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The questions raised by this book are of central importance to the world today, and it is no doubt for this reason that it was accepted for publication. Sadly, I found it a difficult read, heavy with jargon, and written from the unhelpful assumption that the reader would be fully aware of the arguments of the many theorists mentioned. The intended audience is unclear. It cannot be third-world women, for they are in large part innocent of the heavy baggage of theory necessary to follow this discussion. It cannot be first-world students, for they will be equally innocent of the background debates. Perhaps the book is meant to convince male political theorists that 'the Third World feminist theory of social criticism' expounded is worth taking seriously. If so, I doubt that it will succeed.

Third World feminist social criticism is a very first-world doctrine. It is grounded in first-world theories of deliberative democracy, but it gives up on the idea that participants in the democratic debate need some minimal level of rationality, information and shared cultural norms. Ackerly says: 'Third World feminist social criticism does not rely on common political norms, self-and mutual respect, participants' equal ability to influence outcomes, and agreement on what constitutes acceptable deliberative content. It does, however, rely on some people to take up each of the roles of social critics. These roles include helping society recognize the truth in each contribution — particularly those previously unknown' (71). We get a further negative characterization of the theory on the same page: 'Third World feminist social criticism is not only the practical application of deliberative democratic theory in the real world of inequality, disrespect, and disagreement about what constitutes a reasonable argument, but also the theoretical complement to deliberative theory's assumptions of equality, respect, and agreement and its debate over the epistemological value of deliberation.' Such negative characterizations make the substantive position difficult to pin down. So far as I can make out, Ackerly's view is this: if in deliberative theory one demands a minimal level of agreement over standards of rational debate in the deliberative process, then some people: the uneducated, irrational, and those who don't believe in rational debate, will be excluded and silenced (35). This is the fate of Third World women. Therefore, one should give up on such minimal standards.

A more traditional response to the problem of the exclusion from the political debate, of those who fail to achieve minimal rationality, is the call for schools, universal co-education, freedom of the press, and freedom of information, in order that everybody will achieve the minimal competence required to engage in debate. Ackerly claims that this introduces two forms
of tyranny: 'tyranny of the method and tyranny of the meeting' (35). It appears that she is worried by the cultural imperialism that might be thought implicit in the aim of providing all women, in all countries of the world, with access to an open critical education that encourages the values of reason, discussion, and toleration of other people's opinions and life-styles. In some countries, this could only be provided through the overthrow of governments, and the use of force.

Ackerly sees her doctrine as going beyond the views of feminists such as Nussbaum and Okin, by building into the theory of deliberative democracy a mechanism for criticizing the epistemological assumptions of deliberation, by attempting to include all voices. 'Nussbaum's account of social criticism,' she says, 'lacks a mechanism for self-criticism' (199). Yet self-criticism is oddly lacking from Ackerly's work. What, for instance, does the believer in deliberative democracy do when faced with the dogmatist who is prepared to impose his or her beliefs by force? Much is said in this work about the silenced Third World women, but what of their men-folk? Will they be welcome to join the deliberative process?

One concrete example dominates the book. It is a story of a group of Bangladeshi women, brought together by the agency of a Western NGO who, hearing a woman screaming at being beaten by her husband, discuss the possibility of collective action to prevent wife beating. This is offered as an example of 'social criticism in a context of coercive gender hierarchy' (3). It is clear that Ackerly believes that wife-beating is wrong, and that traditions that allow it should be criticised, and I entirely agree. But I do not see how Ackerly has the right to assume this on the basis of the method of social criticism that she proposes. I assume that men who believe in their right to beat their wives will be included by Ackerly's method. Since there is no requirement of reasonableness or respect for participation, men who refuse to listen to women's opinions, and who are prepared to use summary execution, denial of education, denial of freedom of movement and terror in order to enforce their views would seem to be included. 'Truths', based on traditions that allow husbands to beat wives, and that accept that the maintenance of virtue requires it, will surely have to be respected even if they cannot be rationally justified. The originators of western feminism (going back at least six hundred years to Christine de Pizan) argued that a belief in the spiritual equality of women was rational, just, and defensible from an epistemological viewpoint that believed could itself be justified. There are now strong strands within feminism which question the possibility of such an epistemological viewpoint. Ackerly appears to be in sympathy with these strands. Yet without a faith in such a viewpoint how can one believe that either criticism or deliberative democracy is a good thing?

According to Ackerly, 'Because social change is ideally an informed, collective, and uncoerced process, social decision making needs to be informed by many and different social voices' (150). This quote captures, something that I find fundamentally puzzling about Ackerly's position. It demonstrates a strange slippage between a naïve optimism about reason,
and a rejection of rational norms. Ideally social change might be an informed, collective and uncoerced process. In reality social change is imposed on people by internal and external forces: including invading armies, interfering Western feminists, new foreign and local ideologies and developing technologies. Social change is not always improvement. Criticism is not always justified. Deciding when to criticise, and when to accept a set of social arrangements as good enough under the circumstances, is itself an issue that requires rational debate. Ackerly's book is full of pronouncements, and lacks the sort of reflective self-criticism that tries to internalise many points of view. It promotes a radical version of deliberative democracy, which is only justifiable if one believes that rational debate can lead to ethical and social consensus, but it rejects the imposition of rational norms and never critically confronts the fundamental tension that this introduces.

Karen Green
Monash University

Heine Andersen and Lars Bo Kaspersen, eds.
Classical and Modern Social Theory.
US$72.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-21287-6);

George Ritzer, ed.
The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists.

The teaching of social theory within sociology, along with related developments in feminist theory and cultural studies, has provided the occasion for a renewal of the relationship between philosophy and the human sciences. The disciplinary domination of sociology, however, has shaped this process, marginalizing certain themes (e.g., political philosophy and normative theory, anthropology) while highlighting others, as is evident in the two anthologies in question. A characteristic of this pedagogical genre is a difficult choice between vulgarization (accessibility to undergraduates) and providing a general account of the state of the art. As a publisher Blackwell has played a major and constructive role, especially at the more sophisticated end of the
introductory spectrum. The two volumes under examination ably carry on this tradition.

The Andersen and Kaspersen volume is distinctive in several respects, beginning with its origins as a Danish undergraduate text whose contributors are almost all based in Scandinavia. With some 30 chapters, it aspires to be a comprehensive and sophisticated introduction to classical and modern social theory. Unlike most of the single- or co-authored texts originating in the USA, this anthology provides a range and depth of analysis that is a tribute to the high quality of teaching social theory in northern Europe. The introductory intent of the project is reinforced by detailed introductory boxes outlining themes and key concepts, as well as brief biographical statements. The chapters average around 15 pages or so and include bibliographies of primary and secondary readings.

Perhaps the most unusual aspect of this text, however, is that it shifts between 'social theorists' as individuals and 'social theories' as traditions (including American pragmatism, Marxism, the Frankfurt School, neo-Marxist theories, interactionism, rational choice theory, functionalism, neo-functionalism, structuralism, risk society theory, postmodernism, the state, gender), as well as providing a concluding chapter called 'From Aristotle to Modern Social Theory'. As for individuals, the classical canon is fairly standard: Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Spencer and Tonnies. Yet there are no chapters devoted to the Enlightenment or Comte. Three of the contemporary inclusions are standard (Habermas, Bourdieu, Giddens), but others are not: Sartre, Foucault, Luhmann, Elias. In any case, the advantage of this format is that it avoids a distorting focus on 'master thinkers' and acknowledges how much creative work is indeed the outcome of research programs involving numerous significant contributors. Though there is a chapter on 'Gender and Society', there is no effort (common in some more recent American texts) to highlight individual women social theorists. Though it would serve admirably as a secondary reference text and as a jumping off point for writing papers, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine using this otherwise impressive anthology in a semester course.

The Ritzer anthology, in contrast, lies at the reference end of the pedagogical continuum, as a 'Blackwell Companion' to social theory. Its 25 chapters are devoted to the individuals that are taken to represent a new, 'open canon'. Most of the contributors are well-established theorists (two thirds based in North America), and the essays are consistently excellent. The prefatory self-congratulation is justified: this 'may well constitute the best available introduction to the leading social theorists' (x). Nevertheless, a number of reservations can be directed toward this particular intellectual project and others of its kind.

Though the editor attempted to suggest standard guidelines (the theory, the person, the social context, the intellectual context, impact, assessment), the results are quite diverse in terms of organization, themes and length. One of the troubling aspects of the author-oriented introduction is that theorists of quite unequal importance are given relatively equal treatment.
(Comte may rate as many pages as Marx). In this anthology the articles are of unequal length: less than 20 pages for Comte, Habermas, and Foucault at the lower end, and 40-60 at the high (Marx, Durkheim, Mead, Parsons, Weber). But the variations in length do not appear to reflect editorial intent relating to the significance of the topic, so much as the conciseness of the contributor or the attempt of some to make quite in-depth formulations (e.g., Turner on Spencer, Antonio on Marx, Kalberg on Weber, Calhoun on Bourdieu).

Several differences in the selection of individuals are of particular interest in comparing the two anthologies. Though Gramsci is discussed extensively in a thematic chapter in the Danish collection, he is surprisingly absent from Ritzer’s. And several authors that are treated individually in the Ritzer volume (e.g., Goffman, Schutz, Coleman, Baudrillard) only appear in thematic chapters in the Andersen and Kaspersen text.

The most distinctive aspect of the Blackwell Companion, however, is an effort to include several ‘marginal’ figures that slip through the ‘great man’ format: Harriet Martineau, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, W.E.B. Du Bois, Judith Butler. Though the principle of proactive gender and racial inclusion is admirable, the element of arbitrariness involved directs attention back to the tyranny of the individual author focus. Not only do we not hear about the many other contemporary feminist voices (e.g., Dorothy Smith, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, etc.), but race and cultural theory are also shortchanged (Bakhtin, Gilroy, Hall, West, Hooks, etc.). Some thematic chapters may have overcome this problem of contemporary balance. Thematic chapters might have also avoided some related kinds of absences, e.g., a chapter on Habermas, but no one else from the Frankfurt tradition; nothing about structuralism or poststructuralism other than Foucault and Butler; postmodernism is reduced to Baudrillard; and Daniel Bell is included but not Mills and Gouldner. But the culminating effect of the great man/woman focus is also apparent in other theoretical silences: social movements, globalization, postcolonial debates and the North-South dialogue are elided from the map of social theory. Yet other factors are involved in these omissions: despite its thematic chapters, the Danish volume does not always do much better here.

The introductory chapter by Ritzer and Douglass Goodman on ‘Toward a More Open Canon’ would also invite reservations on the part of many readers. Though it serves a certain heuristic purpose in reviewing different strategies of ‘reading’ social theory, it does not really do complete justice to this challenge. On the one hand, Ritzer draws upon his own conception of ‘metatheory’ stemming from earlier publications. A problematic aspect of his schematic approach is that it conflates within metatheory aspects of the philosophy of the social sciences and the sociology of knowledge. Even if one accepts Robert Merton’s distinction between the ‘history’ (or sociology of knowledge) and ‘systematics’ (logic of inquiry) of theorizing, collapsing these into a single concept of metatheory remains questionable. The result is a fourfold classification based on a distinction between ‘internal influences’ (whether intellectual or social), and opposed to ‘external influences’ (whether
intellectual or social). Such a formulation might provide a useful map for undergraduates, but is not adequate as a general account of the production, discourse and reception of social theory. Moreover, this whole approach remains silent about the status of normative theory and the relations between social theory, political philosophy and ideologies.

On the other hand, Ritzer and Goodman also present a typology of strategies of ‘reading’ social theory, based on Rorty’s discussion of the history of philosophy. Yet the outcome remains cryptic and incomplete. Though they supplement Rorty’s schema with Foucault’s notion of ‘effective and critical histories’, none of the contributors’ readings could be situated here. Nor do we hear anything about ‘deconstructive’ readings of a specifically Derridean kind. Nevertheless, the very inclusion of such metatheoretical and hermeneutic considerations marks an important advance in reflecting critically on the canonization of social theory.

A final cost of the individual author format is that the activity of social theorizing as a dialogue among perspectives gets obscured. Despite occasional efforts to consider the ‘impact’ of theorists, the reader is left with little in the way of assistance of formulating criteria of comparison for identifying affinities and antagonisms between theorists such as, for example, Habermas, Giddens, Foucault and Bourdieu. Though the introduction gestures toward the ‘critical and effective histories that are created by the reader using these essays as a resource,’ (13) the tyranny of the ‘great author’ format has not facilitated this process.

Finally, both volumes suffer from a peculiar disciplinary blind spot that has afflicted the editorial canons of anthologizing social theory: the neglect of anthropology and history. Though the Danish volume does have a chapter on structuralism, no account of twentieth-century social theory would be complete with reference to anthropologists such as Lévi-Strauss, Geertz, and Sahlins, or the Annales School.

**Raymond A. Morrow**

*(Department of Sociology)*

University of Alberta
Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds.
*Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary Reflections.*
Cdn$64.95/US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-541608-2);

Is there a distinctively Canadian political philosophy? Canada certainly boasts many distinguished political philosophers — Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and James Tully among the best known. Moreover, the work of these philosophers and many of their compatriots engages a cluster of questions around justice and cultural diversity closely connected to contemporary Canadian debates. Beiner and Norman’s *Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary Reflections* reinforces the sense that Canadian scholars are at the forefront of theorizations of nationalism, citizenship, multiculturalism, and group rights, while also emphasizing the heterogeneity of Canadian political theory.

In the end, the collection is worthwhile not because it maps a distinguishable Canadian perspective in political philosophy — extended reflection on this possibility is frustratingly scarce in the volume — but because it contains quite a number of excellent if eclectic contributions from both established and younger scholars. For Canadian readers, the volume will also enable that perennial national pastime of laying claim to famous figures not widely recognized as hailing from the Great White North — to William Shatner, Peter Jennings, and Jason Priestly we can now add the likes of G.A. Cohen and Eamonn Callan.

The volume’s six sections contain twenty-six chapters, almost all published for the first time. Before dwelling on particular contributions, it’s worth simply listing the contents. Under the heading of ‘Rethinking Liberal Citizenship’ are chapters by Joseph Carens, James Tully, Simone Chambers, Daniel Weinstock, and Eamonn Callan. ‘Equality, Justice, and Gender’ contains pieces by G.A. Cohen, Christine Sypnowich, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Ingrid Makus. ‘Minority Rights, Multiculturalism, and Identity’ has chapters by Will Kymlicka, Margaret Moore, Denise Réaume, Stephen Newman, Melissa Williams, and Clifford Orwin. In ‘Nationalism and Self-Determination’ we find Dominique Leydet, James Booth, Philip Resnick, Guy Laforest, Stéphane Dion, and Dale Turner. And in ‘Dialogue with the History of Political Philosophy’ are contributions from Thomas Pangle, Arthur Ripstein, Edward Andrew, Barry Cooper, and Charles Taylor.

There’s something in that package for almost every taste, from Pangle’s Straussian take on ancients and moderns, to Dion’s politician’s gloss on the Canadian Supreme Court’s reference on unilateral secession, to rich reflections by a number of contributors on identity, membership, and national...
unity. Tully weighs in with a complex and insightful reflection on democracy and globalization, Weinstock offers critical if ultimately friendly challenges to deliberative democratic theories, and Turner considers the forms of dialogue and Aboriginal intellectual leadership that might enable a renewed relationship between the Canadian state and indigenous peoples. A number of established scholars — including Callan, Carens, Cohen, Kymlicka, and Nedelsky — provide essays that to some extent encapsulate their work to date, making these chapters particularly useful for teaching purposes.

Perhaps the greatest pleasure of the volume lies in those contributions that not only represent fine political theory, but excursions into new territory by established scholars, or strong contributions from lesser known ones; let me mention three examples.

In 'Toleration, Canadian-Style: Reflections of a Yankee-Canadian', Melissa Williams suggests that a Canadian aversion to sharp line-drawing in politics — manifested, for example, in the Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Constitution — gives shape to a more humane and creative liberalism than exists south of the 49th parallel. Her focus is on practices of liberal toleration in Canada, which balance considerations of autonomy, equality, and social order; these plural criteria, she argues, provide strong foundations for toleration and accommodation of religious and cultural minorities, while also describing a sequence to political deliberation (in debates over toleration, judgments about social peace frame considerations of autonomy and equality) and defining limits to what should be tolerated.

In 'Lifeboat', Dominique Leydet asks what approaches to collective narrative can bridge an appreciation of the contingency of national boundaries and the imperatives of civic solidarity. Drawing on Habermas, she affirms certain pragmatic elements of the liberal contractarian approach to justice within national boundaries, which acknowledges both internal pluralism and the contingencies of membership. She argues, though, that a critical (and pluralistic) engagement with national history is required both in order to treat citizens justly and to ground a sense of political obligation. While her rejection of teleological and unified history-making is well-taken, however, it’s not clear that she fully grapples with the question of whether we should still aspire to a unitary (if complex) national narrative, or accept a plurality of narratives.

James Booth's 'Communities of Memory' plays nicely off of Leydet's chapter: he too discusses a range of possible stances toward a nation's history, with a particular eye to implications of these for the identity or non-identity of nations over time, and thus responsibility for past wrongs. He points out that constitutional patriotism, with its emphasis on the remaking of collective identities, has trouble giving weight to the moral presence of the past. Yet he preserves this tension in his own reflections, pointing to both the dangers and the progressive possibilities of a willed forgetting of aspects of history.

A further pleasure of the collection lies in the effort of some contributors to tie their theoretical work to autobiographical reflection: Booth’s chapter
begins in this way, as do those of Williams, Laforest, and Cohen. Here we get a glimpse of the sort of contextualization of scholarship that might help to address connections between being Canadian and doing particular kinds of political philosophy; with certain other chapters, one wonders what makes the work Canadian in a way more interesting than the author’s possession of the correct passport.

The volume is not uniformly strong. One piece — by Cooper — is long on autobiographical tidbits but rather short on theoretical reflection. Other contributors stake out political positions, but without the sort of attention to starting points or careful engagement with rivals that makes for convincing argument — I found Newman’s discussion of freedom of expression unsatisfying in this way, along with Orwin’s critique of multiculturalism (notwithstanding his jabs at Taylor) and Andrew’s gloss on the moral vocabulary of liberalism. The generally high quality of contributions, though, makes the collection well worth acquiring. And the juxtaposition of up-to-the-minute essays by this diverse group of Canadian scholars leaves readers to struggle — if they’re so inclined — with how the particularities of national context might shape the work of political philosophers.

David Kahane
University of Alberta

Alexander Bird
*Thomas Kuhn.*
US$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-05709-5);

After Thomas Kuhn’s death in 1996, there has been increasing interest in his work, so much so that in the year 2000 there was a book of Kuhn’s previously published essays, *The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview (RSS),* and there were four books published on Kuhn: Alexander Bird’s book, *Steve Fuller’s Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times,* Hanne Anderson’s *On Kuhn,* and Ziauddin Sardar’s *Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars.* Bird’s book, which is the first book on Kuhn from the perspective of naturalistic epistemology, puts Kuhn’s ideas into their historical context, and expounds on what Kuhn thinks on topics such as normal and revolutionary science. Bird argues that Kuhn’s theory is imbued with commitments to empiricist and Cartesian
traditions, which Kuhn has already rejected. Hence, Kuhn’s theory is not a thorough naturalistic epistemology, which then leads to scepticism and relativism.

Of interest to the generalist are the first three chapters, which are on Kuhn’s historical context, normal and revolutionary science, and paradigms. Of interest to the specialist are the last three chapters that are on the topics of perception and world change, incommensurability and meaning, and progress, truth, knowledge and relativism. In these latter chapters Bird argues that if Kuhn had become a naturalistic epistemologist, he would have avoided scepticism.

Chapter 1 sets out Kuhn’s historical context: philosophy of science pre-Kuhn, which is ‘Old Rationalism’ with main players of Carnap, Hempel, Popper and Lakatos, who hold the task of philosophy of science to be the articulation of scientific method; gestalt psychology which challenges Mach’s empiricism; and Fleck’s introduction of the notion of a thought-collective. Chapter 2 explains the distinction between normal and revolutionary science and, Chapter 3 describes the notion of paradigms. In Chapter 4, Bird discusses Kuhn’s notions of perception and world change. Bird charges Kuhn with remaining an empiricist in spite of his rejection of empiricism’s independence thesis of perception, which is that perceptual experience is independent from an individual’s mental history.

