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According to Charles Taylor, the meaning of our words is held in place by a web of other meanings. As a language-user, I know how to correctly use the word 'triangle' only when I understand its relationship to other words like square and circle, and also to words like blue, car, love, and brisk — words which we ordinarily think of as having only a contingent relationship to triangles, if any at all. This web of meanings is a part of our background — the usually unarticulated and often inarticulate set of assumptions that shape our way of life.

Taylor's work has been devoted to the articulation of this web of background assumptions that shape how we think about ourselves — as social scientists, philosophers, political actors, and modern human beings. While he has developed consistent themes over his career, each time he returns to a theme, it is from a different direction. The impression one gets from reading his books and essays is that he is like a spider weaving a web. In each round, he fills in a little more detail; he discloses lines of connection between ideas we once saw as disparate, revealing through his weaving familiar patterns that we once assumed as background.

Each of the essays in this volume articulates one aspect of Taylor's work, but taken together they also reveal these web-like patterns in his thought. The essays address a selection of his wide-ranging contributions to hermeneutics, epistemology, moral ontology, political philosophy, the politics of recognition, the politics of the good, Catholic philosophy, and the philosophy of history. Whatever one takes as a point of departure for understanding Taylor's ideas, one seems to be led back to familiar ground: Taylor's notion that humans are self-interpreting animals, his method of exploding apparent dichotomies by refusing them, the role of non-human sources of the good, and the importance of pluralism.

This collection is part of a long overdue wave of scholarship on Taylor. It is in Cambridge University Press's Contemporary Philosophy in Focus series, which aims to provide an introduction to the works of major philosophers by means of a collection of short, scholarly articles contributed by established academics. As such, Charles Taylor is neither a systematic introduction to Taylor's substantial and still-growing body of work, nor is it a primarily critical review of his ideas. Some of the articles focus on careful exegesis; others apply or extend his thinking in ways that are faithful to his work. As Ruth Abbey notes in her introductory remarks, the authors tend to use Taylor's own work to criticize Taylor, yet they are all to varying degrees sympathetic to his ideas (25).
This book will be especially illuminating to readers who are only familiar with Sources of the Self or Taylor’s essay on ‘The Politics of Recognition’, because the essays show how these well-known works are connected to Taylor’s other writings stretching back to his earliest book, The Explanation of Behaviour. Since Taylor continues to publish at a prodigious rate, Abbey does her best in the introduction to bring the arguments of the collected essays up to date with his most recent works.

The essays detail a number of canonical influences on Taylor. Nicholas Smith, for example, explains how Taylor draws on and improves on the hermeneutic tradition of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Merleau-Ponty. Melissa Orlie shows Taylor’s indebtedness to Iris Murdoch. Terry Pinkard additionally relates his work to that of Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein. While he acknowledges his debts to these thinkers, Taylor also is engaged in specific controversies with his contemporaries, such as Richard Rorty, John McDowell, and Donald Davidson. Abbey characterizes his way of intervening in current debates by drawing on canonical authors as ‘timely meditations in an untimely mode’ (1). This might make us wonder: insofar as Taylor’s work is unmistakably engaged in contemporary debates, will it seem accessible and relevant in fifty or a hundred years, or more?

I want to suggest that it will — less because our controversies will still be raging, and more because Taylor in these moments embodies the very timeless ideas he aims to articulate: that human beings are beings capable of pursuing the truth, but always from within their particular horizons. This idea is echoed in Hubert Dreyfus’ careful elaboration of Taylor’s epistemology. Dreyfus shows how Taylor can claim that scientific study can reveal some objective truth about the world, at the same time as he claims that each of us can only see the world from our own perspective, within the web of our own cultural background understanding. This theme is approached again from a different direction in Fergus Kerr’s essay on moral ontology. And it emerges yet again when Stephen Mulhall describes what he takes to be the horizons that inflect Taylor’s political philosophy: his political identity as a Canadian, his philosophical sympathies with the continental tradition, and his religious commitment to Catholicism.

Different authors are alternately frustrated (William Connolly) or gratified (Jean Elshtain) by Taylor’s persistent Catholicism — his insistence that we can only meaningfully have access to notions of the good whose sources are theistic, and notably Catholic. Yet even where authors find the appearance of Taylor’s own horizons to be problematic, they also admit that he has hit on some truth about the world. Connolly, for example, is resistant to the idea that moral sources must be transcendent and theistic, but nonetheless he can appreciate Taylor’s insistence that all theories of the good rely to some extent on faith.

What emerges from these essays is a portrait of a thinker who is tremendously admired — who seems to have captured something important about what it is to be human — but who is at once (and sometime frustratingly) caught in his own times. From Mulhall’s account of his political activism to
Connolly’s description of his infectious laughter, we are reminded again and
again that who Charles Taylor himself is affects how we should understand
his philosophy.

**Michaele Ferguson**
*(Department of Political Science)*
University of Colorado at Boulder

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**Christa Davis Acampora** and **Ralph R. Acampora, eds.**

*A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal.*
Pp. xxxii + 371.

*A Nietzschean Bestiary* is a collection of essays on animals and animality in
Nietzsche’s writings and thought. Along with the editors, contributors in­
clude a number of prominent interpreters of Nietzsche, e.g., Babette Babich,
Daniel W. Conway, Lawrence Hatab, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Alan Schrift
and Gary Shapiro, as well as several less well-known scholars. While the
collection is neither characterized by pervasive agreement among the con­
tributors, nor representative of the full range of defensible positions with
respect to the theme of animality in Nietzsche’s writings, it does leave its
reader with an appreciation of the centrality of this theme and the depth and
subtlety of Nietzsche’s thinking about it. According to its editors, the collec­
tion has two aims: ‘to enable an appreciation for the philosophic purposes of
Nietzsche’s metaphorical expression’, and through ‘an investigation of
Nietzsche’s “animal imaginary” … to illuminate historical developments of
zoological constructs of other animals as well as self-conceptions of human
animality’, thereby ‘to intervene in contemporary discussions on the tra­
ditional concept of “human nature” and in the emerging field of “animal studies”’
(xxii). For the most part, these two aims are not both treated in each essay.
Rather, the editors have attempted to meld a collection of brief and direct
considerations of Nietzsche’s use of specific animals with several longer
discussions on the theme of Nietzsche and animality. As for the latter, there
are two introductory essays on the project as a whole, an afterword on animal
parts, and a bibliographic essay on Nietzsche’s influence on some recent
continental thinkers on the topic of animality. Of these, the best is Ralph
Acampora's introductory essay, which is offered as an interpretive key to the whole volume. In it he attempts to reconcile Nietzsche's concern with the domestication of man with his effort on behalf of culture and cultivation, suggesting that feral animals are a kind of model.

What distinguishes this volume and accounts for most of its value, however, are the essays on specific animals and a very helpful index of the references to the animals discussed in the collection. The collection includes chapters on the ape, the camel, the polyp, the dog, the spider, the snake, the alcyone, the cow, the ass, the lion, the blond beast, beasts of prey, women, the satyr, the overman, the mole, the cat and the lizard. While understandably not exhaustive this list is still somewhat curious. Significant lacunae include treatments of the eagle and the goat. There are two chapters on woman, none on the child. The satyr and the alcyone are present, but no other mythological creatures are. Nevertheless, as this enumeration indicates, and the inclusion of Richard Perkins' informative essay on the sources of 'Three Metamorphoses' speech confirms, the collection is also a helpful resource for those studying Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

The opening essay on the ape is among the best in the book, for it clearly and directly treats both the stated aims of the collection and their relationship. In it Peter Groff attempts first to reconcile Zarathustra's familiar characterization of the ape as 'a laughing-stock or painful embarrassment' with Nietzsche's attack on 'the false order of rank in relation to the animals and nature' (GS 115). The question then arises of whether Nietzsche has a basis for all his talk of 'higher' and 'lower' types. For Groff, as for most of the contributors to this volume, Nietzsche's talk of hierarchy and rank ordering is at best merely rhetorical, and at worst groundless and incompatible with 'thoroughgoing naturalism'. Secondly, and mainly through a consideration of the section from Part 3 of Zarathustra entitled 'On Passing By', Groff interprets the image of the ape as an essential but transitional phase in human development.

Another helpful essay is Gary Shapiro's, entitled 'Dogs, Domestication, and the Ego'. Taking as its point of departure the dog in 'On the Vision and the Riddle' — whose presence seldom receives much comment — the essay very quickly expands into a consideration of the relationship between the individual and the herd, and ultimately of how the thought of recurrence changes our understanding of the ego.

Kathleen Higgins' essay on the ass offers a wealth of literary and historical sources for Nietzsche's presentation of the Ass in Zarathustra. Her suggestion of reading Part 4 in light of Apuleius' The Golden Ass and Lucian's 'The Story of the Ass' is particularly noteworthy. However, as with many of the essays in the volume, the reader is led from the text via a series of tantalizing textual connections or literary allusions, and then left to find his own way back.

The highlight of the collection is the three-chapter section on beasts of prey, which consists of Paul Loeb's exceptional essay on the laughing lions in Zarathustra, in which he offers an argument that Part 4 be read as
occurring chronologically before the end of Part 3, Gerd Shank’s able debunking of the Nazi appropriation of the ‘blond beast’, and Daniel Conway’s synoptic consideration of the beast of prey in Nietzsche’s writings. Loeb’s and Conway’s essays are particularly important to the collection as a whole as they remind the reader of the acceptance of cruelty and violence implied by Nietzsche’s effort to re-naturalize man, and thus of the obstacles to the interpretation of Nietzsche as a forerunner of post-modern pluralism. Zarathustra’s lions laugh not because they delight in the spectacle of heterogeneity, but because they are free to destroy and kill untroubled by guilt or remorse.

The two essays on women, both of which seek to qualify the impression that Nietzsche is simply a misogynist, along with Hatab’s essay on the satyr, and a lengthy essay on the overhuman, all take aim at ‘Western thinking’ for devaluing the carnal, the bodily, and the animal as less than human and thus to be transcended. There then follows a set of three essays on various animals Nietzsche likens himself or his thinking to (mole, cat and lizard).

The title of this collection alludes to the medieval tradition of the bestiary, compendia of descriptions of both strange and familiar animals written to encourage pious reflection on the intention of their Creator. If, as we are led to believe, what is distinctively Nietzschean about this bestiary is its incorporation of the ‘dangerous truth’ of evolutionary theory and abandonment of cardinal differences between the species, then there would at least seem to be a profound tension implicit in the title of this volume. Perhaps it could have been phrased as an intriguing, hence stimulating question: how are we to understand Nietzsche’s metaphorical and symbolic use of various animal species given his conspicuous adherence to evolutionary theory? What can it mean to use a species as a symbol or image, if there is nothing specific to it? That this crude and conspicuous tension never fully came to the surface in work entitled A Nietzschean Bestiary indicates that a certain piety in the face of the purposefulness of the author may also have been missing.

Tobin Craig
(Department of Political Science)
Boston College
Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus first met in 1943. They liked each other immediately, and quickly became good friends. Over the next nine years these two international celebrities produced a steady stream of highly acclaimed literary and philosophical works, during which time they saw each other regularly, influenced each other’s thought and writing, and greatly enjoyed each other’s company.

But their friendship ended abruptly, and very badly, in 1952, as a result of an acrimonious exchange carried out in Sartre’s journal, *Les temps modernes*. The journal published a severely critical review of Camus’s book, *The Rebel*. Viewing this as a personal betrayal, an indignant Camus responded with an inflammatory and insulting diatribe directed not against the reviewer, Francis Jeanson, but against Sartre himself. Sartre replied to Camus in at least equally violent and personal terms. The two men never spoke to one another again.

Sartre, clearly embarrassed by this debacle, expressed the hope that it would quickly be forgotten. It appears that he will not be getting his wish, as two new books tell and analyze the story for a new generation of readers, and in greater detail than has ever been done previously. David A. Sprintzen and Adrian van den Hoven’s *Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation* gathers together for the first time all of the primary documents (in the editors’ own extraordinarily lucid and readable translations). These include not only Jeanson’s original review, Camus’s angry response, and Sartre’s venomous reply to Camus (mentioned above), but also Jeanson’s own lengthy rejoinder to Camus, and one more reply by Camus (a considerably calmer one), which he evidently wrote simply for his own satisfaction and did not seek to publish during his lifetime. The book also includes a good deal of helpful critical commentary. Two introductory essays, totaling about seventy pages, offer summaries of the philosophical development of each thinker and examine the historical context of their confrontation. These discussions seem primarily intended for non-specialists and intelligent general readers. Also quite accessible, but of far greater interest to scholars, are a pair of recently-written essays, by William McBride and Jeffrey Isaac. These essays, while exhibiting...
considerably more nuance and less vitriol than those of Sartre and Camus, nonetheless do not refrain from taking sides. McBride argues that, on balance, Sartre had the better of the argument with Camus. Isaac argues for the opposite conclusion. The volume concludes with a ten-page ‘Chronology of the Dispute’, by Salam Hawa.

The focus of Ronald Aronson’s *Camus & Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel that Ended It* is significantly broader. Aronson’s is the first book-length discussion of the Sartre-Camus relationship, and it is offered as a corrective to earlier, briefer, accounts, all of which, Aronson argues, place the breakup, rather than the friendship, at the center of the story. In so doing, these earlier accounts present a distorted picture of the friendship by concentrating primarily on those elements of it that prefigure its dissolution, thereby creating the impression that the breakup was inevitable. Aronson’s emphasis is strikingly different. He devotes far more space to the years of warm relations than to the brief explosion of breakup; he treats the story of the friendship as an interesting one in its own right, and not merely as the opening act in a drama ending in hostility; and he renounces a fatalistic narrative, choosing instead to approach the friendship of Sartre and Camus ‘with their shared sense of unpredictability, choice, freedom, and absurdity’ (7).

The standard, fatalistic, account of the Sartre-Camus breakup sees it as inevitable, given that Sartre and Camus brought to their relationship ‘two fundamentally opposed approaches to life exemplifying the timeless antagonism of reform [Camus] and revolution [Sartre]…’ On this view, Sartre and Camus are virtual opposites, with Sartre representing ‘the abstract’ and exemplifying the philosopher’s attitude, in contrast to Camus’s concreteness and artistic temperament. Above all, Sartre’s sympathy for communism and defense of revolutionary violence are seen as standing in stark conflict with Camus’s principled nonviolence and militant anticommunism (233).

Aronson points out, however, that this standard account de-emphasizes, not only a near decade-long friendship, but also the remarkably extensive list of common concerns that served as its basis. Both men were highly accomplished and extraordinarily versatile writers, as evidenced by the fact that each would eventually win the Nobel prize for literature; they both had a strong background in philosophy; the main themes of their literary works overlapped and revealed their mutual concern for freedom, contingency, absurdity, and other classic ‘existentialist’ notions; and, with regard to politics, they were both members of the independent, non-communist, left.

Moreover, while it cannot be denied that Sartre and Camus had their differences, it is clear that the standard account exaggerates them. For example, in playing up the disagreement between the two thinkers over communism, the standard account glosses over several inconvenient facts: (1) that it was Camus, and not Sartre, who was for a time a member of the Communist Party; (2) that it was Sartre, and not Camus, who was regularly denounced by the French communists as their main ideological enemy during the postwar period; (3) that Sartre, even in his ‘fellow traveler’ years, was
never uncritical of Marxism, the Communist Party, or the Soviet Union; and
(4) that Camus was hardly a supporter of capitalism or of the foreign policy
of the United States. And the standard account also exaggerates the Sartre-
Camus quarrel over violence, forgetting that Camus was no pacifist, and that
Sartre believed there were ethical limits on the permisibility even of revolu-
tionary and anti-colonial violence. Of course, the standard account’s spu-
rious plausibility is greatly aided by Sartre’s and Camus’s own conduct
during the quarrel in the pages of *Les temps modernes*, as each man there
hardens his own position and downplays all points of agreement with his
adversary.

So what did cause Sartre and Camus to split, if the main culprit was not,
as the standard account would have it, simply the ideological and tempera-
mental incompatibility of the two men? Aronson, while not excusing the two
individuals for their own bad behavior, places most of the blame on a specific
historical contingency, namely, the intensification of the Cold War. His
argument is that the escalation of the Soviet-American conflict destroyed the
middle ground that Sartre and Camus had occupied together, forcing them,
and everyone else, to take sides. Their philosophical and political differences,
though much less extensive than their points of agreement, were sufficient
to lead them to take different sides. As if that were not enough, their
intellectual standing in France at the time was such that each quickly
‘became his own side’s moral and intellectual leader’ (2). When Camus then
wrote a book articulating and defending his side’s position, it received the
sort of review one might expect in the journal headed by the moral and
intellectual leader of the opposing side. There is some evidence, however,
that Sartre did try to soften the blow, out of respect for his friendship with
Camus, first by refraining from reviewing the book himself (and thus avoid-
ing a direct confrontation), and then by choosing a reviewer whom he thought
would be ‘polite’ (136). When Jeanson’s review came in, Sartre complained
that he had written the article ‘in the way I had not wanted, that is to say,
it was violent and slashing, and it pointed out the book’s faults, which was
not difficult to do’ (139). Another editor at the journal, the distinguished
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, then tried, but failed, to persuade
Jeanson to tone down his criticism. Camus, understandably, took the publi-
cation of such a harsh review in a journal edited by his friend as a personal
affront, and the friendship immediately ended, a casualty of the Cold War.

And yet, if that is the right reading of the Sartre-Camus breakup, it might
appear to hold little contemporary interest. The Cold War is over. Why should
we, unless we are enthusiasts for the history of the Cold War, or of twenti-
eth-century French culture, or of existentialist philosophy and literature,
particularly care about the quarrel between Sartre and Camus? Aronson
provides a convincing answer: ‘The deepest issues motivating and dividing
Camus and Sartre are still with us. Much of humanity continues to struggle
for self-determination, or to be ground down by inequalities of wealth and
power, or to be caught up in the North’s domination of the South. Terrorism
seems to go hand in hand with the global economy. Violence and war are still
the order of the day. Nuclear terror persists. Much remains radically askew in our world, and as we grapple with it, Sartre and Camus continue to be relevant — as does their relationship, their arguments, and each man’s wisdom and blind spots’ (233-4).

But what, specifically, should we learn? McBride, Isaac, and Aronson all write sensitively and intelligently on this question. Isaac stops just short of endorsing Camus’s stance wholesale as the appropriate one for our times. While McBride (explicitly) and Aronson (implicitly) express more sympathy for Sartre’s position, they each suggest that strengths and weaknesses are to be found on both sides. For my part, I would argue that Sartre is right to call on contemporary intellectuals to focus primarily on injustices perpetrated by their own country and its allies or surrogates. Such a focus is necessary both because intellectuals are more likely to exert a positive influence on their own country and its friends than they are on ‘enemy’ regimes, and because their efforts are needed in the former sphere, but not the latter, to overcome the prevailing propaganda. One’s own government, after all, is already doing the work of pointing out the crimes of its enemies, even as it busily covers up its own. But surely Camus is also right that such a choice of emphasis should not be taken to the extreme of denying or apologizing for the crimes of ‘the enemies.’ Such intellectual dishonesty is not only objectionable in principle, but also robs the critic of his or her credibility and independence. And if Sartre is right to point out that a stance of neutrality unwittingly strengthens the status quo, so is Camus right to loathe violence, and to call (as did Sartre as well, at least some of the time) for strict limits on its moral permissibility. Indeed, the Sartre-Camus debate contains many insights and lessons for the contemporary world. Thoughtful readers of these two fine volumes will find them, and be stimulated to develop a few of their own.

David Detmer
Purdue University Calumet
It is always a pleasure to come across a publication devoted to the work of the highly creative but, until recently, sadly largely ignored German neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. The book consists of a collection of five essays, two of which — Birgit Recki’s and Cyrus Hamlin’s — were presented as lectures for the annual ‘Ernst Cassirer Lecture in Intercultural Relations’ which was instituted at the University of Glasgow in 1999 to commemorate Cassirer’s legacy and contribution to thinking about culture. All lectures form part of a larger research project focussing on conceptions of cultural studies in Ernst Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms.

The main purpose of the book is to demonstrate the relevance of Cassirer’s — and, prior to him, Goethe’s — notions of symbol, to cultural studies today. Dissatisfied with the ‘high theory’ of most post-structuralist and deconstructionist cultural studies the editors believe that the German aesthetics of Goethe, Schiller and Cassirer has a lot to offer to what one critic refers to as the current ‘theory mess’. As they formulate it: ‘It seemed to us timely to re-examine, both analytically and historically, what, according to Goethe, is a deeper mode of understanding — the symbol — than what, thanks largely to Paul de Man and his followers, became in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and in some circles still remains, the dominant master-trope of literary and cultural reflexion, namely, the extended metaphor or “allegory”’ (ix).

One of the editors, Roger H. Stephenson, addresses this issue head on in ‘The Proper Object of Cultural Study: Ernst Cassirer and the Aesthetic Theory of Weimar Classicism.’ Providing us with a penetrating historical account of the roots of Cassirer’s notion of symbol in Goethe’s aesthetic symbolism he points out that, instead of viewing discursive language as the primary context of meaning, Goethe considers the aesthetic experience as captured in the symbolic “Gestalt” primary for humans in making sense of the world.

