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Karl Ameriks, ed.

*The Cambridge Companion to
German Idealism.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.

Pp. xiii + 306.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-65178-6);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-65695-8).

Given that three of the four great figures of German Idealism already have their own *Cambridge Companions*, I was pleasantly surprised to see a volume devoted to this poorly understood philosophical era in its entirety. I was even happier to discover that Karl Ameriks has managed to assemble an absolutely superb team of scholars, including a number of contributors to, and editors of, the volumes on Kant, Hegel and Fichte. This experience is important, of course, because for this format scholarship must be married with an ability to translate extremely difficult concepts and obscure intellectual linkages into clear, accessible discussions for a broad academic audience. With such bench strength comes high expectations, but I am confident that neither the green undergraduate nor the greying specialist will be disappointed.

As editor, Ameriks provides a brief introduction to the volume wherein he explains what is meant (and not meant) by 'idealism' and assesses the philosophical achievements of the movement. Additionally, he importantly situates the movement alongside the cultural aspirations of romanticism, broadly construed, in order to emphasize that, unlike much Anglo-American philosophy, German Idealism is in constant dialogue with literature, theology, and politics, and a full understanding of this period cannot be realized by attending to the officially philosophical works alone. This point is made even more dramatically before the introduction, however, as we are provided with a plan of nineteenth-century Jena, wherein so many of the movement's pivotal figures resided. One's jaw tends to drop upon realizing that the Schlegels, Goethe, Schelling, Schiller, Hölderlin, Fichte and Hegel were all more or less neighbors in those heady years following the French Revolution. But appreciating this background setting is crucial, for the story of German Idealism is a convoluted tale of small-town friendships, academic scandal, mutual influence and, eventually, dispersal, and this is why we cannot rest content — as the German scholars in this volume tend to remind us — with the familiar progressivist interpretation of the movement according to which Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all improve upon their predecessors' work, and all the other figures merely play bit parts in this four man drama. One of the many successes of the *Companion* is its ability to overturn this simplistic view of things — a view only reinforced in North America by the lack of English translations of many of the movement's so-called peripheral works.

Fred Beiser is the historian of philosophy who has done more than anyone to bring these 'minor' figures of the Kantian aftermath to our attention

through his magisterial study, *The Fate of Reason*. If anything, the success of that book renders almost superfluous Daniel Dahlstrom's fine discussion of Hamann, Herder and Schiller and Paul Franks' dense overview of Jacobi, Reinhold and Maimon. In the *Companion*, these chapters work very nicely, but thanks to Beiser, much of this summary work has already been done in greater detail. Beiser's own thematic introduction here begins by addressing the various *aporiai* of the Enlightenment, and shows convincingly how idealism in its transcendental, ethical and absolute phases attempted, following Kant, 'to establish criticism without skepticism, and naturalism without materialism' (23). Beiser does a marvelous job guiding us through the thickets of the pantheism controversy, and provides an extraordinarily clear account of how Fichte in particular tried and failed to get beyond these *aporiai* while remaining faithful to Kant's critical spirit.

Paul Guyer and Allen Wood seem like lone Kantian voices in the volume, offering a belated defense of Kant against a wide array of idealist criticisms, generally prompted by dissatisfactions with Kant's dualistic positions. Guyer begins with Hegel's claim that Kant's distinction between sense and intellect is the ground of all the other Kantian dualisms, but that the distinction is based on 'experience and empirical psychology' (49) alone, and is thus not insuperable, as Kant's reliance upon the (regulative) role of intellectual intuition suggests. Guyer agrees with Hegel about the fundamentality of the sense/intellect distinction, but through a fine discussion of Kant's pre-Critical and Critical texts, shows that it did not come out of 'thin air,' and at no point, even in the third *Critique*, did Kant think of abandoning it. Wood also complains about the abuse of Kant's texts by his idealist successors. Wood focuses on Kant's moral philosophy, which he groups under four different branches, and suggests that the idealists' preoccupation with the foundational writings — the *Groundwork* and the *Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason* — underlies their now familiar charges of formalism and rigorism. Unfortunately, I might add, this bias persists today (especially in our moral philosophy courses), and we continue to marginalize Kant's less formalistic work on the application of ethical principles, on right, human nature, history, and theology.

Fichte and Schelling are the focus of two different chapters. Rolf-Peter Horstmann examines their early philosophical work, attending admirably to the philosophical milieu and the conceptual complexities of Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* especially. Günter Zöller takes the surprising tack of recovering the 'realist self-supplementation' (201) of these ostensibly arch-idealist figures by examining how a reality beyond reason in fact guarantees the self-sufficiency of reason itself. As such, Zöller argues that Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer (who only features in this chapter) 'provide the basic arsenal for the subsequent attacks on Hegelian idealism to be found in such diverse thinkers as Kierkegaard, Feuerbach and Marx' (202).

Charles Larmore's recent study of this period equips him well for the task of reconstructing the theoretical work of Hölderlin and Novalis. Too often overlooked, these figures are placed alongside Reinhold, Fichte and Jacobi

(the ubiquitous gadfly of his times) and their debates about the need for, and the possibility of, a single, fundamental principle of philosophy. Larmore manages to move through a surprising number of topics in this space, including a highly insightful reading of Hölderlin's bizarre epistolary novel, *Hyperion*, before concluding with a brief consideration of Schlegel's theory of irony.

Terry Pinkard and Robert Pippin are, in my opinion, the two most compelling Hegel scholars in the English-speaking world. Pinkard's book on the *Phenomenology* is a model of clarity and rigor, and he has somehow managed to condense this elaborate reconstruction of Hegel into about eight extraordinary pages here, before finishing the chapter with an equally insightful overview of the *Science of Logic*. Pippin's contribution is a more wide-ranging assessment of Hegel's practical philosophy. Once again taking on some long-standing Hegel myths, Pippin works through a number of difficult issues in Hegel's texts, including a very helpful account of the relationship between concept and actuality.

Perhaps the least successful chapter is Dieter Sturma's 'Politics and the New Mythology: the turn to Late Romanticism'. Although important material is covered, too many topics and figures are being juggled here, and the focus tends to get lost. Andrew Bowie also deals with a general topic, German Idealism and the arts, but because he sticks largely with Schelling and Hegel (especially his 'end of art' thesis), the reader isn't swamped by detail and a Russian novel's worth of characters.

Ameriks's chapter on Feuerbach, Marx and Kierkegaard works well as a companion piece to Zöllner's contribution, and is a fitting coda for the *Companion* itself, marking as it does the philosophical dependencies of manifestly non-idealist thinkers upon Hegel in particular. Chapters on existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, the Frankfurt School, etc. could just as easily have been included to emphasize the ongoing legacy of idealism, but the recognition of such influence if perhaps best left to the future *Companions* responsible for covering these more recent philosophical movements.

Jonathan Salem-Wiseman

Humber College

Julia Annas

Ancient Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. 128.

Cdn\$14.50; US\$8.95. ISBN 0-19-285357-0.

Julia Annas and Oxford University Press have issued closely in time a large source book of ancient thought and this Very Short Introduction to the ancient thinkers. The latter is one of a new Very Short Introduction series of brief entries to subjects like Logic (Graham Priest), and Aristotle (Jonathan Barnes) as well as Buddhism, Hinduism, the Bible, Marxism and more. Annas acknowledges the availability of other valuable introductions to her field, but sets out to provide something compact and different. She eschews the tradition of starting with a lengthy chronology of the *personae*; she treats Romans all along as players in the same league; she stresses and balances the importance of relating (i) 'doing philosophy' today to early concerns, and (ii) contrasting the past and present perspectives of her possible readers. Despite her work's brevity she is attractively generous with illustrations and information boxes without spoiling the flow.

The first chapter, 'Humans and beasts: understanding ourselves', begins with reflections on Euripides' tragedy, the *Medea*. Annas: 'But how do we understand what is going on? How can I genuinely think that A is the better thing to do, if I end up doing B?' What of Medea's killing of her children, when her rage seems to motivate her reason to devise a way of doing what she thinks is wrong? The act is common enough today. Annas skilfully contrasts Plato's tripartite account of the soul in his *Republic* with the Stoics' 'very different accounts of human psychology and the emotions' (1-6). Quickly a web has been traced between drama, philosophers across centuries, psychology, etc., as ancient philosophy is brought almost at once to life and relevance.

Chapter Two, 'Why do we read Plato's *Republic*?', shows how different translations and central issues of changing periods shift readers' focus and reactions across time. An ancient classic's 'meaning' is not *fige en-soi*... She offers specialists a jewel: a contrast of the Utilitarian George Grote's *Plato* (of 1865), 'the first account based on solid scholarship,' with the Idealist Benjamin Jowett's much more accessible work of 1871 that presented Plato 'in a readable way for the first time' (27). Some such discussions across the Very Short Introduction suggest that 'Introduction' is out of place: much more fitting would be 'RE-introduction'. Her book, she might admit, is at its best when it comes across as a 'refresher course' for those who have earlier been introduced to her area and enjoy discussion. For a tour group on a guided cruise of the Greek Isles, dedicated to those with memories of being taught some ancient writers, this might, for example, be a splendid text — given a good specialist lecturer to fill in occasional blanks. For individual readers wanting to refresh what they knew of old and to be stimulated by many fresh points from a distinguished scholar, this would not be an introduction, but a pleasing book to own.

Chapter Three is 'The happy life, ancient and modern'; Chapter Four 'Reason, knowledge and scepticism'; Chapter Five 'Logic and reality'; Chapter Six 'Where did it all begin? (and what is it anyway?).'

Towards her close Annas enquires: When did ancient philosophy become truly philosophical and when did it cease to be? The pre-Socratics tried too often to 'explain' the cosmos in terms that were too long on *speculation* and too short on reasoning, though Xenophanes and Eleatics did use striking arguments (96 ff.) 'From Socrates on, reasoned argument is the lifeblood of philosophy because it is only in the give and take of argument that we achieve understanding of the positions we hold ...' Genuine philosophy is action-minded and not too rooted in money making.

There is no exact dot of demarcation for where ancient philosophy closes, but 'there is something to be said for dating the end ... as a living tradition, in AD 529, the year in which the Christian Emperor Justinian closed the schools of pagan philosophy in Athens' (108). 'With Christianity a single intellectual view of the world was imposed' (110). Do such points seem more helpful for a conclusion than a start?

A good book, but better for whom?

John King-Farlow
University of Alberta

Robert C. Bartlett

*The Idea of Enlightenment:
a Post-mortem Study.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001.

Pp. xi + 224.

Cdn\$/US\$45.00. ISBN 0-8020-4937-4.

While certainly not without merit, this is a somewhat curious book. First of all, for the great majority of potential readers its title is apt to be misleading. The book contains comparatively little actual analysis — pre- or post-mortem — of *the* Enlightenment. Second, in both substance and approach it is rather flagrantly sectarian, as I can attest, being myself an associate of the sect in question (and a most excellent one it is, hence the merit of the book).

The text is divided into two main parts, each comprising three chapters. Part One, 'The Collapse of the Modern Enlightenment', argues that the evident failure of the *modern* Enlightenment project — upon which was based the dream of a wholly rational, scientific, secular, peaceful ordering of political life — needn't be taken as an indictment of enlightenment *per se*, nor as having proven the inadequacy of reason for dealing with the most important concerns of human life. To the extent one is persuaded that this

is so, one is open to reconsidering an earlier understanding of rational enlightenment and its relation with politics. This is the theme of the book's second part, 'An Introduction to the Ancient Enlightenment'. Twice as long as the first, it consists of separate chapters offering partial interpretations of the views of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle as they relate to Bartlett's construal of the matters at issue.

The book begins with a brief review of 'The Contemporary Consensus' regarding both the premises and the actual outcome of the original Enlightenment project to forge 'a new and altogether philanthropic union ... between politics and reason or philosophy', the latter supplanting the authority of religion and (suspect) revelation as a basis for free, moral, rational lives in tolerant, peaceful societies (3). Given how the project has historically transformed itself, with the rule of reason and duty giving way to that of passion and freedom — culminating in a century of unprecedented violence — it is no surprise that 'many observers, left and right, liberal and conservative, pious and "pagan"', join in rejecting the project, with the result that 'reason itself has been entirely discredited in influential quarters ...' (7). Bartlett does not — and need not — extensively document such widely acknowledged claims. His brief references to a few representatives suffice as reminders that a diversity of thinkers 'agree that the liberal rationalism of the modern Enlightenment is seriously flawed' (11).

The adequacy of the second chapter, however, is more questionable. For here we are to be shown what precisely *is* the basic flaw in the Enlightenment's rationale, accounting for its ultimate failure. And here the sectarian character of Bartlett's analysis is especially evident to anyone (such as myself) who is already familiar with what I (fondly, if with regrets) call 'the Straussian party line'. Bartlett is obviously a Straussian — that is, a scholar whose entire approach to political philosophy has been shaped by the teachings of Leo Strauss, in my opinion unquestionably the greatest political philosopher of the past century. According to Bartlett's orthodox Straussian account, the root of the problem is that the leading Enlightenment thinkers set out to refute the claims of religion (thereby 'increase the political power of human reason by eliminating or at least reducing' that of established religious authorities; 13), but careful examination of their arguments show that they didn't, and moreover couldn't, actually succeed. I have no quarrel with Bartlett's critique of the two philosophers he chooses to treat as representative, Bayle and Montesquieu — indeed, I found it very informative. However, I remain unpersuaded that the 'Theological-Political problem', for all of its historical importance — and specifically, the failure of Reason to refute Revelation — really explains either the now-obvious collapse of the Enlightenment project, or the widespread contemporary disdain of reason. I suspect it is more directly due to the specific character of modern science — for example, to the conception of reason and nature upon which it is founded, incorporated wholesale into the Enlightenment rationale.

The third chapter considers two radically different prospects of 'a Return to Premodern Rationalism' as represented in the writings of Alasdair MacIn-

tyre and Leo Strauss. The former would have us replace the moribund thinking of the Enlightenment with a revived Thomistic Aristotelianism grafted onto an historicist ontology. Bartlett has no difficulty exposing the fatal weaknesses of this hybrid monster. Needless to say, his treatment of Strauss has a very different character, being devoted more to defending Strauss from what Bartlett regards as a pernicious and wrong-headed interpretation of his teaching — namely, that he is actually a Nietzschean, as argued by (among others) an eminent former student of Strauss, Stanley Rosen (55 ff). Here, too, Bartlett makes this mainly a matter of how Strauss himself stands on the Theological-Political problem.

The second half of the book, with its three chapters so transparently modelled on Strauss's *The City and Man*, does not require much detailed comment. It consists of some careful textual analyses of portions of three great classics of political philosophy, undertaken ostensibly for the light they shed on the general problem of enlightenment, but really (I suspect) because the study of such texts is where Bartlett's heart is, being the primary source of his own personal enlightenment (I sympathize). To be sure, Bartlett shows these texts to have some relevance to the modern project. For example, Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War implicitly teaches that the thoroughly secular society at which the Enlightenment thinkers aimed is a bad idea (105). Similarly, Plato's *Republic* establishes the standard of genuine enlightenment, encasulated in the most famous allegory in philosophical literature (strangely, however, only a third of the chapter supposedly devoted to explicating this incredibly rich image is actually focused on the Cave allegory; 116-23). And careful study of Aristotle's *Politics* reveals 'The Limits of Enlightenment', that is, the limitations on reason as a basis for political life, therewith the proper role of philosophy. Still, much of the substance of this latter part of the book has, at best, only a tangential bearing on the modern Enlightenment, its demise, and the resulting crisis in which we are currently floundering.

In short, it seems to me that the 'idea of enlightenment' is as much a conceit for this book as it is a unifying theme. If one is concerned to rehabilitate respect for reason and enlightenment, one had better *begin* by grasping the nettle bare-handed (not muffled in thick layers of arcane textual analyses) — that is, directly confront and expose the inadequacies of the modern conception of Nature, of our emaciated notion of reason, the absurdity of the fact-value distinction, the incoherence of the all radical relativisms, the groundlessness of strict determinism, etc. That done, one opens the way to taking seriously once again the premodern alternatives, and thus the sort of textual exegesis that Bartlett engages in, and for which he obviously has much talent.

Leon H. Craig

(Department of Political Science)

University of Alberta

Walter Benesch

*An Introduction to Comparative Philosophy:
A Travel Guide to Philosophical Space.*

New York: Palgrave 1997 (cloth),

St. Martin's Press 2001 (paper). Pp. ix + 229.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-16546-3);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-333-93068-1).

This book's title engenders a pair of expectations: that the author will (a) introduce students to diverse philosophical traditions, and (b) offer students the means to compare these traditions' themes and theories. So my foci will be to articulate this pair of criteria further, and measure whether Benesch meets the resulting benchmarks.

(a) Is the text organized, and written, in a fashion friendly to the first-time philosophy student? By way of organization, Benesch's title hints at his plan to spin an extended metaphor. For starters, he portrays philosophical thinking as a 'voyage into philosophical space' (3). Rough-and-ready traditional foci of philosophical inquiry are, in turn, baptized as 'dimensions' of philosophical space; so whereas most would speak literally (and simply) of inquiries into *mind* and *matter*, Benesch speaks of voyages into the *object-* and *subject-dimensions* of philosophical space (29-30). A bit less perspicuously, we find 'the assumption that the experiences of objects by subjects always occur in situations at times and places' dubbed as grounding the *situational-dimension*; and the *aspect/perspective dimension* is said to 'rest upon the assumption that any thought or statement reflects an aspect of an inseparable totality of thinking and the experienced world' (30-1).

The foregoing taxonomy (geometry?) inspires the text's structure. After a section attempting to motivate this metaphor — the dimensions' 'comparative synthesis,' we're breathlessly promised, will 'unite the strengths of each into a more comprehensive whole that transcends them individually' (32) — Benesch devotes a section apiece to illustrating the philosophizing appropriate to each dimension. Thus, the chapters comprising Part I treat (exclusively) Western philosophical views illustrating the object dimension: Aristotle (ch. 4), Epicureanism and Stoicism (ch. 5), and the medieval/early modern tradition (ch. 6). In like fashion, Benesch singles out Samkhya and Jain philosophy as exemplars of travel along the 'subject dimension' (chs. 7, 8); Nyaya and Buddhism find membership in a third, single-chaptered, 'Situational Dimension'-section (ch. 9); and a host of Chinese philosophers find themselves conscripted into service as 'Aspect/Perspective Dimension'-travelers (ch. 10).

