an adequate theory of reasoning. This problem is amplified by the lack of an account of the relationships between reasoning, argument, thinking, rationality, and intelligence. Johnson calls the task of explaining these relationships the network problem, and it is this problem that is the central focus of his programmatic suggestion. In short, Johnson’s view is that the theory of argument — which is the central concern of informal logic — cannot be fully realized in the absence of a theory of reasoning. What remains unclear in his discussion is whether the task of giving a theory of reasoning is one for informal logic, some other area of philosophy, or some other discipline entirely.

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M.S. Lane
Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman.
Pp. xii + 229.

In this interesting and constructive treatment of Plato’s Statesman, Lane shows how the method employed in the work and the political content that it argues for are inter-connected. Using expertise in classical scholarship, history, philosophy and political theory, L is well equipped to present and defend an important new interpretation of this problematic dialogue. By
respecting the connection between method and subject, she is able to shed fresh light on Plato’s understanding of politics, on the ‘method of division’, on the extended use of examples and of the role of myth in the dialogue.

The *Statesman* and its companion piece the *Sophist* are among Plato’s most sophisticated dialogues. In both dialogues, the main speaker is an Eleatic Stranger, who seeks to discover the nature of the eponymous character-types of each dialogue. To do this, he makes use of divisions, in which he locates the desired character within a set of structured terms, forming a hierarchy of related categories. In each case, the final discovery of an acceptable *logos* is preceded by a number of unsuccessful divisions. In the *Statesman*, these investigations are accompanied by critical discussion of the approach and of defects encountered in using it.

The Stranger uses examples to provide extended structural analogies for relevant parts of conceptual schemes within which the desired character may be located. Further, he uses a myth of origin, which is presented as necessary to the rejection of the first attempted division (the statesman as herdsman). In the final division, the statesman is located among weavers, as an expert in the combination of the warp and woof of civic life, the two complementary character-types of over-rash and over-cautious individuals.

As L argues, the statesman does not have a *specific* expertise on the same level as a craftworker, nor the omniscience found in the *Republic*’s rulers. Instead, true *politikoi* know how to make effective use of other specialists. Their expertise lies in an ability to grasp the *kairos*, or when to act. In theory at least, this ability might become a true expertise, the result of a fully worked out science. As things are, though, there are no such specialists, and so the problem of politics becomes one of explaining how humans are to live in the absence of an ideal guide to correct behaviour. It is under such circumstances that obedience to law (even bad law) can improve on the bad advice of ignorant leaders.

One of L’s contributions is to suggest that the use of example is the way to minimise the influence of prejudice on divisions. To accompany exercises of division with examples is not only the way to discover the nature of the statesman, but also the way to handle questions of political judgement in the absence of a fully developed science of politics. One may compare the combination of presentation and critical treatment to the discussions of the proper way to answer ‘what is ... ?’ questions, as found in such dialogues as the *Meno* and the *Theaetetus*, but here the discussion is more complex.

L notes that both Hobbes and Plato locate the origin of political controversy in the diverse judgments of mankind. Both agree that evaluative conflict is ‘a fundamental constraint on and challenge to political philosophy’ (190) and view it as ‘a profound tendency rooted in the diversity of human dispositions’ (191). But they do not solve this problem the same way: for Plato, the differences between humans are to be woven together to produce the best society, while Hobbes’ answer is to put all decision making power into the hands of an authoritarian ruler. Thus the law for Plato is set over law-givers and law-makers just because of human fallibility.
In a review of this length it is difficult to give any criticism that will not seem trivial. It is no complaint to say that this book suggests a host of interesting new ways of looking at the Statesman and at Plato's more complex dialogues in general. Many new questions are inevitably raised by L's approach, that she does not investigate. For instance, I remain unclear exactly what L thinks the role of division is in discussions of political matters, and why Plato prefers this philosophical technique in his most sophisticated dialogues. But to demand discussion of this additional question would be to ask the author for too much in an already packed treatment. Experts in any of the individual fields Lane draws on will inevitably find shortcomings, but this book represents an attempt to do what is all too rare nowadays, to draw on a width of expertise to look at complex philosophical discussion.

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Michael McGhee
Transformations of Mind:
Philosophy as Spiritual Practice.
Pp. viii + 293.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-77169-2);

In Transformations of Mind Michael McGhee puts forward a view of spiritual development and of philosophy that posits the emergence of a second nature along a line of transformation. The emergence of this second nature opens up the possibility of experiencing previously inaccessible aspects of reality which, when fully reflected upon and integrated, have the power to move us beyond ourselves and to truly treat others ethically. McGhee's account of how we come to this emergence is quite interesting. It seems that our ability to treat others ethically, as ends, is contingent upon our ability to appreciate others 'in relation to their (possible) beauty, beauty understood in a Platonic sense, as the object of eros' (53). Beauty is permitted to be an object of eros because, for McGhee, eros functions as an aspect of a particularly concentrated form of consciousness that, in Buddhist philosophy, goes by the name of samadhi. When such concentration is achieved it becomes possible for eros and its object to form a resonant state (dyana), a harmony of the soul, in which a disclosure of moral beauty can occur. Such disclosures are of epistemological significance because, McGhee argues, their content represents truths about the world that, once realized, can serve as reasons for action...
and also for belief revision. Finally, actions based, directly or indirectly, on such disclosures are authentic actions that express a concern for others, — a concern that manifests itself as a desire to further their orientation towards the good, that is, towards their ability to recognize/realize moral beauty.

Assuming the model is correct, ethically motivated subjects need to concern themselves with the development of their capacity to appreciate moral beauty. The developmental path that leads to such appreciation, McGhee suggests, has as its origins in the sexual desire for physical beauty. The pleasurable intensity of samadhi is, according to McGhee, continuous with sexual pleasure, and the concentrated energy of samadhi depends, at least in part, on sublimized sexual energy. The sublimation of our sexual continence (as opposed to its repression) is, therefore, a pre-requisite for the achievement of that concentrated state of awareness in which moral beauty appears (267). In this way, the transformation of our minds (and actions) becomes dependent on the transformation of our sexual impulses. The key to both types of transformation, McGhee observes, is renunciation, — a humble letting-go in light of an acknowledgment of one's impotence in some set of circumstances. Renunciation prepares the ground for the emergence of eros' capacity to appreciate moral beauty and involves a release from the mind that grasps after things.

Of course, in order to make spiritual progress one must somehow transcend one's current way of understanding. But, when one is successful in clearing the way, how is the resulting space filled? How does one, as it were, acquire the new concepts necessary to appreciate moral beauty? Here, as was already hinted, McGhee invokes aesthetics. Spiritual transformation is about suspending our normal activities and having our minds moved by means of aesthetic ideas that lie on the line of transformation. The unappropriated landscape beckons us toward a deepening experience by means of aesthetic influence, — an influence which, McGhee argues, has ultimately a constitutive and not merely a regulative function in revealing the shape of the yet to be appropriated landscape. Finally, McGhee suggests that this new perspective must be protected and sustained by means of fidelity to a vision that can guide action and further development.

It is at this point that a tension surfaces in McGhee's account of self-transformation that deserves some comment. McGhee seeks for a resolution between the need to transcend the known (e.g., one's point of view, past defilements, etc.), in order to further spiritual development, and the need to have something to hold on to, to give direction to that development. This tension, which comes into focus at several points in the book, is poignantly illustrated when McGhee turns to Heidegger's notion of Besinnung to illustrate the way forward. Here McGhee interprets Heidegger's 'calm self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning' (130), as 'a stance that questions and opens up a path with the answers it receives' (131). Where Heidegger emphasizes an attentive passivity McGhee seems to emphasize an attentive activity. McGhee's concern to provide a mechanism by means of which one can develop an 'exemplary grasp' runs the risk of locking him into
‘one right way’ and also perhaps of limiting ‘spiritual progress’. In the same context he writes that we must ‘start again with an attitude ... ’ (131). But, if spiritual transformation is dependent on ‘other-power’ (tariki), then to start, particularly with an attitude, may be to err.

On the whole Transformations of Mind is insightful and well written. Interesting connections between authors from a variety of cultures, disciplines, and centuries are made. Moreover, some of McGhee’s personal experiences that were central to his own spiritual development are shared with the reader in intimate detail. These poetic sojourns, which are interspersed throughout the book, illuminate aspects of McGhee’s arguments by attempting to move the reader to a resonant vantage point. Although his success in this regard may be debatable in some instances, the writing is always eloquent and a pleasure to read.

Michael D. Kurak

Nenad Miscevic, ed.
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.

In 1986, one could still read that nationalism was not a subject taken seriously by most political philosophers, who lagged in this respect behind historians and social scientists. Since then, nationalism has resurrected as an important political force, both in its traditional guise (in Europe and Asia) and in its multi-culturalist reincarnations (in North America). Situations of ethnic conflict have provided us a major motivation for such a debate, often with an urgent backdrop. Thus, the July 1999 issue of The Monist was intended to spur philosophical discussion on nationalism by bringing together contributions from various political and cultural backgrounds. Half this book reproduces material published by The Monist. With a new introduction and seven extra essays, it now offers a comprehensive analysis of the ethical and political arguments behind and beyond nationalism. Some contributors favor nationalism while others are more suspicious to it, and most come from countries in which this subject is a political problem of much more than academic interest — the USA, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Slovenia, Finland, and Israel.

Part I is devoted to the definition and claims of both nation and nationalism. According to Miscevic (9), the basic nationalist claims are two: every national community has the right (both in respect to its own members and
to any third party) to have its own state; once such a state is in place, its citizens have the right and obligation to favor their own culture over any other. However, the paper by Michel Seymour introduces a new definition against exclusively 'ethnic' and 'civic' conceptions of the nation; by overcoming this dichotomy, Seymour defends nationalism as a defense of the collective rights of nations — something that requires a principle of toleration, but not necessarily the creation of a new state. Olli Lagerspetz is also sympathetic to national belonging, a concept he sees as indispensable in understanding how political communities are brought together and defined by 'shared space' (59). The problem, of course, is that members of a nation sometimes feel forced to share space with other people they perceive as members of other nations. When political self-determination is only understood in terms of statehood, this often leads to the kind of violent struggle found in Israel. In this respect, Elias Baumgarten defends Zionism as a form of cultural nationalism in the face of a series of criticisms commonly lodged against it, but outlines the requirements for a morally acceptable Zionism — one that 'must radically transform its relation both to its own past and to the Palestinian people' (76).

Part II develops reasons for and against nationalism and related phenomena. Igor Primoratz argues that patriotism, traditionally defined as love of and concern for one's country, is morally permissible, but not morally required nor even morally valuable. Patriotism and nationalism are often defended using an analogy with the family, but family relations are not like those between fellow citizens (109). The fact that nations are essentially different from families, religions, or mere countries, provides Christopher H. Wellman with an explanation of why nations cannot be eliminated. Wellman adds that the nation’s peculiar function is to limit the individual’s alternatives in deciding how to live a good life, something that is seen as both helpful and harmful, and explains also the liberal ambivalence regarding nationalism. Margaret Moore then recommends a 'strategy of accommodation toward national groups' and 'a permeable political culture' as the only way for liberals to deal with such an ambivalence (193). This is particularly important, for there are ‘liberal nationalists’ who argue that national identity is intrinsically valuable, that it is instrumental to other goods (via national solidarity), or that it is linked to other liberal values through culture and history.

This tension between liberalism and nationalism is central in the book. On the one hand, nationalism is normally opposed to liberal universalism, as nationalists routinely appeal to man-in-the-street intuitions or Rawlsian ‘considered judgments’ about special obligations owed to our fellow nationals. The paper by Daniel Weinstock carefully scrutinizes these common intuitions, showing that ‘the mere fact of identifying grounds for our obligation to our compatriots does not mean identifying grounds for national partiality’ (152). This argument is reinforced by Friderik Klampfer, who maintains that nationality is not morally relevant per se, but rather by virtue of other features that only contingently appear associated with the fact of sharing a
nation (232). On the other hand, the existence of minority national cultures raises the issue of whether these should be left alone or supported by the state. Alan Patten criticizes Will Kymlicka’s liberal egalitarian arguments in favor of state support, but provides an alternative argument (based on a concept of ‘linguistic capability’) in order to secure the connection between individual freedom and culture. A minority language is thus used as a key to some national identities, but Miscevic’s own paper denies that national identity is an essential requirement for having a personal identity or even a rich personal identity. Finally, the paper by Gillian Brock considers some recent arguments in favor of liberal nationalism. Along the lines of a critique of the arguments put forward by David Miller and Yael Tamir, she concludes that any nationalism that qualifies as morally acceptable is too weak to satisfy typical nationalists and, furthermore, is not much like nationalism at all: it is ‘more like global humanism or cosmopolitanism, though it seems more demanding than such views’ (159).

