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The central negative message of this book is that a good deal of English-speaking epistemology in the second half of the twentieth century (including much of Alston’s own earlier work) has been predicated on a mistake, viz. the assumption that justification is a unique belief-status of central importance from the epistemic point of view. The positive message is about what epistemology looks like once its practitioners have been disabused of that ‘justificationist’ assumption and recognize that there is ‘an irreducible plurality of [positive] epistemic statuses — epistemic desiderata — of belief, each of which defines a distinct dimension of epistemic evaluation’ (47), and none of which is to be identified with justification. Instead of wasting their time in fruitless debates about justification, epistemologists under the new, pluralist dispensation will find plenty of rewarding work to be done exploring the nature, interrelations, realizability, and practical importance of the many epistemic desiderata (both merely putative and real).

The primary argument in support of the negative message comes out in the book’s first chapter, and goes essentially as follows: (P1) There are radical and longstanding disagreements, spawned by the clash of a great many deeply incompatible views, about what justification amounts to. (P2) The best available explanation of these disagreements is not that (a) ‘as is typical for philosophy, it’s just a very tough problem’ (22), but rather that (b) ‘there isn’t any unique, epistemologically crucial property picked out by “justified” ... [and d]ifferent epistemologists have been emphasizing, concentrating on, “pushing” different epistemic desiderata, different features of belief that are positively valuable from the standpoint of the aims of cognition’ (22). (C) Therefore, (b).

More time could have been devoted here to a consideration of alternatives to (b) other than (a). Consider, for example, the following one: (c) there are many irreducible epistemic desiderata, justification is one of them, and sorting out which of them is justification is a very tough problem — particularly when they are all valuable. This explanation would block the move to (C), since if true it would falsify (P2) by falsifying the first half of the conjunct (b); but it would still allow us to go ‘beyond justification’ in that it would encourage epistemologists to focus their attention on more than just that status.

Regardless of whether one accepts the claim that justification is a mere chimera, however, the advice to go beyond it and focus attention on other desiderata is refreshing and worthy of emphasis. In Chapters 4-7 we are treated to a discussion of various desiderata, whose interrelations are helpfully sketched in Chapter 3. Once truth, as the ‘master epistemic desideratum’ (42) is set aside, we have, in descending order of epistemic importance...
(determined by the closeness of the tie to truth), desiderata falling into three main groups: directly truth-conducive desiderata (e.g., being based on an adequate ground, being formed by sufficiently reliable processes, being the product of intellectual virtue) are such that their possession by beliefs renders the beliefs (objectively) likely to be true; indirectly truth-conducive desiderata (e.g., higher-order knowledge of positive epistemic status, successfully defensible likelihood of truth) are such that their possession by beliefs presupposes that the beliefs are likely to be true, and helps the believer arrange things so as to be better able to acquire true as opposed to false beliefs; and belief-system desiderata (e.g., explanation, coherence) are such that they add something above and beyond the positive epistemic value of their possession by arrangements or systems of belief, which epistemic value depends on the pervasive likelihood of truth in those systems. Putative desiderata of the deontological sort (e.g., being held permissibly or blamelessly, having a causal ancestry that does not violate intellectual obligations) are ruled out in Chapter 4 as merely putative, on the grounds that they either assume a kind of voluntary control over beliefs that we don’t have or lack a requisite tie to truth.

This discussion of various desiderata contains gems of insight that alone render the book a must-have for serious epistemologists. The treatment of adequacy of belief grounds in Chapter 5 and the functional solution to the well-known generality problem for reliabilism in Chapter 6 are particularly rich and provocative.

The final three chapters of the book take up a number of meta-epistemological issues that arise in connection with a ‘first philosophy’ approach to epistemology. This approach bans any reliance in epistemology on unproven epistemic commitments, and is clearly at odds with the broad ‘naturalistic’ approach that Alston adopts in the book’s first eight chapters. The pervasiveness of epistemic circularity, the overly-demanding expectations of epistemological skeptics, and the relation of the more specific epistemic desiderata approach to key positions taken under the first-philosophy approach — foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism — are all considered. The recurrent theme throughout is that the naturalistic approach, defined by acceptance of the idea that ‘we have to work pro tem with what we are confident of’ (240), is the ‘only reasonable’ (7) one to take.

It’s worth bearing in mind that the methodological (or meta-epistemological) naturalism here defined commits one to no particular view about the supervenience basis of epistemic status, nor to any particular view about the relationship between epistemology and sciences of the mind-brain. Putnam’s famous rejection of any attempt to ‘naturalize reason’ by reducing epistemic status to nonnormative elements doesn’t disqualify him from being a naturalist Alston’s sense; and Chisholm’s endorsement of a ‘particularist’ response to the problem of the criterion qualifies him. It may also be helpful to view the intended contrast between naturalistic and first philosophy epistemological approaches in terms of the sorts of desiderata that Alston points to in the belief-system group. Whereas naturalists like Alston see the acquisition of desiderata like explanation and coherence in their epistemic belief-
systems as the primary aim of epistemology, first philosophers see proof of the likelihood of truth on which the epistemic value of these desiderata (by Alston's own admission) depends as the primary aim. Hence the difference in what advocates of each approach see as appropriate to rely on from the outset, since successful attempts to explain something, or to render it coherent with other things, are consistent with the presumption that it exists, whereas successful attempts to prove that it exists are not.

David Matheson
Carleton University

Alain Badiou
_Theoretical Writings._
Pp. xv + 256.
US$130.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6145-X);

Because it is the first strictly philosophical collection of Alain Badiou's writings available in English and because it will likely prepare Anglophone readers for the imminent translation of _Being and Event_, which is his most complex and influential text to date, _Theoretical Writings_ is preeminently important for discovering Badiou as a serious and innovative philosopher of the contemporary world. This is especially so since, as the editors, Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano, aptly remark, it is not at all unlikely that the English reader, having gained an acquaintance with Badiou through texts such as _Ethics_ or _Manifesto for Philosophy_, considers Badiou to be little more than a polemical and anti-postmodernist who is just as rhetorical as those he opposes (ix). As such, this text will hopefully promote a serious scholarly engagement with an important philosopher whose greatness is only now gaining recognition outside of his native France.

Through a compilation of essays, lectures and book chapters — both published and previously unpublished — this book attempts 'to distill the essential lineaments of Alain Badiou's philosophical doctrine' (ix). What is subsequently produced is 'not a reader, an overview or a representative selection', but 'a concentrate of [Badiou's] project' (ix). In other words, _Theoretical Writings_ is not intended as a typical anthology, but as an extended argument on its own. It is an articulation of the structure of Badiou's thought through the deliberate reconfiguration of his work. In short, it is an independent philosophical whole. Badiou himself seems to agree, as
he jokes that this book has ‘provided me, along with other readers, with the opportunity of reading a new, previously unpublished book, apparently authored by someone called “Alain Badiou” — who is reputed to be none other than myself’ (xiv).

*Theoretical Writings* is structured to follow the three core elements of Badiou’s philosophy. As its title suggests, the first section, *Ontology is Mathematics*, defends the thesis that mathematics thinks and speaks Being. Badiou’s thesis is not that mathematics is in some sense ontological, but that it is literally ontology. Rather than treating mathematics as one of many possible objects of philosophy, as a sort of ‘regional scholasticism’ (5), he argues that mathematics as such ‘provides a direct illumination of philosophy’ (7). More specifically, mathematics is the language of being itself, a language that simultaneously speaks being (i.e., multiplicities, sets) and non-being (i.e., void, the empty set). Accordingly and in opposition to most contemporary philosophy, ontology is necessarily infinite not finite: ‘mathematics teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confine thinking within the ambit of finitude’; instead, mathematics as ontology teaches that ‘the infinite is nearby’ (17).

The second section, *The Subtraction of Truth*, presents Badiou’s theory of truth. He begins with the insight that, although mathematics speaks and thinks being, it cannot think its own thinking of being: ‘it is not the thinking of the thought that it is’ (97). In other words, ontology cannot speak self-referentially, whereby arises the need for philosophy as an enunciation of ontology. Here the key concept is the *event*, which Badiou defines as ‘a point at which the ontological (i.e., mathematical) field is destabilized or caught in an impasse’ (98). An event is the emergence, out of a given ontological structure and situation, of what is not being qua being. In other words, the event is a breakdown of a given structure, which lies on the precipice of the void (of non-being) and occasions an undecidable moment. This undecidability demands some hitherto impossible decision to pull the event away from non-being. To decide this undecidable is to decide truth, to determine and circumscribe beings from out of a fragile situation and with fidelity to that situation. Thus, philosophy emerges as the theory of the event, of the impossible, and in its most basic sense, of truth.

Finally, *Logics of Appearance* argues that it is of being’s essence to appear not to remain concealed. Following the thesis in set theory that there can be no set of all sets, Badiou concludes that there can be no whole of beings, no indeterminate totality of Being in itself (169). Rather, being is always exposed; it is always only the appearance of beings in relation to other particular beings from within a particular situation, a particular world. Beings appear according to the structure of a situation, according to a condition of possible appearance of multiples in a given world, according to a logic. In other words, appearance requires logic, a sense, direction and structure that ‘establishes the “there” of being—there as relation’ (172).

Though the dim sketch I offer does little to present the complexity of Badiou’s doctrine fairly, rather than linger over possible elaborations, prob-
lems or criticisms, I will conclude with a brief invitation of sorts to the suspicious reader. French philosophy — for some good reasons, though a few more bad ones! — has developed a reputation among Anglophone philosophers and scholars for unforgiving and insufficiently rewarding obscurity. For someone weaned on the writing of Dewey and Quine, reading Derrida or Deleuze can be a punishment of the most sadistic sort. In contrast, Badiou’s work is wonderfully clear, far from easy but lucid and lively. Perhaps more tellingly, Badiou unabashedly rejects the presumption to obscure profundity so prevalent in postmodern philosophy, cultural theory, and literary theory. Consider for instance the following sincere — yet unmistakably funny! — comment regarding Gilles Deleuze’s response to Badiou’s Being and Event: ‘I do not register any incorrectness in [What is Philosophy?], only a bizarre torsion, an impracticable vantage point that makes it impossible to understand what is at stake or what we are dealing with. [...] I would be grateful to anyone who could clarify this textual fragment to me, and explain what relation it bears to Being and Event. This is a genuine invitation, wholly devoid of irony’ (246).

Badiou’s philosophical project represents a total rethinking of contemporary philosophy. It is nothing less than a rejuvenation of traditional systematic philosophy against growing skepticism and fragmentation, a rejuvenation upon which the present and future of philosophy — as philosophy, not as professional sophistry — depend. Theoretical Writings must be read by as many philosophers as possible; it must be engaged with, studied, lived and perhaps only then rejected or accepted.

Edvard Lorkovic
(Liberal Arts College)
Concordia University

Timothy Chappell
Reading Plato’s Theaetetus.
International Plato Studies, Volume 20.

Timothy Chappell has produced a new translation of Plato’s Theaetetus, with running philosophical commentary, in the style of Cornford’s Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. After a general introduction to Plato, Plato’s dialogues and the Theaetetus, the book divides the dialogue into short sections, each preceded
by a brief summary and followed by detailed interpretation and evaluation. Four transitional sections survey long chunks of the dialogue.

Chappell's commentary focuses on whether the failure of the *Theaetetus* to mention explicitly the existence of transcendent forms supports a unitarian or revisionist interpretation of Plato's works. Unitarians like Cornford take the dialogue to argue indirectly that a satisfactory definition of knowledge requires the forms. Revisionists like Owen, Bostock and Burnyeat suppose that Plato has lost confidence in their existence. Chappell defends a variant of Cornford's unitarian interpretation.

On Chappell's account, the overall project of the dialogue is to show the inadequacy of any purely empiricist account of knowledge as constructed solely out of perception. The refutation of *Theaetetus* initial identification of knowledge with perception, besides refuting the sophisticated versions of this theory due to Protagoras and Heraclitus, shows that perception lacks the semantic structure required for an object of knowledge. The failure of various attempts to explain how there can be false beliefs indicates the need for an explanation of how beliefs construed as concatenations of sensory impressions have the required semantic structure. Socrates' 'dream theory' at 201d-2d that all things are composed of unknowable but perceptible elements that can only be named is an attempt to provide this explanation through a kind of logical atomism similar to that of Bertrand Russell and the early Wittgenstein. Socrates objects that it fails to explain properly how knowables are logically constructed from perceptible simples. Nor is it sufficient to pick on one perceptible simple as a distinguishing mark of a knowable.

Chappell develops his interpretation plausibly, with careful attention to the recent scholarly literature in English. (An exception is David Sedley's *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus* [Oxford University Press 2004], a 'wonderful book' [47] that reached Chappell too late.) One may legitimately wonder how much of the case that knowables need semantic structure is due to Plato and how much is due to Chappell. Since the dialogue is meant to provoke reflection on knowledge, this wonder is not really an objection.

The failure of the *Theaetetus* to mention the forms is of course only relevant to the unitarian-revisionist debate if it is a late dialogue. Chappell accepts without supporting argument the standard twentieth-century view that it was written after the *Parmenides* and before the *Sophist*, soon after 369 BCE. But Debra Nails shows in *The People of Plato* (Hackett 2002, 276-7) that *Theaetetus* did not suffer his apparently mortal injury reported at 142a-d in 369 BCE, as late daters assume, but in 391 BCE, a date which suggests composition of the *Theaetetus* before Plato had come to postulate transcendent forms.

Despite his care on details, Chappell is sloppy on generalities. He attributes to Plato's Socrates an argument that it is always better to suffer than to do injustice (n. 2), whereas Plato's Socrates always claims more plausibly that it is worse to do injustice than to suffer it. He attributes to Socrates (n. 2) the claim (at *Theaetetus* 149a ff.) that he knows nothing, whereas Socrates
admits only to having no answers of his own to the questions he asks of others. Chappell's statement of the theory of forms as 'Plato's view that the whole of reality is structured by transcendent abstract objects which impart their qualities to all the other things that exist' (11) suggests falsely that forms are apprehended by a process of abstraction, that they are efficient causes, that anything that participates in a form shares all its qualities, and that the forms structure everything else (including souls). He defines the theory of recollection (241) as the theory that knowledge (rather than learning) is recollection.

The translation is vigorous and colloquial, but occasionally misleading. At 152c5-6, Chappell represents Socrates as assuming that knowledge is by definition an infallible grasp of what is — even though Socrates said not long before (145e8-6a1) that he cannot grasp sufficiently by himself what knowledge is. Further, 'infallible' imports a modal qualification not present in the Greek. Levett more accurately presents the two characteristics as necessary conditions, and renders the second one as truth rather than infallibility. Also misleading is Chappell's translation of allodoxia at 189b ff. as 'interchange of beliefs', when what is intended is a substitution in one's thought of one object for another. Levett's neologism 'other-judging' is happier.

It is not clear who is Chappell's intended audience. We get a laborious explanation (13), appropriate for complete novices, of the system of referring to passages in Plato by their location in the Stephanus edition. But the exposition of the theory of forms gets less than one sentence (11). And Chappell often alludes without explanation to such advanced matters as Berkeley's idealism (n. 10), Cartesian scepticism (n. 10), and the Meno's doctrine of recollection (21).

The book is sorely lacking in scholarly paraphernalia. In the margin of his translation, Chappell prints only the Stephanus reference for the start of each of his main paragraphs (170a1, 170a6, 170b7, etc.); as a result, the reader usually cannot tell where a given section of a Stephanus page begins. He does not tell us which edition of the Greek text he is translating, nor does he ever discuss variant readings. He includes in the bibliography neither the volume number nor the page numbers of journal articles. There are no indexes. There is a glossary of frequent technical terms and abbreviations, but some items in it are out of alphabetical order; the entry for the theory of forms is even on the wrong page.

David Hitchcock
McMaster University
The mark of a great teacher is the ability to enable students to grasp difficult and dense themes. Once again, in this volume of essays, Crowe has demonstrated his status as a great teacher. Emanating from the pages of this volume is a profound respect, not only for his mentor, Bernard Lonergan, but also a profound respect for what Crowe knows and what he does not know. Accordingly, in addition to his gifted abilities as a teacher, Crowe is also a man of consummate wisdom. We are in his debt once again, and in the debt of his editor, Vertin, for making available to us, in one volume, engaging and enlightening ‘Studies’ and ‘Essays’.

In the ‘Author’s Preface’ (xii) Crowe explains that he locates his work firmly in the first two of Lonergan’s eight ‘functional specialties’. He is guided by two questions that identify these two specialties: ‘What did he say?’ (Research) and ‘What did he mean?’ (Interpretation). Crowe ably demonstrates in the twenty chapters of this book that he has a clear grasp of what Lonergan had to say on many topics, but, still more valuable, that he has an even clearer grasp on what Lonergan meant.

The first eight chapters are entitled ‘Studies’ because they are explorations of Lonergan’s thought, with the aim of throwing light on Lonergan himself. Crowe offers, in many ways, an intellectual biography of his mentor, particularly in essays such as ‘Lonergan’s Vocation as a Christian Thinker’ (3-20), ‘All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology’ (78-110) and ‘Lonergan’s Search for Foundations: The Early Years (1930-1959)’ (164-96). These are classic Crowe in that they struggle with the data to reach a clear understanding of what Lonergan was about. Crowe demonstrates an intimate knowledge of Lonergan’s work, including personal correspondence, that enables Crowe to reconstruct the contexts out of which Lonergan’s insights emerged. Crowe’s work is not for the novice to Lonergan studies. However, for the person who has worked through Insight and/or Method in Theology the eight essays that begin this collection are a significant stimulus for further thought, and a prod to return to those two magnificent treatises, with a set of fresh eyes and insights, thanks to Crowe’s efforts.

