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Table of Contents • Table des matières

Mailed in June/July 2006.

Arnold Berleant
Re-Thinking Aesthetics: Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2004.
Pp. ix + 185.
US$89.95. ISBN 0-7546-5013-8.

Arnold Berleant, a philosopher well known for his work in the aesthetics of natural and other environments, has put together this collection of mostly previously published papers from throughout his long and distinguished career. Although he refers to these works as 'rogue essays', it is perhaps a testament to his on-going influence in the field that, today, there no longer appears to be anything particularly roguish about them. Rather, they are very much in tune with recent developments in the field, for example in pragmatist and feminist aesthetics. This volume serves as a series of reminders of Berleant's main positions, and as a late-career retrospective. It allows the reader to contemplate his work as an organic, although historically conditioned and developed, whole.

The book is divided into three sections: 'The Focus of Aesthetics', 'Iconoclastic Implications', and 'Re-thinking the Arts', each containing five essays (if one includes the 'Introduction' with the first section). We begin with a critique of traditional (Kantian) aesthetics, move on to such concepts as 'the sensuous', 'embodiment', and 'intuition', then end with some problems in such specific art forms as sculpture, literature and music. No essays are devoted to environmental aesthetics, one of Berleant's main areas of influence, probably because in 2005 Ashgate published a companion collection by Berleant, *Aesthetics on the Environment: Variations on a Theme*.

The short preface, the most recently written piece, organizes the book with Kant's principle of disinterestedness as the principal enemy. Berleant goes so far as to suggest that this principle has contributed to our living in a world where scientific, technological, and economic processes, no longer guided by morality, dominate politics and religion. This is perhaps too heavy a burden to place on one author or one concept. In contrast to Kantian disinterestedness, Berleant offers an aesthetics of 'engagement'. He thinks this notion captures better the perceptual, cognitive, and somatic involvement entailed in the appreciation of art. Much of what he says is very close to the aesthetic philosophy of John Dewey. However, he also reads and praises a wide variety of other figures including Aristotle, Schiller, Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Eagleton, Derrida, and Dufrenne, associating himself with such philosophical movements as existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, postmodernism, as well as pragmatism.

Like Dewey, Berleant 1) criticizes the emphasis on the aesthetic object as something isolated, 2) attacks the tendency to seclude art objects in museums and similar locations, 3) wishes to break down various oppositions originating in the eighteenth century that have infected philosophy in general and aesthetic theory in particular (i.e., the opposition between concept and

percept, and between substance and quality), and 4) sees art in terms of a dynamic of interactive parts. Someone might argue that George Dickie's more widely recognized institutional theory of art also features such a dynamic. However, Berleant's theory of what he calls 'the aesthetic field' incorporates more elements of the artistic process than just the artist, the artworld, and the art object. Specifically, it includes creative, objective, appreciative, and performative factors. Thus, for example, he holds that the art object incorporates within itself signs of the history of its creation. Berleant also stresses the aesthetic experience both of the artist and the audience. On his view, art is designed to be experienced, and in an active way. All art must be *re-made*, either by a performer, or by an actively engaged audience, to be appropriately experienced. Finally, he speaks of art's involvement in the on-going process of human culture, seeing aesthetic experience as contributing to the enriching and deepening of human life — another Deweyan idea.

One of Berleant's themes is that aestheticians have failed to recognize sufficiently the innovations of twentieth-century art. He therefore rejects such 'anachronistic' principles as that 1) art consists primarily of objects, 2) art objects possess a special status, and 3) art objects must be regarded in a unique way (e.g. via the aesthetic attitude). However his elaboration of 1) leads him into trouble. He claims that in twentieth-century art there are many instances 'in which the entire art work recedes into insignificance, becoming merely the occasion for exciting a condition of awareness' (31). One example is Duchamp's *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass)*. Although Berleant is right that this work uses iconography, this does not establish that the object has become unimportant any more than it would for a pre-twentieth-century work. (This is a *visually* stunning work!) Berleant also mentions a work of Sol LeWitt in which he says that the art object is reduced to its meaning and 'dissolves' into 'trivial gestures'. Yet what is always striking about LeWitt's work is its physical and sensual presence. Nor are descriptions of LeWitt's works as aesthetically interesting as his actual pieces. Even Vito Acconci's *Step Piece* (1970), mentioned by Berleant as an example in which the art object disappears, is made available to us, at least in part, in the form of a stark and modernist photograph showing Acconci, the stool, and, prominently, his shadow (see http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/step-piece/). In these examples, Berleant seems to lose sight of his own principles of the aesthetics of engagement and the primacy of perception, and to ally himself with the very philosophers he should oppose. He himself says that we should not abandon the aesthetic but 'rediscover its greater scope and capacity' (52).

In Chapter 5, originally published in 1965, Berleant rejects the traditional distinction between the sensuous and the sensual in aesthetics. He calls for the incorporation of the physical body, including its sexual dimension, into our understanding of aesthetic experience. This issue has still not been adequately addressed by aestheticians.

This book is fine work by a truly significant and insightful philosopher. It is clearly and colorfully written, and I recommended it for anyone interested in aesthetics.

Thomas Leddy
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Rex Butler
Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. viii + 165.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6994-9);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6995-7).

Slavoj Žižek
Interrogating The Real.
Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, eds.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. 384.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-7110-2);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-8973-7).

As a pair, these two books force an assessment of Slavoj Žižek's philosophical significance. Might he soon possess the influence once wielded by Jacques Derrida, and achieve the international respect now shown to Jürgen Habermas? Or will his dense intellectual *mélange* of ideas drawn from the likes of Lacan and Marx, Wagner and Stephen King, keep him an academic star in the field of 'cultural studies' but a peripheral player in philosophy? There is certainly a substantial body of work on which a judgment can be based. Rex Butler points out that since 1989 Žižek has been the source of 'an extraordinary outpouring of material' that keeps speeding up rather than slowing down: 'in 2000, Žižek publishes three books; in 2001 four; in 2002, four again' (12). It is noteworthy, however, that Butler begins *Live Theory*, a book that tries to suggest the 'overall objective' of Žižek's torrent of writing (27), with a striking description of its subject *lecturing* in a style that 'in a word, is psychotic' (2). After all, the prominent *New Yorker* profile of Žižek (May 5, 2003) also turned on his rhapsodic talent as a performer — 'the Marx brother' — whose jokes, love of Hollywood movies, delight in self-contradiction, and outrageous political stances has generated a reputation that is, allegedly, vastly disproportionate to the cogency and power of his ideas. And after engaging in a detailed analysis of Žižek's 'philosophical system,' Butler responds to the common criticism that his 'entire project is nothing but a

series of examples' with a claim designed to drive analytic philosophers crazy: Žižek is 'always saying the same thing' even though he is 'constantly contradicting himself' and despite the fact that 'he fundamentally *has nothing to say*' (123).

Now, a careful reading of the essays included in *Interrogating the Real* helps put Butler's startling summation into perspective. For example, 'The Eclipse of Meaning: On Lacan and Deconstruction' starts from Derrida's famous idea that the metaphysics of presence is rooted in the illusion that the voice is a self-transparent medium. Yet Žižek immediately adds Lacan's qualifier, namely, the voice also exhibits an alien, parasitic element that undermines self-transparency or, as it were, prevents us from hearing what we are thinking. Derrida's tension between voice speaking and words written is secondary to a conflict within the voice itself. And this internal tension plays a crucial role in transforming the objective or denotative *meaning* of signs into *sense*. For the voice, as a self-transparent medium, is like writing insofar as it involves 'no difference between the enunciated content and its process of enunciation' (213). It is the 'nonsensical vocal dark spot,' the opaque 'non-subjectivizable remainder' of the voice, that actually subjectivizes a chain of signs and allows one to discern sense by partially eclipsing the literal meaning — hence the Lacanian paradox, 'sense = meaning + nonsense' (213). When, therefore, the incessant circling, retracting, and reiterating of a Žižek lecture reverberates with his position of enunciation, we might ask whether he is speaking nonsense. Before asking a question like this, however, surely one should consider the intended audience. Specifically, to whom is Butler talking?

In their introduction to *Interrogating the Real*, Butler and his co-editor note that 'Žižek's work constitutes an endless enquiry into its own discursive conditions' (4). The cultural studies approach to Žižek takes his self-investigation to be of paramount importance, but the editors rightly add that a focus on method has resulted in a neglect of the seemingly old-fashioned aim of Žižek's strategic idiosyncrasies, namely to produce *truth*. *Live Theory*, though, is far from successful in achieving the desirable balance between the philosophical concern for the truth of Žižek's work and the demand that philosophers provide an account of the 'conditions of transmissibility' for the concepts they use (4). As a practitioner of cultural studies, Butler reflects scrupulously upon the appropriate way — or indeed the very appropriateness — of writing a critical interpretation of such a self-critical writer. Although Žižek aficionados are not likely to find the substance of *Live Theory*'s interpretation to be in any way original, they will be very sympathetic to Butler's methodological ruminations. Philosophers, on the other hand, will appreciate the straightforward and informative account of the development of Žižek's thought in the first chapter, 'The Subject of Philosophy'. However, the central chapters dealing with three key notions — 'master signifier', 'act', and 'negation of the negation' — will be tough going for anyone who is not already fully familiar with Žižek and the main themes of continental 'theory'. In fact, the danger is that philosophers might pick up *Live Theory* under the

assumption that it is an accessible introduction to Žižek and end up dismissing him with Butler's paradoxical formulations in mind — Žižek is literally 'psychotic', Žižek really has 'nothing to say'.

A much wiser approach for the uninitiated would be to go straight to *Interrogating the Real*. Advertised as the first volume in Žižek's collected works, this book is really a volume of selected essays. What distinguishes it from many of Žižek's other books that could also be described in that way, is that Butler and Stephens' superb collection of well chosen and carefully arranged pieces of writing provides an excellent introduction to Žižek's unwieldy *oeuvre*. The more conventional first section contains various (mostly early) works exploring the roots of Žižek's thinking in Hegel and Lacan. The second section, containing versions of essays that were later integrated into books, shows off the real coherence of Žižek's developing ideas (and his habit of ingeniously recycling material). The third section brings together a number of Žižek's diverse treatments of the way ideology functions in our supposedly post-ideological world.

Perhaps the best entry point for philosophers is the most recent piece in the first section, 'Lacan between Cultural Studies and Cognitivism', a small masterpiece concerning 'the struggle for intellectual hegemony — for who will occupy the universal place of the "public intellectual" ' (87). In this exceptionally lucid essay, strangely reminiscent of forays in broad cultural engagement by high profile Anglo-American philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum, Žižek goes over ground that has been well worked since the Sokal affair, but with a distinctive destination in mind. His admiration for the hugely popular group of 'third culture' intellectuals — Dawkins and Gould, Dennett and Minsky, Hawkings and Weinberg, etc. — who unabashedly embrace the idea that scientists have knowledge regarding the way things 'really are', is surprisingly characteristic. He comes close, moreover, to endorsing the critique by these 'cognitivists' of 'cultural studies' academics whose resistance to the hegemony of various discourses and power structures is enclosed in 'an elitist jargon' (89) that undermines the possibility of real public debate and masks its own hegemony within academia. Žižek, of course, has a deep and nuanced understanding of Derrida. Yet 'cultural studies,' he argues, '*does* involve a kind of cognitive suspension' (93) inherited from deconstructionism that expresses itself in an incapacity to assess the *truth* of any position or theory and an instinct to 'postpone *ad infinitum* the *ontological* question' (107).

That said, Žižek pinpoints the fatal flaw in the 'cognitivist' position: it is oblivious to the Kantian critical insight that forever precludes naïve realism as well as the pursuit of all-encompassing ('theory of everything') metaphysical world-views. Truth, that is, depends upon the position of a subject thoroughly engaged in the world. However, we are not cut off from an ontologically complete noumenal reality that we only know in an obscured phenomenal way. For the very notion of such a positive cosmological order is precisely what disappears when Kant's transcendental turn changes the terms of the debate. 'The Parallax View' details the argument that we should

not conceive the *Ding in sich* to be a substantial entity beyond our grasp, any more than is the transcendental unity of apperception. The term 'transcendental', rather, stands for something new, namely, an 'irreducible gap' — an emptiness or void 'discernible only via the antinomic character of our experience of reality' (232).

Žižek's philosophy starts with this 'dogmatic' assertion that 'there is "reality" only insofar as there is an ontological gap, a crack in its very heart' (111). And in a pair of early essays ('Lacan — At What Point is he Hegelian' and 'The Most Sublime of Hysterics: Hegel with Lacan') he presses the point that 'the subject is interior to substance as its constitutive gap' (41) while rejecting the view of Hegel as a 'panlogicist monster' (27). Scholars will have to assess the cogency of this interpretation. Still, Žižek's Lacanian appropriation of Hegel results in a striking vision of the human situation: subjects strive to symbolically fill in the void at the center of their being through their attachment to an (often 'insignificant') object — the *objet petit a* — for which they are willing to risk everything. The key analytic concept of this psychoanalytic Hegelianism, moreover, is not 'the unconscious' as a secret, underlying causality shaping appearances, but rather the 'fundamental fantasy that regulates ... the subject's self-experience' and yet remains 'inaccessible to the subject' (114). Again, subjectivity is a kind of empty 'gap' or wound that we strive to heal.

These fundamental fantasies have a socio-political character that provokes Žižek's inversion of the classical notion of ideology. Unlike the 'false consciousness' thesis, he argues, ideology does not conceal or distort some basic reality — social interests, human nature, for instance. Rather the symbolic coordinates that determine what we experience as reality are structured and supported by the fantasy provided by ideology. Indeed, reality cannot be sustained *without* ideology since its ultimate fantasy conceals the traumatic fact that a perfectly integrated social unity is *impossible*. 'Beyond Discourse Analysis' develops this argument in terms of Laclau and Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London: Verso 1985), but Žižek appeals to Hegel's Lord and Bondsman dialectic to show that this impossibility is often translated into the theft of society by some historical Other: 'the external enemy is simply the small piece ... of reality on which we "project" or "externalize" this intrinsic, immanent impossibility' (274). Although 'the Jew' in Nazi ideology is the most notorious example, Žižek claims that the ideology structuring contemporary global capitalism plays the same game. The United States' war on terrorism, for example, both represses the fact that Americans never possessed the utopian freedom that the terrorist is threatening and functions as an ingenious strategy to prevent the traumatic changes required to address global poverty and social exclusion.

From Žižek's perspective, both Derrida's 'radicalization' of Marx and academic leftists' rhetoric of 'resistance' and 'transgressive strategies' amount to 'the exact opposite: the renunciation of any actual radical political measures' (342). In *Live Theory*'s interview with Butler, Žižek explicitly rejects the idea that 'the ultimate guarantee of those who are aware there is

no guarantee' is accepting 'that every collective choice has to be democratically legitimized' (149). Questioning the 'master signifier' of democracy is one reason, perhaps, why Žižek remains outside the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy. But a close reading of *Interrogating the Real* will show that a sustained engagement with Europe's anti-Habermas while he is in his prime, can only enrich philosophy.

Roderick Nicholls
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Adriana Caverero
For More Than One Voice:
Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression.
Trans. Paul A. Kottman. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press 2005.
Pp. xxv + 262.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4954-X);
US$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4955-8).

Adriana Cavarero's *For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression* is an attempt to restore the spoken voice to the heart of philosophy. Drawing upon a rich range of resources, both philosophical and literary, Cavarero attempts to construct a politics rooted in the voice, a politics founded upon the uniqueness of the human individual. To speak of the voice, of the one who speaks, is to speak of uniqueness. It is in the voice, born in the body, in the lungs, throat, chest, that the uniqueness of each of us can be felt to reverberate. When I pick up the telephone and a friend says, 'It's me', I understand that it is precisely *this* friend who is calling and not another.

Such uniqueness is troubling to the Western philosophical tradition. 'The philosophical tradition,' Cavarero asserts, 'does not only ignore the uniqueness of the voice, but it also ignores uniqueness as such, in whatever mode it manifests itself' (9). At the heart of Cavarero's book is this problem of uniqueness, and the attendant political question of how community can be made possible.

The first part of the book, 'How Logos Lost its Voice', traces the outlines of the debate. In many ways this is well-trod ground: both Rosenzweig and Levinas, whom Cavarero cites extensively, have dealt with similar issues. Yet, whilst Levinas writes out a concern with the dying breath and Rosenzweig's own texts are haunted by the spectre of death, Cavarero wishes to re-emphasise that the breath also speaks of newness, that we need to hear the cry of the new-born as well as the sigh of the one who is breathing for a final time. In her attempt to build a philosophy of vocal expression, Cavarero

wishes to give natality at least as much importance as mortality, because any creative politics or ethics, one might say, must also be a matter of natality. The second part of the book, 'Women Who Sing', moves deftly from the muses to the sirens, through opera to a consideration of the materiality of language, rethinking language as rooted in the body, drawing in particular on the work of Kristeva and Cixous. A final part discusses what Cavarero refers to as 'A Politics of Voices'. Here Cavarero skilfully weaves together the work of Aristotle and Arendt to build a framework for a politics that is rooted not in the generalities of *theoria*, but rather in the act of speech. If, for Aristotle, what distinguished us from other creatures was the faculty of speech, and if we are animals of the *polis*, then what kind of politics does this imply? Taking her lead from Arendt, Cavarero considers what a politics might look like from the perspective not of some general theory of humankind, but rather from that of a plurality of speaking, listening, embodied, unique and particular beings. For it is only in politics, in the speaking and listening within the *polis*, that uniqueness could mean anything at all.

The material gathered here is striking for both its breadth and the richness of treatment. Nevertheless, some of Cavarero's readings of mythology are troubling. For example, in her treatment of the Marsyas myth — in which the God Apollo wins over the satyr Marsyas more through skill than through subterfuge — she repeats a slander against the satyr that is so deeply rooted that it passes almost unremarked. Cavarero echoes the judgement of the sixteenth-century *Ovidio Volgare*, which claims that Marsyas represents the ignorant man being stripped of his errors — but this interpretation masks the violence of the image. Cavarero seems to ignore the agonised cry of Marsyas' final hours, and the machinery of violence that lies behind it. We have to look elsewhere, to the poetic voice of Tony Harrison's *Trackers of Oxyrhynchus*, to hear a voice raised in defence of the satyr Marsyas and in protest against the God: 'Wherever the losers and the tortured scream/The lyres will be playing the Marsyas theme./You'll hear the lyres playing behind locked doors/Where men flay their fellows for some abstract cause./The kithara cadenza, the Muse's mezzo trill/Cover the skinning and the screaming still./Wherever in the world there is torture and pain/The powerful are playing the Marsyas refrain.'

There are also times when, despite her best intentions, Cavarero loses herself in an obsession with texts, such that her theorising upon the bodily nature of speech becomes an ironically bodiless affair. This is most marked in the second part of the book where she discusses the poet Edward Kamau Brathwaite. Cavarero writes: 'As any audience that has been lucky enough to hear him can testify, Brathwaite is an extraordinary reader of poetry. He provides not only the kind of experience that can be enjoyed when the poet "makes his poetic activity into pronunciation," exhibiting himself in a "live reading" that restores the voice to the text....' Reading? Text? But the whole point of oral poetry such as Brathwaite's — and of the world of spoken poetry in general whether slam, dub, griot or what have you — is that it is not a text that is read, but is an utterance that is spoken, whispered, hollered, muttered or sung.

In the end Cavarero cannot perhaps avoid the problem that all academic philosophy has in attempting to move towards a philosophy of vocal expression. As long as the expression of such philosophy is written rather than vocal, it risks arguing itself out of existence. Methodologically, it would be better to be a Socrates and to hold court in the *agora*, to stand upon a soapbox and holler one's philosophy to the world, to conduct such philosophy in earnest coffee-shop conversations, or to turn one's insights into song. If a commitment to philosophy and to literature as purely spoken forms misses the living breath of the voice, then no amount of writing will restore such philosophy and literature back to life; but if it is necessary to write books on such matters, then Cavarero's is a worthy attempt to address at least some of the questions that are raised by such an endeavour.

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Jonathan Dancy
Ethics Without Principles.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2004.
Pp. x + 229.
Cdn$82.50: US$59.50. ISBN 0-19-927002-3.

Jonathan Dancy's *Ethics Without Principles* is an articulation and defense of particularism, a position he is largely responsible for introducing into contemporary ethics. It is the culmination of twenty-five years of work and is perhaps the most important book on this topic to date. This makes it a must read for anyone working in ethics.

By Dancy's own admission, particularism is a radical thesis. His formulation of the thesis, however, masks this. Dancy tells us that particularism is the thesis that 'the possibility of moral thought and judgment does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles' (7). It seems obvious, however, that it is possible to engage in moral thought and judgment without invoking principles. Those with deep-set prejudices do so all of the time, not to mention politicians and others who try to win over public opinion. These examples, however, are guided by the idea that an essential feature of ideal or good moral thought and judgment is that it is principle-based. Dancy rejects this idea. Ideal or good moral thought and judgment needn't be principle-based. This is indeed a radical claim. There is a strong intuition that moral thought and judgment that is not based in principles cannot be justified to others, lacks consistency, results in unpredictable action and, most dramatically, is groundless.

How does one argue for such a claim? Dancy tells us that particularism is a 'direct consequence' (78) of what he calls holism in the theory of reasons, the controversial view that a feature that is a reason in favor of action in one case may be a reason against action in another case, or no reason at all (7). The argument is quick (too quick, given its importance), and goes like this: Theoretical reasons are holistic. The fact that this apple in front of me seems red is generally taken to be a reason (not necessarily sufficient) for me to believe it is red. However, if I am wearing color-altering glasses, the fact that the apple in front of me seems red is not a reason for me to believe it is red. Practical reasons are holistic as well. The fact that a person wants the job is sometimes a reason in favor of hiring, and sometimes a reason against. The same is the case for aesthetic reasons. This leads Dancy to claim that 'It just seems inevitable that moral reasons should function holistically in the way that other reasons do' (76). If this is right, then moral reasons cannot be grounded in simple principles that specify features that always count in favor of or against action, like 'promise-keeping is prima facie right' or 'lying is prima facie wrong.' True, but moral reasons could be grounded in complex principles, like 'Do not lie except to save life' or 'Actions with feature F are prima facie right, unless they also have G — except when they have H as well' (11). Nothing in Dancy's argument tells against this. In the end, all Dancy's argument shows is that moral reasons are not grounded in *simple* principles, not that they are not grounded in principles. To make the case for particularism, he must show that moral reasons are not grounded in principles of any sort, simple or complex.