Despite the four chapters Benesch devotes to it, it's difficult to see this extended talk of 'dimensions in philosophical space' as justified; for, once built, the device appears to idle. Nowhere does the notion seem essential to securing any clear, philosophical point; and it's elusive just what pedagogical success it actually enjoys. One *might* hazard that Benesch's intended spirit is one reminiscent of Thomas Nagel's familiar distinction between subjective-

and objective-perspectives, as well as his work diagnosing these perspectives' role in engendering philosophy's most vexing problems. One *could* wonder whether a project similar to Nagel's could be in the offing, this time treating the further two 'dimensions' Benesch singles out. Yet the clarity Nagel achieves *sans* metaphor (including his own inviting philosophical primer, *What Does It All Mean?*) is, alas, lacking in the text at hand.

Benesch's segregation of Western philosophers into his 'object dimension'-section also threatens to mislead. The new student who gathers that Western philosophy can be so safely pigeonholed, for instance, will find quick counterexamples once she makes acquaintance with such 'subject-dimension' Westerners as Husserl and Sartre (to take but two).

The book's very prose, likewise, threatens to stifle student understanding. A moment's revision, for instance, should suggest that the proposition, *Hume critiqued the Argument from Design*, can be better advanced than this: 'Two historical positions of the object dimension of philosophical space were called in question by Hume's Treatise: The first is the assumption of an intelligible world created by a transcendental intelligence in such a fashion that the orders superimposed upon it correspond to the orders that the human mind projects onto it' (99). Again, Kant is admittedly elusive at points; but a new student will surely stumble if we depict the Kantian project thusly: 'In the *Prolegomena* in answering the question as to how nature itself is possible [sic], he decides that the human possibility of knowing nature is the possibility of nature in the human mind and senses' (99). Yet again, I still seek a perspicuous parsing of 'the Samkhya theory of evolution[']s' characterization as a process where 'the evolving and the evolved occur in endless changes before the uncreated and uncreating consciousness in its nature as understanding' (120).

And these examples are hardly exceptional. Repeatedly, we find sin after sin against a basic plea of pedagogical conscience: *Thou shalt not wantonly nest prepositional phrases*.

(b) How does this work fare as a promised 'guide to philosophizing'? (5) How, that is, does it fare in enabling students grasp, compare, and evaluate, diverse philosophical traditions and theories? To be sure, the basic information is present to be grasped; though we must expect the just-exhibited prose to attenuate a student's luck in grasping it. Oddly, too, examples of East/West comparison one might *expect* from a 'comparative' text are conspicuously absent. For instance, Sextus Empiricus (81ff), Descartes (97-8), and the *Chuang Tzu* (ch. 10), each take the stage; but Benesch offers no comparison of these thinkers' skeptical strategies. He notes at one point that 'Samkhya ... accounts for impressions and ideas within a strictly physical ... framework much as David Hume did' (119); but the student who ventures to ask, 'How so, specifically? And how did the two accounts differ?' will find no assistance here. Consider, too, the common observation that Hume's 'bundle of perceptions' view of the Self invites comparison to the Buddhist doctrine of No-Self (162-9); Benesch, alas, declines the invitation. These observations point to a striking pattern: in fact, with Western views safely sealed up in Benesch's

opening part, preciously little side-by-side *comparison* — of views, arguments, and ‘hows of knowing’ (49) — graces this text.

Lastly, the reader will find recitations of various philosophical positions, as well as somewhat tedious sketches of various logical systems (the Aristotelian syllogistic and prepositional calculus find treatment in chs. 3-4). But, strikingly, there’s no indication at all of their relationship — of how philosophers *use* logic to give shape to their philosophical ‘travels’. More basically, unlike many introductory texts (e.g., Mark Woodhouse’s *A Preface to Philosophy*), Benesch omits illustrating how philosophers use *arguments* and diagnose *fallacies* in advancing (and rejecting) philosophical theories. For the student who wishes to philosophize critically, such an omission does such seekers a disservice. Can a student be hoped to gather the Socratic method (49ff), never mind compare it with Eastern methods, *sans* a grasp of how to articulate arguments, and how to hone questions to target them?

The predictable upshot of all this is unfortunate. For no doubt, a reader can discern much to like about Benesch’s ambitions. His efforts to articulate his ‘four-dimensional’ metaphor, for instance, reflects a laudable wish to issue new seekers a compass for negotiating some badly-barbed lands. I fear, though, that this project’s execution fails to realize its engineer’s earnest purposes.

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Isaiah Berlin

The Roots of Romanticism.

The A.W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts:
The National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC:
Bollingen Series xxxv:45.

Edited by Henry Hardy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1999. Pp. xvi + 171.

US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-00713-6);

US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-08662-1).

**Ronald Dworkin, Mark Lilla, and
Robert B. Silvers, eds.**

The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin.

New York: New York Review Books 2001.

Pp. xiii + 198.

US\$22.95. ISBN 0-940322-59-5.

The Roots of Romanticism is a posthumously published version of Isaiah Berlin's A.W. Mellon lectures delivered at the Washington Gallery of Art in 1965. These lectures come from the period when Berlin sought to identify the ideological origins of the conflict between Marxism and liberalism, and developed an appreciation of the contribution that Romanticism made to the rejection of universalistic value theories. They are published as part of a growing acknowledgement of the role played by Berlin's discussion of ideas such as liberty in setting the agenda of some of the most important debates in political philosophy of our time. That acknowledgement is reflected also in the publication of the other book under review. This draws together a number of contributions by leading moral and political philosophers, who discuss and evaluate Berlin's pluralism, which he himself regarded as his most significant philosophical contribution. On Berlin's interpretation, Romanticism affirms pluralism, and he sees this as its most significant influence on the development of political and moral thought. What can be gleaned from these books of Berlin's view of the origins and value of pluralism will be the main concern of this review.

Berlin's discussion of Romanticism suggests one source of value pluralism. This is the idea of humankind as a creator, pursuing ultimately unrealizable ideals in one direction at the expense of what has been left behind in the process of creation, and at the expense of alternative paths foregone. So for Berlin, Scott's medieval romances suggest that a drab, practical modernity necessarily lacks the charm and courtly virtues of the medieval world it emerged from and has left behind (*RR*, 137). Its values are irreconcilable with those of its origins. But, more importantly, Berlin thinks that Scott's evocation of these lost values challenges the assumption that there is a standpoint from which we can judge whether the modern world has progressed from the medieval. Macauley's readers can assume that the modern world has made

progress but Scott's readers cannot. Berlin also claims that Scott is making a point similar to Herder's. The values of, say, Protestant German culture are at odds with those of Catholic French culture, which in turn are at odds with those of a nation of shopkeepers. However, there is no standpoint from which any of these cultures can be judged superior to the others. The inhabitants of each culture feel at home only in it, and from its standpoint cannot value the others as their inhabitants do.

Berlin thus proposes a relativism of values. However, it is also clear that Berlin does not think that value lies in the eye of the beholder. His value relativism is objective, like the relativity of motion rather than the relativity of taste. Charles Taylor, in his contribution to the *Legacy* volume, singles this objective value relativism out as Berlin's principal achievement, but attributes it to the complexity and limitations of human life rather than to the inherent nature of the goods themselves (*Legacy*, 117). There may be irreconcilable conflicts between goods in two particular ways of life, but from the standpoint of human flourishing these might be transcended in a more developed way of life, which offered superior forms of both these goods. Taylor thus proposes to reject the Romantic pessimism of Berlin's position, taking Aristotle's rather than Herder's part (cf. *RR*, 138). Taylor agrees with Berlin in rejecting easy reconciliations of values achieved by showing, as Plato might, that 'true' versions of each value are in harmony, or along the lines, which Taylor thinks more popular, of affirming a master value such as utility or a good will, which excludes conflict of values simply by excluding alternative bases of value.

This is the central focus of the discussion of Berlin's value pluralism in the *Legacy* volume. Dworkin proposes the Platonic solution of reconciling true freedom with true equality. He defends this strategy by claiming that freedom is an 'essentially contested' concept. As such, its application requires complex and open-ended discriminations and is, in part, determined by what satisfies the normative point of freedom (cf. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* [1993], Ch. 1). This enables endless disputes as to whether cases fit the normative point or the complex, indeterminately projectable criteria of its application, and justifies redefinition to achieve a more precise concept shaped, at least for Dworkin, by a commitment to the integrity of liberal values. From this standpoint, Dworkin argues that we should not regard freedom as sacrificed when no wrong is involved in some restraint. Dworkin invites us to consider a restriction on his putative liberty to kill his critics (*Legacy*, 88-9). He claims that conceptions of liberty are interpretive theories, which aim to show why restraints on liberty are bad. Any such theory would fail if it implied that prevention of Dworkin's killing his critics is a wrong because it is a constraint on liberty. However, Dworkin's example is not decisive. Certainly few, probably not even Dworkin, would feel any twinge of regret at prevention of his killing his critics. And Dworkin is right to suggest that Berlin cannot account entirely for this lack of regret by claiming that the wrong of a restraint on liberty is in this case overwhelmingly justified. However, our lack of regret here may only show that restraints on what we

might wish (idly, playfully, etc) to do are not necessarily losses of liberty. For a loss of liberty, the restraint must impact on some *interest* we have in doing the action, which would also explain why restrictions on what we are entitled to do are peculiarly freedom diminishing, since our entitlements cover interests in possibilities of action that are important enough to be protected by right. Dworkin's example therefore does not show that we must redefine liberty in a Lockean fashion.

Dworkin is not alone among the contributors in seeking an alternative to Berlin's romantic pessimism. Nagel and Taylor both point to the possibility of accommodations that at least partly resolve oppositions or contingent conflicts between values, and even may resolve what Nagel terms essentially opposed values, where pursuit of one value involves not only tension with but also condemnation of pursuit of another. But he is alone in wanting to banish any sense of 'irreparable loss' (*Legacy*, 121) in resolutions of value conflict. The discussion of the contributions on pluralism usefully brings out and develops this difference. The essential point of difference turns out to be the claim that liberty has no meaning independent of other values. For Dworkin, but not for the other contributors, there are not two sovereign principles to obey when liberty seems to clash with equality. For Dworkin, the contestability of liberty provides a possibility of redefining it so that conflict vanishes.

Berlin's pluralism seems to come down to something like Ross's notion of conflicting *prima facie* rights, as Frances Kamm suggests in discussion, but differs, as Bernard Williams indicates, inasmuch as Ross's Aristotelian standpoint does not sufficiently stress that, in any resolution of conflicting duties, suppressed values still assert themselves in a sense of loss. This suggests that Berlin's value pluralism could be captured through a Hegelian construal of Ross's conflicting *prima facie* duties, which would stress the preservation of value opposition in any resolution of their conflict. But perhaps Berlin would draw back even from that. It may be that he does not share the aspiration of various contributors to see resolution of conflicts between values. Romantic pessimism may have resigned him to the satisfactions of making choices, which gain in importance the harder they are.

The *Legacy* volume is concerned with two other aspects of Berlin's work. Several contributions deal with Berlin's distinction between Hedgehogs and Foxes, pointing out that Berlin shifts ground, and takes specific examples of Hedgehog and Fox as definitive of the general types. In reading his published work as well as compiled texts such as his Mellon Lectures, one has to be wary of sweeping generalizations that are nevertheless not completely off the mark, and connections made that tend to conflate distinct ideas. Yet Berlin's slippery and allusive prose has provoked fruitful discussion in spite of, indeed because of, its lack of rigour. The challenge he poses of unraveling important issues is one of Berlin's strengths as an initiator of debate.

The other issue covered is Berlin's commitment to the project of a Jewish national home, although he was himself perfectly at home in Oxford, and the problem of reconciling nationalism with liberalism. Once again the volume

combines interesting contributions with an equally interesting discussion of the problem of justifying nationalism from a liberal standpoint. Wollheim argues that Berlin had only a negative justification of Zionism. Jews needed a national home because that was the only way for them to escape persecution. Walzer argues for a different sort of negative justification: a sense of attachment is an inevitable, even valuable, part of the human condition that it would be utopian to seek to rid us of. We can only try to ensure that conflicts arising from such attachments can be accommodated peacefully. That, as contributors point out, is a problem for contemporary Zionism, which has allowed ideological attachments to Biblical lands long settled by Palestinians to frustrate a peaceful end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The *Legacy* volume provides an interesting and important discussion of what Berlin's ideas have to offer us, and the publication of the Mellon lectures casts some valuable light on the background of Berlin's liberalism.

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Eva Brann

The Ways of Naysaying —

No, Not, Nothing and Nonbeing.

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

Publishers Inc. 2001. Pp. xviii + 247.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-7425-1228-2.

Brann's book operates like a history of philosophy with regard to the negative and it is important to note that 'Naysaying' is part of a trilogy of works, the other two dealing with imagination and time. The book begins with a chapter on 'naysaying' itself, with 'aboriginal naysaying' and motivates a thesis that such naysaying is the method of 'distinction making with perspective' (213). A determinative role of the negative in the formation of both the will and thought is suggested (13) but whilst Brann's work is strong on giving an account of the role of the 'no' that account does not offer strong grounds for either being universal nor for being determinative in terms of either will or thought. It is this tendency, never fully explicit, towards assigning a determinative role to negation that is the weakest part of Brann's text, but it is only ever really a tendency and Brann's discussions are wide-ranging and fruitful enough to survive such a weakness.

Brann's text allows, for example, a return to the arguments of Anselm or Parmenides within a context that revitalises the parts often forgotten within modern research, and these powerful argumentative gems are obviously Brann's inspiration. She suggests that 'whoever is disposed to ponder the minds dealings with logical naysaying should ponder Anselm's intricate version of the "via negativa" ' (107). Less successful perhaps is Brann's discussion of the negative within the *Sophist*, opening an idea of 'non-being' that has a 'continental' feel but which doesn't engage with thinkers such as Levinas and Deleuze who have taken up such issues. 'Nonbeing is the antidote to nihilism, since the enfolding of Nonbeing in Being turns negation, whether of things or in words, away from being an irruption of nothingness to being an intimation of difference' (144). Whilst she allows a place for Heidegger, this is only in terms of 'nothingness' and there is a slight unwillingness to fully engage with what are, in effect, metaphysical and ontological concerns commonly found in modern continental thought.

Brann engages also with the analytical tradition, particularly in Chapters 2 and 3, and with the Russell/Meinong dispute, offering a concise and readable account alongside some discussion of modern development by writers such as Terence Parsons (91-2). Her interest in these arguments is turned towards her interest in the imagination and fiction. If the objects of the imagination and fiction are reduced to non-existences, then the theory seems unable to explain the power or reality of either, and Brann suggests that 'fictions inhabit a realm to which the compounded terms Being-and-Non-being, Presence-and-Absence apply' (103), suggesting a need to investigate the multi-valued logics where statements can be meaningful but also classifiable as neither true nor false.

In the final chapter of conclusions, a central thesis is that 'the images of our imagination and the phases of internal time are indeed inner experiences of not and non' (211). The generality of this thesis about the imagination is never fully motivated in Brann's text, and at best a weaker version of her thesis could be upheld, along the lines that the 'not and the non-' are 'inner experiences' necessary but not sufficient for the imagination and the experience of time. This thesis would come down to an argument that absence had as important a role to play in our understanding of the imagination and time as does presence, close to the suggestion in Chapter 3 above (103). In her conclusion, however, Brann again seems to want to offer the not and the non-as determinative of imagination and our experience of time and this relationship, in terms of its determinative direction, needs more work on its own terms than Brann gives. Why is the imagination, for example, determined by and not determinative of the experience of the negative? There is a slippage in Brann from an account of negation to a conclusion about determination that is essentially unfounded.

This slippage can be seen, for example, when Brann suggests that 'we experience quasi-existence, a vivid kind of nonexistence, directly, though internally' (217). The move from quasi-existence to nonexistence is an illegitimate shift in distinction without considerable argument. She goes on to

say that the 'images at the center of our human being' are produced by the mating of the 'thought structure of Non-being' and 'existence voided sensation' (218). The internal/external dichotomy that goes untheorised within Brann is another of the difficulties her arguments face. On her account it is difficult to see how any experience is anything other than internal but if that is so how does the distinction between the experience of quasi-existence and 'real' or 'full' existence operate? The notion of experience is infinitely more complicated and complicating than Brann gives credit for in her work.

Brann follows a long tradition, which includes Hegel, in which the negative and negation plays a positive role in determination. It is here, with this positive determinative role of the negative, that the substance of the argument can be located in the wider philosophical arena. Brann is aware of this when, for example, she remarks that 'Spinoza formulated the principle that "all determination is negation" — Hegel applies the converse: All negation is determination' (163). Yet, she never fully engages with the issue of determination that is central to understanding the power of the negation. Brann thus never grounds her theses solidly enough to convince. What she does do, however, is suggest to us the interest of exploring an ever present thread in philosophical thought, and she does so by laying out a large portion of that thread in such a way that we can begin to grasp the movement and emphases of the discussions. The breadth of Brann's discussion has meant that some depth of argument has had to be sacrificed along the way; but her account of the negative is a useful and worthwhile addition to the philosophical shelves, and it is to be hoped that it inspires more work on the issue.

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William H. Brenner

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1999. Pp. xv + 184.

US\$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4201-2);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4202-0).

This book is primarily an introduction to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. In order to guide first-time readers through Wittgenstein's 'forest of remarks', William Brenner approaches the *Investigations* from several different angles. His brief introductory chapter draws connections between Presocratic philosophy, the work of St. Augustine, and the problems Wittgenstein was grappling with in his later work. Here Brenner's argument is that the philosophical paradoxes about time, knowing what other's think, and

being, all emerge out of our tendency to fix on a single case, and make that case the model for solving all our other philosophical problems. He suggests that Wittgenstein's technique of grammatical investigation — a method of assembling reminders about the various ways in which a word is used to fight against our tendency to insist that any given word *must* be used in a specific way — is the way for philosophers to solve philosophical paradoxes such as the ones developed by Augustine and Thales.

