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Jonathan E. Adler

Belief's Own Ethics.

A Bradford Book.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2002. Pp. 329.

US\$37.00. ISBN 0-262-01192-1.

In this lively and fascinating book, Adler defends Evidentialism as an intrinsic ethics of belief. Extrinsic views, according to which prudential or ethical values are allowed to give us reasons to believe, he rejects as too lax. They would incorrectly introduce non-epistemic values into accounts of epistemic rationality and in this way condone indefensible epistemic practice. Adler is attentive to counter-arguments and consistently fair to opponents. His highly subtle defense of practical objective epistemology and his resolute commitment to plausibility and concreteness make this an attractive and original work.

Written with honesty, humor, and humility, *Belief's Own Ethics* offers energetic discussions of many themes including self-deception, incoherence among beliefs, explicitness, distraction, rumor, appeals to ignorance, authority, testability, testimony, trust, the regress of justification, charity, cooperativeness in conversation, Moore's Paradox, the Paradox of the Preface, reactive attitudes, faith and moral commitment, doubt, and fallibility. Ranging from the homely to the eccentric, Adler's examples have a charm of their own. Never mere philosophers' fantasies, they are taken from common experience and described with a sensitive appreciation of common practice and the significance of context. We encounter the problematic predictions of the *Bible Code*; the beliefs, in *Pride and Prejudice*, that Elizabeth first had about Darcy; the Milgram experiments; the rumor that basketball star Jerry Lucas had memorized the entire Manhattan phone book; and the case of Lance Armstrong, who won the 1996 Tour de France despite having testicular cancer in an advanced state. Adler alludes at one point to the possibility that a person's testimony might seem less reliable if he were wearing dark socks with white running shoes, and explores at some length an exchange (in letters to the editor) between various members of the public and a waiter who complained that his customers asked him whether he was sure their coffee was decaffeinated.

Adler contends that belief has its own ethics because it is strictly speaking *not possible* to believe contrary to, or regardless of, evidence that we possess bearing on the claims that we believe. What is commonly called the ethics of belief is in some sense not ethics at all, since it is not one among several options to be adopted. We cannot choose to believe in order to make ourselves happier or subscribe to some authority that has not provided evidence to us. Bernard Williams' 1973 essay 'Deciding to Believe' plays a key role in Adler's exposition on this point. Adler's position rules out extreme skepticism, fideism, and indeed any view predicated on the notion that we could have 'oughts' for belief that are anything other than epistemic. We 'cannot recognize ourselves as believing *p* while believing that our reasons or evidence are

not adequate to its truth and conversely' (32). When a person knows something, it is true; in attending to the fact that he believes it, he regards it as true.

Adler offers an account and defense of a normative epistemology that offers advice and sets out duties as to how we might improve our beliefs. Our beliefs are transparent in the sense that we look through them to the world, he says. If I believe that *p*, then I believe that *p* is true of the world in which I live and act. With no evidence for it, I cannot simply choose to believe that the number of stars is even. Try it and see — or try believing you are handsome or beautiful in order to make yourself happier or more successful. You won't be able to do it. Beliefs cannot be chosen; to believe is not to perform a voluntary act. We cannot control our beliefs. If we could do so, they would be responsive to our wishes and commands rather than to the way the world is and for that reason would make a very poor guide to the world.

Nevertheless, Adler submits, we are responsible for our beliefs and blameworthy if we omit to reflect critically in cases where we have specific reason to believe that our evidence may be incomplete or misleading. There is such a thing as epistemic self-control; we are aware, and can become more aware, of our patterns of attribution and personal biases and fallibility, and we can act within reasonable practical limits to prevent ourselves from believing carelessly and negligently.

The phenomenon of making up one's mind is discussed, in a case where a person is inclined to think his friend Irene lost a book he lent to her. He decides not to inquire further into the matter, and comes to believe that she has done so. Is this a matter of *deciding to believe* or believing voluntarily, Adler asks. He responds that it is not; rather, this man decides not to inquire further into the matter and that decision puts him in a position where he comes to believe she has lost the book.

When a person asserts a claim, *p*, he is in effect backing this claim with his own commitment to it, and the practice of asserting to others in order to communicate information works because the norm is to assert what we fully believe. In asserting, we are stating claims about the way the world is, not just claims about how we believe or are inclined to believe the world is, and we are stating those claims to other people who are likely to rely on what we say. This practice requires that we have evidence for what we say, which in turn means we must, and should, have evidence for what we believe. The relation between evidence and belief is not, for Adler, a contingent one.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the many interesting discussions to be found in this book. But let me comment very briefly on Adler's treatment of trust and testimony. Adler acknowledges that we rely on testimony of other people for our knowledge on many matters, that we generally credit that testimony and accept what is asserted as true unless we have specific reason not to do so, and that such credence in testimony (along with memory and perception) is highly significant in our accumulation of knowledge. Thus he allows that much of our knowledge depends on trusting other people (normally) to tell us the truth. He is concerned,

however, to deny that this role for testimony and trust makes our knowledge problematic or subject to general doubt. Adler contends that many of the beliefs that we initially derive from testimony are indirectly confirmed: they are validated in other ways. (If you tell me the bus stop is at Oak and Elm Street, I may go there and see it for myself, thus confirming that the claim you asserted is true and that I was right to accept what you told me.) In fact, Adler says, we have access to 'a resilient history of overwhelmingly reliable testimony' (153) because there is so much that confirms so much of the testimony that is offered to us and that we accept. Beliefs based on testimony have credibility based on a broad background of empirical confirmation; our practice of accepting testimony unless we have a clear reason not to do so has served us well in the past.

This account does not obviate the need for trust, because trust itself may be based on evidence; the point about trust is not that it cannot be backed up by some evidence but rather that it cannot be based on fully demonstrative evidence. There are also many cases where testimony turns out not to be correct. In many instances where we would be argued to confirming testimony, we rely on other testimony along the way. Thus it might be alleged that the indirect confirmation Adler cites has question-begging elements. Furthermore, many people who make assertions are careless and negligent in forming beliefs that they unreflectively to others, a point which may open the door to some amount of skepticism about testimony.

This book offers a rich banquet of problems and explorations and should be of interest to many readers.

Trudy Govier
Calgary, Canada

Theodor W. Adorno

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

Ed. Rolf Tiedemann.

Trans. Rodney Livingstone.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.

Pp. xi + 300.

US\$22.95. ISBN 0-8047-4426-2.

Theodor W. Adorno

Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems.

Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Edmund Jephcott.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2000.

Pp. ix + 214.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4247-2);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4528-5).

Theodor Adorno was very reluctant to allow tape recordings of his lectures. Despite giving his first lectures in 1939 shortly before World War II, he did not allow recordings until the late 1950s. The Theodor W. Adorno Archive has begun the project of preparing these fifteen lectures for publication. The two books reviewed here — *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* [KC] and *Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems* [M] — are new translations of these recently prepared lectures. Further translations are due to follow.

These lectures are a departure from the style Adorno uses in his publications, such as *Minima Moralia* or *Negative Dialectics*. There one finds chapters that are little more than a web of related and brief essays, from one paragraph to several pages long. While Adorno's work makes for stimulated reading, the fragmentary style with which he presents his ideas makes it difficult to capture in essay form. Therefore, these lectures are much easier to digest than his publications.

The first thing that will strike the reader is how engaging Adorno was as a lecturer. The common perception of his lecturing abilities is of a difficult, disengaged thinker more concerned with his own philosophical development than his students, in contradistinction to his colleague Max Horkheimer. While the editor (Rolf Tiedemann) tells us in an afterward that '[i]n his lectures Adorno always improvised freely, basing his talk on a few keywords that he had usually noted down shortly before the class,' the lectures truly read as if Adorno had read to his class a carefully prepared manuscript displaying a real gift for lecturing [KC 283].

Each lecture fills an interesting void. It is a curiosity why Adorno never wrote a book about Kant (other than a chapter in *Negative Dialectics*) as he had with Hegel, Husserl, and Kierkegaard, owing to the widespread influence of Kant on Adorno's work. In his lectures entitled *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Adorno's audience is made up of students without any background knowledge in Kant. There are twenty-one class lectures in the volume given between May 12th to July 30th in 1959. Extensive footnotes running over fifty

pages are provided for each lecture proving very useful in explaining further various references made to German philosophy and literature.

Adorno tackles the *Critique of Pure Reason* thematically, not chronologically. His lectures deal with methods and intentions, the concept of the transcendental, metaphysics, enlightenment, knowledge as tautology, the concept of the self, the concept of the thing, the deduction of the categories, schematism, constituents and constitutum, society, the 'block', ideology, the concept of depth, psychology, the concept of the transcendental, concluding with a final lecture on the transcendental aesthetic. Where those most familiar with Adorno will notice immediately that there are discussions of enlightenment (not unrelated to Horkheimer and his *Dialectic of Enlightenment*), society, and ideology that might lead one to think he treats these lectures in a similar vein to his *Hegel: Three Studies*, one may be pleasantly relieved. In his studies on Hegel, one gets the impression that Adorno is giving in actual fact a discussion of *his* philosophy and not Hegel's philosophy. In these lectures on Kant, Adorno sticks close to an accurate presentation of central themes in Kant's thought. While one can see the importance of Kant's philosophy for Adorno's philosophical enterprise, the central task is getting to grips with Kant.

The lectures develop step by step and Adorno does well in taking time to clarify difficult terms and concepts employed by Kant. Adorno's goal is to provide the introductory student with a proper approach to philosophical good practice and grasp of general concepts so that the student can handle adequately an individual reading of Kant (see KC 201). In large part, many readers familiar with Kant's philosophy and his idealist successors will find Adorno's treatment relatively uncontroversial, although there are some exceptions such as his claim that German idealism 'was not the best or most noble German [philosophical] tradition' (KC 117). He also claims that 'Fichte's is the only philosophy to have made a serious attempt to implement this project of a philosophy without assumptions' (KC 15). In addition, Adorno believes Fichte 'regarded himself, not without a cause, as a consistent Kantian', the most consistent of which was Hegel (KC 69-70). Also interesting are Adorno's attempts to discuss Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as an attempt to salvage ontology on a subjectivist basis. Adorno argues that Kant suffers from a 'block', i.e., an inability to accept the idealism Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel found to be an inevitable consequence of critical philosophy. A further benefit of these lectures is that Adorno continuously refers to how central figures in German philosophy — such as Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, in particular — grappled with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. These references bring alive varied and interesting criticisms from a number of quarters without making the lectures appear as a dry, historical reconstruction. Indeed, the lectures are meant to serve as an immanent critique.

Adorno's central thesis is that Kant's philosophical system developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* 'to all intents and appearances [Kant's system] seems to be a coherent totality, held together in a deductive unity, [although

it] is in reality a force field, one that can only be properly understood if you understand the forces that come together in a kind of productive friction and if you are able to bring such a text to life' (KC 27-8). The biggest friction, for Adorno, is Kant's treatment of phenomena and noumena. Here he unsurprisingly follows Hegel: '[for Kant] we assert that all our knowledge ultimately refers to the thing-in-itself, since the appearances that I constitute, that I organize, are ultimately caused by the thing-in-itself. But since the process of cognition and its content are radically separated from this absolutely unknowable things-in-themselves by ... a rupture, in the Platonic sense, the idea of a thing-in-itself adds nothing to my actual knowledge. This means that what I recognize as an object is just that ... it is *not* a thing-in-itself, and always remains something constituted by a subject ... at bottom the subject can only know itself' (KC 129). While this position is highly charged in the literature, Adorno gives a convincing and extended defence. Thus, his lectures on Kant are a particularly exemplary introduction to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* for the beginner and they have much to offer more advanced students of Kant's and the greater German philosophical tradition.

Adorno's *Metaphysics: Concept and Problems* is related to the lectures on Kant insofar as these lectures given in 1965 between May 11th and July 29th were presented to students without a background in metaphysics. The difference is that Adorno attempts to present a new way of thinking about metaphysics as much as he tries to present the received conceptions of what metaphysics is. This book contains eighteen individual class lectures on the following topics: the uncertain subject-matter of metaphysics, the doctrine of the first cause, the history of the concept, universal and particular, genesis and validity, mediation and the happy medium, the doctrine of immutability, form and matter, the problem of mediation, movement and change, the unmoved mover, metaphysics after Auschwitz, the liquidation of the self, metaphysics and materialism, consciousness of negativity, dying today, and metaphysical experience.

Perhaps the greatest surprise about these lectures is its extended discussion of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which comprises more than two-thirds of the lectures. Nowhere else do we see such a lengthy discussion on Aristotle (nor Plato) from Adorno. For this reason, these lectures provide us with new insights into Adorno's tremendous appreciation and study of Aristotle, forcing the editor to provide a glossary of Greek terms to help the reader shift through Adorno's constant references to them. As with the lectures on Kant, this volume also contains a number of helpful endnotes for each chapter nearly fifty pages in length.

For Adorno, 'philosophy owes its existence to metaphysics', a subject which Aristotle holds particular authority in (M 1). In fact, Adorno says rather controversially 'metaphysics began with Aristotle' (M 14). Moreover, '[o]ne could ... write a history of the whole of metaphysics on the basis of Aristotle' (M 97). Those lectures on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are thorough and stimulating and should prove especially useful to the student approaching the subject for the first time. More experienced readers may show less

interest to this large part of the lectures. Unfortunately, some of the individual lectures were not recorded and are presented to us in the broken one- or two-page style of Adorno's own handwritten notes from which he gave the lectures. The editor does an exemplary job through several endnotes of explaining where Adorno might be going in such a lecture and why, something very difficult to make out from what little he worked from.

Perhaps the most important part of the lectures for more advanced readers will be the final few lectures where he remarks that metaphysics has fundamentally changed since Auschwitz because we can now no longer insist on any positive meaning or purpose in being (M 101, 114). The absolute integration of people into one unity is no longer a positive ideal, but equally realisable through genocide (M 108). Adorno's argument is stimulating, controversial, and emotive as much as intellectual, forbidding any brief summary of where he goes better than where he says: 'For I believe that we have nothing except our reason; that we have no option but to measure by our concrete experience; and that within the constellations which now define our experience all the traditional affirmative or positive theses of metaphysics — I think I can put it most simply like this — simply become blasphemies' (M 121). Thus, Adorno claims that metaphysics can no longer be a subject divorced from the empirical world in which we live, in particular to human culture. What he has to argue may not convince every reader, but provides an interesting springboard from which more research should be concentrated. For these reasons, Adorno's *Metaphysics* is best suited for readers either looking for an excellent introduction to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or a new controversial approach to doing metaphysics. If there is a shortcoming, it may be that it may prove a bit too awkward for an introductory textbook in metaphysics.

Each of these new translations of Adorno's lectures should prove highly effective and are strongly recommended for the above reasons. One looks forward to further published lectures in the near future.

Thom Brooks

University of Sheffield

Gary Backhaus and John Murungi, eds.
*Transformations of Urban and Suburban
Landscapes: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Geography, and Architecture.*
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2002.
Pp. x + 270.
US\$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7391-0335-0);
US\$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7391-0336-9).

Transformations of Urban and Suburban Landscapes: Perspectives from Philosophy, Geography, and Architecture collects nine papers selected from those given at the First Annual Philosophy and Geography Conference at Towson University, Maryland, USA. The volume aims to foster inter-disciplinary investigation of 'processes of experience and meaning that inscribe urban and suburban landscapes' (1), especially processes of transformation, or 'change at the systems-level, which results in the reorganization of the whole bringing about newly emergent meanings of the parts' (7). Claiming that the various academic disciplines have become socially segregated and have each developed their own 'specialized language to the point of mummification,' Backhaus and Murungi suggest that 'language must be revived in a way that the disciplines can re-establish a living contact with each other' (4). The editors' ultimate goal, it seems, is to encourage a transformation in the relationship between philosophy and the sciences concerned with space and place. These may be valuable, admirable, and ambitious objectives, but taken as a whole the volume achieves neither the integration of enterprise nor the diversity of perspectives which could have made it truly effective.

Two of the essays explore transformational trends in the built environment. Ruth Connell's 'The Deceptive Environment: The Architecture of Security' examines how security elements in architectural design enter into the use and meaning of public spaces, primarily in terms of a distinction between 'the seen, the unseen, and the disingenuous [or deliberately deceptive] elements of building and spatial design. Noting that architecture can be a powerful tool of social control, Connell contends that 'democratic space is free from deceptive social controls' (70) and asks 'how will a democratic society function in landscapes that may have increasing levels of social control?' (77) These interesting contentions lack argumentative support, however, and the critical questions with which Connell ends her piece are left (as she herself notes) unanswered. Mary Hague and Nancy Siegel's lengthy historical essay 'Municipal Parks in New York City: Olmsted, Riis, and the Transformation of the Urban Landscape, 1858-1897' looks at the contrasting ideological motivations and conceptions of urban life which shaped the development of Central Park and Mulberry Bend Park as 'therapeutic landscapes'. Although there is little philosophical analysis of Olmsted and Riis' ideas, Siegel and Hague's paper nevertheless stands out as an impressive account of how they found expression in two very different transformations of public space in an urban context.

James Hatley introduces us to a case study of a different kind with his quirky account in 'Where the Beaver's Gnaw: Predatory Space in the Urban Landscape' of the time the beavers came to gnaw (but surely not to swallow!) the cherry trees of Washington. Hatley's idea that the urban, suburban and rural can be understood in terms of an 'articulation of a predatory space that is asymmetric' promises to be fruitful, but ultimately his phenomenological musings on our 'uncanny edibility' do little to further illuminate the initial insight, nor to make plausible his contention that we require another ethics wherein might 'the goodness of being edible find its expression in human society' (46). Nevertheless, he is surely right to suggest that 'nothing could be more intimate and natural than to be eaten by an animal in the wild, yet nothing could be more terrifying and seemingly outside the normal scope of human experience (at least in Western culture)' (36).

Shifting gears again, Backhaus and David McCauley investigation of two forms of locomotion — driving and walking. In 'Auto-Mobility and the Route-Scape: A Critical Phenomenology', Backhaus examines the phenomenology of the mutual transformation of life and landscape by the demands of auto-mobility. Backhaus' descriptive interpretations are thought provoking, but he does little to establish the critical element of his account, leaving his contention that the 'positive attributes [of auto-mobility] are outweighed by the negative consequences of the overdependence on auto-mobility and the structuring of lived-space around the parameter of an automobile culture' (119) unsupported by an account of 'overdependence' or when it might occur. McCauley's 'Walking the Urban Environment: Pedestrian Practices and Peripatetic Politics' treats walking as an environmental and political practice and takes a wide ranging and critical look at the connections between walking and place. In addition, he offers us the fascinating information that 'when the social time necessary to produce the means of transport is added to the time spent in transit, the average global travelling speed of modern man is less than that of Paleolithic people' (202). Long live the flâneur!

The more theoretically oriented chapters are, perhaps, the most disappointing, for it is here that the aim of the volume is embodied most weakly and we start to lose site of landscape. Francis Conroy's 'Getting Nowhere Fast: Intrinsic Worth, Utility, and the Sense of Place at the Century's Turn' begins with a potentially interesting distinction between 'homes' and 'settings-in-which-we-are-interchangeable-parts' (81) but quickly degenerates via imprecise generalisations about deontological and utilitarian ethical stances, into an unsupported polemic lamenting the loss of community to the 'utilitarian revolution'. Much of John A. Scott's 'Having a Need to Act' bears little obvious or explicit relation to transformation of urban and suburban landscapes, but takes a long and winding route via Heidegger, Plato, and Aristotle only to assert that 'if architectural principles do not support practically wise people engaging in the reflective discourse they are capable of as citizens with a capacity for living well, then cruelty is licensed once again.' Derek Shanahan's reasonable and well balanced 'Valid Research in Geography and the Image of the Ideal Science' tries to show how the decades-old

wrangle between 'positivist' geography and alternative methodologies can be resolved by clarifying the relationship between Husserlian (and more contemporary) descriptive phenomenology and the scientific project, but there is little of the attention to how these issues might bear upon an understanding of systems-level change in the urban and suburban landscape that one might have expected.

Despite their proximity amongst the pages, there is little 'living contact' here between the 'specialized language' of, say, the phenomenology characteristic of some of the more philosophical chapters and the concerns or approach of the art-historical, political, and architectural contributions. Murungi's own questioning of 'who land is', in 'On the Question of Land: A Philosophical Perspective' is a case in point. His suggestion that 'neither human being nor land is or is not intelligible without the presence of that which is without witness' (21-2), for instance, would seem to exemplify rather than transcend the 'hermetically sealed walls of text' the editors see dividing disciplines from one another. It is perhaps a sad irony that it is the philosophers represented in this volume who seem least able to see beyond the horizons of their own particular landscapes.

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James Conant and Urszula M. Zeglen, eds.

Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism.

New York: Routledge 2002. Pp. ix + 242.

Cdn\$135.00: US\$90.00. ISBN 0-415-25605-4.

This collection concentrates on themes emerging from two major facets of Putnam's recent work. Accordingly the papers are arranged into two parts, each introduced by Zeglen. Papers are followed by Putnam's response, and thus enable the reader to understand how their arguments relate to Putnam's with the benefit of his authorial authority. Although the collection ostensibly concentrates on pragmatism and realism, these are interpreted widely and the papers thereby demonstrate both the depth and scope of Putnam's influence, and of his philosophical interests. While all of the papers are inspired by, elaborate upon and extend themes in Putnam's work, the degree to which they are directly engaged with it varies.