Notice that if moral reasons are grounded in complex principles, it needn't be the case that everyday moral reasoning and judgment utilizes these complex principles. We may use rules of thumb. Or, we may not use rules at all. If this is right, Dancy cannot argue that he needn't address the possibility that moral reasons are grounded in complex principles on the grounds that such principles are too unwieldy to be useful when it comes to moral thought and judgment.

Reasons holism is troubling as well. A forceful criticism of reasons holism is that once we properly distinguish between partial and complete reasons, we see that although holism is true of partial reasons, it is false of complete ones. The upshot is that the truth of holism does not have the radical consequences that particularists suppose it to have.

Complete reasons give a complete explanation as to why an action is right. Partial reasons do not. The fact that she promised to do it is not, by itself, a complete reason. Rather, the fact that she promised to do it, that the promise was not made under duress, that she is capable of doing it, and that there is no greater reason not to do it, is the complete reason. The fact that she promised to do it may be a reason in favor in some cases, a reason against in others, or no reason at all. The complete reason, in contrast, counts either for or against action in all cases.

Dancy responds to this criticism by distinguishing between favorers and enablers. A favorer is a reason for acting. An enabler is a feature that enables

another feature to be a reason for acting. In the example above, that she promised to do it is a favorer, and the features added in the complete reason are enablers. This enables Dancy to argue that the reasons he claims function holistically are complete. The problem with this approach is that it is not so clear that the distinction between favorers and enablers is one that is clear and intuitive enough to do the work required. It seems that reasonable people can have differing intuitions as to whether something counts as a favorer or an enabler. For instance, the fact that I enjoy ice cream is a reason for me to eat it. Is my belief that it won't rot my teeth another reason to eat ice cream, or is it an enabler? Reasonable people, it seems, can disagree.

Dancy devotes much space to discussing these and other criticisms of particularism. In fact, he explicitly responds to most of the criticisms raised in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little's collection of critical essays, *Moral Particularism* (Oxford University Press 2000). As a result, *Ethics Without Principles* can be read as a defense of particularism against some of its most biting criticisms. Nonetheless, if you are not already convinced of the truth of particularism, this book is unlikely to make you a convert. All the same, its subtle and rich argumentation deserves and rewards careful study.

Crystal Thorpe
University of Florida

Pierre Destrée and **Nicolas D. Smith, eds.**
Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy.
Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing and Publishing 2005.
Pp. xii + 180.
Cdn$/US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-90-2);
Cdn$/US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-91-0).

The occasion of this special edition of *Apeiron: a journal for ancient philosophy and science* (Vol. 38, no. 2), was a 2003 international conference on Socrates' *daimonion*, or 'divine sign', in Brussels. It collects ten papers on this relatively neglected aspect of Socratic thought, focusing mostly upon the sources from Plato (*Apology, Euthyemus, Euthypho, Phaedrus, Republic,* and *Theaetetus,* as well as the spurious *Alcibiades I* and the dubious *Theages*), and to a much smaller extent from Xenophon (*Memorabilia* and *Apology*), as well as the Socratic Euclides of Megara. Included are a collected bibliography, *index locorum*, index of modern names, general index, and a preface that introduces the papers.

Socrates several times mentions his apotreptic divine sign that influences him to abandon certain courses of action, e.g., 'avoid the political life'. A number of important interpretive issues thus arise, perhaps the central one of which is how to reconcile divine influence with Socrates' professed rationalism. Quite aside from this volume's value to specialists on the *daimonion*, it is a superb research tool for first encountering the topic: the papers are mostly very clearly written, their approaches are philosophically broad, and the bibliography is thorough.

Luc Brisson, in 'Socrates and the Divine Signal According to Plato's Testimony: Philosophical Practice as Rooted in Religious Tradition', argues that Socrates' rational activity is 'framed by divine intervention, which fixes its limits and orients [it]' (12). Thus he proposes to resolve the tension between divine sign and reason. The stages of his argument traverse the questions of who or what the divine sign is, the sort of signal that is given, how Socrates receives it, and how he reacts to it.

Problems other than that posed by Socrates' commitment to rationalism are the focus of Mark McPherran's 'Introducing a New God: Socrates and His *Daimonion*'. McPherran addresses in part the questions: Who or what *is* the *daimonion*? Why are its signals only apotreptic? Why are its signals apparently unique to Socrates? This is a very thorough study of each of the Platonic and Xenophontic sources, offering thoughtful interpretations, arguments, and resolutions of problems, e.g., that in Xenophon, *Alcibiades I* and *Theages*, the *daimonion* is also protreptic.

Gerd van Riel examines the nature and extent of Socrates' religiosity in 'Socrates' Daemon: Internalisation of the Divine and Knowledge of the Self'. His primary thesis is that the *daimonion* is internal to Socrates, and so does not come to him from without. This purportedly explains why the *daimonion* is unique to Socrates. Particularly incisive is van Riel's discussion of the relationship between the *daimonion* and the *elenchus*, Socrates' alleged method of cross examining his interlocutors.

Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, in 'Socrates' *Daimonion* and Rationality', offer an exceptionally lucid summary and refutation of several rationalist solutions to the problem posed for Socrates' rationalism, most of which figure in the work of Vlastos. Smith and Brickhouse propose their own 'empiricist', rationalist account of the *daimonion* which, they argue, better fits the texts than that of their counterparts.

Two papers contest the presumption that the *daimonion* is unique to Socrates. Pierre Destrée's study, 'The *Daimonion* and the Philosophical Mission — Should the Divine Sign Remain Unique to Socrates?', maintains that the philosophical mission is one that should be common to everyone and that the *daimonion* is a divine assistance in that mission. He also presents a critical assessment of those arguments sustaining the counter thesis.

Motivating Roslyn Weiss in 'For Whom the *Daimonion* Tolls' is *Ap* 40b-c, where Socrates addresses jurists who voted for his acquittal. He comforts them explaining that his *daimonion* did not oppose his actions during his trial. Weiss wonders 'why Socrates thinks [this] would make them feel any

better about his impending demise' (81). She argues that the *daimonion* is 'something he has *qua* just man ... Something he shares potentially with all just men ... ' (82). The jurists were thus themselves 'visited in a sense, if momentarily, by their own *daimonion*' (82).

In '*"To Daimonion"* and the Socratic Problem', Mark Joyal reminds us of 'the Socratic problem' — the vexing difficulty scholars face in identifying the real Socrates, his views, and his method, if any, of philosophizing. Since the *daimonion* is itself an element in the Socratic problem, scholars 'risk ... circularity and begging of the question' (98) in their work on the *daimonion*. Joyal's paper, then, aims to identify in the Platonic sources some of the characteristics, limitations, and implications for how we approach the Socratic problem in the first place.

Xenophon's Socrates receives sustained discussion in both Michel Narcy's 'Socrates Sentenced by His *Daimon*' and Louis-André Dorion's 'The *Daimonion* and the *Megalegoria* of Socrates in Xenophon's *Apology*'. Narcy's close textual readings focus first upon determining whether Xenophon's Socrates is defending himself against the accusation of lying about the gods, or of being mistaken about them. (The Greek *'pseudesthai'* is thus ambiguous.) Narcy is then able to compare and contrast how Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Plato's *Apology* address the reproach that Socrates' protective *daimonion* nevertheless did not help him to avoid a death sentence. Dorion's study focuses upon the testimony of Xenophon's *Apology*, contrasting it with Plato's, and accounting for their dissimilar presentations of the role of the *daimonion* in Socrates' defense. Dorion thus argues that Xenophon's account is intended by him to correct a deficiency in Plato's account, viz., how to justify Socrates' *megalegoria* ('boastfulness' about his virtues) during his trial.

Aldo Brancaccio's 'The Double *Daimon* in Euclides the Socratic' notes (via Censorinus) that the Megarite believed that each person is assigned a 'double' *daimonion*. How are we to account for this view, absent in Plato and Xenophon, among Socratics? Brancaccio develops the hypothesis that Euclides' view is a way to reconcile a tradition of two personal *daimones* with the contrasting *daimones* presented by Plato (apotreptic) and Xenophon (protreptic), viz., a *daimonion* with two functions.

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Kirby Dick and **Amy Kofman**
Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film.
New York: Routledge 2005.
Pp. xviii + 141.
US$95.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-97408-0);
US$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-415-97408-9).

Sean Gaston
Derrida and Disinterest.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. viii + 176.
US$89.85 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-7823-9).

Catherine Malabou and **Jacques Derrida**
Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida.
Trans. David Wills.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.
Pp. xvii + 330.
US$52.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4040-2);
US$20.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4041-0).

Jack Reynolds and **Jonathan Roffe**, **eds.**
Understanding Derrida.
New York: Continuum 2004.
Pp. xiv + 168.
US$110.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-7315-6);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-7316-4).

Jacques Derrida's contribution to and influence on late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century philosophy is beyond dispute. What is disputable, however, is whether this contribution is actually philosophically significant and laudable. It is certainly not uncommon to hear Derrida praised as the greatest philosopher since Heidegger, but it is no more uncommon to hear Derrida dismissed as a fraud and a sophist whose aim is to confuse and obscure rather than illumine. No one who has read Derrida, friend or enemy, could deny that his writing is complex, bordering on the unintelligible. The question, more poignant now since his recent passing, is this: Is there some underlying truth here or is it just academically sanctioned obscurantism?

In the light of this question and dispute, we find four recent contributions to the ever-growing scholarship by and about Derrida: *Understanding Derrida* (*UD*), a collection of introductory essays edited by Jack Reynolds and Jonathan Roffe; Kirby Dick and Amy Kaufman's *Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film* (*D*); Sean Gaston's *Derrida and Disinterest* (*DD*); and Catherine Malabou's *Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida* (*CP*), a commentary accompanied by some notes from Derrida himself.

Of these, the most important offering for assessing Derrida's contribution to philosophy is Reynolds and Roffe's *Understanding Derrida*, which brings

together introductory pieces from important philosophers and Derrida scholars, including David Allison, Robert Bernasconi, and Simon Critchley. The basic goal of this collection is to serve as an invitation to encounter Derrida philosophically and on his own terms, to elucidate his writing in order to promote a more insightful and sophisticated interpretation of a philosopher who has been subjected to numerous conflicting interpretations, from strict anti-realist to textual idol-worshipper, to nihilist, to defender of the dignity of the disenfranchised. In other words, this collection is not intended to provide a general and exhaustive summary of Derrida's *oeuvre* that might substitute an actual study of Derrida himself. If Derrida's commitment to careful interpretation is at all instructive, it teaches that, insofar as they remain on the surface, summaries necessarily miss the important and inexhaustible ligaments of textual meaning hidden below the surface of what is ostensibly stated. Ultimately, we are urged to recall a basic principle that Derrida himself held to in his own treatment of the tradition of philosophy: 'do not judge until you have read' (*UD*, 1).

Reynolds and Roffe have organized their contributors' essays thematically, covering twelve important aspects of Derrida's *oeuvre*: language, metaphysics, politics, ethics, decision, religion, psychoanalysis, literature, art, the subject, translation, and encounters with other philosophers. In light of our question regarding the quality of Derrida's philosophical work, the most interesting contributions are Simon Glendinning's chapter on language and Christopher Norris' chapter on metaphysics.

Glendinning situates Derrida against the famous twentieth-century 'linguistic turn,' the view that philosophical problems are ultimately problems about language, the solutions to which depend on a careful analysis of language. Derrida's famous claim, 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte' ('there is nothing outside the text/there is no outside-text'), is ostensibly a radical articulation of this linguistic turn, essentially reducing everything (all reality as such) to language. On this view, Derrida resigns himself, philosophy, and truth to the transience and mutability of language, our great enabler and oppressor. According to Glendinning, this interpretation is profoundly mistaken and forgets Derrida's important distinction between language and text. Rather than reducing everything to language, Derrida reduces language itself to the written text: 'language is made possible by, and must ultimately be understood in terms of, structures of writing' (6).

Indeed Derrida himself, in an interview included in Dick and Kofman's *Derrida*, objects to the misconception 'that I'm a skeptical nihilist who doesn't believe in anything, who thinks nothing has meaning, and text has no meaning. That's stupid and utterly wrong ... I never said everything is linguistic and we're enclosed in language. In fact, I say the opposite, and the deconstruction of logo-centrism was conceived to dismantle precisely this philosophy for which everything is language' (*D*, 121-2). Derrida is not a part of the so-called linguistic turn at all; rather, he is 'actually working already beyond it' (*UD*, 6). Derrida objects to the view that language can and ought to provide full disclosure of reality as such, of the realm of pure intelligibility,

the *logos*. In contrast, such pure intelligibility, the fully present, is always necessarily absent. What Derrida offers in turn is a return to textuality and writing as the means by which the world is accessed and rendered intelligible in the first place. Reality is not text; rather, reality, including language itself, is *mediated* textually.

This issue of mediation leads us into the realm of metaphysics proper. Far from the common misunderstanding of Derrida as anti-metaphysician, Norris' chapter displays a Derrida deeply embedded in a metaphysical tradition to which he at once objects and adheres. Norris suggests that Derrida makes two main claims. First, metaphysics is not a realm of reflection severed from the everyday. Rather, our most basic beliefs and practices are deeply informed and formed by 'metaphysical presuppositions' (*UD*, 15). In short, life is metaphysical — and if we can believe Nietzsche, whose influence on Derrida is more or less obvious, metaphysics is in turn informed by life. Second, occasions arise (perhaps the twentieth century is an extended occasion) when this metaphysical scaffolding must be challenged and overcome. However, the challenge can only be self-reflexive; it must be acutely aware of the metaphysical under-girding of all thought. We should neither accept all presuppositions without question nor presume to occupy some new God's-eye-view by which we could once and for all transcend all prejudice (metaphysical or otherwise). Rather, we should question with care, always tentatively and always with full acceptance of our own metaphysical rootedness. Deconstruction is this sort of tentative questioning, not some entirely destructive and self-deluded rejection of all significance, tradition, and meaning. Rather than being an opponent of the history of Western Philosophy, Derrida is here presented as its great defender and student.

In contrast to Reynolds and Roffe's introduction/invitation, Catherine Malabou and Sean Gaston have produced 'Derridian' works. Malabou's *Counterpath* is an intriguing and complicated interpretive analysis of selections from Derrida's writing that essentially presents (not to say defends) the claim that Derrida's work and the tradition of philosophy generally can be understood as a long voyage away from and back to catastrophe. Drawing on its signification in the Greek, catastrophe is here conceived as both an end (e.g., the end of life) and a reversal that spells the ruin of an established order. In this way, catastrophe refers both to the truth (as the end and completion) and to an accident that disrupts a given trajectory: the catastrophe sets us a-sail, but is also that to which we sail. Put differently, philosophy's attempted derivation of truth is in truth a sailing (or better, a wading) that cannot arrive without destroying its own journey: '*Arriving* and *deriving* [*dériver*] have separated. *Catastrophe* is the name for the parting [*écart*] that henceforth keeps each out of range of the other. ... I invite the reader to follow the path of this demobilization of what is derived [*la dérive*] so that what arrives, under emergency conditions, as a catastrophe, will be the chance that starts the voyage' (*CP*, 1).

Malabou's strategy is to cite long passages from Derrida, often filling entire chapters with varied quotations, followed by elucidation. Throughout

the text, the reader is also provided with Derrida's ruminations, in the form of postcards written to Malabou, as he read and Malabou wrote the manuscript that would eventually become *Counterpaths*. To add to the complexity, the text has been 'randomly arranged' (xvii). In other words, the logical order of the text, as Malabou wrote it, is abandoned in favor of a jarring and unsettling arbitrariness intended to promote the reader's own personal pathway. As such, the text itself is a catastrophe in Derrida's sense: it breaks an order that is seemingly established, necessitating an ordering voyage that will always be incomplete, never entirely arriving at its intended destination, never deriving what is present.

On the other hand, Gaston's Derridian contribution is more typically academic though much less intriguing. Through a discussion of Derrida, and to a lesser extent Levinas, Gaston attempts to answer the question: 'Is there a place for disinterest in contemporary philosophy?' (*DD*, vii). Traditionally, disinterest is conceived as a mediating point between the demands of public and private interest. Two basic models follow. First, following Francis Bacon, is the view that to be disinterested is to be publicly and politically extricated from one's own strictly private interest. Disinterest is, as such, a public concept. Second, following Descartes, is the view that to be disinterested is to be impartial, to extricate oneself from socially and culturally generated prejudices. Accordingly, disinterest becomes a private concept. However, Nietzsche effectively ends both traditions, stalling disinterest by suggesting that the claim to disinterest, whether public or private, is profoundly interested: it is in the interest of that ever present/ever elusive self to be disinterested. Much like Gadamer's unveiling of the enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice, this move forcibly leads us away from disinterest. Derrida stands at and moves passed this impasse (or perhaps it is another catastrophe and another voyage). According to Gaston, Derrida's basic claim, inspired by Levinas yet attempting to correct Levinas, is that disinterest can be rejuvenated *after* Nietzsche by recognizing that when I take an interest in the impossible, in the Other, I am turned away from my self and my own subjectivity yet turned towards the Other: I am literally dis-interested, disrupted in my own interest by taking an interest in that which resists my interest. As Levinas puts it, this move arrests my power to have power, my ability to be able.

Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film reproduces the screenplay of Dick and Kofman's 2003 film *Derrida* along with two academic pieces by Geoffrey Hartman and Nicholas Royle, an essay by each of the directors, two interviews with Derrida and an interview with Kofman and Dick. This text supplies neither a trustworthy introduction to Derrida nor a viable critical assessment. Instead, here we meet a human Derrida. Certainly, there is no shortage of intellectualism in the screenplay, from voiceover extracts of Derrida's texts to Derrida's own reflections on topics like irony, the sex lives of philosophers, and his discomfort over his photographic image. Nonetheless, what comes across most is Derrida's perpetual *personal* intellectual struggle, a struggle that is at once humorous and desperate. Take for example his 'puzzled' response to a reporter asking about *Seinfeld* as an instance of de-

constructive irony: 'Deconstruction the way I understand it doesn't produce any sitcom, and if a sitcom is this and this, and the people who watch this and think that Deconstruction is this, the only advice I have to give them just is to read, stop watching sitcoms, and try and do your own homework and read' (*D* 93).

Though these four contributions certainly do not definitively resolve the problem with which I began, they offer some assistance. Ultimately, each in its own way reminds us to return to Derrida himself. By extracting the properly philosophical elements of Derrida's work, Reynolds and Roffe have produced a careful invitation that truly and compellingly shows Derrida to be a serious philosopher we should study and from whom we can learn. On the other hand, Malabou and Gaston return us to Derrida for different and not entirely praiseworthy reasons. As I put it earlier, it is true that Derrida is often opaque. It turns out that those whom he has inspired are equally so. Malabou's analysis of Derrida is insightful but too often obscuring, requiring a turn to Derrida in order to elucidate her elucidation. Gaston likewise tells us what Derrida concludes, but rarely why and how. So, either we trust that Derrida is right, assume he offers no philosophical defense of his view of disinterest or drop Gaston's text aside in favor of the original.

The obscurity of Malabou's and Gaston's volumes reminds us of what is most upsetting about Derrida. It is never lamentable for a philosopher to be complicated. Indeed, philosophy that is too simple really isn't philosophy at all. However, Derrida seems to be in the middle of (or leading) a trend that confuses complexity with obscurity, as though the impenetrable resistance a text erects is a sign of its unobjectionable sophistication. Plato, Kant, even Hegel and Heidegger are difficult, but rarely if ever obscure. With Derrida, Malabou and Gaston one too often feels duped. There is something important here, but must it really be veiled to the point where only the few, the initiated, can enter? Or is this just a way for each of us, in our unmediatable difference, to think whatever we want about whatever we want? This is certainly not Derrida's position, as should be clear from this review, but it may very well have been fostered by Derrida — wittingly or not.

Nicholas Royle claims that deconstruction is 'about being open to *being altered* in one's encounter with difference. And it is about making a difference, changing the ways we think and what we think, altering the world' (*D* 13). However, it is more likely that, insofar as deconstruction has indeed changed the world, it has become increasingly popular and popularized. Derridian themes have become ossified, increasingly 'same' not different, increasingly logo-centrized and decreasingly deconstructive. What seems to have happened is a concretization, not necessarily of Derrida's ideas, but of *Derridian* obscurity for obscurity's sake and the very skeptical nihilism Derrida resisted. I am reminded why I chose to not attend the screening of Dick and Kaufman's *Derrida* when I initially had the chance: I like Derrida, but not Derrideans.

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Andrew Feenberg
Heidegger and Marcuse:
The Catastrophe and Redemption of History.
New York: Routledge 2005.
Pp. xvi + 158.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-94177-6);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-94178-4).

There is a curious irony noted by Richard Wolin in *Heidegger's Children*: several of the century's most astute and radical political thinkers were students of Heidegger, the philosopher who famously never wrote an ethical tract and never espoused any clear politics except from his brief but infamous post as Nazi rector of Freiburg University in 1933. Arendt's politics, Hans Jonas' environmental ethics, and Herbert Marcuse's Marxist critique of the one-dimensional technological society come to mind.

But Heidegger also criticised technological society. At issue in Feenberg's book *Heidegger and Marcuse* is this contrast between the overtly political Marcuse, the darling of the New Left in America in the '60s, and Heidegger, who shunned revolutionary politics, refusing to offer answers. A journalist in the famous interview with *Der Spiegel* in 1966 asked Heidegger what is to be done: 'We expect help from the philosopher, even if, of course, only indirect help, help in roundabout ways. And now we hear: I cannot help you.' Heidegger simply replied 'I cannot.'

The real debate between them, the topic of Feenberg's book, is not the analysis of the technological problem. Both Heidegger's essay *The Question Concerning Technology* and Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, the latter heavily influenced by the former but written in Marxist language that distances itself from Heidegger, agree that some form of objectification of nature, reification into 'resource' or standing reserve, along with the modern tyranny of efficiency or orderability for its own sake, is the mark of technological domination, *Gestell*, or 'enframing' in Heidegger's language. Of course, this is not only Heidegger's thesis, but is similar too to Lukacs' *reification*, also highly influential on Marcuse, who saw his project in the early days as *Heidegger-Marxismus*. The problem that Marcuse (and many others) had with Heidegger is that his answer to the technological problem can be seen to be a sort of quietist 'letting be', *Gelassenheit*. Direct action is not possible for Heidegger (although indirect action may be). Heidegger's answer is mystical; we must wait, prepare and remain open.

