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Gregory Dale Adamson

Philosophy in the Age of Science and Capital.

New York: Continuum 2003. Pp. 169.

US\$105.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6031-3);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6032-1).

The bold claims prominent over the first pages of this text immediately disquiet: 'Together, capitalism and science have transformed the environment into a machine for sustaining human existence,' 'Capital ... has so enhanced our understanding and control of social order and the production process that the economy can be said to "organize" itself,' 'Today's anti-capitalist and anti-globalization protests have become more symbolic of disorder than a threat to the establishment,' and 'Since the dawn of postmodernity, virtually every aesthetic and political movement has petered out and every living culture become threatened with dissolution' (1-3). Adamson's standpoint is apparent: a kind of scientific and economic monolith has come into being toward which opposition seems futile.

But as Sartre once pointed out, such pronouncements invariably come with the offer of some slim hope; if we follow the author's directive, perhaps we are not lost. Adamson is no different. His task is explicitly social and situated in the context of an evaluation of Marx: while Marx was right about the globalization of capital, according to Adamson, he was wrong that this globalization would generate an oppositional consciousness. Hence, Adamson calls for to a re-examination of the role of consciousness in conditioning our current state of affairs. Specifically, he urges us to reconsider the metaphysical position of Henri Bergson, who is summoned, as many figures have been before him, to supplement an absence in what is perceived as an overly mechanistic Marxism. In fact, the core of the book consists in an account, analysis, and extension of Bergson's ideas.

Adamson's book contributes to a minor upsurge of interest in Bergson, largely traceable to the work of Gilles Deleuze. What is the appeal of Bergson, a figure who has received scant attention over the last half-century? For Adamson, Bergson is the philosopher of continuity in contrast to science, capital, and contemporary culture's reliance on the category of the discrete. While Adamson announces his task as a social/political one, he begins his argument by outlining and defending Bergson's position. In fact, he devotes almost two-thirds of the text to this task. These sections consist of some fairly dense scholarship, and only those already familiar with Bergson will easily digest them. For example, in the context of a careful study of Bergson's ideas, we revisit Russell's criticisms of Bergson's account of intuition. Here, Adamson employs the work of Gödel, Turing and Post to show the failure of Russell's analytical project, leaving the reader sometimes wondering if he or she has missed an announcement with regard to a program change.

The last third of the book represents an application of Bergson's ideas to the cultural situation described above. Adamson suggests that the dynamic way in which, for Bergson, human beings interact with their environment

through the evolutionary process allows us to better understand our current situation: 'Together the developments of science and capital express an even broader tendency: one which has as its end a world completely adapted to the human and an humanity completely adapted to the world' (119). Humanity changes its environment into a kind of self-sustaining machine. The basis for hope lies, ironically, in recognizing limitation. While our ideologies may tell us that we choose the structure of our lives, we really do not: 'What horrifies many who look back on the seventies is not so much the look of what they used to wear but the fact they desired to wear it. ... It is more accurate to say that it is we who are within desire and desire that chooses us, rather than the other way round. ... While the reflective self has some power in deciding whether or not to act upon them, it is not we who determine the nature of our likes and dislikes' (148). To imagine that we might choose to break with society in a radical way can only be done by rejecting Bergson's insights into continuity: 'If we are to change the nature of existence ... it will not be through some proletarian revolution, but only through the revaluation of thought and values. ... It is by creating differences in what we are attracted to, or part of, that we maintain the substance of culture and give momentum to movement. And it is through desire that we respond to the ongoing problems posed by life and change' (153-4). So, we ought to cultivate desire for that which is other than the growing uniformity of the current social order. Evolutionary change thereby becomes possible.

A number of questions arise. I'll restrict myself to Adamson's consideration of contemporary culture. First, the book is filled with assertions about the ineffectuality of organized political action. For example: 'we now find that any degree of direct opposition to capital, science or their globalizing effects, comes under attack and eventually makes the whole even stronger' (134). However, Adamson offers virtually no empirical evidence for such claims. Surely it remains to be seen what impact the international anti-war, anti-globalization movement may have. When at least 100 million people worldwide took to the streets to protest the U.S. led war on Iraq, the *New York Times* referred to it as a second 'world power'. I gather Adamson would have this power, as it is necessarily ineffectual, disband so as to cultivate desire for difference. A stronger case must be made for this.

Second, insofar as Bergson is supposed to 'offer an extra dimension to Marx's critique' (4), one might have expected more discussion of Marx's position. In fact, while Bergson and writers engaged with Bergson are cited hundreds of times, Marx is quoted *not at all*. Even as Adamson claims that Marx *was right* about the fact of capital expansion, he defines capitalism *without reference* to economic exploitation: 'What else is capitalism but the process whereby life is increasingly objectified, and human actions progressively mechanized and integrated into a unified economic order?' (118) But, *everything* in Marx's account of capitalism leads back to the conflict between capital and labor. While there can be varying degrees of class consciousness, there is *always* fundamental conflict. Hence, an essential volatility in the system suggests the viability of organized political action.

Rather than in any way extending Marxist theory, Adamson seems rather to repudiate it in light of 'the dawn of postmodernity'. But, unlike many postmodern theorists, Adamson recognizes that metaphysical assumptions cannot be avoided. Perhaps this accounts for the renewed interest in Bergson generally. The hope appears to be that he may provide a metaphysic adequate to the postmodern condition.

Michael A. Principe

Middle Tennessee State University

Branka Arsić

*The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity
in Berkeley (via Beckett).*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.

Pp. xix + 210.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4642-7);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4643-5).

I must start by saying that, in today's Berkeley scholarship (dominated as it is by analytically-minded interpretations of all kinds), this book by Branka Arsić brings forth one of the most unorthodox, original, and illuminating approaches to Berkeley's immaterialism. Leaving behind, for the most part, what the mainstream Berkeley commentators find interesting — or worth-discussing, or 'modern' — in Berkeley, Arsić embarks on a very personal and bold project of taking Berkeley's immaterialism to the extreme: 'That was my aim here: to try to take some of Berkeley's theses to the extreme' (xii). More specifically, by artfully intermingling the presentation of Berkeley's theory of vision with the narration of Samuel Beckett's screenplay 'Film' (a piece deliberately designed to illustrate, through artistic/cinematographic means, Berkeley's *esse est percipi*), by constantly placing Berkeley's theory within the complex epistemic context delineated at the dawns of modern age by such figures as Giordano Bruno, Descartes, Kepler, Newton, Spinoza and Leibniz, and, finally, by managing to look at Berkeley with a most open and un-dogmatic hermeneutic eye, Arsić succeeds in offering a cluster of refreshing insights into what Berkeley's philosophy is ultimately about. For instance, as she sees it, the main aim of Berkeley's philosophy is, boldly put, 'the restoration of everything to the state of an absolutely "objective" perception, which is the perceived, the restoration of everything to a state of "virginal" consciousness ... Everything is restored to a state without disguises or masquerades, a state of complete nakedness, complete visibility' (131-2). Brilliant pages are also dedicated to what might have been the deeper

presuppositions behind Berkeley's philosophizing. Immersing herself into the inner logic of immaterialism, and letting herself pervaded by the way this philosophy works, Arsić realizes from within the 'transcendental principle' of Berkeley's empiricism, the secret recipe that makes metaphysically possible the Berkeleian person: 'the person is the impersonal motion of the transformation of an identity into another identity, blind consent to everything' (133).

Yet, this is only one step in Arsić's demonstration. For what is really at stake in her book is the way in which Berkeley could be 'used' in designing a theory of what she calls 'iconographic subjectivity': 'I have used (and therefore misused) a set of claim and utterances "belonging" to Berkeley in order to develop a narration of what I call "the passive synthesis of exhaustion or iconographic subjectivity" ... All of Berkeley's theses on distance, depth, and surface have helped me to elaborate the concept of the passive eye as the eye of an iconographic, exhausted subjectivity' (xi). Not content with simply describing how Berkeley's world works, Arsić shows how this philosophy could be fruitfully employed in some of today's debates over 'subjectivity'. And what she finds in Berkeley is, even if he did not theorize it as such, the interesting concept of 'iconographic subject', which is to say, a 'subjectivity that disappears into the multiplicity of objects ... The iconographic subject is the subject become "objects." It is an objectivity that knows itself as always-different objects' (129). For Arsić, this notion is definitely one of the most important contributions that Berkeley brought to the history of philosophy and to an unprejudiced understanding of the human nature. As a result, a more complex, more comprehensive and more 'generous' knowledge of our real 'metaphysical situation', and of our relationship to God, has become possible: 'Iconography is the totality of all the profiles of the world, seen in their immediacy, or, iconography is the world seen by an innocent eye, which does not recognize distance or the projection of the vantage point. God's eye is innocent' (94).

Throughout her unorthodox approach to Berkeley's theory of vision Arsić is significantly indebted to a series of major developments that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century in the sphere of Continental philosophy. The works of Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Derrida are frequently cited in the book, and the indebtedness to Deleuze is gratefully recognized: 'My effort to draw from Berkeley's philosophy some conclusions and concepts ... was supported by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. It could be shown that Deleuze's philosophy is totally permeated by the experience of British empiricism' (xii).

One of the most refreshing (and, I should add, entertaining) things about this book lies in its high literary qualities. Arsić is indeed a *great narrator of ideas* (something that will never be overrated when it comes to writing philosophy). In some mysterious way, she manages to place herself *into* the ideas she writes about, and then — from that particular vantage point — she fleshes them out, she gives them life, she caresses them and shows them tenderness, all of these forming a process that must be very close to the

process of fiction writing; never has philosophy writing been so close to character creating. Here are a couple of samples of the excellent philosophical prose that one comes incessantly across when reading Arsic's book: 'The eye sees by *feeling* the visible. It finally becomes the *sense* organ that feels the world because it feels the affections ... It has to suffer the picture — the picture becomes the passion of the eye. Between the visible and the eye there is an absolute intimacy, for whatever feels cannot be separated from what it feels' (55). Or: 'The world of the Berkeleian Robinson is organized therefore in a manner that we might determine as the structure of the night: only what is lit by the lamp can exist and be seen. Behind that, there is perfect ignorance, the existence of some absolutely unattainable world. From this darkness, anything can break out — anything does break out — and "strike" with a stroke of surprise' (113-14).

The climax of this grand narrative — a narrative within which philosophy, literature, literary theory, history of ideas, film theory, iconology and theology are wizardly interwoven — is being reached at the very end of the book when the reader comes to recognizes himself both in the defeated man sitting in the armchair of Beckett's screenplay, and — more importantly — in the 'iconographic subject' depicted in Arsic's narrative: 'Every sense goes its own way, to its own objects. This indeed is schizophrenia... the breakthrough that establishes and preserves the schizophrenically "unified," heterogeneous object. By crossing the limit, the iconographic subject simultaneously enters different objects. It is at every moment multiple — it is the multitude of objects, of becomings, of comings and leavings ... A world of nightmare in which only surprises and astonishments are continuous: a world of horror, a world of schizophrenia' (174).

Costica Bradatan

Miami University, Ohio

Rémi Brague

*The Wisdom of the World: The Human
Experience of the Universe in Western Thought.*

Trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003.

Pp. 304.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-226-07075-1.

In his 'history of beings-in-the-world', Rémi Brague traces the discovery and loss of a human meaning that the cosmos holds. Pre-cosmic wisdom led to the Greek discovery that the structure of the cosmos itself contains the key to moral understanding. Attempts to explain the cosmos were bound inextricably

cably to attempts to unfold the ethical meaning inherent in it. Brague shows the transformations of this ancient legacy through the Middle Ages and to our own time, in which cosmic structure has become separated from the moral meaning originally thought intrinsic to it.

Brague's book is divided into four parts: 'Part I: Setting the Stage' explores 'Pre-Cosmic Wisdom' and the 'Birth of the Cosmos in Greece'. 'Part II: Four Models' delineates conceptions of the cosmos from Socrates and Plato, the Atomists, Scripture, and Gnosticism. Part III focuses on 'Medieval Models', and 'Part IV: The New World' considers the fate of these historical experiences of the cosmos in modernity.

In the Introduction, Brague posits a relationship between our questions about the world and those about ourselves. Having distinguished between cosmography, cosmogony, and cosmology, he focuses on cosmology, accounts of the world that include 'a reflection on the nature of the world as a world' and 'the presence in the world of a subject capable of experiencing it as such — the human being' (4-5).

In Part I, Brague traces 'the birth of the cosmos in Greece,' from linguistic origins of the term 'world' in Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Pythagoras, the first to use *kosmos* to refer to the encompassing of all things. Plato's *Timaeus* defines cosmos as 'an ordered whole, both good and after discussing the pre-cosmic civilizations of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, and beautiful ... no longer a common inaccessibility' (22-3). Because man does not construct this cosmos, 'he is able to appear as the subject to which the world shows itself in its totality' (24-5).

In Part II, Brague sets forth the cosmological models of Socrates and Plato, the Atomists, Scripture, and the Gnostics. The Greeks believed that the same moral laws governed the cosmos and human beings, and that human beings 'assured the order of the world.' Plato's *Timaeus* inverts this relationship: 'it is the imitation of the preexisting order of non-human, physical realities that helps man to achieve the plenitude of his humanity ... wisdom will be an imitation of the world' (34).

For the Atomists (Epicureans), the objects of knowledge were empty of human value, and 'imitation of the world unthinkable' (40). Brague contends that Scripture 'does not contain any unified field of cosmological doctrine' (44), but that religions recognizing Abraham offer an 'Abrahamic model' positing that 'the world is created by a good God.' Because man is of greatest value and sovereignty in the world, his model of behavior must not be that of phenomena in the cosmos, but of God himself. 'God manifests himself less through his creation than through a more direct intervention: He can either give the world his law, as in Judaism and Islam, or he can indeed enter into that world through incarnation, as in Christianity' (60-1).

For the Gnostics, the soul, originating from the Good, is cast into the evil material realm where it must combat the influences of the world with knowledge of the good, non-materiality. 'The authentic wisdom' then, 'is the knowledge of ways of evading,' a wisdom that 'negates the world.' (70).

According to Brague in Part III, 'the medieval model superimposed elements emerging from the religions acknowledging Abraham onto a Platonically inspired cosmology.' He describes the return to the Socratic method within the religious/Gnostic tradition from which arises what he terms 'gnoseology'. 'Know thyself' is translated into 'Know God'. But the route is no longer direct contemplation upon God (theology), or nature, the cosmos. Rather we can know God via knowledge of ourselves — our animating spirit also governs the world.

This model held the notion of a multi-tiered cosmos with a hierarchical dimension. Man is a microcosm of the entire world, containing all of the elements, and positioned in the highest station within it. In this model, Good ultimately triumphs — it is beyond 'the sphere of the moon' (111). Only on the terrestrial plane does evil have any effect. Moreover, even on earth, 'one can *appeal against* evil to a higher jurisdiction' (113). Therefore, a study of nature can aid man to avoid evil.

Ancient and medieval thinkers depicted the structure of the world as good, as morally relevant. Man imitated the inherent good (behavior) present at the outset of Being. And his 'moral effort toward the full blossoming of his humanity' shows 'the tendency of all things toward their perfection' (153).

All that he has painstakingly detailed, Brague writes in Part IV, is 'no longer our own' (185). 'The modern cosmos is ethically indifferent' (186). He writes '... there is no longer any connection between cosmology and ethics, no longer any relationship between what we know of the structure of the physical universe and the way man thinks about himself and feels what he is and what he ought to be'. While 'the fantastic progress of astrophysics or of the earth sciences enable[s] an increasingly exact cosmography ... we no longer have a cosmology'. The cosmos has lost 'its constitutive function with regard to the human subject,' and is now 'the indifferent setting in which human activity can continue The world can no longer help us to become men' (216).

Brague concludes, somewhat curtly, with an overview of the contemporary philosophical landscape with regard to world. He disregards any originality in these contemporary philosophical perspectives, especially with regard to the relation between cosmology and anthropology that is so prevalent.

Robert Hahn

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Fritz Breithaupt, Richard Raatzsch and Bettina Kremberg, eds.

Goethe and Wittgenstein:

Seeing the World's Unity in its Variety.

Wittgenstein-Studien, Vol. 5.

New York: Peter Lang 2003. Pp. 170.

US\$33.95. ISBN 0-8204-6078-8.

The German Ludwig Wittgenstein Society started *Wittgenstein-Studien* in 1994 as an electronic journal [see: <http://www.phil.uni-passau.de/dlwg/ws.html>]. In the new millennium it has begun a series of printed publications, some in German, some in English. The present volume collects ten papers from a 2000 conference on Goethe and Wittgenstein.

Goethe was an influential model for Wittgenstein. His *Metamorphosen der Pflanzen* argued that our recognition of the relatedness of plants should be traceable to an *Urpflanze*, a prototype plant. He may have thought that there exists such a plant, or that it can be seen in any plant if one gains the right *aperçu*, but it is in any event not a Platonic Form. It was conceived as an organism with a history, whose natural development could be seen metamorphosed into the life-histories of other plants. Many of the authors relate this method to Wittgenstein.

Breithaupt and Raatzsch's introduction makes no attempt to summarize the contributions. They note that Goethe's *Theory of Colours* provided Wittgenstein with specific phenomenological problems, and suggest that what they otherwise have in common may be a matter of their 'whole approach' (10) rather than of individual ideas.

James Klagge shows that Wittgenstein got the contrasting concepts: 'culture' and 'civilization' from Spengler's *Decline of the West*. Spengler adapted Goethe's distinction between organic and mechanistic explanations of plants to distinguish the maturity of a human era from its end stage. Klagge's thesis is that Goethe's influence, as mediated by Spengler, shows up most clearly in Wittgenstein's rejection of the scientism and mechanistic causal explanations of our current civilization, and in his awareness of the problematic use of terms of criticism taken from the period of our high culture and applied to the period of our decline.

Matthias Kross and Nikos Psarros dispute the influence of *Metamorphosis*. Kross thinks that Wittgenstein 'is not at all looking for a first or last principle or unity' (42), and that he criticizes the Goethean proto-phenomenon (e.g., accusing Spengler of mixing it up with the object it is supposed to explain). A quote from Faraday, 'water is one individual thing — it never changes', is appended to *Investigations* §108. Baker and Hacker have argued that this echoes Goethe. Psarros claims that the cases are quite different: the identity of water-phenomena 'is of the kind of a rule in a language game', while the identity of the parts of a plant 'is an empirically testable assertion' (53). Faraday and Wittgenstein were playing one game, and Goethe a very different one.

Joachim Schulte disagrees. He argues convincingly that Goethe and Wittgenstein both show us problems with how to see a sign 'as embodying all its applications' (60), and then valuably corrects a common reading of 'Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*'. He ends with an ingenious comparison of Goethe's and Wittgenstein's 'chain' and 'ladder' metaphors.

Fritz Breithaupt associates Goethe's strategy of explaining the relations among plants by reference to an original plant, with Wittgenstein's strategy of explaining the meanings of words by reference to original reactions and patterns of use rather than to a Platonic Form, a named object, or a private idea of an object. There is in this paper much metaphysical language of the sort Wittgenstein disparaged, but its main point is insightful.

Alfred Nordmann uses Goethe, Lichtenberg and Kant to triangulate a space of possibilities within which Wittgenstein tried to place himself. Goethe's primal-phenomenon idea is seductive, but it misleads us into thinking that we now understand the way things *have* to be, rather than that this is one of the ways things *can* be. He also accepts Lichtenberg's (*Tractarian*) claim that through correcting language one can see the world aright, but rejects his idea that we can thereby *change* the world. Quoting extensively from Wittgenstein's diaries from the 1930's (now published in *Public and Private Occasions*), Nordmann argues that Wittgenstein has left himself no place to stand: either changing our way of seeing changes the world, or it gets no grip on anything. One might reply, however, that Wittgenstein did not seek a place to stand, but preferred 'the thought that so to speak soars above the world and leaves it as it is — regarding it in flight from above' (109).

Garry Hagberg takes up exactly this theme. 'Person-perception' is awareness of subjects, not as winged cherubs at the edge of the world (to use Schopenhauer's image), but as embodied and engaged. 'We exert ourselves in vain to describe the character of a human being; but assemble his ... deeds, and a picture of his character will confront us', wrote Goethe (114). Hagberg uses Goethe's art-critical essays to great effect; the contortions of the sculptured 'Laocoon' are a perfect reaction to being wounded just where the snake has bitten him. We see his pain. This 'unmediated person-perception' (120) belies the 'inner / outer' dichotomy of metaphysical dualism. Similarly, Leonardo's visual intelligence 'is a *publicly knowable* fact that we see in his work' (122). Hagberg subtly shows how Goethe's examples match Wittgenstein's account of our knowledge of persons.

Richard Eldridge claims that the *Investigations* 'is about the problem of wedding autonomous selfhood to continuing sociality' (142), and develops a comparison with the character, preoccupations and style of Goethe, especially in *The Sufferings of Young Werther*. The modern soul is torn between cozy domesticity and wild creative desiring, between genius and the ordinary. The young Werther committed suicide, but although they both felt that temptation, Goethe and Wittgenstein accepted the duty to write, 'to achieve both autonomous selfhood and continuing sociality' (144).