Part I — Pragmatism — begins, fittingly, with Ruth Ana Putnam's 'Taking pragmatism seriously', which Putnam himself commends as 'a beautiful statement of almost all the ideas that I take to be of lasting value and vital importance in the legacy of American pragmatism' (12). In explaining what

it means to take pragmatism seriously, Ruth Putnam emphasises two ideas that permeate most of the other essays included here: that philosophy deals with (or ought to deal with) problems that confront humanity and that these problems are to be confronted at the level of the everyday. Taking pragmatism seriously, then, involves *evasion* of traditional philosophical preoccupations such as scepticism about the external world. It is to take oneself to be actively involved (as agent, not spectator) in a social world and to recognise the social nature of inquiry. Applied to social and political problems, this means that they are understood as moral problems and that moral inquiry is no different methodologically from all other inquiry. Thus, more generally, and this is where the paper speaks most directly to Putnam's work, taking pragmatism seriously involves denying that the fact/value distinction carries any epistemological or metaphysical weight.

Hilary Putnam's 'Pragmatism and non-scientific knowledge' is an exercise in taking pragmatism seriously. Addressing the possibility of objective value claims, he reminds us that scientific inquiry presupposes evaluative judgements such as those of coherence and simplicity. He argues that not only are there no grounds for thinking that judgements of reasonableness can be reduced to the non-normative, no such reduction is available. In order to see how objective ethical claims are possible, we need both to revise our understanding of objectivity and to recognise that perception is a conceptual exercise; that experience 'comes to us screaming with values' (20). Emphasising the Pragmatists' distinction between being valued and being valuable, Putnam emphasises that objective values arise from criticism whose result is the conclusion that some are warranted, others not. Explaining how we determine which evaluations are warranted, Putnam appeals to a Deweyan response: at its best, inquiry 'avoids relations of hierarchy and dependence; it insists upon experimentation where possible and observation and close analysis of observation where experiment is not possible' (21). By appeal to these types of standard, argues Putnam, we can '*tell*' when our judgements of value are unwarranted.

Brandom's paper, 'Pragmatism and pragmatisms' does not engage with Putnam's work on pragmatism, instead taxonomising pragmatism starting from a distinction between narrow pragmatism — 'the classical American triumvirate' (20) of Peirce, James and Dewey — and Kantian initiated broad pragmatism — 'centred on the primacy of the practical' (*ibid.*), the twentieth-century proponents of which include the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, Davidson and Rorty. Asserting that the broader version is 'more important and interesting' (40), Brandom's taxonomy of pragmatism of the discursive takes the (not uncontroversial) semantic/pragmatic distinction as its framework. Within this framework he usefully differentiates methodological, semantic, fundamental and linguistic pragmatisms. The classical pragmatists are, he argues, pragmatists in all of these senses. More controversially, however, he characterises them as 'instrumental' pragmatists for whom what is true is identical with whatever promotes successful satisfaction of desires, and it is this account with which Putnam takes

(forceful) issue in his response, describing this type of account of classical pragmatism as a 'travesty' (65).

Also included in Part I are Warner's paper 'Pragmatics and legal reasoning', which examines the rationality of practical decision making in the context of legal reasoning with the aim of illuminating pragmatic approaches to moral matters; and Rescher's 'Knowledge of the truth in pragmatic perspective', which considers pragmatic conceptions of truth in relation to Putnam's realist-aligned definitions of truth.

Consistent with what Putnam has identified as the multi-faceted nature of realism, Part II is more thematically varied and forms a less coherent whole. Discussion of realism begins with Haldane's attempt in his 'Realism with a metaphysical skull' to demonstrate why Putnamian middle way realism should take heed of the maxim that there can be no (Aristotelian) epistemology without metaphysics. Haldane believes that this metaphysical skeleton is best provided by a return to form and matter. Because formal identity enables an account of how mind can conform to world, a return to hylomorphism would enable Putnam's natural (direct) realist account of perception to give an explicit account of successful perception as something more than an 'affectation of a person's subjectivity' (Putnam, 'Sense, Nonsense and the Senses. An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind'. (Dewey Lectures, *Journal of Philosophy* 91, 454) Continuing the focus on Putnam's natural theory of perception, Szubka's essay examines Strawson's theory of perception as a counterexample to Putnam's claim that a causal theory of perception is incompatible with a natural realist approach.

Taking logics as idealised models of the parts of language that involve logical inferences, Travis' paper 'What laws of logic say' explains how it is possible for logics to be wrong. In so doing, it offers fresh and thought-provoking insights into (later) Wittgensteinian remarks about calculi and language games, emphasising a reading according to which the latter are 'of a piece' (199) with the former. Also included in Part II are papers by Künne and Ebbs on Putnam's account of truth. The former uses formal devices to address the question of whether the notion of truth is epistemically constrained. The latter concerns the connection between truth and trans-theoretical terms, drawing upon Putnam's (and Quine's) work to present a deflationary account of truth that accommodates those terms.

While all the papers make important contributions to debates about Putnam's work and to conversations about specific philosophical issues, aside from Ruth Ana Putnam's contribution and Zeglen's introduction to Part II, they don't make explicit the intersections between Putnam's commitments to realism and to pragmatism. In addition to the quality of the individual papers, this collection's greatest virtue is the way in which it manifests many of the preoccupations of American Philosophy over the past half-century while foreshadowing those of the next.

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**Simon Critchley and
Robert Bernasconi, eds.**

The Cambridge Companion to Levinas.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. xxx + 292.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-66206-0);

US\$23.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-66565-5).

In adding a 'Levinas' volume to its 'Companion' series, Cambridge University Press employs as editors renowned Levinas scholars Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, who in turn bring together in this volume essays by several well-known Levinas experts, some by as yet less known Levinas commentators, and pleasantly surprise us with articles on Levinas by established scholars known for work in other fields. Despite a solid opening 'Introduction' by Critchley (introducing Levinas in the context of twentieth-century French philosophy, then laying out several of Levinas' key terms) most of the articles in this collection — diverse reflections from a healthy variety of perspectives — aim at more seasoned, rather than beginning, readers of Levinas. The volume includes 'A disparate inventory' of significant events in the life of Levinas as compiled by Critchley, and a good, starting bibliography for English language readers. I here offer only a brief glimpse of the articles found in this volume.

In what could be taken as a second 'introductory' essay, 'Levinas and Judaism', Hilary Putnam argues, plausibly, that Levinas' thought be read as the universalisation of Judaism, the translation of Jewish experience into the essence of the human. Only rare hints of what one might have expected from Putnam — an analytic philosopher's take on Levinas — are to be found in this article that instead gives an exposition of several of Levinas' central ideas, then flows into an examination of the relevance of Levinas' 'ethical' version of Judaism for Judaism itself, as for theology and philosophy.

In 'Levinas and the face of the other', Bernhard Waldenfels analyses the crucial Levinasian term 'the face', tracing the development between Levinas' two *magna opera* by contrasting the employment of 'face' in *Totality and Infinity* ('The [phenomenal] speaking face') with *Otherwise than Being* ('the [un-present] fugitive face'). The product of a seasoned Levinas scholar, this article provides meaningful insight into Levinas' radicalising development, but, unfortunately, the brief critical paragraphs lapse into obscurity.

'Levinas's critique of Husserl' by Rudolf Bernet, perhaps this collection's most technical piece, focuses on 'time' in Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas, arguing that there is no way of finally deciding between time as 'the initial horizon that presides over any appearance of alterity' (the way opened up by Husserl) and the view that it is 'the advent of an *alterity* or alteration that allows time to appear' (the position toward which Levinas' work progressively moved).

In her 'Levinas and the Talmud', Catherine Chaliel demonstrates, across an illuminating exposition of Levinas' vision of Talmud, how Levinas' com-

paratively neglected 'religious' writings can only be viewed as integral to the whole of his thought. In reviewing Levinas' talmudic readings on Abraham, Chaliel shows how the notions of space and time opened up therein cross-pollinate with Levinas' philosophical analyses of the same notions, such that neither his Talmudic nor his philosophical writings can be taken as determinative of the other.

In his challenging 'Levinas and language', John Llewelyn unveils Levinas' philosophy of language over against both the structuralist and ontologist theories of language that prevailed during his authorship. In contrast to Heidegger, Levinas' specific sense of what it means to be possessed by language, his analysis of the significance of verbal nouns, and of pronouns, are addressed in turn. Most interesting is the suggestion of a 'structural' parallel (*mutatis mutandis*) between Heidegger's 'ontological difference' (Being-beings) and what Llewelyn terms Levinas' 'dictive difference' (saying-said), and a discussion of the challenges in finding a language in which to speak of language.

Stella Sandford, in her 'Levinas, feminism and the feminine', reviews Levinas' evolving employment of the term 'the feminine' and provides a brief taxonomy of its reception — positive and negative — by feminists. She concludes that Levinas (in particular his use of 'the feminine') cannot be taken to provide resources for feminism.

In 'Sincerity and the end of theodicy' Paul Davies investigates Levinas' relationship to Kantianism, tracing out — across Levinas' equivocal employment of '*kantisme*', and across each thinker's reflections upon theodicy and sincerity — the senses in which the Kantian and Levinasian 'trajectories' both diverge (insofar as for Levinas *ethics* is first philosophy) and converge (insofar as *ethics* is first *philosophy*).

'Language and alterity in the thought of Levinas', by Edith Wyschogrod, reviews diverse Levinasian strategies for bringing the other of philosophy (ethics) into philosophical language. While often illuminating in its details, Wyschogrod here mostly meanders through the themes of the face and alterity, discourse as gift, art and poetic language, the saying and the said, to end with a too brief comment on the trace and prophecy as Levinas' necessarily non-definitive response to this challenge.

In the collection's most interesting piece (due to the relative inattention given to the topic in Levinas scholarship), Gerald L. Bruns examines 'The concepts of art and poetry in Emmanuel Levinas's writings'. Bruns attempts to sort through Levinas' unsystematic comments on art and poetry, illustrates their importance to Levinas' larger project, and argues — across illuminating comparisons to the aesthetic theories of Kant, Mallarmé, Heidegger, Sartre, and especially Blanchot — how 'poetry and the ethical' can be understood 'as analogous forms of transcendence in the special sense that Levinas gives to this term.'

In his 'What is the question to which "substitution" is the answer?' Robert Bernasconi asks whether we are to take Levinas' descriptions of 'Substitution', as found in the article of the same name, as naming 'transcendental'

conditions for empirical events, or as descriptions of such events themselves. By way of a careful comparison of Levinas' two major works, Bernasconi argues that 'substitution' is an answer simultaneously to more than one question, and should be understood as part of a transcendental account that 'remains directed toward the concrete.'

Finally, in 'Evil and the temptation to theodicy', Richard J. Bernstein defends the thesis that 'the primary thrust of Levinas's thought is to be understood as his response to the horror of the evil that has erupted in the twentieth century.' Bernstein lays out the three moments in Levinas' phenomenology of evil — evil as excess, its 'intentionality', the hatred and horror of evil — to show how evil, irreduced, simultaneously demands the refusal of theodicy, yet calls for an excessive, *ethical* response. This article is an inspiring conclusion to a quite worthwhile volume.

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Steven Galt Crowell

Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press 2001. Pp. 323.

US\$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1804-1);

US\$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1805-X).

The central issue of current research into Heidegger's early thought is whether and to what degree Heidegger remained committed to the transcendental philosophy of his teachers Husserl, Lask, and Rickert. Steven Galt Crowell's excellent and provocative study traces the affinities and historical connections between Husserl and Heidegger by exploring their philosophical activity as a common contribution to a phenomenology of the space of meaning.

Crowell's work challenges some common beliefs about Husserl, Heidegger, and the apparent incompatibility of their thought. Instead of emphasizing the difference between the primacy of consciousness and epistemology in Husserl and the priority of the question of being and ontology in Heidegger, Crowell argues that they are both working out the transcendental space of meaning which is presupposed and enacted in all understanding and interpretation. Rather than interpreting Heidegger's thought as a radical departure from Husserl in the name of concrete existence (existentialism), intuitive non-conceptual experience (mysticism), or the singularity and mul-

tiplicity of life (life-philosophy), Crowell argues that such labels distort Heidegger's fundamental aims. We can only understand Heidegger's project if we acknowledge his continued commitment to the project of phenomenology which articulates the transcendental space of meaning. Crowell thus argues that Heidegger's approach transforms rather than destroys Husserl's basic insights about meaning and intentionality. Heidegger did not reject but shifted the meaning of classic doctrines of Husserl such as categorial intuition, the reduction, the transcendental ego, and even Husserl's later idealism. Crowell unfolds this argument through an analysis of the historical context and arguments of Heidegger's early lecture-courses, *Being and Time*, his turn to meta-ontology, and his later thought. This is done from the perspective of Husserlian and Neo-Kantian problems about logic, language, and meaning.

This reevaluation of transcendental phenomenology is developed first by considering the significance of Rickert's Neo-Kantianism, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, and the mediating role played by Emil Lask for the young Heidegger. Crowell correctly emphasizes Lask, an older student of Rickert's, who died on the Western front, as pointing the way for the early Heidegger. For Lask, ontology is not concerned with entities but with validity, and thus with transcendental logic. Such a logic accounts for the material of which it is to be valid through a doctrine of categories. Heidegger took up this idea as a logic of existence, or a formal approach to the concrete, and reinterpreted validity from the perspective of intentionality.

Crowell is right to emphasize the transcendental motivation behind Heidegger's work on logic in his dissertation and habilitation. Nonetheless, some difficulties arise in his discussion of Heidegger's thought towards the end of the First World War. Crowell points out how Heidegger's interest at that time in questions of existence, history, life, and religion has been overemphasized in the literature and has overshadowed his concern with logic, rationality, and validity. Nevertheless, these new questions did motivate a transformation in Heidegger's thought, and in turn influenced his interpretation of the transcendental and formal. As such, given Heidegger's emerging interests in 1917, which are at least presaged by his concern with singularity in the habilitation on Duns Scotus, we should note how Heidegger took up the impulses and questions of existentialism, life-philosophy, and the interpretation of religious experience. Heidegger reinterpreted the transcendental as immanent to life and developed a new logic of philosophizing which he called the formal indication of factual life.

Crowell corrects previous interpretations that emphasized the concreteness of life and existence to the exclusion of the formal. He thereby points us to the primary methodological question of the early Heidegger — the formal indication of facticity. This is Heidegger's transformation of Husserl's notion of categorial intuition. Categorial intuition indicates that the categorial is already immanent in any apprehension of the given and that this implicit significance characterizes experience. Intentionality is thus the immanent structuring/structuredness of lived-experience itself rather than something superimposed upon it, and phenomenology is the self-explication of life. It is

important to see the unity and tension of the formal and concrete that drives Heidegger's questioning forward.

It is appropriate that Crowell develops his argument for the transcendental Heidegger from his earliest philosophy through *Being and Time* to his later thinking. The understanding of the question of being as the question of the meaning and truth of being indicates the legacy of the transcendental in Heidegger's thinking. Crowell's book is clearly argued, and his thesis is well-constructed and supported. This work is to be greatly recommended, especially for its forceful presentation of the transcendental and formal side to Heidegger's thought.

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Maria Dimova-Cookson

*T.H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy.
A Phenomenological Perspective.*

New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2001.

Pp. xiii + 175.

US\$65.00. ISBN 0-333-91445-7.

There has, in recent years, been something of a revival of interest in the moral and political philosophy of the British idealists in general, and of T.H. Green in particular — as is evident in a recent conference on T.H. Green and contemporary philosophy (Oxford University, August 2002) and the forthcoming republication, by Oxford University Press, of Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* with a thorough introduction on Green's moral philosophy by David Brink. Maria Dimova-Cookson's book fits nicely into this revival, to which it makes a significant contribution.

Dimova-Cookson's Green is firmly situated in a phenomenological perspective that neither he nor Green scholars would recognize. Whether or not Green employs a phenomenological approach is not, however, the issue. The issue, rather, is whether applying this approach to Green exposes significant possibilities and insights that otherwise would remain hidden. Dimova-Cookson claims that it does. She holds that the phenomenological approach reveals the originality of Green's moral philosophy which, in turn, sheds new light on his central conceptions of common good, negative and positive freedom, and rights.

Green's philosophical originality lies in his transcendental account of human practice, which he extends to understanding moral practice. Much like in Husserl, a process of personal self-transcendence is central to Green's conception of moral activity. It encapsulates the moral agent's inner transition from the pursuit of ordinary (non-moral) good to the pursuit of the moral good. This involves overcoming the self-centered motivation underpinning human practice.

This is Dimova-Cookson's core argument. Though Green seeks to give a single, unitary and non-contradictory account of moral activity, he unwittingly employs two perspectives in exploring morality. Hence, his single account of morality is circular. He explains the moral ideal, the unconditional good, as that toward which the good will is directed; and he explains the good will as the will for the unconditional good. This circularity, 'the phenomenological circle', reveals the strength and originality of Green's moral philosophy.

This originality reveals itself once we recognize that the two elements of Green's circular definition — the good will and the moral ideal — constitute two different definitions of morality (formal and substantive) which, because answering different problems, cannot and should not be conflated. The formal definition answers the question 'How can I be moral?' to which the answer is by acting from the good will, i.e., disinterestedly. The substantive definition answers the question 'How do I know that what I believe to be good is actually good?' The answer lies with a person's desire to overcome her self-centered vision of her personal good in pursuit of the moral ideal of human perfection.

Dimova-Cookson forcefully criticizes Green's failure to account for the shift of perspectives from which he defines morality. Chiefly, his two definitions of moral activity are contradictory. Neither definition in itself — moral attitude or moral ideal — is sufficient for explaining moral activity. At the same time, however, the substantive definition contradicts the formal definition. For the substantive definition requires an unconditional good that Green views as moral regardless of the nature of one's motivation; but the formal definition of morality requires a certain motivation (acting out of good will). Green's failure lies with his attempt to conflate the two into one coherent definition of morality. He should have understood that unless he recognized the two moral perspectives that he in fact employs, his single definition remains self-contradictory, thereby concealing the real strength of his moral philosophy.

One might disagree here on the ground that though Green's moral good is unconditioned by certain motivation (what we simply like), it is, nevertheless, conditioned by the motivation of good will. If so, much of the contradiction disappears. The problem, then, is not so much self-contradiction as Green's tendency to assess actions only by their consequences (though he is not a consequentialist), since the internal nature of motivation excludes assessment by others. This notwithstanding, Dimova-Cookson is quite right

to claim that Green's definition of morality is circular, though perhaps not contradictory.

Her dual understanding of Green's morality underpins and is essential for, Dimova-Cookson argues, a proper understanding of Green's central moral and political ideas: the common good which completes his moral theory, the idea of freedom and the idea of rights. Her analysis yields new appreciation of these ideas which at times is rather critical of Green.

Dimova-Cookson's criticism is mainly leveled at the idea of the common good, which is central to Green's moral philosophy. Her analysis of freedom is thoroughly original and should attract the attention of anyone interested in the distinction between negative and positive freedom. Central to both her analysis of common good and freedom is her claim that Green 'loses' the idea of ordinary (personal) good in his eagerness to insist on the coincidence of ordinary and moral good.

Acknowledging the differences between ordinary and moral good, and the importance of ordinary good in human practice, should not, contrary to Green, undermine his idea of the common good. Instead, it should help us see that Green defends not one but two senses of the common good. One, expressing moral good, and the more basic of the two, focuses on the principle of personal moral growth that relies on and develops the formal definition of morality as an activity performed in a disinterested way. The second sense, which extends the substantive definition of morality as the state of human perfection, views the common good as a society of equals, and is an ordinary good.

In a similar vein, positive and negative freedom depend, respectively, on the perspectives of moral and ordinary good. Using the shifting perspectives argument, Dimova-Cookson claims that negative freedom is what the agent receives as a result of others acting morally; and positive freedom is gained in the act of helping others, which is the pursuit of moral good. She insists on appreciating the polarity between negative and positive freedom so distinguished, which, she argues, some current scholars too quickly dismiss. In this way, she suggests a new account of the difference between negative and positive freedom.

On the whole, Dimova-Cookson situates her discussion of Green's phenomenological moral theory in the contemporary context of Greenian scholarship, according to which his moral philosophy properly understood is a reconciliation of opposing, one-sided ethical theories. Though she agrees that Green's moral philosophy occupies a synthesizing position, her core argument is that his middle position is not unproblematic. Indeed, she claims that 'a synthesis cannot be achieved' (73).

We may, however, learn much of what is special about Green's moral and political philosophy, with emphasis on his reconstruction of liberalism, if we try to appreciate the point of his synthesizing project. It is, I believe, an attempt to explore, reconceptualize and apply to the moral realm, the moral terrain in which self-developing persons are mutually dependent and cannot fully develop their human potential unless they are members of a society of equals that is constitutive of personal human flourishing.

To pursue such a project would be to recognize that Dimova-Cookson's book is thought provoking and richly deserves the attention not only of Greenian scholars, but of moral philosophers at large.

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Christopher J. Eberle

Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. x + 405.

US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81224-0);

US\$28.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01155-8).

