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Publications Mail Registration No. 08491 – ISSN 1206-5269
Agreement number 40032920

Published six times a year

Volume XXVI, No. 4
August • août 2006

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Mailed in August/September 2006.

Jean Baudrillard
The Conspiracy of Art:
Manifestos, Interviews, Essays.
S. Lotringer, ed. Trans. Ames Hodges.
New York: Semiotext(e) 2005.
Pp. xv + 232.
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 1-584-35028-8).

This is a collection of essays and interviews spanning the years 1952-2004 (the majority since 1990), with an introduction entitled 'The Piracy of Art' by S. Lotringer (1-21). Some pieces have already appeared in English translation, but there are many that appear here in translation for the first time; an interview, 'Forget Artaud' (1996), between Baudrillard and Lotringer appears in print for the first time. (There is also a name index.) As one has come to expect with Baudrillard, one gets the feeling that he has hit the nail on the head with some very basic propositions, yet on the other hand when these are examined more carefully they turn out to be considerably more subtle than first imagined. Care must be taken with Baudrillard's terminology, especially terms like 'reality', 'hyperreality', 'virtual reality', 'integral reality', 'illusion', 'simulacra', or 'symbolic exchange', otherwise the reader risks considerable misunderstandings of the sort Lotringer recounts (13-14) were made by artists and critics in New York in the late 1980s when they thought Baudrillard's essays on simulation provided not a critique, but an appropriate positive aesthetic, for their own work. In fact, Baudrillard says in an interview in this collection, 'these artists are sly and pretentious ... ' (48). A similar misunderstanding underpins the relation of the makers of the film *The Matrix* to these ideas (in particular as concerns the direct reference to the essay on simulacra and simulation in the film); as Baudrillard says here with considerable understatement, 'there was a misunderstanding' (201).

Baudrillard is one of those writers who has generated a complex, abstract, theoretical system (not presented here) from which he can write extremely evocative analyses of individual events, photos, films or objects (the objects in this collection include the Pompidou Centre in Paris). These texts are theoretical but not burdened with an academic apparatus of detailed referencing or justification. If the reader wants to follow up brief allusions to Hegel, or Kant, or Nietzsche, then they are on their own. The number of artists (in the conventional sense) discussed is surprisingly limited to Duchamp and Warhol. Others, such as Hopper and Cèzanne, get a mention in passing. What we have in effect is some very acute thinking about art without an explicit aesthetic theory — but Baudrillard makes no effort at all to conceal this: 'art, basically, is not my problem ... art interests me as an object, from an anthropological point of view: the object, before any promotion of its aesthetic value, and what happens after' (61). The collection, then, is certain to create misunderstanding since, although it contains individual essays on art and art-related topics, it is not a book about art or aesthetics.

Nevertheless, the collection reveals just how important thinking about the trajectory of Western art has been to Baudrillard's project as a whole. This Baudrillard-centricism is amplified perhaps artificially here, because the collection contains interviews in which appear phrases such as the very strange 'the only things I said about art that excited me were on Warhol, Pop Art and Hyperrealism' (43). But then perhaps Baudrillard is trying to be a kind of philosophical Warhol, for later in the same interview he says, 'I have always more or less done the same thing: reaching a certain emptiness, attaining a zero-level capable of bringing out singularity and style. And be brilliant! [Warhol] achieved just that by asserting that everything is brilliant, art, every-one ... It's a wonderful statement!' (45). On the other hand there is the artist Jeff Koons, whose work 'is not even a regression: it's just mush! You see it and then forget it. Maybe it's made for that ... ' (49). Such judgments do seem to imply that there is an aesthetic here despite the disavowals. Or rather more accurately, these statements raise the question of what might constitute the nature of Baudrillard's writings if this is not, as he insists, an aesthetic.

The specific writing about, and analysis of, art is embedded in thinking that extends right across the spectrum, from the rise of Le Pen in France (30-5) to the nature of radical theory itself (162-77), and from the evolution of particular forms of cultural indifference (141-55) to sexual liberation (181-7). If these essays do not address 'art' directly, they do very coherently address issues such as involvement, illusion, disillusion, seduction, fascination, and so forth; and in reading through them there is a sense of continuity and persistent questioning along certain very coherent lines of analysis. The question therefore in reading these essays is: How does Baudrillard pass from the principles of radical theory to an analysis that draws such a strong demarcation between Warhol and Koons without passing through aesthetics? Two possible answers are, first, that radical theory already contains an aesthetic, and second, that the analysis goes from the theory to the dynamics of the artists' work at some level (say for example its strategy) thus making an aesthetics irrelevant.

If we take the first possibility, it certainly does appear that in Baudrillard's idea of theory, especially when considered in relation to his key concept of 'symbolic exchange', he might well suggest that his aim is to 'Cipher, not decipher. Work on illusion' — even, he says, to 'accentuate the false transparency of the world in order to spread terrorist confusion, the germs of the virus of radical illusion, in other words the radical disillusion of reality' (176). Much of his very passionate objection to 'reality', and the power it now has in our culture, seems to be based on the view that radical illusion is of much higher aesthetic power. Reality itself is a category of our culture which we take as bedrock, but which is in fact a barren desert ('the desert of the real' in *The Matrix* is taken from Baudrillard). He is under no illusion: the real is a constructed stratum in our culture, one that does not exist in pre-modern cultures. His anthropological vocabulary, the theory of symbolic exchange

drawn from Mauss' analysis of gift exchange, provides the framework for an analysis of our own quite different kinds of cultural formations.

Thus when he refers to what a 'culture' is, and conceives culture as universal, he always appears to be able to say exactly what it is: a system of symbolic exchanges that are ritually enacted about certain fundamental reversible and cyclic dualities (masculine-feminine, good-evil), in a framework governed by fatal strategies. The aesthetic moment in this theory is its conception of symbolic exchange as drama, characterized by the working of play, symbolic distance, the action of evil, the 'accursed share'. But Baudrillard also adds something from Nietzsche, Baudelaire (99-103) and Jarry (213-16): symbolic exchange is fatal, not critical; it tends to excess, not resentment, to reversibility, not to repetition. Here, then, there is a fundamental ethic, which is also an aesthetic. The modern obsession with a critical exposure of the real (as oppressive, as limiting) is simply a trap: no human culture could possibly be based on its correlates, reason, and utility. Culture is based on quite other considerations.

If we look at the second possibility, that Baudrillard can evaluate modern art directly without requiring an aesthetic, this also looks to be the case, since he does not seem interested at all in what might be called aesthetic values of beauty, sublimity, and so forth. What interests him is form, and those works or projects which seem to challenge, to push boundaries or transgress them, and thereby make categories like the real, accumulation, even death, become important. Once a degeneration sets in, for example, by repetition, trivialization, or realization, Baudrillard is quick to condemn such a change, as he did with the later works of Warhol. Thus we find a theorist always alert to challenging forms and their decline, not to the evaluation of an aesthetic programme and its products. This means his positions are rarely dogmatic. He does not 'oppose' capitalism in a simplistic manner, since the commodity can amount to a form which has the power to produce primitive symbolic effects (98-110). And this is why Duchamp is so important: 'the event of the readymade indicates a suspension of subjectivity where the artistic act is just the transposition of an object into an art object. Art is then only an almost magical operation: the object is transferred in its banality into an aesthetics that turns the entire world into a readymade' (52). Thus Baudrillard is actually interested not in creating an aesthetics to make judgments about art, but in how aesthetics are created by modern art in an act of self-justification.

But the essential quality that makes this book so readable and entertaining is the way that Baudrillard can turn an acute philosophical observation, or an interesting anthropological principle, or even a banal object, into an intriguing puzzle.

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Seyla Benhabib and **Nancy Fraser, eds.**
Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard Bernstein.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.
Pp. xix + 379.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02567-1);
US$32.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-52427-9).

This book reads like a journal issue. The articles, diverse in topics and composed by some notable philosophers (Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, Jacques Derrida), do not deal directly with Bernstein's philosophy. Rather, many take Bernstein as their starting point, and push off from his multi-faceted embankment as their own interests specify. Others are islands onto themselves.

The book is divided into three sections that pertain diachronically to Bernstein's scholarly work. The first deals with Bernstein's early meta-philosophical pragmatist position, and focuses on philosophy's status in a democratic society. The second concerns the social sciences and focuses on various attempts to construct a viable method of social critique. The final section stands by itself and concentrates on Bernstein in the 1990s when he took up various philosophical-cultural topics such as memory, judgment, and radical evil. Finally, the reader is offered a short biography of Bernstein, which I recommend reading first in that it helpfully situates Bernstein in the American philosophical scene since the 1960s. I will concentrate on a few articles that I think best capture the spirit of the book.

Richard Rorty begins the first section and offers yet another interesting restatement of his neo-pragmatism. Rorty critiques what he calls 'redemptive truth' (7), which is the typical religio-philosophical conception of truth that purports to provide humankind with an ultimate starting point — God, the cogito, sense-data, the list goes on. Although both Rorty and Bernstein espouse pragmatism, Bernstein is more faithful to the classical pragmatists. Unlike Bernstein, Rorty thinks providing the usual philosophical justifications for political action is unrewarding. But would Rorty's utopia of literary culture collapse into intolerance? Moreover, would it be too decadent? Rorty seeks to defend himself against these criticisms. Somewhat predictably, Rorty appeals to his favored public/private distinction, insisting that divergences in worldview, such as between that of the theist and the atheist, do not preclude cooperation in public projects of mutual benefit. Explaining his relationship to Bernstein, Rorty states, 'Our disagreement is not about the truth of propositions but about the fruitfulness of topics' (5). By abandoning the idea of getting it right, Rorty simply tries to make his neo-pragmatism look more attractive than the alternative. Those familiar with Rorty's position will find nothing notably original in this article, though he always provokes a reaction.

Charles Taylor ponders whether he can genuinely take on pragmatist colors. Taylor identifies two kinds of pragmatism, rejecting the radical

pragmatist claim that truth is simply what works, but easily situating himself among classical pragmatists like James and other philosophers like Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who hold, among other convictions, 'some version of the primacy of practical reason' (74). Taylor reminds us that James' *The Will to Believe* depends upon the traditional conception of truth. However, Taylor's two-pronged separation of pragmatism is obviously *ad hoc*. If he is going to include individuals like Wittgenstein and Heidegger under a 'broad church' (75) pragmatism, then he runs the danger of bankrupting the category, especially given the diversity inherent in the classical pragmatists. He does succeed in pinpointing the relevant overlap, but one is simply left perplexed as to whether 'pragmatism' is the appropriate label.

The second section begins with Nancy Fraser arguing for a modified conception of justice. Normally, social theorists have taken up either the mantle of distribution or of recognition, often then accounting for the other in terms of a shaky reductionism. For instance, feminism often reduces inequalities of distribution to the more *fundamental* inequalities of recognition. Refusing a simple reductionism, Fraser forwards her parity of participation principle: 'justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another *as peers*' (127). So, in order to interact with one another as peers, members must have sufficient economic wealth as well as mutual respect. Fraser's move builds on Bernstein's unwillingness to accept hard distinctions, and to look for modes that integrate rather than divide. The real strength of Fraser's argument is her refusal to prioritize justice and reduce one facet to another. This move grates upon theorists like Habermas who argues in Section 1 for his well-known 'thesis of the priority of the Right over the Good' (30).

Issues of justice always run against the dominant Rawlsian paradigm. For Rawls, race falls behind the veil of ignorance and plays no role in the ideal theory. This contains an implicit acceptance of the fact/value split that is characteristic of empiricist social theory. *Contra* Rawls, Thomas McCarthy claims that political theory needs to take into account relevant socio-cultural perspectives, contingencies, and impurities. Normative theory needs to be responsive to the issues of the day if it hopes 'to have anything of interest to say about racial injustice' (166). This presupposes that Rawls indeed has such a hope in the original position, which is doubtful. I think McCarthy would agree with this, but the onus then is on McCarthy in establishing that racial considerations are not eliminable from our considerations of justice, and that the fact/value split needs to be abandoned. Note that McCarthy's argument would work equally well through appeals to inequalities of gender and economic status. Such arguments have been made.

Apersistent difficulty throughout consists in relating articles to one another and to Bernstein's philosophy more generally. Indeed, this book would benefit from a concise introductory synopsis of Bernstein's position. Given the range of topics, the work tends to lack focus. That said, there is a satisfying balance between theorists who basically agree with Bernstein, those that are merely sympathetic to his ideas, and those with their own

projects in mind. It is by no means necessary to read the book in order; be prepared to begin anew with each subsequent article. Inevitably, some will not spark your interest. The end result however is a faithful festschrift that honors Bernstein not only by building on his work, but also by giving his philosophical opponents a voice.

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Stephen Eric Bronner
Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement.
New York: Columbia University Press 2004.
Pp. xv + 181.
US$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-12608-5);
US$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-231-12609-3).

This book consists of Stephen Eric Bronner's attempt to rescue or rehabilitate the Enlightenment as a still vital source for progressive thinking and radical projects in the contemporary context. For Bronner the current age is marked by irrationalism from both the Left and Right ends of the political spectrum.

Bronner is most concerned about the impact of anti-Enlightenment thought on the political Left and in his view such thinking has rendered the Left incapable of effectively countering the Right-wing irrationalism that characterizes the present period, most notably fundamentalist religious thought of various types. Bronner accounts for the recent ineffectiveness of the Left in part by its descent, especially through the influences of post-structuralism, into the language of the Counter-Enlightenment. Bronner locates a root cause for what he sees as the disorientation of leftist activists in their substitution of abstract philosophical analysis and cultural criticism for a more serious study of political theory and history.

Bronner, like others before him, locates the key moment in the recent assault on Enlightenment thought in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's 1947 book, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. In that foundational work the two leading figures of Critical Theory overturned the view of the Enlightenment as the fount of progressive politics and put in its stead a view of the Enlightenment as the wellspring of totalitarianism and political excesses including racism, imperialism and genocide.

Promoted as a defence of political liberty, social justice, and cosmopolitanism against the cynicism that has set in since *Dialectic and Enlightenment* was published, Bronner's book provides rather unconvincing positions on

each of these crucial issues. While Bronner attempts to provide an antidote to the romanticism and nihilism that in his view characterizes much of the contemporary political Left, his alternative ends up being little more than a return to social democratic electoralism and party politics.

Part of the limitation of Bronner's analysis is his insistence that 'it is still the liberal rule of law with its explicit privileging of civil liberty, [and] the interventionist state as an agent of social justice ... that serve as the precondition — the condition sine qua non — for bettering the lives of individuals' (ix). This explicitly statist view serves not only to diminish or even erase the self-activity of people working and struggling to better their own lives and the lives of others, following their own needs on their own terms and without any interest in calling in the state, but also to downplay the injustice, inequality and oppression that many activists have come to see as being inherent in the rule of law and the interventionist state as elite institutions and practices. Indeed from Bronner's perspective the global expansion of capitalism, the rise of the bureaucratic state, imperialist ambitions and 'parasitical elites' are all simply corrupted versions or exceptions to liberal democratic regimes rather than inherent or at least highly probable characteristics. At what point, however, does the accumulation of exceptions suggest that these are not exceptions at all, but regular and expected features of the model? Bronner offers no answer to this except to say that he has little time for leftist appeals to community.

Overall Bronner's arguments are severely undermined by two debilitating flaws in his perspective. The first is an anachronistic eurocentrism that associates progressive values such as social justice with the Enlightenment as if non-capitalist or non-Western communities operated in the absence of such values. Bronner even goes so far as to identify 'political liberty, social justice and cosmopolitanism' as 'western "values."' This is rather ironic given Bronner's attempt to rescue the Enlightenment from charges of eurocentrism brought by Left activists and theorists. Contemporary global justice activists, who offer more in real world struggles against obscurantist and fundamentalist oppression than Bronner is willing to acknowledge, have in fact learned much about progressive battles and movements in defence of those values from allies in non-Western and indigenous communities that draw on traditions outside the range of Bronner's concerns.

The second severe flaw in Bronner's perspective is his conflation of so-called Enlightenment values with the structures and practices of liberal democracy. Bronner either forgets or is unwilling to recognize that the Enlightenment also gave rise to movements and philosophies that went well beyond liberal politics. This point is especially relevant given that it is precisely the offspring of those alternative movements that have begun the revitalization of progressive forces that Bronner clearly desires. The movements against capitalist globalization, perhaps more than any movements in history examples of the cosmopolitanism that Bronner associates with the Enlightenment, are if anything inspired by the very theoretical expressions, most notably anarchism, libertarian socialism and communalism, that Bron-

ner dismisses contemptuously as romantic or nihilistic. Curiously, at no point does Bronner engage in any way with these contemporary movements or perspectives.

At the same time these criticisms should not deter anyone with an interest in current debates around the legacy of Enlightenment thought or with concerns over the re-emergence of political irrationalism from reading this book. These are indeed pressing issues, not only because many opponents of capitalist globalization and American imperialism have been drawn sometimes uncritically to romantic appeals to community, but even more so given the support for irrationalism and religious fundamentalism in the highest echelons of power in the US. Bronner's book provides an invaluable introduction to some of the key aspects of these issues and identifies some troubling developments that should be of concern to anyone engaged in progressive political movements.