Key to Stephenson’s argument is the double structure and function of the aesthetic symbol: both expressive aesthetic form and discursive semiotic sign, the second being derivative of the first. Since the aesthetic symbol deals with the particularities of concrete life rather than with abstract generalisations, it contains the initial apprehension of meaning: ‘symbols in this sense are thus the things of greatest value in life, for they hold up to us the significances of life which, but for the constant renewal of symbols in aesthetic practice, would constantly escape our notice’ (87). According to
Stephenson it is this attention for particularity which is being neglected in the ‘one-sided privileging of generality’ of contemporary cultural studies resulting in a failure to recognise and study precisely those cultural symbolic forms which embody ‘varying degrees of human valuation’.

In ‘Ernst Cassirer’s Concept of *Kulturwissenschaft* and the Tradition of the Humanities in the Modern University’, Cyrus Hamlin approaches the same theme from a different angle. Like Stephenson, Hamlin holds that Cassirer, especially in his later writings such as *Die Logik der Kulturwissenschaften*, has a great deal to offer … for a revisionary defence of the humanities in the context of present troubles (21). He also warns that Cassirer’s notion of symbolic form must not be confused with post-structuralist semiotic theories of the sign. Distinguishing between *Bildung* (Goethe) and *Kultur* (Cassirer), Hamlin points out a difference between individual and collective experience. Unlike individual *Bildung*, culture is always a form of dialogue between the self and tradition. For Hamlin this shows that Cassirer’s concept of symbolic form and his philosophy of culture can provide a ‘reorientation and revitalization for the role of the humanities in university education today’ (21).

Birgit Recki’s essay ‘Cassirer and the Problem of Language’ highlights the problematic relationship in Cassirer’s thought between language and all other ‘symbolic forms’. On the one hand, Ricki argues, Cassirer places language on a par with all other symbolic forms, usually identified as science, art, myth and religion, but also technology, economy, history and law. On the other hand, however, Cassirer seems to privilege language over the others and gives it a foundational status, both in relation to the other forms and to culture itself. Reckl explains — and thus resolves — this supposed tension by arguing that Cassirer used language — the realm of metaphor as a figure of speech — mainly as an example to explain his methodology for his overall theory of symbolic forms — the realm of ‘radical metaphor’. Significantly, the latter forms of symbol are more fundamental to the formation and interpretation of meaning than discursive language.

Co-editor Paul Bishop employs Cassirer’s fundamental analysis-synthesis distinction in ‘Analysis or Synthesis: A Cassirean Problem in the Work of Freud and Jung’ in order to examine the different conceptions of symbol in Freud and Jung respectively. Bishop holds that, whereas Freudian symbols are primarily to be understood as signs or symptoms, Jung’s conception of symbol comes much closer to the richer conceptions of it in Cassirer and Goethe.

In some respects Rebecca Bamford’s essay ‘Nietzsche’s Aestheticism and the Value of Suffering’ is the odd one out. Not only does it not deal directly with any of the above concerns, it does not make any reference to Cassirer either. Bamford argues that, for Nietzsche, life is only justifiable as an aesthetic phenomenon, that is, as embracing both suffering and terror as well as beauty and delight and sees this as evidence of a deep connection between Nietzsche’s commitment to the ontology of the will to power and to aestheticism. In view of that, the editors considered Bamford’s essay as highlighting ‘the urgent pertinence of Cassirer’s endeavour to set the characteristically
human desire for (ever greater) significance — his *homo symbolicus* — at the centre of cultural study' (x).

Considering this emphasis on Cassirer’s potential contribution to the field, it is slightly puzzling that his name is not mentioned in the title on the front cover. This is particularly unfortunate since Cassirer’s notion of ‘symbol’ is not normally associated with the kind of research undertaken at a typical cultural studies department at a British or North American university. However, any reader caring to read further than the front cover will soon be enlightened and not be disappointed.

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**Jessica Brown**

*Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.*
Pp. xiv + 339.

Anti-individualism — the view that thought contents are partly individuated by factors external to a subject — has become during the last thirty years the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. However, a number of arguments have been presented, especially during the last fifteen years, claiming that anti-individualism has radical epistemological consequences. Dozens and dozens of articles have been written about whether one or another of these arguments succeeds, but until now, no book-length treatment of this set of issues has been available. In *Anti-Individualism and Knowledge*, Brown presents a comprehensive and careful diagnosis of the issues and arguments, making this a very welcome addition to a discussion that is still very much alive.

During the latter half of the 1990s, Brown wrote a number of articles on the so-called ‘McKinsey recipe’ (see below), claiming that certain versions of this argument establish *incompatibilism*, the view that anti-individualism is not compatible with the privileged access to our own thought contents which we seem to enjoy. Because of this, I was quite surprised by two things about Brown’s book. First, the McKinsey recipe only gets a relatively short treatment here: the majority of the book is dedicated to other arguments that the anti-individualist should worry about. Second, Brown seems to have changed her mind about the McKinsey recipe. In the book, she argues
convincingly that no version of this argument undermines compatibilism, the view that anti-individualism is compatible with privileged access.

Apart from an introductory chapter where she clarifies the positions under scrutiny, Brown's discussion can be divided into three parts. The first of these takes up almost one half of the book: Chapters 2-4 deal with the various threats that so-called slow switch cases might pose for the compatibilist. The problem, in short, is the following: if thought contents are partly individuated by external factors, it may seem that we cannot have privileged access to our thought contents, because we could not discriminate between (what we take to be) actual cases and twin cases in which the external factors relevant for the individuation of the thought in question have changed (and we are unaware of the change). After a careful discussion and the rejection of various proposals to solve the problem, Brown offers her own limited solution. With the exception of (some) perceptual demonstrative thoughts, we can deny that the twin situations are relevant alternatives, and hence, relying on general reliabilist requirements for knowledge, we can conclude that twin situations cannot be used to undermine our privileged access to our own thoughts.

Chapters 5 and 6, which in my view included the most thought-provoking material in the book, deal with the implications of anti-individualism to the transparency of sameness and difference of content. Brown argues that all versions of anti-individualism are incompatible with transparency of difference of content, the view that a subject can know a priori that two of her thoughts differ in content (when they in fact do). This has been taken to be a major problem for the anti-individualist. Brown, however, argues quite convincingly to the contrary: the anti-individualist can happily accept that difference of content is not transparent. The case of the transparency of sameness of content — the view that a subject can know a priori that two of her thoughts share the same content (when they in fact do) — is a bit trickier. It turns out that a non-Fregean anti-individualist would also have to deny transparency of sameness of content, while a Fregean anti-individualist — one who combines anti-individualism with a Fregean notion of sense — would be committed to the transparency of sameness of content. This, Brown argues, results in a troublesome asymmetry in the (otherwise attractive) Fregean anti-individualist position: one would have to simultaneously hold that sameness of content is transparent and that difference of content is not. While she does not go so far as to claim the position is incoherent, it is clear that she thinks the tension is enough to make Fregean anti-individualism very unattractive. Given that there are quite a few Fregean anti-individualists, responses to Brown's claims will no doubt be forthcoming.

In Chapters 7 and 8, Brown discusses the various answers that have been given to the 'McKinsey recipe': the argument that anti-individualism and privileged access are incompatible, because if both were true, one could come to have a priori knowledge of various external states affairs, such as that there is water in one's environment. Brown rejects many proposed solutions to the argument but, in the end, endorses the response that is perhaps the most common: one simply cannot derive, from anti-individualism, the sort of
a priori entailments between thoughts and the environment which the argument would need to be successful. It is on this issue that she argues against her former self, among other people.

There is a lot to like about this book. It is a very thorough treatment of a set of issues on which the debate is still quite heated. Brown defends anti-individualism, but she is not looking for easy answers: many seemingly plausible replies to the incompatibilist arguments are rejected after careful consideration. Because of this, her book is well worth reading both as a defence of anti-individualism and as a reasonably balanced overview of the area. Brown leaves many questions unanswered, but I think this can be seen as a strength rather than a weakness. Even if more can and should be said about the matter, this book shows us precisely what the obstacles are that an anti-individualist theory of thought content must avoid.

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Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant, eds.
The Aesthetics of Natural Environments.
Pp. 312.

It was not very long ago in philosophical aesthetics that analyzing how we aesthetically appreciate nature took a backseat to the study of how we appreciate artworks. There may have been historical reasons for this form of marginalization, deriving from the simple fact that the production of iconoclastic artworks in the twentieth century — where one movement after another threatened some sacred cow of the establishment — provoked inquiries into representation, expression, form and message in art, as well as the very concept of art itself. There was no end of philosophical puzzlement to lure analytically-minded philosophers. Yet natural aesthetics had puzzles of its own, which for whatever historical reasons (and the introduction to this volume offers some thoughts on why) failed for many years to draw the attention they deserved. This anthology of sixteen essays demonstrates how thoroughly that marginalization has been reversed over the past fifteen years, and casts a favorable light on the lively conversation that has emerged within the field.
I say "conversation" because, although written independently by fifteen different authors, these essays fit together in a remarkably coherent fashion, with the ideas expressed in one essay often woven into several other essays either as shared themes or as objects of critical commentary. For this reason alone, the selection and arrangement of essays by Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant is worthy of commendation: it enables newcomers to see the field's strong dialectical character and encourages old hands to test their own intuitions in a critically stimulating manner. The essays are also well-written and thankfully free of the jargon often preventing audiences beyond the narrow circle of cognoscenti from grasping what the writers have to say. Informed by a lucid introduction (which surveys current research and offers extensive bibliographical references), the collection would be useful in either an undergraduate or graduate course. Yet there is enough substance and nuance throughout to exercise the intellectual muscle of philosophical specialists.

There are a number of useful ways to sort the essays, and individual readers will be struck by different patterns. One that stands out is the nagging issue of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of natural aesthetic appreciation. That such normative concerns are important should come as no surprise, since a similar question may be asked about the aesthetic appreciation of artworks. And on this question, there are two roughly defined camps to which the essays can be assigned.

In one camp we can place those essays (most notably by Allen Carlson, Yuriko Saito and Marcia Eaton) that assume a realist — even physicalist — stance, arguing that, since nature has "its own story" to tell (Saito, 151), proper aesthetic appreciation of nature cannot be reduced to the projection of anthropocentric emotions, imaginative reverie or categories derived from human-made art objects. Moreover, since natural science is the study that most faithfully allows natural settings to tell the story of their origins and structures, scientific information about the natural environment must be invested in some way in the intentional object of aesthetic appreciation.

In the other camp, the essays veer from this realist point of view and assume a variety of positions that can be grouped under the general heading of phenomenalism. These essays argue that the aesthetic appreciation of nature unfolds in response to various appearances of the natural environment as these are experienced by human perceivers. To be emotionally overwhelmed by the roar of a waterfall (Noel Carroll, 94-5), to delight in the "peculiar way" birds in flight "catch the light just so" (Ronald Moore, 223), to hear a bird song "as part of the overall ensemble of sounds in a soundscape" (John Andrew Fisher, 233-4), or to immerse oneself in the sensory shapes and colors of a "stand of wild columbine" (Arnold Berleant, 83-4) does not require awareness of the real, physical structure of the objects generating these phenomenal appearances. The "perfect curve of a wave," Emily Brady bluntly asserts, can be appreciated "without knowing how waves are caused" (158).

The division between the two camps is not a simple one, however. There are important nuances. Among the realists, Ronald Hepburn denies that
scientific understanding must always inform natural aesthetic appreciation (129-30). And the phenomenalists are distinguished by a variety of concepts controlling how natural phenomena are to be organized: emotional arousal (Carroll), narrative and stories (Thomas Heyd, Yrjö Sepänmaa), imagination (Brady), a quasi-theological sense of mystery (Stan Godlovitch), and the immediacy of sensuous experience (Cheryl Foster). Some phenomenalists unflinchingly allow the conceptual categories of art to inform phenomenal appearances (Moore, 227-8; Berleant, 84-6; Donald W. Crawford, 261-2). And in what is a most intriguing effort to fuse the two camps, Holmes Rolston III (in true Aldo-Leopoldian fashion) shows how a realistic foundation in biochemistry and evolutionary biology is exactly what is needed to experience the 'somber beauty' of a phenomenally encountered forest, once struck by fire but now regenerating from the humus and rotting logs of its own decay (192); in this way, 'appreciat[ing] what the forest is in itself' (188) modifies the phenomenal object of our perception, and a fortiori what it is that we are aesthetically appreciating.

Unless one is predisposed toward one side or the other of the dispute, it is hard to see how all the back-and-forth arguing between the two camps can be decided. One reason may be because these essays divide over deeper commitments the writers maintain toward the concept of nature itself — or at least as this concept is applied to aesthetic experience. For realists the term 'nature' refers strictly to a world of objects whose existence and structure do not depend on human construction or mental projection. For a phenomenalist like Crawford, on the other hand, 'there are no purely aesthetic grounds' to be so rigidly exclusive. 'The effects of nature on us as perceivers' — as in the crashing of ocean waves, for example — can serve just as well as the intentional objects of an appreciation that is 'both aesthetic and of nature' (261-2). With conceptual differences of this sort running so deep one should not expect an early end to the divisions that mark natural aesthetic theory. Yet if the essays in this volume are any indication, the journey itself may prove as intellectually rewarding as any resolution that may ultimately emerge.

Ira Newman
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A hotly debated issue in the philosophy of mind and epistemology is over the import evolutionary psychology has towards answering fundamental questions. In *Reconstructing Reason and Representation* Clarke takes as his central task the clarification and evaluation of the empirical and conceptual credentials of evolutionary psychology, and the assessment of the implications of evolutionary psychology for the nature of representation and rationality.

An early goal of the book is to defend the massive modularity thesis originally propounded by Cosmides and Tooby, and elsewhere defended by Pinker and Plotkin. The massive modularity thesis (MMRP, hereafter) maintains that our brain contains modules that are domain specific processors that take as their input content specific bodies of data. These modules are referred to as Darwinian/Chomsky modules (DCMs, hereafter).

The defense of MMRP comes by way of a response to Fodor’s objection that takes as a given that global abductive inference is a type of reasoning that humans engage in, and that cries out for explanation. The problem is that if MMRP entails that the mind only has DCMs there will be no account of global abductive inference, since DCMs — by definition — cannot perform domain general, content neutral processing. Clarke’s response is twofold. On the one hand, he clarifies MMRP by showing that its main proponents are not committed to the claim that the mind only contains DCMs, and that it may contain, for example, domain general processors that take as inputs domain general bodies of data, as long as the mind does not contain only modules of this kind. On the other hand, he argues that a great deal of cognitive activity that looks like abductive inference is really means-end reasoning; and that if local processors can by natural selection be hardwired to produce belief sets that satisfy global desiderata, then global abductive inference will supervene on means-end reasoning in local computational processors.

Clarke’s first point is substantive as a clarification, but odd in the context of the debate. If MMRP is not committed to the view that the mind only has DCMs, then some variant of Fodor’s view must be correct (i.e., a view on which there is at least one non-DCM). In addition, Clarke argues that Fodor’s position is committed to the wildly implausible idea that we have intentional control over how we reason. Clarke says (23), ‘[w]e cannot choose to reason in accordance with modus tollens in one case and choose not to reason in accordance with modus tollens in another case.’ However, students of intro logic classes would seem to show Clarke to be in the wrong. In choosing to do a proof of a conditional one can often choose between reasoning by reductio or by the direct method, which suggests that we do have the ability to choose how to reason. However, independent of the validity of Clarke’s response to
Fodor’s objection the discussion Clarke offers is highly instructive for those philosophers not already familiar with MMRP.

A central problem Clarke sets out to address utilizing MMRP is the disjunction problem. The problem is that the crude casual theory of representation maintains that tokens of 'D' are reliably caused by D. But if the disjunctive property of being (D or E) reliably causes 'D' tokenings, then E-caused 'D' tokenings cannot be misrepresentations, which intuitively they ought to be. Clarke begins his response by arguing that Fodor’s asymmetric dependence account of misrepresentation provides us with a necessary condition for misrepresentation, but that an approach from evolutionary biology and psychology is required for a sufficient condition if one desires an appropriately naturalized solution to the disjunction problem.

The asymmetric dependence view maintains that the possibility of misrepresentation is asymmetrically dependent on accurate representations. For example, the utterance of ‘cow’ upon the perception of a horse is only an error in virtue of the independent semantic relation between ‘horse’ and horses. Clarke’s amendment to Fodor’s view is a ‘gap theory’ of the causes of misrepresentation. The position on offer is that misrepresentations are the consequence of a malfunction in a module caused by the gap between the domain in which the module is being used (the actual domain), and the domain in which the module evolved (the proper domain). When relevant features of the proper domain are significantly different from the actual domain the module will fail to produce accurate representations. The gap theory competes with Millikan’s account of malfunction that employs the distinction between a representation producer and consumer. Clarke argues quite effectively that Millikan’s distinction, though adequate to handle the problem in some respects, lacks empirical support. Contrastingly, the gap theory is well supported by evolutionary psychology and MMRP.

Another substantive claim Clarke sets out to defend is the view that humans reason adaptively not logically. Adaptive reasoning is explained by the existence of domain specific mental algorithms that help us solve important and recurrent adaptive problems. The Wason selection task shows that our performance in identifying how to falsify a conditional of the form — If P, then Q — varies depending on the content. When the content of the conditional is abstract our performance is poor compared to when the content involves cheater detection. The debate on the Wason selection task is over what the best explanation is for why our performance is better when the content is of a certain kind. Clarke defends Cosmides’ view that the best explanation is that we have a content specific module designed for cheater detection because that was a problem that our ancestors had to solve in order to survive. The familiarity theory, on the other hand, maintains that we have a content general module and our familiarity merely with the subject matter in the conditional is what explains our superior performance. Clarke’s contention against the opposing views is that there is no empirical support for either view.
Many parts of Clarke's work contain comprehensive, clear, and informative exposition and analysis of intricate debates in the philosophy of mind. I find that Clarke's book presents a significant contribution to the problems he attempts to solve. More importantly, even if his particular position fails, his presentation of MMRP should have some philosophers reconsidering the view that evolutionary psychology is irrelevant to the philosophy of mind and epistemology.

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Arthur C. Danto

The task that Danto undertakes in The Abuse of Beauty is comparable in scope to that of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace from 1981, one of his most significant philosophical achievements. However, this similarity in scope contrasts sharply with a fundamental difference in concern. Whereas the Transfiguration is billed as a 'Philosophy of Art', the Abuse sets out to address both 'Aesthetics' and the 'Concept of Art'. In fact, the main thrust of the latter is indeed that aesthetics, even if tied to the philosophical understanding of art, also exceeds it.

This is a brave thesis in the context of the analytical tradition in which it is being presented — a tradition which Danto himself has been instrumental in developing — because by turning to aesthetics and what he calls the beauty of the 'Third Realm', Danto undermines the previously unquestioned centrality of the definition of art in analytical philosophical reflection. He makes this move consciously, admitting that 'aesthetics itself has until now had little to contribute to [his] philosophy of art' (6), and he does so for a reason. Motivated by the 'spontaneous appearance of those moving shrines everywhere in New York after the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001' (14), Danto sets out to recover aesthetic beauty as 'one of the values that defines what a fully human life means' (15).
However, this project, if laudable in its aims, is mixed in its results. Part of the difficulty is that Danto's own philosophical investment in the analytical tradition means that the endeavour to reassert the importance of aesthetics has to cede substantial space to the effort to revisit the concept of art. Moreover, in that this latter task is more closely related to Danto's previous work, it is unsurprising that it has a tendency to overshadow the arguments in favour of aesthetics.

That is to say, Danto really shines when he takes on what he dubs 'the Intractable Avant-Garde'. His choice, for instance, of Duchamp's *L.H.O.O.Q.* (which graces the cover of the paper edition) as an example is as astute as his recognition of Warhol's achievement with *Brillo Box* in 1964. 'Duchamp's 1919 work in which he drew a moustache on a postcard of Mona Lisa' is indeed a vivid 'gesture of abusing beauty'. As Danto persuasively argues, what happens with this work is the opening of 'a logical space ... between art and beauty' (46). As this gap yawns, art frees itself of the 'moral weight' (29) that had been assigned to beauty by philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, and philosophy itself is liberated for the analytical task of crafting a proper definition of art.