The last 12 chapters are entitled ‘Essays’, indicating that Crowe is moving into an application of Lonergan’s thought to fields that Lonergan may not have addressed in his own work. These are thoughtful and provocative essays. They provide evidence for Vertin’s claim in his introduction that Crowe is, like his mentor, ‘a pastoral theologian’ (x). Crowe often turns his attention to how Lonergan’s theoretical insights have far-reaching and profound implications for everyday life. The previously unpublished essay
entitled ‘The Magisterium as Pupil: The Learning Teacher’ (283-93) is an illuminating example.

By using scriptural and conciliar examples, Crowe points out that the Church itself, before it can teach anything, must learn what it is to teach. Learning is a process of acquiring insights and allowing the self-correcting process of learning, in the community of believers, to proceed without obstruction or obfuscation. Crowe references the Council of Nicea as the Church Council that answered the question of Jesus’ relation to God the Father. That relation is what Christians proclaim, in some form, every Sunday: ‘light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, one in being with the Father’ (287). Crowe continues, ‘... where did the Council get it? My answer is that the council got it through a learning process that had gone on for one hundred and fifty years in the church’ (287). The Church does learn, in the believing community, what it ought to teach! If this was true of the early Church, how can it not be true of the contemporary Church. Crowe concludes the essay by encouraging lay people to become engaged in the ongoing learning of the Church (293). What is important here is that Crowe provides a way of understanding that learning process that is deeply respectful of the role of revelation and of the Holy Spirit. This approach also takes seriously the communal dimension of ‘reading the signs of the times’.

Two essays that suggest the potential of interdisciplinary dialogue with Lonergan’s thought as a backdrop are ‘Linking the Splintered Disciplines: Ideas from Lonergan’ (252-66) and ‘Law and Insight’ (267-82). The first emphasizes the need to locate what is common among scholars, namely the desire to know. The process of knowing and choosing, moving from experience to insight to judgment to decision, is common to all scholars. However, to claim this common ground each scholar must grapple with the question of interiority. It is here where the language of conversion emerges. How far can one move in interdisciplinary circles if one uses the language of interiority and conversion? Crowe suggests some general ways of doing this, but more work needs to be done to develop a strategy that incorporates interiority into multidisciplinary dialogue.

The second essay is a wonderful analysis of the role of insight in the practice of law, in both its legislative and judicial functions. What Crowe does so well in this essay is illuminate the habitual functioning of legislators and judges with Lonergan’s understanding of the role of human intelligence. The result is a helpful lens with which to make sense of the successes and the failures of legislators and their judicial counterparts.

Two other essays deserve particular mention in this context. The first is ‘The Spirit and I at Prayer’ (294-303). In this essay Crowe argues for a reappraisal of the place of the Holy Spirit in personal prayer and communal worship. What is noteworthy in this essay is the way in which Crowe makes use of Lonergan’s emphasis on interiority in order to re-claim a role for the Holy Spirit in Christian praxis.

The second essay that deserves mention is ‘Why We Have to Die’ (304-13). At first glance this is a highly speculative piece since Crowe tries ‘to think
the way we imagine God to think' (305). Indeed, it remains speculative until the last paragraph. What is striking about the essay is that Crowe exercises both his intellectual prowess in thinking through how God might think about this problem and his genuine sense of humility before the reality that the problem represents. This essay celebrates the best of Crowe. He is a brilliant theologian whose research and interpretation in the field of Lonergan studies is unparalleled. However, he is also a man of faith, who like Aquinas, realizes the relative unimportance of his scholarship in light of the God who inspires all his questions.

This collection provides once more an opportunity for readers to benefit from the life-long intellectual efforts of a thinker like Crowe. Moreover, it offers the benefit of the insights of a deeply religious man for whom the desire to know reality is always sublated by the desire to love reality and its Creator. It is this love and Crowe’s intellectual rigor that characterize all the essays in this welcomed collection. Echoing Crowe’s editor, Vertin, in the introduction, may this collection ‘be found valuable ... by philosophers, theologians, scholars in other disciplines, teachers, pastors, students, and perhaps even some general readers’ (ix). May it be so!

Mark Doorley
Villanova University

Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, eds.
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm.
Pp. xiv + 323.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80746-8);

Even though Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) counts among the classical thinkers in Christian philosophical theology, there has been no up-to-date, comprehensive introduction to his thought available. The publication of a volume dedicated to him in the series of Cambridge Companions is, hence, a very welcome event. The volume consists of twelve essays by twelve authors.

The first essay, G.R. Evans’ ‘Anselm’s life, works, and immediate influence’ (5-31), is a biographical and historical treatment which ‘seeks to provide a brief but necessary context’ (5) for an adequate understanding of Anselm’s thinking and his writings. The chapter is well-written and highly informative. In addition to locating Anselm’s writings in their context, Evans also offers brief descriptions of their nature and content (e.g., of the Proslogion,
Regarding Anselm's administrative and political skills as Archbishop of Canterbury, Evans presents material to support the traditional idea that Anselm was not equal to the task.

In addition to Evans' paper, there is also historical information in the 'Chronology' (xii). The editors have included there the entry '1060-63, Probably working on De Grammatico.' They are here following R.W. Southern's 1990 *Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape*, which they characterize as 'magisterial' (in 'Introduction', 4). Correspondingly, they refer to Anselm's *Proslogion* as 'his third major work' (1). The editors represent a minority view regarding the order of Anselm's treatises (cf. Evans, 11-14), but they fail to mention this to the reader.

Marilyn McCord Adams' essay 'Anselm on faith and reason' (32-60) offers an unconventional discussion of a central theme in Anselmian scholarship. Adams starts from Anselm's anthropology and his view of the human vocation in a Christian perspective and then discusses the varying roles of authority and rational inquiry in the varying contexts of Anselm's writings. Adams emphasizes the 'wholistic' nature of Anselm's understanding of human inquiry: the emotions and will also play a central role in it (35-6), and she argues that Anselm envisions it as 'a matter of divine-human collaboration' (36, 52). Adams' essay is based on a broad and deep reading of Anselm's writings, but it may be difficult for a beginner to comprehend. No survey of recent discussions on the topic is included.

The editors assert that Anselm's intellectual background was 'one dominated by the Bible and the writings of St. Augustine' (1). Gareth B. Matthews' essay 'Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism' (61-83) discusses some examples of Augustinian and Platonic influence in Anselm's writings. Matthews concentrates on the proof of God's existence in the *Proslogion* (including the idea of faith seeking understanding), the doctrine of divine nature in the *Monologion*, and the problem of foreknowledge and free will.

The following two essays deal with some preponderantly non-religious interests of Anselm, namely, his philosophy of language and his views about modalities, even though theological issues also become involved in connection with them. Peter King's essay 'Anselm's philosophy of language' (84-110) starts with a general description of Anselm's theory of signification, then discusses his semantics of names (especially in *De Grammatico*) as well as his agency theory of predication (the *Philosophical Fragments*) and, in the end, his view about the truth of statements. Simo Knuuttila's 'Anselm on modality' (111-31) contains first a sketch of modal conceptions in Anselm's sources, especially in the works of Boethius and Augustine, and follows with a description of some eleventh-century theological controversies related to modalities (Peter Damian). Anselm's views of modal issues are then discussed in the framework thus created. In the end, Knuuttila offers a sketch of Anselm's modal semantics.

Brian Leftow's 'Anselm's perfect-being theology' (132-56) is one of the essays dedicated to Anselm's views about God. Anselm's formula for God in the *Proslogion*, 'that than which a greater cannot be thought,' implies that
God is a perfect being, but the idea that God is in all respects perfect already appears in the *Monologion*, e.g., in Chapter 15. Leftow discusses Anselm’s criteria for selecting the descriptions which apply to a perfect being, and comments on issues related to the different ‘perfections’ (e.g., existing as perfection, 145-7).

Brian Davies’ essay ‘Anselm and the ontological argument’ (157-78) deals with Anselm’s famous reasoning in Chapters 2 and 3 of the *Proslogion*. After some remarks on faith and reason (157-8; see also 176), Davies discusses the two chapters in the *Proslogion* as well as some points in Gaunilo’s criticism (the Lost Island). Regarding the conclusiveness of Anselm’s argument, Davies holds that Anselm’s *Proslogion* 2 argument is formally valid and that there is no obvious mistake in its premises. Nevertheless, one can reject Anselm’s argument as inconclusive because we can refer to things and think of them in different kinds of ways. To elucidate the issue, Davies makes use of a distinction between referring to something ‘constitutively’ as opposed to ‘parasitically’ (173).

Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams have jointly authored two essays, ‘Anselm’s account of freedom’ (179-203) and ‘Anselm on truth’ (204-21). The former discusses Anselm’s account of free choice and freedom on the basis of *De Veritate*, *De Libertate Arbitrii*, *De Casu Diaboli* and *De Concordia*, relating it also to discussions about freedom in contemporary philosophy. Visser and Williams develop an Anselmian outlook into freedom as a power for self-initiated action. The latter essay discusses the main points in Anselm’s *De Veritate*.

Jeffrey E. Brower’s ‘Anselm on ethics’ (222-56) offers a new perspective into some important aspects of Anselm’s thought. Even though none of Anselm’s treatises is dedicated to a systematic discussion of ethical issues, it is possible to extract from his works something that moral philosophers today would recognize as a worked-out ethical theory — one that includes a sophisticated moral metaphysics, moral semantics and moral psychology’ (222). Anselm’s theory is ‘at bottom ... deontological in nature’ but it also incorporates central elements of medieval eudaimonistic ethical theory’ (223). Brower’s essay is probably the best treatment of Anselm’s ethics that is currently available.

The last two chapters deal with two doctrines that are specifically Christian. William E. Mann’s ‘Anselm on the Trinity’ (257-78) offers a discussion of Anselm’s thought on divine simplicity and triplicity, mainly on the basis of the *Monologion*. David Brown’s ‘Anselm on atonement’ (279-302) is a sympathetic and learned treatment of the account of redemption in *Cur Deus Homo*. By locating Anselm’s ideas in their context, Brown shows that the common views of Anselm’s account as being legalistic or feudal are largely based on misunderstanding.

From this brief description of the content of the essays, it should be clear that the volume as a whole is a very useful one. The essays in the collection cover a wide range of central topics related to Anselm’s philosophical contribution, they reflect reasonably well the mainstream views in Anglo-Ameri-
can scholarship, and they are, as a rule, well-written. *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm* is the most important single volume on Anselm's thought since Jasper Hopkins' 1972 *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, and it is likely that it will be the standard point of reference for the next decade(s).

Nevertheless, there are also serious weaknesses in the work. Eleven of the twelve contributors to the volume come from Britain or North America and, with a few exceptions, they do not refer to any studies in languages other than English. If the *Companion* is to be trusted, the last notable non-English contribution to Anselm studies was Karl Barth's 1931 *Fides quaerens intellectum*. There is actually plenty of recent scholarly work published in other European languages, some of it quite good. Such scholars as Coloman Viola, Yves Cattin and Paul Gilbert in the French area, and Klaus Kienzler, Markus Enders and Georgi Kapriev in the German area, to mention just a few, quickly come to mind. Even though the Anglo-American discussion forum is the largest, it is simply not admissible to ignore the other forums.

The volume is advertised as offering 'a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Anselm' (i). It fails to fulfill this promise — even for the Anglo-American discussions — for two reasons. First, few of the contributors are interested in relating their own view to the views of others. Second, there are interpretational problems that do not neatly fall into the topical scheme devised by the editors. In one of the central areas, the interpretation of the *Proslogion*, the *Companion* gives only a very pale reflection of recent discussions. Symptomatically, the bibliography at the end of the volume is short and appears rather accidental. One looks in vain for names like Thomas Morris, Katherin Rogers or Sally Vaughn, not to speak of the European scholars mentioned earlier.

Finally, in looking into Anselm's intellectual background, it is high time to take seriously the fact that Anselm's thinking is permeated by influences deriving from the art of logic or dialectic, which was studied on the basis of the Boethian logical corpus. Actually, the rise of logic in Anselm's time was one of the factors that made the full reception of Augustine's writings possible because the Bishop of Hippo also strongly relied on this art in his work.

**Toivo J. Holopainen**  
 *(Department of Systematic Theology)*  
 University of Helsinki
Harry G. Frankfurt
*On Bullshit.*
Pp. 67.

Michael P. Lynch
*True to Life: Why Truth Matters.*
Pp. xii + 204.

Few would deny the instrumental value, other things being equal, of having beliefs that accurately reflect features of the world and of living with others whom we can trust to share their true beliefs with us. Do these pragmatic considerations suffice to explain the concept of truth and account for its value? What is truth? And how does caring about it matter? These important questions — and many related ones — are tackled by Michael Lynch in his lively new book, *True to Life: Why Truth Matters.* They are also treated, from a different and more focused angle, by Harry Frankfurt in his essay, ‘On Bullshit’. This piece was originally published in *Raritan* in 1986, and reprinted in Frankfurt’s collected essays, *The Importance of What We Care About,* published by Cambridge University Press in 1988. It has been recently published yet again by Princeton University Press as a slender but handsome monograph, with much media attention and little reference to its more humble — or less pretentious — origins. Frankfurt’s agenda is to show that bullshit is worse than lying; Lynch’s more ambitious goal is to show that caring about truth for its own sake is a constitutive part of a good human life and is a requirement of liberal democracies. Both works are accessible to a general public; Lynch’s book could serve well as one text in a lower-level undergraduate philosophy course, although there are some annoying referencing mistakes in the Notes.

Lynch acknowledges a long-standing professional scepticism about the possibility of attaining truth and a more recent cynicism about the value of truth arising from postmodernist identifications of truth with power, or of truth with what passes for truth. This cynicism is not confined to the academy: the claim that truth is valuable only as a means is reinforced in the public’s eye by political leaders who explicitly value truth only pragmatically. Against this background, Lynch’s attempts to show that truth is objective and worth caring about for its own sake may strike some as quaint or naive. But Lynch does his homework, presenting and criticizing various accounts of the notion of truth and various arguments that purport to show that truth is unattainable, relative, or has merely pragmatic value.

Lynch sets out to establish four claims about the nature of truth, claims he calls ‘truisms’. He does not deny that some would dispute them, but he
takes them to capture what he means by ‘truth’ and what is involved in truth ‘mattering’. The four truisms are: truth is objective; it is good to believe what is true; truth is a worthy goal of inquiry; and truth is worth caring about for its own sake. Lynch’s understanding of ‘objective’ is deliberately minimalist and is not grounded in an extravagant metaphysics. Truth is something at which we aim, but it may not be simple, and we may be mistaken in thinking we have attained it. Dogmatism, stubborn adherence to beliefs thought to be true, or feelings of absolute certainty are not evidence that truth is objective. Our ignorance and the fact that we can be mistaken in our beliefs provide the best grounds for insisting on the objectivity of truth. The truism that it is good to believe what is true is supported by noting that ‘true’ as a way of characterizing beliefs provides a positive evaluation. As James put it, truth is ‘the good in the way of belief.’ Being true is what makes a belief good to have. This leads us to the third truism: given that true beliefs are good to have, we have reason to pursue truth. We cannot pursue truth directly (we cannot believe on demand), but we can pursue it indirectly by adopting methods and habits of inquiry that are generally likely to result in true beliefs. We evaluate cognitive strategies and dispositions, and we commend those that reliably conduce to acquiring true beliefs. These strategies and dispositions are valued because we value true beliefs. The last truism explicitly introduces the ideas that truth has more than instrumental value and that our lives will be better to the extent that we care about truth for its own sake. The claim that truth has intrinsic value is one about which philosophers, with the notable exception of the late Bernard Williams in *Truth and Truthfulness* (Princeton UP 2002), have had little to say recently. The case for this fourth truism is developed by Lynch in Part III.

In the remainder of Part I and in Part II, Lynch’s strategy is to show that standard philosophical theories about the nature of truth deny one or more of these basic truisms and that, in doing so, each of them fails to provide an acceptable account of truth, and each fails to explain why truth matters. Part I focuses on traditional sceptical arguments about the possibility of attaining the truth; relativist challenges, including recent postmodern ones, to the concept of truth; and the worry that true beliefs can be harmful. Part II looks at more technical arguments in recent analytic philosophy of language about the nature of truth. This section will prove more challenging to a general non-professional audience, but Lynch does an admirable job of presenting judiciously pragmatist, coherentist, verificationist, correspondence, and deflationary or minimalist theories of truth. His exposition of these positions serves the dual purpose of providing the reader with a clear outline of the relevant philosophical positions and of inviting the reader to consider whether any of them captures the truisms about truth to which Lynch claims we are all committed.

Lynch argues that truth should be viewed as a higher-level functional property that is dependent upon but not reducible to lower-level properties. Indeed, truth may be multiply realized by distinct lower-level properties. Being true is what beliefs are supposed to be: it is their proper function. But
not all true beliefs are true in the same way. Lynch argues that viewing truth as a 'thick' sort of value — with both descriptive and evaluative content — commits us to an understanding of truth, features of which sceptics, relativists, naysayers about truth, pragmatists, coherentists, verificationists, correspondence theorists, and deflationists and minimalists cannot accommodate.

In Part III, Lynch develops his position that our own lives will go better to the extent that we care about truth for its own sake. He does not insist on the implausible claim that each additional true belief will make our lives go better. Caring about truth for its own sake is distinct from wanting to hold lots of true beliefs. The former involves a commitment to truth as a goal of inquiry, valuable for its own sake, and it reveals what Lynch identifies as the deeply normative feature of truth. Lynch appears cautious about the prospects of being able to establish directly that truth has intrinsic value. Instead, he appeals to self-respect, authenticity, and integrity as constitutive parts of a good human life. They each require, ‘caring about truth and believing the truth about what you care about’ (143). Caring about truth in the right way engages the will, and it requires a respect for truth as such which is incompatible with according truth merely instrumental value. It is here that the intersection with Frankfurt's essay is clearest.