Chapter 5 is a discussion of incommensurability and meaning in which Bird argues that since Kuhn does not adequately address the causal theory of reference, Kuhn does not establish his different versions of the incommensurability thesis. In Chapter 6, which discusses truth, knowledge and relativism, Bird charges that Kuhn’s epistemological neutralism has strong relativistic tendencies, and if Kuhn had adopted naturalistic epistemology with externalist epistemology, then Kuhn’s need for an independent Archimedean standpoint would be banished for externalism assesses the reliability of the belief forming process of the scientist. Finally, Chapter 7 is on Kuhn’s influence on the Strong Programme, Fuller’s reading of Kuhn as a political conservative, and empiricism.

My criticisms are: though Chapter 1 discusses Kuhn’s context in terms of ideas, Bird does not mention the influence of Conant, Koyré and Meyerson, all of whom Kuhn mentions in his 1997 autobiographical interview (‘Interview with Thomas Kuhn’, RSS, 253-324), which was originally published in Neusis. Bird holds that he is not interested in Kuhn’s biography because it does not affect the quality of Kuhn’s arguments (ix). However, it seems to me that the actual influences of Conant, Koyré, and Meyerson are important to the reader.

From the perspective of a naturalized epistemologist, Bird questions why Kuhn did not thoroughly embrace naturalistic epistemology and the causal theory of reference, and hence avoid problems such as incommensurability. Bird argues that Kuhn made the wrong turn towards Kantianism and because Kuhn denied absolute knowledge, he was led to scepticism (280). I argue that Kuhn, who calls himself a post-Darwinian linguistic neo-Kantian
in RSS, avoids embracing naturalized epistemology, and would respond that Bird is begging the question against him. First, a clue as to why Kuhn aligned himself with Kantianism and not with naturalistic epistemology was that, when he was a student at Harvard, he was strongly influenced by Kant and not by Hume (RSS, 264). Second, Kuhn was not inclined towards a Quinean-type naturalistic epistemology even in Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for Kuhn held that there were normative criteria to evaluate theories. Third, though Bird contends that Kuhn is concerned with the project of traditional epistemology, which addresses issues such as empiricism and Cartesianism, and its naturalistic version, which addresses issues such as reliabilism, Kuhn is not concerned with those strictly epistemological issues. Instead, Kuhn's project can be fit into another project of epistemology, which is the evaluation of theories. Popper, Lakatos, and Laudan are part of this project. Fourth, in the 1980s and 1990s Kuhn took a linguistic turn in which he emphasized the role played by taxonomic lexicons. Kuhn was inspired by Whorf's studies on the influence of language on our thinking, understanding and experience of the world. Kuhn holds that language, specifically, structured lexicons are constitutive of the phenomenal worlds and possible experiences of them. Kuhn's view is that a taxonomic lexicon and its structure function very much like Kantian categories of the mind though they vary historically. This leads Kuhn not only to hold to a distinction between the noumena and phenomena, but also to introduce the notion of synthetic a priori truths (Road Since Structure, RSS, 90-104). I argue that because Kuhn holds to the notions of a taxonomic lexicon and its structure, which function very much like Kantian categories of the mind that vary historically, Kuhn avoids naturalistic epistemology: 'an evolutionary epistemology need not be a naturalized one' (RSS, 95). Moreover, Kuhn was aware of naturalistic epistemology, but Kuhn decided not to go down that road and Kuhn opted for a post-Darwinian linguistic neo-Kantianism instead. The advantages of the notions of the lexicon and synthetic a priori truths are that they help to refine and unify Kuhn's notions of incommensurability and scientific revolutions. (Irzik and Grunberg, 'Whorfian Variations on Kantian Themes: Kuhn's Linguistic Turn', Studies in History of Philosophy of Science 29 [1998] 211-15).

In spite of my cavils, Bird provides a rigorous challenge to Kuhn in terms of naturalistic epistemology and externalism that would be hard to ignore.

Francis Remedios
francisr@oanet.com
Contrasting the manifest dream-content with the latent dream-thoughts in a discussion of the dream-work, Freud considered the former to be quantitatively meagre in relation to the abundance of the latter, suggesting a recounted dream of half a page might yield at least a dozen upon interpretation. Readers of these Blanchot and Derrida texts face a similar situation. The little essay by Blanchot occupies only nine pages, including the original French, while Derrida’s accompanying interpretation weighs in at nearly ninety, excluding a postscript on the moronic inferno of anti-Derridean pseudo-scholarship.

It takes Derrida some pages before he gets to the Blanchot text, which he considers to be ‘enormous’, despite its ‘economy’, but it’s worth the wait. For the Blanchot piece is challenging: obviously autobiographical (Derrida confirms it, producing a letter from Blanchot), yet written in the third person; recounting a (non)experience before which one can only bear witness in a fiction (hence Derrida’s subtitle: ‘Fiction and Testimony’).

The ‘fiction’ is told by a narrator about a young man. It is 1944. A Nazi lieutenant knocks on the door of a French Château. A young man is among its occupants and is brought before a firing squad. Before the order of ‘Fire!’ he feels ‘an extraordinary lightness’. A diversionary explosion nearby suspends the death sentence. The German soldiers were not Germans — they were Russians. The Nazi lieutenant spoke ‘shamefully normal French’, before devolving through bowling into Nazi non-language. Although the Russians allow the young man to slowly move away, the Château was not torched in revenge. Everything else was burning, except this place, with the year 1807 inscribed on its façade (the year that Napoleon passed under Hegel’s window). Instead, a manuscript was taken. Then, in a little postscript of sorts, after the narrator notes that the young man later went to Paris and met Malraux, who also lost a manuscript during his wartime capture, this closing statement: ‘All that remains is the feeling of lightness that is death itself or, to put it more precisely, the instant of my death henceforth always in abeyance.’

Reading Blanchot under the diverse signs of passion, Derrida emphasizes sufferance of what has no essence, what is unstable (literature). The instant is singular, unique, irreplaceable. Derrida asks about the relationship between testimony and fiction and how they can possibly coexist. Testimony is
neither law nor proof—it is haunted by literature. Testimony is what I alone can give; it is my secret at this instant. A secret testimony? It makes one wonder. But Derrida thinks it is possible if at the heart of the secret to which one testifies there is 'some third party in oneself that one calls to witness', an 'absence of attestation.'

On the stand, the present witness speaks in the present, in an indivisible instant. Yet bearing witness, Derrida suggests, is sequential, the instant divisible, making testimony both reliable and unreliable. The witness bears witness before someone who is competent to understand, an addressee who has the knowledge of the difference between fiction and testimony, or so one hopes ('I did not have sex with that woman', insisted President Clinton).

Singular witness, exemplary instance (yet universalizable). Does autobiographical testimony exclude fiction? No, Derrida writes, despite what common sense tells us. In the case of death, we assume that survivors cannot testify to their own demise and this holds death in abeyance, making it an 'unexperienced experience'. If you try to say this sort of thing before a judge, Derrida admits, you won't get very far. The serious reader of Blanchot, however, must face this 'unexperienced experience', despite its evident absurdity. Fiction plays a 'dangerous game' in Blanchot because it haunts truth. There is in Blanchot, Derrida points out, an 'unbelievable tense' that bears upon dying as an instance of the 'imminence of what has always already taken place.' This suspension of death that will come, yet has already arrived, suggests that one may testify to it, despite knowing that it was never there, and not experienced, not individually, at least. A disturbing thought for which Derrida produces much evidence in Blanchot's oeuvre.

Fifty years before the publication of _The Instant of My Death_, Blanchot was put up against a wall to be shot. One cannot say simply that death happened to him. It happened to 'him-them': Blanchot, the narrator (who knows what's in the young man's head and testifies to it) and the young man he shadows. The text may be calculated to reveal political allegiances, but it is a complex calculation involving a witness for the witness before an inescapable death that is unsurvivable, even if survived.

Readers may want to see the same person in Blanchot-narrator-young man, but we learn at one point in the text that the narrator can no longer replace the young man, even if they were the same. Derrida explains: 'he testifies for a witness ... in the place of the witness he cannot be for this other witness that the young man was, and who is yet himself.' Isn't this banal, Derrida asks? Of course you are not the person you were fifty years ago. There is also the feeling that the narrator relates of being invincible—not yet dead, but already so: impermanently immortal and full of compassion for human suffering. But this is not a metaphysical immortality. Rather, it is a non-world before the order 'Fire!' from which the young man returned 'like a ghost'. His return is also a return of the real, or what sounds like real testimony—the Resistance fighters, the young man's friends, the narrator's allies, Blanchot's comrades, saved him-them. Again the tendency to compress the three is a slippage Derrida wants to indicate is a fiction. His point is that
it may be a fiction but 'without the possibility of which no truthful testimony would be possible'. Truth relies on the fiction that haunts it.

Blanchot's *The Instant of My Death* is for Derrida a meditation on injustice from which the young man benefited since he was from a 'noble class'. The young man will always suffer from this torment and the 'lightness' will never dissipate, not even fifty years later.

Derrida's close analysis fizzles out rather quickly, its ending perhaps held appropriately in abeyance, since along the way Derrida announces the possibility of many chapters. Still, Derrida's reading is accessible and involving and its political poignancy makes it particularly compelling.

### Gary Genosko

*Department of Sociology*
Lakehead University

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### James Robert Brown

*Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures.*
Cdn$105.00/US$80.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-12274-0);
Cdn$34.99/US$26.95

Anyone sincerely interested in philosophy must be interested in the nature of mathematics, and I hope to show why. As for those who persist in thinking otherwise — let them burn in hell (xii).

There are at least two approaches to writing an introductory book on some area of philosophy. The first is to strive for a sense of objectivity and resist the temptation to take sides on key issues. Indeed, this is by far the most common approach and it has a lot to commend it. The other approach is a little more adventurous. It involves the author letting his or her readers know what he or she thinks about the issues in question and defending those views — as one would in a research work. With this approach the reader gets to see philosophy in action. For my money, I'm very pleased that Brown took the second option when writing this delightful book. The book is filled with Brown's insightful views on many issues in the philosophy of mathematics; most importantly, his love of, and enthusiasm for, his subject is apparent on every page. You might not agree with all
Brown has to say in this book, but there's no chance you'll fail to engage with the subject. Students, I think, will be provoked by Brown's up-front approach and inspired to think seriously about the philosophy of mathematics themselves.

Since the book is intended as both an introductory text and a vehicle for defending some controversial views about mathematics, Brown finds himself engaged in a delicate balancing act. This balancing act, I hasten to add, is performed to perfection. Brown manages to mount a sustained defence of his two central theses: mathematical Platonism and the thesis that pictures can serve as rigorous proofs. Moreover, Brown sees important connections between these two theses; he argues that picture proofs help Platonism answer the standard epistemic objections. As Brown puts it: 'some “pictures” are not pictures, but rather are windows to Plato's heaven' (39). But Brown also manages to introduce the reader to the usual topics of any standard introductory course on the philosophy of mathematics: intuitionism, formalism, structuralism, the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, Benacerraf's epistemic challenge to Platonism, and so on. These latter topics, however, are presented in relation to the main theme of the book, not, as is so often the case, as isolated topics. The book thus has a coherence that is rare in introductory treatments of the philosophy of mathematics.

The book is also refreshing in other ways. There are a number of topics that this book addresses that are not usually covered in introductory books on the philosophy of mathematics. (Indeed, some of these topics are rarely discussed anywhere, but I dare say that will change.) These topics include the nature of applied mathematics, the role of definitions in mathematics, the role of proof in mathematics. All these topics are illustrated with fascinating and accessible mathematical examples from various branches of mathematics including: knot theory, graph theory, analysis, and number theory. Indeed, the examples are interesting in their own right and give the reader a sense of the diversity of techniques and subject matters that modern mathematics encompasses. The examples are no mere decorations though. They are always employed to illustrate the point at hand. For example, the discussion of the distribution of Mersenne primes and perfect numbers (160-4) beautifully illustrates both the difficulties and legitimacy of inductive inferences in mathematics. And the discussion of Conway notation (84-6) in knot theory is a wonderful illustration of the power and importance of notation in modern mathematics.

As I've already mentioned, one of the central theses defended in the book is that, contrary to accepted wisdom, pictures are not merely pedagogical aids, in mathematics — they can, in some instances, be legitimate and rigorous proofs. A defence of this thesis obviously requires examples of picture-proofs. The wealth of accessible and interesting examples that Brown calls upon here is a highlight of the book. He has some beautiful examples of pictures that he suggests prove the relevant theorems. Included here are well known examples, such as: the picture-proof of the intermediate-value theorem of calculus; the Greek picture-proof of \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} (2j - 1) = n^2 \); and an example of a picture-proof
of a fixed-point theorem of analysis. There are also many lesser examples, as well as some very interesting examples of pictures that lead us astray.

Of course you can't do everything in a book this size, so some of the topics that you might normally expect to have star billing in an introductory treatment are relegated to supporting roles. For example, the discussion of Paul Benacerraf's epistemic problem for Platonism ('Mathematical Truth', Journal of Philosophy 19 [1973] 661-79) is given rather short shrift. Brown shows how this epistemic-access problem relies on the causal theory of knowledge and then he demonstrates the inadequacy of this as an epistemology. He concludes his discussion (18): 'Once the causal theory is rejected, there is no objection to our knowing about abstract entities without being related to them. The problem of access is a pseudo-problem; resistance to Platonism is motivated by misplaced scruples.' No mention is given of what many philosophers consider the most compelling formulation of this problem: Hartry Field's presentation in the introduction to Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Blackwell [1989] 25-30). This latter presentation does not rely on the causal theory of knowledge and so seems immune from Brown's rebuttal. Still you can't do everything and you can't please everyone. And all things considered, I'm pleased that Brown covered the topics he did, even if sometimes it was at the expense of a deeper coverage of some such as this.

All in all this is a wonderful introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. It's lively, accessible, and, above all, a terrific read. It would make an ideal text for an undergraduate course on the philosophy of mathematics; indeed, I recommend it to anyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics — even specialists in the area can learn from this book (I certainly did).

Mark Colyvan
University of Tasmania
and
(Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science)
University of California, Irvine
Robert Butts (1928-1997), widely respected as an historian and philosopher of science, was equally well known for his ability to identify and nurture philosophical talent. The philosophical community has been, for many years, the net beneficiary of it. That ability, in turn, was the product of a clear grasp of what reason can do, where its limits lie, and how both affect human values.

Nowhere is that more evident than in the contents of this particularly welcome collection of his works, some previously published, some not, written at various points in his long career. They give evidence of the considerable scope and depth of Butts’s thought, covering everything from witch hunts, to Kant on musical sound, to the difference between science and pseudoscience.

From the beginning — a section on witchcraft (‘Two Stories About Evil: Christianity and the Creation of Witches’) — Butts’s strain of historically-based pragmatism is immediately evident. Showing a distaste for idle philosophical abstraction, he points out that evil is real — something everyone knows because it is something directly experienced. How to account for it? Here the reason for talking about witches becomes apparent: like so many other demonized target groups throughout history, witches become evil personified because of the widespread acceptance of a context based on unreasoned belief, the implications of which then having been worked out by ‘cold logic’ with the result that reification of evil seems inescapable.

The witchcraft theme is then continued in a series of three further lectures. In a style typical of Butts’s writing, they are nuanced, highly literate pieces designed to show that ideas do matter, sometimes tragically, and that it is possible to convey important philosophical thinking about matters of existence and belief without having to resort to the flat prose in which it often appears. In style and substance, the lectures are reminiscent of another pragmatist who thought that it was important to put philosophical ideas before a literate audience much wider than just philosophical professionals, i.e., Charles Sanders Peirce. The entire section on witchcraft is a particular pleasure to read.

Next comes a series of Butts’s best known papers, each in its own way tying together science and philosophical thought in the period from the mid-seventeenth century to the late nineteenth. What shows through the entire section are his thorough and fine-grained knowledge of the major figures of the period (and particularly of Kant, his lifelong speciality), and his penchant for taking perspectives which show their thought in ways that add substantially to our understanding of them. Did Leibniz’s physics influence his metaphysics, or was it vice versa? Or did they share an origin in

Robert E. Butts
Witches, Scientists, Philosophers:
Essays and Lectures.
Graham Solomon, ed.
Pp. ix + 204.
earlier religious thought? Was Hume’s skepticism strictly anti-rationalist in origin, as Kant suggested, or was it (as Husserl suggested) the product of a clash Hume encountered when he tried to use science based on facts of human nature to serve as a foundation for sciences which were exact and certain? The section ends with a previously unpublished account of Kant’s use of dialectic as a way of exposing metaphysical illusion rather than as the highest form of knowledge production. Once again, Butts’s emphasis is on the way matters addressed in science — in this case physiology and psychology — intrude in the creation of such transcendental illusion, and how the results are reckoned by critical reason.

The final part of the volume contains four papers directly centered in the philosophy of science. Topics addressed include the traditional (a critique of the hypothetico-deductiv e method; philosophy as a conservative extension of science), the recently interesting (how to distinguish science from pseudoscience), and a final one, published here for the first time, recounting (often from personal experience) the reception and progress of German scientific philosophy in North America. It is both a detailed recounting of the influences which led to the main turning points in twentieth-century philosophy, but it also contains historical theses designed to make sense of those events. Thus Butts suggests, for instance, that, rather than the German influence falling on untilled soil, in fact, conditions were already favorable to its reception. But the article is more than that. It is a wonderful reminiscence of what it was like to be a student in the period of the intellectual diaspora of the time. Butts captures the sense of sheer intellectual excitement like no other, and the paper is a classic recounting of the period.

[N.B. As this review was being written, terribly sad news arrived of the sudden and untimely death of the editor of the volume. While much of the subject matter addressed in it lies outside Graham Solomon’s prime area of philosophical interest — it was obviously done out of respect and affection for Robert Butts — the work will stand as a small part, typically well done, of an intellectual life cut far too short.]

James Van Evra
University of Waterloo
Leibniz scholarship has seen a tremendous renaissance over the past decade or two. Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's book is an exciting and exceptional addition to a thriving field. This is not an easy book, and it is not for beginner students of Leibniz. The authors are dealing with some of the most central and difficult concepts in his metaphysics, and they are dealing with them at a high and rigorous level. This results in one of the book's chief virtues: it significantly forwards the debate in current Leibniz scholarship on a number of interesting fronts. This book thus does more than its share of the work in keeping the field of Leibniz scholarship a stimulating and challenging one.

Within the first few pages of the introduction, we get a couple of statements of the authors' aims. 'Our historical objective is to gain some measure of appreciation for how Leibniz's views on substance and individuation emerge in the context of certain scholastic themes, and to secure a better understanding of those themes and their place in Leibniz's overall system' (1). And the 'philosophical aim of this work is to grasp more clearly the metaphysical problems of individuation by taking seriously how these are played out in the hands of one influential philosopher standing as an important mediary between scholastic and modern metaphysics' (4). These are ambitious goals, and the chapters that follow will satisfy the reader who takes that ambition seriously. But at least as interesting is the authors' position, implicit here, although made explicit a few pages further on (5, 8), regarding the debate surrounding the relation between history and philosophy: is it the philosopher's job to give an historical explication of the works of past philosophers, or ought we to engage in collegial debate with these historical figures? Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne state their intention to do both, and this ambition, too, is well satisfied. The book is historically sensitive and philosophically engaging, and so should appeal to historians of philosophy (of whatever inclination), and to contemporary metaphysicians alike.

This approach is evident from the first chapter. Here, Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne lay out the conceptual terrain of the problem of individuation, and they then turn to a discussion of how the issues are addressed in some Scholastics. With this philosophical and historical groundwork set, the authors then turn to Leibniz's own early account of individuation as found in his 1663 *Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui*. They draw out four themes from this early text: a principle of individuation has to be internal; metaphysical unity must be grounded in numerical unity; universals are conventional and not real; and there can be no formal distinctions, but rather only real or mental distinctions (28-38). They also identify Leibniz's own positive doctrine of individuation in this text: the 'whole entity'
The approach Leibniz is keen to reject in the *Disputatio* is the view that, among the non-accidental components of thing, only a subset of them need be invoked to explain [the thing's] individuality (40-1). Cover's and O'Leary-Hawthorne's aim with subsequent chapters is to investigate how these early themes develop, change, and are augmented with new ideas, as Leibniz's philosophy matures.