Marcuse found this shying away from politics inexcusable in Heidegger. He thought that technology and values, and hence politics, were inextricably linked. The problem for Marcuse, therefore, is finding a suitable and authentic (i.e., philosophical) political response, that is, a politics capable of articulating the situation of contemporary *Dasein*.

Feenberg clearly agrees with Marcuse that Heidegger's response is inadequate, and it is clear from his other writing on Heidegger and technology that he believes, against Heidegger, that something can be *actively* done to

alleviate our technological 'enframing', to work towards an alternative modernity that engages critically with technology and alters our relationship to it in a liberating way. At the same time, Feenberg recognises that much of Marcuse's writing is confusing, and his solutions are not always clear. One of Feenberg's proposed explanations of this is that what Marcuse lacks in his later writing is the phenomenologico-existential insight that he gained from his early encounter with Heidegger. Feenberg claims that Marcuse retreats into his Marxism, and that his rejection of 'Heidegger the political failure' amounts to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Feenberg therefore attempts a salvage operation on his old teacher, which involves restoring to him a phenomenology of technical devices. This phenomenology is what is perhaps also lacking in Heidegger, with his antipathy for the 'concrete', be it concrete analysis of technology or concrete routes for action, and his focus rather on the lofty ontological level where the essence of technology is at work. We can therefore see the task of this book as writing the script for the dialogue between two great figures in modern European philosophy which never took place: between Heidegger, the existential phenomenologist, and Marcuse, the Marxist critical theorist.

Feenberg's route to this is through an examination of Heidegger's Aristotle, the root of much of his philosophy, in particular Heidegger's use of Aristotle's *techné,* which he reads as an alternative to modern technology, one which realises the inherent possibilities of things rather than violating them. Feenberg claims that although Heidegger never called for a return to *techné,* this 'repressed theme' in Heidegger can help us understand how Marcuse proposes we move forward. Aristotle appears as a proto philosopher of technology in Heidegger's early work, but is suppressed in his later work. *Techné* was taken up by Marcuse, yet never found its true voice there either, as Marcuse also repressed this Heideggerian theme. Marcuse's solution based on some sort of 'aesthetic redemption', argues Feenberg, is a liberated technology, free to discover and realise the possibilities of things and men; playing with potentialities as such, technique would become art, and art would form reality. This sounds to Feenberg a lot like the *techné* from Heidegger's Aristotle courses from the '20s and '30s.

Feenberg, one of the chief philosophers of technology, having already devoted several books to the topic, and a student of Marcuse in the 1960's, hence an intellectual *grand*child of Heidegger, is in a perfect position to tell this story. But as with his other writing (for example his exchange in *Inquiry* over Heidegger's essentialism about technology with Iain Thomson), Feenberg seems reluctant to give Heidegger his due. At times it was hard to see what exactly was novel or innovative about Marcuse, since he seemed to put forward very similar theses to Heidegger, but without the Heideggerian language. If he is politically unclear, and can only be salvaged by returning to an (albeit latent) theme in Heidegger, what does he bring to the discussion? It is not always convincing that this theme is so 'latent' in Heidegger at all. At points it seemed that, had Feenberg been more sympathetic to Heidegger, it would have been easier to try to draw out such themes and simply forget

about Marcuse altogether. For example, throughout this book, the turn to art, to aesthetic redemption, is described as Marcuse's turn while Heidegger is constantly criticised for failing to provide concrete answers. But it is clear when reading the end of *The Question Concerning Technology* that Heidegger advocates art as an alternative revealing to technological revealing, one which does not foreclose possibilities in things as the essence of technology does, but frees their potentialities — yet this thesis is attributed to Marcuse. Would Feenberg not have been better to simply concentrate on drawing out some explicit course of action from Heidegger's critique of technology?

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Thomas R. Flynn
Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason Volume Two: A Poststructuralist Mapping of History.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005.
360 pp.
US$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-25470-4);
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-25471-2).

This book, and its preceding companion volume, place themselves at the heart of several fundamental debates within and surrounding French philosophy that are represented on one side by the well known essay of Foucault's which serves as an introduction to the English edition of Georges Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological*. It is an essay which bifurcates French philosophy perhaps even too simply: 'Recall Foucault's division of the French heirs of Husserlian phenomenology into two strains, the formalist and existentialist strains, with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the latter side and Bachelard and Canguilhem on the former' (182). Foucault was to extend this analysis even further to cover French thought as a whole, Bachelard becoming an inheritor of Couturat, and preceding him Comte, in their opposition then with Lachelier and Maine de Biran. There is also the contemporary public debate as to how to best perceive Foucault's *oeuvres*, whether as history or as philosophy. Flynn's book can be seen to take the latter position, if simply in order to complicate the former, for this is the position Foucault himself took. He complicated the 'historicity' of the existentialists to emphasise the historicity of 'forms' of experience. Mark Poster has similarly complicated the need to categorise Foucault, calling him 'an anti-historical historian' (6). Indeed, Foucault philosophically reformulates history, 'with its implicit postulate of continuity' (9), according to his discontinuist philosophical allegiances, such as to the historical epistemology of

Bachelard which was in many ways contrary to the continuist tradition of Bergson, Duhem, and Meyerson. This tradition built itself upon a wish to reform Kantianism, rather than to discard it. It saw physics and metaphysics as inseparable in the discursive profile of knowledge.

To distinguish his approach to history from the traditional one, Foucault uses the term 'archaeology'. Following Bachelard and Canguilhem, his method takes its instruction from science: *'the only pathological fact is a comparative fact'* (18). Just as modern medicine has epistemologically broken with the eighteenth century medicine of species, so archaeological comparisons break with the phenomenological intuition that relates all to an absolute. Instead 'the relativity of difference' asserts an epistemological profile of pluralism, where existence is not a monotonous function. For Foucault a philosophy that is not simply a theoretical activity totalising experience can be defined as a diagnostic activity of the past, evaluated and rewritten anew in accordance with its relation to the present, 'recurrent' as Bachelard would say. Philosophers of action from Alain and Brunschvicg up to Foucault philosophised through history.

As Flynn observes, 'not only concreteness but methodological variety follows' (30) from Foucault's identical wish to study problematization without the necessary anthropological constant or chronological variation. Contrary to Sartre, therefore, Foucault's historical method placed the emphasis away from individual consciousness and instead on the historical contingency of it to the system, the historical a priori. Philosophy becomes both concretised and pluralized through history. 'If Aristotle propounded the ideal of understanding many through one, Foucault reverses this goal as well, proposing we grasp the "one" through the many, appealing to what he elsewhere calls in nominalist fashion a "polyhedron of intelligibility" ' (46). History hence appears not as a continuity under an apparent discontinuity, but a tangle of multileveled discontinuities. History does not resemble the single time-span of Bergson's *durée*, but a multiplicity of time-spans; Foucault has a more multiplied notion of 'event' than Braudel for instance.

Flynn takes us further through Foucault's philosophical landscape in Chapters 5 and 6 with close, careful, and clear analysis of the continuing Kantian aspect that is his *oeuvre*'s governing spatial perspective. Bergson, who for Foucault devalued the spatial in history, is the main adversary again (99). Deleuze is for us now perhaps the most noticeable figure to have highlighted this important aspect of Foucault's philosophy when he described him as a 'cartographer.' This demonstrates his place at the end of the rationalist lineage in French philosophy for which history was crucial. In their increasingly radical philosophical gestures against transcendentalism, reality became a technical realisation of the normative plane of the rational in what Bachelard termed an 'inter-materialism', where the rational was equally moulded anew by the real's reaction to it. This was termed a 'technique of effects,' where the theatre of production, or 'power relations,' were constantly shifting. For Foucault this was to manifest itself in his analysis of power and knowledge, an archaeology of knowledge hence provid-

ing a potential for unlocking the networks of power in the application of knowledge. 'It is, in fact, this very spatialized discourse that enables Foucault to bring into relation the power/knowledge dyad that comes to [then] characterize his genealogical works' (115), in particular his 'spatialization of reason (and rationalization of space)' (127).

As Flynn points out, it is Foucault's use of spatial metaphors that avoids the 'anthropological' bias of modern philosophies of history. 'For Foucault, the notions of discontinuity and transformation are part of a renewal of the disciplines that study change' (119). Critically, as Flynn notes, for Foucault discontinuity was a historical problem to be resolved, not a philosophical maxim. Indeed, from Bachelard to Foucault 'discontinuity' was never a holistic philosophical thesis, but rather an assertion against its previous neglect at the hands of critics of Kantianism. For Bachelard, for instance, philosophy took lessons from wave mechanics. It was simply one level of a foliated ontological tableau. As Flynn states, 'these terms denote a mélange of transformations and displacements with their multiple temporal "viscosities" that can be charted along lines that converge and diverge but that do not totalise in any Sartrean or Marxian sense' (122).

What results from Foucault's 'microphysics of power' is therefore both pluralist and 'particularist' pragmatism that distrusts any universal, systemic, social praxis. The spatial question is key for the comparative work that Flynn tries to do here, and key to such work in the divisions of twentieth century phenomenology was indeed Riemann's concept of multiplicity, the multiple now no longer existing as a mere relational concept to the One (215). Indeed, Flynn asserts the concepts of multiplicity and reciprocity resolve Foucauldian contradictions more adequately than the transcendental position ascribed to him by Béatrice Han. The tension between Sartre and Foucault, experience and the concept, arranges itself around these problems, which take their leave, as Foucault states, from an interpretation of Husserl. Crucially, however, as Flynn merely alludes to but as Bachelard was to point out, Sartre in many ways interprets Husserl against himself. But Flynn elegantly shows here just what was at stake in such interpretations, violence as against power, just one of the many in-depth ramifications explored here.

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Steve Fuller
Kuhn vs. Popper:
The Struggle for the Soul of Science.
New York: Columbia University Press 2004.
Pp. vii + 143.
US$24.50. ISBN 0-231-13428-2.

Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have probably exerted the most influence on the philosophy of science in the last half of the twentieth century. Accordingly, an enormous amount has been written about both of them. Why then, one might ask, yet another book? Steve Fuller, a sociologist at the University of Warwick in England, defends his slim, 122-page contribution to understanding the deep disagreement between Kuhn and Popper, since he thinks that the soul of science depends on it (ix).

This book is not a dispassionate survey of the differences between Kuhn and Popper or their followers. Fuller clearly sides with Popper and is embarked on a mission to vindicate him. He thinks that Kuhn and his followers have (for now) emerged triumphant; but he also thinks that this is for the worse (2, 4) and should be reversed, with Popper's position (finally) accorded the respect it rightly deserves. 'Adopting a Popperian perspective, I conclude that the career of Kuhn and the reception of his work manifest failures of intellectual responsibility on several levels, from which we may still hope to recover' (11).

To evaluate Fuller's argument for this view is no easy matter, however, since his text is 'stripped-down' (intentionally so), and since he makes a large number of startling claims, usually without much defense or documentation. A summary of some of them includes the following: Popper was an enlightenment thinker, in science and in politics, dedicated to the idea that critical inquiry can liberate us, scientist and citizen alike, from the power exerted by others (73). In consequence, he was a proponent of 'open societies' (16-17, 60-1). By contrast, Kuhn was a totalitarian thinker (yes, that is the word Fuller uses) who praised the conformity required by 'normal science', the science done by most scientists most of the time, and acquiesced to the Cold War power structures — the military-industrial complex, for example — needed to pursue science as usual (50-1, 118). He defended science as 'closed societies' of experts, each bound by a common 'paradigm', or collection of assumptions, that (rightly) goes unchallenged so long as scientists are successful in solving the 'puzzles' defined by it (12-13). He was also a defender of 'mandarinization', a detached, élitist German precursor to the attitude of Cold War scientists, who refrained from criticizing the state's use of research in return for autonomy, the freedom to pursue research within their specialties without public supervision or accountability (77-9). For Popper (and Fuller), such capitulation and closure, evident in the practice of Kuhnian normal science, is intellectually irresponsible and morally repugnant. Scientific inquiry and democratic politics are alternative expressions of an open, self-critical, and accountable society (16).

One important difference between closed societies and open ones, according to Fuller, is that the former are organized according to 'belief by evidence' while the latter are organized according to 'belief by decision.' It might seem that belief by evidence is to be preferred. Until, that is, we are told that it presupposes a passive and accepting attitude toward the world, whereas belief by decision presupposes a more active and constructive one (64-6). The epistemological (and quasi-theological) correlates are dogma and heresy, respectively. Kuhn was a dogmatist (and embraced it) while Popper was a heretic (and gloried in it). There are also ethical correlates: an 'ethics of conviction' versus an 'ethics of responsibility' (59-60). For Fuller, Popper's falsificationism is an ethics of responsibility, since one is required to take responsibility for one's decisions and for the consequences of one's actions, whereas a Kuhnian paradigm embodies an ethics of conviction which is pursued dogmatically by docile conformists to the point of self-destruction. Popper, along with other post-Marxist 'social democrats,' aspired to recover an integrated sense of critical inquiry and transformative politics that would complete the project of the Enlightenment. For Popperians (and Fuller), Kuhn's account of the nature of science, exemplified in his own career, abandoned the Enlightenment project. Captive to an insular and defensive Cold War mentality, he had no interest in global integration or transformative politics, but was concerned only to preserve and protect the prerogatives of closed normal-science communities (11, 19-20, 22, 115-18).

This promotion and protection is allegedly accomplished in many ways. The cozy relationship between government and normal-science communities allows 'establishment' scientists to thwart would-be challengers to dominant paradigms through, for example, negative reviews of requests for funding. Normal scientists also control scientific education. As Fuller sees it, a normal-science community is a 'politically primitive social formation that combines qualities of the Mafia, a royal dynasty and a religious order' (27). In consequence, scientific education is akin to religious or political indoctrination (13, 72). The established regime actively recruits and converts acolytes who are fed Whig histories — Fuller calls them 'Orwellian' — that document their paradigm's glorious triumph in the battle for Truth (54, 67). Kuhn allowed this kind of history, since it keeps the troops in order and focused on the puzzle-solving activity of normal science, although he officially endorsed a more academically pure form of history of science. But that form of history is politically irrelevant (54-5). What of philosophers of science? Are they relevant? Yes, but only as 'under-laborers' who work for the establishment by validating the Whig (Orwellian) histories — as Kuhn does so neatly in his account of scientific change (49).

Fuller's book is a disturbing one. I cannot develop all the reasons here, but I would at least like to mention a couple of them. To begin with, his attack (the right word, I think) on Kuhn is very personal. Fuller doesn't just critique Kuhn's ideas, he judges the man. Kuhn was an 'intellectual coward' (viii), who failed to assume responsibility for the consequences of his ideas, and morally deficient, since he was an opportunist who isolated himself and

refused to become involved in the transformative political enterprise in which, Fuller thinks, anyone with Kuhn's (undeserved) influence should be involved. Kuhn's behavior does not 'speak well to his courage, his concern, his clarity of mind or his sense of the times' (121). Like his normal scientists, he was a conformist, a 'heads down' organization man. Never mind that while Popper wrote endlessly about what, ideally, things should be like, he never participated actively in any political causes. Fuller ignores that. He also ignores the fact that while Popper preached openness and self-criticism, he was hardly a model of his preaching. As David Edmonds and John Eidinov rightly point out in their highly acclaimed *Wittgenstein's Poker*, 'while one of Popper's major contributions ... was the insight that for a theory to be scientific it must be open to falsification, he was never happy to accept the application of this principle to his own ideas.' And there is also the question of whether Kuhn's account of the way science works, shorn of the ideological overlay Fuller imparts to it, is not, in fact, more accurate than Popper's. Fuller mentions in passing that Kuhn 'could find little historical basis for falsifiability as a working ethic in science' — others haven't either, since scientists tend to be inductivists — but replies that 'Popper's normative horizons were always more expansive than Kuhn's' (16). Meaning what? That Popper got it right about how science *should* be practiced, even if that's not how it *is* and *has been* practiced? If so, Fuller needs to defend that claim with more than insinuation and character defamation — the comparison of Kuhn with Heidegger in the last three chapters is particularly egregious.

Fuller's book will be a provocative read for those who already know something about Popper and Kuhn, but it is not a good introduction to their ideas (although it was apparently intended to be), since Fuller has a very definite slant on who has won, and who should have won, the 'struggle for the soul of science.'

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Rick Anthony Furtak
Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 2005. Pp. xii + 236.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-02873-7);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-02874-5).

Is there a cogent alternative to the Stoic account of emotions? The brief of *Wisdom in Love* is to show that this question is well-motivated, that it can be answered in the affirmative, and that Kierkegaard's works furnish the resources to do so in an especially illuminating way.

Furtak presents us with a dilemma. Suppose we accept the Stoic's claim that emotions are, as such, false and misleading. If so, we ought to be compelled by the ideal of a life in which all emotional attachments have been expunged. On the other hand, if we find this unattractive, we owe an account of how a life of emotional sensitivity can be free from illusion. For Furtak argues that there is much going for the claim that emotions are false. What we cannot do, he thinks, is simply fall back on the view that, since emotions are non-cognitive, they are neither true nor false. For he takes it to be the lesson, not only of Stoicism but also of much contemporary work, that emotions have ineluctably discursive elements. It is plausible, for instance, that dispositional (if not episodic) emotional states essentially involve judgements: part and parcel of what it is for me to fear X, for example, is that I judge that X is fearsome — or at least that I take it to be so. The challenge for the non-Stoic is thus to acknowledge the sense in which emotions can be false — and indeed the fact that they often are false — whilst resisting the extreme view that to be emotionally engaged is to err.

This challenge is made pressing by what Furtak views as serious tensions within the Stoic position as a whole. For one thing, the Stoics appeal to a notion of *in*appropriate emotions in order to make the case that our passions are typically misdirected. For instance, we may suppose that it is both widespread and irrational to be more afraid of travelling in aeroplanes than cars. And yet the Stoics also deny that anything falls under the concept of an appropriate emotion, since they characteristically deny that there are any true evaluative judgements. This is due to what Furtak calls the 'fundamental thesis' that the world is, in itself, value-free. But there appears something quite unstable about this conjunction of views: viz. that our emotions are often irrational because they fail to properly capture the value of some things relative to others and that nothing is truly judged to be valuable. On the contrary, we may suppose that it is precisely because it is indeed more dangerous to travel in cars than aeroplanes that a disproportionate fear of the latter is properly characterized as disproportional and therefore inappropriate.

Now, Furtak shows how Kierkegaard's *Either / Or* can be read as exploring the underlying tension here between our sense of emotions as sources of confusion and illusion and yet also as potential sources of truth and illumi-

nation. For we have in Kierkegaard's figure of Judge William what is in many ways an attractive picture of emotional integrity, of a life in which all emotional ties have been transformed into enduring commitments. And yet Kierkegaard has also bequeathed us masterful portraits of characters whose intense imaginative and emotional sensitivity, however misdirected and prone to fantasy, expose the conventional Judge as constricted and complacent. The *aporia* that *Either / Or* presents us with, on Furtak's reading, is that, if the good Judge has reason on his side in his critique of the sentimentality and narcissism of an 'aesthetic' life, there is also reason on the side of the aesthete's resistance to a form of life that has become desensitized by a judicious commitment to highly parochial values.

Furtak's reading of *Either / Or* is itself refreshingly dialectical, given that this work is often presented as little more than an idiosyncratic if colourful exercise in philosophical anthropology. But he wants to show, further, that Kierkegaard elsewhere gives us the resources to resolve the tension he dramatizes in *Either / Or*. More particularly, Furtak draws on Kierkegaard's development of a distinctively religious conception of love to show how we can at least envisage a form of life in which being sensitive does not mean being sentimental and in which being committed does not mean being complacent.

At the heart of this conception is an interpretation of love as a basic and general disposition to perceive things in the world as unconditionally valuable, that is, as valuable independently of any particular assessment we might make of their merit or interest to us. For Kierkegaard, this conception has a religious inflection: for it is perhaps only in the light of the idea of divine love as the source of value that it really makes sense to love unconditionally in this sense. But for Furtak, what ought to recommend this conception to us is just that it shows, *pace* both the aesthete and the neo-stoical Judge William, how a certain kind of emotional sensitivity might be nonetheless resolute and enduring. In Kierkegaard's terms, it shows how emotions can be subject to 'repetition'.

Furtak's discussion of unconditional love is sensitive to Kierkegaard's own emphasis that such love is anything but rational in the sense of cost-benefit analysis. On the contrary, as Furtak movingly reminds us, the price of emotional receptivity is vulnerability to suffering. His defence, rather, rests solely on the need for a model that takes seriously the challenge to account for the possibility of emotional integrity.

Just showing how deeply Kierkegaard has engaged with this issue in general — and with the challenge of Stoicism in particular — is sufficient to make *Wisdom in Love* a very valuable contribution. But it is especially to be noted for the disciplined pathos of Furtak's writing. The book bristles with highly suggestive and often illuminating literary examples and allusions. And, even if we may sometimes wish for a closer discussion, one of the most impressive features of *Wisdom in Love* is that it resists our tendency to suppress the emotional resonances of philosophical texts and problems.

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Bernard Gert
Morality: Its Nature and Justification
(revised edition).
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. vii + 438.
Cdn$173.50: US$99.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-517689-8);
Cdn$63.50: US$35.00
(paper: ISBN 0-19-517690-1).

Bernard Gert's work has enjoyed increasing attention, from the success of the original *Moral Rules* (1970), up until the publication of its more compact, readily accessible sister, *Common Morality* (2004). The goal of the newest version of the Gertian text is to speak to the recent concerns that have emerged from the rising philosophical interest in Gert's system, without changing the essential components of the approach he first introduced in 1970. The revised edition of *Morality* still has as its focus the distinctive Gertian themes of rationality, impartiality, and the moral rules that provide the category of publicly allowable actions. The question remains whether Gert's newest alterations can clear up the ambiguities found in what is becoming a classical theory of morality.

