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Henry E. Allison
Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. xvi + 424.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79154-5);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79534-6).

Henry Allison has written previous books on Kant's theoretical and moral philosophy. In his most recent work, he turns to aesthetics with a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the first part of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (CJ). As indicated by the title, Allison concentrates on Kant's theory of taste. However, his examination extends beyond this central concern in the initial chapter, wherein the focus is on Kant's conception of reflective judgment and its consequences for Kantian epistemology, and, again, in the final two chapters, which deal with fine art and genius, and the sublime, respectively. Taken all together then, *Kant's Theory of Taste* manages to incorporate all of the major issues of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*; but, as noted by Allison (6), makes no attempt to deal in any systematic way with the problems and issues arising out of *Critique Teleological Judgment*.

The book consists of four main divisions. Allison opens with a rich discussion detailing Kant's conception of reflective judgment. This discussion notably provides interesting insight into the historical ideas to which Kant was reacting, and also deals with issues that Kant felt required further elucidation stemming from the first two *Critiques*. Since the first chapter focuses on the need for a deduction of an *a priori* principle (the purposiveness of nature) for reflective judgment in its theoretical, or determinative, activity it stands well on its own and will be of interest to *First Critique* enthusiasts as well as Aestheticians. In the second chapter, Allison begins to narrow the scope of the discussion by relating reflective judgment to aesthetic judgment and by succinctly bringing out the characteristics of 'merely reflective judgments,' which seem paradoxical in being nondeterminate but judgments nevertheless. He then makes clear the distinction between aesthetic and teleological judgment. In this first part, the main source materials for Allison are the two Introductions to the CJ; however, he does make reference to Kant's earlier works, and in particular to the *First Critique*. These initial chapters help the reader situate the concerns of CJ with respect to Kant's overall thought and the ideas to which he was responding.

The heart of the book is contained in Part II, chapters 3 through 8. Chapter 3 serves as an introduction to the main concerns of the section and the four following chapters are devoted, in turn, to the four moments in Kant's *Analytic of the Beautiful* (Quality, Quantity, Relation and Modality, respectively). The final chapter of this part centers on the *Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgment*. Since the structure of this section of the book closely follows Kant's own text, Allison's analysis can be used as a commentary, but its real value is in the original interpretation he offers.

Allison's main concerns in Part II are to define the general features of judgments of taste, including their aesthetic nature, to defend the legitimacy of organizing the *Analytic* to correspond to the table of logical functions in the *First Critique*, and, consequently, to show how the entire *Analytic of the Beautiful*, including the fourth moment, provides 'a progressive determination of the *quid facti*' (68). As a foil to his position, Allison uses Paul Guyer's interpretation, which, instead of seeing the moments as a progressive argument, holds the *Analytic* is best understood when reorganized into two categories with 'the first and third [moments] offering "justificatory" and the second and fourth "analytic" criteria' (82). If Guyer's interpretation holds, the second and fourth moments are taken as being equivalent and as providing the single analytic criterion of either universality or necessity (79). Given this, only a part of the *Analytic* would relate to *quid facti* and the fourth moment becomes a failed deduction of the principle of taste. Allison suggests such readings fail to appreciate that each of the moments of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* are concerned with the question of origin no less than is the Metaphysical Deduction of the *First Critique*. Indeed, the only difference is that in the former 'the concern is with the origin of the *feeling* underlying a judgment of taste, rather than of a concept on which the judgment is based' (83). And, although the fourth moment does not further delineate the content of a judgment of taste, it nevertheless provides a unifying function, in the idea of a common sense, for the preceding three and is, therefore, still concerned with the conditions under which a judgment can be pure, i.e., concerned with *quid facti* (144).

Having made his case for the *quid facti* nature of the *Analytic*, Allison moves on in the final chapter of Part II to address the concerns of *quid juris* and the *Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments*, i.e., the rightful demand for agreement in judgments of taste. The crucial move made by Allison here is to interpret Kant as setting for himself a more modest goal than has been imputed to him by other commentators. Allison holds a successful deduction requires only 'the legitimation of a general principle of taste, and that such a principle retains its validity even if it turns out that one can never determine with certainty that a given judgment accords with it' (180). In fact, it turns out that one can never be sure that a particular judgment of taste is pure. This lowered expectation of the deduction allows Allison to respond to Guyer's and Savile's criticisms that the deduction does not do enough to ground particular judgments of taste. In the concluding section of Part II, Allison shows the superiority of his interpretation by also responding to those who claim the Deduction, if anything, proves too much — 'that every object must be judged beautiful' (184).

Part III, entitled 'The moral and systematic significance of taste', is less controversial than the previous section, which is not to say it is less interesting. It is here that Allison conducts a careful investigation into the connection between taste and morality, and how the beautiful symbolizes the morally good by virtue of its 'transition from the sensible to the supersensible' (267). At this point, the analysis of Kant's theory of taste is concluded; however, as

noted above, Allison includes two additional chapters, which he refers to as 'parergonal' to indicate that the issues contained therein (fine art and genius, in chapter 12, and the sublime, in chapter 13) do not constitute part of the theory of taste.

Although the book presupposes some knowledge of Kant's previous works (as does the CJ itself), it will nevertheless appeal to a diverse group, from specialists and students of aesthetics to the philosophically minded artist. Much of the interest is due to the methodology Allison employs to interpret Kant's work, in that, he attempts to make sense of the text from within the perspective of Transcendental Idealism rather than dealing with individual arguments in isolation. Critics might complain that Allison is occasionally more concerned with reconstructing arguments and repairing Kantian inconsistencies than with exegetical sensitivity; those familiar with Allison's work will note well his enduring attempt to demonstrate how Kant continues to inform contemporary debate. The result is that anyone engaged in studies of Kant's theoretical, moral or aesthetic philosophy will find much to be excited about, including the always interesting ongoing debate between Allison and Guyer as to the proper interpretation of Kant's philosophy.

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Sharon Anderson-Gold
Unnecessary Evil. History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
Albany: State University of New York Press
2001. Pp. xiii + 138.
US$50.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4819-3);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4820-7).

Kant's ethical theory has often been derided by its critics as cold moral mathematics, suppressing our sensual and social nature, beating down on it with the yardstick of the categorical imperative. The philosopher was seen as looking down on mankind from the Olympian standpoint of pure practical reason: 'What need have they to know the outcome of their moral actions and abstentions which the ways of the world will bring about? It suffices for them that they do their duty; even though all things may end with earthly life and though, in this life, happiness and desert may never meet.' (*Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, AA VI: 7, 16-20). From the rule of the moral law seems to arise a dictatorship of duty that leaves no room for human emotions, aspirations and companionship. With everyone keeping to his own business

and doing his duty, we all will be fine. What else to expect from a Prussian professor who was famous for following his daily schedule with the precision of a clock?

But just as the common portrait of Kant's personality owes more to cliché than reality, the view of his ethical theory as a soul-less system is misguided. It is true that in his major ethical writings Kant is not concerned so much with what people want, but with what they ought to do — regardless of what they want. The rules of a virtuous life are laid down, but not much is said about the direction of such a life. In addition to that, the demands of virtue are very hard to meet, if they can be met at all. Under the cold stare of the categorical imperative, human beings may therefore seem like hamsters in a treadmill, one by one running alone after an unattainable goal in a vain attempt to live up to his or her duty, not making any progress at all.

In her highly original book, Sharon Anderson-Gold shows that such a view is neither convincing nor the one that Kant himself held. For her, 'the conception of virtue as a private struggle within a hopelessly corrupt will, which threatens the individual with a life of futility, must be recast as a social struggle guided by an ennobling vision of a common goal and destiny' (26). Her argument is based essentially on Kant's late work *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* in which according to her reading Kant extended his concept of moral autonomy to include the highest good as a social and historical object. Anderson-Gold focuses on two of the books core concepts, the doctrine of radical evil and the idea of an ethical commonwealth.

The doctrine of radical evil offers her 'a systematic means for evaluating the sources of our historical failures to realize human freedom' (26), i.e., to lead a moral life. The sources for failure are found in man's social nature: 'The existence of others, the inescapable social conditions of man, will create challenges for the moral life' (33). For Anderson-Gold, evil is 'not an additional constituent of human nature but particular transformation of self-love in a social context' (56).

As the sources of failure are social so must be the remedy: 'there are no "private" solutions to the problem of evil' (39). Virtue must be seen as a 'social good' (41), that in the end cannot be achieved by the exertions of the single individual toward his own perfection. Instead, the 'moral life' must be represented 'as a social or collective undertaking' (45), guided by the idea of an ethical commonwealth that is nothing but the 'social and historical form' of the intelligible kingdom of ends articulated in the *Groundwork* (71). With both the reasons for failure and the resources for a solution being social in nature, the conclusion is clear: 'Kantian ethics is social at its core' (30), there is a 'social context of virtue and vice' (25).

One of the things that seem to be questionable from a Kantian point of view is the assumption that shines through some of Anderson-Gold's arguments: that the collective enterprise is not only a religious one, but a political one too. Kant himself separated quite clearly between virtue and justice ('Tugend' and 'Recht'), the two 'branches' of morality that provide answers to the question: What should I do? He makes a corresponding distinction when

it comes to answering the subsequent question: If I do what I should, what may I then hope? Trying to answer the question about the rewards of a virtuous life inevitably leads to religion (*Religion* 6). Trying to answer the question about the outcomes of political justice leads to the idea of historical progress instead. Therefore, it can be doubted if Kant's ethical commonwealth would include institutions for economic justice and ecological sustainability (cf. 7).

Doubts are even more appropriate regarding Anderson-Gold's understanding of the concept of radical evil that is so fundamental for her book. Seeing a 'social context of virtue and vice' clearly does not cut to the heart of the matter as Kant saw it: 'We must not ... look for an origin in time of a moral character for which we are to be held responsible; though to do so is inevitable if we wish to explain the contingent existence of this character ... But the rational origin of this perversion of our will ... remains inscrutable to ... there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come' (*Religion* 43). Whereas for Kant radical evil is as inexplicable as freedom itself, Anderson-Gold reduces the concept of radical evil to its inevitable contingent dimension.

But as Anderson-Gold warns us early on in her book that her conclusions will at times go beyond anything that Kant has actually stated, even a major doubt as this one does not much damage to her essay. Rather the contrary: like so many other things in the book, this doubt is thought-provoking, and this is probably one of the best things to say about a book.

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Gary Banham
Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press 2000.
Pp. ix + 211.
Cdn$87.95/US$65.00. ISBN 0-312-22748-5.

Books on Kant's third *Critique* are rare. Books on both parts of the third *Critique* are rarer still. Banham's is one of the rarer ones. The reason why there are not too many books that treat both parts of the third *Critique* together is that the two parts are commonly regarded as related to each other only insofar as they both concern the faculty of judgment, but otherwise unrelated. Banham's thesis is that the two parts are linked by a common

aesthetic *and* that the third *Critique* is linked to other critical works by virtue of the link between the third aesthetic and the other two aesthetics. The three aesthetics together contribute to a 'general aesthetic' which is the 'lynchpin' of Kant's critical philosophy (33). Furthermore, they share the same ends, precisely those outlined in the second half of the third *Critique*. This is a bold thesis and, although Banham's argument is not wholly convincing, it is worth putting forward and worth defending. After all, Kant's ultimate aim in his critical philosophy is to build an architectonic of reason. If Banham is successful, we will have an idea of what the whole structure looks like.

A problem that emerges straightaway is the idea of an aesthetic in the second *Critique*. There is no aesthetic of practical reason that strictly parallels the transcendental aesthetic of the first *Critique*. Practically, the will needs an incentive to act according to the moral law, but the moral law itself is such an incentive. The law itself can generate an intellectual feeling of respect for itself and in this way it becomes an incentive. The second aesthetic, then, consists in showing how the agent is affected by this intellectual feeling of respect. This is accomplished in the Chapter entitled 'The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason'. In the elucidation that follows, Kant says that while we may speak of the discussion of respect for the moral law as 'aesthetic', the term is 'not entirely suitable.' Given that this is so, much has to be said to justify linking the first two aesthetics.

Banham's solution is to treat the second as 'an extension of the first aesthetic' (34). This means, according to Banham, treating it as 'a transcendental exposition of time.' Treated as such, Banham argues, the second is an extension of the first because the 'transcendental exposition of time' is 'lacking from the Transcendental Aesthetic.' This is astonishing. What would Banham call Section II of the Transcendental Aesthetic? In particular, how would he account for Section 5, the title of which is 'The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time'? Even if we ignore all this, it still has to be said that Banham gives no explicit account of the second aesthetic as a transcendental exposition of time. Having given his reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic in Chapter 2, Banham goes straight to a reading of the third aesthetic in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, skipping over, it seems, the second aesthetic.

On the link between the three aesthetics, Banham's view is somewhat confusing. He says that the second aesthetic is 'the hinge between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*' (34). I take the 'hinge' metaphor to mean that on one side of the second aesthetic hangs the first, and on the other side hangs the third. It is not clear how this is consistent with the claim that the third aesthetic 'rests on the first with its critique of taste and on the second with its critique of intellectual feeling' (34). If the latter claim is right then we should rather take the third aesthetic to be the hinge between the other two. This is at least consistent with Kant's claim that the third *Critique* is the hinge between the other two. To make matters worse, Banham concludes from all these claims of linkages that the 'three aesthetics are therefore mutually dependent.' But how is the first dependent on the second (which is implied by the relationship of mutuality),

if the latter is an 'extension' of the former? And how are the first two dependent on the third if the third 'rests' on them both? All these claims are made on the last page of Chapter 1. The rest of the book fails to untangle them.

As mentioned, in Chapters 2 to 5, Banham gives his reading of the first and the third aesthetics, and in Chapter 6 he discusses the role of the third aesthetic in the account of teleology. The discussions in these chapters of individual topics, such as the A- and B-Deductions, and the accounts of the beautiful and the sublime, are clear enough but there is not a great deal that is new. What is not so clear is how they help establish the claim that there is a 'General Aesthetic' emerging 'through the accounts of imagination, schematism and judgment' (59). Banham's discussion, at the end of Chapter 2, of the different roles of the imagination is promising. It seems that the operations of the mind's various faculties, hence all three critiques, depend crucially on the imagination. Banham would be right to suggest that a certain 'General Aesthetic' is the lynchpin of Critical Philosophy if by 'General Aesthetic' he meant a general account of the imagination. The trouble is that the idea that the imagination is the lynchpin is already found in Makkreel's *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*.

What distinguishes Banham's thesis from Makkreel's is his insistence that the three aesthetics together help establish Kant's conception of the end for humanity, his eschatology. This is argued for in the final chapter, Chapter 10, which follows on from three chapters (7 to 9) devoted to the discussion of the implications of the critique of teleological judgment. However, while it is clear enough that the second and particularly the third aesthetics contribute to the idea of an end for humanity, it is not so clear what the Transcendental Aesthetic has to do with that idea, other than through its linkage with the other two aesthetics. But then, as pointed out, Banham's account of this linkage is rather confusing.

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Luc Brisson
Plato the Myth Maker.
Trans., Ed. and with an Introduction
by Gerard Naddaf.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1998.
Pp. lv + 188.
US$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-07518-4);
US$16.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-07519-2).

Plato is a master of discourses, imitating the voices and styles of others while revealing little of his own. His work raises the question of discourse itself and how best to describe the world and what is beyond it. Focussed on the literary power of the dialogues, we may fail to appreciate Plato's accomplishments as a stylist and innovator of speeches. But once we attend to his choices of form, we face questions of purpose and meaning. As Brisson shows in the case of myth, Plato's approach is complex and often confusing: he decries it, surpasses it, and yet somehow depends on it.

Standing on the transition between civilizations founded on orality and writing, Plato inaugurates a new type of discourse while breaking myth's monopoly. Perhaps it is the power of that monopoly that requires it to be replaced gradually and with care. Because Plato's discourses are not free of myth. While the project of replacing a discourse does not preclude also using it on occasion, still that use remains puzzling. Brisson does much to clarify matters, even if a final judgement must await the conclusion of work he is still conducting.

Essentially, the understanding of 'myth' employed here is the conveyance through tradition of information about an event or past state for which we lack direct or indirect testimony. A key example of this, for Brisson and Plato, is the Atlantis myth of the *Timaeus*. Such myths, narrated at festivals or religious ceremonies, had great persuasive power. In fact, suggests Brisson, it is this traditional power that shows Plato the utility of myth in both ethics and politics, where it can replace philosophical discourse and transmit a basic shared understanding.

But it is with the transmission of philosophical truth about reality that Plato faces the greater problem. What language can he use to convey such philosophical insight (if, indeed, we accept he was interested in doing so)? The task of bringing the intelligible world of truth into the visible world of appearances, of translating the first into the terms of the second, seems made for mythic discourse, albeit in a non-traditional sense, free of direct or indirect testimony. Importantly, in this regard, Brisson examines two oppositions: that between myth as non-falsifiable speech and logos as falsifiable speech, and that between myth as story and logos as argumentative discourse. Space precludes addressing more than the first of these.

Brisson understands a discourse to be falsifiable if it can be confronted with facts that will either corroborate or invalidate it. Myth, which can be judged neither true nor false, would thus seem to be non-falsifiable. In

contrast to this, the discourses of the sophist, on terms defined in the dialogue of that name, are falsifiable, since such a discourse 'gives an unfaithful image of the reality which it claims to depict' (95). This is to define *logos* itself as a falsifiable discourse and so, if myth is to be understood as a type of discourse it must be defined in terms that distinguish it from *logos*. Here arises one of the confusions in Plato's usage. Brisson observes that Plato's own discourse does not obey the restrictions of the *Sophist*: the most important components of his philosophy (associated with the immortal soul) are situated between the world of forms and that of sensible things. Since the referents of Plato's soul, gods, daimons and heroes are accessible to neither the intellect nor the senses, there seems no way to falsify the discourse of myths (105). And yet, in places like Book II of the *Republic* and the *Cratylus*, when the true nature of the gods or heroes can be badly imagined or Pan can be truly described, Plato depicts myth as the kind of discourse that can be false. Investigating these passages, Brisson proposes that the truth or falsity of a myth must depend on its conformity with the philosopher's discourse on the forms, or with the discourse that provides an explanatory cosmological model. Thus, the philosopher's discourse, characterized by its argumentative nature, achieves priority in Plato, and myth must conform to its insights.

In such ways, Brisson culls Plato's attitude on myth from the references and usages of the dialogues and weaves together a fascinating account of the discourses Plato employs and his reasons for doing so. The fluidity and excitement of his thought is communicated through Gerard Naddaf's commendable translation. Naddaf also supplies a lengthy introduction that rehearses the various positions on myth held in Ancient Greece and provides the background for Brisson's study, as well as particularly insightful remarks on Plato and writing, a problem as enigmatic in its own terms as the role of myth.

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Martin Carrier, Gerald J. Massey, and **Laura Ruetsche, eds.**
Science at Century's End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press/Universitätsverlag Konstanz 2000.
Pp. xii + 385.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-8229-4121-X.

Are there any legitimate empirical questions that science cannot resolve? Are there limits to the progress science can make? The nineteenth-century German physiologist Emil DuBois-Reymond (1818-96) maintained that there exist some questions about the natural world (he called them 'world-riddles' or *Welträtsel*) of which we must say *ignoramus et ignorabimus* ('we don't know, nor shall we ever'). By contrast some modern physicists hope for a final Theory of Everything (TOE) that will show how to unite all the fundamental physical forces (electromagnetic, strong and weak nuclear, and gravitation) and so bring physics at least to completion. But if science were ever to attain this 'final' theory, would that not mean an end to further scientific progress (at least in this particular field)? In that sense science would have reached a limit. These are the central issues addressed by this collection of twenty-one papers (seven of which are commentaries on other papers in the volume) originally presented at the fourth biennial meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, at Pittsburgh October 3-7, 1997.

The papers range from the general, dealing with questions of epistemology, to the more specific, involving issues in the special sciences. There are also papers considering the extent to which computers might be said to have extended the limits of scientific knowledge beyond unaided human cognition. The papers are organized into two sections: 'Frontiers of Knowledge', includes several dealing with Nicholas Rescher's extensive writings on the nature of scientific knowledge and the question of its progress, in addition to others of a general epistemological nature. 'Prospects for the Special Sciences' contains eight pieces dealing with biology, biophysics, quantum physics, complex systems, and statistical method.

Rescher's influence looms large in the first section. For those unfamiliar with his work Robert Almeder provides a helpful summary and analysis of how those views have evolved over the years. Laura Ruetsche and Jürgen Mittelstrass each discuss Rescher's views critically, Ruetsche by considering them in relation to the ideas of physicist Lee Smolin, who employs a kind of cosmological Darwinism to sketch out the form that any final theory of physics might assume. Rescher himself provides a response to these three authors and contributes an additional paper that investigates the potential for computers to overcome human cognitive limitations.