As this work unfolds, we are taken into some of the most complex and central terrain of Leibniz's metaphysics. Reviving old answers to some debates and joining many of those debates that are currently most lively among Leibniz scholars, the authors develop a rich interpretation of this metaphysics. So, for example, they contest the recent trend which denies that Leibniz envisions a reduction of inter-monadic relations, and instead they revive the old interpretation that indeed, Leibniz is a reductionist about such relations. But to bolster their claim, they give a careful analysis of what is meant by 'reduction', showing that we need to think of the problem from a broader (metaphysical) perspective than that offered by Leibniz's subject-predicate logic (chapter 2). This material on relations is crucial, argue Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, because getting straight about this will help us gain a better understanding of issues that bear more clearly on a discussion of individuation proper. These include: Leibniz's views on modal individuation, especially the sort of essentialism he endorses (chapter 3); what Leibniz intends by his Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (chapter 5); and why spatio-temporal relations cannot be invoked to account for the identity of individuals that are distinct from one another.

At the outset of the chapter on essentialism, the authors identify an addition to Leibniz's mature metaphysics of individuation, namely, the complete concept doctrine. This indicates a modal approach to individuation that gives rise to two serious issues. First, Leibniz's complete concept doctrine seems to necessitate that individuals be world-bound — that they exist in one possible world only (87-8). Second, and more fundamentally, the authors ask how it is possible to make use of a complete concept to define an individual (143). Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne note that this latter problem is manifest as a serious tension in Leibniz: 'while Leibniz gives undeniable voice to a haecceitist position, various strands of his thought exert significant pressures toward an anti-haecceitist view' (144). They address the first problem by arguing for what they call 'strong essentialism', a view that is weaker than the super-essentialism endorsed by many Leibniz scholars, and yet stronger than mere moderate essentialism. This position, the authors contend, allows Leibniz to maintain the trans-world identity of individuals that they think fits more accurately with Leibniz's system.

Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne address the second problem (chapter 4) by arguing for a 'brand of weak haecceitism' (169) that they also believe best preserves central Leibnizian themes. (Haecceitism, as used here, is the doctrine that allows a common individual essence despite radical dissimilarity of the individual across possible worlds [143-4].) This, in turn, brings them back to a consideration of the complete concept doctrine and their particular
interpretation of what that doctrine must be in order to salvage Leibniz's various metaphysical commitments in the fashion argued for by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne. The chapter on haecceitism also leads the authors to a consideration of 'the relationship between haecceitism and two important Leibnizian principles: the Identity of Indiscernibles ... and the Principle of Sufficient Reason ...' (155, chapter 5).

The penultimate chapter of the book addresses the problem of the enduring identity of individuals, and the role of Leibniz's doctrine of the law-of-the-series in dealing with this problem (chapter 6). And the authors complete their study of Leibniz on individuation by turning to a consideration of the threat of Spinozism — and the slide into a one-substance metaphysics — that looms over Leibniz (chapter 7).

As noted, this is an ambitious book. As the arguments unfold, the reader gains an appreciation for the authors' rich and interconnected interpretation of many strands of Leibnizian metaphysics. Part way through the book, having argued for a number of substantive conclusions, they note that they will now begin to take 'the first steps, to be continued in later chapters, toward combining the relevant threads of Leibnizian thought into a unified and coherent picture' (145). Given the sometimes hard-to-reconcile lines of thought in Leibniz's corpus, the authors provide a strongly argued and plausible account of how at least large parts of the system might all fit together: 'one begins to see strong essentialism, [the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles], [the Principle of Sufficient Reason], and weak haecceitism as intimately connected in such a way as to form inseparable aspects of a sweeping metaphysical vision. One might have expected as much from Leibniz' (161). It is a pleasure to see this sweeping metaphysical vision explicated and argued with within the context of the Scholastic background that Leibniz inherits.

Karen Detlefsen
University of Pennsylvania

Czeżowski belonged to the Lvov-Warsaw School founded by Kazimierz Twardowski, and although he was one of its most important exponents, he is very little known outside Poland. Czeżowski was interested in the nature of philosophy (or of 'philosophical disciplines', as he preferred, [24], [26]), the role of metaphysics (which he divided into inductive, intuitive and axiomatic) ([25], [29]), the methodology of science ([14], [15], for which he formulated a core of axiological principles of procedure (rules of honesty, objectivity and impartiality) which also philosophy must follow, and in particular reasoning and induction ([1], [4], [7], [9], [12], [13], [15]). He was also active in the philosophy of logic ([8]-[11], [28], [30]), analytic metaphysics ([27]), perception ([28]) and chiefly analytic ethics ([17]-[23]), which clearly shows the profound influence that Brentanian ideas, through Twardowski, had on him. For Czeżowski philosophy is a scientific enterprise not only because it shares with science the above-mentioned procedure rules, but also because it is
linked to scientific disciplines via logic and because both philosophy and
science use the method of analytic description ([2], [3], [16]): ‘analytic description
starts with a described object taking it as a representative of a certain
totality and leads to general statements of apodeictic self-evidence’ (44).

Before the appearance of this volume most of Czeżowski’s writings were
available in Polish only. According to the bibliography less than a tenth out
of 185 publications were not written originally in Polish or have a translation
in English. Now an incomparably wider audience can enjoy Czeżowski’s
thought. Anyone interested in Polish analytic philosophy and every scholar
working in the field is aware of the importance of books like this. An
enormous amount of philosophical literature of outstanding value produced
within the Lvov-Warsaw School was written in Polish, and only a small part
of it has been made accessible to western readers. However, it is crucial that
these rare efforts are carefully and consistently carried out. This volume is
less successful in this respect than the one immediately preceding it in the
series, a collection of Kazimierz Twardowski’s writings. The selection of the
material is not the most felicitous, nor are some editorial choices. The
above-mentioned titles seem the editor’s, as any indication of the original
publication data is missing. The reader is told, however, that the pieces come
only from Odczyty filozoficzne (Philosophical lectures, 1949) and Filozofia na
rozdrożu (Philosophy at Crossroads, 1965), with one exception ([1] probably
translates ‘Quelques problèmes anciens sous la forme moderne’, 1939/46).

But, very regrettably, page indications are not provided. It is not possible to
check in the bibliography, where no cross-references are given (entry 163
ought to be the translation of 145, but it is not indicated in either place),
which papers were then collected, or otherwise printed for the first time, in
the volumes which serve as the source of the book. This would have been
quite important, as the original texts are scarcely available outside Poland.
The editor points out that the volume publishes only papers from 1940 to
1965 because this was Czeżowski’s mature phase. However, at least a couple
among the earlier writings, for instance Teoria Klas (Theory of Classes,
1918), Zmienne i funkcje (Variables and functions, 1920), ‘Imiona i zdania’
(Names and sentences, 1918), ‘O zdaniach bez treści’ (On sentences without
content, 1918), and Klasyczna nauka o sądzie i wniosku w świetle logiki
współczesnej (The classical theory of judgement in the light of contemporary
logic, 1927), would have been welcome here. Whoever is familiar with the
development of Polish thought, the history of mereology and set theory, and
the metalogical turn in Poland will regret their absence.

There are mistakes and misprints — ‘Vilnius’ is ‘Vilna’ in all the introduc-
tion, and there are too frequently single instead of double consonants, like
‘aniversary’ for ‘anniversary’ (278) — but they are not annoyingly many. The
price is still high for a volume which aims at making Czeżowski more widely
known. But the book will surely succeed in this aim, and even if not appealing
to individuals, the price is still well below the exorbitant price-tags of similar
publications. The book should thus be present in any library wishing to
provide resources related to Czeżowski, the Lvov-Warsaw School, the tradi-
There are two major contemporary approaches to understanding function attributions in biology. The Etiological Theory (ET) holds that the function of any given sort of trait is the effect of the trait that brought about its selective success. The Systemic Capacity Theory (SCT) construes a function as an effect of a trait where that effect contributes to the operation of a capacity of the larger system to which the trait belongs. Recently, several philosophers have advocated pluralism regarding these views: each may be correct in a different domain, or perhaps both are unified within a more general concept. Paul Davies's *Norms of Nature* takes a sharp turn away from this trend. Davies argues that the ET should be abandoned, outright and completely, and that the SCT is the only defensible view of functions.

Davies articulates the latter claim by defending and developing the SCT in three ways. First, in chapter four, he defends it against counterexamples purporting to show the theory positing functions for traits where they have none. Davies deflects the objection by outlining constraints on the sorts of systems to which the theory may be applied. He then reviews each of the counterexamples, demonstrating how the constraints eliminate them. Second, in chapter six, Davies celebrates the SCT's success in naturalizing function attributions. He does this by arguing that systemic functions are an integral tool in scientific inquiry, providing tentative 'top-down' taxonomies for complex systems that 'provide a preliminary map with which to parse the system and study its functional parts' (159-60). Here Davies nicely dovetails the SCT with recent work on the research strategies of decomposition and localization.

Third, in chapters five through seven, Davies tackles the charge that the SCT is unable to accommodate our intuition that there are malfunctional traits. Davies accepts the charge, but thinks our intuitions mislead us here. He offers a deflationary 'Humean' account of these intuitions, on which we
judge traits to be malfunctional 'because we have acquired the expectation that components situated in systems of this type perform the stated task' (176-7). Davies does not develop this view in any detail, emphasizing instead that 'the essential point is the plausibility of the Humean strategy generally' (179). This is somewhat disappointing, for, as well-known criticisms of Hume's theory of causation demonstrate, such strategies often need substantial development to be plausible.

Although Davies’s defense of the SCT is lucid and insightful, in the present pluralist climate it is his attack on the ET that will raise eyebrows. He claims that it is (i) redundant (ii) non-naturalistic and (iii) unable to accommodate malfunctions. In chapter three, Davies argues for (i) by showing that etiological functions can be construed as a certain sort of systemic function. The idea is to treat a population as a system having a capacity to evolve. The SCT can then assign functions to traits that bring about selective success, on the grounds that they contribute to this capacity. Claim (i), however, is compatible with a pluralist view, and so Davies’ case for extirpating the ET rests on his arguments for (ii) and (iii).

Claim (ii) is of especial interest, because the ET itself has been used as the basis for attempts at naturalizing philosophy of mind, language and epistemology. If (ii) is true, this entire program is not only doomed but is rotten in its very foundations. Davies sees the ET as committed to an ontology he calls ‘minimalism’: ‘possession of a systemic function is equivalent to possession of a certain kind of history — a history of selective success’ (137). He thinks that minimalism violates naturalism, because naturalists will insist on knowing ‘what causal-mechanical properties of our history have the power to produce norms’ (141) (i.e., functions), and no such account is forthcoming on the ET. But this objection appears to be a non sequitur: if an etiological function is equivalent to a certain kind of history then surely it makes no sense to ask how it is produced by that history.

Davies’ argument for (iii) is also problematic. Davies argues, rightly, that in order to malfunction, a trait must have a function in the first place. The ET holds that if a type of trait T has an etiological function F, then T was selected for Fing. But ‘selected for’ trait types are ‘individuated in terms of the property selected for’ (200). So, for instance, a defective heart could be malfunctioning only if it has a function of pumping blood. It has such a function only insofar as it belongs to a type of trait selected for pumping blood. But such types are individuated by the property selected for, viz., pumping blood. This means that hearts that cannot pump blood do not belong to this type. Hence damaged hearts have no function and thus cannot malfunction.

This argument turns on the criteria for inclusion in a ‘selected for’ type. Davies claims that (A) such types are individuated in terms of property selected for and that it follows that (B) no thing lacking that property belongs to the type. Though (A) is plausible enough, it is left unclear why we should accept the inference to (B). A theory might individuate a type based on possession of a certain property, but it does not follow straightforwardly from this that possession of the property is essential for membership in that type.
The ET individuates a ‘selected for’ trait type as a sort of trait that caused survival by Fing. For this to be coherent, it surely must be true that many things of the type caused survival by Fing, but it hardly seems necessary that all of them did, or even that all of them were capable of Fing.

Despite these difficulties with Davies’ case for (ii) and (iii), Norms of Nature is a well-written, rigorous and provocative book. Its attempt to illuminate the ontology of selected functions under the stark light of an uncompromising brand of naturalism will surely shake up the pluralist orthodoxy. It is deserving of study by all interested in the truth about functional ascriptions.

Glenn Parsons
University of Toronto

Jeffrey Dudiak
Pp. xvii + 438.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8232-1965-8);

‘From the macro-cosmic levels of international relations, through national democratic politics, down through labor-management negotiations, to the micro-levels of marital and even personal therapies, twentieth century humanity places a great deal of faith and hope in dialogue as a way of peacefully settling conflicts and resolving tensions that threaten to devolve, or have already devolved, into violence. There would, moreover, appear to be some warrant for this faith ... but dialogue also, sometimes, fails — either in breaking down or in failing to get underway at all’ (Dudiak xi). The opening to Dudiak’s The Intrigue of Ethics immediately introduces the reader to the problem at hand: violence and/as the breakdown of dialogue. Whether or not Dudiak implies by this that all violence is the result of failing dialogue, a claim that is not explicit but seems plausible given Dudiak’s analyses, the intuitive appeal of this initial comment seems more than likely widespread: we are all too familiar with the kinds of violence at stake here. In particular, Dudiak concerns himself with ‘the problem of interparadigmatic dialogue,’ dialogue that lacks a common point of appeal, where the status of the logos grounding the dia-logos is strained and put into question. This too seems quite recognizable, perhaps more now than ever.
The main thesis of *The Intrigue of Ethics* is that discourse, as a robust and non-violent/non-violating relation with the other, is the condition of possibility for dialogue. As such, attending to and improving dialogue, and primarily the interparadigmatic sort, requires that I (as the one engaging the other in and through the dialogue) be 'more good', that I be ethically better rather than 'more rational' (or a more clever and/or persuasive speaker). Improved dialogue need not be more rational, it must be *more discursive*. Dudiak develops his defense of this thesis in three steps:

First, Part I, 'the idea of discourse', makes the claim that discourse is the condition of possibility of dialogue. Beginning with an examination of Levinas's 'le Dialogue' and following with an acute analysis of *Totality and Infinity*, he proposes that the shared *logos* of dialogue (*dia-logos*) is rooted in the primordial ethical relation between the self and the other: the possibility for sameness, and thus dialogue, depends on the separated non-allergic discourse of ethics.

Second, Part II, 'the possible impossibility', argues, through an examination of *Otherwise Than Being*, or Beyond Essence, that according to Levinas, discourse ought to be understood as a possible impossibility. The condition of possibility for discourse is what Levinas refers to as 'the saying', the possibility of communicating authentically and ethically with the other, while the condition of impossibility of discourse, that which makes discourse alone impossible and needful of the move to dialogue, is 'the said', the actual and performed ontological regime of language. In justifying the appeal to two different texts with seemingly different projects, this part adds considerably to Levinas scholarship by stressing the conceptual continuity between the earlier *Totality and Infinity* (1961) and the later *Otherwise Than Being* (1974). Although the two texts stress different elements, and in particular, different temporal moments, the project revolves around the same complex of ethical issues: 'whereas *Totality and Infinity* begins with the ego in the present being interrupted by the face calling it to a responsible future, the possibility of this call affecting the ego is traced, in *Otherwise Than Being*, to a deep past in which the ego is already implicated' (171).

Finally, Part III, 'discourse, philosophy, and peace', argues that Levinas's philosophical discourse, far from falling into the trap of ontological domination of which Levinas accuses the philosophical tradition, should be understood as a performative example of discourse, and so as a testimony to peace, thus rendering peace itself a possible impossibility. Dudiak importantly stresses the ground of Levinas's own work, the invitation to listen to the testimony or not, making it clear that there is nothing, nor can there be anything, which compels a reader to accept Levinas's conclusions. Persuasion is only possible from within an ontological use of language. If Levinas's discourse is a discourse and not a dialogue (or, worse yet, a monologue!), it must rest as an invitation and testimony, not an argument in the traditional sense.

In general, Dudiak's text works on two levels. It works first as a scholarly text, offering a thorough, although at times overly dense and heavy-handed,
explication and interpretation of Levinas's obscure radical ethics. Dudiak explains the terms of Levinas's work and admirably attempts to resolve a number of tensions in Levinasian scholarship (including among others the question of the status and appeal — either transcendental or empirical — of Levinas’s philosophical project; cf., pp. 352-94). On its second level, The Intrigue of Ethics attempts, as its professed thesis suggests, to benefit the discussions, both academic and otherwise, regarding the possibility of interparadigmatic discourse, and ultimately to promote peace and loving discourse. Not only does this work hope to improve meta-debates around interparadigmatic discourse, but to add and benefit those strained talks themselves. No small task.

The overall strength of this text lies in its thorough and informed consideration of Levinas, a thinker who has finally, over the past dozen or so years, been accorded the attention he deserves from academia (someone who interested folks like Derrida, Blanchot and Nancy is, oftentimes, for that very reason an unlikely candidate for serious academic attention). Where this text fails is in its few substantive suggestions for improved dialogue. Ultimately, Dudiak urges those who share his hopes to read Levinas. Although I share that commitment, the reader of this text is left wondering what more Dudiak can offer. The intrigue of this text suggests to me that there is more, but it has not yet been (transformed into a) said.

Edvard Lorkovic
University of Alberta

Terry Eagleton
*The Idea of Culture.*
Pp. 156.
US$57.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-21965-X);

'Culture', Eagleton tells us, is one of the two or three most complex words in the English language. It is also an increasingly important concept, lying as it does at the intersection of a number of important debates. Multiculturalism, cultural relativism, globalization and cultural imperialism, the culture industry, and more besides; all raise a host of pressing questions. Yet the concept itself is amorphous and ill-understand; a book that analyzes it, and explores the role it plays in these debates is therefore timely.
This is not that book. Eagleton’s slim volume is published in Blackwell’s Manifesto series, and accordingly this work is more polemic than careful argument. Many of the topics just mentioned are covered, in one way or another, but Eagleton’s purpose is not to give both sides of a debate, nor even to define the concept of culture. Instead, it is to argue for a particular view of it and its role.

His target is the manner in which postmodernism invokes the idea of culture. For postmodernists, the notion of culture is expanded to cover just about everything. Starting from the reasonable proposition that we are cultural creatures, in that symbolic representations mediate almost all our experiences, they argue to the conclusion that everything is cultural. They do so in order to multiply the differences between each of us; thus they emphasize subculture (gay, sado-masochist, and so on) as much or more than culture, in the anthropological sense. In doing so, Eagleton argues, they ignore and obscure the facts that make us alike: the shared bodily nature that allows us to sympathize with one another, and to engage in joint political projects. He doesn’t deny the central importance of culture to our self-understanding; rather, he holds that this is itself part of our shared nature, along with our body and the limitations and opportunities it offers us. Eagleton thus argues for a ‘dialectical’ notion of culture as it intertwines with nature.

Eagleton distinguishes several different meanings of the word ‘culture’, but he concentrates on just two. ‘Culture’, with a capital ‘c’, refers to the finest products of the human imagination: ‘the best that has been thought and said’, in Matthew Arnold’s famous phrase. But culture — this time with a small ‘c’ — is also used to refer to the way of life of a people; its institutions, rituals, dress, and so on. On the first view, culture is elevated; on the second, it is ordinary. Eagleton believes that these two meanings are inextricably linked, so that we cannot invoke the one without having the shadow of the other fall across it. Moreover, he thinks that they are capable of coordination, in an enlarged concept of culture which includes both, and which is also politically progressive (from his, broadly Marxist, standpoint).

He develops this conception of culture by contrasting T.S. Eliot’s and Raymond Williams’s suggestions on the topic. Both aimed to elaborate a common culture, but for Eliot commonality was entirely compatible with hierarchy. Culture — with a capital ‘c’ — was to be elaborated by an intellectual elite, who were entrusted with consciously shaping it. The masses, who lack the intelligence to participate in this ongoing task, would nevertheless partake of it, unreflectively living what their betters consciously made. Thus Culture (the intellectual production of the high-minded) and culture (the way of life of a people) are brought together.

Eagleton, of course, objects to the elitism of the Eliot model. However, he sees a useful corrective to it in Williams’s notion of a common culture. Williams accepts that a culture will be unconsciously lived, as much as consciously shaped; that the notion necessarily brings together Culture and culture. But he denies that the masses cannot play a role in this shaping. Indeed, it is precisely because we all engage in the activity of forming our
own culture that it cannot be brought to consciousness in its entirety. No one person can comprehend a whole shaped by the unplanned actions of many thousands. Culture thus formed requires and validates the participation of everyone, and is therefore, Eagleton contends, radically democratic.