Part III explores the possibilities for a compromise between nationalism, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism. Taking into account the present context of crisis of the state, Jocelyn Couture examines the claim of recent political philosophers (such as David Held) to promote a cosmopolitan model of democracy. Couture argues for liberal nationalism, which she finds helpful in promoting democracy in a world of economic globalization, but still compatible with cosmopolitanism as long as it does not become an institutional framework. Kai Nielsen even argues that liberal nationalism is the best carrier of cosmopolitanism (310). In a shorter paper, Robert E. Goodin argues for a ‘liberal internationalism’ by extrapolating from the domestic actions of a liberal state to interventionism in the global order in order to ‘stamp out’ certain sorts of ethno-nationalism (294). Of course, those sorts are not of the kind that the pro-nationalist contributors to this book would adopt, but philosophical (anti-)nationalists are to some degree responsible of the public consequences of their doctrines. Thus the need for clear and fair-minded discussion such as that found in this book, discussion that remains a necessary tool to guide and enlighten both political ideas and political practice.

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S. Sara Monoson
Plato’s Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy.

In this book Sara Monoson offers a new account of the relationship between Plato’s thought and democracy. Specifically opposing what she calls the ‘canonical view’ of Plato as a virulent anti-democrat, she argues that his attitude was instead one of ambivalence and that his work includes ‘a searching consideration of the possibilities raised by some democratic ideals and institutions’ (3).

Monoson holds that the Athenians understood their democracy in a very broad sense: not just as citizenship and governance, but also as the city’s culture. This conception of democracy as governance plus culture thus incorporates a great deal, including elements as diverse as the rituals and codes of physical exercise, sexual behaviour and poetic production. Monoson explores four such elements: the legend of the struggle against the tyrants, the commitment to frank speech in democratic life, rituals constraining sex and courtship between adult males and their younger (male) partners, and the place of theatre in Athenian democracy. In the first part of her book Monoson considers these elements in their own terms, as aspects of culture, apart from any reference to Plato. The second part of the book then situates Plato’s political thought in the context of these cultural elements. Monoson begins her account here by arguing that Plato’s thought is not virulently anti-democratic. This is persuasive, although it is not clear to me that the virulently anti-democratic reading is as canonical today as she suggests. Monoson then argues that Plato’s work shows an ‘explicit and sustained appropriation for philosophy’ of the cultural practices and ideas explored in the first part of her book. Very briefly, Monoson describes Plato’s idea of philosopher-rulers as a ‘stunning parallel’ with the Athenian legend of the overthrow of the tyrants. She suggests that Plato appropriated the democratic ideal of frank speech to depict the relationship between philosophy and democratic politics, that Plato modelled citizenship on family obligations in contrast to the erotic model which she finds in Pericles’ funeral oration, and that Plato used the Athenian experience of theatre as a metaphor to explain the practice of philosophy.

The first part of the book — on Athenian cultural practices — is engaging and informative. Monoson’s delight in the affinity of ideas is a pleasure to read. But it is not always persuasive. Monoson argues by piling similarity on similarity — sometimes without considering what might count against the story being told. An entire chapter, for example, is based on the claim that Pericles understood the citizen-city relation in erotic terms, modelled on the (homo)-sexual relation of adult to younger male. This interpretation is based on just one word in Pericles’ funeral oration. As the oration is usually
translated, Pericles urged his hearers to look upon the power of the city 'till love of her fills your hearts' so that, appreciating the greatness of the city, they will understand why men were willing to serve the city with their lives. Monoson holds that the word for 'love' here explicitly refers to physical penetration and so she reads Pericles as urging citizens to 'love' the city in this sense, as the older male lovers of attractive, adolescent boys. This is an intriguing idea but there is an obvious difficulty with it that Monoson never considers. Her reading has Pericles construing the citizen-city relation as one in which citizens see themselves as powerful and mature in relation to a city which is subordinate and immature. This exactly reverses Pericles' message. He invites citizens to love the city's power and greatness, not 'her'(sic) boyish charms.

A larger problem infuses Monoson's discussion of Plato and democracy in the second part of her book. Her strategy, as I have noted, is to construe democracy broadly, as governance plus culture; on this basis she relates Plato to democracy at the level primarily of cultural practices, rather than governance. Her account of Plato in relation to these cultural practices is informed, imaginative and crisply written. But the cultural practices are not specifically tied to democracy-as-governance, even as the Athenians practised it; nor are they related to democracy in any sense used today. As a result, it is not clear how her account of Plato's relation to these practices shows anything at all about his relation to democracy as we understand it. Monoson's point seems to be that the cultural practices in question are democratic because they were part of Athenian culture. So construed, her work does not exhibit any deep entanglement by Plato with democracy, but only — and not surprisingly — a complex relation to his own culture.

**Don Carmichael**

*(Political Science)*

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Richard Moon, a professor of law at the University of Windsor, has published a number of articles and case-notes in Canadian law journals over the last fifteen years on the numerous Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the area of freedom of expression. These writings not only evaluated critically (and illuminatingly) the decisions; they also implied a more general and far-reaching theory of the nature and value of constitutional protection for freedom of expression. This piecemeal account is now replaced, and vastly surpassed in its depth, systematicity and rigour, by the book under review. Scholars in the area have been eagerly awaiting the full version for some time, and the wait has proved most worthwhile.

The structure of the book is elegantly simple. After a brief introduction, the crucial first full chapter lays out the general theory of freedom of expression at a high level of abstraction (high from the point of view of legal writings, that is; philosophers will be familiar with it). The second chapter discusses, still quite generally, the structure of constitutional adjudication about freedom of expression, in the light of the first chapter. The subsequent five chapters then work out the application of the theory to different areas of freedom of expression of current interest and controversy. The brief final chapter points to further as yet unexplored implications of the theory. In this review, I will concentrate on the conceptual arguments of the second chapter, as they will be of most interest to readers of PIR.

The heart of Moon's theory is the claim that 'freedom of expression does not simply protect individual liberty from state interference. Rather, it protects the individual's freedom to communicate with others. The right of the individual is to participate in an activity that is deeply social in character' (3). That is, Moon wants to combat what he sees as a widespread misconception in contemporary liberal thought, that freedom of expression is an individual negative liberty right, and that constitutional protection for this right amounts to protecting the right of some speaker to speak or the right of some hearer to hear. Instead, Moon argues, freedom of expression is to be seen as essentially freedom of communication, and constitutional protection for freedom of expression protects the right to communicate. One might think that, if one person speaks and another hears and comprehends, communication takes place; so the supposed incompatibility between the negative liberty account and the communication account is illusory. Not so, says Moon; such an encounter does not count as 'communication'. Communication properly
understood is something which is essentially social, relational, interactive, dialogic, participatory, equal. Communication, in short, is used by Moon in a thick sense; the term connotes much more than one speaker, one listener and comprehension. Moon takes over from thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Ricoeur, Gadamer and Bakhtin a strong position on the essentially social character of language and meaning: ‘In expressing him/herself to others, a speaker employs a language that is created and shaped in discourse. In an important sense, language precedes the individual user. It is produced intersubjectively ... The creation of meaning is a shared process, something that takes place between speaker and listener. A speaker does not simply convey a meaning that is passively received by an audience. Understanding is an active, creative process in which listeners take hold of, and work over, the symbolic material they receive’ (21, 23).

In logical order (though not in point of exposition in the book), the next stage of the argument is of great ingenuity and importance. Freedom of expression could just be labelled ‘freedom of communication’, but that would be a weak basis for a strong account of freedom of expression. Moon follows a different route. The world abounds in justifications for valuing freedom of expression highly, but not every base can be touched, even in a 300-page book. Instead, Moon takes his cue from the Supreme Court of Canada, who declared in a 1989 decision (Irwin Toy) that the three ends promoted by freedom of expression were the search for truth, participation in the political process, and individual self-fulfilment and self-realization. Moon takes each of these in turn, and argues that only if expression is conceived of as ‘communicative’ in his thick sense can freedom of expression serve these ends. The utility of truth is not to the individual, but to the community, and the search for and attainment of truth is not private, but communal and participatory (12). Free expression as an essential part of the search for truth implicates communication. Democracy is not a matter of merely aggregating individual preference-rankings; it has to do with public discourse. ‘Democracy requires that “public action be founded upon a public opinion formed through open and interactive processes of rational deliberation”’ (18; quoting Robert Post, Constitutional Domains [1995], 312). Democracy is inherently communicative. Finally, ‘the value we attach to freedom of expression makes sense only if we recognize that the creation of meaning (the articulation of ideas and feelings) is a social process, something that takes place between individuals and within a community. Freedom of expression is central to self-realization and autonomy because individual identity, thought and feeling emerge in the social realm’ (21). The theoretical conclusion now pulls these strands together. If the search for truth, deliberative self-government and individual self-realization are all social and interactive, and if freedom of expression is valuable because it promotes all these three, and if expression is essentially communicative in the thick sense, then freedom of expression must be understood as valuable because it promotes communication in the thick sense. Constitutional protection for freedom of expression is justified as protecting communication.
Obviously, the argument depends heavily on the initial assumption about the essentially social character of language and meaning. Without that, while Moon would be able to show that a thick sense of communication is sufficient for justifying constitutional protection of freedom of expression, he could not show that it was necessary. Moon argues against the negative liberty right construal of freedom of expression that such an account can explain neither the value of freedom of expression nor the harm from its absence. But, since the definitions of ‘value’ and ‘harm’ are in terms of communication, this argument already assumes the validity of the ‘expression is communication’ theory. So the argument is question-begging, unless we have some reason outside of the conflict between the negative liberty right account and the expression-as-communication account for preferring the latter. If the ‘language is social’ claim is correct, then we have such an independent fulcrum.

Moon is not shy of emphasizing one extremely important consequence of the cogency of the communication theory of freedom of expression. If what matters is communication understood in this thick sense, then constitutional protection for freedom of expression must include, wherever it is appropriate, action, whether civic, judicial or legislative, to protect communicative opportunities for all. That means taking a stand against creating and protecting concentrations of economic communicative power, and that in turn implicates questions of redistribution of wealth. Moon observes, with indisputable correctness, that seeing freedom of expression as a negative liberty right makes it very difficult to raise these questions. Current both popular and judicial thinking, most clearly in the U.S., but increasingly so in Canada and elsewhere, de facto protects vast concentrations of economic communicative power in broadcasting and entertainment, advertising and marketing, electoral campaigning - all in the name of freedom of expression.

The chapter on the structure of constitutional adjudication takes off from a quirk of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Unlike, for example, the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Charter formally begins with a section which lays down conditions for the justified limitation of the rights and freedoms which follow. (Arguably, moreover [my argument, not Moon’s], even in the U.S., courts in fact observe the distinction.) Courts therefore have to follow in adjudication a two-step approach - determining whether an infringement of a right or freedom has taken place, and then determining whether it is a justified infringement. The second enquiry is, crudely, whether some social or individual harm has occurred. But that makes no sense, since the point of placing a high value on freedom of expression is to protect expression even when harm results from it. Moon displays at length the Supreme Court of Canada helpless in the toils of the contradiction, and claims that the only way to avoid this conflict is to begin with the acknowledgment that freedom of expression is freedom of communication.

The remaining chapters trace out the more detailed application of Moon’s communication theory of freedom of expression to the cases of regulation of commercial and political advertising, of pornography, and of racist expression; of access to state-owned property; and of compelled expression and
freedom of the press. It is impossible now to give any details. Let it suffice to say that, if fecundity is a test of a theory, then the richness of the perspective that the communication theory affords on these enduring puzzles within freedom of expression goes a long way towards not only proving, but proving the theory.

The idea of using the concept of ‘communication’ to illuminate freedom of expression is not new in itself. Most famously, perhaps, Habermas deploys the notion of ‘communicative action’ in construing freedom of expression. But, if (and it is a big ‘if’) I understand Habermas aright, he would be, from Moon’s point of view (although Habermas is not mentioned in the book), still too wedded to seeing communication on a ‘one speaker to one hearer’ model. Moon’s distinctive contribution to freedom of expression theory here is the articulation of his interactive and relational model of communication, and the exploration of the consequences of that for constitutional protection of freedom of expression. The general theory is of great philosophical interest. The general warnings about the structure of constitutional adjudication make the book of interest to anyone concerned with the design of political institutions. The extensive ‘Canadian content’ of course makes the book a must for anyone seeking to understand the current state of the law on freedom of expression in Canada and how it got into that state. The book is of wider legal interest, too, since the problems themselves occur in any liberal jurisdiction struggling with the hard cases within freedom of expression. Moon has written a very significant book.

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Edgar Morscher, ed.
Pp. 479.
DM68.00. ISBN 3-89665-013-0.