Moreover, Danto also acknowledges that this is only half the story of the Intractable Avant-Garde, only the *philosophical* significance of their abuse of beauty, and he goes on to outline its *political* significance, as well. For what is paradoxical about artists such as Duchamp and the Dadaists is that their endeavour to purify art of its moralising tendencies was motivated by none other than moral outrage. When Duchamp scribbled a moustache on the *Mona Lisa* he made a political statement, and no matter how naive we might consider the gesture today, the refusal of beauty was a protest against the society that had produced the barbarism of World War I. As Danto says, it was 'a device for disassociating artists from the society they held in contempt' (48). But what Danto cleverly realises is that if moral outrage can feed an abuse of beauty — a phenomenon he traces as recently as in the 1993 Whitney Biennial — 'moral pain' (111) can call for the reintroduction of beauty into art. In the cases of Maya Lin's *Vietnam Veteran's Memorial* and Robert Motherwell's *Elegies for the Spanish Republic*, beauty is essential to a process of healing. It transforms 'pain from grief into sorrow' and invites the viewer into 'a community of mourners' (111). This is a politically significant beauty that serves as the mirror opposite of the abuse of beauty. Rather than the expulsion of beauty as external to art, it realises beauty as potentially 'internal' to the very thought of art (101). In this way, Danto is able to suggest that even if beauty cannot be considered part of the definition of art, it must be considered a possible aspect, amongst other aesthetic qualities, of a concept of art. For if nothing else, this aesthetic aspect would 'help explain why we have art in the first place' (122).

But this begs the question of aesthetics all the more forcefully: for if 'beauty is an option for art', but 'a necessary condition for life as we would want to live it' (160), the problem of aesthetics would seem to far outweigh that of the concept of art. And yet aesthetics is the issue that Danto struggles
with without ever really arriving at even a formulation of the problematic. And the reason for this may be that the problem is more internal to philosophy than Danto wants to acknowledge. For him, philosophy 'aspires to universality' (137). However, his very project of explaining the 'spontaneous appearance of those moving shrines' after 9-11 makes very clear that it also aspires to particularity — to answering those questions that we urgently pose ourselves today. As such, if Danto fails in his aesthetics it is because, even though he recognizes a 'Third Realm of beauty', where 'human life is actually lived' and 'every practice is connected with some vision of what a human life ought to be' (72, italics added), he persists in a philosophical practice which believes it can cut short these visions and 'put into words what we as human beings [already] are' (118, italics added). As Danto himself says, philosophy as it is currently practiced is 'hopeless in dealing with the large human issues' (137), but it doesn't seem like it has to be. Certainly, such issues are beyond the reach of a putatively autonomous philosophy. But this still leaves the possibility of a philosophy — one, ironically, that is not unlike Danto's own in its unguarded moments — that admits that like art it 'is inseparable from the rest of life' (124), and thus also like art, is motivated by life's concerns.

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University of Greenwich

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**Bruce E. Fleming**

*Art and Argument: What Words Can't Do and What They Can.*


Pp. 208.


The great problem in writing a book that concludes the unlikelihood of changing other people's minds through argumentation is all too clear. This is not really a criticism of Fleming's *Art and Argument*, but simply an observation of the slightly awkward nature of writing within the philosophical discipline while using the language of certainty. Arguments do not change people's minds, whether they are yelled out or written down. Fleming is well aware of this, and avoids the logical pitfalls while never directly addressing this contradiction. That being said, this work contains some wonderful insights into everyday occurrences and helps make certain life experiences seem simple again, in a field that tends to complicate some of the most basic such experiences.
This book's most welcome feature is its ability to discuss solidly philosophical material while utilizing a more relaxed and informal language that is seldom found in the writings of this discipline. Realizing that a discussion of language, disagreement and aesthetic experience ought to appeal to all social beings; Fleming relies more upon describing human behavior than on making theoretical assumptions. When he discusses art as an event, rather than a type of object, the support for that claim comes from pragmatic observations, and not from philosophical argumentation. His useful examples, both of personal and historical origin, appear at regular intervals to support his various claims effectively and in an entertaining manner.

Fleming writes with a certain control over the shape and direction of his position. While this is a great strength, the book's lack of a singular, structural consistency is a source of frustration. Made up of seven chapters, Art and Argument reads more like a collection of philosophical essays than a unified work in aesthetics. Each chapter takes on a slightly different topic, and not all of the essays are clearly linked to the main themes of discourse. Some tangential musings, such as Fleming's numerous slips into literary criticism, run too far afield from his greater philosophical objectives. Perhaps utilizing one critical analysis of a well-known novel would aid his position that literature articulates a certain silence. However, taking the reader inside the works of Natsume Soseki is not as explanatory as it is merely distracting. This structural flaw does not upset the effectiveness of the book, although it might tempt the reader to skim over a few diversions.

Argumentation in human endeavors is the essential focus of this work. Fleming illuminates some of the subtleties in social disagreements, and identifies the subjective goals of arguing with others. He states that 'argument should be regarded not as an attempt to change someone, but an attempt to articulate for ourselves who we are' (173). There are linguistic limitations to the ways that a special and personal experience can be communicated. Attempting to share or describe these private, first-person experiences with others verbally, creates confusion or argumentation. Fleming's book refers to these special, first person experiences as 'interest units'.

Although the term 'interest unit' is a rather dry and ineffective label for such a powerfully reflective moment or an aesthetic experience, the discussion of these events is perhaps Fleming's most important exploration. He explains that these interest units belong to the individual and that 'it is part of the nature of an interest unit that it may well seem to others to be wrong' (78). Even this very brief description helps the reader to understand Fleming's position that articulation of these certain types of experiences is difficult to communicate, and all too easy to argue about.

Fleming does not attach a concise and deliberate definition to his use of the term 'interest unit'. First, this is to avoid analytic bickering over this fundamental term. Furthermore, the idea is so basic to daily life that it exists more firmly in Fleming's 'realm of silence' than in interpersonal communication. When we notice the little things in life, are taken aback by a sensory
experience, or see things in a new and different light; these are the ‘interest units’ that Fleming is discussing. These moments are known by all who exist: but the interest unit does not reach the individual by any form of communication; it is simply experienced. This is why sharing the experience with others takes on a certain complexity and allows plenty of room for disagreement.

Obviously, aesthetic experience is a prime example of this sort, and Fleming writes about art expertly. Art is described as one kind of interest unit, and because art is thereby an experience and not a type of object, only an individual can say which things actually are ‘art’. To reach this conclusion, Fleming adamantly dismisses the notion that art is a form of communication. He writes that art is created to be a unit of interest for individuals, but not to trigger any specific type of reaction. Removing works of art from the realm of communication may be severely problematic for some readers. This distinction seems to go against our practical experiences with art, and thereby requires more support from Fleming. He states that these aesthetic experiences are silent in nature, and that ‘we don’t argue with art: we accept it or we don’t. And if we accept it and are in a position to, we respond’ (146).

People defend their opinions concerning works of art to help better understand the experience for themselves, and not with any hope of winning an argument with others. Fleming’s evaluation maintains that arguments don’t change other people’s minds, but the process benefits the person doing the arguing. If this happens to be true, then argumentation exists to serve the individual, as the objectification of their own silent experiences. This recognition of the underlying, self-serving goals of argumentation ought to be the first reflection of any philosophical project. Fleming then, by arguing this position, has thereby improved his own understanding of himself as a philosopher, while inviting others to do the same.

Adam Melinn
Philadelphia University
Most histories of philosophy are as dull as ditch-water. Nobody chuckles, or even smiles over anything in, say, Copleston’s magisterial *A History of Philosophy* in nine volumes, to say nothing of all those histories written by Germans. Nobody knows why this should be so, since a goodly number of philosophers are witty and amusing. Perhaps it is just because they are written by philosophers who are too close to their subject. This book is different. It contains hundreds of footnotes and other scholarly appurtenances, despite which it is no high-toned and impartial account of Australian philosophy. It is well-written, partisan, polemical, often amusing, a hard-to-put-down page-turner. Franklin is a mathematician, but clearly had a good undergraduate education in philosophy and has kept up with developments in the field in his country.

It is notable that Franklin relates Australian philosophy extensively to its social, cultural, political, and historical contexts. But not all this contextualizing is useful for understanding philosophy in Australia; much of it is rather distant from philosophy, and some of it is just implausible. There is, for example, a chapter on ‘The Push’, a degenerate group of ‘60s-’70s Sydney middle-class hippies (misdescribed by Franklin as bohemian), writers, poets (mostly failed), drug addicts, alcoholics, and promiscuous sexual anarchists who derived their ‘philosophy’ from Libertarianism and, they claimed, from some aspects of the seminal philosophy of John Anderson, Australia’s most famous and most influential philosopher. With utter implausibility Franklin attributes to The Push, through the influence of some of its members who immigrated to the U.K. and elsewhere, considerable causal responsibility for some of the salient characteristics of the ‘60s world-wide, laying at Anderson’s feet some responsibility for the low and dishonest youth revolt against civilization in the ‘60s and beyond, despite Anderson’s own vigorous opposition to The Push and everything it stood for. There was no doubt a confluence of many causes at work, but widespread laxity in child rearing of the post-war baby-boomer generation is a more likely proximate cause, I should think.

The book is, as Franklin admits, focused on Sydney. Melbourne, the other important centre of philosophy in Australia in the period, gets rather short shrift. This appears to be because Franklin has little sympathy for the sort of philosophy done in Melbourne, but mainly because the Melbourne department was the home of quite a number of left-wing, often Communist-affiliated or -oriented philosophers. Other Australian philosophers get even shorter shrift, except for Roman Catholic Thomists and neo-Thomists, who get more attention than one would have thought they merited given their isolation from mainstream philosophy in Australia.
Sydney was the locus of Australian scientific realism/materialism, and, apart from an early left-wing period under the influence of John Anderson, was the home of several very right-wing personalities such as Anderson (converted or evolved into a consummate reactionary), the late David Stove, and David Armstrong. Franklin's philosophical interests and political sympathies are clearly aligned with Sydney, mixed with a dollop of Thomism. He appears to be a Catholic, but does not avow it in this book.

The title obviously alludes to the charge against Socrates, and Franklin thinks the same charge, mutatis mutandis, can be leveled at Anderson, in this book the ever-present Godfather, even after death. Anderson arrived in Australia in 1927 from Scotland to take up the post of Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sydney, and plunged immediately into notoriety. In the class-room and in a series of articles in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Anderson founded and promoted 'Australian materialism' (sometimes called 'Australian realism'). Until then Idealism was the prevailing philosophy, but it was Anderson's bête noire, and he was determined to root it out, promoting in its place atheism, determinism, a rejection of ultimates of any kind, ontological pluralism, and a rejection of any idea of a soul or substantial self. A central feature of his philosophy was his rejection of internal relations, the idea that the definition or nature of a thing can be constituted in any way by its relations to something else, a view he called 'relativism'. Anderson was implacable in rooting out relativism (essential to Idealism) wherever he detected it. In ethics Anderson recognized that there are good and bad things and actions, but because of his opposition to non-contingent internal relations of any kind, he insisted that there cannot be any such things as 'moral necessity' or 'moral obligation'. One of his minor but scandalous doctrines was that there is no such thing as obscenity. He taught these doctrines to every academic generation during his career, many of whom later became school teachers, journalists or other professionals with influence on the public mind. Franklin thinks that they were a major factor in corrupting Australian youth, presumably on the old dictum that things spoken softly in the class-room in one generation will be shouted in the streets in the next.

Anderson popularized his views outside academia in lectures and debates. Early on he worked closely with the Communist Party, arguing for social revolution, atheism the ejection of religion from public schools and so on. After breaking with Stalinism and then Trotskyism, he moved rapidly to the far right, supporting in 1949 the Australian Government's using the army to break the coal miners strike, and opposing welfare policies such as providing free milk for children. He certainly had an extremist personality. It seems never to have occurred to him that the social democratic Australian Labor Party was a decent and viable alternative to Stalinism. He raced from one barbarism to another, never acquiring any tincture of moderation.

Anderson's immoderation survived him in his disciples and in their left-wing opponents, very nearly destroying the Sydney department in the '60s. Franklin's account of 'the Sydney disturbances', which were on all sides rhetorically violent and sometimes physically as well, is the best I've read,
and seems just in assigning the blame chiefly to the (‘New’) left. The affair is an object lesson in the absolute need for generosity, mutual toleration and forbearance, a dollop of skepticism about one’s own views, and other such civic and intellectual virtues that clearly were in disgracefully short supply all around in Sydney at the time.

Chapter 12, ‘Science, Antiscience and Australian Realism’ is a tour de force exposition of the chief contentious issues in Australian philosophy of science from Popper to Artificial Intelligence, in thirty-one pages. The hero is the late David Stove; Popper and Thomas Kuhn are quixotic knights errant unseated by Stove’s brilliant polemic in Anything Goes (Sydney 1988), and Paul Feyerabend the mad villain, with several anti-rational, probably irrational, Frenchmen and feminists in supporting roles.

The philosophical issues revolve around the ‘problem of induction’. J.S. Mill said that the inference from the whiteness of European swans to the whiteness of all swans ‘cannot have been a good induction, since the conclusion turned out to be erroneous’ (A System of Logic, Bk. III sect 3, 205 [8th edition, London 1941]). Popper and Kuhn took up this manifestly wrong-headed view and erected a whole philosophy of science on it. Their works, especially Kuhn’s, opened room for a myriad of anti-scientific crackpot views about the ‘social construction of science’ that conjured into existence out of nothing grotesque fantasies of Australian Aboriginal physics (without numbers and no concept of prediction) or, in Canada, ‘First Nations’ epistemology. Stove, and with him David Armstrong, Michael Devitt and others, subjected this sort of nonsense to careful and devastating criticism and gave a rational defense of induction which Franklin sets out clearly and plausibly.

The book also contains photographs of a number of the leading personalities in Australian philosophy.

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In *Eros and the Good*, James Gouinlock revives the ancient paradigm for discussing human virtue by placing the ethical discussion within the context of human nature. Gouinlock advocates a full appraisal of nature as essential to proper moral judgments. Thus, Gouinlock provides a metaphysical views of nature and human nature before delineating a moral system.

Gouinlock refuses to address metaphysical issues along the lines of contemporary scholarship (40): 'In the form of metaphysics that I prefer, what we seek ... is discrimination, description and generalization, drawing from all of human experience. Such generalizations ... offer a view of the whole, one that gives scope and clarity to our understanding of the human condition.' Prefacing his contribution to such a metaphysic is a critical discussion of Plato, Descartes, et al. Having dismissed the major metaphysical and ethical frameworks from the history of philosophy, Gouinlock develops another model following Dewey's metaphysics wherein the subject is 'the entire context of the nature of things as it bears on aspiration, practice and the meaning of life' (66). Gouinlock asserts that 'human nature itself is the outcome of a history uniting organism and environment ... Human nature is not a fixed essence; it is dependent upon innumerable variables — most of them, Dewey believed, in the social environment' (75). Given our evolutionary and social history, Gouinlock concludes (97): 'For a moral being, "by nature" ... refers to ... patterns of conduct that are well suited to human endurance and flourishing, and significant deviations from these conditions tend to meet with frustration, failure, and even disaster.' Gouinlock's system makes morality depend on human nature, which is a historical accident. Gouinlock thinks that this strips morality of some of its usual metaphysical grandeur, but argues that morality is not relegated to the subjective or cultural. A human nature has resulted from this cosmic accident and there are facts about what conditions are necessary to the flourishing of such.

Gouinlock proceeds to develop an account of these facts, defining the moral as (143) 'what is supportive of well-meaning human endeavor'. Thus (149), 'moral considerations exist according to nature, they are not conventions. They are indispensable to a shared life.' Though these considerations are not a matter of convention (153), 'moral beings do not begin their appraisal from a morally indifferent posture; they are cognizant of the fatefulness of their undertaking for the formation and preservation of a decent and stable life. A pertinent knowledge of nature is a vital and sometimes decisive resource in these appraisals.' And nature dictates that (155) 'the minimal requirements of any morally good society ... are "civility, equality, freedom, healthy environment, justice, order, peace, property, rights, security, toleration, and welfare".' Morality consists in the settled disposition to embrace these values;
such dispositions are virtues. Since the virtues maintain a functional society, Gouinlock argues that virtue and happiness (i.e., flourishing) are interrelated. Virtue is connected to happiness primarily because moral values are adaptations. Societal requirements are not engraved in the structure of the universe, but depend on our nature as it has developed through evolutionary changes and our historical situation. As adaptations, the virtues are essential instruments in living a complete life. Additionally, our nature requires communal life (333): 'We live in connection; we live as organic parts of orders, and we love those that are enduring. Isolated, disconnected, and fragmented experience is called “meaningless”.'

Gouinlock strikes an interesting note in developing a virtue ethical theory grounded in our communal nature. However, there are two substantial problems with Gouinlock's presentation of this idea. First, he dismisses competing ethical views too quickly. For instance, Rawls' theory of justice is dispensed as (179) 'a mad theory, a prescription for creating an ever-enlarging mass of disabled men.' Likewise, Gouinlock dismisses hedonism as (192) 'predicated on the shallowest conception of human nature.' He completely ignores the great hedonistic theories of Epicurus and Mill, who argue that the greatest pleasures satisfy human nature in its complexity. Second, Gouinlock routinely substitutes bombastic rhetoric for argument. In addition to heaping insults on major figures in philosophy, Gouinlock attacks his colleagues, intellectuals, and the left. These attacks are bizarre because they recur throughout the book and contribute nothing to his view. I offer some of the more egregious examples. Gouinlock refers to 'the insular character of philosophy, easily lured on by the herd instinct, ideology, and love of celebrity' (110). He also denigrates altruism as politically correct morality and the compassion that supports altruism as superficial and producing 'hypocrisy, cynicism, and moral breakdown' (132). About his colleagues, Gouinlock states: 'Only intellectuals profess egalitarianism — for others, of course' (173). He later refers to intellectuals whose morality he summarizes (213): 'All you do is express outrage, engage in the occasional demonstration, denounce the establishment, and feel righteous.' When Gouinlock assaults the 'political left', he refers to our political woes and claims that 'the ideologies of the political left are particularly well suited to sustain these base ambitions' (220). He later concludes (226) that 'there are many politicians who are morally despicable, most of them on the left.' Finally, he defends gender hierarchy through a type of social Darwinism by citing 'facts' such as 'women cannot fight as well as men' (255), and blames feminism for social ills: 'A further triumph of the rationality of women's rights is no-fault divorce. One effect of this “right” is that women and their children are being abandoned more commonly then they used to be.' And though he acknowledges that women have suffered, Gouinlock is quick to point out, that 'the feminists have less cause for complaint than have blacks and other minorities.' The aspect of these claims that is most repugnant is that none are argued for or defended. There is no research cited, sociological or otherwise. For a book that ties ethics to historical,
cultural, and biological factors, a failure to use research in these fields undermines the plausibility of its claims.

In short, insofar as Gouinlock's book makes some interesting points, he recapitulates ideas from MacIntyre's *After Virtue*. Gouinlock overlaps with MacIntyre by appealing to the Ancients, developing a virtue ethic, dichotomizing between the Ancient outlook and Nietzsche, and appealing to the authority of custom. MacIntyre, who understands the history of philosophy and provides reasons for accepting a virtue ethic connected to the community and rooted in tradition, provides a better treatment of these materials. And in reading MacIntyre, one can avoid the derogatory comments that belong in a third-rate partisan magazine or on a talk radio program.

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**Susan J. Hekman**
*Private Selves, Public Identities: Reconsidering Identity Politics.*
Pp. vii + 159.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02382-1);

Identity politics challenges the most basic assumptions of liberal society — most prominently, the idea of the abstract or neutral subject. In this book, Susan Hekman claims that identity politics can never fully overcome its limitations without taking into account the larger problem of identity, which concerns not only the political sphere but who we are in our private lives as well. Her analysis of the relationship between the public and private sphere uses feminist theory as a springboard for thinking about the nature of identity and how it might enter into politics — that is, how does identifying a citizen specifically as a woman reveal the inconsistencies and contradictions of liberalism? Further, what does the label ‘woman’ mean? This question has troubled feminist theorists since the 1980s, when the charge of essentialism began to be leveled at second-wave feminists.

Hekman negotiates an alternative position to three dominant conceptions of the human subject: 1) the fixed identity of the modern subject as rational, autonomous, and isolated; 2) the naive essentialism that inverts these characteristics in order to claim a separate fixed identity for women, misleadingly associated with Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan; and 3) the
complete rejection of any stable identity, which she attributes to postmodern feminists, notably Judith Butler. Her concern with Butler’s critique of the modern self is that she has too hurriedly rejected any ideal of a substantial identity because of the violence and coercion associated with the liberal subject. Butler has correlatively rejected identity politics as a viable alternative and has rather turned to ill-defined and perhaps ineffective forms of resistance — pastiche and parody. However, Hekman notes that fragmented identities indicate emotional disturbance and cannot serve as the basis for psychological health and political action. In this sense, the wholesale denial of an identifiable center to the self is damaging to feminist projects and goals.

Hekman’s alternative involves a turn to object relations theory, and specifically the notion of a ‘core self’ generated by our early relationships with family members, principally our mothers. This core identity is thus socially constructed, unlike the supposedly ahistorical liberal self, and yet more than merely the locus at which various social forces intersect. Instead, ‘the self is created from meanings assigned to experience’ through unique social situations and emotional commitments (23). Our personal identity receives its stability and its particularity from this filtering of cultural values and beliefs, but we will be influenced by these forces in very different ways. Hekman refers to this ‘I’ as the ‘ungrounded ground,’ a self that is antifoundational and inessential, and still substantial enough to have psychological unity and political agency (26). One advantage of object relations theory is its rejection of the originary or essential autonomy of the liberal subject; we become who we are only through our emotional and social attachments to others.