The core of Brenner's book (Chapters 1 and 2) is dedicated to a commentary on the most significant passages of the *Investigations*. The commentary shifts back and forth between simple textual exegesis and a series of dialogues. While the constant shifting between styles is a bit disconcerting, Brenner does an excellent job introducing and explaining a very difficult text to first-time readers.

The rest of the book is a series of meditations on different philosophical problems that Wittgenstein grappled with in his later works. Chapter 3, 'Sensation and the Soul', deals with Wittgenstein's remarks of private language and his work on the 'inner life'. In the first part of the chapter, Brenner considers Wittgenstein's arguments against those who believe that we can never tell how another person feels. Wittgenstein's argument here is that when we make statements about being unable to express our pain to others or about our inability to know if others are in pain we are actually confusing two different uses of language. The type of confusion associated with philosophical problems about sensations occur when we mistakenly believe that words such as pain designate sensations. We avoid this confusion by reminding ourselves that we learned how to use the word 'pain' by *experiencing* pain and communicating this pain to others. We are able to tell if others are in pain by judging if appropriate behaviour accompanies their use of the word 'pain'.

In the second half of the chapter Brenner refutes the charge raised by Wittgenstein's critics that Wittgenstein denied the inner life via a careful reading of Wittgenstein's allegory of the 'soulless tribe' — a story about a government that enslaves another culture and then tells its citizens that slavery is justified because the people of this race have no souls. There is no way that one could refute the government's claims by pointing to the 'inner life' of the slaves. The only way to demonstrate that the slaves do have souls, is to point to similarities between the behaviour of slaves and the behaviour of citizens of the society, and make the case that on the basis of these similarities, the picture of the soul should also apply to the slave.

Chapter 4 considers Wittgenstein's work on colour and number and the connections between these two concepts. Wittgenstein's philosophical work on colour grows out of his disagreement with Newton's premise that white contains all the colours. While it makes sense to describe brown as yellowish-reddish-greenish-blue, one does not describe white in this way. By turning our attention away from experiments with prisms and towards how we learn and use language games of colour, Wittgenstein provides us with a perspicuous representation of colour — in the form of a colour wheel — which allows

us to see which kinds of colours we can talk about (i.e., we can talk about a greenish blue, but not a greenish red). Wittgenstein's remarks on number grow out of a different concern, Pythagorean confusion over the meaning of number, but, as Brenner reminds us, Wittgenstein's solution is almost identical to the one he proposed for colour. In this instance, Wittgenstein argues that confusion over what number is comes from asking the very question 'What is a number?' Just as Wittgenstein proposed that our confusion about the composition of colours can be cured by turning our attention to how we use the concept of colour in our language-game, when it comes to number, Wittgenstein recommends that we investigate the different ways in which the concept of numbers functions in our language-games. Arithmetical propositions, then, are rules that mathematicians are taught about how to use numbers in order to carry out their work.

The final theme in Wittgenstein's writings that Brenner investigates is Wittgenstein's theology. This is by far the most interesting chapter in the volume, and the theme is worthy of its own book. Drawing on Wittgenstein's many remarks on God and religion Brenner argues that theology for Wittgenstein consists in the study of the uses of the word 'God'. The grammar of the word 'God' is a special case because there is no picture of God with which we can compare our descriptions instead we are taught how to use 'God' in various ways. One outcome of a perspicuous representation of God, would be an understanding of the variety of different ways the word 'God' is used in different religions. Brenner argues that this perspicuous representation however does not amount to a religious relativism, because the real question is not which religion is true, but whether or not a religion 'conforms to reality' (153). By judging a religious system on whether or not it conforms to reality, Brenner is not arguing that religions are proven by appealing to sense-data. Instead, he is arguing that a religion conforms to reality if the loss of the concepts articulated in the religious system of thought would lead to 'a significant loss or ready-to-hand resources of thought and expression'.

In conclusion, I would not hesitate to recommend Brenner's book to those who are looking for a good introduction to one of philosophy's most difficult texts. My only criticism is that the shift in styles between simple textual exegesis and philosophical dialogue is a bit difficult to get used to, and Brenner should have decided upon one of the approaches and stuck to it.

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Ivo Coelho

Hermeneutics and Method:

The 'Universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001.

Pp. xx + 345.

Cdn\$/US\$65.00. ISBN 0-8020-4840-4.

Hermeneutics and Method traces the development of Bernard Lonergan's notion of the universal viewpoint from *Insight* to *Method in Theology* (11). Although the focus of the book is the period spanning these two works, Coelho goes all the way back to Lonergan's doctoral dissertation to show how this important concept evolved. Coelho also draws heavily on archival material to make his argument. The survey ends with the publication of *MT*. Coelho does not systematically discuss Lonergan's post-*Method* writing (*HM* xiv-xv).

The question that occupies *HM* is just what Lonergan means by the term universal viewpoint (3). Chapter 17 of *Insight* discusses the universal viewpoint in the context of a dialectical metaphysics. Section 3.2 of that chapter defines the universal viewpoint as 'a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints.' It is a heuristic structure for hermeneutics that is concerned with meaning, and it is presented as a high and distant goal that we strive to attain. *Insight's* epilogue goes on to mention the need for a theologically transformed universal viewpoint (*HM* 4).

The situation is quite different by the time we arrive at *MT*, however. There, the universal viewpoint is mentioned only twice — in the chapters on the functional specialties interpretation and foundations, but *not* in the chapter on the functional specialty dialectic. Further compounding the problem is the mention of the *comprehensive* viewpoint in Chapter 5 (*HM* 4). This material seems to discuss something quite different from what we find in *Insight*. It also seems to be the case that Lonergan is moving away from the idea of a universal viewpoint altogether (*HM* xiv). What is one to make of this?

That is the question that *Hermeneutics and Method* tries to answer. To answer it, Coelho repeatedly appeals to Lonergan's hermeneutical metaphor of the two blades of a scissors. The lower blade is the data, and the upper blade is what we bring to the data. What we learn is that the universal viewpoint is a heuristic structure that belongs to the upper blade.

The trouble in trying to learn what Lonergan is doing with this upper blade is that he switches gears as his career progresses. When he begins, he is working out of a Thomist background. This the soil from which the universal viewpoint sprouts. In its early formulations, the universal viewpoint is a metaphysical idea that is chiefly rooted in the Thomist conception of wisdom and in faculty psychology (*HM* 213, 210). Part One of *HM* documents this process, and shows how it culminates in *Insight's* account of the universal viewpoint.

Shortly after *Insight* was finished, however, Lonergan underwent an intellectual sea change. Coelho places this between the years 1954-1968 (*HM*

101). In this period, Lonergan begins moving away from Thomist metaphysics and toward the formulation of his generalized empirical method. The key to this method is Lonergan's elaboration of the cognitional structure of the subject. This cognitive structure now becomes the basis for Lonergan's system, displacing metaphysics (*HM* 146). *Insight's* metaphysically conceived universal viewpoint is now apparently in limbo. Part Two of *HM* details this massive change.

Finally, we arrive at *MT*. At this point, Lonergan has crystallized his notion of method. Has he abandoned the core idea of a universal viewpoint? Coelho thinks not. Method itself is dialectical, so there is a basic continuity in Lonergan's thinking. Method takes over the functions of the universal viewpoint, and sublates it. Furthermore, *MT's* reference to a comprehensive viewpoint is a carryover from earlier material (*HM* 211, 187).

Hermeneutics and Method contains a wealth of additional resources that should prove useful to Lonergan scholars. There is an appendix that attempts to work out the chronology of material in the Lonergan archives, and another in which Coelho discusses the historical evolution of Chapters 7-11 of *Method in Theology*. The book also includes an extensive bibliography of both primary and secondary sources. The former are arranged chronologically and are in a separate section. Finally, the book includes an extensive index.

Hermeneutics and Method is an important book for Lonergan scholars, but is less useful for students of hermeneutics in general, unless one agrees with the author that Lonergan represents a real advance in interpretation theory (213-14). The reason is that the book is a very detailed study of the history and development of one particular idea in one particular author during a limited time period. On the other hand, anyone interested in the evolution of Lonergan's thought will find this book stimulating. Coelho's scholarship is thorough, and he presents his case with authority. A close reading of *HM* is bound to lead one to a deeper understanding of Lonergan.

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Drucilla Cornell

Just Cause: Freedom, Identity, and Rights.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers, Inc. 2000. Pp. xi + 205.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9790-8);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9791-6).

Drucilla Cornell's *Just Cause: Freedom, Identity and Rights* is an important text for scholars in political philosophy, legal studies, political science and feminist studies, as well as for those interested in grounding commitments to activism in such diverse areas as workers' rights and multiculturalism. *Just Cause* offers both theoretical and concrete elaborations of Cornell's concept of the imaginary domain and its significance for political and legal debates; indeed this book is in spirit and theoretical substance very close to her 1995 *The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment*.

Although *Just Cause* is composed of distinct essays on diverse topics (including Spanish-language rights, personal experiences of labor union organization, and the doctrine of employment-at-will) and makes use of wide-ranging philosophical and literary resources, the book's frequent thematization of identification, self-representation and the dignity of personhood makes for a unified argument. While the book's introduction promises a defense of the significance of ideals in political and legal philosophy, the theme of ideals is in the essays subsumed to that of self-representation and self-identification, and the concept of the aesthetic is also deployed to refer to the practices of self-representation and self-fashioning that are, in Cornell's applications of Kant, inextricably linked to what freedom and personhood are. While feminism is thematized occasionally in the book — particularly in the first, partly autobiographical chapter, as well as in chapter two's response to Rita Felski and a discussion of abolitionist feminism in chapter four — neither feminism, nor workers' rights, nor Spanish-language rights is the overarching theme; rather, the approach to each specific topic exposes a different aspect of the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings in which are interwoven principles of Kantian personhood, Hegelian recognition, Rawlsian liberalism and communitarianism.

The book's earlier chapters are directly concerned with feminist issues. In a first, brief chapter Cornell recounts her experiences in a consciousness-raising group with Latina and African-American women, in order to illustrate what she (borrowing from Marilyn Friedman) calls the 'demoralizing' of gender, i.e., practices counteracting and dissolving gender norms in the course of fashioning other self-representations. The book's second chapter was originally published together with an essay of Rita Felski, to which it is a response; as might be expected, the absence of Felski's own essay is a bit frustrating for the reader. For those who are less familiar with Cornell's work, the reply to Felski will be especially useful as an explanation of Cornell's terminology of the 'imaginary domain' and of her engagements with

Hegel and Lacan with regard to a feminism based not on women's rights but on the rights of persons to self-representation as sexuate beings. A review of David Richards' *Women, Gays and the Constitution* is perhaps the least substantial of the book's chapters with regard to the clarification of Cornell's theoretical framework and its application to a concrete issue.

Chapter three (written together with Sara Murphy) is a complex discussion of multiculturalism and what Cornell calls 'the ethics of identification'. It summarizes important arguments for and against multiculturalism as a cure and compensation for racism, and takes Toni Morrison as an exemplar for a notion of culture in which active identification and the presentation of cultural personae allow for the dissociation of culture and fixed identity. In this context, recollective imagination is significant for the forging of what Stuart Hall calls 'new ethnicities'.

Cornell's response to an article by John Brenkman on 'extreme criticism', in which Brenkman defends Enlightenment humanism against what appears to be an anti-Enlightenment tendency in cultural studies, is this book's most purely theoretical and philosophical essay. Cornell discusses the flaws in the ideal of the Enlightenment that situates it as the source of 'sound liberal values', and she emphasizes the self-critical and hence ongoing, incomplete and nonsystematizable aspect of the Enlightenment. Particularly useful is Cornell's passing criticism of Habermas' collapse of the *sensus communis aestheticus* into the *sensus communis logicus*. Cornell also borrows from arguments of Judith Butler in order to reaffirm the significance of ideals as demanding a contested and necessarily ongoing fashioning of our individual personhood.

In 'Worker's Rights and the Defense of Just-Cause Statutes', an intricate weave of philosophical and legal discussion, Cornell argues that the doctrine of employment-at-will is incompatible with our notions of personhood and its relationship to community and state, as well as with what Cornell claims is the noncontractualist basis of the modern community and the significance of reciprocal symmetry in civil society. Cornell's debts to Hegel are here clearly stated. In opposition to a contractualist model of state authority, Cornell uses Hegel to argue that personhood and individuality — and thus the capacity to enter into contracts — are achieved only in a social context that is secured by institutions and ultimately the state. Likewise the sphere of civil society is not one of pure individuality, but of concrete relations of reciprocal symmetry. On these bases Cornell argues that employment-at-will is a violation of personhood insofar both as work is central to one's personality and as persons are deserving of reasons, e.g., for termination of employment. The chapter following 'Worker's Rights' is a substantial reply and criticism of Cornell's position by Richard A. Posner, but Cornell does not take the liberty of replying to his reply, which seems a bit of a lost opportunity since Posner's criticisms beg consideration.

The final chapter considers the issue of Spanish-language rights and English-only movements in the United States. Again the notions of the imaginary domain and the freedom of persons to fashion their own self-iden-

tifications are central in Cornell's argument for the importance of Spanish-language rights to the dignity and personhood of Latinos and Latinas. Nonetheless, Cornell points out, identifications are not simply chosen but are constrained by parameters — which Cornell distinguishes from hard-and-fast limits — of which language is one.

Just Cause is a valuable book for those who know Cornell's work and seek further clarification of her theoretical framework and its applicability to diverse topics. The clear and explanatory style also make it extremely worthwhile for those who come to the book, as they should, out of either a concern for an individual topic it addresses or out of general curiosity.

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Robert Corrington

A Semiotic Theory of Theology and Philosophy.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.

Pp. xi + 268.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-7827-6.

Philosophical speculation is rarely as confessional as Robert Corrington's *A Semiotic Theory of Theology and Philosophy*. In this book speculative cosmology emerges from philosophical reflection that is sensitive to human experience and struggles, engaging the problems of men and women that Dewey suggested was the main task of philosophy. Corrington's exploration ranges widely over philosophical and religious traditions and freely transgresses boundaries and barriers of reified thought such as all manner of theism and the general acceptance of human consciousness as the ultimate origin of meaning in the universe.

The language of this text is typical of Corrington's writing, a dense mixture of Peircean and psychoanalytic terms, joined with allusions to theater and art, but always moving a line of thought like an explorer pushing through tall grass. Corrington's platform of 'ecstatic naturalism' is the driving theme, developing Peirce's and Buchler's semiotic theories into territory neither traveled. A fundamental question I have is whether 'ecstatic naturalism' is broader than Corrington himself which comes down to asking whether this labyrinthine reflection is idiosyncratic or generically human. It is the same question, interestingly, that plagued Peirce about his own work.

Corrington presents his thought in three extensive chapters. Corresponding vaguely to Peirce's categories of First, Second, and Third, each of these chapters exhibits an internal logic and a structural openness to the other sections. Corrington moves from nature to signs to the evolution of meaning. Anyone familiar with Corrington will not be surprised that his Third, evolutionary meaning, recurs strongly to the First, nature. This strategy reflects Corrington's general dissatisfaction with the philosophical primacy granted to human consciousness that is reflected in the Kantianism Peirce could not escape. Human consciousness almost disappears in this work, or rather, appears as a debilitating limit to the full encounter with the underconscious of nature, Corrington's term for the origin of meaning and the ground of impulse in the universe.

In the first chapter, 'The paradox of "nature" and psychosemiosis', Corrington introduces the primal distinction between nature naturing, a momentum within nature, and nature natured, the categorial array interpreting this momentum. The underconscious of nature cannot be lifted to view, but only be the subject of a metaphysical tale where 'phenomenological and transcendental categories require each other' (39). An instance of this reciprocal requirement of categories is psychoanalysis. Corrington aggressively argues for the transformation of psychoanalytic terms, theory and practice into a species of psychosemiosis, the uncovering of the effect of the underconscious of nature in the semiotic exploration of psychological effects and disturbances. Corrington demonstrates psychosemiosis with an analysis of a cycle of his own dreams. This integration of his experience with philosophical argumentation for ecstatic naturalism is deeply revealing and personally courageous.

The most technical part of this volume is chapter two, 'The sign vehicle and its pathways'. Corrington is a master of description when it comes to signs, Peirce's semiotics, and critical development of issues of semiotic theory. Probably the most important issue he focuses on is the abyss over which meaning is suspended within any sign system. Peirce saw clearly that meaning entails the most ethereal of grounds. Treading this ground implies the intersection of signs and communities, both interpretive and natural. Corrington gravitates toward the aesthetic pathway for negotiating this abyss saying that aesthetic is the 'antechamber of the religious, because it prepares the way for another relationship to the orders of the world' (152). This openness through aesthetic is critical for Corrington's promise to address theology, which he does in chapter three.

Qualifying and correcting the correlation of the sign and its object is the main thrust of chapter three, 'World semiosis and the evolution of meaning'. Corrington addresses the most intractable issue of semiotic theory, the movement and development of signs and meaning. Peirce located his developmental teleology in the communal pursuit of the dynamical object, but Corrington locates it in the underconscious of nature that exhibits a kind of directive interaction without constituting a ground of divine creation as Robert Neville suggests. Corrington is aware of the temptation to find nature

'magical' in this creative enterprise, but this would severely undercut his project. Instead of safely cutting off this interaction at an abstract level, however, Corrington turns directly to texts of scripture and other encounters as species of 'sacred folds'. He states the point this way: 'If we were to combine the best of the Greek with the best of the Hebrew worlds, we could say that the sacred folds of nature are in some sense responsive to our own semiotic and moral probes, and that there are energies that are extra-human that can aid us in the process of moral growth. But these powers are not extra-natural, nor are they in a "position" to give us a moral blueprint. Yet without their powers, we are truly at the mercy of semiotic inertia and blind habit' (224). What becomes most clear in this chapter is Corrington's dependence on Tillich. 'In the spirit of Tillich,' he says, 'who argued that religion represented the depth-dimension of culture, and culture the form of religion, ecstatic naturalism affirms that the sacred folds that disturb, transform, haunt and goad us are the religious heart of the self/world correlation' (244).