The challenge raised by his book, and another reason it deserves reading, is to determine how a new Left, suitable to the era of capitalist globalization, might develop a language and practice that are effective and relevant for local opponents of neoliberal domination and exploitation. In part this will require, as Bronner suggests, moving away from abstraction and obscurantism while simultaneously avoiding the too easy answers of a latter-day romanticism. It will also require, however, a willingness to critically reflect on the political visions inherited from the Enlightenment and perhaps uncover overlooked or forgotten visions that counter both mainstream versions of Enlightenment thought as well as the excesses of Counter-Enlightenment. To do this will require looking beyond the confines of a discourse and debate structured primarily by the parameters of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. Already, if one looks to participants in what are wrongly called the anti-globalization movements, such as the Zapatistas in Chiapas, piqueteros in Argentina, or anarchists in various places, one sees the beginnings of that very process.

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Gillian Brock and **Harry Brighouse, eds.**
The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. x + 262.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-84660-9);
US$24.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-60909-7);
US$20.00 (e-book).

The editors of this book set themselves a tremendously important task, namely compiling a volume that fleshes out the positive principles to which cosmopolitans are committed. Contributing authors were asked to consider some of the practical and theoretical questions that cosmopolitanism would need to deal with, in order to present a full picture of the nature of cosmopolitan philosophy. The issues selected for deeper consideration range from the moral status we ought to grant national borders and the feasibility of cosmopolitan ideals, to the nature of the equality to which cosmopolitans are committed and the obligations we incur by committing ourselves to this equality. As with all attempts to flesh out a positive political theory, it turns out that there are many ways in which to deal with the central questions, ways which aren't necessarily consistent, even if each is committed to the main cosmopolitan tenet, namely, that 'each human being has equal moral worth and that equal moral worth generates certain moral responsibilities that have universal scope' (4). I'll explore how the authors deal with these ideas, below.

National borders, for cosmopolitans, are not sacrosanct even if they maintain a kind of legitimate moral importance. Allen Buchanan, in his contribution, argues vehemently against the view that national interests ought to dominate or even predominate a state's foreign policy. In realizing the moral impermissibility — and lack of realism, in fact — of this view, he writes, 'we can begin to face the difficult but necessary question of how we are to balance a concern for the human rights of others with a proper special regard for our own country's welfare' (125). Indeed, among the contributors who broach the topic of national boundaries, most steer away from arguments for overcoming them; rather, the contributors recognize the stability of national borders and, moreover, the genuine importance national borders play in the consciousness of citizens. For example, Richard Miller argues that a commitment to equal moral respect has room for — indeed, even encourages — 'a duty to give priority ... to the serious deprivations of compatriots' (134). It is tremendously important, he argues, that domestic communities are characterized by social trust. This social trust will be unreasonably disrupted in the event of a 'failure to provide tax-financed aid sufficient to relieve serious burdens of inferior life-prospects among compatriots, when this shortfall is due to provision for neediness abroad' (134).

Although all the contributors to the volume are committed to equality in some way, there is considerable disagreement among them with respect to what we ought to equalize as well as the mechanisms by which we ought to

instantiate equality. Christine Sypnowich suggests our main concern should be with equalizing the 'universal constituents of human flourishing' (63); Christopher Bertram is concerned with 'democratic equality' at the national-level, which consists in an environment in which 'co-citizens all enjoy their status fully rather than as a matter of degree' (85); and David Copp argues that our commitment isn't to equality per se, but rather to a kind of 'basic needs principle', by which we can evaluate our global responsibilities towards others. Our goal should not, he says, be one of strict equality — inequalities are not unjust, in and of themselves — rather, we should commit ourselves to providing the conditions under which the basic needs of all global citizens are met (47).

Finally, is cosmopolitanism feasible? Yes, the authors agree, it is. We need not, suggests Buchanan, commit ourselves to a kind of naïve idealism in agreeing that justice is something we need to be concerned about on a world-wide scale: 'one can acknowledge that certain practices violate basic human rights, but also recognize that efforts to end them must be informed by considerations of feasibility' (123). Catriona McKinnon argues, likewise, that we can imagine a world — however distant — in which cosmopolitan ideals might be instantiated. In her words, our commitment to this regime is evidence of a kind of 'cosmopolitan hope', in which accepting the cosmopolitan principles 'demands commitment to a future state of affairs in which all persons act so as to satisfy' them (248). Cosmopolitanism is, moreover, consistent with a kind of tolerance for illiberal regimes, suggests Jon Mandle in his analysis of John Rawls' concept of a 'decent society.' Consequently, we need not naïvely believe that cosmopolitanism requires the invasion of national borders to instantiate cosmopolitan ideals aggressively. Rather, a cosmopolitan world is one in which we are committed to toleration, where toleration 'concerns restraints on the use of force, not a compromise on the ideals one advocates' (231). As cosmopolitans, we can agree that a state is a legitimate player in the global arena if we can see that, in the eyes of its citizens, it has a certain kind of legitimacy (231).

In sum, the essays presented in this volume paint an image of cosmopolitanism as vibrant, engaging and diverse. Readers may not finish the volume with a sense that they know what cosmopolitanism is, even if they may emerge with the sense that they do know that many views can consistently be defended as cosmopolitan. The most surprising conclusion readers may draw from the volume is how non-radical cosmopolitanism is. It is not a program that militates for great changes (indeed, what specific changes we might encounter in a cosmopolitan world is left relatively unconsidered in the volume — Thomas Pogge's contribution is the lone exception); it does not argue for the dismantling of states; and it does not object to the commitment that citizens often have to co-citizens. Contemporary cosmopolitan theorizing emerged, in part, in response to the view that egalitarianism is too preoccupied with domestic politics. This volume shows that there is little philosophical distance between the two theories — any egalitarian theorist who focuses

on the global arena can, if we are to accept the message of *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, refer to herself as a cosmopolitan.

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David J. Buller
Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 550.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02579-5);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-52460-0).

According to David J. Buller, the debate about evolutionary psychology has been characterized by a 'lack of civilized, reasoned dialogue' (6): critics have focused on evolutionary psychologists' imagined political and ethical motives; evolutionary psychologists in turn have responded that their critics are simply unwilling to accept the true animal origin of humans. This point is no longer as true as it once was, but Buller's 'extended analysis of the *reasons* (the arguments and evidence) that evolutionary psychologists offer in support of their claims' (7, his emphasis) is still a valuable addition to the literature on the application of evolutionary ideas to human mental and behavioral functioning.

Buller's book functions in three different ways, some more successful than others: 1) as a summary of the methodological and theoretical commitments of Evolutionary Psychology (a term which, when capitalized, Buller uses to refer to the particular evolutionary approach to psychology which is dominant today, as opposed to evolutionary psychology, uncapitalized, which he uses to refer to the general field of inquiry applying evolutionary concepts to the study of mind and behavior); 2) as a critique of the assumptions of Evolutionary Psychology; and, 3) as a review and critique of specific research programs in Evolutionary Psychology.

Despite Buller's negative attitude toward Evolutionary Psychology, he presents a clear and unbiased summary of the assumptions that guide this research paradigm. More central to Buller's goals, however, are his criticisms of these assumptions. Although Buller tells us (twice: x, 12) that he is 'unabashedly enthusiastic' about evolutionary psychology, he believes that Evolutionary Psychology is 'wrong in almost every detail' (3). Notwithstanding this expression of universal disagreement, Buller agrees with much

Evolutionary Psychology. Like Evolutionary Psychologists, Buller is an adaptationist. Furthermore, Buller agrees that human psychological function operates in an essentially modular, domain-specific (actually, 'domain dominant', 139) way. However, based on a critique of a notion of species as natural kinds, Buller rejects the notion, a guiding principle of Evolutionary Psychology, that there is an identifiable human nature.

More importantly, Buller parts ways with Evolutionary Psychology concerning which specific feature of humans are adaptations, and concerning how the modularity of the mind comes about. For Buller, contra Evolutionary Psychology, there are no *cognitive* adaptations. Rather, the brain has evolved as a general purpose adaptation. Modularity develops, according to Buller (and Valerie Gray Hardcastle, who co-wrote the chapter at issue), in a fashion analogous to the development of specific antibodies in the immune system. Specific antibodies develop in response to specific pathogens encountered from the environment. Similarly, say Buller and Gray Hardcastle, specific mental modules develop in response to specific environmental stimuli encountered by the developing brain.

It is to his credit that Buller does not just criticize Evolutionary Psychology, but offers this alternative perspective. Unfortunately, the implications of his alternative perspective are not developed. (To be fair, this is also true of most other alternative approaches to Evolutionary Psychology, including those in my own book, Scher & Rauscher, *Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches*, Boston: Kluwer 2003). Evolutionary psychology (uncapitalized) is a science, and the payoff of a scientific viewpoint is its empirical consequences. Evolutionary Psychology (capitalized) has been successful because a relatively large number of empirical results have grown out of its theoretical standpoint. Until those proposing alternatives can come up with alternative empirical hypotheses, the alternatives will remain only interesting mental exercises. But, perhaps Buller, a philosopher, cannot be faulted for falling short in this way. It is up to psychologists to pick up this challenge and do the science that follows from Buller's philosophical analysis.

However, this criticism of Buller's work only applies because Evolutionary Psychology has made many empirical contributions. The third aspect of this book argues that Evolutionary Psychology has been empirically infertile. Buller's reasons for such an argument are to undermine Evolutionary Psychology: If the theoretical assumptions do not stand up and the empirical results do not hold up, then the entire enterprise does not hold up. However, Buller's critical review of Evolutionary Psychology's empirical work is unsuccessful. His criticisms are, to be sure, exhaustive. Each of the three research programs covered are subjected to close scrutiny, and any short-coming or flaws in the studies chosen for review are highlighted. The flaws discussed are both methodological and logical.

This exhaustiveness, however, is part of the problem. Buller claims that he is not looking for a single fatal flaw in Evolutionary Psychology. But any empirical study will have weaknesses — it's in the nature of the empirical endeavor. We rely on the strengths of each study to compensate for the

shortcomings of other studies. A long list of minor flaws cannot undermine a unified research perspective if they do not add up to a more coherent set of problems which apply to all of the studies. Even more problematic is the fact that Buller's approach, of highlighting flaws in individual studies and individual research programs to invalidate Evolutionary Psychology, can only invalidate the specific studies he discusses. Without identifying flaws that are inherent to any research program deriving from the Evolutionary Psychology metatheoretical perspective, Buller has to suppose that all of the research that falls within this perspective has some (unique?) flaw. Since Buller cannot, of course, cover every single research program (he reviews three in this book), he cannot use this approach to demonstrate Evolutionary Psychology's empirical uselessness.

Therefore, this aspect of Buller's book largely fails as a damning critique of Evolutionary Psychology. It is, however, a very thorough review of the specific research programs that Buller chooses to cover. And, as these are three of the most successful and — more to the point — most frequently cited research programs from within Evolutionary Psychology, this is a very valuable feature. Furthermore, as with the more general criticism of the metatheoretical assumptions of Evolutionary Psychology, Buller does not just criticize, but also offers alternative interpretations of the data collected within the research programs. These alternatives (which, to my reading sit comfortably within the general Evolutionary Psychology paradigm) should provide valuable stimulus to researchers who want to work within any of the research domains reviewed.

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R. G. Collingwood
An Essay on Philosophical Method.
James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro, eds.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. cxxxii + 360.
Cdn$174.00/US$99.00. ISBN 0-19-928087-8.

An *Essay on Philosophical Method* was published in 1933 and subsequently harshly criticized by, among others, Ducasse, Hartshorne, Ryle, and Schiller. It was then largely forgotten, overshadowed by the relative successes of Collingwood's *The Principles of Art* and *The Idea of History*. Hence, it is pertinent to ask, 'Why is Collingwood's *Essay* important today?'

The book is crucial for Collingwood scholars. He called it 'my best book in matter; in style, I may call it my only book' (xiii). His literary executor, T. M. Knox, considered it a "'philosophical classic'" (xxxvii), and it earned Collingwood a coveted Oxford professorship. In this welcome new edition, Connelly and D'Oro include well-chosen, previously unpublished materials that illuminate its main themes, and the comprehensive 'Editors' Introduction' expertly contextualizes the book within Collingwood's thought, early twentieth-century British philosophy, and key contemporary debates.

The importance of the book, more generally, lies in its original formulation of a distinctive method for philosophy. The dust jacket eulogizes, '*An Essay on Philosophical Method* contains the most sustained discussion in the twentieth century of the subject matter and method of philosophy and an unparalleled explanation of why philosophy has a distinctive domain of enquiry that differs from that of the sciences of nature'. It is difficult to think of other twentieth-century works so focused on philosophical method, and Collingwood's insightful *Essay* should be required reading for current philosophers corrupted by scientism. Besides arguing for the autonomy of philosophy and its method, Collingwood also advises that philosophical language should be clear and non-technical. If heeded, this advice might temper the encyclopedic compilation of increasingly arcane jargon by philosophers who have confused the use of technical language with precision and rigor. Collingwood is no hypocrite: his prose is a model of clarity and graceful literary style.

Collingwood's *Essay* creatively builds on transcendental and dialectical elements borrowed from Kant and Hegel, and the central chapters are Chapters 2 and 3, 'The Overlap of Classes', and 'The Scale of Forms'. Viewing philosophy as a chaotic morass, Collingwood claims that the subject matter of philosophy must be clarified and its appropriate method ascertained. These tasks entail distinguishing the activity and method of philosophy from those of the exact and empirical sciences. The key difference is that, in philosophy, classes overlap. In science concepts are classified according to genus/species relationships. The generic concept is the genus, its instances the species, and the latter are exclusive and exhaustive. Instances of a concept are classified according to essential common characteristics, and

there generally is no overlap of classes. However, 'the specific classes of a philosophical genus do not exclude one another, they overlap one another' (31). Good actions may be pleasant, expedient, or right, but not exclusively so: e.g., the same action may be expedient and right. Philosophical distinctions, therefore, may entail "'a distinction without a difference'" (50).

Besides overlapping, philosophical concepts also compose a scale of forms, in which generic concepts are divided into species or forms that differ in degree and kind. For example, the virtues of Plato and Aquinas are different kinds of virtue, but they also manifest virtue to differing degrees (Collingwood's many examples from the history of philosophy are a strength of his analysis). In a scale of forms, there is a variable exhibited by all the forms, e.g., virtue or goodness, which 'is identical with the generic essence itself' (60). A higher form is 'a more adequate embodiment of the generic essence' (88), but also a different kind of embodiment. Moreover, the relation between adjacent overlapping forms is not only one of distinction, but also one of opposition. A higher form negates its adjacent lower form, transcending it, and thus is opposed to it. The positive content of the lower form overlaps with the higher form, but the higher rightly rejects the negative content of the lower, which falsely claims it exhausts the generic essence.

This is the foundation of Collingwood's theory of philosophical method. From it other significant conclusions follow: definitions of philosophical concepts do not describe essential characteristics but provide a minimum specification of the concept, then more adequate ones; there is no bifurcation of knowledge and ignorance: in Socratic fashion 'we come to know better what in some sense we know already' (106); philosophical arguments are transcendental or 'reversible,' for their principles must establish conclusions and vice versa — i.e., philosophical conclusions must comport with experience — whereas scientific arguments are 'irreversible'.

Collingwood's early critics rightly noticed that his understanding of method in science was naive and inadequate. It is now dated: few would claim scientific arguments are irreversible. Yet Collingwood was not mainly describing scientific practice; he was criticizing methods transported from science to philosophy. Here his arrow finds its mark, e.g. in Moore's claim in *Principia Ethica* that good cannot be defined because there is no single property characteristic of all good, but only good, things.

The previously unpublished works included in this volume are 'The Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley: An Essay on "Appearance and Reality"', 'The Correspondence between R. G. Collingwood and Gilbert Ryle', and 'Method and Metaphysics'. It is concerning these less familiar writings that the 'Editors' Introduction' exhibits its few shortcomings. It may be impossible to write a clear commentary on Collingwood's defense of the ontological argument or on his none too transparent epistolary exchange with Ryle, but the editors' discussion could be more illuminating about both Collingwood's meaning and aim. Ryle's consternation is understandable; even philosophers sympathetic to Collingwood may view Collingwood's defense as an unproductive red herring. His related comments about 'the Being of Aristotle' (127)

and philosophy as 'the task of thinking out the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason' (125), raise additional issues that seem contrary to the editors' tendency to read Collingwood outside of the context of idealist metaphysics. Perhaps attention to the relation between Collingwood and Bradley beyond the question of degrees of truth and reality would have been fruitful in clarifying Collingwood's relationship to idealism.

This volume is valuable to Collingwood scholars, historians of early twentieth-century British philosophy, and philosophers concerned with philosophical method. It is an unduly neglected classic.

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Leo J. Elders
The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law, and the Virtues.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2005.
Pp. 313.
US$49.95.
ISBN 3-631-53748-4 or 0-8204-7713-3.

Leo J. Elders has extensive and impressive experience in teaching and researching the ethical thought of Thomas Aquinas; indeed, he has worked at universities on three continents and is a member of the Papal Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. The present book is his English translation of a work that first appeared in Dutch in 2000.