Most conspicuously unique, and contentious, of Gert's concepts is 'rationality'. Gert contends that traditional ethics breaks down at the level of content (6), since most moral theories ground moral agency in a capacity for rational thinking. But rationality, according to Gert's revised position (33), is not a faculty, nor can it prescribe moral action. Agents act without reasons every day, but their actions are not irrational or immoral as a result. Regardless of the reason, if an agent's action does not cause significant harm, it is rational. Conversely, irrational actions significantly increase the risk of harm without providing the agent a compensatory benefit. Irrationality is parasitic to morality only if the agent is apathetic about harming herself or others, or if the agent is simply not motivated to act from her belief that an act will cause harm (87). The only component of rational action, then, is to avoid harm (93).

There is no clear difference in the early texts, however, between objective and personal rationality. If 'moral' indicates actions that an impartial, rational spectator would publicly allow (137), and if there is no further distinction between objective and personal rationality, then an agent could hold beliefs that are personally rational and yet objectively irrational, and so could act differently from an impartial spectator who holds publicly rational beliefs. Furthermore, impartial, rational spectators could determine that contradictory actions are moral, since for Gert, if an impartial, rational spectator would permit an act, it is moral. Also, if morality is based on objective rationality, then, to decide what objective reasons are, Gert would need to identify characteristics of rationality that all rational people share.

But, such a move would mire Gert in a theoretical account of rationality that he wants to escape, since for him rationality is tied to the moral psychology of what rational beings *avoid*, rather than to characteristics of agents.

Gert's revision takes up these concerns in three ways: by distinguishing between objective and personal reasons, by changing his use of 'duty', and by specifically addressing moral disagreement. First, he differentiates between objective and personal rationality that give reasons for actions. Objective rationality is based on facts that can make an otherwise objectively irrational act rational (68). Giving painful injections to infants would ordinarily be irrational, except that immunizations provide exceptional benefits to most infants that receive them, which makes the act of giving them rational. Personal rationality is based on motivating beliefs that can make an otherwise personal irrational act rational (58). Providing painful injections to an individual to significantly increase her chances of athletic success may be rational, says Gert (58), if the agent believes the benefits seriously outweigh the potential medical risks involved. In any situation, the rational act is to avoid harm, and though personal beliefs might change *how* a moral rule applies, *that* the moral rules apply is objectively certain, and all violations of moral rules require justification that all rational agents would publicly allow (196).

Gert's revision includes altering his notion of 'duty' to avoid the problem of relativity. He no longer contends (212) that duties are tied to social roles; rather, something is a duty if all rational persons using only rationally required beliefs would publicly favor enforcing the duty. The duty to help, for example, is universally favored by all rational persons, independent of cultural factors. While '[d]oing one's duty' lends itself to relativity, by tying specific duties to the favor of impartial rational persons, Gert objectifies the moral rules in a way that escapes relativism.

Finally, Gert devotes a section in this book specifically to moral disagreement between rational agents. His earlier texts substitute 'publicly advocate' for the impartiality that is required by morality, but in this revision Gert provides an analysis of impartiality to show how moral disagreement between impartial rational agents is possible. Gert believes that impartial rational persons can differ in their ranking of goods and evils as well as their beliefs about what is publicly allowable (237). Most disagreements are about beliefs, although a few disputes are over moral facts. In the latter, new information can unify impartial spectators, but in the former, publicly allowed acts can be more strongly or weakly morally justified, based on their effects (236). Morality, however, is an informal system, and so there are some controversies among impartial rational agents (239), and for these, rational persons must decide from their own beliefs whether they would publicly allow an action, and wait for objective facts to change for further discussion about the act to continue.

A potential criticism could still face Gert's revision. Gert explains that agents' moral impartiality is always toward the moral rules (139, 148). Baseball umpires illustrate this well, since good umpires are impartial to the rules, but might still apply the rules differently. (One might call a strike at

the shoulders, while another will call a strike at the letters.) But, if a single umpire calls both a pitch at the shoulders a strike, and a pitch at the letters a strike, '[h]e would not be a good umpire, for a good umpire must be consistent as well as impartial' (150). Analogously, a good arbiter of the moral rules will consistently and impartially apply the moral rules. Consistency, however, is a main attribute of rationality often found in traditional ethical theories. Packing in aspects like consistency with impartiality could undermine Gert's overarching goal of disconnecting rationality from theoretical characteristics of moral agents.

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William F. Harms
Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xi + 268.
US$70.00. ISBN 0-521-81514-2.

Human cognitive faculties are the product of a long history of biological evolution. Our particular beliefs result from cultural evolutionary processes. The challenge for evolutionary epistemology is to show the significance of these facts for philosophical questions about knowledge. Evolutionary epistemologists attempt at least two projects. One is purely descriptive: it tries to map the causal relationships between human cognition and the world. The other is normative: it uses evolutionary theory to address traditional epistemological questions concerning meaning, justification, and truth. In *Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes* William F. Harms contributes to both.

The book has three parts. In Part 1, Harms criticizes theories of memetics and argues that cultural evolution is best understood as a replicator-free process. Part 2 develops ontologically neutral accounts of evolutionary processes and information, allowing the construction of more complex models of the evolution of the structures needed for knowledge. Finally, in Part 3, Harms argues that his models enable a naturalistic account of the meaning and truth-conditions of normative judgements.

Harms locates the central problem with memetics in its search for an entity — the meme — to play the role in cultural evolution that the gene plays in biological evolution. He considers three important conceptions of the meme, from Richard Dawkins, David Hull, and Daniel Dennett, and argues that each fails to identify an entity whose tokens' similarity can be specified

in a way that allows the application of evolutionary models. For example, he critiques Dawkins because his memes do not resemble each other enough to count as replicators, and Dennett because though he may capture resemblance by re-identifying memes through their semantic properties it is doubtful that entities so identified share causal properties such that they have uniform effects. These criticisms warrant a response from memeticists, particularly in the light of alternative models of cultural evolution.

In Part 2, Harms sets out his positive view, starting with a perspicuous bare-bones account of the features that are essential for any population to evolve by natural selection. He argues that these features are ubiquitous: any group of arbitrarily chosen objects can be treated as a population and the types within it assigned fitness values on the basis of their growth rates. Harms proceeds to develop an account of what he terms 'mutual information', which measures the correlation between the states of two systems. Together these accounts allow us to view evolution as an information transfer process: the result of selection is that a population carries mutual information about the selective forces in its environment.

Harms uses this view to develop a multi-tiered model of how organisms, including humans, may evolve to utilize information. Biological adaptations hold in a genetic form mutual information about the environment of adaptation. Where those adaptations make behaviour vary in response to environmental conditions, there is natural selection of behaviours. In turn, this allows genetic selection for the ability to develop preferences for certain behaviours depending on past states of the environment. The development of these preferences — learning — consists in information being captured in internal states of the organism. This is the basis for knowledge.

Of course, there is nothing surprising about any of this: evolutionary biologists normally assume that we have psychological adaptations that bias our acquisition of beliefs, often in ways that make the beliefs more likely to be reliable. What Harms hopes to supply is a rigorous mathematical framework to model how this happens. Indeed, one of the central contributions of the book is to provide precise characterizations and mathematical models for some familiar concepts and metaphors in evolutionary epistemology.

Finally, in Part 3, Harms makes use of his descriptive model to defend a theory of meaning borrowed from Ruth Millikan. According to this theory, the meaning of a signal is given by its evolved function, i.e. those characteristics of the signal for which the sending and receiving of the signal was selected. Such signals can be the product of genetic evolution, as with the warning cries of monkeys, or the joint product of genetic and cultural evolution, as with human languages. In each case the signal will be true just in case it is produced in accordance with the conditions under which it was selected.

Viewing meaning as the product of a historical process has an added advantage. Harms thinks that the basic vehicle of meaning is neither purely representational nor motivational. Instead, he suggests, it is a signal that simultaneously tracks the environment and motivates the receiving organism. Epistemic norms may be like this, too: our normative intuitions arise

from mechanisms adapted to govern the operation of our system of representation. When a belief violates such a norm these mechanisms alert us to the fact by activating intuitions that deny the belief the status of knowledge. Hence, Harms argues, judgements concerning, e.g., justification will be true under certain, historically-specified conditions, but their history also allows us to account for their normativity.

Harms' ambitions regarding these epistemic norms need clarification. At times he acknowledges that his descriptive account could not tell us that some belief constitutes knowledge — we can capture the extension, but not the intension of epistemic norms, he says, and it is the intension that provides normativity and so allows participation in the normative system (227). But if Harms' account could supply genuine truth-conditions for claims of epistemic justification it is unclear what else would be needed for creatures like us who are already internal to the system of epistemic norms. The confusion seems to arise from a conflation of truth-conditions with the conditions for successful functioning. Even if our normative intuitions are functioning properly, they may not tell us the truth about justification, since the intuitions themselves may not be warranted. With regard to epistemic standards, at least, it is therefore unclear that Harms avoids the common concern with naturalized epistemology: that it describes our epistemic practices, but leaves it up to us whether we should use the standards described.

Such concerns notwithstanding, this is a very enjoyable book. Harms writes with panache, and his frequent meta-philosophical asides are insightful rather than distracting. Further, the book's scope gives it broad appeal. The discussions of memetics and models of evolutionary processes will likely be of interest to philosophers of biology. The project as a whole, and the last two chapters in particular, deserve the attention of epistemologists. It is unlikely to convert committed non-naturalists, but Harms' demonstration of the fecundity of his approach may persuade those sympathetic to naturalism that evolutionary epistemology has much to offer.

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Dieter Henrich
Between Kant and Hegel:
Lectures on German Idealism.
David S. Pacini, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2003. Pp. lv + 341.
US$57.00. ISBN 0-674-00773-5.

This publication of a 1973 Harvard lecture series makes accessible some of the highly influential work of Dieter Henrich. Despite continuous progress in the field in the intervening period, these lectures remain a valuable resource. They present a powerful and coherent interpretation of the development of German idealism, focusing on freedom and self-consciousness in Kant and his successors. David Pacini is to be commended for his careful editorial work and extensive annotations, recording Henrich's subsequent development, and signalling some current controversies.

Henrich states that his intention is to examine three questions: Kant's relation to succeeding idealism; the relations among the idealist systems; and the precipitous collapse of the idealist project, yielding to existentialism and Marxism. While the last issue appears only in marginal asides, Henrich offers sustained and penetrating analyses of the first two questions. He seeks to reconstruct the systematic form of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophies, acknowledging the failure of the authors themselves to articulate these structures fully (9-10). This problem, together with a singular opacity of language, has hindered communication with other traditions, a difficulty Henrich also wants to overcome. He treats the history of the period not as a unilinear process of advance or decline, but traces alternative paths, which he describes as those of Kant, the later Fichte, and Hegel (300). The lectures focus much more on the early than the later Fichte, while noting motives in his pre-1800 Jena work that conditioned his subsequent metaphysical theory. Henrich's goal is to re-open the contest among these positions, while clarifying their deep connections. He privileges the standpoint of theoretical reason, noting that a parallel account could be offered from practical reason and moral theology. These he addresses in other publications.

The book is divided into five parts. The first deals with the systematic structure of Kant's philosophy. Kant's criticism of metaphysics identifies two separate trunks of knowledge, sensation and understanding, but precludes a monistic system, such as those sought by the post-Kantian idealists. Through his encounter with Rousseau, Kant works out the idea that freedom is the keystone of his own system. Freedom is not, as with the later idealists, the point of departure, but a unifying element, integrating the cognitive faculties, and connecting the intelligible and sensible worlds through actions originating in the former but affecting the latter. Although the reality of the practical self is not deducible from the combining activities of pure reason (58), freedom is integral to the comprehension of these activities and of the unity of reason itself. While Kant concludes that the *Critique of Practical*

Reason merely demonstrates that we cannot disprove the reality of freedom, Henrich's reconstruction offers a more robust vindication.

The second part of the book describes initial criticisms of Kant, including Jacobi's fideism and philosophy of immediacy, which inspired sceptical attacks on the coherence of the Kantian system, and on the admissibility of things in themselves as a cause or source of intuition. Jacobi and Schulze/Aenesidemus challenged Kantians to admit either determinism or radical subjective idealism as the only consistent results of Kant's critiques. Reinhold's defence of Kant through the concept of representation is riddled with ambiguities, particularly whether the relational structure (subject, object, and representation), or the subject itself, is preponderant (133). Fichte opts for the subject.

The third section, on Fichte, is by far the richest and most detailed. Fichte takes opposition rather than combination to be the basic structure of mind, but the shift from representation to the self entails intractable paradoxes of self-consciousness (240ff). If we pose the problem of self-reference through reflection, implying a distinction of subject and object, we are confronted with problems of circularity or infinite regress, as we try to identify the object reflected upon as being the subject. Fichte's various attempts to solve the problems of self-reference explain his later elaborations of the *Wissenschaftslehre* (166).

The fourth section is a brief but significant discussion of Hölderlin. Henrich argues that Hölderlin's invocation of a unity prior to the split of subject and object, and efforts to restore unity through history and art, mark an essential transitional step to Hegel. Influenced by Hölderlin's reformulation of idealism, Hegel's *Logic* probes the structure of negation, rather than that of consciousness. This move, the subject of part five, preserves many of Fichte's accomplishments, while also losing sight of the problem of self-reference (329). Thus the dispute between Kant and the idealists remains open, as each position attends to the weaknesses of its precursors but fails to engage with their strengths.

Henrich's discussions of Romanticism, and of the resurgence of pre-modern ideas, are also noteworthy throughout. Commenting on Fichte's reception by Romantic authors, and its importance for literature and modern self-understandings, Henrich observes that Fichte's influence is arguably greater than any philosopher except Plato (184). In distinct ways, Schlegel, Novalis, and Hölderlin (though not himself a Romantic) draw on Fichte's theory of longing and drives, and the wavering and hovering of the imagination, to envisage modern subjectivity and its tasks (223-7). Henrich also describes the revival of neo-Platonism and Stoicism (89-97), the former holding that the ultimate ground of being is transcendent, with particulars emanating from it, the latter defining an immanent and dynamic order of particulars, manifesting either *oikeiosis* (being at home with oneself, or self-consciousness) or *allotriosis* (alienation). These theories resonate within the idealist systems.

The complexities of Henrich's approach cannot be properly canvassed here. A few sources of possible disagreement can simply be noted. They are

aspects of the problem of mediation, or the relation between self-reference and the distinctiveness of the world, other subjects, and history.

In describing how the Fichtean self posits the not-self, or limits its own activity, Henrich depicts the self-reference of mind essentially as its self-confinement. It is mind's relation to nothing external to itself that establishes its absolute character. In Henrich's reading, the not-self appears to be entirely derivative of the self (methodologically, at least, since explanation of mind through the non-mental is precluded, 285); but this relationship is open to other interpretations. In seeking to avoid explanation of the mind's functions by what is opposed to it, Henrich may be underemphasising the irreducibility of the not-self. While the not-self is no external *object*, because objects are constituted only within consciousness, Fichte does not attribute to the not-self a wholly 'transferred' or derivative status in respect to the self; otherwise a dogmatic idealism would ensue. The not-self is dependent but not derivative. Its dependence means that the not-self is not what Fichte calls a real ground of causality; in checking the self's strivings, it does not violate the spontaneity of the subject, or operate causally without the subject's collaboration. Yet it remains distinct from the subject, though experienced within consciousness as an obstacle. Positing the not-self is not simply encountering it as something merely given, nor creating it as a nebulous and impenetrable region of consciousness; rather, the subject actively assumes a relation with the not-self. In this relation, the subject is self-causing, changing itself and the world, and responds to external checks by internalising them, thus imposing limits on its activity. Pippin and Pinkard formulate this as a question of normativity: not that the self *is limited* by the not-self (or that the non-subjective illicitly exercises causality on the subject: Jacobi's criticism of Kantianism), but that the self *takes itself, or posits itself*, to be so limited. If the not-self is not completely derivative, then the absoluteness of the self must also be rethought. Philonenko, Beiser, and Breazeale stress the finitude of the ego for Fichte, and present the absolute self as a dialectical illusion or object of striving, but not as the transcendental ground of all reality.

Secondly, while Lauth and Philonenko emphasise the defining role for Fichte of relations to other selves, and while Henrich critically addresses issues of intersubjectivity in other works, this question is not fully explored here. Henrich illustrates the aporias that arise for a Fichtean theory of intersubjectivity which borrows from (transcendent) neo-Platonic or (immanent) Stoic construals of the relation of the one and the many (280-2): neither approach is compatible with Fichte's methodological rules. These alternatives do not appear to be exhaustive, or exhaustively analysed. Other resources available to Fichte for theorising about intersubjectivity remain untapped. Because he here restricts attention to theoretical philosophy, Henrich must set aside Fichte's *System of Ethics* and *Foundations of Natural Right*, as well as his texts on the French Revolution, which are vital for his theory of freedom and interaction (Buhr, de Pascale, Fonnesu).

Finally, Henrich downplays the importance of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, seeing it only as a sedimented philosophy of reflection, excluded from the

purely speculative *Logic*. He concludes that Hegel's theory of negation in the *Logic* fails to address the unresolved Fichtean paradoxes of self-reference. But Hegel's analysis of subjectivity, whose concepts the *Logic* provides, requires reference to the *Phenomenology* for its historical unfolding. The *Phenomenology* mediates selfhood and history (Bubner, Harris); but it could also be understood through Henrich's own presentation of the general issue of idealism (22-3), to which he does not revert. Henrich describes the correlation of self-image and world-image as central to the idealist programme and the history of freedom. This co-presence is thematic in the *Phenomenology*.

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Eva Jablonka and **Marion J. Lamb**
Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 462.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-10107-6);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-60069-2).

The presence of variation in organismal properties and a system for the inheritance of these properties from parents to their offspring are prerequisites for the occurrence of evolution by means of natural selection. Although Darwin's *Origin of Species* revolved round the themes of inheritance and variation, Darwin did not specify the mechanisms underlying these phenomena. After the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1900 and the gradual uncovering of the chemical constitution of the genetic material provided insight into the mechanism of inheritance and the causes of variation, the standard textbook account of evolution as we have it now was established: organismal properties are transferred from parents to offspring by way of information contained in the genetic material; variations arise through random mutations in this genetic material; and subsequent generations slowly become better adapted to their environments as natural selection filters out less adaptive properties and spares more adaptive properties.

Jablonka and Lamb convincingly argue that this textbook picture is far too simple. Of course, genetic inheritance and random mutations are crucial factors in the evolution of life on Earth, but there is more to heredity than just the genetic system. According to Jablonka and Lamb, four types of inheritance should be distinguished by way of which evolutionarily important information can be transferred between generations: genetic inheritance, epigenetic inheritance (both found throughout the living world), behavioral inheritance (found in many animal groups), and symbolic inheritance (found primarily in

humans and some closely related species). In current biological research it is increasingly realized that there indeed are various ways besides the genetic system in which evolutionarily important information can be transferred between generations. For instance, a recent paper reports that research on chimpanzees ' ... has revealed a complex social inheritance system that complements the genetic picture' (Andrew Whiten: 'The second inheritance system of chimpanzees and humans', *Nature* 437 (2005): 52-55).

Jablonka and Lamb provide the big picture in which such results can be interpreted, but also argue for another important point: variation does not only arise in a random manner but can occasionally be directed. They claim that, 'contrary to current dogma, the variation on which natural selection acts is not always random in origin or blind to function: new heritable variation can arise in response to the conditions of life' (319). This directed evolution is made possible by the epigenetic, behavioural, and symbolic inheritance systems that allow for the inheritance of acquired organismal traits, that is, Lamarckian evolution.

The view of Jablonka and Lamb, which as they clearly realize 'may sound heretical to anyone who has been taught the usual version of Darwin's theory of evolution' (1), is summarized as follows: 'there is more to heredity than genes; some hereditary variations are nonrandom in origin; some acquired information is inherited; evolutionary change can result from instruction as well as selection' (1). While many biologists today already recognize the existence of other inheritance systems in addition to the genetic system, the claim that evolution incorporates Lamarckian components is generally rejected (no doubt because of the history of conflict between Darwinism and Lamarckism) and will confront much scepticism.

Perhaps, however, one should not be too sceptical too soon. Recognizing the existence of four different types of inheritance systems and the occurrence of both random and non-random variation yields a much richer picture of the evolution of life than the widely endorsed Modern Synthesis view and — more importantly — helps to prevent us from uncritically accepting incorrect or merely partially correct explanations of the origin, existence, and diversity of organismal properties. In contemporary biology, Jablonka and Lamb argue, too much emphasis is being placed on genetic explanations of the properties that organisms exhibit. Jablonka and Lamb provide many examples to make their case, one of which concerns literacy in humans (213-5). From the genetic perspective, the phenomenon of literacy would be explained in the same way as all organismal properties, i.e., as the '... product of a lengthy past selection of genetic variations influencing literate behavior' (215). However, as Jablonka and Lamb point out, literacy has arisen only very recently in human populations, indicating that direct genetic selection was not involved. Thus, '... we must be very careful about inferring genetic selection for such a faculty, for although it may be the outcome of direct genetic selection, it need not be. We must also consider the alternative or complementary possibility — that what we see is the outcome of cultural-historical evolution and developmental construction' (216).

Evolution in Four Dimensions has three parts. Part 1 discusses genetic inheritance. Chapter 1 provides a thorough discussion of Darwinism from Darwin's own theory to contemporary biology. This discussion is insightful, because it not only gives the historical facts but also takes into consideration the various social and ideological factors that have influenced biological theory change. Chapter 2 discusses the relation between genes and organismal development and warns us that many of our hopes (e.g., with respect to genetic diagnostics or genetic therapy) are based on an oversimplified picture of this relation. Chapter 3 provides a state-of-the-art overview of the material causes of genetic variation. Anyone who looks for an up-to-date overview of the genetic basis of evolution and development will be well served with these first 100 pages of the book.