Thus, Eagleton holds, Williams brings together Culture and culture in a distinctive way, reconciling the anthropological account with the artistic. In fact, however, Williams’s position does not seem to be distinctive at all. Far from finding a middle way between the anthropological and the artistic conception of culture, it just is the anthropological conception. At least in its more modern variants, which recognize the agency of the ‘natives’, all such conceptions recognize that culture is actively shaped by the very participants who live it. It is doubtful, too, that the conception actually entails radical democracy, as Eagleton seems to think. Languages are shaped in just this way, and no more so than today. Much of the language of advertising, for example, has its origin in street slang. But this fact does little for the real social and economic power of the underclass who are its major source. The generalization of genuinely popular culture by postmodernism is perfectly compatible, indeed an indispensable element of, late capitalism.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how Eagleton sees the third notion of culture dear to his heart fitting into this schema: the notion of culture as critique. Yet it is this third notion that must be the true animating force behind Eagleton’s arguments. It is not due to any supposed incoherence of the anthropological or the artistic notions of culture that he seeks an alternative; it is because the notion of culture, as it functions in what has come to be known as cultural studies, is depoliticized and thin. His criticisms of this notion of culture are well taken, but outside of this narrow and rather marginal debate, they seem rather odd. In this increasingly scientistic society, the idea that we risk losing touch with the fact that we have animal natures is absurd. In fact, the danger, political and intellectual, comes from the opposite direction: that we will over-emphasize the natural, the genetic and the inherited, at the expense, for instance, of the social programs which can ameliorate disadvantage. The extent to which we are, in fact, cultural animals, as much cultural as animal, stands in need of defense, not attack. Though Eagleton’s work may be a useful corrective to the worldview of a particular subculture, it is irrelevant or worse for the wider culture as a whole.

Neil Levy
(Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics)
Charles Sturt University
In this slim and elegantly-written book, Fairfield sets out to offer an alternative to many of the ethical theories currently on the philosophical market. His theory attempts to make ethics a concrete chapter of social theory by casting the former as an investigation into the nature of pre-existing forms of human engagement instead of the search for rational principles culled from conceptual reflection. Though this ultimately leads to what many readers will consider to be a conservative brand of liberalism, the novelty of the theory will make it worth the attention of philosophers working in many areas of social and ethical theory.

As Fairfield (and many others) argue, one of the faults of much contemporary ethical theory is its tendency to search for an understanding of human flourishing in abstract spaces rather than in what is already plainly before our eyes: the concrete realm of actual human comportment. The approach Fairfield urges as a corrective to contemporary trends in ethics is what he calls ‘practice-immanent theorizing’. It is, in other words, a theory that directs the attention of the ethicist towards the internal structure of our existing practices. If we look carefully enough, Fairfield argues, we will find within these practices an implicit teleological structure, one that defines and delimits the boundaries of moral and ethical activity. It is the goal of ethical inquiry to bring to the level of reflective awareness the principles inherent in these practices.

Versions of what can be called practice-immanent theorizing can be found in the sorts of theory associated with philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Hegel, and Wittgenstein, and to this extent Fairfield’s book offers nothing new. But the idea takes on an unexpectedly unique form in Fairfield’s book. Drawing on what is common to the projects of two of the most notable philosophical traditions of this century, Fairfield constructs a theory of what he calls ‘hermeneutical pragmatism’. Little needs to be said to bring to light why a philosopher interested in a form of practice-immanent theorizing would find pragmatism and hermeneutics attractive. What is striking, and timely, about Fairfield’s book is that he uses these two regions of twentieth-century philosophy to show how the placing of practice before theory allows the contemporary ethicist to avoid the lapse into forms of relativism once she gives up on the search for ‘transcendental’ ethical foundations (any theory that attempts to ground ethics on abstract principles is for Fairfield ‘transcendental’). His book is an attempt to show that hermeneutical pragmatism allows us to recover most of what we once thought we will lose if we accept that ethical life has no practice-transcendent justifications. Though no extra-cultural justifications are available for our social practices, Fairfield argues that by examining the principles already operative in cultural activity
we will find that we have all we need to speak of the legitimacy of — the meaning and truth inherent in — the structure of ethical life.

After two initial theoretical chapters, Fairfield goes on to work his position through some of the core areas of applied ethics, namely business and legal ethics. This is where the conservative tenor of Fairfield's theory begins to appear. Fairfield's interest here is primarily to address the fear many of us have of the tendency of corporate and legal practices to run roughshod over ethical principles (consider, if an example is needed, the lawyer who obscures the truth to win a case or the international corporation that buys and bankrupts small businesses to make room for a monster store). This offers Fairfield a case for testing the ability of his theory to offer a rigorous critical analysis of local ethical challenges. Fairfield's response is essentially that larger practices (judicial, for example) provide external constraints on these practices, constraints that keep them rationally aligned with the general ethical goals of our culture. This is, of course, how most liberal democracies are set up, with a certain blend of checks and balances. But anyone sympathetic to left-leaning liberalism (or theories that fall to the left of this) will find this assurance to be at best highly optimistic: search as we may many of us just will not see emerge the rational structure Fairfield believes appears when we examine the interrelation of the activities that constitute our culture. This is a problem with any theory that argues that ethical critique is always an internal affair, limited to the critical principles we can take from our existing practices, and Fairfield certainly needs to address it. Much work has been done to show that the denial of the possibility of extra-cultural critique is compatible with a revolutionary-spirited principle of ethical criticism, and so Fairfield has a number of possible ways of assuaging this fear many will have of his theory. But without an involved discussion of this fear, Fairfield risks turning away many who might otherwise be attracted to his theory.

Fairfield pulls off a very difficult trick in this book, one which ultimately shows his theory to be worth the attention of any serious student of ethics. He draws together elements from theories as disparate as virtue ethics and German Idealism and philosophers as seemingly contrary as Heidegger and Dewey, and he manages to blend together their various jargons and outlooks seamlessly. This book is an excellent example of how to speak intelligently about a single subject in a variety of philosophical tongues, and it leaves the reader with a significantly expanded understanding of how one might communicate across the analytic and Continental divide.

John Gibson
University of Toronto
French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century is not, strictly speaking, a philosophy text. Gary Gutting neither defends a particular philosophical position nor adopts an existing position located within the twentieth-century French tradition in order to propose new extensions. Instead, he offers a compellingly clear and sympathetic study of the philosophical movements in France over the last hundred years. What makes his study so compelling is his ease, as a philosopher, in moving through the various complex and challenging episodes of the philosophy of this era, laying out carefully the arguments contained therein.

Gutting divides his text into three parts. In the first part ('The Philosophers of the Third Republic') he examines philosophical activity between 1890 and 1940. Through an account of the role of philosophy in the French education system and the three principal turns of the century schools of thought (positivism, spiritualism and idealism), the first chapter provides the reader with a sense of the intellectual environment out of which the major twentieth-century philosophical positions will arise. The next chapter offers an overview of early twentieth-century French philosophy of science, introducing the roots of the challenge to the objectivity of scientific truth and the active role of the observer in ordering the 'objective' world of facts that becomes so important in the work of Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault. The following chapter is entirely devoted to Henri Bergson, engaging all his major texts and their attempts to solve the aporias of traditional philosophy through analyses of time, free will, memory and creativity. Here the complexity of Bergson’s thought is explained admirably, both for its own merit and with a forward gesturing toward his important influence over later generations of French thinkers. The first part ends with a gloss over philosophical activity between the wars, focusing on Bachelard’s philosophy of discontinuity, the Christian thought of Blondel and Maritain and Marcel’s proto-existentialism and its connection to the new concern with concrete lived experience that comes to occupy Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty.

The second part of the text, aptly entitled ‘The Reign of Existential Phenomenology’ [my emphasis], offers extensive analyses of the three most prominent existentialists: Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty. Although Gutting offers accurate and clear expositions of quite challenging and often opaque material, the most interesting aspect of this part is Gutting’s frequent reminders that these philosophies are situated in the context presented in the first part. Instead of seeing the existentialists merely as radical thinkers preoccupied with death and anxiety and more concerned to promote their vision of extreme freedom than engage in institutional philosophy, we find
in addition a picture of young philosophers taking exception to the stagnant authority of their teachers who have seemingly forgotten the concreteness of lived-experience. This context helps the reader grasp the significance of the famous existential tropes: engagement (political engagement and engaged writing), the turn to phenomenology, the Other and the resulting tense relationship between ontology and ethics.

Taking up almost half the book, the last part ('Structuralism and Beyond') engages the work of over a dozen prominent philosophers and philosophically-minded thinkers (I suspect that some may prefer that the noun 'philosopher' not be used to describe Levy-Strauss or Saussure, for instance) of the past four decades. Once again, Gutting ensures that his readers understand that the story being told is a continuous one. Not only does Structuralism begin where Existentialism ends, but, given Merleau-Ponty's hope that structural analysis could help existential phenomenology provide a more complete account of human 'being', it begins in the existential movement itself before taking Existentialism over and leading to its (and the subject's) demise. As such, this part begins with a chapter on Structuralism and its own self-incurred downfall in Post-Structuralism (with Barthes as the destructive bridge), followed by chapters on Foucault (which is particularly strong given Gutting's expertise on this topic), Derrida, the Philosophy of Difference (Lyotard, Deleuze and Irigaray) and the new fin-de-siècle (Levinas, Ricoeur and other more recent developments — primarily the work of Ferry/Renaut and Lacoue-Labarthe/Nancy). Gutting then completes his text with a short consideration of freedom as the underlying theme of twentieth-century French philosophy, once again ensuring the continuity of his-story.

Gutting's French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century is a worthwhile text, and that for three main reasons. First, he has constructed a comprehensive and eminently readable historical overview of the philosophy in question. As I have already alluded to, his text does not merely provide the reader with strong accounts of philosophical positions, which, incidentally, it does compellingly well, but stresses the inter-textual relations between the various philosophers considered. Without losing any philosophical rigor, Gutting supplies good historical contextualization. He neither restricts himself to writing history, nor does he merely reconstruct and evaluate philosophical arguments. Rather, his text lies somewhere in between, in that space that one often wishes more historical surveys of philosophy might occupy.

Second, Gutting admirably plays up the relationship between philosophy and education. From the initial chapter considering the educational atmosphere in the nineteenth century to the appendix describing the structure of the French school system, Gutting has, without explicit statement, demonstrated the social and political place of philosophy and the social and political means by which philosophy can be and is advanced. Although he nowhere defends the role of philosophy in state-governed education, given the present weariness in North America directed against philosophy and the humanities in general, we can only imagine that such a defense is implied. Making this connection thus seems particularly appropriate as a potential source of
ammunition for those who will want to venture such a defense, or at least as a possible spark for reflection on this topic.

Finally, by providing clear and compelling analyses of both well known and obscure French philosophers' texts, by examining recent developments in French philosophy, often co-terminal with contemporary non-French philosophy, and by showing these accounts situated in a tradition, Gutting gives those in the academy who have been reluctant to delve into the sometimes foggy realm of French philosophy a reason to bother reading some of these texts. French philosophy is neither as foreign to the philosophy taking place in the English-speaking world nor as impenetrable as is often thought. Gutting's text in some sense reintroduces French philosophy to the rest of the Anglo-American philosophical community; it is a helpful read for anyone at all interested in French philosophy, and entirely indispensable for those who reject French philosophy altogether.

Edvard Lorkovic
University of Alberta

Andrew Haas
Hegel and the Problem of Multiplicity.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1669-3);

One way to make sense of the history of western philosophy is to track the development of related concepts such as unity, one, many, identity, sameness, difference, and the like. That is, just about every philosophical system takes a stand on 'what there is' and how 'what there is' is individuated. The goal of Haas's book is to analyze the development of a member of this family of concepts, the concept of multiplicity. Haas has it that Hegel's account of multiplicity marks the point where traditional metaphysics gives way to a new way of thinking of multiplicity which supersedes the naïve view of multiplicity as mere plurality. Hegel's logic of multiplicity generates multiple meanings of multiplicity, such as 'universal particularity, a kind (way, quality) of becoming that shows itself in the moments of being and not-being multiple, a quantitative relation of an identity and multiple identities, the relation between qualitative and quantitative multiplicities, and so on' (277). To explain the transition from superficial to Hegelian multiplicity, Haas
examines Aristotle's struggle with the concept of 'many' and Kant's analysis of the 'manifold'.

Haas tells us that the Greek manner of thinking about multiplicity is illustrated by Aristotle's critique of Plato. According to Haas, Aristotle's problem in the *Metaphysics* was to show how 'being' could be 'many' (32). Plato and the Pythagoreans failed to ask the question 'How relative terms are many and not one', and they 'used “many” without asking what it is, without understanding what it means, how it is spoken, what causes it, what we mean when we say “many”' (31-2). Aristotle conducts such an investigation and concludes, unsurprisingly, that the term is used in a variety of ways in a variety of contexts. However, Haas thinks Aristotle's *Metaphysics* contains an answer to the question 'what does “many” mean?'. Aristotle argues that being is multiple in the sense that there are many substances. Substances are individuated numerically in the sense that there are many subjects for predicates. A similar view is advanced by Leibniz, whose monadology is a sustained defense of absolute multiplicity (*absolute Vielheit*) (260). But Haas argues that Aristotle's analysis does not penetrate to the core of the problem of the 'many'. Where Aristotle thinks of the 'many' as opposition to the one, there is a more fundamental sense in which 'many' can be understood as a principle underlying identity and difference rather than brute numerical differentiation (44).

Kant's exposition of the necessary conditions of experience moves the dialectic of multiplicity forward but not to completion. The key to Kant's analysis of multiplicity, or to use Kant's terminology, the manifold, is the transcendental unity of apperception. Haas argues that, for Kant, in order for the manifold to appear it must be structured by the forms of intuition, it must be appropriated by the concepts of the understanding, and, most importantly, it must be unified as the experience of some subject (54). For Kant, the manifold is obliterated in the process of experiential unification; thus, the many disappears under the rubric of unity. However, like Aristotle, Kant's solution to the problem of multiplicity does not completely resolve the issue, for, 'the problem of the manifold remains unsolved, beyond the realm of transcendental philosophy, outside the horizon of human understanding and the truth (*verum*) of the critique of pure reason, problematic: like the regulative ideas, like free will, immortality of the soul, the existence of God, the manifold qua manifold can be neither affirmed nor denied by reason' (ibid). Here, Haas notes Kant's inability to make sense of multiplicity in-itself, apart from the defragmenting process of experience and understanding.

Haas argues that Hegel breaks free from the conceptual straightjacket which shaped the simplistic or inchoate notions of multiplicity found in Hegel's predecessors in the history of western metaphysical thought. Here Hegel marks a certain horizon: on the one hand, the thinking of multiplicity opens up to the logic of multiplicity, to its identity and difference, its contradiction and non-contradiction; on the other hand, it closes off multiplicity under the sign of the double-bind of the concept, the double — and
only double — entendre’ (275). According to Haas, Hegel sees multiplicity as both multiple and non-multiple. That is, the dichotomous understanding of multiple and non-multiple is overcome by the logic of the concept. Hegel tells us that ‘the logic of the concept of multiplicity shows what it is (its being), what it is not (its nothing), and what it is and is not (its becoming)’ (281). That is, multiple and non-multiple are different moments in the dialectical process. With Hegel’s rich concept of multiplicity, the principles of identity and difference are not expressible via the traditional logical axioms of identity (A = A) and of non-contradiction. Hegelian multiplicity ‘marks a breakdown in grammar and language, the logical glitch, the prick in the tissue of a discourse that burns out or flags with multiplicity’ (285).

The gist of Haas’s account of multiplicity is clear. The concept of multiplicity or ‘many’ has been subjected to a variety of analyses in the western metaphysical tradition, yet the latent complexity of the concept is not made explicit until Hegel achieves a severance with the logico-categorical thought of his predecessors. Hegel is often credited with accomplishing similar feats with other important philosophical concepts. However, the satisfaction one receives from reading Haas’s depiction of the problem and his commentary on the efforts of luminaries in the western philosophical tradition to solve it will depend upon the reader’s philosophical leaning. Although the methodological distinction between continental and analytic approaches to philosophy is often abused or misleading, the distinction merits attention when one asks ‘who would profit from reading this book?’ Readers with an exclusively analytic background in Hegelian studies may find Haas’s language impene-trable. Those who have a background in the somewhat specialized language of the contemporary continental tradition may find Haas’s work an engaging historical survey of a fundamental metaphysical concept.

H. Darren Hibbs
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
This book is a valiant rearguard action, defending the study of literary texts from those who might consider that to be a worthless activity. Following on his study of *William Wordsworth and the Hermeneutics of Incarnation* (1993), Haney presents the English Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge as a writer whose philosophical reflections as well as his poetry should receive serious consideration in ‘the vital discussion of the relationship between ethics and literature now taking place in both literary criticism and philosophy’ (xi). Ethics has of course always been a major domain of philosophy; the interest in ethics by literary critics is a recent development, made necessary by the increasing marginalization of literary studies in the university and made possible by continental philosophy’s dialogue with literature (*Dichtung*). Haney relies heavily on Gadamer and Levinas, and to a lesser extent on Derrida and Heidegger, for the framework in which poetic utterances can be taken seriously as thinking. A loose analogy might be that Haney is attempting to do with and for Coleridge something like what Heidegger accomplished with Holderlin or, on a lesser scale, Gadamer did with Celan.

Since Coleridge was not a systematic thinker and because his writings are diverse in genre, often consisting of fragments or rough sketches, it is to be expected that this study is organized around a number of related topics, rather than attempting an outline of a tightly reasoned argument. A cursory glance over the chapter headings indicates the range and type of issues covered: 1. ‘Hermeneutics, Ethics, and Historicism’; 2. ‘Ethics and Art: Problems of Phronesis and Techne’; 3. ‘Knowledge, Being, and Hermeneutics’; 4. ‘Is and Ought in Literature and Life’; 5. ‘Literary Criticism and Moral Philosophy’; 6. ‘Oneself as Another: Coleridgean Subjectivity’; and 7. ‘Love, Otherness, and the Absolute Self’.

This is a difficult book to read because of the author’s cloying style. For some reason, Haney finds it necessary to refer by name in the text to every author or critic associated with any topic he is discussing. Perhaps this is supposed to enact a ‘conversation’, but the effect is off-putting. Passages such as the following abound: ‘As Stephen Knapp points out, Coleridge parallels his own experience of “my final reconversion to the whole truth in Christ” with Augustine’s in the Biographia (BL 1:205, qtd. Knapp 45), and Tilottama Rajan asserts that “[t]he Biographia is ... a conversion narrative” (The Supplement of Reading 105).’ Or: ‘With important exceptions such as Julia Kristeva’s *Tales of Love* and Martha Nussbaum’s *Love’s Knowledge*, and to a certain extent Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another*, love has not usually been seen as a paradigm for human ethical relations in a secular ethical tradition that
rejects sentiment as a foundational ethical source' (228). While honesty in citing is a scholarly virtue, there is also something to be said for elegance and for the use of judicious paraphrasing. Nor does it really enhance our grasp of the basics of hermeneutics to be incessantly returned to Gadamer.

Another source of difficulty in following Haney’s discussions is the lack of clear distinctions and definitions. The failure to distinguish clearly between ‘work of art’, ‘poem’, ‘literature’, ‘narrative’, and ‘fiction’ makes it difficult to connect the arguments here with those being conducted elsewhere (whether in narratology or in philosophy of science) and introduces or obscures problems. For example, one ought to be able to begin with the recognition that ‘Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ is a fictional poem and therefore fundamentally different than those of the ‘Lyrical Ballads’ purporting to be historical, autobiographical accounts. These distinctions were important to Coleridge and his contemporaries, not least because fictional texts had to struggle for legitimation in ways that histories did not. Blurring of the distinctions means that much of what troubled Coleridge about the epistemic status of Biblical narratives gets lost.

The thicket of citations also makes it difficult to discern just what Haney’s positions are. He states that he hopes ‘to make some contributions to our developing understanding of Coleridge as a philosopher’ (xii) and intends ‘to read both Coleridge and some modern positions in light of each other, within the conversation that Hans-Georg Gadamer sees as the appropriate model for our interpretation of the past’ (xii). One question arises immediately: on what principle have some modern positions been selected? For that matter, why has Coleridge been selected? Books are many, life is short, so it is not too much to expect that a study crossing disciplinary lines make some effort to explain why Coleridge might be of interest or importance to philosophers or to readers in general. The claim is made that ‘Coleridge has directly influenced modern theories of both selfhood and interpretation’ (xi), but the compelling evidence for this influence and for his putative centrality is not presented.