This radical rethinking of the subject who enters into the public sphere, and indeed disrupts the accepted dichotomy between the private and the public spheres, changes how we conceive of identity politics. Hekman claims the word ‘identity’ tries to capture two disparate connotations, in the sense that we conflate the ‘identity’ of identity politics with the personal identity she describes in terms of object relations theory. Our ‘core selves’ may develop in response to race, class, gender, and sexuality (and more precisely how those identifications play out in our early and intimate relationships), but our political commitments may or may not be reflective of that personal identity. We may take on new identifications for particular political purposes — an idea reminiscent of coalition politics. We cannot assume how people will identify themselves, and indeed people may take on multiple and interlocking identities, as in Maria Lugones’ notion of world-traveling. This disjunction between our personal identities and how these identities inform our political commitments allows identity politics to avoid the charge of essentialism from those concerned about the repetition of the exclusionary political gesture of traditional liberalism.

Hekman suggests that identity politics be used to develop ‘a politics of diversity rather than uniformity,’ that it avoid reinscribing essentialism at another level by being ‘a politics of embodied citizens and multiple standards’ (69). She describes this in more detail using Martha Minow’s language of ‘I want’ politics, as opposed to ‘I am’ politics (111). This revision of the liberal
privileging of the universal citizen ‘entails that dealing with differences between citizens is not an aberration to be avoided at all costs but a necessary and legitimate element of political life’ (6). This change in the way we view the political sphere is matched by an attention to the social and cultural powers that shape identity. This revision of our political imagination is ambitious, but the process by which it might be actualized remains obscure, given the strength of our implicit commitment to the liberal model. One of the strengths of Hekman’s work is her extensive review of the pertinent scholarship on contemporary liberalism, identity politics, the essentialism/anti-essentialism debate within feminist theory, multiculturalism, and the politics of recognition. However, her analyses of the existing scholarship at times tends to distract from the force of her own thesis.

One question we might raise in response to Hekman’s analysis is whether object relations theory does in fact release us from the alienation of social constructivist theories: how is our core identity not one more way in which we are determined by social forces, even if this is not monolithic determination? How is it that this identity can come be seen as ours? And, to follow a Foucauldian insight, is the psychological need for a core identity ahistorical and natural, or is it socially constructed? Butler’s project is not only to contest the particular content of our gender norms, but also to analyze workings of power in the process by which we become subjects in the first place. Although Hekman too quickly dismisses the most far-reaching postmodern challenges to liberalism, this is an important examination of what is at stake in identity politics and a well-reasoned attempt to resolve the tensions inherent within it.

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Tom Huhn

Imitation and Society:
The Persistence of Mimesis in the Aesthetics of Burke, Hogarth, and Kant.

Tom Huhn has written a book that is both fascinating and frustrating. The fascination lies in the basic thesis. Huhn argues that mimesis, which remains the theoretical touchstone of art theory throughout the eighteenth century, continues to drive the newly emerging theories of taste and the fine arts instead of being replaced by them. Moreover, Huhn sees this mimetic impulse
as essentially social rather than individual, which would place it in strong
contradistinction to the emerging cult of individual expression that appears
in both British and post-Kantian Romanticism. If the continued importance
of mimesis to theories of taste can be established, it would clarify what is
most interesting but often lost in the foundation of aesthetics: its complex
interaction with new forms of art such as the novel and such social phenom-
ena as sentimentalism.

The frustration arises both from the form and focus of Huhn's argument,
however. Formally, the book is densely and sometimes impenetrably written.
What is one to make of the following claim: 'The secondary judgment of
contemplation compensates for the untrustworthiness of objective subrep-
tion' (133). 'Subreption' means attaining an end by falsification, concealment,
or suppression of information. Its earliest use refers to obtaining Papal bulls
by misrepresentation, and it is used philosophically to describe misrepresen-
tation by the senses (OED). 'Objective subreption' is unclear enough to begin
with, but an untrustworthy falsification or misrepresentation is something
of a mystery. ('Subreption' plays a large role in Huhn's discussion of Kant,
but it is never clear exactly what is meant.)

The chosen focus of the book is on Burke, Hogarth, and Kant, and this
focus is also somewhat frustrating. Burke and Hogarth each provide a single,
significant text of interest to aesthetics. It is certainly interesting to have
Huhn's analysis of those texts. But if the larger thesis about mimesis and
society is to withstand scrutiny, they are not the ideal choices, and it is that
thesis that makes this book so potentially interesting. Both Burke and
Hogarth are eccentric, even in a century that produced a great many eccentric
excursions into the theory of taste and beauty. Burke's essay is a juvenile
effort by an Irish outsider looking to establish himself as a man of letters
with political ambitions. Like Mandeville, Burke is undoubtedly looking to
attract attention by shocking as well as informing. Hogarth is something of
an outsider as an artist as well. As a portrait painter, he is less successful
than Gainsborough, Reynolds, Hoppner, or Lawrence, for example. His
success is as an engraver and entrepreneur. His theoretical Analysis of
Beauty was a polemical effort that was easily parodied by his contemporaries.
Huhn pays some attention in his discussion of Burke to Shaftesbury and
Hutcheson, but Shaftesbury would seem much more central to his thesis
about mimesis and society than Burke, and Reynolds' Discourses are a much
more complex instance of the interplay of mimesis and theories of taste than
Hogarth’s analysis of beauty. The jump to Kant is largely unmotivated in the
text, and it shifts the nature of the argument as well. The essays on Burke
and Hogarth are clearly about their central texts. But the discussion of Kant
turns out to be about the reception of Kant by recent commentators: John
Zammito, Henry Allison, Salim Kemal, Eva Schaper, Mary McCloskey, and
Paul Guyer. All of them are judged to be seriously in error by Huhn, but it is
never quite clear what Huhn's own reading of Kant is.

I take Huhn’s basic thesis to be that the sensate elements of taste — both
its foundation in a real, external sense, and its analogous metaphorical
foundation in a reflective or internal sense — are mimetic. That is, the feeling and pleasure that occupy aesthetics retains a representative element. That representative element depends on the imagination, and as Burke argues, it is felt as a social emotion. Hogarth's attempts to establish the line of beauty and the serpentine line as necessary and sufficient conditions for beauty are equally founded on the social nature of response — vision and movement are conditioned by the world and are not simply individual givens.

As Huhn notes in his introduction, mimesis is difficult to pin down theoretically, and the influential treatments of it approach it obliquely. He follows Adorno in arguing for a dialectical approach: 'The dialectic at work in this characterization of mimesis is thus as follows: mimesis is the nonconceptual affinity between social relations and subjective production' (4). A basic problem for all eighteenth-century theories of taste that are based on the theory of ideas is that ideas themselves, as Bishop Berkeley demonstrated, cannot resemble objects. If taste is felt, as passionate response, then judgments of taste are purely subjective, and their imaginative objects — nature and the fine arts — are inaccessible. My taste is what it is, and art and beauty are nothing more than what I feel them to be. That conclusion was unacceptable, though Thomas Reid and his followers used it to ‘refute’ Hume. Huhn, demonstrates, I think (if I understand him, which is questionable), that the ideas that constitute taste are never so completely subjective because taste itself is mimetic. That is, the passions are themselves dialectical representations of a social sense and not just Lockean passive responses. The theories of sympathy developed especially by Adam Smith and David Hume, which are economic and social, are actually the best evidence for this, though Huhn, while he discusses sympathy, does not make as much of them as he might.

It is less clear that Kant can be made to support this thesis. The overwhelming evidence from the commentators on Kant whom Huhn discusses is that Kant is in fact separating both aesthetic intuition and aesthetic pleasure from its social, conceptual, and mimetic roots. The historicist reactions of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel are the result. The final essay on Kant is thus the most interesting but the least convincing part of the book.

On the whole, this book is a commendable and provocative attempt to locate three figures in the history of aesthetics in an essentially modern, dialectical understanding of aesthetic pleasure. Huhn ultimately concludes that aesthetics defies all attempts to reduce aesthetic pleasure to some objective theory or origin. One may agree with that conclusion without being wholly convinced by his readings of his three illustrative figures, however.

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The Stoics' commitment to theoretical systematicity is matched by openness to close scrutiny of their own philosophical positions, sometimes to the point of internal disagreement. Our sources also attest to vigorous debates with their major adversaries. These features of Stoicism help explain some of its attractions for contemporary scholars. Yet they also pose special challenges, exacerbated by the nature of our sources, for someone newly approaching the study of Stoicism. The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics aims to serve both those who attend to Stoicism 'for the first time or after considerable prior experience' (2). The editor, Brad Inwood, himself a distinguished scholar of Stoicism, has assembled a collection of essays on central Stoic themes by other prominent authors in order to accomplish these ends.

The Companion is not a conventional introduction. However, its design is to furnish beginners with points of entry to sometimes dense Stoic theorizing in hopes of making the 'plunge more inviting and less hazardous than it would otherwise be' (5). It also proposes to offer more 'advanced students and specialists ... a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of the Stoics' (i). Newcomers will find several of the essays demanding, in part, because they sometimes assume an acquaintance with recent scholarly debates. Yet, despite limited interchange among the authors, the essays as a group help convey the philosophical richness of Stoic theory and are likely to enhance an appreciation of its intellectual challenges. Moreover, many of these essays are replete with fresh and provocative readings of significant scholarly issues, which will interest specialists.

The first two chapters survey the history of Stoicism in antiquity. The next eight chapters deal with several major Stoic themes, corresponding to the traditional Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics. Three chapters look at Stoic influence on science and language in antiquity. The last two chapters discuss aspects of Stoic influence on modern philosophy. The volume also contains select bibliographies of primary and secondary sources, a general index, and an index of cited passages.

In the first essay, David Sedley traces the formation and development of the Stoic school from its beginnings through the late first century BC. Sedley argues that each phase of this period of Stoicism exhibits roughly similar philosophical commitments while adopting somewhat different conceptions of what constitutes Stoicism. Next, Christopher Gill argues, inter alia, that despite the disappearance of its formal institutions Stoicism's vitality is still evident during the Roman imperial period. Philosophical innovations include contributions to ethical theory by Hierocles, causal explanations of natural phenomena that Seneca holds compatible with the divinity of the world, and
developments in practical ethics in the work of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca.

In the next section, R. J. Hankinson discusses epistemology, which the Stoics include as a part of logic. The notion of cataleptic impression, a criterial impression that discloses truth, is at the core of their generally empiricist epistemology. Hankinson clearly shows how forceful criticism from Academic skeptics prompts the Stoics to revise their conception without ever relinquishing their commitment to it. Suzanne Bobzien's elegantly succinct summary of a Stoic logical system describes its logical language, consisting of assertibles (axiomata), connectives, and syntax, as well as its deductive apparatus. Bobzien identifies both similarities with and differences from standard, contemporary systems. For example, derivations involve reduction to 'indemonstrables' that are self-evidently obvious rather than the other way around from, say, self-evident axioms.

In his lucid and accessible chapter, Michael J. White examines the consequences for physics and cosmology of the Stoic assumption that the cosmos is a cohesive unity. For example, their monism prompts an account of causation in biological rather than mechanical terms. Other consequences include the relation between the divine cosmos and its constituent material pneuma, the doctrine that material things have a continuous structure, the theory of blending, and the thesis of causal determinism. Essays by Keimpe Algra, Dorothea Frede, and Jacques Brunschwig develop more fully the details of several of these issues. Algra examines Stoic theology and its relation to physics, arguments for the existence of the gods, how a fluid conception of the divine makes possible a plurality of gods, and other issues such as theodicy. Frede offers a useful overview of the consistency of the Stoic account of determinism and responsibility. According to her account, the Stoic analysis of causation results in a form of compatibilism in which our inner nature can be the source of actions. In Brunschwig's investigation of current debates about Stoic ontology, he reveals the complexities of holding only corporeality exists and also admitting non-corporeals such as void or sayables (lekta) as non-existing reals. Among other issues, Brunschwig shows how their teleological materialism prompts a sophisticated metaphysics of identity and individuation.

In the first of two chapters devoted to ethical topics, Malcolm Schofield considers 'how the Stoics conceived the project ... of ethics' (233). Several passages, especially, DL 7 84-131, Stobaeus 2 57-116, and Cicero, Fin 3 16-76, lead Schofield to distinguish two relatively independent goals in Stoic ethics: (i) outlining and classifying systematically Stoic ethical concepts and propositions, and (ii) arguing for and explaining different features of their ethical system. Among the major interpretive debates that Schofield considers is whether the Stoic end, living consistently with nature, refers to human or cosmic nature. His solution treats human nature as a sufficiently thick concept for the Stoics to avoid having to choose between versions of internalism or externalism. Schofield's discussion of Stoic ethical doctrine is sparse. Newcomers to this area might need additional acquaintance with Stoic
ethical theory to appreciate Schofield’s essay and those with more experience might wish for additional argument. In the next essay, Tad Brennan explains key elements of Stoic moral psychology and their application to ethical theory. He summarizes the basic Stoic psychological architecture of impression, assent, and impulse and how it is utilized to argue for the extirpation of emotion. Although the Stoics endorse a cognitivist theory of emotions, Brennan suggests that their therapeutic practice also appears to attribute non-cognitive features to the emotions. He also identifies a puzzle about how deliberation is possible if impulses consist in actions. Finally, Brennan argues that their account of impulse enables the Stoics to reject the Socratic position that an agent’s conception of the good motivates every action. Brennan’s fresh and challenging readings of Stoic psychological theory will provoke scholarly response.

R. J. Hankinson’s second contribution to the Companion reviews the impact of Stoicism on ancient medical theory. The Stoics investigate several central concepts in medicine — e.g., pneuma, the nature of causation, and the notion of signs or symptoms. However, Galen rightfully admonishes the Stoics for neglecting scientific advances in, say, knowledge of anatomy. Hankinson concludes that the extent and direction of theoretical borrowing between various schools of medicine and Hellenistic philosophers is ultimately unclear. David Blank and Catherine Atherton argue that despite the lack of clarity about precisely how Stoic philosophical investigations of language and ontology affected later writers on grammar ‘the fact of Stoic influence ... cannot be doubted’ (318). Their discussion examines syntax, parts of speech, and cases. Alexander Jones describes Stoic contributions to the technical astronomy of Eudoxus and others as relatively limited. He also summarizes issues concerning astral divination about weather and agriculture, omens, astrological predictions based on the position of the heavenly bodies, and, very briefly, the geographic interests of Posidonius and Strabo.

Terence Irwin traces three elements of Stoic ethical theory — eudaimonism, naturalism, and moralism — in mediaeval and modern thought. Aquinas and Suarez fit Stoic naturalism about virtue into an Aristotelian framework. Grotius seeks a naturalistic basis for the pursuit of moral rightness. Pufendorf takes the eudaimonistic pursuit of one’s own good as incompatible with the intrinsic value of moral rightness. Hence, he rejects the naturalism and eudaimonism of these modern descendants of Stoicism. Butler’s position accepts much of Stoic naturalism, but also rejects eudaimonism because of conflicts between his egoistic version of Stoic eudaimonism and the moral priority of conscience. By attesting to both the strengths and weaknesses of these various responses to Stoicism, Irwin produces a fascinating, if programmatic, defense of Stoic naturalism. A. A. Long’s essay, the only chapter not written specifically for the Companion, explores the legacy of Stoicism in Spinoza, Lipsius, and Butler. Long identifies some significant similarities and differences between Spinoza and the Stoics. In one departure from Stoicism, Spinoza, for instance, rejects the notion of divine providence while the Stoics embrace an orderly cosmos that is per-
fectly good. According to Long, it is unsurprising that the ideas of modern philosophers like Spinoza are sometimes similar to Stoic positions. But he urges caution about whether the parallels are attributable to intellectual affinity or the deliberate or unconscious appropriation of Stoic sources. Lipsius provides perhaps the fullest modern discussions of Stoicism, but often distorts it as anticipating Christian theology. The chief exception, Long argues, is Lipsius’ *De constantia*, a moralizing work that relies heavily on Seneca. It also unfortunately conveys the modern stereotype that Stoicism’s principal message is an uncomplaining acceptance of one’s fate. Long conjectures that Butler’s ethics relies on a reading of Cicero’s *De officiis*. Unlike other Stoic ethical works, it minimizes the role of cosmic teleology and treats ethical theory as theoretically autonomous. Although Butler appropriates many features of Stoic ethics, he rejects the Stoic account of the emotions and the basic tenets of eudaimonism. Among Long’s conclusions in his nuanced assessment: the reception of Stoicism in modern philosophy reflects internal disagreements among Stoics.

Although the volume is generally well produced, an example in Bobzien’s essay transposes the antecedent and consequent of a conditional (104-5). In addition, it would have been helpful to beginners to have included a general survey of source materials.

The Companion succeeds remarkably well as a resource for nonspecialists as well as those with greater familiarity with Stoicism. It should have genuine appeal for both audiences.

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Gary Iseminger
*The Aesthetic Function of Art.*
Pp. x + 147.

The major aims of Gary Iseminger’s *The Aesthetic Function of Art* are to argue: 1) for the existence of what he calls ‘aesthetic communication’ as a ‘transaction’ that can occur outside of any practice or institution, and 2) that the artworld is an informal institution designed to foster aesthetic communication. Function is thereby shifted from works of art to the artworld, and the function of the artworld is understood as artifactual (designed) rather than systemic. Institutional theories do not do justice to a human universal, and systemic theories of artworld function (Bourdieu, Mattick) do not do
justice to the artifactual nature of institutions. The most unusual aspect of the book is the space devoted to the concept of informal institutions.

Although Iseminger makes his case in *The Aesthetic Function of Art* by explicating his major concepts, a quick way to understand his 'new aestheticism' is to extrapolate a narrative. To begin with, 'making things to be appreciated by others is a fundamental human impulse' (137). Such transactions, which are instances of 'aesthetic communication,' 'occurred and now occur in non-Western and preliterate cultures' (74), and thus aesthetic communication 'in no way depends for its existence on the artworld or the practice of art' (137). It then became the foundation for practices in which the aesthetic was central (74-5), although it was and still is found in predominantly non-aesthetic practices as well, e.g., military music (100). That is where things stood until the eighteenth century, when some European artists and theorists realized that a variety of practices were intimately related by virtue of their common aim of aesthetic communication (106-9): 'the atmosphere of theory from which the artworld emerged strongly supports the thought that its earliest members saw it as an aesthetic institution' (111). This led to the concept of art and the making of an artworld, an informal institution dedicated to promoting aesthetic communication. That, in turn, eventuated, a century and a half or so later, in the idea that one might make a work of art without aesthetic content, a pure work of art so to speak, simply by virtue of placing an artifact in the context of the artworld. Thus were works of art emptied of any aesthetic function. The theoretical consequence of this was the institutional theory of art. *The Aesthetic Function of Art* is an effort to return to us to theoretical good sense, where in practice (both making and criticizing) we mostly are anyway.

Iseminger argues that the best way to make sense of the artworld is to understand it as having an aesthetic function, by which he means that it is designed to promote appreciation, 'the new aestheticism's aesthetic state of mind' (34). He wants to revive functionalism by tying aesthetic communication historically, but not necessarily, to an institution (the artworld), and a practice (art). The result is what Iseminger calls 'the new aestheticism', but, as he himself recognizes, the break with the traditional version might be sufficient to 'disqualify it from any claim to be an aestheticism' (2). Since proceduralists will reject the idea that the artworld, if not every work of art, was designed to perform and still performs an aesthetic function, it looks like few philosophers of art will be happy with Iseminger's view. It is, however and happily, rather close to Francis Sparshott's in *The Theory of the Arts*. In that work, 'disengaged communication' is a mimetic step away from Iseminger's aesthetic communication, 'performance' (a term of art here) does the work of 'things to be appreciated', and criticism is the counterpart to appreciation: the basic transaction, someone making or doing something for someone to appreciate is very similar. The difference is that Sparshott pointedly offers a theory of the *fine arts*, and rejects 'aesthetic this and that'. However, once one has said that the function of the artworld is to foster appreciation, and appreciation is defined as 'finding the experiencing of a
state of affairs to be valuable in itself (36), the term ‘aesthetic’ looks like a mere label and is perhaps unhelpful rhetorically.

Traditional aestheticism is here represented by Beardsley’s theses:

(F) Something is a work of art if and only if its function is to afford aesthetic experience,

(V) A work of art is a good work of art if and only if it has the capacity to afford aesthetic experience (8-9).

This is the new version:

(F’) The function of the artworld and practice of art is to promote aesthetic communication.

(V’) A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it has the capacity to afford appreciation. (23)

The Aesthetic Function of Art explicates the concepts in, connections between, and implications of (F’) and (V’).