This extended statement of ecstatic naturalism is intriguing, especially for readers already in the semiotic fold. One argument that Corrington does not make well is why such a naturalism is necessary for his larger argument. He dodges the issue early in the volume by proposing this study as a bit of speculative naturalism, one that moves beyond the limits of anti-transcendental arguments. But in the course of the book ecstatic naturalism restores almost every categorical position related to traditional transcendental theology. I am reminded of Peirce's claim that some philosophical doubt is not satisfied until it has formally recovered all the components of what it dismissed. Corrington did not demonstrate the genuine character of his doubt of the transcendent, at least not to my satisfaction. Further, Corrington's ultimate categories of nature and its underconscious seem rather domesticated. Though it may be revealed through Jungian archetypes and interpreted through dream work, there is a palpable absence of obligation, fear, or reverence for the 'underconscious of nature', theological phenomena that demand explanation.

Corrington's work here is much like James in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Both try to understand religious experience without reifying 'god'. In the process Corrington and James diminish both the necessity or significance of individual will and any resistant content of the divine. Corrington is architectonic in his thinking in a way that James was not but Peirce was. I think Corrington may be attempting to mediate the disagreement between those two old friends over the reality of God. Whatever the motivation, Corrington's semiotic exploration exceeds where other descriptions do not. This is speculative philosophy that is challenging and refreshing.

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Simon Critchley

Continental Philosophy:

A Very Short Introduction.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 2001. Pp. vii + 149.

Cdn\$15.95/US\$8.95. ISBN 0-19-28559-7.

Certain people will find this book, and the series in which it appears (*Very Short Introductions*), yet another sign that academia has gone to hell in a hand-basket. For here we have a book, like the many cartoon introductions-to-everything, that markets big ideas in small consumable packages, literally pocket-sized — presumably for the cocktail set. Worse, the new series is published by the venerable Oxford University Press. All of which goes to show, so the complaint goes, how market considerations have swallowed up the last bastions of serious scholarship.

Philosophers are often among the first to complain in this way, and may be bemused by a series devoted largely to philosophy's Big Names and Big Questions. Luckily, all is not lost. Every teacher knows that reducing thought to its barest bones can sharpen the mind when it comes to thinking through more complex questions. And it just isn't true, in any case, that deep thinking is always an obscure and long-winded thinking. Sometimes just the opposite is true — even when it comes to Continental philosophy, which often prides itself on its opacity.

Critchley's little book delivers. Naturally, though, the democratic levelling and demystification of Continental discourse is its greatest strength. By connecting the dots for 'intellectually curious but decidedly non-specialist' (vi) readers, Critchley provides a surprisingly good picture of what has been, and continues to be, at stake among Continental thinkers. In fact, the book is far more nuanced and witty than you might expect. Sprinkled throughout are wise first-person observations and insider reflections, qualities that should make the book an interesting and entertaining read even for professional philosophers.

Not that everyone will appreciate his basic message. Critchley blames philosophy for having abandoned its core values — and popular shelf space — to folk psychology and New Age pap. He thus attempts to rehabilitate old-fashioned characterizations of philosophy as intimately concerned with wisdom and the meaning of life. And while this strategy surely favours historically-minded Continental thinking over (mostly) ahistorical analytic thinking, he really intends to destabilize their apparent differences. To this end Critchley gives a pointed history lesson about the shared origins of modern thought in the work of Kant. Following thinkers like Michael Dummett, he reminds us that Kant's belief in critique also applied to rationality itself, thus fuelling both Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment perspectives. According to Critchley, Continental and analytic 'cultures' are the consequences of these fundamentally different views of reason's authority. And so while Bentham and Coleridge were among the first to argue the

relative merits of this authority (41-5), the disagreement has resurfaced again and again as a common 'cultural pathology' among Western intellectuals — more recently between Carnap and Heidegger (90-110).

Critchley rejects the pathology, provocatively arguing that the appellation 'Continental' only came into vogue in the 1960s as an '*invention*, or, more accurately, a *projection* of the Anglo-American academy onto a Continental Europe' (32). His claim: impressions of the other culture are often more ideological than intellectual, and deserve no place among thoughtful people. Critchley repeatedly argues that we cannot decisively choose between knowledge and wisdom, analytic and Continental philosophies, although it's easy enough to reject their extreme formulations as scientism and obscurantism. He thus reserves for himself the mediating role once played by John Stuart Mill in the debate between Bentham and Coleridge. His solution, likewise, is Mill's solution: more education (51). To this heuristic end, which nicely dovetails with the mission of these introductory books, Critchley rehearses relevant debates in the history and politics of philosophy even as he unpacks the importance of key ideas for Continental thinkers, such as historicism, emancipation, and nihilism.

Critchley's overview of Continental philosophy in the context of a prolonged debate with analytic philosophy is well done, and I highly recommend it for students and professional philosophers alike. I'll even confess that I learned a thing or two from this unusually thoughtful 'beginner's' introduction. But three points. First, Critchley's historically grounded attempt to mediate the differences between Continental and analytic philosophy already plays to a Continental tune — Mill notwithstanding. And so many analytic philosophers will not be impressed, and will not appreciate the lesson. The problem, no doubt, is that sophistication about this 'crisis' or 'stalemate' in philosophy generally assumes the kind of historico-political expertise, perhaps even optimism, that only Continentals like Critchley possess. Second, Critchley's ultimate recourse to pre-theoretical 'practical interests' — invoked to encourage mediation between the two cultures in philosophy — is a bit naive, if not in its own way obscurantist. Surely more recent work in Continental philosophy, especially French post-structuralism, contests this phenomenological approach — work about which Critchley has little to say. And third, it may in any case be too late for mutual recognition based on well-intended mediation. As Critchley knows, Continental philosophy has long turned toward other disciplines for inspiration and community, be it from political theory, cultural studies, literary theory, or psychoanalysis. The same can be said of analytic philosophy, which has always chummed up to the sciences. And so, although Continental and analytic philosophers may have once engaged each other in a battle for recognition, the lessons of this battle have been well lost if one (or both) has died in the process — or, more simply, has walked away. Unfortunately or not, best enemies can be hard to keep.

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Ronald Dworkin

Sovereign Virtue.

The Theory and Practice of Equality.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
2000. Pp. 512.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-674-00219-9.

Sovereign Virtue is a collection of Dworkin's writings on equality. More than once Dworkin decided to make his ideas accessible to a wider public by publishing a collection of his papers. In this respect, *Sovereign Virtue* does not stand out. What makes the book special, however, is that the texts comprising the first two chapters have, in the years following their original publication in 1981, taken on a landmark status in late twentieth-century political philosophy. The approach developed in 'Equality of Welfare' and, even more importantly, 'Equality of Resources', has come to be understood as an important rival version of egalitarian political liberalism to Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. Ever since their publication, the articles have invited widespread commentary, some of which critical, and have become a major source of other important work in modern political philosophy. The two articles are the mainstay of Dworkin's theory of equality. Not surprisingly, they provide the backbone of *Sovereign Virtue*. Other chapters, such as those on liberty, democracy, the value of community, and the good life, further expand and specify the underlying ideas. There emerges a mature system of legal philosophy, which is supplemented, in several chapters, with applications to fields as diverse as affirmative action, modern biomedical ethics and campaign finance laws.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that this collection is distinctive. Equality lies at the heart of Dworkin's legal and political philosophy. It is the centre of gravity from which other topics are systematically explored. For the time being *Sovereign Virtue* safely can be taken to be his major work.

It is impossible to do justice to the major work of one of the world's leading legal philosophers in the few pages available for this review. Needless to say that the book is masterful — not only in its scope but also in the detailed exposition of ideas. Since I cannot follow Dworkin's incisive analyses into their complex ramifications, I should rather like to sketch the basic conception and try to point out in which respect this conception may be difficult to square with the 'ethos' underlying his (or any) egalitarian political philosophy.

The tension I have in mind here is spelled out already in the opening pages of *Sovereign Virtue*, where Dworkin introduces the two principles of ethical individualism animating his book (5). The first principle has it that, from an objective perspective, all human lives would 'rather be successful than wasted'. The stark formulation suggests that the success of everyone's life is of equal importance. There can be no doubt that this is part of the ethos of egalitarian political philosophy. The second principle, however, states that even though it cannot be denied that the success of life is important regard-

less of the person affected, every person has a 'special and final' responsibility for that success. Indeed, Dworkin claims that owing to this 'principle of special responsibility' his 'new' egalitarianism is different from, and is indeed more plausible than, the 'old' egalitarianism that defined equal concern regardless of personal responsibilities.

One may wonder, however, whether the application of the second principle is likely to give free rein to resentful attitudes towards other people's achievements or failures. Such attitudes appear to be at odds with the solidaristic (or 'fraternal') underpinning of the first principle, which suggests that mutual support for the success of everyone's life is an overriding concern (279).

In drawing out the meaning of ethical individualism, Dworkin departs from what he calls the 'abstract egalitarian principle,' which states that 'government must act to make the lives of those it governs better lives, and it must show equal concern for the life of each' (128). After rejecting the idea that well-being is the appropriate measure of equality, he seeks to explain that equality of resources is the best interpretation of that principle. Accordingly, government treats each citizen equally if social arrangements are such that each is awarded an appropriate share of external resources. Its scope is to be adjusted with resort to an 'ideal auction' in which everyone makes his or her bids from equal budgets (65-71). The point of such a hypothetical auction is to determine what individuals are entitled to, given that concrete life-projects are pursued under conditions of scarcity. The value of resources is set, then, with an eye to the competing claims made by others. The price of having something reflects the opportunity costs that a person's life exacts on the life of others.

Following Dworkin, the auction can only succeed in accurately internalising the costs of a way of life to others into the price of resources if a system of basic liberties, which are inalienable, supplies the legal baseline (122, 140, 149, 171). The value of liberty enters the scene as a necessary condition for computing true opportunity costs (150-1). A system of basic liberties bestows a format on resources that makes them accessible to universal freedom of choice (152).

Even though owing to the exceptionally counterfactual nature of the enterprise the whole approach might strike one as odd, as a measure of equality, equality of resources appears faithfully to comply with the principles of ethical individualism set out above. In the light of the first principle, every participant in the auction is forced to attribute to the life-prospects of others equal importance simply by having the value of his or her resources determined on the ground of opportunity costs. In respect of the second principle, the auction is 'ambition sensitive' (80-1). Everyone is given opportunity to obtain what he or she wants against the backdrop of what he or she has *chosen* to want. At the end of the day, everyone is satisfied when nobody prefers the resource-bundle that was allotted to her or him to the resource-bundle of others ('envy-test', 67-8). The unwelcome consequence that an auction per se is not merely 'ambition-sensitive' but also 'endowment-sensi-

tive' and therefore is likely to give rise to distributions that are arbitrary from a moral point of view, is accounted for by Dworkin in a complex hypothetical insurance scheme. Consequently, persons with handicaps and those whose talents do not command market value may obtain insurance against the ill luck that they have had in the lottery of nature. The details of this peculiar construct need not concern us here (73-83).

From the vantage point of equality of resources, one is acting impartially toward others by conceiving of oneself as one among many participants in the resource-auction. Conceiving of oneself as being one person among others in this way is disturbing, though. In Dworkin's philosophical space, we are a cost-factor to one another. We threaten constantly to give rise to externalities, either by taking a free-ride on other people's efforts or by burdening their freedom of choice through our own choices. It comes as no surprise, then, that the attendant attitude towards others invites resentment. We are lead to believe that if others fail in their lives on account of their own choices they themselves are the one's to blame. They have had their chance of 'performing' a challenging life project (253, 265). If people have chosen poorly or performed badly the community is under no obligation to step in. They have had their slice of the pie. After all, owing to their presence in the world the size of the pie was smaller than it would have been without them. Surprisingly enough, in Dworkin's philosophical space, social co-operation is not a positive sum game.

Thus understood, the claim that one's life be as successful as possible can be consumed or, even worse, forfeited; this, at any rate, is what we are told by the special responsibility principle. Should a committed egalitarian ever endorse such a position? Is telling a person that he or she has consumed or forfeited the community's concern for his or her life a way of expressing equal concern? I doubt it, and I am afraid that Dworkin is led astray at this point by the architectural allure of equality of resources.

According to Dworkin, not forcing people to put up with the consequences of their own imprudent behaviour leaves one with having to endorse one of the following two unpalatable consequences: either equality of resources collapses into some variety of equality of welfare, for it would then be the well-being rather than the responsibility of persons that matters; or the unlucky one's are to be held to the standards of the (mentally) handicapped who are eligible to compensation for want of any responsibility for their ill-adapted condition. Both consequences are rejected by Dworkin. Rightly so, I might add. The mistake, however, lies in conceiving of the matter from the vantage point of this alternative in the first place. In particular, having no other way available of accounting for the mishap and misfortune of other people than attributing to the unlucky and less capable the incapacity to lead a successful life is, using Dworkin's parlance, simply 'bizarre' (291). At any rate, it does not suffice to explain why concern for those who have made a complete mess of their lives should be abrogated from an egalitarian political agenda. If concern for the success of the lives of others were authentic everyone should be granted opportunity for a fresh start.

Such a genuine concern for the success of the lives of others, however, is not subdued completely in Dworkin's book. On the contrary, the first principle of ethical individualism finds ample resonance in the civic republicanism to which Dworkin also subscribes (224-5). In this context, Dworkin regards citizens as having a critical interest in the success of the lives of others. They are not reduced to creatures who are resentfully aware of whether others stay within the limits of their own responsibility or threaten to burden them with excessive demands.

The tension between the first and the second principle is, I take it, the key to understanding that complex and even protracted passages are an essential and integral part of the book. In other words, I surmise that the divergence in respect of attitudes is reflected in a recurring predicament of exposition. Dworkin introduces, boldly, his major conception. In the process of drawing out the meaning of equality of resources, however, Dworkin is steering a collision course in respect of his own egalitarian ethos. While Dworkin is at pains to avoid counter-intuitive results, he is constantly forced to introduce additional supplementary principles whose point is to restrict the scope and implications of the original conception. Going down the egalitarian road with Dworkin one encounters a proliferation of restraining and explanatory principles and strategies, such as 'the principle of abstraction' (147), 'the principle of correction' (156), 'dominating v. non-dominating improvements' (168) and so forth.

With this observation I do not mean to deny that *Sovereign Virtue* is a masterful book. It is a rare achievement, indeed, which will be of relevance to legal philosophers for generations to come.

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William J. Fitzpatrick

Teleology and the Norms of Nature.

New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2000.

Pp. xi + 390.

US\$76.00. ISBN 0-8153-3602-0.

Naturalizing teleology is all the rage, and rightfully so. It would bring considerable intellectual satisfaction if our pre-theoretical observations of the apparent purposes and functions of the parts of living beings could be scientifically vindicated. Fitzpatrick's *Teleology and the Norms of Nature*, however, attempts to provide us with a non-naturalized account of teleologi-

cal properties, while recognizing that teleological ascriptions are inextricably normative in character.

A successful theory has to (i) account for the normative features of teleological discourse; an organ can malfunction or function properly and (ii) give an account of the difference between functional effects and nonfunctional effects. E.g., although the heart pumps blood and makes a thumping noise, and although both of these may have some current survival value, only the pumping of blood is a plausible candidate for the function of the heart. Fitzpatrick's account of function appears to be this: 'For a certain type of part ... or activity of a given type of working system ... to have a proper function within such a system is for it to play some non-incidental role in the working of such a system, this being its function ...' (102).

The function of an item is identified with the non-incidental role that it has, and we find that a non-incidental role is a role that a thing has non-accidentally. What, then, is the notion of accident being employed here? Fitzpatrick is not too clear on this, despite numerous uses of the concept. A non-accident appears to be whatever has a causal historical story explaining its features. Thus natural and artificial selection both produce non-accidental features: '... it must be no accident that the system possess at least a certain subset of the parts and features it does, and the organization among them, such that these parts and features so organized interact causally to produce a certain subset of the effects they bring about ... I believe that the satisfaction of these conditions is not only necessary, but also sufficient for something to constitute a working system ... to which explicitly teleological concepts ... have application' (119-20).

Fitzpatrick relies upon this analysis throughout the book, but the notion appears to be far too broad, since all things have causal histories explaining their features non-accidentally. Everything, it would seem, is a teleological system. If events are governed by laws, then their occurrence is a matter of lawful necessity; hence, events are, in one sense, non-accidental. Paley was happy with this result; the very existence of lawful regularity was, for him, good evidence for design. But this goes too far. (Fitzpatrick notes that a 'system' consisting of a sphere rolling in a bowl is 'not a very robust case of a working system' (125), suggesting that nevertheless it still is such a system!) Of course, Fitzpatrick doesn't mean to deny that the heart's thumping sound is a lawful consequence of its structure and environment (indeed, due to a possible common cause the thumping sound may be necessary to the pumping), but that the thumping sound is *functionally* incidental to the system. But this isn't very informative, since the teleological language of function and purpose, and the concept of accident derived from them, are left greatly unexplained.

What of malfunctions? When my diseased heart gives up the ghost, we say it has the function of pumping blood, but is failing to do so. How do we account for this? Fitzpatrick notes that the standard etiological approaches of Millikan and Neander have a ready answer: hearts were selected for pumping. Due to this history, this particular heart has the function to pump blood,

despite its failure to do so. Fitzpatrick's own solution amounts to the appeal to the type/token distinction. This heart has the function to pump blood because it is a token of the type that has a certain role which is its function. But why, we may ask, is this particular a token of the type? Furthermore, we may ask, does the appeal to the standard role amount to a statistical claim regarding what hearts do? Neander and Millikan have interesting answers here: what makes a token a member of the type is its historical relation to prior individuals. Second, the function is identified with what the object, part etc., was selected for, and this may not be a statistically typical activity of current cases. But Fitzpatrick's response to these issues isn't at all clear. He denies that his appeal to 'a standard role' is a statistical claim, rather, it is 'simply a remark about a type of working system that has been put together by natural selection in a certain environment' (156). Not much help here, unless we know what makes something a member of the type. But Fitzpatrick seems to think it is obvious that the diseased heart is still a member of the class of hearts. But since the malfunctioning heart lacks many of the standard features of hearts (behavior and structure) the only membership criteria available seems to be history. But if so, then Fitzpatrick's view collapses into the etiological approach.