The volume concludes with Richard Raatzsch's tightly argued account of the 'Lecture on Ethics' as transitional between the transcendental ethics of the *Tractatus* and the absent ethics of the *Investigations*. Goethe's *Elective Affinities* uses a chemical metaphor to explain why some people mix easily (like water and wine), while others are like water and oil unless a mediator (alkaline salt, e.g.) facilitates their mixing. Goethe's characters grow in and out of personal relationships, but Charlotte reminds the reader that the metaphor can extend to peoples, religions, classes, sexes, and generations. Some relationships are natural to us — we *choose* them. Raatzsch describes this as worldly (not transcendental), inter-subjective (not individualistic), and naturalistic. Moreover, it shows its moral lessons through a simile. This is how the late Wittgenstein would have done ethics had he written an *Ethical Investigations*.

This collection (though unevenly proofread) contains some excellent recent research on the influence of Goethe (and Spengler) on Ludwig Wittgenstein. It adds a valuable dimension to our understanding of the Austrian whom Russell once called 'my German'.

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Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, eds.

Ethics and Foreign Intervention.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Pp. xiii + 301.

US\$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81074-4);

US\$21.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00904-9).

In their introductory chapter, Chatterjee and Scheid observe that, with the end of the cold war and with the ever-increasing international emphasis on human rights, there has been an increase in both the instances of military intervention for humanitarian purposes and the acceptance of the humanitarian justification for such interventions (4-5). *Ethics and Foreign Intervention* is a collection of thirteen original articles by prominent philosophical and political scholars that attempt to provide moral and legal guidance with respect to military humanitarian interventions. Chatterjee and Scheid have placed the articles in four sections: 1. 'The Conceptual and Normative Terrain', 2. 'Just-War Perspectives and Limits', 3. 'Secession and International Law', and 4. 'The Critique of Interventionism'. These divisions provide

helpful guideposts. The articles, however, are much richer than the division headings may suggest.

As a starting point, consider Tom Farer's thoughtful article, 'The Ethics of Intervention in Self-determination Struggles' (included in section three). Farer begins by helpfully placing the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the right of self-determination in a historical context. He then analyzes the concept of nation, distinguishing the 'constitutional nation' from the 'community of blood'. This distinction is used by Farer to explain the ways in which liberalism is and is not compatible with certain nationalist aspirations. It is only in the context of this rich background discussion that Farer addresses the topic of succession and humanitarian intervention, both by critiquing Michael Walzer's principles for military intervention and by drawing his own conclusions.

The question of what a liberal political philosophy entails with respect to military intervention and state relationships is one of the themes that arises in a number of the articles. Michael Blake, in 'Reciprocity, Stability, and Intervention: The Ethics of Disequilibrium', argues that it is not, as an ethical matter, possible for a liberal state to enter into principled reciprocal agreements with illiberal states in an attempt to obtain international stability. As part of his argument, Blake criticizes Rawls' arguments that seem to support reciprocity in international relationships. Blake argues that international state reciprocity fails to satisfy the liberal's obligation to 'defend and promote individual dignity' (65). At first glance, this rejection of an 'equilibrium of reciprocity' appears to give the liberal state license to militarily intervene in the affairs of illiberal governments. However, Blake contends that there are still strong reasons for the liberal to 'avoid [military] intervention in all but the most obvious and clear cases of injustice' (67, bracketed text added).

Christine Chwaszcza, in 'Secession, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Normative Significance of Political Boundaries', also considers military intervention from the liberal vantage point. She argues that the liberal position cannot support a basic right of succession in the case of 'just rule'. Instead, succession is only justified in some cases of 'unjust rule' (175; Allen Buchanan draws a similar conclusion in 'Secession, State Breakdown, and Humanitarian Intervention').

While the articles all revolve around the issue of military humanitarian intervention, they also provide important insights that apply more generally to the morality of war. Henry Shue, in 'Bombing to the Rescue? NATO's 1999 Bombing of Serbia', considers the morality of attacking dual-purpose targets — for example, electric power plants — that serve both vital military and civilian functions. Shue argues that the doctrine of double-effect, applied to dual-purpose targets, shows that such targets are sometimes, but only sometimes, legitimate targets (i.e., such targets sometimes, but only sometimes, satisfy the just-war discrimination condition). Since, Shue contends, international law currently recognizes dual-purpose targets as *always* satisfying the discrimination condition (106), there is a need to modify the law, so that it is less permissive. Considering the Kosovo war, Shue argues that the

bombing of the electric grid in Serbia, while legal under current law, was immoral.

A number of other authors argue for revisions and modifications to the just-war criteria. George Lucas, in 'From *Jus ad Bellum* to *Jus ad Pacem*: Re-thinking Just-War Criteria for the use of Military Force for Humanitarian Ends', argues that the requirements (and hence the definitions) of the just-war criteria need to be modified to deal with particular considerations that arise in the context of humanitarian interventions. For example, since the just causes that ground humanitarian interventions so markedly emphasize protecting the rights and liberties of civilians, Lucas contends that this places extra restrictions on the means that can be invoked by the military in achieving those just causes. Says Lucas: 'international military forces (like domestic law enforcement personnel) must incur considerable additional risk, even from suspected guilty parties, in order to uphold and enforce the law without themselves engaging in violations of the law' (92; parentheses in the original text).

This sampling only touches the surface of the varied issues and topics covered in this collection. Some of the other topics addressed include: duty versus permission, law and policy versus morality, last resort, right intention, and proportionality. One helpful way into the collection is to read the articles with one or more of these (or other) issues in the back of one's mind. The articles also consider a variety of conflicts and examples from past decades and a number of the articles consider in detail aspects of the Kosovo war. (And while the articles appear to have been written either prior to or just after the September al-Qaeda attacks, much that is said 'speaks', at times presciently, to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Lastly, the authors also criticize and reflect upon the arguments and positions of many prominent scholars including: Arendt, Beran, Chomsky, Gauthier, Rawls, Walzer, and the neo-realists.

The articles are essential reading for moral and political scholars of war and will also appeal to those new to the field, including those undergraduate or graduate students taking a first course on the morality of war. Each author has included a rich set of footnotes that direct the reader to other scholarly works, reports from legal and NGO organizations on recent conflicts, and speeches and articles by military personnel and prominent political figures. These references alone are worth the price of admission.

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Vincent Colapietro

Fateful Shapes of Human Freedom: John William Miller and the Crises of Modernity.

Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press

2003. Pp. xv + 323.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8265-1409-X);

US\$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8265-1433-2).

When a philosopher's name appears in a book title, expectations of either close exegesis or critical commentary on that philosopher are typically aroused. The high philosophical merit of Colapietro's book arises from accomplishments having little to do with either exegesis or criticism. The reader is instead drawn into a series of engaging meditations on closely related perennial issues of human nature, metaphysics, culture, history, and freedom. These meditations proceed with the occasional assistance of inspiration from selected sentences of Miller, carefully drawn from his large body of published and unpublished writings. Colapietro has the happy facility of finding just the right quotation to punctuate the point being made, without ever setting Miller up for a hard blow. Indeed, it appears that Miller is never contradicted or criticized in these pages; a more ideal conversation partner than Colapietro could not be imagined. The primary aim of this book, we are told in the preface, is to reveal the extent to which the theme of history dominates Miller's philosophy. But this is merely a conciliatory bone thrown to the sort of historians of philosophy who anticipate a full meal of critical exposition and who read prefaces first. Since these meditations do have the nominal assignment of saying something about Miller that has not been said before, which is certainly accomplished, we need some acquaintance with this obscure philosopher.

John William Miller (1895-1978) was a Harvard graduate (PhD 1922) and taught at Williams College until 1960. Miller, caught between sharply opposed camps during Harvard's 'second golden age' of C.I. Lewis, W. E. Hocking, R. B. Perry, and E.B. Holt, sought a compromise between Hegelian idealism and pragmatic naturalism. One wonders how a confrontation with Whitehead, who arrived after Miller graduated, might have aided this search since Miller is evidently a process thinker. In any case, virtually no one at the time, or since, would have suspected Miller of intense philosophical thinking and writing. Miller was among that last generation of philosophy professors who could enjoy a fine teaching career while publishing almost nothing. Only a few devoted students have kept his thought alive, by getting into print several books after his death. Those who have read them find them to be a treasure. They apparently belong to that interesting genre of philosophical effort that tries to synthesize the best from two firmly opposed systems; Miller called no-one Master. This genre calls to mind similar creatively compromising (and better published) figures from that generation such as Stephen C. Pepper (1891-1972), Susanne K. Langer (1895-1952), Van Meter Ames (1898-1985), John H. Randall, Jr. (1899-1980), Arthur E. Mur-

phy (1901-1962), and Sidney Hook (1902-1989). From the fine efforts of Miller's students and admirers like Colapietro, it is obvious that Miller is hardly out of place with this quite respectable company and deserves serious attention from more than just historians.

The reader would hardly know (or long care) where Miller's philosophy leaves off and Colapietro's own philosophy begins. Approval of Miller is so unwavering and heartfelt that the sporadic exegesis becomes quite transparent to the perspicuous view of the philosophical problems themselves. The merely annoying habit of supplying fragmentary quotations, often so brief, oracular, and pulled from context as to be quite obscure by themselves, might leave the historian of philosophy frustrated from an inability to read paragraph-length stretches of Miller for herself and compare them with Colapietro's explanations. But I rather think that this sort of reader was never the intended audience. Miller is only a convenient jumping-off place for Colapietro's own extended musings, which in turn are exquisitely designed jumping-off places for the reader's own contemplations. Rare is such a book that makes a trained philosopher think for themselves, and to such profit.

Pluralistic pragmatists and hermeneutical continentalists will find this book quite congenial and stimulating. Friends of William James and John Dewey will agree with Colapietro that indeed we are here given an empirical naturalism worth fighting for. The comparisons with Henry Thoreau are brilliant. Most Wittgensteinians would find rewarding material here, although (surprisingly) Wittgenstein is first mentioned on the very last page. Not everyone enjoys a useful compromise, however. Reductive materialists, determinists, and rationalists beware! Miller (and Colapietro) advocate the fundamental nature of the 'Midworld' of human experience in all its pluralistic and historicist glory, which grounds agency, ordinary language, and any form of knowledge. Scientific realists will be dismayed to hear how physics cannot replace lived reality, just as idealists will be dismayed to see that no absolute of reason can guarantee coherence to the finite individualities of life. Colapietro explores the many aspects to the issue of how cultural processes both shape our capacities and potentials for freedom. Neither determined by history nor free from it, humanity is destined to endlessly re-formulating our story of how we can to have stories and how we might have better stories. After the chapters on revising philosophy and on the Midworld, two more chapters on 'Historical Displacements and Situated Narratives' and 'Critique, Narration and Revelation' complete the book. Miller and Colapietro find a point of mediation between tragedy and creativity, between pessimism and optimism. Although the trajectory of the past has made us, we need not reject the past or cultural bonds to find ourselves (what would we find?), since it is enough to take advantage of the openness of the future to seek gradual change for the better.

Should Miller's compromise be our compromise today? It is the end of Cartesian rationalism and metaphysical realism. The long-anticipated convergence of American pragmatism with the continental tradition of Hegel, Heidegger, and Gadamer is promised if we go down the path laid out by

Colapietro. Only the work of Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, or Joseph Margolis' work compares. Colapietro's outstanding work should be read by anyone interested in the open possibilities of future philosophy.

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Bernard Faure

*Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist
and Western Discourses.*

Trans. Janet Lloyd.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.

Pp. xiv + 195.

US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4348-7);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4347-9).

While Buddhism is gaining philosophical attention in the West, its central ideas are still far from mainstream. Many Western philosophers will resist Buddhism because its religious and pragmatic approach is viewed as being at odds with the logical and rational methods prized in analytic philosophy. In his book, Bernard Faure takes Western philosophy to task on this matter. His aim is to debunk various stereotypes about Buddhism and to suggest that Western philosophy can benefit from incorporating strands of Buddhist thinking into its rubric. His coverage of Buddhist thought — mainly informed by Chan/Zen and Tantric sects — ranges from its history and depiction in the West, to a survey of different Buddhist traditions ('Realism', 'Idealism' and 'The Middle Way'), to a discussion of dream, myth and ritual, to the elusive *nirvāṇa*, the goal of Buddhist spiritual practice. Central to Faure's analysis of Buddhism is what he terms 'the two-truths theory', a schema upon which Buddhist thought is founded. These are (1) 'conventional, worldly truth' and (2) 'ultimate, supramundane truth' (xii). He claims that this 'two-truths theory' directly challenges a coveted assumption of Western philosophy (owed to Aristotle): the law of excluded middle, where 'if one of two contradictory propositions is true, the other is necessarily false' (xii). Faure thinks many debates in Western philosophy have been stifled by a dichotomy stemming from adherence to this law — for example: idealism versus materialism, reality versus appearance, essence versus existence (126). The traditional envisaged solution to these debates, says Faure, implies subscribing to one camp or the other, with no middle ground. It involves the assumption of only one right answer, one universal truth of the matter. According to Faure, better progress could be made by adopting Buddhism's

more fluid way of thinking; its endorsement of the 'middle way', of tetralemmic logic, and ultimately, of supramundane reality which transcends language and logic.

Faure's central thesis is an intriguing one. There is some intuitive appeal in the suggestion that Western analytical method may not be the sole authority on understanding reality. Unfortunately, he fails to take his inquiry beyond a vague stirring of intuition. This is partly due to poor structure, a circuitous writing style and a lack of clear objectives for each chapter. The foggy presentation obscures any sense of progression from premises to conclusion. We would like to know exactly how Western philosophy's (supposed) adhesion to the law of excluded middle falls short in its depiction of reality, and how Buddhist thought could help fill in the gaps. Part of the problem is that while Faure condemns Western philosophy for over-subscribing to dichotomous logic and universal truth (18-48), he provides few concrete examples of its supposed failure to depict reality. The mention of such standoffs as idealism versus materialism (129) will not get one thinking: 'Now *here's* a nut traditional philosophy can't crack'. Nor is the cause much helped by his cryptic shift to such enigmas as Zen *kōans* and dream-logic. In fact one wonders whether the analytic philosophy he burns — depicted on the whole as a language game (26, 33) — is not a straw effigy. He seems unaware that many debates in philosophy (for example, in mind, science and art) are not merely logico-grammatical: they also utilise empirical data, with metaphysics never far behind. As for universal truths, we are told that in all probability these do not exist (32). Readers hoping for arguments — and indeed an immediate *context* for this potentially startling claim ('universal truths' pertaining to exactly what?) — will be disappointed.

Faure's discussion of Buddhism (1-12) begins promisingly. He rightly warns against the temptation to prematurely take psychological and moral aspects of Buddhism out of their wider arena. But he goes too far by including ritual in the arena, treating it, in fact, as central to Buddhism as the Four Noble Truths (15). The heart of Buddhist thought is not ritual, but the proclaimed teachings on the causes and cure for suffering. These teachings expand into the Four Noble Truths with their wider cosmology (including *karma* and rebirth). Faure's fascination with ritual qua ritual is like a fixation with the finger that points to the moon. It masks the actual purpose — to serve as a vehicle through which transformative practices of virtue, meditation and insight (towards *nirvāṇa* and the end of suffering) are supposed to occur. His vapid portrayal of Zen seated meditation as 'first and foremost a ritual imitation of the posture adopted by the Buddha' (162) is typical of this fixation — diverting attention from what is really relevant to Zen practice. The diversion is ironic because meditation and insight practice — said to evoke deep and non-discursive understanding of reality — could offer the best clues on how to challenge the limits of rational thought. Nor is the reader much enlightened by Faure's often lyrical depiction of *nirvāṇa* and other Buddhist concepts.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that, by page 16, Faure has already announced — without argument — that there is no universal mysticism: cultural norms inform supranormal perception and its deliverance of ‘absolute’ truth! But since cultural norms are mundane, we end up with mundanely informed supramundane truths — about as possible, on Buddhist terms, as married bachelors. In this alarming early twist, Faure therefore exterminates the very paradigm that is supposed to challenge Western rationality. Perhaps its early death and mangled resurrection explain Faure’s later idea that in the realm of twofold truth, anything goes — for example, that the *Mahāyāna* equation of *nirvāṇa* or awakening with *saṃsāra* and its passions can be possibly reversed to allow for materialism and hedonism (140-1), or that ‘in the realm of twofold truth ... the finger *is* the moon and the moon is nothing but a finger’ (171). But in Buddhism, such equations are only portrayed as applicable to and understandable from the supramundane perspective of awakening. When distorted into a mundane heuristic and apology for poor logic, they become not a help, but an embarrassment to Buddhist and Western thought.

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Richard Feist and William Sweet, eds.
Husserl and Stein.
 Washington, DC: Council for Research in
 Values and Philosophy 2003. Pp. iv + 202.
 US\$17.50. ISBN 1-56518-194-8.

Edmund Husserl was among the outstanding intellectual figures of the twentieth century. His philosophical exploration commenced with his study of Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Here Husserl was introduced to Brentano’s two theses that the proper subject matter for psychology is the psychic life itself and that there exist two different but related phenomena, namely, the physical and the psychical. Appropriating Brentano’s use of the term ‘intentionality’ while rendering a new connotation and grounding, Husserl’s point of departure suspended or ‘bracketed’ physical phenomena in order to analyze the processes of consciousness itself and what psychic phenomena reveal to reflection. The critical attitude required by a rigorous, sustained, and systematic approach that turned to ‘the things themselves’ inaugurated the ‘phenomenological movement’ of the 1900’s.

Like many philosophers before him (e.g., Descartes, Berkeley, Kant) who aimed at a theory of consciousness, Husserl's project anticipated a pure science of consciousness with indubitable foundations. Indeed, he insisted that phenomenology itself be rigorously scientific and critical. If the phenomenological method was to provide a secure base for a pure theory of consciousness, its achievement warrants the designation of phenomenology as a legitimate discipline of philosophy, a branch in its own right. The fertile field of the discipline and its methodology has given rise to a plethora of analytic, existential, anthropological, and scientific interpretations. *Husserl and Stein*, a gem of a book, is a case in point. Spanning the history, foundations, and promise of phenomenology, *Husserl and Stein* is a work for professional philosophers and friends of philosophy. It is especially refreshing to see in the volume's title Husserl's former student and assistant, the philosopher Edith Stein.

The 'Introduction: Husserl, Stein, and Phenomenology', by the editors Richard Feist and William Sweet, serves as an important prologue for the range of topics and offers a lucid rationale for the selections. The reader gleans an appreciation of the myriad avenues of interest evinced by a study of phenomenology. The ten original articles explore the influence of phenomenology and its applicability in the areas of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics, philosophical psychology, social and political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics. Themes investigated include the idea of intentionality in Brentano (Rolf George, 'Brentano and Intentionality' including a handy summary of Brentano's claims); the role of intuition in naturalized epistemology (Anoop Gupta, 'Altered States: American Empiricism, Austrian Rationalism, and Universal Intuition'); an original solution entailing ideas from quantum mechanics to the problem presented in Descartes' Sixth Meditation (Richard Holmes, 'The Sixth Meditation'); the question of the inter-subjectivity of 'ego and world' (Rene Jagnow, 'Carnap, Husserl, Euclid, and the Idea of a Material Geometry'); the problem of the spatio-temporal object (Richard Feist, 'Reductions and Relativity'); two conceptions of the nature of consciousness (David L. Thompson, 'Are There Really Appearances? Dennett and Husserl on Seemings and Presence'); an endeavor to understand the role of 'projection' in Stein's analysis of empathy (Judy Miles, 'Other Bodies and Other Minds in Edith Stein: Or, How to Talk About Empathy'); the notion of empathy as an act and disposition (Ernest McCullough, 'Edith Stein and Intersubjectivity'); Husserl and Stein on individuals, communities, and states (Marianne Sawicki, 'The Humane Community: Husserl versus Stein'); and Stein's understanding of the Infinite and the problem of subjectivity (Chantal Beauvais, 'Edith Stein and Modern Philosophy').

Early in his career Husserl studied mathematics, logic, and the natural sciences. Though he did not add anything original or substantive to the disciplines, certainly these antecedents helped to create the intellectual climate for his phenomenological philosophy. Disciples of these sciences have found much in Husserl to resonate with their own projects. The first six

essays testify to this reality, as they articulate how the phenomenological methodology comes to bear on pure mathematics, Euclidian geometry, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Students of the 'hard sciences' will welcome the cogent argumentation and engaging discussions that cover the 'Husserl' division of *Husserl and Stein*.

The volume's inclusion of Edith Stein's philosophical contributions is no less prolific. Two essays focus primarily on Stein's interpretation of the human person as an individual and as an inter-subjective and communal entity. In her 1916 dissertation, *The Problem of Empathy*, Edith Stein asserts that this phenomenon is constitutive for access to the psychic life of others. She defines empathy as the given-ness of foreign subjects (i.e. a person or living being other than you) and their experiences. (See Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*. Translated by Waltraut Stein, in *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, Third Revision Edition, Washington, D.C., 1989, xviii.)

Stein's hermeneutics of empathy opens a dialogue entailing the activity of empathic understanding. Miles' analysis attempts to explain the dynamic as the ability of the ego to transfer one's personality *into* the other. This is followed by Ernest McCullough's treatment of Stein's understanding of person in its various plural modes. The last two entries by Marianne Sawicki and Chantal Beauvais engage in critical discussions of Stein's distinctive contributions to 'socialized phenomenology' and the synchronicity of being and spirit.