In the opening chapters on traditional and new aestheticism Iseminger sketches the intuitions that aestheticism (new and old) wants to honor, outlines the objections that have been raised to traditional aestheticism’s effort to do so, and points toward the ways in which his theory will meet antiessentialist, antifunctionalist, antipsychological, antiformalist, and absent artist objections to traditional aestheticism (12-22). These issues are addressed in subsequent chapters in which Iseminger explores major concepts: function, informal institution, artworld, aesthetic communication, and appreciation. So, for example, the idea that there is no special aesthetic state of mind (the antipsychological objection) is addressed via the concept of appreciation, which is not a genus that contains a putative and question-begging aesthetic species, but is ‘appreciation simpliciter’ (35); appreciation links (F’) to (V’), and — a nice point — it was already present in Dickie’s definition of a work of art.

The chapters on the concept of function and the nature of informal institutions form a solid foundation for the claim that the function of the artworld is aesthetic. Iseminger’s manner is nicely exemplified in the ironic conclusion to a discussion of latent versus artifactual functions: ‘I hesitate to choose sides here, but where we seek to explain the existence of institutions, I am inclined to invest somewhat more faith in speculations about the thoughts and plans of their designers than in an appeal to the presumed contributions of presumed organs to the stability of a presumed system’ (90). His manner is also evident in the very understated conclusion. Iseminger has made a strong case that, pace Duchamps and some inferences from his gestures, the function of the artworld remains what it was from its inception in the eighteenth century. However, he conjectures that that might change and art would then cease to be an aesthetic practice. That might please many, but not for long, because ‘in all likelihood’ this would be followed soon enough by the appearance of a new practice whose end ... was aesthetic, and there would be sufficient reason to regard the rise of such a practice as the revival of art’ (138). That is the politely defiant conclusion of a politely defiant book.
Here are some possible objections. One: Can aesthetic communication be pre-institutional and pre-practice? Iseminger’s paradigm case — ‘someone polishing and carving a stone into a smooth spheroid incised with curving lines’ (31) — strikes me as rather sophisticated, and a very unlikely act without a practice and its world. Two: Iseminger thinks, as I do, that jokes are no less aesthetic than that stone, but he probably didn’t use jokes as his example of aesthetic communication because there is a strong, perhaps overwhelming, pull toward formalism in aestheticism. Any sense that art is about something (mimesis) or is expressive (however that concept is understood) threatens the distinctive character of the arts; formalism does not, although it may thin it out. Three: (F") is in part empirical, but The Aesthetic Function of Art is thin on evidence. Iseminger says that the ‘the modern system of the arts’ and aesthetics, which are joined in Iseminger’s theory, were not associated in the eighteenth century. If true, that raises an eyebrow, but one wonders if research might not turn up some connections.

The Aesthetic Function of Art sketches a theory that tries to take us in a new direction by making an end-run around the functional-procedural conflict. This move might both open up new territory and at the same time regain some lost ground; and it leaves much work for others to do, both conceptually and empirically.

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Lesley A. Jacobs
Pursuing Equal Opportunities: The Theory and Practice of Egalitarian Justice.
Pp. xiii + 280.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82320-X);

In Pursuing Equal Opportunities: The Theory and Practice of Egalitarian Justice, Lesley Jacobs resurrects the equality of opportunity model of justice that has in recent times fallen out of favor with many liberal egalitarians. Traditional equality of opportunity models set out norms for regulating our social institutions and practices in accordance with procedural fairness and background fairness (especially since Rawls). However, these models have been widely criticized for endorsing a merely formal equality and/or for allowing contingencies such as talents and abilities too much influence on
how goods and resources get distributed. Jacobs makes a new and important contribution to the debate by adding a third conception of fairness — stakes fairness. Prize-fighting is an example of a fair competition: its regulations ensure that the match is fair, that the competitors have equal status (e.g., featherweights are not fighting heavyweights) and also that the prize is fairly distributed amongst the competitors (e.g., the winner does not take home all of the prize money) (38).

The three-dimensional model of equal opportunities Jacobs defends serves as a regulative ideal for competitive procedures in civil society that distribute scarce resources or goods (7). A strength of Jacobs' account is that it does not seek a single norm to regulate all competitions, but rather considers norms for specific social institutions, focusing on those that have been sites of injustice organized around race, class and gender. Regulative ideals that follow from his 3D model include civil rights and affirmative action to protect the status of minority groups (including ending the use of standardized tests for university admissions cutoffs) (Chapters 4, 5), mandatory workfare to protect the status of the unemployed (Chapter 6), affirmative action and pay equity in the labor market and reform of divorce law to protect the status of women (Chapters 8, 9). The 3D model does not apply to noncompetitive institutions such as health care (thus justifying universal access) (Chapter 7), nor does it apply to the family (commonly understood as an important site of injustice).

Jacobs delivers strong criticisms against egalitarian heavyweights such as Rawls, Dworkin, Roemer, Arneson and Van Parijs (Chapter 2). Contra Rawls, he makes a compelling case against his commonly accepted idea of natural inequalities (which leads him to the difference principle). Instead of considering traits and abilities such as strength, deafness and intelligence as natural advantages or disadvantages, Jacobs shows that these are social constructs that can (and should) be regulated by regulating the design of our institutions. Contra Roemer and Arneson who advance their own versions of equality of opportunity, he argues that individual responsibility and choice should not play a central role in our theories of justice. If Jacobs is right about this, we are able to side-step the notoriously difficult problem of distinguishing between choice and circumstance. His 3D model is meant to respond to criticisms of equality of opportunity without having to resort to concepts such as personal responsibility of which he is skeptical.

Jacobs' concept of stakes fairness may be his most important contribution, but it is also the most controversial and least persuasive. The idea of stakes fairness arises out of two concerns: the first is a concern about there being too much at stake in any given competition and the second is a concern about one competition having an effect on another competition (38). Many would agree with the second point: allowing winners of one competition advantages in others is unfair (e.g., financial success leading to better educational prospects), but the first point goes much further. Perhaps there is something disconcerting about competitions with extremely high stakes, especially when it is winner-take-all; and perhaps broadening the distribution of prizes
(as is done in prize-fighting) seems more fair or just; but it is one thing to say that stakes fairness is an important element of just institutions and practices and quite another to conceptually link it to equality of opportunity. Exactly how does it speak to the equality of our opportunities?

Jacobs does not show that the various regulations he argues for cannot be achieved without appealing to stakes fairness at all, but merely by appealing to another (better established) concept already central to his account — equal status. Ensuring that we have equal status (both moral and social) is certainly essential for equality of opportunity, though Jacobs specifically restricts it to being a measure of background fairness. This is why racial profiling is problematic — it treats one group as having lower standing. But if the concept of equal status itself is enough to achieve the same practical results, the advantage of Jacobs’ 3D model over other models diminishes. I will briefly explore this with respect to one regulation Jacobs supports — workfare.

Considering the various regulatory devices he supports such as affirmative action, pay equity, divorce law reform, his support of workfare may be the least controversial policy from the perspective of the general public (if current voting patterns are any indication) but it is certainly the most controversial from a liberal egalitarian perspective. Jacobs justifies workfare by focusing on the third dimension of his 3D model — stakes fairness. Workfare’s advantage over welfare is that it better addresses the stakes unfairness in the labour market since what is at stake is more than income. The unemployed also lose out on job-related assets such as wages, mental and physical health benefits, self-esteem, social networks, pension funds, etc. Remedies such as Van Parijs’ basic income are inadequate for addressing stakes unfairness since financial assistance may help level the playing field but distributing these other job assets can only be done by giving people jobs (164). The mandatory nature of workfare is a concern Jacobs anticipates but does not entirely alleviate. He claims that taking the ‘right to employment’ seriously prevents us from adopting it as a voluntary scheme. Voluntary schemes, as a matter of empirical fact, often become marginal or easily cut; but it is worth exploring less coercive alternatives to address this practical concern about implementation and efficiency (166). While appeal to stakes fairness certainly helps us understand the disadvantages facing the unemployed, it does not explain why someone who is willing to tradeoff job assets for no-strings-attached cash, should not have the opportunity to do so — for this person, should there not still be a safety net in place?

Pursuing Equal Opportunities makes a significant contribution to the egalitarian debate. But more than just advance an academic debate, Jacobs shows that his 3D model has relevance for current social and political debates. It does all of this in a thorough and philosophically engaging way.

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Laurence J. Jost and Roger A. Shiner, eds.
Eudaimonia and Well-Being:
Ancient and Modern Conceptions.
Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing &
Pp. xxxiii + 198.
Cdn$/US$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-78-3);

This book was also published as Volume 35 no. 4 of the journal Apeiron, and
is a compilation of revised papers from the University of Cincinnati’s 1996
conference on the topic of the title. It includes contributions from seven
ancient and three modern scholars, and an index locorum.

The central theme of this book is the relationship between the ancient
view of eudaimonia and the modern view of happiness. ‘Eudaimonia’ is
almost universally translated as ‘happiness’, even as the translators admit
the ill fit. Yet they maintain the practice for ease of translation. In his
introduction Jost cites Vlastos’ justification: ‘Well-being has no adjectival or
adverbial forms’, and well-being is ‘a stiff, bookish phrase’ (xxii). This makes
it difficult to find a better English word for an accurate clause-by-clause
translation, one that will capture the sentence structure as well as the sense
of the Greek. But if we must choose surely it is more important, at least for
philosophers, to have a translation that accurately captures the meaning
of a term rather than its grammatical flexibility.

In ‘Happiness Now and Then’, L.W. Sumner argues that we should
interpret eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to mean well-being,
not happiness. He is not arguing that ‘eudaimonia’ be translated as ‘well-be­
ing’, recognizing the above-mentioned difficulties, but that it is the best way
to understand Aristotle’s ethical project (37, n21). Sumner means by well-be­
ing ‘the prudential value of a life, namely how well it is going for the
individual whose life it is’ (37). Sumner stresses the subjectivity of this
concept, and argues that an adequate theory must retain this subjectivity to
capture our ordinary concept of well-being.

So what is wrong with reading eudaimonia as happiness? Sumner says
that even on the more plausible interpretation of Aristotle as holding that
virtue — aretê — is necessary though not sufficient for eudaimonia (external
goods also being necessary), Aristotle’s position is overly optimistic because
‘the vicious are therefore precluded by their very constitution from being
happy’ (23). Unfortunately this consequence is false, as vicious happy people
do exist. What we today mean by happiness is some sort of psychological
state, which makes it subjective. But Aristotle’s identification of eudaimonia
with aretê makes it thoroughly objective: ‘whether or not you are leading a
virtuous life is determined by certain features of your life ... and not by any
positive assessment you might make of it’ (25). Eudaimonia cannot, there­
fore, be what we mean by happiness.
Aristotle's theory of eudaimonia is the most prominent and influential form of an objective theory, excluding 'all reference to the subject's attitudes or concerns' (38). Being objective, Sumner believes it fails as an adequate theory of human well-being. But interpreting eudaimonia as well-being yields a theory that needs a lengthy philosophical argument to disprove, which Sumner says is preferable to interpreting it as happiness which makes the theory 'seem silly or absurd from the outset' (39).

Julia Annas' paper 'Should Virtue Make You Happy?' argues that examination of ancient eudaimonistic theories can enlarge and develop our modern understanding of happiness, and may not be as unavailable to us as some suppose (19). She notes Sumner's view that the modern understanding of happiness is subjective, and since ancient theories are objective they cannot be theories of what we understand as happiness. So it is 'the subjectivity of modern theories of happiness as desire-satisfaction that is the key to deep differences between ancient and modern' (16). We moderns locate happiness in the desiring part of ourselves, whereas the ancients located it in our reasoning part. But Annas offers an example to challenge this sharp distinction. A class of students was asked what would make them happy, and they named money, a big house, and other conventional trappings of success. Suppose a rich relative died and left them a big house, cars, lots of money, etc. Would they now be happy? Most students said, No, because it is not the mere possession of these goods that they valued, but rather having them as a result of having made the money themselves, and having lived a certain kind of life (18). So the mere satisfaction of desires is not sufficient to understand the modern view of happiness. More objective elements are involved as well, which our reflection can uncover. Annas does not claim that modern views of happiness have any obvious relation to virtue, the central notion in ancient theories. She merely suggests that eudaimonistic theories 'might appeal to aspects of our notion of happiness which have been overlooked in the general emphasis on the desire-satisfaction model' (19).

In 'Happiness and Death in Epicurean Ethics' Phillip Mitsis addresses the Epicurean view that 'death is nothing to us,' especially stressing that death does not detract from one's eudaimonia. He defends the counter-intuitive view that the life of a murdered child is no less happy than the life of an old person who has always fared well, because the child's premature death had disvalue only for those left behind, not for her, since she no longer exists as a subject of value/disvalue. Glenn Lesses defends Epicurus in a different way in 'Happiness, Completeness, and Indifference to Death in Epicurean Ethical Theory'. Examining Epicurus' distinction between kinetic and static pleasures, he argues that while a longer duration of kinetic pleasures may be more valuable, a longer duration of static pleasures may not — duration may not matter once you reach that state, so that your death would not be a harm to you.

In other papers, Stephen White addresses the development of Aristotelian eudaemonism from Theophrastus to Antiochus of Ascalon, with a critique from Brad Inwood. David Hahm traces the development of a subjectivist
ethical theory in Polybius that was heavily influenced by Academic skepticism, with a critique from Jost suggesting that Stoic influence was more likely. Thomas Hurka and David Sobel debate the interpretation and validity of the ‘Sen-Nussbaum capability theory’ (140), a contemporary objectivist theory stressing the equal capability of people to choose what they value, where they are truly free to choose and not constrained by lack of access to education, etc.

This book will interest mainly specialists in ancient eudaimonist theories, but will also enlighten contemporary philosophers on ancient themes that may prove helpful in formulating a satisfactory theory of happiness.

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Immanuel Kant

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, with Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason.
Trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield.
Pp. xlv + 223.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82824-4);

Anyone reading over two or three translations of the same work will quickly realize that a translation is never merely a translation. Each of them may be accurate, consistent and coherent, and yet each may leave the reader with a different impression of the original author’s intentions. Because this translation of the Prolegomena has been done with full awareness of, and reference to, earlier versions by competent scholars, it is interesting to watch a selective process in progress, attempting to provide the reader with the most valuable insights as each choice of expression is brought into play. Moreover, because this is a second edition of an earlier translation (1997), it is possible to observe revisions and insights intended to strengthen the work. These occur in the text itself, in the introductory essay, and in the bibliographical data provided to assist the reader’s efforts to master Kant’s thought beyond the confines of this individual work.

Because ‘the Prolegomena are to be taken as a plan, synopsis, and guide for the Critique of Pure Reason’ (xxii), the work has great significance for any attempt to properly evaluate the arguments of the latter work. This was necessary because even Kant himself recognized that the Critique was dry, obscure, opposed to all familiar concepts, and long-winded (xxi; Kant, 11).
Thus the *Prolegomena* provide a key to Kant’s most basic insights; and the translation provides (for the reader of English) an important access to this key. Yet the key must not be used as an end in itself; the *Critique* alone provides a complete and fully argued presentation of Kant’s distinctive position. Both Kant and Hatfield implore the reader to employ this introductory work only as a means to a deeper understanding within the *Critique* itself.

The work displays many efforts to facilitate that process. Hatfield was careful to refine the material in the Introduction for greater clarity. The translation itself is given additional polish, undoubtedly as a result of continuing suggestions from colleagues. In Section 8, we now find ‘magnitude’ substituted for ‘quantity’ (Grösse); and ‘significance’ substituted for ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung). In Section 59, ‘in’ becomes ‘with respect to’; ‘to’ becomes ‘for’; ‘by which’ becomes ‘whereby’ (dadurch). These are worth mentioning only to indicate the relatively minor nature of the improvements over the first edition. But because the translation will serve primarily students and scholars who are not yet ready to perform very careful analyses of particular phrases, these revisions would not be sufficient to warrant a new work.

What is more important, however, is the additional material from the *Critique of Pure Reason* (13 pp.), and two very interesting reviews of the *Critique* by Kant’s contemporaries (11 pp.). Because these supplementary materials had not been provided earlier, the work is now more suitable as a textbook, or as a tool for independent research for students who might be lost in the brief arguments of the *Prolegomena* — rather than lost in the baroque structure of the full *Critique*. Since Kant felt it necessary to make reference to the original (longer) arguments to provide the reader of the *Prolegomena* with details for clarification, as well as making comments about the reviews, it is useful to have these items readily available. Finally, there are several improvements in the way the Index is structured, and in the preparatory comments offered to the reader in the Introduction. These elements combine to make the new presentation a worthwhile addition to the works already available.

But there is one matter that might trouble the reader, and should at least be mentioned. Hatfield states that: ‘The primary aim of this Introduction ... is to provide a context within which readers can approach Kant’s texts for themselves’ (xi). But is this aim fulfilled? For example, is sufficient information provided by which a proper critical evaluation could be developed and sustained? Would it not be necessary to point out alternative perspectives that are in some respects similar and in others different? Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (within which knowledge that is absolutely certain is restricted to that which is gained through the senses) is recognized as a very important and distinctive revision with respect to previous philosophical insights. Hatfield discusses the position briefly (as he must in an Introduction) with emphasis on the pure forms of intuition (space and time) provided by the mind, and the essential role given to the unity of consciousness. With
respect to this latter notion, the important use of ‘apperception’ by Leibniz is mentioned (xxv), but the reader is left unaware of the various ways in which the unity of consciousness had played vital roles in both medieval and early modern philosophy. Similarly, the reader might be left with the illusion that ‘form’ contributed to our knowledge by the mind is an entirely new conception. Without going back to the roots of the doctrine of form in ancient philosophy, it might be mentioned that for medieval thinkers the position was commonplace that ‘formality’ (i.e., the very possibility of form) belongs to the mind. This involved the insight that no form is directly perceived in sensory data as apprehended. And in the early modern period there had already been the transition from form as a constituent of physical objects (i.e., the substantial form) to the recognition of form as a well-ordered mental determination (i.e., the idea or concept as the form of the mind). Moreover, the notion that absolutely certain knowledge is restricted to the realm of sensory awareness was clearly preceded by the medieval position (e.g., Aquinas) that we can have true understanding only of those things of which we have a sensory ‘image’ or species — the phantasm. How does Kant stand in relation to these matters? It would be asking too much to require an extended treatise on these issues in a mere introductory essay; but a reader should not be introduced to Kant without some sort of context that might facilitate proper evaluation of his insights. Aside from such carping comments, this work is well-done and should be well-received. It even eliminates some defective printing in the earlier edition.

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Alphonso Lingis

Trust.
Pp. xii + 207.

For anyone who is already familiar with the work of Alphonso Lingis the topic of his latest book should come as no surprise. Lingis’ previous works draw on his many travels to a variety of locations and into a variety of cultures, and his encounters and experiences along the way often serve as the basis of his description and analysis of such topics as community, emotion, death, sensation, and reason. This new work also draws on those travels and yet treats
them in a different way, for now they are not simply the fodder for research, but instead the bedrock phenomenon that underlies their ability of having taken place has become the focus of Lingis’ work.

Trust is the unifying theme that draws together Lingis’ varied topics. These topics are those to which he has turned time and again. Death, love, sexuality, otherness, religion all fall under his gaze. As such, the work is broader in scope than the title alone suggests.

While the work is ostensibly focused on trust, in fact trust is the paradigmatic example of the phenomena Lingis describes. Trust cuts through the sedimented layers of living in community with others. ‘How often,’ Lingis writes, ‘am I aware that others are only dealing with some role I occupy in society, some pantomime I am performing, some set of clothes and haircut I am wearing’ (viii). Our normal, mundane interaction with others is filtered through these sedimented layers of societal categories. Underneath these layers, behind the ‘rationalist, structuralist, or postmodern fables’ (viii), there lies something more fundamental, namely, myself. What trust uncovers is me. Trust is the paradigmatic example of a set of human interactions that cuts through to this level of my existence. When we trust someone, Lingis tells us, we trust neither their skillfulness nor their knowledge, rather we trust them. Thus, ‘to trust you is to go beyond what I know and to hold on to the real individual that is you’ (ix). To be erotically drawn to you is to be drawn to you and not to your status or wealth.

This theme of phenomena that cut through to the very heart of our existence recurs throughout the work. In his descriptions of virility, for instance, Lingis shows that what is vital to virility has little to do with status or social categories. The essence of virility is universal: ‘[t]he virility of a bus driver, a window washer, or a junior executive asserts itself in sexual arousal before a woman who denudes herself ... ’ (76). There is something truthful about virility — and trust, death, or religion — that shows us for who we are. One loses one’s virility in the adaptation of the social constructs in which one lives. To sink into the categories adopted by us and projected onto us is to undermine virility (79). What is at stake, then, in all of the interactions and phenomena described by Lingis is the openness that comes when these social layers are cast aside or plumbed.

If trust is merely the paradigmatic example of the sort of human interaction described throughout the book, why does it appear as the central focus of the work? Trust, it seems, is present in most, if not all, of the other phenomena described here. Love, lust, and courage require trust. ‘The act of trust is a leap into the unknown’ (65). This act lies underneath loving, lusting, or bravery.