Both Rescher's response and Paul Humphreys's lead paper provide helpful conceptual clarifications of what it might mean to say that science has

limits or that it might eventually cease making progress. Humphreys urges that the notion of science at the ideal limit of inquiry — i.e., achieving all that we could possibly hope it to — not be confused with the separate notion of a possible limitation or failure on its part to resolve certain questions. He explains how in the past inappropriate ideas about what a completed science in the final limit must be like have engendered unnecessary complaints that actual science suffers limitations when it has been unable to live up to that particular image of limit science. It is perhaps unfortunate that few of the other authors make use of this distinction between limit and limitation.

Science, as these papers help to clarify, might be said to face limits if there are legitimate problems that cannot be resolved by any of its methods, (these are 'insolubilia' and would be *limitations* by Humphreys' account). Scientific progress might come to an end for the *positive* reason that scientists manage to explain every scientific phenomena worth explaining; or for *negative* reasons, for instance the experiments needed to probe any further may require technology too expensive to be obtained for practical or political reasons; or scientists may in the future lack the imagination to come up with any further questions to explore.

Rescher believes that science knows no in principle limitations. Insolubilia we may hope will be overcome as a result of the plasticity of science — what cannot be resolved by current methods may be conquerable with new ones — and 'erotetic propagation' wards off the worry that science will eventually run out of things to explain, since progress in any area always raises more questions to explore. On a similar note, Jürgen Mittelstrass offers that people will always find new objectives or ends for engaging in scientific activity, thus opening up another avenue for unlimited scientific progress. Martin Carrier adds that in a complex universe like ours there are emergent properties not fully intelligible on the basis of current atomic and molecular physics, and this means science will have to continue moving forward to understand novel emergent properties and systems.

Not all of the contributors to this volume are as optimistic. Thomas Breuer provides a formal argument to show that no complete internal measurement of a system can be made from within that system, with obvious consequences for a Theory of Everything. Alfred Nordmann draws on Bruno Latour to argue that science is a genuinely historical process whereby both subject and object are involved in a process of 'becoming' something they were previously not. It is an essential feature of the experimental process that both nature and science are changed by it, and so long as science refuses to adopt this 'historicized' perspective it will fail to know itself.

Several papers urge that the use of inappropriate methodologies hampers specific sciences from making progress. Hans Julius Schneider appeals to Georg von Wright and Wittgenstein to motivate his claim that psychology requires a hermeneutical rather than a natural scientific approach. Alexander Rosenberg argues that biology could not be reduced to physical and chemical laws and still serve our cognitive interest in biological functions (the relation between physical structure and function is many-to-one). And

according to Giora Hon the current experimental method involves tracing a system's evolution from an initial state description, and is thereby inappropriate for understanding living systems because cells do not possess the requisite kind of 'states'.

Lastly, if the unity of scientific knowledge is a goal of science, then we have the question whether science is limited by the failure to unify physics, let alone all the disparate scientific disciplines. Margaret Morrison and Gordon N. Fleming discuss the fortunes of unification within physical science.

All of the papers are interesting and rewarding in their own way, although they do not all address with equal force the questions about limits and progress discussed in this review, (and for that reason some have been skipped over here). There is a good index and each paper has a useful references section.

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Tina Chanter
Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. 294.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-804-73932-3);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-804-74311-8).

Time, Death and the Feminine consists of a series of essays thematically bound by a consideration of the relationship between Heidegger and Levinas on the issue of temporality. Many of the essays examine the distance between the two figures, and emphasize the implications of diachronous temporality, as opposed to ecstatic temporality, for political thought. Chanter finds in Levinas's notion of diachrony 'a far-reaching critique of Heidegger's understanding of temporality,' particularly its neglect of embodiment and its emphasis on eventual synchrony (1). However, she finds that Heidegger becomes a valuable ally for contemporary feminists insofar as he is interpreted, critiqued, and revised by Levinas. But Levinas's own work on corporeality retains certain commitments to an inherited view of paternity and maternity; these issues have been raised most compellingly by Luce Irigaray, and were first noted by Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex*. Chanter's innovation lies in her attention to Levinas's account of time in order to

elucidate how other concepts deployed by Levinas can be useful to political movements around authority and marginalization.

The question of embodiment becomes a vital theme insofar as it brings together Levinas's emphasis on vulnerability on the part of the subject and contemporary feminist revisions of an inherited dualistic self-conception. Chanter indicates that the most promising work of feminism and race theory involves the analysis of the significance of bodies, in their difference, in their givenness, and in their ability to serve as the space for transformation: 'to simply set aside, ignore, or bracket bodies, biology, and materiality, in order to focus on the constructed or symbolic meanings of self identity, is to recast the Cartesian privilege of mind over body. ... What is needed, then, is not a willful avoidance of bodies, but a thorough and nuanced account of them and their relationship to symbolic aspects of identity. Even if Levinas has not thought through the complexities of race and gender in relation to bodies, his account of materiality, sensibility, and enjoyment, and their relation to representation, constitution, and language can contribute to this project' (12). This 'recasting' of the body fundamentally involves a consideration of temporality, as the history of philosophy ties embodiment to existence within time: physical reproduction, aging, and mortality all signal this bond. Indeed, Chanter's most thorough consideration of Heidegger's work concerns his emphasis on the anticipation of one's own mortality. It is Levinas's rejection of this model — in favor of an understanding of mortality that privileges the other's death — that she finds useful in its resistance to an implicit and subtle totalization sheltered within Heidegger's overturning of metaphysics, which 'seems to cancel the radical alterity of death' (199). Similarly, Levinas's insistence on the diachronous nature of time and its persistent distention of subjectivity is extended by Chanter to evoke the alterity between genders, races, and within the self. This provides the bridge to 'the political', in its more conventional understanding.

However, the essay format detracts from a sustained examination of these issues. Fragmentary discussions and repetitive expositions of Heidegger and Levinas hamper Chanter's endeavor to chart the political implications of these movements in Continental thought. There is an uneven quality to this work; different essays seem to presuppose varying levels of familiarity with Levinas and Heidegger. Although there are deeply original insights about these central issues in contemporary Continental philosophy, the essays have a primarily preparatory tone. Chanter never fully articulates how Levinas's understanding of temporality helps feminists gain a new historical consciousness with respect to patriarchy (19), and she remains undecided on the issue of how Levinas uses the figure of the feminine (250ff.).

However, part of Chanter's emphasis lies with the multiple interpretations of what are most indeterminate themes: politics, ethics, and the feminine. The move to understand gender differences as neither arising from ahistorical essences nor 'mere' fabrications of culture marks how strongly Chanter has been influenced and inspired by Luce Irigaray and other French feminists. Her focus is on the historical construction of gender, and its

intersection with historical constructions of the dichotomy between embodiment and consciousness; thus the question of how histories are told, even the history of feminism itself, remains a crucial issue. This concern with history forms the point of access to Heidegger and Levinas's conceptions of time, and the demands that temporality places on human agents. What Levinas leaves unsaid and uncertain — the extent to which the feminine can be identified with individual women, the possibility of translating the infinite responsibility of the ethical encounter into political activism, whether corporeality is equated with susceptibility and exposure on a historically contingent basis — remain in irresolute contention here. After many analyses that have merely repeated Levinas's own ideas, this collection stands as a transitional piece: it remains very close to Levinas's commitments but articulates some of the most significant questions with which those commitments leave us.

The paired essays on the status of philosophy in Levinas's thought — 'A Mourning of Philosophy: Levinas' Legacy as Traumatic Response' and 'The Betrayal of Philosophy' — are especially incisive and complex explorations of his understanding of how alterity can enter into language, into ontology, and also disturb that realm. Chanter examines Levinas's strained relationship with the history of philosophy by specifically considering the evolution of his relationship with Heidegger (and particularly the movement of his reading of *Being and Time*) from very early essays such as the little-read 'Martin Heidegger and Ontology' to his later critiques in *Otherwise than Being* and 'Dying for ... ' Chanter argues persuasively that both Heidegger and Levinas should be considered allies, if problematic ones, for feminists, race theorists, and other activists who seek theoretical foundations in Continental philosophy. In this work, however, she only gestures toward the particular ways in which this alliance could be enacted.

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Richard A. Cohen
Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. 361.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-521-80158-3.

Joyfully readable, Cohen's *Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy* effectively cuts through the usual verbiage of contemporary, Continental discourse to clearly present the simple and persistent message of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas ('Very simply, nothing is more significant than serving others. All other significations, in all other registers, derive from this deepest or highest significance' [17]), without (much) trivializing the complexities that are involved in articulating this message in the context of the Western philosophical tradition that Levinas at once criticizes and in which he self-consciously participates. With the ease and facility open only to a mature and confident Levinas scholar, Cohen offers here a text that joins Adriaan Peperzak's *To the Other: An Introduction to the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas* at the top of a short list of books on Levinas that make the thought of the philosopher accessible to (advanced) undergraduates, while still opening new vistas of thought for the specialist. If the analyses occasionally oversimplify complex issues (for example, when Cohen glosses over the intricate relationships between Levinas and, for instance, Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida — painting these relationships as ones of more or less simple opposition), one senses that such is primarily a matter of strategic choice; Cohen evaluates what is gained by refusing to get lost in the convolutions of such discussions (many of which he has taken up elsewhere), and what is gained is a straightforward statement of Levinas's profound philosophical revolution, and a book from which much can be learned.

Cohen's principal thesis is that the thought of Levinas proceeds by way of what Cohen terms 'ethical exegesis', defined as 'philosophy conscious of the true stature of the good' (11), a good that is better than being, and that underwrites being, truth, and history. Ethical exegesis has an ear for a Sacred history, the history of righteousness, 'beneath' the history of Being. 'Philosophy as ethical exegesis — discovering the ethical in the ontological, seeing the lower in light of the higher, ... — is attuned to this deeper, weightier, truer history, ... that of the humanity of the human,' but where humanity 'is not a given but an achievement, an accomplishment, an elevation' that 'emerges when and where morality is at work' (15). Cohen reads Levinas as reading the Talmudic sages as ethical exegetes (238), reads Levinas as continuing in this tradition, and attempts here to himself read Levinas in this tradition.

After outlining the project of 'ethical exegesis' in his Introduction (wherein 'ethics' and 'aesthetics' are presented as the two viable but contradictory options open to a post-epistemological philosophy, and which contains an interesting introduction to introductions), Cohen carries out his project

across two major 'Parts'. The first, 'Exceeding Phenomenology', principally 'historical', situates Levinas, by contrast and comparison, by filiation and opposition, with respect to, consecutively, Bergson, science and phenomenology, Husserl, and Heidegger. Of special interest in this instructive section is the placement of Levinas's thought in the context of a non-conventional history of philosophy that Cohen adapts from the Harvard medievalist Harry Austryn Wolfson, one that replaces being/becoming as philosophy's central question with that of the relationship between reason and revelation, that replaces Plato and Descartes with Philo and Spinoza as philosophy's key pivotal figures, and that takes Bergson (Cohen's own modification) as 'the core inspiration and guiding spirit of our time' (31).

The second 'thematic' part, 'Good and Evil', deals with the issues of alterity, Levinas's notion of 'maternity', Biblical humanism, suffering and evil, Levinas's 'small disagreement' with Ricœur, and religion (and its relationship to ethics). These chapters, containing sometimes close textual readings, sometimes paraphrastic (but faithful) distillations of Levinas's ideas, sometimes careful philosophical argument, sometimes contemplative reflections, allow Cohen to put his intimate familiarity with Levinas's thought, and his mastery of a broad range of philosophical and religious discourses, to productive work. Cohen's unfolding of the 'trope' of maternity is particularly illuminating here, as is his deepening and sharpening of his notion of ethical exegesis as contrasted with 'criticism' on the one hand, and with 'Nietzschean interpretation' on the other, all unfolded in the context of an important exposition of Levinas's 'Biblical humanism'. The closing 'In-conclusion' examining the relationship between ethics and religion, universal responsibility and personal piety, is also provocative and helpful.

Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy is the work of a Levinas disciple. The up-side of this is that Cohen is a devoted reader and effective expositor of Levinasian thought. The down side is that Cohen's exposition is an unapologetic apologetic for Levinas, and Cohen evaluates philosophers based on whether they agree or disagree (on his judgement) with Levinas. Such a practice is philosophically instructive, and, indeed, benign — until Cohen attaches (as he often does) a moral judgement to these evaluations. Illustrative here are Cohen's frequent criticisms of Derrida, which, while not without substance and importance, are animated by a quiet but seething vitriol and ungenerosity (which, indeed, seem more 'personal' than 'academic' — as if Cohen sees himself scrapping with Derrida over a piece of Levinas's heritage), and are centered on the claim that, in short, Derrida goes 'aesthetic' rather than 'ethical' in his post-epistemological thought. Other thinkers are likewise (though usually less aggressively) designated as sheep or goats based on their philosophical 'proximity' to Levinas. In his haste and anxiety to stare evil in the face and name it as such (the failure to do so being, in Cohen's eyes, the bane of contemporary thought in its attachment to 'aesthetic' postmodernism), Cohen both does, in his own 'said' (195-6), and does not, in practice, distinguish between Levinas's own philosophical articulations of 'the good beyond being' and 'the good beyond being itself' — a

distinction that Levinas himself enforces across his distinction between 'the said' (including his own) and 'the saying' to which any said is but a response. That is, I am doubtful whether Levinas's thought really warrants the kind of moral confidence Cohen draws from it. Indeed, the calling into question of *one's own* philosophical articulations of the relationship with the other is, as Levinas insists, not the end of ethics, but its very condition of possibility.

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Alice Crary and **Rupert Read, eds.**
The New Wittgenstein.
New York: Routledge 2000.
Pp. ix + 403.
Cdn$135.00/US$90.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-17319-3);
Cdn$39.99/US$29.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-17319-1).

With one significant exception the papers in this collection challenge orthodox interpretations of Wittgenstein's work. Interpretations, which, Crary argues, '*utterly fail to capture its therapeutic character*' (3, her italics). The papers are organised into three sections: Part I deals with Wittgenstein's later work, Part II with the *Tractatus* and further earlier work and Part III consists of Peter Hacker's response to the papers from an orthodox standpoint.

Contributors comprise a balance of established Wittgenstein scholars and newer scholars whose work elaborates upon and defends the approach to reading and interpreting Wittgenstein first developed by Cavell, McDowell, Diamond and Conant. Part I begins with Cavell's 'An Excursus on Wittgenstein's Vision of Language' (taken from his *The Claim of Reason*) through which we can trace the early genealogy of therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It is followed by John McDowell's 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following' (re-printed here) and then by papers that use this approach to consider rule-following and to interrogate the assimilation of Wittgenstein's later work to anti-realism, relativism and post-modernism.

In Part II Diamond's 'Ethics, Imagination and the *Tractatus*' (re-printed here) serves as the progenitor for the readings pursued by Conant, Putnam, Floyd, Cerbone and Witherspoon. Diamond's paper argues for an approach to reading the *Tractatus* that takes seriously the remarks about nonsense in

the 'frame' (151) formed by the Preface and final remarks. Continuing this theme, Conant also undertakes a reassessment of the Fregean legacy in Wittgenstein's work. Examination of this legacy continues in papers by Putnam (re-printed here) and Cerbone. Floyd's paper applies a therapeutic reading to Wittgenstein's remarks on impossibility proofs, while a second paper by Diamond demonstrates continuity between Wittgenstein's Tractarian remarks on the impossibility of making judgements about private objects and his later discussion of the possibility of private language. Finally, Witherspoon's paper turns to the original reception of Wittgenstein's work, focussing on the relationship between Wittgenstein and Carnap and arguing that any apparent convergence between their work is merely an appearance.

The novelty of these papers is claimed to lie in their unorthodoxy. In what sense are they unorthodox? According to Crary (5), their goal is to show that Wittgenstein's primary philosophical aim was therapeutic. It is intended that this goal be accomplished by the papers' content and also by their organization, so that the approach to the late work feeds into our reading of the early work, thereby emphasising continuity in terms of therapeutic aims and methods and prompting reassessment of the early work.

What does 'therapeutic' mean here? What is the ailment that requires therapy? According to these papers, Wittgenstein criticises the very idea that there is a standpoint external to language from which we can get a clear view of the language/world relationship and hence be able to make meaningful philosophical claims about that relationship. Rather, that standpoint is an illusory one that (conventional) philosophical thinking leads us to believe is properly available. Such exegetical points are not that distant from standard interpretations of Wittgenstein's later work. However, this approach goes further by taking the implications of Wittgenstein's criticism more wholeheartedly than those exegeses do. So, rather than arguing that Wittgenstein's point is that the external standpoint is unattainable, thereby keeping it in play as a possible and comprehensible framework for understanding the world, these writers claim that Wittgenstein's aim is to get us to see that the very idea of the standpoint is incomprehensible. We are unable to say anything meaningful about the standpoint or what might be understood from within it. If we fail to understand Wittgenstein as making this point about the external standpoint, then we construe him, contrary to his aim, to be doing metaphysics.

Following Diamond, all of these writers claim to take seriously Wittgenstein's remarks about nonsense. When he claims that a philosophical utterance is simply nonsense, he is *not* saying that the words attempt to say *some*thing that cannot be put into words. Rather, he is expressing the therapeutic idea that they don't say anything at all; they are not significantly distinct from gibberish. Applied to the *Tractatus*, the therapeutic reading implies that we should do as Wittgenstein counsels us at the end of the book and take its apparently metaphysical claims as nonsense that serves as the rungs of a ladder that should be kicked away once descended. Read this way, the *Tractatus* can be seen as sharing with its descendents the aim of getting

us to see that metaphysical accounts of the language/world relationship are nonsensical and that the possibility of saying anything meaningful about the relationship is merely illusory.

The impossibility, rather than the unavailability, of an external standpoint is taken up in Cerbone's paper, which sees Wittgenstein's case of the wood sellers as intended to prompt a reassessment of Frege's case of the illogical beings. Cerbone shows that the impossibility of thinking *as* an illogical being demonstrates the impossibility of thinking the limit of thought, which requires us to think both sides of that limit, something that could only be done from the external standpoint that we should recognise as illusory.

The papers in Part II of this collection are perhaps more controversial and they form the target of Hacker's paper. Applying a 'pincer movement' (360), he draws upon the *Tractatus* and sources contemporaneous with it, such as Wittgenstein's letters and manuscripts, to undermine the interpretations delivered by the therapeutic reading. He shows that these interpretations still require at least some of Wittgenstein's remarks to be treated as though they are not simply nonsense (360-1). In so doing, he demonstrates just how challenging an enterprise it is to do philosophy in a purely Wittgensteinian vein.

Given the diverse and contested nature of the vast corpus of Wittgensteinian scholarship, one would be hard-pressed to isolate the standard interpretation, although that is clearly what Hacker's paper is meant to represent here. Kripke's Wittgenstein (Read's paper) is hardly orthodox, nor Rorty's (Crary), nor that of those who seek to assimilate Wittgenstein's work to deconstructionism (Stone). A significant difference between the standard and the *new* is that where Hacker and others seek to find and engage with arguments and theories in Wittgenstein's work, the New Wittgensteinians give priority to the philosophical attitude they find in Wittgenstein's work and their exegetical points are informed by this attitude.

This is clearly an important collection that deserves to be taken seriously by anyone interested in Wittgenstein's work.

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Jacques Derrida
The Work of Mourning.
Anne Pascale Brault and Michael Naas, eds.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001.
Pp. viii + 262.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-226-14316-3.

The Work of Mourning is a collection of 14 texts that Jacques Derrida has written at one time or another in response to the death of a friend or colleague. The texts span a rather large time period, beginning with Derrida's early text in response to the death of Roland Barthes (1980), and concluding with two texts on the death of Jean-François Lyotard (1999). While the texts span almost two decades of Derrida's work, one cannot help but be struck by their consistency and near repetition of each other. A variety of themes resurface from text to text (such as the possibility of an impossible mourning, the threat of narcissism inherent in mourning etc.). While it might at first seem that these highly personal texts would need to remain linked to the occasion which produced them (namely the singular death of an individual), the volume's chief merit is that, by bringing each of these texts together and thereby linking them in a serial chain, the book highlights the nature of the double bind that Derrida finds at work in the work of mourning. This double bind consists in the fact that in mourning one must pay respect to the singularity of the other, and to the uniqueness of the event of his or her death. And yet, though each death is singular, there is an inevitable repetition of this singularity. The volume very powerfully treads the line between a theoretical text *on* the work of mourning, and personal texts that are themselves *acts* of mourning. While the volume certainly seems to presuppose Derrida's more 'theoretical' work on mourning, it does not require it, and in fact offers an excellent introduction to it for the very reason that it exemplifies that of which it speaks.