The work of Bernard Bolzano is known to a broad audience of philosophers mainly for his contributions to logic and his influence on the school of Franz Brentano, Husserlian phenomenology, as well as on the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. The present book on Bolzano’s intellectual heritage for the twenty-first century does not aim to present historical studies on Bolzano’s philosophy, its context or influence on other philosophers, but
rather analyses which aspects of Bolzano’s work can or should influence twenty-first-century philosophy. In consequence, most contributions to the volume do not give introductory overviews but rather systematic reconstructions of some aspect of Bolzano’s work which show its strengths, but also its weaknesses and, thus, its relevance for contemporary philosophers who work on one of the topics discussed — and the range of topics discussed in the 18 contributions to the volume is broad.

The book is divided into four parts: epistemology; logic, mathematics, and physics; metaphysics and philosophy of religion; and ethics and aesthetics. The first part opens with an article by Peter Simons who discusses Bolzano’s theory of truth. According to this theory each sentence has to be reduced to a Satz an sich of the form A has b. Simons shows that such reduction is, in fact, possible for all sentences but concludes that Bolzano’s theory of truth is nonetheless latently inconsistent and allows for paradoxes. In his contribution ‘On Lye and Deception’, Wolfgang Künne presents an interesting analysis of these and related concepts found in Bolzano’s philosophy. Künne, thus, shows how Bolzano’s work can provide a fruitful background which allows for achieving interesting results in a field that thus far has been hardly considered by analytic philosophers. The remainder of the first part is dedicated to a critical overview of Bolzano’s epistemology by Mark Siebel and two articles by Jan Berg and Rolf George that focus on the relation between Kant and Bolzano.

The second part of the book contains articles on the topic Bolzano is most known for, his logic, mathematics, and physics. Most of the contributions give a systematic reconstruction of an aspect of Bolzano’s theory, relating it to other philosophers: Mark Siebel compares Bolzano’s notion of deducibility with that of Tarski and relevance logic; Jan Wolenski contrasts Bolzano’s view on negative existence statements with those of contemporary logic; and Peter Simons discusses Bolzano’s theory of numbers in relation to that of Frege. These comparisons, however, do not attempt to put Bolzano’s work in a historical context; the comparison rather helps to accentuate some aspects of his position.

Edgar Morscher shows in his contribution that the standard interpretation of Bolzano’s notion of ‘logical universal validity’ is formally incorrect and inadequate and shows how the interpretation can be rectified. Jan Sebestik discusses Bolzano’s work on infinity, focusing on his difficulties in developing that notion as well as his motivations for doing so, which were in part religious. Jan Berg reports on the existence of important unpublished manuscripts on natural philosophy, physics, and mathematics and the difficulties of transcribing them.

The third part on metaphysics and philosophy of religion opens with an article by Mark Textor on Bolzano’s proof for the immortality of the soul and the context in which the proof was developed: his philosophy of mind. Textor shows that the proof is flawed because of Bolzano’s method of variation which can explain why Bolzano refined that method in his later work. Winfried Löffler contributed two articles on Bolzano’s philosophy of religion, the first
of which focuses on his cosmological proof for the existence of God. Löffler gives a semi-formal reconstruction of the proof and shows that it is rooted not only in rationalism, but also adopts several — carefully chosen — insights from the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. In his second article, Löffler depicts the theological context of Bolzano's writings on religion. Kurt Strasser reports on a project of preparing an edition of Bolzano's exhortations, weekly sermons he gave to University students in which he discussed not only religious, but also political and philosophical topics.

The last part of the book is dedicated to Bolzano's ethics and aesthetics. Wolfgang Künne gives a systematic overview of Bolzano's utilitarian approach to ethics which is complemented by Heinrich Ganthaler's study on Bolzano's utilitarian notion of 'private property'. Ganthaler shows that this notion leads to consequences that were quite unconventional not only when the theory was first formulated, but are still so today. Bolzano was arguing, for example, that children should not receive any heritage from their parents, since property should be distributed in a way that best serves society as a whole, and the fact that the parents could use property in a way that serves society best does not show that their children can do so as well. Both Künne and Ganthaler argue that Bolzano's approach falls victim to the main arguments against utilitarianism that have been formulated after Bolzano had written his theory.

Otto Neumaier focuses in his contribution on a topic that is hardly discussed among Bolzano experts: his aesthetics. Bolzano distinguishes between pure and composed art and puts an emphasis on the production of the art object rather than the object itself which results in the thesis that an art object can exist in the thoughts of the artist only. With this theory, Bolzano provides a powerful tool to analyse not only the art of his time, but also artistic developments of the twentieth and, quite possibly, the twenty-first century.

In conclusion, the present volume shows that Bolzano's philosophy can and should have an influence on twenty-first-century philosophy. It is definitely not an introduction to Bolzano's work, since most of the articles are rather specific and there are no introductions to the various parts of the book. This makes it, however, a valuable source for two kinds of readers: those already working on Bolzano who are interested in a sophisticated discussion of rather specific problems as well as philosophers who work on one of the many philosophical problems discussed and who look for interesting conceptual analyses and fruitful insights.

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In *The Deleuze Connections*, in an economy of pages, John Rajchman presents many key Deleuzian concepts: singularity, haecctic, rhizome, difference, noo-ology, arrangement, sensation, haptic space, deterritorialization, plane of immanence. His concise explanations and lucid writing make these difficult concepts significantly less so, yet Rajchman does not compromise the novelty, the beauty or the aptness of Deleuze's ideas for glossary's sake. Famously, Deleuze described philosophy as a kind of evolving tool box which one must put to work doing what philosophy is best suited for: making connections; that one must make and use philosophical concepts, not just repeat them. Rajchman honors this injunction and thus extends the spirit of Deleuzian thought. *The Deleuze Connections* models many of the concepts described, demonstrating how and confirming that one could use them to make productive, if peculiar, connections — in this case, between politics, philosophy, aesthetics. Rajchman, a Visiting Professor of Art History at M.I.T. and at Columbia University, has previously shown a similar deftness working with, and working out, some of the aesthetic and political richness of 'post-analytic' philosophy: in *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy* (Columbia 1985); *Philosophical Events: Essays of the 'BO's* (Columbia 1990); *Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Eros* (Routledge 1991); *Anyhow* (M.I.T. Press 1998); and the unexpected but wonderful *Constructions* (M.I.T. Press 1998), on Deleuze, space and architecture.

Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) authored 23 books (some with Felix Guattari), (re)covering from Kafka, Hume, Spinoza, Bergson, Nietzsche, Liebniz, Proust, Sacher-Masoch, and Foucault the singularity of their ideas. Deleuze produced a 'history of philosophy' according to these singularities, which he called 'the image of thought' (32-9). In addition to these persona and their specific contributions, Deleuze also took on what he saw as some of the special stupidities of Freudian psychology, late capitalism, Marxism, and cinema. Deleuze's projects were neither primarily extraction nor reproduction but involved the creation of concepts and connections. 'Creating connections' is not some groovy but irredeemably ironic 'textual' strategy. From the opening pages Rajchman confronts us with what Deleuze felt was at stake; what doing philosophy cannot not respond to: 'a new problem, which, on several occasions, he would come to present as our problem today — the problem of belief in the world' (25). Deleuze's many-volumed 'answer' formed a series which Rajchman reproduces as sub-headings: 'Experiment', 'Thought', 'Multiplicity', 'Life' and 'Sensation'.

Underlying this series is a unique view of philosophy. Deleuze saw and practiced philosophy not as 'judgment' (5) nor as 'pretense to some Urdoxa or higher knowledge' (141) but as the practical, specific activity of formulat-
ing new problems and ‘plunging into the unthought’ (115) through engage­
ment with ‘peculiar problems, events that these give rise to, the intuitions
through which they take form, and the effects they have on previous ways of
thinking’ (117). Rajchman sticks close to this throughout the book, mapping
not a history of achieved answers, but a topology of answers to problems and
the novel problems which those answers, in turn pose. For Deleuze this
mapping did not ‘belong’ exclusively or even necessarily to public philoso­
phers but to any who see (33) and fold — complicate, explicate, replicate (55-6)
— thought and sensation in new ways, and introduce them into film, fiction,
computer logic, microbiology, paint, or ‘our very conception of ourselves, our
world …’ (80).

_The Deleuze Connections_ confirms that this does not require a retreat to
religion, Self or Dasein; that is, toward transcendence. Nor does it require a
holing up in justified true belief, bad faith or nihilism (75-6); that is, in the
hopeless. It involves, or rather requires, an empirical experimental mode of
being which divides lines and masses up differently (157), rewires the
nervous system (135) and hence ‘introduces into our view of ourselves and
our world this sense of what is to come … ’ (76). Rajchman, taking his cue
from Deleuze’s last 3 works (on cinema, and Francis Bacon’s painting), makes
an excellent case for the timeliness and the transformative capacities of art.
‘Artworks are composed of sensations, prelinguistic and presubjective,
brought together in an expressive material through a construct with an
anorganized plan, with which we have peculiar relations. They are not there
to save us or perfect us (or damn us or corrupt us), but rather to complicate
things, to create more complex nervous systems no longer subservient to the
debilitating effects of clichés … [f]or in the first instance our relation with
the sensations we call art is not defined by some higher realm or “transcen­
dence” … but rather what Nietzsche called a “higher health” ’ (138). This
‘higher health’ is a kind of ‘attentive’ rather than ‘habitual’ recognition (135)
of the world facilitated by art’s capacity ‘not only to extract sensations’ but
to ‘put them into a kind of construction’ (135) precisely after the manner of
a new image of thought.

Revitalizing practices of making ‘higher health’ or ‘connections’ do not
eschew logic but rather ‘involve a logic of a peculiar sort. Outside of estab­
lished identities divisions and determinations, logical and syntactical as well
as pragmatic, [where] it has often been assumed that there is only chaos,
anarchy, undifferentiation, or “absurdity”’ (8). Rajchman helps to make the
case that this zone of logic or orientation, (what Deleuze called ‘the logic of
sense’ to contrast with the sense of logic), is integral to practical philosophy.
A logic of sense is integral to living a life which embodies and extends the
possibility of belief in the world.

Rajchman convinces us that Deleuze is a good candidate for quieting
Heidegger’s lament: ‘For a long time now, for much too long, thinking has
been resting on dry land. Should one then call by the name of “irrationalism”
those efforts to bring thinking back to its element?’ (‘Open Letter on Human­
ism’, C. Welch, trans., private translation, 2001). _The Deleuze Connections_ is
an excellent and articulate witness to the capacity of (what is sometimes dismissed as mere) ‘irrationalism’ to bring thinking into its element. Its major success lies in its ability to present and vindicate Deleuze’s special view of philosophy; to show how thinking stylishly in unexpected ways can ground an ethos of believing in the world without smuggling humanism, transcendence or cynicism in the back door.

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Nalin Ranasinghe
The Soul of Socrates.
Pp. xv + 196.

In the Preface to this book one reads: ‘the living presence of Socrates seems to have been lost in the verdant groves of academia. This work sets out to reconstruct the uncanny experience of meeting him’ (ix). In doing so Ranasinghe finds it necessary to save Socrates from his ‘analytical’ as well as his ‘dramatic’ readers. Neither have paid enough attention to Socrates’s erotic dimension, which ‘seeks to attune the loving soul to the cosmos’ (xii).

When we pay closer attention to erotic contexts we can ‘resurrect the daimon of Socrates’ (xiv). What we then encounter is a great liberal philosopher equidistant from anarchism and totalitarianism. An ally in the defense of the ‘Western Intellectual Tradition’, this Socrates faces up to the Sophists, whose nihilistic challenges [are] very similar to those that confront us today.’ In uncovering him, Ranasinghe acknowledges that he owes his approach to the investigations of ‘such giants as Stanley Rosen, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein’ (xv). Readers are forewarned.

The Republic, and not the aporetic dialogues, is Ranasinghe’s point of departure. If Socrates is to pass as a liberal he must be disassociated from the totalitarian policies of the tyrannical guardians and their auxiliaries, ‘the mother of all secret police.’ The anti-liberal views defended in the dialogue cannot, therefore, be attributed to Socrates or Plato. Ranasinghe finds a way around the anomaly by proposing the novel suggestion that the Republic depicts Glaucon’s ideal republic, or better still, ‘Socrates’s thought experiment ... intended to make Glaucon see the tragic consequences of seeking, secretly, to gratify his own desires at the expense of everyone else’s’ (16). Socrates detects in Glaucon a craving for tyranny hidden under his anarchic tendencies. This ‘unjust eros’ must be purged by downplaying freedom and promoting the ‘community values of endurance and stability’ (13). Socrates
and Plato believe that the creation of a state ought not to be interpreted as the imposition of totalitarian rule.