The only discordant note sounded in the text is Lingis’ brief homage to Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. The passage comes at the end of his description of virility and after earlier references to revolutionaries. But for all of his wonder at the virility displayed by Che, Lingis does not even glance at the other side of Che’s record. There is, for example, no accounting for his involvement in the firing squads that followed the triumph of the Cuban
Revolution. How does this facet of Che's personality fit into his virility? Lingis provides us with no answer because he does not ask the question. Despite this brief note, the work as a whole does not suffer.

Trust is certainly of the same caliber of work that one has come to expect from Lingis, and reading and re-reading it uncovers new layers of description. Yet, for those not yet familiar with Lingis' work, this may not be the best introductory text. The novice would be better served by turning to one of Lingis' earlier works — perhaps The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common or The Imperative — before taking up this book. Still, for those who have enjoyed and learned from Lingis in the past, Trust is a welcome new exploration of being human.

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Dan Lloyd
Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness.
Pp. xvii + 357.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-12259-6);

Lloyd delves into the mind-body problem, describing several contrasting approaches to explaining cognition and consciousness, and offering his own theory of conscious experience. Along the way, he explains some techniques for analyzing data from brain scans, including fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) data. What is remarkable, and fun, is that he does all this by way of a detective novel, with a female philosophy graduate student as the cynical yet vulnerable central character. The setting is an academic one with scenes taking place in classrooms and faculty offices; the plot involves a missing professor. Philosophical and literary jokes abound. Also noteworthy about the presentation is Lloyd's incorporation into the story of virtual links to web-based material, both his own and that of others. (At this time of writing the URLs are still current.) Radiant Cool is divided into two parts; Part II consists in a more standard style of exposition of the main lines of argument presented in the novel. Space constraints conspire to turn this review into one mostly about Lloyd's philosophical claims rather than his art, although it is not entirely clear that separating them would suit Lloyd, philosophically speaking.

Lloyd's starting point is phenomenology — the study of experience from the 'inside'. The central character of the novel, Miranda Sharpe (whose dissertation title is 'The Thrill of Phenomenology'), tells us what phenome-
nology is and is not. In Chapter 9 we learn that it is not (the study of) 'self-consciousness'. It is not 'dwelling on or in a point of view'. It amounts to more than trying to imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Lloyd also cautions us against thinking that the phenomenological project is to ogle the varieties of experience (251); phenomenology is not mere observation of inner processes. Rather it involves the Husserlian (and Kantian) project of exploring the necessary conditions for experience. 'Careful phenomenology,' he says, 'reveals that the what it is like comprises many distinct facets, bound together in discernable structures' (228, my italics).

One upshot of the phenomenological analysis, for Lloyd, is that there is no consciousness (no conscious awareness, no conscious experience) without consciousness of the flow of time. Thus it is consciousness of the flow of time that must be mimicked by a material system in order to find an explanation of consciousness, and special analytic techniques that Lloyd describes make it appear that certain kinds of neural-net-like distributed processors can indeed mimic it. Data from brain scanning technology suggest that brains may work the way those artificial networks operate.

Finding material systems that mimic the relevant kind of temporal experience is no easy task. For Lloyd, consciousness of the flow of time involves consciousness of the past, but it is not merely representation of, or the encoding of information about, events that occurred in the objective past. Nor does it consist merely in the fact that events of the past modify our present state in any old way. 'The analysis of temporality shows ... that my present state of awareness contains the past and future in a sense very different from the causal dispositions discovered by science. I am not just the product of my past, but ... it lingers in my present awareness'. (264) Past experience always infuses present experience.

What kind of material system can mimic temporal experience? Systems that can do the work are certain kinds of parallel distributed processors — neural nets that contain units (nodes of the net) each connected to all the other units in the net and capable of activating them to varying degrees of intensity. More particularly, Lloyd thinks that recurrent networks (as opposed, e.g., to feed forward networks) can do the job. (Lloyd cites the work of J. Elman, 'Finding Structure in Time', Cognitive Science 14 (1990) 179-211 here.) Neural nets have a layer of units that receive inputs to the system, an output layer, and a layer of what are called 'hidden' units. Patterns of activation of the units change with new inputs. Recurrent networks are set up so that the hidden units have the job of copying a pattern of activation, and then feeding in that pattern as additional input during the subsequent round of activation in the input units. A second crucial element to the story Lloyd tells is the susceptibility of such networks to a kind of interpretive strategy that allows one to compare patterns of activation in the network that occur at different times.

The interpretive strategy is to use 'dimensional thinking' — multivariate analysis. Each unit in a network has a certain activation value at a time. The strategy is to treat each unit as a dimension of a space, and to treat each
activation value as a magnitude along this dimension. So 100 units together represent a space of 100 dimensions, and the activation values of the units are coordinates in the space. So an individual point in the space represents a whole pattern of activation at a time. Different points in this space represent different patterns of activation (i.e., perhaps, experiences had at different times). Points in this space that are closest to each other represent more similar experiences than those that are farther from each other, so the space allows comparison of experiences had at different times. Of course spaces of 100 dimensions are not possible for us (as viewers of an artificial neural net) to visualize, but, says Lloyd, such spaces can be reduced to three-dimensional spaces, as Lloyd’s character Porfiry Petrovich Marlov explains to the Miranda character. This is multi-dimensional scaling.

Lloyd gets into the novel as a character himself after multi-dimensional scaling is introduced, and the Miranda character asks the Lloyd character ‘Isn’t this a theory of consciousness?’ That is, is it an explanation of consciousness and not merely a theory of how consciousness might be implemented in a material system? The Lloyd character is cautious in his response, but he seems to think that it is. Whether it is depends in part on whether such a processor as he describes in fact mimics consciousness of the flow of time. Recurrent networks are promising since they input past patterns into the present: recall that consciousness of the flow of time for Lloyd means in part that present experiences are infused by past experiences. But consciousness of the flow of time is more than that.

The experiences of the past must also be represented as being in the past. My past experience of this cat now before me may infuse my present experience of it, but I also am able to distinguish the present experience from the past experience (as Lloyd recognizes and emphasizes, since it is needed to explain our perception of change and constancy in objects experienced). How does that work? Distance among points on a 3-D or 100 D space show similarities among experiences. The present pattern of activation in my brain may be similar to a recent past activation in my brain (and the corresponding points in activation space nearby each other), but which point in activation space is earlier and which one is later? (Time itself is not one of the dimensions of the space.) How could a ‘meta-net’ pick up this information? For Lloyd, time is represented as a trajectory through the space. It is a trajectory connecting the points that represent different patterns of activation, so a curve with a direction. But there are lots of curves that can be drawn through such a space. In Part II of the book Lloyd discusses experimental set ups that would discriminate between the hypothesis that a recurrent neural net processor is, or is not, using temporal information and ordering events in time to solve various problems. So the upshot is that things look promising, but more work needs to be done.

I want to turn briefly to the evaluation of one of Lloyd’s central phenomenologically derived claims about consciousness, viz., that past experience does always infuse present awareness. The argument for it goes something like this. (1) There is no experience or awareness of an object without what
Lloyd calls 'superposition' (which he distinguishes from superposition in the quantum mechanical sense), and (2) there is no superposition without experienced events being ordered in (subjective) time; so (3) we cannot have awareness at any given moment without consciousness of the past.

Early on in the novel we are told that 'superposition' is a pervasive feature of consciousness. Experienced things, such as a squiggle on a chalkboard, include superposed meanings — one cannot be aware of the squiggle without being aware of what it looks like, what it could be used for, how it could affect one. Such affordances of things and situations are different at different times and for different people. A different set of affordances means a different experience, even if the two experiences are 'of' the same chalk squiggle. Miranda Sharpe remarks that outside of the context of a story a 'piece of string or a crumpled shirt is just something in the way, but in a movie they are clues, everything has a second meaning'. The thought is that our conscious lives are like movies. A more careful statement would be: if our conscious lives are like movies, this would explain the supposed fact that every experience is infused with meaning and if they are like movies, our conscious lives are ordered in time.

Notice that if experience of the squiggle or a cat or a cup just means detecting the squiggle or the cat or the cup then of course it is possible to have the same experience at different times. But if experience of the squiggle instead means conscious experience (the sort of thing that phenomenology examines), then, for Lloyd, it will not be possible for a person to experience the same squiggle the same way at different times. Lloyd in fact thinks that though mechanisms in the brain for detecting objects in the world are fine as far as they go, what he calls the 'detector head' model holds no promise as a basis for a theory of consciousness. He wants to prise apart the theory of cognition and the theory of consciousness.

The detector head model of experience is one way of conceiving how it could be false that experience of an object always includes superposed meanings, and thus false that we cannot have any awareness at any given moment without consciousness of the past. Another way of seeing that this could be false is to notice that affordances are associated with objects experienced, even if they have existence only as intentional objects. Some will want to resist the assumption Lloyd is making that all awareness is awareness of some object. If there is awareness without an intentional object, there will be no argument for the claim that awareness at any given moment involves, at the same time, consciousness of the past or of the flow of time. To put the point another way, Lloyd argues that phenomenology shows that in conscious life we distinguish between the subjective and the objective from within the subjective point of view, and he argues that to make this distinction we must be able to assess the constancy or change in an object, and so must compare experiences, and so must be conscious of the flow of time. But it is not obvious, not to me anyway, that we are always in the business of distinguishing between the subjective and the objective in conscious life. Perhaps direct introspective observation can show, on the contrary, that
there is such a thing as present awareness without consciousness of the past. I guess it depends on whom you ask.

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Basil Mitchell and J.R. Lucas
*An Engagement with Plato's Republic.*
Pp. xi + 177.
US$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-3365-9);

Basil Mitchell and J.R. Lucas have achieved distinction as philosophers in areas other than ancient philosophy. Their new book, *An Engagement with Plato's Republic,* is an engaging companion to Plato's *Republic,* if not always an easy one. The book starts with three chapters which provide clear explanations of a number of staple items in any discussion of Plato's philosophy, such as the analogy of soul and city (this, Mitchell and Lucas show, is an explanatory analogy rather than a rigorous argument), and the tripartite division of the soul (best understood as a theory of the different aspects of personality and the related idea that the moral personality is the well-integrated personality).

The next nine chapters each take a different theme from Plato's philosophy. Chapters Four, Five and Seven explain Plato's views on knowledge and opinion and the notoriously difficult Theory of Forms. Mitchell and Lucas trace the development of the latter from a theory of adjectives to a theory of nouns, which development was due, among other things, to the tendency of Greek to nominalize adjectives.

There is a great deal of Greek in this book, and this brief point on καλλος (beauty) and καλος (the beautiful) is just one quite simple instance of an interesting but to the Greekless reader not always helpful attention to grammar. In a book of this kind chunks of Plato's Greek mid-sentence hamper reading and should be confined to endnotes.

R.M. Hare contributed to the famous Oxford tradition of launching lucid dichotomies by saying that different commentators on Plato, often give the impression of talking about two wholly different philosophers, Pato and Lato. Briefly, one is a mystic, the other a logician. To their great credit Mitchell and Lucas argue with both Pato and Lato. Plato, in his Lato guise, thought that knowledge of an object (a Form) equalled propositional knowledge since he conflated knowledge of objects with knowledge of truths 'connaitre' with 'savoir'. The regress of the Third Man argument is explained by showing that
Plato ran together sharing and resembling, two men share in the concept of humanity but there is not for that reason a third man they both resemble. These familiar points of logic are expounded here in a way forcing one to think the arguments through for oneself.

However, logic is not all there is to thinking. Mitchell and Lucas, through showing that he did bring out the fact that for cogency Lato the logician turns to Pato the dramatist to make his point for him.

Mitchell and Lucas, then, have taken seriously philosophy's task of painting a convincing picture as opposed to merely putting together an edifice of arguments. Therefore though being analytic philosophers, they are not only that. Or rather, they are analytic philosophers with a flair for drama and rhetoric.

There is a good deal of rhetoric in An Engagement with Plato's Republic. This holds good for their argument that no psychology can do without metaphor as well as for their claim that education implies inducting the pupil to objective truths which requires holding on to some objective standards. It is equally true of Plato's philosophy of mathematics. Mathematics cannot be fully axiomatized, for each consistent system there are always truths that can be seen but not proved. It is true here, though elsewhere it often is not, that seeing is believing.

The purportedly most provocative chapter of the book, which deals with feminism to a great extent relies on drama. Plato's ideas on the family are obviously rather 1984-ish. Plato's at first sight laudable feminism comes at a great price. There are to be no exclusive romantic love bonds, nor families. Mitchell and Lucas's account of Plato's feminism can be read as a poignant reductio ad absurdum of his utopian project. As such it is very effective, especially since Mitchell and Lucas are remarkably even-handed in their account. It is not clear however, why this chapter should be thought provocative. Are there any Platonic feminists about in England?

Some of the most engaging chapters in the book are on Plato's anti-democratic views and on his indictment of the poets. Plato's political views are unacceptable today, to the extent that he does not see the value of autonomy. His account of shared ethics and his concept of the rational debate about what we are to do on the other hand, can be seen as the basis of what we call democracy.

Plato's notoriously puzzling ideas about poets are discussed even-handedly. Plato for all his dramatic talent, and wise tutor's counsel about untrustworthy actors is unable to see what Aristotle did see, namely that art may lead one to see not what is accidentally there, but what sort of things there are. Mitchell and Lucas argue that Plato must have been irrecoverably stylish, since the Republic is itself a work of art. Their book about the Republic equally is one of the more engaging works of art-history.

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Most people can remember from their student days an instructor whom they might well have nicknamed ‘Professor Handout’, on account of a tendency to distribute copious explanatory sheets in his or her class. Sometimes such instructors will bind a long sequence of handouts together, to be sold to students in a campus bookstore. Such a book of handouts, if well-done, can serve as an appealing and effective guide to a subject that might be complex or remote otherwise; handouts tend to break up information into sensible chunks of manageable length, to anticipate and correct characteristic confusions, and thereby to make comprehension and retention easier for the beginner.

I have often wondered why books of this style — built from dozens of 500-word essays of compact, clear discussion of some portion of a complex, systematic topic — are not cleaned up and published with greater frequency than in fact they are. In *Aquinas*, Ralph McInerny provides an introduction to the thought of St. Thomas on exactly this model — its 160 pages contain 56 ‘chapters’, which are really 56 mini-essays on the biography (1-10, Part I), the philosophy (11-51, Part II), and the institutional school (52-6, Part III) of Thomas Aquinas. The center chapters are well-arranged, and this is no easy task, since it is notorious that one never knows where to begin to exposit a systematic thinker; one place seems as good as another. In general, the native subject matter is quite suited to the style and conception of the book: the introduction to Aquinas that results from this structure is generally clear, self-contained, and surprisingly comprehensive, given its brevity. McInerny is good at expositing Thomas as an original thinker and as a commentator on philosophy, with the result that he connects Thomas’ theological and philosophical projects in a realistic way. This balance of theological and philosophical material can be a difficult mark to hit in expositing mediaeval thinkers.

The chief fault of this text is that not enough care has been give to the ‘cleaning up’ part before publication. Problems ranging from occasional lapses in clarity, to moderately serious typesetting errors, have crept into the finished product. This is a shame, since there is no need for such a result on a well-conceived book; good editing would take care of these problems. Still they are more than simply distracting. Given the likely neophyte audience for such a text, they make a difference in its overall effectiveness.

To take one example, the prose is laced with un-translated Latin. This is not necessarily a problem when confined to Latin phrases that are used with some frequency — *ceteris paribus*, or maybe even *vive voce* — but ‘*Oportet addiscenlem credere*’, for example, is not among the stock Latin expressions
of modern English (51). A portion of such phrases are used and defined by McInerny, or are given parenthetically as technical terms; again, a fine practice, which should draw no censure. But there is no reason why the Oportet addiscetem credere's of this book — and there are a surprising number of them — should not have been removed, translated, footnoted or defined during the editing of the book as a whole.

One final difficult point deserves note. The short section on Thomism as a school of thought does not lend itself to the short essay style. Here McInerny moves from expositing philosophy to describing and explaining historical trends, and the brevity of the format leaves some worrying mischaracterizations hanging in the air. For example, by framing part of the contemporary critical reaction to Thomas as, in part, a battle between Dominicans and Franciscans, he claims that the mission of both Scotus and Ockham was to 'overthrow Thomism in both philosophy and theology', a seriously misleading characterization of these two important thinkers (143).

In these ways the text falls short of its potential, which is a shame, since the concept is quite nice. If a second edition is planned, it is to be hoped that the rough edges will be smoothed out; if this were done the text would make an excellent companion in a college course devoted to Aquinas, or where Aquinas is one of a very small number of major figures discussed. Similarly, such corrections would make the text usable for the general public, and would help to bring forward an important philosophical figure, unfortunately underrepresented in popular learned discourse.

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Martha Nussbaum
Hiding from Humanity:
Shame Disgust and the Law.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Pp. xv + 413.

This book is a discussion of the proper role of the disgust and shame in legal analysis and decision making. Although Nussbaum supports a central role for emotions such as compassion in deliberations about justice, she sees both disgust and shame as having a particularly problematic relation to justice.

Nussbaum positions herself primarily in opposition to Dan Kahan, who has argued that both disgust and shame have a legitimate place in legal
culture. In 1997 William Ian Miller published a nuanced, sophisticated and innovatively researched book entitled *Anatomy of Disgust* (Harvard UP). This book sparked considerable discussion of disgust in the legal academy. Kahan, in his 1999 review of *Anatomy of Disgust* (in Susan Bandes, ed., *The Passions of Law* [New York UP]), claimed that disgust at criminal conduct has a vital role in expressing society's disapprobation of the criminal's violation of others; our collective moral judgments can be shared and expressed effectively through disgust. Nussbaum rejects Kahan's contention, arguing that disgust is presumptively suspect. Disgust, in Nussbaum's view, is the emotion through which we reject our own animality and project it onto others. Thus, Nussbaum sees disgust as an emotion particularly susceptible to encouraging stigmatization of others. Disgust too often casts others — and groups of others — as less than human.

Nussbaum considers the question of whether a violent offender's disgust toward his victim should ever justify violence. Not surprisingly, Nussbaum thinks it should not. More specifically, she considers the question of whether the disgust a homophobic man feels toward a gay man's advance should ever count as a mitigating factor reducing murder to manslaughter. While Nussbaum does not offer good evidence that such a defense presently exist under the law, she expends considerable effort convincing us that it should not.

Nussbaum does not have much to say about *The Anatomy of Disgust* itself. She dismisses Miller as having a thin normative agenda (86). At the same time, however, she claims that Miller 'argues that the more things a society recognizes as disgusting, the more advanced it is in civilization' (115). This is a reductionist reading of Miller's ideas about the relation between democracy and disgust, to say the least. Following Miller, however, Nussbaum stresses the relationship between misogyny and disgust (111).

Nussbaum takes up Lord Patrick Devlin's book *The Enforcement of Morals* (Oxford UP 1965), in which he defended the moral and legal significance of disgust. Predictably, Nussbaum rejects Devlin's view that society's right to self-preservation justifies legislatures in criminalizing whatever the average person views as immoral even though the conduct does no harm. Unfortunately, however, Nussbaum neither discusses nor even cites H.L.A. Hart's famous and definitive refutation of Devlin's arguments, *Law, Liberty, and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). Nussbaum's arguments against Devlin seem lackluster and approximate when compared to the precision and wit of Hart's. For example, Hart wrote: 'No reputable historian has maintained this thesis, and there is much evidence against it. As a proposition of fact it is entitled to no more respect than the Emperor Justinian's statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes' (51). And later: 'No doubt it is true that if deviations from conventional sexual morality are tolerated by the law and come to be known, the conventional morality might change in a permissive direction ... We should compare such a development not to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society but with its advance' (52). Forty years later, Nussbaum gives us
this: ‘Here we feel we have arrived at the heart of what is troubling, for the liberal, in a policy like Devlin’s, which willingly turns conventional morality into law even when the conduct in question causes no harm. Such intrusions of law into the “self-regarding” conduct of others deprive people of what they have a “just claim” to have, namely, a space within which to develop and unfold their own plans of life’ (335). Nussbaum is not giving us much here to lead us to believe we’ve come a long way since 1963.

Nussbaum opposes censorship of pornography and views obscenity law as wrongly giving play to disgust. Nussbaum seeks to bolster sexuality in the public esteem by arguing that sexually explicit material is, from a more enlightened viewpoint, actually a healthy reclaiming of our bodily existence. D.H. Lawrence and James Joyce are Nussbaum’s core cases of great literary figures whose explicitness about bodily functions led them to be rejected by their contemporaries as obscene. Nussbaum deplores this condemnation of their work and celebrates both authors as extremely progressive in their frank embrace of the human animal body.

Nussbaum then goes on to discuss Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon’s position on pornography. Nussbaum squares her defense of MacKinnon and Dworkin with her own pro-pornography stance by way of a strained interpretation of Dworkin and MacKinnon’s anti-pornography position. Nussbaum writes: ‘it must be stressed again and again (because this fact has been much misunderstood) that MacKinnon and Dworkin do not support censorship. What they do support is an ordinance that gives individual women a civil cause of action for damages if they can show that they have been harmed by men in a way that crucially involves pornography’ (140). This claim will be unconvincing to anyone who is familiar with MacKinnon’s active participation in LEAF’s (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund) intervention in *R v Butler* [1992] 1 SCR 452, successfully arguing to the Supreme Court of Canada that the constitutionality of Canadian criminalization of obscenity should be upheld.