The volume opens with Derrida's text on Barthes, 'The Death*s* of Roland Barthes', which acts as a kind of prologue for the other essays. One of the longest essays in the volume, it also develops most of the major themes that Derrida repeats (with a difference) in each of the other texts. One of these major themes is Derrida's insistence on the simultaneous necessity and risk of an internalization of the other in mourning. That the other has died means that it is only 'in us' that the other still survives — and yet this is also the threat of the reduction of the singularity of the other. Speaking of Barthes Derrida writes: 'I was searching *like him*, as him, for in the situation in which I have been writing since his death, a certain mimetism is at once a duty (to take him into oneself, to identify with him in order to let him speak within oneself, to make him present and faithfully to represent him) and the worst of temptations, the most indecent and most murderous. The gift *and* the revocation of the gift, just try to choose' (38). Derrida goes on to tackle a whole series of 'risks' of mourning all of which revolve around the question of 'fidelity' in mourning, a fidelity to the other who cannot speak. All of these

risks in some way involve a settling of accounts — such as the threat that an admission of guilt in the act of mourning would entail nothing but the attempt to give the mourner a good conscience. In short, the primary risk for the act of mourning, according to Derrida, is a kind of narcissism — the threat of the 'use' of the death of the other for one's own ends. The mourner is thus caught between two infidelities — remaining silent, not speaking of the dead at all, and of speaking *for* the dead.

Derrida's strategy with regard to this first double bind is in part to cite the other, to let the other speak through citation. But, as Derrida argues, in the move towards citation one encounters a mourning that is already at work, even before the death of the other in and through his name. The name is structurally linked to the death of the other in advance because it can exist without him in advance. Mourning, Derrida argues, is already taking place, even before the 'actual' death of the other. The name, which is supposed to designate the other in his singularity, is also his death in advance. What this leads to in Derrida's argument is the possibility of an interiorization of the other that is never completed. The other's name — that which designates the other in his singularity — is what forbids a mourning that would come to a completion. Since the other is dead *in advance* — we cannot but continue to mourn him. It is in this sense that mourning is 'impossible' according to Derrida — mourning must take place, but it must not end in any kind of expiation or settling of accounts with the other. So while the first moment of mourning necessarily involves an interiorization of the other, this remains incomplete. There is, Derrida argues, an asymmetry in the relation between the mourner and the mourned, such that the mourner is seen by the mourned 'before' the act of mourning. It is this priority and asymmetry in the relation of mourner to mourned that is the source of the mourner's responsibility to the other. It is gaze or a 'look' of the other that is 'in the mourner' but does not belong to him as himself. This, in turn, leads Derrida to a discussion of ghosts, of the return of the other within the same ('revenant' in French implies both ghost and return).

Though these general thematic points are continuously reiterated throughout each of Derrida's eulogies, each time Derrida repeats one or more of these thematics, a different aspect of it is articulated in the case of each of the singular deaths Derrida mourns. While the larger texts on Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Louis Marin and Jean-François Lyotard actually allow Derrida the chance to engage with the work of each of these figures in detail, even the shorter texts (such as the one on Gilles Deleuze) often provide suggestive points of intersection between Derrida's thought of mourning and their work. Often, Derrida's work on other 'concepts' (such as friendship or forgiveness) intersect with a particular act of mourning. In the text of Foucault, for example, Derrida suggests the possibility that one way in which to maintain fidelity in mourning is to pay tribute to a work through a question that it itself formulates for itself, thereby, in a sense, keeping it alive. Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of the kind of difference in repetition through mourning is in Derrida's text on the death of Sarah Kofman. As the

only woman eulogized in the book, the question of the impossibility of mourning (or the impossible interiorization of the other), encounters the added problem of sexual difference and the sexed body. In each text, though the basic theme of impossible mourning is maintained, it does not remain intact. It is repeatedly forced to encounter the work of the other — and in each repetition something else is discovered about mourning. Though the texts are not as detailed as, for example, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, or *Memoires for Paul deMan*, their accumulative impact through a direct engagement with the actual *task* of mourning, makes this volume an important document in the development of Derrida's thought of mourning.

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Jacques Derrida and **Maurizio Ferraris**
A Taste for the Secret.
Trans. Giacomo Donis.
Eds. Giacomo Donis and David Webb.
Malden, MA: Blackwell 2001. Pp. 161.
US$55.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7956-2333-6);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-2334-6).

The first part of the book consists of a set of six interviews between Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris conducted in Paris, Naples and Turin between July 1993 and January 1995. The second section of the book is a 60-page essay in four parts by Maurizio Ferraris. The book cover shows the title 'A Taste for the Secret' superimposed on an image of Eve holding the apple, from a diptych of the 1528 painting by Lucas Cranach.

In the brief introduction 'Secrétaire', Derrida and Ferraris ask, 'What secrets?' And they refer to the etymology of *secrétaire*, meaning an assistant like Phaedrus who conceals Lysis's speech under his cloak, and also Phaedrus 'as a sparring partner — or interviewer — of Socrates.' But except perhaps for the opening pages, the analogy of Ferraris as Phaedrus and Derrida as Socrates as sparring partners would be misleading. The interactions are usually friendly though sometimes cryptic. In the introduction, Derrida and Ferraris say that more than half of the book is composed of 'an interview' which is subsequently referred to as a dialogue to which Vattimo becomes a third party in the final interview.

At the outset Ferraris asks Derrida: 'How does writing enter philosophy?' Immediately Ferraris proceeds to provide the answer himself by questioning the generally accepted version of this entrance, which holds that after the end of metaphysics philosophers are no longer dealing with truth but are serving something like 'a sort of social welfare service based on conversation.' Ferraris is troubled by the new tolerance for letting philosophers do whatever they wish, with the exception of their proper work, which is 'the search for truth.' This tolerance is actually repressive, he says, since it leads to the historical circumstance where philosophy has just become another form of 'literature' — a clear reference to Rorty.

The introductory question, so promisingly expounded by Ferraris, is immediately contradicted: 'Writing did not "enter" philosophy, it was already there,' says Derrida. But he agrees with Ferraris that truth is not outmoded. 'Truth is not a value one can renounce.' The reader of *A Taste for the Secret* should not necessarily expect the sort of interview that others have held with Jacques Derrida, such as in *Points ... Interviews* (1995). After raising the question of the entrance of writing in philosophy Ferraris rarely asks further questions. In fact, the exchanges can hardly be called a dialogue. And yet, the reflections are generally interesting and provocative. Often the interview is engaged through a brief statement or the utterance of a quote, followed by a lengthy 'response' by Derrida.

For example, on page 52 Ferraris quotes a passage from Emmanuel Levinas's *Proper Names*. In it Levinas mentions that the literary effect of Derrida's writing stirs images: 'When I read him, I always recall the exodus of 1940. A retreating military unit arrives in an as yet unsuspecting locality, where cafés are open, where the ladies visit the "ladies' fashion store", where the hairdressers dress hair and the bakers bake; where viscounts meet other viscounts and tell each other stories of viscounts, and where, an hour later, everything is deconstructed and devastated.' In response to the quote, Derrida admits that he had only recently become aware of the accusative tone of this text. He states that Levinas had always been a friend and 'generous' toward him. Yet, here Levinas presents the image of the author as the 'Nazi invader'. It makes you wonder. It's bizarre, says Derrida. But then he asks, what is the unconscious of that image? (Who are the inhabitants of the village? And what were they doing that could be so easily and unsuspectingly disrupted and dislocated?) 'It's sort of like the Resistance dream we spoke about,' says Derrida, 'but turned upside down.'

Throughout the interviews Derrida offers frequent insights into his life as author, such as his reasons for writing, his resistance to be photographed, etc. The curious reader might ask, but are personal secrets revealed? The title would lead one to expect not. Yet, Derrida shares some inner thoughts. On clarity: 'my own experience of writing leads me to think that one does not always write with a desire to be understood — there is a paradoxical desire not to be understood' (30). On school: 'even though I have always been *in* school I was never good *at* school. I failed a lot of examinations, was held back ... ' (40). On grammar: 'I detest grammatical mistakes. Even when I take

liberties that some people find provocative, I do so with the feeling — justifiable or not — that I do in fact know the rules. A transgression should always know what it transgresses' (43). On death: 'I think about nothing but death, I think about it all the time, ten seconds don't go by without the imminence of the thing being there' (88). On afterlife: 'I do not believe that one lives on post mortem' (88).

The concern with the meaning and place of writing recurs throughout the interviews. Derrida explains how the condition for sharing, thematizing, or objectifying something implies that there be something non-sharable, non-thematizable, non-objectifiable. And this something is the absolute secret — we speak of it but we cannot say it, we evoke it but we cannot write it. The secret is absolute because it is de-tached, cut-off (*ab-solutus*) or separated (*secrète*) from that to which it belongs. What is the significance of this unconditional and absolute secret? Dwelling in the secret forces the recognition of the irreducibility of things. It reminds of the singularity of experience and of existence in its relation to language and inquiry. The reader may agree that we must not only have a taste for the secret, we must cultivate the care for the secret.

Having a taste for the secret, has personal significance for Derrida. He relates it to his childhood in Algeria, his Jewishness, his sense of a mother-tongue, and his contested status in the Academy. All of this has made him prefer the secret to the non-secret: 'it clearly has to do with not-belonging', he says. And he explains that ultimately, there inheres a kind of terror in the demands made by the public and political space. It leaves no room for the secret. If the right to the secret is not maintained we are in a totalitarian space.

The second part of the book contains the essay 'What is There?' by the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris. The essay explores questions of indication and time, the 'this'. He argues that Augustine was quite right to draw our attention not to the words but to the finger that produces the ostension. 'We have seen what there is: not the thing, the percept or its mnestic phantasm, but rather a finger, and to be precise an index that gives a sign and says "this", assuming it as present and in the present — as, precisely, the indicative present' (97). But how is the fleeting nature of the *this* of sense certainty preserved over time? Here Ferraris turns to the theme of writing that has also preoccupied much of the interview part of the book. If by 'writing' one does not mean the empirical act of writing then it is a system of retentions already at work in sense-certainty: 'every being endowed with retention writes incessantly' (115).

Ferraris uses the work of Derrida, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel, Rousseau, Heidegger, Condillac, and Wittgenstein to rethink the relation between speech and writing, hieroglyph and alphabet, image and name. If, as Hegel claims, we think in names, then handwriting is ultimately a hieroglyphic writing that has become increasingly abstract and habituated. The experience of writing itself finds a provocative expression in Ferraris. 'A literate person makes use of writing as of a perfect automatism,' he suggests

(130). Ultimately this notion seems at odds with Derrida and the latter's debt to Maurice Blanchot. But Blanchot receives no mention from Ferraris.

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Simon Glendinning, ed.
Arguing with Derrida.
Malden, MA: Blackwell 2001.
Pp. l + 143.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-631-22652-4.

Gideon Ofrat
The Jewish Derrida.
Trans. Peretz Kidron.
New York: Syracuse University Press 2001.
Pp. l + 201.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8156-2885-4);
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Richard Rand, ed.
Futures of Jacques Derrida.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. xi + 252.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3955-2);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3956-0).

Transcribed from the 1999 University of Reading conference of the same name, *Arguing with Derrida* provides an insight into the relationship between Derrida's work and Anglo-American philosophy; particularly 'ordinary language' philosophy. This relationship is often tense, but *Arguing with Derrida* demonstrates why these remain tensions and not impassable dichotomies.

In addition to Simon Glendinning's meticulous introductory essay on Derrida's reading of Austin, and Darren Sheppard's retrospective evaluation of the 'Reading affair', this volume comprises of four papers to which Derrida responds directly. Glendinning identifies the most substantive outcome of the proceedings when he argues that Derrida's 'suspicion' (117) of the notion of 'ordinary language' (and the 'ordinary' more generally) is due, not to a rejection of that category, but rather to a desire 'to do justice to "the ordinary"' (32).

For, as Derrida later remarks, what interests him is locating 'the production of the extraordinary *within* the ordinary' (117). (Derrida's example is 'trusting someone', which he sees as both 'part of the most ordinary experience of language' and also 'most extraordinary'; 'an act of faith ... totally heterogeneous to proof' [119].)

This brings Derrida into proximity with the later Wittgenstein (responding to Adrian Moore, Derrida even describes himself as an 'analytic' or 'conceptual philosopher' [83, cf. 105-6]) — as are Derrida's remarks on animality (103, 106-8) broadly in-keeping with Wittgenstein's later naturalism. So why, Stephen Mulhall candidly enquires, has he 'never engaged in any detailed consideration of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*?' (109) Derrida answers (responding to Thomas Baldwin): 'I have to confess that I'm not familiar with Wittgenstein' (105), and likewise (to Geoffrey Bennington): 'I have no justification for that. Simply: *I failed*' (53).

Aside from these confessions (which are significant given Derrida's numerous analyses of testimony and the pre-performative ' "Believe me" ' (119) implicit in any meaningful utterance) Derrida clarifies a number of further points about his work. Most notable in this regard is Derrida's response to Baldwin on the question of death. Derrida maintains that — contra Baldwin's reading — his account of *iterability* is 'not a thesis on our mortality', for it is not 'the *inevitability* of death' that is important here, but rather 'the *possibility* of death'. Derrida proceeds: 'The point is that for a sentence ... to *be* a sentence — an intelligible, meaningful sentence — it has to be implied that I may be absent and that it can continue to function ... the functioning of the sentence implies the possibility of my being radically "on leave" ... radically absent'. While Derrida is right to highlight the difference between the *inevitability* and *possibility* of death (that one will *eventually* die is certainly true, but it obscures the crucial point that death can come *at any moment*), he overstates his position by insisting that 'it is not a thesis about death'. For although Derrida employs 'death' as a 'figure' of 'absence' *in general* (absence of intention, seriousness, sincerity, etc.) to 'refer to the structural conditions of possibility for the sentence to be performed, understood and repeated' (102), it is also clear that 'death' — in its more 'ordinary' sense — represents 'absence' in its most inordinate form. Thus it is not entirely fair to claim that all this 'has nothing to do with a metaphysics of life / death, or of mortality / immortality' (103).

Arguing with Derrida should be of interest to philosophers on both sides of the alleged 'analytic / continental' divide. It will also, one hopes, make that division seem all the more unhelpful.

Transcribed from the 1995 symposium at the University of Alabama, *Futures of Jacques Derrida* comprises seven essays, including Derrida's 'History of the Lie'. This is a more traditionally 'Derridean' collection insofar as these essays enact close readings of numerous other philosophers *through* which Derrida's work is approached. Thus, for example, Geoffrey Bennington reads Kant and Derrida with specific reference to the possibility of teleology without 'definable *telos*' (17) (a theme reiterated in Bennington's contribution

to *Arguing with Derrida*), while Paul Davies's essay concerns the 'principle of contradiction' (40) (notably as viewed by Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger), and Werner Hamacher focuses on the spectre of the 'messianic' in Marx and Derrida.

Derrida's own contribution follows the same path, where, through readings of Arendt, Kant and Koyré, he touches upon a number of themes prominent in his recent work; notably the necessary intertwining of (possible) deception and (implicit) trust in the social bond (67-9, 74, 92, 95), the promissory structure of testimony (77-8, 90, 95), truth and performativity (81-3, 90-1), the im/possibility of self-deception (67, 86-7, 96), the secret (93), and the distinction between 'the lie' and 'error ... ignorance ... faulty reasoning' (86). But the governing theme in this piece is the *productive* nature of the possibility of lying, false-testimony and perjury; necessary possibilities which constitute the very 'possibility of history' (98).

In keeping with this general point, Derrida has argued that the possibility of 'radical evil' (of which there exists a 'multiplicity' [125]) is *necessarily* inscribed into even the most 'good' or 'moral' of actions. With this mutual contamination in mind Peter Fenves enquires whether 'by assigning radical evil a function, however cryptic' Derrida thereby 'runs the risk' of enacting 'a new attempt at philosophical theodicy'? This important question has been neglected by commentators, and although Fenves believes that Derrida's position is better understood as 'an oblique attempt to free theodicy from its self-defining intention: justification, showing the justice of things as they *now* stand' (128), the possibility of interpreting Derrida's recent thinking as a proto-theodicy remains itself a 'risk' which — to borrow Fenves's words — could never be said to have come *entirely* 'out of the blue' (119, cf. 122).

Futures of Jacques Derrida requires patience and stamina of the reader, and will appeal to those familiar with both Derrida's work and that of his most demanding commentators.

In *The Jewish Derrida* Gideon Ofrat claims to have provided the first exposition of the 'Jewish current' (1) running through Derrida's work. Although this claim is not entirely accurate (155), *The Jewish Derrida* does offer the most detailed study of this theme to date. Comprised of nineteen brief chapters, Ofrat's book attempts to 'meander in the tracks of a Jewish wanderer' (6) and thereby trace a number of correlations between Derrida's thinking, his early life in Algeria, and some key Judaic motifs. But this task is hampered by the fact that Derrida rarely speaks explicitly, either of Judaism in general, or of his own Jewish heritage. Ofrat is thus forced to quarry the Derridean corpus for examples of how Judaism nevertheless haunts Derrida's work, and this he does, not with a view to methodical argumentation, but rather to providing a patchwork of Judaic-deconstructive portraits.

Given Ofrat's objective ('to argue that Derrida cannot be thoroughly understood without elucidating the Jewish current running through his philosophy' [1]), *The Jewish Derrida* ultimately fails to establish its author's underlying conjecture. While Ofrat elaborates on some interesting correla-

tions (e.g., between the Holocaust and Derrida's rhetoric of 'survival', 'fire' and 'ash' [92-102, 124, 151-4]) the deeply 'spectral' nature of the latter's Judaism ultimately undermines the force of Ofrat's position.

Hindered by an overly piecemeal structure, *The Jewish Derrida* thus tends toward biographical reconstruction (32) — and sometimes the merely anecdotal — which becomes most apparent where Ofrat allies Derridean themes too closely to events through 'which he [Derrida] lived' (31) as a Jewish child in Algeria (33, 47, 117-18). For too often is the reader *appealed* to for endorsement of Ofrat's general thesis. Thus, in relation to Derrida's 1964 essay on Edmond Jabès, Ofrat enquires: 'And yet the reader wonders: Is Derrida writing about Jabès or about himself?'. His preferred response is clear, for Ofrat considers Derrida's essay to be essentially a 'self-portrait' (32). Similarly, of Derrida's 1996 analysis of death as 'borderline' (in *Aporias*), Ofrat asks: 'Do these words not remind the reader of the experience of the refugee in flight from one country to another ... only to be stopped, denied entry? Do we not in effect confront Derrida's basic Jewish experience ... [?]' (122) Such petitions prompt one to enquire what, *philosophically* speaking, hinges on these Jewish 'parallels' (101)? Given Derrida's upbringing, his culture and intellectual inheritance it is hardly surprising that Judaic themes emerge in his writings. But arguably there are as many *Christian* motifs at work here, especially in those texts of an ethical-political bent. Acknowledging one's debt to the conceptual tradition one inherits is, as Derrida frequently stresses, an elementary responsibility. But so too must one avoid conflating influences with causes; especially when surveying the work of *others*.

This potentially reductive subtext to *The Jewish Derrida* is not, however, its only problem. For although Ofrat admires Derrida's 'great magic' (112), his reading of this 'heroic' (2) philosopher is impressionistic. Thus, for example, 'deconstruction' is dubiously allied to processes of 'demolition' and 'pulverization' (71). Likewise, we are told of Derrida's 'peculiar predilection for "double binds," for contrasting paired concepts' (86), and, moreover, that there is 'no meaning ... prior to the act of writing ... rather, the writing itself is the act of creation of the meaning, before which there is nothing' (114). Ofrat's theological characterisation of Derrida is also notable, for having (rightly) emphasised Derrida's anti-salvationism (3-4, 7-8), Ofrat nevertheless refers to 'the Derridean craving for "martyrdom" ' (102) (and even his 'utopian-moral' [110] attitude); 'in its unplumbed depths, Derrida's philosophy is the tragic thinking of a man imbuing his writings with the experience of eternal victim, to the extent that renders Derrida deserving of the title of philosopher of death' (121). Derrida, we are assured, is 'one of the most theological philosophers in contemporary philosophy', despite his 'religious-secular dualism' (115) (a dualism, it should be noted, that Derrida has explicitly rejected).