Part 2 is devoted to the other three modes of inheritance that according to Jablonka and Lamb should be recognized. Chapter 4 discusses the epigenetic inheritance systems (EISs), distinguishing four types of EISs: self-sustaining loops (i.e., genetic feedback mechanisms), structural inheritance systems (prions, for example), chromatin marking systems (e.g., DNA methylation), and RNA interference. As Jablonka and Lamb point out, the existence of epigenetic inheritance was barely recognized until the mid-1970s and in present-day biology its importance is still undervalued: 'Today, epigenetics is quite a buzzword, and biologists are well aware of the existence of EISs and their importance in development and medicine. However, there is still a reluctance to recognize that they may also have a significant role in evolution' (114). In Chapter 5, behavioral inheritance systems (BISs) are discussed and three types are distinguished: transfer of behavior-influencing substances from parent to offspring (mothers who eat much of a particular foodstuff can for example transfer a preference for this foodstuff by way of their milk to their young), non-imitative social learning, and imitative social learning. Chapter 6 presents the symbolic inheritance system that is found in humans.

In Part 3, aptly entitled 'Putting Humpty-Dumpty together again', Jablonka and Lamb tie up the various threads of the earlier discussions. Chapters 7 and 8 consider how the various inheritance systems are interconnected and influence each other mutually, while Chapter 9 focuses on their evolutionary origins and their role in evolutionary transitions. As Jablonka and Lamb suggest, '... some of the great evolutionary transitions — from unicells to multicellular organisms, from individuals to cohesive social groups, from social groups to cultural communities — were all built on new types of information transmission' (341). Finally, in Chapter 10 (as to some extent in the dialogues that end the other chapters — see below), the philosophical, ethical, and political implications of their theory come into focus. Important among these are the meaning of central concepts in biological science and its philosophy, conceptual change, the contents and scope of Darwinism and Lamarckism, and practical issues in medicine, agriculture and ecology. These issues deserve a more extensive discussion than is provided, especially since the book is a volume in the MIT series *Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology* (this book the seventh

in the series). Most of the book, however, falls within theoretical biology rather than within philosophy — but there is much to say for a view of philosophy of biology as a bridge discipline between these two domains — and many of the philosophical issues are not treated in depth; hopefully Jablonka and Lamb will address these issues in more detail in a future book.

Evolution in Four Dimensions is a book with many strengths, with respect to both content and form. Jablonka and Lamb's writing is extremely clear and careful. They do not presuppose a highly specialized knowledge base, and provide many examples and much historical detail regarding important discoveries. Thus, their book will be accessible not only to highly trained biologists, but to a wide audience of readers from the natural sciences, the humanities, and to some extent the general public. The playful illustrations by Anna Zeligowski help make the material more easily digestible, as does the endnote style: these are listed at the end of the book according to the page to which they belong, but no references to notes are given in the main text. I cannot help feeling that notes should be indicated in the main text, but I must also reluctantly admit that not being distracted by notes did make the text read more fluently.

One feature of the book that helps a great deal in clarifying difficult issues and avoiding misunderstanding is the use of dialogues. Every chapter ends with a dialogue of on average 8 pages between the authors and a fictional character called *Ifcha Mistabra*, and Chapter 10 is written entirely in this dialogue form. As Jablonka and Lamb explain, *ifcha mistabra* is an Aramaic term meaning 'the opposite conjecture,' indicating their use of the dialectical style of the Jewish Talmud '... in which arguments are countered and contradicted, and through this dialectic a better understanding of the subject is reached' (3). Most readers will probably find themselves on more than one occasion in *Ifcha Mistabra*'s shoes, having finished the main text of a chapter but left with numerous questions that they would like to ask the authors. The dialogue sections will serve to answer at least some of them.

Jablonka and Lamb's 'basic claim is that biological thinking about heredity and evolution is undergoing a revolutionary change. What is emerging is a new synthesis, which challenges the gene-centered version of neo-Darwinism that has dominated biological thought for the last fifty years' (1). That is, 'evolutionary biologists will have to abandon their present concept of heredity, which was fashioned in the early days of genetics, nearly a century ago. If Darwinian theory is to remain in touch with what is already known about heredity and evolution, efforts must be made to incorporate multiple inheritance systems and the educated guesses they produce' (344). If they are right — they might very well be and certainly have a convincing case — this book will be one of the major classics of this emerging 4D-Synthesis in biological science.

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Martin R. Jones and
Nancy Cartwright, eds.
Idealization XII: Correcting the Model. Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences.
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 86.
New York: Rodopi 2005.
Pp. 293.
US$98.00. ISBN 90-420-1955-7.

This volume is a very diverse mixture consisting of eleven essays on very diverse subjects authored by contributors from very diverse academic backgrounds. As the preface states, the contributions range 'from Chinese calendars to nineteenth-century electrodynamics to options pricing' (9). 'Diverse' can often mean 'messy'; but what we have here is a well-balanced mixture covering the historical, philosophical, and practical aspects of modelling, much along the lines of Morgan and Morrison, eds., *Models as Mediators* (Cambridge University Press 1999). However, as the editors point out in the preface, this book has been a long time coming, with some of the papers well over a decade old. This leaves some of the contributions looking a little dated, missing out on the wealth of recent material on idealization, modelling, and abstraction.

The principle issue that unites all of the essays (more or less: the last three essays leave the track somewhat) is the following: how can our models possibly represent reality given their obviously highly ideal and abstract nature? The point is that most models in science are *so* ideal and abstract as to be true of nothing existing in reality. As Jones puts it, the systems they describe are mostly 'distant relation[s]' of real-world systems (173). Inasmuch as the real-world systems are captured at all, they are often 'systematically misrepresented' (174). More generally, the contributions deal with 'some aspect of idealization or abstraction' in some scientific field. Space restrictions prevent an overview of all essays so I shall focus on the first two, which defend opposing views on econometric models. This pair gives a good indication of the quality, thematic content and spread of the collection.

Most econometric models view macroeconomic properties (i.e., 'global', 'aggregated', or 'distributed' properties such as GNP, inflation, and so on) as *supervenient* on the behaviour of individual rational economic agents (i.e., on the microeconomic structure). The crucial question is whether or not it is possible, or indeed sensible, to attempt to build *realistic* models of macroeconomic phenomena. Hoover defends a view whereby even extremely *idealized* models ('toy models') have a crucial role to play in testing general principles. Such models serve as 'laboratories' in which to conduct 'experiments' that might otherwise be expensive or too risky to test in real economic situations (see *Studies in Business-Cycle Theory*, by R. E. Lucas. [Oxford: Blackwell 1981]). Real-world connections are bought at the price of feeding in by hand any free parameters on the basis of empirical tests or searches

through the space of values that provide 'good fit' with the data (Margaret Morrison criticizes this method in her essay, Chapter 6).

Pemberton goes in a direction opposite to Hoover's. He begins by drawing a distinction between a 'causal' and a 'non-causal' idealized model. The former is defined as 'an idealized model that rests on simple idealized causes' (35). The latter is then an idealized model that is non-causal in the sense that it 'does not attempt to capture causes or the effects of causes that operate in reality' (37). Causal idealized models can tell us what happens in real situations but the latter *never* can. Pemberton's argument then involves showing that in the context of economics both types of model fail to be predictive since 1) non-causal models are true of nothing *actual*, and 2) a causal model suffers from the extreme degree of complexity of social systems such as economies. This is similar to Cartwright's notion that, e.g., a *real* projectile's motion is far too messy and complicated to represent in a mathematical model (*Nature's Capacities and their Measurement* [Cambridge University Press 1989], 187). Models in this sense are not true of anything in the real world, for the real world is always 'messy'. Hoover would largely agree with all of this and that econometric models often violate the data (18-19), but he nonetheless insists that such models can act as quantitative guides in policy making decisions provided one inputs values of the 'key constants' gathered from '[s]ubstantial empirical work' (31) — again, see Morrison's gripe.

What I missed in this particular exchange (and in the other contributions) was any discussion of *simulation*, especially 'microsimulation' or 'agent-based' modelling (see, e.g., K. G. Troitzsch, *Social Science Microsimulation* [Springer-Verlag 1986]; F. Luna & B. Stefansson, *Economic Simulations in SWARM* [Kluwer Academic 2000]): these are understood exactly as ways of realistically modelling macroeconomic (or macro-whatever) phenomena. This omission may well be due to the time lag in the book's publication — agent-based modelling is a fairly recent innovation.

There are also essays from Amos Funkenstein (who gives an erudite examination of the reasons for the demise of Aristotelian *capacities*); James Griesemer (who discusses an example of abstraction in evolutionary biology); Nancy Nersessian (who focuses on abstraction and idealization in the construction Maxwellian electrodynamics); Margaret Morrison (who discusses modelling in physics from the practitioner's point of view); Martin Jones (who focuses on the distinction between idealization and abstraction); David Nivison (who talks about idealization in ancient Chinese calendar science); James Bogen and Jim Woodward (who criticize the view of theory testing based on the inferential relations between [evidential and theoretical] sentences and suggest an alternative); M. Norton Wise (who presents an evaluation of Giere's book *Explaining Science*, which was then just out); and finally a response to Wise from Ronald Giere himself.

For those (not just philosophers of science) working in the area of modelling, abstraction, and idealization in the sciences *simpliciter*, i.e., understood as going beyond physics to encompass the 'life' and 'social sciences' too, this is an invaluable book (though perhaps as a follow up to Morgan and Morri-

son's book). The main reason for the book's success is that, in many essays, one gains an insider's perspective of modelling and idealization within quite different fields. I wish this format were followed more often. I have only two small criticisms: 1) there is no index; 2) one would have liked a more extensive introduction placing the essays into context — though there are abstracts after the fairly brisk preface, the spread of subjects demanded more.

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Mark Kalderon, ed.
Fictionalism in Metaphysics.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. x+354.
Cdn$165.00: US$95.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-928218-8);
Cdn$60.00: US$35.00
(paper: ISBN 0-19-928219-6).

In the eyes of some, fictionalism will seem to have all the advantages of theft over honest toil. This is because fictionalists, unlike other anti-realists, continue to partake in discussions about particular objects despite denying these objects exist. In fact, the fictionalist will affirm and deny most of the claims about these objects as would a realist. But when pressed, the fictionalist will ultimately deny that she is committed to the existence of these entities. Take mathematical fictionalism, for example. According to the mathematical fictionalist, one can *accept* that arithmetical sentences like '2 + 2 = 4' are true so long as one does not *believe* that these sentences are true *simpliciter*. Rather, sentences about mathematical objects are true, in the eyes of the fictionalist, only within a suitable (and pragmatically virtuous) fiction. The mathematical fictionalist engages in something like pretense or make-believe when she makes assertions like 'The set of real numbers is strictly larger than the set of natural numbers.'

To many, this rejection of the strict and literal truth of '2 + 2 = 4' will seem absurd; however, the mathematical fictionalist, whose position is usually motivated by a commitment to nominalism (i.e., the denial that mathematical objects exist), actually aims at a providing an ontological compromise. According to Hartry Field, the arch-mathematical fictionalist, mathematical discourse demands a Platonist interpretation. But, given the mathematical fictionalist's commitment to nominalism, no literal interpretation of mathematics will preserve the truth of our everyday mathematical claims. So, in

order to preserve our everyday mathematical talk, which is prima facie committed to mathematical objects, the fictionalist draws a fundamental distinction between the *acceptance of* theories and theses and the *belief in* theories and theses. Statements of what seem to be mathematical fact are, for the mathematical fictionalist, *accepted* in virtue of their truth in fiction, but not literally *believed*, since the abstracta that mathematical sentences purportedly refer to are nonexistent. It is this unique strategy for preserving discourse despite any objectionable ontological commitments that is the defining feature of the fictionalist enterprise.

Since the publication of Field's *Science without Numbers*, a wide variety of fictionalisms have been advanced. Fictionalist accounts of possible worlds, mathematical objects, material composition, mental states, empty names, colour, and morality have all found advocates. With this boom in the fictionalist industry, this collection provides a welcome opportunity to assess the merits and deficiencies of this increasingly widespread approach to ontology. The contributions that comprise the volume vary widely in scope. Some aim only at tweaking fictionalist accounts already on offer. Others advance entirely new varieties of fictionalism. The most engaging papers are, however, those which tackle issues of relevance to fictionalism in all its varieties. The contributions of Daniel Nolan and Gideon Rosen are particularly successful in this regard.

In his survey of the historical analogues of fictionalism, Rosen not only situates fictionalism in a broader historical context, but, by contrasting the fictionalist stance with historical precursors like Pyrrhonian skepticism, draws out the central commitments of fictionalist epistemology. This contribution, from modal fictionalism's first proponent, is among the most interesting and important chapters in the volume. Nolan's 'Fictionalist Attitudes about Fictional Matters' will also be of interest to those concerned with the development of a robust account of fictionalist epistemology. In it, Nolan outlines a strategy for construing the propositional attitude reports of fictionalists in various contexts, a task that has proven problematic for certain types of fictionalism. Frederick Kroon's contribution is similarly concerned with belief ascription and aims at providing a solution to Mill's problem of empty names by employing fictionalist resources.

Philosophers interested in mathematical, modal, or moral fictionalism will welcome the contributions by Stephen Yablo, Seawha Kim, and Richard Joyce, which build upon their particular fictionalist programs and, in each case, succeed in making substantive contributions to the literature. Although these papers may prove somewhat challenging for philosophers unfamiliar with their varieties of fictionalism, the bibliography supplied along with the volume's admirably concise introduction should provide ample guidance. Moreover, Kalderon's inclusion of Kendall Walton's seminal paper, 'Metaphor and Prop-Oriented Make Believe', is a welcome editorial decision given the considerable influence Walton's views have had upon many philosophers' views of both fiction and fictionalism.

A fictionalist account of truth is on offer in James Woodbridge's contribution, the sole paper advocating a novel form of fictionalism. Woodbridge makes his case for holding truth to be mere pretense by indicating how such an account accommodates not only deflationary intuitions about truth, but also admits of a solution of sorts to certain variations on the Liar Paradox. In the volume's longest and perhaps most challenging contribution, Cian Dorr takes up the issue of how ontological disputes are to be best understood and argues in favour of mereological nihilism, a position usually defended in conjunction with a fictionalist account of material composition.

The contribution most likely to catch the eye of anyone working in metaphysics will be the posthumously published piece of Lewisiana. In 'Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism', David Lewis, with typical lucidity, outlines what he takes to be *the problem* with moral realism and argues that although Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism avoids *the problem* it becomes a form of fictionalism about morality in the process. Of note are Lewis' brief but sympathetic remarks about fictionalism. The volume's final chapter, Blackburn's response to Lewis, is a defense of quasi-realism's independence from fictionalism. Regardless of whether Blackburn's quasi-realism is indeed distinct from fictionalism, this discussion provides every indication that fictionalism will be of considerable interest to those working in metaethics.

One might hope that a volume of this sort would also lay out the challenges faced by fictionalism in general and in its specific variations. This volume would have benefited from the inclusion of a few papers voicing substantive dissent from, or criticism of, the fictionalist stance. There are still serious questions about the extent to which fictionalism is a viable strategy in metaphysics, and those who are sympathetic to Quinean approaches to ontology will find all fictionalists guilty of confused and illegitimate doublespeak. This volume will do little to convince them otherwise, but perhaps it should have made a greater effort to do so.

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Robert Kane
Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005. Pp. x + 196.
Cdn$85.00: US$52.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-514969-6);
Cdn$30.50: US$17.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-514970-X).

Philosophers who have paid little attention to the free will debate in recent years might be surprised to learn that the compatibilist hegemony has been broken, and a variety of incompatibilisms — libertarian and hard determinist — are now respectable. The contemporary landscape is therefore significantly different from the way it was even a decade ago. This book is therefore well timed. It gives us precisely what it claims: a *contemporary* introduction to the free will debate.

Kane is himself a prominent player in the contemporary debate: he is the most prominent and influential defender of event-causal libertarianism. Inevitably, his libertarian commitments influence the way in which he presents the debate, though for the most part his overview is fair minded and balanced. He argues that the freedoms defended by compatibilists — he identifies three, which he terms the freedoms of self-realization, of (reflective) self-control, and of self-perfection — are genuine freedoms, and genuinely compatible with determinism. But these three freedoms are not all the freedoms worth wanting, he claims. There are, in addition, the freedoms of self-determination and of self-formation, which are freedoms that we can have only if determinism is false, and false in the right way. The right way, of course, is the way Kane has himself defended at length: just in case agents occasionally make undetermined choices which are self-forming choices. We do not need to have alternative possibilities genuinely open to us on every occasion of choice, Kane argues, in order to be morally responsible for that choice. We are morally responsible if, inter alia, we *either* have such alternative possibilities available to us, *or* our action is caused by our character, and our character was formed by our choices regarding some of which we possessed genuine alternative possibilities.

Because Kane does not require alternative possibilities on every occasion of morally responsible choice, he is able to offer a reply to the most influential argument against the need for alternative courses of action, the argument from a counterfactual intervener who monitors the brain states of an agent to ensure that she chooses as the intervener desires. Suppose the agent chooses the action the intervener wants her to choose, so that no intervention proves necessary. In that case, the agent seems responsible for her choice and subsequent action, but lacked alternative possibilities (the counterfactual intervention ensures that). Supporters of these so-called Frankfurt examples (after Harry Frankfurt, who formulated the first one in the modern literature) take them to show that moral responsibility — and, according to

some, free will — does not require alternative possibilities. Kane's response, based on the supposed existence of self-forming actions, is only one in what is now a very large and extremely sophisticated literature; his overview of this debate is a thorough introduction to the problem.

Kane's work is important not only for his contribution to the debate over Frankfurt examples. He, along with Derk Pereboom, Galen Strawson, and Saul Smilansky, has also been influential in altering the focus of much of the debate, away from alternative possibilities and toward the question of whether agents are the *sources* of their behavior, in a way that is supposedly incompatible with determinism but required by our intuitions about responsibility. Some knowledgeable observers argue that this debate over what has come to be called *source incompatibilism* will be the single most lively component of the free will debate over the coming years. If this prediction proves correct, Kane's introduction to the question will prove indispensable reading.

Kane's survey does not limit itself to those aspects of the free will debate to which he has been an influential contributor. He aims for comprehensiveness and does not shrink from assessing rival views to his own, event-causal libertarian, perspective. Classical compatibilism, with its conditional understanding of abilities, is laid out and assessed; the problems traditionally ascribed to this view usefully motivate an overview of newer compatibilisms. Higher-order desire accounts, like those of Frankfurt and Watson, Wolf's asymmetrical account, and Fischer and Ravizza's semi-compatibilism, receive a generous, even sympathetic, hearing. Similarly, agent-causal libertarianism and hard determinism are thoughtfully examined. Kane also has a useful chapter examining claims that predestination and divine foreknowledge are incompatible with free will.

The virtues of this book are many. If Kane's personal views color his presentation, that only serves to make the account more lively and readable. Indeed, the book could hardly be done better. Nevertheless, there are one or two places where Kane's advocacy of his event-causal view oversteps the mark and biases the presentation, at least so far as the intended audience of advanced undergraduates, post-graduates, and academics who require a brief overview of the area, is concerned. Most serious, I think, is the misleading title of the chapter called 'Free Will and Modern Science'. The reader is led to expect a discussion of contemporary scientific challenges to free will — perhaps of work in neuroscience, like Libet's well-known results on the timing of conscious volitions — or at least an overview of the state of play in the sciences of the mind. Instead, the chapter is devoted to setting out Kane's account of self-forming actions. The word 'science' in the title refers to some highly contentious and somewhat marginal speculations; the best we can say for the science on which Kane relies is that it is not actually ruled out by what we know about the brain, the mind, and quantum mechanics. Insofar as the title leads the reader to expect that the science in question will be widely accepted, it is highly misleading.

This and a few very minor slips aside (for example the description of Randolph Clark as an agent-causalist), the book is a lively, comprehensive,

and authoritative introduction to the contemporary free will debate, especially, but not only, to Kane's own views and their motivations. Supplemented by some of the recommended readings Kane lists, it will prove a useful textbook for advanced undergraduates, and for philosophers who require a refresher on what's happening in this most lively of debates.

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David M. Kaplan, ed.
Readings in the Philosophy of Technology.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004.
Pp. xvi + 488.
US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1488-9);
US$49.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1489-7).

This anthology aims to help 'us think critically about the ways in which technologies reflect as well as change human life on an individual, social, and cultural level' (xvi). According to Kaplan, one of the key assumptions underlying his book, and the philosophy of technology in general, 'is that the devices and substances we make and use transform our experience in ways that are philosophically relevant' (xiii). The principle task for the philosophy of technology, as outlined by Kaplan, 'is to analyze the phenomenon of technology, its significance, and the ways that it mediates and transforms our experience' (xiii). It is the transformative power of technology, and its various ontological, epistemological, ethical, and political implications, that is the dominant theme here, one whose importance is rightly highlighted in the manner in which the book is laid out. Kaplan's anthology is well designed to meet his stated task, demonstrating and exemplifying through its diverse set of readings 'the multiple ways that humanity shapes and affects technologies and, in turn, is shaped and affected by them' (xvi).

Although the anthology is formally divided into six parts, the parts are themselves organized around four fundamental themes. Broadly speaking, Parts 1 and 2 are *theoretical* in scope, seeking 'to establish the framework for a philosophy of technology by considering the various ways that humans and machines, means and ends, as well as social values and technical reasoning relate to one another' (xvi). Parts 3 and 4 are more *normative* in scope, focusing on the ways in which ethics and politics are intrinsic to technological practice, helping to shape it while at the same time being shaped by it in return. Part 5 examines the *ontological* role of technology in helping to reshape and reconfigure human nature and our subsequent understanding

of it. Finally, Part 6 deals with some of the *epistemic* and *methodological* issues involved in the relationship between technology and science. The anthology aims to be comprehensive in scope, considering 'technology in its moral, political, epistemological, and metaphysical dimensions' (xv), and does a reasonably good job achieving that aim.

The six readings in Part 1, 'Early Philosophy of Technology', are broadly theoretical in scope and represent what Kaplan refers to as '*transcendental* perspectives on technology,' perspectives that treat 'technology as a singular phenomenon with a logic that is radically different from that found in human culture' (1). The readings here are generally very demanding, each presupposing a certain intellectual background oriented specifically around either the philosophy of Heidegger or of Marxist inspired approaches such as critical theory. The selection by Jonas might arguably be pointed out as the one exception here, but even here the philosophy of Heidegger looms large in the background and is periodically unconcealed.