Nussbaum also offers a perplexing reading of Andrea Dworkin’s law suit against *Hustler* magazine. The magazine had published a number of sexually explicit and anti-Semitic cartoons ridiculing Andrea Dworkin (142). Nussbaum takes umbrage at the judge having expressed her condemnation of the material by calling the attacks on Dworkin ‘disgusting and distasteful’ (143). She writes: ‘*Hustler* is disgusting, in short, because it shows obese people copulating, inviting our disgust at their obesity ... The whole idea of the feature is to humiliate feminists and feminism by implying that Andrea Dworkin’s mother’s body (and no doubt, by extension, Dworkin’s own body) is disgusting. When the judge says “disgusting,” then, she is at least in part colluding in the magazine’s project.’ The sentiment expressed by Nussbaum is odd and certainly reads as a backhanded defense of Dworkin. She doesn’t want the judge confirming the view that depictions of obese people copulating are disgusting — even though she does want the judge to recognize that *these* depictions of obese people copulating were humiliating to Dworkin. Though
we can see what Nussbaum is trying to get at here, her aspiration to separate out humiliation, ridicule and disgust here seems artificial indeed.

In her discussion of shame, Nussbaum also takes aim at Dan Kahan's defense of shaming penalties. Kahan defends penalties like forcing those convicted of impaired driving to have a special license plate on their car indicating the conviction, publishing the names of clients of prostitutes in the newspaper, or making child molesters wear T-shirts proclaiming their crime. Kahan argues that these penalties can revitalize our sense of shared moral values. In forging her opposition to Kahan, Nussbaum draws heavily on Dan Markel’s article, ‘Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate’, Vanderbilt Law Review 54 (2001) 2157-242.

Nussbaum concludes with a defense of John Stuart Mill’s defense of liberty. Nussbaum objects, however, to the utilitarian strands in Mill’s work. In Nussbaum’s view Mill’s valuation of liberty hinged too much on the ways in which liberty could be conducive to human excellence (331). Nussbaum prefers to place intrinsic value on liberty and to relate it most closely to respect for human dignity.

In short, the book is a disappointment. It does not meet the standard of Nussbaum’s earlier work. The book reads as a largely predictable defense of a set of standard leftist liberal academic views. She spills much ink arguing for such propositions as: disgust doesn’t justify violence; it is OK to shame multinational corporations for exploiting the south; it is not OK to make the homeless feel ashamed of their poverty; its not OK to make gays and lesbians feel ashamed of their sexuality or to prohibit them from marrying; and we should never allow ourselves to give way to the kind of xenophobic disgust that allows us to view the other as less than human. Hiding from Humanity doesn’t offer much novelty by way of defense of these foregone conclusions.

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Pp. iv + 144.


Catherine Osborne’s introduction to Presocratic philosophy is unusual for a work of its genre, in that it eschews the conventional organization of the subject matter. A new addition to the Oxford series of ‘stimulating ways in to new subjects’, Osborne’s work is no platitudinous survey of the received wisdom on the subject. Rather, it challenges that very wisdom. She argues that the usual presentation of the field of Presocratic philosophy as a search for first principles is an artefact of scholars seeking to bring the Presocratics into line with modern views about the nature of philosophy. Moreover, she contends, the usual organization misleadingly presents Presocratic thought as a dialectical progression of thinkers responding to one another. In truth, we generally don’t know either their respective chronologies or whether they knew of each others’ ideas. Her solution is not merely to alert the reader to the potential pitfalls of the standard organization of Presocratic philosophy, but to abandon it entirely.

It seems fair, then, to ask whether the book offers a better organization or a more accurate picture of the field. The book is short, addressed to a broader audience, and offers only to ‘do philosophy the fun way, diving in where the evidence is rich’ (iii). Nonetheless, it contains a serious challenge: not only is the received wisdom less entertaining, but it is outright misleading. So, while her book claims only to ‘potter about among the pockets of philosophical progress’ (iv), it must surely be assessed as proposing, at least implicitly, an alternative. The work has many virtues as an introduction to the field, and it would be a pity if these were overlooked on account of her controversial attack on the received wisdom. The book succeeds in capturing a rich and intriguing snapshot of ideas, and it provides interesting reading for the general reader seeking a lively glimpse at the thought of some individual Presocratics. But, on the criteria by which she criticizes it, Osborne’s approach is no improvement over the usual organization of the subject matter.

The work opens in an engaging story-telling mode, and takes the reader through the recent recovery of a papyrus of Empedocles. It uses this story as a vehicle to introduce the reader to problems of reconstruction and interpretation, and to discuss the state of our evidence for the Presocratic philosophers. This is great stuff. Still, a novice, perhaps a little lost in the interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmology, might want to have more context here to understand the thought that, say, ‘friendliness’ and strife are ‘items’ (13) — somewhere between feelings or tendencies and gods — that somehow organize the world. And it is no improvement over the ‘first principles story'
to be told that Empedocles' elements 'permanently occupy their own position on the ceaseless pendulum of time' (14).

The received view that the Presocratics are theorizing about the first principles underlying everything not only provides an organizing thread, but also suggests why certain answers are offered. To be sure, it is a reconstruction. But in rejecting this story, Osborne forfeits the explanatory mileage it offers. For example, Osborne presents the views of Anaxagoras and Democritus as attempts to account for a distinction between appearance and reality (72), and not as attempts to show how change can occur without something coming from nothing. But this does not help us understand the motivation for their 'interest in things very small' (68). Although her scepticism is well taken, we are given little reason to think it would be possible — or helpful — to eschew a dialectical presentation of Presocratic philosophy altogether. Osborne does not do so: her introduction notes a progression of questions in Presocratic philosophy, from questions about what there is, to the nature of being itself, to the status of our knowledge. Simply shaking up the order of discussion of the most important figures hardly seems like a solution to the uncertainty about chronology.

Osborne is certainly right that the organization of the Presocratics around a single question is not the whole story and could lead to distortions: but is current work on the Presocratics really so distorted? Do scholars regularly 'sideline' Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Empedocles and Heraclitus, as she suggests (36)? Is the implication that Milesian cosmological theories, or the ideas of Democritus on morality, are typically missed by scholars (37)? Osborne herself tells us little about either, or about the allegedly 'suppressed' second part of Parmenides' poem. One can hardly harp on omissions from such a short work, but this presentation is no less selective: Osborne's criticism of the 'first principles story' unfortunately edges out discussion of the Milesians, to the extent that substantive references to the views of Anaximander and Anaximenes are found only in tabular form in the course of her critique. She is right to caution that the 'first principles story' could overemphasize some topics, and does less than justice to the discussions of unity and plurality in Empedocles and Heraclitus; but this is insufficient reason to abandon it altogether.

Still, such carping is only justified to the extent that Osborne herself throws down the gauntlet. The book is lively and accessible, and nonetheless gives the reader a sense of the scholarly questions and difficulties in studying Presocratic thought. The writing is fresh, and takes its reader seriously: newcomers to the field will doubtless be inspired and intrigued by this accessible and affordable little book. The project of making any sort of sense of figures like Empedocles or Parmenides for a new audience is just difficult, and Osborne tackles it in an open spirit. Many of the individual chapters, such as those on Xenophanes or the Sophists, work admirably. There are many helpful inclusions, such as the timelines, map, bibliography, and a guide to English pronunciation. It is encouraging that a short work aimed at a general audience can both address the contributions of recent scholarship
and attempt an original approach. I don't think this organization of the Presocratics improves on the usual approach; but the series' explicit aim is to be stimulating, and at this, the book rather succeeds.

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Robert B. Pippin and Otfrid Hoffe, eds.
Hegel on Ethics and Politics.
Trans. Nicholas Walker.

This volume provides anglophone scholars with several important German works on Hegel's ethical and philosophical writings. Besides Pippin's introductory essay, there are eleven chapters taken from material written between 1963 and 1997. Roughly proceeding in line with the structure of the Philosophy of Right [PR], the essays fall into four thematic sections: an overview of methodological issues arising from Hegel's mode of analysis and presentation, a section on absolute right, a section on ethical life, and a section on the state.

Opening the section on methodology, Hans Fulda confronts an important question: What are the rights and obligations of philosophers who must conduct themselves both as teachers and as critics of actually existing ethical life? Fulda explicates philosophy's practical role as a social institution whose purpose is to recognize that which is rational and just in society, and to criticize that which is not. Philosophers aiming 'to secure the conditions in which morality can realize itself appropriately within the domain of ethical life' (31) by participating in the inculcation of virtue are not mere pedagogues, however, since an education to virtue necessarily leads to a critical apprehension of actuality — 'the moment of critique is already involved in the teachable form of philosophy itself' (34). Fulda suggests that Hegel's philosophical outlook does not preclude truly dangerous, even destructive results, although 'philosophy could never participate in the destruction of the existing substance of political life unless it were conscious of thereby assisting the reestablishment of that substance' (44). Karl-Otto Apel aims to 'articulate the normative foundations of ethics' by establishing a meaning critical transcendental philosophy wherein we recognize the necessary normative conditions of the possibility for intersubjectively valid knowledge a priori.
while acknowledging (in a truly pragmatic fashion) the in-principle revisability of a priori judgments (49, 51, 52). To reconsider Kant after Hegel, Apel suggests, is to see the need for a nuanced rejection of Kant’s epistemological dualism rather than a speculative metaphysics. Moreover, in the condition of the possibility of valid argumentation itself, Apel finds ‘a fundamental principle of ethics that must be universally acknowledged’ (70). Fulda and Apel both present substantive arguments whose methodological focus expands rather than hinders the scope of their conclusions.

In the opening essay of the second section, Michael Quante’s close analysis of §§ 34-40 of the PR elucidates Hegel’s attempt to ‘explicate philosophically the single foundation of all justified rights and demands by reference to the concept of personality’ (81). In the categorical progression of that concept, Quante discerns something very like Apel’s fundamental ethical principle. But Quante argues that the sublation of traditional legal distinctions that Kant refused to abandon — particularly ‘the right of persons’ as separate from ‘the right of things’ — provides a more systematic and coherent foundation for legal and political philosophy. Joachim Ritter also emphasizes the importance of Hegel’s concept of property and the role of human action as the impetus for the various concrete instantiations of property, including especially the transformation of nature simpliciter into ‘formed nature’. Unlike Quante’s relatively neutral categorical analysis, however, Ritter’s overtly ‘progressive’ interpretation of the PR finds in civil society ‘the ultimate liberation of man from nature’ (144). Yet Manfred Baum is not so optimistic. He notes the mediating role of Hegel’s concept of the will as a putative means to integrate the two previously disparate views of the state: the Platonic/Aristotelian position, which holds that the state is to ensure the common welfare by upholding the good life, and the Kantian/Rousseauian position whereby the universal will of the state’s citizens is to regulate the state itself. Baum takes Hegel to task for his ‘rather weak response’ to the problem of how practical freedom might be ‘detached ... from the domain of natural necessity’ and finds problems with Hegel’s appeal to the ‘speculative unity’ of the universal and particular will such that civil society simply cannot be the realm of future individual freedom that Ritter claims (131). Wolfgang Schild’s essay on Hegel’s concept of punishment — the last in the second section — is a very clear argument that establishes the contemporary relevance, indeed in many respects the superiority of Hegel’s account of crime and ethical responses to it.

The two essays of the third section examine the concept of ethical life. Siegfried Blasche identifies the institutions of the family and the state as ‘paradigmatic examples of praxis’ (185) that presuppose the existence of civil society. He points out, however, that Hegel largely overlooks how social conditions shape the familial institution: the effects of civil society are more pronounced than Hegel’s concept of the family can properly accommodate. Rolf-Peter Horstmann finds a similar problem in the relationship of civil society to the state, and suggests that ‘progressive’ interpretations of the PR gloss over the ‘fundamental aporia’ that forced Hegel to represent his political
philosophy in terms of the structure and development of consciousness. Horstmann insists that we neither accede to the interpretive claim that the concept of civil society is the foundation of Hegel’s political theory nor ignore the fact that Hegel’s struggle to express the proper role of civil society (and other particular forms of ethical life) exhibit a consistent development of the principle of singularity so that ultimately Hegel was able to describe absolute ethical life as something that reconciles the ethical totality with its individualistic modern moments. In sum, Horstmann argues that one cannot acknowledge that position with a progressive or liberal interpretation of Hegel.

The three essays of the final section, focused on the concept of the state, all consider Hegel’s methodological commitments in order to clarify his substantive conclusions. Dieter Heinrich highlights Hegel’s historical analysis and his essential orientation to ‘the history of constitutions and ... organized forms of social life in general’ (241). The importance of the syllogism is paramount as a reflection of the influence of Plato and Schelling. In presenting this ‘syn-logic’ system of mediations, Heinrich draws attention to the whole of Hegel’s writings as the background to the PR: ‘the authentic conceptual form of Hegel’s theory of ethical life and the ethical state cannot simply be read off from the kind of interpretation and exhibition presented in the published text of the Philosophy of Right’ (266). Ludwig Seip concurs insofar as he claims that ‘the “restorationist” tone of the published Philosophy of Right is a largely superficial feature of that text’ (269). At the same time, however, Seip suggests that Hegel’s failure to specify limits on the state’s ability to violate individual rights in exceptional circumstances exhibits the PR’s ‘principal deficiency’ as well as the limits of Hegel’s allegedly ‘liberal’ outlook. Michael Wolff, on the other hand, advocates the benefits of Hegel’s ‘organicism’ — understood, as with Heinrich, in syllogistic form — as an appropriate and enlightening way to bring forth the essence of political constitutions and the role of the monarch in particular. ‘Hegel’s construction of the third power as princely power is certainly ingenious,’ Wolff observes, ‘... but it still represents the weakest part of his overall interpretation of constitutional law and the state’ (312). Nonetheless, Wolff too finds in Hegel a worthy correction and expansion of Kant’s notion of organism.

There is little to criticize in this collection of essays. They are all clear, forcefully argued, and astute critical appropriations of Hegel’s political/ethical philosophy and especially the PR. Though they cover ground that has perhaps been left behind in German scholarship, anglophone scholars encountering them for the first time will find them to be worthy of very serious consideration. One can envision this text being used alongside the PR itself in a course on Hegel. The clarity of the argumentation is enhanced rather than diminished by the wide scope of considerations, and senior undergraduates or graduate students encountering Hegel’s work for the first time would benefit greatly from exposure to these German commentators.

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Göran Rossholm's sweeping survey of the techniques of interpretation and the relation between interpretation, iconicity and fictionality is a systematic exploration of that most elusive of cognitive acts: making meaning from symbols.

Rossholm opens his work with a study of interpretation. It discusses allusions, exemplification, and referential interpretation in great detail, and reveals how works of art — and their interpreters — make meaning out of often-conflicting set of symbols. Discussing 'intentionality', Rossholm's discerns four main levels: reflexive, non-reflexive, intentions whose realizations can be confirmed by interpretation but not realized, and intentions that are seized upon by interpretations but are neither realized nor confirmed. Interpretations that also realize the author's intentions are intentional interpretations, but putative interpretations may also be fruitful because they lead to detailed interpretations. With respect to art, a 'qualified interpretation' is one that goes beyond indisputable fact, which is difficult to validate definitely, and which may have rival interpretations. A rational interpreter cannot simultaneously interpret one object in two ways such that he claims both interpretations are true and that the two contradict each other. Rossholm argues that intention to communicate is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be a work of art, literature or fiction.

In the second part, Rossholm moves on to questions of iconicity. He identifies compositionality — the feature of a picture where any part of the symbol represents some part of the symbolized — and indirect reference as central to the act of reading representations in visual material. Most visual representations have a triangular referential structure consisting of indirect lateral reference and direct denotation. Triangularity and compositionality are integral to iconic representation. Moving on to indirect lateral reference Rossholm focuses on various forms of verbal iconic representation. The quotation, as theorized by Nelson Goodman and Donald Davidson, is a common mode of iconic representation where a quotation refers to what it quotes by being a replica of it, and where replicas are inscriptions of the characters belonging to a notational scheme (interestingly, Rossholm discusses 'allusion' in the section on fiction rather than in the section on iconicity). In indirect and free indirect discourse, Rossholm concludes after an exhaustive analysis, an 'iconic relation holds between the text and a verbal expression-vehicle, suggested by the text' (222). In the case of mental events, when they are described in a text by indirect or free indirect discourse, we proceed as with reports of speech: we construct expression-vehicles that are suggested and iconically represented by the text. Moving on to a discussion
of levels of perspective in a narrative, Rossholm first summarizes the approaches of Seymour Chatman and Gerard Genette. Rossholm argues that the degrees of points of view can be readily described in terms of iconicity. He presents a scale of iconicity: (i) indirect reference which may be more or less specific, (ii) compositionality, which may be more or less fine-grained, (iii) the absence or presence of non-iconic parts in the symbol. The most iconic class of discourses, concludes Rossholm via Brian McHale, are those that omit punctuation marks.

The last, and best, part of the book deals with fiction. Rossholm, begins with the two more influential theories of literary fictionality: ‘possible worlds’ and ‘make-believe’. Rossholm argues that to see the act of reading fiction as mere ‘imagining’ is inadequate. Instead, we need to define the fiction reader’s attitude in cognitive terms, especially ‘information’. We take the symbol as informing us that something is so and so. We can be informed by a documentary film, and by a fictional one. The shift from truth to information accounts for an important feature of fictional narratives. As Rossholm puts it: ‘the novelty of genuine information has its counterpart in the fiction reader’s experience of recognizing what is described as something previously unknown’ (321). Rossholm discusses three central issues here: content, the fictional work and reception. ‘Content’ is the result of a certain process: (i) the reader recognizes the denotative labels, as encompassing as possible, exemplified by the ‘text’ (film, theatre, words on the page), (ii) the reader turns the labels into sentences — which is the content. Rossholm prefers the phrase ‘read-as-true’ over ‘truth-in-fiction’ and fictional worlds. Rossholm suggests that to say that our choice of implicit propositions while reading a text is often chosen from certain relevant contexts, a ‘fictional supplementation’. All supplementation is allusive because the text refers indirectly to some other discourse actually uttered, written and so on. This discourse either re-denotes the initial text, or implies something in combination with what is explicitly stated. Discussing origins of and ‘proper responses’ to fiction, Rossholm deploys the idea of a ‘fictive stance’. Rossholm argues that the function of a text is central to the fictive stance. If a text is produced in order to express its author’s beliefs that the whole content of the text is literally true, then the reader will find it more difficult to take the fictive stance. We adopt a fictive stance toward a symbol S if (i) we make efforts to experience the reading of S as a process of achieving knowledge that the content is true, (ii) that we did not know this content beforehand, (iii) if the content implies that the symbol is an expression-vehicle for its author’s purported knowledge, and (iv) when the reader takes this experience and content as counterfactual (357-8).

Rossholm’s book is an exhaustive, richly illustrated, and well-organized study. Broader in scope and approach than similar works on narratives (such as Genette’s or Todorov’s), To Be and Not To Be presents a spectrum of theoretical insights. Unlike many (perhaps one should say ‘most’) works on narrative technique or reader response, Rossholm’s work attempts and achieves a balance on both sides of the icon-text: the artist/author’s and the
viewer/listener's. Thus, one gets a sense of having explored not only the methods of writing or painting, but also the processes by which we interpret them. The sections on iconicity and fiction (the former a shade too staidly formulaic) explore, for instance, the processes by which an icon draws us into its web, enforcing a certain interpretive stance. To Be and Not To Be is a useful contribution to the semiotics of interpretation.

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Beate Rossler, ed.
Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations.
Pp. ix + 231.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4563-3);

This is a welcome volume of philosophical essays on privacy, and it is to be hoped that its publication will encourage Cambridge University Press to reprint Ferdinand Schoeman’s collection, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge UP 1984), to which this volume is clearly, and rightly, indebted. Rossler’s volume fits nicely in between Schoeman’s collection, with its classic legal, as well as philosophical, articles on privacy and the more sociological collection of essays in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar, eds. Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, (U Chicago Press 1997). Together these three collections provide a wide-ranging, and invaluable, set of essays that introduce readers to the legal, feminist, philosophical and sociological debates about privacy.

This latest addition to the literature is notable for its attention to feminist debates on privacy, and for combining Continental, as well as Anglo-American, styles of philosophizing. Most of the articles derive from a conference on Privacy held in Amsterdam in 1999, although the articles by Jeffrey Reiman, Axel Honneth and Jean Cohen have all appeared elsewhere. Still, it is nice to have them here, in a format that is readily accessible to students of privacy and that, as with other essays in this volume, contains a companion piece that provides sympathetic criticism, or an alternative perspective on the topic. Thus, Nicola Lacey provides a British legal perspective on Anita Allen’s overview of privacy in American law; Maeve Cooke provides a critical evaluation of Jean Cohen’s assumptions about autonomy in her article on sexual
harassment law in the USA; Wendy Brown comments on Moira Gatens; Krishan Kumar responds to Iris Marion Young; Herlindes Pauer-Studer responds to Axel Honneth and Getrud Koch responds to Jeffrey Reiman. Although some of these articles will be a little inaccessible to those who are used to more traditional analytic styles of philosophizing, and none of these provides a sustained analysis of the concept of privacy to match attempts that can be found in the Schoeman volume, this is a collection of essays that should interest non-specialists, as well as specialists.