Contrary to canonic wisdom, Ranasinghe postulates that the Protagoras continues the argument where the Republic left it off. Socrates's exposé of sophistic nihilism and the lack of stable standards explains why Protagoras cannot vindicate any meaningful form of participatory communal life. Since the Protagorean world lacks inherent meaning, it is impossible to assert the supremacy of Promethean reason. This demotion of reason surrenders our lives to the call of each passing appetite and aversion. Epistemological anarchism breeds political totalitarianism.

The Phaedo's puritanical intellectualism is Socrates's first constructive alternative to Glaucon and Protagoras. The comprehensive vision of eros offered in the Symposium is his second. In the Phaedo Socrates reveals his discovery of the Ideas and places freedom under their stern authority. Only an erotic aspiration for these high standards can explain the prisoner's escape from the cave. But this transcendent realm of forms does not lead him 'away from the world of the polis and the agora' (61). The Symposium explains why the prisoner is eager to return to the cave. Because, says Ranasinghe, 'the philosopher is inspired by his erotic ecstasy outside the cave to return to the community and spread enlightenment' (113). Again, Socrates's 'erotic moderation' allows him to mediate the conflict between two extreme positions: the pessimism of Aristophanes's anti-liberal traditionalism and the frivolous optimism of Agathon.

Ranasinghe admits that his book 'does not contain many references to other scholarly works' and that 'its unity derives from its single-minded focus on Socrates' (xv). But a reference to Popper's view that Plato is the father of totalitarianism remains essential, for this nonsense is the assumption that guides the entire argument. In order to save Plato from this charge, Ranasinghe denies that Plato ever owned the political model devised in the Republic, and assumes that his views were essentially the same as those held by Socrates.

But Ranasinghe's argument fails on both counts. First, because Plato's republican guards were not bent on pillaging the members of the productive (or artisan) class, but aimed at ensuring that their limitless acquisition of wealth and the overstepping the limits of necessity did not lead to civil warfare. This was, after all, what prompted Adeimantus's complaint in Book IV: proto-capitalist industrialists owned the land, built grand and beautiful houses, and acquired convenient furnishings, while their guardians endured a harsh Spartan lifestyle.

Second, Ranasinghe believes that the rehabilitation of Plato and Socrates as liberal thinkers requires that the line that divides them be completely erased. But this endeavour, attempted by Burnet and Taylor almost a century ago, has never gained acceptance. To revive it now would require extensive research and most certainly 'many references to other scholarly works.'

Apart from these strategic failures, Ranasinghe's individual reading of the Protagoras, the Phaedo and the Symposium is sumptuous and wonder-
fully evocative. He is capable of bringing to life the dramatic context of these dialogues as few have ever done. Though his interpretation at times borders on the fanciful, a philosophical thread allows him sometimes to rise above labyrinthine profusion and a tendency to read between the lines.

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Paul Ricoeur
The Just.
Trans. David Pellauer.
Pp. xxiv + 155.

It seems that for any philosopher who lives long enough, he or she will eventually come to tackle the great questions of justice and politics. It is in Aristotle's words, after all, the master science — one requiring great facility in all the skills one hopes to attain in the course of a distinguished career. We thus find that Plato's last and most substantial work (The Laws) concerns these matters. Likewise Kant waited until the last decade of his life to compose his Rechtslehre. In contemporary continental philosophy, both Derrida (Spe cters of Marx) and Habermas (Between Facts and Norms) have likewise turned their attention to politics in late career. It can be no surprise then that the distinguished French hermeneuticist, Paul Ricoeur, turns to the question of justice in his 80s, in a book aptly titled The Just. The book, bravely translated by David Pellauer, consists of a set of largely previously published French essays from 1992-94 and addresses such wide-ranging themes as responsibility, punishment, political judgment, rights, and justice itself (including substantial reviews of works by Rawls, Arendt, Walzer, and Dworkin). Since the title of the book, however, is The Just, and Ricoeur himself takes some effort to unite the disparate essays under the common theme of justice, I shall focus my attention here on what Ricoeur himself might mean by this term.

Ricoeur devotes two full chapters (by far the most substantial treatment of any subject) to providing us with his interpretation of John Rawls. And it is from a particularly Kantian interpretation of Rawls that Ricoeur begins to piece together his understanding of justice. The central thread in much contemporary theories of justice has been that of formalism. Kant, in his evident discomfort with the heterogeneity of Platonic ideas, sought in his
Copernican revolution in ethics to dissociate moral — and subsequently political judgment — from the seemingly unjustifiable ground of ideas and intuitionism. And by virtue of this move, Kant has had a greater influence on contemporary political theory than virtually any other figure in the canon in what Habermas has dubbed the 'Postmetaphysical' age. For Ricœur, the proceduralism of Rawls represents the most logical extension of Kantian reasoning. What Rawls strives to give us, according to Ricœur, is ‘deontology without a transcendental foundation’ (39). The problem with this approach, however, is that insofar as Rawls wants us to derive our theory of justice from ‘considered convictions’, is Rawls not appealing to our own intuitive sense of justice — i.e., one not derived from any procedure or other formal mechanism?

There is no doubt that Ricœur is on to something in his discussion of Rawls’ formalism. If Rawls is to limit himself to pure procedure, he faces the same criticism that Hegel leveled against Kant — that his theory is, in effect, contentless. The question is what the source of our intuitions might be. Ricœur’s answer is that ‘our considered convictions [are] ultimately rooted in the sense of justice equivalent to the Golden Rule’ (54). He goes on to explain that the Golden Rule is a negative formulation of our intuitions and that our understanding of what is unjust is always more clear than our sense of justice. Our ‘cry of indignation’ (x), claims such as ‘it’s unfair!’ are the most basic intuitions we have.

To be sure, Ricœur is correct in asserting that our negative intuitions of what is not just and not fair are our most primordial ones. To some extent, the development of political philosophy since the advent of modernity around determinate notions such as natural rights are premised upon prohibitions, rather than the broad positive intuitions of ancient and medieval philosophy one finds in Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas. What Ricœur does not do, however, and what would have been instructive, would be an exposition of the relationship of our determinate (and hence negative) conceptions of injustice with the indeterminate (and hence positive) ones of justice. To be sure, the idea of injustice does not exist independent of justice, and to the extent that Ricœur entitled his book in the positive sense, one is left wishing this link could have been made. What is justice for Ricœur, then? The one thing we know with confidence from Ricœur’s discussion is that it is not something that can be pulled out of thin air, and for that stance alone Ricœur’s book is well worth investigating for those concerned with foundational problems in contemporary political philosophy.

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In November 1998, the ‘Dennett’s Philosophy’ conference took place at Memorial University, St. John’s, Newfoundland. The chapters of this book have their origin in the talks delivered there. The book also includes an introduction by Don Ross that highlights the main themes appearing across different essays, and the responses by Dennett to each of them. The general motivation for the essays in this volume is to determine whether Dennett’s views on intentionality, consciousness, evolution and ethics come together into a single coherent system. Indeed, one might roughly divide the thirteen essays (excluding the introduction) that constitute the body of the volume into four groups, according to which of those issues is the main topic of the essay.

Dennett’s views on evolution are discussed, from considerably different angles, by Timothy Crowe, Paul Dumouchel and Ruth Garrett Millikan. In his ‘Daniel Dennett’s Views on the Power and Pervasiveness of Natural Selection: An Evolutionary Biologist’s Perspective’, Crowe examines Dennett’s defense of selective determinism in Dennett’s ‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’ and tries to elucidate these views with a particular example, namely the evolution of the guineafowl. Crowe characterizes selective determinism as the view that evolution is driven by natural selection, which works through gradual steps that lead to adaptation. Dumouchel, on the other hand, focuses on Dennett’s emphasis on the point that our cognitive faculties have been shaped by evolution. In his ‘Good Tricks and Forced Moves, or, The Antinomy of Natural Reason’ Dumouchel defends that Dennett’s views in his ‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’ have a certain puzzling result. The product of the evolution of human reason allows us to frame questions that one cannot answer. This is what Dumouchel calls the ‘antinomy of natural reason’. Ruth Garrett Millikan’s concern in her ‘Reading Mother Nature’s Mind’ is rather different. She discusses some of Dennett’s views on holism and the theory of meaning that hang on his belief on the importance of natural selection for understanding the human mind. Millikan disagrees with Dennett’s views that indeterminacy is a global phenomenon and that the ‘intentional stance’ is more basic than the ‘design stance’. She also claims that it is otiose to apply, as Dennett proposes, the former to natural selection itself.

The theme of Dennett’s holism is echoed all along the volume by different discussions on the ontological import of Dennett’s views on intentionality. Timothy Kenyon, Don Ross and Christopher Viger seem to share a general concern about this issue. Thus, in ‘Indeterminacy and Realism’, Kenyon
defends that there is a tension regarding the ontological status of propositional attitudes in Dennett's writings concerning the 'intentional stance'. Kenyon thinks that Dennett considers himself a realist towards the propositional attitudes. On the other hand, though, Dennett endorses the 'indeterminacy thesis', according to which there is no fact of the matter about which propositional attitude should be correctly ascribed to a given organism in order to make sense of its behavior. The dilemma lies in finding some conceptual space for a realistic metaphysics of the attitudes that is compatible with the kind of holism that motivates the indeterminacy thesis without endorsing to the type-identity theory. Ross also points out this dilemma and, in his 'Rainforest Realism: A Dennettian Theory of Existence', tries to find a position wherefrom one can coherently defend Dennett's alleged realism towards the propositional attitudes, his endorsement of the 'indeterminacy thesis' above, and his anti-reductionism, as they appear in Dennett's 'Real Patterns'. The purpose of Viger's paper, 'Where do Dennett's stances stand?', is to clarify Dennett's ontological views regarding the propositional attitudes as well. According to Viger, Dennett is a realist towards the propositional attitudes in that he takes us to be ontologically committed to beliefs and desires when we posit them for the purposes of a kind of explanation of human behavior (intentional explanation) whose predictive power is pretty remarkable.

William Seager's paper, 'Real patterns and surface Metaphysics', has the virtue of bringing together the worries about Dennett's ontological views and his views on evolution. If one accepts Dennett's 'intentional stance' view of intentionality, Seager claims, then the naturalization of intentionality is impossible. The reason is that an explanation of intentionality in terms of the intentional stance must make use of intentional notions, such as 'interpretation' or 'predictive purposes'. However, it is open to Dennett to provide a partially naturalistic explanation of the kind of behavior that can be folk-psychologically interpreted from the intentional stance in evolutionary terms.

Not surprisingly, consciousness constitutes another main topic of several essays in this volume. Thomas Polger, for instance, tries to meet a certain challenge once set down by Dennett, namely the challenge to show that zombies are possible. Polger's 'Zombies explained' is a meticulous attempt to show that beings functionally indistinguishable from us who lack consciousness are conceivable. Both David Rosenthal and David Thompson are more concerned with different aspects of the metaphysics of the mind that is implicit in Dennett's 'Consciousness explained'. Thus, David Thompson, in his 'Phenomenology and Heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on Reality and Science', points out some similarities between classical Husserlian phenomenology and some elements in Dennett's account of consciousness in his 'Consciousness Explained'. As a matter of fact, Thompson argues that further Husserlian elements into Dennett's model of consciousness might help to solve some of its difficulties, such as those that concern the status of heterophenomenal objects. On the other hand, Rosenthal's main
objective, in his 'Content, Interpretation and Consciousness', is opposing Dennett’s view that there are no determinate facts about consciousness, beyond those consisting in the effects that the contentful states of which we are conscious have in action. Rosenthal argues that his Higher Order Theory of consciousness can provide a picture wherein it is determinate when states with certain content properties are conscious. Andrew Brook’s paper, ‘Judgments and Drafts Eight Years Later’, will be especially interesting for those who are curious about how Dennett’s views on intentionality relate to his views on consciousness. Brook addresses the question of how the metaphysics suggested by Dennett’s intentional-stance view of beliefs and desires (basically, there is no brain state that constitutes any given belief or desire) squares with the ‘multiple draft’ model of consciousness advanced by Dennett in his ‘Consciousness Explained’. Brook nicely argues for the point that, although the multiple-draft model is compatible with the thesis that ‘seemings’ (like intentional states) are not constituted by brain states, it does not entail such view. The relations between Dennett’s views on intentionality and consciousness are further discussed in ‘Popping the Thought Balloon’, by Dan Lloyd. According to Lloyd, an account of consciousness that is totally free of the kind of mind-world Cartesian picture that Dennett wants to get rid of must not appeal to mental. This is why, according to Lloyd, Dennett’s use of such notions as ‘drafts’ and ‘microtakings’ makes his multiple-draft model of consciousness unsatisfactory.