The goal of *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas* is 'to provide a survey of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas in so far as these are based on arguments of natural reason' (7). As this statement implies, Elders is of the view that there is a strictly philosophical ethics present within Thomas' writings, even though many of these writings are devoted to theological subjects (8). Elders finds this statement of philosophical ethics to be present especially in the *Summa theologiae* and the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*. Elders is less interested in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, but this is not at all to say that he finds the latter work irrelevant to his task.

Since treatments of Thomas' ethical thought are often devoted to such topics as the natural law, Elders takes care to include and even emphasize what Thomas has to say about other matters, such as the passions and the cardinal virtues. The principle of organization that Elders employs is basically to follow (loosely and with some omissions) the order of presentation that Thomas himself takes in the second part of the *Summa theologiae*. Accordingly, the first chapter of *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas* is titled

'Man's Quest of Happiness'. From here, the chapters treat human acts, passions and habits, the virtues in general, the natural law, and the individual virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These first thirteen chapters generally consist of summaries of the individual questions of the *Summa*. The fourteenth and final chapter, however, is titled 'Love and Friendship'. Here Elders sets aside the outline provided by the *Summa theologiae* and bases his discussion on remarks that Thomas makes throughout his various works. Two of the chapters have appendices: Chapter 9, 'Laws and the Natural Law', has an appendix on 'Thomas on the Common Good', and Chapter 11, 'Justice', has appendices on 'War' and on 'Labour'. The volume begins with a short preface and a rather more substantial introduction that attempt to lay out the basics of Thomas' ethical thinking, place it within its historical context, and establish the importance of studying it in contemporary times.

The book does not intend to offer a dramatically new understanding of Thomas' ethics. As Elders puts it, 'The reader should not look for entirely novel interpretations' (8), and indeed Elders says little that can be construed as controversial. In the chapter on natural law, he does expressly distance himself from the controversial new understanding of Thomas offered by Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle (210), but this is an exception. Elders is of course aware of the enormous body of secondary literature on Thomas Aquinas, and he does occasionally refer his readers to it both in the text and in the annotations. He seems to be more interested in European scholarship than North American, though not exclusively so. The volume contains indices but no bibliography.

The audience Elders has in mind consists of readers who do not have access to Thomas' own ethical writings. As he puts it: 'For those who have no opportunity to study the text of Aquinas himself this book offers ... in a shortened, but nevertheless quite complete form, his main teachings' (p. 8). One would hope, however, that the ultimate effect of Elders' book would be something more, namely to encourage aspiring undergraduates or even beginning graduate students to engage Thomas' own works. It would seem appropriate to point out here that many of the texts in which Thomas reflects profoundly on the nature of the virtues have been issued in new student editions; for example, Hackett Publishing has recently offered *Aquinas: The Cardinal Virtues*, translated and edited by Richard J. Regan. Perhaps Elders' volume could be very useful to teachers of courses on Thomas' ethics, serving as a sort of introduction and commentary for primary texts that beginning students often find difficult. 'Virtue ethics' — a redundancy for Thomas and his teacher Aristotle — is very much a concern in philosophy today, and Elders' book could help direct students to struggle more directly with what is probably the most complex and subtle treatment of the subject to be encountered anywhere.

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Kit Fine
Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers.
Toronto and New York: Clarendon Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 387.
Cdn$165.00/US$99.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-927870-9);
Cdn$57.00/US$35.00
(paper: ISBN 0-19-927871-7).

The papers that comprise this, Kit Fine's first and quite superb book in this area, suggest many novel perspectives on these old philosophical warhorses, modality and tense. I have long been a fan of Kit Fine's particular brand of philosophy: it is at once deep, precise, and stylish. This collection of papers, spanning some thirty years of Fine's *opus*, certainly contains many of his most stylish works, though not (fortunately for me) his most technical — Fine *has* written more formal papers dealing with the book's two main themes, but they are not included here. The work is no less precise for this absence though.

Firstly, let me sound an initial note of caution. Not all of the papers are in the *intersection* of modality and tense, as I was expecting them to be. Some (*most*, in fact) are on modality and some (just three, in fact) are on tense — many of the various strands of the book are, however, woven together in the final chapter. There are eleven chapters in all, including two reviews and two previously unpublished essays. These are sectioned off into four parts (three papers in each with the exception of the part containing the reviews) dealing with 'Issues in the Philosophy of Language', 'Issues in Ontology', 'Issues in Metaphysics', and 'Reviews'. (Leaving out the reviews would, I think, have resulted in a tidier and more coherent book, without sacrificing completeness with respect to Fine's philosophical *papers*.) A very lucid introduction connects up the various chapters and provides some useful philosophical background to the collection.

With respect to the modality side, Fine defends a position he calls 'modal actualism': seriousness about modality coupled with seriousness about actuality (i.e., the view that actuality is *privileged* in some way). On the time and tense side, Fine is somewhat harder to pin down, acting more as a cartographer mapping out the landscape of the space of interpretations regarding tense. However, he is keen to shield realism about tense from some standard objections.

The first part constitutes a defence of the intelligibility of modality against the classic arguments of Quine to the contrary. Here he argues that Quine's arguments rest on certain background assumptions that can be denied. He then defends actualism in the second part. Here he makes the first connection to tense *via* presentism, the view that only present objects are real — this is, as it often is, viewed as analogous to actualism (the view that only actual objects are real). The specific problem tackled is how to make sense, from an actualist and presentist point of view, of the perfectly reasonable sounding

talk of possible, past, and future objects. Though we can't go into the details of his proposal here, Fine's answer is to argue that when we do quantification over possible objects, we are *really* just doing quantification over actual objects. The answer with respect to time and tense is more complicated and leads into some very intricate metaphysics, the subject of Part 3. The essays in Part 3 are, for me, the highlights of the book:

In 'Varieties of Necessity' (Ch. 7), Fine defends a non-reductionist (or perhaps anti-*imperialist*) view of the various kinds of modality. Thus, rather than taking one form to be the most fundamental 'layer' of modality, Fine argues that the various forms (specifically: metaphysical, natural, and normative) are independent of one another.

Chapter 8, 'Time and Reality', concerns the debate between realists and anti-realists about tense, on whether or not reality contains tensed facts. Fine introduces a further distinction between 'standard' and 'non-standard' realism, hinging on the kind of tensed facts that exist: present tensed facts or past-, present-, and/or future-tensed facts respectively. The standard realist will allow that facts such as 'Socrates *drank* the hemlock' are part of reality, but not that facts such as 'Socrates *is drinking* hemlock' are. The non-standard realist *can* accept these latter facts as belonging to reality providing adjustments are made to the concept of reality, namely that it is relativistic or fragmented. The result: realism about tense without a privileged moment or aspect. (I have to confess, Fine's application of this framework to special relativity left me with an 'incredulous stare', but that could be due to an internalization of a particular interpretation of special relativity on my part.)

The final chapter of Part 3, 'Necessity and Non-Existence', is where the *Modality and Tense* (i.e., combined) theme really enters — in this sense, the book can be seen as a build-up to future work on more intimate connections between modality and tense. Fine argues that just as there is a genuine distinction to be made between tensed and tenseless sentences, so there is an equally genuine distinction to be made between 'worldly' and 'unworldly' sentences. In the first case the distinction turns on the fact that the truth of tensed sentences depends on the circumstances (the time of utterance and the way the world is) but not so for tenseless sentences. Modality is carved in the same way: worldly sentences depend for their truth upon the circumstances, but unworldly ones do not. On this basis he sets up a further distinction between 'necessary truths proper' and 'transcendent truths'. Interestingly, rather than reading one's position about time and tense from modality, as philosophers usually do, Fine reverses the direction. This machinery leads to controversial results, but also, argues Fine, it resolves many extant philosophical puzzles.

On the basis of these three essays (from 2005), I think there is much to look forward to from Fine *qua* metaphysician. There is a distinct deepening of thought to be discerned as one advances chronologically through the various essays.

Fine's book, then, is full of originality; and though one may not always agree with the results he gets, it is hard to fault his reasoning — as one would

expect of a logician of his calibre, of course. It is, in many respects, philosophy done at its best: the careful mapping out of positions and the formulation of new distinctions that show a finer grain of structure to arguments and positions than was previously supposed. It is often *brave* writing too, following a completely different path from much of mainstream philosophy, but never in an unconvincing way. In sum then, this is a fantastic read from beginning to end, and would benefit readers from many and varied philosophical backgrounds: I can easily recommend it unreservedly.

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Maurice Finocchiaro
Arguments about Arguments: Systematic, Critical and Historical Essays in Logical Theory.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. ix + 467.
US$75.00 (cloth: 0-521-85327-3);
US$31.99 (paper: 0-521-61853-3).

The book is a collection of essays Finocchiaro has written in the last three decades on argument analysis and informal logic. The essays have not been rewritten, so there is some redundancy among them.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part develops Finocchiaro's approach to argument analysis and informal logic. The second part presents his theory of fallacies and the positive and negative evaluation of arguments. On the one hand he claims that fallacies are attributed too hastily, because 'actually occurring logically incorrect arguments are not very common' (116). On the other hand he develops his own typology of six types of actually occurring fallacies. In the third part several alternative or related approaches to argument analysis are critically evaluated. The theses under review range from Cohen's methodological views on analytic philosophy as working by induction on one's own intuition to Gramsci's instrumentalist understanding of logic as a technique of ideologically neutral reasoning. The fourth part provides some examples of historical studies of arguments. As in Finocchiaro's other books, Galileo is used as a paradigm arguer several times in the book. In this part other studies of pre-modern science are presented: Newton's ambiguous formulation of his '3rd rule' of reasoning, or Lavoisier's clever rhetorical embedding of his non-obvious argument on oxidation.

Logic is of different relevance for different understandings of philosophy. There are types of philosophy (roughly those in the analytic tradition) for which the use of formal logic is an essential tool. There is even the even narrower case of an understanding of philosophy which equates doing philosophy with formal (re-)construction — like the late George Boolos considered his formal theory of plural quantification as just being philosophy. For many other understandings of philosophy and for fields like legal argumentation, however, argumentation plays an essential role, but formal logic does not. Here non-formal (informal) logic and non-formalized rules of inference are employed. Informal logic uses almost no formalisms (as can be seen in a typical textbook like Alec Fisher's *The Logic of Real Arguments*, Cambridge 1988). Finocchiaro's book itself does not use formal logic. Sometimes (cf. 67, 93) he equates his historical approach to argument analysis with informal logic. He sets it apart from formal logic, which is often accused of 'apriorism' (32). As philosophy lives by its diversity there is no need for unification here. Avoiding logical imperialism is well advised.

Nevertheless there has to be some relation between formal and informal logic. One connection might be that some proponents of formal logic (and the majority of analytic philosophers) claim that formal logic captures structures of human reasoning. If that is so, formal logic has to have some use in understanding actually employed arguments or attributed reasoning procedures. In analytic philosophy and cognitive science the whole field of such questions is discussed under the title of 'reflective equilibrium': a coherent reconstruction of our logical faculties has to take into account our intuitions on good arguments, our formal explications of reasoning (i.e. formal systems), and empirical results on actual human faculties and performance (an overview is presented in Edward Stein's *Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science* [Oxford 1996]).

Finocchiaro's book can be read as defending the claim that the historical analysis of arguments as presented in classical texts is a further ingredient to be considered in this reflective equilibrium. The historical cases — by just being historical cases of published arguments — provide empirical evidence for what was considered to be good or bad argumentation. Supposed principles of reasoning or the critical evaluation of arguments are to be found in them as well. Given the more or less informal character of most of the historical cases, the theory of these arguments may be considered as part of the meta-theory of informal logic. Historical analysis in this sense has further merits in promoting a better understanding of the historic controversies and the development of science. Finocchiaro, however, claims that this type of argument analysis is *superior* to the empirical study of human reasoning faculties in the cognitive sciences and *superior* to formal logic as providing a theory of reasoning, historical analysis being 'the most scientific approach to the topic' (45).

This can be seriously doubted. The meta-theory of informal logic can hardly be informal itself. So Finocchiaro defines the essential concept of *reasoning* as 'a special type of thinking that consists of interrelating thoughts

in such a way that some are dependent on or follow from others' (15). His theory of fallacies rests on the definition of a fallacy as 'the failure of one proposition to follow from others' (133). One should immediately ask here what 'follows from' means. Finocchiaro gives no explanation. Formal logic does (whether one considers deductive systems or confirmation theories). Formal logic further provides a systematisation of inference by providing sound and complete formal systems. Without such a systematisation we have the ragbag of inferences that pre-modern logic collected. Neglecting this second connection between formal and informal logic, Finocchiaro comes close to presenting just such a collection of rather general principles of reasoning, including even the concept of explanation and any 'rules, and presuppositions of inquiry, truth-seeking, or knowledge gathering' (96).

Informal logic and argument analysis should be seen in connection with formal logic, and as an important ingredient in the wide reflective equilibrium needed to spell out the proper principles of reasoning. Informal logic may also be seen as a pedagogical tool for those who do not need *formal* logic in the sense of manipulating formal systems. Within these limitations informal logic and the evaluation of arguments is part of teaching logic and philosophy, and historical analysis is part of empirically investigating our practices of reasoning. All other pretensions, however, should be dropped.

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Keith Frankish
Mind and Supermind.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xiv + 255.
US$75.00. ISBN 0-521-81203-8.

This is one of the few book-length manuscripts that focuses almost entirely on the nature of belief. In theorizing about belief, Frankish aims at vindicating folk psychology in a way that will account for the insights of both austere and rich versions of folk psychology. His approach is novel and dovetails in ways he sometimes acknowledges with other philosophical work by action theorists, philosophers of mind, and epistemologists, as well as related work by social and cognitive psychologists.

The book is well organized, with each chapter systematically building upon material covered in previous chapters. It consists of eight chapters and a very short conclusion. The book can, however, be divided into three major

sections. In the first section (Chapters 1-3) Frankish articulates his theory of mind and its implications for folk psychology, focuses on belief, and considers some challenges and theories of belief similar to his own along the way. In the second section (Chapters 4-5) he develops his theory of belief further, fleshing out some of the features presented in skeletal form earlier, and considers how the fuller picture overcomes some of the challenges offered in section one. Finally, the third section (Chapters 6-8) is devoted to testing the theory of belief and mind he offers by considering some challenges to folk psychology. In this section he also applies the theory of mind developed to problems in the philosophy of mind (specifically, *akrasia,* self-deception, and first-person authority) as well as empirical psychology.

Frankish defends a two-strand theory of mind that is similar in many ways (as Frankish acknowledges) to the view of the mind proposed by dual-process theorists in psychology. The strand 1 mind is dubbed the 'basic mind' and the strand 2 mind the 'supermind'. Absent any knowledge of the details of Frankish's theory, one might assume that this is like the distinction Keith Lehrer makes between the mind and the 'metamind' (or the distinction between object level cognition and metacognition made by psychologists). However, what Frankish proposes is quite different. In effect, in theorizing about the architecture of the mind and the implications for folk psychology, Frankish brings together two views of the mind. One is austere and has revisionist implications for folk psychology, while the other is rich and leaves our folk psychology intact. Specifically, Frankish gives an austere functionalist account of strand 1 mental states (with mental states being 'thickly carved' functional states) and a rich functionalist account of strand 2 mental states (with mental states being 'finely carved' functional states). Folk psychological explanations (belief-desire explanations) pick out sustaining causes in the strand 1 mind while they pick out dynamic causes in the strand 2 mind (50).

As noted, Frankish focuses on belief (with occasional discussion of desires and intentions) as the means of highlighting and defending his theory of mind. Strand 1 belief is non-conscious, not apt to be activated in occurrent form, partial, passively formed, not language-involving, and common to both humans and non-human animals. Strand 2 belief is conscious, apt to be activated in occurrent form, flat-out, can be actively formed, frequently language-involving, and unique to humans and other language users. The two-strand theory of belief is associated with further differences in how reasoning and the mind itself should be understood. In the case of reasoning, strand 1 reasoning is non-conscious, interpretable as Bayesian, and depends on sub-personal processes that may be non-explicit, are probably not language-driven, and are not under active control. Strand 2 reasoning, on the other hand, is conscious, usually classical rather than Bayesian, can be actively controlled, is explicit, and is frequently language-driven (50).

Conspicuously absent from this book is any sustained engagement with relevant recent research in empirical psychology. I do not count myself among those who argue that fruitful inquiry into the nature of the mind can only be

done when wearing a lab coat or, minimally, when paying careful attention to the research of psychologists and neuroscientists. However, I must confess that I find work in the philosophy of psychology on the scale of this book to have a sense of incompleteness when cognate research by scientists is largely ignored. Apart from a relatively brief discussion in the final chapter of the implications of his theory of mind for dual-process theory, evolutionary and developmental psychology, and clinical psychology (226-33), Frankish discusses very little of the research from cognate scientific fields that supports some of the claims he makes. Similarities between his project and research by psychologists on dual-process theory is mentioned and then dropped. And Frankish completely ignores the literature on cognitive dissonance, metacognition, and mental control that bears directly on his project. This is not to say that Frankish fails to make a significant contribution to the literature on belief and on the philosophy of psychology more broadly. It is just that much of the experimental data and theoretical work by psychologists lends support to Frankish's philosophical work and would have strengthened the defense of his theory if mentioned. One can hope, however, that this book is just one part of a larger research project that will be vindicated (or not!) by experimental evidence from the mind sciences.