Consider the following argument(s):

[1] Hearts were selected for pumping blood, or, hearts pumping blood is a non-accidental feature of hearts (and their bodies)

[2] This heart doesn't pump blood

Therefore

[3] This heart is malfunctioning, i.e., isn't doing what it ought to do.

The conclusion doesn't follow. What is missing is this:

[Normative Principle (NP)] If something was selected for a certain effect, or, if something's behavior is a non-accidental feature of it, then, it *ought* to have this effect.

This normative principle lurks in the background of normative accounts, and as such, needs defense. But like all other such claims, it is by no means clear how we are to defend principles that derive an 'ought' from an 'is' (or a 'was'). Noting that an organ has a non-incidental role to play in a system doesn't legitimate the conclusion that when it performs otherwise the organ is malfunctioning, or not doing what it is 'supposed to do'. To get that conclusion we need something like [NP]. I think that any defender of a normative teleology would want to address this problem, but I couldn't find any detailed discussion of it in *Teleology and the Norms of Nature*. However, in Fitzpatrick's last chapter on teleological explanation he reveals his suspicions of reductionist ideals. Etiological approaches attempt to reduce teleological explanation to causal-historical explanation of the presence of the item in the organism. But when we ask: 'What is this for?', we are not, claims Fitzpatrick, asking for why the organism possesses the organ in question; we are asking for its standard role in that type of system. Neander and Millikan, therefore, don't allow us to ask genuinely teleological questions. Fitzpatrick has a point here, but it needs more argument. Millikan, after all, denies that

she is doing conceptual analysis. She is not attempting to capture our conceptual intuitions, but is rather concerned to stipulate a theoretical concept that is adequately clear and able to cohere with biological theory. Perhaps Millikan is misguided regarding the constraints she must work within, but further discussion on these matters is needed, especially for Fitzpatrick who wishes to defend a non-reductionist account of teleological explanation.

These are my immediate worries regarding *Teleology and the Norms of Nature*. The book is somewhat long and often repetitive, and could do with some reorganization. I admire Fitzpatrick's desire to defend a non-reductionist account of teleology, but, as one might expect with a non-reductionist view, we are left with a feeling that too much is left unexplained.

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Logi Gunnarsson

Making Moral Sense:

Beyond Habermas and Gauthier.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.

Pp. xi + 286.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-78023-3.

Logi Gunnarsson presents an ambitious and novel thesis: '... even if there are flawless non-moral justifications of morality, it is a mistake to think that morality needs such a justification' (5). Taking aim both at David Gauthier's subjectivist rationalism, and Jürgen Habermas's inter-subjectivist rationalism, Gunnarsson argues that it is better to engage in moral evaluation by appealing to his substantive rationalism. Gunnarsson accepts that there are non-reducible external reasons (moral and non-moral) to which we are entitled to appeal when engaging in moral evaluations. He proceeds in four parts: delineating the debate, arguing against rationalism, arguing for the substantive approach, and arguing for his particular substantivism. This book is not for the uninitiated: those not immersed in the surrounding literature will find the philosophical summaries at best terse. Ultimately it is this terseness that renders the effort unsatisfying as a self-contained treatise — a brief sketch of a much more complex project.

No review of this work would be complete without brief comment on the digression that is the subject of Part II of the book (51-125). Gunnarsson takes

the time to summarize and criticize both Gauthier's and Habermas's justificatory enterprises. He argues that Gauthier fails to provide a non-moral justification for a *unique* construction of which kinds of agents inhabit the original position by suggesting that an alternative construction could be forwarded, and that appeals to instrumental rationality *as such* cannot settle this issue. Similarly, Gunnarsson argues that Habermas's discourse agents need not necessarily accept his principle U. Due to ambiguities in what it means to respect a discourse participant, Gunnarsson argues that a person can accept Habermas's premises (one of which crucially depends on 'respect'), and nevertheless endorse Utilitarianism instead of U and D.

Presumably we are to understand that since these particular justifications fail to produce unique results while relying solely on the criteria of rationality, all such attempts will fail ('... it is tempting to draw some further lessons from my argument. ... it is tempting to conclude ... that it is *in principle* not possible to give a utility maximization rationale ... also ... to conclude that no subjectivist notions are rich enough to deliver any substantive moral results' [85]). Gunnarsson's arguments here are interesting, but are not arguments that justify suggesting the *in principle* impossibility of the success of such efforts. This section is all the more puzzling because it is unnecessary. Gunnarsson's main thesis is that *even if* successful, all such justifications are misguided; 'subjectivist rationalism itself should be rejected' (131).

Gunnarsson observes that rational deliberations arise in both the arenas of self-evaluation (what kind of person should I be?) and moral criticism (are people correct in so acting?). Accordingly, Gunnarsson argues that subjective rationality (Gauthier) is worse than substantive rationality in explaining self-evaluation, and that inter-subjective rationality is worse than substantive rationality when engaging in the moral criticism of others.

Against subjective rationality, Gunnarsson argues first that people sometimes find themselves engaging in evaluations that do not seem to them to be based on utility maximizing concerns, but rather on external reasons. People who ask 'what kind of person *ought* I to be?' do not equate this with 'what kinds of preferences or dispositions ought I to adopt in order to maximize on my current preferences?'.

Recognizing that the subjectivist might reply that these people are mistaken, or that they ought to revise their practices, Gunnarsson now takes the central question to be: 'do we [sometimes] have a good reason to rely on substantive reasons rather than on subjectivistic rationalistic reasons' (147)? He subsequently identifies one such reason: only by relying on substantive reasons can one claim meaning for a life in which an agent's preferences are *converted* from one set to another, when this latter set is not utility maximizing relative to the first. If one's preference set is simply changed, there is no subjective standard via which to evaluate such a change as one *for the better*. Realizing that he has not evaluated all of the different pros and cons of substantive vs. subjective rationalism (151) Gunnarsson nevertheless allows himself to conclude that he has now given good reason to accept the substantivist position.

Gunnarsson admits that his methodology is driven by a desire to defeat subjectivism (171). This, combined with the lack of detailed analyses of the pros and cons of subjectivism vs. substantivism, will lead many to dismiss his arguments. Nevertheless even the particular argument just summarized deserves further scrutiny. Has Gunnarsson proved too much? If any conversion may be counted as meaningful progress, does this not trivialize the notion of progress? Any change may be counted as progress at least for its novelty — but if every change is change for the better, why would the evaluation be valuable? Gunnarsson has possible answers lurking in his discussion of the evaluation of substantive reasons, but whether or not they are themselves good answers remains to be seen.

Leaving aside whether moral criticism of others is every justified, Gunnarsson argues against the inter-subjectivist by suggesting that such criticism distorts the nature of moral debate: torture is not wrong because participants in a discourse would agree that it is wrong. It is asserted that torture is wrong because, in part, it is cruel — where cruel is an ineliminable external reason against something.

Much has, of necessity, been ignored in this brief review. Gunnarsson's defense of his particular version of substantivism has been entirely ignored, where he contrasts this with Bernard Gert's. His argument regarding the suitability of substantivism in general crucially relies on his defeating subjectivism in chapter 10 (229), and so this argument has been focused upon. This book has at least two virtues: it is clear, and it is concise. Theorists who disagree with Gunnarsson's claims will know exactly why, and find a precise formulation of each of Gunnarsson's claims easily. Its brevity, however, is also its undoing: given the centrality of the claim that we sometimes have good reasons to engage in substantivistic evaluations, a much more detailed analysis is necessary.

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James L. Heft, ed.

A Catholic Modernity?

Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture.

With responses by William M. Shea, Rosemary Luling Haughton, George Marsden, and Jean Bethke Elshtain.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 1999. Pp. ix + 130.

Cdn\$39.95: US\$22.00. ISBN 0-19-513161-4.

At the end of *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989), Charles Taylor declared that 'a stripped-down secular outlook' involves 'stifling the response in us to some of the deepest and most powerful spiritual aspirations that humans have conceived' (520). His Marianist Award Lecture picks up where this tantalizing conclusion left off. But this time he is speaking as a Catholic to a Catholic audience, so he begins by reflecting on the Incarnation and the Trinity. His question is what, given their doctrinal commitments, Catholics ought to make of modernity. Taylor is asking 'what it means to be a Christian here, to find our authentic voice in the eventual Catholic chorus' (15).

An incarnate savior is one who redeems humanity through 'the weaving of God's life into human lives' (14). Redemption thus consists in a kind of reconciliation of all with all. But the wholeness thus won is not a disappearance of difference in an undifferentiated unity, for the incarnate God is also triune. The divine life remains internally differentiated even in its wholeness, and — quite rightly — so too does the life of the church over the centuries. Because the reconciliation between divine and human that Catholics proclaim is itself modeled on the differentiated wholeness of the Trinity, Catholics are bound to acknowledge the fittingness of various human responses to the Incarnation. Catholicism aspires to universality, not uniformity. So a principle implicit in both Catholic theology and Catholic missionary activity at their best is 'no widening of faith without an increase in the variety of devotions and spiritualities and liturgical forms and responses to Incarnation' (15). It is therefore incumbent on Catholics to look kindly on whatever there is in modern life that can be construed, charitably, as an appropriate response to Incarnation.

This is the principle Taylor proposes to apply when addressing the question of what Catholics should make of modernity. But there are limits to the variety of responses Catholicism can encompass while remaining committed to the notions that gave rise to the principle. For example, 'exclusive humanism' is clearly inconsistent with the Incarnation, because it dispenses with the divine altogether. Any ideology that rejects transcendence as such is clearly incompatible with the interweaving of transcendent divinity and immanent humanity that is essential to the Incarnation. Catholics can hardly treat a rejection of an idea essential to the Incarnation as an appropriate response to it. Similarly, both totalitarian collectivism and

atomistic individualism directly oppose the normative ideal of sociality associated with the Trinity. It is therefore a Catholic's responsibility to resist these ideologies and to criticize the arguments used to support them.

Accordingly, Taylor offers internal criticism of various strands of modern life and thought, drawing on arguments he has made in more detail before. Throughout, he is concerned to display hermeneutical charity of a kind that can be squared with Christian ethical commitments. He also repeatedly expresses the need for humble recognition of the extent to which the ideologies he criticizes arose historically as reactions against the injustice, narrowness, and hypocrisy of Christian believers and officials. His charitable, humble spirit makes his cultural criticism both subtler and less shrill than that of the modernity 'bashers'. Taylor's respondents in this volume do him a disservice, I think, by failing to distinguish his approach from the anti-modern traditionalism of his fellow Catholic, Alasdair MacIntyre. Taylor wisely complicates the over-simplified pictures of modernity that its 'bashers' and 'boosters' alike provide.

Does Taylor's internal critique succeed in showing that exclusive humanism stifles spiritual aspirations that should not be stifled? It is clear why someone already committed to the doctrine of the Incarnation would want to resist an outlook that denied the existence of a transcendent divinity. There can be no incarnate God if there is no transcendent God to become incarnate. But to criticize humanism solely for this reason is to offer a merely external critique. It does not give humanists a reason, grounded in their own commitments, for changing their minds about transcendence. So Taylor wants to describe their position in a way that will make it seem spiritually stifling even to them. With this end in view, he initially defines exclusive humanism as an outlook 'based exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no valid aim beyond this' (19). Defined in this way, Taylor implies, exclusive humanism is incompatible not only with Christianity but also 'a number of other faiths' (20).

Taylor mentions Buddhism in particular. It is not clear, however, that Buddhism should be described as a faith at all. More important, Buddhism comes in many varieties, some of which are non-theistic and some of which call into doubt the centrality of metaphysical commitments to spiritual practice. These forms of Buddhism aspire to a type of transcendence of self that resists explication in the metaphysical terms Taylor otherwise associates with the transcendent — something 'beyond life'.

As Taylor puts it, 'acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life or opening yourself to a change in identity' (21). Or? One can aim for a change in identity, and in that sense aim for transcendence of one's self, without aspiring to a metaphysical state that transcends life and without having faith in the existence of a divinity who transcends life. The possibility of self-transcendence would seem to be sufficient to avoid the stifling of the human spirit. Indeed, it appears that there are many self-transcending religious possibilities that do not involve commitments to transcendent metaphysics. Emerson, Dewey, and Santayana come to mind as thinkers who

have explored this territory. It is far from clear whether Taylor would want to classify them as exclusive humanists. In any event, the terms in which Taylor casts his critique are too imprecise to sustain his conclusion.

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Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

*Respect, Pluralism, and Justice:
Kantian Perspectives.*

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. xi + 281.

Cdn\$92.95: US\$60.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-823835-5);

Cdn\$39.95: US\$19.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-823834-7).

In *Respect, Pluralism, and Justice*, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. brings together a variety of previously published journal articles and conference pieces from the 1990s. Continuing and expanding the aims of his earlier collections, *Autonomy and Self-Respect* (Cambridge University Press 1991) and *Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory* (Cornell University Press 1992), which brought together many of his journal articles from the 1970s and '80s, the present volume seeks both to develop a 'suitably reconstructed' Kantian moral theory in a contemporary context and to present Kantian responses to a variety of substantive moral issues. The chief moral issues to which Hill responds in this new book are pluralism, cultural diversity (including multiculturalism and the canon battles within colleges and universities), punishment, political violence (primarily violence against the state — e.g., rebellion, revolution, and resistance to civil authority), and conflicts between conscience and authority. Specific theoretical issues explored include the place of rules in ethical theory (including of course the interpretation and application of Kant's categorical imperative), the nature and ground of respect for human beings (e.g., *Why* should we respect all human beings? Can respect be forfeited? What is the most plausible interpretation of Kant's categorical imperative formula that humanity is always to be treated as an end in itself?), responsibility for consequences (When are we morally responsible for the bad consequences of our actions?), as well as a Kantian hypothesis for explaining John Rawls's shift in position from *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press 1971) to *Political Liberalism* (Columbia University Press 1993).

Although Hill can certainly argue details of textual interpretation and historical scholarship with the best Kant commentators, his primary interest is not in the letter but rather in the spirit of Kant's ethics. The specific project to which he has devoted the most energy over the years is that of reconstructing and modifying Kant's moral theory; locating a central, convincing core which — after this core has been detached from controversial, objectionable, outmoded and/or metaphysically extravagant doctrines — can be effectively adapted and applied to contemporary contexts. Broadly speaking, this project is similar to that of John Rawls (who was one of Hill's teachers), the main difference being that Rawls's focus has been more on political issues of justice, Hill's on moral issues of dignity and respect for persons.

The main peripheral layers to be detached from Kant's ethics are its rigorism or absolutism (viz., the view that principles such as 'Do not lie' are always binding in all circumstances); its transcendental idealism (within ethics, the claim that moral agents act in a noumenal realm independent of time and space); and the claim that empirical information is irrelevant to resolving ethical disputes. Additionally, neither Kant's progressivist views about history and culture nor his sense of religion's necessary role in realizing moral community appear to survive Hill's reconstructive surgery.

What then is the remaining plausible core of Kant's ethics? First and foremost, there is the importance of dignity and respect for all persons, as articulated most famously in Kant's principle of humanity as an end in itself — though surprisingly, even here Hill favors a 'thin, non-substantive' reading, the central message of which is simply that reason is to be viewed as authoritative over inclination. Second, there is a belief that the different formulas of the categorical imperative, when taken together, can serve as a valuable tool for addressing and reflecting on contemporary moral issues. Finally, Hill sees a suitably reconstructed Kantian ethics as constituting a convincing alternative to consequentialism (for many contemporary theorists, the only viable option to Kantianism within modern ethics) and, on the more political side, as providing strong support for a liberalism that affirms the freedom and equality of all persons but also places normative constraints on rulers and citizens alike.

There are at least three questions that may be asked of such a project. First, how compelling is the core once the exterior layers have been removed? (Or, to vary the metaphor, what kind of quality of life may be expected for a body after several of its limbs and organs have been amputated?) Second, have the allegedly detachable layers and central core been correctly identified? For instance, it is hard to believe that the Kant who proclaimed at the beginning of one of his ethics lectures that 'morality cannot exist without anthropology' [Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, edited by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind (New York: Cambridge University Press 1997), 42; Academy ed. 27: 244] did in fact hold that empirical information is irrelevant to resolving moral issues. And third, in the final analysis how important is the sanitized, reconstructed version of Kant's ethical theory for the contem-

porary purposes to which it is being applied — is its role indispensable or dispensable?

Nevertheless, questions and potential disagreements aside, within the wide stream of the recent renaissance of Kant scholarship, Hill's own clear-headed and somewhat skeptical approach merits special praise as one that can speak intelligently to both believers and non-believers alike.

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Philip J. Ivanhoe

Confucian Moral Self Cultivation.

2nd edition.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000. Pp. xvii + 125.

US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-509-6);

US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-508-8).

The question of how to make a good thing better challenges many researchers and writers today, but the answer is probably no more apparent than in Philip J. Ivanhoe's revised and expanded second edition of *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation*. Evidently, stick to a protocol that has already proven itself worthwhile and simply make it longer. That is the formula which has made this newest release by Ivanhoe an even greater success than its previous incarnation.

For those who are unfamiliar with the first edition, Ivanhoe delivers a lucid exposition on the views of some of the greatest philosophical minds from within the Confucian tradition. The original edition contains a judicious treatment of the thoughts of Kongzi (Confucius) in relation to moral self cultivation. Virtue, as Kongzi claimed, is acquired, and he mentions at least two methods — reflection (*si*) and study (*xue*) — as avenues toward their development. Ivanhoe capitalizes on the subtle interplay between the intellectual and the intuitive approaches and exploits the thematic thread of moral self cultivation to examine the tension created between these two throughout the philosophical positions of subsequent influential Confucian thinkers.

While it may appear inconceivable to provide a meaningful or accurate portrayal of such a large tradition in less than 125 pages of analytical text, Ivanhoe manages to deliver a coherent picture of Confucian history with few diversions into historical narrative. By relating Ivanhoe's interpretative commentary to the fundamental motif of moral self cultivation, the reader comes to appreciate the evolution of Confucian thought without losing the subtle distinctions between each of the historical personages. Ivanhoe man-

ages to untangle the subtle weight of both Buddhist and Daoist influences on Neo-Confucian thought to render an accurate portrayal of each Confucian philosopher.