The discussion on Dennett’s views on ethics is perhaps the main weak point of this collection. Only Brian Mooney’s ‘Dennett on Ethics: Fitting the Facts against Greed for the Good’ addresses Dennett’s ethics. Mooney discusses the connections between Dennett’s naturalism and some of his views on ethics, such as his rejection of ethical reductionism, deontology and naturalism. Furthermore, Mooney proposes virtue ethics as the most coherent position for someone who shares Dennett’s naturalistic views on ethics. It might have been interesting to see more discussion on how, if anyhow, Dennett’s views on ethics relate to his ontological views and his holism about the propositional attitudes. Otherwise, this is a very comprehensive collection of essays, where important connections are drawn between those issues that have been occupying Dennett over the years. Whether or not Dennett can be said to hold a ‘philosophical system’, the essays above clearly help us to appreciate the big picture of Dennett’s philosophy. This is, most definitely a volume worth reading.

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John Sallis

*Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental.*


Pp. xii + 237.


John Sallis's work *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental* successfully synthesizes extensive periods within the history of philosophy, with a particular emphasis on the achievements of the phenomenological tradition, to offer a powerful, and often new, understanding of the imagination. The book is distinctively continental in its style and approach.

Sallis's work situates itself quite consciously in some of the recent work on the imagination by Ed Casey, Eva Brann, and Rudolph Gasché. It spans both the philosophical tradition, as well as the Western Literary tradition at large. Sallis moves with mastery from Jean-Paul Sartre, to the Pre-Socratics; from Keats to Shakespeare. His basic approach, however, is through and through phenomenological. He directly engages phenomenological figures like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Yet even when he is not directly referencing such work, for instance when he reads Plato, his philosophical method seems decisively formed by Heidegger.

The title of this work 'Force of Imagination' is Sallis's own translation and transfiguration of the German notion of *Einbildungskraft*. The traditional English rendering of this term as 'imagination', or perhaps (more literally), 'power of imagination' suggests a faculty of the imagination. And this is precisely the concept that Sallis's notion of force hopes to escape. He intends to free imagination from subjectivity.

Now, as Sallis recounts, philosophy has long had an ambivalent, contentious, but above all fascinating relationship to this force called the imagination. Philosophy's inability to domesticate the imagination has often led it either to exclude it outright from the rigor of the discipline or at least to attempt to relegate it to an insignificant affiliate. As Sallis recognizes, however, 'imagination has never entirely ceased exerting a kind of oblique force on philosophy, countering it, precisely driving it on ... interrupting and suspending its smooth operation' (43). Here then, the value of an investigation of the imagination becomes clear: it marks the beginning, the very limit and origin, of what is called philosophy.

Part of the work in over-turning the imagination's relegation to the role of philosophy's step-child resides in questioning some basic philosophic distinctions, like that between truth and illusion, and the sensible and the intelligible. Sallis's persistent questioning of these conceptual distinctions calls into doubt the received understanding of the imagination and its relation to philosophy in such a way that a new form, or better yet, sense, of the imagination is articulated through an explanation of the very disciplinary limits of philosophy.

This book's phenomenological approach then, asks us to return to things and think the source of appearance and the sensible as such, as the site of
the imagination. From detailed readings of Kant (following Gasché) Sallis shows that the imagination suspends its role as faculty and functions more as an abyss, or force without determinate location.

While Sallis has many influences in this woven and complex work, his understanding of the imagination in terms of a ‘shining’ seems most indebted to Heidegger’s notion of ontological difference. Sallis reads the phenomenological appearance of things as the effect of a primordial force of imagination that is forever in withdrawal, even at its moment of appearance. He speaks about this appearing as a ‘sensible monstration’, which ‘displays itself by showing itself as withheld’ (123). Sallis sees himself as moving from a phenomenology strictly speaking to what he calls a ‘monstrology’, or ‘remonstration’: an original revealing ‘akin to what Kant calls originary intuition’ (105). This distinction is highlighted by emphasizing that the image itself is without presence: it is only loosely tied to appearance. The appearance of the image, as the effect of the force of appearance we call the imagination, however, is not merely a shining, ethereal moment; it is also sensible, intuitively bound-up with the earth. In a language made popular by continental figures like Emmanuel Levinas, and Alphonso Lingis, phenomenological appearance is also bound to the ‘elemental’. It is the elemental, the immemorial silence of stones, earth, and sky, that is the support of any possible experience. Here Sallis’s phenomenological articulation of the force of imagination finds its source or foundation in the elemental. In his words, ‘pragmatology as monstrology requires also elementology’ (173).

The Heideggerian theme of the retreat of Being certainly returns in the elementology in Sallis’s claim that ‘though all things are earth, earth is not a thing’ (174). Sallis, however, creatively breaks new ground by radicalizing Heidegger’s own meditation on earth and stone, to reveal the earth itself as an anti-foundational foundation, a self-revealing beyond ‘thing’, forever in retreat. Here Sallis aligns the force of imagination — as a simultaneous not-force, or passivity — with the immemorial being of the earth. By casting the force of imagination in terms of the creative life-giving power of earth, Sallis offers a unique and profound mediation on ecology from a perspective that opens the status of the earth itself as a philosophical question.

This work’s powerful and original exposition is made possible by the best elements of continental thinking. However, at times, it also suffers from some of the excesses of this very same tradition in the forms of obscurity and — to be kind — poetic license. See the following example: ‘Things come to pass./ All and each./ The ancient temple of Zeus as well as its very stones, more ancient still, yet worn away by the unabated persistence of the elements, crumbling away into grains of sand’ (5). Yet despite these occasional stylistic stumblings, this work stands as an original philosophic contribution worthy of serious consideration.

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In his *Three Philosophical Poets*, George Santayana tells us that poetry and philosophy differ in their scope and presentation, but have the very similar aim of offering a vision. Irving Singer quite rightly portrays Santayana, not as a philosophical poet, but as a literary philosopher. In the eyes of some, the literary characteristic must weaken the philosophy; but Singer disagrees. Philosophy can be consistent and important without being a leafless forest. Santayana's four categories — his realms of being — are powerful and significant, but do not lend themselves to formal definition; well chosen images are indispensable to their introduction and application.

Singer deals with a range of themes related to art and literature: the autobiography, the novel, idealization and love, and criticism, all treated capably in the context of Santayana's overall philosophy. Both *Persons and Places*, the autobiography, and *The Last Puritan*, a remarkable novel, are rich in philosophical lights; and both were best sellers. This is surprising for the latter, in which all the characters sound like the author himself discoursing on philosophical issues. Highly interesting as a philosophical novel, yes — but today it would be a peculiar Book of the Month Club selection. Singer endorses the defense offered by Santayana of this unusual technique: it is doubtful that a more colloquial narrative would yield a more realistic picture of Oliver's inner development; and should the novelist not use those devices with which he is most comfortable? Singer discusses in detail the contrasts between the failed puritan hero Oliver and many of the other characters in the novel.

Like Freud, Santayana is a materialist, and their accounts of love have similar starting points. Singer points out, however, that Santayana combines this everywhere with a highly personal form of Platonism. He recognizes the importance of Santayana's often criticized doctrine of essence in making this Platonism viable. Unlike some other writers interested in Santayana's artistic side or in his position on the issues of the day, Singer has a keen sense of the importance to his thought of the later ontological ideas. Santayana agrees with the Freudian view that love is illusory; but through his notions of essence and spirit he is able to assign important positive aspects to this illusion. Singer has published an ambitious trilogy on the philosophy of love, in which he acknowledges his debt to Santayana. Both there and in this book Singer looks for but does not find any place for the love that can exist between persons. Santayana does not disparage a sexual love; he also delineates a pure detached love in which spirit projects onto the object of love an undeserved perfection, directing the love towards an essence rather than a person. Singer describes both of these, but argues that Santayana misses an important third form that love takes, that between persons; this is neither the adoration of essence nor simple lust. There is some truth to this. An analo-
gous criticism can be directed against the realm of truth, that individual persons and events vanish and are replaced by mere essences. In both cases, the later Santayana sees himself as rejecting an excessive psychologism he finds throughout Western philosophy. Indeed, at times he describes this as a move away from humanism toward a hard materialism. This would seem in conflict with Singer’s assessment of Santayana as the humanistic thinker he most admires (5). However, I think not; Santayana may change the tone of his humanism, but does not renounce it. Humanism remains important to humans, but is not a characteristic of the cosmos at large and has no part to play in his materialist doctrine.

Santayana says, and Singer agrees, that the passion of love can generate in the mind an illusory perfection projected onto the object of that passion. This is the love of essence, and Singer rightly holds that this cannot explain the love of persons as persons. Perhaps he should consider more closely the other kind of love admitted by Santayana, to which he gives a rather narrow interpretation. While it includes sexual love, it goes well beyond this. Singer finds in some passages on friendship hints of a love, not of essences but of other persons (122-126). He quotes Santayana: ‘one’s friends are that part of the human race with which one can be human’ (122). In this passage on friendship he finds an embryonic third kind of love. It is not love of essence; but I see no obstacle to its inclusion in the more mundane first kind of love. I see this as a special case of an error easily made in regard to spirituality. Through the function of spirit, Santayana admits a kind of charity, an appreciation and sympathy for the ideals of others; but this is too detached to account for active benevolence, generosity, and magnanimous actions within society. These come rather from the enlightened self-interest entailed by participation in society and from a genuine liking of people for each other when not (in Santayana’s sense) distracted. In my view, the love of persons belongs there.

As well as a one-time novelist, Santayana was both a poet and a literary critic. The considerable poetry he wrote as a young man is left for others to assess. Santayana turned to prose because he found that what he had to say could be said better without traditional poetic form. His many literary essays are invariably tied to his philosophy; as he got older, these became more and more rooted in his philosophical vision of a naturalism touched with a demystified Platonism of non-existent essences and described through an original ontology. Singer appreciates these literary works, both early and late. The last chapter is devoted to literary criticism, but as befits an admirer of Santayana, he enlarges the topic to include moral criticism.

Singer is devoted to Santayana’s thought, and especially to the humanism he finds there. A harder materialism in the later writings give him some pause. However, the unique Platonism remains and continues to fascinate Singer; he presents an excellent rendering of the issues involved and of the humanism that endures.

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Baruch Spinoza

*Political Treatise.*

Trans. Samuel Shirley.


US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-545-2);


With his previous translations of Spinoza’s *Ethics, Letters, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy,* and the *Theological-Political Treatise* (all appearing in the ‘Hackett Classics’ series), English-language Spinoza scholars were already in the debt of Samuel Shirley. This debt deepens yet again with Shirley’s new translation of Spinoza’s *Tractatus Politicus,* a work left unfinished by Spinoza’s death in 1677 but which is nevertheless of capital importance to his thought as a whole. Previous full translations of the *Political Treatise* by Maccall (1854), Elwes (1883), Baiz (1937), and Wernham (1958) are superseded by Shirley’s new translation, which does a fine job of combining readability with fidelity to the meaning of the original Latin (Shirley’s translations are based upon the 1925 Heidelberg Academy Edition, edited by Gebhardt).

Shirley’s translation is fair-handed; he attempts to maintain as much neutrality as possible between competing interpretations of Spinoza’s political thought (i.e., he does not attempt to force the text into a pre-conceived interpretation by making use of a contentious translation scheme). Wernham’s translation, which is undoubtedly the best of the earlier translations, was quite obviously consulted at every turn of Shirley’s own work; indeed, Shirley manages to emend Wernham’s translation errors and to provide a consistency in rendering Spinoza’s technical language into English. General readability is also an advance that Shirley’s translation makes over that of Wernham (which itself is far more readable and accurate than the translation that it itself superseded, viz., that of Elwes in the *Bohn’s Philosophical Library*). One drawback to this new translation, however, is the lack of the facing-page Latin (which Wernham, for example, included with his own translation). Yet though quite useful for the specialist, such an omission is perhaps inevitable given considerations of cost and the task of providing a translation for a wide general readership.

An ‘Introduction’ by Steven Barbone and Lee Rice precedes the translation itself and provides a concise — but for the general reader quite useful — background to the history of the text’s composition, its importance for an understanding of Spinoza’s thought as a whole, and various difficulties faced by any translation from the original Latin. In particular, Barbone and Rice prepare the reader for potential problems of translating *potentia* and *jus.* Moreover, Barbone and Rice’s notes to the translation conscientiously provide the original Latin when, e.g., ‘power’ is given as a translation of some or other cognate of *potentia.* Of particular interest in the ‘Introduction’ is a discussion of the unfinished nature of the *Political Treatise,* which comes to
an end just three paragraphs into Chapter Eleven (the focus of which is of no doubt great interest for the contemporary reader of Spinoza, viz., the nature and organization of democracy). Barbone and Rice offer a 'conjecture' regarding the content and structure of what the missing chapters may have looked like, a reconstruction that, they claim, is guided by the need to account for the problems inherent to an account of democracy qua the equilibrium of the multitude (where the multitude is under the sway of passions that ever threaten to disrupt that equilibrium).