Problems aside, in *Mind and Supermind* Frankish offers a fresh and challengingly new perspective to debates over folk psychology and the nature of belief. The chief value of this work lies more in its role as a contribution to the sparse but growing literature by philosophers whose concerns about the nature of belief are not explicitly epistemological. But there is much in this book that should be of value for epistemologists (especially those working on doxastic voluntarism and epistemic responsibility). So the potential readership goes beyond those working in the philosophy of psychology. This book merits careful reading by anyone with research interests in folk psychology — and especially philosophers and psychologists interested in the nature of belief.

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Vincent F. Hendricks
Mainstream and Formal Epistemology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 200.
US$70.00. ISBN 0-521-85789-9.

In this book Hendricks undertakes the honorable task of bringing together both mainstream and formal approaches to the theory of knowledge. His discussion is unified by the concept of *forcing*, which he shows all approaches employ in one way or other to defeat the skeptic.

After priming the pump in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapters 3-6 discuss mainstream epistemologies, in particular Goldman's epistemic reliabilism, Nozick's counterfactual epistemology, and Lewis' contextual epistemology. The discussion focuses on the definition of knowledge and the skeptical challenge. Hendricks argues convincingly that these three approaches try to defeat the skeptic by what he calls *forcing*: 'whenever skeptics cite possibilities of error as arguments against knowledge claims, the strategy is to show that, although they are possibilities of error, they fail to be *relevant* possibilities of error' (2). Epistemic reliabilism forces by requiring the method of belief acquisition to be merely reliable (in a stochastic sense) rather than infallible. Counterfactual epistemology forces by requiring that truth is tracked only in worlds close to the actual one rather than in all possible worlds. Contextual epistemology forces by properly ignoring possibilities that do not fit the context. In addition, these chapters illustrate the difference between a first-person and a third-person perspective on inquiry.

The chapters on counterfactual and contextual epistemology refer to various principles of epistemic logic, which is dealt with in Chapter 6. Hendricks gives an informed overview of the field since the time Hintikka first brought logic to bear on epistemology in the 1960s. By showing how the accessibility relation on possible worlds limits the scope of the knowledge operator, and thus forces the skeptic, Hendricks develops his main theme. Autoepistemic logic, as introduced by the computer scientist R.C. Moore in the 1980s, serves as an example of how mainstream epistemology — in this case G.E. Moore's autoepistemology — can fruitfully bear on formal epistemology, and *vice versa*.

Agency is another important theme. The epistemic agents who have knowledge are inactive in first-generation epistemic logic which is based on alethic modal logic. 'They serve as indices on the accessibility relation between possible worlds ... [which] ... will not suffice for epistemological ... pertinence simply because there is nothing particularly epistemic about being indices' (101). And another one of the many crispy lines: 'What bakes the epistemological noodle ... is *how* the agent has to *behave* in order to gain the epistemic strength that he has' (101-2).

This brings Hendricks to Chapter 7 and computational epistemology, which is based on Kelly's formal learning theory. While the business of mainstream, as well as logical, epistemology is largely conceptual analysis,

computational epistemology is a formal account of normative or means-ends epistemology. Rather than appealing to intuitions in order to test various proposals for a definition of knowledge, computational epistemology investigates whether or not a particular method reliably solves a given problem in a certain sense. For instance, consider the method that conjectures that all ravens are black as long as only black ravens are observed, and otherwise conjectures that some ravens are white. This method reliably answers the question whether all ravens are black when the background knowledge is restricted (thus witnessing the forcing relation!) to worlds consisting of sequences of observations of black and white ravens. The sense in which the method reliably solves the problem is called *stabilization to the correct answer*. If all ravens are black, the method will eventually start to conjecture that all ravens are black, and will continue to do so forever. If not all ravens are black, the method will eventually start to conjecture that not all ravens are black, and will continue to do so forever. Whether the method's conjectures are intuitively appealing is irrelevant for its justification. Rather, the method is justified relative to the goal of reliably answering the question because it furthers that goal. This clearly illustrates that the justification of a norm is a relation between the norm and a goal that holds to the extent the norm furthers the goal.

Chapter 8 contains Hendrick's own epistemology. 'Modal operator epistemology is a model of inquiry obtained by mixing alethic, tense and epistemic logics with a few motivational concepts drawn from computational epistemology ... It was developed to study the acquisition and subsequent validity of limiting convergent knowledge' (130). In addition to these formal ingredients from logical and computational epistemology, modal operator epistemology employs the first- versus third-person distinction that is in play in many mainstream epistemologies. The tripartite definition of knowledge is turned into the following proposal: A method, δ, '*may know h in the limit iff there exists a possible world that validates* δ*'s knowledge of h. In other words: 1. h is true, and 2.* δ *conjectures h after some finite evidence sequence has been read and continues to conjecture h in all future*' (139). One of the properties a discovery method, δ (that actively outputs hypotheses on the basis of finite initial segments of evidence streams), may possess is to have consistent expectations. Roughly, if a possible world (μ, k) (consisting of an infinite data stream, μ, and a state coordinate, k, specifying the age of the world) is consistent with what δ conjectures on the basis of the first n items of the data stream, ε, then μ and ε share the first n items and k does not lie in the past (139). Thus such a method δ conjectures only hypotheses that are consistent with what has been observed so far. Based on these notions Hendricks is able to prove that '*[i]f knowledge is defined as limiting convergence, then knowledge validates* **S4** *iff the discovery method has consistent expectations*' (141).

Results like these are important components of 'plethoric' epistemology, a programmatic view Hendricks puts forth in the concluding Chapter 9. The idea seems to be that plethora builds bridges between mainstream and formal epistemologies and, or so I would like to add, between conceptual

analysis and normative epistemology. Hendricks has a section on conceptual analysis (151-4) and is well aware of the distinctive features of normative epistemology (Chapter 7). Unfortunately the comparison between these two epistemological enterprises remains on a general level. Indeed, given Nozick's and Lewis' quasi-formal mainstream epistemologies, as well as Hendrick's quasi-mainstream formal epistemology, one starts to wonder whether it is the mainstream/formal distinction that divides contemporary epistemology, or whether it is the distinction between conceptual analysis and normative epistemology. Still, Hendrick's book is a must read for both mainstream and formal epistemologists.

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Vittorio Hösle
Morals and Politics.
Trans. Steven Rendall. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 2004.
Pp. xxi + 991.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-268-03065-0.

While *Ethics and Politics* includes a great deal of discussion of philosophical viewpoints, it is not truly accurate to describe it as a book of philosophy. Rather, Vittorio Hösle has undertaken a project increasingly common amongst philosophers, and has aimed his book at a broad, educated readership, rather than at academics. Hösle's specific goal is to convince his readers to reject what he sees as the dominant contemporary view that 'in the modern world, politics is successful to the degree that it has nothing to do with morals, and that a moralization of politics not only does not help us resolve our problems, but ultimately makes them more difficult' (xv). In its place he wishes to advance a 'political ethic for the twenty-first century' that recognizes and embraces their interrelation.

Hösle should certainly be praised for retaining the philosophical aspect of his book, rather than eliminating this normative foundation and commencing immediately with his views on practical issues. After all, except for normative argument philosophers rarely possess the kind of practical political experience that would make their contributions particularly valuable, and Hösle gives no indication that he is atypical in this respect. Moreover, while the reader of a philosophical work can judge the positions advanced just by

examining the supporting arguments offered, when the author is delivering practical guidance it will be rare that conclusive arguments are available. As a result, a philosopher attempting to provide practical advice needs to establish his credentials to have any level of authority, and that can only be done through good argument and/or perceptive commentary.

Nonetheless, despite Hösle's apparent recognition of this problem he has not adequately resolved it. While a great deal of time is spent discussing normative issues, the discussion is uniformly shallow and non-reflective. Moreover, the concluding 'practical' discussion seems not to rest at all upon the normative foundations supposedly laid. As a result, instead of being a book of political advice with a normative foundation, *Ethics and Politics* ultimately becomes simply a collection of Hösle's unsupported, and usually unexamined, opinions, on both practical and philosophical issues.

The book is divided into three large sections, 'Normative Foundations', 'Foundations of a Theory of the Social World', and 'Political Ethics', progressing sequentially from intellectual history and meta-ethics, to social and political theory, to practical advice on a genuinely impressive range of political issues.

The problems with the book become clear very early, resulting from weaknesses more troubling than a simple failure of argument. Part 1 consists of a rambling survey of an enormous variety of philosophical positions that Hösle sees as relevant to his inquiry. Unfortunately, Hösle rarely addresses any of these positions in depth, generally constraining his attention to a single sentence noting that a particular philosopher expressed a certain view, and that this view either seems correct or misguided. No argument is presented, and no time is spent examining the complexities of the view in question. While professional philosophers will find this approach unsatisfying, a serious problem arises from the fact that Hösle is aiming his book at an audience of non-philosophers, few of whom will be aware of the complexities that Hösle elides, or even of the true substance of the views that he glosses over in a single reference. In a book aimed at philosophers Hösle's approach would come off as little more than name-dropping, but in a book aimed at a broader public it risks giving readers the impression that the views dispatched with such speed are indeed largely worthless.

Hösle continues this style in Part 2 of the book, but here the approach is at least less concerning from a philosopher's perspective, as the subject matter relates more to science and history than to philosophy itself. Nonetheless, the same issues of authorial responsibility continue to exist, as Hösle again repeatedly elides complications in his assertions and presents his interpretations of complex historical events as though little of real substance could be said in opposition to them.

In Part 3, Hösle reaches the motivating purpose of the book, and begins his discussion of a 'political ethics for the 21st century'. However, the failure of the previous two sections of the book to construct a substantive normative foundation for this practical discussion reduces this section to one of the least helpful forms of 'political handbook' available — a rambling discussion by an

academic philosopher of his personal opinions on how the world should be run. An astonishing number of issues are addressed, and a corresponding number of opinions expressed, but there is never more than a cursory attempt to address competing views, and equally little attention is devoted to the complicating realities of political action. If Hösle himself possessed significant political experience, the reader could justly ignore the absence of detailed practical discussion, presuming that the views expressed had gone through the filter of the author's political experience. However, since Hösle lacks such experience the reader is left with no reason to give his views particular credence. This is, of course, unless the reader lacks the philosophical training to realize the weakness of the preceding theoretical discussion, and is instead dazzled by the unquestionable breadth of Hösle's reading and the confidence with which he advances his views.

This is not to suggest that Hösle fails completely to establish any form of authority as an author. His intelligence is obvious, and he is clearly at home when discussing Modern philosophy (as might be expected given that his 1987 book, *Hegel's System*, is widely recognized as among the most important recent Hegel commentaries). Nonetheless, even in those areas in which he clearly possesses specialized knowledge his discussions rarely address competing interpretations, and his own interpretations are sometimes seriously questionable.

For example, Hösle devotes almost ten pages to a discussion of Hobbes, demonstrating at least some familiarity with his work. Nonetheless, he attributes to Hobbes the view that 'all human beings are rational egoists ... [and] men are all the same in their desire for self-preservation and their impulse to satisfy their needs' (36) — an interpretation of Hobbes that is common amongst freshman philosophy students, but is broadly recognized by philosophers as an unfair caricature of Hobbes' complex views.

Similarly, Hösle criticises Marx' labor theory of value on the grounds that '[t]he value of a product or a service cannot be determined by the producer's labor, but must rather be determined by the needs of consumers, whom Marx underestimated along with traders' (676-7). However, while this would certainly be a valid criticism of Locke's labor theory of value, Marx' own theory was intimately connected to the market. Indeed, Marx not only insisted on a market-based connection between the distinct concepts of price and value (a distinction Hösle neglects), but also insisted that work not performed for the market, and hence not at least partially 'determined by the needs of consumers', simply did not constitute labor. So essential to Marx' work was this connection between labor and the market that its rejection became the centerpiece of Jurgen Habermas' 1970s 'reconstruction' of historical materialism.

Of course, given the enormous variety of topics that Hösle has set himself to discuss it is unavoidable that a large number will receive inadequate attention, and also that some mistakes will occur. However, even where Hösle sets himself to a more detailed examination of a particular viewpoint his work comes off as shallow, with little concern for the correctness of his

assertions. Moreover, the general readership at which this book is aimed would be unable to recognize the errors in question, and Hösle gives no indication to such readers that there are even competing interpretations to the one he is presenting.

This impression of a highly intelligent author more concerned with expressing his thoughts than with their correctness is further solidified by Hösle's repeated use of 'knowing' references to literary works. While significant insights can unquestionably be gained through a thoughtful use of literary examples, Hösle's literary references are almost uniformly inadequate, consisting of simple throw-away references to a parallel that Hösle sees between the issue under discussion and a certain literary work. Rarely is any explanation offered of the nature of the insight he believes the literary work can offer, or of the ways in which the limited factual situation of the literary example might need to be supplemented for a full understanding of the problem at hand. Indeed, he rarely offers any information to the reader on the literary example being referenced, contenting himself with a mere citation of author and title. For the broad readership Hösle is seeking such references can only be seen as meaningless.

Certain consistent philosophical themes will, however, emerge for an attentive reader, the most prominent being a thoroughgoing consequentialism. This aspect of his work is surprising given Hösle's repeated praise of Kantian ethics and strong criticism of utilitarianism, and it is therefore particularly unsatisfying that he makes no real attempt to explain the nature of the consequentialist evaluations that he makes. For example, he repeatedly cites the dire consequences that will result if politicians continue to neglect the environment. However, since Hösle rejects a utilitarian comparison of pleasures, it is unclear on what grounds he regards a degraded environment as undesirable. While Hösle has previously devoted an entire book to environmental questions (*Philosophie der ökologischen Krise*, 1991), few of the readers at whom this book is aimed are likely to search out a copy of that book just to understand Hösle's views, particularly since it is unavailable in English.

Such murkiness of argument undermines Hösle's entire project. Either readers will reject his views because they see them as unsupported, or they will accept them because they lack the training necessary to detect the flawed argumentation and simply find the proposition itself appealing. Hösle's repeated emphasis on the importance of philosophical integrity indicates that he would find neither of these outcomes satisfactory.

It is this sense of lost opportunity that ultimately makes *Ethics and Politics* such a frustrating and disappointing book. Hösle's intelligence is evident throughout the volume, and there seems little doubt that if he were genuinely to apply himself to any of the questions he addresses his contribution would always be worth hearing. However, in the case of *Ethics and Politics*, it simply is not. It is to be hoped that he will again address these issues in the future, in a more philosophically rigorous form. However, in the meantime, readers interested in an attempt to build a political theory from

the ground up can more profitably turn to Philip Pettit's *The Common Mind* than to this rambling collection of Hösle's personal political and philosophical views.

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Dominique Janicaud
On the Human Condition.
Trans. Eileen Brennan. New York:
Routledge 2005.
Pp. xxiv + 71.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-32795-4);
US$10.85 (paper: ISBN 0-415-32796-2).

This last book by French Heideggerian Dominique Janicaud appeared only months after his death in 2002. It is conceived as a preliminary inquiry into the stakes of a possible overcoming of humanism. Humanism is understood as pertaining both to modes of explanation in the human sciences that put the human individual at the centre and also to ethical universality. The book is wide-ranging, with discussions of the anti-humanism of structuralism in the human sciences, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* and other fictional warnings, cloning, Nietzsche's last man, and Primo Levi's *Survival in Auschwitz,* among other topics. They are held together by his critical approach concerning whether any substantially new human condition might arise from the technological-organizational tragedies and promises of our time.

Alot depends upon what is understood by 'overcoming' in this context. The French title uses the word *dépasser*, which is normally used to translate Hegel's *Aufhebung*. Translation into English has always been a problem: *sublation* has been used, but unfortunately doesn't convey much at the intuitive level. *Transcend* is more common but doesn't carry the equally important sense of preservation of what is essential. Heidegger introduced the term *Verwindung*, usually translated as 'overcoming', in contrast to the Hegelian term which suggests both that everything essential from the past is preserved in the future and that new conditions are set in place such that the past becomes past. Gianni Vattimo has suggested that *Verwindung* should be understood as 'healing', and thus as containing a more negative sense of the past and perhaps a less complete sense of the future.

This conceptual history is important to Janicaud's text because it is not addressed directly there. He poses the alternatives as 'transfiguration or disfiguration of the human?' (47) during his discussion of Nietzsche's last

man and, generally throughout the text, he appears to see it in essentially these terms: either humans are to be transformed into something qualitatively new or they are to remain substantially the same. These alternatives don't come up to the level of the conceptual history upon which the title rests. Simon Critchley points out in the introduction that the main feature of Janicaud's work is 'to leave behind all fantasies of overcoming, whether that concerns an overcoming of metaphysics, of rationality, or humanity as such' (vii). It is possible that the meaning of the 'overcoming' that is to be rejected is understood more completely in Janicaud's other work, but in this text it seems to come down to the binary opposition: the same or different.