Rossler’s introduction, and article, ‘Gender and Privacy: A Critique of the Liberal Tradition’, provide a helpful over-view of the book, and of feminist critiques of privacy, although I was disappointed that the latter did little more than indicate how she would reconfigure privacy so that women as well as men can enjoy its benefits. As her book on privacy is in Dutch, and there seem to be no imminent plans to translate it into English, it is a shame that her contribution to this collection concentrates on what, by now, is some fairly well-trodden ground, rather than on the more innovative work of rebuilding a workable idea of privacy as a moral and political value.

Moira Gatens’ article, ‘Privacy and the Body: The Publicity of Affect’, on the other hand, does mark out new ground, and new sources for thinking about privacy, and receives a lively and typically illuminating response from Wendy Brown. These two pieces, with the moving piece by Iris Marion Young on the importance of privacy for old people, struck me as the most gripping and unusual papers in the volume.

Gatens examines the ways that norms of privacy help to constitute people’s personal identities, as well as to mark their social status within a particular society. This is possible because ‘privacy, as a norm of civility, as a degree of control over one’s thoughts and actions, and as a limitation on the actions of others, tracks broader power relations between individuals existing within particular groups, communities, or societies’ (116). In order to capture some of the variety that follows from this, Gatens looks at three autobiographical, or ficto-autobiographical works: J. S. Mill’s Autobiography, J-P. Sartre’s Words (and his short story ‘Childhood of a Leader’), and Sally Morgan’s My Place — which describes Morgan’s discovery of the sexual and racial history behind her family’s seemingly peculiar attitudes to privacy in 1960s Australia.

Brown agrees that we need to think more about the ways that norms of privacy and publicity shape individual identities, but notes that Gatens’ case studies unfold as accounts of subjects who are not so much produced by norms of privacy as embroiled in them, failed by them, or activated by them’ (137). Responding to the extraordinary ubiquity of cell phones in Italy, and the extent to which a table of Italians will turn out to be talking animatedly to interlocutors elsewhere, rather than to each other, Brown notes that it is our capacity to experience privacy, quite as much as social norms for protecting privacy, which help to define us as individuals (136). She concludes with the troubling, but nonetheless pertinent, question whether there is ‘anything
more to public and private today than a ghostly residue of a once-important subjective capacity and way of life?" (141)

In this, as in other articles in this volume, philosophy is perceived as an historical activity, engaging with historically situated individuals, marked in various ways by their particular spatial and geographic location. This perspective can seem inimical to the sorts of conceptual analysis and philosophizing found in Schoeman’s collection, dominated as it was by the task of explaining what, if anything, is distinctive and valuable about privacy, taken as a moral or legal value and right. However, the evident deficiencies of the latter — where intuition and subjective preference are so often confused with timeless truths — helps to explain the need for, and appeal, of the more self-consciously historical and political approaches found here. Still, these are not the only two options we face as philosophers, and I look forward to a new collection of essays on privacy which actively strives to combine a lively sense of the way that power differentials shape the identities and values of all people — even philosophers — with the drive for clarity, precision and rigour that animated the best pieces in the earlier volume.

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Nadia Urbinati

Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government.
Pp. xiii + 293.

Nadia Urbinati’s Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government is the latest in a line of works that aim to represent John Stuart Mill as a balanced yet creative and relevant political and moral theorist. During his lifetime, Mill was vilified by the left for being elitist and overly individualistic and by the right for being a socialist ready to sacrifice the rights of individuals to the caprice of the mob. His attempt to strike a dynamic balance between the values of individual freedom and the common good continued to get him into philosophical and political hot water throughout the twentieth century. Isaiah Berlin, Gertrude Himmelfarb and Alan Ryan, to name but a handful of his philosophical critics, argued Mill was a muddled thinker who, far from presenting solutions to political and social
conundrums, actually exemplified them in his own work. Like other defend- ers of Mill, myself included, Urbinati believes the explanation for the short shrift is a general failure to go outside the 'standard' Mill reading list, and she aims to remedy this by reading Mill's more familiar works in the context of his larger corpus. Unfortunately, the contextualizing move does not get to the heart of the problem such works aim to remedy: why, in the face of constant efforts to change it, is the 'muddled' view of Mill so recalcitrant?

Mill seems to have got an even rougher ride from political scientists on this point than from philosophers. Indeed, philosophers reading Urbinati's book, if my own reaction is a guide, will be baffled by the simpel-mindedness which characterizes mostly question-begging critical commentary of Mill from that quarter. Urbinati is not always as thorough as one might like in her responses to these attacks and the problematic assumptions upon which they rest. Nevertheless, since the aim of her work is to repaint a faithful picture of his political theory, what few lapses there are in this regard can be forgiven.

Philosophers, at this point, might quip that long parallel traditions of attacking and defending famous thinkers are the substance of their discipline, which progresses by means of dialectical reasoning. As such, there seems nothing extraordinary in this case about the 'line of works' aiming to rescue Mill from the jaws of philosophical and political critique. Yet, in Mill's case, there is a notable difference from cases such as Aristotle's or Kant's or even Wittgenstein's or Rawls'. Mill is not often included on 'must teach' lists. And if you look for an explanation, you find it is either mere habit or, where explained, it is because he is regarded as a muddled thinker. However, as noted, he is not seen as muddled by everyone. Nevertheless, these other voices are, as far as I can tell, unable to break through the dumb stares one still gets from colleagues who think 'specializing in Mill' is on a par with being an astrologer. There is a mystery here which calls for unravelling.

What is at stake in this latest defense of Mill is his liberal theory of democracy. Urbinati wants to show it is based upon his understanding of Athenian democracy as liberal (i.e., progressive, pluralistic and tolerant) and, given this understanding, that his view of modern democracy has a lot to teach Americans in particular, about their own. Two obstacles stand in her way. First, Mill does not have a clearly worked out theory of modern democracy, or at least not one which would satisfy the requirements of a political scientist. Second, the standard political-science version of his understanding of politics in Athens is that it was illiberal and as such a poor basis for a liberal theory of democracy. So Urbinati must do a considerable amount of conceptual reconstruction around a defensible but non-traditional account of Mill's understanding of Athenian democracy in order to support her thesis.

The first half of the book is taken up by the painstaking work of developing a defensible account of Mill's understanding of Athenian democracy. Urbinati explores various European thinkers of the Modern period, critically evaluating their appeals to and uses of ancient sources as inspiration or even frameworks for their own political views. She uses this exploratory work to
separate Mill from both the conception of a democracy as a kind of mob rule and from the conception of a republic as a kind of bureaucratic rule. In neither case, of course, is there any question in the Modern period that the people consent through their electoral choices to the form which government takes. So in that sense, both the democratic and the republican forms are what we today call ‘democratic’. But using the term in this loose way fails to identify the problem which democracy poses: should crucial questions of individual and collective interest be decided by the gale-force winds or even spring breezes of impulse? And if not, what sorts of education and experience qualify one for deciding them?

No one wants their interests decided by dumb waves of public opinion and heat of the moment. Yet, everyone wants a voice in how public policy affecting them is worked out. Various attempts at making public opinion less impulsive have been tried as have been various ways of delegating the professional task of governing and policy making to experts. These many models of political society constitute Mill’s grist, according to Urbinati. He comes out, she argues, on the side of representative democracy, but not the usual model. It is here, in the details of her theory of Mill’s view of representative government, that Urbinati argues is Mill’s unique contribution to political theory — a contribution Americans would do well to accept if they want to preserve theirs.

For the best sort of democracy, Mill blends, in effect, mob rule and rule by a bureaucratic or aristocratic elite. Under mob rule, the majority of citizens have a direct part in decision and policy making however trigger happy that participation is. The virtue of mob rule is the majority feels itself in charge, in which case it is unlikely citizens will lose interest in how things are going. The cost of mob rule (to be charitable) is fields go unplowed, and the flashiest flash in the pan often wins the day when duller choices would have ‘promoted the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Under elite or bureaucratic rule, the ordinary working citizen is left, more or less, to work, bring in the crops, to raise families, form clubs, create the minutiae of what we all regard as our common life. The main virtue, it might be argued, of this sort of democracy is that, all consent to entrust the commonweal to those with proven knowledge of defense, history, economics, sociology and law and so on.

The challenge facing those who saw the necessity of expert governance equal with the necessity of widespread participation was to create a democratic form which facilitates popular participation at the local level (on issues of concern to all levels of policy making), but most crucially as the means of training for the purpose of serving in a representative government. In this way, the ‘mob rule’ version of democracy is actually relied upon by Mill as a sort of ‘farm team’ system for producing expert government representatives. People feel active in decision-making (weakening the threat of bureaucratic control) and are in fact informed when making their electoral and if elected, policy decisions (weakening the threat of mob rule). One cannot overemphasize Mill’s focus on public education in this regard. And, if at all persuaded by his common sense approach, one cannot help but deeply regret the
abandonment of formal debating education by the public school systems, in
North America especially. While Urbinati is not explicit regarding her own
list of lamentations for her dying American democracy, one cannot help but
read between the lines it is long indeed.

As a philosopher, I often felt lost in deep pockets of Urbinati’s political
science world. Though the signs were always recognizable, it was clear they
were not always used the way we use them. Here’s one favourite example:
According to Mill, Urbinati writes, ‘Voting as a “public function” or duty is
republican and democratic in character, not liberal’ (112). And another, ‘The
ballot issue reveals Mill’s deep discomfort with a utilitarian and rationalist
conception of politics’ (107). There also appear to be numerous occasions on
which Urbinati cedes more to the negative view of Mill’s commitment to
Utilitarianism than she ought. For example, she argues Mill’s ‘inegalitarian
strategies ... made him both a spurious utilitarian and a moderate democrat’
(97). And then there are the usual and, in my opinion, always alarming
number of typos, spelling mistakes, grammatical errors and the like. I’ll
forego my customary rant.

In spite of much of the book being impenetrable because unfamiliar to me
as a philosopher, I cannot help but think it is one that I should pick up and
struggle with again from time to time. It is a definite ‘should read’ for the
serious Mill scholar or student of classical Athens.

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Frans H. van Eemeren and
Rob Grootendorst
A Systematic Theory of Argumentation:
The Pragma-Dialectical Approach.
Pp. viii + 216.
US$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83075-3);

A Systematic Theory represents the results of a thirty-year collaboration
between Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst that was cut short by
Grootendorst’s untimely death in February 2000. It stands together with
Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), Argumentation, Commu­
nication, and Fallacies (1992), and Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse
(1993) (written with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs), as well as numerous
A Systematic Theory presents the fundamentals of the pragma-dialectical research program, including an overview of its theoretical influences (Ch. 2), and a description of its ideal model of a critical discussion (Ch. 3). The PD model is characterized largely by its procedural rules which are given in detail (Ch. 6) as well as translated into a ‘code of conduct’ for arguers (Ch. 8). In addition to presenting the details and theoretical bases of PD, the book also addresses a number of topics endemic to any theory of argument, including the general structure of argumentation (Ch. 3), relevance (Ch. 4), the reconstruction of everyday argumentative discourse (Ch. 5), the problem of unexpressed (or missing) premises (Ch. 5), and fallacies (Ch. 7).

Pragma-dialectics seeks to amalgamate normative and descriptive approaches to the study of argumentation by drawing upon the theoretical resources of its two principal influences: pragmatics and dialectics. Argumentation is conceived of both as the process or activity of arguing as well as the product of this activity. Dialectically, argumentation is conceived of as a dialogue normally occurring between two parties whose goal is to resolve a difference of opinion. Pragmatically, argumentation is viewed not as a set of propositions, but as a complex speech act which is analysed into the basic speech acts comprising it. A critical discussion is a model of an ideal discussion procedure designed to bring about the resolution of a difference of opinion. It has four basic stages Confrontation, Opening, Argumentation and Concluding. Each is characterized by stage-specific goals and a set of permissible speech acts (57ff). This ideal model is informed by four meta-theoretical principles which together shape the PD methodology: functionalization (treating linguistic activity pragmatically as purposive speech acts), externalization (focussing on public commitments of linguistic activity not private beliefs), socialization (relating these commitments to interaction through linguistic activity) and dialectification (treating dialogue moves as attempts to resolve a difference of opinion in accordance with critical norms of reasonableness) (52ff).

A key difference between PD and rhetorical models is its normative component whereby argumentation is not audience-oriented but resolution-oriented (24-5), and evaluation is not agreement-based but also involves a critical norm of reasonableness (53, 123ff). The rules governing critical discussions are justified by their problem validity (an instrumental standard of how successfully the rules bring about the goal of the discussion) and intersubjective validity (an anthropological standard of reasonableness, external to any particular instance of argumentation) (17, 132). A key difference between PD and epistemic models (such as informal logic) is that the normative, critical and evaluative standards of PD are not only embodied in, but based upon, pragmatic rules which form a system of procedural rules both constitutive of, and regulating, critical discussions. The inspiration for many of these rules comes from Gricean conversational maxims, and Searlean ‘felicity conditions’ for speech acts of various kinds (75ff). The rules of
ideal critical discussions provide not only evaluative standards, but also guidelines for analysing actual argumentative discourse.

Analytical reconstruction (Ch. 5) is the process of analysing everyday argumentative discourse to allow for its structural description and evaluation. In non-dialogic models, this is typically accomplished through argument diagramming. On the PD model, this process involves reconstructing the discourse according to the four stages of an ideal critical discussion. This reconstruction can involve four types of transformation of an original dialogue: deletion, addition, substitution, and permutation (103-4). Through these transformations problems in the analysis of arguments (e.g., unexpressed premises) are solved.

Relevance, on the PD model, is viewed mainly as a problem of how to apply the various transformations utilised in reconstruction (84ff). It is generally explained instrumentally as any speech act that helps the discussion advance towards its stage-specific goals. In this way, relevance has both an interpretive and an evaluative aspect, each of which relate to the overall coherence of a dialogue in relation to the ideal model (70-1).

Fallacies, on the PD model, are conceived of as discussion moves that impede the resolution of a difference of opinion. As such, they are explained pragmatically as violations of the procedural rules governing critical discussions, and their fallaciousness is linked to the problem validity of the ideal model. In the present work the authors summarize and develop the more extensive treatment provided in their (1992), linking fallacies to the four stages of critical discussion.

The work concludes (Ch. 8) with a restatement of the so-called ‘ten commandments’ which provide a code of conduct for ordinary discussants in their everyday argumentation (190), and which are meant to be a less technical version of the rules for a critical discussion (presented in Ch. 6).

Much of the content of A Systematic Theory has been presented elsewhere in the pragma-dialectical corpus. Further, on many topics (e.g., argumentation schemes, 14; justification of the meta-theoretical principles, 52; unexpressed premises, 118) the present work refers the reader to other, previously published works that provide a more in-depth discussion of the topic at hand. As such, A Systematic Theory is best read as a reference work providing a global overview of the mature pragma-dialectic theory. The value of the work is in its comprehensiveness, even if its treatment of individual topics is, at times, only summative. This overview is supplemented with an extended example illustrating the application of PD in the analytical reconstruction of arguments (100-22). Read in this way, the work is a resource not only for those whose business it is to study argument, but also to researchers in communication studies and discourse theory who seek to explore interdisciplinary connections with argumentation theory. Additionally, it would serve as a superlative introduction to the PD theory for senior students of argumentation and communication.

The significance of pragma-dialectics to the contemporary study of argumentation cannot be overestimated. Over the course of its development, it
has provided the discipline not only with a new theoretical framework, but with a repertoire of effective methodological tools. Unquestionably, van Eemeren and Grootendorst have made an inestimable contribution to the study of argumentation.

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Albert Keith Whitaker
A Journey Into Platonic Politics: Plato's Laws.
Pp. x + 244.

Albert Keith Whitaker's work on the Laws is not, as he admits in the Introduction (ix), a 'thorough commentary' on Plato's text. He wishes, instead, to treat the Laws as a 'foreign country' that we might visit as members of our own Nocturnal Council (the body which travels abroad to research and recommend improvements to existing laws). Whitaker aims, he says, to comment on the dialogue's most salient points, 'all in an attempt to hold up [its] sober and restrained political reasoning ... as a worthy example.'

Nor does Whitaker's study much concern itself with presenting and assessing the extant scholarship on the Laws, lest doing so 'obstruct the view' of 'first-time visitors' to the dialogue. Of the secondary literature that Whitaker does mention, Strauss' Argument and Action of Plato's Laws [1975], and Pangle's translation and commentary [1980], receive most of his attention.

Whitaker's book is written primarily with students in mind; in my estimation, this means that it is written to get them interested in the dialogue. He achieves this mostly by beginning and ending each chapter with brief discussion of a relatively modern political question (e.g., Chandler v. James, concerning prayer in public schools), and discussing in that context the relevant Book of the Laws most pertaining to that question (Book X). He also achieves his aim by introducing most of the particular issues and nuances of each Book as puzzles. That is, rather than dismissing the more peculiar of the Athenian Stranger's political recommendations (e.g., there ought to be public drinking parties), Whitaker explicitly invites the reader to enquire as to why the Stranger adopts such a position, and offers his own answers supported by textual justifications. He thus demonstrates a strategy whereby
students might work their way through the text on their own, come up with their own interpretations of difficult passages and develop their ability to read critically.

His prose reads like a series of lectures on each book of the Laws, as though one were meant to listen to, rather than to read, what he has to say. This suits the books purpose well, ironically. It would be counterproductive to have students listen to a series of lectures fraught with references to secondary scholarship and overly-detailed argumentation; most students seem to garner the benefits of such scholarship more when they can study the details slowly and repeatedly, if needed. Whitaker's book, by contrast, can be read relatively quickly while gaining a pretty thorough account of what transpires in the Laws — the main topics discussed and their potential relevance to modern social and political thought.

A Journey is relatively poorly edited. Mostly, these are minor matters (e.g., 'disputes' instead of 'dispute', 'just' instead of 'justice', and the like) that can easily be corrected without interrupting a smooth read. An unusual such error is that the book's front cover reads, 'Plato's Law', rather than 'Laws' (though the facing page reads, 'Plato's Laws'). I believe that it is also overwritten in places, often restating certain points and explanations by way of clarification when, at least in my view, Whitaker's writing is straightforward and clear enough without needing to do this.

But Whitaker's work may really get students interested in studying the daunting dialogue, per his aim. Many of the introductory and concluding portions of each chapter (which place the topic in a modern context) are beautifully written, especially those on change and the preservation of ways of life (Ch. 7), male/female relations (Ch. 8), and atheism and religion (Ch. 10). The effect is to heighten one's curiosity as to what — in contrast to modern views — the Athenian Stranger, Kleinias and Megillus have to say on these matters, and why. Hence, I suppose, Whitaker's allusion to the readers of the Laws 'visiting' it as though visiting a foreign country, looking for ways to reconsider or to improve their own laws. This recapitulates the staging of the original. Plato's Laws supposes that the statesman, Kleinias, is empowered with establishing a set of laws for a new colony to be founded by the Cretan cities. Kleinias may simply import the laws of Knossos, or establish a new code altogether. Thus, none of the interlocutors is in any way bound by his present political circumstances to recommend one thing or another, but may instead wrestle solely with the question of what the best laws would be for a brand new city.

Whitaker's book is divided into twelve chapters (some with titles that are more 'memorable', and less 'descriptive', e.g., 'That Old Time Baloney', focusing upon Book Three's discussion of the beginnings of human history), with their notes gathered at the end of each chapter. In fact, Whitaker's twelve chapters each focus upon their twelve counterparts in the Laws. Each chapter is divided into a series of subtopics, presumably the 'salient points' that Whitaker announced would be his focus. Many of these sub-sections are also memorably titled, e.g., 'Getting Shamefaced', 'Geriatric Chorale', 'Kin-
dler, Gentler Slavery'. There are separate introductory and concluding sections to the book, plus a bibliography and index. In addition, Whitaker includes an appendix of study questions, arranged by chapter, designed to guide the student's reading of the *Laws* itself. Here is a sample: ‘Chapter Four: Read *Laws* Book Four. Focus on 712b-718a and 719e-720e. What is the good of tyranny? What is the good of theocracy? What does the stranger’s myth teach about justice? How does the stranger define law? What is wrong with saying that law is simply force? What is wrong with saying that law is simply the distribution of the intellect?’ There is also an appendix of related readings, organized by chapter.

The book’s third appendix, a superb ‘map’ of the *Laws*, deserves special mention. It is divided into an ‘overall plan’ indicating the dozen or so main topics covered in the dialogue, and what Books cover them. Then, there is an outline of individual Books: each book is analyzed according to specific sub-topics, listed by Stephanus pages. This ‘map’ is an extraordinary research and review tool that both students and professionals will welcome.

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