Keeping in mind that one volume cannot be expected to meet all agendas, *Husserl and Stein* is a critical addition to philosophical attention to questions of humane interest. As the 'Introduction' makes clear, a historical background is important. Perhaps a timeline included in the next edition might prove helpful for the general audience. Also, as is made plain, Husserl's impact on contemporary philosophy is eminent. Perhaps future volumes will feature works of other students of phenomenology who have contemplated the problem of the structure of the human person and momentous issues confronting our contemporary world — for example, Hannah Arendt's meditation of *The Human Condition* (Chicago 1958) and the role of the human being as *Beginner*, and Karol Wojtyla's *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht 1979), where the philosopher formulates his questions about the constitution of the human self, its uniqueness, its acts, and its consciousness. For their part, however, Feist and Sweet advance an engaging and well-developed study of issues of consequence to the field of phenomenology in this collection of essays.

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Steven Fesmire

*John Dewey and Moral Imagination:
Pragmatism in Ethics.*

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2003.

Pp. xiv + 167.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34233-3);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21598-6).

Since the 1980s John Dewey's work has received renewed attention from specialists in ethics, science, and to a lesser degree, art. This booming scholarship has clearly profited from an openness of our historical times to what is called 'the pragmatic turn' and a 'post-modernist' distrust of dogmatic and fanatic quests for certainty. Dewey more than any other philosopher of the twentieth century stressed the (democratic) ideal of 'the education of disciplined yet flexible, [fallibilistic,] experimental intelligence, in moral life as much as in science' (37). Steven Fesmire sees pragmatism as valuable 'instrument' for attempts to contextualize reason and rationality: '... it offers a new model, which recognizes reason's ineliminatively temporal, aesthetic, evolving, embodied, practical, and contextual character' (52).

Fesmire argues that Dewey's theory of moral understanding could 'contribute to a richer account of moral experience, inquiry, and judgement' '[b]y urging a shift in the center of gravity of ethics from foundational principles to imagination' (3). Thus Fesmire's project is constructive, not merely exegetical. Part I offers a careful treatment of pragmatic ethics (knowledgeable readers can skip this). Part II develops a theory of imaginative moral inquiry and/or reasoning derived from Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), *Experience and Nature* (1925), *Ethics* (1932) and *Art as Experience* (1934).

Fesmire's book serves two aims. On the one hand, it provides an interpretation of a neglected aspect of Deweyan philosophy, aesthetics. On the other, it demonstrates how imagination could revitalize ethics, and for this it turns to Dewey for support. Fesmire wants to convince the reader of the 'budding awareness among philosophers that [imagination] plays a vital role in moral judgements' (62), but this renaissance of imagination has proceeded 'more or less ignorant of Dewey's fecund insights' (64). Fesmire seems to think this may partly be due to misinterpretation of Dewey's phrase 'dramatic rehearsal' to characterize his notion of moral deliberation. There are two readings in Deweyan scholarship: one stresses the scientific character of Dewey's method in ethics and the other views it as 'story-structured, aesthetically funded capacity' (51). Fesmire follows in the footsteps of Thomas Alexander, Mark Johnson and Jim Garrison, all of whom conceive of (moral) inquiry and conduct as art rather than science. These scholars write about the peculiar importance Dewey assigned art and aesthetic experience in the 1930s and interpret this as his effort to get philosophers to start thinking like artists.

But one must not trivialize the role of science in Dewey's (ethical) thought. Certainly Dewey contributed to a recognition of the similarities between art and science, and ethics and science. Moreover, it would be a mistake to pass

over the fact that the most prominent philosophers from the interbellum (Otto Neurath, Max Horkheimer, Ernst Cassirer, ... and, yes, John Dewey) were enmeshed in (intercontinental) debates about the relevance of the methods of science to philosophical inquiry. This is crucial for understanding later Dewey-texts such as *Theory of Valuation* (1939), which, Fesmire admits, 'longs for a "science" of moral valuation' (75). Fesmire does not claim to offer 'a fully comprehensive exposition of Dewey's moral philosophy' (4), but rather a Deweyan reconstruction of moral deliberation. There is nothing wrong with this kind of intervention — except when he tries to have his cake and eat it too, as for example when he attacks the alternate interpretation of Dewey's theories as wrong rather than rejecting them as unsuited to his purposes.

But one cannot help wondering where Fesmire's ambiguous attitude towards science comes from. As David Depew and Robert Hollinger have remarked in the introduction of *Pragmatism. From Progressivism to Postmodernism* (1995), since the 1960s the cultural reaction against fetishized scientific and technocratic worldviews has engendered a new attraction to aestheticizing, expressive, and participatory conceptions of the lifeworld. And from then on, pragmatism began to disentangle itself from positivism, scientism and technologism, and to link itself with the humanities. Is Fesmire one of those 'postmodern' pragmatists (like Richard Rorty) whose efforts are better interpreted as a revolt against positivized pragmatism of the middle decades of the twentieth century than as an account of what Depew and Hollinger call 'progressive' pragmatism (like Dewey)?

In the last chapter, art is seen as the better model for ethics because 'it highlights the role of an expansive imagination that enables sensitivity to social bearings and consequences, intervenes widely and deeply in experience, and brings diverse elements together in a unified experience' (110). 'In art', so it goes, 'imagination finds its most complete expression as the culminating event of nature — even more so than science, itself an art whose proper role is to serve aesthetic enjoyments' (109). But a defence of embodied reason does not imply an abandonment of science. Fesmire himself appeals to cognitive scientific research on metaphor, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson's *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999), which profoundly bears on Deweyan ethics since it (empirically!) advances its project of intellectual disrobing, enabling us to critically inspect culturally internalized intellectual and social habits — metaphorical structuring and conceptual mappings, if you like — to see — in the words of Dewey — "what they are made of and what wearing them does to us" (91). Fesmire finds a wealth of alternative (general) metaphors in Dewey's philosophy, such as organic growth, scientific experimentation, and art, and although no metaphor alone is sufficient (!), 'those of artistry provide a promising model' (110), because 'the general logic of artistry ... is revelatory of the potencies of moral inquiry' (119).

So really, there is no denial of the role of scientific and experimental thinking in Dewey's ethics and in ethics in general. Fesmire's objection is really to certain predominant *metaphors* — the moral accounting metaphor

(110) and the morality as science metaphor (75) — and not necessarily to the integration of scientific methods into moral reasoning per se.

The confusion in the book has much to do with Fesmire being uncertain of how to reconcile a pragmatically reconstructed ethics centred ‘on the recognition of the existence of plural primary factors in moral situations’ (57) and the workings of science. Fesmire wants imagination to play an independent role in moral philosophy, but if independent means independent from science, then this new kind of compartmentalization will rather bar ‘the door to a more responsible ethic’ (125). Fesmire might have asked himself whether the problem with taking science as a model for ethics wasn’t an artefact of the model of scientific reasoning he had adopted. He could have tried understanding science in alternative ways. As Abraham Edel sagely remarked in reply to his critics in *Ethics, Science, and Democracy. The Philosophy of Abraham Edel* (1987): ‘[o]n the whole, ... , I am inclined to give less importance to the selection of the model than the interpretation of the model itself that is selected. The disputes about the nature of art and law are as deep as those about the nature of science. If, ... one takes an interpretation of art ... that art provides a different way of seeing the world ... and if one takes the view of science that is not just lining up facts but offering in its theory an imaginative construction for seeing the world ... , then there is no impassable gap between science and art’ (263).

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Robin N. Fiore and

Hilde Lindemann Nelson, eds.

*Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights:
Feminist Ethics and Social Theory.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2003.

Pp. v + 233.

US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1442-0);

US\$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1443-9).

Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights (published in Rowman and Littlefield’s Feminist Constructions Series, whose logo is a needle and thread) stitches together a great group of essays on current developments in feminist theory, politics and ethics. The stitching is intentionally uneven since, as the editors note in their Introduction, the themes of recognition, responsibility and rights are mutually informative. Part of the delight in reading this collection is precisely this looping resonance of its respective parts.

Loop #1: Contesting 'Gender': The *Recognition* section immediately takes on the fractious issue of the relevance and adequacy of the concept of gender to subjectivity and politics. Contested by third-wave feminism and queer theory, the concept of gender has been exposed as inadequate with respect to diversity and the restless narrativity of subject formation. Both Cressida Heyes, in 'Queer Politics of Recognition' and Abby Wilkerson, in 'Memoirs of the Sick and the Queer' (looping from the *Responsibility* section) demonstrate how far the discussion of subjectivity has come from the crude categorisation by gender alone. For Heyes, queer theory's rejection of essentialism generates a positive demand for recognition of the *narrative techniques* of the self, rather than stable identities. Wilkerson's contrasting of apositional and oppositional narratives simultaneously challenges the privilege of stories of sickness and alterity while upholding the value of the (fluid) story-telling genre to witness and to motivate political action.

Iris Marion Young's 'Lived Body versus Gender ...' presents and critiques a proposal that the concept of the 'lived body' replace the category of gender, since 'lived body' offers both flexibility and groundedness. Young approves, but calls attention to the residual but urgent need to preserve 'gender' '[t]o describe and explain some of the structures and processes that effect differential opportunities and privileges in contemporary society ...' (12). The sexual division of labour and normative heterosexuality in particular remain intransigent and powerful barriers to equality. Like Young, Bonnie Mann wants to highlight material realities, lived bodies. She foregrounds *place* as both 'subject-productive' but offering a basis for political analysis of cultural and environmental commonalities.

'Gender' and 'place' come together in the final section (*Rights*), where Alison Jaggar and Maira Pia Lara explore the impact of globalization on liberatory struggles. Lara identifies the potential of 'exiled people' in 'marginal spaces' (eg., political refugees) to challenge binaries by their 'hybrid identities' and also to initiate 'reverse colonisation' through their dislocated narratives. Such narratives, says Lara, '... shape Western initiatives in supporting other countries' transitions to democracy' (192). But more needs to be said about the vulnerability and silence of persons in 'marginal spaces' (the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay; women working in the 'free trade' spaces) and the unholy alliance between neoliberal visions of democracy and globalization. Jaggar shows how inequalities between and within nations are being exacerbated by the policies of the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In particular, the structural adjustment policies to 'handle' the problem of the debt of developing countries have permitted ever deeper involvement in local economies, to the detriment of women and other vulnerable citizens. Jaggar's discussion importantly nuances the kind of 'democracy' for which 'dislocated' voices must lobby.

Loop #2: Social Practices, Voice and Accountability: In 'The Role of Recognition in the Formation of Self-Understanding', Misha Strauss explains how the many harms of recognition-deprivation reduce the capacity of individuals to participate in and shape the shared meanings of the

community. Margaret Urban Walker illustrates this in her discussion of truth-seeking, where she notes that '... not everyone's truths are equally likely to be sought or told.' (170) Lack of, or limited, recognition will devalue the voices of those who have been 'systematically silenced and epistemically discredited.' Epistemic standing and its relation to our knowing practices are taken up in detail in Heidi Grasswick's essay on epistemic responsibility. Feminist epistemology, she argues, needs a non-punitive concept of epistemic responsibility, yielding a concept of good knowers (who can stand behind their practices) and good practices (reliable but also habitable — committed to transparency and pursuing significant truths at acceptable costs.)

Loop #3: Relational Autonomy and Rationality: My thematic account finishes by tracing themes of autonomy and rationality through the four remaining essays. Each engages with the reality, scope, and social perception of women's moral agency.

In a detailed discussion of women's dependency work, Diana T. Meyers states: '[T]hat there is no incompatibility between dependency work and autonomy does not entail that there is no contingent conflict between them.' (24) Critiquing the remedial proposals of Bubeck and Kittay, her proposal is to degender dependency work by denormalizing motherhood and the heterosexual nuclear family.

Kate Parsons, Cheryl L. Hughes and Norah Martin each emphasise social relations in our understanding of autonomy. For Parsons, the dismissal of the anorectic as 'unreasonable' overlooks the powerful social norm prescribing thinness in women. Neither valorising the anorectic as 'a committed activist' nor individualising her condition, Parsons considers anorexia a 'group-based problem' and concludes that '... the anorectic's perception does not come out of nowhere, [but] is traceable to the norms of our society and to the circumstances in which she lives, including the circumstance of being a woman' (81). Hughes tackles the medical context, in which the integrity and autonomy of 'indecisive' patients and persons with dementia are questioned. Describing integrity as 'a social and relational virtue', she shows that each can be viewed as exercising agency, if we understand integrity and autonomy as communal and relational. The 'indecisive' patient seeks a 'fit' with important others; the person with dementia who is no longer 'the principal narrator' of her own life finds narrative integrity from others. Finally, Martin's essay returns us to the debate over the politics of women requesting physician-assisted death. Canvassing the responses to Susan Wolf's seminal article on gender, feminism and death, Martin claims that the tension between caring for the suffering (whose requests for help in dying can be rational and urgent) and critiquing a coercive system has not been resolved. Feminists must keep the issue before the public eye.

This collection is welcome. It offers an update on old chestnuts (e.g., subjectivity/politics), several vignettes of powerful feminist concepts being productively applied (e.g., relational autonomy), and a glimpse of exciting new feminist explorations (e.g., voice and global positioning). Like all good feminist philosophy, it offers a rich dialectic of conceptual revision and

attention to particularity. And it demonstrates feminism's resilience and honest self-scrutiny.

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Guttrom Fløistad, ed.

Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey:

Volume 8: Philosophy of Latin America.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003.

Pp. viii + 316.

US\$138.00. ISBN 1-4020-1476-7.

This book is the eighth volume of a series that aims to 'give a survey of significant trends in contemporary philosophy' (vii). This volume focuses on philosophy in Latin America. It is made up of thirteen essays by philosophers born in that region, with a preface and introduction by the editor. Many of the essays offer surveys of different aspects of in Latin America, though some are simply reviews of an author's own work or short biographies of regional figures. Some essays focus on Latin America as a whole others focus on a particular country; Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador receive their own essays. A handful of essays focus on particular movements, including analytic philosophy and the philosophy of liberation. Three essays offer substantive pieces of philosophical work on specific topics.

For the purposes of acquainting oneself to the main currents of recent Latin American thought, the most useful essay is Dussel's 'Philosophy in Latin American in the 20th Century'. It provides a useful overview of the main developments and traditions in Latin America, and it is accompanied with bibliographies for each of the countries or regions discussed in the essay. Also useful is Salmerón's essay on analytic philosophy in Latin America. He discusses the arrival and adoption of analytic philosophy in various regions of Latin America, and he relates that many philosophers in the first generation of Latin American analytic philosophers adopted the topics and methods of analytic philosophy only after years of training and activity within a phenomenological tradition principally influenced by Husserl, Hartmann, Scheler, and Heidegger. As both Salmerón and Dussel suggest, acceptance or rejection of German phenomenology has played an important role in the construction of the intellectual terrain in Latin America. This phenomenon suggests that some comparative history might be illuminating, given the similarly divisive role phenomenology played in the European intellectual

tradition, leading to the split in mid-twentieth century analytic and Continental philosophy.

Essays of special interest to Anglophone analytic philosophers include Olivé's discussion of the relationship of truth to knowledge, especially in the context of Villoro's work in epistemology, and Da Costa and Doria's 'On Some Recent Undecidability and Incompleteness Results in the Axiomatized Sciences'. Continental philosophers and literary critics will be more interested in Sanjinés' 'A Phenomenological Reading of the Andes' and Mayz's 'Meta-Technics as the Philosophical Expression of the New World'.

Though the chapters are diverse in approach, aims, and even genres, two themes recur with enough frequency to deserve merit repeating here. First, several of these essays remind us that the practice of philosophy — regardless of its form — is susceptible to the exigencies of local politics, history, and economics. Political coups, exile-hood, the influence and history of Catholicism, and the pervasiveness of Latin American poverty have all exercised enormous influence on the practice and content of Latin American thought, and not always in the ways one might expect. For instance, the expulsion of a group of philosophers from Argentina in the 1970s did more to spread the philosophy of liberation than its opponents might have hoped. And, the often unhappy grip that Catholic philosophical thought had for so long on Latin American universities seems to be partly responsible for the casual disregard with which it is treated by many (though not all) of the volume's contributors, now that said grip has been relaxed. Second, though the volume mentions it more frequently than it displays it, the impressive diversity of philosophical camps in Latin America makes it obvious that the analytic/Continental distinction that has so much currency in the U.S. is woefully inadequate as a taxonomical tool in most of Latin America.

Despite its rewards, there is much that is puzzling about this volume. Consider that there are at least two possible aims this volume might hope to achieve. First, it might acquaint its readers with the philosophical scene in Latin America. That is, it could offer some sense of the problems and methodologies of philosophy throughout Latin America. Second, the volume could be a survey by demonstration, offering a representative sample of substantive philosophical work in Latin America. Fløistad has assembled a volume that appears to aim, if somewhat unevenly, at the first. However, volumes of this sort are not philosophically unproblematic in the Latin American context. First, a comparatively large part of the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Latin American philosophy has been concerned with how to define and pursue philosophy in Latin America. What counts as philosophy, what counts as national or Latin American philosophy, and what tasks are proper to philosophers are topics on which Latin American philosophers have spilled considerable ink, and on which disagreements remain vituperous. Second, the notion of Latin American philosophy, as a regional grouping of philosophical pursuits, concerns, traditions, or methods is not unproblematic, either. For example, Jorge Gracia has recently argued that Latin American philosophy can be understood properly only within a

broadly Hispanic philosophical tradition, one that includes the Iberian peninsula. Naturally, others have disagreed. And, the role of the Caribbean and Caribbean philosophers to Latin American philosophy is similarly complex and contentious. For example, Franz Fanon is rarely thought of as a Latin American philosopher, though he was born in the Caribbean nation of Martinique. Additionally, the status of philosophers who work on topics in 'Latin American philosophy' but who are located primarily in or even born in the United States raises further questions about how to conceive of Latin American philosophy. Thus, we might say that both the *Latin American*, as well as the *philosophy* parts of a book on Latin American Philosophy require taking a stand — even if only implicitly — on substantive questions that have been the subject of considerable investigation by philosophers we might recognize as working within a broadly Latin American tradition.

Though some of the authors (Dussel, Vélez) show sensitivity to these issues, neither the essays nor the scattered editorial introduction provide the unformed reader with any systematic resources to understand what the stakes have been, what the positions are, and why any of this was thought to matter. This shortcoming is not the only one of the volume. There is no obvious reason why some movements (analytic philosophy and the philosophy of liberation) receive chapter-length treatments, while other important movements (Thomism, Marxism, Latin Americanist philosophy) are addressed only in passing or in a brief section of an overview essay. Similarly, there is little rhyme or reason why some countries or regions (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador) receive survey essays while other obvious candidates (Mexico, Brazil, the Caribbean) do not. And although eight of the essays as well as the preface and introduction have been written or translated into English, other essays are divided between French (four) and Spanish (one). No essays are in Portuguese. The editorial motivation for this motley goes unexplained.

There are virtues to this collection, but its vices are significant. Notably, the price of the volume makes it unsuitable for classroom use, and an unlikely purchase for anyone other than research libraries with a specialized interest in Latin American thought. The fact that it requires trilinguality from its readers makes it unwieldy for many researchers and students. Finally, the spotty proofreading (e.g., 'Salmerón' is rendered 'Salméron' in the table of contents, 'Tomists' for 'Thomists' [68], 'Schick' for 'Schlick' [62]) impedes the intelligibility of various passages. When coupled with the aforementioned difficulties concerning its aims and organization, the volume leaves something to be desired.

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Stathis Gourgouris

*Does Literature Think? Literature as
Theory for an Antimythical Era.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.

Pp. xxvi + 391.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3213-2);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3214-0).

In *Does Literature Think?* Stathis Gourgouris re-stages Plato's quarrel between the philosopher and the poet within the context of a critique of modernity. 'Re-stages', because Gourgouris is interested 'in literature's *performative* capacity to disrupt the traditional philosophical desire for cognition, the mastery of the world through cognitive privilege' (29). However, Gourgouris rejects Plato's conceptual opposition between literature and philosophy — that opposition is itself philosophical — and rather claims for the literary text an ability to 'transform itself into a theoretical vehicle beyond its apparent boundaries' (17). Literature *performs*, in both the speech-act and theatrical senses, what philosophy *says*: Gourgouris presents himself as a 'post-Enlightenment' reader sufficiently 'cognizant' (an oft-repeated word in this book) of the interaction of his own subjectivity with the 'social imaginary' constructed by the literary text to engage in a series of readings which are not themselves 'analyses', but cognitive encounters which enact an internal ideological distancing from the reality constructed by the text's fictionality. This, of course, reverses the traditional way of seeing fictionality as a mode of representing reality (*mimesis*). What facilitates this reversal is Gourgouris' belief in myth: 'the mythic domain grants us a unique apprehension of how the poetic is interwoven with the political', and moreover 'myths can ... exercise a historical force as imagined alterities of society without instrumental regard' (42). Hence the book is a coming to terms with literature's 'relation to knowledge, a relation that cannot be appropriated by philosophical *logos* because it does not partake singularly in the domain of *logos*, but also partakes of the domain of *mythos*' (44). Gourgouris presents myth as a critique of modernity in the same way as classical Greek theatre presented myth as a critique of the Greek *polis*.