Given these alternatives, it is hardly surprising that the text concludes that 'it is unlikely that, in a foreseeable future, man will cross the thresholds that amount to escaping his condition' (54). The main point of the text thus is the deflation of the exaggerations of what he calls 'techno-discourse' and the insistence that ethical problems, and the terms in which we pose them, remain the same. This strikes me as singularly unenlightening. On the one hand, it cuts only against those who ecstatically proclaim that new technologies will transform us into a post-human world without any ethical reservations about such a world. On the other hand, it utterly fails to attain the level of thinking about new ethical issues that Hannah Arendt and Emil Fackenheim, for example, achieved with regard to the Holocaust.

The conclusion exhorts us to combine a cautious humanism with an opening to the superhuman, a defence of the human with an acceptance of what surpasses the human condition. If one understands this conclusion in technical-organizational terms, it seems merely descriptive. If, as I suppose Janicaud to intend, it is taken in ethical terms, it seems merely to restate the problem without advance. Either we are to hold to ethical standards that have come down to us, however threatened, or we have to abandon them in the face of new possibilities. To say that we must do both says not much at all. His final sentence claims that 'our freedom' (58) makes this possible.

Freedom, insofar as it is embedded in the human condition, consists in passing beyond a given state of affairs. Freedom is transcendence. Thus, freedom implies that a new human condition is continually coming into being as a consequence of human action itself. Janicaud wants us to recognize that this new human condition, insofar as it is a product of freedom and still contains the possibility for the exercise of freedom, remains the 'same' human condition. Fair enough. But is it not possible, even likely, that the exercise of this freedom in, say, cloning, will test the limits of the ethical practices that our past freedom has disclosed? Are we not, then, faced with a choice between what must be maintained and what must be left behind? What must be overcome? And in what sense of overcoming? In this context, Janicaud's text, by asserting the sameness of this condition of choice, simply fails to address the necessity of choice itself and, to this extent, asserts freedom as if it were itself a kind of permanence.

Modern humans understand themselves as self-overcoming. Self-overcoming has accumulated to a point where it is now foreseeable that we may

be coming to a boundary in which future possibilities signify a break with everything that we have understood to be human in the ethical sense. It is from this possibility that Janicaud's book draws its sense of urgency. It is from this same possibility that the twentieth century has experienced many attempts to reject modern freedom for a belief in ontological foundations of goodness. Meanwhile, the ecstatic assumption that the transformation will be benign continues. I do not see how Janicaud's argument helps to clarify, even in an initial way, the alternatives that strain the human condition today.

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Joshua Kates
Essential History: Jacques Derrida and the Development of Deconstruction.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2005.
Pp. xxix + 318.
US$74.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-2326-6);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-2327-4).

This is a 'radical reappraisal' (xv) of Jacques Derrida's work. Surprisingly, what makes it radical is that it asks some very basic questions about Derrida: just what is he doing, and why? Is he a traditional philosopher or a radical sceptic? Is his main concern language or something else? Kates answers these questions by examining Derrida's relation to Husserl. Derrida's first publications were a series of commentaries on Husserl, and while it has long been recognized that they play an important role in his development, little has been said about *how* they do so. According to Kates, if we wish to understand deconstruction, we must see how it grows out of Husserlian phenomenology.

Kates begins with a survey of the state of Derrida studies. Though Derrida's major works are almost forty years old, there is little agreement about what they mean and why (or whether) they matter. Some commentators, such as Rodolphe Gasché, see Derrida as a traditional philosopher engaged in transcendental analysis. Others, such as Richard Rorty, see him as a critic of the tradition who wants to show 'what literature looks like once it is freed of philosophy' (15). Kates argues that each side is partly right, but that we lack a framework for adjudicating them. Such a framework can be found in Derrida's early engagement with Husserl, which gave him the

project he pursued for the rest of his career. Accordingly, much of the book examines Derrida's writings on Husserl from the 1950s and 1960s. The earliest, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy* (1954), is of a piece with Husserlian phenomenology. It seeks the transcendental conditions that make possible our experience of ideal entities such as numbers. Derrida suspects that the most fundamental of these conditions cannot be articulated by Husserl — that Husserl's work presupposes something 'ultra-transcendental' (140), something that in principle it cannot describe. But at this stage, Derrida cannot give a coherent account of what this is. Derrida's 1962 introduction to Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* develops his project further. This late text of Husserl's argues that our experience of idealities is made possible by writing. Only if mathematical truths can be preserved in writing can they be given as valid for anyone, at any time. Derrida agrees with Husserl about this, and with his claim that the writing at issue here is transcendental — a 'pure possibility' (64) of being preserved, rather than any particular empirical text. Derrida accepts the need for a transcendental account of writing, but finds Husserl's account inconsistent. At this stage, however, he is still too much of a Husserlian to break with phenomenology and develop a radically different account of writing.

Derrida finally gives such an account in the 1967 works that invent his method of deconstruction: *Speech and Phenomena* and *Of Grammatology*. Kates's developmental approach provides an invaluable frame for viewing these mature works. It lets us see Derrida as engaged in a project inspired by Husserl, but doubtful that this project can be completed on Husserl's terms. Kates shows that a widespread interpretation of *Speech and Phenomena* — that it is a simple attack on Husserl's theory of signs, and an ill-informed one at that — is just wrong. The book's famous discussions of '*différance*' and the 'phenomenological voice' are attempts to *complete* Husserl's transcendental project, not reject it. They do question whether this project can be completed, but they also make clear that simply abandoning the project is not an option. Kates's approach also sheds valuable new light on *Of Grammatology*. Since much of that book is devoted to a discussion of de Saussure, it is often taken to be concerned with empirical language alone. Kates shows, however, that this reading is mistaken, and that the book adopts the same transcendental perspective as Derrida's earlier writings on Husserl. Its notions of 'archi-writing' and 'trace', for example, are not merely linguistic, but 'ultra-transcendental' (140). If Derrida studies empirical language at all, it is to show that it faces the same difficulties as Husserl's account of thought — that is, to show that Saussurean structuralism is not a serious rival to Husserlian phenomenology. At the same time, Derrida's turn to empirical language makes it difficult to 'retain transcendental considerations of any sort' (159). So it is not surprising that Derrida is often seen as just another linguistic philosopher — or worse, just another literary theorist. Such is the fate of a philosopher who questions the transcendental perspective by means of the transcendental perspective. Whatever we think

of this questioning, however, we must see that it is part of a very traditional philosophical project.

Essential History is valuable in a number of ways. Not the least of these is that it recognizes that Derrida studies are at an embarrassing impasse, and proposes a way of moving forward. Kates is surely right to claim that we cannot understand Derrida without viewing him in the context of his long apprenticeship to Husserl. Several of the texts he discusses — Derrida's introduction to *The Origin of Geometry*, for instance — are extraordinarily difficult, and his careful readings of them are welcome in their own right. A minor problem is that the book's organization sometimes obscures the structure of its argument. Kates claims that Derrida's attitude to Husserl evolved considerably through the 1950s and 1960s, and that we must trace this evolution if we want to understand Derrida's project as a whole. But Chapter 3, which deals with the 1962 introduction to the *Origin of Geometry*, is followed by a chapter on the 1954 *Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*. If Derrida's development is as important as Kates says, then why not discuss these texts in chronological order? That quibble aside, Kates's book is perhaps the best overall discussion of Derrida's work that currently exists. *Essential History* is essential reading.

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Aurel Kolnai
Sexual Ethics: The Meaning and Foundations of Sexual Morality.
Trans. and ed. Francis Dunlop. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2005.
Pp. xviii + 316.
US$114.95. ISBN 0-7546-5312-9.

This volume, expertly translated by Francis Dunlop, should add to the growing reputation of the late Aurel Kolnai (1900-1973). Born in Budapest to a family of assimilated Jews, Kolnai was intellectually precocious; when only twenty he published an interesting, if highly speculative, psychoanalytic critique of communism. It was his countryman, Sándor Ferenczi, who had introduced him to what, for a few years, he regarded as a revolutionary new science of human behavior. His fascination with psychoanalysis was, however, short-lived, even though he took up residence in Freud's Vienna shortly before the collapse of Hungary's Soviet Republic of 1919.

Psychoanalysis disappointed Kolnai above all by its reductionist approach to ethics, and in 1922 he enrolled as a student of philosophy at the University of Vienna. By then he had developed an interest in phenomenology, particularly in the form given it by Max Scheler, who attempted to establish the objective and absolute character of ethical values without having to adopt Kant's formalism and thereby miss the richness and diversity of the concrete, content-filled, moral life. Although he eventually drifted into apostasy, Scheler was, when Kolnai discovered his work, a Roman Catholic; thanks to him, and to the writings of G. K. Chesterton, the Hungarian was baptized on the day in 1926 that he completed his university studies.

Although he had to eke out a living as a political journalist, Kolnai managed to publish his dissertation, *Ethical Value and Reality*, and an important essay on 'disgust' in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, before *Sexual Ethics*, in part a reply to Freud, appeared in 1930. While he rejected any slavish adherence to method, his approach was phenomenological in that he sought, by being responsive to objects, to discern essential values in human sexual experience. He did not disguise his Catholic belief, but neither did he attempt to support his arguments by appealing to divine revelation.

Kolnai begins *Sexual Ethics* with the matter-of-fact observation that human beings always and everywhere make value judgments concerning sexual conduct. They do so because they recognize the danger posed to individuals and communities by unrestrained sexual arousal. 'Unrestrained' is here the essential word; an enemy of puritanism, Kolnai believes sex to be both normal and good — as long as it remains subordinate to spiritual love and does not destroy the unity of personhood.

Kolnai does not believe that the claims he advances concerning sexual ethics represent mere subjective opinion or historical conditioning. Rejecting the exaggerations of cultural relativists, he argues for the universality of sexual ethical value experience — as opposed to the moral *rules* established by particular societies. 'Relativity,' rightly understood, 'means imperfectly or defectively grasped absoluteness, not meaninglessness, fantasy, or caprice' (24). The philosopher will find, he maintains, three central demands of sexual ethics: limitation, completeness, and compatibility.

The ethical person must, to begin with, shun perversions that subordinate a spiritual and well-ordered life to the dictatorship of an abnormal obsession. Among these perversions are self-gratification, sado-masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality. Kolnai has much to say about the latter that contradicts contemporary wisdom. To be sure, he believes a tendency to 'inversion' to be inborn, and he finds despicable those who harass or mistreat homosexuals. Nevertheless he insists that we cannot do away with objective norms because some group of people are naturally handicapped. And something more: the frame of mind underlying homosexuality 'is more likely to include the overthrow of the "constitution of the world"' (191). One thinks of the consciously subversive work of Michel Foucault.

Kolnai also has important things to say about incest, adultery, prostitution, and pre-marital sex. The latter he views as a relatively minor sin (or

ethical failing), though he points out that public indifference to it undermines the institution of marriage, and that it rarely leads to a more lasting relationship. His conclusion is that, from the standpoint of ethics, sex should be restricted to marriage between persons for whom sexual love is only a part — if an important part — of a deeper, more enduring, conjugal love.

The personal element in sexual activity is one of the requirements of Kolnai's second guiding principle, completeness. But the latter also entails the literal completion of the sex act, with an attendant awareness that procreation is, by nature, its ultimate goal, even when conception is impossible or blocked. Compatibility, the third principle, refers more specifically to the requirement that sex be subservient to and in keeping with the purposes and values of personal life.

Writing more than seventy years ago, Kolnai foresaw the challenges sexual ethics would confront in the future. He warns of homosexuality's 'proselytising intention' and dismisses feminist charges that holding women to a higher moral standard in matters of sex constitutes an unacceptable 'double standard.' Let us not forget, he observes, that men are held more blameworthy for cowardice, children are held to different standards than adults, and each social class has duties appropriate to itself. The sexual conduct of women is of greater social relevance because of their role in reproduction and because confidence in the nature of their sexual relations is the condition of establishing the fatherhood of their children. The aborting of children is, in Kolnai's view, a form of murder, 'quite apart from the self-violation the woman undergoes by annihilating the life unfolding in her womb' (266).

The argument, or rather the pronouncement, to the effect that changing times demand changes in sexual morality does not impress Kolnai. Sexual life, because it is closely linked to biology, is not 'historical' in the way that, say, political institutions are. Marriage must therefore ever be the ethically proper arena for sexual relations. It is testimony to Kolnai's unfailing reference to reality, however, that he acknowledges marriage's difficulties, its changing levels of feeling, even its wars. That is life as it is rather than as one might wish it to be. The good, he rightly concludes, is too often sacrificed — here as elsewhere — to utopian dreams of the perfect.

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Psychoanalysis disappointed Kolnai above all by its reductionist approach to ethics, and in 1922 he enrolled as a student of philosophy at the University of Vienna. By then he had developed an interest in phenomenology, particularly in the form given it by Max Scheler, who attempted to establish the objective and absolute character of ethical values without having to adopt Kant's formalism and thereby miss the richness and diversity of the concrete, content-filled, moral life. Although he eventually drifted into apostasy, Scheler was, when Kolnai discovered his work, a Roman Catholic; thanks to him, and to the writings of G. K. Chesterton, the Hungarian was baptized on the day in 1926 that he completed his university studies.

Although he had to eke out a living as a political journalist, Kolnai managed to publish his dissertation, *Ethical Value and Reality*, and an important essay on 'disgust' in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, before *Sexual Ethics*, in part a reply to Freud, appeared in 1930. While he rejected any slavish adherence to method, his approach was phenomenological in that he sought, by being responsive to objects, to discern essential values in human sexual experience. He did not disguise his Catholic belief, but neither did he attempt to support his arguments by appealing to divine revelation.

Kolnai begins *Sexual Ethics* with the matter-of-fact observation that human beings always and everywhere make value judgments concerning sexual conduct. They do so because they recognize the danger posed to individuals and communities by unrestrained sexual arousal. 'Unrestrained' is here the essential word; an enemy of puritanism, Kolnai believes sex to be both normal and good — as long as it remains subordinate to spiritual love and does not destroy the unity of personhood.

Kolnai does not believe that the claims he advances concerning sexual ethics represent mere subjective opinion or historical conditioning. Rejecting the exaggerations of cultural relativists, he argues for the universality of sexual ethical value experience — as opposed to the moral *rules* established by particular societies. 'Relativity,' rightly understood, 'means imperfectly or defectively grasped absoluteness, not meaninglessness, fantasy, or caprice' (24). The philosopher will find, he maintains, three central demands of sexual ethics: limitation, completeness, and compatibility.

The ethical person must, to begin with, shun perversions that subordinate a spiritual and well-ordered life to the dictatorship of an abnormal obsession. Among these perversions are self-gratification, sado-masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality. Kolnai has much to say about the latter that contradicts contemporary wisdom. To be sure, he believes a tendency to 'inversion' to be inborn, and he finds despicable those who harass or mistreat homosexuals. Nevertheless he insists that we cannot do away with objective norms because some group of people are naturally handicapped. And something more: the frame of mind underlying homosexuality 'is more likely to include the overthrow of the "constitution of the world"' (191). One thinks of the consciously subversive work of Michel Foucault.

Kolnai also has important things to say about incest, adultery, prostitution, and pre-marital sex. The latter he views as a relatively minor sin (or

ethical failing), though he points out that public indifference to it undermines the institution of marriage, and that it rarely leads to a more lasting relationship. His conclusion is that, from the standpoint of ethics, sex should be restricted to marriage between persons for whom sexual love is only a part — if an important part — of a deeper, more enduring, conjugal love.

The personal element in sexual activity is one of the requirements of Kolnai's second guiding principle, completeness. But the latter also entails the literal completion of the sex act, with an attendant awareness that procreation is, by nature, its ultimate goal, even when conception is impossible or blocked. Compatibility, the third principle, refers more specifically to the requirement that sex be subservient to and in keeping with the purposes and values of personal life.

Writing more than seventy years ago, Kolnai foresaw the challenges sexual ethics would confront in the future. He warns of homosexuality's 'proselytising intention' and dismisses feminist charges that holding women to a higher moral standard in matters of sex constitutes an unacceptable 'double standard.' Let us not forget, he observes, that men are held more blameworthy for cowardice, children are held to different standards than adults, and each social class has duties appropriate to itself. The sexual conduct of women is of greater social relevance because of their role in reproduction and because confidence in the nature of their sexual relations is the condition of establishing the fatherhood of their children. The aborting of children is, in Kolnai's view, a form of murder, 'quite apart from the self-violation the woman undergoes by annihilating the life unfolding in her womb' (266).

The argument, or rather the pronouncement, to the effect that changing times demand changes in sexual morality does not impress Kolnai. Sexual life, because it is closely linked to biology, is not 'historical' in the way that, say, political institutions are. Marriage must therefore ever be the ethically proper arena for sexual relations. It is testimony to Kolnai's unfailing reference to reality, however, that he acknowledges marriage's difficulties, its changing levels of feeling, even its wars. That is life as it is rather than as one might wish it to be. The good, he rightly concludes, is too often sacrificed — here as elsewhere — to utopian dreams of the perfect.

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Dominic McIver Lopes
Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 210; 17 figs.
Cdn$87.00/US$55.00. ISBN 0-19-927734-6.