In *Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics*, Christopher J. Eberle considers whether it is morally justifiable for a person to defend controversial laws on the basis of their religious convictions *alone*. He believes that it is justifiable, so long as citizens offer grounds for support. Eberle defines a religious ground as one that has *theistic content* in which support is made with regard to the will of God, a reading of a divinely inspired text, or the dictum of a religious authority (6). His reproach to dogmatism rests on the types of moral standards we expect of a citizen in a liberal democracy to accept, e.g., that 'a citizen won't knowingly support laws that further his interests to the detriment of the "common good"' (7).

Eberle's book is divided into three parts. Part One introduces us to the arguments of justificatory liberalism and renounces the view that religion should play no part in public justification. Part Two covers what Eberle regards as the main principle of justificatory liberalism: respect for persons, whilst part Three demands that we reject the justificatory liberals' view that religion remain private — since, according to Eberle, secularised views fare no better. The main thread of the text is thus to offer a defence of religious conviction by refuting the main claims of justificatory liberalism. Whilst Eberle accepts that each citizen 'ought sincerely and conscientiously to attempt to articulate a plausible, secular rationale for any coercive law she accepts,' he argues that no citizen should be morally criticised for supporting or opposing such a law solely on the basis of her religious convictions. On this point he sets himself in opposition to 'justificatory liberals' such as John Rawls and Thomas Nagel who advocate that religion be kept private (11).

Eberle focuses on two tenets of justificatory liberalism: *the principle of pursuit* which advocates the necessity of public justification for coercive laws, and *the doctrine of restraint* which holds that no coercive law should be supported where public justification is lacking (68). He fully advocates the former but rejects the latter, for he regards the doctrine of restraint as incompatible with religious justification. In rejecting the doctrine from restraint, Eberle attempts to reveal the flaws in several philosophical arguments, including those of Lawrence Solum and John Rawls. It is here that the book takes an unpleasant and peculiar turn. To give one example: Solum argues that respect for citizens requires that our reasons for public justification should be acceptable to those who do not share our religious beliefs (116). Eberle retorts: 'The notion that there are people who *can't* accept the claim that the Bible is the word of God (or that homosexuality is an abomination or that God has a preference for the poor) is, if not simply false, then more than a little mysterious, given that, over roughly the past 1,500 years, large sums of diversely committed people have passed from a state of disbelieving that the Bible is the word of God to believing that it is' (117).

In order to refute any suggestion that religious beliefs can be ignored by justificatory liberals, Eberle turns to Rawls' Original Position. In Rawls' hypothesis, public justification requires the exclusion of self-interest. In order to show how this is possible, individuals are hidden behind a 'veil of ignorance'. Though they are aware of human psychology, they do not know anything else about themselves or the type of society they inhabit. They do not know, for instance, what class, gender, sexuality or religious perspective (if any) they would hold if the veil were removed. Though Rawls' hypothesis is questionable — we all make decisions on the basis of who we are — Eberle argues that in the widest conclusion of the hypothesis 'parties in the original position have to take seriously the possibility that they might turn out to be theists' (148). But such a consideration, if it is to work, would also have to consider contradictory positions: atheists, pantheists, agnostics, Buddhists, and so on. Eberle makes no recourse to these others but instead turns to our view of religion in history, predicting that by now the reader may have started to think that 'because the intrusion of religion into politics has had such baleful consequences in other times and in other places, we ought to quarantine religion from politics in the contemporary United States' (152-3). Eberle believes that religious conflict will not happen in the United States because religious citizens have 'learned from the tragedies of the past' (167). But how can we be sure?

We can be sure, Eberle believes, for 'most of the citizens in the United States are religious; many of those citizens are politically active; and undoubtedly, many of them decide political issues on the basis of their religious convictions' (237). He assumes, without qualification, that any reasonable person would readily accept American politics and culture, which begs the question. Pre-empting disagreement, Eberle uses Martin Luther King as a prime example of a reasonable person who offered public justification on the

basis of his religious convictions. From this he infers that people do not support laws they have good reason to doubt.

Eberle rejects the view that imposing moral values onto others on the basis of one's personal religious experiences or beliefs is inappropriate, so long as these beliefs are founded upon doxastic practice, such as the Bible. It is for this reason that the doctrine of restraint should ultimately be rejected, for 'that doctrine is *gratuitously burdensome* to religious citizens: it requires them to disobey God and thereby imposes on them a substantial burden for which there is no compelling rationale' (332).

Though Eberle offers some legitimate criticism of the liberal positions of Rawls and others, his argument rests on a positivist account of American culture. As this appeal is controversial, Eberle would have been better placed at trying to defend his cultural position, rather than focusing on whether or not the justificatory liberals have got it right with regards to the privatisation of religious belief.

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Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Pp. x + 182.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-521-79308-4.

Living a normal life requires trusting that one's opinions are generally correct, and the faculties and practices that give rise to them generally reliable. Likewise, it's hard to imagine sane-looking living on the part of someone who placed no trust in the opinions and faculties of others. A philosophical account of intellectual trust will go beyond these platitudes and 'say something about what necessitates intellectual trust, how extensive it should be, and what might undermine it' (3-4). Such is the task of Richard Foley's *Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others*.

Those familiar with Foley's next-most-recent book, *Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press 1993), will know that he promotes a certain way of reading post-Cartesian epistemology. Descartes attempted an epistemology in which internally defensible beliefs would be guaranteed to amount to knowledge. Most allow that the Cartesian project is doomed to fail, and that there is no response to the skeptic that is both knock-down and non-question-begging. (In Chapter 1 Foley criticizes some recent attempts to avoid this result.) The moral, however, is not that either of the central notions — crudely, knowledge, and

(egocentrically) rational belief; 'what is required for one to stand in a relation of knowledge to one's environment', and 'what is required for one to put one's own intellectual house in order' (13) — should be abandoned, or even that we must choose between them. While contemporary 'internalists' and 'externalists' tend to treat rational and reliable belief, respectively, as *the* central epistemological notion, we should acknowledge that they correspond to 'different, equally legitimate projects for epistemologists to pursue' (13), and give up the idea that these epistemological goods are bound to converge — that even the most (egocentrically) rational of our beliefs is bound to be true. Hence the necessity of trust, a 'leap of intellectual faith' (18), 'the need for which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry' (20).

Having made a case for its inevitability (Chapter 1), Foley presents the outlines of a positive account of self trust (Chapter 2), which he sees as a contribution to the 'rational belief' side of the aforementioned divide — to 'egocentric epistemology', as he has called it. Foley sees questions concerning intellectual trust as 'first-person questions', matters to be addressed 'from one's own perspective' (27), in terms of an invulnerability to self-criticism. Here, the core idea is that, insofar as one strives to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs, one's current belief that P is rational just in case one would, on reflection, regard believing that P as part of what's involved in one's now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs' (33). Part One of the book concludes with Foley's (Chapter 3) discussion of familiar empirical findings concerning humans' tendency base-rate neglect, overconfidence bias, and so on. In Foley's view, such findings may highlight the need for reflective 'self-monitoring', but they do not undermine — as though they could! — the necessity or reasonability of self trust.

In Part Two, the account is extended to intellectual trust in others, including one's past and future selves. In Chapter 4, Foley defends a form of 'universalism' about the opinions of others: what others tell us is *prima facie* credible, even where we know little or nothing about the source. Foley rejects overly *strong* forms of universalism, according to which testimony is somehow 'necessarily reliable in general' (97) and/or 'necessarily *prima facie* credible' (107) — a view that Foley (though by no means him alone) attributes, erroneously, to Thomas Reid (97-9). The proper brand of universalism is grounded in a consistency argument: I have good reason to think that my beliefs have been deeply influenced by the opinions of others, and that my intellectual faculties and environment are broadly similar to theirs; but then if self trust is ineliminable, so too must be a basic trust in the intellectual authority of others (106ff.); thus, '[t]rust in myself radiates outwards towards others' (106). (*This* is pretty much Reid's view: it is among 'the first principles of contingent truths' that we must grant others' testimony *prima facie* authority.) Because such trust is only presumptive, and can often be overriden, this is a 'modest' form of universalism. But it is no more avoidable, and no less reasonable, than intellectual trust in oneself.

An exactly similar argument warrants trust in one's past (Chapter 5) and future (Chapter 6) selves: one's past opinions have shaped one's current

opinions, which will in turn shape one's future opinions; so, given present self trust, what I have believed and what I will believe ought to have *prima facie* credibility for me too. (For obvious reasons, we are seldom actually confronted with what we will believe, where this is interestingly different from what we believe now.)

Though most contemporary epistemologists regard the enterprise as a dead-end, current theorizing about knowledge and rational belief does continue to be shaped by our Cartesian heritage. Foley's book is an admirable and important treatment of a topic that, as a result, has gotten far less attention than it deserves. At certain points, however, Foley's own discussion may betray a residual adherence to Cartesian assumptions. For instance, if we've rejected classical foundationalism and ceased to seek 'ironclad assurances' that our beliefs are on the whole reliable (17), why speak of intellectual trust as a 'leap of faith'? Why should a lack of *demonstrative* assurances of our own reliability make the assumption thereof less than perfectly rational? Likewise, it may be misleading on Foley's part to speak of self-trust as 'radiating outwards' (106, 168), suggesting as it does that there is some interesting sense (either ontogenetic or epistemic) in which self trust is prior to trust in others. From a purely egocentric perspective, self trust might *seem* to have a certain sort of priority, but the consistency argument itself suggests that there is a genuine parity here: I could not have been so significantly shaped by the opinions of others without trusting them; and unless such trust were warranted, how could *self* trust come to be such?

Another important question concerns the general internalistic tack Foley takes in his treatment of intellectual trust. For example, some externalists balk at the suggestion that there are multiple 'senses' of 'justified' or 'rational belief', none of which is more fundamental than the others (10-13). (See, e.g., Fred Dretske, [1991] 'Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational vs. Reliable Belief', in *Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays* [Cambridge University Press 2000], 80-93.) Further, while it is a common complaint against externalist theories that they fail to offer 'useful advice' (22), Foley is explicit in saying that we should give up on the idea that epistemologists 'have a privileged role to play in handing out intellectual advice' (22) — of providing *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*; and while Foley sees his account of rational belief as importantly internalistic (39), he allows that, from a first person perspective, there's no special reason to think that one will be able to tell whether a given belief can/could withstand one's own critical scrutiny — hence, whether that belief is rational (39-40, note 8). Together, these points might make one wonder whether intellectual trust does require a specifically internalistic handling, or whether one couldn't profitably explore the subject from an externalistic perspective (in terms of the legitimacy of certain default inference rules, say: see, e.g., Kent Bach, 'A Rationale for Reliabilism', *Monist* 68: 246-63).

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Allan Franklin

Selectivity and Discord:

Two Problems of Experiment.

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

2002. Pp. 290.

US\$37.50. ISBN 0-8229-4191-0.

'*Observation, reason, and experiment* make up what we call the *scientific method*.' Before the early 1960s, statements like this of the physicist Richard Feynman were taken by many without hesitation to express the rationality of science. While this view no longer seems to be as prevalent, the physicist and philosopher of science Allan Franklin defends it in *Selectivity and Discord: Two Problems of Experiment (SDTPE)*. Accessible to anyone with a college-level education in physics, this lucid and persuasive book collects Franklin's previously published investigations on the epistemology of experiment and is a 'must read' for either students or professionals with an interest in the history and philosophy of science.

Sociologists of science claim that decisions between conflicting results are made by the community of scientists and are thus inherently social and dependent on historical context. In the *Introduction* Franklin presents and critically responds to the views of Galison, Staley, Collins, Pickering, Ackerman, and Hacking. Franklin believes that if external factors such as career advancement, prestige and economic gain are crucial in the acceptance of scientific beliefs, then science has no claim to knowledge. He argues that the social constructivists' explanations are incompatible with the history of science, and (in Parts I and II) presents his own vision of several episodes in modern high-energy physics where the discordant or conflicting results were settled by methodological and epistemological arguments instead of social factors.

The first part of the book discusses the problem of selectivity, or possible experimenter bias in the production or analysis of data. The second part examines the problem of the resolution of discordant results in science, often associated with such bias.

In the first five chapters (Part I) of *SDTPE*, Franklin presents detailed case studies of five historical experiments that involved arguments regarding the reality of an observed effect. Experimenters never use all their data in producing a result. Selection criteria, or 'cuts', applied to either the data or the analysis procedures are unavoidable in a real experiment in which one wants to maximize the desired signal and to eliminate or minimize background that might mask or mimic the desired effect. That scientists choose only selected portions of data ('good' data) to support their theories raises a legitimate concern that the experimental result may be an artifact produced by the cuts. The question how one *argues* that an observed effect is not an artifact acquires crucial importance. In the *Introduction* Franklin outlines his epistemology of experiment conceived of as a set of strategies that

scientists can — and do — legitimately use to provide grounds for *reasonable* belief in experimental result.

The first example (Chapter 1) illustrates an experiment designed to measure the K^+_{e2} branching ratio to test the then-generally accepted V-A theory of weak interactions. Cuts were applied to experimental data to reduce preferentially background due to more common decay modes while preserving a large, and known, fraction of the K^+_{e2} events. The strategy used to argue for the validity of the result was to vary the values of the cuts being used. If the result remains constant under such variations then it can be argued that the outcome is not an artifact of the cuts. In this episode both the range cut and the track-matching criterion were varied over reasonable intervals and the ratio found was shown to be robust under those variations.

Chapter 2 discusses the early search for gravity waves in which Joseph Weber claimed to have observed the effect, whereas six other experiments did not find anything. Here the selection criteria were applied to the analysis procedures used to transform data into an experimental result. In this episode, there were no arguments as to what constituted good data. The question was whether the data were being analyzed correctly with the suggestion that Weber chose a particular nonlinear algorithm with varying thresholds to create evidence for his positive signal. Franklin discusses how these issues were decided and the discord resolved.

Chapter 3 presents Millikan's famous measurement of e , the charge of electron. Examination of his laboratory notebooks reveals that he was selective both in his choice of data and in his analysis procedures to obtain the result he had expected from his earlier work. Unlike the two previous episodes, in which the cuts were publicly accessible, Millikan's questionable selection criteria were kept private. Franklin demonstrates that the effects of Millikan's selectivity were small and did not affect significantly the final value of e . The correctness of the result was checked subsequently by the numerous independent measurements.

The episodes with the asserted existence of a heavy, 17-keV neutrino (Chapter 4) and low-mass electron-positron states (Chapter 5) are more intricate because results on both sides were reported by several groups and included those that could be replicated only some of the time with experiments performed under seemingly identical conditions giving different results. Franklin shows how the both phenomena were agreed to be artifacts by methodologically convincing arguments.

A more technical final chapter of Part I discusses blind analysis, a modern technique designed to safeguard against possible experimenter bias, and contains a discussion of Monte Carlo simulations as a legitimate tool of calculative analysis.

Part II deals with the resolution of discordant results. As seen in Part I, experimental results often disagree. If we believe that the correctness of an experimental result in science is established by epistemological and methodological criteria, how can there be discordant results and on which grounds are they resolved? Franklin argues, contra social constructivists, that the

appearance of discordant results is eventually due to some strategies applied incorrectly, and the resolution of a discord proceeds by identifying which of them have been applied incorrectly by means of reasoned argument, based on epistemological and methodological criteria. He examines four episodes from a recent history of physics: the suggestion of a Fifth Force, a modification of Newton's law of gravitation; early experiments on the absorption of β particles; experiments on neutrino oscillations; and experiments on atomic parity violations and the scattering of polarized electrons, and their relation to the Weinberg-Salam unified theory of electroweak interactions.

One may object that case studies cannot demonstrate that scientists generally use epistemological and methodological criteria to resolve discordant experimental results. At best, they only show that these particular episodes were indeed so resolved. However, Franklin believes that these episodes do provide a reasonable picture of the practice of modern physics. He notes that social constructivists also provide case studies to support their views of science. Interestingly, two of the episodes in the book — the early search for gravity radiation and the atomic-parity violation experiments — have been used by constructivists to cast doubt on the rational status of science. Undoubtedly, the counterweight which Franklin poses against social constructivist view of science is an important contribution to the on-going debate on the status of scientific knowledge, and both those who agree and those who disagree with his conclusions will benefit from reading it.

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John Haldane, ed.

*Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the
Thomistic and Analytical Traditions.*

Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press 2002. Pp. xi + 225.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-268-03467-2.

The importance of Thomism within analytic philosophy has risen and fallen with changes in philosophical fashion. Anyone familiar with the work of Geach, Anscombe, or Kenny will be aware of how well a certain kind of Thomism fit with the Wittgensteinian currents of the fifties and sixties. In the succeeding decades, as various kinds of naturalism came to the fore, Thomism suffered eclipse. It remained important in philosophy of religion, of course, and historical scholarship proceeded apace, but philosophers doing

creative work in metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory could (and did) ignore it. More recently there have been signs of a rapprochement. A turning point came in 1994 with the publication of *Mind and World* by John McDowell and of Hilary Putnam's Dewey lectures, 'Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses'. Both works made spirited attacks on representationalism in epistemology and on the naturalistic approaches to metaphysics and philosophy of mind that have been its bedfellows. Most importantly, from a Thomistic standpoint, they called for a return to something like the direct realism of the Aristotelian tradition. One must say 'something like', for although each author drew upon Aristotle in various ways, neither was willing to go the full distance of endorsing the ontology of matter and form or its corollary, the Aristotelian view of the soul. McDowell ignored such issues altogether, and Putnam's strictures against 'traditional realism' were presumably aimed at, among others, Aristotle and Aquinas.

That left the door open for an enterprising Thomist to argue that although McDowell and Putnam had achieved an important breakthrough, they had not gone far enough. The author who has done the most to advance this message is the editor of the present volume, John Haldane. He has argued in a number of articles that direct realism requires an ontology robust enough to explain how mind and world can achieve the kind of isomorphism necessary for knowledge to take place without an intermediary representation. Barring idealism, the most obvious candidate is the Aristotelian ontology of matter and form. Such a line of thought raises many questions: what precisely it means to accept form as an element within one's ontology, for instance, and what (if any) are the theological implications of such a view. Haldane has not been shy about addressing such issues, but it would be good to see others engaging his views and making their own contributions.

That will explain why I came to the present volume with high expectations. It seems to me that the time is ripe for Thomists not just to nibble at one or another specialized topic in philosophy, but to engage the central issue that, more than any other, must determine the course of philosophy as a whole: that of the relationship between mind and world, along with what it implies about the constitution of the world and of ourselves as knowers. Judged by that standard, the volume is a disappointment. A number of contributors (Haldane, Fergus Kerr, David Braine, Jonathan Jacobs) deal with the issues I have mentioned, but they do not carry matters significantly beyond Haldane's existing work. I found the most interesting essay in this group to be Kerr's 'Aquinas after Wittgenstein'. It draws a parallel between Wittgenstein's argument that 'there is no real problem about how one passes from the private to the public world' and Aquinas' rejection of the Augustinian privileging of self-knowledge over knowledge of external objects. The essay is marred by a failure to appreciate the indebtedness of both Augustine and Aquinas to Aristotle's thesis of the identity of mind with its object. Kerr's interpretation of Aquinas' account of Christ's acquired knowledge (which Kerr sees as a potential threat to his Wittgensteinian reading of Aquinas) is also unsatisfactory, insofar as it makes what Aquinas says

distinctively about Christ apply to human knowledge generally. Nonetheless, the essay broaches new ground, and it is one of the few in the volume to relate Aquinas to analytic philosophy in a systematic and far-ranging way.

The other essays generally either clarify Aquinas' thought using analytic techniques or argue that Aquinas provides a promising approach to an issue of particular interest. There are discussions of Aquinas and the mind-body problem (Richard Cross), of voluntary action and agent causation (C.F.J. Martin, Stefaan Cuypers), of individuation, modality, and essentialism (David Oderberg, Gerard Hughes, Gyula Klima), of divine foreknowledge (Christopher Hughes), and of natural law (M.W.F. Stone). Which of these one finds most engaging will naturally depend on one's prior interests. My favorite was the essay by Stone on natural law. It argues that Aquinas' official position is antinaturalist because it holds that our natural needs and tendencies do not in themselves establish moral ends, but must be judged by practical reason. The fly in the ointment is Aquinas' sexual ethics, which does treat a natural end (propagating the species) as *ipso facto* moral. Stone infers that the distinction between naturalism and antinaturalism is unhelpful in reading Aquinas, since Aquinas, like the medievals generally, held a teleological view of nature. I find this last move puzzling; it seems to me that, on Stone's showing, one ought rather to conclude that Aquinas was inconsistent. (The fact that the medievals did not think in terms of naturalism vs. antinaturalism surely does not mean that we cannot.) Be that as it may, the essay addresses an important issue and certainly deserves attention from experts in the field.

Other essays in the volume also make contributions to their own specialized areas. On the whole, however, I cannot help feeling that the book is less than the sum of its parts. One comes away from it without a sense that Thomism is anything more than a box in which to rummage for useful ideas. There is a more ambitious work waiting to be written that will call for a thoroughly Thomistic reformation of analytic philosophy.

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Ted Honderich

After the Terror.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2002.

Pp. vii + 160.

US\$22.50. ISBN 0-7486-1667-5.