Regarding the substance of the text itself, one could ask: Why is the Political Treatise — and, thus, Shirley’s fine translation of the same — of interest and importance? The Political Treatise purports to offer a science of politics; it is thus quite unfortunate that many readers of Spinoza rely upon his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus as the touchstone for what Spinoza has to say about political theory, for this latter work is devoted to the problem of defending freedom within civil society (and not with offering a theory of civil society as such). To read the Political Treatise is to open up new vistas on Spinoza’s political thought, which in this work is a kind of proto-Realpolitik: politics, Spinoza tells us, must begin from a realistic assessment of human nature and its passions and must take into account the historical and developmental context of a people. Indeed, the aim of this work is to offer a conception of an ideal state toward which all peoples must aspire (though Spinoza did indeed think that democracy was the most ‘natural’ form of civil society) but, rather, to offer a pragmatic theory within which a given people can best organize itself (which might be a monarchy, if the situation is not yet ripe for democracy). As indicated by the subtitle of the work, Spinoza’s central aim is to show ‘how a community governed as a Monarchy or Aristocracy should be organized if it is not to degenerate into a Tyranny, and if the peace and Freedom of its citizens is to remain inviolate’ (33). The problematic that orients Spinoza’s discussions of monarchical and aristocratic forms of society is just this: how is the preservation of the state compatible with freedom of its members given Spinoza’s central systematic claim that power = right? Shirley’s translation of this text is thus timely as well as of scholarly importance, for this problem is one with which political theorists, in one form or another, are quite preoccupied.

In addition, it has long been standard (e.g., Matherton [1969]) to note that all semblances of a social contract, which seems to be present in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, are absent in the Political Treatise. This purported change will undoubtedly be of interest to contemporary readers and, indeed, a close reading of the present text will do much to aid the reader in drawing clearer distinctions between Hobbes (a contract theorist) and Spinoza. Indeed, the whole matter rests on the difference between a transfer of rights in Hobbes and a transfer of power (potentia) in Spinoza. Moreover, the precise way in which obedience to the sovereign is maintained in Spinoza points back to the connection of this work with the Ethics; i.e., obedience is a matter of the imitative psychology that Spinoza establishes in Book Three of the latter work.
In conclusion, this is certainly a text that anyone interested in either Spinoza or political theory should own; and it is Shirley's signal achievement to have provided contemporary scholars with a quite readable and accurately translated version of the same.

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M.W.F. Stone and Jonathan Wolff, eds.
The Proper Ambition of Science.

This collection is the second volume of a series issued as London Studies in the History of Philosophy, under the auspices of the Philosophy Programme of the University of London School of Advanced Study. Some volumes in this series are meant to trace the history of particular problems in philosophy. This collection addresses a cluster of problems that can be called epistemological in senses of that term associated with both Anglo-American and French traditions in philosophy: the scope and limits of scientific endeavor. Wolff's introduction sets this discussion against the background of Husserl's concerns that the pursuit of science has led to blindness to important human questions, on the one hand, and Quine's well-known naturalism, on the other.

Any diachronic discussion of the 'totalising ambitions' (2) of science will encounter complexity. For example, over two and a half millennia, 'science' has been not one, but many things. This is apparent in the contributions of R.W. Sharples and of Stone, which deal with the ancient world and Albert the Great as representative mediaeval thinker, respectively. Sharples sees apparently scientifically inclined ancient thinkers, the physicalist Epicureans and the deterministic Stoics, as more concerned with the moral uses of their doctrines than with empirical investigations based on them. Stone's account of Albert on scientia shows the relatively low position that he accords to physical investigation. It is more accessible to humans but is far less intelligible in itself than mathematics or theology. Theology, on the other hand, is largely beyond our limited capacities despite its intrinsic clarity, and its fundamental character. Our expression of it is, therefore, limited, necessarily expressed in a rhetorically and poetically persuasive way, since it is necessary for salvation, and cast in negative terms because of the limited expressive capacity of human language (44-5).
The discussion ramifies. Two contributors deal with feedback effects between science and philosophy. G.A.J. Rogers considers how early modern interpretations of scientific advances accommodated scriptural revelation and avoided the scepticism associated with corpuscular accounts of perception. Many attempted to defuse potential conflicts between science and theology (Bacon, Galileo, Descartes), while others, notably Boyle, Locke and Newton, tried to reconstruct knowledge so that scientific studies melded with theological investigations. J.R. Milton addresses the demise of hierarchical, perfection-based ontologies in the wake of a universalized science of bodies in motion and increasing acceptance of nominalism. He holds that these developments were neither necessary nor sufficient for the reformulation, but had a clear contributory role.

Aaron Ridley’s contribution on Nietzsche, and Dermot Moran’s on Husserl, raise questions of a transcendental sort about the features of the human condition which justify or motivate scientific endeavor. Moran, in particular, suggests that the answer to such questions cannot be the naturalist’s answer, cast as a result of scientific investigation. Christopher Hookway argues that American pragmatists saw a two-sided relation between ordinary belief formation and the scientific method. The sciences draw on common techniques for testing the responses of the world to our opinions about it, but manifest a stronger interest in correcting falsehood. Ordinary belief formation aims at removal of cognitive dissonance and at action. Its standards of evidence are less rigorous and its point of fixity more immediate than the special sciences.

Three articles confront possible limits to the subject matter of science. Thomas Uebel revisits the criticisms by Popper and Hayek of historicism in the social sciences. For different reasons these two thinkers rejected historical laws of development which could be employed in rational economic planning. Hayek maintained that these attempts neglected the explanatory role of actions in any social discipline. Their structure is understood a priori. Empirical study reveals only the distribution of such actions, their motivating attitudes and their unintended consequences. In contrast, Popper maintained that the social sciences were not distinctive in their method but dealt with a subject matter that could not be explained adequately by laws of social development. Hayek, thus, denied the naturalism that Popper was willing to accept. Uebel holds that they aimed at the views of the positivist philosopher/economist, Otto Neurath, and that their criticisms generally missed their mark.

In a wonderfully clear article, David Papineau offers an explanation for the recent decline in non-physicalistic theories of mind. Their obsolescence is due to the relatively recent availability of a powerful empirical premise, that of the completeness of physics, which holds that every physical effect is determined by law by a purely physical history (180). Then if all mental events have physical effects, and causes do not overdetermine, there is no room for a non-physical construal of the mental. To support his claim that
this completeness principle has only recently become available, Papineau offers a brilliant history of conservation principles.

Nancy Cartwright closes the collection with a rejection of the completeness of science that contrasts sharply with, but does not contradict, Papineau. She relies on examples from microphysics to argue that scientific laws are always hedged by *ceteris paribus* assumptions and apply only to isolated well-behaved systems that she describes as *nomological machines*. Outside systems that can model available physical theory, very little can be said about how things behave. The range in which theories can apply are patches of particular types of order in a ground consisting of other patches either ordered differently or not now understood. She describes this as a 'dappled world', about which no assumptions of uniform order can be made.

While this is an exciting use of scientific practice to limit scientistic pretensions, Papineau’s position is not affected by it. He employs existential quantification, maintaining that for any physically described effect, there is a physically describable cause. The possibility that the cause is located in an as-yet-undescribed nomological engine is not ruled out. Similarly, he holds that every mental event must have physical effects but makes no commitment about what effects must occur in particular cases. A Popperian would describe his position as metaphysical, since it is immune from direct empirical refutation, but virtuously so since it can lead a research endeavor.

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**C.C.W. Taylor**


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Pp. xii + 308.


The standard collection of the Presocratic philosophers (H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edit., 1951) assigns over 250 fragments to Democritus (with one fragment, Leucippus is little more than a name). Scarcely a tenth address fundamental questions of atomic ontology or epistemology. Most are maxims for moral behavior with little philosophical interest and whose relation to atomic theory is unclear. To understand the foundations of ancient atomism prior to Epicurus and how they explain the phenomenal world, we must rely on second- and third-hand reports by the...
so-called doxographers. These are extracted from a variety of sources including Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, Aristotelian critiques of Democritean arguments, Simplicius’ Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle, and so forth. Needless to say, they are not equally reliable and frequently difficult to assess. As a result, the study of Democritus (and other Presocratics) presents demands not faced by the scholar of Hume, Descartes or Plato. For those philosophers we are confident we are reading their words whereas a significant part of Presocratic scholarship wrestles with uncertainty about this most basic matter.

In this latest addition to the Phoenix Presocratics, C.C.W. Taylor sets out anew the direct and indirect evidence for Democritus and assays a fresh determination of the genuine fragments. Taylor trims the number to 162 after separating out the ethical sayings assembled under the name ‘Democrites’. At the same time he substantially expands the amount of indirect evidence (testimonia) over that collected in Diels-Kranz. Taylor orders the fragments and testimonia to reflect his understanding of the structure of the atomist arguments. It is substantially at variance with the arrangement in Diels-Kranz, but a concordance of Taylor’s fragments and testimonia with Diels-Kranz as well as with S. Luria’s 1970 Russian edition of Democritus facilitates use of the volume. A Greek text and a facing translation are provided for the fragments, while English alone is given for the testimonia.

The second half of the volume is largely a philosophical commentary presented as a series of topical essays on Democritean atomism addressing the theory’s underlying principles, psychology, theology, epistemology, and lastly ethics and politics. The essays make frequent reference to the preceding fragments and testimonia, but do not offer analysis or comment for each individual fragment in the manner of a traditional commentary. Nonetheless, the format allows Taylor to address the significant questions and problems of ancient atomism without bogging the reader down in excessive detail.

The commentary rightly stresses the systematic nature of Democritus’ thought, implicit in the titles ‘Greater World-system’ and ‘Lesser World-system’ brought to our attention by Diogenes Laertius and evident in the explanatory continuum the atomic theory provides. The resilience and expandability of its mechanistic account of natural phenomena make atomism the fulfillment of the original Milesian programs of historia or the investigation of nature.

Not all scholars will accept Taylor’s sometimes unconventional views. He rejects the evidence presented by nearly all the ancient sources that atoms actually collide. Instead he favors the statement of Philoponus that atoms do not come into direct contact with one another. Taylor in effect postulates a version of atomic repulsion and attraction at a distance. Impact is a ‘repulsive force’, which is in ‘direct proportion to [an atom’s] mass’ (183). Correspondingly he takes Simplicius’ claim that atoms of like size tend to congregate with one another as ‘the postulation of some principle of attraction among the fundamental principles of atomism’ (193). To do so he over reads the
evidence. Philoponus makes the undemonstrated claim that when Democritus says atoms have contact (haphe) with one another he intends this equivocally and not ‘in the strict sense’ (Testimonia 54d, 84). The Simplicius passage says that like is moved by like and that things related (sungenē) are brought to one another. Nothing in Simplicius’ words entails a notion of atomic attraction. Attraction is descriptive of living things that purposely congregate together, but Sextus Empiricus in fragment 6 of Taylor’s numbering, presents Democritus’ example of doves and cranes gathering with one another as illustrating the analogous (hōs autōs) congregation of inanimate entities such as different sized stones on a beach or grains in a sieve, concluding that the inanimate objects do so ‘as if’ (hōs an...) there were an attractive force uniting them. These in turn point to the disposition of atomic shapes in the universe, cosmic motion sending small and motile atoms to the heavens which create the fiery sun and stars, leaving larger and more easily encumbered atoms in the center as earth and so on. Nowhere does Democritus say an attractive force exists in fact, and he relies on cosmic motion and the consequences of atomic geometry to account for all natural phenomena.

Taylor points out Democritus’ failure to reach a coherent understanding of the most daring idea of ancient atomism, the void. He explains that Democritus sometimes equates it with a gap or space, that is anything not occupied by an atom (185); at other times, in opposition to Parmenides and Eleaticism, Democritus includes void with atoms as one of the constituent entities of reality, as something therefore that really exists. Void is thus treated sometimes as what is, sometimes as what is not.

On the thorny problem of atomic divisibility, Taylor suggests that rather than being confused over physical versus theoretical divisibility, Democritus failed to distinguish conceptual divisibility from the conceptual possibility of physical divisibility. Thus Democritus’ concept of the void can’t provide the means for distinguishing between a single continuous object such as a marble sphere and a pair of perfectly fitting marble hemispheres lacking any interstices, because absence of void is the sole explanation of physical indivisibility (188). There would of course be invisible interstices between physical objects like marble sphere, but were two atoms to come into contact they would become one, according to Taylor, a result he disallows.

Whatever the scholarly disagreements over details, this book is highly welcome. It will likely prove to be the place from which anyone, particularly those not knowing Greek, will embark who seeks an in-depth understanding of Democritus.