In practice this project is realised in a series of eight self-contained essays. In the first, 'Enlightenment and Paranoia', Gourgouris follows Arendt and Derrida in seeing a 'lawlessness of the law' (that there should *be* law is not itself enacted in law) which proceeds from law's foundation in violence (historically, bourgeois or enlightenment law is founded on revolution; conceptually, the law exists to prevent violence, which it does through the institutional dispensation of violence). This 'paranomic autonomy' (80) of the law is enacted in Kafka's tale 'Before the Law', which Gourgouris uses to teach Kant a thing or two about the utopianism of imagining one's actions as universal law.

The three central chapters are the most ambitious insofar as they advance their arguments alongside (in what Gourgouris calls *co-incidence*) historical

accounts of the interwoven intellectual biographies of the participants in Germany's great debate between totalitarian nationalism (Schmitt, Heidegger) and cosmopolitan pluralism (Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Scholem). In this way Gourgouris' book is, in Hegelian fashion, itself an enactment of the methodology and theoretical position it describes, and achieves an interdisciplinary synthesis of history of the Frankfurt School and their adversaries, literary criticism of their works, and exposition of their philosophy, all in a manner of which Adorno and Horkheimer themselves would have been proud.

Hence, in 'The Concept of the Mythical', Carl Schmitt is seen to go wrong in his reading of *Hamlet* as 'merely confirm[ing] ... society's historical myth(s), never raising the question of tragedy as a mode of interrogation of society's historical myth(s)' (111), whereas Walter Benjamin, on the contrary, in not reading 'Hamletisation' 'as the outcome of class bewilderment but as a radical moment of realisation', 'succeeds in evoking the historical-philosophical dimensions of a cultural moment' (112).

In 'Philosophy's Need for Antigone' Gourgouris uses his knowledge of classical Greek to demonstrate how Heidegger systematically mis-translates to further his own philosophical ends. Heidegger's well-known poetic licence in translation is not, for Gourgouris, merely a 'poetics of error', but is, rather, 'an erring poetics' (137). Heidegger's translation of *polis* by *Da*, for example, forgets that the *polis* has 'a differential autonomous plurality' which constitutes the political subject, and also embodies that subject in 'a politics which demands a collective knowledge emerging out of a shared commitment to self-interrogation' (141). Heidegger wants to say that the modern concept of the political is not derivable from the Greek concept of *polis*, which instead leads to a generalised affirmation of 'there'. For Heidegger, the Greek sense of the *polis* is merely the there where being is to be found; in other words, Heidegger makes Greek thought consistent with Nazism rather than with democracy.

'The Gesture of the Sirens', meanwhile, reads *The Odyssey* alongside Kafka's 'The Silence of the Sirens'. Following Benjamin, Kafka's story is seen as theatrical; indeed, Gourgouris reads it as a literary instantiation of Brechtian *hypokrisis*: 'not the incorporation of a fictional persona by an act of mimesis but an expression of the very process of the actor's self-objectification in the course of dramatic action' (190). Moreover, this *hypokrisis* can be read back into Homer's epic, and the Greeks more generally: the sirens are a 'nightmarish inversion of the muses', and represent 'the moment when mythic thought in the epic registers its full-fledged performative reality, a prescient moment that announces myth's overt theatricality in tragedy' (196).

The fifth essay, 'The Dream Reality of the Ruin', reads Benjamin's *The Arcades Project* as 'the historical theory and the poetic method of the dialectical image'; the upshot of this is that 'myth is destroyed by means of myth; myth is rescued by means of its destruction' (227). Three further essays, on Flaubert, Genet and DeLillo, display Gourgouris' skills as a literary critic;

through the theme of life and literature being paranomic enactments of one another, they make biographical criticism respectable once again.

In a final essay, 'Beyond the Damaged Life' (the reference is to Adorno's *Minima Moralia*), Gourgouris re-iterates the Frankfurt School dialectic that has unified the preceding essays, claiming the comparison of the historian, the philosopher and the poet to reveal that 'the dichotomy between truth and falsehood is a historical condition' (332). The consequence of this is that in modernity, 'truth and lying became interchangeable in a social universe governed no longer by polyvalence but by equivalence'; nevertheless, there is one place where poetry and philosophy 'can exist again' in coincidence with one another, and that is in the affirmation, not ironically of life as such, but of mortality, which counters capitalism's ideological fantasy of immortality (342). Uniting its 'sociological' and 'literary' senses, meanwhile, Gourgouris has himself breathed new life into critical theory, and has launched it on a difficult, challenging, but important new trajectory.

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Michael Heidelberger

*Nature From Within. Gustav Theodor Fechner
and His Psychophysical Worldview.*

Trans. Cynthia Kloor.

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

2004. Pp. viii + 446.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-8229-4210-0.

Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) is widely known as one of the nineteenth-century pioneers of empirical psychology; his philosophical views, by contrast, are virtually forgotten. In 1875, in his seminal *History of Materialism*, F. A. Lange expressed, while Fechner was still alive, what was to become the standard judgment on the philosopher-scientist: he is, wrote Lange, 'a living example for how even an enthusiastic [*schwärmerische*] philosophy does not always poison the spirit of true scientific research.' The philosophy was romantic *Naturphilosophie*, deriving from Schelling; the scientific research was Fechner's experimental and theoretical work in psychology.

Heidelberger attempts to rescue Fechner from this standard verdict and establish him as a serious philosopher who by no means let enthusiasm take the place of rational argument. In *Nature From Within* Fechner emerges not only as an important philosopher in his own right but also as a significant,

though forgotten, influence on later philosophical movements like American Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism.

The core of Fechner's thought may be seen in his concern to establish what he called the 'day view' of science against the dominant 'night view'. According to this dominant understanding of science, secondary qualities do not objectively exist in nature because the scientific description of nature has to do without them; nature, considered independently of us, is without colors, tastes, etc. — metaphorically, it is a world in darkness, completely separated from direct human experience. Fechner's program of 'combining science with direct human experience' (65) or of establishing the 'day view' of science, reintroduces qualities into nature by insisting that science ultimately is about nothing but sensations, not about objects abstracted from sensations. All there is, for Fechner, is appearances without anything behind them. This view sounds like phenomenalism, and it serves in Fechner's hands, like later versions of this doctrine, to denounce traditional metaphysics. But it is an anomalous brand of phenomenalism because Fechner allows sensations, as the ultimate constituents of the world, to exist outside and independently of our consciousness. Thus there can be appearances that are not given to us (or any other conscious beings). We are, however, justified, in special circumstances, to infer the existence of such 'objective' sensations, for instance, when we use our best scientific theories to make predictions about the existence and properties of atoms. Atoms can never be given to us; but in Fechner's phenomenalist view they can exist as appearances nevertheless. (Because Fechner uses this mode of inference to the existence of unobservable entities, Heidelberger labels him a 'scientific realist'.) The doctrine of sensations without consciousness obviously has similarities with what later, with Mach and others, became known and influential as 'neutral monism'. According to Heidelberger, Fechner's 'day view' of science is probably the first formulation of this view.

Although Fechner is critical of traditional metaphysics, his criticism leads to a new approach to metaphysical questions, a sort of 'inductive metaphysics'. Philosophy, he declares, must not use the 'categories and methods of science' up to some point and then replace them with different, 'philosophical' tools. The philosopher instead has to analyze and develop the very same tools the scientist uses. We should abandon the task of 'finding a foundation for metaphysics and make [instead] physical science the foundation we need... and thereby in fact ... elevate the title of metaphysics, making it something that comes after physics, instead of something a priori or underlying physics ... We want to make the entirety of physical science the substructure for metaphysics ...' (148). In this way metaphysics becomes the 'philosophical closure' of physics.

Heidelberger shows in detail how the anti-metaphysical metaphysics of Fechner's 'day view' informs, more or less visibly, his contributions in other areas — in empirical psychology ('psychophysics'), philosophy of mind, probability theory, and physics. Integrated in Heidelberger's presentations of Fechner's views are excursions into the nineteenth- and early twentieth-cen-

tury reception of his ideas by Mach, James, Peirce, Freud, and others. The results of these sections are often surprising.

There lies a well-known danger in such philosophical rescue attempts: they tend to portray their subjects as too familiar, too close to contemporary ways of thinking. But overall Heidelberg has succeeded in resisting this tendency. Although one may sometimes have slight doubts about whether the conceptual tools from contemporary analytic metaphysics which Heidelberg uses ('non-reductive materialism', 'scientific realism', 'functionalism', ...) are indeed suitable to capture Fechner's thoughts, such doubts are clearly far outweighed by the insights gained into virtually forgotten debates. There can be no doubt that Heidelberg has identified interesting and previously unexplored connections between rich nineteenth-century discussions and contemporary concerns in philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.

One of the most interesting aspects of this study is the connection Heidelberg traces between the speculative ideas of Schelling and his disciple Oken and the empirically oriented views of Fechner. Like his friend Lotze, Fechner tried to develop a monistic view of the world that did not conflict with — and could claim to supplement — the scientific research of his day. In some sense, this had already been the program of the younger Schelling, resulting in the various versions of his *Naturphilosophie*. But it is fascinating to see how some of these often ridiculed ideas inspired Fechner and were transformed by him — 'empiristically' transformed, as Heidelberg says — into a sensible view of science and nature. We have learned over the past decade or so that Logical Empiricism arose from a neo-Kantian background. Now we are offered the claim that this anti-metaphysical movement owed, through Fechner, a debt even to Schelling.

The slightly different German version of this book was published more than ten years ago as Heidelberg's *Habilitationsschrift*. Not very many exemplars of this genre get translated, and perhaps often justifiedly so. In Heidelberg's case there were excellent reasons for producing an English version. The impressive 66-page bibliography at the end of the volume is in itself a joy to study.

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Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, eds.
Essays on Kant's Anthropology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. ix + 265.
US\$60.00. ISBN 0-521-79038-7.

This is a valuable and timely work. It is intended to complement the volume *Lectures on Anthropology* appearing in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. The Introduction outlines previous attempts to place the Anthropology within Kant's philosophical work, which constantly suggests a philosophical orientation on human nature. Thus, 'one might refer to Kant's anthropology as a "philosophical anthropology" were it not that philosophy is an entirely rational and non-empirical enterprise, while anthropology is completely empirical' (3). This presents the first challenge. Then there are problems with source materials. There are many copies of lecture notes taken by students (enough to provide evaluative criteria), quite apart from Kant's published *Anthropology* (1798). Both of these sources 'contain a number of considerable tensions with other aspects of Kant's thought' (4-5). Thus, the volume will attempt on the one hand to 'deal with the systematic relation of the anthropology to the critical philosophy — especially its relation to the claims of speculative knowledge and ethics. On the other hand, several of the essays focus on the anthropology as an important source for clarification about the content and development of Kant's views on particular topics of interest' (8).

Werner Stark provides historical background and a brief analysis of the anthropology lecture notes as we now know them. Comparison of several sets of notes permits us to determine what Kant actually said. The analysis reveals a reciprocal relationship between the 'empirical and intelligible' characters of the human being, the two sides of the 'human coin', which resemble each other. He concludes 'that Kant regarded it as precisely the task of the human subject, of every self, to make this resemblance as close as possible' (30).

Allen Wood emphasizes the difficulties inherent in attempting to attain a conception of human nature within Kant's system. Kant recognizes that the human being is not a rational animal, but only a being capable of reason. Thus the individual must first achieve self-development before entering into the task of guiding the species toward fulfillment. The individual must impose limitations on his own personal autonomy in order to enter into 'the progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically combined' (56).

Robert Louden takes up anthropology as 'the second part of morals'. The first part lies in its metaphysical principles; the second is moral anthropology, to which the empirical principles belong, i.e., 'morality applied to the human being' (61). This is a project that Kant did not complete. 'Rather it remains for us today and in the future to develop a viable moral anthropology from the exploratory and fragmentary beginnings that he left us' (80).

Reinhard Brandt takes up the guiding idea of Kant's anthropology: the vocation or destiny of the human being. He sees this as conceived within a nature in which Christianity and Stoic teleology are combined. As an autonomous individual it is possible to accept or reject the ends offered by a providential nature. Yet even when we pursue a selfish end we are subject to a determination by which we inadvertently contribute to the world-good. 'An invisible hand guides us to something we do not choose, but the philosopher knows that it is, always and a priori, good' (102).

Brian Jacobs discusses the essential role of 'character' in Kant's anthropology. It is the capacity to take on a good (or bad) moral stance, and thus the most central element in the individual's struggle to fulfill human destiny. But because Kant sees the self as both morally autonomous and also a determined part of the scheme of nature he 'seems to have remained caught between an individual expression of freedom (in the concept of character) and a collective teleology' (128). Because we see ourselves as captured in this dilemma, we feel an ongoing need to seek understanding, and this can only be satisfied 'by a succession of alternative inquiries into the self, empowered in turn by the strength of endless self-critique' (130).

Paul Guyer emphasizes the manner in which Kant's anthropology lectures display his progress as the details of the mature Critical project fall into place, e.g., the role of aesthetic and teleological principles as they integrate the apparently disparate realms of nature and morality.

Howard Caygill argues that: 'Without the invention and justification of *Sinnlichkeit* or "sensibility" the concept of experience informing the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the critique of traditional metaphysics based upon it would not have been possible' (164). In particular, 'the step of reducing the baroque descriptions of the formative sensibility to the pure forms of intuition remains an extraordinary act of philosophical invention. It would not have been possible without the lectures on anthropology ...' (181). The details of Kant's 'apology for sensibility' follow (183-90).

Susan Meld Shell shows how Kant was persuaded to alter his sense of what happiness involves, through the reading of Pietro Verri's work on pleasure and pain. This provided Kant with a new conception of 'the true economy of human nature', maintaining that pain is 'the natural goad by which man is prompted to develop his inborn talents and abilities before reason is ready to take over' (195). While much of his earlier position remained, he now accepted the view that pain is a necessary condition for happiness, as the means by which life itself is promoted (197). Kant continued to refine this view throughout the Critical period, but we find it first outlined in his *Reflexions on Anthropology*, based on the reading of Count Verri.

Patrick Kain focuses on the importance of prudential reason in Kant's anthropology. Because the anthropology proposed by Kant has an essentially pragmatic orientation, prudence must play a role both in the judgment of goals and in the means chosen to pursue them. 'Kant was convinced that human beings are subject to both moral and prudential imperatives.' He therefore had to provide 'an account of practical reason that integrates both

kinds of norms and, in particular, preserves the supremacy of the categorical imperative' (251). In order for us to preserve the coherence of Kant's system, it is necessary to distinguish and preserve the role and genuine authority of prudential norms, without jeopardizing the prior claims of morality.

Curiously, one thing is missing from this excellent set of essays: Kant's motivation. As a moral person, he was concerned to permit the normal citizen (and not just the technical philosopher) to understand the importance of morality and the necessity that it be fulfilled in the life of each individual. Anthropological observation provided the original data that could then be analyzed and given a technical formulation, in order that philosophical respectability be achieved through technical and logical validity. But once the essential insights had been established, it was still necessary to provide the normal, thoughtful human being with the benefits of this achievement by means of lectures and narratives which do not rely on mere technical and formal distinctions, but which carry conviction by means of clear examples and illustrations that would enable ordinary people to both understand and fulfill in their own lives the insights attained. Kant scholars must remain sound technical analysts, but they must also keep in mind that, for Kant, the technical was never more than a means that would permit us to recognize the legitimacy of the obvious (the reality and importance of morality) and to engage in the project of fulfilling our human potential.

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Todd Lekan

Making Morality:

Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory.

Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press

2003. Pp. x + 205.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8265-1420-0);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8265-1421-9).

Lekan apologizes for the title. He knows "pragmatism" has come to represent an array of philosophical positions ... [he has] no special attachment to the word ... [he] would be happy to insert some other label ... [he] use[s] the label ... to express grateful acknowledgment ...' (10). The book really aims to be a Deweyan metaethics. Nevertheless Lekan persistently attributes to the genus the differentia of a species, be it Dewey's or his own. There is no mention of Peirce or James, which may also cause of Lekan's mistaking

pragmatism's essence. More specifically, Lekan 'develops the metaethical implications of pragmatism's focus on norms or habits' (11), as though these were the same. Peirce, for one, did not conflate them; though virtues and vices are mostly good and bad habits, not so for norms of rights and duties.

Regarding pragmatism on theory and practice, Lekan says because 'theorizing is an intrinsic feature of practical activity; the choice for pragmatists is not between theory and practice but between intelligent and unintelligent practice' (1). Why? Not merely because theory can be applied: 'Pragmatism challenges our very conception of theorizing' (1), because theory grows from dilemmas found in practice; 'moral theory is simply a more systematic reflection of what we must do when different customs, practices, and activities with their unique goods come into conflict' (4).

This is Peircean in one respect: inquiry — including theory — grows out of real doubt (contra Descartes), and ends/concludes with real belief, an idea as old as Plato (*Republic* X, 602c-5c), and no challenge to common conceptions of theory. The converse is more to pragmatism's point: practice is intrinsic to theory. As Positivists were demeaning evaluations as 'noncognitive' imperatives, Peirce urged an imperative account of cognition. Dewey agreed in *Essays in Experimental Logic*: "pragmatic" means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to consequences for final meaning and test. Nothing is said about the nature of those consequences; they may be aesthetic or moral, or political or religious in quality — anything you please' (334). Pragmatism is meaning consequentialism; speech act competence is incomplete without action implications, Austinian commissive force.

Pragmatism is often misread on this score. Peirce credits Bacon with realizing that science is essentially a method of inquiry: 'not the attainment of knowledge, but the single-minded absorption in the search for its own sake.' Scientific theorizing is of course an activity; but theories themselves are effects of semiotic interpretation with consequences for both pure (theoretical) and applied science. Normative theorizing has consequences for theorizing as well as pedagogy, politics, jurisprudence, psychotherapy, and science itself. For Peirce, the main normative 'sciences' are Logic (norms for abductive, inductive and deductive inference), Aesthetics (intrinsic value) as well as Ethics (norms of conduct-in general). These are distinguishable yet interrelated: e.g., the norms of science presuppose at least logic and ethics.

What is a Deweyan revision of morality? Well, what it is opposed to? According to Lekan, the old vision is essentially religious, realist, fundamentalism (8). But opposition to these doctrines is hardly unique to Pragmatism; see Plato's *Euthyphro*.

Lekan does 'not offer a complete pragmatist's moral theory' (6), but his view is ambitious enough, addressing the following questions: 'What is the structure of practical reason ... ? ... the relationship between practical reason and values? ... the function of moral principles? ... [can we infer] moral from nonmoral norms? ... what is...moral criticism?' (6) The theory is meant to account for aesthetic, practical, and cognitive values, as well as those values narrowly defined as 'moral'. The pragmatist is said to deny a radical distinc-

tion between moral and nonmoral values (13). Lekan analyzes and rejects 'fixed-end' conceptions of practical reasoning, attributed to Hume and Aristotle. 'Fixed end conceptions' seem to be conceptions of intrinsic value based on intrinsic desire — hedonism, for example, which explains Hume. But Aristotle is a peculiar case: though *eudamonia* is the ultimate end of practical reasoning, it is not like pleasure a mere factual state; the 'eu' makes it evaluative, better rendered as 'living well' which is at best the formal end of practical/evaluative/justificatory reasoning, in need of content, which the virtues provide.

'The fixed end view fails to make sense of learning processes that occur when we seek justification for changes in practice' (21). However, even old-fashioned hedonists can explain changes of penultimate ends by changes of belief about the means to pleasure; and post-Pavlovian or -Skinnerian hedonists might explain them in terms of conditioning. Aristotle also knew that personality or character in general as well as particular traits, virtues and vices, are mainly matters of such conditioning — i.e., habituation.

Lekan's Deweyan revision rejects the fixed end view in favor of 'a habit-based view of practical knowledge' that (alleged refutation aside) is Aristotelian. (Incidentally both Aristotle and Peirce were realists about habits, dispositions; they are real forces and not mere inferences tickets [Ryle] or decisions [Sartre].) Lekan and Dewey fully appreciate that explanation of human action in terms of mere belief and appetitive desire is inadequate, since habits play an irreducible role as well. And they add important refinements to the structure and interrelations of habits.

What is the re-make of morality? Three issues are distinguished: formal definition of moral norms (moral vs non moral), substantive/normative issues and substantive issues of moral subjects or standing (130). Formally, Lekan says, 'moral norms can be expressed in terms of a three-part relation: the agent who is responsible, the recipient (to whom the responsibility is due), and a value or good (that which the agent is responsible for with regard to the recipient)' (127). This seems a variant on the Hohfeld scheme of legal duties — one of the readings of 'responsibility'. If so, how are law and morality to differ? Another 'generic property' of moral norms, Lekan says, is this: 'The responsibilities that count as moral tend to be *important*. Without them a community could not function as a unit' (133). But this may be more definitive of 'community' than 'morality': a community is a group of people sharing (close or loose knit) values/norms; thus even linguistic communities.

Nevertheless, it is refreshing to see Dewey taken seriously again, and Lekan deserves full marks for breaking the ice and much more.

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Joseph Margolis

*The Unraveling of Scientism: American
Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century.*
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2003.
Pp. xii + 178.
US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-4152-8.

Joseph Margolis' *The Unraveling of Scientism* is a polemical account of contemporary analytic philosophy, which he finds has reached a state of 'exhaustion' (xii). This does not mean that philosophy itself is bereft of intellectual resources. Margolis thinks that the way forward lies with what he calls 'pragmatism' (xii), but in point of fact is Hegelianism (147).