One final example, indicative of the problems haunting *The Jewish Derrida*, is Ofrat's account of Derrida's remarks on Abraham in *The Gift of Death* (trans. David Wills. University of Chicago Press 1995). Commenting

on Derrida's reminder that, geographically, Mount Moriah is now the home of Jewish, Muslim and Christian religio-political sites and tensions, Ofrat claims that, for Derrida '[t]he sacrifice of Isaac has not ended, even if Derrida does not extend the fate of that sacrifice to the pogroms and the Holocaust.' Moreover, 'the fate of the present-day sacrifice is [for Derrida] mainly the fate of Jews and Moslems, waging their political-religious conflict in the Middle East' (110). But this overlooks the fact that, in *The Gift of Death*, Derrida describes this extraordinary sacrificial narrative as illustrative of 'the most common and everyday experience of responsibility'; namely, that 'I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others', including those 'whom I know or don't know, the billions of my fellows (without mentioning the animals ...) ... who are dying of starvation or sickness' (ibid., 67-9). Thus, contrary to Ofrat's reading, Derrida maintains that we *all* necessarily dwell in the shadow of Mount Moriah.

The Jewish Derrida will be of most interest to those who want a taste of Derrida's thought, specifically in relation to Judaism. For those primarily interested in Derrida's philosophical import, Ofrat provides some useful — though insufficiently organised and developed — thematic signposts.

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Robert Gooding-Williams
Zarathustra's Dionysian Modernism.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. 420.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3295-7);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3294-9).

Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, according to its author, is his most profound work. And most informed commentators would concede that it has few rivals in the philosophic tradition in either imagistic richness or world-historical ambition. To take on the role of guide and surveyor of this veritable jungle of imagery and allusion is a dangerous and difficult task. Robert Gooding-Williams's *Zarathustra's Dionysian Modernism* is his travelogue through this still dark and misunderstood domain, and any future travelers would be well served by consulting it. More than an interpretive guide to *Zarathustra*, however, Gooding-Williams uses the text to provoke reflection on one of the

fundamental questions posed to we heirs of modernity: is fundamental change possible from within modernity, or does the progressive character of modernity and its carrier-regime of liberal democracy simply metabolize any and all efforts at change?

Thus the 'modernism' of Gooding-Williams's title is that of literary and aesthetic theory, concerned with novelty and innovation that truly 'interrupts' modernity's catholic tendency. Gooding-Williams introduces his work with the now familiar 'situation' of his reading, namely, in the context of other discussions of the modern and post-modern. He takes up the task of defending the idea of philosophy in literary form and including *Zarathustra* in this category. In so doing, he establishes his interpretive approach as both dramatic (i.e., the speeches of the protagonist are to be interpreted in light of the action, setting and, audience to whom they are addressed) and historical (i.e., as engaged with the continuing conversation between the greatest minds that constitutes our philosophic tradition).

Gooding-Williams begins with an analysis of the Prologue to *Zarathustra* prefaced by a reading of the all-important first speech in the 'Motley Cow' ('On the Three Metamorphoses'). Taking his cue from Nietzsche's own extra-textual remarks and a consideration of the Prologue, Gooding-Williams identifies a key structural motif that informs the work as a whole: that of the 'stammer'. We are to see in Zarathustra's narrative a series of encounters with skeptical, doubting voices who call into question the possibility of new value creation and the project of the overman. These 'representations of repetition' force Zarathustra to revise his manner of acting in the world, as well as his self-understanding, finally forcing him to become one who is capable of new value creation and inspiring others to follow.

The interpretive key to these sequential self-transformations is provided in 'On the Three Metamorphoses'. Gooding-Williams reads this speech, however, not as simply disclosing a path Zarathustra has already traversed, but rather as an anticipation of what he (and any others who would join him as fellow harvesters and rejoicers) must yet do. On this reading, the Zarathustra who descends from his cave is still a spiritual lion, despite the saint's remarking that Zarathustra is child-like. And Gooding-Williams sees Zarathustra as a lion for most of the book, though he occasionally reverts back to camelesque behavior in the face of certain of these 'representations of repetition'.

Gooding-Williams himself interrupts his reading of *Zarathustra* with a digression on Nietzsche's changing understanding of the Dionysian, contrasting the account given in *Birth of Tragedy* with that which he perceives in *Zarathustra*. The analysis of Part I that follows focuses on Zarathustra's search for and selection of fellow lions as disciples. For Gooding-Williams, the central concern of Part I is the identification of virtues with passions, and the bodily account of the self that is its necessary implication. For the early Zarathustra, value creators are those who legislate their passions, their estimations of high and low, their 'virtues'. Values are thus to be seen merely as artifacts of the passions of past creators.

Proceeding to examine Part II, Gooding-Williams returns to a distinction he made earlier in his reading of the Prologue between two forms of Dionysian experience: that of the Promethean hero, and that of the child-creator. The former characterizes Zarathustra through Part I and most of Part II. And while resilient in the face of nay-saying voices, this heroic, leonine Zarathustra is ultimately self-estranged. He is oblivious to his own inability as a lion, to create new values (despite having articulated his awareness of this fact at the outset). Gooding-Williams connects these two alternative forms of Dionysian experience to the Romantic and Kantian distinction between the sublime and the beautiful, arguing that Zarathustra as Promethean hero must ultimately relinquish his sublime self-sacrificing impulse — manifested in his will to truth — in favor of a will to life and the beautiful. This movement from crisis to cure, culminates in the section 'On Those Who are Sublime'.

The remainder of Gooding-Williams's book (almost half), focuses on the thought of eternal recurrence, the *Grundconception* of *Zarathustra*. For anyone wrestling with this enigmatic centerpiece of Nietzsche's thinking, Gooding-Williams's account is helpful, though at times arcane and awkwardly articulated. Generally, his approach is very much to be applauded, for he refuses to consider the thought as a doctrine to be divorced from the drama in which it is articulated. He grants that there is some utility to considering the place and role of eternal-return in Nietzsche's thought generally, but confines himself to its function in *Zarathustra*. So considered, it appears as a dynamic concept, 'a sort of three-act thought drama in its own right' (297) which serves Zarathustra variously as a 'practical postulate that refers to a cosmological vision' (185), and as a belief in the possibility of a redemptive future. On this reading, eternal recurrence is first articulated by the soothsayer, who is the paramount 'representation of repetition' challenging Zarathustra's belief in the possibility of change. And, initially at least, Zarathustra is foiled by this nay-sayer. But as he lives with the pessimistic soothsayer's formulation, appropriating it, and suffering from it, he translates it into a Kantian-esque practical postulate which encourages even while it denies. Finally, he is liberated from this Promethean anguish, from the final sin of pity, from a spirit of revenge, by a sign announcing the advent of his children. In Gooding-Williams's language, the sign announces 'the return to European modernity of the possibility of experiencing passional chaos' (296).

As a reader, Gooding-Williams's instincts are sound. He rightly identifies the key concern in *Zarathustra* as being the possibility of 'interrupting' modernity, but he fails to explain clearly how the possibility of genuine change is reconciled with the thought of eternal recurrence: *the* interpretive question raised by this reading. Second, he correctly emphasizes the importance of the first speech to *Zarathustra* as a whole, though he is not as convincing to in portraying Zarathustra as a self-deceived lion who fails to see in himself what he explicitly tells of in the opening speech. Furthermore, while displaying an admirable willingness to identify and follow Nietzsche's

allusions to previous philosophers, Gooding-Williams (unlike, say, Laurence Lampert or Stanley Rosen) fails to identify or fully consider the significance of some of the more important. This is most conspicuous in his ready and repeated references to Nietzsche's opposition to 'Christian-Platonic values'. However, for readers who see nothing questionable in this conjunction of terms and are confident in Nietzsche's unqualified antagonism with the Platonic, this will cause little concern. Reservations aside, this is a helpful contribution to our understanding of a most difficult and enigmatic work.

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Robert Greenberg
Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2001.
Pp. ix + 278.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-271-02083-0.

In this book, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned less with empirical knowledge and its *a priori* grounds than with *a priori* knowledge itself. Greenberg thus opposes, as he repeatedly stresses, the prevalent 'Anglophone interpretations' (viii), which, especially since Strawson, see the first *Critique* as a theory of experience and not as a theory of *a priori* knowledge. In the preface Greenberg sums up the claims he is defending. His main thesis is that Kant is 'primarily concerned with the possibility, or relation to objects, of *a priori*, not empirical, knowledge' (vii); his second thesis is that Kant's 'transcendental ontology — the ontology of his theory of the possibility of specifically a priori knowledge — must be distinct from the conditions of that possibility' (viii); in his third thesis he claims that the 'logical functions of judgment have *content*' and 'make a contribution to the possibility of a priori knowledge' (viii). His fourth point is that we should fundamentally distinguish between what Kant calls *Verhaeltnis* and *Beziehung*, the first expressing an 'order relation' between intuitions, perceptions, representations, or cognitions, the second a 'reference relation' between these items and the object referred to.

The distinction between such order and reference relations is fundamental to Greenberg's interpretation. He makes extensive use of it in defending his other three theses regarding a priori knowledge. Furthermore, he claims

that this distinction has been ignored in the 'Anglophone tradition'. Kemp Smith, for instance, 'unfortunately' (57) translates both German words with the English word 'relation', and even the new translation by Guyer and Wood still does not quite get it right, although they have learned something from his, Greenberg's, suggestions, as he points out (57 footnote 1).

Based on the distinction between *Verhaeltnis* and *Beziehung*, Greenberg offers a 'model of Kant's theory of representation'. This model underlies his explication of Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, an explication that is new, as 'none in the recent English-speaking tradition has yet produced a book devoted primarily to his [Kant's] theory of the possibility of a priori knowledge' (3).

Greenberg introduces the terms 'V-relation' and 'B-relation' in order to translate *Verhaeltnis* and *Beziehung*. the 'ultimate task' then is, to understand how 'V-relations determine B-relations' (63). According to Greenberg, 'the primary theory of the *Critique* concerns the B-relation of our *a priori* knowledge to objects, and not the B-relation of experience to objects' (68). Here he certainly stands in opposition to the dominant Anglo-American Kant interpretation. He claims to offer a 'new interpretation' (72) and a 'new approach' (73). But is what Greenberg offers really 'new'? And is it clear and convincing?

It is true that the Anglo-American traditions tend to be rather one-sided in reading Kant's first *Critique* as a theory of experience and in neglecting the transcendental aesthetic and the dialectic. In that sense, Greenberg's book offers something new. But it does so only within the Anglo-American tradition. What about the German and French traditions? Is Greenberg's book something new in this wider perspective as well? Or does he only write for an Anglo-American audience?

Greenberg places himself, sometimes rather schematically, in the tradition of Kant scholarship by addressing himself to about forty Kant scholars, mainly discussing the views of Allison, Aquila, Brandt, Guyer, P. Kitcher, and Strawson. But he does not address a single piece of writing in German or French that is not available in English. The Kant scholars that he quotes from outside the Anglo-American traditions are: Baum, Brandt, Heidegger, Henrich, Krueger, Longueness, Prauss and Reich. And the only pieces of writings that he quotes and that are not available in English are by Krueger, Henrich, and Prauss. But if one has a closer look at Greenberg's book, one will realize that he discusses these works only through works by Guyer and Allison: 'It is Henrich, Guyer says, who argues ... ' (191); 'This view should allow us to agree with Allison's endorsement ... of Krueger's position' (139), 'Allison is following the lead of L. Krueger' (179); 'Following Gerold Prauss in this matter, Allison has argued ... ' (14). These four quotes give *all* the passages in which he discusses works by Kant scholars that are not available in English. It is thus evident that he does not, on his own account, address any piece of work on Kant that is not available in English. Here we should not forget that a crucial point of his 'new approach' is his criticism of what he thinks are too narrow 'Anglophone interpretations'.

With respect to Longueness, he writes: 'Beatrice Longueness's *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998) appeared only after I completed writing this book. To give it the detailed attention it deserves would take us into areas that extend beyond not only the present chapter but other chapters as well' (157, footnote 11). This is not a good excuse, because her book is a revised English version of her French book that appeared five years earlier with a distinguished French publisher, the Presses Universitaires de France.

On the one hand, it is a good thing that there is an opposition against a dominant and somewhat one-sided Anglo-American tradition, on the other, it is not excusable that such an opposition confines itself to this tradition, that it pays attention only to literature that is available in English. How can one make sure that what Greenberg has to offer is really new and better than what has been done by others already? Works by Baum, Daval, Carl, Hoppe, Lebrun, Moerchen, Tuschling, Wagner, and especially Wolff's *Die Vollstaendigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel* (1995), just to name a few, are easily available and relevant. Some even already offer such an opposition. A study of Wagner's *Philosophie und Reflexion* and the analysis of judgment to be found there, for example, would have greatly assisted Greenberg, to say the least, in developing his 'model of Kant's theory of representation', and Wolff's book definitely should have been consulted.

Greenberg writes that 'the intended audience for this book comprises advanced undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy, philosophers generally, and, of course, Kant scholars' (vii). But it seems to me that only Kant scholars and graduate students writing their PhD thesis on Kant's first *Critique* will find this book accessible and stimulating.

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John E. Hare
God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy.
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 2001.
Pp. x + 122.
US$14.00. ISBN 0-8028-3903-7.

A scholarly book about divine command theories of morality might be aimed at philosophers (some of whom are devout) or at the educated devout (some of whom are philosophers). Recent books of the first sort include Robert M. Adams, *Finite and Infinite Goods* (1999); Paul Rooney, *Divine Command Morality* (1996); and Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, *Religion and Morality* (1995). Recent books of the second sort include Richard L. Mouw, *The God Who Commands* (1990); and John E. Hare, *God's Call*. Hare's book comprises three chapters, based on three lectures Hare gave at Calvin College in 1999, and loosely unified by his aim to give in the book 'an account of God's authority in human morality' (vii).

Ch. 1 ('Moral Realism') is 'an account of the twentieth-century history of the debate within Anglo-American philosophy between moral realists and moral expressivists' (1). Hare calls his own position 'prescriptive realism' and claims that it 'preserves ... the surviving merits on both sides' (1-2). He says that 'To judge that a thing is good is not merely to report the magnetic force [it exerts on us (this is the survivor of realism)], but to judge that the thing *deserves* to have that effect on us [(this is the survivor of expressivism)]' (21-22). Surely, though, to judge that the thing deserves to have that effect on us is just to judge that it is good that it does. If judgments of goodness are to be understood in terms of endorsement, then endorsements cannot be judgments of goodness. Realist and expressivist accounts of endorsement precisely mirror realist and expressivist accounts of judgments of goodness. So it is unclear how headway is made in the latter debate by appeal to the notion of endorsement. Hare's remarks here about endorsement are fragmentary and he refers readers to his previous book (*The Moral Gap*, 1996).

Ch. 2 ('God's Commands') is a defence of 'a version of divine command theory as the account of the authority of morality which best fits the meta-ethical theory about moral realism and expressivism outlined in the first chapter' (49). Hare describes his divine command theory as a modification of that of Duns Scotus (50). Hare is concerned to counter 'one of the standard objections to divine command theory, that it makes morality arbitrary' (74). The basis of his reply to this objection is that 'after the Fall our natural inclinations are disordered, and we cannot use them as an authoritative source of guidance for how we must and must not live' (x). In other words, our ordinary moral intuitions (such as that bestiality could not be a morally permissible expression of our sexuality) are evidentially impotent, even against a divine command theory that leaves open the possibility that God could have called us — with the nature we in fact have — to

bestiality (73-4, n. 44). However things are with bestiality, the evidential impotence of our ordinary moral intuitions seems epistemologically problematic for Hare's own meta-ethical position.

Ch. 3 ('Human Autonomy') defends Hare's divine command theory from the 'broadly Kantian line of argument, that a Divine Command Theory of ethics is heteronomous' (Paul Helm, *Divine Commands and Morality* [1981], 5). Hare claims that this objection is wrongly attributed to Kant. Interested Kant scholars should see Hare's previously published paper ('Kant on Recognizing Our Duties as God's Commands', *Faith and Philosophy* [2000]) from which ch. 3 is abstracted. Against the objection itself, Hare allies himself with other defenders of divine command theories who invoke a notion of 'autonomous submission'. Hare claims that 'there is nothing heteronomous about willing to obey a superior's prescription because the superior has prescribed it, in a discretionary way, as long as the final end is shared between us, and we have trust also about the route' (115). Hare's argument is by analogy with the supposed autonomy of submission to political authority. I do not believe this analogy can be sustained without violence to our ordinary intuitions about morality and autonomy. Hare seems to admit as much (111, n. 46). The criterion of theoretical adequacy here is coherence with authoritative revelation, not coherence with our ordinary intuitions.

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Elliot L. Jurist
Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2000.
Pp. xii + 355.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-10087-8);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-60048-X).

Jurist begins with the observation that 'twentieth-century Continental philosophers can be classified, more or less, as Hegelians or Nietzscheans' (1). As Jurist points out at the end of the book, the Hegel-Nietzsche divide has substantial philosophical consequences, for the usual story is that Hegelians address the problems of modern philosophy and culture by emphasizing how the self is intersubjective and embodied in culture, whereas the Nietzscheans want to get modern culture off our bodies and disrupt its architectonic of subjectivity. Hegelians and Nietzscheans, in other words, approach the problems of modern subjectivity in very different ways, and they should not

be on speaking terms, since the former emphasize system and totality and the latter 'decentre the subject' by emphasizing life and difference. This is the usual story, and Jurist's book is a welcome effort to complicate it, to get beyond the Hegel-Nietzsche divide, and to show how both can help us with the problems of modernity.

In the book's first part, Jurist argues that Hegel and Nietzsche share a web of fundamental concerns. Both conceive philosophy as emerging from culture, and as responsible to it. Indeed, this seems profoundly right: in contrast (yet still in continuity) with early modern philosophy, Hegel and Nietzsche are remarkable for emphasizing that philosophy needs to address culture and philosophy's relation to it, and needs to respond to pressing problems posed by culture itself. Philosophy isn't timeless. Jurist makes his case by a scholarly survey of their work, in which he compares their various claims and situates them in the larger sweep of their own culture's turn to culture and the psyche. Jurist helpfully contrasts three senses of culture important to Hegel and Nietzsche: culture as custom, culture as *Bildung*, and culture as self-fathoming. The latter term is of Jurist's own coin and is meant to impress us with culture as the dimension in which we fathom the depths of self. Culture as *Bildung* is the modern response to the dissatisfactions of tradition, of culture as custom. But as Jurist shows, for both Hegel and Nietzsche, modern culture, in contrast to ancient Greek culture, ends up being the culture of alienation and despair. Jurist brings in Heidegger and the Frankfurt School to add to the point that in modernity, culture as self-fathoming has reached its shallow end.

Part one comes together in Jurist's claim that for both Hegel and Nietzsche it is culture that itself drives itself into the shallows. Both thinkers, then, need to rethink culture, to show how it can be a realm of self-fathoming, and this, according to Jurist, requires a revision of the concept of agency. Agency occupies part two and is the core of the book. Jurist first locates Hegel and Nietzsche on agency via Charles Taylor. He then gives an extensive discussion of agency in terms of recognition in Hegel, through the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. One of the most interesting sections of the book is Jurist's subsequent discussion of how we can make sense of agency in Nietzsche (despite Nietzsche's attempt to dissolve the unity of the agent), and how self and other matter to Nietzsche. Jurist draws many Hegelian and Nietzschean philosophers into discussion (e.g., Kojève, Honneth, Derrida and Butler), and also draws on psychoanalysis. He concludes with a brief epilogue suggesting how his explorations could renew the theme of agency, by mixing the intersubjective and decentred agencies that we find in Hegel and Nietzsche respectively, and, on Jurist's argument, in *both* Hegel and Nietzsche (to some degree).

This brief review can hardly address the detail that Jurist brings to his study. Some readers will need that detail to be convinced, for the Nietzschean may detect a whiff of a bad synthesis here, and the Hegelian may not wish to drop the spirit of rationality and join the dance — or so the myths around both (another common feature) would have us say. But Jurist musters a

wealth of evidence without dissolving differences. For those not already attuned to the affinities between Hegel and Nietzsche, yet ready to listen, this will be a helpful and perhaps convincing sounding of the territory, that strikes places of interest in their works, and resonates with the secondary literature. It is also a lucid read. But for those already tuned to the odd Nietzsche-Hegel chord, the work may be a bit dissatisfying. There is so much material here, thickets of loose ends, postponements, seeming non-sequiturs, that I would have welcomed a greater effort on Jurist's part to synthesize and forge conclusions. But each time Jurist's own voice appeared I would sadly be at the end of a chapter and on to the next step. Deep philosophical problems are left untouched or unresolved.

For example, Jurist admits that neither Hegel nor Nietzsche really use the concept of agency, but Jurist's treatment of this problem is quite perfunctory. In its current use, the main connotations of agency concern the sphere of practical reason, but Hegel's point in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to show that what really matters for action is *Geist*. Action is not merely a matter of practical reason, but unfolds through language, history, culture, ethos. Perhaps this is Jurist's point — that agency needs to be enriched this way. But why choose agency as a focus, rather than, say 'self'? Jurist gives some reasons — e.g., it is a bit more neutral than 'self'. But on the other hand, agency has a bit too individualist a ring to it (especially given its role in Jurist's discussion of Nietzsche) to stay neutral in the heated debates around individualism, communitarianism and decentred subjectivity that surround Jurist's discussion. It is not quite clear what specifically is at stake for Jurist in focusing on agency. Jurist's claims about a split between being-for-itself and being-for-another in Hegel's account of desire also raise serious philosophical questions. But questions of this sort are postponed in Jurist's effort to survey the secondary literature and muster evidence for his claim.