Ted Honderich's *After the Terror* constitutes a philosopher's attempt to analyze the ethics of the spectacular attacks on the New York World Trade Center that took place on September 11, 2001. In a brisk style reminiscent of Hume's *Enquiry*, Honderich examines September 11 from the context of 'good lives' and 'bad lives'. For Honderich, good lives are characterized by longevity and five other great goods. These have to do 'with freedom and power of various kinds, to which can be added safety. There is also respect and self-respect, and private and public relationships with others, and the satisfactions of culture including religion and diversion' (5). Bad lives, on the contrary, show major deficits in each of these goods. The pressing ethical task prompted by September 11, according to Honderich, is to improve the quality of bad lives starkly demonstrated by the comparative per capita incomes of the West (\$24,000) and African nations such as Mozambique and Malawi (\$200). Honderich's well-meaning concerns here are somewhat mitigated by the fact that despite economic disparities, human agencies *in loco* are constantly seeking creative solutions.

Honderich's task in general is to mount an 'inquiry into terrorism and ourselves,' and he points out immediately that it may not be economic privation that prompted the attacks since their agents hailed from a set of countries whose average income approximates \$4,000 (5). But regardless of relative economic privation or any other cause, Honderich argues that the terrorist acts of September 11 cannot be supported by any moral argument whatsoever. For Honderich, the acts themselves achieved no positive end and, more importantly, flouted what may be taken as an a priori principle of human existence, the principle of the natural morality of humanity. As he puts it: 'One true reason why the killers of September 11 rightly have our revulsion is that they violated the natural fact and practice of morality' (117). This is the basis of Honderich's theory of ethics, an ethics that rejects the alternative theories of libertarianism and liberalism. In this connection, terrorism is a flat concept applying equally in qualitative terms not only to individual groups but also to states.

What follows from this assumption is that although the violent acts of September 11 cannot be justified, a moral responsibility must be borne by those whose omissions are causally linked to the existence and persistence of bad lives in the world. It is the positive obligation of those who lead good lives, acting on the unavoidable principle of humanity, 'to change the world of bad lives, and not just to make more terrorism against us less likely. The first is our greatest obligation, but it is fortunate that the two go together' (147). But according to Honderich the good lives are nourished by capitalism

and as a result are 'ignorant, stupid, selfish, managed and deceived for gain, self-deceived and deadly' (147).

The solution is to appeal to our moral intelligences and thereby embrace the principle of humanity. This principle of humanity is what leads to the reciprocal recognition of the universal human desire for the six great goods (153). A less than a full embrace of the principle of humanity finds expression in charity, and Honderich writes, that 'charity is a refuge from obligation, something like Sartre's bad faith' (152). We are also told that the recipients of the acts of specious obligation can see 'what we have done to them, and what we are doing to them. So our question of what to do, and also their question of what to do — neither of these will ever go away' (153).

The central issue posed by *After the Terror* is how to reconcile two important theories of contemporary ethics, those of the principle of humanity according to which all human agents are intrinsically of equal moral worth hence equally worthy of being regarded as ends in themselves and not means to other ends; and that constructed on the principle of utility. In this regard, Honderich would most likely agree that serious questions must be raised about the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the creation of bad lives.

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Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno

Dialectic of Enlightenment.

Translated by Edmund Jephcott.

Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2002.

Pp. xix + 282.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8407-3632-4);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8407-3633-2).

In 2002, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (famed classic of the first generation Frankfurt School) appeared in a new translation undertaken by the respected translator of *Minima Moralia*, Edmund Jephcott. There has been a cry for a new translation since John Cummings' translation appeared in 1969. Many argued that this translation hindered the reception of the book in the English-speaking world. Of course, most realize that any work having a connection to Adorno is notorious for its dense, cryptic style, and it's a wonder that translators would have the courage to undertake such a project.

Still I must concede that I find the new translation infinitely more readable. It flows more, and Jephcott seems to have put more attention into a 'wholistic' reading of the book. I no longer need to reorder subordinate clauses or follow the relation between nouns and antecedents with criss-crossing arrows across pages (okay, less often). Of course, it is never an easy task and some things are more to one's liking than others. I find the work translated quite literally, but am impressed by the addition of footnotes that explain historical references that wouldn't be common knowledge to the average reader in 2003. One of the greatest strengths of the translation is its distinguishing between the words 'peculiar' and 'particular', which is essential to an understanding of Adorno's later work. 'Peculiar' refers to non-identity, the period before identity, whereas 'particular' refers as it should to being an example of a universal, or part of identity. With this distinction, the important idiosyncratic nature of the peculiar has been maintained, and thus its antagonizing opposition to that drive of identity to encompass everything as same. On the downside I prefer to see the relationship to nature described in terms of domination rather than power; domination better represents the exploitation and control of nature.

Another great plus to this translation is its appearance as part of the 'Cultural Memory in the Present' series from Stanford University Press, with an excellent essay by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr entitled 'Editor's Afterward: The Position of "Dialectic of Enlightenment" in the Development of Critical Theory'. The first of three subsections of the afterward discusses the book's joint authorship, insofar as chapters can or should be attributed to one or the other. The second addresses the genesis of the work and its theoretical implications. This discussion is from the point of view of Horkheimer's development as the editor argues that *Dialectic* fits seamlessly into Adorno's *œuvre*. The afterward examines the move from an immanent critique of different disciplines to a critique of instrumental rationality, the emphasis of the Freudian drives, and the recuperation of Marx within the book as the domination of nature, where class society is one historical but still important and developing manifestation of that. The last section looks at theoretical revisions between different versions of the text and the authors' misgivings on re-editions. It starts with a classification of the types of changes between the '44 and '47 editions, which centered around putting the text in a broader historical and theoretical context in the postwar period, and making language more precise or less loaded, especially vis-à-vis Marxism (these issues are interrelated). A comparison of the texts has been undertaken by Willem van Reijin and Jan Bransen, is marked by footnotes in this new translation, and is addressed in a final essay. Lastly, the section discusses the issues around the re-release of *Dialectic*, the first time to a vast audience, in 1969.

Further to the benefits of having the changes in the '44 and '47 editions marked in footnotes, van Reijin and Bransen have analyzed them in an essay called 'The Disappearance of Class History in "Dialectic of Enlightenment"'. The authors argue that the changes represent a debate going on between the members of the Institute over whether to see fascism as marking a new world

order with respect to capitalism or being a continuation of it. For them, Horkheimer and Adorno follow the former course and see the emerging importance of politics in relation to economy.

Now that I have argued for the readability of this new translation, I want to argue for the 'actuality' of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* — why it is worth reading. For one, Adorno's name is around a lot lately in its connection with the rising star of his friend and fringe member of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin, whose influence is especially attested to in literary studies today. Moreover, there is new interest in Adorno himself of late, and *Dialectic* is important in that the basics of his thought are discernible and accessible in this early work of partnership with Horkheimer. Further, 2003 marks the hundredth anniversary of Adorno's birth, and invites a return to his work.

But more than this historical interest in Adorno's work, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* should be read or reread because it *is* actual — both philosophically and politically. It offers an alternative to the seemingly politically correct course of the inversion of power. Indeed, it allows a middle way that engages a critique of and on both fronts, a midpoint between the apparent oppositions of fundamentalism and unrepentant liberalism. In today's academic environment it allows a way of remaining material and within the realms of traditional philosophy as well as being open to highly exciting and reinvigorating post-modernist/post-structuralist 'innovations' since the 1960s. And it addresses issues that are contemporary: social oppressions, language, theories of subjectivity and philosophical approaches to history, without falling victim to the pluralism or reductionism of Derrida or Foucault. Horkheimer and Adorno retain textual rigour while at the same time being contemporary and politically engaged. The utopian moment remains central to Adorno's work. Such an approach is important in a world that, like theirs, again seems to be separating into both economic and political power blocks, which at the brink of war needs to ask itself to what extent its political enemies are economic scapegoats.

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Benjamin Kilborne

Disappearing Persons: Shame and Appearance.

Albany: State University of New York Press

2002. Pp. xii + 192.

US\$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-5199-2);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-5200-X).

Shame is a difficult emotion to define or truly understand — so difficult, in fact, that any rigorous attempt to explain or define shame will necessarily draw from psychology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, sociology, and, perhaps most importantly, literature. In *Disappearing Persons*, Kilborne takes on this definitional task by making use of examples from literature (in particular, Greek and postmodern tragedies) to illustrate the psychodynamics of shame. He also uses psychoanalytic vignettes and models to entice the reader into new ways of thinking about the role of shame in literature.

Kilborne's mosaic of literary and psychoanalytic presentations of shame dynamics begins with the familiar climax of Sophocles' tragedy *Oedipus Rex*, in which Oedipus, upon being confronted by the suicide of his wife-and-mother Jocasta, blinds himself with the spikes from the broaches of her robe. Kilborne suggests that Oedipus blinds himself because 'he cannot tolerate seeing others looking at him in scorn and derision' (3), i.e., that even his own annihilatory self-criticism is dependent upon his perception of how others see him. In a sense, Oedipus idealizes society's view of him, and cannot participate in that viewing once his own profound failure — to be whom he saw himself to be — is revealed. This theme of sublime visual discourse runs throughout Kilborne's work, and is presented in the context of a variety of literary works (in particular, those of postmodernist tragedian Luigi Pirandello).

Not only is our sense of shame dependent upon our ability to watch (or imagine) others watching us, but our very identity is constructed from this dynamic. Our sense of presence, for example, is at least partially connected to our physique, but we necessarily understand our physique in relative terms. Kilborne invites the reader reconsider the psychic impact of changes in physical size that are playfully presented in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* and in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*. Alice, for example, struggles desperately to 'find' herself after she shrinks and then grows, and then discovers that her sense of who she is, is a psychic phenomenon constructed by reference to external comparisons. As she suffers under the blistering attack of the Caterpillar's simple query, 'What are you?', Carroll demonstrates the critical identity-prescribing role of the onlooker. Shame enters the story as an emotion that hovers between a fear of vanishing and a terror of being thoroughly seen and understood, and is informed (if not created *de novo*) from real or imagined discourse with the idealized onlooker.

Appearance anxiety is not the only facet of shame that reveals the tentativeness of our self-image. *Disappearing Persons* addresses, in separate chapters, the shame of feeling excluded (shedding new light on Aristotle's

understanding of man as a social animal), fantasies of invisibility (and related expressions of performance anxieties), narcissistic vulnerability (with generous references to the myth of Narcissus and the story of Lady Godiva), the debilitating excesses of shame, and the dysfunctional responses to shame (such as raging or lying). The unconscious effects of unacknowledged shame and bypassed shame, including spirals of shame, violence, and other threats to social bonds, are also addressed. Along the way, Kilborne considers whether the idea of shame has shifted from an honor-related dynamic associated with Greek mythologies and values, to an identity-related game that we play amidst the deconstructed rubble of a hero-less postmodern society.

Kilborne explains how shame is connected to painful identity confusion. *Disappearing Persons* leads the reader to ask whether we can construct a self that we can truly esteem, perhaps by purchasing and employing the appearance-changing wares of Western society (cosmetics, hair styling, enhanced vocabulary, rhetorical skills, stylish clothing, culturally correct political views, etc.). Kilborne suggests that the opposite result occurs: we actually disappear when we attempt to gain the approval of others. He explains that 'behind the desire and addictive need for applause, acclaim, fame and recognition lies the unconscious fear, which amounts to conviction, that one has lost all hope of ever finding viable sustenance from the outside' (56). Our efforts to build our self-esteem on the praise of others reinforces our confidence that they can never see in. What cannot be seen, has disappeared.

Disappearing Persons takes into account, but does not necessarily build upon, the rich intellectual histories of analytic philosophy, metaphysics, and Continental philosophy. Similarly, this work is not an extension of the guilt-versus-shame debate, or any of the other threads of shame-related empirical research familiar to social scientists. And the inclusion of Freudish descriptions of clinical sessions (Kilborne narrates segments of therapy sessions involving a 'Sam' and a 'Susan' and several other patients) may not appeal to some readers. But this work is nevertheless a careful, complete, and coherent articulation of the bond between shame and identity, and a compelling argument that shame cannot be sequestered from its social components.

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*Wittgenstein's Investigations 1-133:
A Guide and Interpretation.*

New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. x + 214.

Cdn\$128.00: US\$85.00. ISBN 0-415-23245-7.

Not many philosophers will look at a book with the words 'a guide' in the title and think it is for them. As the title makes clear, this work deals with only a portion of the *Philosophical Investigations* (roughly a fifth), and many a philosopher will be inclined to think, If I can't manage fifty pages of Wittgenstein without guidance then there is just no hope — and down the book will go. But this book soon shows just how easy it is to read the *Investigations* dimly, just how much the *trained* philosopher needs a guide.

Wittgenstein published the *Investigations* because he had tired, he said, of hearing ideas he had expressed in lectures 'misunderstood [and] more or less mangled or watered down.' He was surely sharp enough to guess that putting those ideas on paper would not altogether spare them that fate. The problem facing the *Investigations* is that it is a primer conceived to rid its readers of ingrained habits of thinking — habits *instantly* applied in reading the text itself. Lugg wholly persuades me that the *Investigations* is a kind of graduated training in a new way to think about philosophical problems. But any work that sets forth 'a new way of doing philosophy' (207) will itself be read, pretty much by default, in the old way. That makes a guide — a reading that acts as a brake on the impulse to get the old wheels turning, precisely as you are being shown something new — truly invaluable. Lugg's is the only book on the *Investigations* I know of that gives this problem its due — that sees it as posing a genuine challenge to understanding Wittgenstein's work. Hardly a page goes by on which you do not see the pitfall that awaited you but for the caution Lugg provided.

No other book on the *Investigations* that I have seen helps the reader both escape these traps and read the work as the primer it is. Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker's *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (1980) washes away the pedagogical effect in a flood of information; it is not a reading but an encyclopedia (where you can trace the lineage of ideas, etc.) and it is not conceived around the problem of misreading. Nor is Marie McGinn's *Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations* (1997). This opens with the statement that Wittgenstein's work 'is concerned with two principal topics: the philosophy of language and philosophical psychology.' After reading Lugg's work, a statement like that seems not just stubborn but truly unsympathetic to the text; moreover, McGinn's work deals with §§1-133 in less than forty pages. The only actual 'guide' to the work — Brendan Wilson's *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Guide* (1998) — seems profoundly misdescribed. Instead of proceeding through the *Investigations* — taking the hint, dropped in Wittgenstein's Preface, that it mattered a great deal to him that his thoughts 'proceed from one subject to another in a natural order' — Wilson opens with a chapter titled 'A Private

Language' (something first mentioned by Wittgenstein almost 100 pages into the *Investigations*). And then Wilson has to extricate himself from troubles like this: 'I have been making free with the phrase "the Use theory of meaning," and anyone who has read the *Philosophical Investigations* will, very properly, object to the term "theory"'. Lugg never has to do this sort of backpeddling.

Lugg's book is therefore unique. It accords significance to the structure Wittgenstein established; it guards against 'falling back on the easy option of summarizing what [Wittgenstein] is saying instead of working out the details'; it strenuously resists the impulse to 'overinterpret and overstructure' the text; and it develops a careful, cumulative reading of these sections that can count harmony with the text in its favour. The latter alone is no small achievement. Any author who aims at an actual 'guide' is essentially forced to do what common readings of isolated passages never do: match the ongoing interpretation against every page of the original. Since each of the 133 sections is discussed, a reading that did not truly serve consistency would soon find itself snagged by or trampling Wittgenstein's text. In a book that interprets every discussion, skipping over almost nothing, there is really no alternative but to find a sense to Wittgenstein's words that is divisible all the way through (which may explain why we see so few 'guides' in philosophy). Lugg has done that rather well. One sees why Harvard's Burton Dreben called this 'a genuinely important book ... there is nothing I know of ... which goes into such sophisticated detail ... in getting Wittgenstein right.'

One may wonder if, since Lugg deals with only fifty pages of Wittgenstein, the claim of thorough compatibility ought to be pressed. But a consistent reading of the 133 sections with which Wittgenstein opens his work seems to present trouble enough. As Lugg writes, 'Wittgenstein's remarks are exceptionally compressed, and it is easy to misconstrue what he is saying if one allows oneself the liberty of skipping from section to section and disregards how they are arranged' (vii-viii). The *Investigations* often seems to jump, to leave questions hanging, to shift arguments. One often has the impression that Wittgenstein 'is going back on what he said earlier' (155). One can very easily think the word 'Investigations' refers to a kind of experimental philosophy, a series of groping false starts. But that impression is dispelled by Lugg.

The challenges to understanding are dealt with in a variety of ways: by signalling alluring misreadings that only foul us up (as when it seems Wittgenstein says a rule is *just* an interpretation, 146, or that a sharp boundary *cannot* be drawn around concepts, 134); by grouping the sections into meaningful units; by itemizing and differentiating Wittgenstein's points; by revealing the connections between discussions that on the surface seem unrelated (e.g., descriptions, language, and shapes), showing how Wittgenstein's claims are reiterated (the issues of superstition, 'spirits'); by pointing out where the text is actually ambiguous; by explaining Wittgenstein's strategy in taking an unexpected turn; by furnishing examples not given by Wittgenstein (illustrating claims he leaves abstract, naming philosophers

who hold the ideas he challenges); and by 'reattaching' some of Wittgenstein's cryptic and apparently dangling asides.

Dissatisfaction crept in occasionally. Some assertions seemed to require more support. 'Wittgenstein is not extolling ordinary language' (141) — maybe, but I want to see why. There were also some occasions when I found myself trudging through the detail of Wittgenstein's response to a preposterous-sounding proposal (e.g., that real names 'name things that cannot be broken up', 81). In many of these cases (but not all), I gradually came to see what kind of logic might lead you to such a thought, but by that time I had missed much of Wittgenstein's reply. That may be one drawback of the sequential form of a guide, which discourages leaping forward to the clearest expression of a problem — but a bit more stage-setting might have helped.

Another odd drawback is the requirement to stick to Wittgenstein's text. That is patently the object of an *interpretation*, yet it struck me as a problem in the discussion of simples. In §46 Wittgenstein cites Socrates, who explains the *simple* as what is named and not described, exists in its own right, etc. Wittgenstein responds in §47 by asking, 'what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?' — which struck me as a different sense of 'simple' altogether. 'What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?', he asks, or a tree, chessboard, or colour? But Socrates was not thinking of chairs or chessboards, and the sense grows that Wittgenstein has selected an easier target. One wanted Lugg to respond to this — to formulate Wittgenstein's response to a more 'metaphysical' target and dispel the sense of question-begging; I found myself wanting not just interpretation but more *extensions* of Wittgenstein's thinking than Lugg provided.

Yet I have to qualify even that quibble. Since Lugg has framed his own book as a kind of training in a manner of thinking, at a certain point one does have an inkling of one's own as to how one might backtrack to deal with the Socrates episode. ('I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking,' writes Wittgenstein in his Preface.)

This is a valuable book. Anyone who believes they have an understanding of Wittgenstein's late philosophy will find they can put that to the test rather easily with this fairly slim volume.

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Andrew Newman

The Correspondence Theory of Truth:

An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. xii + 251.

US\$60.00. ISBN 0-521-81139-2.

Newman defends a version of the correspondence theory of truth based in part upon the views of Bertrand Russell and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein. Since Newman thinks that any adequate theory of truth must explain the nature of truth bearers and truth makers, he spends significantly more time discussing the metaphysics of propositions, facts and predication than most other truth theorists. As a result, Newman is able to provide his readers with a much clearer idea of what he means by 'true propositions correspond to reality' than is usually found in the literature.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth is a welcome addition to the literature on truth because there has not been a sustained defense of the correspondence theory for quite some time. The central issue in the contemporary debate about truth is the contest between the correspondence theory and its deflationary rivals. Yet most of these contemporary discussions either defend or criticize deflationary theories without much attention being given to the correspondence theory itself. Newman's detailed defense of the correspondence theory and his emphasis on how the metaphysics of facts and propositions bear on the nature of truth is a refreshing change.

According to Newman's version of the correspondence theory, a sentence (or proposition or belief) will be true just when the particular(s) referred to by the sentence (or proposition or belief) actually instantiate the universal referred to by the predicate in the sentence (or the mental equivalent thereof). Newman defends a realist view of universals because he thinks it is difficult to see how one could be both a correspondence theorist and a nominalist. According to a realist view of properties, 'there is something in the world other than particulars in virtue of which sentences and propositions are true' (2). However, according to nominalism, particulars do not possess real properties. Since a nominalist metaphysic does not allow facts or truth makers to be composed of anything other than particulars, Newman thinks it is difficult to see how nominalists could allow there to be real things in the world that make sentences or propositions true.

Newman subscribes to an 'immanent realist' view of universals, according to which universals are located in the spatiotemporal world and — as multiply instantiable entities — can be in more than one place at a time. He does not take universals to be abstract objects that inhabit Platonic heaven or Frege's third realm. Although Newman disagrees with Platonic realism about universals, he does not argue against it as he did in his previous book, *The Physical Basis of Predication* (Cambridge University Press 1992). He does, however, argue strongly against a Platonic view of propositions as

abstract objects. In its place, Newman defends a modified version of Russell's theory of propositions. According to Newman, 'a Russellian proposition has as components the particulars the proposition is about and the relation that is thought of them' (193). One striking feature of this view of propositions is that they are *mind-dependent* entities. A proposition, Newman claims, 'is only found when believed by a person' (130).