In the expanded second edition, the illustrious Confucian traditionalist Yan Yuan (1635-1704 CE) is added in a seamless fashion to further expand the range of interpretations and positions offered by Ivanhoe. He avoids the use of complicated jargon and, consonant with the original edition, develops this newest philosophical position in a concise and readable way. Yan Yuan expressed a great disfavor toward what he felt were overly intellectual interpretations of the teachings and practices of Confucianism from both the Song and Ming dynasties. Described by Ivanhoe as a type of *praxis model* of self cultivation, Yuan advocated a return to the traditional practice of Confucian rituals and practical arts in order to revive a complacent and failing era for China. We are presented with the unmistakable rationale used by Yuan to distinguish his particular expression of a robust and 'muscular' form of Confucianism from preceding theorists. Yet Ivanhoe's description remains unclouded in relation to how this new perspective embraces fundamental Confucian ideology.

One feature of Ivanhoe's analysis may strike readers as irregular. While his elucidation of the subtle nuances distinguishing the opinions of these Confucian metaphysicians borders on brilliant, his interpretations of some Western philosophers (in particular, Socrates) appears less thorough by comparison. This may arise out of the compact way in which he mixes both Eastern and Western traditions or, perhaps, from the uncomplicated writing style which refuses to bend enough to afford a more critical interpretation of Western concepts. While it does nothing to damage his main project in any significant way, it leaves readers of the western philosophical tradition soliciting more conceptual depth to facilitate comparison.

This text has an extensive index for easy referencing along with a comprehensive bibliography to enhance the reader's knowledge of this area. It provides a reliable and accessible overview of many of the major figures in Confucian thought including the sometimes ambiguous position of Confucius himself. Within his own mandate, Ivanhoe has tried 'to provide a philosophically sensitive and sophisticated account of Confucian moral self cultivation, as represented by important figures from different periods of time, who present distinct and diverse views' (vii). He has certainly accomplished his aims and this comprehensive work would serve as a valuable text for introductory undergraduate study. As an added bonus, Hackett Publishing is offering this edition in both library binding as well as an affordable paperback version (the previous publisher, Peter Lang, only published an excessively expensive hardback edition). All in all, a wonderful primer in Confucian philosophical thought.

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Manfred Kuehn

Kant: A Biography.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Pp. xxii + 544.

US\$54.95. ISBN 0-521-49704-3.

The legend of the life is familiar scholarly lore: Immanuel Kant, born 1724 to Pietist parents in the back-water that was then Königsberg, East Prussia, spent his entire adulthood as an academic devoted to a life of the mind, died 1804, never married, never travelled, an early riser whose daily existence was regimented in every detail, a man so regular in his habits that the housewives of Königsberg set their clocks by his daily walk. The legend of the philosophical doctrine is almost as familiar: A dogmatist of the Wolffian sort, Kant is awoken from his 'dogmatic slumber' by Hume to become the 'all-crusher' (*Alleszermalmder*), rejecting traditional metaphysics as such by denying in principle the possibility of rational access to transcendent objects, thereby effectively replacing metaphysical theory with theory of knowledge.

Both legends have had their advocates. Pietists and Romantics, for instance, were both happy to perpetuate the legend of the life. Pietists were, since it allowed them to claim a provenance among their own for Kant's seemingly austere moral philosophy. Romantics did to a captious end, arguing *ad hominem* that the stolid and sheltered life of the man could only serve to engender an absurdly abstract philosophy. The legend of the life persists nowadays as a negative symbol, freely invoked by those who would decry the philosopher's lack of worldly involvement, the seemingly rigid formalism of his moral philosophy, and more generally, the narrowness of Enlightenment attitudes, of which Kant is taken to be representative.

The legend of the philosophical doctrine has had a similar fate. Empiricists were content to accept the description of Kant as the 'all-crusher', since in that light the critical project could be more closely identified with Humean scepticism. Dogmatists accepted this characterisation for the same reason but to the opposite purpose, viewing any identification of Kant with Hume as grounds for reproving the 'new critique'. This characterisation also appealed to philosophers in whose view Kant's denial of transcendent knowledge by means of synthetic judgements left open the possibility of such knowledge by means of immediate intellectual intuition. In a curious way, even the idealists helped to perpetuate the doctrinal legend. For although they saw more than merely negative possibilities in a transcendental 'turn' that would limit genuine knowledge to the bounds of possible experience, they regarded Kant's positing of the thing-in-itself outside those bounds as a fatal lapse, making his critical philosophy essentially no different from the sceptical empiricism it sought to overcome.

Kuehn shows clearly that the legend of the life is little more than a 'caricature of a caricature'. It originates in one-sided descriptions of Kant as he came to be only late in life when, with increasing anxiety, he was working under a strict, self-imposed regimen contrary to his natural inclinations in

order to finish the critical system before he died (14). Such descriptions were then exaggerated by Romantics like Heine to create the cartoon portrait of Kant that has become the accepted image and the grounds for oblique reproach. Countering this twofold caricature, Kuehn describes a more human and humane Kant — not just the transcendental philosopher of legend, but also the socialite and avid conversationalist, a man thoroughly familiar with the events and controversies of his day, a teacher and University administrator, and even a Kant who was a bit of a dandy and in his youth, a card-shark.

Kuehn focuses appropriately, however, on Kant's intellectual development rather than simply on biographical details. His aim is to describe 'Kant's intellectual journey from narrow concerns with the metaphysical foundations of Newtonian physics to the philosophical defence of a moral outlook appropriate to an *enlightened* "citizen of the world"' (21). Guided by Kant's assertion of the primacy of practical reason, the leitmotif of Kuehn's description is ethical and 'worldly'. 'We can learn from Kant's biography,' he writes, 'because Kant's character was quite clearly meant to be his own creation' (22). The chief task of the theoretical philosophy was to make room for the practical extension of pure reason, with the practical philosophy mapping the moral space within which we can and ought to make our character as a free rational production.

Similarly, Kuehn helps to debunk the legend of the doctrine. Kant does 'crush' the old kind of metaphysics based on a priori speculation in order to prepare the ground for a wholly new kind of metaphysics based on moral consciousness. The finite rational understanding of morality does not need philosophy to tell it what to do. It knows that already as an agent compelled to act in the world. Likewise, it is as a moral agent and not as an objective observer that the philosopher is in touch with the ultimate (moral) reality. Qua philosopher, then, the task is to explicate and legitimate what as an agent the finite rational understanding always already knows. Qua human being, it is to construct our character in accord with what this finite practical understanding dictates. (In this respect, Kuehn's biography serves as an ideal compliment to Munzel's *Kant's Conception of Moral Character*.)

Kuehn provides what to my knowledge is now the most thorough-going account in the literature of Kant's life, situating it directly in the global context of the Enlightenment century, the regional context of German affairs, and the local context of Königsberg life. Moreover, he provides not only clear summaries of the major works but also thorough accounts of both the pre-Critical development and the occasional works of the 1790s. Kuehn thus redresses once and for all the narrow, tendentious 'official' reminiscences of Borowski, Jachmann and Wasianski. He provides much greater detail concerning both the life and the development of the doctrine than, for example, do Stuckenberg, Cassirer or Gulyga. And he goes beyond Voländer's hitherto authoritative work by considering a more extensive range of evidence, especially concerning Kant's relation to political affairs of the time, and in the process, demonstrates a better understanding of the historical back-

ground. The overall result is to my mind the best biography of Kant now available, of use to both specialists and non-specialists alike.

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Brian Leiter, ed.

Objectivity in Law and Morals.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Pp. xi + 354.

US\$64.95. ISBN 0-521-55430-6.

Hard cases in law raise difficult issues about the objectivity of the law. Does it make sense to think there is an objectively right answer to a moral or legal issue when there is widespread disagreement about that answer? To what extent does skepticism about the objectivity of morality entail skepticism about the objectivity of law? To what extent does legal interpretation necessarily incorporate processes of moral reasoning? Brian Leiter's *Objectivity in Law and Morals* is a collection of seven outstanding essays that address these and other issues.

In 'Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality', David O. Brink develops a holistic approach to interpretation. Brink allows that legal interpretation can legitimately involve identifying author intentions, but argues that different kinds of intention require different interpretive techniques. While identifying a lawmaker's specific beliefs about the application of some rule requires historical analysis, identifying abstract intentions requires moral analysis. If the framers of the U.S. Constitution, for example, intended the Eighth Amendment to prohibit *morally cruel* punishment, then interpretive fidelity to those intentions requires a moral analysis of cruelty — and not a historical analysis of the framers' beliefs about which punishments are, in fact, cruel. Brink concludes that 'we cannot completely separate the merits of the law from the correct interpretation of the law' (56).

In 'Objectivity Fit for Law', Gerald J. Postema attempts to develop a methodological account of objectivity that is (1) specific to the domain of law and (2) doesn't rely on ontological claims about the metaphysical status of legal facts. According to Postema, a legal proposition is objectively correct if and only if 'maximally supported by the arguments and the balance of reasons available for articulation and assessment by reasonable and competent persons in a fully public deliberative process' (117). Even so, Postema denies that the relational property of being maximally supported by the

arguments is what *constitutes* a judgment as objectively correct; the instantiation of this property by a judgment provides an 'assurance' that the judgment is correct.

Leiter rejects such accounts of objectivity in 'Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication', arguing that though moral discourse is susceptible to reasons, such susceptibility isn't sufficient to confer objectivity on morality. First, Leiter points out that people often have reasons for views on paradigmatically subjective issues like the taste of chocolate or wine. Second, those elements of moral discourse that are genuinely susceptible to reasons are factual claims; what is objectively incorrect about the Greeks' view of slavery are the factual views about the abilities of a particular class of persons. But, as Leiter points out, such considerations ultimately undermine Ronald Dworkin's views about the objectivity of law because if there are no objectively correct answers to moral questions, then there are no objectively correct answers to legal questions that turn on the answers to moral questions.

In 'Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?' Sigrún Svavarsdóttir explores the Nagelian response to Mackie's view that there is no objective property in the world constituting a reason that applies to every agent regardless of her interests, desires, and preferences. Svavarsdóttir argues that to make sense of Nagel's view that objective reason-claims do not entail that value constitutes part of the furniture of the world, we must construe Nagel's conception of objectivity as reached within (rather than outside) value inquiry. Thus, Nagel's conception of objectivity entails a rejection of the idea that metaethical questions are best approached through a naturalistic methodology — a position that Svavarsdóttir argues is deeply problematic. Echoing Leiter, she writes, 'we cannot ignore that our confidence in the scientific method builds on the remarkable success we have had in applying it' (183).

Philip Pettit moves away from methodological conceptions of value objectivity in 'Embracing Objectivity in Ethics'. Pettit argues for a so-called sensibility conception of value objectivity; on this view, 'we learn to use a value term like "desirable" of things that are disposed to look attractive under specifications that [like redness] require a normal and even ideal perspective' (258). According to Pettit, moral terms pick out the properties that make these things look attractive and thus refer to entities of an immanent and anthropocentric character — and not entities that exist independently of human thoughts, beliefs, and shared practices. In this sense, such qualities resemble secondary qualities.

In 'Pathetic Ethics', David Sosa evaluates sensibility theories, like Pettit's. Sosa argues that theories assimilating ethical properties to secondary qualities commit the pathetic fallacy: they essentially project our subjective moral responses onto the precipitating events and entities themselves. Moreover, he argues that sensibility theories are ultimately circular. Since not every subjective evaluative response can count as moral, sensibility theory must provide some sort of test for distinguishing those that are associated with

moral properties from those that aren't. But, Sosa argues, there is no way to specify this distinction without using the very moral notions that sensibility theories are trying to explain.

In 'Notes on Value and Objectivity', Joseph Raz argues that criticisms of value objectivity frequently rely on 'an overdemanding and overrigid conception of justification and objectivity' (229). While abstract normative concepts, like 'duty' and 'right', may presuppose certain social practices and perceptual capacities, this doesn't entail that normative properties are non-objective: 'even if all goods are socially created (and they are not) it does not follow that the reasons that explain why they are good, what makes them good, consist in an appeal to the fact that the relevant social properties exist' (224). Nor, on Raz's view, does the fact that justification is internal (or relative) to a system of thought entail the non-objectivity of evaluative judgments; that justification is internal in this way doesn't entail that there is no way to adjudicate between systems.

Though this volume doesn't include an essay defending a classical ontological objectivism, it nonetheless covers an impressive range of positions on the objectivity of moral and legal values. Each essay is accessible enough to be suitable for a comparative layperson but contains enough depth and originality to interest the specialist. I strongly recommend this outstanding volume to anyone interested in theoretical ethics and the philosophy of law.

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Jean-Luc Nancy

Being Singular Plural.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2000.

Pp. xvi + 207.

US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3974-9);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3975-7).

In this important and timely book, Jean-Luc Nancy forcibly suggests that our inability to think the 'social' underlies the sterility of political reflection in our times; our entrapment in a tradition that has exhausted its promise in complacent liberalism; our bewilderment before the impasse of Enlightenment and Romanticist critiques. The problem, as Nancy puts it, is how to understand the 'with' of social being, how to acknowledge its primordial character which will lead us to view the social not as problem of *com-position* — the gathering together of individuals into a whole — nor as the 'One' of some underlying Being or *community*, but rather as the '*dis-position*' of Being (46). Nancy does not hesitate to call this an ontological question — or even

'the ontological question absolutely' — but to avert misunderstanding adds that "ontology" does not occur at a level reserved for principles, a level that is withdrawn, speculative, and altogether abstract. Its name means the thinking of existence and today, the situation of ontology signifies the following: to think existence at the height of this challenge to thinking that is globalness as such (which is designated as "capital", "(de-) Westernization", "technology", "rupture of history" and so forth)' (46-7).

The Heideggerian resonance is unmistakable, and indeed, one element of the rethinking begun here takes up Heidegger's thought of *Mitsein* as essential to the constitution of *Dasein* itself, thereby displacing the motif of 'the subject'. This is a thought, however, which at several key moments Nancy shows Heidegger to have betrayed in a manner exemplary of a 'philosophical politics' which persistently closes down the insight into 'being-with' that it has *itself* opened up. The Heideggerian ontology of *Mitsein* remains no more than a sketch, which reverts again and again in twentieth century philosophy to the model of Being as substratum of the social, rather than, as Nancy will argue, constituted in the 'with' of the social. What is thus betrayed is the 'singular plural' of the origin, a 'with' which we must learn to understand as 'the proper realm of the plurality of origins insofar as they originate, not from one another or for one another, but in view of one another or with regard to one another' (82). Appearing is always co-appearing and nothing lies behind or sovereignly governs the meaning of it.

This essentially Nietzschean critique of a metaphysics that finds behind all appearances a reality (hence a *singular* origin permitting absolute judgement upon the *plural* world) is deployed to good effect in revealing a 'refusal of insight' in that philosophical politics whose figure of the social Nancy aims to extend. Dissenting from Heidegger, Nancy writes, it is 'as though it had been a matter of "forgetting the between" rather than "forgetting Being" ' (76). Forgetting the 'between', refusing the 'appearing' of the social world which the tradition has always referred to some dimension of Being beyond it (the individual, God, the destiny of humanity etc.) our patterns both of critique and of political ethos and praxis prove unable to affirm a world that lacks a 'meaning' in the sense of a higher purpose. The dangers of reinventing and politically appropriating such a 'meaning' is what remembering and reinstating the 'with' promises to address. Our contemporary problem is a problem of meaning, Nancy plausibly argues, in the face of which the political has 'retreated'. In the wake of the discourses of sovereignty, we lose the sense of social meaning which refers to some greater purpose. Our continued preoccupation with the manifestation of sovereignty, our desire for a purpose beyond ourselves, is evidenced by the enthusiasm which greeted the Gulf war. But this lapse into nostalgia simply evades the pressing problem, beyond the reach of liberalism entirely, of 'how we be capable of saying "we" ... beginning from the point where no leader or God can say it for us' (41).

This problem is, of course, constitutive for the politics of Rousseau or Marx. Nancy argues, however, that whilst both the thought of the 'social contract' and of 'capital' *expose* being-with, they also operate with a figure of

the social that leads them to seek to go beyond it, to judge it in terms of some value other than itself. This question of the 'measure' of the social, a problem integral to social critique runs through Nancy's work; what he promises is a 'measure' which will not reproduce the implicit reference of the critical tradition to a 'view from nowhere', the appeal to a reality of man in terms of which the 'alienation' of man might be judged.

What is offered here, then, is a 'weak ontology', true to the radical thought of *Dasein* as *Mitsein*, and capable of displacing or disrupting those 'strong ontologies' that would do politics by speaking the truth of humanity as such. 'We do not "have" meaning anymore,' Nancy writes, 'because *we ourselves are meaning* — ' (1). Meaning, which is 'its own communication or circulation', meaning which must necessarily be *shared*, meaning which 'begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence comes apart [*se disjoint*] in order to be itself *as such*' (2) becomes the figure of a fundamentally social Being which does not refer beyond itself. The '*dis-position*' of Being signifies the plurality of origins, each a singularity irreducible to the possession of any 'property', each arousing a curiosity signalling ineffable alterity, but each, nonetheless, only capable of saying 'I' by way of a 'we' which defines its unity and uniqueness. There is much plausibility in his thought that we go fundamentally wrong when we attempt to add a 'social' or 'communitarian' dimension onto a primitive individual given (44). When he suggests that what we must seek to grasp instead is the 'enigma' of co-existence, he offers an important criticism of the tradition and opens up a valuable vista that might reorientate us in the effort to transgress the violent logic of capital and to reinstate in our politics the question of human meaning.

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John Rawls

Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

2001. Pp. xviii + 214.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-00510-4);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-674-00511-2).