The point is not trivial, because what emerges in the course of Haney’s discussion tends to confirm that Coleridge was a derivative thinker, fundamentally loyal to a conservative Christian world-view (90; 129-30; and passim). This, regrettably, is what makes a philosophical engagement with Coleridge less productive than one with the radical theologies revealed in the poetry of Holderlin, of Celan, or even of Percy Shelley. What is ultimately disappointing about this book is not due primarily to Haney or his careful concern for the texts, but rather to the fact that Coleridge was not particularly incisive as a thinker. His anti-Kantianism seems largely a reactionary refusal to follow Kant’s logic and does not amount to a significant rebuttal. Even though Coleridge’s thought might fare well when conjoined with Gadamer’s conservative exposition of hermeneutics, the juxtaposition of Coleridge with Levinas proves embarrassing because it reveals how relatively untroubled Coleridge’s world was. God was still in a Heaven and all could be right
with the world. The threats of German Higher Criticism were gentle things compared to the absolute evil of the Nazi genocide.

Even so, a more ruthless phenomenological interrogation of Coleridge’s anxieties might have proved more revealing than Haney’s effort to make Coleridge our contemporary. The discussion in Chapter Two of phronēsis and technē is suggestive in this regard, where Haney explores the implication of technology in ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, deploying insights from Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (33-50; see also the article ‘Text and Technology in Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, English Studies in Canada 15.1: 35-47, not cited by Haney). This could have afforded an opening to the understanding of that which in Coleridge is most alien, most other to us, namely his anxiety that, under an amnesia induced by technique and reinforced by technology, he might lapse into prophetic enunciations, might become the dread poet of ‘Kubla Khan’. Such a poet-prophet would enter into competition with Scripture and with revelation. This was Coleridge’s perennial anxiety, encapsulated in a sentence quoted by Haney: ‘If any one’s head or tongue should grow apace, and all the rest stand at a stay, it would certainly make him a monster’ (130). The angst roused by the possibility of such monstrosity deserves closer attention in an age when just such originality has been hallowed beyond all doubt, all critiques. The difficulty presented by Coleridge for us is to understand what it once meant to reject unlimited originality, what it meant to resist idolatry, and how it might be possible to develop an ethics of self-restraint. It may take all our combined skills, as philosophers and as critics, to rise to that challenge.

Arnd Bohm
(Department of English)
Carleton University
In *Communicative Action and Rational Choice*, Joseph Heath develops an insightful account of practical reason that builds on his critical evaluations of both Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action and the instrumental conception of rationality.

Heath contends that reflection on the nature and use of language makes it clear that not all action, or even all *rational* action, can be understood instrumentally or, equivalently, as aimed at promoting the agent’s preferences over outcomes. Heath argues that if all action were so aimed, then (1) language would never have come into existence, since symbols could not acquire meaning if their use was not, at least typically, independent of the agent’s preferences over outcomes, and (2) even assuming language could somehow come into existence, it could not be used, as it is used, to solve the problem of indeterminacy — which results when there is an inadequate basis for forming expectations concerning the actions of others — since this use of language is possible only if the norm of truth-telling is generally respected. Heath then reasons that since language use, and in particular language use to solve the problem of indeterminacy, is rational, there must be cases of rational action that are not aimed at promoting the agent’s preferences over outcomes. As Heath convincingly argues, his Habermasian picture is a significant improvement over Habermas’s own picture in that it does not incorporate Habermas’s problematic theory of meaning, according to which comprehending an imperative involves knowing what would make it acceptable.

Toward working out an account of practical reason that does not have the limitations of a purely instrumental account, Heath makes explicit a distinction previously implicit in his discussion between *desires* (preferences over outcomes) and *principles* (preferences over actions). Though it at first struck me as odd and misleadingly labeled, this distinction allows Heath to make an interesting move. Heath argues that agents who are disposed to assign significant weight to shared principles can use language to solve the problem of indeterminacy. Furthermore, since agents can be socialized to seek shared principles and then give them priority, without necessarily being socialized to accept any principles in particular, an agent’s commitment to certain principles need not be interpreted as merely the result of socialization. There is thus room for the view that normative judgments (or, more precisely, norm-based judgments interpreted as categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives) are straightforwardly true or false. Indeed, Heath defends this view, which he argues has been dismissed on inadequate grounds. Heath explains that while the view does not fit neatly with the position that truth is a substantive property of sentences or with foundationalism, these posi-
tions are implausible; they should be rejected, according to Heath, in favor of deflationism and a dialogical and contextualist theory of justification according to which the background of any justification includes ‘those beliefs that are taken for granted by the audience to whom the justification is addressed’ (204).

Still, according to Heath, more needs to be said since non-cognitivism about normative judgments does not stem primarily from philosophical theories, but from the great divergence concerning which normative judgments are correct. Rather than focus on showing that the divergence appealed to is exaggerated, Heath defends the more original and radical claim that the extent of convergence in a discourse depends not on whether the claims being made are straightforwardly true or false, but on the extent to which lack of convergence will have dire practical consequences. The pragmatist picture Heath develops is intriguing as well as effective in terms of casting doubt on pervasive views about why it is that beliefs converge to a much greater extent than desires.

When combined with his view that without shared principles we will not have an adequate basis for forming expectations about the outcomes of our actions and thus no adequate basis for choice, Heath’s pragmatist account of the variation that discourses exhibit in their levels of convergence makes sense of our level of commitment to achieving moral agreement. In particular, it makes sense of our persistence in arguing with those we interact with on a regular basis about candidates for shared principles until some sort of consensus, perhaps the result of compromise, emerges. Heath explains that the use of argumentation, rather than say coercion, to settle on a set of shared principles is not dispensable, since ‘ultimately the system of norms will be stable only if it is endorsed by all’ (308); and since ‘argumentation … imposes a set of constraints that are captured in the familiar moral ideas of symmetry, reciprocity, recognition, and so forth, … the decision to “talk it out” … commits participants to a specifically moral resolution of their differences’ (281).

Heath’s account of practical reason is impressively clear and subtle. I do, however, have a few worries. Here is my main worry: Suppose it is granted both that ‘languages would be unlearnable if the norm of truth-telling was not generally respected’ (302) and that ‘agents are in a position to recognize that they would all be better off if they could come to some agreement [instead of all reasoning purely instrumentally]’ (273). Still, once language is in place, each agent might also realize that, though she is disposed to seek and prioritize shared principles, insofar as she can weaken this disposition, which includes a willingness to compromise, she can take advantage of a system that requires only general adherence to survive. (Heath’s claim that ‘ultimately the system of norms will be stable only if it is endorsed by all’ [my emphasis] seems an exaggeration.) In particular, the agent can pretend to accept the principles that have been settled on, but freely violate them whenever she can get away with or significantly benefit from doing so, taking into account of course the long term consequences of her action, including
any effects on her future opportunities for profitable interaction with others. (Note that, unlike David Gauthier, Heath does not think it reasonable to assume that agents are ‘translucent’ so that a change in disposition would necessarily be detectable.) Nothing in Heath’s account makes it clear that a mock compromiser is open to rational criticism, particularly since, assuming she can weaken her disposition to seek and prioritize shared principles, her strategy of pretending to agree to constraining principles will be her best strategy whether others also adopt this same strategy or follow the disposition they were socialized to have. Of course, she would be open to rational criticism if her choice were that all agents weaken their disposition to seek and prioritize shared principles, but that is not her choice (nor could it be, since she can choose only for herself). This suggests that Heath’s solution to the problem of indeterminacy is not reflectively stable, since the foreseeable temptation to only pretend to compromise is not countered by any reason to remain a genuine compromiser. Heath might reply that it follows from his dialogical model of justification that the agent I have been considering is open to rational criticism. The problem with this possible reply is that while Heath argues effectively against foundationalism, he does not provide any arguments against monological (i.e., non-dialogical) theories of justification in general.

Though I have some worries about Heath’s position, his thought-provoking book definitely vindicates his claim that we can expect a great payoff from developing a dialogue between Habermas’s theory of communicative action and the theory of rational choice.

Chrisoula Andreou
University of Utah

Christopher Kutz
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age.
Pp. xii + 331.

Our leading moral theories focus on direct acts of intentional, individual wrongdoing. As Christopher Kutz effectively illustrates in this book, that leaves out a lot of important moral terrain. We often participate in wrongful situations without causing them. We own stock in a company that exploits the environment. We buy products made in sweatshops. We are citizens of nations founded on stolen land. Some wrongs so far outstrip individual intention and control that they seem 'more inhabited than made' (119). Kutz argues that, unless we abandon our individualistic conceptions of moral
agency we will be unable to detect many cases of wrongdoing. But unless we continue to tie accountability for moral wrongdoing to individuals’ understandings of themselves and their actions, we will be unable to motivate them to do anything to prevent these wrongs. Kutz’s project is to find a way to balance the perspectives of the individual and the group. He focuses not on individual intentional action or group action, but on individual accountability for what we do with others.

The first step is to show how individuals can be responsible for the actions of their groups. Kutz develops an account of collective action in terms of overlapping, individual participatory intentions. The main idea is that a group acts when individuals intend to act as part of a group. This account deals most easily with cooperative or joint action, for example, the actions of corporations or teams. However, Kutz argues that the theory can be extended to deal with the actions of unstructured groups as well, like the group of all CFC-users who collectively caused a hole to form in the ozone layer.

‘No participation without implication’ is the slogan for Kutz’s theory of moral accountability. To participate in a group wrong is to share in the accountability for that wrong. Kutz supports this view with an extended discussion of the firebombing of Dresden. The thousands of deaths in the firestorm were so radically over-determined by the Allied bombing raids that no single airman’s actions affected the outcome. Individualistic conceptions of moral agency and accountability have a hard time assigning responsibility to agents when their actions make no individual difference to outcomes. But Kutz’s theory of collective action and accountability allows us to concur with the airmen’s own intuitions that their participation in the bombing of Dresden was morally weighty.

Importantly, to intend to participate in a certain collective action is not the same as intending the action itself. In cases of coercion, willful ignorance and moral cowardice, agents help bring about an end from which they would like to distance themselves. The navigator of a bomber may be repulsed by his army’s strategy of bombing civilian areas. He cannot be said to be aiming at that end. His intention is merely to follow his orders. Kutz’s account of collective action allows us to link the deaths to this reluctant agent. The navigator intends to play a role in the bombing of civilians under some description, and so he shares in the responsibility for the outcome.

Kutz’s threshold for complicity in wrongdoing is relatively low. He even argues that there are cases in which mere membership in a wrongdoing group can place duties of reparation on an agent. But accountability itself is highly sensitive to the details of particular cases in a way that mitigates the severity of judgments of complicity. To be held accountable for wrongdoing or complicity is to deserve some kind of negative response. These responses include punishment, but they also include subtler signs of disapproval, such as raised eyebrows.

One of Kutz’s main interests is to argue that accountability is relative to both the agent’s mode of participation in wrongdoing and the agent’s relationship to the people affected by the wrong. Any act of wrongdoing or
complicity on my part will affect a variety of my relationships to other people, including the person who directly suffers the harm, those who love that person, my own friends, bystanders and the state. They will be warranted in responding to me with a variety of attitudes, sanctions and demands, each related to their own positions. To some, the consequences of my actions will understandably be most important. Others will respond to the content of my character or my causal role. Individualist theories of accountability usually offer univocal judgments of desert. Kutz charges that this is to confuse a judgment of moral wrongness with a judgment of accountability. Instead, we should conceive of accountability as a complex social relationship, consisting of a set of warranted responses between an agent and a host of moral respondents.

In the latter chapters of the book, Kutz turns his attention to issues of complicity and accountability in the law. He finds the law to be interestingly inconsistent. In the prosecution of accomplices and co-conspirators, criminal law makes a tight connection between the acts of the group and the accountability of individual group members. However, in corporate law, tort liability attaches to the group but not the individuals within the group. Kutz argues that both branches of the law would benefit from a closer examination of the roles of individuals within groups.

Linda Radzik
Texas A & M University

Neil Levy

Being Up-To-Date: Foucault, Sartre and Postmodernity.
Pp. v + 207.

As we are all aware by now, during their careers, the philosophical relationship between Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault was — at best — tenuous. Although separated in death by only four years, the generation gap between them seemingly implied that they were worlds apart on philosophical issues. Neither did much to downplay this suggestion. In fact, their antagonistic assaults toward one another only served to perpetuate this assumption. Without a doubt Sartre and Foucault are two distinct and original thinkers, thinkers whose mark has been left on twentieth-century continental philosophy and whose influence has reached beyond the tradi-
tional boundaries. Although Sartre is currently considered to have had his
day, the present intellectual milieu is still very much coming to terms with
Foucault. What then, one might ask, would encourage a comparative study
of these two philosophers? Is not Sartre a philosopher in the modern tradi-
tion? One who had described existentialism as a humanism? Is not Foucault
a postmodern thinker? One who had coolly announced that man was an
invention of recent date? Is not the generation gap telling? It is precisely
questions such as these that motivate Neil Levy in *Being Up-To-Date*.

Levy observes that post-structuralism, the kind of philosophy which came
to prominence in the France of the 1960s, claimed to institute a break so
fundamental and radical in the history of Western philosophy that it not only
demed the majority of thinkers prior to this rupture as *passe*, but it ushered
in a new historical epoch. This epoch, known as postmodernity, claims to
initiate a host of original and novel themes. Nevertheless, as Levy recognizes,
many of the topics that postmodernism claims as its own are shared with
modernism, and he sees a comparison of Sartre and Foucault as a golden
opportunity to bring this congruence of modernity and postmodernity to
light. In carrying out this comparison, Levy seeks to argue that the common
portrayal of a rupture between the thought of Sartre and Foucault is, ‘at best,
highly simplistic’ (xi). More broadly, in accomplishing this task, Levy desires
to suggest that the relation between modernity and postmodernity is itself
much more ‘complex’, ‘subtle’, and ‘contradictory’ than commonly thought to
be.

*Being Up-To-Date* is essentially divided into two halves. In the first half,
Levy sets the stage for the comparison of Sartre and Foucault by elucidating
the issues that encompass their thought. In chapter one, he makes an
attempt at defining postmodernism by suggesting that it best be understood
as ‘that which claims to be after the present’ (2). In chapter two, among other
things, we learn about the circumstances which lead Sartre and Foucault to
reject the suggestion that a substantive basis for comparison exists between
them. The third chapter sees Levy make a brief but important detour that
traces the influence of Heidegger on Foucault. Chapter four is again, for the
most part, concerned with Heidegger — specifically, the implications of his
thought not succumbing to the doubles of modernity that Foucault identifies
in *The Order of Things*. Chapter five examines the consequences of Foucault,
in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, completely freeing himself from these
doubles. Levy concludes this chapter, by reading Sartre’s existentialism
through the prism of Foucault’s doubles and, in doing so, argues that for
thought to be critical — instead of avoiding the doubles — it is perhaps best
to lucidly enter into them.

In the second half Levy begins his explicit comparison of Sartre and
Foucault. Chapter six brings to light the important parallel between Sartre
and Foucault with respect to the role of ‘the gaze’ in their thought. Here, Levy
is careful to stress the differences between Sartre and Foucault — for Sartre
the objectification of the gaze originates from an ontology of the subject while
for Foucault it becomes historically embedded in relations of power. Chapter
seven sees Levy present a subtle and intricate argument that relates to the role of critique and reflection in the early works of Sartre and Foucault. From different angles, Levy shows that both arrive at a similar impasse. In chapter eight, the ethico-political thought of the two philosophers is examined. While in chapter nine, Levy — in dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty — examines the implications of conflict and antagonism in the social thought of the later Sartre and Foucault, circa his analysis of power. Chapter ten sees Levy argue that postmodernism — understood in terms of the future or ‘not yet’ — is an untimely notion. Recognized in this manner, Levy shows that the thought of both Sartre and Foucault, at various points, is indeed untimely or postmodern. In chapter eleven, Levy returns to the topic of ethics and argues that Sartre and Foucault each develop their own ethical vision that appeals to the future. The concluding chapter sees Levy arguing that the work of Sartre and Foucault demonstrates not only the importance and necessity of reflecting upon the present but also the possibility of a postmodern humanism.

*Being Up-To-Date* is an important and ambitious work. The ambition lies in the fact that as his topic, Levy takes two of France's twentieth-century intellectual giants. Such a project presents, as Levy acknowledges, many risks. The most obvious would be linking Sartre and Foucault together in such a manner that the originality of their thought becomes flattened. Levy certainly does not succumb to this danger and, instead, presents a well-balanced work that demonstrates affinities in Sartre and Foucault but, at the same time, is sensitive to preserving the crucial differences. For anyone interested in either Sartre or Foucault the importance of this work goes without saying. For those interested in the continental tradition in philosophy this work is crucial. Levy convincingly shows that Sartre and Foucault are not two philosophical strangers separated by a generation gap, but two thinkers on a common philosophical horizon. Of equal importance, this comparison challenges us to rethink some of the basic assumptions that define our present era.

Mark Raymond Brown
University of Ottawa
If reason today is providing poor refuge in the urge to comprehend a world long fallen beyond — if ever part of — the confines of conventional comprehension, then perhaps it is time to lift the philosophical gaze from the bounds of current positivist penchants, and face, genuinely, the evocative appeals of substantive, lived nourishment. There is an old saying which goes something like: ‘Love may be the oldest emotion, but it has always been accompanied by a kiss.’ We all know love’s presence as a first-felt quickening, its eventual loss as a brutal gutting, its sadness as a shaking, staring absence. Love constitutes its force, its vitality and sensibility, its sheer sensual physicality, in the obligation of embodied proximity. But no more love than any other emotion manifests itself as lived sensibility within a plenum that confronts and stands over against our feeble bleatings. Emotional physis constitutes our possibility and obliges our ability to respond.

Foucault reminds us, we who believe ourselves bound by an all too human finitude which opens the truth of the world by means of our supposedly unique cognition, that ‘we are bound to the back of a tiger.’ For Alphonso Lingis, this tiger is the torrent of being, a torrent in terms of which our emotional lives are inextricably woven, something originating outside ourselves, already and always otherwise. ‘An active organism does not simply dissipate its energies; emotions channel the currents. Euphoria and torment, sensuality and rapture thrust it into the thick of the world’ (69). ‘Emotions get their force from outside, from the swirling winds, ... the rotating planet, ... the ocean currents, ... the continental plates shifting and creaking, ... the whimsical fluttering of butterflies’ (18). Poetic bursts like these are what philosophy should also be: bold, impassioned, evocative, deeply moving, and bang on.

Alphonso Lingis, from by all accounts an odd and idiosyncratic philosopher, is at once a knight of phenomenological transformation and a contemporary Diogenes. Dangerous Emotions is indeed a riveting performance. In this, his latest and perhaps most moving book-length study, Lingis demonstrates the poverty of contemporary philosophy’s consideration of emotions by extending his celebration and thoughtful exuberance to a meditation on how emotions channel thought to its ethical task, ‘the reckless and violent compulsion to open our eyes and face what is! To seek contact with reality ... to expose ourselves not only to the hard edged resistance of things but to be pained and exhausted by them’ (79). Like his intellectual master, Emmanuel Levinas, many of whose texts he has translated, Lingis does not attempt to discover truths of ethical regulation, rules for deliberative understanding. He appeals for ethical transformation by manifesting before our eyes the
event of being, the remarkable adventure and process of being alive, the
adventure that is always already ethical in its pre-occupation with the other,
and the tumult to which we are inextricably obligated.

Dangerous Emotions continues a form of inquiry now familiar to readers of
some of his earlier works, Excesses (1983), The Community of Those Who Have
Nothing in Common (1993), Abuses (1994), Foreign Bodies (1994) and The
Imperative (1998). Lingis weaves his own personal experiences of travel with
sustained critical reflections on philosophers like Kant, Freud, Levinas,
Nietzsche, Husserl, Bataille, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Mauss and
Derrida. The philosophical narrative takes us from Easter Island to Brazil,
Kenya, Chiapas, Java, Peru, Antarctica, Calcutta, Montana, Turkey and
Tierra del Fuego. It is sweeping in its geographic and philosophical focus and
generous in its presentation of the most intimate lived particularities: the
sublime experience of sitting at the bottom of the world’s deepest terrestrial
canyon, the marvel of turning a pre-historic stone axe in one’s hand, the
courage of a woman standing up to her oppressors in military controlled
Nicaragua, the albatross who leaves its nest only to touch land seven years
later.

Lingis’s exploration of the most intimate experiences of our everyday —
the surreal witnessing of a car accident, and the (extra-)ordinary pleasure of
a caress — is the real strength of this book. From the angry opening chapter
which explores the horrific colonial history of Easter Island within its
mysterious landscape as the ‘navel of the world’, to the last chapter, a plea
to consider the subjective, ethical implications of choice, Lingis has crafted a
stunning exploration of how thinking is the most material, embodied, and
most splendid of physicalities. The essay entitled ‘Gifts’ is worth the price of
the book alone. Lingis makes short work of Mauss and Derrida who interpret
the gift as only an exchange function within a necessarily reciprocal economy.
Giving, for Lingis, is the experience and expression of a reckless, passionate
risk to sacrifice, ‘[t]he gift is truly a gift only to the extent that, however
modest, it ... educes the passion to give one’s life’ (175).