Frankfurt does not suppose in his essay that the notion of truth is problematic. Starting with Max Black's essay, 'The Prevalence of Humbug', he sets out to explore the concept of bullshit. Both bullshit and lies involve misrepresentation. An agent who lies typically intends to bring about in her audience beliefs that she herself regards as false. She also typically intends to get her audience to attribute to her beliefs she does not hold. One who lies must therefore respect truth: she investigates the world in ways she takes to be reliable, and she forms beliefs that she takes to be true. Her aim is to acquire true beliefs, but her decisions to share her true beliefs are based on the pragmatic value to her of having others believe particular non-truths. One who lies aims to direct others away from the truth in cases where the discovery by others of the way things are would threaten some of her own ends. Lying is prima facie bad because it is a form of exercising power over another, but it takes place within the constraints of standards of cognitive inquiry.

Frankfurt claims that an agent who bullshits may well intend to get his audience to acquire beliefs, often about himself, often about some product or cause he wants to promote, but he himself is indifferent to the truth of the claims he makes or the truth of the claims he wants his audience to infer on the basis of the claims he makes. One who utters bullshit, according to Frankfurt, has insufficient regard for truth. His claims may be quite carefully wrought, as seen in the bullshit of advertisers and politicians, but they are wrought with non-cognitive ends in mind, and they do not result from investigations into the way things are. An agent who bullshits is not concerned to acquire true beliefs, nor is he concerned to share beliefs he takes to be true with others. But he pretends that he is. It is his attitude to truth
and to truth acquisition that he misrepresents, and it is in virtue of this
deception that Frankfurt argues that bullshit is a greater enemy of truth
than are lies.

Liars and truth-tellers are equally truth-seekers, but the former are not
reliable truth-sharers. Bullshitters are neither truth-seekers nor truth­
sharers. Their aim is to get others to acquire certain beliefs, but not because
they think these beliefs are true, or because they have or are prepared to
provide compelling evidence in their favour. Frankfurt accounts for the
prevalence of bullshit by citing some people’s readiness to pronounce on
matters about which they have little expertise, sometimes fueled by a general
scepticism about the possibility of getting at the truth or about the notion of
objective reality. Lynch’s arguments against a pervasive postmodern cyni­
cism about the nature of truth are relevant here, as is his observation that a
commitment to the objectivity of truth requires that we concede both our
ignorance where it exists and the difficulty of attaining some truths.

In saying whatever he thinks will make it most likely that his audience
will acquire the beliefs he wants them to acquire, Frankfurt’s bullshitter does
care about truth, either for its own sake or instrumentally. The sincere
person cares about truth for its own sake, and she values saying what she
thinks is true because she thinks it is true. But one can care about truth for
its own sake and at the same time assess the value of sharing one’s true
beliefs along merely instrumental lines, as does the one who lies. Or one can
pretend to be sharing beliefs one has investigated to be true and at the same
time not care about truth, either for its own sake or instrumentally, as does
the one who bullshits. Frankfurt and Lynch, in their different ways, provide
us with good reasons to care about truth for its own sake and to employ our
versions of P.T. Barnum’s ‘humbugometer’ to detect and resist the cognitive
bullying in which purveyors of bullshit — both within the academy and
outside it — engage.

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Animal Pragmatism attempts to answer the question whether American pragmatism has a special and valuable contribution to make to debates in animal ethics. Obviously, the editors, authors and publisher who have produced this volume believe it does. Having read it, however, I am less impressed by the theoretical impact of pragmatist ideas in this sphere than by how the pragmatic spirit of experimentation shapes the practice of animal welfare.

To begin with, as many essays in Animal Pragmatism point out, John Dewey (whom most of these authors regard as the central canonical figure in the movement) did not write very much about the human-nonhuman animal relationship, and what he did write is generally highly anthropocentric, but sometimes also ambivalent. Thus, he asserts, in a 1926 article for Atlantic Monthly on ‘The Ethics of Animal Experimentation’, that using animals in biomedical research is not only permissible but obligatory, even if it causes ‘some pain’ to them. The argument is as follows. Nonhuman animals lack the capacities necessary for full participation in the moral community (self-awareness, responsibility, relevant interests, educability, etc.). Hence, they cannot be ‘partner[s] in a shared activity’ such as the moral life (Democracy and Education). Their moral status is therefore secondary to that of humans. But those who can participate in the moral community have an obligation to contribute as best they can to improving one another’s quality of life. Consequently, humans may use animals as means to this end, even if in doing so they regrettably cause suffering to them. Elsewhere, Steven Fesmire (‘Dewey and Animal Ethics’) lists, in two appendices, all of the categories of evaluation according to which Dewey both separates humans from nonhumans (consciousness, language, thought, culture, emotion, etc.), and asserts the evolutionary advancement and superiority of the former over the latter. Fesmire avers that the expression ‘Deweyan animal ethics ... appears oxymoronic.’

But as Erin McKenna points out, for example (‘Pragmatism and the Production of Livestock’), both Dewey and William James contradict themselves in their pronouncements concerning animals. Dewey can be found arguing for ‘the continuity of nature, man and society’ (Human Nature and
Conduct), while James, although declaring that animals possess little or no reasoning ability (Principles of Psychology), also criticizes 'the stupidity and injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the significance of alien lives' ('On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings').

These problems of consistency lead some authors in this collection to re-examine the basic meaning and commitments of pragmatism, and it is as a primer in the original philosophy of pragmatism that the book is most instructive. For several pieces review the ideas of pragmatism (usually with reference to a particular thinker), as a starting-point, or else attempt to separate these ideas from the idiosyncratic prejudices or areas of ignorance that, in individual pragmatists, mask the underlying, more productive discourse of the movement. Those who choose this second path endeavour to take a fresh look at problems of animal ethics, using a pragmatist framework of inquiry.

What are the salient points about pragmatism that makes it pertinent to debates over animal use issues? John McDermott calls attention, in his 'Foreword', to a 'pragmatic sensibility, by which I mean the systemic alertness to the presence of consequences in all of our practices and decisions.' The editors then observe that pragmatism is 'a school of thought born in part out of the desire to make philosophical labor more relevant to public concerns, maybe even more necessary,' and that it 'focuses on developing a critical approach to life in which all people can engage' ('Introduction: Pragmatism and the Future of Human-Nonhuman Relationships'). Each form of inquiry (ethics no less than any other), as Phillip McReynolds urges, is situated, contingent and generates tentative conclusions ('Overlapping Horizons of Meaning: A Deweyan Approach to the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals'). McKenna states that pragmatism 'starts with where we are and continually checks in with experience .... [It] challenges received experience and inherited wisdom and pushes people to be critical of their habits.'

Whether it follows from all these good orientations that pragmatism per se is naturally inclined to question the abuse and exploitation of animals is far from clear, however, the editors' claims to this effect notwithstanding. Some of the pragmatists in this volume seem at least reasonably comfortable with the pain and suffering endured by animals in the processes that yield meat, medical discoveries and hunting opportunities, for instance. So it seems that pragmatism alone is not enough to develop a genuine concern over these things, a clearly defined ethical position on them, and a will to do something to ameliorate the present situation; adherence to an animal rights or animal liberation stance (or some other related view) is also essential. Furthermore, and more worrying, pragmatism seems to lend itself rather readily to the justification of animal abuse and exploitation precisely because of its dedication to a flexible approach to knowledge and practice. While it is laudatory that pragmatism stands for an experimental approach to experience, and to what Fesmire calls the 'fallible and revisable' nature of ontological categories, one wonders whether it is the case that, for practitioners of this theory, anything goes. As Paul B. Thompson argues, 'getting pragmatic
in practice requires some sophistication about which practices we want to affect ("Getting Pragmatic about Farm Animal Welfare"). Which indeed? And how should one's principle of selection be guarded against arbitrariness and control by vested interests? For Thompson, greater benefits flow to livestock from 'consumers willing to pay for humane farming practices' than from 'the advocacy of vegetarianism'. This may be true in the short term, but it does nothing to address the inherent cruelty, speciesism and instrumentalism of basing our diets on meat, let alone the environmental damage that this choice entails. Such issues, however, are overshadowed by Thompson's irrelevant, misleading, indeed bizarre observation that 'enduring slaughter has proved to be an enormously successful evolutionary strategy for domesticated livestock species.' Similarly, Jennifer Welchman contends that animal experimentation is 'a tragic necessity'. But this is only so for those who (like Dewey and Welchman) have rationalized the exclusion of animals from the moral community to begin with, see no positive duties toward them, fail to understand that animals, even with limited intelligence, are unconsenting subjects whose welfare matters to them, and show little interest in promoting alternatives to animal research.

On the plus side, there are several voices in this collection that extend pragmatism in a different, more revolutionary direction. James M. Albrecht, for example, drawing upon Emerson as a proto-pragmatist thinker, suggests that 'a pragmatic ethic of cultivating an openness to those aspects of experience obscured by our culturally constructed purposes' may lead us to revise how we treat animals ('"What Does Rome Know of Rat and Lizard?": Pragmatic Mandates for Considering Animals in Emerson, James, and Dewey'). According to McReynolds, it is in the spirit of pragmatism to hold that 'moral standing, like community membership, is always a product of negotiation and is never solved once and for all.' Douglas R. Anderson, in the only essay devoted to Charles Sanders Peirce, maintains that this philosopher's analysis of semiotics entails that there is rich and significant communication between humans and animals, and 'indirectly calls into question the natural privilege of being human' ('Peirce's Horse: A Sympathetic and Semeiotic Bond'). McKenna suggests that the 'social complexity' exhibited by the great apes should lead a 'consistent pragmatist' to embrace them within the moral community, and that the meat industry's wasteful and cruel usage of animals should give way to 'a more sustainable diet.' Todd M. Lekan strongly presents 'A Pragmatist Case for Animal Advocates on Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees', and Matthew Pamental offers a very interesting close-up report on ways to create greater social responsibility for companion animals in 'Pragmatism and Pets: Best Friends Animal Sanctuary, Maddie's FundSM, and No More Homeless Pets in Utah'.

In addition to all this, there is something very appealing about the pragmatic approach to moral thinking, as it is represented in this collection. For much of the debate surrounding contemporary moral issues — whether in normative ethical theory or in applied ethics — has the character of entrenched positions clashing against one another, with little prospect of
modification, compromise or resolution. From this perspective, pragmatism seems to offer a breath of fresh air, in that it endorses a different, more constructive view of what is involved in working through moral issues. A particularly good exposition of this sort is given by Ben A. Minteer (Beyond Considerability: A Deweyan View of the Animal Rights-Environmental Ethics Debate). Minteer argues that the debate he surveys has generally been cast as one 'over the moral status of nonhuman animals and nature, rather than a series of practical conflicts requiring the evaluation of competing goods and deliberation over alternative proposals and claims in specific cases requiring intelligent judgment.' Minteer advances the Deweyan claim that 'moral reasoning is an experimental activity carried out in the context of specific “problematic situations”.' Conceptualizing it in this way elicits an image of ethical thinking that is 'more akin to contemporary methods of dispute resolution than to traditional ethical theorizing,' and that makes it into 'a more experimental and case-based approach.' In a similar vein, Andrew Light (Methodological Pragmatism, Animal Welfare, and Hunting) posits that when environmental ethicists and animal liberationists agree on ends (such as the abolition of factory farming), the question should be who 'can offer appeals for stronger and better policies and laws ... , which will be intuitively appealing for those who do not count themselves as either environmentalists or animal advocates?' One can only applaud such remarks, as they are in the interest of progressive dialogue, consensus-building and change, as opposed to sterile, adversarial, litigious conflicts between rigid standpoints.

How far this kind of ethical project can realistically be pursued and can succeed in today's world is itself a pragmatic question. But like many social reforms and innovations that have not really been tried out seriously in practice, we cannot rationally pass judgment upon it a priori.

Julian H. Franklin's short monograph, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy, is a determined attempt to ground Tom Regan's argument in favour of animal rights in a Kantian rational imperative. After reviewing the deficiencies of utilitarianism, as a general ethical approach and as an approach to animal ethics, Franklin then conducts a careful examination of Regan's theory of animal rights which, despite its shortcomings, Franklin nonetheless considers 'the best argument for giving full respect to animals.' The main problem he finds with this theory is that, in ascribing (equal) inherent value to animals that are 'subjects of a life', Regan relies on the proposition that 'no serious moral thinker' would deny moral status entirely to animals. Franklin counters that even if none would, such a view is theoretically possible, and therefore Regan's proposition weakens the foundations of his own approach. (Deciding who counts as a 'serious moral thinker' also yields an opportunity for serious arbitrariness — a point Franklin fails to make. And indeed he indulges himself in referring to those who would avoid denying moral status to animals as a class of 'decent and responsible moral theorists'.)

There follow two lengthy chapters on Kant and on contractarianism, in which Franklin argues, in sometimes recondite and obsessive detail, that: (a)
Kant’s categorical imperative, properly understood, either collapses as a supreme moral principle, or else must be extended from all rational to all sentient beings; and (b) any contract theory that excludes sentient beings from the scope of the moral community is defective. As Franklin notes, limiting the class of moral agents to rational, consenting or responsible beings does nothing to restrict the class of moral patients or their claims to considerate and respectful treatment. Furthermore, ‘the life of every sentient being is as important to that individual as our life is to us. It is not a question of anything like “better” or “richer”. The life of a dog, of an ant, or of a human is the only life it will ever have. It is inevitably finite, and once it is over it is infinitely gone. In that sense all sentient lives have an equal inherent value.’ Franklin’s overall conclusion is that Kant’s categorical imperative, in a revised form, is the appropriate foundation for animal rights theory: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat sentience in your own existence or in the existence of any other, never simply as a means, but also as an end.’

While Franklin’s arguments are interesting, detailed and original, there are a few lapses of logic in his book. One example is furnished by the statement that ‘if “wrong” can be done to animals, they must have rights.’ This just seems to be a dogmatic assertion that a rights approach is the only way to give content to statements about what kind of conduct is right or wrong. Another concerns his critique of the ethics of care. Franklin makes the valid point that care needs guidance and direction, which it can only acquire by being grounded by some independent moral principle(s). But it is equally true that if people don’t care (e.g., about other humans or nonhumans), then they aren’t likely to be motivated to act according to ethical imperatives (except for prudential reasons). So abstract moral principles alone are equally inadequate (as the case of Kant shows).

Toward the end of his book, Franklin takes on the difficult task of reconciling animal rights with environmentalism. Like Regan, he rejects holistic ethical theories (such as Aldo Leopold’s ‘land ethic’ and its derivatives) as incompatible with individual rights of any kind, and rejects moral pluralism as incoherent. Unfortunately, he follows Regan’s lead in asserting that ‘legitimate’ human interests that ‘enhance [or protect] their quality of life’ trump animals’ rights (to habitat, to flourishing and even to life). The claim is that humans can (and should) be anthropocentric, though they must respect the inherent value of animals’ lives at the same time. There is a fine line between this view and incoherence too, however, and Franklin’s thought experiment, in which he asks us to conceive of our relationship to non-domesticated species as a just war situation, does not help.

These problems aside, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy is a worthy addition to the animal rights literature, inasmuch as it attempts to fill in some gaps in this theory and to explore more fully its broader implications.

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Twentieth-century mainstream academic philosophy was neither intellectually nor demographically inclusive of real life social justice. Reasons proposed have included the racism and sexism of individual philosophers and an antiseptic history of abstract thought that keeps the hands of thinkers clean from the germs of human life. It is unusual for members of any established philosophical subfield to interrogate their tradition about these matters. That work is still quarantined, as are feminists, specialists in race or ethnicity, and those who teach 'applied' ethics.

Therefore, given just the title, Bill E. Lawson and Donald F. Koch have made an important contribution to American Philosophy, or Pragmatism, by editing and writing in *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race*. Their goal is to redirect American Philosophy toward issues concerning race, specifically the problems of African Americans, and to do so based on an awareness of how their pragmatic predecessors failed to be engaged in the same way. Their efforts receive enthusiastic support from Cornel West, in an Afterword interview conducted by Lawson, in which West also evokes several new questions.

Lawson and Koch introduce the anthology by noting that problems with race in the U.S. were generated by American slavery. Pragmatism, in addition to being as distinctively American as race during and after slavery, was created to connect ideas with action and theory with practice. Dewey, James, Mead, Pierce and other American pragmatists inverted the philosophical presumption that knowledge precedes action by describing knowledge as a response to difficulties encountered through action. According to James, the sentiment of rationality could be divided into a passion for simplicity and a passion for distinction. Inspired by this distinction, Lawson and Koch have divided the writings in *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race*, into Part I, which mainly addresses theoretical issues, and Part II, which is about more specific concerns involving minority racial experience.

Thus, in Part I, 'Pragmatism as a General Approach to the Problem of Race', Michael Eldridge, Gregory Fernando Pappas, Donald F. Koch, John R. Shook, D. Micah Hester and Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. undertake some of the criticism and reconstruction of Pragmatism required by its historical neglect of social justice. Eldridge explains how Dewey neglected the subject of race in his writings, even though his heart may have been in the right place and he goes on to show how a Deweyian approach can be applied in its collaborative, deliberative, experimental and educational dimensions. Pappas also takes up a positive Deweyian methodology as a way to end racial prejudice.
by closing the ‘distance’ between philosophers and this problem. Koch and Shook take Dewey further into these issues, with Koch calling for an application of Dewey’s thought to end racial segregation and Shook offering a pragmatist defense of public education. Hesta draws on Mead’s notion of social selves to further develop a pragmatist perspective on race, and Glaude, through a reading of Toni Morrison, opens the worm can of the compatibility of democracy and race in the U.S., given what he calls the ‘tragedy’ of American race.