The eight selections in Part 2, 'Recent Philosophy of Technology', highlight an 'empirical turn' away from the transcendental orientation of the earlier, 'founding' philosophy of technology and toward a more practical, contextual interpretation. The selections here are all by major figures in the field and represent a more contemporary approach to the philosophy of technology. Thus, in contrast to the more 'pessimistic assessments of a singular technological rationality' found in Part 1, the philosophers highlighted here 'tend to view technology empirically and historically — in terms of its actual uses in particular situations' (89). Kaplan's highly positive and enthusiastic portrayal of the authors selected here has the rather odd effect of making the works and authors of Part 1 appear somewhat old fashioned, outdated, and perhaps even quaint. As with Part 1, many of the selections here are challenging, especially to first-time readers, with the selection from Latour requiring at least some modest familiarity with his work and the general issues addressed. Overall, however, the selections in Part 2 are all of very high quality and serve as good introductions to the sort of 'empirical turn' in the philosophy of technology that Kaplan has chosen to highlight.

Parts 3 and 4 consider some of the moral and political questions raised by technology. A key element is the idea that ethical and political issues are 'intrinsic to technological practice. Technology is neither ethically nor politically neutral' (285). The main focus of the four articles in Part 3, 'Technology and Ethics', is less upon issues and problems relating to particular technologies and more upon 'the ways that technology transforms how we think about moral issues ... , our notions of responsibility, human rights, constitutional interpretation, and the good life' (xvi). Jonas reappears once again here, with a welcome continuation of some of the themes addressed in his previous article. With the possible exception of Michelfelder, who must be read in the context of Blumenberg's philosophy, the articles stand well on their own as interesting and generally accessible.

The four articles in Part 4, 'Technology and Politics', focus upon the vital role technology plays 'in the organization of social life.' Of central concern

here are the ways technology 'shapes our lives as citizens, and thus is bound up with questions of freedom, democracy, social justice, and our vision of the good life' (285). The particular selections chosen here 'examine the relationship of technology to our political rights, democratic practices, and social and economic justice' (xvi). As with the section on ethics, the readings here generally stand well on their own and are highly informative, suggestive, and largely accessible.

Part 5, 'Technology and Human Nature', also has a strong ethical and political leaning, but with a particular emphasis on how technology affects human nature (and various issues relating to it). The five articles included here 'explore the various ways that technologies shape, transform, and call into question our very idea of human nature' (355). Of central concern is the constitutive role of technology in redefining, in potentially radical ways, both the perception and the reality of human nature. The articles focus on the ways in which technologies 'call into question what is natural for a person to do or to be,' by blurring 'the lines between what is natural and what is artificial.' Particular issues addressed here include: 'personal and social identity, medical practice and social values, artificial intelligence, and our associations with artificial life' (xvi). The articles here are often disturbing, stimulating, engaging, and in some cases highly speculative. With the exception of Foucault (whose work presupposes the kind of familiarity referred to earlier) all can be read as autonomous texts.

The final section, Part 6, 'Technology and Science', takes up the recent trend toward examining 'the role that technologies play in science' (431). A central claim in the four closing articles is that 'technological instrumentation is essential to scientific practice' (xvi). The readings here 'reverse the received view' of technology as merely applied science (i.e., the application of theoretical, scientific understanding to concrete problems), and instead view science itself as a dimension or mode of a more primordial, practical, technological interaction with the world. In other words, it is 'instruments' rather than theories that tell us what reality is, making 'science less a practice of addressing ideas than one that is about machines' (431). Kaplan's selections present science and technology as part of an interdependent 'web of humans, machines, and social relations' (431), and examine 'the relationship of technology to scientific experimentation, laboratory life, scientific realism (determining what really exists), and democratic ideals encoded within technoscientific practice' (xvi). Most of the readings here presuppose a certain familiarity with certain contentious issues in the history and philosophy of science.

In general this is a very good anthology that accomplishes many of its stated aims. The selections and themes range from the extremely challenging, stimulating, and disturbing, to the highly entertaining. I should add, however, that Kaplan's anthology has what I would describe as a very strong 'Continental' drift. In Part 1, for example, writers of a more 'Anglo-American' style and approach (such as Mumford, Dewey and others) are noticeably absent from the 'founding fathers' list. While there is nothing inherently wrong in this (for an anthology of this scope must inevitably omit certain

seminal figures), nevertheless some introductory explanation of the strong Continental flavour of the selections would be helpful and informative. Some introductory mention of the notable omission of other key figures from the Continental tradition as Ellul and Ortega y Gasset would also be helpful both for the novice as well as the more advanced reader.

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Andrew Light and **Jonathan M. Smith, eds.**
The Aesthetics of Everyday Life.
New York: Columbia University Press 2005.
Pp. xv + 224.
US$64.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-13502-5);
US$24.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-13503-3).

Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith have done a genuine service in assembling the essays in *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*. The book offers a snapshot of an emerging trend in philosophical aesthetics — the exploration of the aesthetic dimension of all the things that are most often the object of our aesthetic judgments, namely, a world of things other than works of fine art. In fact, the topic merits a much larger collection of essays. Yet there is something odd about binding just these eleven essays, sequenced just so, between two covers. As I worked my way through the book, I found myself thinking about the editors' principles of selection and organization nearly as much as I did about the actual topic of the aesthetics of everyday life.

Who is the intended audience for this collection? If it is philosophers of art who do not yet admit that art is only a small subset of the aesthetic domain, then it seems rather pointless, for such philosophers inhabit an intellectual paradigm that will make it unlikely that they will bother with a book with this title. But if the purpose is something other than addressing and challenging traditionalists, then why the repetitiveness in demonstrating that aesthetic judgment applies to so many experiences and situations besides fine art? By the sixth or seventh attack on the narrowness of traditional aesthetics, I wished that the editors had opened the book with one essay focusing on that point. One solid essay would be quite sufficient to do the job, freeing the rest of the contributors to get on with the task of exploring the aesthetics of everyday life.

The book opens with a group of four essays, intended to jointly establish that 'aesthetic criticism' applies to everyday 'objects and events' previously 'exempt' from aesthetic evaluation (ix). What Light and Smith mean, of course, is that mainstream modern occidental aesthetic theory has tended to

denigrate the aesthetic richness of everything except fine art. As most of these essays take pains to note, there have long been alternative perspectives (e.g., nonwestern aesthetics, Dewey's pragmatism) celebrating the aesthetic potency of many things besides art. Of the four essays in the first section, Michael A. Principe's contribution confirms that this section is aimed at readers who already know a great deal about aesthetic theory. His essay focuses on Arthur Danto on the end of art. I wager that anyone whose primary interest is learning more about the aesthetics of everyday life will find it uninformative. This is not to criticize the essay on its own merits. It might have been published in any number of good journals. However, Principe is working squarely in the philosophy of art tradition that focuses on avant garde art — in this case, Marcel Duchamp and Italian painter and writer Gianfranco Baruchello — and there is no obvious illumination of everyday experience.

The second section brings together three essays on the aesthetics of environments, emphasizing that aesthetic judgments are not necessarily directed at unified objects with distinct boundaries or beginnings and endings. At this point, the book's organization into three sections becomes arbitrary. This is the perfect place to locate the book's second essay, Arnold Berleant's concise summary of positions he has been defending and developing for thirty years. In this case, Berleant focuses on social environments and the strong parallels between loving relationships and intense aesthetic engagement. Instead of featuring Berleant, section two reprints a strong essay on landscape appreciation by Allen Carlson. Pauline von Bonsdorff contributes a chapter on buildings as inhabited environments. Finally, editor Andrew Light reprints one of his own essays, which offers a detailed reading of a commercially unavailable Wim Wenders film.

The third section is designed to shift attention from environments to 'particular everyday events, experiences, and objects' (xiii). But why are Yuriko Saito's interesting ruminations on the aesthetics of weather located here, and not in the second section, with the other essays on the aesthetics of environments? Saito's point is that weather is aesthetically significant for the way in which it 'envelops and affects our whole being' (159-60), so that weather generally resists the viewing conventions that direct us toward the artistic values that dominate the experience of artworks. It would be interesting to read Saito's piece in conjunction with Barbara Sandrisser's fine essay on the aesthetics of rain (not included here). Since the book is not restricted to original essays, Sandrisser's absence is regrettable.

Emily Brady's contribution on the aesthetics of smells and tastes is a wonderful companion piece to Leddy's piece on the general idea of an aesthetics of everyday experience. But Leddy's essay opens the book. Brady's is next to last. As a result, their interplay is obscured by all that comes between. Grouped with Wolfgang Welsch's essay on the aesthetics of sport, the trio of Leddy, Brady, and Welsch would have made for an inviting first section for the book, making the remainder far more accessible to anyone not already immersed in aesthetic theory.

The essays by Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant provide straightforward presentations of their views. One can hardly imagine a collection of essays on everyday aesthetics or on the aesthetics of lived environments that would not include their work, for the philosophical legitimacy of the general topic is largely due to their efforts and arguments. But for that very reason, their presence here requires no comment.

Leddy's work is perhaps less well known, but he has an admirable track record with these topics. He begins, unsurprisingly, by criticizing Carlson and Berleant in order to broaden the field they have done so much to establish. Leddy argues that aesthetic theory did not begin with a narrow focus on the aesthetics of art, and traditional aesthetics provides tools that will help us 'to expand the domain of aesthetic terms' beyond the realm of art (12). Leddy offers an interesting argument that the field is expanded greatly if we acknowledge that aesthetic judgments 'can never be supported by referring to nonaesthetic properties' (20). However, this argument is compressed and hard to follow. The argument would benefit from a fuller explanation of how aesthetic judgments relate to the use of aesthetic terms.

Anyone who knows the work of Carlson, Berleant, and Leddy is also likely to know and respect Emily Brady's work. Where Leddy draws on Kant as a positive resource, Brady rightly challenges Kant for having banished smells and tastes from 'the aesthetic domain set out by traditional aesthetic theories' (177). Unfortunately, her response to Kant may simply beg the question of what makes an experience aesthetic. She notes that, for Kant, 'there must be something more than mere sensations; there must be some form or structure' about which we make judgment (181-2). Brady's response, that smells and taste can be complex, does not address Kant's point, which concerns spatial and temporal form. An aggregate is not, for Kant, a structured whole.

I will now turn to the book's two unanticipated pleasures: contributions from two of the book's three European contributors, Arto Haapala and Wolfgang Welsch.

Haapala's essay is 'On the Aesthetics of the Everyday: Familiarity, Strangeness, and the Meaning of Place'. Centered on the example of a daily walk from home to work, it dovetails neatly with Leddy's essay, which opens the book with the example of Leddy's daily walk to work. (Von Bonsdorff likewise notes the aesthetic dimension of walking, but she immediately shifts to the contrasting case of driving.) Haapala uses his example to analyze three distinct meanings of 'place' before concentrating on the third, an ongoing 'interpretation of an environment by an existence' (47). This heavy phrase develops into the idea of place as a thoroughly familiar environment to which one has an emotional attachment. Too often, Haapala argues, aesthetics of environment focuses on encounters with unfamiliar or special environments, where there is a 'surprise element or freshness of the strange' (50). Yet for most people most of the time, the aesthetic response to environment is 'pleasure through a kind of comforting stability' (50). Haapala argues that this sense of being deeply rooted is an aesthetic response with ontological

and ethical implications. The essay nicely contrasts with the strategy adopted by several of the other authors (e.g., Glenn Kuehn on food), who look for the aesthetics of the everyday in unique and life-changing experiences.

Welsch examines sport. He argues that almost every case of contemporary sport satisfies at least one function that is otherwise accepted as sufficient to establish that something is art. He is less concerned with establishing that sport is art than with explaining why sport now substitutes for art 'for a broader audience no longer reached by art' (149). His ultimate aim, it turns out, is to wonder why artists have been so eager 'to escape [their] golden cage of autonomy' (150). If artists downplay differences between art and everyday aesthetics, art is not the obvious beneficiary.

I hope that this volume finds an audience among philosophers. If I have been critical, it is because a few strategic changes would have made it more accessible to a much larger audience.

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Jean-Luc Marion
The Crossing of the Visible.
Trans. James K. A. Smith. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press 2004.
Pp. x + 99.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3391-0);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3392-9).

While ostensibly a collection of essays on painting, *The Crossing of the Visible* is neither a work that deals primarily with aesthetics, nor one that attends essentially to the history and art of painting, or painters themselves. The painting, rather, is given the task of situating an approach to the question of visibility, with an eye to seeing in what way phenomena become visible, and what gives them over to visibility at all. Although centred around the shared theme of painting, these essays betray a deeper commitment to phenomenology as such, which means, for Marion, to philosophy itself, and to exploring a variety of fundamentally related issues including the problematics of givenness, the 'gaze,' the conditions of appearance, and the restriction of possibilities which afflicts the phenomenality of the phenomenon.

In his celebrated essay, *Eye and Mind*, Merleau-Ponty already provides the rudiments of a phenomenological inquiry into visibility from the example of painting. Yet, despite its novelty, Merleau-Ponty's account remains too focussed on the horizon of the visible itself, and thus too fixed on what Marion calls the 'potential visible' (55). Marion's own project is to disclose a more

profound sense of the invisible, approaching the question of the phenomenality of visibility 'as a gift of appearance' (ix), by looking beyond the given spectacle to its invisible source. The task is to put the very horizon of visibility, and horizonality itself, in question by exploring the event of phenomena's being given.

The choice of visibility, and the painting as its exemplar, is in no way accidental. In Marion's assessment we live in a world where the image has come to exhaust the possibility of appearing. 'The world is made into image' (46) to such an extent that it is no longer an image of ... with which we are confronted, but image as such, without an original to which it refers. Our effective reality, then, is one wherein phenomena have been restricted in advance with respect to how they might show themselves, such that phenomena, in their very phenomenality, suffer a reduction. All that constitutes the visible world has been pre-emptively determined as image without original, under the demand to correspond to, and thus satisfy, the voyeuristic desires of the viewer. In Marion's words, 'every image must make itself the idol of its viewer ... or it isn't even seen' (51). Marion's intention is to provide an account that will redeem the phenomenon, and its givenness, liberating it for other possibilities of phenomenality than those of image and idol.

To effect this redemption, Marion takes his clue from the creative event in painting. Today, conditioned by the phenomenality of idolatry, all other possibilities for manifestation have been, near-exhaustively, marginalised and disallowed; this effectively means other possibilities have been rendered phenomenally impossible because forbidden to appear. What is otherwise than image or idol is what must properly be understood as invisible, the unseen on the hither side of the visible that is at once the source of its visibility, and yet, although announced in the visible, cannot itself be foreseen or anticipated therein. Here the creative event serves to reveal. Whether in the artist's liberating receptivity to the irruptive force of the un(fore)seen overcome by its own need for visibility, or under the overwhelming gaze of the icon, which offers 'a visible image of the invisible *as invisible*' (56), there is a transpiercing, a crossing of the visible and the invisible. At such a junction of visibility and invisibility, Marion locates the possibility of freeing possibility, that is, freeing phenomenality for more than just the idol. Whereas today 'the autonomous glory of the painting has disappeared' (33) because visibility itself has been subjected to the exaction of the viewer to appear within a framework providing a paucity of permitted possibilities, the painting no longer imposes itself on us, no longer surprises us, for it has no possibilities of which to avail itself for such startling novelty, and thus the visible world becomes stale and self-replicating as it satisfies expectations. The authentic painting, on the contrary, 'does not accomplish an already-defined possibility; it opens up a possibility to that point not anticipated, unthinkable, impossible' (32). It effectively creates possibility. It opens up the world to that point where phenomenality is not an obstacle to phenomena, because it is not determined in advance by the aims and desires of the viewer, but is determined itself only insofar as it is given dimension by what makes

itself visible. For Marion, visibility is not a fixed horizon within the light of which the visible is permitted its manifestation; rather, visibility is granted its horizonality by, and through, the directives issued from what is visibly given. Because of this priority, the visible is not restricted in its significance by the delimitation of the horizon drawn out by human desires, but the horizon is operating at the behest of the visible, and what it shows, or signifies — which may not itself be visible.

It might be wondered, however, if visibility is deserving of this exalted prestige in terms of phenomenality. And perhaps in attending to the scope and origin of visibility Marion is carrying out such a calling into question. Through thinking the (in)visible, rather than endorsing the priority long enjoyed by visibility as the privileged sense of appearance, the diagnosis of visibility's regency ultimately points to possibilities for phenomenality which exceed, and are still otherwise than within, its limited purview. The contemporary situation of nihilistic idolatry, in which 'nothing *is* if it is not seen' (53), conceals, and yet betrays, in its own way, that 'we live and we move not in the middle of what we see, but in a relation — through what we see to what we don't see' (55). Through turning our gaze to the invisible which is adumbrated, and thus non-phenomenally manifested, in the visible, Marion seeks to emancipate us from our 'imaginal exile' (55), to liberate us for what gives and what is given, and for possibilities still yet impossible.

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John McCumber
Reshaping Reason: Toward a New Philosophy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2005.
Pp. 263.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-253-34503-0.

At a time when the relevance of philosophy is increasingly put in question, and when the postmodern skeptics and nihilists have all but sealed its fate by trumpeting its end and turning themselves into happy 'undertakers' all too content or merely resigned to celebrate its demise, McCumber's latest book, building on crucial results laid out in previous works, is a fresh, bold yet modest, highly critical yet constructive effort to set philosophy on a new path for the twenty-first century and beyond. Its main thrust is to invite us, as temporal and relational beings, to take *time* seriously, and systematically draw the implications of a properly construed and constrained 'temporal reason' in an effort to characterize the proper task of philosophy at this juncture of history, namely, rationally constructing situations, or 'situating' us. For, as he

puts it, 'human reason does not have to be either universal or situated' (11). For McCumber, philosophy itself then becomes 'a way of inhabiting time' (78, 89). His project is in effect 'a critique of temporal reason' seeking to ascertain the necessary conditions, principles, and most importantly, the philosophical tools (enlarged and re-organized) for the exercise of such a reason.

Why has such a project not been undertaken systematically up until now and in the way outlined? It is actually surprising. But the well-known historical and philosophical reasons are spelled out (in Chapter 1). Philosophy thus far can be said to have had at least two jobs: the first, which it readily acknowledges but has (arguably) performed miserably, is that of producing true assertions by arguments alone; the second, which it has performed rather well but surreptitiously, is that of the creation and revision of basic concepts which inform our lives and societies — the 'reshaping' of reason itself (22). Such basic concepts include love, courage, happiness, well-being, right, force, power, nature, reality, mind, body, cause, freedom, justice, beauty, and scores of others (12). Why, one might ask, has traditional philosophy not seen itself as primarily having the task suggested above even though it has certainly been its 'second job,' one that it has not only had all along but also performed admirably (11)?

The main reason, McCumber argues, is its exclusive devotion to *truth*, which is itself rooted in an ancient desire for *timelessness*, *transhistoricality*, and *universality*. This desire has in fact trapped philosophers in a doubly 'aporetic' situation: either they remain with the old way of trying to establish truths by arguments alone, in which case they restrict themselves to a self-enclosed 'island' of fantastic reifications (analytic philosophers) or they hopelessly struggle to free themselves without much success and therefore go nowhere quickly (continental philosophers). The former find it increasingly difficult to explain themselves to non-philosophers since that would require them to deal with realities that are not to be found on their fantasy island, while the latter find that they can explain nothing at all to anyone, so they become permanently subversive strugglers (7).

To be sure, various philosophers since Kant have sought to introduce time in their theorizing or temporalize their philosophies, most notably Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and later on Heidegger in *Being and Time*. But McCumber argues that they both failed because each in his own way merely sought to reconceptualize truth itself in temporal terms (23). Though their failures provide important lessons, he wishes instead to articulate different goals for philosophy which do not merely reduce to truth, truth-claims, or 'truth games.'

Traditional philosophical thinking is conducted in the present tense making use of various forms of inference; its goal and medium is the true assertion (sentence, belief, or proposition). McCumber's account of temporal reason aims in contrast to 'enlarge the philosophical toolbox' (Chapter 2) by introducing new concepts, principles, and methods which would enable philosophy to relate not only to the present but to the past and future as well, in ways that do not reduce to stating truths about them and have contextually

definable objectives and purposes of their own. Going beyond the archetypical practices of Hegel and Heidegger, he calls these ways of relating philosophically to the past and future *'narrative'* and *'demarcation'* respectively (89, 102). They correspond loosely speaking to 'telling stories' and 'formulating questions,' but when undertaken philosophically they face special constraints that McCumber discusses at some length. Added to the traditional practice of inference for the sake of making true assertions (for which Quine stands as an archetypical practitioner), the result is a 'comprehensive view of reason,' fully temporal and relating equally well to the *past* (the past in itself, the *usable* past), the *present* (the present in itself, the *presentable* present), and the *future* (the future in itself, and the *predictable* future) [33-40]. For McCumber, an effective *situating* philosophy is one which is fully responsive to time in all of its dimensions, and serves to illuminate our status as temporal and relational beings by putting into play the re-evaluated *inferential tools* of (Quinean) analytic philosophy, (Hegelian) tools of *dialectical reconstruction* ('narratives'), as well as (Heideggerian and Derridean) tools of *destruktion* and *deconstruction* ('demarcations') — all stripped however of their supposed truth claims, and apprehended only in their performative functions beyond traditional notions of *bivalence*, *totalization*, and *universality*. 'Demarcation without narrative is empty; inference without narrative is blind; narrative without demarcation is reactionary; narrative without inference is fiction. All three must work together in thinking' (102) —which alters thinking, specifically in philosophy (64).

In Chapter 3, McCumber shows what temporal reason enables us to know about (knowable) reality. After carefully reviewing the confused state of metaphysics, and the conflicting ontologies that have proliferated in the Western tradition without resolution, he makes a vigorous case for *a new way of doing 'ontology'*, not as a universal 'theory of being' — abstract, recondite, and of interest only to philosophers, but as a generalized recommendation as to how things should be situated, understood, responded to, and acted upon, one which always requires a *pragmatic evaluation* making use of such newly redefined concepts as *guiding deltas*, *situations* and *parameters* (160).