Perhaps this focus on collecting the evidence is warranted, given Jurist's conception of the Hegel-Nietzsche divide, and of his task. But it leaves open the deeper philosophical task of figuring out what exactly getting beyond Hegel and Nietzsche would entail philosophically, what concepts we would need, and whether getting beyond them is a good thing. That will have to wait for further exploration. Jurist's book adds to the discussion that would get us over the initial hurdles.

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Frank G. Kirkpatrick
Ethics of Community.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers 2001.
Pp. xiv + 183.
US$62.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-21682-0);
US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-21683-9).

In speaking of the ethics of community, Kirkpatrick does not mean to tell us *how* one is to live ethically within a community; rather, he means to advance an overall ethics that is based on a certain conception of community. The community with which Kirkpatrick is concerned is one based on a Christian 'moral ontology'. There is no effort here to offer an apology for this specifically Christian concept or for the ethics that is purported to flow from it. Readers who do not share Kirkpatrick's faith commitment or metaphysics are left to draw any analogies as best they can to other worldviews. This is no complaint; only the book would be better titled: *A Christian Ethics of Community* or *An Ethics of Christian Community* (these are not synonymous).

Kirkpatrick draws a distinction between 'community', a realm of intimacy and face-to-face interaction, and 'society', the larger networks of relationships — political, economic, technological — in which we live our lives. Kirkpatrick asserts that 'Christians are meant to live in community with each other and with God as a condition for their fulfillment, well-being, and flourishing' (ix). This requires a balancing act. It entails, first, that community neither cede to society its essential features (as in totalitarian regimes) nor allow libertarian individualism to dismantle it. Second, the balancing act requires that community allow individual members their 'space' and that its members work for a societal structure which fosters community. As Kirkpatrick puts it, it is a balance between love and justice.

The presumed moral ontology undergirding his concept of the ethics of community rests on the existence of God who creates and continues to act as Agent in the world in and through human beings. God, as the saying goes, loves us and has a wonderful plan for our lives, and God has 'hard-wired' into us the inclination to live in a manner that is in keeping with this divine aim. Thus, ethics is teleological — it points us towards God's purpose for us and the cosmos. Kirkpatrick leans on the New Testament expression of *koinonia*, a community of sharing and having all things in common, distinguishing this, interestingly, from *ekklesia*, which he views as more societal, public, or political (14).

The book continues with some historical examples of attempts to live the *koinonia* life within various social and economic structures: monasticism, Calvin's Geneva, Anabaptist communities, and the Bruderhoff. Kirkpatrick also reviews the history of Christian concepts of community in American life. All along, he highlights the swings between 'individualism' and 'socialism', both within conceptions of community and within society at large.

Kirkpatrick's philosophy of (Christian) community relies heavily on the work of John Macmurray (*Self as Agent* and *Persons in Relation*). Macmur-

ray's ideas from mid-last century share much with continental philosophers such as the early Heidegger, Blondel, Buber, and particularly Levinas (none of whom is mentioned by Kirkpatrick). All critique the Cartesian dualism between thought and action, opting for action as the more inclusive concept for the phenomenology of human being. Macmurray's concept of the person is that 'the Self is constituted by its relation to the Other; that it has its being in its relationship; and that this relationship is necessarily personal' (68, cited by Kirkpatrick). Macmurray thinks that in community, persons will care for one another, that community 'is for the sake of friendship and presupposes love.' In a phrase that could come from the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, Kirkpatrick reads Macmurray as holding that 'there is no "purpose" behind community to which it is a means: the relations that constitute it are ends in themselves' (73).

Yet Kirkpatrick criticizes Macmurray — as would Oakeshott — for confusing the universal thrust of community (i.e., that the love and harmony of the members of this community point to the love and harmony of all — *as an ideal*) with *universal (political) community*. Kirkpatrick writes (76), 'It is utopian fantasy to believe that a society, especially one of the enormous size and complexity of the modern nation-state, can be turned into a community by the devices of politics.' This criticism points to the need for an engagement with political philosophy. Kirkpatrick considers the debate between liberals and communitarians through the work of Rawls and the libertarian Nozick, communitarians such as Sandel and MacIntyre, the liberal critique of communitarianism (Derek Phillips), feminist critique of both liberalism and communitarianism (Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib, Susan Parsons) — all to point out the ongoing tension between individual freedom and essential relation. Kirkpatrick also deals with the specific question of a Christian's (and the Christian community's) relationship with society and politics.

Finally, the book grapples with the potential dangers of community — its threat to individual liberty and growth and its apparent immunity to internal critique (a problem as old as Aristotle's *Ethics*) — and with the positive possibilities for Christian community to inform a just society.

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James J. Lennox
Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology.
Studies in the Origins of Life Science.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. xxiii + 321.
US$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-65027-5);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-85976-0).

In this volume, Lennox collects papers he has written over the last twenty years on Aristotle's philosophy of biology. The majority of these papers have been published previously, but brought together, they present a single, compelling interpretation of Aristotle's thought. The papers are collected under three headings: 'Inquiry and Explanation'; 'Matter, Form and Kind'; and 'Teleological Explanation'. Each of these parts is introduced by an overview of the papers to follow and a few comments upon the conceptual links among them. By the end of the book, Lennox has developed an account of the relation between the theory of explanation found in the *Analytics* and the theory and practice of explanation in the biological treatises, an account of form and matter in the *Metaphysics* and hypothetical necessity in the *Physics* and the treatment of these notions in the biological treatises, and an account of the difference between Aristotle's conception of teleological explanation and its role in biology and Plato's. In short, Lennox's presentation of Aristotle's philosophy of biology over the course of these papers displays the strengths of Aristotle's biological theory and places it in the context of his other philosophical projects and concerns. Individually Lennox's papers have contributed to a re-evaluation of Aristotle's biological treatises that has profoundly influenced the interpretation of Aristotle's thought; collectively, their impact is even more palpable.

In 'Divide and Explain: The *Posterior Analytics* in Practice', Lennox identifies two types of explanation, which he labels 'type A' and 'type B'. The middle term in a type A explanation is the proximate kind of the subject; the middle term in a type B explanation is not a wider kind but an aspect of the subject's specific nature (10). These two types of explanation in the *Analytics* correspond to the distinction between incidental and unqualified understanding. Lennox then turns to the biological writings for evidence of this conception of explanation. The *Historia Animalium*, while stopping 'short of actual explanations has organized the facts' in a way appropriate to explanations of both type A and B (22). In 'Between Data and Demonstration: The *Analytics* and the *Historia Animalium*', Lennox argues that Aristotle seeks to identify wider groups to which individuals or sub-groups belong by identifying a common differentia. This approach fits the theory of explanation found in *APo* II and thus provides further evidence that the former shapes Aristotle's practice as a biologist. The remaining papers in Part I further develop the argument for the role of the *Analytics*' theory of explanation and inquiry in Aristotle's theoretical and practical work in biology. Not only is Aristotle shown here to have a coherent view of explanation but also the

biological treatises are shown to have an underlying theoretical framework — even those such as the *HA* that might seem to be mere collections of facts.

In Part II, Lennox takes on what he believes to be various misreadings of Aristotle's notions of form, formal natures, species and genera. According to him, Aristotelian forms are not eternal nor do individuals who are one in form share a common essence; however, species (kinds) are eternal because 'there is an eternal generation of organisms which are one in form' (131). Building on this analysis in 'Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle's Biology', Lennox argues that the construal of differences between the forms of a kind (species) and the kind (genus) to which these forms belong in *PA* and *HA* is based on the *Metaphysics*' account of the relation between form and genus. In the biological writings, forms that are one in kind (genus) differ from one another only by the more and the less, although this appears at first glance to be a different picture than that of genus as matter, Lennox argues that it is not. In a short paper on formal and material natures in Aristotle's biology, Lennox maintains that the formal nature acts selectively and informatively on a material nature that constrains its actions. Part II concludes with 'Nature Does Nothing in Vain ...', which argues that for Aristotle and much later for Harvey, the principle that nature does nothing in vain is a basic supposition of biological explanation.

Part III turns to the topic of teleological explanation; more precisely, it consists in four papers that seek to solve specific challenges to the adequacy of Aristotle's treatment of final cause and chance and that differentiate his position from both earlier and later construals of teleological explanation. Lennox argues that Aristotle's account of spontaneous generation is consistent with his metaphysical doctrines of causation and chance. In order to defend Aristotle's teleology, Lennox attributes a distinction between 'a causal and a descriptive sense of "for the sake of" to him' (258). In 'Theophrastus on the Limits of Teleology', Lennox finds in Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, a call for 'an explicit account of the conditions under which teleological explanations are and are not appropriate' (262). He cites a series of passages from the *PA* to show the relevance of Theophrastus' concerns to Aristotle's use of teleological explanation. The concluding paper is about Plato's conception of teleology and its requirement that there be an intelligent agent who is responsible for order in the natural world. Although 'Plato's Unnatural Teleology' does not discuss Aristotle's views, it does defend the interpretation of Plato's teleology that has been contrasted with Aristotle's in a number of the preceding papers.

Lennox's Aristotle is a very sophisticated philosopher and scientist, and one who has a single and compelling vision of explanation and ontology. Displaying the unity of Lennox's reading of Aristotle is a good reason for the existence of this volume and makes it valuable reading even for philosophers who are already familiar with Lennox's work. There is, of course, the further question of whether this reading is correct in all its particulars. The case for the role of the *Posterior Analytics*' theory of demonstration and definition in shaping the inquiries undertaken in the biological treatises has been estab-

lished not only by Lennox but also by other commentators in the last twenty-five years. There are now only a few holdouts with respect to the earlier view that there was a radical discontinuity between what Aristotle said about the structure of a science and what he did as a scientist. Lennox's analyses of form and matter, biological species and the kinds to which they belong, are somewhat more problematic. There are subtle shifts in vocabulary that can be confusing. For instance, species are labeled kinds, sub-kinds and forms of kinds in different contexts. Other claims seem in need of further argument than is found here. The form (*eidos*) is not eternal but the species (*eidos*) is, yet the common characteristics of the members of a species are determined by the form of those individuals. This is because, according to Lennox (154), kinds are the right sort of thing to be eternal but forms are not. The grounds for attributing the former position to Aristotle, however, would seem to warrant the attribution of the latter position to him. Another worry concerns one of Lennox's strategies for defending Aristotle's conception of teleological explanation. It consists in showing that Aristotle does not have Plato's conception of an external source of intelligent design, a divine craftsman, but one might grant this point while still doubting the cogency of Aristotle's approach to teleology. These are, however, minor worries, in comparison to the advantages of Lennox's interpretation of Aristotle's biological theory.

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Jeffrey S. Librett
The Rhetoric of Cultural Dialogue: Jews and Germans from Moses Mendelssohn to Richard Wagner and Beyond.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2000.
Pp. xxiii + 391.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3622-7);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3931-5).

This book begins with an epigraph taken from an article by Gershom Scholem, published in 1970, in which Scholem says 'I deny that there has ever been ... a German-Jewish dialogue in any genuine sense whatever, i.e. *as an historical phenomenon*. It takes two to have a dialogue, who listen to each other, who are prepared to perceive the other as what he is and represents, and to respond to him. Nothing can be more misleading than to apply such a concept to the discussions between Germans and Jews during the last 200 years. This dialogue died at its very start and never took place.'

The start which Scholem refers to is evidently with the era of the European Enlightenment, and in particular the labors of Moses Mendelssohn and his opponents, such as Friedrich Jacobi.

Readers of *Philosophy in Review* may be interested in considering Librett's work in connection with some aspects of philosophy of language, in particular how ordinary language functions in the course of dialogue and debate, and in hermeneutical contexts. Of course, this sort of thing goes back at least to Plato, for example in connection with contrasts between sophists and philosophers of the sort depicted by Plato, not to mention the literary form of Plato's writings.

Librett's aim is to investigate some of the unfolding of this failure of dialogue from the time of Mendelssohn to the time of Richard Wagner. In his Introduction, Librett discusses a view of dialogue which pays attention to the violence between participants in discussions of religious differences. He also pays considerable attention to interplay between what he calls the literal and the figural in dialogical interchanges. At times he seems to be referring to something like 'literal' as in 'literal meaning of statements' with metaphorical meanings or 'figures of speech', and at other times to 'literal' vs. 'figural' as in 'letter versus spirit' as used in religious discussions. Indeed, one of his main considerations seems to be closely related to the contrasting interpretations of the Hebrew Tanach by Jews with those of the closely related Christian Old Testament by Christians. There is special emphasis on characterizations of Jewish religion as devoted to the 'letter of the law', so to speak, an attitude which can be traced back to works of the apostle Paul. This is contrasted with Christian attitudes that in Christianity, one finds the 'spirit' underlying, for example, the writings of Moses and the prophets.

In the introduction (21), Librett makes use of five triangular figures with pairs of arrows, one in each direction (vectors, as it were) joining the vertices in each triangle (not between the triangles) to illustrate some of his ideas. These are labeled in three cases with the terms 'Jewish', 'Catholic', and 'Protestant'. Underneath these three triangular figures one finds, respectively, the labels 'Reformation Context', 'Enlightenment Context', and 'Romantic Context'. These three triangular figures are identical, except that they are presented in three orientations, i.e., they are rotations through 120 degrees of each other. The first triangle has 'Jewish' on the upper left, as the triangle is drawn on the page. This maneuvering is done, presumably, to indicate something about the three different eras. In any case, the idea of the arrows, which run in both directions between the vertices, is evidently to indicate the active interplay, back and forth, between these religious positions. This includes a kind of assignment of 'literal' and 'figural' to *each* of the positions, with the term to attach to which vertex changing in the courses of the attempted dialogues between Jews and Christians over the course of time. This is complicated by the fact that during the Reformation, there was a major split of Christians into Catholics (presumably Librett has in mind Roman Catholics) and Protestants (Librett deals especially with the Lutheran kind).

The other two triangular figures are one which is assigned to a 'Medieval Context', with vertices being labeled 'pagan', 'Jewish', and 'Christian', and the other with vertices labeled with rhetorical rather than religious terms, viz. '*litera* (pre-prefiguration)', '*figura* (prefiguration)', and '*veritas* (fulfillment)'. This figure has the caption 'Functional Context of Figural Interpretation'. Evidently these terms refer to what may be technical terms in the study of rhetoric, but they also seem to be derived from the sort of thing one sees in the development of Jewish-Christian relations from early times to the present. Thus 'litera' might be taken to refer to presumed original Jewish interpretations of Scriptures before Christianity, as seen from the viewpoint of some Christians; 'figura' might be taken to refer to Christian interpretations of Hebrew Scriptures; and 'veritas' to some sort of truth of the matter, although 'fulfillment' might be taken to refer to Christian views about the advent of Jesus as Christ as contrasted with the 'prefiguration' of Christ which Christians see in the Hebrew Scriptures.

There is another triangular figure in the postscript (269) with the caption 'The Judaeo-Christian Triangle in the Modernist Context'. The vertices are labeled 'Non-Catholic (Romanticism)', 'Neopagan Neo-Protestant (Post-Romanticism)', and '"Judaic" Non-Enlightenment (Modernism)'. This is evidently meant to illustrate Librett's views about what took place after the mid-nineteenth century, as exemplified by works of Marx and Wagner. This was the era when antisemitism is commonly considered to have taken a political and racial turn, to some extent divorced from religion proper, although presumably still influenced in some ways by religious matters. (Introduction of the term *antisemitism* is commonly assigned to about the middle of the nineteenth century. Before that, one spoke of anti-Judaism, or some equivalent.)

Librett's study, after his theoretical introduction, proceeds by close readings of a number of works by central figures in the literature of Jewish-Christian relations from the time of Moses Mendelssohn to the time of Richard Wagner. These include two works by Mendelssohn, three by Friedrich Schlegel, one by Dorothea-Mendelssohn-Veit-Schlegel (who was Mendelssohn's daughter and became the wife of Friedrich Schlegel), Marx and Wagner. A good bit of the discussion revolves around views of the earlier authors about the works of Lessing, and accusations and interpretations of Spinoza in this connection. The book brings up some interesting interpretative ideas in connection with its topic. It is densely written, and takes some patience to read. The triangular diagrams, and the author's text which they are meant to illustrate might benefit from a formulation in terms of feedback, in the manner of cybernetics systems theory, as has been done, for example, in connection with interpretation of language, by Wolfgang Iser in his book *The Range of Interpretation* (Columbia University Press 2000).

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Peter Loptson
Reality: Fundamental Topics in Metaphysics.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001.
Pp. xii + 305.
Cdn$/US$65.00. ISBN 0-8020-4816-1.

In this clear, vigorous book, Loptson not only discusses metaphysical topics but goes to some length to justify the subject against recent avoidance behavior. Loptson's recurrent discussion of Kant as the conflicted source of modern anti-metaphysical sentiment reflects one of the better features of the book. The preface and first two chapters are occupied with general issues about the nature of metaphysics and a useful taxonomy of its criticism. While he discusses historical as well as contemporary figures in the third chapter, and briefly in others, Loptson believes metaphysics to be ahistorical in content if not *ordo cogniscendi*. We should see the history of philosophy Whiggishly as a story of *discovery* rather than invention. Metaphorically, something lurks at the center: metaphysics is an avocado, not an onion.

There follow fourteen chapters, each devoted to a classical metaphysical concept (with my added parenthetical caricature of thesis): Categories and First Principles (ontological commitment and the heuristic principle of sufficient reason), Existence ('extra-causalism'), Essence and Possible Worlds (Occamized realism, anti-essentialism (but not quite? [101]), Plantinga's 'existentialism'), Substance (anti-reductionism), Universals ('abstract entities are real'), Space (Empiricism largely right), Time (Rationalism largely right), Causality (Tooley-like Singularism), Purpose ([of life] maybe; 'benign *versus* 'malignant reductionism), Persons and Personal Identity (underdeterminist, anti-reductionist disagreements with Parfitt), Mind (strong type-identity of mental states and denial of bodily identity), God (contingently possible but, unfortunately, not a necessary being), Freedom and Determinism (defense of Compatibilism), Immortality (conceptually problematic, but disembodied survival coherently describable) — the last three mirroring Kant's own metaphysical trinity: God, Freedom, and Immortality. Some chapters are quite short with the longest, reflecting contemporary interests, being Freedom and Determinism, Mind, and Persons. Although taking Kant as a focal point, Loptson attempts answers where Kant saw only paralogism, antinomy, or faith. Throughout these pages, Aristotle, Russell, Hume, Reid, Quine, Putnam, and Devitt positively influence the discussion. For some, Kantian qualms will persist: Can these questions really be answered but to the satisfaction of the answerer and his closest friends? Do the important things in philosophy lie at the destination or in the journey?

Loptson claims that 'metaphysics does not go very substantively beyond science, but this is not supposed to be true "by definition" ' (8). He continues: 'it is quite possible (even though I believe that it is unlikely) that a naturalistic metaphysics is indefensible and possible in fact that first philosophy (first science) will necessarily need to include kinds of entities (irreducible mental phenomena, perhaps *abstracta*, gods, even God) that could not be

included within the framework of modern natural science ... . I think there are good arguments for naturalistic metaphysics but they are not proofs ... .' Indeed, like many, Loptson assumes naturalism to be a philosophically expanded form of materialism, but he avoids the issue of whether they *are* coextensive: a principle that lies at the heart of his book (see 221f., e.g.).

Loptson's realism is robustly *de re* rather than deflationary *de dicto* (84). He agrees with Sterelny and Devitt (and Russell) that not just things but truth is *out there*, independent of thought and language (although there is little discussion of truth *per se* [see 272]). *De re* ontology need not disguise a foundationalist plot, however (9, 42, 72). Moving from his thesis that metaphysical claims are justifiable on (scientifically enlightened) rational grounds, he contends that his realism is 'external' rather than 'internal' (Putnam's, not Carnap's different distinction) (83, 103, 130-3), radically distinguishing inscrutability of reference and ontological commitment. But he warily regards the possibility of an absolute conception of reality ('one true description'), with underdetermination playing an important role of his discussions of personhood and free will.