James’ distinction between simplifying and specifying could be specious because good simplifying should contain relevant complications and good specifying will be no more complicated than it has to be; moreover, the line between theory and practice is difficult to maintain in pragmatist philosophy. But there is a difference between Part I of Pragmatism and the Problem of Race and Part II. In Part I, the writers are looking back toward their founders, whereas Part II gives us a taste of the positive program. Thus, in Part II, ‘Pragmatism and Means’, Bill Lawson, David E. Mc Clean, Paul C. Taylor, Alfred E. Prettyman, Scott L. Pratt and Judith M. Green pay attention to existing and historical events, present difficulties, and real people in ways that provide pragmatic content that was lacking when Dewey managed not to write in Crisis or participate in crusades against the lynchings that were committed while he was America’s premier public intellectual. As the editors put it in their introduction, Dewey’s concept of ‘the problematic’ entails that an engagement with means to an end will generate a new inquiry about the end as soon as the sailing is not smooth (3).

This realistic or pragmatic relation between means and ends is first explored by Lawson in his argument that Booker T. Washington’s practical and somewhat conservative approach to race relations historically served high ideals of education and civic development for very large numbers of African Americans. McClean makes a case for racial ‘eliminativism’ on the grounds that everything good about race can be preserved if we instead focus on the contingent non-racial traits and conditions that have accompanied false biologistic notions of race. Taylor disagrees with him and claims that we need to conserve ideas of race in order to understand present mentation and institutional structures of our culture, as well as its history. This debate, as a debate, is anchored in inquiries that extend into non-pragmatist subfields of philosophy and beyond, but it is very interesting that on its pragmatist ground, the distance between so-called ‘eliminativism’ and ‘conservation’ shrinks to an implicit suggestion that we can have both. We just need to remember to distinguish between what we think our best claims are and what we think the claims of others with mistaken premises are. That is, we can conserve race by studying the culture in a second-order discourse, a conservation that in itself eliminates race from our own first-order discourse. (This may sound like elitism but even stand-up comics today play with ideas of elitism, which suggests that public intellectuals and those who aspire to that role, need not worry too much.)
Going on in Part II, Prettyman (who was one of the principal founders of twentieth-century African American philosophy) writes about the danger minorities face of being smothered in a democratic culture that implicitly privileges assimilation. Pratt develops a contemporary perspective on the importance of racial diversity in higher education, using both the example of the mission statement of the University of Oregon and his own view of his responsibilities as a white male philosopher in contexts that have not been racially diverse historically. Judith Green closes the volume by advocating the post-9/11 development of cosmopolitan hospitality through love developed in religious community.

Lawson asks West incisive questions in the Afterword, and West responds from what he calls the bedrock of his Jacobian Christianity, which he says cuts deeper than his pragmatism. Still, West is somewhat dismissive of what he calls 'spiritual edification and moralism' in the absence of strong analytic skills, mobilizing leadership under pressure, and communication. Communication is in fact West’s answer to the tragedy of race in the USA and his present struggle against this tragedy, through movie roles, television appearances and spoken word CD’s is described by him as ‘contextualized’ communication. This would seem to leave the ideal of pragmatic activism unfulfilled, because discourse, besides not being action, may risk just being about the performer and preclude an engagement with those he or she is trying to help.

However, West offers a fascinating contrast between the Christian God who creates everything ex nihilo and Greek gods and demi-gods, who in Plato’s *Timaeus* have to deal with a pre-existing material world that has intractable limits. West suggests that race is analogous to *ananke*, the ultimate constraint that ushers in tragedy.

There is indeed frequent reference to the tragedy of race in the U.S. in Lawson and Koch’s volume, and this is puzzling. The contributors do not define tragedy, which leaves us with Aristotle’s notion of the consequences of an error in judgment stemming from the settled trait of character of someone who is good but not extraordinary. If the actions that have caused and sustained American racism were or still are errors of judgment — which few now believe — are those responsible for them otherwise good? Furthermore, if racism in the U.S. were a tragedy, then its perpetrators and not its victims should suffer from it. That it is the victims who have suffered and continue to suffer suggests that philosophers and other scholars, no matter how high there literary and rhetorical skills, would better serve us all if they used the word ‘crime’ instead of ‘tragedy’.

All of the contributors to *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race* succeed in demonstrating how pragmatism as a mode of philosophy can be more than the reading and writing and thinking and talking that make up academic philosophizing. The problem of the marginalization of pragmatism itself by those who reign in the center of twenty-first century academic philosophy is small compared to this achievement. And despite its marginalization, few doubt that pragmatist philosophy is philosophy (no matter how maliciously envious some analytic philosophers may be of Richard Rorty). So now, there
is a strong precedent for the incorporation of concerns about race and racism, into pragmatist philosophy. *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race* should be very useful for classes on American philosophy, classes on race and research in both broad subfields.

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Noah Lemos  
*Common Sense: a Contemporary Defense.*  
Pp. xvi + 192.  

Gone are the days when walking off a cliff, living in a bathtub, or inventing a new science would have seemed natural outgrowths of philosophical epistemology. Whether this reflects growing modesty or a lamentable failure of commitment, few contemporary philosophers would undertake the radical reforming projects that animated ancient skeptics, early modern natural philosophers, or nineteenth-century Idealists. And fewer yet would countenance a theory of knowledge that abjured the collective beliefs of certain important, non-philosophical communities (except those of Twin Earth or strange swamps). To this extent then, most epistemologists today can be said to respect the common knowledge of some community.

For naturalists of various stripes that community is natural science. Common-sense theorists, though, give at least equal credence to some beliefs of 'common-sense'. They need not credit all beliefs of common-sense, but the hallmark of their approach is that at least some such beliefs are as good as our knowledge gets, and that that is more than good enough. But if the naturalist relies on an idealized picture of science that abstracts from incompleteness and internal conflict, the common-sense theorist faces considerable difficulty even in identifying her subject-matter, despite such philosophical chestnut as 'this is a hand', or the familiar injunction to come in out of the rain.

The first example figures prominently in Noah Lemos' book, which looks to the work of Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm for an account of common-sense epistemology. Despite some (unavoidable) vagueness, Lemos thinks we can unpack the notion of common sense by considering various particular propositions: those that are matters of common knowledge, including epistemic propositions (e.g., 'people know things and know that they know things'); those that might not be common knowledge, but are readily available to individuals (e.g., 'this is my hand'); and readily available entail-
ments of those propositions (e.g., ‘there are material objects’). Such propositions are typically derived from perception or memory, and so the common sense theorist will be committed to assuming the general reliability of those faculties. But she is no reliabilist: her starting points are simply the particular propositions of common sense. They are starting points not because they are psychologically irresistible, or even indispensable, but because they are genuine instances of knowledge and data for any theory of knowledge.

Lemos’ main aim is to show that the common sense tradition is not ‘unphilosophical, dogmatic, intemperate or question-begging, at least not in any intellectually vicious way’ (182). Part of what drives his defense is an epistemic anti-elitism that denies that knowledge could depend on some intricate epistemological theory accessible only to a few. Instead, Lemos maintains it is much more reasonable to hold that we know — and know that we know — certain common sense propositions with a degree of security no merely theoretical claim can trump. Showing the philosophical respectability of this stance is the task of the rest of the book.

Chapters 2 and 3 consider how to account for the reliability of our faculties. Borrowing from Ernest Sosa to distinguish between the animal knowledge of children and animals and the reflective knowledge of adults, Lemos maintains that the former needs no justification, only the various intellectual virtues that make a belief ‘apt’. On this basis, he argues that by starting with a set of apt beliefs that qualify as knowledge, we can justify the reliability of our faculties through abductive inference. Such procedures may be circular, but not viciously so, for holding that some belief is justified by way of other beliefs is simply not the same as holding that it is generated by those justifying beliefs. More generally, Lemos points out that although circular accounts can provide some justification by showing how our beliefs cohere, we can look for other virtues and other ways of checking our beliefs besides mere coherence. One way is through wide reflective equilibrium, which Lemos takes to go well beyond a method of adjusting our beliefs for optimal coherence.

Some of the same strategies appear in Chapter 5, where Lemos considers the charge that Moore’s arguments against external world skepticism are question-begging. Lemos allows that there is a tension between common sense belief and such meta-epistemic claims as the ‘principle of exclusion’ and ‘sensitivity requirement for knowledge.’ Again, he borrows from Sosa to substitute ‘safety’ for ‘sensitivity’, thereby disarming skepticism, while showing its plausibility. But even were there no such alternate requirement of safety, Lemos maintains that it cannot be more reasonable to believe in any such requirement than in the particular proposition that ‘this is a hand’.

Chapter 6 tackles methodological considerations head-on, arguing that the common-sensist must be a particularist, rather than a ‘methodist’ — not a matter of religious practice, but of the direction of explanatory dependence. Methodism holds that we need a method for determining what will count as instances of knowledge. But since we lack justified belief in relevant general principles, it entails that we either don’t know particular propositions, or
must wait for epistemologists to complete their work to decide if we do. And so methodism (and its evil twin, methodological skepticism) is pretty much ruled out for the common sense particularist, who puts her epistemic stock in particular common sense propositions. This is so even if the normative qualities of epistemology (e.g., being known, justified, reasonable) themselves supervene on other non-epistemic properties of our beliefs (a lesson also applied to moral properties in Chapter 8).

None of this is to deny that there is some room for the general claims we expect from a theory of knowledge or ethics. Chapter 7 seeks to accommodate a priori knowledge, particularly of epistemic principles such as the principle of exclusion, by endorsing a ‘modest’ a priorism, in which a priori knowledge need be neither subjectively certain nor permanently indefeasible. And so, Lemos makes room for philosophical investigation within the broad common sense tradition. Common sense propositions may provide a starting foundation of data, but we can use them to search for criteria of justification, knowledge and right action through wide reflective equilibrium.

Although Lemos’s book is clear and straightforward, it may not fully escape dogmatism in its treatment of common sense ‘data’. For Lemos seems to countenance no possibility that these data might be defeasible. If what is at issue is what we have most reason to believe, might we not prefer to hold that no proposition — methodical or particular — is immune to revision? Naturalist accounts typically allow that any proposition can be defeated if the cost of maintaining it is too high. Perhaps we should set the bar for revising common sense propositions quite high, but without making them sacrosanct — any more than theories of natural science take empirical data to be sacrosanct in the long slog towards achieving equilibrium between our beliefs and whatever contributions the empirical world might make in the future. True, I find it hard to imagine that it would ever be reasonable to give up my belief that these are my hands typing on a computer, but perhaps I ought to keep an open mind about both the world and the limits of my imagination.

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Peter Ludlow, Yugin Nagasawa and Daniel Stoljar, eds.
There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.
Pp. xx + 463.

This volume is a selection of papers (of which four are new) dealing with Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. The argument considers Mary who is assumed to know all the physical facts. She has so far been confined to a strictly black and white environment. Upon her release, she encounters a red tomato. Jackson claims that she thereby learns something new, namely what it is like to experience the colour red, and thereby knows a new fact. Ex hypothesi, there are therefore non-physical facts and physicalism is false. After the two original papers by Jackson presenting the argument (42-3; 51), the responses are organised according to how much of the original argument is accepted. The following issues are thus addressed in turn. Does Mary learn anything new? If she does, is this factual knowledge or not? If it is, is it only know-how or acquaintance? If not, is it merely knowledge of old facts in a new form? The final two questions addressed in the volume deal directly with the main assumption and the conclusion of the argument: did Mary know all the physical facts prior to her release? Is physicalism false? These issues are clearly presented in the introduction after a very interesting historical context setting of Jackson’s argument (6-9).

The book’s foreword, by Jackson, does a wonderful job of whetting the reader’s appetite for what is to follow. He reminds us why his knowledge argument potentially represents a strong challenge to physicalism, while indicating that he now views the argument to be invalid. The importance of the argument rests first upon the power of the intuition that underpins it. And second, it lies in the failure of two important forms of criticism of the argument, which Jackson briefly argues for. To describe phenomenal knowledge as perspectival is to overlook its objective content: it describes in what way certain agents are similar (namely in their having an identical experience) (xviii). And as for the claim that phenomenal knowledge is just knowledge under a different aspect/mode from that acquired through physics, this leaves open the question of whether this aspect/mode is itself physical (xix).

The responses to Jackson’s argument start with an opening salvo from Dennett. He dismisses the whole problem by simply claiming that Mary’s having complete physical knowledge about colours would have enabled her to know what it is like to see red (62). Dennett is eloquent in his condemnation of those who take on board some of the argument’s claims. He talks of the ‘woebegone mistake’ (65) of the epiphenomenalism entailed by Jackson’s conclusion, and of ‘the preposterous and ignoble relic of ancient prejudices’...
(66) of the related idea of the possibility of zombies. Howard Robinson's response (69) is well pitched: ‘[Dennett] believes that if he marches around a philosophical problem often enough ... the problem will dissolve before our eyes.’

Pettit’s paper written for this volume shows one way in which Dennett’s position can be fleshed out. He endeavours to show that there is nothing about ‘what it is like’ that cannot be accounted for in terms of a subject’s dispositional properties (124). This analysis may not convince the reader, but it is a worthwhile investigation into the nature of phenomenal consciousness. Churchland defends the related view that the knowledge argument equivocates upon the notion of knowledge. Mary’s ‘new’ knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. But the claim Mary knew all the physical facts is only defensible on the assumption that this is knowledge by description (164). That phenomenal knowledge involves acquaintance is also the line taken by Bigelow & Pargetter (191) and Conee (203). The main shortcoming of this view lies in the absence of an uncontroversial definition of what acquaintance actually involves.

The volume includes some of the key papers in the discussion of the knowledge argument. One of those has David Lewis arguing that all that Mary acquires upon her release is an ability (77). Lewis’s claim that Mary’s new knowledge is not factual since it does not involve the elimination of hitherto open possibilities (94), is directly refuted in Nida-Rümelin’s excellent paper. She considers Marianna, who is not assumed to know all the physical facts, but has lived a sheltered life in a black-and-white world. She experiences two phases of epistemic progress (254). First, as she is shown coloured slides, she gains access to questions she could not have considered before, e.g., what is it like to see something red? Then, upon entering the coloured world, she finds answers to these questions and, pace Lewis, thereby locates herself in the space of possibilities.

Tye’s defence of the view that Mary acquires new concepts but not knowledge of new properties is welcome for its clarity. Tye’s argument is constructed around an attempt to understand the ‘what it is like’ of the phenomenal experience. He shows that this cannot be reduced to know-how (153), and thus proposes a disjunctive account (155). This is an important paper which, like Bigelow & Pargetter and Conee, shows the shortcomings of Lewis’s claim (98) that the possession of phenomenal information is merely that of abilities to ‘remember, imagine and recognize’ (102).

The claim that what Mary learns is not knowledge of new properties, but rather of old properties with new concepts is examined in greater detail by Loar (222-3) who shows that this response cannot simply appeal to the notion of a posteriori necessity. Rather, Loar makes a subtle case for viewing phenomenal concepts as a particular type of recognitional concepts that refer to physical-functional properties (227). This appeal to a strong notion of metaphysical necessity is grounded in the rejection of a semantic premise needed by the anti-physicalist argument (224). But, as Chalmers (292) points out, no good reason has been given to reject this premise.
Chalmers' contribution, written for this volume, is remarkable for its clarity. Using the two-dimensional framework for the analysis of intension, it pinpoints small weaknesses of the argument and produces a formalised version which convincingly addresses the main objections (279-83). It interestingly throws up panprotopsychism as a possible alternative to outright rejection of physicalism (283). Although Chalmers does not commit himself as to whether panprotopsychism is a form of physicalism, Stoljar, in a very original and well-written paper, sees this as the form that physicalism must take in the light of the knowledge argument (325). This Russellian position (also defended elsewhere by Feigl, Galen Strawson and Lockwood) has emerged as an important metaphysical position as a result of this whole debate.

After a paper by Horgan (301) and a new paper by Hellie (333), which question Mary's complete physical knowledge prior to her release, Van Gulick's contribution, written for this volume, discusses the options already reviewed by Chalmers. He claims (369) that each one exhibits a weakness of the knowledge argument, namely its inability to resolve conflicts between competing intuitions. The discussion is disappointing, but Van Gulick does make an important contribution in examining the knowledge argument from the perspective of non-reductive physicalism. He puts his finger on an unresolved issue (397): although what Mary discovers is not derivable a priori from micro-physical truths, she does not have the available concepts. It would thus seem the argument cannot draw the required metaphysical conclusion: similarly, our inability to derive the facts of biology from physics without biological concepts does not entail the non-supervenience of biology on physics.

Nevertheless, given the non-reducibility of phenomenal concepts, and the fact that the epistemic gap dividing them from the physical is prima facie quite different from that separating the special sciences from physics, Van Gulick's claim that it is up to the anti-physicalist's 'destructive intuition' to 'achieve a clear victory over its competitor in order to win our acceptance' (384) is surprising, to say the least. Why would supervenience of the phenomenal be the default assumption? The onus would rather seem to be on the physicalist to justify it with more convincing tools than respect for the dominant metaphysics of the day.