Margolis indicates that there are four *dramatis personae* in his account — Quine, Davidson, Putnam and Rorty (x). Though Rorty and Putnam are frequently referred to, neither receives serious attention. Thus the book is concerned with Quine and Davidson, the former receiving decidedly more positive treatment than the latter. Both embrace and seek to develop 'scientism'. Scientism involves a commitment to materialism and extensionalism (5, 107). To put it another way, scientism attempts to account for all phenomena — in particular all distinctively human phenomena — using the methods of the natural sciences. The story of analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century is the story of the failure of that program.

The first substantive chapter ('Materialism by Less than Adequate Means') is an examination of some recent work in cognitive science (Pinker, Dennett, Chomsky, etc.). The reason for this indirect strategy is not clear. One way to vindicate the program of scientism is to show that it has born fruit in areas such as psychology, linguistics and so on (see 121). I take it then that the purpose of this chapter is to show that it has not. If the quotations in this chapter are representative, then scientism is in a bad state indeed! However, in the absence of any serious attempt to show that the sterility and emptiness of cognitive science undermine either Davidson or Quine, this chapter is tangential to the book's main line of argument.

In the second chapter ('Incommensurability Modestly Recovered') Margolis defends Kuhn and Feyerabend against Davidson's critique of them in 'On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'. Margolis charges Davidson with misreading Kuhn and Feyerabend as arriving at their views on the basis of a priori epistemological considerations. To the contrary, Kuhn and Feyerabend's arguments are based simply on an examination and interpretation of the historical record. In other words they defend incommensurabilism at retail, not at wholesale as Davidson wrongly supposes (44).

Margolis valorizes Kuhn and Feyerabend because they are 'Hegelian in spirit' (51). They support the inseparability of metaphysics and epistemology by showing that reality is dependent upon our means of knowing it, and that those means of knowing must be historicized. This is as close as Margolis comes to offering an argument in support of Hegelianism. (He has a disturbing tendency to *proclaim* that Hegel is right [12-13, 49-51, 78-80, 85 and 100].)

The argument is weak since, even if Davidson is wrong, it does not follow that Kuhn and Feyerabend are right. Moreover, given that the purpose of the book is to present the case *against* scientism and not to argue *for* Hegelianism, the chapter hardly seems necessary. It provides no support for the attack on scientism, though Margolis clearly thinks that it does (51).

Chapter Three ('Restoring the Bond Between Realism and Truth') is primarily an attack on Davidson's work on the theory of truth. Margolis finds Davidson, and analytic philosophers generally, to accept an unduly impoverished concept of truth. He is particularly critical of their attempts to sever the theory of truth from epistemology 'all in a vain attempt to isolate scientism from the subversive penetration of the play of human interests and practical success — in a word, the penetration of one or another constructivism along broadly Hegelian lines' (77). Margolis' argument is that Davidson's attempt to get by with a merely semantic theory of truth distorts our concept of truth. As Margolis analyzes that concept it is inseparable from epistemology and metaphysics, which themselves are inseparable. The argument rests on nothing more than a series of remarks on what the word 'true' means in English (101-2). Since Davidson does not take himself to be giving an analysis of what 'we' mean by 'true', it is not clear that the argument has any force against him.

The final chapter ('The Unraveling of Scientism') is a critique of Quine, specifically his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, which Margolis sees as underwriting scientism (118-19). The argument is unusually detailed by comparison with that found in the rest of the book. It focuses on two notions central to the thesis: 'stimulus meaning' and 'holophrastic sentences'. Margolis finds both to be incoherent. The first is incoherent because there is no way to make sense of stimulus meaning apart from bringing in the 'intensional' (115) dimension the indeterminacy thesis is meant to eliminate. The second is incoherent because holophrastic sentences must contain words if they are to do the job Quine wants. But by definition holophrastic sentences do not contain words (128-30).

In the end this book does not deliver what it promises. It purports to demonstrate the exhaustion of scientism, but neither the interpretations of Davidson and Quine nor the arguments against them are adequate to that task. Though short, the book is a chore to read because of its style, which is by turns annoyingly conversational and turgid, with frequent exclamatory outbursts littered throughout. The case against scientism is certainly one that needs to be made. Versions similar in spirit to the one Margolis presents can be found in the work of Wittgensteinians such as Hacker, Glock and Mulhall, as well as in Heidegger as interpreted by Dreyfus. A Hegelian contribution to the genre would be most welcome. Unfortunately Margolis has not provided it.

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David Mikics

*The Romance of Individualism in
Emerson and Nietzsche.*

Athens: Ohio University Press 2003. Pp. 263.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-8214-1496-8.

This graceful and provocative book is a welcome addition to a growing literature on the varieties of perfectionism that have grown up in the Western tradition over the past couple of centuries. The way in which the history of modern moral philosophy was told in the English/American tradition thirty or forty years ago tended to divide that history into two streams — utilitarianism (or more broadly consequentialism) and Kantianism. For this reason, and others, figures like Emerson and Nietzsche tended to be pushed out of Philosophy Department curricula in that period. However, the last twenty or so years have seen the return of the repressed with a vengeance. Stanley Cavell, whom David Mikics acknowledges as the main influence on his reading of Emerson, has been the central figure in bringing Emerson and, indirectly, Nietzsche back into the conversation of Anglo-American moral philosophy. Mikics' book moves to a new stage of the discussion of the relations between Emersonian and Nietzschean perfectionisms. Earlier writers have been concerned to stress the resemblance between Emerson's and Nietzsche's views, and to establish the actual historical influence of Emerson on Nietzsche (not a difficult task, since Nietzsche acknowledges it at several points). Indeed, Mikics provides a clear account of the general resemblances between their views on p. 1 of his book. This is done however, to stress that in this work, he intends to concentrate on the differences between Emerson and Nietzsche, in particular their differences over 'individualism' or what one might call the nature of the self. I shall first try to give a fairly detailed account of the structure of Mikics' work, and of his main line of argument. Along the way, I'll raise a few particular questions about what he has written.

Mikics structures his book around a selected set of texts (really a selected set of passages within those texts) of Emerson and Nietzsche. After an introduction setting out his original comparison of the two thinkers and his strategy for the book, he has five chapters. The first is called 'Emerson's Individualism' and draws on a number of Emerson's essays, especially 'Experience'. However, the chapter makes constant reference to Nietzsche, emphasizing the comparison begun in the introduction (17) in these remarks: 'In Emerson ... there is little sense of the characteristic Nietzschean melancholy, the inescapable pain of a history that lives on within the self ... [Emerson] lacks Nietzsche's interest in how repression works, in how we are mastered, despite ourselves, by influence' In this Emerson chapter, Mikics characterizes his reading as having been developed from the work of Stanley Cavell. The remaining chapters all focus on texts of Nietzsche, though Emerson remains as a constant point of reference.

The standard account of Nietzsche's philosophical development divides his work into three periods — (1) the earliest exemplified by *The Birth of*

Tragedy when he was dominated by the twin influences of Schopenhauer and Wagner, (2) a second period when he separated himself from these influences beginning with the *Untimely Meditations* and extending through most of *The Gay Science*, and (3) a final period beginning with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (or perhaps with the start of *Zarathustra* in *Gay Science*) and extending through the rest of his works which Nietzsche once characterized as 'introductions' to *Zarathustra*. Mikics gives a rather different four stage account of Nietzsche's development, though it is here that I am unclear about whether his is an account of the development of Nietzsche's thought about the self, or an account of the development of Nietzsche's own self.

This is partly because of Mikics' use of Lacan's notion of 'the object *a*' as the fundamental concept in his analysis of Nietzsche. Mikics explains this as 'a permanent frustration for any self that wishes to assume its integrity ... this wish ... provides the origin of our humanness ... The problem is that the unity is illusory' (60). What I find problematic here is not Lacan's thought (though 'the object *a*' is a protean concept that formulates an important point differently than I would). Rather, the issue is whether Mikics is using Lacan's theory to explicate Nietzsche's *thinking* or whether he is subjecting Nietzsche's psyche to Lacanian psychoanalysis. Perhaps, he thinks there isn't a great difference; if so, I disagree.

Chapter 2 discusses *The Birth of Tragedy* in a not unfamiliar way. In that work, Nietzsche formulated the Apollinian/Dionysian distinction, which roughly corresponds to the distinction between the world of representation and the world of, will formulated in Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Mikics reformulates this as a distinction between two conceptions of the self — the 'architectonic' and the 'musical.' The former term would apply to a self that is structured and could be, in some sense, 'completed'; the latter term applies to an always incomplete, always changing self. In the *Birth of Tragedy*, Mikics sees the distinction as being formulated generically, but in subsequent chapters it is applied to possibilities for the individual self which he believes are explored in Nietzsche's works. Chapter 3 comments on *The Untimely Meditations* (particularly the meditations on history and on Schopenhauer). Here, Mikics finds Nietzsche to put forward the possibility of a perfectionist, architectonic self that might be freely formed, partly by using the techniques of critical history. Chapter 4 traces out a reading of parts of *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science* in which he finds a contrasting emphasis on the possibility of a musical self. Chapter 5 reads Emerson's 'Fate' in conjunction with Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* and *Ecce Homo*. Emerson is here to provide 'an alternative to the ascetic stance that finally takes over Nietzsche's work' (187). No one would disagree that Nietzsche is the analyst of asceticism; moreover, there may be an argument to be made that the biographical Nietzsche was dominated by a personal asceticism (though that argument is not to be found here). However, in the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche's consciously presented position is to raise the *question* of whether human beings can go on with ascetic ideals no longer being able to serve their purpose for life. Moreover, he clearly intimates that he thinks his *Zarathus-*

tra provides an answer to that question. *Zarathustra* is almost entirely ignored by Mikics. He does give a fascinating reading of *Ecce Homo* as Nietzsche's 'drama of pathology ... driven by the role of woman as object *a*' (218). Inevitably, closing with this understanding of *Ecce Homo* shifts the focus to Nietzsche's personal 'pathology.' However, Mikics is far from a crude psychoanalytic reader of Nietzsche. This book as I said, is provocative in a good sense, and rewards the reader of Emerson and Nietzsche with new insight into their relationship.

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Sandra D. Mitchell

*Biological Complexity and
Integrative Pluralism.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.

Pp. xv + 244.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81753-6);

US\$25.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-52079-7).

In *Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism*, Mitchell addresses the epistemic (dis)unity of science. Starting from the observation that science is *in fact* a pluralistic enterprise (1-3, 208 — an observation that in itself can be debated but that is given no further defence in the book), Mitchell asks why this is the case and which form of pluralism best fits the actual practice of science.

Mitchell's answer comes in the form of *integrative pluralism*, a position that can be described as follows (see p. 216). According to Mitchell, an important distinction lies between two epistemic domains — the domain of modelling and theory construction and the domain in which particular, concrete cases are explained. The former domain requires a pluralist approach: science makes use of a plurality of generalized models and theories that account for different aspects of the phenomena in question and pertain to different levels of organization. Rather than constituting competing explanations of one single phenomenon, by subsuming different aspects of the phenomenon the invoked models and theories jointly apply to the various phenomena under study. The latter domain calls for integration: because in every concrete case '... there is only one causal history that, in fact, has generated the phenomenon to be explained' (216), the explanation of a particular, concrete phenomenon needs to integrate the various theories and models that apply to its various aspects into a single complete explanation

of the phenomenon in question. Integrative pluralism thus provides a picture of science that is pluralist with respect to scientific theories and models and integrative with respect to scientific explanations of individual, actual phenomena.

According to Mitchell, '... the complexity of the subjects studied by the various sciences and the limitations of our representations of acquired knowledge jointly entail an integrative, pluralistic model of science' (2). Correspondingly, Mitchell's argument for integrative pluralism proceeds along two paths. Part I of the book addresses the complexity of the phenomena and systems that constitute the subject matter of scientific (read: biological) study, while in Part II the focus lies on our epistemic limitations. Although the schematic outline on p. 4 suggests that the two paths independently lead to Mitchell's position, the second argument builds on the first: the diversity in the epistemic domain is due to the complexity of the subject matter under study — '... nature is complex and so, too, should be our representations of it' (115).

Part I (chapters 2-4) discusses three types of complexity. A particular system is called *constitutively* or *compositionally complex* if it consists of many parts of different kinds that interact in various ways. A system is called *dynamically complex* if it exhibits non-linear behaviour that may result in emergent order from self-organisation. Finally, a system exhibits *evolved complexity* if it exhibits complex organisation due to contingent factors in its evolutionary history. This latter type of complexity is characteristic of the living world: 'Variation is perpetually produced, and competition and natural selection tune that variation to the biotic and abiotic environment in which a population finds itself. Thus, the diversity of life is not random, but neither is it uniform. The sciences that attempt to characterize living things ... must face up to the complexity of this domain' (58). The systems under study in a particular field of investigation can be complex in one or more of these senses and, as a consequence, can be susceptible to multiple theories and models that each account for a particular aspect of their complex structure or behaviour.

In Part II (Chapters 5-6), Mitchell addresses the issues of pluralism and laws of nature and defends a *pragmatic approach* that focuses on how laws '... function to allow us to make predictions, explanations, and successful interventions' (142). According to Mitchell, the two main approaches that have been taken in the literature to understand laws of nature sketch an oversimplified picture of scientific knowledge and fail to do justice to the manifest pluralism in science. While the *normative approach* employs a priori criteria for lawhood to evaluate the generalisations used in the various scientific disciplines and the *paradigmatic approach* evaluates putative laws for their degree of resemblance to paradigmatic examples of laws of nature, both divide the domain of scientific knowledge into two parts: laws that can be used in explanation and prediction and non-laws that cannot be used thus. The complexity of the systems and phenomena studied in many disciplines, Mitchell argues, requires a variety of epistemic representations that cannot adequately be captured by the laws/non-laws dichotomy. Thus, '... to reserve

the title of "law" for just one extreme end is to do disservice to science by collapsing all the interesting variations within science into one category: nonlaws' (138).

Although Mitchell suggests that integrative pluralism applies to all of scientific investigation, throughout the book the focus lies exclusively on biological science — Mitchell's favourite example concerning cooperation and division of labour in social insect colonies. While I think that Mitchell's view of biological science in general is well taken, and that particularly the example regarding social insects constitutes a good case for integrative pluralism regarding (some subdisciplines of) biology, I do not think that the case for integrative pluralism with respect to all of natural science (or even all of biology for that matter) is sufficiently made. One nagging question that thus remained present after having read Mitchell's book was whether the need for integrative pluralism is merely an idiosyncrasy of biology, or of the sciences that study complex systems, or whether it constitutes a feature of science in general that surfaces in all domains of scientific investigation and on all levels of organization. This is one important issue that needs to be addressed before integrative pluralism can claim to be a full-fledged philosophical theory of science.

Another issue that needs more elaboration is Mitchell's treatment of laws of nature. Mitchell — in my view, rightly — states that the strengths and weaknesses of the various generalisations used in scientific explanation and prediction are inadequately represented by the one-dimensional laws/non-laws dichotomy. The multi-dimensional framework that Mitchell proposes (142-7) seems a promising option for assessing these epistemic strengths and weaknesses, but is still insufficiently spelled out.

Unfortunately, the presentation of the material is not optimal. Mitchell's book is a collection of previously published essays (complemented with a few previously unpublished sections) that have been incorporated into a continuous treatise. However, apparently only minor editing has been done on the constituent essays, resulting in a text that contains several redundant passages, lacks internal references and on occasion jumps back and forth between topics. The discussion of three approaches to understanding laws of nature in section 5.1, for instance, is repeated in section 5.2. Largely overlapping discussions of various types of contingency are found on pp. 151-6 and again on pp. 169-72. And on many occasions only references are given to the essays as they were published elsewhere, but not to the pages in the book itself where these essays are reprinted. For these reasons it would have been preferable to publish *Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism* as a collection of separate essays rather than as a continuous text.

Concluding, I think that integrative pluralism constitutes a viable and promising view of scientific investigation. By only addressing biological science, however, Mitchell's book insufficiently makes the case for integrative pluralism as a general position in philosophy of science. Probably this book is best seen as an in-depth case study of one particular scientific discipline from the viewpoint of integrative pluralism. As such, it constitutes an

intriguing starting point from which the rest of science can (and should) be examined.

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Michel de Montaigne

Apology for Raymond Sebond.

Trans. Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company

2003. Pp. x + 164.

US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-680-7);

US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-679-3).

Some time in 1575 or '76, Montaigne began reading the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* of Sextus Empiricus, recounting the scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BCE). At his beloved father's request he had already translated (in 1567) the 1487 *Natural Theology* of Raymond Sebond, but a decade later it seemed to be due for a delayed book review. Since about 1572, Montaigne had been sketching what he called his *essais*, in no particular order and without any agenda, he tells us, except to explore himself. His 'Apology' for (defense of) Sebond became Chapter XII of Book II of the *Essais*, published in 1580. This 'defense' carefully shreds every argument made by Sebond, and dozens Sebond never considered, leaving natural theology in tatters and the case for fideism in its place. As Richard Popkin has shown in his *History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle* (Oxford 2003), the *Apology* disseminated the tropes of Sextus near and far. *La crise pyrrhonienne* has its parameters established by Montaigne's inquiry; virtually all of early modern epistemology took its cues from this work.

Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, with the help of Hackett's modest pricing scheme, have made this challenging, infuriating, ironic and hilarious classic readily available in a faithful and well-presented translation. Montaigne's original footnotes (and many from the Thibaudet/Rat *édition critique*, as well as a few of their own) are included. I shall use the Ariew/Grene pagination, followed by Donald Frame's 1965 Stanford Press *Complete Essays* pagination as cross-reference, in order to provide a sampling of what awaits the reader:

'... There is no need to go hunting for strange examples to show convincingly the weakness of our reason: it is so deficient and so blind that there is no matter clear enough for it.... All subjects equally, and nature in general, disavow its jurisdiction and mediation'(11 f./328).

'Presumption is our natural and original illness. The most ill-fated and feeble of all creatures is man, and at the same time the vainest...he equates himself with God, ... attributes divine attributes to himself, picks himself out and separates himself from the crowd of other creatures ... How does he know the internal movements and secrets of animals by the effort of his intelligence? By what comparison between them and us does he infer the stupidity that he attributes to them? When I play with my cat, who knows if she is making more of a pastime of me than I of her?' (15/330f.)

'I say, therefore, that there is no evident reason to consider that beasts perform through natural instinct and obligation the same operations that we perform through our choice and industry. From like effects we must infer like faculties ...' (22/336f.).

'What [,then,] shall I choose? — 'Whatever you like, as long as you choose!' — There's a stupid reply, which it seems is what every dogmatist comes to ...' (66/373).

The Pyrrhonians, then, 'use their reason to inquire and to debate, but not to stop and choose' (67/374). [They] '... cannot explain their general conception in any kind of discourse for they would need a new language ... when they say, "I doubt", they are held to be running at the mouth for asserting that at least they avow and know that they doubt ... This idea is better conceived by asking, "What do I know?" ...' (89/393).

'Man is quite mad. He does not know how to produce a mite and produces gods by the dozens' (91/395).

'The impression of certainty is certain evidence of madness and extreme uncertainty ...' (102/404).

Our senses do not agree with each other, or with themselves; our reason deceives itself and is deceived by our senses. '... [W]e need a judge who is not attached to one or the other side, exempt from choice or affection, ... it would take someone exempt from all these qualities, so that, without preoccupation in his judgment, he would judge of these propositions as indifferent to him To judge appearances that we receive from [objects], we would need a judicatory instrument; to verify that instrument, we would need demonstration; to verify the demonstration, an instrument; here we are going round a circle ... thus he who judges by appearances judges by something other than the object' (161/454).

'Finally, there is no constant existence, neither of our being nor of that of objects. Both we and our judgment and all things mortal go on flowing and rolling endlessly. Thus nothing certain can be established for certain of the one or the other, both the judging and the judged being in a constant state of change and motion' (161/455).

Scholars will find this volume a fine choice for introducing students to early modern philosophy. Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza, Bayle, Locke, Hume and Kant anguish over or delight in, struggle with or borrow from Montaigne's treatment of Pyrrhonian scepticism and his framing of the criterion problem. His piety, fideism, irreverence to human pretension, his humor and irony are interwoven with earthy and classical examples to create

his seemingly wandering, yet obliquely Socratic manner, all the while creating the essay. This is a welcome publication.

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Bertell Ollman

Dance of the Dialectic:

Steps in Marx's Method.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2003.

Pp. x + 232.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02832-5);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-07118-2).

In *Dance of the Dialectic*, Bertell Ollman brings together his work on the dialectic from three books and four recent articles. The consistency of his views is obvious from the near-seamless weaving of mostly unchanged texts published over a period of thirty years. There are still many lapses, he says, but he announces that his 'next volume on dialectics [will focus] on appropriation _ and try to make up for these lapses' (112n6).

In this book, after a brief overview, Ollman gives his account of the philosophy of internal relations (from *Alienation*, 1976) and then in Chapter 5, 'the longest and probably most important' (6), discusses abstraction, which is the 'centerpiece' (63) of dialectics. The next 'step' consists of four chapters discussing what follows from the method and the 'best summary' of it (Chapter 9). Finally, Ollman gives useful comparisons of his account with Roy Bhaskar's Critical Realism (173ff), and Systematic Dialectics, advocated by many (182ff). The final chapter, which is devoid of dialectical language, is an interesting but impressionistic case study of the Japanese state.