Newman also does not think that a correspondence theory must be committed to the existence of facts as real entities. He claims that the instantiation of universals by particulars can serve as a sufficient basis for explaining what it is in reality that makes sentences, propositions or beliefs true. Although many of Newman's metaphysical views will be controversial, it is good to see someone defending a version of the correspondence theory that comes with different metaphysical baggage than one might expect.

A weakness of Newman's book is that his brief engagement with deflationary theories of truth in the second chapter is somewhat disappointing. While Newman makes several claims that are incompatible with deflationism — e.g., that an adequate account of truth must also provide an account of propositions, facts and predication — he does not argue directly against key deflationary theses such as the following:

- 1) Although it is possible to formulate necessarily true statements of the form ' p is true iff p is F ', it is not possible for any such statement to count as an analysis of truth because no statement of the form ' p is F ' could ever be more explanatorily fundamental vis-à-vis truth than the platitudinous instances of schemata such as ' p is true iff p '.
- 2) The concept or property of truth can never be used to perform any real explanatory work. Reference to truth in an explanation is always eliminable.

One reason why Newman does not fully engage the deflationists may be that he feels a kind of kinship with deflationists such as William Alston who claim that propositions and sentences are made true by objective features of reality. But while Alston may be a realist about truth, he is also a deflationist, claiming that no definition or analysis of truth can be given. When criticizing Paul Horwich's minimalist theory of truth, the leading deflationary theory, Newman takes Horwich to task for not offering a general explanation of what it is in reality that makes propositions true. However, one of the central tenets of Horwich's minimalism is that no such general explanation is necessary. Merely pointing out a feature of Horwich's theory that he not only admits but decidedly embraces does not constitute an objection against it.

In spite of the weaknesses of Newman's discussion of deflationism, his account of truth and the metaphysics of predication provide a nice platform from which a direct assault on deflationism might be launched. Before one can successfully pit a correspondence theory against any of its deflationist rivals, one must first have a fully worked out account of what truth as correspondence consists in. Such an account will include an explanation of the metaphysics of truth bearers and truth makers. Newman has done a

thorough job of providing us with such an account. His book should be at the forefront of the debate about the nature of truth for a long time to come.

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Peimin Ni

On Confucius.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning,
Inc. 2002. Pp. 96.

US\$15.95. ISBN 0-534-58385-7.

Confucius once wrote, 'a man who reviews the old so as to find out the new is qualified to teach others.' Peimin Ni would certainly exemplify this Confucian proverb with his new book, *On Confucius*. As a part of the Wadsworth Philosophers Series, this primer on Confucian philosophy is a valuable supplement to any introductory course on ethics or eastern philosophy, and Ni has provided a systematic examination of Confucian ideas in a clear and crisp manner. His approach takes the reader through a brief introduction to the life of Confucius before examining the chief characteristics of Confucian thought which, on the one hand, distinguish it as a philosophy and, on the other, as a religion. These include matters concerning the immanence and unity of Heaven and Earth as well as questions surrounding self-responsibility, choice, fate, and the meaning of existence.

Ni goes on to provide a series of brief, yet concise, discussions on some of the central notions that have made Confucian thought the centerpiece of Chinese society for over two millennia. He describes *ren* (human-heartedness) as perhaps the central concept underlying the Confucian way of life and his thorough examination of its nuances and interpretations provides a fresh and masterful study of this complex idea. Through its various translations as benevolence, human-heartedness, altruism, humanity, or goodness, the notion of *ren* is carefully scrutinized in light of its vital place in Confucianism along with its manifestation by way of the 'Golden Rule'. Ni demonstrates a detailed insight into this central idea and it is not surprising that a full quarter of the book is dedicated to this single principle.

Following on the heels of his discussion on *ren* is a similar exposition on *li*, or the righteous expression and embodiment of *ren*. Once again Ni extracts the many subtle variations as he examines the limits surrounding the meaning of *li*, paying particular attention to its various modes of embodiment

which combine the close observation of traditional ritual proprieties with aesthetic activity.

The remainder of this book focuses briefly on the various aspects of Confucian social and political philosophy, such as the ideas of freedom, democracy, and the status of women. This is highlighted by a final glimpse at the transformational practices of *xue* (self-cultivation), *si* (deep reflection), *zhi* (knowing), *zhong yong* (following the Mean), and *yue* (aesthetic enjoyment).

This is a wonderful primer on the core principles within Confucian philosophy and this book would make an excellent compendium to any class on ethics. Ni pays particular attention to an analysis of the terms, providing both an etymological as well as a sociological interpretation, and writes in a clear and comprehensible style. Moreover, he includes an abundance of citations from the *Analects* to present a comprehensive idea of what Confucius offered in the way of moral reasoning and guidance.

Individuals purchasing this book should be warned ahead of time not to expect an exposé on the life of Confucius, or even the social context in which this philosophy was initiated and then developed over the subsequent centuries. This is purely a philosophical primer on Confucian ethics and only passing reference is given to such important neo-Confucians as Mencius and Xun Zi. Nevertheless, Ni's grasp of Confucian ethics is evident in his explanations and this is more than sufficient to compensate for any contextual or historical constraints. This is a brilliant manuscript and a valuable addition to Wadsworth's collection.

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Peimin Ni

On Reid.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 2002. Pp. 84.

US\$15.95. ISBN 0-534-58387-3.

Thomas Reid

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

Edited by Derek R. Brookes.

Pennsylvania: Penn State University

Press 2002. Pp. xiv + 651.

US\$95.00. ISBN 0-271-02236-1.

The past two decades have seen a remarkable resurgence of interest in the writings of Thomas Reid, founder of the Scottish common sense school of philosophy. His work has been cited with increasing frequency by the likes of Keith Lehrer, Roderick Chisholm and Alvin Plantinga. Despite this, scholars have endured a long wait for critical editions of his works to emerge. Derek R. Brookes' new annotated edition of Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* is, therefore, both timely and welcome.

The *Intellectual Powers* (1785), and its companion volume *Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (1788), likewise published under the general editorship of Knud Haakonssen as part of the Edinburgh Edition of Reid, together constitute the fullest presentation of Reid's philosophy of common sense. The earlier work, drawn from Reid's lectures at the University of Glasgow but with roots in his earliest thought, contains his most carefully developed critique of the theory of ideas, more painstaking and astute than that presented in *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* (1764), and systematic studies of the faculties of reason, memory, conception, taste and perception.

The text of Brookes' new edition is based on the only edition of the *Intellectual Powers* published during Reid's lifetime. Printer's errors have been corrected in the light of Reid's own manuscripts, held in Aberdeen University Library's Birkwood Collection. The work is carefully annotated throughout by Brookes and Haakonssen. Inevitably, some compromises have had to be made. The *Intellectual Powers* offers critical discussion of the work of a great array of thinkers, including Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and, of course, Hume. A full annotation of all of Reid's references would have made for laborious reading. The selection, guided by the principles of specificity and obscurity, has been judicious.

Haakonssen has contributed a short introduction. In part, the need for a longer, more detailed introduction is obviated by the presence of notes referring the reader to the sources of most of Reid's references. This policy works well up to a point. However, the editors' failure to place the work in some broader context is likely to deter readers whose knowledge of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy is not sufficient to allow them to make sense of much of Reid's difficult, and often long-winded and tangential, argumentation. Some more extensive introduction, perhaps giving the

reader the intellectual background and other contextual resources necessary for informed engagement with Reid's thought, would have been useful for the less expert reader.

To my knowledge, Peimin Ni's *On Reid* is the first introduction to Reid's thought written for the general reader. Ni puts the long years of Reid's philosophical neglect down to Kant's severe judgement that Reid had not only failed to understand the nature of the problems raised by Hume but had, in effect, abandoned philosophical deliberation in favour of 'the opinion of the multitude'.

Ni seeks to demonstrate the falsity of both claims. He succeeds in showing that Reid is not merely appealing to common sense, but is instead set on investigating the nature of common sense judgement. Proceeding from Reid's rejection of the theory of ideas, Ni demonstrates, through a consideration of Reid's thoughts on perception and common sense and their application to issues such as causation, personal identity and freewill, the sophistication of Reid's view. He presents Reid's refutation of the ideal theory as the root of his thought, allowing its themes to develop naturally through accessible and lightly referenced discussion of Reid's theory of perception as a response to signs and his appeal to the principles of common sense.

Where Ni is less successful is in clearing Reid of Kant's first charge, that he radically misinterpreted Hume. Although it may be true that, as Ni suggests, Reid's errors are no worse than Kant's own, this is no great recommendation, and Ni shows little interest in either drawing out the errors or presenting Hume as anything other than the straw man at which Reid gleefully hacks. The Hume presented by Ni is very much the old, sceptical Hume, the Hume of Ayer and T.H. Green, the Hume who denied the existence of everything not directly perceived (15). In treating Hume as a wholly negative sceptic, and ignoring the positive philosophy from which Reid took much, Ni undermines the readers' ability either to critically evaluate Reid's arguments, or to assess their originality.

Ni cites Thomas Brown's well-known remark that the difference between Hume and Reid was one of expression or emphasis, rather than of substance (37). He rejects the suggestion because of Reid's repudiation of the theory of ideas, his espousal of the legitimacy of common sense belief and his emphasis on their immediacy (37-8). Reid, of course, did reject the theory of ideas and, I think rightly, attributed the view to Hume. But, beyond this, there is a great deal of common ground which Ni does not explore and which his latter two points rather gloss over.

The extent to which Reid sympathised with the sceptic's position rarely draws comment. Where the sceptic gets it right, according to Reid, is in showing up the natural 'imperfections' of human understanding. Reid, as much as Hume, considers that belief is 'regulated by certain principles which are parts of our constitution' and which are grounded neither in 'just reasoning' nor in 'intuitive evidence'. Hume, however, argues that we both can and ought to subject our natural beliefs to scrutiny, in the hope of improving them. For Reid, there is a strong presumption against any hypothesis which leads

to conclusions at odds with common sense. Any such hypothesis, Reid says, 'would be ridiculous', for it would contradict the clear and distinct conceptions of common sense, and ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected. By contrast, Hume recognises that the 'true philosopher', setting aside the 'easy' and 'obvious', in favour of the 'anatomical' style of philosophy, must acknowledge that while a belief be both natural and irresistible, it may yet be false.

The recent revival of interest in Reid, Ni says, 'shows the profound significance of Reidian philosophy' (2), but he does little to demonstrate engagement with the new scholarship, and offers no guidance for the reader keen to explore Reid's work in the light of this work. Indeed, in treating Reid's philosophy of common sense as 'a direct objection to Hume's philosophy' (36-7) he reaffirms the view of Reid which contemporary scholars, such as Keith Lehrer, eager to promote Reid's own positive contribution, have sought to resist. Ni dedicates too little space (two pages) to exploring the general intellectual background to Reid's thought, and, while some effort is made to give a broad-brush account of the views Reid is attacking directly, there is no attempt to explain the origins of Reid's own positive theory. Perhaps as a result of this, there is little sense of the development of Reid's thought. Ni offers some interesting parallels, not least with the philosophy of Kant, and his book may well inspire readers to forge their own inroads into the philosophy of Reid, but the resources necessary for genuine critical engagement with his thought are conspicuously absent.

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**Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and
Russell D. Gray, eds.**

Cycles of Contingency.

A Bradford Book.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2001. Pp. xii + 377.

US\$50.00. ISBN 0-262-15053-0.

Cycles of Contingency is a collection of original papers (except for a few, mainly in the first section) on developmental systems theory (hereafter DST) that our reading group has studied over the last couple of months. Given the length and richness of this book, it would be impossible to do justice to all its contributions here. Therefore, this review will be restricted to doing two things. First, it will point out the main goals and theses of the book; second, it will attempt to shed some critical light on certain aspects of the book that strike us as more contentious.

The whole book attempts to achieve two interrelated goals, namely, (i) to argue that much of contemporary biological thinking has to be 'reconceptualized' (7) and then, (ii) to show that the best way to do this is by reintegrating developmental biology into biological thought. As two of the book's contributors put it, 'the central problem in theoretical biology is the integration of developmental biology with genetics and evolutionary theory' (239). Given the nature of these two goals, the key theses of this book can be divided into *negative* ones (those challenging contemporary biological thinking) and *positive* ones (those stressing the insights that can be gained by focusing on developmental biology).

Let's start with the negative theses. Most of the authors in *Cycles of Contingency* believe that the current paradigm prevailing in biology is misguided because it is based on highly problematic dichotomies. Such dichotomies include the nature/nurture, innate/learned, and organism/environment divisions. Here the reader is offered a panoply of arguments and examples intended to undermine these dichotomies once and for all. Among other things, it is argued that there is just no principled way of determining which phenomena fall on one side of the dichotomy and which ones fall on the other, therefore rendering such dichotomies useless. But that's not all. Other fundamental ideas are subjected to critical scrutiny. For instance, DST advocates take issue with the attribution of causal primacy to genes, the idea that genes somehow play a more fundamental role in development and evolution than other causal factors. Along the same lines, several shots are taken at the metaphor construing DNA as information — that is, as a sort of genetic blueprint or program that would already contain all the necessary information for an organism to develop, a view that betrays a commitment to a form of preformationism which DST theorists reject.

The positive theses put forth in *Cycles of Contingency* stem from taking developmental biology seriously. This results in a 'substantial reformulation' (1) of many biological ideas and notions. From a DST perspective, the causal role of genes is no more important than that of all the other developmental resources underpinning an organism's ontogeny (e.g., its habitat, the presence of predators in its environment, the concentration of ozone in the atmosphere). Nor can genes be reduced to DNA, as their effect is highly dependent on what is happening at the molecular level (Chapter 7). What is more, there is no such thing as a one-to-one correspondence between genes and phenotypes; phenotypic variations seem to be so sensitive to context that any minor change in one of the developmental resources could completely modify how a trait unfolds. Thus, there would be no straightforward causal relationship between genotypes and phenotypes (Chapter 11). In turn, this reconsideration of genes from a developmental perspective has an impact on the notion of heredity. For DST advocates, genes are only one of several resources that are being passed on to other generations and that affect an organism's ontogeny; as Eva Jablonka points out (Chapter 9), our notion of heredity has to be extended so as to include many extragenetic mechanisms of cellular heredity, let alone cultural and ecological mechanisms of inheri-

tance (Chapter 23). All of this, in turn, paves the way for a reconceptualization of evolution itself (Chapter 16). Drawing on the works of Richard Lewontin (Chapters 5 and 6), an inspirational figure for the whole DST movement, DST theorists suggest that evolution be construed in terms of a co-evolution of organism and environment. Organisms do not 'adapt' to an environment existing independently of them; rather, they modify and 'construct' their own niche (Chapters 10 and 23) in such a way that both organisms and environment can be cause and effect in the evolutionary process.

This finally brings us to formulate some critical remarks about *Cycles of Contingency*. The first has to do with the book as a whole. Despite the editors' aim of a unified volume (vii), the book is rather uneven. Indeed, while some contributions are truly remarkable and illuminating (e.g., Chapters 9, 11, and 13), others are just not as satisfactory — either because they are too technical, slightly off topic, or simply unconvincing (e.g., Chapters 12, 15, 19, and 24). As a result, many readers will likely have mixed feelings about the book as a whole.

Moving on to a more substantial criticism, it is unclear to us what the future of DST is as a *scientific research program*. In one of the most interesting papers of the book, Peter Godfrey-Smith (Chapter 20) makes a distinction between DST as a *scientific research program* (i.e., as a set of empirical claims that will be confirmed or disconfirmed through testing) and DST as a *philosophy of nature* (i.e., as an overall perspective on the biological sciences that is theoretical in nature and that uses a distinct set of notions). Though Godfrey-Smith does not suggest this explicitly, we suspect that DST may turn out to be more fertile as a philosophy of nature than as a scientific research program. To illustrate, consider DST advocates' recurrent insistence that *every causal factor be taken equally seriously in biology in every investigation* (283). Such a strategy seems to fit the purpose of a philosophy of nature, in that it is likely to yield an overall picture of biological phenomena that is rich in detail and one that does justice to all the subtleties of nature; it is also likely to call our attention to biological processes and phenomena that are too often neglected. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the same strategy is the most appropriate for a scientific research program. In fact, we suspect that such a strategy would likely paralyze biological research, because it would become extremely difficult to single out some causal factors as being more significant than others. Yet this is standard practice in science, and one that has generated very impressive results in genetics over the last fifty years. In other words, for a scientific research program to produce significant results, the most productive strategy may well be to make use of simplified models that isolate certain causal factors or variables as being more important in explaining very well-defined phenomena. In our view, DST's commitment to a form of holism, one stressing that no causal factor should be privileged because all of them are equally important and interrelated, might hinder biological research, which is why it seems to us to offer more promise as a philosophy of nature than as a scientific research program, at least at this stage.

Cycles of Contingency is a thought-provoking book that is worth reading because it leads one to revisit some of the key ideas, notions, and research strategies of the biological sciences. We doubt that everyone will want to go as far as the most extreme DST advocates in their reconceptualization of biology. But at the very least, it will force those who want to cling to the prevailing paradigm to go back to the drawing board and reconsider ideas they have too long taken for granted.

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Robert Pasnau, ed.

*The Cambridge Translations of
Medieval Philosophical Texts.*

Volume Three: Mind and Knowledge.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. 374.

US\$150.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79356-4);

US\$50.50 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79795-0).

This splendid volume contains English translations by Robert Pasnau of texts of two anonymous Arts masters (from c. 1225 and c. 1270), Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham. The first two texts establish a baseline in the discussion of philosophy of mind and epistemology in the Arts Faculty at the University of Paris. They are followed by ten texts that illustrate the development of thought in these areas on the Continent and in Britain through the 1330s. Of these texts, the one by Bonaventure establishes a baseline for Franciscan thought. That should have been complimented with a text from Thomas Aquinas or Albert the Great, both of whom are Dominicans and near contemporaries of Bonaventure. On the whole, the selection is admirable, although Dominican thought has received short shrift.

Whilst the arrangement is approximately chronological, the general introduction includes a rough ordering by difficulty. This will be useful for instructors attempting to come up with a list of texts to be studied in a seminar or reading group for fourth-year undergraduates or graduate students in Philosophy or Cognitive Science. All but the easiest texts require direction from a specialist in medieval philosophy, because their formats, concepts and terminology are not in the compass of most students and scholars.

Pasnau's abridgements of the texts are fair to the authors: all necessary background knowledge is left in. An introductory note precedes each of the texts, and, at the end of the volume, a bibliography with primary and secondary literature, an annotated list of translations and an index are provided. Pasnau's apparatus is also very helpful. It includes subheadings in the text (in square brackets), pagination in the Latin text on which each translation is based (in curly brackets), in-text references to texts cited by the author (in square brackets), and a limited number of explanatory footnotes. Textual emendations are relegated to an appendix. Overall, the text has few distractions and is a pleasure to read. In almost all cases where the reader feels the need to see the Latin word or phrase being translated, Pasnau has put it in parentheses after the first occurrence. Thus, it is unnecessary to refer to the Latin text to grasp the meaning of text. The one irritating feature is the appearance of contractions in some of the translations. Perhaps this was the result of the use of another translation as a guide, but, in any case, the use of contractions in formal prose must always be defended.

All medievalists should applaud the excellent work of Pasnau in providing a fine collection of translations that make late medieval writings on philosophy of mind and epistemology accessible to twenty-first-century students and scholars. This volume offers us all ample evidence of the great strides made by the philosophers and theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the development of what we now know as 'cognitive science'.

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Tilottama Rajan and
Michael J. O'Driscoll, eds.

After Poststructuralism:

Writing the Intellectual History of Theory.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002.

Pp. xiii + 344.

Cdn\$/US\$50.00. ISBN 0-8020-4791-2.

The present volume is a collection of expanded papers from the Histories of Theory Conference held in 1998 at the Centre for Theory and Criticism, University of Western Ontario. The *After Poststructuralism* of the title might be misleading: this is not a consideration of the main trends in literary theory since the heyday of poststructuralism, but rather, a series of reinterpretations of aspects of 'theory' (the interpretation of philosophical texts by humanities professors outside philosophy), united by fact that they are, largely, interpretations of influential interpretations, the juxtaposition of one luminary with another.

Stanley Corngold's 'Hegel's Theory of Comedy' addresses difficulties in Hegel's theory of comedy, initially in the light of de Man's reading of the philosopher. Corngold concludes that Hegel's aesthetics have consistently been misread as normative despite the presence in them of a 'counter-aesthetic' rendering them deliberately ironic. In 'The Double Detour' editor Tilottama Rajan sets out to trace the role of Sartre's supposed misinterpretation of Heidegger in the rise of deconstruction, and the role of Heidegger's real misinterpretation of Sartre in the turn away from deconstruction and towards at least one form of poststructuralism. Each of these themes receives a very full treatment in an essay that is, disconcertingly, more than twice the average length of the other contributions.

Victor Li's 'The Premodern Condition' deals with what he calls 'a preposterous convolution of the *pre-* and the *post-*' in the work of Baudrillard and Lyotard, in order to argue that both theorists may be seen as 'neo-primitivists'. Li argues that while Baudrillard, as Lyotard has pointed out, relies on the notion of an idealized primitive Other, Lyotard himself succumbs, in his later work, to the same notion, as evinced by his repeated deployment of the example of the Cashinahua tribe as a foil to the modern West. Ian Balfour, like Corngold, takes Hegel and de Man as his subject in 'The Sublime between History and Theory'. The greater part of the essay consists of an interpretation of the place of the sublime in Hegel's aesthetics that supports de Man's reading of Hegel.