The volume concludes with three contributions from Jackson. The first is pre-retraction and further clarifies the fact that appeal to a posteriori necessity along Kripkean lines cannot save the materialist position here (411-15): for any a posteriori identity X=Y between rigid designators, knowing enough facts about X should enable one to know the identity a priori. This is equivalent to Chalmers's (288) point that if X=Y could not have been known a priori, then there are not enough facts about X to account for Y-facts, so that some Y-facts are not X-facts. Take X as microphysical facts and Y phenomenal facts, and you have a refutation of the 'old fact-new presentation' objection made by Loar (227) among others.

Jackson's retraction is most eloquently defended in the difficult final paper. Essentially, Jackson relies upon a representationalist account of consciousness to eliminate the problem. With this account, his final position
is close to Lewis', as Mary here only acquires a new ability. But it crucially relies upon accepting representationalism. Given the many problems it encounters, this will leave many unconvinced. This open-endedness is however a fitting conclusion to a volume that ably demonstrates the philosophical richness of its topic.

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Doris Olin's *Paradox* is a well-researched, and up-to-date analysis of some of the major paradoxes that have exercised philosophers and logicians over the past several decades. It is clearly written and thoroughly examines the debates that surround the different approaches and 'solutions' to the paradoxes that can be found in the literature today. Like much of the current work in this area, the chapters in this book can sometimes be technical, but Olin does an admirable job summarizing those results so that they are easily understandable, appealing to technical devices only when necessary.

*Paradox* consists of eight chapters. The first chapter, which is introductory in character, provides a framework by which we can define and classify the paradoxes (veridical or falsidical, controversial or uncontroversial, etc.). This framework is used in the last six chapters, each of which is devoted to analyzing a particular paradox, and examining the current debates that surround it. But *Paradox* is not a mere survey of the literature. Part of Olin's aim in this book, though not explicitly stated, is to separate out 'radical' from 'conservative' approaches and solutions to the paradoxes. A radical solution to a paradox is one that somehow suggests that the paradox is so pervasive that our logical system, traditionally understood, is itself in need of change. These sorts of solutions vary, but in general they call for the replacement of our logical scheme with a system that rejects bivalence and/or the principle of excluded middle. A conservative solution is one that preserves as much of classical logic as possible. In every case, Olin strongly suggests that these radical
approaches are untenable as the rejection of classical logic is too high of a price to pay.

In Chapter 2, Olin directly addresses one of the more notorious 'radical' approaches to be found in recent literature: dialetheism — the doctrine that some contradictions can be true. According to dialetheism, and its resulting paraconsistent logic, we are in possession of three truth-values (true, false, and both-true-and-false), which entails that the sentential connectives alter in meaning (e.g., a conjunction is true when both conjuncts are true, false if one conjunct is false, and both-true-and-false otherwise). In order to avoid the possibility of true contradictions entailing the truth of every possible sentence, several well-known principles of inference, such as disjunctive syllogism, modus ponens, modus tollens, and reductio ad absurdum must be rejected (28). Olin convincingly argues that dialetheism is too radical of an approach to the paradoxes and she forcefully argues that once we reject bivalent classical logic, in which the two truth-values are exhaustive and exclusive, we will be forced into an infinite regress of logics with an increasing number of truth-values (35-6).

Each of the remaining six chapters is devoted to a different paradox: the Surprise Exam paradox, the Preface paradox, the Lottery paradox, Newcomb's Problem, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Sorites paradox. In each case, Olin meticulously outlines the premises and conclusion of these paradoxes, and uses her classification system from Chapter 1 to exactly identify the kind of paradox we are dealing with. Once the paradox has been analyzed, she summarizes, clearly and fairly, the different sorts of attempts to solve those paradoxes and points out, when she can, where potential problems arise.

Her treatment of the Preface Paradox is typical. According to this paradox, you are asked to imagine that you have just written a book in which you are justified in believing each proposition \(B_i\) asserted in the book. However, as you recognize that no one is infallible, you assert in the preface that there is likely some error in the book. In other words, you are justified in believing that each proposition asserted in your book is true \(B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_n\), and you are also justified in believing that not all of those propositions are true \(\left(\bigland_{i=1}^n B_i\right)\). So, from warranted and justified beliefs we are able to derive an inconsistent claim. According to the radical position, the conclusion of the above argument is indeed correct, and these theorists attempt to show how and why we are sometimes justified in holding inconsistent beliefs. One such account offered by the radical is the Epistemic Probability argument whereby we do not assign the values True and False to each of our beliefs, but rather a numerical value between 0 and 1 which indicates the degree of confirmation or support in light of the total available evidence. We are warranted in believing a proposition when the epistemic probability is sufficiently high. Conjoining a large number of beliefs that each has a high degree of epistemic probability yields a conjunction with a low degree of probability — low enough that its negation is actually warranted (71). Although this seems to offer a neat and intuitively plausible solution, Olin, the conservative, rejects this approach as it is at the same time a rejection of
classical two-valued logic. As in her criticism of dialetheism, and of radical approaches in general, Olin points out that once we reject bivalence, we are on the road to rejecting long-held principles like modus ponens and reductio ad absurdum, and ultimately, to a logic in which any statement whatsoever can be derived (77-8).

Her treatment of the remaining paradoxes takes a similar course: conservative, yet thorough, careful and methodical. Many paradoxes not addressed in a separate chapter are given brief mention in a helpful appendix (191-8).

The only problem with Paradox is that there should be more of it. Of course, one cannot achieve everything in one book, and there are too many paradoxes deserving the sort of careful treatment Olin offers, but a philosophical work that addresses the paradoxes, yet omits any treatment of The Liar is wanting. If this is the only book you pick up in order to learn about how philosophers think about paradoxes, you are going to be missing a large piece of the picture, a piece much larger than if Olin had decided to omit her chapter on, say, Newcomb's Problem. Nevertheless, Doris Olin's Paradox is a very helpful book for those who want to be introduced to the philosophical treatment of paradoxes, or for those who already have knowledge of the general area and would like to have a helpful resource book. In that respect, it can be recommended for senior undergraduate and graduate students who are studying paradoxes, or for professional philosophers who want a concise introduction to the topic.

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Franklin Perkins
Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light.

It would be no exaggeration to say that increased contact with the world beyond Europe's borders, picking up rapid speed after 1492, was the single most important factor in Europe's transition into modernity. By the seventeenth century, European thinkers were consumed by questions about the inhabitants of the rest of the world, and by the way in which their customs, technologies and beliefs compared with their own.

This possibility of comparison with independently emerging, radically different cultures is responsible for many of the genuinely new developments
in early modern philosophy. Yet most scholars remain content to treat this period's philosophy as though it emerged in a vacuum. When non-European cultures play an indispensable theoretical role — such as that of the American savage in social-contract theory — they are duly acknowledged. But the curiosity that European thinkers had about the attainments of other cultures in science, mathematics, and technology goes largely unacknowledged. One does not have to be all that enthusiastic about multiculturalism to find this neglect unfortunate. For to consider Europe in relation to the rest of the world in the seventeenth century, whether one is interested in philosophy or in the spice trade, is not necessarily to engage in cross-cultural comparative study. Such consideration is also a fundamental part of understanding early modern Europe itself.

As Franklin Perkins notes in his fine new book, _Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light_, the lack of acknowledgement among scholars has something to do with the self-presentation of at least some early modern thinkers themselves. Descartes, for example, does not dwell on the Persians or the Chinese (though he does mention them more often than the index to the English edition of his writings would lead us to believe). The world outside Europe, Descartes may have thought, could only provide complicating and messy evidence against the universality of his claims, and, more damagingly, against the a priori method of producing claims about what sort of entity a human being is. This, as Perkins notes, is why far-away cannibals were, if a potential embarrassment to Descartes, celebrated by skeptics such as Montaigne.

Cannibals and other so-called savages threatened to disconfirm universalizing claims made by Europeans about humanity. But the Chinese presented a very different sort of problem: their advanced civilization (advanced, that is, according to all the indices that interested Europeans) threatened European claims to particularity. Some thinkers, though, were happy to move beyond European particularism. One particular early modern universalist — namely, the optimist who is the subject of Perkins's book and who believed that every human being, not to mention every substance, constitutes a unique representation of the same harmonic order of co-existence — did not perceive Chinese civilization as a threat at all, but as an opportunity for mutual benefit. As Perkins shows, attention to Leibniz' engagement with China reveals the philosopher at his best, employing the method and principles familiar to us from other, better known aspects of his work in a creative way. In Perkins' account, we also learn quite a bit about the state of knowledge of the Far East in Europe in the seventeenth century. Finally, because of Perkins' impressive command of the intellectual traditions of both sides of this story, we gain extensive familiarity with the philosophical and scientific life of China during the period we, in another expression of our regional bias, think of as 'early modern'.

Perkins' picture of early modern Europe's contact with China is more nuanced than the common emphasis on the contemptfulness and aggression of Christian missionaries vis-à-vis the indigenous people they sought to
convert. Indeed, Perkins shows why Leibniz' own support of the task of Christianization can only be called humanistic. From Leibniz' point of view, conversion was desirable because Christianity was true, and the Chinese were just as worthy of lives in accordance with the truth as were Europeans. And in any case this would not be a one-way exchange. The Chinese would be given spiritual salvation. The Europeans would gain, in turn, ethical instruction from the ancient Confucian tradition and technological benefit from contemporary Chinese science.

Confucianism was often portrayed in early modern Europe as a system of laudable rules, the reasons for which had been forgotten in the flow of centuries. This contrasted sharply with the assessment of, e.g., Buddhism and Taoism, which were taken as garden-variety idolatry. According to the so-called Jesuit 'figurists', the admirable ethical code and technological adeptness of the Confucian Chinese, and the simultaneous evident absence of knowledge of things divine, lay in the ancientness of their civilization, and in its tragic forgetfulness. For them, the Chinese were but a tribe of Israel that had wandered so far, and stayed there for so long, that they forgot the ultimate reasons for their wisdom, which were, namely, exactly the same sequence of revelations that made the acknowledged forebears of Christian Europe wise. The Chinese became, as it were, wise automata, and missionary activity was in fact nothing more than the task of reminding them who they really were.

Leibniz did not believe that the Chinese had biblical origins, but he did share with the figurists the belief that the Chinese have just as much access to the truth of Christianity as do Europeans. One of the great ironies of early modern ethnography is that it was the religious and creationist world-view that spoke in favor of common origins for all humanity, while the abandonment of the need to interpret human diversity in scriptural terms easily led to the racist idea that non-European peoples are unworthy of salvation simply because they lack truly human souls. Leibniz, as a representative of early modern humanism, may effectively be serving as an apologist for missionary work in China. But he believes missionary work is a worthwhile project only because he presumes the full humanity of the Jesuits' targets. Perkins treats Leibniz' support for the Christianization of China with all the sensitivity and charity this potentially touchy topic deserves.

As historians of philosophy grow increasingly interested in the contexts that produced the figures we study, and steadily less inclined to treat them as geniuses generated ex nihilo, we will need to pay attention not just to the narrowly focused questions of, e.g., scientific practices within the laboratories of Royal Society members, but also to the very wide-focused questions concerning the global context of early modern European history. It will be best if this work is done by scholars trained in philosophy and appreciative of what Leibniz loved to call the 'commerce of light' between cultures rather than primarily the commerce of goods (even if the two must ultimately be studied in conjunction in order to arrive at an accurate
picture). For this reason, Perkins’s book is not just good and informative, but also pathbreaking.

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Jacques Rancière
_The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing._
Pp. ix + 169.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4069-0);

Jacques Rancière
_The Politics of Aesthetics._
_The Distribution of the Sensible._
Pp. x + 116.

In 1965, Jacques Rancière’s name became instantly famous through his contribution to _Reading Capital_. Following his break with Althusserianism, there followed twenty years of writings on political and social theory, culminating in the widely admired _Disagreement_ (1995 for the French edition). All of Rancière’s books dating from that period have now been translated into English. But since _Disagreement_, Rancière’s thinking has turned to literature and aesthetic questions, most recently to the visual arts and in particular cinema, with a dozen books published in France in the last decade. These two publications give English-reading audiences their first insights into the rich and challenging world of Rancierian aesthetics.

The choice to translate the very short _Politics of Aesthetics_ is well justified in the context of this partial reception of Rancière’s work. It gives a good condensed version of his main aesthetic theses, and shows how they are linked to his theory of politics. The strategic utility of this small text is exploited to the full by the translator. After the presentation of his methodology — a nice application of Rancierian ideas to the specific problem of translation — the translator situates the text in Rancière’s overall development. After the text itself (only forty pages long), an illuminating interview
with Rancière is offered, followed by a laudatory piece by Slavoj Žižek, and two useful appendices — a glossary of key Rancierian concepts, and an exhaustive bibliography. What was a very thin volume in the original edition is thus transformed into a major instrument of Rancierian dissemination, an instrument that will be indispensable for anyone intending to work with Rancière’s ideas.

Rancière’s aesthetic thinking is articulated around two basic theses that are substantially related to this vision of politics. They are well encapsulated in the equivocity of the French word ‘partage’, which means ‘sharing’, in the two contradictory senses of separating and distributing the parts of a whole, and of having a whole in common. The translation of ‘partage’ by ‘distribution’ seems to only render one of those two meanings. Politics for Rancière is synonymous with a ‘partage du sensible’, a symbolic and material sharing of the social world, as he sees in politics the denunciation of the forms of social domination that decide who does and who doesn’t deserve a ‘part’ in the management of that world, a denunciation performed in the name of the more basic common sharing of it. The political moment is therefore aesthetic in the primary sense of the term, since it targets modes of social visibility (who is a recognised social agent, what objects, what spaces are socially relevant, etc.) and works towards a less exclusionary perception of the social world. Rancière’s first fundamental thesis is therefore that ‘there is an aesthetics at the core of politics’ (13), that politics is essentially aesthetic.

The second, reverse thesis, that aesthetics has fundamental political significance, mobilises an historical detour. Politics is for Rancière egalitarian and democratic: it consists in upholding the equality of all individuals in systems where some remain invisible and inaudible. The historical actualisation of this egalitarian principle, that anyone is equal to anyone, challenged the classical system of representation. Rancière thereby proposes his own interpretation of aesthetic modernity. The classical system of representation was ‘into an analogy with a fully hierarchical vision of the community’ (22). In it, ‘the dignity of the subject matter dictated the dignity of genres of representation (tragedy for the nobles, comedy for the people of meagre means; historical painting versus genre painting, etc.). Along with genres, the system of representation defined the situations and forms of expression that were appropriate for the lowliness or loftiness of the subject matter’ (32). With the revolutionary emergence of the democratic principle, egalitarianism enters representation itself and defines what Rancière calls the ‘aesthetic regime of the arts’: from now on, any subject matter is worthy of artistic representation, any action, in whatever genre, using whatever style. The collapse of hierarchy in aesthetic representation has a far-reaching consequence: the Romantic notion that ‘everything speaks’, that natural formations, even inert objects, have their own secret language, and that art is therefore only a second-order reformulation of preexisting systems of signs. Rancière argues that this idea of meaning (lost) in nature, ‘is the invariable core in the identification of art that have configured the aesthetic mode of thought from the outset’ (23). He quotes
Schiller’s ‘aesthetic state’, Kant’s ‘genius’, Schelling’s ‘conscious unconscious’, and the great modernist writers (Flaubert, Mallarmé, Proust, the Surrealists) and shows them to be all engaged in the same contradictory task: to ‘establish the autonomy of art and the identity of its form with the forms that life uses to shape itself’ (ibid.). By being structured by the radical equality of all subjects, and subject matters, modern aesthetics proves to be political in its core, beyond the ideological preferences and actual engagements of the artists. The characterisation of this ‘aesthetic regime’ of the arts is much more developed in other books, La Parole muette and L’Inconscient esthétique. The translation of the former at least seems to be an urgent task today.

Rancière does not support his theory with other congruent analyses. There are very few footnotes in his books. He identifies, however, his main opponents, formalist, modernist and postmodernist readings of modernity: ‘the notion of modernity seems to have been deliberately invented to prevent a clear understanding of the transformations of art and its relationships with the other spheres of collective experience’ (26). Against approaches to art forms through the specificity of their medium, Rancière defends a position sensitive to the reciprocal relationships between artistic and other social productions. If ‘artistic practices are ‘ways of doing and making’ that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making, as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility’ (13), then a strictly immanent account of an art form’s development is only a one-sided view on it. For example, cinema and photography should not be defined by their specific mimetic technique, but rather as products of the aesthetic age, as arts of the anonymous that became possible, as arts, when the anonymous itself became a worthy subject of art. Equally, the ‘new history’ and the modern social sciences which focus on long trends and everyday life are themselves such products: ‘the science of history and the arts of mechanical reproduction are inscribed in the same logic of aesthetic revolution’ (33). But given that ‘the honour conferred on the commonplace is part of the science of literature before being part of the science of history’ (ibid.), history itself is essentially linked with fiction: ‘Writing history and writing stories come under the same regime of truth’ (38). Similarly, the dichotomy between art and work disappears when the former is no longer conceived of as mimesis, but as life producing itself. In the aesthetic mode of thinking, art becomes ‘a symbol of work’ (44).

With this, the materialism of Rancière’s thinking that gives it its unity underneath its diversity appears fully. This is one of the most important insights provided by the book. A passage in the interview is especially revealing: ‘I always try to think in terms of horizontal distributions, combinations between systems of possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum. ... I have tried to conceive of a topography that does not presuppose (a) position of mastery’ (49). Rancière’s materialist aesthetic critique is thus underpinned by a horizontal ontology that collapses the dichotomy of the real
and the ideal. As a result, symbolic representations are viewed as concretely ‘rearranging’ (partager) the real, while the real steps into the symbolic.