Although his discussions of particular topics will be variously interesting to readers, Loptson's apologetic of realism will be for many the most problematic aspect of this book. His externalism requires an ontological distinction, rather than a continuum, e.g., between appearance and reality, between Jamesian cash-value, warranting conditions, epistemology, etc., and Being ('Something's reality is not a function of utility' [131]). Rorty, to whom Loptson refers several times, argues that this distinction, once useful as a grand divide in the social and political differentiation of Enlightenment science from medieval religion, has by now (except in philosophy departments) outlived its transcendental necessity in the Republic of Ideas to be left to increasingly isolated academic warfare over onions. But if Rorty does not, e.g., believe in an afterlife, that counts as a metaphysical belief (25). Though Rorty agrees that 'real' and 'unreal' have uses, Loptson argues that such pragmatist turns lead to linguistic idealism (to which Rorty cheerfully confesses).

Rorty, however, argues not so much against metaphysics (a voice in the Conversation that he wants to redescribe in his Darwinian historicism (see, e.g., Chapters 2 and 3 in *Philosophy and Social Hope* [Penguin 1999]) as its foundationalist and essentialist applications. Loptson seems to agree with some of that argument. For interested readers, Rorty's reviews of books by John McDowell and Michael Ayers in *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers* Volume III (Cambridge University Press 1998) apply pretty much to Loptson's as well.

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Rhonda Martens
Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2000. Pp. 201.
US$37.50. ISBN 0-691-05069-4.

Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) is known, first and foremost, as an astronomer. He supported the Copernican hypothesis; abandoned the perfect celestial spheres of the ancients for elliptical orbits; and argued that astronomy should be a physical, as well as a mathematical, discipline.

There are wildly divergent accounts of how Kepler developed his revolutionary astronomy. Bernard Cohen, in a statement that is typical of one common view of Kepler, describes him as 'a tortured mystic, who stumbled onto his great discoveries in a weird groping.' Other commentators claim that Kepler was nothing more than a very patient and very persistent number-cruncher. In *Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy*, Rhonda Martens uncovers a different, and underappreciated, Kepler: she shows that Kepler was a fine philosopher. Kepler's philosophy has received little attention, at least in part because Kepler never wrote an exclusively philosophical treatise. As a result, his philosophical views must be sought in treatises that he wrote in other disciplines.

Martens focuses on the philosophical ideas that emerge out of Kepler's treatises on astronomy. These works represent an especially significant source for Kepler's philosophy: as Martens notes in her introduction, Kepler was a Copernican when there was no empirical reason to support the Copernican over the Ptolemaic or Tychonic systems. Many of Kepler's reasons for supporting Copernicanism were thus epistemological, metaphysical, methodological, and aesthetic. Martens argues, in contrast to depictions of Kepler as a mere number-cruncher, that Kepler's philosophical commitments had a significant influence on his scientific work. However, Martens also argues persuasively that Kepler was no mystic and that, in fact, his appeals to extra-scientific ideas were motivated by rational concerns.

Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy opens with a brief biography and a survey of the philosophical and scientific background to Kepler's astronomy. This is followed by an extended discussion of Kepler's astronomical works. Martens begins with Kepler's first book, the *Mysterium Cosmographicum*. It is in the *Mysterium* that the crucial notion of the 'archetype' is introduced. According to Kepler, God created the physical world in according with pure or ideal archetypes. As Martens puts it, there is a 'divine blueprint of the universe.'

The archetypes, which are also ideas in God's mind, are both mathematical and aesthetically pleasing — for example, Kepler famously claimed that the number and relative size of the planetary orbits are determined by the number and relative size of the five regular solids (cube, tetrahedron, octahedron, dodecahedron, and icosahedron) nested inside one another. The

universe has been structured in accordance with a perfect ordering of the most perfect geometrical figures.

Importantly, the human mind is, for Kepler, rational (as God's is). This means that human beings can come to some understanding of God's archetypal ideas, and hence of the structure of the physical world. It is by means of reason, rather than a mystical communion with nature, that the Keplerian astronomer explores the universe. These beliefs led Kepler to make some radical claims about the study of astronomy as a discipline. According to Aristotelian physics, all celestial bodies move in perfect circles around the sun. However, in order to account for the apparent motions of the heavens, Ptolemaic astronomy was forced to posit various sorts of non-uniform motions, as well as circular motions around centres other than the sun.

One widespread way of resolving this tension was to claim that astronomy, while it could describe and predict the apparent motions of the heavens, could not provide knowledge about the causes of those motions (this attitude is reflected, for example, in Osiander's famous preface to Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus*). Kepler offered a realist alternative to this compromise: he argued that astronomy, if it made use of his archetypal theory, could produce knowledge of the true causes of the celestial motions. Kepler's arguments in the *Mysterium* thus appeal to the archetypes in order to establish the superiority of the Copernican hypothesis.

In the remainder of the book, Martens argues persuasively that Kepler continued to make extensive use of his archetypal cosmology in his later natural philosophy. Among other things, Kepler appealed to the archetypes to defend his methodology and to choose between empirically adequate hypotheses. Eventually, Kepler's dedication to the archetypes resulted in a significant tension between his physics and his astronomy, as he found it increasingly difficult to develop an archetypal account compatible with his beliefs about the physical world. For example, Kepler found it difficult to reconcile his archetypal cosmology with his discovery of the elliptical orbits of the planets. This discovery led him to question if there could be a close correspondence between the archetypal and the physical, since a mind would no doubt prefer perfect circular motion over non-uniform elliptical motion.

Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy represents a valuable contribution to our understanding of Kepler. With the notable exception of Neil Jardine's essays on Kepler's *Apologia*, little work has been done on the philosophical ideas that, as Martens shows, played such a significant role in the development of Kepler's natural philosophy. *Kepler's Philosophy* also provides a useful overview of Kepler's astronomy, the technicalities of which Martens presents with admirable clarity. More broadly, *Kepler's Philosophy* increases our understanding of the significant role that philosophical questions played in the scientific debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Martens reminds us, Renaissance and early modern scientists were well aware of the philosophical problems raised by the new astronomy. Although, as Martens emphasizes, Kepler's responses to these difficulties were deeply influenced by his archetypal cosmology, the problems, and

Kepler's answers to them, are still of interest to philosophers of science. The debate over the plausibility of the Copernican hypothesis raised questions regarding realism and anti-realism, the interpretation of data, and the empirical equivalence of competing theories.

Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy concludes with a problem: why wasn't Kepler's philosophical legacy more significant? As Martens points out, Kepler's philosophical ideas, which represented thoughtful responses to pressing problems, are conspicuously absent from some sources where one might expect to find them, including the Descartes-Mersenne correspondence and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Martens raises, but does not address at any length, the question of Kepler's influence on subsequent philosophy. Martens' book, which demonstrates that Kepler was an 'uncommonly good philosopher', makes this question all the more puzzling, and all the more urgent.

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Christopher Morris and
Arthur Ripstein, eds.
Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. 239.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-78184-1.

When it first appeared in 1986, David Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement* seemed poised to dominate the philosophical discussion of justice and morality, much as John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* had done the previous decade. But such was not its fate. The book was subjected to such withering criticism that Gauthier was forced, step by step, to retract pretty much every substantive philosophical thesis advanced therein. Now, just as the corpse appears to have been picked clean, along comes another collection of essays, striving to disturb the bones.

This is, however, a very nice collection of papers. Although it is a *festschrift*, it easily surpasses the standards of that genre. But beating up on *Morals by Agreement*, like most other activities, is subject to diminishing returns. Most of the papers in this volume are focused on the concept of counterpreferential choice, which looms large in both *Morals by Agreement* and some of Gauthier's subsequent work. Many of these papers will be of

interest to anyone curious about the nature of intentions and preferences, regardless of their feelings toward Gauthier.

The collection leads off with a paper by Robert Brandom, who draws attention to a fairly major problem in Gauthier's work that has largely escaped notice. Gauthier simply states, without much ado, that the set of intentional states underlying decision theory — beliefs and preferences — have a 'normative role' in the theory of action. He then goes on to elaborate his account of constrained maximization. But where does this normativity come from? The conception of constrained maximization presented in *Morals by Agreement* is intended to explain normative constraint, not presuppose it. This issue becomes even more pressing in later formulations of the theory, where Gauthier shifts the burden of proof away from the concept of a 'choice disposition' toward an intentionality-based account in the style of Michael Bratman.

In these later versions, the only reason for agents to conform to commitments undertaken is the binding force of the intentions adopted at some earlier point in time. But if this is so, then the normative authority of our intentional states provides, quite literally, the foundations of morality. It is therefore quite important that the theory come clean on the source of this authority. Brandom focuses his analysis on the difference that Gauthier introduces between expressed and revealed preference. Clearly any set of preferences ascribed through observation of behaviour cannot have normative status. Thus Gauthier argues that preferences should be understood as having a hybrid origin, inferred from the combination of verbal reports and actual behaviour. Gauthier is obliged to accord some authority to verbal reports in order to avoid the flip 'it's all tautological' defence of orthodox rational choice theory peddled by Ken Binmore and others. But it then becomes difficult to avoid wondering where these reports get their authority from, and whether the kind of verbal behaviour associated with such reports does not *already* reveal the exercise of some form of deontic constraint. This gives Brandom his entry-point into the discussion. Similar concerns about the normative authority of preference are raised by Arthur Ripstein in his contribution, within a more orthodoxly Sellarsian framework.

These papers aside, most other contributions focus upon the nexus of issues surrounding the concept of a 'choice disposition' that Gauthier introduces in order to justify deontic constraint. Peter Danielson emphasizes again that Gauthier's argument for this disposition is not especially robust. Michael Thompson also raises problems for the idea that practical reason can be located at the level of dispositions.

It is precisely concerns such as these that led Gauthier, in post-*Morals by Agreement* work, to shift the emphasis away from dispositions toward intentions and plans. In a series of papers culminating in the 1994 'Assure and Threaten', Gauthier argues that individuals should respect their commitments, not because they have a disposition that locks them into so doing, but simply because they have no reason to revise the intention that they adopted, back when they agreed to cooperate.

In her contribution, Claire Finkelstein raises some serious doubts as to whether this latter account is able to do the same work as the earlier dispositional theory. However, even more serious problems loom. Gauthier makes his argument for the plan-based view in a purely counterfactual mode. Agents should not revise their intentions, he argues, because even though there may be better options available to them here and now, carrying through on the intention will leave them better off than they would have been, had they not adopted the intention in the first place.

There is an inherent danger in making philosophical claims that depend entirely upon counterfactual reasoning. The most significant is that one may attract the attention of those philosophers who have built entire careers by confounding such arguments with perverse and counterintuitive counterfactual counterexamples. Derek Parfit is one such philosopher. In this volume, he delivers the philosophical equivalent of a mob hit, acting as though he was called in on short notice, not having been fully briefed on the victim's identity or occupation.

In other words, there is plenty of good stuff here. What the volume really lacks — what the philosophical world in general lacks — is a statement from Gauthier of his current position, including a general summary of what he has modified or retracted over the years, and where he believes that he can still stand firm. In fact, there is nothing at all from Gauthier in this volume.

Gauthier has spent the more recent years seemingly focused on historical work. Since 'Assure and Threaten', there has been no significant development of the system. The final paper of this volume, by Candace Vogler, tries to bring some of Gauthier's recent work on Rousseau into dialogue with his *Morals by Agreement* views, with mixed results. The paper risks being just a fancy restatement of the old red herring about social contract theory presupposing a fictitious 'asocial' individual. It is, however, the only contribution that tries to follow Gauthier on the path that has led him to his current domain of inquiry, and so it rounds out the collection quite nicely.

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Leonhard Praeg
African Philosophy and the Quest for Autonomy — A Philosophical Investigation.
New York: Rodopi Publishers 2000.
Pp. xxxi + 322.
US$60.00 ISBN 90-420-1363-X.

Leonhard Praeg's *African Philosophy and the Quest for Autonomy* examines the idea of African philosophy within the context of the African post-colonial world in general and the South African world in particular. While there are more or less settled definitions of what constitutes African literature, African art or African political science, the issue of African philosophy — mainly on account of the idea of philosophy itself — remains a subject of debate.

According to Praeg, African philosophy, if properly defined, could play an important role in the creation of a post-Apartheid South Africa by focusing less on the transcendental and epistemological question about the definition and content of African philosophy in favor of the ethical question, 'where does African philosophy speak from?' (303) By focusing on this ethical question, Praeg suggests that establishing the ethical foundations of the new South Africa should take precedence over the irresolvable issue of African philosophy as an autonomous body of knowledge.

Praeg's program is suggestive and metaphorical. He structures his debate in four chapters: 'The Social Contract', 'The Discursive Invention of Africa', 'African Philosophy', and 'Truth and Reconciliation: a Social Contract'. He begins with the thesis that the search for an autonomous African philosophy springs from the challenge faced by post-colonial African thinkers to correct the Eurocentric vision of Africa as a Hobbesian state of nature, as in Hegel's view (in *The Philosophy of History*) that Africa was a land of the ahistorical and that nothing comparable to the idea of civilization ever belonged to 'Africa proper'.

But Praeg argues that any attempt to formulate an autonomous pre-colonial philosophy is doomed to failure because any such formulation would itself be a re-invention founded on a palpable lack of evidence or metaphorical *corpus delecti*, as Praeg puts it. Praeg seeks to reinforce this point by reference to the idea of Africa as seen by the European antipodean other: as a natural pre-contractual state. Africa, so the implicit argument would go, can progress only when an ethically binding social contract is established. Thus we are subtly told that any talk of an 'African Renaissance' or attempt at theoretical autonomy would be seen as risking reversion to a Hobbesian state of nature. The function of African philosophy, then, would be to take the African ethical and humanistic notion of *ubuntu* ('I am because we are') and extend it to the new post-Apartheid state as a whole (299). And the reason for the choice of *ubuntu* is that it is the most preferable of the 'three visions of the social bond that combine in order to produce the post colonial social bond' (xxix). According to Praeg, the other two visions are nationalism and Christianity, which are 'to a large extent ideologies foreign to Africa (the

former more so than the latter)' (xxix). This claim is problematic from a strictly historical angle but is not significant for Praeg's general thesis that discourse on the indigenous idea of *ubuntu* raises the transcendental question, 'What does *ubuntu* really mean?' (xxix) The answer to this question according to Praeg 'must remain undecidable'. Thus 'to construct an independent, authentic and autonomous subject that will, at the same time, represent an ethics of intersubjectivity — *that* is the peculiar task of African philosophy' (xxx).

To effect this task, Praeg assumes that ethnophilosophical discourse must be the natural point of departure. As he puts it: 'ethnophilosophical texts are widely recognized as some of the earliest attempts to present us with an African philosophy. Senghor's *Negritude* and Placide Tempels' *Bantu Philosophy* are often considered as classics' (135). The function of ethnophilosophical discourse was one of 'intervention, re-invention and invention. Ethnophilosophy represents an historical *intervention* in the discourse *on* Africa. At the same time ethnophilosophy undertook the process of *re-invention*, it also situated this attempt in the context of a meta-narrative of oppression and liberation with *invention* as the final end, the concluding act of liberation conceived of in terms of re-established individuality and autonomy. ... Conceived like this, there is not really much of a difference between ethnophilosophy and African philosophy in general because the overall aim or purpose of the debate as such can also be described in terms of these three functions' (135).

As is evident, Praeg accepts this definition of African philosophy, examines its methodology and goals, then concludes that African philosophy as exploratory metanarrative collapses into undecidability — political, epistemological and representational (136). The problem with this approach is that Praeg pays little attention to alternative approaches to African philosophy such as those of Paulin Hountondji and Marcien Towa. Hountondji (1983) views ethnophilosophy as a kind of 'folklorism' or 'collective cultural exhibitionism' packaged and marketed for a Western public. For Hountondji, African philosophy must conform to the orthodox definition of modern philosophy and therefore must be engaged in critical and scientific inquiry. Towa's approach to African philosophy (in *Essai sur la Problématique dans l'Afrique actuelle*) is to appropriate as much as possible the intellectual instruments and knowledge of the colonizer to solve the problem of Africa's defeat. In this regard, ethnophilosophy is subjected to harsh criticism as the logical end of *négritude*. Towa would argue that appropriation of the intellectual instruments of Europe does not entail a submission but rather an appropriation in defense of the self. The goal is make European philosophy African (1971, 69). Praeg views Towa's approach as unhelpful since instead of negating ethnicity it suggests 'a hope to restore an immutable ethnicity, one that cannot be denied or negated' (213). Praeg's choice of paradigm for African philosophy obviously favors ethnophilosophy in the mode of Tempels and Senghor as opposed to that of Hountondji and Towa.

But just how valid is Praeg's approach to African philosophy? Has the history of Africa been so different from elsewhere that African philosophy should be approached as an experimental novelty? There is evidence to the contrary. The ethnophilosophical enterprise is suspect because it explores the history of ideas in Africa in a way that has not been done elsewhere. The requirement of autonomy for African philosophy has not been requested of the history of ideas elsewhere. Let us take the analogical case of the West. The West as a cultural unit has certainly been invented, with its intellectual origins constructed out of whole cloth. Greek philosophy and intellectual constructions in general are not *sui generis* given their roots in Ancient Egyptian civilization and elsewhere. Later constructions by Western historians of ideas are to be credited with establishing the foundations of Western thought in a Greek intellectual patrimony. But Plato would have been uncomprehending of attempts at intellectual expression from the fifth-century B.C.E. ancestors of a Hume or a Kant. Western philosophy was able to progress without attempting to inculcate into its structure the myriad ethnophilosophies of groups such as the Visigoths, Gauls, Celts, and Saxons. The obvious question is: what does this make of the autonomy and authenticity of Western philosophy?

Philosophy is to be understood as attempts by thinking humans to understand the structure of their experienced world (the ontological task), to vouch for the authenticity of these experiences (epistemology), and to appraise the sensate qualities of these experiences (axiology). What is vital here and separates philosophical thinking from other kinds of intellectual effort is the act of 'critically vouching for'. Myths and unchallengeable claims characteristic of transcendental metaphysics — as in religious doctrine and magical explanation — do not satisfy the criteria of critical inquiry here. The diachronic development of philosophy (as natural and moral philosophy) has produced what we now call the natural and social sciences. So how then can African philosophy be normalized as the history of attempts at critical inquiry by those historically linked to the cultures and civilizations of Africa?

The earliest attempts of the ancient Egyptians in the area of generic philosophy constitute an appropriate starting point. The direct historical trend would progress through the seminal disquisitions of the native Egyptian philosopher, Plotinus (the founder of the erroneously named Neo-Platonism) through Augustine (a native North African and intellectual descendant of Plotinus) and Ibn Khaldun (a native North African). The next step would be to examine the myriad writings in jurisprudence and logic of the members of the sixteenth and seventeenth philosophy school at Timbuktu (in medieval Mali-Songhay). In this school the writings of the well-known Ahmed Baba offer examples.

In contemporary times the intellectual tradition of African philosophy has continued with the writings of philosophers such as Hountondji, N'Daw, Wiredu, Gyekye, Diop (perhaps the best example to date of an African thinker exploring the idea of 'Renaissance' in the African context), et al. as they attempt to parse the idea of African philosophy in an academic context. The

question of the definition of African philosophy in the transcendental sense is thus necessary and is easily answered. African philosophy exists side by side in the modern African university with vital disciplines such as economics, physics, literature, and political science. One of its functions in this context would be to engage in epistemological debate with these special disciplines. In this connection Praeg's question of 'where does African philosophy speak from?' is answered. African philosophy and its quest for autonomy should be understood then in the same way that one would understand questions about Western philosophy and its own autonomy.

Leonhard Praeg's *African Philosophy and the Quest for Autonomy* is a provocative text setting itself the task of unpacking the interesting question of African philosophy. He offers a creative solution by making of African philosophy a predominantly ethical enterprise. The equally important transcendental question concerning the nature of African philosophy posed by Praeg may be answered by examining its vintage ancestry.

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Anthony Preus, ed.
Before Plato:
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy VI.
Albany: State University of New York Press
2001. Pp. 250.
US$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4955-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4956-4).

Before Plato is a valuable research instrument for students of ancient philosophy, and a vital one for those working in, or with, contemporary continental thought. There are good indices of names, concepts, and classical citations. Carefully edited for lucid exposition, texture, and crisp argument, these eleven papers (some previously published elsewhere) exhibit a wide range of philosophical resources for filling in some elements missing in contemporary scientific, epistemological, logical, and moral/political debates.

A fruitful collaboration of philosophy, history and philology, the book is assembled with a weather eye to contemporary needs. Anthony Preus's introduction highlights the value in reconsidering the foundations of Plato's thought in some of those who preceded him. Insofar as Plato continues to dominate our philosophic imagination into the twenty-first century this is wise and timely, if only as a way of shaking off the monolithic Plato we inherited from the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries.

Gerard Naddalf and Dirk L. Couprie examine Anaximander's cosmological methods and his contribution to our experience of space. Richard McKirahan, with characteristically elegant argument, reconsiders the extent of Anaximander's accommodation of motion in assessing his position on the world as closed or the universe as infinite.