Rodolphe Gasché, in 'Theatrum Theoreticum', suggests that theory is fundamentally theatrical. 'The theatricality of theory', he writes, 'derives from its impossibility to speculatively complete the closure of seeing's being seen by itself. Theatricality names theory's impossibility of achieving a reciprocity between seeing and being seen, one that would secure the possibility that it would see itself.' This conclusion is preceded by a lengthy discussion of Hans Blumenberg's discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of

the story of Thales as recounted in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Arkady Plotnitsky's 'Topo-philosophies' examines what he sees as Irigaray's 'radical transformation of classical philosophical conceptuality' through a comparison with Hegel, in particular in their respective use of topographical images. Peter Dewes, in 'The Eclipse of Coincidence' (published in *Angelaki* in 1999), notes how influential Lacan's thought has been in cultural studies, and points to some of its antecedents in the history of philosophy. He also seeks to show how Žižek's recent championing of Schelling as a precursor to Lacan overlooks crucial differences in their thought.

Anthony Wall takes the volatility, or inconsistency, of Bakhtin's thought as the subject of his 'Contradictory Pieces of Time and History'. The fragmentary nature of Bakhtin's thinking, Wall argues, is a reflection of his fragmentary theory of history, and is of positive contemporary value. Mani Haghighi's 'The Body of History' offers, by way of a response to work by Butler and Taylor on the inadequacy of Foucault's conception of the body, a Deleuzian reading of an essay by Foucault on Nietzsche. Brian Wall's 'Written in the Sand' takes Bataille as its subject and argues that, for Bataille, inner experience is 'certainly not the will, but neither is it the unconscious; it is informed by the social, but transgresses the social; and thus it is an in-itself that cannot remain an in-itself since it depends on the for-itself ... ; and in seeking transcendence, it must have its limits in order to surpass them. It is not a positivity but rather a negativity that becomes a positivity that is itself transgressed and undone by its own transgression.'

Linda Bradley Salamon's 'Theory *avant la Lettre*' finds a 'ready dialogic relation' between the relationship of sixteenth century 'art-texts' (the 'how to' books of their day) to emerging intellectualism, and the 'late twentieth-century turn towards the discourse of material culture and its multiple meanings'. She claims that such art-texts form part of the history of cultural studies insofar as they 'explore cultural, rather than literary, philosophical, or historical texts', though does not make clear in what sense they are an 'exploration' rather than simply an instance of such texts. Michael J. O'Driscoll's 'Derrida, Foucault, and the Archiviolithics of History' examines post-structuralism's fascination with the archive in order to argue that 'contemporary theories of knowledge' are the by-product of the way in which material texts have been managed: that the archive is not only constructed by theoretical discourse but also constructs that discourse. Orrin N.C. Wang begins his 'De Man, Marx, Rousseau, and the Machine' by asking what it means for deconstruction and Marxism to consider de Man, as Jameson does, 'as a postcontemporary version of eighteenth-century mechanical materialism', and concludes: 'The form in history that is not history: that is the machine, as much as the literal in deconstruction that is not pure figure, history in Rousseau [sic].'

In keeping with the book's origins in what was evidently a permissive conference, and perhaps as a reflection of the editors' doubts (voiced in the introduction) about the very possibility of 'writing the intellectual history of theory', the contents of the book are too disparate to permit a useful summary

of the whole. Such continuities as do emerge seem rather the product of chance than a reflection of the actual dynamics of the field. (Can Hegel, for example, really be this ubiquitous?) *After Poststructuralism* is, then, very much a conference proceedings, and most of the pieces it contains will doubtless appear in print again in the more specialized contexts their writers originally intended them for.

James Kirwan

John Raines, ed.

Marx on Religion.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2002.

Pp. vii + 242.

US\$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-939-4);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 1-56639-940-8).

Marx's outlook on religion is in different ways well and inadequately known. As John Raines, the editor of this anthology, points out, the first words to occur to most of us on this theme are: 'Religion is the opiate of the masses' written by the 25-year-old Marx early in 1844. Consequently, we know Marx as a notorious critic of religion. Other facets of Marx's view of religion are less well known. This extends, as Raines notes, even to the lines immediately following: 'Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions.' As Raines reads these lines, religion functions not just as legitimating ideology, but also as an actual protest against the realities of exploitation. Why then does Marx go on to reject religion? Because it stands for *illusory* happiness. The rejection of illusion is a call for *real* happiness. The argument of this anthology is clear. Raines seeks to illuminate this argument of Marx's as well as question it. He seeks to situate Marx's view of religion in his own time, suggesting that Marx does well in describing and rejecting much of the religion of his own era. Perhaps, though, and this would be consistent with Marx's materialism, a fresh analysis is required.

Toward this end, this new collection of Marx's writings on religion is intended to differ from the two previous North American anthologies. According to Raines, Saul K. Padover's 1974 attempt focuses too much on the question of Marx's alleged anti-Semitism, while Reinhold Niebuhr's 1964 compilation has the largely critical purpose of showing that Marx is an unrealistic utopian in need of a better grasp of the Christian doctrine of sin.

Raines states his contrasting purpose clearly: 'It is my judgment that Marx is less a poorly informed critic of religion than an important friend and dialogue partner' (13).

The focus is largely on Marx's early writings. In fact, the collection could, for the most part, easily double as an introduction to the early Marx. Rather than arranging Marx's writings chronologically, the book is divided into five parts: The Young Man Marx, Consciousness and the Material World, Bad Work/Good Work, The Criticism of Religion, and Occasional Writings. All but the last section, clearly intended as the least important and also containing selections from Engels and Jenny Marx, focus on texts composed prior to 1849. In fact the only exceptions in these first four sections are a two-page selection from *Capital* in the Good Work/Bad Work section and the famous 'Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' in the Consciousness and the Material World section. Raines justifies this approach noting in a brief preface that most of Marx's writing on religion occurs in this early period. But what is interesting is that many of the selections Raines does include are not about religion in any straightforward sense. Raines seems to have a target audience that is inclined to think of Marx as a narrow-minded and fairly crude reductionist.

Hence, Part One begins with the writings of the teenage Marx: 'Reflections of a Youth on Choosing an Occupation' and the famous 'Letter to His Father'. Clearly Marx is a smart, passionate young man with wide ranging interests, rather than a heartless mechanist. Also included in this section is 'On the Jewish Question'. Raines tells us that while this essay is often employed to show Marx's anti-Semitism, 'it is really a criticism of religion in general for focusing upon the private life of individuals rather than the emancipation of public life' (44). Probably, though, the real import of the essay lies in Marx's critique of an essentially liberal political theory grounded in individual rights, while he at the same time tries to find a way beyond the Young-Hegelian preoccupation with religious criticism.

In fact, the next two sections of the anthology have very little direct connection with religious critique. We find instead selections in Part Two emphasizing Marx's developing dialectical conception of humanity's relationship to nature. Again we see Raines' concern to show that Marx is no crude reductionist. Human beings are dependent on nature, transform it, and in turn are created by it. However, this process under capitalism is fundamentally alienating and exploitive (Part Three). For Raines, Marx here can be seen as an ally of religion insofar as he analyzes and criticizes *this* realm of the crudely materialistic.

Raines sees Marx's own criticisms of religion (Part Four) as criticism of *one* of religion's possibilities. Religions can indeed look at the world described by Marx and retreat into otherworldly hope, thus giving functional support to the ruling classes. But there are other possibilities for religion. Marx, says Raines, would have been surprised by religion's ability to align itself with the oppressed in the late twentieth century. Raines sees it as an open question which way religion will go. He thinks it almost certainly true that religion in

the twenty-first century is about to once again become an important historical force. From both a Marxist and a religious perspective it then becomes extremely important to think about the relationship of religion and class. This is the focus of Part Five.

In the end, this anthology is intended as a contribution to the opening up of a space for inquiry. Raines' main audience seems to be a religious one insofar as he argues that Marx is potentially relevant to the struggles for a better world that he sees as part of the best in the religious traditions. Included also are study questions which suggests a student audience. The collection is probably a good way into the study of Marx for those who begin from a religious orientation. Hopefully, though, such readers will go on to explore more of Marx's mature writings, especially *Capital*.

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Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, eds.

Making Good Citizens.

Education and Civil Society.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2001.

Pp. 358.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-300-08878-7.

The line of thought running through this collection of essays is that there is a crisis of civic participation in the US, attributable to the covariant failure of (public) schools in educating for citizenship and the alleged collapse of consensus based civil society. Moral fragmentation leaves young people with no conception of a common life on which to build a public identity. Some recurrent themes emerge. One concerns the genesis of the problem, focusing on Coleman's concept of 'social capital' as a resource of civil society, now depleted. Another is the suggestion of a two-pronged solution through identifying a common ground of political values on which schools could build education for citizenship, while remaining neutral on contested ground.

No one doubts the importance of education and participation for democracy. The problem when education fails is acutely felt, so why is the lasting impression of this collection so unsatisfactory? One reason is the assumptions in the analyses of community change. Another is the normative orientation towards personal morality and local solutions.

'Social capital' figures heavily in the contributions by Robert Putnam, Gerald Grant, William Damon, and Mark Holmes: America's traditionally

high stock of social capital — norm and trust sustaining local networks of fellowship and sympathy — has been depleted since the 1960s. The failure of education and participation affect each other and the cause is a failure of community. The preferred solution is the creation of new social capital.

A problem with 'social capital' though, is its use as an empirical tool to measure the effectiveness of civil society in creating public-spirited kids, while really being a normative concept. Social capital, it is assumed, requires a moral consensus on a preferred way of life. The conservatism in this is obvious. The stock of social capital is supposed to have been highest before the 1960s, i.e., during the time of race-segregated schools and women-at-home. Since then we have questioned racial and gender hierarchy. The civil rights and women's movement are mentioned here but not analysed for relevance, feminism and anti-racism referred to by Holmes as 'passing enthusiasms' (199). There is a preoccupation with authority. The young admit no leaders and don't want to be leaders, complains Damon. Jean Bethke Elshtain argues that authority is what sustains civil society. Traditional forms of authority are regarded as a social asset, with little reflection on the false consensus they uphold. Nathan Glazer recognizes that the value coherence of the '50s was an imposition by an elite; Putnam mentions that bolstering existing social capital may reinforce inequities, but little analytical attention is paid to this.

How do we address the concerns of young people? And what about the girls? If good citizenship requires 'republican motherhood' (Rakove, 241) what does that tell young women of today? Women's role in society has changed radically since the '60s, so one could expect *some* gender analysis. But when Grant refers to interviews with teenagers, boys are either in the street or doing well in school, while girls either get pregnant, or not.

'Social capital' is a fuzzy analytical tool. The metaphor of 'capital' is carried so far that it ceases to make sense. Social capital is 'withdrawn' from community and 'spent' as if it were like money rather than a matter of social dynamics. It is supposed to be independent of socio-economic factors, yet how could efforts to create more of it ever be independent of the variables that supposedly lie outside it, like poverty, health and equality? The depletion of social capital is conceptualised as a local problem and an outcome of moral erosion, requiring local and moral efforts. We know that there is a political explanation to this situation, yet it continues to be analysed as a problem of bad parenting and lax morals. Admittedly Grant recognizes the importance of housing segregation and middle class white flight encouraged by tax benefits, but only Joseph Viteritti regards the education problem primarily as a matter of racial inequality and poverty, induced by *de facto* segregation.

Several contributors advance a 'two-pronged solution' (described as such by Warren Nord, with Holmes, Rosemary Salomone and Alan Wolfe concurring) to the alleged failure of schools in educating for citizenship: Combine a liberal education based on what we have in common (commitments to justice, honesty, democracy) with neutrality on contested moral ground. A problem with that is how to give content to buzzwords like justice without venturing

into contested ground. Wolfe advocates 'robust pluralism' (289) allowing all views, also the illiberal ones, to compete. But some won't allow that their view is one in a competition. Some parents want their children exempted from parts of the curriculum to prevent them from knowing that there is a competition (see the *Mozert* case discussed by Salomone).

At least Elshtain makes no pretence at neutrality. Her strong claim is that religion is necessary for civil life and that the education of citizens and of souls goes hand in hand. Again one is struck by the question of how this is supposed to connect with young people, disenchanted by adult performance. Believers 'are more apt to learn how to compromise,' Elshtain bafflingly asserts (268), moving on to the 'extraordinary contributions of Pope John Paul II' (277). The souls in school should learn intelligent criticism, not cynical debunking, she says. Fine, but can we expect young people to grow anything but cynical if established religion is held up as a guiding light for their civic development, while Catholic priests are busy bugging choir boys under the shelter of their bishops?

If young people shun traditional authority and question the point of engaging in a civic life run and defined by an immutable establishment, couldn't it be that they are actually on to something? Putnam asks if test score decline is a schooling or a community problem. It might well be both, but importantly it is a political problem. And moral consensus was always a myth, so why lament what was never there?

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Richard Schmitt

Alienation and Freedom.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2003. Pp. x + 145.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-6588-0);

US\$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2853-5).

While primarily intended for the undergraduate student of philosophy, this slim and accessible volume is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Largely eschewing a didactic exposition of various arguments, historical positions, or proofs regarding the concepts of alienation and freedom, the book instead engages the reader in an implicit dialogue in which everyday assumptions, emotions, and interpersonal and workplace interactions are presented. From this presentation Schmitt teases out the symptoms of an alienated life. Here Schmitt is marvelously attentive to the fabric of contemporary experience in

Western society. As a result, the book ably serves some of the highest goals of philosophy or political philosophy. By causing us to reflect seriously upon those otherwise obscured conditions of alienation that 'deform our personalities and mak[e] our lives less firmly ours, less adventurous, and less meaningful' (ix), we are forced to confront the Socratic principle that the unexamined life is not worth living.

The book's opening sections aim to rescue the concept of alienation from its exclusive associations with Marxian and existentialist philosophy. On the one hand, a study of 'global' or systemic alienation (5) should be restricted neither to just those objective conditions that concern the processes of labor, nor to an enumeration of objective conditions themselves. On the other, it must avoid a purely subjective account of feelings of alienation. The reason: oppressive social conditions alone can invoke heroic, non-alienated responses; by themselves, feelings of alienation will be transitory or linked to particular situations and not to the whole of existence. In a way that reflects the concerns of the Frankfurt School, for Schmitt alienation is most properly found and studied where these two aspects come together in the concrete life activity of the individual.

Although 'freedom' stands alongside 'alienation' in the book's title, Schmitt is not equally concerned with the conditions of freedom or an analysis of the concept. He is content to adopt J.S. Mill's understanding that freedom resides in the unrestricted pursuit of my private goods (although these certainly may have a public character) insofar as I do not hinder others in theirs (12). Alienation becomes a hidden and profound hindrance whose identification and removal, for Schmitt, then opens the way for the natural blossoming of freedom.

Before turning to his examination of alienation itself, Schmitt takes us through a brief survey of the concept of alienation in the thought of Rousseau, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. His purpose is to show that the concept of alienation has a worthy pedigree and so cannot be easily dismissed as a subject of serious reflection. Nonetheless, this chapter seems more detour than tour. To his credit, his analysis of alienation does not require, or build upon, any prior acquaintance with these thinkers or indeed any formal philosophic training. Instead, the book very successfully uses literature — both classic (e.g., Kafka's *The Metamorphosis*, Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilych*, Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*) and contemporary (e.g., Dufrene's *Love Warps the Mind a Little*) — to extract and richly illustrate archetypal narratives of alienated lives. These narratives, and not the thought of Rousseau et. al., are the thread that runs through the book. So at most this chapter serves as a series of helpful signposts to further study, yet whose material might have been incorporated more profitably into the other chapters as the need arose.

The heart of Schmitt's analysis occurs in Chapters 3 and 4 where alienation's individually and socially rooted aspects are treated respectively. The conditions for alienation are always present for the individual because of the 'human condition': a tension between our intellectual ability to will and make

plans and our physical nature that throws us into a world in which we find ourselves arbitrarily possessing a particular body, enmeshed in contingent relationships, possessing certain roles, and caught between an unchangeable past and an unknowable future. If we are not careful to reflect upon and fashion some sort of deliberative, coherent and recognized narrative out of this Heideggerian thrownness, then these inherent preconditions for an alienated life will become the actual conditions of alienation. The world will always be an unknowable surge of forces that simply sweeps us along, without a chance to build a self out of the chaos. As a distinct and, implicitly for Schmitt, lesser problem, these inherent preconditions for alienation become especially pernicious and difficult to overcome given certain forms of social organization. Here, the book rightly focuses on problems that the market economy poses both for the self-construction of a meaningful life and for human relations that not mediated by the value of a dollar or the imperative to earn one. His analysis closely follows the contours laid out by Rousseau and Marx, while nicely demonstrating its practical import for our contemporary lives. Additionally, he does not neglect the problems and consequences of systemic gender and racial discrimination.

Unfortunately, the book's concluding discussion of freedom does not take us much deeper into Mill's conception than the page and a half devoted to it at the beginning. Nonetheless, Schmitt uses this conclusion to effectively bring together the previous two chapters. He underscores that alienation is both an 'internal' and 'external' (117) constraint on the pursuit of life goods. In this way, the mere presence of mature democracies and entrenched freedoms in the West precludes neither the question of alienation nor of freedom. Pedagogically, the advantage of Schmitt's Millian conception of freedom is that it immediately or intuitively resonates with our unreflective understanding, and so requires little elaboration. Metaphysically, it embodies an unresolved tension within Schmitt's analysis of alienation. Is freedom fundamentally a matter of individual willing in which our social world is at most an instrumental barrier or aid? Or, are we in some way constituted by this social world and the relations in which we are situated so that there is no freedom apart from a world that is free? At many points Schmitt implies the latter but, in the end, seems to opt for the former. Which of these conceptions of the self we choose ultimately will shape the nature of our deepest commitments, and so the path we pursue in our attempt to overcome alienation and sustain freedom.

Although no traditional textbook, *Alienation and Freedom* is clear, accessible, and acutely insightful about the everyday impact of modern life on the possibilities of living a good life; these features make it highly suitable as companion reading in any undergraduate classroom where the problems of the human condition are being discussed.

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David Schweickart

After Capitalism.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2002. Pp. xxiii + 193.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1299-1);

US\$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1300-9).

Many book-cover blurbs urge that no one interested in its field can afford to ignore the pages within: here, for once, there would be no element of exaggeration. Schweickart initially intended to popularize his thorough, more technical refutation of claims for capitalism in *Against Capitalism*, but was led to argue instead for an alternative to capitalism, which would be: 'as efficient in the allocation of existing resources'; 'as dynamic in its innovative growth'; 'as compatible with liberty and democracy' (87); while also lacking the flaws of capitalism, including inequality, unemployment, overwork, poverty, sham democracy, and environmental degradation (88). The new form of his project addresses a need for a feasible alternative that he encountered among audiences interested in his earlier critique of capitalism, while it also seemed that this alternative — termed 'economic democracy' — could serve as a constructive objective for expressions of popular discontent with capitalism that emerged strongly once again as he wrote.

Karl Marx — or more likely, Friedrich Engels — could have written such a book if he had experienced the lack of decisive success by working class political movements over the last hundred years or so, and had also freed himself more thoroughly of Hegel's influence. That Hegel's influence was pernicious, distorting what would otherwise have been a perfectly respectable 'analytical Marxism', flies in the face of the many fruitful ways that Marx and Engels drew on Hegel. Even so, they failed to work through thoroughly the implications of their turn from Hegelian philosophical interpretation. While Hegel flies with the owl of Minerva at dusk, striving to complete comprehension of a passing way of life, Marx and Engels attempt to depict scientifically an old form of society pregnant with a new one. Nevertheless, they inherited from Hegel teleological assumptions as to the new form of society and its relation to capitalist society, which sat rather oddly alongside their relatively rigorous critique of capitalism. They also clung to the Hegelian notion that they could not gaze forward into the future to depict the society that would emerge from capitalism or, from their standpoint in the present, rationally recommend any features of a future society.

In drawing from Marx's critique of capitalism, Schweickart manages to avoid excessive homage to its author. He rightly considers that Marx has left a gap, to be filled with what he terms 'successor-system theory', which would 'define an economic order genuinely superior to capitalism — that is, better able to take advantage of the technical and social possibilities opened up by capitalism but incapable of realization under that system' (9).

While Marx was persuaded that market relations alienate us from the process of social cooperation in the production and allocation of material

goods, Schweickart claims that successor theory should accept that markets impose a competitive discipline, encouraging efficient allocation of scarce resources and innovation. Accepting the merits of markets, as Schweickart does, involves no concession to sweeping dismissal of administrative allocation within Neo-Liberal economic theory. Administrative allocation works very well in public hospitals and public education, provided such institutions have a properly devolved control over their own affairs, and are leanly, though not meanly, resourced. Schweickart accepts a mixed economy, with child care, education, health care and care for the disabled and elderly assigned to the public sector and non-market allocation (71). His key idea is not a change in forms of allocation but a change in enterprise ownership from private capital to worker co-operatives, where workers have equal shares in the ownership of their enterprises, coupled with a change from private to public control of investment.