In particular, this materialist principle, combined with the idea of democratic aesthetics, forms the thread that runs through the essays gathered in *The Flesh of Words*. By ‘literarity’ — which, again, *La Parole muette* characterises more fully — Rancière understands the same kind of ‘disordering’ that democracy introduces in the social: the works of the democratic age ‘outline a unique space that superimposes itself on the normal arrangement of bodies in a community and reorganises the entire relationship between words and things, between the order of discourse and the order of conditions’ (102). In the *Phaedrus*, Plato famously condemned writing for being a letter both mute (because it cannot answer for itself), and too talkative (because it talks to anyone and can be taken in any sense). Writing in the democratic age fulfils Plato’s prediction by producing letters that escape the representational ordering tied to a hierarchical social worldview. The trouble, as Rancière argues, is that it is impossible for writers to fully embrace the literarity principle since one of its consequences is the negation of the author’s power. This is the literary specification of the productive contradiction inherent in the aesthetic regime. In these essays, Rancière retraces the ways in which modern writings deal with their own internal contradiction: ‘the way a text gives itself the body of its incarnation to escape the fate of the letter released into the world’ (4). Rancière follows different exemplary dialectics of this positive contradiction: the exhaustion of the lyrical I between Romantic and contemporary poetry; Rimbaud’s ‘logical revolts’ between Baudelairean symbolism and Mallarméan formalism; the adequacy of the novel as literary genre for the democratic era; Balzac’s struggle to tame the democratic letter through the symbolism of his plots. The volume ends with two remarkable chapters dedicated to Althusser and Deleuze on the relationship between literature and philosophy. In both cases, Rancière highlights the way in which each attempted to circumvent the contradictory nature of modern writing. In Althusser’s case, Rancière shows how his ‘enterprise is marked throughout by the dread of the Marxist intellectual, the dread of the intellectual fallen prey to politics: not to make ‘literature’, not to address letters without addressee; not to be Don Quixote, the fine soul who fights against windmills; not to be alone, not to be the voice of one crying out in the wilderness, an activity by which one loses one’s head, literally as well as figuratively’ (137). In Deleuze’s case, he highlights the ‘inconsequence’ of the thinker of multiplicity and heccity whose literary analyses concentrate on individual characters and the fable and not on the power of language.

Whereas the translation of the *Politics of Aesthetics* seems faultless, the translation of *The Flesh of Words* contains quite a few inaccuracies. The mistakes in translating the literary texts (Rimbaud in particular) could easily have been avoided by referring to existing translations.

Rancière’s erudite, elliptical prose and sinuous arguments will probably repel readers with an analytic training. For those who appreciate the ‘conti-
nental' style, this is philosophical and literary critique at its best. These two volumes should begin to extend Rancière’s reputation as one of the leading contemporary aestheticians beyond the borders of his home country.

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Nicholas Rescher
Pp. v +131.
US$69.95. ISBN 3-937202-65-X.

Cosmos and Cognition comprises six essays by Rescher, covering a range of philosophical issues, tracing them back to points of departure in Greek Philosophy. Versions of all but one of the essays have been previously published; while some of the places where they appeared are easily accessible (Kantstudien, Review of Metaphysics) some are not (Revisto Latinomericana de Filosofia). R. says this collection is a ‘token of historical piety’ to the Greek philosophers, in whom we can trace the roots of perennial philosophical problems. Each essay is of intrinsic interest and presented with R’s usual directness and clarity. The collection would appeal to specialists in Greek philosophy as well as those with an interest in the history of philosophy; some of them are admirable introductions to the topics discussed.

‘Cosmic Evolution in Anaximander’ examines Anaximander’s understanding of the cosmos. The major contribution is the progressive diagrams presenting R’s visualization of Anaximander’s universe. The supposition on slim evidence that there must be a series of eternal conflagrations of the universe goes a bit far, and would require a deeper analysis of the uses of the word ‘cosmos’ by ancient commentators. Also a bit far reaching is the idea that Anaximander is ‘scientific’ because ‘sophisticated’. ‘Science’ in Anaximander is to be found in the only extant fragment that we have from him. The portrayal of cosmic processes in legalistic metaphors suggests that nature has laws and as such can be understood as a rational, regular process. R’s references in this essay, as throughout, are rather antiquated. Reference is made to Kahn’s important book on Anaximander, as well as recent books by Hahn (2001) and Couprie et al (2003), but no obvious attempt is made to engage them.

Early on in ‘Contrastive Opposition in Early Greek Philosophy’, R. makes the point that tracing one issue through several presocratic philosophers is more
useful than what he calls a ‘Cook’s tour’ approach to the presocratics. We see the issue of contrastive opposition at work from the Milesians through to Aristotle. The treatment of Xenophanes is disappointingly short, and Parmenides is conspicuously absent, yet Anaxagoras’ and Empedocles’ use of opposition in cosmic processes are often read as responses to Parmenides’ monism. R’s overall approach is salutory, and most important for its identification of types of opposition, but there is a danger of understanding presocratic philosophy strictly as a series of antecedent dependencies. In many cases the ‘developments’ are independent observations, and foisting developmental sequences upon them can be just as misleading as a Cook’s tour.

‘Thought Experimentation in Presocratic Philosophy’ identifies various processes of reasoning in presocratic philosophy. As the definition of ‘thought experiment’ is broad enough to count as just about anything other than direct observation, the insight here is limited. Moreover the employment of Aristotle’s reasoning about the presocratics taints the ideas of the presocratics. While this is unavoidable, more work needs to be done to show why what R. calls thought experiments are anything more than reasoning. It is hardly enlightening to suggest that the Greeks reasoned; nor is it the case that the ability to identify similarities between our reasoning and theirs helps us understand them or improve our own methods.

‘Greek Scepticism’s Debt to the Sophists’ is most original and engaging. R’s ability to draw fine distinctions and categorizations shines in this valuable piece of scholarship that is useful for those interested in Sophists and Sceptics alike. The main argument is that the scepticism of the Sceptics is traceable to the argumentation of the Sophists. At the same time R. stresses that there is a distinct difference in their respective responses to scepticism: the Sophists aimed at a positive appreciation of communal consensus in cases where we cannot know, whereas the Sceptic is nihilistic. R. seems almost to endorse the Sophistic approach, and defend it against Plato’s dismissal of them. At the same time the attempt to defend Sophists against charges of cynicism is weak, and R’s passing over of the Sophistic doctrine of pleonexia — central to Plato’s counter to Thrasymachus in the Republic — worrisome. R. tends to ignore places where Plato shows respect for the intellectual ability of the Sophists - witness Protagoras and Meno, and R. might have usefully inquired into Plato’s dominant concern, namely the ethical and political implications of relativism and the Sophist’s lack of a techne. The essay is very welcome given the sparsity of informed treatments of the Sophists.

‘Anaximander, Aristotle and Buridan’s Ass’ is the most philosophically interesting essay in the collection, and would serve as an excellent general introduction to the problem of ‘choice without preference’. This erudite essay examines the nascent aspect of rational choice theory in Anaximander (cosmic equilibrium) and Aristotle (comparison of cosmic equilibrium with choice), via Simplicius’ commentary through to more logical formulations of it in AlGhazali and Averroes. The treatment of the oft-ignored contributions of Islamic philosophy sheds fresh and interesting light on the problem (R.
suggests that the problem of 'Buridan's Ass' ought properly to be called 'Ghazali's Dates') as well presenting an important dimension of Medieval Islamic assessments of the will of God. Footnotes point readers in the direction of an examination of the issue in Rationalism and more contemporary philosophy.

'Aristotle on Ecthesis and Apodeictic Syllogisms' seems out of place in this collection, as the five previous essays deal with the historical roots of philosophical methods and problems. This essay is dedicated to a treatment of Aristotle's use of ecthesis in apodeictic syllogisms, and suggests that Aristotle's metaphysical concerns affect the way in which he approaches certain logical problems. The text is unavoidably laden with logical symbols and hence not so accessible to a non-logician.

All of the essays are evocative, informed and well worth reading. The text needs to be re-edited. The text of my copy is upside down and backwards in relation to the cover. In addition to two typographical errors on the back cover, I counted no less than twenty typos in the 131 pages that this text comprises.

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Kenneth A. Richman
Ethics and the Metaphysics of Medicine: Reflections on Health and Beneficence.
Pp. x + 222.

Richman's Ethics and the Metaphysics of Medicine falls squarely within a venerable philosophic tradition where one begins by isolating the proper definition of a concept — in this case, health. Since, according to Richman, 'knowing what it means for a person to be healthy is relevant to almost every medical encounter' (4), he thinks that his definition can be used to resolve or at least clarify a whole host of related issues in biomedical ethics. Most prominently, Richman argues that his definition of health implies specific positions with respect to advance directives and physician-patient relationships. Indirectly, he argues that his definition also has implications regarding the meaning of autonomy and beneficence within a health care setting.

The Richman-Budson definition of health, developed collaboratively in a previous work, is most succinctly expressed as 'whatever state [that] allows
the person to reach or strive for his or her goals’ (27 — Richman’s emphasis). That is, health is a match between the goals one has and the ability one has to reach those goals. Richman refers to this definition as a form of ‘embedded instrumentalism’: it is instrumental because it explicitly connects means to ends, and it is embedded because the goals are internal to (or embedded within) a specific individual.

Because Richman believes that a definition of health must ‘capture our intuition that health really does not vary greatly from individual to individual’ while simultaneously being sufficiently ‘flexible to allow for different circumstances and goals’ (32-3), Richman differentiates between the health of a person *qua* organism and *qua* individual. Clearly, health *qua* organism is quite consistent across members of the same species. In this sense, my heart is healthy if it can pump a sufficient amount of blood to allow my body to perform ‘normally’. My health *qua* individual, however, can be very idiosyncratic and relative to my particular personality and the life goals I have. Thus, my heart may be considered healthy *qua* organism given what humans typically do, but unhealthy *qua* individual if my aim is to win the Olympic gold medal for the marathon.

Richman believes enhancing the health of a person *qua* individual to be more central in our health care. To see this, consider two of the major obligations of health care professionals (HCPs) — beneficence and respect for patient autonomy — which sometimes appear to be in conflict as they are when a patient requests a treatment that would be harmful to them. Richman argues that conflicts of this type are more ostensible than real. Acting beneficently toward a patient usually means helping them attain their personal goals, which are arrived at through the autonomous choices of the patients. Hence, beneficence and autonomy both aim more at health *qua* individual than *qua* organism. In fact, both rely upon us coming to know what Christine Korsgaard (and Richman, following her) have called our ‘practical identities’, which she defines as ‘a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking’ (cited on 101). Acting autonomously, then, will be acting in a way that furthers, or is at least consistent with, one’s practical identities.

Richman’s discussion of advance directives follows from this analysis. Such directives have strong prima facie force as edicts that promote both the well-being and autonomy of patients. But we must be careful here, Richman cautions, that they actually do this. In particular, advance directives that specify particular treatments in particular situations often are not truly autonomous because it is unclear whether they express the real desires of the patient in what are typically truly novel, and indeed dire circumstances that often require medical knowledge not available to the typical patient. Richman therefore prefers advance directives ‘that identify our goals and practical identities [since these] allow people to express themselves in a way that really reflects who they are and what they value’ (155).
Given the centrality of practical identities in Richman's conception of health care, there is an obvious need for physicians to get to know their patients. As a result, Richman advocates what Ezekial and Linda Emanuel have called the 'interpretive model' of the physician-patient relationship, the aim of which is for the physician to 'elucidate the patient's values and what he or she actually wants, and to help the patient select the available medical interventions that realize these values' (cited on 161). Medical education has historically failed to help develop the skills HCPs will need to operate under this model effectively. Richman hence devotes the penultimate chapter of his book to a discussion of pedagogical changes required in health education.

Richman's analyses of issues are always lucid, and his theory potentially has some far reaching effects, and this book is therefore a worthy addition to the biomedical literature. Let me close this review, however, by mentioning two areas where I think the book could have done more. First, it's odd that Richman fails even to mention what is clearly the most widely promulgated definition of health, namely, the World Health Organization's claim that health is 'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity'. This is not to say that I necessarily agree with the WHO's definition — indeed, it is notoriously too broad since it fails to exclude much of anything under the definition of health — but it would have been interesting to see Richman's take on it in contrast to his own definition.

Second, while I found lots to commend in Richman's analyses of autonomy and the ways in which HCPs need to attempt to enhance patient autonomy if they are truly to act beneficently toward them, Richman needed to spend more time on the notion of what real patient goals are in this age of increasing medical enhancement technologies and direct marketing to individuals by Big Pharma. It is now difficult to determine the health of an individual by saying it's the ability to attain what he or she wants since those wants are being controlled to an ever greater extent by drug companies who make much of their profit via a dependence effect which they have created, e.g., for larger breasts, smaller noses, less sadness, and more frequent, longer lasting erections.

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The philosophy of biology community has long been guided by Dobzhansky’s famous saying that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. Now however, one of our intellectually rigorous members of that community, Sahotra Sarkar, only out of concern about any creationists’ abuse, restrains from insisting that ‘much of the received framework of evolution makes no sense in light of molecular biology’ (5).

Sarkar’s book comprises thirteen papers written in the fifteen-year period from 1988 to 2004 plus a new introduction designed to relate these papers to one another and embed them into a wider context. Sarkar defends a model of ‘strong reduction’ in which properties of wholes are explained entirely through properties of their parts, a model laid down in detail in the first three chapters. Arguably the most important and compelling view presented in these chapters is that a substantive reductionism in biology does not need to, and in fact should help to refute, a simplistic genetic reductionism or determinism.

The second section of the book explores the major challenge to reductionism presented by functional explanations that are ubiquitous in biology, including molecular biology. Unfortunately the three chapters that comprise this section all take a narrowly evolutionary perspective on the concept of function, something that would not be surprising in a philosopher guided by Dobzhansky’s maxim, but which seems strangely at odds with the book’s declared objective of providing a new and unifying molecular perspective on life complementary to the received evolutionary view. Only Chapter 7 goes some way to fulfill this promise, highlighting the Human Genome Project as a research program not guided by functional questions, although this argument is surely weakened by the extensive criticism of that research project elsewhere in the book. It would have added substantively to the book if Sarkar had extended on the alternative, much broader sense of function outlined in the introduction, a sense which comes closer to how function is understood in molecular biology and by critics of the evolutionary concept of function from developmental biology and complexity theory.

Other topics touched on in the introduction and the final chapter remain tantalizingly explored in the body of the book, such as the extension of evolutionary theory by developmental biology, bridging the gap between proximate and ultimate explanations in biology, and reconciling molecular reality with many received assumptions of evolutionary theory. Sarkar is one of the philosophers most competent to offer substantial insights into these issues, but he does not do so here.
Arguably the most exciting, if somewhat mutually redundant, chapters come in the third section of the book and give a detailed analysis of the concept of information in molecular genetics. Whilst Chapters 8 and 9 conclude that the terms 'biological' or 'genetic' information are mostly used incoherently and arguably only masquerade as a substantive technical concept, Chapter 10 develops a rather specific notion of semiotic information based on the twin criteria of specificity and arbitrariness. Its usefulness, however, remains unclear since its rigorous conditions can—if at all—only be met by prokaryotic genetics but, at least theoretically, also by certain environmental factors. By detailing the complexities of eukaryotic genome expression these chapters show that eukaryotic DNA alone does not specify the primary sequence of amino acids of a protein, let alone their tertiary structure or a phenotypic trait. A point not driven home sufficiently (though hinted at in the introduction at p. 25), which is hard to square with Sarkar’s reductionist stance, is what constitutes a ‘gene’ in the first place—where it begins and ends, and which sequences it comprises—is determined by the cellular and extracellular phenotype at each point in an organism’s developmental trajectory. The whole determines what counts as a part.

The introduction takes the discussion of bioinformation further by embedding the concept of genetic information in a broader analysis of the use of language metaphors in molecular genetics, their shortcomings and their effect of ‘obfuscating the physical complexity and developmental contingency of gene expression’ (25) and thereby promoting an unwarranted genetic reductionism. Picking up on this theme, Sarkar’s last chapter argues that biological agency is distributed over different kinds of molecules and different levels of biological organization.

The last section of the book contains three chapters on the problem posed by directed mutations in bacteria for Darwin’s model of evolution by natural selection by violating some of its central assumptions. Again the introductions proves extremely useful, this time through the integration of these chapters in a wider discussion of how developments in molecular biology have challenged many of the assumptions of the received view of evolution.

It is worth asking how the defense of strong reductionism in this book is likely to hold up in the light of twenty-first-century molecular biology. Although twentieth-century molecular biology had many spectacular successes, it also made clear that a mere inventory of genes, proteins, and metabolites is not sufficient to understand the cell’s complexity. There is remarkable integration of the various layers, both regulatory and structural, and most biological characteristics arise from interactions between numerous cellular constituents. Viewing the cell as a network of genes, RNAs, proteins and metabolites offers a viable strategy for addressing the complexity of living systems. Therefore, a key challenge for postgenomic biology is to understand how interactions between the molecules of a living cell determine the function of its enormously complex machinery, both in isolation and when surrounded by other cells. The future lies with ‘systems biology’ rather than
with proteomics, as Sarkar in several places suggests, or any other ‘omic’ inventory of cellular contents.

Thus, for example, biologists are increasingly turning to three-dimensional cell cultures. In mammalian tissues, cells are embedded into a structure called the extracellular matrix (ECM) of proteins that give tissues their mechanical properties and help to organize communication between cells. Receptors on the surface of the cells anchor their bearers to the ECM, and also determine how the cells interpret biochemical cues from their immediate surroundings. This complex mechanical and biochemical interplay leads to distinctive patterns of gene expression and other biological activities and renders the whole of a cell tissue more than the sum of its parts.