Deleuze might have paused to reconsider his romance with the void had he read István M. Bodnár's paper on atomic independence and indivisibility. He certainly would have benefited by reading the papers by Carl Huffman and Wallace I. Matson for an understanding of the relations (particularly of likeness and kinship) operating in Anaximander and Philolaus in their influencing Plato's thought on the reflective occasions of being. Joel Wilcox's treatment of Empedocles's cosmic cycle helps make accessible the erotic and generative dynamic we observe in Plato's natural philosophy. (Again, Deleuze might have profited from such reflections.)

Carol Steinberg Gould's review of moral dilemmas in Sophocles's *Philoctetes* and of Plato's philosophic sensitivity to artistic influence does not exactly make Plato into a post-modern; but it does continue that fruitful kind of dialogue across the millennia. Michael Gagarin's study of varieties of pre-Platonic truth helps us appreciate that Plato himself grew out of a maturing cultural experience of the dynamic ambivalence of word and concept.

Thomas M. Robinson's study of the *Dissoi Logoi* as a likely bit of Sextus Empiricus reminds us of the importance of skepticism to philosophical exploration, especially in our own day. Patricia Curd's study of why Democritus does 'not embrace skepticism,' contra Jonathan Barnes and others, provides a helpful way to review a detail of that skeptical tradition.

The collection is engaging not just because the writing is uniformly good and the topics intriguing but also because the ancients represented are those who are back on the cutting edge of philosophical concern. Anaximander the geographer, Zeno the skeptic, Empedocles the lover fill out our understanding of Plato's encounters with systems like those of the Pythagoreans, the sophists, and the atomists, ancient and modern.

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Patrick Riley, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. vii + 453.
US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57265-7);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57615-6).

The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau is an expected and welcome addition to the Cambridge series on philosophers. Patrick Riley commissioned new essays for this collection except for pieces by two late professors, George Armstrong Kelly and Judith Shklar. Rousseau is a philosopher, music composer, novelist, playwright, poet, and autobiographer. This volume responds to his multifaceted creativity and explores Rousseau through his philosophical, literary and autobiographical writings. His political and moral theory remains the unifying prism through which his 'nonphilosophical' works are appreciated.

The book opens with a panoramic political view in George Kelly's essay on Rousseau's despondent historicism. He analyzes *Émile*, *The Social Contract*, and *Corsica* as antihistorical treatises that refuse to accept history as authoritative, but are not fully confident in the possibility of human redemption from its woes. Kelly weighs into the individualist/collectivist debate by arguing that Rousseau's 'real preference' is intermediary between man and citizen (24, 36). Shklar analyzes one of Rousseau's hopes for salvation from history 'through the personal authority of great men' (154), namely, the 'soul surgeons' of the family and the polity (161): M. Wolmar, the paternal head in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, and the Legislator of *The Social Contract*. Shklar's topic does not ultimately put her on the suspicious side of the ledger regarding Rousseau's commitment to individual autonomy; she concludes that 'if Rousseau's images of authority show any one thing it is the intensity and consistency of his hatred for all form of personal dependence and social inequality' (185). In a fitting political end to this volume, Robert Wokler defends Rousseau against Hegel and liberal critics that he is the intellectual source of the French Revolution and more generally of modern tyranny. Wokler counters these charges by invoking Rousseau's union of ancient republican freedom with modern sovereignty, his separation of legislative from executive powers, and the incompatibility of his political ideals with the prevailing views of the French revolutionaries.

Several essays continue to address Rousseau's social and political ideas by examining his lineage to subsequent thinkers, and his intellectual influences and conflicts. Riley asserts the centrality of freedom to Rousseau's notion of the general will by revisiting his points of continuity and discontinuity with Kant. He contends they share an understanding of will as the voluntary source of morality, but there is no precedent for Kant's rationalistic universalism in Rousseau. While mindful of the complexity of Rousseau's intellectual influences, in another essay Riley traces his debt to Fénelon for his appreciation of the civic-mindedness of classical antiquity. Mark Hul-

luing adds the intellectual context to Rousseau's account in *The Confessions* of the personal reasons for his break with the *philosophes*. Rousseau challenged the French Enlightenment as a secular Pascal darkening the promise of society with the misery of the divided self. Christopher Brooke explores Rousseau's synthesis of two apparently antithetical intellectual strands — the Stoic and Augustinian. One key innovation, among others, is Rousseau's distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* which integrates the Stoic impulse to self-preservation and Augustinian prideful self-love.

Rousseau is renowned not only for his philosophical innovations, but also as an originator of modern autobiography. Jean Starobinski and Christopher Kelly mine the philosophical significance of his autobiographies. Starobinski examines Rousseau's middle-aged oath to truth in light of his self-exculpation for an adolescent lie ultimately excused in *The Confessions* as 'frustrated goodness' (370). In *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker* the same lie occasions Rousseau's more overtly philosophical discussion of when it is permissible to lie, a discussion Starobinski illuminates by comparing Rousseau to Grotius, Pufendorf, and Augustine. Christopher Kelly maintains that Rousseau bases his philosophical authority on his 'exemplary behaviour' (310). Kelly reconciles this interpretation with some of the scandalous behaviour Rousseau recounts in *The Confessions* by drawing a distinction between virtue and natural goodness: the latter is retained despite moral failings.

Obviously no collection would ignore Rousseau's most recognized works, but readers will also be intrigued by treatments of relatively unexamined texts. Victor Gourevitch elevates Rousseau's *Letter to Voltaire* to being his 'most authoritative discussion of religious issues' for several reasons, including his propensity to speak through other characters on religion in his published works (194). Gourevitch explains how Rousseau defends the coexistence of evil and an omnipotent God against Voltaire while rejecting individual providence. Through a study of Rousseau's short essay, 'On Theatrical Imitation', Plato emerges as Rousseau's interlocutor in C.N. Dugan and Tracy Strong's piece on theater and music. They demonstrate that Rousseau shares Plato's concerns about the arts, but modifies his position to culminate in exempting music from the moral and political condemnation of the arts. Thomas Kavanagh addresses Rousseau's transformation of the Book of *Judges* from the *Old Testament* into prose poetry in *The Levite of Ephrain*. It was written under the cloud of Rousseau's warrant of arrest for publishing *Émile*, and according to Kavanagh, it expresses a preoccupation with victimhood, and the wish for a just community, which are seen in some of his other philosophical and autobiographical writings.

Geraint Parry and Susan Meld Shell take up the well-travelled route of Rousseau's views on education. To Parry, Rousseau provides a natural education in *Émile* for autonomous men in a corrupt society who perform civic duties without being true citizens; in contrast, he offers a denaturing education for citizens in an unequal and tightknit community in *Letter to M. D'Alembert*, *The Government of Poland*, and *Discourse on Political Economy*. The usual understanding of *Émile* as the educational companion to *The*

Social Contract still seems relevant in Parry's observations on the 'reconciliation of an education for autonomy with an education for community' in the equal and self-determining polity (266-7). Shell concurs with Rousseau's feminist critics about the sexism of girl's education in *Émile*, but she disagrees with their charge that it is inconsistent with his position on human nature (272-3). Shell turns to the *Discourse on Inequality* to establish that Rousseau's guide for girls' education is a natural female constitution; if this interpretation is not self-evident, it is because she denies Rousseau's depiction of the independence of tribal life to advance her own conjectures on the origin of female dependence at this stage (280-3).

The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau claims to be 'the only volume that systematically surveys the whole range of Rousseau's activities in politics and education, psychology, anthropology, religion, music, and theater' (i). It takes good advantage of the possibilities a collection offers to bring diversity to the study of Rousseau. Only readers looking forward to a piece on anthropology will be disappointed. This volume also squarely addresses Rousseau in the context of other historical thinkers. Aside from Wokler's brief remarks on Rousseau's affinities to postmodernism (419-20), the essayists do not relate his significance to contemporary political theory. Nonetheless, their work is alive to the twenty-first century through Rousseau's prescience in speaking to our current sentiments and problems. As George Kelly concludes, 'We look around in the fascinating junkyard of our artifacts and we try to find ourselves. For this task Rousseau is an eminent companion' (45).

Perhaps no political thinker other than Machiavelli has been more assailed by his critics than Rousseau. There have been different waves of interpretation over the centuries, but at worst Rousseau has been judged politically as a democratic totalitarian, and personally as a vain and depraved narcissist. If this volume is indicative, he may fare well in the twenty-first century. There are some familiar trigger points of criticism seen, for example, in Shklar's remark on Rousseau's 'subtly hateful' view of women (169). But on the whole this is a volume that leaves a sympathetic impression of Rousseau vis à vis his intellectual peers and in respect to current political values and personal struggles.

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Severin Schroeder, ed.,
Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd. 2001.
Pp. xiii + 223.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-333-91871-1.

The essays in this collection are mostly defenses of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind against various positions that have been influential over the last few decades. They fill an important gap in the Wittgenstein literature, in that most collections of writing by Wittgenstein scholars have been devoted to matters of interpretation. Though there are a couple of exegetical essays here, the focus is on confronting recent trends in philosophical psychology. Several of the chapters, all written for this volume, are of very high quality, and most make significant contributions to the subject.

The word 'contemporary' in the title must be taken somewhat loosely. The positions that form the pole of opposition here — e.g., those of Armstrong, the Churchlands, Davidson, Fodor, Thomas Nagel, Quine, and Wilfrid Sellars — were mostly in print by the early 1980s, and many of them well before that. Though there are references to more recent literature as well, the contributors hardly touch on debates over externalism, connectionism, holism, modularity, etc., or on specific research in cognitive science. Nor is there much by way of response to recent theories of concepts, content, color, or qualia. Only one article directly addresses the current debate on consciousness.

The reason, I think, is that having begun to move from exegetical studies to the application of his method, Wittgenstein's recent disciples are finding it necessary to start at the roots of present trends. In any case, the book is an important source of Wittgensteinian thought on some key topics. Hans-Johann Glock takes on Quine's naturalism; P.M.S. Hacker contributes a sharp critique of eliminative materialism, challenging Sellars' influential views as well; Michel Ter Hark considers Dennett's reduction of the mental to 'behavior patterns'; and Severin Schroeder attacks Davidson's causal theory of action. There is also an argument against functionalism by Roger Teichman; a wide-ranging article on consciousness by Oswald Hanfling; and an essay on mental images (rather preoccupied with translation problems) by Stewart Candlish. The more exegetical contributions include Robert L. Arrington on the relation of speech to thought, and Edward Harcourt on the location of pains. In the one epistemological entry John Hyman offers a theory of knowledge inspired by Wittgenstein's idea that 'the grammar of the word "knows" is ... related to that of "can", "is able to" ' (*Philosophical Investigations §150*).

Wittgenstein's perspective, so influential in the decades after the publication of the *Investigations*, has been increasingly marginalized, especially in the U.S., by the onslaught of materialism, naturalization programs, causal explanation, computational and functional models, and related physicalistic

or quasi-scientific approaches to the mind. Whether the 'physicalist turn', as it might be called, is an historic advance (over Wittgenstein, behaviorism, positivism, or whatever) or a fin-de-siècle malady remains to be seen. But surely if any school within analytic philosophy is robust or influential enough today to oppose physicalism it is that of Wittgenstein. Thus one finds here some continuity in the authors' refusal to follow what Wittgenstein once called 'the grammar of physics'. For example: 'the physical phenomena Quine insists on do not qualify as mental' (Glock, 16); 'empirical discoveries would not undermine our use of the word pain' (Teichman, 31); 'the "mystery" of consciousness ... is due to the assumption that consciousness is something that is "produced" by our bodies' (Hanfling, 37); 'it is assumed [incorrectly] that we predict overt behavior ... and action in the same way as we predict the behavior of physical objects' (Ter Hark, 100); 'it is important not to confuse a disposition with its underlying material basis' (Schroeder, 159). Similarly, Candlish on 'the unthinking expectation that talk of mental pictures can be modeled on talk of physical pictures' (110). In these comments one finds a basis for a unified platform of opposition to the leading trends in the philosophy of mind.

Consistently enough, Wittgenstein took theorizing itself to be a game of the empirical sciences mistakenly transposed into philosophy. Some philosophers have even adorned ordinary language with the garland of 'theory', for it allegedly embeds a causal theory of behavior (i.e., 'folk psychology'). This idea is the target of a vigorous attack by Hacker, who argues that observations of behavior provide conceptual, not causal, criteria for the attribution of mental states. A similar line is taken by Schroeder in arguing that contra Davidson, reasons for action are not causes. The first-person authority we are granted in giving reasons also argues against their being thought of as causes.

Hyman's theory is that '*A* knows that *p* if, and only if, the fact that *p* can be *A*'s reason for doing ... something' (180). This is aligned with Wittgenstein's remark on knowledge and 'can', 'is able to' by showing that one's reasons for acting can be put into a form that modifies an action verb. Knowledge can then be characterized as 'the ability to do thing_*ly*' (178), i.e., in a certain way (the 'because of ... ' way, roughly). If this seems a bit too clever it is about par for epistemological theories nowadays. Wittgenstein's remark, though, only suggests that the language game of ability is related to that of knowledge, not that the former concept figures in a necessary and sufficient condition for the latter. The theory lends some support to the Hacker-Schroeder assault on a causal construal of acting for reasons. But it also leads Hyman to affirm that we can know things that we cannot coherently doubt: I can *know* that I am in pain, since the fact that I am in pain can be a reason for my groaning. Thus it denies one of the most fundamental positions of Wittgenstein's own epistemology.

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind is a useful entry in the debate between materialism of various stripes and Wittgenstein's grammatical (or 'criterial') approach to the mental. One might wish the editor had

focused even more strictly on direct confrontation between these trends, and perhaps that the list of contributors was a bit more diverse (seven out of ten are associated with British universities). Still, the collection contains many worthy examples of how Wittgenstein's method can be used to challenge the claim that the true nature of the mind is revealed by cognitive science and causal psychology.

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Barry Stroud
The Quest for Reality, Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2000.
Pp. xv + 228.
Cdn$61.50/US$47.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-513388-9);
Cdn$34.95/US$19.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-515188-7).

In *The Quest for Reality, Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour*, Barry Stroud is engaged in a meta-quest, a critique of metaphysics as the quest for the nature of reality, where 'reality' is the world minus appearances, and 'appearances' are the world with an ingredient subjective factor contributed by, and so dependent on, us (human beings), on our experience and beliefs. 'The philosophical quest for reality asks about the relation between the world and our conceptions or beliefs about it. It asks the question with the prospect of eliminating from our conception of the world certain features which most or all people appear to believe in' (15). The feature centrally under discussion is colour, and subjectivism is the metaphysical thesis that reality or the world is colourless: 'As things are fully independent of us in such a world, objects are not coloured' (43). On this view, our ordinary, naive colour beliefs are false; that is the basic nature of their relation to the world. Stroud, however, shows that the relation between our ordinary colour beliefs and the world involves a complexity which forestalls the conclusion that such beliefs are simply false and that, in fact, any such conclusion must be self-defeating.

Stroud begins by observing that one cannot arrive at the falsity of our ordinary colour beliefs simply from a conception of a purely physical, colourless world independent of us. The purely physical description of the world ascribes no colours to things, but 'Why should we draw more than the

unremarkable conclusion that the physical sciences do not mention the colours of the things they describe? Colour is not alone in this respect' (63). The further declaration that the only truths are the physical truths — that nothing else is true — is insupportable (65). In short, 'the physical truths alone simply leave it open whether physical things are coloured' (68).

Further, the conception of a purely physical world can pay no reductive dividends since the world so conceived, though containing no colours, will also contain no beliefs. But the metaphysical project of subjectivism is essentially an exercise in, as Stroud puts it, *unmasking* our ordinary colour beliefs wherein we ascribe colours to physical objects (75). No such beliefs are there to be unmasked if they are thrown out along with colours and all else that the conceivers of a purely physical world consider ontological bath water.

The psychological fact of colour belief provides then the *raison d'etre* of subjectivism; the point is to unmask such beliefs. How? One strategy is to treat such beliefs, and other psychological facts such as perceptions of colour, as the effects of certain circumstances in the uncoloured real world. But no such conception of such facts as 'mental or psychological by-products merely added on to an otherwise purely physical world' (87) can deliver a satisfying explanation of them. Why do we get perceptions of yellow in the presence of lemons? Not, on the subjectivist account, because lemons are yellow and we, with full-blooded intentionality, have perceptions *of* such a property of lemons. If the intentionality of perceptions of yellow is foregone in construing them as effects of causes it becomes a mystery why we get such perceptions in the presence of lemons, short of occasionalist orchestrating by the Wise Architect. So too with perceptions of shape (92). Moreover, the version of the by-product view which has perceptions of colour as 'sensations', 'splits off perception of colour from what we think of as belonging to an object when we think of it as coloured' (113). It thus can give no account of what Stroud calls 'predicational seeing' — that we see a lemon to be yellow — and conflicts with the 'direct connection' or identity of the intentional objects of perception and the intentional objects of belief: the colour I see a lemon to be is the same property I believe a lemon to have (115). This direct connection underlies predicational seeing.

A dispositionalist account of colour attempts to bar colour from fully independent objective reality by analyzing colour in terms of the following bi-conditional: x is yellow if and only if normal human perceivers standing in certain relations R to x in certain kinds of perceptual circumstances C would get perceptions of yellow (121). Stroud holds that the vindication of such a claim has two requirements: 1) it must be a necessary truth if it is to be an account of *what it is* for something to be yellow, and 2) what 'having perceptions of yellow' is must be something specifiable and identifiable independently of what 'x is yellow' is or means. But these, as Stroud brings out, are mutually incompatible requirements: the requirement 'that perceptions of yellow be identifiable as such independently of any appeal to the colour of objects ... is just what leaves it always *possible* for an object that is

disposed to produce such perceptions of that identified kind in normal human perceivers in the specified conditions not to be yellow. That means that when perceptions of yellow are identified in that way, the biconditional about yellow things is not necessarily true. But a dispositionalist theory requires a necessary connection' (144).

The achilles of dispositionalism — the attempt to identify perceptions of and beliefs about colour independently of any appeal to the colours of objects — Stroud subsequently discovers to be the downfall of any unmasking project. This is his central finding: 'if we cannot attribute perceptions of and beliefs about the colours of things to anyone without ourselves having beliefs about the colours of objects, then the psychological facts that the project of unmasking the colours of things needs to explain cannot be acknowledged without our also accepting some nonpsychological truths about the colours of things that the project means to deny. Accepting the relevant *explananda* violates a necessary condition of the project's success. Fulfilling that condition would render the relevant *explananda* unavailable. Either way, the project cannot succeed' (169).

Having succeeded, as I think he does, in establishing the major negative finding of the futility of unmasking projects, has Stroud thereby positively proved the objective reality of colour? He says no: 'Given that we competently attribute to one another perceptions and beliefs about the colours of things, and given that that, in turn, requires that we also believe that the world contains many coloured objects, no necessary links have thereby been established or proposed between the presence of such beliefs and their truth. The most we can conclude is that we cannot carry out a certain intellectual project' (193). Only the establishment of such necessary links, and thereby the demonstration of a contradiction in the subjectivist/would-be unmasker's position could, Stroud thinks, supply a 'metaphysically satisfying' proof of the objectivity of colour. But no such demonstration, he thinks, is forthcoming. Friends of objective colour will find Stroud's pessimism dispiriting, coming as it does after the relentless and awe-inspiring ingenuity of his campaign against unmasking projects. And they should, I think, find it unwarranted for several reasons that cannot be gone into here, but which begin with doubts that metaphysical claims retain standing — indeed, retain sense — just so long as they are not contradictory.

In any case, friends, foes and neutrals alike must, I think, find Stroud's book a remarkable philosophical performance of sustained argument and penetrating analysis.

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Paul Thom
Making Sense: A Theory of Interpretation.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
Pp. viii + 119.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9782-7);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9783-5).

Paul Thom's aim in this short book is to present a general theory of interpretation that is inclusive of all possible ways in which we can be said to interpret something. He is particularly intent to show that the term 'interpretation', as it is used in the performing arts (as in, 'Horowitz's interpretation of the Liszt *Piano Sonata*'), should not be regarded as a secondary or derivative sense of that word (56-7). From Thom's point of view, a general theory of interpretation is one that regards both performative and critical interpretations as species of a more general concept. This entails that any theory of how it is we interpret music, for example, is not going to differ in kind from a theory of how we interpret written texts or even how scientists interpret the natural world. This is an interesting and bold claim, but, unfortunately, the book does not support it. Thom's theory never moves beyond very vague and general pronouncements, and he fails to provide arguments at crucial places in the text.