All of this is done in five steps, without clear indication of the dance. Sometimes the heavy use of metaphysics makes it look more like gymnastics than ballet. There is a good index and a comprehensive bibliography, but with little material from analytical marxists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to consult references to Marx without citations to the *Collected Works*.

Ollman's 'Dance' is devoted to a correct understanding of Marx' methodology, his dialectic, which is necessary for understanding how Marx could 'construct theories _ that are at the same time scientific, critical, visionary, and revolutionary' (2). Such understanding, Ollman contends, requires 'a radical transformation in the way one thinks about anything' (7). We are told to abandon common sense and mainstream social science.

I agree with Ollman that Marx's dialectic (as well as Hegel's, its source) is — rightly — about 'change and interaction (or system)' (63). Mainline, even 'bourgeois', theory can be faulted for not adequately accounting for change and interconnection. Academic theory is largely about individuals and sometimes human nature. It also depends, as Ollman notes, on simplistic causes. My agreement does not extend to Ollman's account of social change with overlapping classifications, interdependencies, and tendencies. Dispositions and their interconnections would serve him better.

Internal relations and abstractions are central to Ollman's interpretation of Marx. The philosophy of internal relations is the view 'that everything in reality is internally related' (177). It is part of the concept of a capitalist that there is capitalism, workers, surplus value — and everything else from here to Tokyo. Granted, the concept of a father is 'internally related' to the concept of an offspring. One can even find a conceptual relation to everyone: family, friend, foe, acquaintance, and stranger. But Ollman wants to pack all of these relations, from one point of view or another, into a single concept. This does produce conceptual richness, but also muddled theoretical denseness.

Ollman opposes commonsense to relational conceptions (53), and claims greater utility for the latter. It is unclear to me what the utility is of 'elastic meanings' (178, cf. 79). How can we make use of 'the complex categories whose meanings stretch to the limits of the system' (153) using Ollman's account of totality and internal relations? The supposed usefulness is complicated by reconstructed senses where, allegedly, for Marx 'the essence of anything varies somewhat with his purpose' (79).

'Aware that reality doesn't come with its boundaries already in place, Marx knows that it is up to him to construct them [and] he can redraw them as suits his changing purposes' (176). Ollman sees this as 'Marx's skills and flexibility in making abstractions' (176). Others will see it as abandoning common sense and losing his way. Abstractions are the centerpiece of the story and are discussed at length in Chapter 5. (This chapter comes from *Dialectical Investigations*, which I reviewed in *Canadian Philosophical Reviews* 13 [1993] 255-7.) Abstractions and theory vary according to multiple extensions (73ff), seven levels of generality (86ff), and a variety of vantage points (99ff).

This leaves a lot of waffle room. There is elasticity in extensions which 'var[y] somewhat with his purpose' (79). '[D]epending on the level that is brought into focus, the sense of [a] claim — though true in each instance — will vary' (98). And 'it is largely differences of vantage point that lay behind many of the great debates in the history of Marxist scholarship' (110). In my view, the differences are more about what is right than about how the claims are made. When one tries to make sense of Marx, and of the world, it is unhelpful to have wobbly subjects and varying claims.

It is a pity that Ollman did not look at work in analytical marxism, especially that of G. A. Cohen in *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978). There is a lot of evidence against Ollman's claim that 'Marx did not take much care to distinguish _ different formulations' (79).

Interpretations differ about Marx's description in the *Grundrisse* of 'the correct scientific method' about 'the real and concrete' that arrives at 'a whole, [with] a rich totality of many determinations and relations' (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 28 [New York: International Publishers 1986], 37f.). For many, Marx' ideas, in the proper context with good understanding of interconnections, are not far off from common sense. Oppressed people do not have to be taught a complex theory of internal relations and forms of abstraction (cf. 168) before understanding and accepting most of Marx's central points.

Important but questionable claims about the future are central in this new work. Ollman notes a difference between Bhaskar's view and his own. Bhaskar projects 'the communist future on the basis of an analysis_of_needs, wants' and other aspects of the human condition, while according to Marx, says Ollman, the contradictions of capitalism such as class struggle 'reveal not only how communism might come about but a good deal of what it might look like' (179).

A general and fundamental point exercises Ollman. Marx is said 'to discover communism inside capitalism' (2). 'Tomorrow is today extended' (28). We are able to 'project the evolution' (160) since 'capital contains the seeds of a future socialist society' (65). This sort of view, which occasionally appears in Marx, is strongly challenged by G. A. Cohen as a misguided 'obstetrics metaphor' (G. A. Cohen, *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000], 58-78). The challenge goes unnoticed here, but there is enough to alert us in the idea that we can project evolution. The future is not something already formed — nor would we want it to be.

Dialectics can force us to think about change, but it cannot reveal what the future will be. Ollman forces us to think about dialectics in this provocative book, and we can expect more in the future.

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Adriaan T. Peperzak

Elements of Ethics.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.

Pp. xiv + 283.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4769-5);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4770-9).

Adriaan Peperzak's *Elements of Ethics* begins where all good philosophy begins — with dissatisfaction, We seek truth because the opinions we hold

are unsatisfactory; we seek the good because our ethical pursuits are inadequate or bad; we seek justice because injustice abounds in the political world. In short, philosophy begins with dissatisfaction insofar as the philosopher, dissatisfied and disappointed with the world as she finds it, is compelled to question that world, analyzing its consistency while offering modifications that would render experience of that world more consistent, true, just and good.

Peperzak's dissatisfaction is twofold. First, it is philosophical. The standard treatises on ethics do not adequately match up with moral experience, the most 'neglected and distorted' element of ethics (ix). The formalism of traditional ethical philosophy, whether it points to ethical truths or not, somehow misses something essential in the experience of living within the context (and with the content) of everyday life. According to Peperzak, ethics, which is inspired by experience, ought to carefully attend to moral experience in all its manifestations and styles in order to properly elucidate the challenge of living well. Second, his dissatisfaction is moral. The ethos of the contemporary world, which is at once positivistic and post-modern, elides the truthfulness of moral reasoning. According to this ethos, morality is either a hoax to be overcome or nothing more than a psychobiological impulse on par with bodily functions like eating, sleeping and defecating. In either case, the ethical — the genuine responsiveness of everyday moral engagement — is lost. If we take ethics seriously, we more than likely will share this dissatisfaction, hoping to discover a more earnest and appropriate account of the ethical project of living well.

Implicit in Peperzak's approach is the view that moral experience is situated; to respond ethically is to invoke a tradition of moral reasoning, an ethos that structures our experience and makes ethical responses available to individual moral actors. This is not to say that ethics is determined by history. Ethics is informed and conditioned by history, but, as Peperzak insists, we ultimately choose our responses to moral dilemmas from a wide range of options: 'the self has the last word, but what it says and does is for the most part borrowed from other actors' (192). I may do as others have done before me, but doing so is up to me; I am responsible for my moral response. As such, moral responsibility is moral responsiveness; I am obliged to respond and my response is conditioned by a tradition to which I am heir, but my response is ultimately free.

Responsiveness is not just free; it can be transformative. Because a moral response is chosen by moral actors, moral experience can be (and likely should be) innovative. However, innovation is always situated; just like any technological innovation, I always start with the work of my forbearers, who have provided me with the material, language and occasion for innovation, for alteration, critique, improvement and transformation. As such, Peperzak's approach to ethics is at once conservative and progressive. He encounters his own ethical tradition, accepting — and thanking — the ethos within which contemporary ethical responses are made possible. However, the approach is always critical and evaluative; he seeks the most

consistent account of the logic (*logos*) of moral phenomena. The project, in true phenomenological spirit, is one of retrieval and refinement.

What is it that Peperzak retrieves? And how does this refine our current ethics? Peperzak discovers a non-formal ethical universal: namely, that all ethical action is motivated by radical Desire. Desire cannot be reduced to particular desires. In fact, we only have particular desires (or drives for specific goods that we deem valuable) because human life is governed by (a universal, yet never formal or concretely determinable) Desire. What is ultimately desired is a good life: in desiring this or that good, we aim at living well, which seems to be the goal of human living. To live a human life is to approach the world desiringly.

At first glance, this thesis appears too general; it does not tell us — the 'ethical' actors seeking to live well — what we must do in order to ethically succeed or desire well. What's more, an appeal to Desire seems to be entirely subjective, defending each subject's particular desires whatever they are. What we need, an objector might interject, is a concrete and *formal* theory of ethical desires. However, this is precisely what Peperzak resists — it is the formalism of standard ethics that dissatisfies him after all. Peperzak's response lies in a theory of correspondence: our desires for particular objects ought to correspond to the way those objects present themselves to us. The means of successful ethical living are openness and attentiveness; we must be open to phenomena, as they actually appear (within the meaningful context of their appearance of course) *for* us. This returns us to the central notion of responsiveness. To live well is to respond to the various phenomena (human and otherwise) that approach us, present themselves to us and even call on us (as the face, in Levinasian terms, always does). How this is done is ultimately decided by each actor, but clues and criteria are embedded within the context of meanings we have at our disposal, which we can criticize, refine and transform through genuine and innovative response. In some sense, this is precisely what Peperzak has done. His book not only defends correspondence and response as essential elements of ethics; it is itself an open encounter with an entire tradition of moral reasoning, seeking to respond adequately and to correspond to the tradition through description and critique. In light of this, *Elements of Ethics* is philosophical in the truest sense: it is not only rigorous and engaged in the language of western philosophy; it is good, just and beautiful.

Edvard Lorkovic

(*Core Curriculum*)

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Claudia M. Schmidt

David Hume: Reason in History.

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 2003. Pp. xiii + 473.

US\$85.00. ISBN 0-271-02263-9.

Hume is sometimes accused of having an atomistic philosophy. Yet his critics often take a highly atomistic approach in their interpretations of him, attending selectively to passages in the texts that interest them while ignoring the overall shape of his thought. In recent years, writers more sympathetic to Hume have opposed this approach. From their portrayals, Hume emerges as a constructive, unified thinker whose real views, which are not necessarily the views for which he is famous (or notorious), are not so easy for the critics to dismiss. Claudia Schmidt's book is a part of this encouraging trend in Hume scholarship. But Schmidt aims to go further in this direction than others have. Her book deals not only with the *Treatise* or *Enquiries*, but also the many essays, *Dialogues*, *Natural History of Religion*, *History of England*, fragments, juvenilia, occasional pieces, and even much of the correspondence. Schmidt's own portrayal of Hume draws ecumenically from this diverse array of sources.

Each chapter examines a single general topic (e.g., 'Metaphysics', 'Moral Theory', 'Economics'), and consults what Hume has to say on the topic throughout his career. The book begins with Hume's philosophy of mind and increasingly works outward to Hume's writings on society, ending with treatments of aesthetics, religion, and history. The choice of topics for this concluding trio has an Hegelian flavor, and Schmidt wants us to detect Hegelian resonances. The subtitle — 'Reason in History' — intentionally evokes Hegel; and Schmidt's Hume is engaged in a 'single integrated project' whereby the processes of human thought that are accessible to introspection are to be understood ultimately in the light of human 'historical existence' (416). Hume's empiricism is the starting-point for inquiry, not a narrowly constraining methodological principle.

As for her interpretive procedure within the chapters, Schmidt announces that she has 'not attempted to criticize or evaluate Hume's arguments' (10). This policy, adopted because the project of the book is demanding enough, is one to which she largely adheres. At the same time, she is not reluctant to take stands on exegetical controversies in the secondary literature on Hume. Although Schmidt does not explain this aspect of her procedure, there may be an expectation that if Hume's total picture is set out in sufficient detail, the old questions will take care of themselves, or that other (and better?) questions will arise. Schmidt's main agenda, at any rate, lies in making narrative sense of all the particular things that occupied Hume as a man of letters.

Schmidt's global familiarity with Hume is dauntingly evident on page after page, and the way in which this familiarity is put to work is one of the merits of this book. Schmidt gives sustained attention to the *History* (which

philosophers routinely ignore), as well as to neglected passages in texts that philosophers do not ignore, such as Hume's sections, in *Treatise* Book Two, on the effects of space and time on the passions and imagination. Also, she sometimes makes unusual juxtapositions of Hume's writings, as when she turns from the exceedingly familiar 'Of Miracles' to the obscure late unpublished essay on James MacPherson's fraudulent Ossian poems (387-92). Both these texts reveal Hume as a skeptical evaluator of historical evidence, one whose skepticism rests confidently (i.e., non-skeptically) on causal generalizations about human nature. It is illuminating to pair these texts, as Schmidt has done, for the sake of obtaining a more fine-grained revelation.

The book is also useful for its abundant references. Readers of Hume, advanced or beginning, who want to get a grip on the ever-growing field of commentary can profitably consult Schmidt, who does a painstaking job of identifying pertinent leads for further study. And Schmidt is good at providing us with rather recondite facts about other thinkers' perceptions (or misperceptions) of Hume. If you want to know what Albert Einstein or Joseph Schumpeter said about Hume, this book will tell you.

There are relatively minor infelicities of detail or emphasis. In characterizing some calm passions as settled or enduring inclinations (180, 221), Schmidt seems to run together the calmness of a passion with its strength. When she says that the freedom of the imagination is one of the two basic principles in Hume's science of man (22), she is referring to what has been called the Separability Principle, but separability of idea-contents is not quite the same thing as imaginative freedom. That the fancy is not always fanciful is an idea with a certain importance for Hume's philosophy of belief, and that role is obscured in Schmidt's presentation. Schmidt also makes some ado about the role of 'probable reasoning' (Chapter 3). For Hume, unbroken experiential regularities give rise to causal inferences that are conceptually prior to the merely probabilistic judgments that are responsive to irregularities: proof, not probability, indicates the cement of our universe. Schmidt makes it seem as if the reverse were true.

It may be claimed that such complaints merely point up differences in interpretation. Perhaps so. But pressing this line raises a larger issue about the book. By not evaluating Hume, Schmidt's interpretation often leaves the impression of being a meta-commentary. Although it is easy to sympathize with an author who avoids entanglements with commentators, a thought-provoking reading cannot avoid entanglements with the texts. When Schmidt quotes Hume, there is often little sense of philosophical perplexity. For instance, Hume says that the vice of an action cannot be found 'till you turn your reflexion into your breast.' Whose breast is yours? The ordinary moral agent's? Hume's fellow-anatomist's? The answer could affect what we say about the practice of moral judgment, but from Schmidt's discussion (227) 'you' might conclude that the meaning of the remark is transparent. A more puzzled engagement with Hume would have invigorated the interpretation.

Given Schmidt's approach, the book is least helpful, for specialist readers, when dealing with Hume's more self-contained topics (such as the idea of

causal connection, or personal identity). It is more helpful when, as in the later chapters, the topics are those that Hume treated less systematically. These chapters are better at bringing out Schmidt's virtues.

To say that Schmidt's survey is systematic, however, is not to say that Hume has a single project. For Schmidt, Hume abandons his skeptical doubts to pursue inquiries concerning the 'standards of critical judgment' (420) that we deploy in the various areas of our social life, and Schmidt thinks that in a sense these standards are objective, if we acknowledge the historical traditions that lead us to agreement in judgment. Yet some readers could have the feeling that Hume, on this showing, and for all that Schmidt has said about it, is offering us nothing but sociology (of taste, of morals, of politics). Presumably Schmidt would not welcome this result, but it is unclear what her answer to such a criticism would be. If this objection is unanswered, then Hume is indeed a many-sided thinker, but not necessarily a thinker whose many sides are unified by a particular conception of reason. As it stands, the book serially presents Humean motifs, and it is not without value to have them even so displayed. But in a book that promises us something of Hegel's spirit, evidence of a more robust dialectic would have delivered more convincingly on the promise.

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Alan Singer

Aesthetic Reason:

Artworks and the deliberative ethos.

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 302.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-271-02312-0.

A spectre is haunting modern intellectual life, the spectre of aesthetics — or so Dave Beech and John Roberts contend (*The Philistine Controversy*, 2002). Their polemic attests to a striking recent phenomenon: the vigorous championing of art and the aesthetic against attacks from Cultural Studies, Post-Structuralism, and assorted Postmodernist practices. Alan Singer's book may fairly be situated within this continuing battle, though it wears idiosyncratic colours. He speaks not for purist 'aestheticism' or an 'autonomous' art, but rather for the view that artistic production and reception bear directly upon ethics and politics. Moreover he repudiates the main line of

philosophical aesthetics from Shaftesbury via Kant, one emphasizing sensuous taste or absence of rules, preferring instead Baumgarten's 'cognitivist' line. A previous book (*The Subject as Action*, 1993) had more to say on B's norm of 'confused clarity', how it takes narrative shape in a series of particulars nonetheless perceived as aesthetically unified. This new work shares the same basic idea: reason generates the artwork, as it generates ethical action, though not by any abstract ('logical') rule. The active construction of art, whether making or interpreting, models our deliberative agency. Coherence ('continence') should never be presupposed, however, but is to be arrived at contingently and over time.

If the so-called 'Enlightenment project' claims much of S's allegiance, a second resort is to an older tradition of rationalism, that of Aristotle; not just the poetics of *peripeteia* (reversal) and *anagnorisis* (recognition), but also his ethics, suitably revised by recent theory of action. This in turn is linked with ancient tragedy: *hamartia* (error) or *akrasia* (going against our better judgment) are assumed to define our moral being. Third, artworks are taken to transcend a mere reflection model (a) by enabling us to understand our actions, hence ourselves, and (b) in relation to others' perspectives. They offer what S calls 'protocols' for making reasonable choices in our lives. Hence they carry a pragmatic charge: 'recognition' (Fichte's *Anerkennung*) implies intersubjectivity, again in the double sense of ethical action and of spectatorial involvement in the artwork. As S puts it, rather than offering a representation (*Vorstellung*), art operates as presentation (*Darstellung*), for an engaged audience or reader. Indeed, one of the book's strongest features is the critical application to particular texts and images (Beckett, Melville, Joyce, Caravaggio, Gerhard Richter). The pragmatic take on world and work has for S two further implications: a democratic vision of active participation or 'exemplary validity' (Kant, Arendt), and reason understood as productive without being instrumental (when ends are already given and recognition is passive). The adequacy of the aesthetic — to cite the first chapter — lies in a process of adequation, a procedural rationality.

It all makes for a very rich feast, meaty, sometimes hard to digest. Courses don't follow a progression so much as circle around a set of concerns, gathering or rejecting names along the way (among the first group, Adorno, Arendt, Charles Altieri, MacIntyre, Hegel, and Marcuse; among the second, Althusser, Jameson, Habermas, Guillory, Bourdieu, Foucault, and Nancy; Kant features in both). Despite the wide range of reference, it escapes the charge of eclecticism in that sources are engaged with and put to work; the reader likewise is made to work hard at the often intricate and original interpretations. More straightforwardly commendable are ingenious critical readings of (e.g.) Beckett's late manner (86-100), in which underdetermined syntax invites the reader's intervention to fill out the action with no guarantees of resolution. Or again, in a nuanced look at the *Conversion of Saul* (133-7), S points up Caravaggio's articulation of perspectives calling for our judgment about vision rather than noting its mere *patency* (Nancy).

A great deal remains murky, however, not all of it due to an often opaque style, syntax, and lexicon (e.g., the eccentric use of 'protocol', 'métier', or 'counter'). Take the central theme, S's revisionist use of Aristotle and his understanding of ancient tragedy as 'an exemplary cultural site where appearance mediates human agency _' (73). S follows post-Davidsonian approaches to *akrasia* as connoting not weakness of will but acting against one's better judgment. He adds that this need not amount simply to irrationality, for — 'all things considered' or 'internally' — we might have good reasons for acting in a way that turns out not to be for the best. Hence (S argues) there is a continuum between *akrasia* and fully rational (*enkratic*) action, which tragedy illustrates in exemplary fashion. Tragedy exhibits a learning from mistakes, via reversal and recognition, from the audience's if not protagonist's perspective. S generalizes this model to all rational agency: we are continually revising our self-understanding. One problem with such an approach to art and action as errant, corrigible, always under revision, is — paradoxically — its *a*-historicality. It conflates tragic with Fichtean, quasi-existential 'recognition', and, unlike Ricoeur or Taylor (say), takes no account of the sources of *modern* selfhood or action. At one point tragic reversal is compared with Hegelian 'forgiveness', neglecting the historical distance Hegel measures between Antigone and Romantic 'conscience'. Equally dubious is the analogical mode of argument, especially the leading analogy between artwork and action, the precise mechanism of which is never made clear. Or again, the analogy S draws (120-6) between MacIntyre on the rational engagement with rival traditions (*Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*) and our hermeneutic engagement with art appears strained and ill-thought-out. What plausibility it has derives from an opposition to the Althusserian-structuralist model of textual explanation of 'meaning effects' (misattributed to Jameson, incidentally). But even if MacIntyre were justified in his stance on liberal individualism, it is hard to see how reading or viewing is always or best understood as a conversation with alien traditions.

More broadly, is this vision of rational context-formation adequate to our times? Writing about our modern predicament (*Situatedness*, 2002), David Simpson notes that the conversational model fails to reflect a prevailing 'anxiety' in contemporary 'risk society' (Giddens). S's book is hardly self-satisfied, but it does take much on faith, or at least on hypothesis. He should perhaps be somewhat anxious about that.