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The world is in need of a thoughtful and stimulating book about women philosophers, a book that will challenge both students and scholars to reconsider what is included, and not included, in the philosophical canon. Unfortunately, *Presenting Women Philosophers* is not this book.

I should be clear about my expectations, and about the reasons why the present volume failed to satisfy them. I expected a collection of essays that analysed, with philosophical rigour, the intellectual work of women whose contributions to philosophy have long been overlooked or unexplored. The book's four section titles seemed at first quite promising: *The Loss and Recovery of Women's Voices* (an introductory section); *Naming Reality — Differently* (which looks at the contribution of individual women philosophers); *Philosophical Friendships* (which explores relationships between women and men philosophers); and finally *Love, Feeling and Community* (which examines a common theme in philosophy by women). Essays address the work of such diverse writers as medieval scholar Hildegard of Bingen, Chicana theorist Gloria Anzaldua, early Black feminist and educator Anna Julia Cooper, and British novelist/philosopher Iris Murdoch.

And yet there are also notable absences here: no word from contemporary French feminists like Irigaray or Kristeva; nothing from Marxist feminists like Chantal Mouffe; no Woolf nor Wollstonecraft nor Simone de Beauvoir. While I realize that no book can be everything to everyone, there is certainly more room for diversity in this collection of essays. For example: rather than address any of the above, *Presenting Women Philosophers* gives us three separate essays on eighteenth-century French salons — none of which is significantly different in content or style from the others — and two virtually identical contributions from co-editor Tougas detailing, and even reproducing in their entirety, letters she has sent to her apparently ungrateful male colleagues. Clearly, there is room in this volume for a more satisfying range of topics.

So much for the Table of Contents. And yet a reading of the essays themselves proves to be equally, if not more, disappointing. Gerda Lerner's essay, 'Why Have There Been So Few Women Philosophers?', is competent, though it does not go far beyond the analysis of an entry-level Women's Studies class; and Lisa A. Bergin's essay (about her experience teaching Anzaldua's notion of mestiza consciousness alongside Descartes' notion of the rational self) is interesting, especially from a pedagogical point of view. However, most of the essays in this volume offer very little in the way of philosophical interpretation or critique. Rather than discuss these women
philosophers as philosophers — by engaging with their ideas, examining their implications, making connections with other ideas, and so forth — the essays in this volume tend to restrict themselves to ‘filling in’ an historical context and making repeated impassioned calls for a re-examination of this or that neglected philosopher. What we don’t find here is a substantial groundwork for such a re-examination, or for a subtle and sophisticated historical analysis.

We also fail to find in this volume any serious attempt to address what gender means, or how it means, for the work of women philosophers. Due acknowledgement is given to the fact of women’s historical exclusion from philosophical institutions; however, many contributors seem to be caught in the web of assumptions that women ‘just think differently’ from men, that we are simply more nurturing, more open to connection with others, more resistant to cold, hard reason. Unfortunately, these assumptions merely puppet the same conventional notions of ‘the feminine’ which formerly excluded women from philosophy. Without a rigorous political and historical examination of the differences between women and men, we have few resources with which to resist women’s exclusion from the canon, or to transform the canon itself. In this sense, Presenting Women Philosophers works at cross purposes with itself, wanting to include women philosophers in the canon, but not quite willing to address the terms of their exclusion.

Andrea Nye’s essay on the ‘philosophical friendship’ between Elizabeth, Princess Palatine and Descartes, is a notable exception to this rule; and is by far the most interesting essay in this collection. With clarity and insight, Nye charts the development of both writers’ thought — in radically different directions — through their correspondence with one another. While Descartes places reason at the base of all knowledge, Elizabeth argues convincingly that ethics is the basis of reason itself, and so of all other knowledge as well. The fundamental difference between these two thinkers articulates much of what is at stake in the difference between male-dominated philosophy and philosophy by women; but Nye makes it clear through her analysis that this difference is not the result of women’s ‘naturally’ more intense commitment to others, but rather the effect of different social and historical pressures put on women and men.

In short, the essays in this volume tend to ‘present’ women philosophers without developing a meaningful dialogue with them. This approach does not make women philosophers more accessible; if anything, it does them a disservice by failing to give what they most deserve, and most often lack: a careful and attentive reading. If anything, a book like Presenting Women Philosophers leads one to consider what kind of book one would like to see in its place. One possibility might be an anthology of women’s philosophy, with each selection accompanied by both a brief historical essay and a rigorous philosophical response. Such a volume would give women philosophers the exposure they need, by letting them speak for themselves; but it would also provide starting points for philosophical analysis. Such an approach might better accomplish what this book presumably sets out to do: to challenge the
traditional exclusion of women from philosophy, and to let these women’s voices be heard.

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Peter Vardy
What Is Truth?

Vardy attempts to solve epistemological problems by approaching from the philosophy of religion. He wishes to defend the search for truth as a rational enterprise against the depredations of post-modernism and radical relativism on the one hand, and fundamentalist certainty in religious and secular forms on the other.

The first part of his book sets up the problem; Vardy sees this as the division between realist and anti-realist theories of truth. There follows a brief sprint through the history of modern epistemology, post-Cartesian foundationalism, constructivism, and anti-realism, in the context of a debate about religious truth. Vardy concludes that at this stage anti-realism seems to have defeated both Natural Theology and Reformed Epistemology, becoming the most plausible candidate for a theory of truth with considerable explanatory power. The treatment in this section is sometimes shallow but presented with Vardy’s customary admirable clarity.

The second section seeks to analyse relativism’s apparent historical triumph, with Vardy focussing upon what he sees as the key bifurcation in epistemological thinking after Kant. On the one hand, there is an anti-realism about God and world, typified here by Hegel. (And, curiously, Marx, seen by Vardy as a species of anti-realist, at least about God. This doesn’t follow from Marx’s atheism and he clearly wasn’t anti-realist about the world.) This path leads on through Nietzsche and the anguished doubts of Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov to a position where the denial of God brings about complete meaninglessness in the modern era.

The other post-Kantian path is that which denies the real world. How this differs significantly from Hegel’s denial of the Kantian noumenal world isn’t made clear. Indeed, the nineteenth century disappears and the precursor to modernism appears, via a curious juxtaposition of chapters, to be Quine’s alleged disposal of an independently existing real world. But we get a clear and sympathetic view of a number of post-modern figures — Derrida and
Irigaray especially — though Richard Dawkins is rather parodied in a section describing the scientism against which post-modernism is so opposed.

The diagnosis at this stage is that it is the denial of the existence of God that is to blame. God's non-existence starts by undercutting the possibility of a Kantian noumenal world separate from our perceptions of it, and ends by leaving us with the extreme relativism of post-modernism where we can know nothing at all outside of the limits of each particular discourse.

What then is to be done? Vardy commences the third and final part of the book with the claim that his object is 'to chart a path between the rocks of fundamentalism and relativism' (123). If we are to identify the division in epistemological traditions that Vardy has previously proposed with this division, then Hegel and Marx are fundamentalists while Quine is a relativist. (But neither Hegel nor Marx are fundamentalists in the way that, say, Ayatollah Khomeini was, and Quine bears very little resemblance to Derrida!) The categorising here is a little simplistic, and one can doubt Vardy's claim that it is fundamentalism, of either variety, which causes post-modernism.

But we are offered a more positive message, for Vardy seeks to trace another separate tradition, one running through Kierkegaard to Wittgenstein, and incorporating mystics of various faiths. He quotes Kilby: 'if a person is well-meaning and acting in good conscience they have in fact latched on to the truth, whether they have appeared to do so or not' (140). This subjective way of looking at the matter runs the risk of equivocation: we preserve a meaning of truth, but it is not clear that we preserve the central meaning in which the debate has so far been cast.

Equivocation aside, the notion that we find truth in the lives of ordinary conscientious people around us is of little help unless we can distinguish between the conscientious good people and the others. Vardy describes the extremes of Vaclav Havel and Pol Pot, a range that leaves a tremendous area between saints and monsters. We are offered no means but instinct and intuition to guide us in this zone. Some who reject the total subjectivities of post-modernism might wish for something a little more solid to act as a bulwark against wickedness. Conscientiousness need not be a protection: wasn't Eichmann the most conscientious of murderers? If truth is to be accessible only in terms of what moral people believe, then we need some reason to believe that moral people always or usually believe truly, and some way of telling moral people from the immoral.

A reliance on moral instincts can perhaps solve epistemological problems here only at the expense of creating others. Vardy's solution is ultimately unsatisfactory, though his description of the problem is clear and the journey not without illumination along the way, a way towards a work of faith rather than epistemology despite what the book's title might suggest.

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Timothy Williamson became Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford in 2000. Thus it is appropriate that *Knowledge and its Limits* can be seen as an homage to John Cook Wilson and his school, for Cook Wilson was Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford from 1889 until his death in 1915. Williamson’s purposes are systematic, so he assiduously avoids exegetical and historical issues and resolutely pursues critical and constructive philosophical issues. Indeed, Cook Wilson’s name appears nowhere in Williamson’s book and only one other Cook Wilsonian is mentioned at all (Prichard, briefly twice). Nevertheless, readers familiar with the early history of analytic philosophy will appreciate and approve of the way *Knowledge and its Limits* seems to resonate with reflection on and respect for the work of Cook Wilson, H.H. Price, H.A. Prichard, and other able but not now well known philosophers.

*Knowledge and its Limits* can be seen, not only as an homage, but as a rejuvenation of and an especially powerful contribution to the Cook Wilsonian approach to the theory of knowledge. Williamson in effect distinguishes central from peripheral theses traditionally associated with that school. He himself then accepts and defends central theses, ceding peripheral ones when necessary for the well-being of his overall position, which he develops far beyond the traditional boundaries of the school.

The most central traditional Cook Wilsonian thesis about knowledge is that it is indefinable. ‘We can give no definition, in the ordinary sense of that term [i.e., definition by genus and species], either of thinking or of knowing ...’ (Cook Wilson, 16. All references not to *Knowledge and its Limits* and not otherwise identified are to selections in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed., *Knowledge and Belief*, 1967.) Williamson accepts this as a ‘working hypothesis’ about the concept of knowledge and about knowledge itself. On the one hand, ‘the concept knows cannot be analysed into more basic concepts’, where ‘an analysis provides a non-circular statement of necessary and sufficient conditions’ (33). On the other hand, ‘knowing is not a metaphysical hybrid, because it cannot be broken down into ... elements’ (51). Williamson recognizes that justification must come from an explanatory competition with other working hypotheses and he does not pretend that the outcome of that competition is decided in his book. The initial motivation he offers is largely rhetorical. In general, ‘The pursuit of analyses is a degenerating research programme’ (31). In particular, we should deplore ‘the more or less ad hoc sprawl that analyses [of knowledge] have had to become’ in response to counterexamples (31). This sort of talk might raise a suspicion that his thesis, that knowledge is unanalysable, is merely a crude labour-saving device, a ‘sledgehammer’ solution when what is needed is ‘skill in analysis’ (Russell,
in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, 1971, 716). This suspicion should not be harboured, for Williamson works very hard and very skilfully to prepare his working hypothesis for explanatory competition.

He responds creatively and effectively to one of the traditional objections that contributed to the former decline of the Cook Wilsonian school. Here is the objection. 'Now if there were a state of mind unique to knowledge and logically necessary to it, it would have to follow that being in this state of mind guaranteed the truth of what was said to be known. But it is difficult to see what the state of any human individual's mind, whatever it might be, could have to do with the truth of such statements as "The sun is bigger than Jupiter" or "The Pterodactyl is extinct". But if we admit that states of mind are in no way connected with the truth of such statements, then it is possible that the state of mind can obtain whether or not what is said to be known is true; in which case the state of mind (which might then look very like belief, or certainty, or opinion) is not unique to knowing.' (Phillips Griffiths, 7). The unsatisfying traditional Cook Wilsonian response to this objection rests on the claim that states of knowledge are not truth-valued. '[There is no condition of mind of which it can truly be said that it is necessarily true; what seems nearest to this is the condition of knowing, which is necessarily not false, but yet is not true' (Prichard, 63). 'Knowledge is by definition infallible .... But it cannot intelligibly be called true, for the alternatives true or false have no application to it' (Price, 41). Thus, we are invited to accept that knowledge guarantees the truth of what was said to be known (knowledge is infallible, necessarily not false) without having anything to do with the truth of what was said to be known (knowledge is neither true nor false). It is hard to see how one can have it both ways, and Williamson does not try. He unambiguously affirms that 'knowing is merely a state of mind' (21) despite being infallible in the sense that it is factive, where 'A propositional attitude is factive if and only if, necessarily, one has it only to truths' (34). The difficulty of seeing what the state of any human individual's mind could have to do with truth-making facts in the external world is attributed by Williamson to a presupposed internalist picture of the mind. Modern philosophy of mind has rejected this internalist picture and has replaced it with an externalist picture of the mind. '[Belief as attributed in ordinary language is a genuine mental state constitutively dependent on the external world. If the content of a mental state can depend on the external world, so can the attitude to that content. Knowledge is one such attitude' (6). In other words, Williamson's response to the traditional objection is to say that knowledge is a state of mind but it is not in the head.