In Chapter 4, McCumber argues that temporal reason calls for a re-conception of ethics as the set of answers to the question 'how is it necessary to live?' He claims that such a formulation, harking back to ancient Greek thought, expands the scope of ethics beyond the modern conception, both vertically and horizontally. The former in that it does not specify whether the living 'thing' is a person, a community, the whole human species, or indeed the entire biosphere. As a result, it incorporates social and political philosophy as well and comprises the general principles by which life should be navigated, and in particular how individuals and communities make their way through the world (162). The question is not how it is necessary *to act*, but how it is necessary *to live,* and thus goes beyond the traditional sphere of action. In this view, the exchanges between the different levels of individuals, communities, societies, and species are more significant ethically than what happens on any one level. But these exchanges take place on 'the edge

of ethics' as traditionally conceived, and are arguably best understood in terms of different kinds of '*poetic interactions*.' 'The edge of ethics,' he writes, 'is the place where nature, society, and community guide me, even as I seek to transform them. It is the place where I have to respect things and people, instead of act on or with them — i.e., where I must *situate* myself with respect to them' (164). In order to act ethically, we must have defined the situation we are in. What traditional action-oriented ethics leaves out is that defining our situation is also an ethical undertaking. 'Situating us among concrete circumstances, this aspect of ethical "behavior" is best viewed as *responding* to things rather than merely as acting on them: it is the place where my active freedom comes to the edge' (164).

Despite its avowedly limited and modest nature, McCumber's book deserves to be scrutinized further in order to more critically take its proper measure. His proposal for a new 'philosophy in time' draws on diverse sources in the entire history of Western philosophy, as well as on relevant empirical studies. Critical and technical discussions are provided optionally throughout in italicized passages. This makes his defense of a post-analytic, meta-continental philosophy even more compelling. We stand to gain valuable insights by extending it more fully to ontology, epistemology, and ethics, and by applying it to as many disparate issues as the humanism/scientism debate, the politics of identity and recognition, cultural politics, social and political struggles for social, economic, and environmental justice, democracy and human rights, roles and functions of government, interpersonal relationships, psychological counseling and therapy, as well as education, etc. There is a good chance then that 'philosophy, far from having died, will, once again, have just begun' (xvi), and its relevance to the world in which we live will be vindicated anew.

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Colin McGinn
Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004.
Pp. vi + 209.
US$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-01560-6);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-674-02247-5).

The publication of Kendall Walton's *Mimesis as Make Believe* in 1990 will do as well as anything to mark the emergence of the imagination as a hot topic in philosophy. More recent notable works include Gregory Curry and Ian Ravenscroft's (1998) *Recreative Minds* and Shaun Nichols and Steven Stich's

(2003) *Mindreading*. Now Colin McGinn has joined in. *Mindsight* is an entirely readable and engaging new book that approaches the topic from the perspective of armchair philosophy of mind.

Although the book is divided into thirteen chapters, it really has two parts. The first part (Chapters One through Seven) defends the idea that mental imagery is not merely attenuated perceptual imagery, but in fact a distinct sort of mental state altogether. This is the core thesis of the book. The second part (Chapters Eight through Thirteen) goes on to explore the significance of mental imagery and of the imagination more generally in the mind, touching on topics such as delusion, reasoning, and grasping meaning. McGinn puts together a fairly convincing defence of his core thesis. Images can be willed but percepts cannot; images are not in a position to provide us with new information but percepts are; some of the qualities of our sensory fields are not shared by the fields of imagery; percepts are saturated but images are not; percepts do not require attention but images do; perception presents a specific relation between the body of the perceiver and the object of perception but imagery does not; one can recognise the object of perception but one is simply given the object of one's imagery; and finally, imagery does not occlude what one perceives, but hallucinatory (etc.) percepts do prevent forming percepts of what lies beyond them (12-34). Even if a few of these items are not convincing, the general pattern is hard to deny. Having a visual image is not much like having a very faint visual perception, contra Hume and others.

Even after this defence, though, one wonders about certain things. Why is it that I cannot visualise colours that I cannot perceive? Why is it that I cannot visualise things as though I could see behind my own head, though I can visualise them as being within the space of my visual field? In short, why is it that the contents of the mental images I conjure are largely parasitic upon my perceptual contents? Neuroscientific investigation has for some time been suggesting that this is because imagery relies on many of the same structures in the brain as perception. This suggests that perhaps some of the characteristic features of imagery derive from the fact that, whereas in perception full use of perceptual resources is mandatory, in imagery the will is responsible for selecting which perceptual resources get used, and a number of them are used only partially. This might go some distance to explaining why percepts are saturated, occlusive, and clearly located in personal space while images are not. But because McGinn restricts himself to fairly traditional philosophizing, ideas that blend neuroscience and philosophy are beyond the scope of his book.

Surprisingly, McGinn also has little to nothing to say about Walton, Currie, Ravenscroft, Nichols, Stich, et al. The philosophers to whom McGinn responds in any substantial way are Hume, Sartre, and Wittgenstein. To some extent this is a product of the fact that McGinn is especially concerned with whether mental imagery should be counted as attenuated perceptual imagery, a question not much addressed by the existing literature on the imagination. It is also a product of the fact that McGinn's focus is mostly on

imagery and only secondarily on more cognitive uses of the imagination, while in the philosophical literature the emphasis is the other way around. But it also seems to reflect McGinn's disinterest in what his colleagues have been saying about imagery and the imagination. When contemporary philosophical work does come up in *Mindsight*, it is invariably relegated to the footnotes, even when there is reason to treat disagreements at length in the main text.

Occasionally, this disengagement from contemporary thought creates real problems for *Mindsight*. In Chapter Eight, on delusion, McGinn describes his theory of how delusions of grandeur and persecution arise. 'The subject suffers from an emotional disturbance centering on anxiety or thwarted desires. This emotion stimulates the imagination, producing images of persecution or wish fulfillment. These images feed back to the emotions and inflame them further. A feedback effect ensues. The images come to be *believed* by the subject; hence the conviction of persecution or of grandeur' (113-14; italics in original). As this is a fairly empirical matter, it would be nice to see some empirical support. McGinn appeals only to Karl Jaspers, and his justification for turning to Jaspers is that 'he was an acute phenomenologist, well attuned to the distinctions among mental states' (117). That the relevant work was published in 1913 does not, apparently, concern McGinn. And the fact that McGinn's proposed explanation is powerless to explain how prolonged use of stimulants such as cocaine can induce delusions of persecution (for instance) does not seem to occur to him.

Lack of interest in the facts also impairs McGinn's treatment of dreams (Chapters Six and Seven). On McGinn's view, 'the dream is a story — a piece of fiction — told in sensory terms (images), in which the dreamer becomes unusually deeply immersed' (103). That is, dreaming is a voluntary activity one engages in through the use of one's ability to create mental images. The powerful emotional effects created by dreams are produced by the depth of our immersion in the stories we weave, he holds. But treating dreams as voluntary exercises of the imagination makes no sense of the distinction between REM and non-REM dreams, makes no sense of our tendency to dream only during sleep, makes no sense of the fact that REM dreams occur in highly predictable cycles at specific times during sleep, and so on.

In spite of these flaws, much of *Mindsight* is interesting, well argued, and thought-provoking. If it lacks the impressive rigor of some of his earlier work, it compensates by being full of new and interesting ideas.

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Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and **Kent Still, eds.**
Addressing Levinas.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2005.
Pp. xxxiv + 342.
US$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-2046-1);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-2048-8).

The essays in *Addressing Levinas* were originally presented at the conference, 'Addressing Levinas: Ethics, Phenomenology, and the Judaic Tradition', held at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, October 15-17, 1999. This collection deals with how to address the Other, Levinas' central concern, but also how to address Levinas himself. Specifically, Eric Nelson and Antje Kapust write in the book's preface that the current state of Levinas scholarship requires us to attend to the nuances in his philosophy and read him 'more critically and more thoroughly' (xi). This the essays in this volume accomplish, making it an important contribution. What it means to read Levinas critically is itself an essential question, to which the essays present us with a wide variety of approaches.

Rather than merely criticizing or defending Levinas' work, the essays represent an engagement with him that respects what makes him so unique. The essays are broadly 'Levinasian' in approach, although this means that they sometimes conflict with the letter of what he wrote. This creative engagement makes them more Levinasian, since Levinas himself sought to re-write his own work, overturning and opening it up. In his preface to *Totality and Infinity*, he expresses a desire to be the first critic of his own book, to respond to it as if he had not wrote it. He asserts that it 'belongs to the very essence of language, which consists in continually undoing its phrase to restate without ceremonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said delights' (30). Addressing Levinas requires attending to the differences within his work, while also recognizing how the letter of his text demands engagement, re-interpretation, and perhaps even a radical betrayal in the spirit of responding responsibly to him.

These essays wrestle with how to understand selfhood as constituted through the relation to the Other. Levinas' ethics is not normative; the radicalness of his thought lies in understanding ethics not as rules that can be grounded upon a metaphysical system, but instead that ethics underlies our interactions in the world. Ethics is first philosophy, according to Levinas. The address to the Other is thus the foundation of human existence. In 'Bare Humanity', Alphonso Lingis gives us a first person interpretation of the responsibility a unique individual must owe to others. Describing what it means to be confronted by the Other, who is a specific human being in need, not some abstraction to which we owe a duty, Lingis writes in the first person so as to underscore that responsibility to the Other is something that is owed by *me*, and no one else can absolve me of that responsibility. The Other in this

essay is many different people — my neighbour, a stranger with a stalled car, a homeless woman — but each imposes upon me a unique obligation to address her.

In addressing Levinas, the authors of the essays in this book interrogate the roots of his work. Leslie MacAvoy's essay, 'The Other Side of Intentionality', explores Levinas' complex relation to phenomenology, arguing that he radicalizes phenomenology rather than rejecting it. The Other cannot be an object of intentionality, according to Levinas, because he is beyond the reach of consciousness. However, MacAvoy argues this does not mean that Levinas gives up on phenomenology, but rather that he sees intentional subjectivity as founded upon something other than itself. It is through intentionality that Levinas gets to the ethical. The ethical becomes apparent in the way intentionality is turned back from its intended object. Consciousness is thrown into question because the structure 'consciousness of ... ' is thwarted. In this turning away of intentionality the face of the other can signify as absence. MacAvoy asserts that the 'way to the ethical is through intentionality; the ethical is not so much a surpassing or overcoming of intentionality as a mutation and alteration of it' (114). While intentionality fails to comprehend the Other, nonetheless MacAvoy does not think that this means intentionality is destroyed. Rather, intentionality is altered. The self is no longer only the ego, but becomes 'me', accused by the Other even before being a willing self. Still, intentionality must be retained. In order to give to the other, there must be interiority.

Jill Robbins' essay, 'Strange Fire', delves into the other major source of Levinas' work, the Judaic tradition, and in doing so sheds light on his motivation for separating his work in the Jewish exegetical tradition from his more properly philosophical work. In examining the Leviticus chapter in which Aaron's sons are burnt by the fire of the Lord, Robbins shows how Levinas rejects religious ecstasy, while still finding in religion a great ethical resource. Robbins argues that the epigraph to Levinas' *Difficult Freedom*, 'Let them not enter the sanctuary drunk', illuminates Levinas' project in the book to 'render explicit the "hidden resources" of the Judaic tradition'(12). The Judaic tradition would provide an ethical contribution, without overwhelming the obligation that people have to each other and without prioritizing the sacred over the ethical obligation we owe to other people. Robbins raises the intriguing point at the end of the essay that perhaps the most Levinasian point in this biblical story is not God's vengeful fire, but rather Aaron's silence after the horrible death of his two sons when Moses attempts to give a theological explanation of the act. Robbins writes that 'Moses's *theological* explanation of Aaron's sons' death is too pat, too totalizing. But in Aaron's silence, might not one read the beginning of a response, or responsibility, to the disaster?'(15) In the face of tragedy the Levinasian would not try to explain, but rather to truly *respond*, to address the incomprehensibility of it, and to let that stupefaction fuel genuine responsibility.

David Wood's essay, 'Some Questions for my Levinasian Friends', explores why Levinas' insistence on restricting ethical obligation to humans alone

betrays a reliance on ontological foundations that he sought to move beyond. In this case, it might in fact be 'more Levinasian' to consider our ethical obligations to other species.

In an essay on Levinas and Kierkegaard, Claire E. Katz examines the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac. She attempts a synthesis of Levinas, Kierkegaard, and Judaism; however this downplays the significant differences between Levinas' and Kierkegaard's interpretations of the story of the akedah. While Katz ultimately advocates a reading of the story that accords with what Levinas actually wrote about Kierkegaard, she does not challenge Levinas' vitriolic reading of Kierkegaard, attempting instead to tone down Kierkegaard in order to alleviate Levinas' opposition to him. This 'synthesis' rejects what is most troubling and provocative in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. In stating that 'Abraham needed to have faith in a compassionate God in order to offer Isaac up, only to see the face of the other in Isaac' (28), Katz sides emphatically with Levinas and with an understanding of duty to God as identical with the ethical. However, Kierkegaard gives us a reading of responsibility as teetering on the blade of a knife, involving both obligation and sacrifice. Katz, with Levinas, asserts that the pinnacle of the story lies in Abraham's loving the ethical more than God, putting down the knife, and realizing that ethical responsibility trumps religious obligation. But Kierkegaard's genius lies in reflecting the ambiguous nature of responsibility. Katz cites Derrida's reading of Kierkegaard, but does not take seriously his insight that responsibility is aporetic; that all responsibility involves betrayal, and that being responsible to the Other means being irresponsible to another Other. In remaining so faithful to the letter of Levinas' work, Katz is perhaps, ironically, less 'Levinasian' as a result.

Antje Kapust, in her essay, 'Returning Violence', interrogates Levinas' relation to violence more provocatively, subjecting him to a 'sort of cross-examination by placing his quest for an ethical orientation under pressure and by constantly confronting it with its refutation of ontological violence' (237). She traces a history of violence as resurfacing through the form of unity that is blind to the traces of violence and the destruction of speech. The trauma of violence is replaced by the philosophical desire for conceptual order. Kapust brings up a fragment from Heraclitus indicating that political unity depends on ongoing violent movement. While violence appears necessary, nonetheless Kapust sees the possibility for a non-inert peace dependent upon ethical performance. Also included in this book are contributions to the debate over Levinas' understanding of politics by Robert Bernasconi and John Drabinski. Other essays examine Levinas' relation to Derrida, Heidegger, psychoanalysis, and feminism.

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Rod Preece
Brute Souls, Happy Beasts, and Evolution: The Historical Status of Animals.
Vancouver: UBC Press 2005.
Pp. xvi + 480.
Cdn$/US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7748-1156-0);
Cdn$/US$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7748-1157-9).

It is now just over three decades since the publication of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation*. In that time, the issue of the moral status of animals has become a significant arena of philosophical debate, generating hundreds of books and articles. Some writers, like Singer, have adopted a utilitarian position; some others, most influentially Tom Regan in *The Case for Animal Rights*, have taken a deontological one. Jan Narveson has argued against animal rights from a contractarian perspective in the Hobbesian mould; Mark Rowlands has made a case for animal rights from a modified Rawlsian position. Others have weighed in for or against including animals in the moral community from feminist perspectives or in terms of virtue ethics.

In this explosion of academic theorizing, and in the 'animal rights' movement, the assumption has typically been that the past — certainly in Europe and the West and at least until Darwin — was a kind of Dark Ages, in which animals were almost universally regarded as having no significant moral standing. Preece aims to show that, generally speaking, scholarship regarding the historical status of animals in Western civilization (that is, over the past twenty-five hundred years or so) is seriously deficient. Specifically, the views he addresses are '(1) that *the* Christian doctrine, typically presented as an unchanging monolith, has denied immortality to animals, with the corresponding implication that they were thereby denied ethical consideration; (2) that there was a near-universal belief animals were intended for human use, with the corresponding implication that they were not ends in themselves and thus not entitled to ethical consideration; (3) that Charles Darwin's theory of evolution had a profoundly positive impact on the way in which nonhuman animals were regarded and treated; and (4) that the idea of the "happy beast" was merely a trope to condemn humans for their hubris and was not at all a sincere attempt to raise the status of animals' (2). Preece believes that our ethical responsibilities to animals are ill-served by this simplistic and misleading conception of the historical record.

Few, if any, can match Preece's knowledge of that record; his work sets the standard with regard to the long history of Western attitudes toward animals. He challenges current assumptions and shows in detail that the reality is far more complex than normally appreciated. Even opening this book at random, as one might do with an encyclopedia, can be instructive and fascinating. It complements Preece's two other works on animals for UBC Press: *Animals and Nature* (1999) and *Awe for the Tiger, Love for the Lamb* (2002).

This is a book about the history of philosophy as it pertains to the issue of the moral status of animals, with a view to how this history may usefully inform the current debate. Preece is sceptical about applying the language of moral rights to animal ethics, given that non-humans cannot claim rights for themselves in a manner consistent with the traditional concept of rights. Yet he is far from unsympathetic to the animal rights position: 'Just because they may be deemed not to have rights, philosophically speaking, does not mean that they do not possess what are often called rights. The fact that animals have legitimate needs, distinguished according to their species characteristics, and are commonly recognized to possess such needs, is *prima facie* sufficient for their interests to have earned consideration' (365). Preece's idea that animals 'may be deemed not to have rights, philosophically speaking' should not be taken to mean that philosophers are of one mind here: certainly Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar, Gary Francione, and others have made lengthy and forceful cases for rejecting the traditional, Kantian restriction of moral rights to rational beings. But Preece's point is that the debatable applicability of moral rights to animals makes it too easy for opponents of 'animal rights' to dismiss the legitimate claims that the interests of animals have on us.

In an Aristotelian vein, Preece maintains that our ethical decisions ought to be the product of practical judgements in practical circumstances, involving the satisfaction of the needs of individuals according to their individual and their *specific* characteristics. And although change in prevailing attitudes is called for, we must not ignore what the past has to teach us. 'If Aristotle is right, a careful nonideological analysis of the history of animal ethics will not only provide an appropriate understanding of the development of Western culture, but also be a guide and a check in our attempts to develop an appropriate animal ethic. ... Prevailing beliefs will inevitably need refinement and refraction, but they are the appropriate starting point because the elusive "common man and woman" possesses an instructive instinct. This instinct is one that philosophical wisdom may improve upon but it may only refute the belief with overwhelming evidence of the idea's fallacy' (378). Hence, in line with commonly held notions of the duties engendered by community and against those who, following in the egalitarian footsteps of Bentham, would have each count for one and only one, Preece argues for a 'reasonable partiality' in our dealings with others, human or non-human, based on lived relationships and bonds of affection.

Preece's approach has an affinity to that of feminist philosophers who have insisted on the inadequacy of abstract rules for dealing with the concrete and the particular. Recently Martha Nussbaum, in *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, has made the case for animal entitlements by extending the notion of dignity to sentient non-humans, based on innate capabilities for functions that are evaluated as good. Like Preece, Nussbaum rejects a 'one size fits all' approach; she argues that there is a wide range of types of animal dignity, and that in order to know what it is that different types of animals need to flourish, we must restore complexity

to the issue of animal ethics. *Brute Souls, Happy Beasts, and Evolution* goes a good way toward doing just that.

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Michael Quante
Hegel's Concept of Action.
Trans. Dean Moyar. New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xvi + 199.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-82693-4.

Thinkers trained in Anglo-American analytic philosophy have traditionally not paid much attention to Hegel, but this has been changing somewhat in recent years. Part of the reason for the change is that there is a growing body of English-language Hegel scholarship (for instance, by Robert Pippin, Tom Rockmore, and Allen Wood, among others) that is expressly informed by the attempt to put Hegel's thought into dialogue with concepts and controversies at play within recent analytic philosophy. In addition, analytic philosophers such as John McDowell and Robert Brandom have been concerned to demonstrate key parallels between Hegel's thought and their own work, and have also begun to make contributions to Hegel scholarship in their own right. Michael Quante's *Hegels Begriff der Handlung*, originally published in 1993, is one of the more important contributions to this growing dialogue between Hegel studies and analytic philosophy, and I expect that Dean Moyar's recent translation of Quante's book into English will have a significant impact on the shape that this dialogue will take in the years to come.

Quante's goals are to offer a detailed interpretation of Hegel's theory of action and to articulate this theory in such a way as to show how it prefigures and unifies many of the recent insights of philosophers of action working in the analytic tradition (most notably those of Davidson, Anscombe, Castañeda, and Goldman). Quante focuses his interpretation of Hegel almost exclusively on the brief account of 'Morality' in the *Philosophy of Right*, for, though the *Philosophy of Right* is, as a whole, a work of practical philosophy, it is in the account of 'Morality' in particular that the nature of action *per se* becomes an explicit issue for Hegel. (It should be mentioned that Quante abstracts from the moral dimension of Hegel's account here, in order to distill an account of action that he takes to have no specific implications for moral philosophy.) Quante works through this brief text with meticulous care and impressive analytical rigor, and his specific analyses bring to light subtle conceptual distinctions and nuanced insights into Hegel's thinking that, in

the final analysis, constitute a valuable contribution to the scholarship on this text. Moreover, by spelling out the implications of these distinctions and insights in the light of recent philosophy of action, Quante brings this text to life by showing how the account of action that Hegel articulates here actually engages in fruitful ways many of the specific issues and debates that have recently been at play in the analytical tradition.

In unpacking the significance of Hegel's basic claim that actions are 'expressions of the subjective will,' Quante argues that Hegel (foreshadowing here the accounts of Anscombe and Davidson) conceives of action as 'an event under a certain description.' In Hegel's rendering, the relevant description and the objectively present event are not ultimately independent of each other. Moreover, the relevant description is always first-person, affirmed by the individual agent herself at the time of the action, and it contains propositions that, from the agent's perspective, describe the action-event as an adequate, external realization of an inner content that she took to be part of her own, subjectively-posited end. Quante shows that this implies, among other things, that attributing an action-event's various consequences to an agent cannot be based exclusively on external, causal considerations, since only those causal consequences of the action-event that are self-consciously posited in a cognitive manner in some part of the original, operative description can be considered to belong within the scope of her 'action' in the strict sense.

After discussing some further implications of the 'striking dominance of the cognitive element' in Hegel's conception of action (129), Quante offers a helpful interpretation of Hegel's account of the logical structure of the agent's operative description of her own action. Quante here brings to bear Hegel's analyses of different types of judgement in the *Science of Logic* to show that, for Hegel, there are two distinct logical structures that are at work in the agent's description: the agent posits her own action both as an immediately existing individual with certain universal properties, and as the exemplification of a universal action-type. This latter structure, which has the form of what Hegel calls a 'judgement of reflection,' and which for Hegel is proper to all full-fledged intentional actions, implies a relatively high degree of rationality on the part of the agent, and Quante shows that it is in part because of this implicit rationality that certain sorts of non-moral evaluations of actions by other agents are possible. Thus Quante shows how it is that, though the agent's first-person description is a constitutive part of the agent's action, this description can be legitimately challenged by others, for instance on the grounds that the action-event does not, in fact, exemplify the action-type posited within the agent's self-description.