While Sarkar acknowledges the universality of molecular structures and mechanisms at the cellular level, results from the new field of network and systems biology suggest that the universality increases enormously with every higher level of organization from gene-regulatory motifs and metabolic pathways over functional modules to the organization of the system’s large-scale architecture, a universality not mirrored at the level of its molecular constituents. No matter if the system is approached from the bottom up or from the top down, the acknowledgement that functions are deeply interlinked forces us to complement the ‘local’ molecule-based research with integrated approaches that address the properties of the system as a whole.

The introduction is ample evidence for how much more Sarkar has to offer for a unifying molecular perspective on life than the selection of papers suggests, and it is to be hoped that he will soon publish a monograph laying out his current perspective. This aside, the book comprises an impressive body of work that combines conceptual, historical, and technical considerations into philosophy of (molecular) bioscience of the highest quality. *Molecular Models of Life* appears at a time of an unexpected transformation of molecular biology from genetic to (post) genomics and systems biology and offers the interested philosopher of science a scientifically informed window into this new exciting field of study.

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Most philosophers have never heard of Otto Weininger. Weininger was a Viennese cultural critic and philosopher (in the broadest sense) who was born into the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1880. He took his own life on October 4, 1903, by shooting himself in the house in Vienna where Beethoven had died.

Weininger's book, *Geschlecht und Charakter*, published in May, 1903, generated enormous interest, especially after his suicide. In the book Weininger deployed a number of stereotypes — about male and female, Christian and Jew. Some of these ideas led others to draw racist and sexist conclusions, but Weininger claimed that all people fall on a spectrum of degrees to which they embody these stereotypical characteristics. One of his conclusions was that it was the duty of the male aspect within us to strive to become a genius, and to forego sexual love in favor of an abstract love of the absolute — God.

Wittgenstein likely read *Geschlecht und Charakter* during the Great War when he was stationed at Olomouc. He recommended the book at various times to others, though when G. E. Moore expressed reservations about what he had read, Wittgenstein told him to 'just add an "-" to the whole book'. In 1931 Wittgenstein listed Weininger along with nine others as people who had influenced him.

To Wittgenstein's English-speaking students and friends his ideas had always seemed to have sprung fully-formed into existence, with perhaps some minor assistance from Frege and Russell. It was through the suggestions of G. H. von Wright, and then the extensive research of Allan Janik, that Wittgenstein scholars began to see the relevance of his cultural background in Vienna to the *Tractatus*. But the ideas of Wittgenstein's later philosophy continued to seem underived. So it was something of a revelation when the 1931 list of influences was finally published in *Culture and Value*. Wittgenstein listed Frege, Russell, Spengler and Sraffa, and then added Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Kraus, Loos and Weininger. Now scholars had something to work with.

There has grown up a sort of cottage industry among Wittgenstein scholars studying how Wittgenstein might have been influenced (positively or negatively) by these figures, or, for that matter, by others, such as Goethe, Lichtenberg, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Freud, Lewis Carroll, William James, Köhler, and Ramsey, that he unaccountably chose not to mention. This collection will interest scholars of Wittgenstein as a valuable addition to that project, addressing 'what may be the most puzzling case of all' (118).

How did Weininger influence Wittgenstein? Ray Monk answered this question in a very general way in his 1990 biography of Wittgenstein, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*. As indicated by the subtitle of the biogra-
phy, Monk saw Weininger's influence primarily on Wittgenstein's self-conception. Monk presented Wittgenstein's life as a nearly-suicidal struggle with genius. In fact, Monk's book made a strong case that a clear distinction between Wittgenstein's life and his philosophy was an untenable one. The collection under review follows in this growing movement of scholars of Wittgenstein that see the personal and the philosophical as inextricable (22, 32, 62, 81, and 157).

But, 'precisely how' (14) did Weininger influence Wittgenstein? That is a more challenging question that the six contributors to this collection seek to answer. Their search is bolstered by a recent surge in scholarly attention to Weininger's writings in the English-speaking world. *Geschlecht und Charakter* was originally translated into English as *Sex and Character* in 1906, but in an abridged form. One of the contributors, Daniel Steuer, has co-edited and introduced a new improved and complete English translation that appeared in 2005. After Weininger's death a collection of his other writings was published in 1904 as *Über die Letzten Dinge* — with which Wittgenstein was also familiar. This remained untranslated until another contributor, Steven Burns, published an English translation — *On Last Things* — in 2001.

Some of the contributors look for fairly specific echoes of or reactions to what Weininger wrote in what Wittgenstein wrote. Béla Szabados, not content with the general sort of influence that Monk discerns, uses a 'method of juxtaposition' to show that some of Wittgenstein's ideas are 'in notable accordance' with Weininger's views, and concludes that there are 'important textual traces of the Weiningerian influence' (58). But others are more cautious. Joachim Schulte, for example, says that various things in Weininger 'may have inspired' (131), 'may help us to understand', 'may have influenced', or 'might help explain' (132) various things in Wittgenstein. Schulte warns that in some cases ideas common to Weininger and Wittgenstein were 'in the air' (127) in Vienna, so that Wittgenstein's use of them cannot be assumed to be derived from Weininger.

The notion of 'influence' is rather fluid. If the later agrees with the earlier writer there is a positive influence; if the later disagrees with the earlier writer there is a negative influence. Since there is little direct and specific evidence to go by, it is sometimes hard to see how the assertion of influence in particular cases is a testable hypothesis.

But perhaps a claim of influence should not be seen as a historical-cause hypothesis. Perhaps the value of this sort of exercise is in the illumination that it produces in the reader. If the reader is a Wittgenstein scholar, then there are several illuminating comparisons between Weininger and Wittgenstein in these papers — for example, the isomorphism of logic and ethics, solipsism, and anti-essentialism. There are further comparisons that are perhaps not as important, but still notable, such as the uni-directionality of time and man as the microcosm. And finally there is the almost bizarre topic of dogs and criminality.

In each of these instances a case can be made for 'textual traces' of Weininger in Wittgenstein. But I was bothered by the question of what we
really learn from these comparisons and textual traces. In particular, I never felt that I wanted to share any of these connections with my students when I teach Wittgenstein (at the advanced undergraduate/beginning graduate level) — sometimes because they don’t really impact Wittgenstein’s main texts, and sometimes because they just don’t seem all that helpful.

I referred earlier to the cottage industry of tracing influences on Wittgenstein, and I count myself among the craftspeople. But it is worth wondering to what extent we survive by selling our wares only to each other or, to switch metaphors, taking in each other’s washing. Though I don’t expect that our research needs to impact philosophy or the educated public at large, at least it should impact the general understanding of Wittgenstein. I will be interested to see what influence this collection has on our general understanding of Wittgenstein.

The Library of Congress cataloguers have actually chosen to catalogue this book with books about Weininger (B 3363 ... ), rather than with books about Wittgenstein (B 3376 ... ). Coincidentally there are no prominent German-speaking philosophers with last names between ‘Weininger’ and ‘Wittgenstein’, and hence the book is in fact shelved adjacent to the Wittgenstein books in the library after all! I wouldn’t care to guess how the cataloguers made that decision, but it wasn’t a bad one. The essays do much to illuminate Weininger. Unfortunately, contemporary philosophers have very little reason, except for his connection to Wittgenstein, to take an interest in Weininger.

Schulte’s essay is a masterpiece that explains how we can make something interesting out of Weininger’s writing, without neglecting its fin-de-siècle origin. In particular, his discussion (124-6) of Wittgenstein’s perplexing prescription for Moore to add a negation sign to the book is fascinating. But the value of Schulte’s essay, I believe, just goes to reinforce Monk’s original intuition that the influence of Weininger on Wittgenstein was very general.

Finally, a word about the title of the collection, ‘Wittgenstein Reads Weininger’, and the title of the Introduction, ‘Reading Wittgenstein (on) Reading’. In choosing these titles the editors allude to the fact that Wittgenstein himself has extensive reflections on the concept and practice of reading (especially §§156-71 of the Philosophical Investigations). A section of the Introduction (11-12) mentions these passages and notes that Wittgenstein limits his discussion there to reading, without necessarily understanding, in the sense of rending a written text aloud. There is a danger that a century after Weininger died we are able to do little more than render his words aloud, with little comprehension. This collection helps us to read Weininger with some understanding, and to see what Wittgenstein may have seen when reading Weininger.

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When deciding about the legal or moral permissibility of something like euthanasia, it is not illegitimate to make some kind of appeal to 'the good', be that personal or supra-personal. Similarly, the idea, pursued by Sullivan in this book, that feelings or affect are relevant to identifying this good is not incoherent: even if one wants to minimise the importance of feelings, it is difficult to deny that they have something to do with how a person might identify the good, at least for himself. As a result, the reader might well expect rather a lot of this book. Such an expectation is likely to be disappointed.

Sullivan's strategy is to focus on the work of the theologian Bernard Lonergan, using him as a vehicle to advance the thesis that affect plays a significant part in the identification of the good, and to translate this thesis into debates about euthanasia. In practice, this means that the majority of the book is given over to an exposition of Lonergan's epistemology. But Lonergan's epistemology, if Sullivan is a reliable guide, is a very odd beast indeed: there is something very reminiscent of Flann O'Brien about the exposition, though it is unclear to the uninitiated whether the fault is Lonergan's or Sullivan's.

It starts from a question: what am I doing when I am knowing facts? Already, this is puzzling: we might imagine a child asking its mother what she is doing when she hands the piece of plastic to the person at the supermarket checkout, but it's not clear that one is doing anything when knowing facts. At most, but still oddly, the response to such a question might be that I am believing, with justification, something true. But this is not Sullivan's line: for him, '[t]o avoid giving the mistaken impression that all of my knowledge is self-generated through mental words constituted by reflective insights, it is important to distinguish between knowing and believing. Believing is knowledge that, though appropriated as my own, is generated by someone else' (110). That is, instead of knowledge being a kind of belief — specifically, justified true belief — Sullivan is claiming that belief is a kind of knowledge. No argument for such a dramatic reversal of orthodoxy is forthcoming; but given that the book is directed at knowing the human good, such an omission grave. Maybe Sullivan has simply blundered — but a blunder of this magnitude must call into question the seriousness with which we can take the rest of the book. As an aside, the quotation just given nicely illustrates another problem with the book: the idiom in which it is written is frequently unclear and sometimes incomprehensible. Mistaken or not, just what are we to make of the impression that knowledge is self-generated through mental words?
Nevertheless, it might still be the case that feelings help us identify the good. If one accepts such a line, one might also accept that, feelings being personal, 'the good' is something subjective. Sullivan's position, by contrast, is that it is possible through feelings to identify 'the good' objectively. His strategy is to suggest that one knows facts through a layered process of experience, understanding and judging — so, for example, one might come to know that Paul is having a heart attack by experiencing his report of a pain in the chest, understanding the significance of this pain, and judging what the pain signifies. Objective factual knowledge is possible, the story goes, because 'objectivity is nothing more than the consequence of my own authentic subjectivity, that is, of following my own internal cognitive norms' (126) — norms, that is, of attentive experiencing, intelligent understanding and reasonable judging (passim). On top of this, though, one may add a fourth level: that of value judgement, which allows the deliberator to grasp whether or not something is worthwhile. And this fourth level arises through affect (155).

Of course, the problem here is that it is not yet clear what we are supposed to be grasping when we apprehend that something is worthwhile. Sullivan is rather quiet on this matter beyond the vague claim that identification of value involves self-transcendence and that 'it is only through ... value judgement that I know a particular value' (161). He claims that the real can be known as a fact or value, which suggests some kind of metaethical realist position: value is something grasped or responded to, rather than ascribed. He also insists that there is a distinction between value and satisfaction, such that value and true good are synonymous (173), whereas satisfaction is subjective and ambiguous, therefore not truly good. Hence the cocaine user thinks that his use of the drug represents a value (wouldn't we normally say that it has a value to him, albeit one that we would not recognise?), but his understanding is deficient 'primarily because it is not properly based on his self-transcending affectivity that responds to values' (175). It is in a similar way that someone who seeks euthanasia is dealt with: Sue expresses a wish for euthanasia because she is 'mistaken in her affirmation that physician-assisted suicide [is] a true value for her' (287); this mistake arises through a conflation of 'the relevant affects (i.e., intentional responses to values) [and] other feelings (e.g., intentional states or trends)' (246). Sullivan hints that her desire to die can be traced to isolation (49). Yet contributory to such a desire as this might be, it doesn't follow that a desire to die is therefore based on an error, or that someone with a close family will not want to die. After all — a feeling might be unwarranted, but that's not the same as it being mistaken. The suspicion is never allayed that Sullivan identifies all those things with which he is sympathetic (not seeking euthanasia, not using cocaine and so on) as values, and everything else as a 'mere' satisfaction. Questions are being begged. And there's something uncomfortably moralistic about a stance that allows the claim that Sue's mistaken judgements are culturally conditioned and therefore not culpable (288): with exculpation like that, who needs condemnation?
Other aspects of Sullivan's position are either deeply odd or simply based on invalid argument. For example, he takes seriously the Pollyanna-ish idea that a heart attack might be 'a valuable personal experience' (163). Taking his lead from an unsourced comment from Jack Kevorkian, Sullivan also notes that 'the arguments of the proponents [of euthanasia] have finally begun to admit the unstated social aim of physician-assisted suicide. Any student of the history of the twentieth century might rightly be chilled by the similarities between the current debate and the events of the Second World War' (284). Here, in less than two sentences, he implies falsely that Kevorkian speaks for all advocates of euthanasia, and incoherently that they are morally depraved Nazis. But one does not have to be a Nazi to suggest that euthanasia might have social benefits, and the mere association of something with Nazism will not establish its wrongness. We might just as well claim that, because I wear shoes and Nazis wore shoes, I am a Nazi and shoe-wearing is wrong. Elsewhere, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is confused with the distinction between killing and letting die, as though it is impossible to remove treatment while hoping for an unforeseen recovery. And the repeated claim that feelings are cognitive is simply irritating.

Those seeking a new insight into the euthanasia debate are unlikely to finish the book; if they do, it is likely to be with irritation and bafflement.

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Douglas Walton
Abductive Reasoning.
Pp. 320.

In Abductive Reasoning Douglas Walton analyzes abduction as a form of defeasible inference best understood as occurring within a dialog. Walton begins by considering Peirce's classification of reason as being of three kinds, deductive, inductive, and abductive, but rejects that tripartite distinction in favor of a binary distinction contrasting deductive and inductive arguments as one group with plausibilistic arguments (33). Using this distinction, Walton regards abductive reasoning as that species of plausibilistic reasoning involving inference to the best explanation. Walton later adds to this taxonomy by asserting that abductive reason can be divided into two subcategories which he characterizes using argument schemes, one involving a
dedefeasible form of reasoning similar to *modus ponens*, and another similar to the classic fallacy of asserting the consequent (217). Walton uses the conceptual mechanisms of dialog analysis to understand abductive reasoning because he believes that explanation is best understood as a component of a dialog. He sees traditional forms of argument analysis as incomplete because they are context-free (86, 88). Since he sees abductive reasoning as essentially involving explanation and explanation as essentially dialectical, he seeks to apply dialog analysis to abductive reasoning.

Walton’s taxonomy involves a puzzle. He regards inductive arguments as those in which the truth of the premises is intended to make the conclusion more likely to be true than false and deductive arguments as those in which the truth of the premises is intended to guarantee the truth of the conclusion. He also contrasts plausibilistic arguments with the union of deductive and inductive arguments. Since his understanding of deductive and inductive arguments are that both make the conclusion probable to different degrees, one would think that he should regard plausibilistic arguments as those in which the premises are intended to make the conclusion rational in spite of the fact that it is improbable. But this isn’t what Walton has in mind since he suggests that plausibility is not connected to probability (28). Instead, Walton says he follows Rescher in thinking that plausibilistic arguments select the conclusion from a number of alternatives on the basis of some evidence (31). If this is the case, then Walton’s taxonomy is malformed since such selection could be either deductive or inductive, depending on the particular selection and evidence involved. Consequently, Walton’s taxonomic analysis of abductive reason is unclear.

Walton’s analysis of abductive reasoning suggests strongly that many intellectual endeavors will benefit from further investigation of this subject. In the course of his investigation, Walton touches on a wide range of subjects and makes use of a wide range of conceptual tools. Walton’s examples come primarily from the philosophy of science and from legal reasoning, and his discussion touches on important issues of explanation (56), quantification (138), causation (158), induction (e.g., 215), and belief maintenance (234). Walton’s intellectual tool-kit comes primarily from the fields of artificial intelligence and philosophy, and it includes Schank-style scripts (52), Gricean speech acts (80), the deductive-nomological model of explanation (56), Aristotelian topics (225), formal logic (e.g., 93), and expert-systems technology (e.g., 105). The number of different research areas mentioned in this brief summary of Walton’s discussion suggests strongly that Walton has chosen a topic central to much modern research.