A detailed discussion follows of the comparative merits of 'economic democracy', which Schweickart models on the Mondragon co-operative system in the Basque country of Spain. Since they are involved in market competition, worker co-operatives have incentives to use resources efficiently and innovate. However, they do not have the same incentives as capitalist firms to shed labor, or grow boundlessly (127-31). Schweickart, for once, puts his case a little imprecisely. He refers to 'labor costs' but does not distinguish between aggregate and unit labor costs. The claim that '*democratic firms have no interest whatever in lowering labor costs*' (128) applies only to aggregate labor costs, which do equal worker income. However, democratic firms presumably have incentives to lower 'unit labor costs', so that we cannot be confident that they will not introduce new technologies that replace skilled with unskilled labor, as Schweickart claims. True, worker co-operatives have such incentives only when they encounter increasing product demand, while capitalist firms have an incentive to cut unit labor costs in all circumstances, perhaps even especially when product demand falls. Schweickart also claims that 'once a firm reaches the optimal size for technical efficiency, it will stop growing. If demand for the product remains strong, new firms will come into being ...' (130). However, this assumes a constant technology. With new technologies, firms can increase their outputs and even increase their workforce, if technical efficiency is achieved at a higher level, given the new technology. Nevertheless, since we cannot expect innovation to accommodate increased demand always, there will be a greater tendency for new firms to spring up under economic democracy, as Schweickart suggests, and for firm closures rather than layoffs when demand shrinks.

The differences are more pronounced but also more speculative when it comes to inequality: Schweickart extrapolates from capitalism to estimate that there will be income differentials of about ten to one in an economic democracy but argues that these, while significant, do not have the same capacity to ground exploitation and oppression as much wider differentials under capitalism (131-4). Unemployment would be taken care of by public sector employment, while worker ownership could eliminate overwork. Lack-

ing great concentrations of private wealth, democracy might even work in an economic democracy (151-4). One sobering note, however, is the observation drawn from the case of Mondragon that worker co-operatives tend to provide managers rather than workers with a sense of ownership of their enterprises (69-70). Schweickart hopes that this experience merely reflects the surrounding sea of capitalist competition. Marx, on the other hand, would expect alienation to remain so long as workers are subject to a surrounding sea of blind market competition.

This book provides a clear and persuasive argument for why practically no one should resign themselves to the evils of capitalism.

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Amartya Sen

Rationality and Freedom.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press 2002. Pp. ix + 736.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-674-00947-9.

Rationality and Freedom is the first of two volumes of essays by Amartya Sen on rationality, freedom, and justice. As with most exciting collections, the pieces in this volume, having been brought together, bring new things into view. Emerging particularly clearly from this collection are (i) the main contours of the interdisciplinary debate among ethicists, political philosophers, and economists concerning rationality and freedom, and (ii) the ties between Sen's own various influential insights concerning rationality and freedom.

In exploring the nature of rationality, Sen challenges several prominent views concerning rational choice. According to one such view, an agent's choices are rational if and only if they are consistent with one another. This view is based on the presupposition that choices can, like statements, directly conflict with one another. Sen argues convincingly, however, that 'there is no way of determining whether a choice function is consistent or not *without* referring to something external to choice behavior (such as objectives, values, or norms)' (121-2).

Sen also challenges the 'self-interest maximization' view, according to which rational choice involves the unfailing pursuit of options that will maximally promote one's own self-interest. Sen reasons as follows: If, on the one

hand, the view is interpreted as committed to the assumption that the promotion of one's own self-interest is the only goal that reason endorses, it can be dismissed as arbitrary, since the assumption on which it is founded is arbitrary. Sen also suggests, in relation to this interpretation, that 'the insistence on the pursuit of self-interest as an inescapable necessity for rationality subverts the "self" as a free, reasoning being, by overlooking the freedom to reason about what one should pursue' (46). If, on the other hand, the self-interest maximization view rests on the assumption that the promotion of self-interest is the only (ultimate) goal that individuals do in fact have, the view can be dismissed, according to Sen, as an implausible oversimplification.

More radical than Sen's rejection of the self-interest maximization view is his rejection of the view that rational choice involves the unflinching pursuit of one's own goals. Sen's rejection of this latter view is built on his distinction between an agent's goals and an agent's values. According to Sen, one's values can include priorities other than the maximum fulfillment of one's own goals, and, when they do, these other concerns cannot just be ruled out as irrelevant to the rationality of one's choices.

While Sen rejects the self-interest maximization view and the view that being rational involves seeking the maximum fulfillment of one's goals, Sen does not dismiss the idea that rational choice can be interpreted as maximizing choice. Sen does, however, insist that 'maximizing behavior is at most a necessary condition for rationality' (39). He also argues that rational choice can be interpreted as maximizing choice only if maximization is interpreted as compatible with incomplete preferences, with menu-dependent preferences, and with process sensitive preferences.

In exploring the connection between rationality and social choice, Sen argues that while Arrow's impossibility theorem identifies 'a profound difficulty in combining individual preference orderings into aggregative social welfare judgments' (289), the difficulty can be resolved via the introduction of interpersonal comparisons of individual advantages. Sen does not deny that comparisons may have to be rough; but he sensibly maintains that sometimes all we need to arrive at a solid social welfare judgment are approximations that are good enough, and sometimes imperfect methods for arriving at interpersonal comparisons (such as comparing real income or the holding of primary goods) yield such approximations. This last move by Sen relates to something that is particularly inspiring about this collection, namely that it reflects not only Sen's commitment to subtle and rigorous conceptual and theoretical analysis, but also his commitment to putting such analysis to good use. The latter commitment becomes apparent every time Sen focuses on a specific practical issue in order to explore the possibility of fruitfully applying theoretical results via a creative interpretation of these results or via the careful search for approximations that, relative to the practical issue in question, simplify things without being simple-minded.

In exploring the connection between social choice and liberty, Sen argues, on the one hand, that consideration of some minimal demands of liberty

reveals 'the need to go beyond the utility-based foundations of traditional welfare economics (including the Pareto principle)' (432). On the other hand, Sen resists the idea that taking liberty seriously requires putting preferences aside and arriving at aggregative evaluations via the consideration of processes only. For Sen, it must be acknowledged that 'freedom is valuable for at least two distinct reasons. First, more freedom gives us more *opportunity* to achieve those things that we value ... Second, the *process* through which things happen may also be of importance in assessing freedom' (585). Sen then argues that social choice theory cannot only comfortably accommodate these two aspects of freedom, it can be used to enhance our understanding of both aspects.

Having focused on a selection of ideas and arguments that figure prominently in the volume, I will now turn to a possible worry concerning an idea that frames Sen's work, namely the idea that 'reason has its use not only in the pursuit of a given set of objectives and values, but also in scrutinizing the objectives and values themselves,' which must be 'supportable through careful assessment' (39, 41). On the basis of this idea, Sen rejects instrumental conceptions of reason, which do not 'have any condition of critical scrutiny of the objectives themselves,' and thus fail to fully capture the demands of reason (286). Yet there seems to be a tension between this stance and Sen's view that reason does not identify certain objectives and values as 'proper' (6). If reason does not endorse or reject objectives and values considered in and of themselves, then it seems like either (i) reason only endorses or rejects objectives and values considered in relation to other objectives and values, or (ii) reason does not endorse or reject objectives and values at all. If (i) is true, then it seems like an instrumental conception of reason may be able to fully capture the demands of reason, since, while it is true that instrumental conceptions of reason do not have any condition of critical scrutiny of objectives and values considered in and of themselves, they do have room for critical scrutiny of objectives and values considered in relation to other objectives and values. (Presumably considerations of the form 'If I X, then that will rule out Y-ing' will figure in the reasoning of an instrumentally rational agent.) If, on the other hand, (ii) is true, then it is not clear how reasoned scrutiny can supply assessments of objectives and values. Perhaps Sen thinks that while reason itself does not endorse or reject objectives and values, reasoned scrutiny is a creative reflective process in which the agent embraces, abandons, or ranks objectives and values without relying on any external test(s). This is an interesting possibility, though more would need to be said about this creative reflective process and about why it should count as reasoned scrutiny. (It cannot be assumed that every creative reflective process is a case of reasoned scrutiny. For example, I may abandon my objective to eat the fresh cup of yogurt in my fridge after vividly reflecting on the live cultures it contains. Does my process of reflection, which results in my abandoning my objective, count as a bit of reasoned scrutiny? It doesn't seem like it.)

Though I would have welcomed more discussion concerning Sen's view of the nature of reasoned scrutiny, there is no scarcity of enlightening discussion in Sen's impressive and thought-provoking book.

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Reading Hume's Dialogues:

A Veneration for True Religion.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2002.

Pp. x + 281.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-24116-7);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21534-X).

As Sessions himself points out, *Reading Hume's Dialogues* fills a gap in Hume scholarship, for this is the first English-language book-length commentary on the *Dialogues*. Sessions argues that the importance of Hume's *Dialogues* in the philosophy of religion, as well as the text's literary merits, justify a much closer look at what the text tells us 'on its own terms' (3). Sessions thus provides a careful, detailed analysis of every move in the *Dialogues*, with extensive quotations and paraphrases of the text. After an introductory chapter explaining and justifying the use of what Sessions calls 'internal' interpretation, a chapter of scene-setting, and a chapter examining Pamphilus' preface, there is a chapter for each of the twelve parts of Hume's *Dialogues*, plus a conclusion in which Sessions comments on some of the broader themes of the *Dialogues*.

In explaining what he means by 'internal' interpretation, Sessions contrasts his approach with two standard approaches to the *Dialogues*: first, those 'analytic mining operations' which extract some argument from the *Dialogues* and seek to evaluate it without much (or any) reference to its textual context; second, historicist approaches which seek to understand Hume's views through locating them in the context of eighteenth-century Scottish thought (2). Sessions' 'internal' approach examines the *Dialogues*' 'self-luminescence' (3), understanding the text using only the materials provided by the text itself. Although he concedes that a wholly internal interpretation of a text is neither possible nor desirable, Sessions does hope to provide a more-or-less self-contained account of the *Dialogues*. Thus the book addresses not just the arguments, but also the dramatic setting and the characters' motives, actions, points of view, and relationships with each other.

Readers who are already familiar with the *Dialogues* may find the summary that is interwoven with Sessions' commentary to be more detailed than they need. But Sessions' internal approach does yield some fruitful results. For example, through close attention to Philo's claims, Sessions shows that the apparent 'reversal' of Philo's views in Section 12 in fact has a straightforward explanation (186-7). He also shows how Demea's desperate desire for religious certainty leads him, again and again, to sacrifice consistency.

In the concluding chapter, Sessions elaborates on some of the themes that he finds recurring in the *Dialogues*: the role of teleological thinking in the three characters' views; their different conceptions of the purposes and methods of religious education; the varying types of friendship they display. If Sessions can be said to present a central thesis concerning the *Dialogues*, it is that the *Dialogues* should be read not so much as a discussion of theological design arguments as an exploration of contrasting accounts of piety. As Sessions puts it, 'The *Dialogues*, it turns out, is more about piety than theology' (10). For Demea, piety involves a life of unquestioning submission; he cannot tolerate uncertainty or any disagreement with his own views (223). For Cleanthes, piety involves 'trusting confidence' that there is a 'benevolent guardian and protector' who will reward us in a future life (224). Concerning Philo's piety, Sessions is less clear: he emphasizes that Philo and Cleanthes share a form of piety (204), yet he also says that 'Philo's piety is centrally expressed in his skeptical questioning' (20), which Cleanthes does *not* share.

The difficulty here is that Sessions never spells out what 'piety' means. He characterizes it variously as 'natural religious practice' (10), 'life, the way one lives one's life' (20), and religious 'practice and sentiments' (180). He also occasionally uses, without any explanation, the phrase 'natural piety' (202, 222). As is well known (and as Sessions himself points out), 'natural religion' was used in the eighteenth century to refer to religious views that are discovered through reason, in contrast both to revealed religion and irrational superstition. One might think Sessions is using 'natural piety' in a similar way, to refer perhaps to those religious practices which reason shows to be best. Indeed, he attributes to Philo the position that 'false' religion, held by the majority of people, 'draw[s] one away from the company of common life into the irrational beliefs of superstition and the irrational zeal of enthusiasm. Vulgar views of divinity are rooted in this irrational complex of mood and practice (piety)' (201). This might suggest that 'piety' *simpliciter* refers to an unexamined, even irrational way of life, while 'natural piety' refers to the pieties of Cleanthes and Philo, which Sessions does seem to think are based on a rational investigation of the best way to live life. Yet Sessions then describes Philo as 'having disposed of natural religious piety' (202). So apparently even an irrational piety counts as 'natural'.

Perhaps, then, Sessions uses 'natural piety' to describe the way of life that humans can't help but find compelling, something like an instinctive form of religious practice. Yet would Hume really want to characterize the pieties of the vulgar, of Demea, and of Cleanthes and Philo, all of which Sessions calls

'natural', as 'natural' in this sense? It seems that to settle the appropriateness of the terms 'piety' and 'natural piety' here, Sessions needs to step outside his internal interpretation and take a look at other Humean texts. But even within the confines of his internal interpretation, 'piety' and 'natural piety' need clarification; without it, the exciting thesis that the *Dialogues* is all about piety loses much of its force.

Reading Hume's Dialogues is probably too detailed to use in undergraduate survey courses, but might be appropriate in upper-level courses on Hume or philosophy of religion. Hume scholars will find it interesting but may be frustrated by the constraints of the internal approach, insofar as it refuses to identify connections between the *Dialogues* and other works by Hume. I imagine, however, that anyone who teaches the *Dialogues* in philosophy of religion courses will find *Reading Hume's Dialogues* extremely helpful and provocative.

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Rob van Gerwen, ed.

*Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting:
Art as Representation and Expression.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Pp. viii + 285.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-521-80174-5.

This book is a collection of sixteen critical essays by philosophers and art historians, originally given at a three-day conference in honor of Richard Wollheim. In addition to the critical essays, there is an introduction by the editor, a lead essay by Wollheim, and a concluding essay where Wollheim replies to his critics.

The theme of the book concerns the conceptual relations in the art of painting between expression and representation. In a painting that represents a landscape but expresses melancholy, how can we best describe the conceptual relations between what is represented and what is expressed? For Wollheim the key that connects what is represented with what is expressed is to be found in the psychology of art.

Seeing the landscape is not a matter of seeing the painting as a landscape, as if looking at pictures were like looking at things, but according to Wollheim involves a type of seeing that is distinct from ordinary perception, which he

calls 'seeing-in'. While being fully aware that one is looking at a painting, one 'sees in' the painting the landscape, for instance. This 'seeing-in' occurs when the intentions of the artist result in a painting that can 'cause, in a suitable spectator, an experience which tallies with the [artist's] intentions' (Wollheim, 27). It should be noted that the intention of the artist is communicated to the spectator by means of objective properties of the painting.

'Seeing-in' the painting what is expressed, e.g., melancholy, 'involves a *projection* of mental properties with a personal history' on the part of the spectator (van Gerwen, 6). Again, the correctness of such a projection will be based on objective properties of the painting by which the artist communicates his intentions. It is, then, by the psychologies of art creation and art appreciation that Wollheim explains the relations between representation and expression, the meeting point of the two being the properties of the work itself (van Gerwen, 5).

A third element to Wollheim's aesthetics is the role of the internal spectator. Sometimes this internal spectator is visibly depicted in the painting, but at other times her presence is implied as though the depicted scene is viewed by someone residing within it. For Wollheim, the internal spectator invites the viewer of the painting to imagine viewing the scene from the same point of view as the subject in the painting (van Gerwen, 5-6). Whereas Wollheim holds that representation and expression are perceived, one sees the scene as if through the eyes of the internal spectator by a further act of imagination.

In light of these fundamental features of Wollheim's aesthetics, the present volume is divided into three parts. In Part I, six essays deal with Wollheim's theory of pictorial representation. In Part II, five essays deal with his account of expression. In Part III, six essays discuss the role of the internal spectator. And finally in Part IV, Wollheim replies to his critics.

In his opening essay *On Pictorial Representation*, Wollheim attempts to specify the 'minimal requirement' of pictorial representation in terms of a certain kind of 'appropriate experience' of a picture by the viewer, in essence a perceptual experience of the representation as such. Along the way, he first dispatches semiotic theories which model rules of representation on the rules of language, and then second goes on to attack the resemblance theories of Christopher Peacocke and Malcolm Budd. Against semiotic theories, which hold that representational meaning depends upon picture structure, Wollheim argues that pictures do not have the sort of relevant structure that is in any way analogous to the structure and rules of language (Wollheim, 14). For Wollheim, even the best semiotic theories describe the grasping of representational meaning as an interpretative activity, and not a perceptual experience, and this, for Wollheim, misconstrues the nature of experiencing representation in pictorial art (Wollheim, 15). For Wollheim, the semiotic account of seeing a horse in a painting would be a matter of applying rules of interpretation to deduce the representation. Such a deduction is not a perceptual experience, and hence for Wollheim, fails to capture the essential perceptual nature of the experience.

Turning to the resemblance theories of Budd and Peacocke, which hold that our recognition of a representation is based on an experienced resemblance between the representation and the object represented, Wollheim argues that there need not be any separate experience of resemblance between the object and its depiction for a representation to be recognized as such.

As for the critical essays that constitute the body of this work, the majority of pieces are written from within the perspective of Wollheim's aesthetics, and offer critical comments from within that perspective. Thus in Chapter 2, Jerrold Levinson states that he is in the Wollheim camp, but takes issue with Wollheim's treatment of *trompe l'œil*, aspects of his conception of seeing-in, and his appeal to the intentions of the artist as a standard. In Chapter 3, Andrew Harrison, accepting Wollheim's account of the twofoldness of representational perception, takes issue with his strict division between pictorial and descriptive representation. In Chapter 4, Monique Roelofs disagrees with Wollheim's claim that 'seeing-in' is a distinct and primitive type of perception. She argues that the background knowledge we bring to perception results in our 'seeing-in' being a matter of advancing and testing hypotheses concerning what is represented. The other essays are much in this same vein.

For those who possess a prior knowledge of Wollheim's aesthetics, this is an important volume. Wollheim's lead essay and closing comments give a good indication of how Wollheim has continued to evolve and respond to his critics. The critical essays themselves are all of interest, some pointing to novel directions in which the theory might be taken, others making critical corrections which make the theory more plausible. For those who are less familiar with Wollheim, the editor's introduction and Wollheim's lead essay provide a good introduction to the current state of the Wollheim school of thought.

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Francisco Vergara

*Les Fondements Philosophiques du libéralisme
— Libéralisme et Ethique.*

Paris: La Découverte 2002. Pp. 220.

€ 9.50. ISBN 2-7071-3520-8.

Economiste et journaliste français, Francisco Vergara est connu pour ses analyses critiques de célèbres commentateurs de la pensée libérale tels Elie Halévy, et Louis Dumont, dont les thèses ont influencé de manière capitale la pensée Européenne contemporaine, ('Les erreurs et confusions de Louis

Dumont', *L'économie politique*, no. 11, 2001; 'A critique of Elie Halévy: an important distortion of British Moral Philosophy', *Philosophy*, Janvier 1998). Dans la seconde édition du livre *Les Fondements Philosophiques du Libéralisme*, Vergara spécifie et complète ces analyses antérieures, mais se positionne également dans la tendance analytique récente, encore peu développée, qui étudie les liens existant entre les positions économiques (tant au niveau théorique que pratique) et leurs fondements philosophique, moral ou épistémologique.

Vergara propose une analyse des différents courants libéraux à partir de leurs fondements éthiques. Partant du problème de l'hétérogénéité des libéraux classiques, l'éthique, effectivement, offre une piste intéressante en *permettant de distinguer deux grands types de libéraux* :

- Les tenants d'une éthique utilitariste (ou conséquentialiste d'une manière plus large): 'Hume, Smith, Bentham, Ricardo et Mill soutiennent explicitement qu'en dernière instance le seul critère pour distinguer les bonnes lois et bonnes institutions des mauvaises est le bonheur qu'elles tendent à occasionner à la communauté. C'est la doctrine éthique appelée "utilitarisme" ' (13). Vergara propose alors une mise au point concernant le sens de l'utilitarisme, qui a été, et demeure, une doctrine mal comprise et empreinte de méprises importantes : 'les commentateurs désignent souvent, par [cette] expression, plusieurs choses différentes ... ainsi, certains entendent ... une théorie psychologique ... d'autres désignent [une] éthique égoïste ... d'autres encore ... désignent une préférence pour la richesse et les biens matériels' (59-60). Et ce malgré que les utilitaristes fondateurs aient pourtant 'insisté sur le fait qu'ils réservaient l'expression "utilitariste" pour désigner ... une doctrine éthique et rien d'autre' (67).
- L'autre grand courant de libéraux, illustré par des auteurs comme Turgot, Jefferson et Condorcet, évalue la justesse d'un acte, en général, selon 'sa conformité avec la Nature' (37). La connaissance des lois de cette dernière, accessibles par le biais de la raison, permet l'établissement de règles de droit (et de devoirs correspondant) incontournables, dites de 'Droit naturel'. Cette logique suppose que 'derrière le sentiment spontané du juste et de l'injuste il y a une réalité logique ... une sorte de code juridique, un droit tout fait, un Droit naturel' (125).