The evaluation of artworks, and the evaluation of pictures in particular, has been rather neglected in recent years. Recently, however, more philosophers have been turning their attention to the question of evaluation, which, after all, lies at the heart of aesthetics. Several philosophers have argued that the evaluation of artworks has something to do with the contribution they make to knowledge. Others have held that the moral evaluation of artworks has implications for their aesthetic evaluation. Despite recent progress, the relationship between cognitive value, moral value and aesthetic value is still imperfectly understood. In this book Lopes offers an interesting and original theory about how cognitive and moral evaluation interact with the aesthetic evaluation of pictures. Although Lopes restricts his attention to the evaluation of pictures, his approach could profitably be extended to the evaluations of other sorts of artworks.

Chapter 1 begins by considering what Lopes calls the puzzle of mimesis — the question of how viewers can be moved by, or otherwise appreciate, a picture of something that would not itself move them. We appreciate, for example, van Gogh's painting of old shoes, but 'looking at old shoes is not moving' (23). (I am not sure that this is always true. One might be very moved by seeing the broken-down shoes that a poor person, a child perhaps, is forced to wear. One might also find it moving to see the primitive climbing shoes that Edmund Hilary wore up Everest.) As a partial solution to the puzzle, Lopes proposes that pictures can 'reveal facets of their subjects not revealed by seeing them face to face' (24). Pictures can 'extend and elaborate recognition' (47).

In Chapter 2 Lopes examines how pictures express 'the emotions, feelings, and mood the [represented] scenes express' (49). Lopes distinguishes between figure expression, the sort of expression found in depictions of people, and scene expression, the sort found in depictions of solely non-human subjects. Lopes draws upon the contour theory of expression, developed by Peter Kivy to account for expression in music. In simple terms, as extended to pictures, the contour theory states that 'a pictorial design, a depicted figure, or a depicted scene expresses E if and only if it is an expression-look of E' (71). An 'expression look is a physical configuration that has the function ... of indicating an emotion' (73). The contour theory does not explain what makes a picture look, say, sad. It just says that a sad picture has a look that has the function of expressing sadness. Lopes recognises this and makes a number of helpful suggestions about how certain physical configurations of pictures can have the function of expressing given emotions.

The central argument of the book begins in Chapter 3. When we are engaged in the aesthetic evaluation of pictures we are evaluating them as

presenters of scenes. This does not, however, distinguish aesthetic evaluation from non-aesthetic evaluation. According to Lopes there are cognitive and moral evaluations of pictures as presenters of scenes that are not aesthetic evaluations. Consider Picasso's *Guernica*. One might evaluate the painting and conclude that it conveys the knowledge that the bombing of Guernica was a terrible crime. A journalistic report of the bombing could convey the same knowledge. Lopes invites us to believe that an evaluation of the journalism that comes to this conclusion is not an aesthetic evaluation. So an evaluation of the painting as having cognitive value is not an aesthetic evaluation. (I believe that this argument is flawed because the painting and the piece of journalism contribute to knowledge in different ways. An experience of the painting is worth having — and so it is an aesthetic object. It is worth having, in part, because it contributes to knowledge. Nothing about the experience of the piece of journalism helps it contribute to knowledge.) While a cognitive evaluation of a picture is not an aesthetic evaluation, it can imply one. (This is what leads Lopes to characterize his position as 'interactionist'.)

In order to distinguish aesthetic and non-aesthetic evaluations, Lopes offers an account of aesthetic evaluation. He calls it the internalist conjecture. (The conjecture is internalist in that 'experience is part of aesthetic evaluation' (103).)

> (IC) An evaluation, R, of [picture] P as [having property] F is an aesthetic evaluation if and only if, were R accurate, (1) being F would be a (de)merit in P, all else being equal; (2) a suitable observer's experience, E, of P as F is partly constitutive of (1); and (3) R is an experience with the same content as E or R is a representation warranted by E (107).

Consider an example of an aesthetic evaluation. Suppose I experience some picture as serene. If my experience is accurate, then serenity is a merit in the picture. Part of what makes serenity a merit in the picture is the experience of a suitable observer. That is, serenity is a merit of the picture partly because a suitable observer finds experience of serenity to be valuable. Finally, my experience of the picture has the same content as the experience of the suitable observer. Lopes maintains that the experience of a suitable observer is only partly constitutive of the goodness of aesthetic properties. This is so that it is possible to distinguish aesthetic and hedonic evaluations. Consider a hedonic evaluation of a chocolate as delicious. Here the deliciousness of the chocolate is wholly owing to the experience of an observer.

Chapter 4 argues that, although cognitive evaluations are not aesthetic evaluations, they can imply them. Lopes first maintains that pictures have cognitive value in that they enhance viewers' cognitive capacity. In particular, they boost viewers' capacity for accurate seeing. Lopes then offers the 'step-up argument'. He takes the judgement that Dorothea Lange's photograph, *Migrant Mother*, is 'true to life' and so boosts the capacity for accurate seeing, as an example of a cognitive judgement with aesthetic implications.

Lopes holds that this cognitive evaluation is an aesthetic evaluation if and only if three conditions are met. For a start, the property of being true to life must be a merit in the photograph. Next, 'a suitable observer's experience of the picture as true to life must be part of what makes being true to life a merit in the picture'. Finally, 'a suitable observer's experience must warrant the judgement' that *Migrant Mother* is true to life (152). As a matter of fact, Lopes writes, '*Migrant Mother* is true to life because it boosts accurate seeing'. As well, suitable observers see it as 'making a contribution to a capacity for accurate seeing'. Now, since it boosts accurate seeing, the picture has 'ground level' cognitive merit. The judgement that it has ground level cognitive value is not an aesthetic judgement. However, part of what makes being true to life a cognitive merit in *Migrant Mother* is that 'it is experienced as true to life by a suitable observer' (153). Consequently, it has 'step-up cognitive merit'. Since a merit of the picture depends, in part, on its being experienced as possessing the merit, an attribution of step-up value to the picture is an attribution of aesthetic value.

In Chapter 5, Lopes offers another step-up argument to show that moral evaluations can imply aesthetic evaluations. He argues, using illustrations of from various editions of Dante's *Inferno* as examples, that pictures can contribute to our capacity for moral sensibility. They do so he says by enhancing our 'repertoire of moral concepts' (180). He can then use a version of the step-up argument to hold that moral evaluations of pictures are aesthetic evaluations. The version of the step-up argument given here is very compact. Lopes holds that 'if part of the boost to moral sensibility [provided by experience of some picture] comes from a suitable observer's experience of the boost as a merit', then a moral evaluation of the picture is an aesthetic evaluation. Lopes holds that having enhanced moral sensibilities is one good thing. Experiencing that one has enhanced moral sensibilities is another good thing. And this second good thing provides the step-up merit. 'Attributions of step-up merit,' Lopes maintains, ' ... are aesthetic evaluations' (181). I am sceptical about the claim that all pictures with step-up value have aesthetic value. Suppose I am looking at a diagram of the solar system and it boosts my capacity for scientific thinking. The diagram then has ground-level cognitive value. Now suppose that I further recognise that the diagram is responsible for the boost in my scientific acumen. The diagram then has step-up cognitive merit. It seems implausible, however, to suggest that it has any aesthetic value. Interactionism is not the key to showing that cognitivism is correct. We need some sort of direct aesthetic cognitivism that recognises that certain cognitive evaluations simply are aesthetic evaluations.

Despite this misgiving, there is no doubt that this book is a major contribution to the literature in philosophy of art and that it should be in every college and university library.

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Elijah Millgram
Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation of Moral Theory.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. x + 344.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83943-2);
US$27.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54826-8).

This is a collection of eleven essays (nine previously published) covering a broad range of topics in value theory, united by a relation to practical reasoning. Millgram's approach is refreshing, his work imaginative, and his conclusions challenging.

Millgram professes the modest hope that the essays, along with an introduction that includes some reading instructions, will demonstrate that theories of practical reasoning are foundational in moral theory on the grounds that the big three moral systems (utilitarian or consequentialist, Kantian or deontological, Aristotelian or virtue-centred) make substantive commitments to conceptions of practical reasoning that deeply influence the forms those systems take and the standard problems that afflict them. More ambitiously, he defends the claim that his 'Method of Practical Reasoning' provides a new and improved way of evaluating moral theories. The method begins by canvassing the possibilities for theories of practical reasoning, then pairs theories of practical reasoning with the moral theories to which they give rise, and then, without appeal to any substantive moral theory, identifies the correct theory of practical reasoning. The moral theory that presupposes the correct theory of practical reasoning is the correct one; competing moral theories presupposing mistaken theories of practical reasoning are mistaken (4).

Moral philosophy is in need of this new method because the alternative (a wide reflective equilibrium procedure), which tests moral theories by revising or abandoning them when their outputs are unappealing, is really a form of intellectual dishonesty. Millgram's method is an apt substitute, he claims, because it begs no questions, leaves open the possibility that we have been 'completely mistaken in our ethics' (10), and may be forced to 'reconsider and revise our understanding of what a moral theory looks like, and what it does' (27). Indeed, he argues, innovation in morality is needed as the 'moralities we have been living by perform erratically at best, dismayingly at worst' (27).

Millgram's modest aim of demonstrating the fundamental role of theories of practical reasoning in moral systems is skillfully met. His more ambitious aim of advancing his Method of Practical Reasoning as a distinct and superior procedure by which to analyze and select moral theories is not fully met, although it is advanced on a number of interesting fronts and poses real challenges for competing views. Given the magnitude of the proposal it is not surprising that the introductory essay doesn't do what it sets out to do. Still, the individual essays in the volume are, in every case, rewarding reading.

Two chapters focus on utilitarianism. Millgram argues that this family of theories fails because of its foundational commitment to instrumentalism about practical reason. The argument of 'What's the Use of Utility?' claims that phenomenal utility is not a goal of action and that utility is not the sole bearer of value. Rather, utility functions as an indicator of value, to provide an agent with information about how well she is doing (39), and to trigger readjustment of her preferences and desires (46). 'Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility' is an interesting, primarily exegetical essay, tracing the problems in Mill's argument to an incoherence in instrumentalism. In his introductory essay Millgram tells us that he no longer stands by the interpretation of Mill's argument advanced in 'Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility' (it turns out that some of Mill's correspondence contradicts his interpretation). Still the essay is rich in detail, attentive to Mill's commitments as an empiricist, and serves Millgram's strategy of tracing the problems in particular moral theories to their presumptive theories of practical reasoning.

Millgram takes on the Kantians in 'Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction in the Will?', raising worries about the defeasibility of moral rules (practical inferences). Specifically, he challenges the coherence of the first formulation of the categorical imperative (as interpreted by Herman, Korsgaard, and O'Neill), arguing that it is self-refuting because the universality it demands cannot itself be rationally willed. Rational willing seems to require that moral rules admit of exceptions from time to time.

The three essays on Hume include one previously unpublished, 'Hume, Political Noncognitivism, and the *History of England*', which expands on his account of Hume as a nihilist about practical reasoning (as argued for in the two other pieces) and attempts to answer the question of how a nihilist could go on to advance the sort of moral and political argument Hume advanced in the *History of England*. Hume faces a standard objection to noncognitivism, that it is unable to account for the seeming truth-aptness of moral and political argument. However, Millgram suggests, there is in reality very little genuine argument about politics or morality, and it isn't an objection to noncognitivism that it can't account for the seeming cognitive nature of political discourse if there is little genuine discourse of that sort to be had. The evidence for this claim includes not only barroom political discussion but also 'much of what passes for academic writing both in political theory and political philosophy' (253). Here Millgram doesn't put the problem he will go on to analyze clearly enough, and too much that is germane to the problem for noncognitivism is buried in the footnotes. This weakens Millgram's provocative claim that 'Political Noncognitivism is the correct account of much of our political discourse', a claim he nonetheless finds deeply troubling in practical terms (254).

In the other previously unpublished essay in the book, 'Reasonably Virtuous', Millgram proposes that virtue should be thought of as 'what a person has to be like if he is to be a master of the inference patterns that rationally reconstruct practical reason properly performed — whatever those turn out to be' (138). This is a radical proposal and as a suggestion for further analysis

is an interesting thesis, for which no adequate argument is given. To be fair, Millgram is careful to note that he does not argue for a conclusion but instead advances a proposal (156). Still, as a case study for his Method of Practical Reasoning, this essay fails to show that analysis of practical reason, divorced from any conception of value, can serve as the method to assess and select a correct moral theory. In the course of canvassing the conceptions of virtue arising from a variety of theories of practical reasoning, Millgram claims, for example, that Kantian virtue will be 'geeky' which, although in itself not a problem, is a problem for Kantian theory insofar as it promotes geekhood to an extent that cannot be rationally willed. It could not be rationally willed that everyone be a geek because human personality would be uniform and autonomy would be undermined by a lack of 'incompatible personality traits' (145). But here the homogeneity that turns out to be the problem seems to be assumed from the start. Why suppose that the theory would require a single version of 'what a person has to be like' as a master of inference patterns? Millgram's more general expression of his thesis is that an account of virtue should serve as a reality check for theories of practical reason. However, in order for this to be a useful proposal to consider, the details would need to be worked out much more fully and carefully.

This collection also includes two essays dealing with the problem of commensurability which challenge the presupposition of instrumentalism that values are commensurable, and argue that commensurability is a product of practical reasoning rather than a datum met with by practical reasoning. Indeed Millgram argues that 'full commensurability is not even an ideal that successful practical deliberation will approach' (25). In these essays, Millgram expresses a healthy (if perhaps occasionally exaggerated) suspicion of 'values' which, he argues, have little explanatory power of their own.

Millgram's work is consistently interesting and challenging, although a bit cute in places (as when he quips that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is 'sometimes called the Goldilocks theory of virtue') (136). Although I suggest that the essays in this collection do not come together entirely successfully to fulfill his ambitious project, the ideas in this book are broad-ranging and provocative, the essays are stylistically varied (some historically focused, some quite speculative) and the collection is well worth reading.

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Richard D. Mohr
The Long Arc of Justice: Lesbian and Gay Marriage, Equality, and Rights.
New York: Columbia University Press 2005.
Pp. 143.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-231-50944-8.

To appreciate the current state of gay rights in the United States, it is helpful to think about how far gays (by which I mean both lesbians and gay men) have come since 1994, when Richard Mohr's last book about gay rights appeared. Since then, two legal developments and a larger cultural shift stand out as especially important.

As for law, the first development was the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*, which decriminalized sodomy. As criminal sodomy laws had long hindered the cause of gay justice, a term Mohr uses to frame the issue, the Court's decision was nothing short of monumental. Indeed, it quickly led to other legal and political developments outside criminal law, in particular paving the way for the other significant legal development, same-sex marriage. Since 1994, same-sex marriage has gone from being a long-term political aspiration to a political reality, as one state, Massachusetts, already recognizes same-sex marriages and other states seem likely to follow suit in the coming years.

On the cultural level, the last twelve years have seen a seismic shift in cultural attitudes about homosexuality. In that time we have seen an increase in positive portrayals of gays in television and film (e.g., *Ellen*, *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy*, *Will & Grace*, *Philadelphia*, and *Brokeback Mountain*); an emergence of cultural trends whereby straights appropriate gay culture ('metrosexuality' and the short-lived 'gay-vague' fad); and the creation of 'the gay market', a coveted niche market for advertisers and marketers.

So begins *The Long Arc of Justice*. For Mohr, such progress marks a turning point in gay history. As the homosexuality taboo is at its end, gays are beginning the downward descent toward justice. Though he recognizes that lesbians, gay men, and their supporters have come a long way in a short time, Mohr does not regard the book as a tribute to past accomplishments. To the contrary, the book looks to the future, setting its sights on the last leg of 'the course along the moral arc of the universe to justice' (1). Mohr invites us to think critically about what it will take for gays to win justice. Interestingly, his intent is not to mobilize gays and their allies, nor is it to make the case for gay justice in the hope of bringing around staunch opponents of gay rights. Rather than provoking either extreme of the cultural divide, Mohr directs his arguments to the middle: 'The book is intended as a handshake of greeting from gay experience to the hearts and minds of mainstream America' (8). A gay ambassador of sorts, Mohr seeks to convince 'mainstream' Americans that when the moral — and to a large extent legal — principles they hold dear are applied to lesbian and gay social policy, these principles

tip the scales toward justice. In his words, 'the book aims at filling the gaps and enhancing the quality of argumentation in society's thinking on policy issues affecting America's lesbian and gay citizens' (8).

To do this, Mohr zeroes in on six areas wherein the work of gay justice must be done — the lesbian and gay basics, sexual privacy, same-sex marriage, equality in the public sphere, civil rights, and the special case of the military — and he dedicates a chapter to each area. Mohr's chapter on 'lesbian and gay basics' should be familiar, as it is an updated version of an essay Mohr previously published. In it, Mohr challenges some of the more entrenched stereotypes about gays (e.g., gays are immoral, even willfully so) and responds, swiftly and cogently, to some of the persistent arguments raised against gay rights, such as the slippery slope claim that recognizing gay rights will lead to 'the destruction of civilization itself' (31).