Because it is dialog-based, Walton’s analysis of abductive reasoning is holistic, informal, procedural, and open-ended. Walton’s model of abductive reasoning is holistic in the sense that it demands that one consider the context in which an apparent act of abductive inference is performed. Since he models explanation as a transference of understanding from one participant in a dialog to another (81), he believes that abductive inferences involving explanations cannot be evaluated in a context-free way like tradi-
tional deductive validity. For this reason, Walton’s model does not allow one
to analyze an abductive inference without considering the context in which
it is embedded. Walton’s model does not allow that abductive reason may
occur in contexts that do not include a dialog. Walton’s model is informal in
the sense that it does not require that we formalize abductive inferences in
anything like the way that we formalize deductive inferences. Walton pro-
poses to evaluate abductive inferences using questions about such informal
concepts as the plausibility of a proposed explanation, making it unnecessary
to examine the formal structure of the inference. Because Walton describes
abductive inferences as proceeding in four steps or phases in a dialog, his
model is procedural, and because the procedure described has no well-defined
halting condition, the model is open-ended. These four features of Walton’s
model make it quite different from traditional bottom-up, formal, static, and
closed-ended models of deductive and inductive reason, which allow us to
evaluate inferences compositionally, analyzing larger arguments by break-
ning them into smaller parts and analyzing the basic components using formal
context-free methods. Such methods of argument analysis have the advan-
tage of treating arguments as completed objects rather than as open-ended
procedures, and in many cases they have the advantage of decidability.

The field of logic has made progress in part because it has been able to
analyze arguments as bottom-up, formal, static, and closed-ended. A pro-
posed model of abductive inference that rejects this way of working has many
difficulties to overcome, and these are not simply the reluctance of Walton’s
opponents to accept non-deductive inferences as Walton seems to suggest.
One such difficulty, which Walton does not address, is the initial formation
of the explanation(s) that play a role in abductive reason considered as
inference to the best explanation. By forgoing the benefits of the bottom-up
analysis of argument, and by making his analysis dependent on the analysis
of vague or controversial concepts such as plausibility and explanation,
Walton has put himself on the leading edge of a new style of argument
analysis. He may be ahead of his time, or he may be approaching a dead-end,
and it will be some time before one can tell which is the case.

While *Abductive Reasoning* demonstrates that abductive inference lies at
the intersection of many vital questions, and it examines an interesting
dialectical analysis of abduction, it suffers from the difficulty of taking a very
different path (as noted above) in a way that does not make that path very
clear. Walton’s argument was difficult to follow due to subtle awkwardness
of structure and presentation, including much redundancy and many irrele-
vant asides. In addition, much of Walton’s text has the character of a
literature review, which sometimes contributes to the obscurity of the main
line of thought. The text seems overly long for what it manages to accomplish
(275 pages). The best explanation for this may be a lack of sufficient editorial
control in modern academic publishing rather than any failure by Walton
himself.

David V. Newman
Much of contemporary Philosophy of Biology is focused on evolutionary biology, and in particular, on the conceptual bases of evolutionary biology (e.g., the nature of selection, the species problem, etc.). Relatively little philosophical work has focused on experimental organismal biology — the nitty-gritty details of how biological facts about organisms are discovered and how hypotheses regarding these biological facts are tested. In *Philosophy of Experimental Biology* Weber attempts to redress this imbalance, arguing that an attention to the details of discovery and testing in experimental biology will not only reveal important connections between the Philosophy of Biology and larger issues in the Philosophy of Science, but will also point towards resolutions in some hitherto overly-theoretical debates within the Philosophy of Biology.

Weber’s book is organized around several case studies, including, for example, the mechanisms of action potential in neurotransmission, the discovery and eventual acceptance of the urea cycle, the resolution of the ‘oxidative phosphorylation’ controversy, and the ‘molecularization’ of the model organism *Drosophila*. Weber uses these cases to tie the history of particular experimental discoveries to larger issues in the Philosophy of Science. These latter issues include the strengths and weaknesses of reductionism, the nature of scientific discovery, the role of evidence in settling controversies and debates in science, the nature of reference and its relationship to conceptual change, and the realism/anti-realism debate in the sciences. Obviously, no book tackling a huge assortment of major topics could hope for thoroughness; rather, what Weber aims to do is show how particular attention to the details of a case study can provide an (often unexpected) entry into some of these issues.

For example, Weber argues that attention to the way that action potentials in neurotransmission came to be understood reveals some ways in which biological explanations are profoundly reductionistic. Weber suggests that at least one kind of good biological explanation — those that explain how particular systems work — are really an application of a combination of chemical and physical explanations. We learn how neuron action potentials work when we can explain, in terms of the chemistry and physical properties of the cells (and other structures) involved, how it is that the biological systems involved do the kinds of things they do. By this example, Weber hopes both to show that experimental work in biology is in fact reductionistic, and to provide a compelling example of what good reductionism might look like in practice.

Weber’s discussion of ‘model organisms’ likewise ties experimental work in biology to larger issues in the Philosophy of Science. His discussion of
'preparative experimentation' is particularly valuable in this context. Weber argues that much work with 'model organisms' was done (and continues to be done) not to test any particular hypothesis, but rather to learn how to work with such organisms (how to successfully breed them, how to find interesting mutations, etc.) and to find out in what kinds of projects such organisms might be valuable. These 'preparatory' roles for experimentation are unlike the roles usually attributed to experimental systems (such as testing hypotheses, falsifying theories, etc.), and the concept of preparative experimentation likely has broad applicability to other domains.

While Weber’s arguments are compelling in many of these cases, it is unclear how general the conclusions he draws are meant to be. For example, it isn’t clear that philosophers arguing that biological theories are non-reductionistic in interesting ways think that all work in biology is non-reductionistic. Rather, one might interpret these positions as arguing that there is a large, and interesting, part of the biological sciences that resist standard reductionistic arguments. For example, there are a number of different questions one might ask about a particular biological system involved in the formation of action potentials in neurons. Weber’s reductionism applies to the question of how such action potentials are generated and used. But there is another question one might ask — namely why such systems developed. What, in other words, is the system of action potentials, etc., for? On one interpretation of for-ness, this kind of question is unique to evolved biological systems, and cannot be reduced to an explanation in terms of chemical-physical actions. Admittedly, Weber may not be open to the above criticism, since he rejects functional ascriptions based on selective history (‘etiological’ or ‘direct proper’ functions). But as his reasons for rejecting these functions are, in part, wrapped up with his reasons for supporting a broadly reductionist program, it is unclear how helpful this move really is.

A similar point can be made with respect to his arguments regarding the degree to which particular research results in biology are contingent on accidents of history (or politics, or personality, etc.). While the particular cases he analyzes broadly support a kind of ‘non-contingency’ thesis, the contingency hypothesis being opposed is never made particularly clear, nor is there any attempt at a sympathetic defense of it (see Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999] for discussion). Again, in the particular cases he addresses, the positions he defends seem reasonable, but again, it isn’t clear how general those positions are supposed to be.

In part, a focus on the details of particular experiments may not be compatible with very broad or very general conclusions. In areas, Weber’s work suggests that, e.g., issues about realism and anti-realism in the biological sciences may best be settled one structure (organelle, etc) at a time. This may be why Weber is less successful in, for example, his confrontation with Developmental Systems Theory (DST). Here, Weber attempts to use a current ‘evo-devo’ (evolutionary developmental biology) approach to one aspect of Drosophila development to show that the main theoretical commit-
ments of DST are either over-stated, mistaken, or trivial. The problem is that the case study in this case is inadequate to support the conclusions he hopes to draw. Even if that aspect of Drosophila development does not involve any known substantial heritable non-genetic variation associated with fitness differences, this does not imply that there is no such variation in other systems, nor that such variation has not in fact been very important in evolutionary history. His claim that DST proponents have not properly distinguished between systems of inheritance and systems in which there is heritable variation is not supported by the literature, and his failure to seriously address the growing literature on heritable variation in non-genetic systems that is associated with phenotypic differences is, in this context, a serious slip. Recent reviews of these issues include book-length treatments by Eve Jablonka and Marion Lamb (Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life [Cambridge, MA. The MIT Press 2005]) and Mary West-Eberhard (Developmental Plasticity and Evolution [New York, Oxford University Press 2003]), and work on these issues, though never particularly common, has been pursued throughout the ‘modern-synthesis’ (see Otto Landman, ‘The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics’, Annual Review of Genetics 25 [1991] 1-20 for review).

But insofar as Weber over-reaches in this case (and perhaps some others), it is in large part because he has taken on some of the grand issues in the Philosophy of Science. And even where one might be legitimately skeptical of the conclusions he reaches, Weber’s overall approach is compelling; his book’s focus on the philosophical significance to be found in details of experimental biology is a welcome addition to the philosophy of biology, and to the philosophy of science more generally.

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P.H. Wiebe’s recent book *God and Other Spirits* defends the reasonableness of the claim that transcendent entities (God, angels and evil spirits), although unobservable, are real. They are a subtle form of nature. The most important task of this volume is to set the traditional Christian commitment to transcendent entities in an agreement with an empirically founded scientific worldview. This task seems not impossible to accomplish when we consider that the theoretical entities postulated by contemporary physics are as ‘supernatural’ and unobservable as God or other spirits (cf. the thesis of the convergence of physics and Eastern Philosophy in Fritjof Capra’s *The Tao of Physics)*.

Improving on William James’ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Wiebe claims more than subjective authority for the individual’s encounters with spirits. He observes that generally speaking these encounters can be objectively described as part of our space-time causality. Our book is about how to capture belief in transcendent entities with a scientific method and is a brilliantly written major contribution in this field.

Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the empirical evidence leading to belief in transcendent reality. The examples come predominantly from biblical sources. Although Wiebe concedes that contemporary Western society is reluctant to believe in the existence of good and evil spirits, he maintains that there is belief particularly in evil spirits when human evil reaches proportions that appear nonhuman (e.g., in the case of apparently demonic forces at work in the Nazi Holocaust). In cases of personal experience there is an obvious problem with the evidence: how can the experiencing individual be sure about the nature of the encounter with spirits? In the end, we have to rely on the phenomenological description of what is experienced. These descriptions have to serve as evidence even for those who do not have religious experiences themselves.

Chapter 3 discusses the adequate method for the study of transcendent reality. Deduction, induction and the method of hypothesis (abduction) are the discussed alternatives. Wiebe settles for abduction. This method explains phenomena of the empirical world through postulating new kinds of objects or properties. The objects that are postulated to exist are conjectural and tentatively put forward. This choice of method is fortunate because it ‘... allows human “knowledge” to be expanded in creative ways, beyond those that are available by means of strict observation’ (115). Abduction has already been very successfully used in the natural sciences for the last twohundred years. The thesis put forward in *God and Other Spirits* is that religious experience can use this same method (cf. Edward Schoen’s similar
view in *Religious Explanation*). David Lewis also supports this approach, noting that in using abduction we do not need to know an awful lot about the hypothesized transcendental causes of the explained empirical phenomena (130ff).

Chapters 4 and 5 defend ‘nonreductive naturalism’ which interprets God and spirits as subtle forms of nature. In its ontology, immaterial nature (transcendent beings) is closely related to material nature (studied by physics). This seems to promote a physicalist outlook. The defended naturalism, however, is nonreductive because it differentiates irreducible levels of description. We do not have to choose between transcendent description of reality and scientific description because neither does justice to the complexity of the world today. In contrast to J.J.C. Smart’s physicalist outlook, Wiebe doesn’t believe that physicalism will eventually be able to explain the full range of religious experiences. Talk about transcendent reality will always remain meaningful. It must be noted, however, that *God and Other Spirits* reinterprets religious belief scientifically. Like the physicist’s belief in unobservable physical entities on the subatomic level, religious belief is not a free act of faith but naturally adopted upon critical reflection on human experience. Our faculty of critical reflection allows us to be more or less impressed by the evidence leading to the belief in transcendent beings. In exploring the empirical world we find apparently inexplicable phenomena that fascinate us. The belief in transcendent beings arises naturally on this basis: ‘I offer the conjecture that one of the reasons for the persistence of the cosmological and design arguments is that they describe phenomena that are psychologically impressive for many people’ (216). W.V.O. Quine’s radical naturalising epistemology, however, is rejected because it excludes the significance of reflection for the formation of belief (215).

Assessing Wiebe’s account, we must mention that today scientific experience not only dominates but replaces the religious experience of earlier ages. Wiebe admits that nowadays even the Catholic Church has become reluctant to admit the objective occurrence of phenomena like possession by evil spirits. This does not distract Wiebe from gathering empirical evidence for encounters with evil spirits. Drawing the larger picture, however, it seems impossible for any author to hold on to both, (1) a scientific worldview and (2) phenomenologically describable experiences which cannot be captured by scientific means. Wiebe tries to save himself in talking about these experiences as hallucinatory (138). This makes the experiences psychologically explicable and thus an object of scientific investigation. In the end, phenomenology has to fade away and so does any alternative to a scientific understanding of reality.

The tension between Christian faith which is beyond science and Christianity as a belief system in need of empirical defense pervades every aspect of this volume. Unsurprisingly, this indicates not only problems but might also account for the book’s attractiveness. After all, Wiebe is probably right that contemporary Christianity needs the support of scientific thinking: ‘... faith cannot be expected to survive in a scientific age if its cognitive compo-
nent is deemed to be without significant empirical support' (220). The idea expressed here doesn't seem to be new and the price paid by Christian believers for the much needed scientific support is quite high. Max Weber's conception of the 'disenchantment of the world' comes to mind. But in contrast to Max Weber, God and Other Spirits maintains the hope inspired by faith that Christianity can draw strength from knowledge of scientific truths.

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Martin D. Yaffe
Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise.
Translation, notes and interpretive essay.
Pp. 433.
US$36.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-58510-112-5);

One of the most influential scholars working in the area of modern philosophy, Edwin Curley, called Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise (TPT) a 'neglected masterpiece' ('Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece', in Graeme Hunter, ed., Spinoza: The Enduring Questions [Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984], 64-99). There are two major reasons for the neglect TPT has suffered. First, for philosophers who are not bent on becoming specialists in modern philosophy Spinoza's writings can seem like luxury items. They are hard to understand and arguably not essential background reading, if one's main object is to follow current discussions in most areas of philosophy. A lot of contemporary philosophy presupposes Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau or Kant in ways and to a degree that it rarely presupposes Spinoza. In the second place, even specialists in modern philosophy often ignore the TPT. There is a widespread view (a prejudice really) that Spinoza's other main work, the Ethics, corrects or supersedes it. Conjoin this prejudice with the fact that the TPT demands a degree of biblical literacy unknown today outside of seminaries (and rare in them) and you will understand why many of those who would say they know Spinoza have read nothing but his Ethics.

I do not wish to exaggerate the degree of neglect however. Theologians and political scientists continue to study the TPT as do specialists in political philosophy, Jewish studies and philosophy of religion. There is also a surprising number of people not professionally connected with universities who are attracted to Spinoza, and to this text in particular, by the peculiar
mixture of rationalism and mysticism for which Spinoza is known. Spinoza is probably the only philosopher of the modern period who attracts cultish veneration in addition to (and sometimes unhappily mixed up with) scholarly interest. Readers of these heterogeneous kinds have generated enough of a market to keep a couple of English translations of the TPT in print.

The new translation by Martin D. Yaffe ought to do more than merely enter this small marketplace. It should change it. First, I would expect it to displace its predecessors while nudging the TPT closer to the philosophical mainstream. The TPT is, after all, unjustly neglected. It is a philosophical and theological masterpiece that ought to be much better known. It deals with the political and religious foundations of a liberal democracy in terms almost as challenging today as they were in the seventeenth century. And this generation is unlikely to see a better rendering of it in English than Yaffe's.

Yaffe's work is a guide to the TPT as well as a translation. It includes critical tools such as a glossary, together with indices of terms and Bible references that will enable serious students to overcome the linguistic and thematic obstacles that have discouraged first-time readers in the past. However new readers will derive more benefit still from the substantial 'interpretive essay' (267-347) that follows the translation and provides a succinct guide to the chief arguments of the TPT.

Fifteen of the twenty chapters of the TPT are predominantly theological in nature; only in the last five does the emphasis become political. Yet one ongoing argument unifies the book. Yaffe is good at presenting the closely woven details of argument in each chapter without losing the main thread.

To focus his exposition of each chapter Yaffe chooses one short passage which he treats as an aphorism, building around its thesis his account of the chapter's argument. As he discusses astutely each of the twenty chosen aphorisms in sequence, Yaffe simultaneously unfolds the argument of the whole book as he sees it. What Spinoza wants to show in this work is that, while a biblically grounded foundation is necessary to society, it must be one that is consistent with allowing freedom of thought and self-expression. Far from undermining the stability of a republic, Spinoza argues, such freedoms are essential to it.

The translation aims, in the translator's words, at 'the utmost literalness and consistency' (vii). Yaffe appears to me to achieve that goal. A disadvantage of Yaffe's literalism, however, is that it tends to capture some of the poverty and dryness of Spinoza's Latin along with its clarity. As in love, so in translation, fidelity has its price.

The contention that Spinoza systematically 'imputes new meanings to old words' or deliberately uses 'double meanings' (vii) is a familiar one in the secondary literature. I would have thought it a fatal belief, however, for any translator to adopt, because it would be a temptation to fanciful, overly interpretive translating. Yaffe, however, who does subscribe to this view of Spinoza, has manfully resisted that temptation, and actually makes the ambiguity thesis work to the reader's advantage. He provides a glossary (253-65) of what he feels are 'deliberately ambiguous' terms (253), with
careful notes on each. In addition, a thorough index of Spinoza's main philosophical vocabulary (373-433) permits even unilingual readers to compare Spinoza's use of terms in many contexts and so form an independent judgement about his usage.

This index and the two others (of names and of Bible references) form an abridged lexicon for the TPT and make possible a far more advanced study of the text than could be achieved with any other translation. Most words in the index of terms also include the Latin original, enabling the reader with elementary Latin to form a better idea of Spinoza's real philosophical vocabulary.

Yaffe's translation is a book every university library must have and which should gradually replace the Elwes and Shirley translations in the classroom.

**Graeme Hunter**  
University of Ottawa
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