The contemporary academic life of calculated self-satisfaction comes to
harsh judgment throughout the book, and rightly so. We are a self-satisfied
lot ‘who have imprisoned [our] hearts through many years of well-paid
compromise and betrayal’ (181). All too often in accepting jobs in Cleveland
and writing papers for tenure and job security ‘we also decide never to go
spend twenty-four hours and see dawn, high noon, and mid-night in the
sequoia forest! ... decide never to climb Machu Picchu, ... decide never to hurl
a rock at a riot squad protecting the oligarchy’ (181). Lingis reminds us that
every choice we make has implications for our embodied, and thus ethical
lives. Increasingly, our choices constrict our experience, asphyxiate and
ashame our sensuality, the very source of our joy and the danger that makes
life meaningful. If there is a shortcoming to Lingis’s didactic tone, it is that
he too is a comfortable academic, and only so because he plays the game so
well. But, Lingis does foray beyond his beard and his office. He does practice
what he preaches, and it is marvelous reading.
When was the last time you were brought to tears reading philosophy? Read Lingis. Read this book. Don't read it with a pencil in your hand. Read it out loud to your family, to your students, to your lover as you sit in the bath together. Any one of the essay chapters in here should be used in introductory classes to show why philosophy, why thinking, matters. Lingis has crafted an emotional space where we can reflect upon the ecstasies of thinking and the intensities of living well. It is a paean devoted to the beautiful tragedy academic philosophy works so hard to silence and continues so vehemently to deny, our complex visceral lives.

Mark Jackson
(Department of Sociology)
University of Alberta

Douglas Low
Merleau-Ponty’s Last Vision:
A Proposal for the Completion of
The Visible and the Invisible.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1806-8);

The primary intention of this work, conveyed by its subtitle, is to propose a completion for Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible, the unfinished posthumous work that, according to Low, bridges modernism and postmodernism in philosophy. Low intends to carry out this task by supplementing the extant sections of Merleau-Ponty’s final work with insights gleaned primarily from his last lecture courses, as conveyed by the summaries published in Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France, and from later essays including ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ and ‘Eye and Mind’. Given this stated intention, the reader might be forgiven for expecting an analysis and synthesis of Merleau-Ponty’s later concepts, if not their further development along the lines suggested by the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible and other later texts. But, in fact, Low stops far short of this goal, providing only an introductory summary of the texts he discusses, and making few suggestions for how Merleau-Ponty’s thought may have gone beyond the material already published. Although this text will be useful for students seeking an introductory overview of Merleau-Ponty’s later thought, it makes little contribution to contemporary Merleau-Ponty scholarship.
After a brief introduction explaining the state of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished text and the method of its proposed reconstruction, Low’s text is divided according to a 1960 outline for the contents of *The Visible and the Invisible.* Part I, ‘The Visible and Nature’, is devoted to the corporeal relationship with the perceptual world and includes four chapters: Philosophical Interrogation, The Visible, Nature, and Classical Ontology and Modern Ontology. The first two chapters summarize the key themes of *The Visible and the Invisible*, the first concentrating on Merleau-Ponty’s general approach to the body, reflection, and language, while the second focuses more specifically on the ontological claims of that text’s final chapter, ‘The Intertwining — The Chiasm’. Throughout these chapters, Low emphasizes the role of pre-reflective corporeal experience in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, his attempt to avoid the extremes of idealism and realism, and the function of such central concepts as ‘chiasm’, ‘dehiscence’, and ‘flesh’. Chapter three summarizes Merleau-Ponty’s three lectures on nature at the College de France, including his response to the work of Descartes, Kant, Schelling, Bergson, Husserl, Driesch, and Freud. Chapter four summarizes his last published essay, ‘Eye and Mind’, focusing especially on the exemplary perceptual and expressive role of the painter and the move of contemporary art beyond the confines of Cartesian modernism.

Part II, ‘The Invisible and Logos’, draws from Merleau-Ponty’s courses at the College de France that deal with perception and language, along with the essays ‘On the Phenomenology of Language’ and ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’. In particular, Low summarizes Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the expressive power of perception, the transition from perceptual meaning to gestural and linguistic meaning, and the constitution of ideality through speech and writing.

Low provides a useful service by organizing the material from Merleau-Ponty’s later courses and essays according to the structure proposed for *The Visible and the Invisible*, and his clear presentation of the material will be accessible to first-time readers of Merleau-Ponty. Those already familiar with the contents of Merleau-Ponty’s writings, however, will find little original insight here. Low’s work consists almost entirely of exegesis of familiar texts, adding little by way of commentary or critical discussion. Although Low does occasionally offer his views on the relationship of Merleau-Ponty’s work to contemporary ‘postmodernists’, this theme is not developed in detail or with any serious examination of relevant texts. He mentions only Derrida by name, and his comparisons seem to be based entirely on caricatures borrowed from other secondary sources.

Apart from the disappointing lack of critical examination of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Low’s book suffers from an even deeper fault that strikes at the heart of his project. Although he claims to offer a ‘completion’ of *The Visible and the Invisible*, he makes no effort to carry Merleau-Ponty’s analyses beyond the state already found in his published works and lecture summaries. Certainly it is surprising to be told that Merleau-Ponty’s masterpiece, the culmination of a decade of work, would have consisted of little
more than studies stitched together from already published essays and lecture notes. Nor does Low pay more than passing attention to the rich material contained in Merleau-Ponty’s published working notes. In fact, it is fair to say that many of the most evocative and fertile insights in Merleau-Ponty’s last work go completely unremarked in Low’s ‘completion’.

Furthermore, Low seems unaware of the voluminous body of material from Merleau-Ponty’s last period that has been published in the last ten years, none of which is cited in his study. He is content to quote summaries of Merleau-Ponty’s later lectures, although the full text of many of these lectures, drawn from both student notes and Merleau-Ponty’s own manuscripts, are now widely available in La Nature, notes, cours du Collège de France (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1995) and Notes de cours, 1959-1961 (Paris: Gallimard 1996). In addition to these texts, a large collection of unpublished material, including many notes from Merleau-Ponty’s later period, can now be consulted at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Certainly no serious attempt to reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s final work can be entertained today without close examination of these materials.

The claim to have completed The Visible and the Invisible is apt to raise the eyebrows of anyone familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s œuvre — we might as well hope for the completion of Husserl’s Krisis or Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. And in truth, the task of ‘completing’ The Visible and the Invisible is not only, as Low admits, ‘dangerous’, but also simply unnecessary. The true ‘completion’ of Merleau-Ponty’s thought lies not in such reconstruction but precisely in our own possibilities for taking up that style of philosophical interrogation he inaugurated, for rediscovering that ‘middle ground’ where, as Merleau-Ponty wrote in his last essay on Husserl, two thinkers can be ‘present together’. In other words, the future of Merleau-Ponty’s thought lies not in how he might have finished his final work, but in realizing the task of continuing it ourselves.

Ted Toadvine
Emporia State University
Matthew McGrath  
*Between Deflationism & Correspondence Theory.*  
US$55.00. ISBN 0-8153-3852-X.

*Between Deflationism & Correspondence Theory* is part of the Garland ‘Studies In Philosophy’ series, edited by Robert Nozick, which publishes outstanding dissertations in philosophy. McGrath’s primary goal is to present and defend a view about truth which he calls ‘weak deflationism’. Weak deflationism is an alternative version of Paul Horwich’s minimal theory of truth, which Horwich also calls ‘deflationism’.

Deflationism is the view that there is no more to the truth predicate than what is expressed by uncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema

\[(E) \quad \text{the proposition that } p \text{ is true iff } p\]

Horwich excludes instances of (E) which lead to paradox; the uncontroversial instances are the axioms of deflationism. Deflationism is close kin to Quine’s disquotational theory, except that for Horwich it is propositions which bear truth. Because Horwich excludes paradoxical instances of (E), deflationism does not endorse the universal quantification of (E) over propositions. Consequently, deflationism cannot be given a finite statement; it has an infinite number of axioms. This is a source of objections, on the grounds that deflationism cannot account for the explanatory role of truth, and cannot provide a characterization of the nature of truth. (Horwich embraces the latter result.) Objections have also been raised against deflationism stemming from the use of the substitutional variable ‘p’ in (E); specifically, problems arise where ‘p’ is ambiguous, contains context-sensitive terms, or is a non-English sentence.

Ernest Sosa (who advised McGrath’s dissertation) has proffered a refinement of deflationism based on a schema using an objectual variable ranging over propositions, and which is finitely stateable:

\[(FMT) \quad (x)(x \iff (x \text{ is true}))\]

Sosa’s finite minimal theory claims that every proposition entails and is entailed by the *de re* proposition that it is true. Sosa’s theory is finitely stateable, and is compatible with various characterizations of the nature of truth; thus, the finite minimal theory can account for the role truth plays in explanation.

Weak deflationism is a development of Horwich’s deflationism, and is an alternative to Sosa’s finite minimal theory. Following Horwich and Sosa, McGrath takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth. Likewise, the truth predicate expresses a property, but a deflated property; that is, a property explained by reference to a schema such as (E) or (FMT). Strictly speaking, weak deflationism is a determinable theory whose determinates are determined by the interpretation given to the symbol ‘\(\iff\)’ in (FMT). This symbol may be interpreted as mutual entailment to yield the finite minimal
theory; it may be interpreted as material equivalence, to yield Horwich's deflationism, so long as the universal quantification is eliminated. From discussions later in the book, McGrath's preferred interpretation of '↔' seems to be the asymmetric relation of explanation, in a special sense: e.g., the proposition that whales are fish explains the proposition that 'whales are fish' is true. This sense of explanation does not entail that the explanans is true, only that the two propositions are related such that the explanandum would explain the explanans, should the explanans be true.

What makes weak deflationism a weak version of deflationism is that while truth for propositions is deflationary, truth for sentences, utterances, beliefs, and other non-propositional truthbearers is inflationary. 'If one is willing to inflate meaning, one can give an account of truth for non-propositional entities that recognizes explicitly a dependence on meaning, but which remains deflationist about truth for propositions. Truth for non-propositional entities will be analyzed in terms of expression of true propositions' (39).

Although the weak deflationist's ontology is 'inflated' by recognizing propositions as meanings, the correspondence relation in which sentences participate is simply the relation of expression. This is not a relation of correspondence which will satisfy a correspondence truth theorist. Hence, weak deflationism is thoroughly deflationary; it does not lie between deflationism and correspondence theory.

Weak deflationism is presented and defended in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 1 McGrath discusses and argues for realism about propositions and properties. Chapter 4 defends Platonism about properties and propositions against modal realist challenges. Chapter 5 discusses the relation of the truthmaker project to correspondence theories and to weak deflationism. Throughout, McGrath's discussions are detailed and interesting.

A more serious problem addressing weak deflationism is addressed in chapter 6: the Liar Paradox. To his credit, McGrath does not endorse restricting the central truth equivalence, i.e., (E) or (FMT), to non-paradoxical instances, on the grounds that such a move is ad hoc. His solution is based on 'an (almost) general account of truth' according to which both ordinary and strengthened Liar sentences (L) are ungrounded, and consequently neither true nor false. However, his (almost) general account does not permit '(L is neither true nor false) is true' to be asserted, since it is ungrounded; hence, the account is unduly restrictive, albeit not ad hoc. Another problem facing this account is the ordinary Liar sentence, which poses a more tenacious paradox than the strengthened Liar sentence.

Jay Newhard
Texas Tech University
In a time of uncertainty and conflict, it is not surprising that there is a renewed interest in the study of human passions (or emotions). Several books have recently appeared in the English-speaking philosophical world on this subject, ranging from studies of the passions in a particular historical period to more ambitious treatises on their role in ethics. A common target of this latter group is Kant's perceived denigration of the emotions in ethical life. Some, like Martha Nussbaum in *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, defend a revised stoic view of the passions as a kind of judgment, while others, such as Simon Blackburn's *Ruling Passions*, revive a kind of Humean naturalism, in which reason has an advisory role. Although Michel Meyer's book has several points in common with these works — for instance, it offers a wide-ranging historical perspective on the subject and advances a broad theory of human nature in which the passions are central to ethical life — it offers a very different approach to the topic. As the translator, Robert F. Barsky, points out in his useful preface, Meyer continues the legacy of Chaim Perelman, who revived the tradition of Aristotelian rhetoric to address questions of justice. Meyer eschews the terms of the never-ending debate over whether emotions are rational or not and argues that the discourse of the passions is a kind of rhetoric expressing the radical contingency of human nature.

The work is divided into a multi-part historical study and a long, concluding section, in which the author sets forth his systematic view of the problem elicited in the historical sections. The historical part offers a grand narrative of the development of philosophy itself in terms of the passions. The point of the history, as Meyer notes in his introduction, is two-fold: first, to combat the view, found in the stoics and enshrined by Kant, that the passions are a kind of disease or folly; and second, to show that 'there is a rationality in the reflections concerning passions' (3).

The historical narrative is based on a modified version of the fall from grace. In the beginning the Greeks, especially Aristotle, understood individuals in relation to the City, and the passions were above all about the relation of the individuals to each other. Christians like St. Augustine, drawing on Plato, transformed the passions into sin. The passions are no longer about the relation of man to the polis but about the relation of man to God. In the modern period (1500-1900), there is a gradual, but profound reaction to the Christian view. The passions of the flesh become rehabilitated as interests, which are the basis of social relations in a democratic society. And it is this
tension between the Christian disdain of the flesh and the modern focus on primary passions, like Freud’s concept of sexuality or Hobbes’ will to power, that has produced a kind of nihilism, which opens up the possibility of reconceiving the passions as ‘above all, a form of sensitivity,’ or as a ‘sign of the contingent in human beings, that is to say, that which they wish to master’ (5).

Although Meyer clearly values Aristotle’s approach, he does not advocate a simple return to the Greek conception of passion and the related study of rhetoric. In his fascinating discussion of Plato, he points to the paradox of passion: it is at once a problem to be overcome through reason, but ‘also, that which, by its own nature, opposes itself to all resolution,’ because it blinds us to the very problem in the first place (24). As he shows in each successive chapter, the effort to pigeon-hole the passions, that is, define their ontological essence so that they can be overcome by reason, is misguided. While it is the paradox of the passions that produces philosophy in the first place, each attempt to overcome it only reinscribes the paradox in new terms. The study of the passions becomes a study of the very possibility of philosophy itself.

The historical narrative, which has ended with the open possibility of a new way of thinking about the passions, one in which Plato’s paradox is not overcome but reconceived, culminates in Meyer’s own analysis in the last chapter. It is not the passions which are the obstacle but a certain conception of reason, which he calls ‘propositional’, which defines them as a problem in the first place. The paradox of passion is really a paradox of this kind of reason, in which ‘the eradication of the interrogative becomes the very foundation of the rationality’ (206). Meyer suggests that this denial of the question is a feature of consciousness itself, a desire for necessary continuity in the face of constant change. Passion marks the subjective experience of taming chance through its mastery by reason, which is symbolized in the transformation of real questions into merely rhetorical ones that reason can answer (217). Since passion inevitably means the raising of a question about ourselves, and it is our very nature as contingent beings to be constantly put into question (by ourselves and the external world), Meyer thinks that to embrace the passions and the questions they raise is to embrace our very humanity.

Although his narrative cannot do full justice to each figure and period he discusses, it is refreshing to encounter such an ambitious project, full of rich insight. Meyer shows that the passions are central to deep metaphysical and epistemological issues both in the history of philosophy and in contemporary thought. And while the presentation of his ideas is highly abstract, in the concluding section he does offer a variety of practical cases to illustrate and test his analysis. Meyer’s approach offers a stimulating and alternative perspective on the debates found in much recent literature on the emotions.

Michael A. Rosenthal
Grinnell College
Feminist discourse has long been dominated by Anglo-American and French authors while works of scholars from German-speaking countries have been far less widely read and translated, since their work has been until now only scattered across journals. This anthology by Nagl-Docekal and Klinger is thus an important contribution to the feminist debate, as it strives to present a picture of German feminism and its specificities through translations into English of articles that have appeared previously only in German-language journals. What connects all the essays is the shared underlying intention of the contributors to critically assess the tradition of the ‘Continental European “malestream”’ (6), with Enlightenment thought as the point of departure. The angle from which this tradition—the canon that is to be re-read—is approached is the question of how gender as a philosophical category works pervasively to produce, structure, and limit theoretical constructs. With this background in mind, the essays in the collection can roughly be divided into two groups, one in which the authors proceed from a key thematic question and then inquire into a variety of texts, as do, for example, Lieselotte Steinbrügge in ‘Femininity and Critique of Reason in the French Enlightenment’ or Cornelia Klinger in ‘Woman—Landscape—Artwork: Alternative Realms or Patriarchal Reserves?’ The second and larger group concentrates on a few texts by one or two authors who are subjected to a close reading and from whom insights are then gleaned regarding a certain question, as, for example, in Herta Nagl-Docekal’s ‘Philosophy of History as a Theory of Gender Difference: The Case of Rousseau’ or Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky’s ‘Woman: The Most Precocious Loot in the “Triumph of Allegory”: Gender Relations in Walter Benjamin’s Passagenwerk’.

The intention of this anthology, apart from introducing German feminist authors to a wider English-speaking audience, is on the one hand to transcend a reduced paradigmatic notion of patriarchal thinking that works on the basis of a reiteration of a presumed gender split. On the other hand, the contributors share the self-critical intent to challenge interpretations and contentions that have attained ‘canonical’ status within feminist discourse. Perhaps the most valuable contribution of Re-Reading the Canon in German is the discussion of philosophers that Anglo-French feminist discourse has generally engaged only marginally, especially Schopenhauer, Simmel, and Benjamin. Deuber-Mankowsky’s inquiry into Benjamin’s use of gender metaphors in connection with his examination of the fetishism of the modern hero...
is especially instructive. Deuber-Mankowsky offers an insight into sexual difference as thematizing the more general philosophical problem of sameness and difference and at the same time exposes the necessity of inquiring into sexual difference when notions such as experience, the subject, or history are to be theorized. Another thought-provoking contribution is Klinger's examination of the connection of woman and nature, in which often, she argues, nostalgia for and idealization of untouched and unspoiled nature is paralleled and intertwined with a certain symbolization of femininity. Klinger shows that this signifying intertwinement is based on a fundamental split between instrumental and aesthetic reason, which then points to the necessity of a critique of the conceptualization of reason and its effects on the understanding of gender.

While not denying the importance of this anthology, there are nevertheless a few points at which the collection did not quite fulfill the promise of the introduction. First of all, eleven of the thirteen essays were published for the first time around a decade ago, and even the remaining two are several years old, leading one to wonder what has happened over the last decade in German philosophical feminist critique. The collection would have profited from an introduction to each essay contextualizing it with respect to recent development in feminist debate and clarifying the essay's ongoing relevance in that debate. Second, several articles appear to stop just as they become interesting; the most obvious example is the article by Christa Rhode-Dachser, who offers an examination of the theoretical manifestation of the inferiority of women in Freud's theory of femininity and traces the unconscious motivation back to the male fear of an independent mother who could leave the child at any time. What does such an insight now mean for the use of Freud in feminist theory? What would change in the reading of Freud due to these insights? As in this case, and others such as Bennent-Vahle's essay on Hegel or Birkhan's comparative study of Weininger and Freud, it would have been interesting to read at least sketchy suggestions of what the analyses might mean for feminist theory. Finally, while the introduction explicitly draws attention to the reliance of the construction of gender on the construction/understanding/concept of sex, the juxtaposition of gender and sex with sexuality is utterly ignored, which is symptomatic for the entire anthology. Sexuality is mentioned, but it is not further questioned with regard to the underlying dispositif of heterosexuality. For example, in her study on Georg Simmel and the philosophy of the sexes, Ursula Menzer mentions the heterosexual matrix that underlies the concept. Instead of asking what meaning and function heterosexuality attains here so that men and women via the ontologization of sexuality can be 'each assigned different forms of thought and knowledge' (218), Menzer, like other contributors, turns away from the issue of sexuality, which, had she addressed it, could have made her critique even more powerful. As one reads the entire anthology, it becomes very obvious that the disavowed unconscious of the German feminist debate as one encounters it in *Re-Reading the Canon in German* is sexuality studies in general and queer theory in particular.
Despite these shortcomings, this anthology most definitely is a long-needed publication and should prove valuable to the Anglo-American discourse, especially as the incisive and extensive re-readings from the German perspective can provide new impulses to the English-speaking feminist debate. In both its strengths and short-comings, *Re-Reading the Canon in German* demonstrates the importance of feminist theorists more closely engaging with and challenging each other’s work.