Taking up sexual privacy, Mohr begins and ends with the Supreme Court's opinion in *Lawrence v. Texas*. For Mohr, *Lawrence* is a double-edged sword. On one hand, *Lawrence* is both 'an important moment in the discussion of lesbian and gay issues in America' and a 'national symbol of change on [gay] issues' (38). On the other hand, *Lawrence* is weak in its articulation of the source and content of the now-constitutionally protected right to sexual privacy. In his words, *Lawrence* is 'an inadequate and intellectually puny decision' (45). The problem with *Lawrence*, according to Mohr, is that the Court does not fully grasp the relationship between sexual acts and privacy. Whereas the Court portrays sexuality as a constitutive part of lasting human relationships, Mohr argues that the Court could have grounded the sexual privacy right in a number of existing moral arguments that justify fitting consensual sexual acts within privacy rights. Perhaps his most interesting argument — which also happens to be the one least likely to make it into the Court's jurisprudence — is that a conception of privacy is inherent in sex acts. As sex acts are 'world-excluding', suspended in time and place and separate from the rest of the world; they are inherently private (43-4).

Mohr next tackles same-sex marriage. What makes his discussion especially valuable is that rather than simply arguing that gays should be granted the right to marry, Mohr attempts a more meaningful project, namely, giving content to the definition of marriage. Not satisfied with the current legal definition of 'the legal union of one man and one woman', Mohr argues that marriage is the 'development and maintenance of intimacy through the medium of everyday life' (61). Put poetically, it is the 'fused intersection of love's sanctity and necessity's demand' (61). For Mohr, marriage is not a stamped piece of paper; it is a union of two people, not unlike a common law marriage, which develops over time through the processes of living day-to-day life together. Besides teasing out this definition, Mohr's marriage discussion also has a radical streak. He argues that recognizing same-sex marriage will provide models 'for rethinking and improving family life' (68). It is debatable whether mainstream America is ready to have a conversation about the potential benefits of 'queering' family life, nor does it seem likely that Mr. and Mrs. Mainstream America are going to feel as good about

same-sex marriage when they find out that it will help us to see that 'monogamy is not an essential component of love and marriage' (69). But the ideas are worth taking seriously, even if Mohr's stated audience may not think so.

The remaining three chapters deal with issues of equality — constitutional equality, civil rights laws, and the military under the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' rule. All three hover around two main points. The first is that inequality is a strike against gay dignity. Throughout his career, Mohr has consistently argued that gays are morally entitled to equal dignity and full personhood. Driven by this moral principle, Mohr makes the case, for instance, that gay inequality should violate the Constitution when a law 'draws on or enhances society's perception that one of the groups is worthy of less moral regard than the other' (88). Yet even if you accept this as a legal matter — which is problematic because it opens the door for potentially limitless classes of new constitutional infirmities — it is hard to understand why Mohr spends so much time discussing the indignity of anti-gay slurs. How, one wonders, does a thorough analysis of the word 'cocksucker' get us (or mainstream America) to the point where we can determine what constitutional issues are raised when a public school teacher loses her job for telling her students she is gay?

The second main theme of the equality chapters is that gays suffer a unique harm because they are an invisible minority. Because homosexuality is not detectable in the same way race or sex is, many gays pass as straight in order to avoid discrimination, and not just in the military. Mohr shows how the closet conceals more than gay identity; it also masks the realities of gay discrimination, concealing the extent to which gays suffer indignities on a daily basis. Once again, however, Mohr does his arguments injustice by veering off course. His point about gay invisibility, while immensely valuable, leads him to the curious argument that because we have yet to pass gay civil rights laws, gays are 'blackmailed by our judicial system' because they must be open about their sexuality in order to avail themselves of its protections (101). His example: a gay person who is 'queerbashed' will likely choose not to testify against his attackers in court if he fears his boss will turn around and fire him for being gay. Even if true, this whole line of inquiry calls attention away from his substantial arguments articulating a moral basis for gay civil rights protections.

This book is compelling; it is filled with artfully turned phrases and has an engaging quirkiness all its own — including a space alien anthropologist who makes an appearance in the chapter on sexual privacy. Even if Mohr occasionally goes too far, his arguments are serious and they demand attention.

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Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and
William H. Brenner, eds.
Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005.
Pp. xiii + 334.
US$99.00. ISBN 1-4039-4449-0.

This is the first collection of essays ever published on Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* — his 'third masterpiece', by the editors' reckoning (the other two being, of course, *Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*). Its publication attests to a recent surge of interest in Wittgenstein's last work, which it seeks to promote and consolidate. Wittgenstein's text comprises notes written in the last year and a half of his life and largely in response to Moore's defence of common sense. The material, left unrevised and not intended for publication, is as rough as it is brilliant. The articles gathered in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner's collection are written by Wittgenstein scholars and epistemologists, and aim to enhance our understanding of this difficult text by advancing a range of possible, and often competing, interpretations.

The editors have helpfully divided those contributions into four sections: 'Framework reading' explores foundational and grammatical interpretations (Stroll, Williams, Schulte, Moyal-Sharrock); 'Transcendental reading' explores neo-Kantian and neo-Realist interpretations (Mounce, Brenner, Rudd); 'Epistemic reading' examines epistemic and non-espistemic construals of the notion of certainty (Morawetz, Pritchard, Kober); and finally, 'Therapeutic reading' advances an anti-theoretical interpretation of the text, in line with the 'New Wittgenstein' agenda (Minar, Crary, Read). These four sections are preceded by a highly personal contribution from D. Z. Phillips, who in a series of 'unbroken reflections' (16), and under the heavy influence of Rush Rhees, aims to isolate Wittgenstein's main concern in *On Certainty*. I will briefly concentrate on two important issues discussed in the book: Was Wittgenstein a foundationalist? Was Wittgenstein a realist?

In 'Why *On Certainty* matters', Stroll tries to show that in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein indeed advances a novel and non-standard form of foundationalism. Like other commentators, he seizes on the recurrence of foundationalist talk and imagery in the text: 'the hinges on which the doors turn', 'the rock bottom of our convictions', 'that which stands fast for me and many others', etc. Stroll's core claim is that, in what amounts to a significant departure from previous mature work, Wittgenstein now thinks of 'the language game' as having foundations that 'stand *outside of* and yet *support*' it (34). Stroll then marshals further textual evidence, in particular section 111, to suggest that Wittgenstein identifies certainty with what is foundational. (There is much else in Stroll's paper, including an attempt to explain the kind of aberration involved in doubting human certainties in terms of what he dubs 'negational absurdity'.)

Michael Williams takes issue with the foundationalist reading of *On Certainty* championed by Stroll (and others). In 'Why Wittgenstein Isn't a Foundationalist', he identifies four characteristic features of foundationalism, and claims that for Wittgenstein what is objectively certain has none of them. The features in question are 1) universality: the foundations of knowledge are the same for everyone; 2) specifiability: the line between foundational and non-foundational beliefs can be clearly demarcated; 3) independence: the foundational beliefs are epistemically and semantically autonomous from the non-foundational beliefs they support; and finally, 4) rational adequacy: there is a tight logical connection between foundational and non-foundational beliefs which can provide resolution for clashes among non-foundational beliefs.

I think that Williams is on solid ground here, particularly with respect to 3). Perhaps Stroll can accommodate these points by insisting that Wittgenstein's brand of foundationalism is *very* non-standard. But I, for one, begin to wonder what is to be gained by persisting with the label. There is, to be sure, plenty of foundational language in *On Certainty*. But there is also plenty of *coherentist* language, which Stroll does not consider (cf. Schulte's essay). More importantly, still, it is unclear whether the points Wittgenstein wishes to make with regard to those propositions and judgements that stand fast for us in fact *require* the use of foundational language. Certainly, if as Stroll claims, 'Wittgenstein's main thesis [is] that what stands fast is not subject to justification, proof, the adducing of evidence or doubt and is neither true nor false' (34), then it is plausible to think that Wittgenstein could in principle have dispensed with *both* foundational and coherentist language.

Was Wittgenstein a realist? As Mounce characterises it in 'Wittgenstein and Classical Realism', the realist/anti-realist dispute centres on whether the world imposes order on the mind (realists), or whether instead the mind imposes order on the world (anti-realists). It is widely held that Wittgenstein did not so much attempt to solve the dispute as to *dissolve* it, finding it ripe with philosophical confusion. Mounce disagrees with this orthodoxy, and attempts to show that Wittgenstein's work, including *On Certainty*, bears significant connections with classical realism. Wittgenstein commentators often reduce the realist/anti-realist dispute to the following dilemma: either we can transcend language and ground it in the world or our language is wholly autonomous. Mounce rejects the dilemma as spurious, finding a third possibility: 'that language develops *through* our interrelations with an independent world' (106). It is this latter possibility that he takes Wittgenstein to embrace and to make him a classical realist of sorts.

Undoubtedly, Wittgenstein would not have denied the existence of an independent world, but that, I take it, is not enough to make him a realist in the intended sense. For Mounce, I think, what warrants the applicability of the label is the particular nature Wittgenstein ascribed to the 'interrelations' grounding the sense of our language. Those interrelations typically involve activities, ones that are not primarily linguistic. But even in this sense, I wonder whether the comparison with classical realism is really apposite. For

it seems to me to pay insufficient respect to the centrality of the notion of the autonomy of grammar in Wittgenstein's later thinking — a notion that is, in any event, wholly anathema to the sort of classical realism one might attribute to Plato and Aristotle. In his contribution, 'Wittgenstein's "Kantian solution"', Brenner takes issue with Mounce's interpretation, developing instead a Kantian reading of Wittgenstein's mature work. Brenner does not disagree with Mounce on the grounding role of human activity, but tries to show that the grounding in question cannot be understood on the model of a truth-making relation of correspondence, and rightly emphasizes precisely the sense in which for Wittgenstein our concepts cannot be justified by reference to an independent reality.

Overall, this collection of essays is excellent, and Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner ought to be commended for their work in putting it together, as well as for writing a very helpful introduction (they also contribute an article each).

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Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak
Philosophy Between Faith and Theology: Addresses to Catholic Intellectuals.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 2005.
Pp. xiv + 216.
US$46.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-03886-4);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-03887-2).

Philosophy will never be the same. At least, that's how Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak would have it. He invites philosophers, theologians, indeed all of academia to a renewal of philosophy by recalling what it was all about in the first place: a reflective, even contemplative, understanding of what interests us most: life. The philosopher lives before he philosophizes, and he philosophizes about life. Consequently, philosophy can never be the activity or product of an autonomous and universal reason as proposed by philosophers of the modern era.

Every philosopher's life with its concrete culture, intellectual tradition, and goals conditions his questions, hypotheses, and methods for seeking answers. But every philosopher also has a faith, by which Peperzak means 'a basic orientation and conviction' regarding the overall meaning of his or her life (36). Christians, Buddhists, atheists, agnostics, Hegelian philoso-

phers, all *as such* have a 'faith'. As a conviction, this faith involves trust, a self-giving or submission to some authority. (Again, reason is not autonomous.) As an orientation, faith implies a person's movement in accord with his belief (i.e., a 'spirituality'), which also takes concrete form in his life (as a 'religion'). Peperzak's book aims to illustrate this 'inseparability between experience, faith, spirituality, philosophy, and theology' (205). He also offers examples of how a philosophy conscious of its faith might still strive for the ideal of universally valid truth on such topics as freedom and ontotheology, thereby simultaneously maintaining and refreshing the philosophical tradition.

Peperzak holds that the key for this renewal in the Western tradition is development of our appreciation for the significance of personhood. Given the radical importance of our faith for our lives, philosophy would be enriched by a more conscious cooperation with faith even as philosophy's illusory autonomy were humbled by faith's trust in an Other. This trust establishes the philosopher in a dialogue with the Other, the fruit of which is shared with still others via the dialogue of speech and writing. The experienced intersubjectivity of the philosopher's faith and his philosophizing, his being addressed and his addressing within a tradition and a community, should set philosophy free from the impossible dream of autonomy, making it again relevant to life as it is lived, i.e., in relation to other people and to the ultimate desire that draws us beyond the disappointments of all lesser desiderata.

By Peperzak's provocative integration, philosophers are called to responsible acknowledgement of both unconsciously held biases and dearly held beliefs. His aim is not that they do away with them all — an impossible task and even the opposite of what he seeks — but that philosophy be reinvigorated through reacquaintance with life as its inspiration and the realm of its significance. Peperzak challenges the idea of philosophy as a faithless activity of reason, arguing this image itself expresses a particular faith (in reason's autonomy), which, as such, need not be held by others. He also examines the difference between philosophy as a religion and philosophy of religion; the common ground philosophy and faith share in wonder; the philosophy of salvation; and the different implications for theology if reason is seen as autonomous or as dialogical. Peperzak closes with the intentionally provocative invitation to renew philosophy by resituating it in a dialogue with faith, as necessary to respect philosophy not only as a speaking about, but also a speaking to.

Although Peperzak addresses his book to Catholic intellectuals, a far-wider audience can appreciate it. Philosophers who consciously profess any faith will be encouraged to overcome any dualism in their thinking, while those who claim their most basic life convictions are irrelevant (or almost so) to their philosophy will be tickled or irritated into reexamining their claim.

Taken with Peperzak's thesis, however, his subtitle suggests that there is something particularly Catholic about his approach or that his conclusions represent the sort of integration of philosophy and faith (Catholic, in this case) he advocates. I am still considering what it might be. For example, does

his suggestion that all 'faiths' converge on the same truth and the same salvation (81, 128) do justice to his own faith's profession of Jesus Christ as the unique savior? I am also not sure that the 'relativity' Peperzak advocates (e.g., 81) always escapes being the relativism rejected by Catholicism. Again, by raising faith to the generic level, does Peperzak overlook faith's differing significance in different religions (and 'religions') to the point of equivocation?

Peperzak wants to avoid any 'dogmatic exclusivism' (19; see also 84), which is consistent with his preference for affective responses (e.g., 63), his cautions about doctrinal (i.e., propositional or theoretical) expressions of faith, and his assertion that philosophy cannot prove the truth of Christianity, or vice versa (51; see also 192-3). But these positions raise questions for his own methodology and conclusions: How can a person philosophize conscious of his faith, unless he is both conscious of the dogmas of his faith and holds them to be true, thereby excluding others? How can a philosophy — particularly a phenomenology — reflect upon the universal characteristics of God's speaking in different religions without a judgement that it is true God is speaking in these cases (182, 192-3)? The validity of inductive judgement depends upon the accurate grouping of the examples considered.

Finally, does describing philosophy as *fides quaerens intellectum* (84, inter al.) leave a place for theology? And does describing theology as the philosophy of a theistic faith (74, 84) do it justice? Wouldn't all the philosophy of theists who are conscious of their faith be exactly such a philosophy without yet necessarily being theology? Do both descriptions then merely transpose the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, without touching it in substance?

These questions merely suggest the challenge of the topic, the originality of Peperzak's proposals, and some of its potentiality for furthering discussion. A more immediate and profound apprehension of Peperzak's ideas might have been served by a greater integration of his key themes, which are often introduced as if for the first time in successive essays, and each time with different nuances, but Peperzak's provocation is worth the patience.

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Robert B. Pippin
The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. viii + 369.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-84858-X);
US$28.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-61304-3).

Robert Pippin's latest book is a collection of fourteen essays, much like his *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations* (1997). The new book continues the project developed in that earlier collection and other of his works, notably *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture* (1991, 1999). Pippin advocates a Hegelian conception of the modern condition as one in which socially situated, reflective, self-determining subjects can flourish. This position is for the most part articulated in *The Persistence of Subjectivity* by means of a critique of various anti-modernist philosophers. A direct defence of the Hegelian stance Pippin adopts is only adumbrated here; we are directed (often) to both earlier and forthcoming works for the fuller story. The sense that what Pippin provides is but part of a larger project is best conveyed by the suggestion (more modestly expressed by him) that the book can be seen as a set of contributions towards 'an extended *Phenomenology of Spirit*' (23).

Nearly everything in the book has been or is due to be published elsewhere, so some items will already be familiar to readers. But various chapters have only appeared in rather out-of-the-way places or in other languages, and many have been revised. The only entirely new piece (other than the helpful 'Introduction') is the fifteen-page 'Postscript' to the chapter on McDowell. (One omission from the details given in 'Acknowledgments' [vii-viii]: a version of the chapter on Heidegger is due to appear in a forthcoming collection edited by Crowell and Malpas, *Heidegger and Transcendental Philosophy*.)

The essays are presented in four parts. Part 1, 'Setting', has just one chapter, 'The Kantian Aftermath'. This describes how Hegel's historical phenomenology continues and improves upon Kant's transcendental critique in its attention to 'the normative dimension of thought and action' (53). Pippin also makes some interesting comments on other contemporary commentators, notably Frederick Beiser. Part 2, 'Theorists', is the most substantial, amounting to half the book, and of most general interest. It contains seven chapters, the first five of which address philosophical critics of the 'bourgeois', modernist position Pippin defends: Heidegger, Gadamer, Adorno, Strauss and Arendt. The final two chapters engage with two contemporary philosophers with whom Pippin has nuanced differences: Frank and McDowell.

In the essay on Heidegger, Pippin argues that the 'analytic of Dasein' should not be interpreted as a transcendental enterprise. First, there is nothing like a 'transcendental deduction' in *Being and Time*. Second, Heideg-

ger is just as much concerned with the ways conditions of intelligibility *fail* (in contrast to the Kantian tradition) as with the ways they succeed. As a result, Heidegger is placed closer to Hegel, as both focus attention on breakdowns of experience-enabling conditions. With Hegel, though, these breakdowns are themselves interpretable and reintegratable.