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Quentin Skinner

Visions of Politics:

Volume I, Regarding Method.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. 226.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58105-2);

US\$22.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58926-6).

[*Visions of Politics* 3-volume set

US\$180 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81382-4);

US\$65.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89075-6).]

Quentin Skinner's methodological works are now so well known that he has become an essential point of reference for anyone working in the general area of intellectual history (the history of ideas in general, the historical sociology of ideas, the history of philosophy and concepts, cultural history, etc.). Skinner's central thesis is relatively simple: valid historical research in the field of philosophy presupposes a contextualization of the thoughts of the author whose argumentative arsenal is to be elucidated. However, this contextualization must never be accomplished by abandoning the singular features proper to the author or to the concepts under study. The intellectual context does not cause an idea's apparition: it explains it, because it stands in relation to it.

Skinner's program was developed in order to counter structuralism and similar forms of historiography. In fact, his work is set against any type of speculative or teleological philosophy of history. This means Skinner is opposed to the kind of work carried out by Arthur Lovejoy, often considered to be the 'father' of the history of ideas. And so, against the principle of a strictly internal reading of philosophy's major works, and against the will to read the history of ideas as a single narrative where every author takes over from the previous, Skinner has shown the importance of the contingency of historical facts. The thesis seems trivial, because it contrasts so vividly with the works of the Lovejoyan and structuralist 'schools', it has changed considerably the way in which intellectual history is practiced. So much so, in fact, that for about twenty years now this methodological program has itself been seen as a school: the 'Cambridge School'.

Skinner's thesis rests first and foremost on two epistemological concerns. First, when reading past authors, we must be mindful of the important gap between their intellectual world and our own. By not concerning ourselves with this gap, not only do we run the risk of tacking our present worries onto the intellectual world of the past, but we also risk cutting ourselves off from crucial information. For Skinner, such information is accessible to us only insofar as we do not attempt to reduce it to our vocabulary, our conceptions of the world, our theories, etc. Of course, this does not entail that we must give up all forms of dialogue with authors of the past. It simply means that, if something like a dialogue is to take place, we must not reduce their universe to ours. In order not to indulge in such reductionism — and here

this epistemological concern ties up with an important idea mentioned above — the respect for the text's historical otherness must play a role in its historical contextualizing.

Second, the historical context of a text, although crucial to any understanding of the text, is not however decisive. Were it decisive, it could then be argued that everything in the text is already present in its context. One way to present this idea, to which Skinner is opposed, is to understand the context as the text's cause. Admittedly, one can understand a context as a partial cause of a text without necessarily assuming that everything that the text contains can be found in its initial context. Nevertheless, the idea of causality, that is, the idea that a specific context begets a certain text, suggests that a good number of elements composing the 'caused' object — in this case, a past author's text — are already present in the context, here understood as a matrix for the aforementioned object. Skinner rejects this idea, and an attempt to reduce his methodological program to this kind of contextualism would be both misleading and dishonest. His main objection is that such contextualism reduces texts to mere effects of the context and therefore refuses to grant them any form of autonomy. Methodologically speaking, it then becomes impossible to ask the question of an author's intentions when writing, for 'causal contextualism', if one can call it that, sees the relations between context and text forming in only one way: from the context, as a social and/or ideological matrix, to the text as its production. And yet, it is not only possible but also easy to conceive the relation in inverse order, whereby a text would produce an effect on its immediate context. Hence, Skinner's contextualism is not causal. It could, however, be qualified as being dialogical.

Just as is the case for the two other volumes of *Visions of Politics*, the reissuing of these now famous Skinner texts is in fact a rewriting. And as certain readers have already pointed out, this rewrite comes at the price of sacrificing the intellectual context of Skinner's methodological texts. Most of these texts were in fact written at the time of the 'linguistic turn' in the human sciences, and Skinner's rewriting casts a shadow on his work's more polemical character. Nevertheless, this reissuing/rewriting could not have come at a better time. Ever since the publication of recent works such as Melvin Richter's and Kari Palonen's, there has been renewed interest in Skinner's theses. This is mostly due to an important discussion touching on the epistemology of history and the points of convergence between Skinner's works and those of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck, head of a German research group devoted to the history of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*). What's more, this discussion has led to the creation of an international research group where English, French, German, and Italian researchers are together trying to define a methodological program that is taking the form of a new epistemology for the Social Sciences (http://www.helsinki.fi/hum/nordic/concepts/hocn6_web.pdf). In this connection, the book's last chapter, 'Retrospect: Studying Rhetoric and Conceptual Change' (previously unpublished), allows Skinner to clarify what distinguishes his own

program from the different types of research concerning what could be termed 'intellectual history'. Picking up on Kari Palonen's commentary on his work (*Quentin Skinner. History, Politics, Rhetoric* [Polity Press 2003]), Skinner states the difference by arguing that, if Koselleck is more interested in the historical transformation of concepts and political vocabulary, his own approach stresses the transformations in the uses being made of concepts without, however, presupposing that these concepts necessarily undergo important transformations, nor that their signification is permanent. That's why it could be said that the entirety of Skinner's work is, first and foremost, a history of the rhetorical techniques used by the political actors of the past.

To many, the reissuing and updating of these texts by Skinner has become indispensable. Not only does it provide a new dissemination of his works, but it also renders possible the comparison between his theses and the different methods that engage in a dialogue with them or were inspired by his work.

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Quentin Skinner

Visions of Politics:

Volume II, Renaissance Virtues.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. 482.

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[*Visions of Politics* 3-volume set

US\$180 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81382-4);

US\$65.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89075-6).]

This is primarily a work of erudition, and most welcome when students of political thought seemed in danger of deserting old texts in favour of other pursuits. It also has a philosophical dimension, for Skinner has employed historical documents to speak to the philosophical debate about good government for our time. It may then find readers amongst critics — not his most discerning ones — who had complained of an antiquarianism that offered little for the present-minded. The two tasks of historical construction and normative proposals intermingle through thirteen essays (plus introduction) that make up this volume. Most were previously published, one a good three decades ago, and all have been revised for this version. Skinner is a demanding writer who offers both close conceptual argument and dense documentation of texts. Neither is the reader's task made easier by the invitation to see

this within a larger pattern formed by the three volumes that share the same title. Our attention may thus be drawn, not only to the earlier versions of these thoughts, but also to Skinner's numerous other publications that explain his current agenda. The fashionable jargon of intertextuality applies with a vengeance.

So what is this about? The 'Renaissance virtues' of the sub-title are those associated with the struggle for freedom in Florence and in other city states, though the theme draws us back to the ancient world and forward to early-modern Britain and beyond. Largely an exercise in Skinner's ambition of 1978 to offer an account with 'a genuinely historical character', it is also a tale with a moral that argues how an attractive form of political freedom is the product of some schools of thought and not others. Theories that have the closest affinity to the ideal are now styled 'neo-Roman'. The neologism serves notice that, for some purposes, the term 'republican' won't do, for defenders of limited monarchy may also have said the right things. Actually, the general preface to this volume tells us that it treats the 'fortunes of republicanism' (x) and if the author of the new category can so forget himself, the distinction may not have been essential. So important is it to sort out the various protagonists involved in the drama that their identification, along with some criticism of the categories here on offer, will form the bulk of this comment.

Skinner's argument varies with the telling, for even with the current revision, the essays represent different stages in his thinking. A major signpost as to what matters is the claim that, for the Renaissance writers who predominate here, Roman inspiration was far more important than was Greek. This means that Aristotle has been demoted to the advantage of Cicero and other Roman Stoics. Another crucial litmus test gives the nod to the Italian humanists, including pre-humanists, while downgrading the scholastics, who were, on the whole, associated with the universities. A further way of presenting the causes here being opposed to one another is to say that the neo-Roman school found its ultimate other in the modern theory of the Hobbesian sovereign state (9). For purposes of contrast, the neo-Romans must be seen as upholding popular sovereignty.

Other forms of choosing up sides include dubbing as 'liberal' the school of thought that displaced the neo-Roman (161). The term does not appear here often, but it serves as the antithesis to neo-Romanism in essays that Skinner has contributed to the debate about the influence and relative merits of republican and liberal visions. Skinner sees liberalism as more given to emphasizing self-interest where neo-Romanism relied on the virtuous citizen and zeal for the common good as barriers against tyranny. To find the antecedents of the liberal position one must look for thinkers who wrote of contract and rights. In a recent refinement of the shibboleth for distinguishing virtue, we now have a claim that republican theory offers a more subtle rendering of the condition of unfreedom. In place of liberals' alleged focus upon force or coercive threat as the main danger, we are urged to find that slavery lies in the very situation of being dependent for one's freedom on the benign impulses of authority. This more anxious watch over freedom may

entail the formula, implicit in Machiavelli and explicit in Rousseau, that in the interest of the public safety, citizens may have to be forced to be free (177).

The several different accounts of contrasting positions do not superimpose neatly one on another. For example, though it might seem a simple matter to compare the place of Greek ideas with those of Roman provenance, the plot thickens when we reflect that, behind Cicero's stock of ideas — and the same is true of Titus Livy — stands Aristotle. Many figures were influenced by both sorts of sources, and modern scholarship refers to 'humanist Aristotelians', tribute to the process whereby humanists made Greek philosophy speak elegant Latin, and thus saw the further incorporation of Aristotelian categories into humanism. As part of the same process, we find a schoolman such as James of Viterbo availing himself of Cicero. Few points arise as often in the argument as the reminder that modern scholars made too much of the recovery of Aristotle, whereas Roman sources sufficed to reveal republican values to the teachers of rhetoric (*dictatores*) from the early twelfth century on. Some students of relevant periods, including J.H Burns, have sought to elide the differences between scholasticism and humanism, but Skinner tends rather to emphasize them. Nor are all of the differences entirely to the advantage of the humanists, as when Skinner tells us (122) that the humanists, unlike their scholastic brethren, never showed any anxiety about the pursuit of worldly glory. When we recall that they aspired to posts at the courts of rulers, one might be forgiven for wondering whether their role was to speak truth about the common good to power, or whether some were just on to a good thing.

A complicating feature of this work seems to lie in the methods that Skinner has long employed for purposes of redefining where to look for political ideas. Without discarding the great books, he has sought the relevant sort of political language earlier than had conventional scholarly judgement. Some of the scholars with whom he has differed on these matters — Nicolai Rubenstein, for instance — have persisted in refusing to find interesting political theory in the *dictatores* because they were rhetoricians and neither philosophers nor theorists. Readier to cherish his ideas where he finds them, Skinner has suffered from fewer inhibitions. We should then be alerted to the possibility that it may not be that experts who preceded these enquiries were ignorant of the existence of certain documents, but rather were hesitant to deem them a useful resource. Evidence comes in an article of 1996 that another historian Ronald Witt wrote for a retrospective on the career of Hans Baron, the scholar who created the category of civic humanism. The article is cited, but not Witt's grumble that Skinner uses the label constitutional theory to apply to 'a wide range of statements, often isolated phrases and sentences ...'. The sniff of distaste that Witt relegates to a footnote may add to our understanding of what is at stake here.

Method of investigation and presentation also figures in the rather bewildering array of categories that confront us in this book. In his seminal article on method of 1969, Skinner dismissed efforts to write the history of an idea through time, and he then sought to practise what he preached. With the

publication of the *Foundations* (1978), certain critics objected that the flow of his history had been inhibited by his unwillingness to trace a unit idea through all of its manifestations and saw his account of the modern state as taking what they called an 'episodic' or 'incremental' turn. This was more in keeping with a method that proclaimed the statement in a text as the relevant unit. Extreme atomism seems now to have lost its hold, but there remains the tendency to stress arguments and a vocabulary that seem most comfortably applied to a particular period. This surely privileges what is synchronic over a diachronic account, not any help when 'unit ideas' (as A.O. Lovejoy called them) seem now to be his objects of enquiry. Another problem that complicates the presentation of neo-Roman and liberal visions is the assumption that a thinker must belong to one school or the other, whereas the two may not be easily separable, as J.G.A. Pocock's difficulties in tracing a republican alternative to liberalism have amply revealed.

What is most impressive here is the bringing to bear of Skinner's learning on issues that defeated others. His interpretation of a Lorenzetti fresco and the accompanying inscriptions is thoroughly convincing and should suitably humble some art historians. Less appealing is a tendency to brush aside inconvenient evidence. One finds a readiness to make little of earlier discoveries of points which Skinner has made his own, as when a comment by J.H. Burns that scoops a favourite claim by Skinner is noted but somehow disqualified as counting (351n). Discovery of Catholic antecedents of the Protestant theory of rebellion has long been a point of pride, revealing the cogency of Skinner's methods, and it is surprising then to find Francis Oakley, in 1962, already pointing in the right direction. An author who is noticeably gracious to his sources must have reservations of some sort about these ones. Meticulous, as always, he cites the evidence that allows us to draw conclusions different from his. This is a remarkable collection and will stimulate readers who have sufficient background. Such erudition deserved, from the press, a better subject index.

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Quentin Skinner

Visions of Politics:

Volume III, Hobbes and Civil Science.

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[*Visions of Politics* 3-volume set

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US\$65.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89075-6).]

Did I ever think I would sit down and read with pleasure a detailed analysis of some of the obscurer tropes of classical and renaissance rhetoric? No, I didn't. But when the analysis comes from the elegant pen of Quentin Skinner I find I am turning the pages with an eagerness usually associated with reading Jane Austen — only with Skinner the plot is more enticing and the characters more interesting. Skinner is of course regarded as the master of the art of the history of ideas. Some would question his methodology, or dispute his interpretations of texts. But his scholarship is impeccable, his analysis profound, his style heavenly and his wisdom irenic. All these virtues are to the fore in this the third volume of his collected essays, on the political theory of Hobbes, or rather, as we should say, on his conception of 'civil science'.

Part of Skinner's method is to read texts in their intellectual contexts, and to understand debates within their discursive frameworks. So there is in these essays much detail about not only Hobbes but also his classical and contemporary sources, his opponents, his followers and his influences. The debates, at a time of civil war, could not have been more vital: literally matters of life and death. Hobbes believed that a complete natural philosophy was possible in three parts: bodies in motion, the human being, and social and political life. The method, though, was not to be inductive and experimental, but rationalist and deductive. One widely-held belief that Skinner successfully challenges is that Hobbes was intellectually isolated, a lone voice rejected with horror on all sides. Not true. His views overlapped and intersected with those of many others. What makes him stand out, according to Skinner, is not so much his conclusions as the single-mindedness of his focus and the rigour of his arguments. This leads Skinner to reconsider, for example, the case of Hobbes's exclusion from the Royal Society. He concludes there is no case. Hobbes was not so much excluded as simply not included, along with many other leading intellectuals who were worthy candidates for inclusion.

Many of Skinner's chapters (some new, some rewritten from earlier publications) are concerned with one of the central issues of Hobbes's politics: the relations between the citizen and the sovereign. When the multitude find no security in the state of nature, they contract together, each to each, to form the artificial person of the commonwealth or state, which is then represented by the sovereign. The sovereign imposes law and order on the state, so that

the safety and security of each person is ensured, but at the cost to that person of giving up natural rights. But how many rights? Not all of them: the right to protect your own life is never surrendered. Skinner also mentions that according to Hobbes, in areas of life where the sovereign has issued no laws, citizens may use their own discretion. But suppose the sovereign decides to regulate every area of life? Strictly, the role of the sovereign is protection. But as again Skinner points out, at the time of the original contract the multitude is in no position to impose limits to the sovereign's power, and, furthermore, the sovereign is not a party to the contract. So the sovereign cannot break the contract, and even bad behaviour has to be endured by the citizens. If the sovereign's behaviour deteriorates to the point where it is indistinguishable from the state of nature, then the contract is still not broken, but no longer has any point.

Some of these ambiguities remain, even after Skinner's analyses and discussions. The relation of the non-contracting sovereign to the contract is a little obscure. This problem is added to when Hobbes (and Skinner) turn from the original contract to the question of conquest. This was a matter of enormous significance at a time when the Cromwell regime had killed the king and abolished the monarchy. It held *de facto* power but lacked *de jure* right. Hobbes wanted to treat sovereignty by 'institution' and sovereignty by 'conquest' in parallel. Hobbes's general line was clear. For self-preservation it was rational and lawful to submit to a conqueror, even if the victor held no lawful title. But Hobbes seems to make a mistake when he refers to a 'contract' between the victor and the conquered. Skinner interprets this as between the victor and an individual, and suggests that we can ignore the contract, and just talk about the individual agreeing to obey the victor in exchange for protection. But this will not do as it is not parallel to the case of the original contract, which is not each individual agreeing to submit to the sovereign, but all individuals contracting with each other to submit to the sovereign. And furthermore, Hobbes, in the text being discussed (the Conclusion to *Leviathan*) is not talking about individual submission to the victor, but a collective submission, thus trying to preserve the parallel between the original contract and conquest. But I am not convinced that this is possible, because the two situations are too unlike.

Another major area discussed by Skinner is the roles of reason and rhetoric in civil science. At first Hobbes followed the conventional Renaissance line. Political leaders issue reasoned policy, but the multitude is not bright enough to see the point, so leaders have to resort to rhetoric as a medium between reason and the brains of the multitude. But when he came to write *The Elements of Law* and *De Cive* Hobbes completely changed his mind, rejecting rhetoric as pernicious and unnecessary. Rhetoric allows every question to have two sides, but Hobbes was arguing, according to Skinner, that his was the one true account of civil science. Hence reason is necessary, and indeed sufficient. Skinner does not mention two arguments that might have appealed to Hobbes. The first is that if the multitude cannot recognise the force of reason, how can they recognise the force of rhetoric? The second

is that if the multitude do recognise the force of rhetoric, then it must be so far distant from reason that the communication is distorted. There is a *tertium quid* (or 'pineal gland') point here: the impossibility of introducing a medium to reconcile two irreconcilables. Skinner discusses how when he came to write *Leviathan* Hobbes seemed to go back on his attitude to rhetoric, arguing for the need for 'eloquence'. But on my reading there is a clear difference between rhetoric and eloquence. Rhetoric is a medium that distorts truth and reason, but eloquence acknowledges truth and reason and merely presents them in the most perspicacious way.

Skinner discusses a wealth of other Hobbesian topics, from his attitude to the Norman Conquest to his theory of laughter. From these as from every part of this book the reader will obtain much illumination. Nor should it be thought that it concerns only scholars of seventeenth-century ideas. Perhaps it is a depressing thought, but so many of the issues then are still issues today. Rhetoric ('spin'), sovereignty, obedience, conquest, resistance, war — they have not gone away.

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Cass R. Sunstein

Why Societies Need Dissent.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

2003. Pp. x + 246.

US\$22.95. ISBN 0-674-01268-2.

This book considers the prevalence of conformity and the necessity of dissent. Some contemporary philosophers write as if 'the fact of pluralism' were an inevitable consequence of modern liberal societies. Cass Sunstein argues instead that most human beings habitually conform to the prevailing social consensus. His short, perceptive and persuasive argument for dissent begins with the correct observation that most people shape their ideas and conceptions of the good to suit the actions and expectations of others. Pluralism is not an inescapable fact, but a desirable objective. Sunstein suggests that societies should nurture unusual and eccentric views, as possible sources of insight and truth against the tyranny of public opinion.

Sunstein makes a convincing case for the epistemic value of dissent, without denying the time-saving benefits of conformity. Conforming to widely-held beliefs spares individuals the trouble of investigating the whole universe of human knowledge for themselves. Taking to be true whatever most people can agree to as true spares conformists the labor of independent research, while dissenters often face persecution, ostracism, or worse. Small

wonder, then, that most people follow prevailing opinion, even when it is mistaken, harmful, or obviously wrong. Sunstein praises dissenters as selfless and heroic sources of valuable information. By pointing out, when no one else will, that the emperor has no clothes, dissenters defend society against dangerous mistakes.

John Stuart Mill famously asserted in his essay on liberty that society is a tyrant, which imposes its own ideas and practices on its subjects, irrespective of magistrates or the law. Smaller associations can be tyrannical too, in the sense that people too easily converge on a common point of view. Sunstein gives the examples of corporate boards, investors, White House advisors, Federal courts and juries, as groups that have made obvious and costly mistakes in recent years through their tendency towards consensus, and insufficient encouragement of dissent. Sunstein suggests that conformists hurt societies and groups by depriving them of necessary information, while dissenters strengthen societies and other associations by forcing them to face suppressed but valuable truths.

Sunstein takes it as given that societies should act on true principles and an accurate perception of reality. He values dissent for helping people to make such judgments correctly. Sunstein quotes Kanan Makiya to support his assertion that intellectuals (in particular) can prevent injustice and oppression by speaking truth to power. He rightly values democracy for the access it gives to all citizens' knowledge and experience. But Sunstein would like to limit and control democracy to prevent its tendency towards excessive conformity. This leads him to minimize the equally harmful social effects that sometimes arise from nurturing mistaken and illiberal ideas. Sunstein makes a strong and well-substantiated instrumental argument for dissent as a check against political correctness, but sometimes slips into the less well-considered assumption that dissent is always beautiful for its own sake. This may be true, but not on the strength of the arguments put forward in this book. Dissent is valuable for its service to the search for truth, and not as an end in itself.