John Rawls is one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century. The influence which Rawls's theory of 'justice as fairness', first articulated in *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and then in *Political Liberalism* (1993), has had on contemporary debates in political philosophy is unrivalled. This fact alone is likely to motivate political philosophers to rush out and buy a copy of Rawls's latest book *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. The book is

based on lectures Rawls gave at Harvard in the 1980s and, due to illness, the book is not completely finished. While *A Restatement* is not the ground-breaking work of *A Theory of Justice* or *Political Liberalism*, it is a valuable supplementary addition to the Rawlsian canon.

A Restatement has two aims: first, to rectify the more serious faults in *Theory*; second, to connect into one unified statement the conception of justice presented in *Theory* and the main ideas found in Rawls's articles published after *Theory*. Much of the book outlines ideas and arguments which are more fully developed in *Political Liberalism*. For this reason I think it is fair to say that *A Restatement* will appeal more to political philosophers who are concerned with the more detailed aspects of Rawls's theory and his transition to a 'political conception of justice'. Parts IV and V of *A Restatement* in particular are important parts of the book as Rawls expands on some neglected aspects of justice as fairness. For example, in Part IV entitled 'Institutions of a Just Basic Structure' Rawls examines five different social systems: laissez-faire capitalism, welfare-state capitalism, state socialism with a command economy, property-owning democracy, and liberal (democratic) socialism. This discussion is useful because Rawls makes explicit what he finds deficient with the first three regimes as well as expanding on how a property-owning democracy is distinct from a welfare-state. This is important because many commentators have assumed that Rawls is a proponent of the welfare-state. Rawls rejects welfare-state capitalism because it 'permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production' (139). A property-owning democracy avoids this by 'ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity' (139). Part IV also includes a discussion of the flexibility of the index of primary goods, the family as a basic institution, and Marx's critique of liberalism.

In *A Restatement* Rawls reaffirms his commitment to what he calls a political conception of justice and the main ideas associated with that conception (e.g., an overlapping consensus). Rawls's revision of justice as fairness has deeply divided supporters of the theory. Some remain faithful to the original formulation presented in *Theory*, others welcome Rawls's transition to a political conception of justice, while others believe that there is no real change in Rawls's theory. *A Restatement* may help shed some light on these issues but is unlikely to resolve them. One tension in Rawls's political conception of justice comes to the fore in Part V of the book when he contrasts the right and wrong ways justice as fairness is political. A political conception is political in the wrong way, claims Rawls, 'when it is framed as a workable compromise between known and existing political interests, or when it looks to particular comprehensive doctrines presently existing in society and then tailors itself to win their allegiance' (188). Justice as fairness does not proceed like this, claims Rawls. It 'elaborates a political conception as a free-standing view working from the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and its companion ideas' (189). But the idea of

society as a fair system of cooperation and its companion ideas (e.g., the idea of free and equal persons) are themselves presented by Rawls as ones embedded in the public political culture of democratic societies. This suggests that these ideas express 'known and existing political interests'. If they do not, then they could not be the focus of an overlapping consensus. Rawls seems to want it both ways. He appeals to ideas he believes decent people share and care about, and yet he recognises that these ideas do not always guide everyday politics.

The fact that most societies fall well short of meeting the requirements of the two principles of justice, especially the difference principle, suggests that the fundamental ideas justice as fairness invokes are not as embedded in the public political culture as Rawls suggests. But the strength of Rawls's project is its ability to force us to contemplate and revise our most basic moral commitments. He seeks to inspire a public philosophy that is, as Rawls puts it, 'realistically utopian'. This phrase effectively captures the fundamental tension which Rawls has spent nearly half a century trying to resolve. The tension between articulating a theory that is 'realistic' in the sense that it appeals to the moral sensibilities of real people, here and now, and yet one that inspires us to transcend the status quo and move closer to a more decent political order. *A Restatement* will be of interest to those who find Rawls's project a compelling one and wish to examine further the revisions he has made to his original theory.

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Henry Sidgwick

Essays on Ethics and Method.

Ed. Marcus Singer.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. xlvii + 346.

Cdn\$106.00: US\$65.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-825022-3);

Cdn\$42.50: US\$24.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-825023-1).

Marcus Singer first began thinking about putting together a collection of Henry Sidgwick's essays back in '1961 or 1962', and he has been working on the project on and off ever since. It was a wonderful project — one that both J.B. Schneewind and I were involved with at various points — and the resulting volume is excellent, essential reading for anyone with a serious

interest in Sidgwick or the classical utilitarian tradition that he so ably and creatively represented. Singer, an eminent philosopher in his own right, is to be commended for his sustained effort.

Most contemporary philosophers know Sidgwick chiefly from his masterpiece, *The Methods of Ethics* (first edition 1874), a work lauded by both Rawls and Parfit as the best single work classical utilitarianism ever produced. But Sidgwick was a most productive academic, one of the 'new dons' who wanted Cambridge University to teach modern subjects, admit women, and house productive scholars. He wrote two other major treatises, *The Principles of Political Economy* (1883) and *The Elements of Politics* (1891), and many other works as well, notably *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers* (1886) and *Practical Ethics* (1898). Indeed, he was a prolific essayist and reviewer, and his shorter works are often both more enjoyable reading than his tomes and singularly helpful in coming to terms with the longer and larger arguments.

Hence the value of Singer's collection. In such essays as 'Utilitarianism' (1873), 'Professor Calderwood on Intuitionism in Morals' (1876), 'The Establishment of Ethical First Principles' (1879), 'Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies' (1889), and 'Criteria of Truth and Error' (1900), to name but a few of those reproduced in this collection, Sidgwick proved to be highly effective in explaining and defending what he was about in the *Methods*. From his day to ours, critics have found his fallibilistic, multi-criterial intuitionism puzzling, and have objected to his efforts to demonstrate that common-sense morality is unconsciously utilitarian. There has also been much controversy surrounding his 'dualism of the practical reason' — his frustrated conclusion that rational egoism would appear to be as reasonable as utilitarianism, with no reconciliation in sight short of a questionable 'Theistic postulate' underwriting the harmony of interest and duty. All of these matters, vital to any understanding of the *Methods*, are treated in lucid and cogent fashion in the essays reproduced here, which range across 'Ethics', 'Value Theory and Moral Psychology' and 'Method: Truth, Evidence, and Belief', as Singer's section headings put it. There is also a delightful section of 'Comments and Critiques', including some of Sidgwick's (often quite witty) reviews of the likes of T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, and Herbert Spencer. As these amply demonstrate, Sidgwick may have departed from Benthamism in various ways, what with his intuitionism and dualism, but he was nonetheless a very effective critic of the obscurities attending Idealist and Social Darwinist attempts to fill in for fading religious belief.

The pieces by Sidgwick are bracketed by a substantial introductory essay, 'The Philosophy of Henry Sidgwick', and an extensive, forty-page bibliography, with annotations. The latter is helpful, but perhaps not an altogether judicious use of the space, which could have been given over to material by Sidgwick. Certainly, it would be more useful to have more of Sidgwick's commentary on Green, for example. And such late essays as 'On the Nature of the Evidence for Theism' and 'Authority, Scientific and Theological' — both of which were included in *Henry Sidgwick, A Memoir* (1906), assembled by

his widow Eleanor and brother Arthur — are sorely missed, since they, respectively, fill in some of the more interesting, coherentist sounding justifications for the Theistic postulate found in the concluding chapter of the *Methods* and point up the larger social dimensions of Sidgwick's intuitionistic epistemology. Moreover, the bibliography does not include references to primary manuscript collections or to most of the reviews of Sidgwick's works by his contemporaries — for example, the telling reviews by von Gizycki, especially of the second edition of the *Methods*. It is therefore of rather limited use to scholars, who would do better to consult such standard reference works as *The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, third edition.

Singer's introductory essay, which with its various 'Notes' ends up being over thirty pages in length, is rather more welcome, providing as it does a sweeping and very informed review of Sidgwick's life and work. Although he seems largely unaware of the significance of Sidgwick for current research in gender and gay studies, Singer rightly stresses such things as the influence of John Grote, one of Sidgwick's senior Cambridge colleagues, on the development of the *Methods*, and the importance of the religious context in which Sidgwick's thinking developed — particularly the casuistry involved in his 1869 decision to resign his position rather than subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, as legally required. Sidgwick was very much a part of the reform movement dedicated to weakening the grip of the Church on educational institutions, and his action may have hastened the abolition of religious tests, which soon followed.

Perhaps most importantly, Singer, in marked contrast to his earlier writings, acknowledges in this essay some of the more troubling, even sinister, aspects of Sidgwick's work. In the section titled 'A Negative Note', he quotes one of Sidgwick's more disturbing lines concerning the duty of 'civilized' nations to 'civilize' the world, educating and absorbing 'savage nations' (xxxvi-vii). On this, he comments: 'Even though the hindsight of a hundred years later, after two world wars, worldwide revolutions against exploitation and imperialism, mass starvation, terrorism, torture, and brutal slaughter on an unprecedented scale, can enable us to see the unwisdom of these ideas to a greater extent than was available to Sidgwick in his period of history, it is not outrageously contrary to common sense to suggest that even in his time the objectives he proclaimed were not sustained by common sense (though they might have been sustained by public opinion), but were rather the conclusions drawn from his utilitarianism, with its maximizing ideology' (xxxvi-vii).

Alas, things are not so simple. Sidgwick's broadly Darwinian philosophical milieu was pervaded by virulent forms of racism and Eurocentrism, and the would-be 'Lords of Human Kind' were as often Idealist as they were utilitarian, and perhaps more often than not scarcely philosophical at all. Singer is quite right to stress the importance of these matters, but he cannot be said to make any headway with them, and his sketchy hints are misleading. Still, past scholarship on Sidgwick, even that addressing his politics, has typically not even managed to hint that there are subtexts — and texts — of oriental-

ism and imperialism in the *Methods* and his other writings. Witty philosophical gibes about 'Government House' utilitarianism do not a historical critique make. So, this is progress of a sort.

For these reasons and others, Singer's long-awaited collection of Sidgwick's essays and reviews deserves a wide and deeply reflective readership.

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Kok-Chor Tan

Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice.

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 2000. Pp. x + 233.

US\$28.50. ISBN 0-271-02067-9.

The pursuit of universal human rights by Western states and non-governmental organizations is met with resistance by many in the Third World, particularly state officials. These officials typically claim that human rights conflict with 'Asian Values', Islamic law, or, most generally, non-individualistic cultures outside of the West. Additionally, the long-standing failure of liberal states that profess a faith in human rights to overcome inconsistency, hypocrisy (because of their own human rights problems), and even a large measure of moral culpability in fostering global inequality, has undermined the acceptance of liberalism globally. In light of such difficulties, how plausible is a global liberal theory premised on universal human rights? Presuming it is plausible, how can global liberalism be made to succeed in practice?

In attempting to answer these questions, Kok-Chor Tan argues for the theoretical applicability of liberalism, understood properly. His aim is to show how certain fundamental misunderstandings of liberalism's core features need to be rectified in order to properly apply it to the global setting. Perhaps surprisingly, Tan concludes that it is liberals themselves who are the most damaging sources of misconception and error, a serious charge that he attempts to level at John Rawls. This book can thus be located in the critical literature on Rawls's considerable place in contemporary political philosophy, in addition to the growing literature on Rawls's more modest contributions to global political theory. Like others, Tan holds that Rawls's intellectual evolution from *A Theory of Justice* (1971) to *Political Liberalism* (1993) is highly problematic, and is the source of the imperfect vision of global liberalism found in *The Law of Peoples* (1999). However, there are also some

fresh arguments in this book about the relationship among liberalism, cultural membership and diversity.

Tan's approach is to compare critically Rawls's 'political liberalism' with what he dubs 'comprehensive liberalism'. The key difference between these liberal doctrines is that the former makes *toleration* the fundamental essence of liberalism as a political doctrine, while the latter holds individual *autonomy* as the supreme value. Tan argues that for comprehensive liberals, autonomy is something that must be directly promoted and instilled in the full realm of human experience, from the household to the global polity. This contrasts with Rawls's view that autonomy is something that is only indirectly inculcated by the liberal state. After providing a reasonably detailed critique of Rawls's domestic 'political liberalism' and the problematic limitations it places on autonomy, Tan proceeds to argue that Rawls's toleration of non-liberal states abroad is similarly unacceptable. A comprehensive liberal position requires that we tolerate only those societies and states that are committed to, and show some success in achieving, autonomy-promoting human rights.

Fortunately, Tan does not rest after showing the logical and ethico-political deficiencies of Rawls's political liberalism. The most original contribution of the book is his contention that liberalism (i.e., his comprehensive liberalism) is superior precisely because it best respects and enables cultural diversity. Global diversity of 'ways of life' is key, argues Tan, because it is through culture (and particularly a national culture) that individuals are given a meaningful context in which to exercise their autonomy. The problem with Rawls's political liberalism is not only its failure to confront non-liberal practices globally; it is also unsound because toleration is simply a negative duty of forbearance; it does not support the direct promotion of global collective and cultural rights that can foster individual autonomy. (In making this claim, Tan carefully tips his hat to the communitarian critique of liberalism. Yet he also criticizes well-known communitarians like Michael Walzer for making sovereign states the basis of a cultural community.) Global liberalism is best advanced, claims Tan, when the collective rights of cultural groups, whether minorities in states, and even nations within certain vulnerable, weak and poor states are enshrined *in tandem* with human rights. Tan thus sees no real contradiction between such things as a Right to Development or a Right to Self-Determination (realized through the United Nations) and the individualistic rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He also rejects the idea that collective rights will necessarily be used by state elites to deny individual rights, but his treatment of this issue is far too brief and pays scant attention to the problematic actual practices of states.

There are additional shortcomings in Tan's project. First, although he rightly claims that global inequalities, particularly material disparities, are the chief cause of human rights abuses in addition to conflicts between liberal and non-liberal societies, he pays scant attention to the global(izing) political economy. This undercuts his otherwise convincing claims at the end of the

book about how best to bridge the gap between global liberal theory and current practice. Certainly the current practices of the global trading, finance and investment regimes are premised on solidly liberal economic ideas. Yet except for a brief and incomplete section on neoliberalism, Tan does not confront arguably a more profound set of contradictions within global liberalism today than between Rawls's 'political' and his 'comprehensive' liberalism. To some degree, Tan circumvents this problem by declaring that neoliberalism reflects not truly liberal principles but an excommunicated 'libertarian' sect. But this is too easy and not entirely fair. Although it is true that liberalism has become more 'egalitarian' in the twentieth century (not least through the efforts of Rawls and the development of the welfare state), it never became historically detached from *ideology*. Liberalism as ideology has tended to veil some inequalities in tandem with exposing and protesting others. This raises the second problem: Tan fails to recognize just how divided and contradictory liberalism is in practice. Although he is perfectly entitled to 'clean house', he might also more readily concede that those with whom he disagrees are still well within a dynamic moral and political tradition. In other words, to paraphrase Rawls, we can have 'reasonable' disagreements about what liberalism requires of us in our time and circumstance.

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J.E. Tiles

Moral Measures:

An Introduction to Ethics West and East.

New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. xii + 334.

Cdn\$128.00: US\$85.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22495-0);

Cdn\$38.99: US\$25.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-22496-9).

As the title suggests, *Moral Measures: An Introduction to Ethics West and East* aims to be a contribution to the emerging field of comparative East West philosophy and ethics. J.E. Tiles offers an elaborate and detailed exploration of cross-cultural ethical thought, which focuses on standards of conduct in diverse cultures. Three broad categories of ethical measures of conduct — measures of the good, of virtue, and of right — are put under scrutiny and the comparative threads teased out in depth.

In the spirit of this project of cross-cultural exploration, Tiles examines moral theories within a framework of cultural studies. Ethical theories are

seen as responding to general human concerns, but also as dependent upon and reflective of broader cultural phenomena. The three categories of measures are connected with three sorts of theories: '(1) laws and rights, or "practical deontology" ... (2) human exemplars and their qualities, or the virtuous and their virtues ... and (3) teleological or consequentialist theories based on an idea of the human good (14).'

The early chapters of the book take up questions preliminary to this exploration of the three sorts of standards. Cross-cultural studies of concrete moralities lead to familiar questions about whether there is an objective foundation for attitudes of approval and condemnation of moral conduct and whether such a basis can be utilized to resolve or at least reduce uncertainty and conflict. The social dimension is examined in the first few chapters, in which Tiles gives the reader a brief overview of the perspective of the social sciences on ethical phenomena.

The heart of the philosophical argument is covered in the scrutiny of these three kinds of standards. Cultural traditions are organized and ordered, producing legal institutions and the first 'measure of right'. Law evolves from authoritative custom, the shared sense of justice within a society. The 'measure of right' approach to moral standards turns on the notion that moral judgments involve commitments to general principles. But since laws are general rules, which cannot anticipate particular variations and so cannot provide reliable guidance about what should be done in all circumstances, we need to probe deeper.

Tiles appeals to Kant. Kant's standard for all moral judgment of action claims that 'we would be true to our nature as rational creatures if we not only lived by general principles (maxims) but by those that were capable of being made universal laws. This meant that our general principles applied to everyone without exception' (183). This first basis of justification relies upon the conception of a person or agent who has the ability to think and act rationally and thus be a source of action.

The second category of moral measures is that of moral excellence: we look to the moral responses of virtuous agents as the moral measure. The cross-cultural theme appears as different cultures acknowledge different characters as virtuous. Here Tiles's argument turns on a comparison of Confucian and Aristotelian concepts of virtue. Confucius and Aristotle 'believe that we must seek to identify exemplary individuals (to be used as models we should follow) by attempting to specify the qualities that make them exemplary' (191). Central to Confucian thought about exemplary persons is the concept of *li* or ritual practice and *li* is regarded both 'as an important force both for forming characters and for governing people' (196). Aristotelian virtues or ethical excellences, by contrast, are states of character and the habits that form one's ethical character are 'acquired dispositions to act or feel along a variety of dimensions', and in the right degree (203). Aristotle's analysis of the qualities of exemplary individuals rests on the possession of practical wisdom. However, Aristotelian practical wisdom involves 'the very thing we had hoped to see defined, ethical excellence' (213). An account of ethical

excellence is needed to assure a correct analysis of the end of human action, i.e., a flourishing life.