While a careful study of Quante's book would be extremely valuable for anyone who wanted to get clearer on Hegel's contribution to the theory of action, it is not entirely clear whether one ought to assume, as Quante does, that Hegel's account in 'Morality' constitutes his final word on the nature of action. A fuller account of Hegel's theory of action would seem to me to require an account of how action, agency, and practical rationality come to be reconceived within Hegel's account of the foundational social institutions of

the 'Ethical' realm, as presented in the third part of the *Philosophy of Right*. On Quante's reading, ethical action is not — *qua* action — essentially distinct from moral action. However, the account of action at work in Hegel's discussion of the Ethical realm brings into play certain essential features of practical life — for instance, the centrality of character and habit, the role that action plays in reproducing certain social institutions, and, related to this, the capacity of an action to embody directly the collective intentions of a community of agents — that cannot readily be explained in terms of the categories derived solely from Hegel's account of the individual, *moral* agent and her fully conscious, cognitively held intentions.

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George Reisch
How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. xiv + 418.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83797-9);
US$26.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54689-3);
US$22.00 (e-book).

Against the common view that Kuhn and Quine brought about the downfall of logical empiricism, Reisch argues that the Cold War was responsible. In contrast to John McCumber's *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era* (2001), which argues that analytic philosophy became dominant in the U.S. because McCarythism influenced American philosophy to become concerned with true propositions, Reisch is interested only in logical empiricism. His thesis is that, though logical empiricism had progressive social and political goals in Europe, especially with Neurath's Unity of Science movement, after it came to the U.S. logical empiricism was transformed and became depoliticized due to the Cold War. As his method, Reisch uses historiography with the analysis of letters of logical empiricists. This book is for the specialist, who is interested in the philosophy of science, sociology of science, and the history of science.

Reisch begins with a portrayal of logical empiricism's healthy progressive political and ideological vision in Europe and in the United States, through discussions of the major figures of the movement and political aspects of their work: Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, and Charles Morris. The strong collaboration of Neurath's Unity of Science movement with New York Intellectuals, who included Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, and

others, is then explored. What follows is a discussion of the development of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, and how American pragmatism and logical empiricism collaborate to promote Western culture's liberal values through Dewey's contribution to the *Encyclopedia*. Dewey viewed the unity of science as a 'social problem,' in response to the enemies of science: neo-Thomists and European antiscientific fascists.

Next, Reisch explores North America's leftist intellectual scene and some of its radical philosophers — Albert Blumberg, a communist, and William Malisoff, the founder of the journal, *Philosophy of Science*. The FBI knew Malisoff was a confidant of the KGB. Kallen's attack on Neurath's Unity of Science movement, which Kallen charged with totalitarianism, and the lack of unity within logical empiricism, including a schism between Neurath and Frank and other members, are examined. After the Cold War, Morris, Carnap, and Frank attempted to revive the Unity of Science movement, but failed. Anti-communist pressures, such as the anticollectivisim of Hayek's economic theory, personal campaigns against Morris, Carnap, and Frank in the form of loyalty oaths, FBI anticommunist investigations, and colleagues' complaints, all opposed the revival of the Unity of Science movement. Three factions struggled to shape post-war philosophy of science — Frank's new Institute for the Unity of Science; Reichenbach, Feigl and others who wanted more technical topics in opposition to Frank; and C. West Churchman as the new editor of *Philosophy of Science*. Reisch describes Frank's loss of the Institute, Morris' loss of influence, the death of the Unity of Science movement and its consequences, including an exploration of the association of some logical empiricists, such as Reichenbach, with government funded military research of the RAND Corporation, for which he was an operations researcher. Reisch concludes with the view that philosophy of science would have been more oriented towards values and politics if the Unity of Science movement had not been sidelined by the Cold War.

An anomaly to Reisch's thesis is Carnap, who, though investigated by the FBI and alleged by Hook to be a Communist sympathizer, did not pull back from his socialist leanings. Moreover, Carnap did not lose his popularity as a philosopher even with the anti-communist politics of the Cold War, because he was able to separate within his philosophy a division of labour among semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. His philosophy addressed semantics and syntax; he left it to others address pragmatics, which concern value.

Reisch's comparison of Kuhn and Frank is very illuminating in terms of the road not taken by philosophy of science towards public engagement. Though Frank and Kuhn agreed that history of science was a check on philosophy of science and that discontinuities in science revealed more about its nature than periods of normal science, they came to opposite conclusions. Kuhn emphasized the professionalization and specialization of science studies, while Frank, as the leader of the post war Unity of Science movement, emphasized public engagement and interdisciplinary cooperation. Reisch argues that Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR)* won over scientists and intellectuals because of its emphasis on professionalization,

which was associated with job security. Reisch's thesis is very similar to Steve Fuller's controversial *Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History of Our Times* (2000), which avers that Kuhn's *SSR* is a Cold War document. Though Reisch's analysis draws from Fuller, Reisch does not make the bold move of Fuller who brings his reading of Kuhn's motivations into his analysis.

Though I am very impressed by Reisch's historical work, which documents how the Cold War and McCarthyism affected logical empiricists, Reisch should have provided an argument in his introduction against mainstream philosophers of science and analytic philosophers who do not accept his thesis that the Cold War brought about the downfall of logical empiricism. Their contention is that his approach does not account for the philosophical content of the logical empiricists' theories, and that the social and political context does not impact the content of philosophical theories or how they are formed.

Nonetheless, Reisch's case for how the Cold War affected logical empiricism is formidable. The larger question that arises out of Reisch's book is: how does philosophy of science recover its political and social mission to get science to improve humankind? Though that question is very difficult to answer, Reisch offers a hint, namely the re-examination of Frank's work.

Reisch has written a complex, controversial, and richly documented book on the fall of logical empiricism in North America. I highly recommend it.

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Richard Terdiman
Body and Story: The Ethics and Practice of Theoretical Conflict.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2005.
Pp. xiii + 265.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-8018-8068-8.

Body and Story asks two related questions. What is it about the world that constrains us to think and speak about it in certain ways rather than others, to believe and say that this is how things really are? And why is it that — at the same time — the world does not constrain our thought and language enough to yield one truth rather than a multiplicity of theories?

Following from these questions *Body and Story* pursues two projects. The first, a more general one, is to find a way of coming to terms with the underdetermination of theories by the world. Terdiman's example of this are theories in the humanities. Unlike in the natural sciences, theories in the

humanities do not tend to be invalidated or falsified once and for all. They go out of fashion, are abandoned or forgotten, but retain explanatory power. At any moment in time there are multiple theories in use that seem to account for a certain cultural phenomenon equally well, in spite of being mutually contradictory or incompatible. How do we learn to live with, and act on, these underdetermined, conflicting pieces of knowledge? Especially: how do we so learn, as we should be able to cope with them without succumbing to either the temptation to reduce (treating contradictions as merely apparent) or the temptation to give up (and accept a multiplicity of reality)?

Terdiman's second project is to demonstrate how his general approach to theoretical conflict grows out of a practice of critical reading. Under the headings enlightenment 'materialism' and postmodern 'textualism', he describes and confronts two conflicting paradigms of relating bodies and stories, materiality and thought. Diderot, especially in *La religieuse*, reveals the first paradigm: a prime example of the materialist's preoccupation with the power of language (especially in storytelling) to generate unreliable, yet convincing, fictions. Diderot's realization that to make up stories is 'too damn easy' combines with a desire to make language subserve the material reality of bodies and things, with important theoretical and political consequences. Terdiman very convincingly reads Diderot as a precursor of the postmodernist inasmuch as he registers, and is disturbed by, the dissociation of language and representation from material reality, of the sign from the referent.

Terdiman's second paradigm involves taking issue with postmodern textualism, and above all with Derrida, as the main advocate of the view that 'there is no outside-the-text'. Unlike Diderot, he argues, Derrida and his followers have lost touch with reality by focusing too exclusively on language and signification, and by assimilating all reality to representation. The tendency of textualists to approach everything, bodies as well as stories, as texts governed either by the laws, or by the free play, of signification is neither theoretically sound nor politically liberating. This second part reveals the bias in Terdiman's presentation of the two paradigms. Materialism is being offered us not merely as a theory of equal standing with textualism but rather as a cure for our postmodern blindness to what is really real.

Body and Story is open to criticism on several counts. The first is its representation of textualism. Terdiman seems to waver in how far he wants his criticism to go. In places he writes as if materiality had an ontological precedence as well as phenomenal independence from semioticity — as if there were an outside-the-text in the strong sense of the words: an a-significant material reality directly apprehensible by anyone endowed with common sense, the 'weight' of which could not be denied. Textualism would then be a folly inasmuch as it entails a dogmatic insistence on the incommensurability of language and materiality, declares all mediation between them impossible, and in effect occludes the latter. But the focus of postmodernist theorizing has surely been the problematic nature of such mediation, and its only worthy target the unwarranted assumption of an inherent, essential link between things and signs. Elsewhere, the attack on textualism is

weaker. It comes down to arguing that materiality, while being inapprehensible, unthinkable, and unspeakable other than in signs, does register in sensation, thought, and language as a palpable resistance to the arbitrariness of signification.

If Terdiman's argument does not quite convince, it is because the work of constraining, imagined to be the effect of things on words, is largely done in his book not just in language, but by language. Materiality and bodies are repeatedly modified by adjectives such as inexorable, consequential, or refractory, and associated with nouns such as weight and burden. Language, signs, words, and stories, on the contrary, are said to be easy, labile, weightless, malleable, unreliable. To support this distinction Terdiman appeals to our commonsense experience of materiality's pressures. We all know how easy it is to say 'x' and how hard to do what one says. And yet a contrary appeal to experience could be made: surely we all know just as well how hard it is to make language represent our deeds, how fluid our bodies and how constraining the language without which experience cannot be made real, how easy it is to do something and yet how hard, *contra* Diderot, to tell a convincing story about what it is one has done. This is not a mere quibble about style. What Terdiman cannot quite substantiate is the view that the relationship between materiality and signification, bodies and stories is really overwhelmingly constrained and constraining in one direction only: from materiality to language, from bodies to stories. Reality and unreality are neither prevalently of matter, nor of representation.

This seems especially true in the context of ongoing developments in natural sciences. What separates us from Diderot the most seems to be our theories of matter, not of language. Matter has proven less refractory, less commonsensically weighty than it must have seemed to Diderot. We live in a world where flying is taken for granted and the atom has been split. Postmodern textualism seems less the product of a wilful forgetting of materiality's pressures, and more the result of an effort to catch up with the scientific and technological deconstruction of matter. However, *Body and Story* remains a thought-provoking book and an original contribution to the problem, especially in the chapters on Diderot.

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Alex Thomson
Deconstruction and Democracy: Derrida's Politics of Friendship.
New York: Continuum International Publishing Group 2005.
Pp. x + 226.
US$120.00. ISBN 0-8264-7577-9.

In *Deconstruction and Democracy* Alex Thomson investigates the possible politics of deconstruction through an assessment of the contributions of Derrida's work to political thought. His intention is to evaluate Derrida's claim that there is 'no democracy without deconstruction'. In addition to offering an evaluation of Derrida's linking of deconstruction and democracy, Thomson hopes to demonstrate that Derrida's work offers a major contribution towards an understanding of politics. He suggests that Derrida's work upsets various distinctions by which the analysis of politics is approached.

This is counter to much of the prevailing opinion about Derrida's work viewing it as of little interest in political terms. While deconstruction is sometimes seen as a critical approach that might complement political analysis, it is also viewed as a strong refusal of politics, and of greater concern for highlighting textual manifestations of power than for contesting power. Critics point to the abstract and ambiguous character of Derrida's terms and his move away from the specificity of politics to suggest that his work represents little more than a retreat to theology or mysticism. For critics such as Simon Critchley, there is refusal of the empirical, of the fields of antagonism, decision, dissension and struggle, in Derrida's work. This is, for Critchley, nothing less than a refusal of politics.

For Thomson, however, deconstruction can only be condemned for failing to generate a political practice if one assumes a distinction between theory and practice. From Derrida's perspective, Thomson suggests, such a distinction is unsustainable. Thomson argues that Derrida's critics, by presuming to know ahead of time what politics is, are unable to read Derrida's works without imposing their own preconceptions. For Thomson this interferes not only with their capacity to read Derrida but, more significantly, with their capacity to view the movement of politics (3). Thomson suggests that for Derrida the deconstructive questioning of politics is not a rejection of politics but instead a necessary precondition for thinking about politics at all. For Derrida there is a self-deconstructive force in democracy itself, which he suggests is the possibility and duty of democracy to delimit itself. Deconstruction is at work within democracy, while democracy is already inscribed within deconstruction. Thomson suggests that for Derrida deconstruction is oriented towards the world and what happens, not away from it.

Thomson is especially concerned with the later work of Derrida, most notably the otherwise under-examined *Politics of Friendship* (1994). That work represented the culmination of a period of engagement with explicitly political themes between the early 1980s and early 1990s, such as the status

of the university, Nelson Mandela and racism, philosophy and nationalism. In 1994 Derrida claimed that deconstruction is 'literally the most ethical and political way of taking seriously what is implied by the very concepts of decision and responsibility.'

The more explicit expression of political concerns within Derrida's writings coincided with a period of direct political intervention around a number of social issues as Derrida became involved in public debates. Beginning in the 1980s, Derrida's approach to being a public intellectual changed, and he engaged with popular media through a number of television, radio, and newspaper interviews. Thomson argues that this development should not be viewed as the coincidental involvement of a philosopher in political activities that are otherwise extrinsic to his philosophical work. For Thomson, the politics of deconstruction is bound up with its form and practice (5). Put another way, Derrida's involvement in specific political situations is continuous with the work of Derrida as a philosopher in the development of theories and knowledge.

Thomson suggests further that political involvement is not solely an aspect of Derrida's later work but has been an ongoing part of his approach. In supporting this claim Thomson notes that in 1968 Derrida insisted that 'every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political significance' (5). In 1977 Derrida asserted that 'philosophical activity does not *require* a political practice; it is, in any case, a political practice' (5). Derrida himself viewed his earlier 'more academic or philosophically more reassuring' texts as a necessary precondition for his later work, but he did not view this necessity as a fundamental or foundational condition.

Thomson's approach is particularly interesting because it opens Derrida's work to an engagement with visions of democracy beyond the limited context of the liberal democratic state. While approaches to questions of deconstruction and democracy typically relate deconstruction to liberal democracy, Thomson suggests that Derrida's criticisms also extend to radical democratic thought, as in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. Thomson concludes — and this is an avenue that might be fruitfully pursued — that in terms of deconstruction as a politics to come, democracy is only a familiar name on an unfamiliar path. Deconstruction may raise possibilities beyond democracy. Democracy is not the necessary or adequate conclusion to deconstructive projects. That deconstruction might lead somewhere well beyond even radical democracy is a possibility that has already been pursued by some anarchist philosophers recently, such as Todd May and Saul Newman. Unfortunately, Thomson does not engage with this compelling and growing body of work at all.

The reader can agree with Thomson that one should not be too quick to conclude where the political or philosophical significance of Derrida's texts lies. In terms of the claims regarding deconstruction and democracy, the work is intriguing but not entirely convincing. Similarly the notion often put forward by proponents of deconstructive politics, and repeated by Thomson, that readings and writings are, on their own, political and institutional interventions, is not one that rings with much force.

Certainly the complexity of Derrida's writings and the debates that have occurred around his writings over the course of decades suggest that his writings are a matter of dispute and remain open to evolving interpretations. In addition, the texts are influenced by context, as well as by the arrangement and mobilization of political forces receiving and responding to them. Nevertheless, Thomson offers a detailed engagement with Derrida's work and the arguments of Derrida's critics. As a primer on the voluminous and often obscure body of work developed by a philosopher whose works have been widely influential, reaching from philosophy to literary criticism, cultural studies, sociology, and beyond, *Deconstruction and Democracy* offers a useful and accessible interdisciplinary resource.

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Rosemarie Tong, Anne Donchin, and **Susan Dodds, eds.**
Linking Visions: Feminist Bioethics, Human Rights, and the Developing World.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004.
Pp. ix + 260.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-3278-X);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-3279-8).

This anthology focuses on the contributions of feminist bioethics to concerns raised by the effects of globalized capitalism, especially on the health concerns of women in 'developing countries'. It is divided into four parts. The first deals with theoretical issues to do with the relations between feminist bioethics, human rights, and globalization. The second looks at the effects of international trade, foreign policy, and new therapies on women's reproductive health and choices. The third deals with some of the effects of genetic research. The final section is to do with HIV/AIDS health policies and the issues they present for the lives of many women.

Astriking asset of the collection is the series of eye-opening empirical facts about practices, customs, beliefs, and policies affecting women's healthcare around the world. For example, K. Shanthi in 'Feminist Bioethics and Reproductive Rights of Women in India: Myth and Reality' notes the young age of girls marrying in India, the resulting deaths from pregnancy complications, other health problems resulting from the strong 'son preference,' and the domination of girls and young wives and mothers (119-32). The 'Global Gag Rule' that Karen Baird describes bans foreign non-governmental organizations from any form of pro-abortion speech or action, if they are to receive U.S.

family planning funds (133-45). The chapter by Michele Harvey-Blankenship and Barbara Hocking refers to the mass abduction of children often by government or military personnel — for example, the Australian government's abduction of 'Aboriginal children' who were then placed with white families or in white institutions (a parallel of which, I note, occurred in Canada), the infants of murdered dissidents who were kidnapped and adopted out in 1970's Argentina, the children who disappeared in the civil war in El Salvador — and then raises the question of whether DNA testing should be used to re-unite abducted children with any remaining biological family (203-14). Revealing such situations is valuable, but I think the anthology's organization would have been more helpful if the attempt to orientate Parts II-IV around medical topics (reproduction, genetics, HIV/AIDS) had been dropped and, instead, their contents were divided between those that are mainly descriptive of such important phenomena with minimal application of any theoretical principle (which are basically 'case studies') and those that contain considerably more by way of theoretical substance (which could be added to an expanded and possibly sub-sectioned Part I).

This brings me to the theoretical content. In recent years feminist ethics has begun to re-claim conceptual apparatus it previously rejected. In her article, 'What Feminism Can Teach Global Ethics' (15-30), Donna Dickenson explains the limitations of ethical particularism and the moral urgency of addressing issues of justice from a wider foundation (18). Nussbaum's capabilities approach is also limited since 'human' capabilities need to be morally screened before they can give rise to ethically normative rules (19-21), and her selection is heavily anchored in 'intuition'. As Dickenson notes, recent feminist theory tends to combine universalism and difference, and claims that universal human rights language is vital in tackling the oppression that global capitalism involves (23). Some non-western feminists such as Uma Narayan have criticized western feminists for tolerating cultural practices in the global South that oppress women (25). This said, Dickenson speaks approvingly of transcending 'the two extremes of full-fledged multiculturalism and inflexible human rights' (24). Setting aside the emotively laden and therefore persuasive language ('extremes', 'inflexible'), it is on this issue that the reader wishes to hear more, more about what such an underlying position, both coherent and self-consistent, would look like.

In her chapter (57-72), Arleen Salles is refreshingly clear about her position. She first notes the hazards of focusing on culture and ethnicity in bioethics if stereotypes are heavily involved, and sees more promise in relational approaches to both concepts. Even so she argues for a priority role for an enriched conception of human rights in protecting the most vulnerable and in morally assessing cultural practices.

Jing-Bao Nie advocates human rights principles in dealing with China's family planning policies and points out that such principles are compatible with much of Chinese thought (76, 83-4). This is theoretically interesting, and what Nie gives by way of explanation could have been helpfully expanded.

Rosemarie Tong's and Anne Donchin's chapters are perhaps less clear in this respect. Although both are excellent overall, they evoke the same response as does Dickenson's piece. Tong advocates 'some combination of the language of human rights, human responsibilities, human capabilities, and human needs to highlight that our rich diversities — as particular political, social, and cultural identities — need not negate our common human unity' (89-90). This sounds intriguing, but how does it work? Her account of Macklin's distinction between 'ethical principles' and 'their interpretation' (93-4), Noddings' ethics of care (98-100), and Nussbaum's capabilities approach (100-1), leaves the reader wanting to hear considerably more about their integration. Anne Donchin claims that feminists have too readily abandoned human rights language, and gives an insightful account as to why (32-6), yet proposes that '[i]nstead of aiming at any single grand theory, we reconceive moral theories as multiple perspectives that provide partial and overlapping resources to address difficult moral issues' (50).

Again setting aside the persuasive implications of the phrase 'grand theory', it is nonetheless true that in any moral action more is achieved in practice if those with different approaches unite in fighting for goals they agree on. Classical utilitarians, animal rights theorists, groundbreaking theologians of different faiths, and others have fought side by side on some animal cruelty issues. Donchin is right in saying that '[a] multipronged pluralistic approach seems more likely to contribute to alleviating injustices than would a unified theoretical design' (48), but there is a distinction between, on the one hand, welcoming different individuals and groups with different theoretical bases as fellow activists in a shared cause and, on the other hand, adopting a kind of smorgasbord approach to one's own theoretical apparatus. The one is political common sense. The other is ultimately unsatisfying with neither non-arbitrariness nor consistency taken seriously. Is this a fair characterization of their views? Very probably not, but only by hearing more about integrating and prioritizing the disparate theoretical elements will this be clear.

The collection is thought provoking, sometimes shocking, in its revelations, and well worth reading. It highlights the interconnections between straightforwardly medical issues and those to do with education, employment, poverty, family power relations, and political involvement, since one cannot adequately approach the first without tackling these others. For too long medical ethicists have examined moral issues associated with such things as genetic and reproductive technologies with the affluent family in some western nation as the paradigm setting. This anthology emphasizes the plight of women around the world leading lives of massive deprivation and oppression, and the urgent need to address bioethical issues as they arise in such stark settings. It is a valuable contribution in the battle for a socially just world.

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