**Annika Thiem**  
*Department of Theology*  
University of Tübingen

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**Elizabeth Neill**  
*Rites of Privacy and the Privacy Trade.*  
Cdn$US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2097-X);  

In recent years the concept of privacy has been co-opted with increasing frequency in support of a vast panorama of ethical and legal claims. In many cases, the right to privacy has acquired the status of a moral trump card requiring no further justification. Its usefulness to the protagonists in such a wide variety of disputes reflects the privileging of individual interests over social ones but is greatly enhanced by its being a relatively unexamined and poorly understood concept, both in terms of what it is and where it comes from. Elizabeth Neill’s attempt to illuminate this area is therefore a contribution to a philosophical project of great contemporary relevance.

Broadly, Neill’s approach is to provide an ontological basis for a natural right to privacy based on innate human properties, thereby distinguishing it from other related natural rights. At the practical level, this analytic approach is intended to establish grounds for determining which aspects of privacy should be regarded as inviolate and which may be waived or, to use Neill’s term, traded for other rights or goods. A theory of privacy as a natural right is developed in the first part of the book; in the second, its practical application is demonstrated with respect to two real-life examples which are analysed in depth with respect to the theory.

As ever, the challenge that must be faced when attempting to derive moral significance from innate properties is of how to arrive at ‘ought’ from ‘is’. In
this case the innate properties in question are the privacy and autonomy of thought. The gap from these to a right to privacy is bridged in two independent ways, corresponding to 'factual' and 'moral' ontologies of natural rights respectively. First, privacy rights are societally bestowed as symbols of the value placed on the human dignity that arises from the innate properties. Second, the innate properties themselves are valued as rights which are founded on the conception of human beings as dignified. This may appear to be a circular argument in which human dignity is introduced both as arising from and the foundation for the valuing of privacy. Neill goes to some lengths to dispel the appearance of circularity, employing the device of moral conception as metaphor to do so.

Whether one accepts this account of the ontology of natural rights depends to a great extent on one’s attitude to an approach that locates the origin of rights within the individual, as opposed to, for example, the contractual alternative which is explicitly rejected by Neill. Irrespective of this, the development and treatment of the theory is undeniably thorough and consistent. The explanation of how and why concepts of privacy may appear to be culturally determined and yet are grounded in universal qualities is particularly convincing. In the end though, the test and value of any moral theory is in its ability to generate answers to moral questions that agree with our intuition or are able to explain the theory’s departures from it. The theory is put to the test here by employing it to judge the validity of the privacy claims made in two specific social dilemmas.

In the case of the institution of national medical data banks, Neill finds that opposition on the grounds of invasion of privacy to be unjustified. Objection on the same grounds to the disclosure of personal counselling records in court cases is declared as valid. The difference in the conclusions turns on the distinction between the body and the mind as objects with properties on which rights claims may be founded. On Neill’s view, the privacy accorded the body and bodily functions is merely a socially constructed symbol intended to represent the actual inviolate nature of the mind whereas the expression of mental states vouchsafed to the therapist are closely linked to that nature. Therefore, the transgression of the privacy of thought is a breach of a more fundamental right than the transgression of the privacy of the body.

Perhaps because the first part of this book is an example of analytic philosophy being done in a well-ordered and consistent manner, the subsequent attempt at application demonstrates particularly clearly the problems inherent to such an approach. Unsurprisingly echoing the underlying analysis, the practical conclusions can be acceptable only to the extent that one agrees with Neill that the biological nature of the individual takes precedence over socially constructed features. Having said that, it is possible to arrive at these same conclusions without taking the same route. However, many of the other incidental judgements made are less plausible. For example, Neill states that, although eavesdropping violates privacy, the eavesdropper does not violate privacy by subsequently relating what they have
heard to a third party, since there is no direct access being made to the speaker at the time of the recounting. This will be a strongly counterintuitive result to many people, and the theory provides nothing to explain why our intuition should be wrong other than to repeat its own axiom that the individual is more fundamental than the social.

Nonetheless, despite the unavoidable limitation arising from its theoretical approach, this book is a thoughtful and thought-provoking contribution to the understanding of privacy as a concept and as a right.

**Andrew Bartlett**
Knowledge Workers Ltd.

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**Brian Orend**

*Michael Walzer on War and Justice.*
Cdn$/US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2223-9);

The Cold War is over and the ‘Empires’ are leaving room to would-be states. Low intensity wars rage in Europe, Africa and Asia: battle lines, as well as the battlefields, are foggier than ever. Some countries have high technology, use intelligence, professional soldiers and guided missiles; others, not having these luxuries, rely on other means. Some must deal with public opinion at home requiring them to act morally; others have no public opinion, no home, or neither.

In war, the usual moral thinking does not apply: one is not only allowed but required to kill. In war, particular cultural norms and traditions seem to override universal moral principles. Michael Walzer offers both a complex political philosophy and a strong view on the ethics of war. Philosophers have tried to establish rules of war, and Walzer stands at the sophisticated end of a long tradition. Orend’s book offers a rather short, readable introduction to Walzer and more precisely to Walzer’s views on war; it is a welcome summation of ideas outlined by Walzer over the last thirty years. It is written for a wide audience, including professionals, philosophers and students, and will be of interest to philosophers and political scientists.

The first two chapters treat Walzer’s view on justice and are, by and large, independent from the core of the book. Orend then presents the methodology followed by Walzer. Curiously, Orend never makes explicit that Walzer is a
communitarian, nor does he emphasize the importance of that school of political thought. I would have liked to see more emphasis on this tradition and how it opposes contractarianism or utilitarianism. The occasional references to Rawls give an idea of the unbridgeable gap between communitarianism and 'game theory oriented' foundational ethics. Exploring this gap would have been interesting, but is clearly not the point of the book. Nonetheless, the reader will easily identify clear points of disagreement — relying on tradition or on rationality; particularism vs. universalism; questions of relativism; varying degrees of attention to issues of motivation — and will be able to reconstruct broader arguments on this basis. The second chapter introduces the thin/thick distinction. Basically, thin norms are 'universal' principles under a different name and 'thick' norms are embedded in a culture and specific to that culture. The ethics of war is a thin moral code.

Most wars are not conflicts between states. Walzer, by focusing on states, simplifies the complexity of the international relations, where there are many unequal players playing a game for which philosophers try to provide rules; where states are not islands, being influenced by, and influencing, other states; where many states have rather artificial borders (in Europe and Africa, for example); and where non state-like entities have powers different from those of states. Walzer is also rather conservative, suspicious of global institutions like UN and NATO. The latter play and will play an increasing role.

The bulk of Orend's book (pp. 61 to 152) concerns Walzer's theory of war. Orend is obviously on familiar ground here, and these pages are much more specific and interesting than the previous ones. In fact, they constitute a good introduction to the topic. They are also largely disconnected from the first chapters, and can be read independently of these. Chapter 3 addresses general issues in war theory (realism, pacifism, utilitarianism) and the following three chapters examine the famous triad — *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*. The chapter on *jus ad bellum* includes some revision of the theory of just cause when it comes to anticipatory attack, counter-intervention and humanitarian intervention. Because Walzer did not say much on *jus post bellum*, Orend tries to articulate a Walzerian stand on that topic. However, the discussion does not go very deep, and avoids some controversial issues, something that is particularly evident in the discussion of the war crimes trials. Ironically, this issue is the focus of attention of global institutions — which Walzer is reluctant to recognize.

Unfortunately, one will not find here what could have been a good introduction to Walzer's political philosophy and, as far as his views on justice are grounded in his political philosophy, one will not be able to appreciate the complexity of his views on war either. Orend tends to stay very close to Walzer, beginning many sentences with 'Walzer believes that' or 'Walzer suggests that'. He provides a summary rather than focusing on and exploring the principles underlying Walzer's project. Things improve in the chapters on war. Still, the discussion never goes into depth: one has a rather sanitized picture of an extreme and brutal world. The beginner will not have a window on the complexity, and sophistication, of Walzer's views on justice and war.
One would also have liked to read more of Orend's own assessment of Walzer and of the applicability of his work to hotly debated issues. How, for instance, do these principles apply to the situation in the Middle East, and more generally to wars not involving the US?

Richard Vallée
Université de Moncton — Campus de Shippagan

David Owens

*Reason without Freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity.*
Cdn$130.00/US$90.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22388-1);
Cdn$49.99/US$29.99

Hume said ‘A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.’ But Hume also thought that what we believe is not up to us, that is to say our beliefs are not subject to our will. There is a tension between these two plausible theses. On the one hand, it certainly seems to be the case that if our beliefs are to be well grounded, they must accord with the evidence for and against them. And if we are to be responsible epistemic agents, it seems it must be up to us to make our beliefs line up with the evidence. Epistemic normativity seems to depend on it. On the other hand, if beliefs were entirely under the control of our will, then it looks as if we could believe whatever we wanted. This seems simply false, not only for perceptual beliefs, but also for what Hume called beliefs in unobserved matters of fact. Our beliefs seem to be at least partially determined by factors outside our control. So there is a serious problem for epistemic normativity. The case is partially analogous to the longstanding problem of free will. If we are to be morally responsible for our actions, then it looks as if what we do must be up to us, under the control of our will. On the other hand, it seems simply false that actions are entirely up to us; on plausible assumptions they seem at least partially determined by factors outside of our control. So there is a serious problem for moral responsibility. David Owens's *Reason without Freedom* is the first book-length study of this cluster of issues considered together.

As a first step out of Hume's impasse, Owens argues that it is a mistake to think that both our actions and beliefs must be subject to our wills, in order for us to exert the control necessary for responsibility. There is an attractive
picture of human rationality that extends a different sort of control to our beliefs, as well as our actions, thus laying the ground work for a unified account of normativity. Owens quotes Korsgaard, concerning the problem of the normative: ‘For our capacity to turn our attention onto our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason’ (9). Owens accepts this account with regard to our actions, but rejects it with regard to our beliefs. In Part 2, he argues ‘that practical judgement, and not the will, is the instrument of control over our agency’ (9). But in Part 1, he rejects it as the basis of an account of epistemic normativity. Although he accepts that such normativity requires responsibility, he denies that responsibility requires control, even control based on judgment rather than the will.

A traditional picture of belief, one to which Locke and Hume subscribed, is to think of belief as coming in degrees: the higher the proportion of positive to negative evidence in favour of a proposition, the higher degree of belief or assent we will (or should) have towards the proposition believed. Roughly, knowledge is certain, and though some beliefs have a very high degree of certainty, it is of a different sort than that accorded to knowledge. Owens mentions this picture only to set it aside (21; see also p. 38), perhaps not noticing its distinguished ancestry. For Owens, and for many modern epistemologists, ‘to believe that \( p \), I must be under the impression that I have a conclusive reason to think \( p \) true: reflection on inconclusive evidence is quite inadequate ... In belief, what we claim is knowledge of the truth, not just a sporting chance of being right’ (35). On the traditional picture, a belief is justified in so far as our assent to that belief is proportional to the evidence. On Owens’s account, no amount of evidence can determine or justify belief; the evidence must be seen to be conclusive or sufficient. This requires pragmatic considerations. But mere reflection on pragmatic considerations will not move us to form beliefs, though they may move us to act. If we reflect that the time to act is now, we can act. But simply being aware that our time is almost up will not lead us to form a belief. ‘We just do not have that sort of control over our belief’ (34). This is why Owens thinks that Korsgaard’s attractively unified picture of rationality falls apart: ‘believing is not an action with truth as its goal, which is why it is not under our reflective control in the way that action is. Pursuing truth in belief is nothing like seeking the good through action’ (31).

Owens’s final view of epistemic responsibility is, roughly, as follows: an agent is responsible if that agent is sensitive to first-order epistemological
reasons (reasons to think that a proposition is true or false), and can correctly respond to pragmatic factors which allow inconclusive evidence to become sufficient for knowledge. In the last part of the book, Owens applies his account of responsibility to develop interesting accounts of the epistemology of memory and testimony. He argues that both memory and testimony are ways of 'borrowing' reasons, of which a person may not be aware, from external agents and hence of transferring a person's responsibility for his beliefs to others. In each case, an agent is rationally permitted to use reasons by proxy. In the case of memory, the original reasons for belief support the remembered belief because the agent shifts responsibility for the belief onto a prior self, while testimony works by allowing an agent to use another agent's reasons as her own (even if these are unknown). These views are both original and interesting, and allow Owens to maintain that agents can still be responsible for memory and testimonial beliefs.

Owens's book is at times quite difficult to follow. The first section, which is extremely important to the project of the book, is very difficult and its argumentative structure is sometimes quite opaque. This may be due to the fact that Owens is working at the intersection of epistemology and meta-ethics, and thus a good working familiarity with both literatures is important to understanding some of the general contours of the debate. That Owens is sensitive to both epistemological and meta-ethical theories makes it frustrating that he never seems to address one of the issues that is central to certain epistemological debates: are epistemological statements really normative or are they merely evaluative? The latter but not the former might be the case when we say that a belief is well-placed with respect to the truth; no 'oughts' follow from this claim alone. One of the things at issue between internalists and externalists about justification is whether responsibility of certain kinds is important to justification or knowledge. Some externalists, for example simple reliabilists, can be read as claiming that an agent can have justified belief and knowledge and yet not be positively rational in her beliefs. As long as a person is not actually irrational in holding a belief (and hence the justification of the belief becomes subject to internal defeat), if the belief is the product of a reliable cognitive process, then it is justified. While Owens may have good reasons for rejecting such views, he needs to argue explicitly that epistemological responsibility really is the central epistemic concept. This he fails to do, except in an extremely roundabout manner in a chapter where he argues that skepticism gets started because of certain assumptions about control over belief. Nonetheless, this is an important and interesting book that extends the debate in modern epistemology in significant ways.

[NB: David Owens, the author of this book, is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Sheffield. David Owen, one of the authors of this review, is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona. We are not identical with each other. And neither of us is identical with the David Owen at the University of Southampton, the David S. Owen at Hamline University, or the David G. Owen at the Law School of the University of South Carolina.]

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As far as I can tell, none of the latter three are identical with each other either, nor have any of us served as Foreign Minister in Her Majesty's Government.]

David Owen and Todd Stewart
University of Arizona

Samuel M. Powell
The Trinity in German Thought.
Pp. 288.

While interest in the Trinity may seem restricted to Christian theologians (and many theologians and philosophers have keenly provided reasons for this restriction), many philosophers have not only contributed to the history of Trinitarian thinking; they also have greatly been influenced by their attempts at understanding the Trinity and its ontological, historical, and soteriological dimensions. The Trinity is a theological doctrine that still attracts philosophical interest, particularly in German-speaking thought where the Reformation and German idealism were golden ages of Trinitarian reflection. German intellectual history — at least until the mid-nineteenth century — can hardly be written apart from a careful examination of both philosophical and theological Trinitarian thought.

Samuel M. Powell's The Trinity in German Thought presents the main stages of German philosophical and theological consideration about the Trinity. Particularly for students of Leibniz, German idealism in general, and Hegel in particular, this book will be an invaluable source of information about the historical and theological context within which these philosophies need to be interpreted. Powell provides concise overviews of Luther's and Melanchthon's interpretation of the Trinity and examines the path German Trinitarian thought has taken since the Reformation. His account of the transformations of Trinitarian thought in the early (Zinzendorf, Leibniz) and, as he has it, the critical (Reimarus, Semler, Lessing, and Schleiermacher) Enlightenment shows how Luther's and Melanchthon's impulses were adopted and transformed as well as rejected. Powell not only summarises different views of the Trinity; he also provides a convincing key to understanding the history of German Trinitarian thought and its implications. He suggests that German Trinitarian thought is mainly concerned with three key concepts. First, the idea of reflective selfhood: of particular
interest for German thinkers was the question of whether human consciousness could be analogized to the Trinity — as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas assumed — or not. Second, the concept of revelation: post-Reformation theology and philosophy were crucially interested in whether the doctrine of the Trinity could be derived from the bible, and how the Word of God might properly be understood. Third, the idea of history, which became important from the mid-eighteenth century onwards: Powell shows that while interest in history first led to questioning became an interpretative key to understanding the history of God and his relation to the world. Powell shows this historicization of God, as it were, in his masterful interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. The last two chapters on nineteenth-century liberal theology and twentieth-century Trinitarian thought offer a thorough examination of Protestant theology and its attempts to arrive at an adequate understanding of the Trinity (be it even by marginalizing this doctrine). Philosophers, too, can benefit from Powell’s discussion of, for instance, Barth, Tillich, Moltmann, and Pannenberg. These theologians not only show how indebted theology still is particularly to Hegel’s Trinitarian thought; they also show the implications of Trinitarian thought for the understanding of history, the human self, and God.

Powell thus provides a detailed account of the history of Protestant theology and of philosophy insofar as it has been influenced by the principles of Protestantism. He rightly points out that there was a decline of Trinitarian thought in German philosophy after the demise of Hegel’s philosophy. Yet philosophical thought about the Trinity was not merely abandoned and handed over to theologians. It was also substantially transformed so that there also is a hidden history of Trinitarian thinking in German philosophy that is largely, though not exclusively, due to Hegel’s influence. This leads us to an important question that Powell’s book almost inevitably raises: if Trinitarian thought has been central not only for the understanding of revelation but also for the philosophical understanding of reflective selfhood and history, it would be an interesting enterprise to examine how the philosophical understanding of reflective selfhood and history has been affected by the demise as well as by the often implicit aftermath of philosophical Trinitarian thought — whether philosophy could still benefit from Trinitarian reflection.

Holger Zaborowski
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau
To anyone interested in the contributions of Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap to twentieth-century scientific philosophy, this is an important book. It contains the proceedings of the First Biennial Meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in Philosophy of Science which was held on the centennial of their births in 1891. The essays succeed at demonstrating the considerable scope of Carnap's and Reichenbach's philosophical thought: topics addressed range from general epistemology and philosophy of language to logic, semantics, and the philosophy of physics and mathematics.

While the twelve contributed essays are not uncritical, they maintain the view that the analysis of language, aided by the techniques of formal logic, provides a valuable tool for tackling traditional philosophical problems. And it is not hard to see the book as yielding a useful corrective reading of the achievements of logical empiricism in light of certain imprecations post-positivist construals. There are two themes that recur quite prominently.

The first theme involves the so-called first dogma of empiricism: the analytic-synthetic distinction. Michael Friedman's essay, 'Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori', provides a powerful statement of his view concerning the conception of scientific knowledge that emerges with logical empiricism. This conception involves a sharp distinction, for any given physical theory, between a constitutively a priori part, relativized to that theory, and a properly empirical part. It is a conception that is not strictly Kantian since, in reaction to nineteenth-century work on the foundations of geometry that culminated in Einstein's theory of relativity, the logical empiricists rejected the notion of synthetic a priori judgements. Nor is it a conception that is strictly empiricist, as they rejected the idea of any conception of the spatiotemporal framework of physical theory as straightforwardly answerable to empirical investigation. Friedman describes Reichenbach's early distinction between axioms of coordination and axioms of connection, found in *The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge* (1920), as a particularly striking version of this new conception. He then argues for three points: first, that what actually results from Schlick's conception of scientific knowledge is Quinean holism. Second, that Carnap's distinction between L-rules (analytic sentences) and P-rules (synthetic sentences) in *Logical Syntax of Language* (1934) constitutes a revival of Reichenbach's original sense of the relativized a priori. And third, as an analysis of Carnap's logical
syntax program shows, it is possible to accept Duhemian holism and the idea that all theoretical principles are revisable without being committed to Quinean holism.

Richard Creath’s essay, ‘Functionalist Theories of Meaning and the Defence of Analyticity’, makes a case for interpreting Carnap as having a use theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of an expression is given by specifying its role with respect to a structure of relations that relates sentences to sentences and sentences to the physical world. This view contrasts with ontological approaches to meaning that reify the meaning of an expression into an intrinsically meaningful non-spatio-temporal object. On Carnap’s theory, linguistic structures give us the structure of justification. Creath uses this feature to address Quine’s concerns about the empirical intelligibility of meaning and analyticity that he poses in his discussion of radical translation. Without going into details about Quine’s famous argument, Creath argues that there is nothing that needs to be added to what Quine is already prepared to grant in order to make a Carnapian attribution of meaning empirically significant.