Sunstein values dissenters for performing the same service as the devil's advocate in Roman Catholic sanctification procedures. No matter how specious or ill-founded their arguments, dissenters can sharpen the acuity of majority opinion. This may not always be true. Sunstein concedes that Hitler, Lenin and Osama bin Laden's dissent against established social norms has had less than fully beneficial consequences, but does not seem to grasp how often the danger of pernicious lies outweighs the burdens of political correctness. Sunstein rightly complains that the pressures of majority consensus encourage conformity to pious untruths, without recognizing the value (for example) of the scientific method, or rational deliberation, as techniques for separating truth from falsehood. Sunstein does not make a clear enough distinction between constructive dissent and self-serving propaganda. He offers no method for distinguishing useful insights from antisocial delusions.

Many elements of American constitutionalism and orthodox liberalism reflect the epistemic value of dissent. Sunstein gives the examples of first amendment free-speech protections and republican bicameralism. But de-

mocracy and consensus can be valuable too. Constitutional checks and balances harness democracy and dissent in pursuit of greater justice. Democracy secures the participation of all citizens. Dissent allows new voices to be heard. Sunstein believes that states should not just tolerate but actively encourage a diversity of views, to overcome social pressure towards silence and consensus.

Consensus can be a good test of truth, however, when people express themselves freely, as in scientific journals, or reasoned public debate. Dissenting factions have their own orthodoxies, as Sunstein recognizes, which can prevent constructive consensus. Factional solidarity often imposes greater conformity to politically 'correct' untruths than society as a whole demands of its members. This is particularly true in liberal democracies, where material advantages can follow the construction of cohesive political interest groups. Factions reinforce themselves in their unreasonableness, to extract excessive benefits from the state. Sunstein's brief for affirmative action is the weakest chapter in his book, because it runs counter to the rest of his argument, and his heart is not in it.

Several things follow from the social tendency towards conformity: Law can harness conformity for the common good by expressing shared rules of cooperation; societies will change slowly, because established practices are hard to dislodge; and dissent should be encouraged, to supply useful information to the group. Sunstein suggests that because conformity is so prevalent, and dissent so fragile and costly, dissenters deserve subsidies and special privileges, to keep their nonconformity alive. Here again, Sunstein's conclusion leaps ahead of his evidence by valuing all dissent, without regard for truthfulness or sincerity. Rational and open-minded deliberation for the common good will lead to a better and more well-informed society than histrionic and self-interested advocacy (for example) of racial or religious intolerance. Sincere and informed dissent has greater value than factious propaganda.

Cass Sunstein's fear of conformity provides a useful corrective to the multicultural assumptions of many contemporary philosophers and lawyers. The standard viewpoint sees diversity as unavoidable, and therefore to be recognized and embraced. Sunstein perceives real diversity as unusual, to be fostered precisely because it is so rare. Organizations and nations thrive best when they promote openness and tolerate dissent. Individuals serve the public good by speaking and following the truth, as they understand it, even when others disagree. Sincerity can be the salvation of society when it gives citizens the courage to dissent.

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Jacques Taminiaux

*The Metamorphoses of
Phenomenological Reduction.*

Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2004.

The Aquinas Lecture, 2004. Pp. 64.

US\$15.00. ISBN 0-87462-171-2.

Jacques Taminiaux's pithy little book on the phenomenological reduction is an invaluable resource. For many, the difference between the work of, say Levinas and Sartre, seems to be so great as to preclude any overarching understanding of the phenomenological method. Originally given as a lecture, Taminiaux's book resists this kind of conclusion, and yet it is also admirably clear regarding the various twists and turns in the history of the reduction. Considering Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas in some detail, Taminiaux argues that the phenomenological method cannot be restricted to its initial formulation in the work of Husserl. As Taminiaux points out, all of the above theorists claimed, at one point or another, to be truer to the phenomenological spirit than either its originator or their immediate teacher, and they all gave different characterisations of the two tools of the phenomenological method: the negative move consisting in suspending judgment on anything that might prevent us attending to the 'things themselves' (the famous *epoche*, or suspension of the natural attitude); the positive move involving a 'return' to the specific mode of appearing of the phenomenon and requiring some kind of eidetic reduction or search for essences.

Taminiaux's book emphasises that on Husserl's initial understanding, phenomenology is a methodology of immanence, and he discusses the historical criticism of Husserlian phenomenology that it became an immanence so purified of transcendence that the *cogito* that is described is entirely abstract, lacking any connection to world, to body, to others, and to history. For Merleau-Ponty, and the existential phenomenologists more generally, this reduction to immanence is impossible. In their usage, phenomenology becomes a philosophy of 'transcendence in immanence', and this is because the transcendent world cannot just be bracketed away. Rather, there is an intertwining that obtains between the transcendent and the immanent, and it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty famously claims that the most important lesson of the reduction is that it cannot be completed (27). What the reduction is able to reveal, in its failure, is something that we already know, albeit in disguised form, amidst the natural attitude and the 'thesis of the world', and Heidegger makes a related point in his own emphasis upon the forestructures of our understanding, and upon the way in which 'average, everydayness' always contains some partial, albeit limited, comprehension of the question of Being.

While it may be argued by those sympathetic to the work of Deleuze that 'pure immanence' can be redeemed on other terms, Taminiaux points out that Husserl's notion of the life-world undermines many of the dualisms that are

operative in his attempt to legitimise the method of reduction (he posits a radical difference between sensible intuition and categorial intuition and thereby reintroduces a mind-body dualism). Rather than return us to pure immanence, with the thesis of the world bracketed away, Taminiaux shows how Husserl's notion of the life-world means that the reduction can never be fully completed. This failure points toward an ontology not unlike that which Merleau-Ponty will later formulate using terms like the intertwining and the chiasm. Given Taminiaux's own enduring interest in Merleau-Ponty, it is perhaps fitting to conclude with his citation of one of Merleau-Ponty's final reflections on Husserl and the fate of the phenomenological reduction: 'Reduction is no longer a return to the ideal Being; it leads us back to the soul of Heraclitus, to a string of horizons' (30).

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Michael Tye

Consciousness and Persons:

Unity and Identity.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003.

Pp. xv + 203.

US\$52.50. ISBN 0-262-20147-X.

Intentionalism about consciousness is the thesis that the phenomenal *character* of consciousness — what it's like — is determined by the *contents* of suitable intentional states. To experience a specific shade, *S*, as being just there in front of one now is, on this view, to have a suitable intentional state that *says* 'S is just there in front of me now'. What is said by these suitable intentional states just *is* what is felt by the person.

In 1987, Bill Lycan published got the intentionalist ball rolling with *Consciousness*. Dan Dennett followed with *Consciousness Explained* in 1991, then Fred Dretske and Michael Tye chimed in with *Naturalizing the Mind* and *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, respectively, in 1995. These days, between articles and books, it feels as though the literature is overflowing with statements of intentionalism. Michael Tye's newest book, *Consciousness and Persons*, is a refreshing change. Instead of trying to convince us that intentionalism is a good idea, Tye has advanced to the next stage: showing how intentionalists can explain the less frequently discussed, though still important, problems of consciousness.

The principal problem Tye sets out to solve is that of the unity of consciousness. At a given instant, my consciousness is unified both within modalities (I see the shape and colour of the note stuck to my computer as

unified into one thing, the note) and across modalities (my seeing the note and my hearing the fan of my computer are both parts of a single, unified state of consciousness). Furthermore, consciousness is generally unified over time — I don't experience a mere sequence of moments, but instead a continuous flow from this event to that.

A little thought shows just how challenging it is to solve these problems. Experiencing the note as yellow and experiencing the note as rectangular does *not*, in and of itself, entail experiencing the note as a yellow, rectangular whole, any more than wanting beer and wanting a ham sandwich entails wanting both a beer and a ham sandwich together (which, as Tye notes, might actually strike one as repulsive [26-7]). Likewise, experiencing an apple as green and experiencing one's foot as aching does not, in and of itself, entail experiencing these things together in one unified state. The puzzle of unification across time has perhaps received the most attention historically: a succession of representations, it seems, is not a representation of succession. How then do we experience things as succeeding other things?

Tye's view is that an intentionalist is well equipped to solve these problems. The intentionalist should say that normal human subjects undergo a *single* experience from the moment they regain consciousness until the moment they lose consciousness. This single experience would, as per intentionalism, have a single content, and it is this content that solves the problems of unification. The yellowness and rectangularity of the note on my computer are experienced as a unified whole because one experience has the content that the note is yellow and that the note is rectangular. Different sense modalities seem to make up one consciousness because their contents are combined together in a single content in a single experience. And successive moments are experienced as following one after the other because they are represented as doing so: succession is experienced by being represented as succession in the content of experience.

The idea that there is just one experience had by a typical person between morning and evening will strike many as odd, and Tye addresses a large number of possible objections. He has two principal strategies of response. First, he allows that in casual conversation we break down experiences into smaller units, distinguishing experiences of green apples from experiences of aching feet and so on, but holds that we can likewise talk about parts of a painting without being committed to them being independent objects, much less independent paintings. Second, he holds that as a general ontological principal, not every part of an object is itself an object. A part of a statue that, were only it separated off, would serve nicely as a pot, is not thereby made a pot. Many other points are also made, though, and cannot all be summarised here.

An objection that Tye does not address is how exactly time features in consciousness. The most natural way to describe my current state of consciousness is that I experience a slight pressure on my lower back now. Ten minutes ago, I had an experience that could then have been characterised as 'I have an experience of pressure on my lower back now'. If these contents

are distinct (because 'now' meant t_1 then and means t_{1+10} now), then it follows from intentionalism that my consciousness of the moment *now* was different in the two cases, which seems false. It would have been interesting to see how Tye would address such a concern. But even if it is a problem for Tye, it is not clearly a problem for his account of unity as such, so perhaps another book will follow taking up the problem of how to characterise the content of the intentional state that makes up consciousness.

Tye goes on to discuss disorders that produce disunified states of consciousness, especially split brain cases, and finishes with a perhaps less successful account of personal identity, but it would be quite unfair to finish on a complaining note. Tye's book is full of good ideas and good arguments. It is also marvellously clear and brief, and can be read from beginning to end — and understood — over one long afternoon. Though it hardly connects itself to the philosophical literature on its topic, it seems to benefit rather than suffer from this fact: the book is like a long, intense conversation with a very smart philosopher about a gripping problem, and will educate as well as please if approached as such.

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Howard Williams

Kant's Critique of Hobbes:

Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism.

Cardiff: University of Wales Press 2003.

Pp. 244.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7083-1815-0);

US\$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7083-1814-2).

Howard Williams' monograph in the series *Political Philosophy Now*, of which he is the Chief Editor, is a welcome contribution both to the history of philosophical ideas and to contemporary debates on cosmopolitan citizenship and sovereignty. However, this is true with one important proviso: the book in question only 'presents a microcosm within the macrocosm of Kant's critical philosophy' (221). Thus, it should not raise expectations for a comprehensive Kantian theory of sovereignty and cosmopolitanism too high.

The structure of the book's argument is reasonably straightforward and in a way follows Kant's own exposition in his (1793) *Theory and Practice* essay. Williams contrasts Hobbes and Kant by taking as the basis of comparison their opposed views on the three fundamental Enlightenment ideas of 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' [*liberté, égalité, fraternité*]. This contrast is also at the core of Williams' exposition. For their essential differences in

the conceptions of liberty and equality mark the basic *differentiation* between a Hobbesian statist view of political philosophy and a Kantian non-statist view of cosmopolitan citizenship. Although a more explicit and thorough contrast between Hobbes' and Kant's rival conceptions of human nature and temporality would clarify things further, there are nevertheless some stimulating conclusions from discussions of revolution (Chapter 1) and political change (Chapter 7; but see also p. 73 on the discussion of freedom).

There is no doubt that Kant's critique of Hobbes and his political philosophy is largely based on their different conceptions of human nature and freedom. It is the latter, though, which makes the difference at the *normative* level. Chapter 3 engages with Hobbes' and Kant's quite differing conceptions of freedom. Where Hobbes conceives freedom in a narrow physicalist and causal way, namely as the absence of external constraints (the classical conception of 'negative freedom in the liberal tradition), Kant opens the path for a non-physicalist conception of it, compatible with physical causality, but not causal. This is freedom as a capacity to choose, a capacity for self-direction ('positive freedom') [*Metaphysics of Morals*, Vol. 6, 213]. Williams devotes much space to explaining the transcendental idea of freedom as derived from the 'Third Antinomy' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (86-9) and its relation with practical freedom. In the end, the challenge of Kant's argument is how such a transcendental freedom can be *realized* in this world. The question of realization constitutes the transition to *political* freedom.

For Kant, the *constitutive* element of political freedom is *the* problem of political philosophy, granted that he has established that *internal* freedom has to be preserved as a mark of humanity. Hobbes' *Leviathan*, on the other hand, finds this constitutive element in *awe* and *fear*. Following a simple empiricism, Hobbes blurs factual and normative elements by taking for granted people's egoism, need for self-preservation, and quasi-normative adherence to security. Kant does not deny the presence of these characteristics in human nature; he only sees them as being *temporal* and under no circumstances of a normative character. *Fear* is the driving force behind Hobbes' political philosophy. That is why the need for an absolute sovereign — one that can be only local and not international — is absolutely essential.

The contrast between Hobbes and Kant also extends to the issue of equality (Chapter 5). Here the interesting point Williams makes is in relation to their implicit point of convergence rather than divergence. Hobbes says briefly that 'nature has made men equal' [*Leviathan*, ch. 13, 141]. But equal in what way? Hobbes' observation is empirical and claims scientific objectivity (103, 127). Kant also says that we are equal, not as an empirical observation, but as a normative claim. We are equal as moral beings. Note that Kant's statement is a very tricky one. Kant does not say we should flatten out all inequality. The task of freedom is not to achieve material equality or an absurd equality in relation to talent (Kant is not an egalitarian like Rawls). Williams provides a good discussion on Kant's dismissal of bourgeois charity (118ff). Bourgeois charity potentially makes people *dependent* on each other, and does not allow for real *self-direction*.

This leads us perhaps to the most important chapter in the book, alongside Chapter 7, on the nature of the political. Where the French revolution relied on the ambiguous notion of *fraternité*, Hobbes and Kant have the common notion of the 'social contract'. Hobbes is very hostile to any notion of sociability and community and sees the 'social contract' as a one-off human contract of an essentially bargaining nature. The social contract imposes order on recalcitrant and unorganised material. For Kant, things are very different. He sees the 'social contract' as the space in which freedom is to be *realized*. But instead of fraternity and brotherhood, Kant uses the highly significant, although much neglected, principle of independence [*Selbständigkeit*]. Williams is right to defend the thesis that independence and fraternity do *not*, in principle, refer to different things. Kant is putting forward a remarkably reworked conception of community and republicanism. People have to work out a political organization for themselves. To my mind, this idea can be found most eloquently embodied in Kant's notion of *sensus communis* [*Critique of Judgment*, par. 40]. Kant crucially links the quasi-epistemological orientation of *sensus communis* with its political significance as the *original contract*. Williams himself does not provide this link, which leads him to present Kant's notion of 'publicity' as just a principle of the freedom of dissemination of information (5). It is clear though that Kant's notion is far more than that.

Such a link would make the very interesting presentation of political change in Hobbes and Kant more substantial. In Chapter 7 Williams outlines the distinction between *metamorphosis* and *palingenesis* as two very different ways of conceiving political change. The discussion on the biological presuppositions of Kant's account of the emergence of *forms* sheds light on the fact that Kant had also a sophisticated theory of nature. Nature is not as mechanistic as Hobbes would claim it to be. It is this mechanical, linear account that makes Hobbes favour palingenesis, a licence to go back in time or reverse it and restore the system of monarchy. Kant, in some ways perhaps a precursor of Bergson, is clear on this point. Time is irreversible; one cannot go back in time.

The last chapter of Williams' book attempts to compare directly Hobbes' and Kant's major political writings: *Leviathan* and *Perpetual Peace*. It is here that Hobbes' unitary, non-representative, anti-republican account of state is clearly contrasted with Kant's republican and representative federation of states that must also operate under a cosmopolitan law of universal hospitality. Overall, Williams' book is both accessible and well-written. It has the merit of introducing us to two political philosophies from the standpoint of their different conceptions of human nature. In the process his monograph has significantly enriched our understanding of both.

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Charlotte Witt

*Ways of Being: Potentiality and
Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2003.

Pp. x + 161.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-4032-7.

Charlotte Witt's book focuses on a discussion of the concepts of potentiality (*dunamis*) and actuality (*energeia*) in *Metaphysics* (*Metaph*) IX. Witt argues, contrary to exegetical orthodoxy, that Book IX should not be seen as part of the extended discussion of substance in *Metaph* VII and VIII. Her main claim is that in Book IX Aristotle tries to advance an ontological thesis that is independent of the controversial theme of substance. She contends that Book IX is intended to serve two functions. First, it presents an analysis of 'ways of being' that applies across the categories. And second, it shows, through this analysis of 'ways of being', that Aristotelian reality is hierarchical and normative. Finally, on the basis of the above, Witt argues that although Aristotle's account of reality is clearly normative, this does not show that his ontology was designed to justify the sexist gendered ideology of his culture.

The general argument Witt advances is laid out in five chapters. In Chapter 1, Witt examines the inadequately discussed *Metaph* IX 3. It is here that Aristotle discusses the actualist thesis put forward by the (early) Megarians: something has the power/capacity to ϕ , if and only if it is presently ϕ -ing. As Witt explains, this thesis is an essential element of the extended argument in Book IX. By refuting the Megarian position, through an array of different arguments, Aristotle establishes the existence of inactive powers. Having done this much, Witt argues in Chapter 2, the Stagirite proceeds with the introduction of an important distinction. This is the distinction between potentiality and actuality understood as two distinct ways of being. According to Witt, Aristotle argues that there are two ways of being something: being X potentially and being X actually. Furthermore, she notes that in *Metaph* IX 6 Aristotle illustrates the relationship between being X potentially and being X actually by utilizing two kinds of examples: 'the relationship between an inactive capacity and its active exercise, and the relationship between an incomplete substance and a complete (or perfected) substance' (39). In Chapter 3, Witt claims that Aristotle introduces a further distinction: that between rational and non-rational powers. Putatively, the Stagirite needs this further distinction because it affords him the chance to discuss the different ways in which an actuality may be said to be prior to a potentiality. In Chapter 4, we are presented with the key point in the book's argument. Witt's position is that there is textual evidence, mainly in *Metaph* IX 9, which shows that an Aristotelian actuality, such as a complete substance (viz., an adult human being) or an active power, is both prior and better than its corresponding potentiality; namely, the corresponding incomplete substance (a child), or

the corresponding inactive power. Finally, in Chapter 5 Witt notes that Aristotle accepts the following: (a) there is a metaphysical hierarchy between form, which is actuality, and matter, which is potentiality, (b) form is prior and better than matter, and (c) form is somehow male, whereas matter is somehow female. One of Witt's main claims in this last chapter of the book is that there is no evidence to support the possible feminist charge that Aristotle's hierarchical and normative ontology was created so as to 'justify his embrace of inequalitarian gender norms' (115).

There is no doubt Witt's book deserves attention. For one thing, it brings to discussion issues which have yet to be thoroughly discussed — e.g., the concept of priority in Aristotle's ontology. Second, it presents a reading of Book IX that gives it a place within the context of the *Metaphysics*. And third, it attempts to show that the concepts of potentiality and actuality are related to Aristotle's claim that there is hierarchy of gender. Despite its merits, however, the book fails to convince on some of the important points it tries to make.

Witt's thesis is that *Metaph IX* deals with an issue that is largely independent of the discussion of substance in Books VII and VIII. To support this claim, Witt offers a number of different arguments. For instance, she urges us to note that Aristotle illustrates the distinction between potentially X and actually X by using examples outside the category of substance. More specifically, she points out that Aristotle illustrates this distinction by referring to active and potential causal powers, such as heat and house building (55). It is not clear at all, however, how this shows that Book IX has an ontological purpose distinct from the one guiding the investigation of substance. The distinction between potentially X and actually X is in fact a cross-categorical one. Nevertheless, this in itself does not show that the treatment of 'ways of being' is an ontological project that is independent of the treatment of substance.

Witt argues that what underlies the 'two ways of being' thesis, is Aristotle's priority thesis: what is actually X is prior in substance to that which is potentially X. According to Witt, this sense of priority, priority in substance, is to be understood as ontological priority: what is potentially X cannot exist without that which is actually X, whereas what is actually X can exist independently of what is potentially X. What one needs to note here is that there is ample textual evidence, e.g., *Physics* VIII 7 and *Generation of Animals* II 6, which strongly suggests that priority in substance cannot be ontological priority.

Finally, Witt argues that it is a mistake to assume that Aristotle invented his normative ontology to justify his sexist views. It is hard, however, to believe that Aristotle's claim that form is prior and better than matter was not intended as a tool to support his well-documented view that male is superior to female. At any rate, to convince us, Witt will need to improve on the arguments she does offer in her book.

As was noted earlier on, despite the problems Witt's argumentation presents, it is still fair to say her book deserves a thorough reading from those

who are interested in the issues it deals with. Her book brings to attention a number of topics that certainly deserve further discussion.

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Edited by Lawrence J. Jost and Roger A. Shiner

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