The decline of the Cook Wilsonian approach to the theory of knowledge perhaps was also hastened by Cook Wilson's claim that the indefinability of knowledge implies that 'we cannot make knowing itself a subject of inquiry in the sense of asking what knowing is. We can make knowing a subject of inquiry but not of that kind of inquiry. We can, for instance, inquire how we come to know in general, or to know in any department of knowledge' (21). On its face, the claim appears to urge philosophical quietism about knowl-
edge, and deference to descriptive (empirical and phenomenological) cognitive studies. Williamson, on the other hand, explicitly repudiates any suggestion that the unanalysability of knowledge has anti-epistemological implications. He sets it as a 'chief aim' of his book 'to develop a rigorous way of doing epistemology in which knowledge is central, and not subordinate to belief. ... without abandoning epistemology itself' (5). His impressive efforts in pursuing this aim produce much solid constructive philosophy. Some of the theses he defends strengthen his fundamental alignment with the older Cook Wilsonian tradition: 'Any genuine requirement of privileged access on mental states is met by the state of knowing $p$' (25); 'Believing $p$ truly is not a mental state' (27); 'belief aims at knowledge (not just truth)' (47); 'All and only knowledge is evidence' (193). Others distinguish him from the older tradition: 'the fundamental rule of assertion is that one should assert $p$ only if one knows $p$' (11); 'Not all believing is mere believing' (42); 'One can know something without being in a position to know that one knows it' (114). Many discussions (on, e.g., the surprise examination paradox, knowledge and sensitivity, scepticism, Bayesian probability theory, Fitch's knowledge paradox) are so closely engaged with cutting edge literature and issues or so reliant on technical tools that it is difficult to discern any particular orientation of the older tradition to the present discussion.

Knowledge and its Limits is a demanding, stimulating, and satisfying book that deserves sustained critical discussion for which there is not space here even to begin. (I thank Ernest Sosa for comments.)

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The bulk of this book was published in 1991 under the title *The Disappearance of Time: Kurt Gödel and the Idealistic Tradition in Philosophy*. Yourgrau has updated the book to take account of some reactions to the earlier volume, added a chapter on time travel along with two appendices, and changed the title.

Yourgrau rightly says (xii) that his book is ‘the only serious, full-length philosophical investigation of Gödel’s argument for the unreality of time.’ In the 1940s Gödel discovered a novel solution to the Einstein field equations that permitted the existence of closed timelike curves (CTCs) in a general relativistic spacetime. (I will follow Yourgrau in calling Gödel’s solution an R-universe.) Since a timelike curve represents a possible path of a material body, the existence of closed timelike curves indicates that a material body with sufficient energy could travel continuously into the future from some spacetime point \( P \) and yet eventually arrive at \( P \) from its past. In fact, in Gödel’s R-universe this trick can be accomplished starting at any point in the spacetime.

In a highly compressed (9 paragraphs) paper in the Schilpp volume, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist* (Open Court, 1949), Gödel argued that the existence of R-universes had important consequences in the philosophy of time. Time, according to Gödel, requires change and change in turn requires ‘the lapse of time’. But, according to Gödel, ‘The existence of an objective lapse of time, however, means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality consists of an infinity of layers of “now” which come into existence successively’ (Gödel, 538). It is demonstrable, however, that an R-universe cannot be foliated or partitioned into layers of ‘now’ (spacelike hypersurfaces usually called Cauchy surfaces) and hence there can be no objectively lapsing time in Gödel’s sense in it. But our world differs from an R-world only in ‘the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world’ and this difference, in Gödel’s view, is not significant enough to ensure that time is lapsing (and so really exists) in our world. This last step is usually called the modal step in Gödel’s argument.

Such is in brief the argument that forms the main thread of Yourgrau’s book and the focus of this review. He adds, though, that (xiv-xv) ‘[i]n a larger sense, this book makes a case for the thesis that, contrary to received wisdom, none of the formal sciences — including relativistic physics, tense logic, and the semantics of so-called “indexicals” like “now” — has succeeded, to date, in bringing forth a successful analysis of time.’ Whether the concept of time can be or needs to be analyzed is a contentious issue. Yourgrau (in Chapter 1) attributes to Gödel and seems also himself to lean towards the widely-accepted view that the peculiar transitory aspect of time is best understood in
terms of McTaggart's A-series, and the failure of the formal sciences to capture time comes down to their inability to capture the A-series.

I believe that the first part of this view concerning the central importance of the A-series, though widely shared, is fundamentally wrong, but that war cannot be waged in a review. I note only that the quotation above from page 538 of Gödel's paper does not mention A-properties. In fact, this observation of Gödel's has led Mauro Dorato and me independently to develop (or, perhaps, revive) a view of temporal passage or becoming that dispenses with the mysterious (and possibly self-contradictory) A-series and A-properties. And even though, according to Yourgrau, Gödel's genius lay in the invention of what he calls 'Limit Cases', formal devices that show the limitations of formalism itself, what Gödel's argument shows straightforwardly is that R-universes cannot have the sort of passage that Dorato and I are concerned with and that there cannot be A-properties in such universes.

The title of Gödel's paper is 'A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy', and Gödel's idealism is the view that 'change is an illusion or an appearance due to our special mode of perception' (Gödel, 557). In the course of the paper Gödel mentions three philosophers — Parmenides, Kant, and McTaggart. Yourgrau's Chapter 2, 'Godel's Idealism' is a sketch of how some problems raised by these three philosophers might incline one towards the idea that passage is mind-dependent. In Chapter 3, however, 'Time Travel in the Gödel Universe', Yourgrau begins to consider Gödel's new argument to this old end. The basic idea is that an essential feature of intuitive or A-theoretic time is that later temporal stages of the world come into existence after earlier stages. But along a closed timelike curve, the characteristic peculiarity of R-universes, later events are before earlier events as well as after them. The idea of successive coming into existence seems to make no sense along a CTC and hence intuitive or lapsing time also fails to make sense. Since Yourgrau repeatedly quotes Gödel as asserting that something that lacks the character of passing 'can hardly be called time', it seems to follow that if there can be time travel via a CTC in an R-universe, there can be no time in it.

What does this conclusion mean for us, who most likely do not inhabit an R-universe or any other sort of universe with CTCs? After a discussion in Chapter 4 of some of the standard attempts to reconcile temporal becoming with Minkowski spacetime, in the newly added Chapter 5 Yourgrau considers some reactions to Gödel's argument that appeared after The Disappearance of Time. In an Appendix to Chapter 6 of Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks (Oxford University Press, 1995) John Earman tried to reconstruct Gödel's argument for the conclusion that time is ideal but found the argument invalid, lacking a premise. Yourgrau discusses Earman's argument at length, clearly exercised by its irreverent treatment of Gödel, but I find his response unsatisfactory.

Earman suggested that the argument would be valid if the following premise were added to it: 'The existence of an objective lapse is not a property that time can possess contingently' (p. 197 of BCWS). Yourgrau never directly
agrees or disagrees with Earman on this point, which is remarkable, since
he attributes this view to Gödel (unless I misunderstand the remarks of
Gödel’s quoted on p. 51 or 112, amongst others, that something that lacks
the character of passing ‘can hardly be called time’). If he were to straight-
forwardly endorse the premise, though, then Yourgrau would have to con-
front Earman’s objection to it, a bit of Earman’s argument that he omitted:

There seems to be no lurking contradiction or anything philosophically
unsatisfactory in saying in the same breath: “Space in the actual world
is open, but if the mass density were a little greater, space would be
closed,” or “Time in the actual universe goes on forever into the future,
but if the mass density were greater the universe would eventually
recollapse and time would come to an end.” Why then is there a lurking
contradiction or something philosophically unsatisfying in saying:
“Time in our universe lapses, but if the distribution and motion of
matter were different, there would be no consistent time order and so
time would not lapse.” (p. 198 of BCWS)

I see no answer to Earman’s challenge and so think that the modal step of
Gödel’s argument fails. Yourgrau seems to take the modal step seriously. If
so, he should have responded to Earman’s challenge.

Having been convinced by Earman that the modal step failed, I tried to
present (in ‘The Replacement of Time,’ Australasian Journal, 1994) a valid
Gödel-style argument that was, necessarily, weaker but still interesting. The
conclusion of my argument was: since there is no objective lapse of time in
an R-universe, there is no reason to suppose that there is an objective lapse
of time in our universe either. Yourgrau (on pp. 97-8) considers this argument
more sympathetically than Earman’s, since he considers it an elaboration of
an argument he sketched in The Disappearance of Time. He does imagine an
objector who just supposes that in our universe, where the ‘standing condi-
tions’ are ‘favorable’ the direct experience (as of) time does suffice to estab-
lish objective time flow. Indeed, one can suppose this. The challenge of the
argument is, however, to provide some non-question-begging rationale for
this supposition, since in an R-universe with no objectively laping time we
also could (presumably) have just the ‘direct experience’ we have had to date.
The chapter concludes with some remarks on Gödel’s interest in Husserl’s
account of the phenomenology of time perception, but neither these observa-
tions nor the discussion of recent versions of Gödel’s argument advance our
understanding of it.

Chapter 6, ‘Formalization and Representation’ consists of two loosely
related parts. In the first Yourgrau describes the formal system of Thomas-
son’s ‘Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps’ (Theoria, 1970) in which,
even though at a given time $\alpha 'Fp'$ (a present tense proposition ‘p’ preceded by
a future tense operator) is true, it does not follow that at $\alpha 'Fp'$ is inevitable.
Yourgrau objects that this attempt to formalize the Ockhamist way out of
fatalism fails because the formalism is not well-motivated philosophically.
The relevant sense of necessity or inevitability is, according to Yourgrau, this:

Indeed, Aristotle’s original intuition [in *De Interpretatione*, chapter 9] seems clear enough. If the past is now necessary because it is, all of it, a big unalterable fact to which present truths about the past correspond, then if there are truths about (all of) the future, then the future, too, is a big unalterable fact, and so it, too, is, in this sense, necessary. I detect no sign of the modal fallacy that some have attributed to Aristotle. (135)

The idea, then, is that ‘by hypothesis, Fp is true, and thus ¬Fp is not subject (now) to my control or deliberation; it is not now possible’ (133), and so, in the relevant sense, according to Yourgrau, inevitable, despite Thomason’s formal result. But no argument beyond bare assertion is produced to buttress the claim that from the truth of Fp one can infer more than just Fp, that one can infer that Fp is necessary (and so unavoidable or not subject to one’s deliberation or will), the quintessential fatalist conclusion.

One cannot do justice to the tangle of arguments concerning this infamous inference in a review, but I urge the reader interested in this topic to consult the elegant presentation in Chapter 1 of Jordan Howard Sobel’s *Puzzles for the Will* (University of Toronto Press, 1998) of the family of modal fallacies that are typically called upon to support fatalist conclusions. Yourgrau’s criticism of Thomason for proposing alternative futures for times like t (133) indicates to me that the relevant sense of necessity is for him captured by Sobel’s actuality operator, @, in which case, although the truth of Fp does indeed render Fp necessary in that sense, that sense warrants (without further argument) only the further conclusion that p indeed will be true, not that it is not subject to choice or deliberation.

Continuing the theme of the inadequacy of formalism to capture the intuitive yet essential essence of time, Yourgrau gives us a primer on Fregean semantics and a critical account of Perry’s semantics for the indexical now. According to Yourgrau, the crux of Perry’s account is the role (or rule): for all times t and speakers s, if s employs ‘now’ correctly at t, he or she refers to t. Yourgrau comments, however, that ‘a rule is no good unless you can use it,’ (165) and he seems to be arguing (or implying) that one can not use Perry’s rule. One cannot instantiate the universal quantifier in the rule, he says, unless one has ‘a particular time, t, in mind’ (166). But why? Need one have a particular place in mind when using ‘here’? (Imagine someone lost.) Need there be a difference for uses of ‘now’? Yourgrau’s argument seems less than decisive.

The book is rounded off by discussions in Chapter 7, ‘Being and Time’, of the connection between lapsing time and the notion of potential (as opposed to actual) infinity and a discussion of the dead, whom Yourgrau supposes to have a kind of non-Meinongian being, though they lack existence. There are also appended discussions of Brouwer’s Intuitionism and the limits of infinite series.
The tone throughout the book is oracular and allusive. Those who are inspired by suggestive connections between big ideas may be inspired by this book. Those who seek crisply worked-out arguments will have to look elsewhere.

Steven Savitt
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