Ainsi, l'idée centrale est qu'au-delà de leurs divergences, les libéraux forment des sous-groupes présentant une cohérence théorique profonde. Cette base permet alors à Vergara de défendre la vision selon laquelle les ultra — libéraux n'ont guère de lien théorique avec les classiques, car précisément ils ne présentent pas de telle cohérence en matière éthique: 'les ultra — libéraux opèrent simultanément avec plusieurs critères éthiques supérieurs, changeant de critère lorsqu'ils passent d'un problème à un autre, sans établir une hiérarchie claire entre les critères' (168). Ainsi, Bastiat, ou Spencer, (177-81), mettent en avant une version particulière de la théorie du droit naturel; alors que d'autres tels Friedman, adoptent un principe d'utilité

identifié au principe d'efficience qui finalement aboutit à éliminer toute forme d'intervention étatique. Pourtant, le libéralisme des classiques n'a rien de non interventionniste, (contrairement à la thèse d'Halévy reprise par nombreux économistes): 'la lecture la plus rapide de Smith ou de Turgot révèle une foule de propositions d'intervention de l'Etat' (9).

Deux aspects de l'argumentation de Vergara nous semble néanmoins discutables:

- Premièrement, Vergara identifie l'éthique déontologique aux théories du droit naturel (72). Pourtant chacune repose sur une ontologie bien distincte : la première suppose un principe de liberté de la volonté et d'autonomie alors que les secondes conçoivent l'homme soumis à un ensemble de lois qui s'imposent. En outre, on observe deux sources épistémologiques distinctes aboutissant à deux manières opposées de concevoir les notions de lois et de nature : l'une autoritaire et rationnelle, (issue de Descartes et de Mallebranche), a fortement influencé les physiocrates et les utilitaristes; l'autre plus 'légaliste', (issue de Newton) est présente chez Smith et Turgot (voir *Maximisation de l'utilité contre marché égalisateur: une explication de nature épistémologique*, F. Clavé et S. Potulny, working paper, University of Paris 2, 2003). De tels arguments s'opposent aux propos de Vergara qualifiant Turgot de 'physiocrate' (147), et Smith d'utilitariste. La réalité est plus complexe et la matrice analytique posée gagnerait à être affinée par l'introduction de données épistémologiques et ontologiques.
- Deuxièmement, il est loin d'être unanimement reconnu en philosophie morale que 'nous sommes obligés d'utiliser un critère éthique unique' (206). Une tendance récente, (voir les travaux de J.-P. Dupuy, Ch. Larmore, Th. Nagel et P. Ricœur), tend à coordonner de manière lexicographique et analytique les différents critères de jugement moral car, par définition, nos motivations et nos valeurs sont hétérogènes et conflictuelles. Dans cette optique, discréditer les thèses ultra — libérales à partir de leur éclectisme éthique ne semble pas être le meilleur terrain; l'analyse des arguments classiques (smithiens en particulier) en matière de justice constituerait une piste plus judicieuse.

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James Warren

Epicurus and Democritean Ethics:

An Archaeology of Ataraxia.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. xiv + 241.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-521-81369-7.

In this compelling addition to the Cambridge classical studies series, James Warren reconstructs a story of influence between Democritus' thought and that of Epicurus. In particular, Warren explores the influence on Epicurus' ethics rather than his atomism. To this end, he takes us through a 'successional list' of fourth-century BC followers of Democritus — like Metrodorus, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, and Epicurus' own Democritean teacher, Nausiphanes — reconstructing aspects of their thought. As interesting as the details of this story are, equally fascinating is the way Warren approaches his material, reading and extrapolating from the 'biographical tradition'.

Warren's interest is not to offer a detailed discussion of Epicurean ethics, but to explain how Epicurus came to hold the views he did (5). In particular, he addresses the puzzle of why, given his rejection of Democritean eliminativism, Epicurus would espouse either atomism or an ethics related to it (200). In a like vein, the presentation of Democritus' moral thought is admittedly incomplete, avoiding the more 'social' and 'political' fragments. Instead, Warren develops those aspects of Democritus' thought that he believes had a bearing on later Democritean and skeptical traditions (29).

One famous fragment of Democritean thinking is reported by Sextus Empiricus (B9 Diels-Kranz): 'By convention sweet, by convention better, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color, but in truth atoms and void'. Here, Democritus opposes what appears by convention (however we understand that) to what exists in truth — atoms and void. The Epicureans interpreted this as an eliminativist position — that everything in the world is 'nothing but' atoms and void, and rejected the ethical implication of this, that moral properties were only conventions, in favour of a view that saw them as a class of things existing by nature.

Central to this ethical debate is an understanding of *ataraxia* (tranquility of the soul). For Democritus, this is seen in his proposal of *euthymia* as the goal of life — 'a state in which the soul proceeds peacefully and well settled' (Diogenes Laertius, IX 45). Hence, Democritus is no hedonist nor *telos*-centered eudaimonist. Warren presents the evidence for a close connection between Democritus' ethics and his physics that depends on a physical interpretation of disturbances and desires, namely, the ideal state of *euthymia* in a certain physical arrangement of atoms (59).

Many Democritean statements find echoes in Epicurean discussions, as in the common response to the fear of death and anxiety caused by religious superstitions. They both argue for the mortality of the soul and against the intervention of demiurgic gods. Such ethical consequences of the atomism attract Epicurus to the physical theory. At the same time, he resists the

reduction of ethics to physics (and hence attacked his own teacher, Nausiphanes), advocating philosophical thought as the attainment of the goal of a human life (identified with pleasure).

Warren presents this mixture of acceptance and resistance as a reasoned response to the ideas of those like Anaxarchus, Pyrrho and Nausiphanes who ingested and developed aspects of Democritean thought. It is in such investigations that his methodology becomes most interesting. Several of his many examples will illustrate his approach.

Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus report Pyrrho as holding that nothing is good or bad by nature, and so there is no cause to be troubled. A passage from Aristocles attacks Pyrrho for, on this view, being hardly human and capable of all kinds of evil. Aristotle (1008b12-20) also thought that someone who held such a position could not consistently act in a recognizably human way. The question then arises whether Pyrrho could have lived without committing himself to inconsistencies. A secondary question concerns the type of skepticism indicated by such views — is he a moral skeptic, or a more thorough epistemic skeptic? Warren turns to anecdotes to investigate these questions: 'I shall also attempt to provide an interpretation of Pyrrho's relationship to the passage in question by referring to the image of Pyrrho found in the biographical sources ...' (109). Several relevant anecdotes indicate that he avoids falling into a well, and stands up to whatever he comes across, whether carts or dogs. Some passages show him not paying attention to his senses (hence the thorough skepticism), but others show him taking account of the information the senses give him for practical purposes. While he may seem prone to Aristotle's criticism, Warren points out that the anecdotes also offer a response. We are told that Pyrrho lived to be nearly ninety years old. 'His failure to avoid physical dangers can therefore remain as a positive sign of his indifference, rather than a potentially fatal eccentricity' (111). Such an 'argument from anecdote' has drawbacks, and we would hesitate to hang too much weight on it. Still, Warren works well with materials available to him and proceeds cautiously, demanding consistencies between the thought and the life (at least on questions of how to conduct one's life).

While aboard a ship, Pyrrho's fellow passengers are alarmed by a storm. But Pyrrho remains untroubled, drawing their attention to a pig calmly eating on the deck, suggesting that this was the kind of tranquility for which they should aim. On such 'extreme anecdotal evidence' (136), Pyrrho advocates a life that strips away the human. Warren uses the anecdote to stress the absence of an epistemological tone to the skepticism: the pig does not doubt its senses. Epicurus admires the disposition of the pig (and the pig was retained as a symbol of *ataraxia*), but disagreed that it was desirable to strip oneself of the rational psychological pleasures of the human.

Warren returns repeatedly to this strategy, using biographical evidence to suggest a solution to the puzzle of whether Nausiphanes as a youth could have heard Pyrrho lecture (DL IX 64). For Epicurus to have studied with Nausiphanes before 323, this encounter must have occurred before Pyrrho

accompanied Alexander on his expedition. But it was as a result of that expedition that Pyrrho developed the disposition that impressed Nausiphanes as a youth. Warren responds to this by advancing similar stories in parallel texts, and concluding that the story of Nausiphanes and Pyrrho can be seen not as historical fact, or error, but as 'a *topos* of philosophical biography' (163). The role of such biography is 'to suggest ways in which the reader of [in this case] Diogenes is asked to construct images of the various philosophers through their interrelation. It is an enactment of the perceived relationship between the two thinkers' philosophical stances.' There is still an element of speculation in Warren's methodology, but it is notable for its suggestiveness and the plausible ways he marshals evidence from the selective sources available. It is also a refreshing advance on speculative readings that lack the attention to argument.

In sum, this is a piece of dense and detailed scholarship, painstakingly referenced and thoughtfully argued. It will provide the reader with an introduction to neither Democritus nor Epicurus, but builds on a basic appreciation of their thought. Undeniably linked by their physical theories, Warren expands this to include the ethical. Along the way, he draws insight from the lives of lesser-known figures. In fact, his contributions toward a reconstruction of the thought of Nausiphanes are among the many unexpected delights of the book.

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*Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the
Concept of Political Liberalism.*

Lanham, MD: University Press of America
2002. Pp. xix + 207.

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John Rawls died on November 24th, 2002, at the age of 81. Shortly before, fellow philosophers like Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Nagel had called him 'the most distinguished moral and political philosopher of our age', and 'the most unworldly of social and political philosophers'. A look to the obituary tributes shows the importance of his life's work in the public sphere. Ben Rogers, writing in the *Guardian*, declared that 'the English-speaking world lost its leading political philosopher'; in the *New York Times*, Douglas Martin wrote that Rawls' work 'gave new meaning and resonance to the

concepts of justice and liberalism'. All this makes the publication of Shaun Young's book quite pertinent, for it is devoted to Rawlsian liberalism and, more precisely, to the assessment of a concept of political liberalism that goes beyond Rawls' work in order to encompass contributions from other philosophers, such as Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar.

Beyond Rawls has eight chapters. Along with the introduction, the first two outline the main features of the liberal solution to the problem of political stability. The central part of the book is devoted to presenting Rawls' political liberalism, which is then compared to Larmore's and Shklar's. In both cases Young concludes that, in the relevant aspects, their political liberalism is more similar to that of Rawls than these authors are ready to acknowledge. This enables Young to use Rawls as a paradigm in order to extrapolate from his recent work *the concept* (as opposed to *a single conception*) of political liberalism. The last three chapters evaluate this concept, focusing criticism on the way that typical political liberals (i.e., Rawlsians) define the limits of 'reasonable' doctrines and the threats posed by the abuse of political power. Hoping that it will help to improve liberal theorizing, Young concludes that Rawls, Larmore, and Shklar, are equally incapable of providing a viable response to the problem of political stability in a world increasingly torn apart by ethno-cultural conflicts.

Despite the absence of a unified definition of liberalism, by showing the similarities between contemporary liberal philosophers Young claims to be able to evaluate them as a group. Therefore, reading this book gives rise to two distinct questions: (i) whether Larmore's and Shklar's political liberalisms are reducible to Rawls', and (ii) whether Young's criticism of Rawls is sound. Although a full answer would need a more complete reading of all three authors than he offers, Young manages to demonstrate that some problems afflicting Rawls' theory also affect Larmore's and Shklar's. To this extent, the answer to question (i) is positive. As for question (ii), Young successfully shows how the liberal reliance in reasonableness, the keystone of Rawls' theory, is empirically unfounded and liable to manipulation by political elites. Moreover, he exposes the blindness of many political liberals to the fact that even 'reasonable' people may abuse political power when they believe it advantageous or necessary to do so.

Is this new? Not much in respect to Rawls and Larmore, who readily acknowledged the similarities between their work. Shklar, on the other hand, has sought a different path in political liberalism, and Young concedes that her work goes further in terms of focusing on the need to protect citizens from cruelty and fear. However, he argues that Shklar's conception, 'like those of Rawls, Larmore, and other political liberals, is problematically biased in terms of its provisions concerning access to political power and influence, while simultaneously failing to provide adequate protection against the possible abuse of political power' (178). This assertion seems a little unfair to those liberals who are as interested in justice as in stability, for at least traditionally, they have called for resistance and dissent whenever political power is abused.

What is perhaps missing in Young's argument is a more explicit discussion of possible ways to address conflicts between stability and justice within the concept of political liberalism. After all, in *A Theory of Justice* the role of civil disobedience was to provide stability to the democratic regime as a warrant of concord between constitution and citizenry: strange as it may seem, in the Rawlsian society civil disobedience helps to maintain and strengthen the just constitution, because it enables citizens to inhibit departures from justice and to correct them when they occur. But since the idea of political stability has been deeply revised by Rawls over more than two decades, the role of civil disobedience becomes problematic within *Political Liberalism*, published in 1993. Here he reckons that 'the problems of civil disobedience ... are still unresolved' (346). This is not surprising: even though the civil rights movement eventually led to a more just situation in the USA, Martin Luther King was often charged with sowing seeds of violence and political instability. Kind's civil disobedience aimed at a new stability based 'on the right reasons', and therefore was justifiable by Rawls, but this may only be appreciated in hindsight.

This problem is also identified by Young when he shows how the 'reasonableness' of appeals to nonpolitical values can be determined only with due reflection, thus casting a shadow of uncertainty over the whole concept of 'reasonableness', for what is now considered reasonable could be deemed unreasonable in the future (153). This coheres with his final assessment of Rawlsian political liberalism as an untenable paradigm, but does not prevent other theorists from attempting a more successful articulation of liberal values. Raz's perfectionist liberalism, or Habermas' defense of the democratic *Rechtsstaat*, to mention two examples, have their own ways of accommodating civil disobedience within a more realist picture of a liberal polity.

This book attempts to be something more than just another collection of papers dealing with family quarrels within liberalism. Although there are unnecessary repetitions and a carefully analytical tone that is almost as dry and abstract as Rawls' own, these minor faults are balanced by a sensible selection from the existing literature, the judicious use of examples, and a persistent awareness of socially significant issues. The debate over Rawls' legacy is both philosophically rich and politically necessary, and Young provides an excellent introduction to it. Anyone concerned about the health and prospects of liberal theory will find ample stimulation in *Beyond Rawls*.

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Jerzy Wojciechowski

Ecology of Knowledge.

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Jerzy Wojciechowski has long been working on a theory which he originated, 'the ecology of knowledge'. This book is his statement of that theory. 'The ecology of knowledge', Wojciechowski begins, 'is a study of the relationship existing between humans and the *body of knowledge*.' This body of knowledge is independent of any knower, or even all knowers at once, because it is 'a product of human evolution — possessing an existence of its own and distinct from the knowers who produce it — an element of the human environment with which humans interact in a — feed forward or feedback relationship' (Introduction). As 'external to knowers', this knowledge construct constitutes a formidable power independent of any generation contributing to it by its ability to impact, obstruct, change, harm, or uplift our lives whether or not we recognise this independent power. As a 'non-biodegradable entity', the knowledge construct has an ontological status which is deeper than the knower-known relationship that is addressed by epistemology, and so it eludes the understanding of philosophers of knowledge who focus on the relationship between knowing agent and the object of knowledge. Relating to its knowers, its products and nature in 'a dynamic, implosive, self-stimulating and form creating [way],' the knowledge construct [is] growing in size and complexity and evolving ever faster — inducing increasingly higher forms of behaviour and organization — forcing humans towards [a] more rational, consciously self-directing and synergistic, globalized humanity' (cited from the volume's Explanations).

At first, one might suspect there is a problem of reification here — hypostasising the results of the traditional knower-known relationship into a self-acting entity operating independently of its creators. Yet the reification here is not fallacious since, Wojciechowski argues at length, the knowledge construct really *is* such an independent entity. Although all of us will die, and those before and after us have gone or will go the same way, the knowledge construct will grow more complex and influential the more we who die contribute to *it* as an overall 'body of knowledge'. Our semantics and syntax of ordinary language presuppose the insight that Wojciechowski draws our attention to, and then pursues systematically.

Sociologists of knowledge or human geographers might not be surprised at Wojciechowski's recognition of the knowledge construct and its independence of knowers. But, Wojciechowski would reply, neither philosophers nor their method have addressed this epistemological-ontological bridge at the basis of our condition, nor have they considered its profound implications for philosophy and, in particular, for metaphysics, epistemology and moral thought.

Wojciechowski organises his analysis in terms of a set of twenty-five 'Laws' which, he argues, govern the knowledge construct and its human and natural

environment in a dynamically interrelated system which he calls 'the ecology of knowledge'. I cannot report this architectonic of 'laws' here, but I will try to indicate their unifying nature. They are all descriptive laws, none prescriptive, and they all have as their referents different dimensions of the complexification and the causal interrelatedness of the knowledge construct and its effects on nature and humanity taken both individually and collectively. Law I — 'The number and variety of causes of stress are proportional to the amount of knowledge' (5) — builds to Law 25 — 'the capacity to do good or evil is proportional to knowledge' (129). Concise overview frameworks and tables of the theoretical system are provided on pages 81, 102-3, and 132-3.

Wojciechowski's analysis ineluctably evolves into deep normative ground. His principal concern is Western culture's abstracting delinkage of knowledge from its context of nature and its subsequent destructive subjugation of environmental processes and beings as man's disposable resources. Cartesian dualism is singled out for splitting the world into a realm of abstract ideas, on the one hand, and nature's body of extension, on the other, a dualism in which the non-human is reduced to a soulless mega-machine. Today this Cartesian world-view is incorporated into the globe-regulating capitalist mechanism, and turns more and more of the planetary ecosystem into dead commodities, profit and waste. Wojciechowski's anti-Marxist cast of thought, however, does not engage this economic-structural dimension of the problem. Rather, he presses the issue back to the very foundations of Judaic-Christian Western culture, and Yahweh's command enjoining 'radical superiority of humans over other beings' and their title to rule and exploit Nature solely for their own benefit (44-6). Modern Science from Francis Bacon on, with Descartes as its ontological standard bearer, has empowered this Western *Weltanschauung* with an all-powerful scientific technology which has systematically despoiled the world's ecosystems since.

The degradations and destructions of the earth and its species by this 'Demiurge' of the knowledge construct is Wojciechowski's prime concern. Western Science and its knowledge empire, he implies, need to be rescued from their destructive autism and re-understood as in vital and dynamic interrelationship with the living world in an 'ecology of knowledge' that is self-conscious.

Wojciechowski calls for the recognition of the regulating-ecological principles of our condition so as to enable us to act in understanding of, and harmony with, the global life-system, rather than continue to depredate it for short term self-gains. Verifiability is not enough for human intelligence to be satisfied with, and predictive control of what is verified may present a danger of blind power. In short, science is radically inadequate to our problematic. Scientific knowledge must be surpassed by comprehending and guiding the knowledge construct with an ecological 'morality'. This morality is not much spelled out by Wojciechowski, but it requires relinkage to the world by a 'traditional sense-knowledge' that feeds back the environment's states, and not only what we can control and predict and get from it. The key

moral concept Wojciechowski appeals to here is 'respect for the objective order of things' and consequent 'limits to the ego's whims and desires' (146).

In a 'global market' propelled by a 'knowledge revolution' that rapidly dismantles civil and ecological infrastructures to produce more commodities for consumers who are non-satiable by neo-classical axiom, Wojciechowski is certainly on the side of the angels. His sensitivity to the insane hubris of mechanistic instrumentalism and resourcism now violating the world has moved him to his pioneering concept of 'the ecology of knowledge'. My principal criticism is that the axial concepts on which he builds his case require more criterial exactness. To begin with, 'knowledge' itself is not defined to distinguish it clearly from falsehood. Thus we never know whether it is the *knowledge* construct that is the problem, or a pretence of knowns which are, in truth, blind partialities being used by powerful institutions like states and corporations as convenient tools to impose life-blind prescriptions.

Concepts like 'rationality' and 'efficiency' likewise remain sufficiently short on definition so as to allow the actually irrational and the inefficient to qualify. 'Respect for the objective order of things' and 'humanisation' are the normative bearings Wojciechowski appeals to re-harmonize the knowledge construct with the creation. But these again are not explained in principle. Typically, metaphysics requires the precision of axiology. One senses the moral meanings through the contexts, but exactly where does 'respect for the objective order of things' violate 'morality' or 'humanness' when people standardly consent to mass changes of this 'objective order of things' as moral and human? If the ultimate problem we face lies not in knowledge or the knowledge construct as such, but in how they are *used*, then our moral guides become the primary issue. It is not the knower or the known nor the knowledge construct that we need to understand, then, so much as the *values steering them*. Here again, we need an exact compass.

Wojciechowski would, I think, not disagree. But if he is crucially insightful, as I think he is, in his case for an ecology of knowledge, we must sometime confront the deep normative issues which environmental ecology itself must face. After we awake to the dynamic interdependency of the changing life system which we are situated within, what principle(s) of value do we affirm, or reject, in adjudicating existing industrial society into accordance with 'the objective order of things'? Natural ecologists have no adequate answer. For their method does not speak to the form of normative principles. My own works argue for a life-value axiology to guide us in which, to be inadequately brief, the better is told by the more comprehensively conscious and biodiversely expressive (most recently in *Value Wars: The Global Market versus the Life Economy* [London: Pluto Press 2002]). But these are deep waters, and need to be sounded more fully to understand the meaning of good and bad directions of ecological systems, which do not of themselves answer the question.

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