Thom defines 'interpretation' as 'aiming to endow a given object with a particular type of significance by subsuming a representation of it under a governing concept' (71). This definition mentions three features that Thom regards as essential: the object, its representation and the governing concept. The object is that which one interprets — a piece of music, a text, a sentence, etc. The representation of the object is the way in which one grasps that object; this is done by highlighting or omitting certain features of the object. In this way, we can have two different representations of the same object. The governing concept is the structuring system that endows significance on the object-as-represented. For example, the English language is a structuring system (governing concept) that endows a certain string of sounds with significance; it makes sense of those sounds by representing them as words and bestows them with meanings.

Thom asserts that if this is the correct structure of interpretation (it consists of an object, representation and governing concept), then we are able to reconcile two seemingly contradictory principles that he wants to preserve. On the one hand, we have the principle of pluralism. This is the view that there could be two or more successful, yet incommensurable, interpretations of the same object (10). On the other hand, there is the principle of the hermeneutic circle. This principle states that 'it is not only the interpretation but also its object that gets constructed in the process of interpretation' (14). These principles seem to conflict in the sense that the latter implies that different interpretations, by their nature, are about different objects, as those very objects are only constructed in that process. If that is right, then there

can never be two different, yet successful, interpretations of the same object, as pluralism demands. Part of Thom's solution is to say that it is not the object that is reconstituted according to the governing concept, but rather the representation of that object. In that respect, we could have the same object represented in different ways, and with a different governing concept, yielding a different interpretation. But different interpretations do not imply different objects. Pluralism is maintained and the hermeneutic circle is modified to incorporate the idea of a representation of an object (107).

Armed with this general theory of interpretation, and guided by these two principles, Thom spends the final two chapters examining the rules and constraints on successful interpretations. According to him, success in interpretation relies on two factors: the significance and comprehensiveness of the governing concept. A successful interpretation is one where the object, its representation and the governing concept are chosen so as to be appropriately related to the other elements of the interpretation in order to preserve this significance and comprehensiveness (82-4). These factors are very general. It seems that by 'comprehensiveness' he means that an interpretation of a part of the object, or object-as-represented, should also cohere with an interpretation of the whole (80-1). But by 'significance', he also seems to mean no more than coherence. However, in the last chapter, he does outline three types of significance. First, there is natural explanatory significance, essentially the significance with which we endow the natural world when we undertake to construct explanatory and predictive laws; second, there is intentional significance, the significance we ascribe to intentional actions of human beings; and finally there is artistic significance. Despite the seeming importance that Thom wants to place on this last type of significance in his attempt to mark the artistic as a major contributing factor in a theory of interpretation, he quickly skips discussion here and equates it with the unhelpful, yet ubiquitous, concept of coherence.

Thom's book abruptly ends at this point with a brief summary of the previous chapters. He concludes, claiming that all interpretations exhibit the structure he has outlined (106), and that his account is better than his rivals (108). These claims are difficult to assess since (i) Thom does not spend any more than a few paragraphs looking at how scientists study and interpret natural phenomena or how we attribute intentional explanations to human actions and (ii) he does not present, summarize or mention any rival theories from which we can make an assessment.

The dissatisfaction one feels with this abrupt ending, however, is symptomatic of a style found throughout the book. For example, we are not told why Thom takes pluralism and the hermeneutic circle to be the guiding principles in interpretation, and hence his argument as to how they can be reconciled seems unmotivated. In his brief discussion of intentional significance, he again arbitrarily asserts that there are two guiding principles: the principle of charity and the fusion of horizons (89). These two principles are of course familiar to anyone doing work in philosophy of language or hermeneutics. To understand the importance of the principle of charity one needs

to at least have some familiarity with the work of Neil Wilson, who first coined the term, and with Willard Quine and Donald Davidson, who taught us its importance in translation and interpretation. But Thom neglects to discuss any of that literature; instead, he directs us to Simon Blackburn's *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (89).

This book is suitable for those with an interest in the performing arts and are looking for a general theory that provides a conceptual framework by which to assess different performative interpretations of a piece of work. It lacks the rigour and clarity of some of the classical theories in hermeneutics and theories of interpretation, but this may be the result of its attempt to achieve such a high degree of generality in such a short space.

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Timm Triplett and **Willem DeVries**
Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: Reading Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company 2000.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-551-7);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-550-9).

Wilfrid Sellars's influential essay 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' (EPM) was initially published in 1956, and many of its arguments aim at targets, such as sense-data theories of perception and versions of behaviourism, long gone. Nevertheless, taking a broader view of the themes discussed, the essay has a critical bearing on a remarkably large number of current debates in philosophy, including discussion of intentional content, scientific realism, normativity and folk psychology. It is thus unsurprising that, after a period of relative neglect, discussion of Sellars is once again in vogue, and his influence can be felt on key contemporary philosophers, including Brandom, McDowell, Dennett & Rorty.

This current book is yet another sign of this revival of interest, and includes a reprint of EPM, a section-by-section commentary, a useful glossary of terms and an excellent introductory essay. Given that the entire essay has only recently been reprinted with a study guide by Robert Brandom (Harvard University Press 1997), one may justifiably question the need for yet another. However, in addition to some interpretative differences between the two, Triplett and DeVries provide a clear and accessible companion to what is

undoubtedly a difficult essay to follow; placing the essay in its wider context and setting out clearly central themes and arguments. In contrast, Brandom's guide, whilst closer to the spirit of EPM in both style and content, remains largely opaque to the uninitiated and of limited use as an aid to the struggling student of Sellars.

A central interpretative theme is that, in contrast to typical comments made about Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given, EPM does contain a clear and sustained argument against the Given, in all its various manifestations. The last clause is important, for Triplett and DeVries stress the need for an appreciation that the Given attacked in the essay is not the narrow notion of some brute, mind-dependent entity found in sensory experience, but rather it should be seen as any 'element in experience that has positive epistemic status simply in virtue of the occurrence of that experience' (xxv). According to Triplett and DeVries, Sellars's central argument against the Given turns on the claims that (a) only that which is propositionally structured can play an epistemic role, and (b) that which is propositionally structured must derive its epistemic status from other epistemic states. The two claims combine to ensure that there can be no Given, even in this wider sense.

Whilst a wider conception of the Given is undoubtedly Sellars's target, it seems to me that, in employing strict epistemic terms, the definition proffered is not wide enough to capture the central Sellarsian concerns here. On this alternative reading of the essay, EPM concerns not just knowledge and justification (the issue of a 'positive epistemic status') but the very question of the world-directedness of thought, whether justified or otherwise. On this reading, the problem with the Given lies in the claim that the aboutness of such mental states can be accounted for simply in virtue of the occurrence of experience alone in the here-and-now without such content being related to a broader worldview. These Kantian concerns pervade much of Sellars's writings, even if not made explicit in EPM, and are largely ignored in the interpretation of the essay proffered by Triplett and DeVries that primarily focuses on traditional epistemic issues.

Triplett and DeVries characterise Sellars's positive contributions to epistemology as occupying a series of intermediary positions between what are usually viewed as competing poles. For example, Sellars's rejection of the Given ensures that he is no foundationalist, yet he is prepared to acknowledge some basic (albeit non-epistemic) role for certain states in contrast to coherentism. Similarly, Sellars is hailed as an early proponent of epistemic externalism in acknowledging the centrality of reliable processes, and yet he does not dispense with the (internalist) requirement that the individual must know that his belief is reliable. Whether such a unique hybrid of competing positions works as a viable 'middle way' is highly debatable. Much turns on the claim that a causal association between belief and object plays a central, even foundational, role, but one that is not an epistemic Given. To my mind, it is here that Sellars's position becomes untenable: his own separation of the normative from the non-normative ensures that causal processes cannot play

the quasi-foundational role ascribed to them. This has been a central theme of recent discussions of Sellars, and this book makes little reference or contribution to this ongoing debate.

The source of the myth of the Given has its roots in the philosophy of mind, and the latter parts of EPM are dedicated, through telling the alternative 'myth of Jones', to outlining an alternative conception of mindedness according to which mental states are like theoretical entities and talk of thoughts and such like are an extension from our everyday talk of publicly-available, physical objects. Sellars's claims here are influential yet sketchy, and Triplett and DeVries do a good job of filling in the details to make the overall account clear and well integrated into the essay as a whole. One puzzle in the commentary concerns the status of the myth of Jones itself. Early on we are told that all Sellars need do is: 'convince us that the Myth of Jones is a possibility' [xlv] or later that: 'the myth elaborates a way things might be, the possibility of which counteracts the accumulated pressures to think that things must be as the Givenists thinks they are' (157). By the end, Triplett and DeVries make the stronger claim that Sellars's myth requires: 'more than mere logical possibility. If the story is found deeply incompatible with our best theories of the historical development of human historical capabilities Sellars will have failed on his own terms' (178). Whilst the latter may reflect Sellars's position, little is done to defend the seemingly unnecessary transition to the stronger claim.

Overall, the dialectic structure of EPM interposes a number of unintroduced, alternative voices together with Sellars's own. Whilst this serves to engage the reader in creative dialogue and thereby expose the myth of the Given in its various guises, it sometimes is difficult to discern the author's position from others. Triplett and DeVries strive to systematise the arguments, allowing for Sellars's own voice to be heard loud and clear. The result is a highly accessible, if uncritical and narrow, account that provides a helpful companion to Sellars's influential essay.

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David Wiggins
Sameness and Substance Renewed.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. xvi + 257.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-45411-5);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-45619-3).

David Wiggins's *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (2001) is a new version of *Sameness and Substance* (1980) which in turn was a substantial rewrite of *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity* (1967). *Sameness and Substance Renewed* is thus the mature reflections of an analytic philosopher who has been seriously investigating these issues for some thirty-five years. The book covers, in considerable detail, the entire conceptual geography of identity and some issues about personal identity. Wiggins contrasts his views with competing accounts and argues for the superiority of his position — a kind of neo-Aristotelian view of substance and a human being theory of personal identity.

The first chapter deals with the controversy over whether identity is absolute or relative. Wiggins, as he did in *Sameness and Substance* argues that identity is absolute. Absolute identity implies a distinction between identity and individuation. In Chapter 2 Wiggins presents his account of individuation. He insists on the sortal relativity of individuation and works out a series of principles related to it, from D*i* (the principle of sortal relativity itself) through D*ix* (which he rejects in favor of D*x*). D*ii* is required because all D*i* guarantees is a succession of phase sortals, while D*ii* is a stronger principle that requires a substance sortal — a sortal that an individual will fall under throughout its existence. Many of these principles play a role in the discussion of personal identity in Chapter 7 and in other chapters along the way. All of this should be familiar to readers of the 1980 version. Chapter 3 concerns itself with the individuation of natural kinds and artifacts and the degree to which decisions about individuation and identity become arbitrary or conventional. Wiggins rejects the nominal essence account of the semantics of natural kind terms and develops a version of Putnam's proposal that takes both micro and macro structures into account. Artifacts are clearly more difficult. D*x* comes out of a discussion of the ship of Theseus example (expanded from the 1980 version) that Wiggins resurrected from Hobbes and introduced into the literature on personal identity in 1967. D*x* gives Wiggins reaction to the 'best candidate' theory of identity. It asserts that the identity of *a* with *b* ought to be a matter strictly between *a* and *b* themselves. In Chapter 4 Wiggins deduces certain essentialist conclusions from his theory of individuation, though he claims that his essentialism is modest and extensionalist. In Chapter 5 he defends his own conceptualist realism against the anti-conceptual realist and the anti-realist conceptualist. Wiggins's conceptualism involves constraints on our conceptions of objects that come from the object, while it is the human mind that makes conceptions. In Chapter 6 Wiggins argues that in singling out an object that object must be determinate

in respect to some kind to which it belongs. He also holds that identity is an all or nothing relation and not a matter of degree. He rejects the account of individuation that sees stages, or other kinds of parts connected together by a 'unity relation'.

In the final chapter of the book Wiggins takes up personal identity. This chapter represents the biggest changes in Wiggins's position from *Sameness and Substance*. In the older version Wiggins defended Locke against Bishop Butler's charge of circularity while raising other objections that he claimed undermine the neo-Lockean project. In the present work he endorses Butler's charge even though he disagrees with Bishop's account of identity and personal identity. While Butler is a substantial soul theorist, Wiggins is a 'human being' theorist — refusing to make the distinction that Locke and neo-Lockeans make between a living human being and a person. Wiggins allows that the two words differ in sense and do not necessarily have the same extension. Still, by the end of the chapter it is clear that he is not going to give the affirmative answer that Locke gives to the question of whether one can be the same person but a different human being. 'Human beings' on Wiggins's account are substances that in Strawson's language have both P-predicates and M-predicates and are a natural kind. Human beings thus fall under the individuative procedure for natural kind substances that he explains in the beginning of Chapter 3. Against Locke, Wiggins thinks that Butler is right to hold that experiential memory presupposes or involves personal identity. He begins by analyzing the importance of being a subject of conscious experiences by rehearsing the Berkeley/Reid Brave Officer Paradox and the neo-Lockean resolution of that paradox. He finds this resolution unsatisfactory, not because it fails to resolve the Brave Officer Paradox but because it has the problem of circularity in experiential memory that Butler pointed out. He then turns to Sydney Shoemaker's Brownson case in which Brown's brain is transplanted into Robinson's body and the resulting person given the neutral name 'Brownson'. This case, he suggests, might give good reasons to resist the conclusion he has drawn about the failure of the neo-Lockeans conception. Many have concluded that Brownson is Brown. Wiggins remarks that there are different reasons for being impressed by this thought experiment. One can be impressed because of the phenomenological continuity in experience from Brown to Brownson. This is presumably what the neo-Lockean finds impressive. Or one can be impressed because of the continuing of the characteristic functioning of the substance. This is what Wiggins finds impressive. Wiggins then makes what turns out to be an interim claim that the Brownson case is the *ne plus ultra* — that case beyond which there will be no genuine identity. So, fission cases, teletransportation cases and so on are going to count as the replacing of A by B and not the identity of A and B. He then takes up Derek Parfit's concept of q-memory. Q-memory, were it coherent, would provide Lockeans with an answer to Butler's charge of circularity and would presumably make the cases beyond the Brownson case more plausibly cases of continuity rather than replacement, whatever the difficulties they pose for the concept of identity. Wiggins

raises a series of objections to show that q-memory is incoherent. He claims that it cannot effectively explain in what way q-memory is similar to normal memory and distinct from false memory as illustrated by the case of George IV recalling being at Waterloo even though he wasn't there. He points out that we need to know how well q-memory works. He then points out that, in fact, Parfit has not defined q-memory at all, but instead 'accurate quasi-memory'. He claims this is not a tiny oversight but the traces of a major philosophical difficulty. He claims that given the definition, nothing q-analogous to ordinary inaccurate memory could be provided for. Having finished with q-memory, he goes on to use D*x* to reject even cases where both halves of Brown's brain are transplanted but only one of them survives. Clones simply represent the production of copies and have little to do with identity. In the end, he seems to reject even the conclusion from the original Brownson case that Brownson is Brown. Brownson fails to have enough of the characteristic functions that Brown had to call him Brown. He finds even cases where Brown's brain is transplanted into the body of a Brown-identical-twin unconvincing as an answer to this objection. He goes on to make the point that insofar as medical intervention in the drastic forms that seem increasingly available makes changes to the natural kind 'human being', we are treating people more and more as artifacts.

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Robert R. Williams, ed.
Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism. Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
Albany: State University of New York Press 2001.
Pp. vi + 280.
US$68.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4933-5);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4934-3).

This book contains twelve essays devoted exclusively to the *Philosophy of Right* (1821), which were originally presented at the 1998 biennial meeting of the Hegel Society of America. The editor is Robert R. Williams, himself the author of a recent monograph on the theory of recognition titled *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (1997).

One of the clear merits of *Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism* is that it brings Hegel onto the scene of contemporary political philosophy, showing how Hegel's political work can be brought into dialogue with con-

temporary debates about contractarian liberalism and communitarianism, against the traditional charge that Hegel's politics amounts to a totalitarianism. The book includes exegetical work on Hegel's texts on property; discussions of the theoretical status of poverty, punishment, the post-colonial state; and the ends of the modern state. It is a relief to find out that the authors do not simply line Hegel up with liberalism and communitarianism. They find all sorts of disagreement as to where he should be placed. The last essay in the collection culminates the debate by analysing Rawls's liberal individualism and Hegel's ethical recognition, and defending Hegel over Rawls. The specific work and accomplishments differ from essay to essay.

In the first essay, Ardis B. Collins introduces the overall debate and delivers a sustained analysis of the opposition between Kant and Hegel, the only such analysis in the book. Her theme is the opposition between abstract morality and legality in Kant's account of the liberal individual, and ethical recognition in the modern state in Hegel's account of the universal individual. The exegetical rigour of Collins's essay matches the rigour of the only other female author in the collection, Angelica Nuzzo. Nuzzo relates Hegel's theory of property to the implicit and explicit theory of the body and the emergence therewith of the notion of the person, as found in the first part 'Abstract Right' of the *Philosophy of Right*. Kevin Thompson shows that the positivity of right necessarily passes through three stages of mediation from abstract, through civil society, to the recognition of the universality of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). He draws on the problematic of the legal debates in Hegel's day, the *Kodifikationsstreit* between Thibaut and Savigny.

The middle group of essays in the book locate Hegel's treatment of the institutions of ethical life and the modern state in the *Philosophy of Right*, in light of various claims of traditional and contemporary contractarianism. Mark Tunick and Alan Patten argue in two different yet related ways that, despite traditional claims, Hegel's claims about the ties between the individual and universal life also apply in multiculturally and religiously diverse forms of ethical life. Joel Anderson proposes, against Avinieri, that Hegel's actual solution of the problem of poverty is to be found in the concept of the *Korporation*. Dudley Knowles argues that Hegel's theory of the justification of punishment would be best understood from a contractarian standpoint while keeping intact, however, Hegel's own notion of right's conceptual reconciliation with itself. Slightly at odds with this group of essays, R. Dien Winfield ponders the postcolonial state and offers the most interesting and most philosophically thoroughgoing critical reflections on Hegel's concept of normative institutions as mediating the freedom of the individual. Lawrence S. Stepelevich's superb attempt at bringing Hegel to analysing American history and civil rights, the American Civil War (1864) between the South and the West, stands out of the group, in both style and depth by far outstripping the rest of essays. Stepelevich is the only author to stress the tragic determination of history's recollection from its past, or to mention Hegel's notion of spirit — the others speak of individuals and their freedom but not of spirit.

The last three essays in the collection each draw on explicit comparison and contrast between Hegel and contemporary legal and political theorists. Andrew Buchwalter unconvincingly contrasts Hegel to Habermas to show that there is patriotic constitutionalism, contrary to Habermas's Neo-Kantian dichotomy of formalist legal law and content-bound idiosyncratic ethical life. David C. Durst argues along with Foucault's hyper-pessimism and against what he calls Hegel's productivist functionalism of the modern state, and its victimisation of the individual. It is interesting to note that Durst and Buchwalter offer completely opposite interpretations of Hegel's term education (*Bildung*). Stephen Houlgate's is the outstanding essay in this collection. Compellingly leftist and Hegelian in its dialectical account, this is arguably *the* essay that gives the most credit to the book's deservedly ambitious title. Houlgate indeed takes Hegel *beyond liberalism and communitarianism*. Houlgate argues that as a political system based on the idea of freedom itself, Hegel's philosophy of right is superior to Rawls's political theory of justice.

This book deserves the serious attention of Hegel scholars, ethicists, legal theorists and the larger academic community. Bringing Hegel onto the scene of the contemporary rationalist debates about politics is an excellent idea, and the results are satisfactorily rich and well presented. The strength of the collection is that its presentations are delivered in clear and accessible writing, making the text and its technical vocabulary inviting and understandable. It is a further strength that all topics under discussion are timely and of extreme importance, bound to provoke reaction both among Hegel experts and the larger socio-political and legal audience devoted to the study of these problems. Given the actual accomplishments of the discussions, the book is sure to create its own opposition. The noticeable weakness of this collection (with the clear exceptions of Houlgate and Stepelevich) is in its slant to the right end of the political spectrum. In the editorial introduction, Williams suggests that the collection aims to present solutions to problems in Hegel interpretations and political philosophy raised as early as 1951, notably by the Marxist oriented Shlomo Avinieri and by J.N. Findlay. However, it may be that the entries in the collection are just too uncritical and guilty of positivist critique themselves to be able to carry out the new Hegelian turn 'beyond liberalism and communitarianism' that they claim to initiate. The problem lies not in bending Hegel to make him fit the discourses of either liberal contractarianism or communitarianism, but rather the other way round. While Hegel's genius may indeed lie beyond both contractarianism and communitarianism, the authors in this collection (except for Houlgate) have not successfully exhibited the exact moment of Hegel's passing beyond them. An unreserved acceptance of this book's ambition would be surprising and perhaps premature.

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