Tiles takes up this question in the first of two chapters on the third sort of measure, that of the good. Tiles's exploration of the Aristotelian measure of the good is extremely technical for an introduction to ethics; it involves a complex examination of the two versions of the *Ethics*, the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemean*. Finally, Tiles takes up the hedonist contribution to the standard of the good, scrutinizing both the Epicurean and, rather too briefly, the utilitarian versions. The only significant treatment of Buddhist ethics is presented in a chapter on the self as a problem. In this sketchy and superficial treatment, Buddhism is presented contentiously as a variety of asceticism. The concluding chapter returns to the comparison of Kant and Aristotle and asks whether a synthesis of these two thinkers yields the basis for an adequate moral measure.

Tiles presents a sophisticated treatment of the enduring question of the standard or measure of moral conduct. It is rich in understanding and offers many insights on the questions and theories surveyed. However, readers turning to this book for its announced purpose of providing an introduction to East West ethics will be disappointed. The dominant theme of the book is a comparison of Kant and Aristotle, two prominent Western philosophers. Readers wishing to learn about the three main schools of Eastern ethics, namely Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, will not find these discussions. The only Eastern theory treated in any depth is Confucianism, and the treatment of the other two is scanty. As well, readers expecting an introduction to the questions will likely find themselves baffled by many of the technical arguments, which are clearly aimed at readers with at least a prior acquaintance with the issues. But these more technical discussions are mixed in with sections that are introductory surveys, often excessively detailed, of other issues. The main line of argument of the book is often obscured by the clutter of numerous side issues, and the use of examples, which would be illuminating if used judiciously, but instead are excessive and erect obstacles to understanding the argument.

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Massimo Verdicchio

Naming Things:

*Aesthetics, Philosophy and History in
Benedetto Croce.*

Napoli: La Citta del Sole 2000. Pp. 245.

US\$34.00. ISBN 88-8292-069-0.

A thing is what it is and not another thing: but equally, we might say, a thing is also what it is not. Benedetto Croce adopted the path of negative determination, capturing, for example the poetic by contrasting it with literature. Things are also subject to continuous change and therefore the act of naming is always a continuous necessity: each act of naming is only a temporary success.

The question posed by this book is that of a return to Croce, a 'reproposal' of Croce. But if we are to return to Croce, to which Croce are we to return? Are we to rehabilitate Croce *tout court* or only those parts which we regard as having a particular resonance with our current concerns and understandings? This seems sensible, and it also seems to be in line with Croce's own approach as typified by the title of his famous book *What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel?*. But this approach, as Verdicchio clearly points out, has drawbacks. It presupposes the ability to separate out the elements of an integral whole and to isolate and retain only those parts which satisfy our present philosophical requirements. This presupposition is flawed because it is likely to do a disservice to a philosophy concerned with the life of the spirit as a whole; the distinctions Croce draws are never simple and it is impossible to effect a neat separation of the true and the false. We therefore need a different approach, an approach adopted in this book.

First, we must avoid burying Croce either under the weight of uncritically sympathetic readings which wish to accept his work in its entirety, and which are premised on the view that we took a wrong path in leaving his work behind, and that we should now return to the true path. This cannot, argues Verdicchio, be right, if only because it ignores the development of thought since Croce and because it is precisely one which Croce himself would reject: he repeatedly emphasised that his own thought was never at rest and that the thought of those succeeding him would necessarily (even as they appropriated his ideas) revise and develop his views. On the other side we find unsympathetic readings which simply reject Croce whole on the view that his philosophy has now been wholly superseded. But this is no more satisfactory than the first: uncritical rejection is no better than uncritical acceptance and each as unphilosophical as the other. Thus Verdicchio remarks (30) that 'we should return to Croce as if he had always been with us', unblinkered by his reputation whether positive or negative: 'to truly return to Croce ... we can no longer call ourselves Croceans', or, for that matter, anti-Croceans.

In Croce's work (10) we find a continuous attempt to differentiate between what is and what is not history, philosophy, science or art. On the one hand Croce wanted to establish once and for all the limitations and distinctions of

and between the various disciplines, but on the other his own reflection on these issues shows the intractability of the task, the impossibility of rigorously distinguishing between them. But we nonetheless need to 'name', to identify, history, poetry and philosophy in order to ensure their survival and continuity. Nothing is fixed and the boundaries are fluid, but the need to identify and recognise does not by that token vanish: a thing is still what it is even if *what* it is is subject to continuous change.

Croce wrote that (117) 'so great and varied, therefore, is the labor, the effort, the awareness, the ascesis which a man must endure in order "to give names to things", to the things of poetry and literature'; and Verdicchio comments (117) that 'this is the final act of the critic, the act of differentiation, whereby poetry and literature are named, separately, and where the rightful name of poetry is given to its otherwise ephemeral and tenuous presence.' Poetry exists 'only by the grace of this act of naming, an act which names it by separating it from all that is not poetic ... the rest is literature.'

How successful is Verdicchio in making the case for Croce? After the introductory chapter the book hits its stride in the analysis of Croce's writing on the baroque, the aesthetic, Dante, Ariosto, Pirandello and Vico. Here we find fascinating and often compelling accounts of both the topics and authors named and of Croce's responses to them, situated within the framework of Croce's overall philosophical position. To give just one example. Verdicchio argues (204) that Vico, in Croce's view, had not made the necessary distinctions that he required of every philosopher, namely to accurately differentiate between philosophy, the empirical sciences and history. On the contrary he had confused these distinct domains, and thereby fallen into error, that is, (for Croce) categorial confusion. These chapters on Vico are genuinely illuminating; I would however make two supplementary points. First, Croce's reading of Vico may be flawed — but this does not affect the general philosophical point concerning the need to distinguish different intellectual domains; second, the question arises of whether distinctions of the sort Croce is looking for are possible, even if explicitly recognised as provisional and interim. A common criticism of Croce (for example, by Gentile and Collingwood) is that he hypostatized distinctions into separations; that the sails of his 'windmill' (aesthetic, logical, economic and ethical) were left unrelated to each other. Croce admitted of no philosophical overlap, only an empirical overlap, between (for instance) art and literature. The unfortunate result for Croce is that he was thereby committed to distinguishing and separating the indistinguishable and inseparable; his distinctions were thus not only made difficult through the everchanging nature of what he sought to distinguish, but also because he set himself an impossible task to start out with. Croce was so intent on avoiding the danger of confusing distinct domains that he fell into the opposite danger of hardening distinctions into absolute separations, and then finds the material recalcitrant to his approach. Criticisms of this kind are perhaps implicit in Verdicchio's analysis, as for example where he writes that (225) 'Croce proves that even a very rigorous and precise intellect as his own cannot distinguish clearly and distinctly between truth

and error, between what is and what is not philosophy': but in my view the reasons for this failure could have been more clearly drawn out.

Overall this is a thoroughly worthwhile and enjoyable book which makes good the case for a return to Croce through analysis of particular concrete cases, although I would have welcomed a conclusion drawing the strands of the argument together. It is a well-produced volume, although marred by a number of typographical errors which should have been rectified in proof.

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Candace A. Vogler

John Stuart Mill's Deliberative Landscape.

An Essay In Moral Psychology.

New York: Garland Publishing 2001.

Pp. xvi + 136.

US\$65.00. ISBN 0-8153-3658-6.

This book discusses J.S. Mill's departure from Bentham's model of utilitarianism. The cliché account is this: Mill jr., scheduled to become the exemplary Benthamite, suffers a disciplinarian education, disregarding his emotional and social development. He promptly has a nervous breakdown at the tender age of twenty. Yet, reading emotionally charged Wordsworth, Mill soon recovers splendidly and ever after romanticises about emotions and the pleasures of 'higher quality'. But ultimately Mill is incapable of renouncing his heritage and produces an awkward 'defense' of utilitarianism that is neither fish nor fowl.

Vogler draws a less simple-minded picture of Mill's development. She presents an elaborate account of the philosophical undercurrents of Mill's 'crisis' in which the dissatisfaction with the understanding of human nature so vividly impressed upon him became irreconcilable with the conscious experience of his own character development. This book follows relatively subtle hints and traces of thoughts that never made it into Mill's 'official' philosophy; inevitably, this feels somewhat speculative at times.

Vogler's main thesis is that Mill discarded Benthamism to the extent that he rejected Bentham's view of practical reason (but she develops no positive account of Mill's view). This view is *instrumentalism*, which 'has it that ends are supplied by what one wants and that practical reason is exercised in order to make the world be as one wants it to be ... Affect supplies ends. Intellect

supplies ways of attaining ends. End of story' (23). Desires are the source of value, and there is only deliberation about the best means to satisfy these desires. So-called 'basic desires' are primitive and not rationally criticisable, whereas 'derived desires' can be criticised — as to their suitability to satisfy basic desires. For Bentham, the basic desire of any individual and ultimate end of her action is for her pleasure and the absence of pain.

Vogler claims that Bentham thought that this pleasure and pain resides in 'consequences', which *follow* an action (33). Hence, it is only by modifying people's expectations of what *will* follow an action, mainly by tacking 'rewards' and 'punishments' onto their 'natural' consequences, that the *value* of the objects of people's objects of desires may be modified — if the general interest requires this. But there is no allowance for a change of desires themselves, '“from the inside”, as it were' (34). As it happens, the criminal desires the crime, but with the expectation of punishment it may not pay to commit it.

Vogler says that Mill saw a problem of *arbitrariness* in this: on the Benthamite view, people seem not to have any particular reason to have the derived desires they do have. They just happen to have them, with no potential for change. While legislation has to cope with such 'arbitrary' desires, morality should make desires themselves the object of rational criticism. Now, how people come to have and develop the desires in their actual internal structure requires a study of *character*. Awareness of these mechanisms would give individuals *themselves* the power to efficiently intervene into their on-going search for happiness, by character formation.

Mill was directed to these thoughts unexpectedly, through reading Wordsworth. The effect on Mill's mind was not to rearrange the payoffs associated with the achievement of secondary desires, but to realise the 'intrinsic worth' of activities and aims. In particular, he realised that *thought*, and the *intellect*, in his predecessors merely instrumental to achieve the aims set by *feeling*, or *affect*, had independent value, separate from that bestowed upon it instrumentally. This conflicts with instrumentalism. QED.

Vogler here seems to claim that Mill had to reject instrumentalism because it assumes, via the traditionally mechanical associationism it springs from, that 'the attachment of feeling to thoughts was the result of a causal process immune to the influence of intellect' (44), but precisely that was what happened to Mill in his crisis: he rearranged the pleasures associated with various activities merely via exercising his intellect. I fail to see entirely why Vogler claims that, assuming instrumentalism, intellect would not be able to influence the attachment of 'feeling' to thoughts (which sometimes she confusingly seems to be equating with the intellect itself [85]). She also believes that Mill himself did not endorse this either (107).

Since instrumentalism embodies enormous critical potential in the theorem that *derived* desires are open to rational criticism, and therefore not arbitrary in any disturbing sense, at least not within *instrumentalism*, much of Vogler's 'arbitrariness argument' must be based on the premiss that there are numerous arbitrary *basic* desires (see, e.g., p. 84). But this seems clearly

mistaken — at least as far as Mill is concerned. For Mill, the ultimate (causal) end of all action is *happiness*, but, maybe unlike what Bentham thought, not exclusively that of the *agent*. Arguably, this is the point of Chapter 4 of *Utilitarianism* containing the ‘proof’. (Vogler thinks that Mill’s ‘pleasure’ refers to a ‘pleasurable’ mental state rather than ‘pleasurable activity’. See Robert W. Hoag, ‘J.S. Mill’s Language of Pleasure’, *Utilitas* 4 [1992] 247-278.)

Anyway, the least Vogler needs is an argument, or good textual evidence, to the effect that Mill did hold such a view of the human mind. Surely nothing in *instrumentalism* precludes one from claiming that knowledge of the mechanisms of character formation is important. Mill merely argues that Bentham failed to see that some actions may be evidence of an ‘evil’ character which might have a tendency to bring about wrong actions generally. Logically speaking, the most efficient locus of intervention, individually and socially, could be at the level of character. But Mill clearly resists such manipulative interventionism.

Another argument emerges in the last chapter. Vogler argues that Bentham’s view of practical rationality cannot explain one paragraph in *On Liberty*, where Mill defends individuality without explicitly claiming that it is a necessary ingredient, or condition, of individual or general happiness; that is, he defends it non-instrumentally. Even if Vogler’s reading of this passage were compelling, and much of Vogler’s exposition is undoubtedly rhetorical (107), this might just be one of ‘those’ passages in Mill’s oeuvre that are hard to square with *anything* he says elsewhere. Anyway it rather seems that Mill’s arguments *don’t work*.

Vogler’s prose is elegant and her reading of authors such as Berlin, Russell, Stephen, and, of course, Mill is perceptive. In many places she exhibits great care in presenting her theses. Unfortunately, the book’s overall argumentative structure remains somewhat opaque. I find many claims entirely unfounded (80), and some arguments unconvincing and only tenuously connected, or overly compressed (60). An analytic conclusion or summary might, after all, have been helpful too.

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Naomi Zack, ed.

Women of Color and Philosophy.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 2000.

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US\$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-21866-1).

Justice in the review of anthologies is always difficult, but the task is doubled when the subject matter is at once so broad, so potentially contentious, and so important. Such is the case with *Women of Color and Philosophy*, edited by Naomi Zack. Unlike other reviews where a pretense to journalistic objectivity might work, it cannot here. My position in relation to these essays as white, middle class, and educated, but also as female and lesbian, locates me both outside and inside each text — depending not merely on whether its subject bears on my own expertise (philosophy of language), but on whether I can assume easy travel to the philosophical worlds of women of color. I cannot, and do not. And I cannot fail to know that my opportunity to review Zack's anthology is borne of the same paucity of women of color in philosophy that confronts her. Acknowledgments made, I offer here reflections more journal than journalistic, my aim less the reproduction of white male adversarial criticism, and more remark in the spirit of a sincere desire to listen to those others marginalized within philosophy.

Zack's arrangement of the contents into critique, activism, and future directions is instructive. First, it provides the reader a way to quickly focus her/his attention on themes in both traditional and contemporary philosophy from perspectives largely absent (or silenced) in the discipline. Second, it discomfits the reader in ways useful to raising questions about her/his expectations about what counts as *doing philosophy*. Zack's carefully chosen authors don't do philosophy in the stereotypical style of the leisured professor whose material comfort affords *him* disconnection from the world of blood and earth — even when, as in the case of Adrian S. Piper, Anita Allen, and Barbara Hall, they might be said to be doing analytic philosophy.

V.F. Cordova's fine 'Exploring the Sources of Western Thought', for example, traces the emergence of the 'western' *leitmotiv* from the perspective of the relevance of its central questions to the cultural and spiritual context of Cordova's own epistemic situation. She shows how the concept 'western' is a creation wrought more of the desire to erect a cultural identity against the incursions of the 'Other' than it is of any internal coherence, especially via the oppressive effects of Christianity. Similarly, Yoko Arisaka shows how the assumption that philosophy is an inherently western and masculine enterprise serves to doubly 'feminize' Asian women both as women and as hailing from traditions who do something other than philosophy.

An important lesson of essays like Cordova's is that they offer not only a view of the 'western' tradition from, in her case, a perspective 'Hispanic' and Apache, but a view formed within the context of homes and communities wherein the discussion of differing worldviews emerge as the natural expres-

sion of the sometimes discordant mix of intellectual, cultural, and spiritual practices. Joy James, for example, argues that we must take seriously the epistemic value of community as a source of knowledge which confronts the alleged supremacy and cohesion of the 'western' canon. Essays such as these are neither applications of 'western' ideas to native, African American, Asian, or Hispanic 'notions', nor are they translations of such 'notions' into 'western' frames of reference. Rather, they disrupt the disproportionate relation of power between 'western' and 'other' (idea and notion, dominant and subaltern, North and South, masculine and feminine, Light and Dark-skinned), first by deconstructing the assumed consistency of the 'western' *leitmotiv*, and second by engaging it in critical discussion about its *philosophical relevance*, a discussion whose disposition owes as much to the spirit of inquiry acquired in home and community as to the halls of academia. Echoed in different projects across the volume, especially those of Joy James, Anita Allen, Yoko Arisaka, Linda Martin Alcoff, Ofelia Schutte, and in George Yancy's 'Interview with Angela Y. Davis', each essay personifies the Marxist task of doing theory to change the world. Moving quickly away from my initial judgment that some of the essays seemed to be reviews of well-trod terrain, I have come to realize that whether the 'central' questions in philosophy have been answered (or even formulated) is nowhere in this volume taken for granted. What seems at first to be a primer is in fact the far more radical quest to query the questions themselves.

The volume left me unsatisfied in the best possible way; a project well-begun but, perhaps like all worthwhile endeavors, leaves much to be excavated, activated, or imagined anew. Hence, I shall end with some questions. First, while I appreciate Anne Waters' argument that fallacies can be taught through the use of culturally relevant examples which move students to esteem their own cultural traditions and to examine their biased assumptions (and what counts as fallacious reasoning), I am not convinced, as she implies, that all worldviews are more or less deserving of respect. I am reluctant to respect the view that AIDS is a punishment of a vengeful god, or that the devastation of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are, as Christian fundamentalist Jerry Falwell claims, the fault of a secularized America removed from its God. Waters doubtlessly agrees with me here, but I worry that the cultural relativism implied by her approach undermines her laudable intentions as well as the point of courses in critical thinking.

Second, while I found Dasiea Cavers-Huff's theory of cognitive properties very fine, an expansion of her argument for its evolutionary advantages would have provided more compelling reasons to accept her theory. Third, Zack's excellent excavation of Descartes' awake/asleep distinction would seem from her introduction to subserve an argument for Descartes' claim that being awake is, if not a necessary condition, a better condition for acquiring knowledge, and that this is connected to developing a clearer understanding of race. Perhaps I misconstrue her intent, but anticipating a return to these themes at the end of her paper left me confused about whether her aims were primarily argumentative or exegetical. Lastly, of all the

essays, it is Adrian Piper's relentless interrogation of western ideas that attracts me the most; her insight that the defense of racist and misogynist social convention too often relies on rationalizing masquerading as rationality is, as she puts it, ironic. Indeed, and for just these reasons, I shall be looking forward to Zack's second anthology.

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