Neil Tennant’s essay, ‘Carnap and Quine’, is a sprawling historico-philosophical account of the relationship between the two philosophers. It addresses contested topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic, language, and mind. It is followed with a critical commentary by Quine.

The other theme in the book is Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause as it pertains to the scientific realism/instrumentalism controversy. Wesley Salmon’s essay ‘Carnap, Hempel, and Reichenbach on Scientific Realism’ begins by relating a classic illustration of the controversy found in Experience and Prediction (1938). There Reichenbach invites us to imagine a world consisting of a translucent cube. By a highly contrived arrangement of lights and mirrors, the shadows of birds are projected onto the ceiling and one of the walls of the cube. The inhabitants of this cubical world cannot escape to observe the birds directly, but by careful observation they notice striking correspondences between the two sets of shadows. A birdshadow on the ceiling pecks at another precisely when a similar event occurs on the wall. The positivist/instrumentalist inhabitant will infer from her observations that the shadows and the observable correlations that they exhibit are exhaustive of what exists. The realist physicist on the other hand will not accept these correlations as mere coincidences. By probabilistic reasoning, when the correlations occur repeatedly the realist will infer the existence of the exterior birds and explain the correlations among the shadows by reference to them. Reichenbach claims that realist’s theory is itself more probable. Salmon asks how probabilistic reasoning extends our knowledge of observed correlations in the macrocosm to knowledge of unobservables in the microcosm. Reichenbach’s answer involves an invocation of the principle of the common cause as articulated in The Direction of Time (1956). This principle says that if an improbable coincidence has occurred, the existence of a common cause is not certain but probable, and that this probability increases greatly if the coincidences occur repeatedly. From this principle, the realist
physicist argues that her theory of the cubical world is inductively and
explanatorily superior to the positivist’s nontheory. Salmon thinks it plausi­
ble that realism with respect to atoms and molecules is likewise superior to
any form of antirealism. He goes on to discuss Hempel’s influence on Carnap,
and their eventual agreement regarding the indispensability of theoretical
terms for the purposes of science. The essay ends by stating a position
regarding the realism controversy comprising contributions from each of the
three philosophers. From Carnap there is the interpretation of realism as a
preference for a linguistic framework incorporating theoretical terms for
unobservable entities. Hempel shows that this language alone is adequate
to incorporate the predictions and explanations that science aims to provide.
And Reichenbach answers the internal problem of existence of unob­s­
servables.

Wolfgang Spohn’s essay, ‘On Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common
Cause’, offers a focused analysis of the principle’s status. Spohn discusses the
principle from the point of view of examples to see whether they confirm or
disconfirm it, and from the point of view of the theory of probabilistic
causation.

Itamar Pitowsky’s essay, ‘Reichenbach on Quantum Mechanics’, discusses
Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1942). He lists some
Reichenbachian claims that can no longer be defended, arguing that these
mistakes carry important lessons for the thesis of conventionalism. He shows
that Reichenbach’s version of quantum logic cannot capture the numerical
probability values predicted by quantum mechanics, and hence cannot ex­
plain how Bell’s inequality is violated by quantum mechanical frequencies.
Pitowsky ends by explaining the effect of Bell’s theorem on the principle of
the common cause, i.e., that the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen experiment is a
counterexample.

David Boutillier
University of Western Ontario
Sexual Orientation and Human Rights is the latest inclusion in Rowman and Littlefield's series 'Point/Counterpoint', in each of which two prominent philosophers take up opposing positions on a current issue of public policy or ethics. This book finds Laurence M. Thomas offering a spirited defense of civil rights for gays and lesbians with Michael E. Levin arguing the reverse position. This particular issue is perhaps especially pressing at the present time in light of various legislative and judicial efforts in many nations to come to terms with the question of gay rights, an issue that tends to polarize liberals and conservatives and to provoke no little animus on the part of many, most especially opponents of same-sex marriage and defenders of the traditional conception of the family.

If the tone of current debate concerning sexual orientation and human rights on the part of legislators, activists, and social commentators alike is often less than civil, one might expect from philosophers not only a commitment to argumentation that is customary in scholarly circles but, with perhaps equal importance, an elevation of tone above its current (lamentably low) level. One of the authors of this book succeeds in both tasks.

Thomas's account, entitled 'The Good Society and Sexual Orientation', takes up arguments against gay liberation that appeal principally to Biblical texts, 'nature', and popular attitudes. Without denying that certain books of the Bible condemn homosexuality in rather harsh terms, Thomas's analysis of such texts illuminates the contexts in which such judgments appear and likens these to similar judgments of other acts — including several which do not arouse the enmity that homosexuality does among religious conservatives. Divorce, deception, and unfaithfulness are among acts condemned in the strongest terms in scriptural text, yet none receives anything like the denunciation that homosexuality does among its critics. Nor do acts such as domestic abuse and child molestation receive much attention in Biblical text while, as Thomas notes, we would be no slower to condemn such acts than we would those that receive such attention. On the subject of traditional societal attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Thomas argues that the antipathy commonly directed toward such groups is of no moral or political importance whatever, and that such sentiments are as untutored as related attitudes (no less traditional) toward interracial marriage. He notes as well that while at the present time hate groups such as the KKK and neo-Nazis are widely tolerated in Western societies, intolerance of gays and lesbians is widespread and often religiously motivated. Thomas makes a case for same-sex marriage, the adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples, and civil rights more generally.
For all his efforts to refute arguments (if one can call them that) against the liberation of gays and lesbians, one wonders whether Thomas grants such arguments a legitimacy that is not their due. Thomas finds himself in the awkward position of having to refute arguments that are almost self-evidently false — arguments offering the flimsiest appeals to scriptural authority and 'nature' — yet which have taken such hold on popular sentiments (particularly in America). While not a difficult task, it is one he carries out with the competence that one would expect.

As its title indicates, Levin's contribution — 'Against Homosexual Liberation' — takes up the reverse position. In his view, not only ought gays and lesbians not to enjoy civil rights protection, the right to participate in the military or to marry (unless it be to persons of the opposite sex), but the revulsion many feel toward such individuals deserves respect, at least as much respect as what is due to gays and lesbians themselves. These conclusions, he argues, are supported by both the weight of tradition, a conception of what is natural, and (surprisingly) political liberalism. His argument appeals as well to traditional notions of normalcy and deviance, which he terms the 'common sense' view and which he situates within an evolutionary scenario (one in which heterosexual aversion to homosexuality is 'an evolved response' [130]). Levin discusses in detail what he describes as the rampant promiscuity and depravity of gays and lesbians, saying of a number of periodicals and websites marketed to gays: "To judge by these outlets, homosexuals are interested in penises, partying, “pride,” ... and above all sex, sex, sex. If these publications and websites accurately reflect the homosexual milieu, concern with sex therein is ubiquitous" (138). He concludes with 'a plea for tolerance and diversity' which, as one might expect, rings somewhat hollow (85).

What is more notable in Levin's treatment of this issue, however, is less the substance of his arguments (there is little that is new here) than the tone of their presentation. Levin regularly proffers statements about homosexuality and homosexuals of the kind that one typically hears only from the most strident of religious conservatives. To cite just a few such remarks: 'Some whites dislike blacks, some blacks dislike whites, but nobody supposes that being black or white is akin to a disease ... [N]obody really thinks of whites, or blacks, or Croatians, as outside the natural biological order. But homosexuals are. This distinguishes the antipathy toward this group from any sort of ethnic hostility; dislike of homosexuals is powered by — well-founded — intuitions of deviance' (125). 'The compulsive promiscuity of homosexuals thus makes "homosexual marriage" an oxymoron, a joke, or an abuse of language' (137). 'Sex is part, but not the essence, of heterosexual lives: the average heterosexual's existence does not revolve around it to remotely the extent that the average homosexual's seems to' (140). 'It is questionable, in my view, whether [homosexuals] ever experience the emotion of love, as opposed to lust, infatuation, and other drives also familiar to heterosexuals' (129). 'Traditionalists [such as Levin] are said to find homosexuality "immoral", and no doubt many talk as if they do think this. But I am not sure
this is what they have in mind. Traditionalists deplore homosexuality, and like most people they utilize the language of disapprobation that is handiest, namely moral disapprobation, to express themselves. But what they really mean is that homosexuality is disgusting, nauseating, closely connected with fecal matter' (145). Dozens of similar remarks are offered throughout Levin's essay and reply to Thomas, the cumulative effect of which is striking to say the least. While Thomas, in his reply to Levin, does not comment on such statements (one wonders why not), they can hardly escape the notice of the reader. Exactly what is one to make of Levin's comparison of homosexuality, and the 'common sense' revulsion thereto, with the revulsion to fecal matter, and insistence that such revulsion deserves no less respect than other popular sentiments and preferences? If this is not the most virulent display of homophobia masquerading as scholarship, I cannot imagine what is. Levin regularly abandons the decorum and civility of tone that one expects from scholarly prose for raw animosity. Why the editors at Rowman and Littlefield allowed such statements into print defies explanation.

There is a burgeoning literature concerning sexual orientation and human rights, much of which is worth recommending. Levin's contribution is not among them. Thomas competently disposes of arguments that I suspect most moral/political philosophers would find unworthy of great attention, albeit ones that required discrediting on account of their unfortunate popularity.

Paul Fairfield
Queen's University

Gideon Yaffe

Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-04966-1);

Locke devoted the longest chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding to an analysis of human freedom. He also seems to have devoted more care and attention to this topic than to any other: in the later editions of the Essay he revised the chapter extensively, even obsessively, in both substance and detail. Yet despite his painstaking efforts, Locke's discussion of freedom has generally received a bad press down the years. To many readers it has seemed that Locke starts out with a simple, clear Hobbesian theory of human freedom to which he is unable to adhere consistently; in a
characteristically Lockean way, as the chapter unfolds he seeks to do justice to competing intuitions about what free agency involves. Thus the discussion as a whole has often struck readers as deeply unsatisfactory; though there are shrewd incidental insights, it seems that there is no coherent overall position. In his stimulating new study Gideon Yaffe mounts a major challenge to the received wisdom; in his eyes Locke succeeds in offering a complex and rather sophisticated theory which should still be of interest to philosophers.

Yaffe's study is divided into three chapters (plus an introduction). In the first chapter, Yaffe sets out in detail his account of Locke's position on human freedom and analyzes its development between the first and second editions of the Essay. In the second chapter, Yaffe addresses what he sees as Locke's account of the difference between genuine actions and mere happenings; here Yaffe argues, against E.J. Lowe, that being caused by a volition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of voluntary action. In the final chapter, Yaffe argues that, without addressing it explicitly, Locke offers a suggestive approach to the Where's the Agent Problem discussed by modern philosophers. Here Yaffe claims that there is an important connection between Locke's account of agency and his famous theory of personal identity: what makes us agents consists in part at least in the fact that our volitions are accompanied by self-consciousness.

The heart of the book is Yaffe's first chapter. Here he argues that, by the second edition, Locke has arrived at a coherent compatibilist theory of human freedom. According to Yaffe, Locke is clear that freedom of action, as analyzed by Hobbes, is not sufficient for full-fledged freedom or 'liberty worth the name'; Locke believes that there is, in addition, an Elusive Something which must be captured to achieve a satisfactory analysis of such freedom. According to Yaffe, as a consistent compatibilist Locke is never tempted to identify this Elusive Something with contracausal freedom; after a few false starts Locke finally succeeds in tracking it down by claiming (in Yaffe's words) that an agent has it 'if and only if' her volitions are determined by the good or she has the power to bring about that her volitions are determined by the good' (54). Full-fledged freedom thus involves a 'second perfection' in addition to bare freedom of action. In places Yaffe seems to analyze the second perfection in terms of our volitions being actually determined by the good (e.g., 65, 73). But this stronger thesis cannot be his considered view, for it has the paradoxical consequence that a person who makes bad choices cannot be a full-fledged free agent; Locke would surely regard this as a disastrous result for his theory of moral responsibility. In fact, Yaffe's most careful statements make it clear that the analysis of the second perfection is irreducibly disjunctive.

Yaffe's interpretation is original and provocative, but there are points at which it might be challenged. For one thing, we might question whether there is compelling evidence to suppose that for Locke full-fledged freedom involves an Elusive Something in addition to bare freedom of action. (We have all heard of Locke's 'something, we know not what' in connection with his theory
of substance, but it is news that Locke believed in an Elusive Something in connection with his theory of freedom. As Yaffe notices, in one place Locke seems entirely satisfied with the view that freedom of action is sufficient for full-fledged freedom, for he rhetorically asks: 'How can we think any one freer than to have the power to do what he will?' (Essay 2.21.21). Yaffe is impressed by the fact that, for Locke, the 'inquisitive Mind of Man' seeks for something more than freedom of action, but as Yaffe acknowledges, the passage in context is ironical: it prefaces a critique of one incoherent view of freedom of the will. One might also wonder whether one of Yaffe's proof-texts establishes as much as he thinks: Yaffe draws heavily on a passage beginning: 'Is it worth the Name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self?' (Essay 2.21.50). As I read him, however, Locke's point is simply that being determined by the good is consistent with human freedom; he is not saying that such determination enters into an analysis of free agency.

In one way, however, Yaffe is in a strong position to answer his critics, for he is the first writer to argue in detail that Locke has a coherent and interesting position on the subject of human freedom. Those who question his reading are unlikely to be able to offer a rival interpretation which makes more sense of Locke's chapter on freedom as a whole. Moreover, there is no doubt that in places Locke does insist that genuine freedom involves something more than mere freedom of action. Some readers would draw the moral that Locke is simply muddled; Yaffe offers a more exciting approach according to which Locke consistently offers a two-part analysis of human freedom.

*Liberty Worth the Name* is an excellent book which displays great subtlety and sophistication in its analyses of the issues. Yaffe is a master of the contemporary literature in the philosophy of action; his book is informed throughout by a deep knowledge of the current positions and debates. Unlike some analytic historians of philosophy Yaffe deploys contemporary insights for a mainly constructive purpose; his goal is to show how Locke's theories may be defended rather than demolished. Yaffe's study will surely stimulate a revival of interest in a largely neglected and undervalued area of Locke's thought.

Nicholas Jolley
University of California, Irvine
Nick Zangwill

*The Metaphysics of Beauty.*


Pp. xi + 224.


*The Metaphysics of Beauty* is a collection of Nick Zangwill’s published essays on aesthetics. Some are revised, and there are three new appendices and one previously unpublished essay. The book touches on an impressive range of topics in analytic aesthetics: aesthetic properties, the intentional fallacy, architecture, gender issues, the aesthetics of nature, the sociology of taste, and more. Throughout, Zangwill confronts the best of philosophical aesthetics in an engaging and honest style. When he is uneasy with his own views he says so, and he is not above occasionally admitting that his opponents are right. That said, Zangwill spends most of the book arguing iconoclastically and inventively against philosophical orthodoxy.

In Part One, Zangwill argues that beauty has a ‘preeminent place’ in aesthetics (2). Specifically, he rejects the tendency, apparent in Austin, Goodman and others, to dismiss verdictive aesthetic judgments (‘this vase is beautiful’) in favour of ‘substantive’ ones (‘this vase is dainty’). This is tricky. For on one hand, Zangwill sensibly maintains that beauty must be ‘tied’ to substantive properties somehow, because ‘something which is beautiful cannot be barely beautiful. It must be beautiful because it has various substantive properties’ (19). Further, if verdictive properties are aesthetic properties, they must have some ‘close link’ to substantive aesthetic properties that ‘justifies grouping them together in one category’ (4). On the other hand, however, beauty cannot be tied too tightly to these properties, lest the distinction between them be lost and verdictive judgements become merely abbreviated substantive judgements.

Zangwill deftly steers a middle course. He sees verdictive properties as tied to substantive ones in supervening on them, and by being ‘essentially linked’ to them. Not only does the elegance of a vase, in conjunction with its grace and delicacy, determine, or necessitate, that it is beautiful; it is also ‘part of what it is to be elegant to be beautiful’ (35). This close metaphysical connection, however, is offset by the ‘epistemic autonomy’ of verdictive properties (21). Although substantive properties determine verdictive ones, one can never argue or reason from the former to the latter. Beauty must be grasped directly by a faculty of taste. Substantive judgments are ‘more like rationalizations, in the pejorative sense, than reasons’ (40), merely describing ‘the way that a thing achieves aesthetic merit’ (34).

In Part Two, Zangwill sets out to rehabilitate that ‘much despised doctrine’, Formalism. He dissociates himself from the aesthetcian’s favourite punching bag, Clive Bell’s theory of Formalism, advocating instead ‘moderate formalism’: (1) many or all works of art have some formal properties, (2) some works of art (nonrepresentational and noncontextual works) have only formal properties, and (3) all aesthetic properties depend, at least partly, on
sensory qualities. To turn aside counterexamples, Zangwill employs several strategies: conceding that some aesthetic properties are not formal, showing that knowledge supposedly required for appreciating an artwork is actually irrelevant to its aesthetic qualities, and demonstrating that supposedly non-formal aesthetic qualities are not really aesthetic. He criticizes, at length, Walton's 'guernica' argument, an influential source of anti-formalist sentiment. His case is rounded out by discussion of the appreciation of artworks, natural objects and abstract entities, such as theories and proofs. In many cases, Zangwill shows that moderate formalism does justice to our aesthetic experience; where it appears not to, he explains away its apparent implausibility.

Throughout, Zangwill construes the formal/non-formal distinction roughly on the lines of Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty. Something that has non-formal aesthetic properties is dependently beautiful, or beautiful 'as a thing with a certain function' (61). Formal aesthetic properties are free beauties that 'do not depend on the fact that the thing has some non-aesthetic function' (61). This way of construing non-formal beauty is one of the weaker points of the book, and it sometimes cripples Zangwill's analyses. This is perhaps most apparent in his discussion of nature, where it leads him to claim that inorganic natural objects, having no 'evolutionary function', must possess only formal qualities. Even apart from its initial implausibility, this is problematic.

What Zangwill has in mind, presumably, is the notion of a 'selected function': that effect of an item or trait that explains the selective success (and hence survival) of ancestral organisms with that item or trait. Since inorganic natural objects do not undergo natural selection, these functions are found only in organic nature. However, many paradigm cases of dependent natural beauty in organic nature are not beauties involving selected functions. For instance, in On The Origin of Species Darwin noted that while 'the sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been advanced as a beautiful adaptation for aiding parturition', in fact these sutures did not arise because of their capacity to aid in birthing. Instead, 'this structure has arisen from the laws of growth, and has been taken advantage of in the parturition of the higher animals'. The example is somewhat esoteric, but the general point is that biological organs and traits carry out many important tasks besides the ones for which they have been selected, and may have dependent beauty in light of performing these.

Therefore dependent/non-formal beauty cannot be accounted for in terms of selected functions. This puts pressure on Zangwill to adopt a wider sense of 'function', according to which a history involving selective success is not essential for having a function. However, on such accounts (e.g., Cummins's) functions are not restricted to organic items that undergo natural selection. So if dependent/non-formal beauty is to be construed in terms of functions then inorganic nature should possess such beauties too. In fact, however, the whole notion that all non-formal beauty can be crammed into a function-based framework is dubious. This is why sophisticated non-formal ap-
approaches to aesthetic appreciation (e.g., Walton's) tend to embrace a pluralism about the ways in which cognitive factors can enter into aesthetic experience.

Part Three of the book advances into metaphysical matters surrounding the ontology of aesthetic properties. Zangwill offers an interesting interpretation of Hume's non-cognitivist anti-realism about aesthetic qualities, but ultimately rejects Hume's account. He also criticizes arguments for anti-realism that play on the metaphorical nature of aesthetic language. Despite opposing these strands of anti-realist thought, however, he also eschews aesthetic realism in its stronger forms, in which aesthetic properties are mind-independent. Zangwill himself opts for the more traditional view that aesthetic properties, though real, are mind-dependent in an important sense. This stance is directly related to his formalist commitment to a dependence of aesthetic properties on sensory ones. Since sensory qualities are mind-dependent, and 'aesthetic properties inherit the metaphysical status of sensory properties, whatever it may be' (200), aesthetic properties are mind-dependent.

The above gloss fails to do justice to the thoroughness, erudition and insight that Zangwill brings to each of the issues he tackles. The book ends with a useful chapter in which Zangwill compares his views with other writers and mounts a rousing charge against sociological approaches to the aesthetic, which he sees as attacking the entire aesthetic tradition. His specific critiques of these approaches aside, The Metaphysics of Beauty itself, as a stimulating and spirited tour through many of the central issues of contemporary aesthetics, is clear testament to the vibrancy of that tradition.

Glenn Parsons
University of Toronto