The *Auseinandersetzung* between Heideggerian hermeneutics and Hegelian idealism is continued in the following chapter, in which Pippin examines Gadamer's oscillation between 'invocation of and separation from' Hegel (91). Gadamer's objection to Hegelian 'subjectivism' is said to be based on a traditional, metaphysical view of Hegel which disregards the emphasis on normative autonomy of interest to Pippin. Not only can Hegel shrug off Gadamer's objections, he can in turn illuminate what is unsatisfactory in the latter's version of hermeneutics.

In the next chapter, Pippin shows that Adorno, like Gadamer, is in the grip of a 'distorted (if conventional) picture' of the German idealist tradition (101), though in this instance it is Kant who is central. Pippin demonstrates how getting Kant right enables us to scale-down and frame more accurately Adorno's diagnoses and thereby see how the problems involved can be resolved with Hegel's help. This is a particularly effective discussion, not otherwise available in English.

The pieces on Leo Strauss and Hannah Arendt are less successful, perhaps because they drift away from the focus on subjectivity and idealism, and maybe also because the thinkers involved are less substantial. Strauss is taken to task for his anti-modern conception of natural right, Arendt for her anti-bourgeois account of the origins of totalitarian evil.

Pippin then considers Manfred Frank's recent defence of subjectivity against structuralist and 'neostructuralist' critiques. Pippin largely concurs with Frank, but feels that Frank inclines too much to a 'romantic' conception of that which he is defending, when it is the idealist tradition that provides the best resources. A similar tack is taken in the chapter on John McDowell. Pippin finds much to agree with, but is unhappy for various reasons with McDowell's naturalism (however 'relaxed' this is meant to be). This piece will already be familiar to those interested in the debates around *Mind and World*, but here it is combined with a new 'Postscript' in which Pippin responds to McDowell's reply to it. Pippin's further efforts to get clear about his subtle disagreement with McDowell leads him into the centre of the idealist revolution — Kant's 'transcendental deduction' and account of autonomy and their reworking by Hegel. These dense pages will be of interest both to those concerned with McDowell and to those wanting to get more of the nitty-gritty of Pippin's own position.

Part 3, 'Mores', comprises two chapters, whose contents are well-conveyed by their respective titles, 'The Ethical Status of Civility' and 'Medical Practice and Social Authority in Modernity'.

In the fourth and final part, 'Expression', Pippin turns to art and literature. The first of the three chapters takes issue with the exaggerated claims for the ethical value of the aesthetic made by Martha Nussbaum and Elaine

Scary. The next chapter considers how artistic modernism, in particular abstract expressionism, makes sense from the Hegelian perspective, taking in along the way the contrasting views of Danto, Greenberg, Fried and Clark. This is a quite excellent account of Hegel's 'end of art' thesis. Pippin ends the book with a fascinating, if not altogether convincing, discussion of Proust and the idea of 'becoming who you are'.

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Paul Ricoeur
The Course of Recognition.
Trans. David Pellauer. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 297.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-674-01925-3.

In this work, his last book published before his death in 2005, Paul Ricoeur opens a problematic concerning the conceptual status of 'recognition' and its meaning for philosophical discourse. Noting that 'recognition' is often deployed by philosophers yet rarely itself made explicit, Ricoeur proposes a hermeneutics of the term to uncover the core of its meaning. It slowly becomes apparent, however, that this core may not lie in recognition itself. Although three aspects of recognition will come to the fore in his analysis, Ricoeur also hopes 'to compose at a higher degree of complexity a chain of conceptual meanings that will take into account the gaps between those meanings governed by heterogeneous ways of stating the problem' (18). In short, Ricoeur aims for a theory of recognition, rationally reconstructed from the plurivocality of its philosophical uses. To this end, a heuristic is developed based 'on the reversal in the use of the verb *to recognize* from the active to the passive voice' (23). The three chapters of the book are organized around the explication of each of these voices.

The first chapter develops the theme of recognition as identification. Kant is the major figure here, as Ricoeur explores how the Kantian synthesis of the imagination produces recognition of objects through representation. Ricoeur's reading of Kant is exemplary, as is his introduction to that discussion through a reading of Descartes, although the force of this is blunted by the translator's use of the standard English translation of the *Meditations*, instead of rendering the French translation employed by Ricoeur and its more prominent use of 'recognition'. This is the most concise of the chapters,

and Ricoeur effectively argues his thesis that recognition for Kant — 'recognition in concept' — assumes epistemological mastery over all of its representations (46). Ricoeur's convincing challenge to this model is made from the perspective of Husserl's later phenomenology, which is read as undermining representation's primacy through the ruination of 'the idea of a relation between subject and object such that that object would be at every instant exactly what the subject is currently thinking' (60). Ricoeur has long been one of the finest interpreters of Husserl's texts, and this section is no exception. The problem then raised for the Kantian concept of recognition is the phenomenon of unrecognizability, which implies to Ricoeur that recognition is not conceptual mastery but rather a kind of relation to objects with their own 'variety of modes of being' (62). To demonstrate this, Ricoeur shifts the discussion to self-recognition, long a problem for both Kantian and phenomenological viewpoints.

The second chapter deals with self-recognition as the middle, reflexive voice of *to recognize*. Although the main interlocutor here is claimed to be Bergson, this is misleading, as Ricoeur's analysis attempts more than just an exegesis of Bergson's conception of our recognition of memory images. The discussion ranges widely here, from Greek tragedy to contemporary issues regarding the recognition of collective identities. Ricoeur characterizes his concerns in this chapter in this way: 'How can we give a continuation to the Aristotelian analysis of action, within the setting of the reflexive philosophy inaugurated by Descartes and Locke, then extended to the practical dimension by Kant's second *Critique* and brought by Fichte to its highest transcendental power?' (90-1). Ricoeur's *Oneself as Another* and *Time and Narrative* have covered this ground, and the rehearsal of the arguments here often strays from the examination of recognition. As we see in the third chapter, this is in keeping with Ricoeur's intent. However, for those familiar with previous analyses of narrative identity and ipseity, this section offers revealing connections to Ricoeur's work on history and memory; but to those unfamiliar, this chapter is not the ideal ground for entrance into Ricoeur's concerns. His concepts are set up at such a breakneck pace that a reader is likely to require some independent knowledge of them before coming to the text. His argument leads from the agent's self-recognition of responsibility and capacities to act to the social capabilities that allow or hinder these capacities. In its reformulation in the social realm, self-recognition becomes the 'attestation' of the agent's capacities and 'a demand, a right to require, under the rubric of the idea of social justice' (148).

Because of this demand, Ricoeur's analysis is able to reach the topic of mutual recognition. However, it is apparent from the introduction to the third chapter that recognition, in all three voices, depends on what Ricoeur will characterize as the dialectic between identity and alterity. Although there are some fine interpretations given in this chapter, notably to Hobbes's and Hegel's differing accounts of the state of nature, if one reads the third chapter *after* the conclusion, this different problematic emerges.

Mutual recognition, the keystone of this attempted theory of recognition, is dramatically difficult to achieve on Ricoeur's reading — and with good reason. The importance of hermeneutics emerges for Ricoeur because of the failure of other theories to achieve philosophical totality; but hermeneutics does not itself promise totality, only enlarged understanding. Therefore, even a theory of recognition will run into a limit that prevents it from gaining conceptual mastery. But Ricoeur will not abandon this investigation as a mere 'rhapsody of ideas' (247). Instead, the 'course' of recognition will reveal that recognition is only possible on the basis of alterity and distance. In every case of recognition — identification, self-recognition, mutual recognition — the problem is that 'of comparing incomparables and hence of *equalizing* them' (161). But, as in all of Ricoeur's texts, this dissymmetry between 'recognized' and 'recognizer' is not grounds for despair but the opportunity to revitalize understanding. In Ricoeur's terms, distanciation from the thing is not necessarily alienation but is necessary for the production of a creative mediation. If philosophers are to develop a more just conception of epistemological, ethical, or political recognition, Ricoeur ultimately argues that we must take into consideration that which threatens all recognition with failure as well as makes it possible, 'the alterity of the protagonists in an exchange with each other' (262). Recognition mediates between agents but never fully closes the gap between them. This subtext makes this book immensely challenging but ultimately worthy of study.

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Wesley C. Salmon
Reality and Rationality.
Phil Dowe and Merrilee Salmon, eds.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 285.
Cdn$129.50/US$74.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-517784-3);
Cdn$35.95/US$29.00
(paper: ISBN 0-19-518195-6).

This book is the first two parts of a three-part project undertaken by Salmon — a project which, sadly, he was unable to finish before his death in 2001. It is largely a selection of his papers, published between 1965 and 1994, on the topics of realism and rationality in science. In addition, it contains introductions, appendices and two previously unpublished chapters all written by Salmon. This collection constitutes a serious challenge to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism and offers an intriguing defense of scientific realism.

The first and shorter part of the book concerns realism. In the first chapter Salmon poses what he takes to be the 'key question' concerning realism: does inductive reasoning contain 'the resources to enable us to have observational evidence for or against statements about unobservable entities and/or properties' (10). Salmon stresses that a failure to recognize the significance of this question 'has had serious philosophical consequences' (10). He accuses a number of philosophers of having neglected this question, with Bas van Fraassen being the most important figure in Salmon's cross hairs. Salmon points out that in *The Scientific Image* van Fraassen uncritically pits realism and empiricism as adversaries. However, realism and empiricism are incompatible with one another only if the answer to the key question is negative. Salmon disagrees with van Fraassen's view, arguing that observations can provide evidence for unobservable entities. Arguments from analogy and common cause arguments are identified as two important argument-types that provide such evidence. The legitimacy of these arguments, according to Salmon, can be evaluated within a Bayesian framework.

The second part of the book concerns rationality. Salmon is interested in giving a characterization of theory choice and theory confirmation that maintains the status of science as a rational enterprise. He also wants an account that incorporates aspects of Kuhn's historical approach to the philosophy of science. Specifically, he wants to include a role for the subjective judgments made by scientists in the process of theory evaluation. Salmon argues that the key to reconciling these seemingly divergent interests is a Bayesian account of confirmation. Most of Part 2 is an attempt to work out the details and challenges facing the Bayesian approach. Chapters 4-6 contrast the Bayesian approach with the hypothetico-deductive method, and highlight the indispensable role of prior plausibility arguments in theory evaluation. These plausibility arguments, which cannot be accommodated in

the hypothetico-deductive method, play a critical role in the Bayesian account, since they constitute the prior probabilities. In Chapters 7 and 8, Salmon develops his notion of 'dynamic rationality', giving substance to his claim that science is rational. The final two chapters compare inductive reasoning to deductive reasoning, and articulate the dangers of drawing an overly strong analogy between the two.

The above description may be somewhat misleading; it might appear that the book is comfortably organized around the topics of realism and rationality. However the book does not read this way. It reads more like a treatise on the usefulness of Bayes' theorem illustrated by its application to an assortment of philosophical problems. If taken as a book primarily about realism and rationality, it is perhaps unsatisfying in scope and focus. However, the exploration of these topics is likely not Salmon's primary goal.

There is a more interesting and unified project lurking behind the selection and ordering of the chapters. Salmon briefly alludes to it in the preface (ix-xi) and in a few endnotes (e.g., 238), but unfortunately does not explicitly carry this theme throughout the discussion. *Reality and Rationality* may be viewed as a sustained challenge to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. This challenge comes in two stages. Salmon first attacks the empiricist/realist dichotomy with the identification of the 'key question'. Here Salmon is most insightful and convincing. He investigates the development of atomism through the twentieth century, identifying a rather convincing instance of the argument from common cause in the determination of Avogadro's number. It is this evidence that finally won over even the most ardent anti-atomists in the scientific community. Salmon rightly holds this up as a compelling example in which there is observational evidence for unobservable objects. If this example and the type of inference involved holds up to scrutiny — and Salmon makes a compelling case — then it poses problems for constructive empiricism.

The second stage of the argument is a response to van Fraassen's concern that there does not currently exist, nor is there likely ever to exist, a 'putative theory or logic' of induction which will ground a robust realism (238). This is van Fraassen's main defense against the challenge posed by the first stage of the argument. Salmon argues that a Bayesian framework can serve this purpose, and he works hard at addressing many of the standard problems (e.g. issues concerning prior probabilities) associated with a Bayesian approach. There is one issue, however, not discussed that leaves a hole in his argument. Salmon specifies a formulation of Bayes' theorem which can be used to evaluate competing theories. In addition to the competing theories there are terms in the formulation that refer to a 'catchall hypothesis' (96). The catchall hypothesis says that the competing theories being evaluated are all false. The obvious concern, in light of the pessimistic meta-induction argument, is that the catchall is almost certainly the correct hypothesis. This is precisely the kind of concern van Fraassen raises in *Laws and Symmetry* when attacking abductive reasoning. We may be able to choose the best amongst competing theories, but this does not warrant a belief that the best

theory is the correct theory. The correct theory is most probably amongst the much larger set of possible theories not being considered. Salmon's Bayesian approach cannot be used to defend a robust realism without addressing this issue.

Although the second stage of Salmon's challenge, the more ambitious part of the project, may not knock down van Fraassen's empiricism, it contributes in important ways to the Bayesian approach and to the defense of realism more generally.

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Scott Sehon
Teleological Realism:
Mind, Agency, and Explanation.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 245.
US$36.00. ISBN 0-262-19535-6.

This monograph is a valuable contribution to current discussions in action theory, the metaphysics of mind, and folk psychology, and is recommended reading for philosophers and cognitive scientists working in these areas. Scott Sehon is among those who present a teleological account of folk psychology as a substitute for the causal status quo, and in this thorough and careful book he defends, point-by-point, a non-reductionist and realist view of folk psychology that he calls common-sense psychology (CSP).

CSP is, for Sehon, 'an ill-defined mass of propositions including individual attributions of mental states to particular agents, explanations of the behavior of individual agents, and generalizations concerning behavior and mental states' (8). From the start, he accepts the standard view according to which CSP consists of a set of propositions and has the same function as scientific theories, namely prediction and explanation. The propositional view of CSP (as opposed to the model or practice approach to folk psychology) also sets the stage for his defense of CSP as ontologically real, but as logically independent from physical science, and thus not reducible or eliminable. To defend his position, Sehon argues that there are no bridge laws between CSP and physical science. (He also takes Lewisian causal functionalism to be a reductionist theory, and while it fails to offer biconditional bridge laws, he understands functionalism as reductionist because it is fully within the domain of natural science.) Of course these arguments are based on Sehon's

starting assumptions, namely that both scientific theory and CSP are sets of propositions, a view that has its critics.

The claim that CSP is not reducible to the physical sciences is further defended using Davidsonian arguments regarding the normative nature of CSP. CSP differs from science in that it isn't open to wholesale revision, given that mental kind terms are not natural kind terms. Sehon also raises Wittgensteinian concerns to the effect that neither can our qualitative beliefs about mental states fix the reference of mental state terms nor can they be otherwise identifiable. Since the reasons and justifications that make up CSP are normative, and science is not normative in the same way, Sehon argues that there is no plausible relation between science and CSP. They must be logically independent.

Sehon's next task is to establish that the causal theory of action explanation is false. To establish that mental states are epiphenomenal, Sehon presents familiar arguments leading to a dilemma between reductionism and epiphenomenalism, and accepts the latter. The epiphenomenalist conclusion is further defended from attacks within action theory. Sehon argues that explanations which may appear to be causal can be restated in teleological terms, and that *contra* the arguments from Mele, Bishop, and Peacocke, such teleological explanations cannot be analyzed in terms of, or reduced to, causal accounts.

The second half of the book is dedicated to developing and defending Sehon's positive view of teleological action explanation. A teleological explanation is an answer to a 'To what end was the agent's behavior directed?' question (136), and must be constrained by rationality considerations. Teleological explanations that refer to the agent's end are not descriptions of states of affairs (*contra* Dancy and Schueler), nor must they always refer to desires (*contra* Davidson). Rather, we explain behavior by finding some end that is both 'optimally appropriate' for the action and that is 'the most valuable state of affairs' toward which the action could be directed given the constraints of rationality and circumstance (155). The view is defended against a host of objections from Davidson, Mele, and Fodor, and it is distinguished from the relatively closer views of Dancy and Schueler.

Near the end of the book Sehon attempts to carve out his own position in the folk psychological topography by arguing that his teleological realism is not consistent with any of the currently existing views. The teleological conception of CSP isn't consistent with strong realism because it rejects the causal story that is one of the pillars of realism. It isn't instrumentalism because CSP allows for both successful predictions and explanations, and an instrumentalism that does permit predictions must be built on top of a realist account, which we don't have. Sehon is committed to the existence of full agents with mental states, and he is concerned that a genuine instrumentalism can't allow for such things. Finally, CSP is distinct from eliminativism, since eliminativism would destroy the talk of purpose that is central to CSP.

It is in his defense of CSP against the eliminativist that Sehon begins to speak of CSP in ways that go beyond his prior description of it as a set of

propositions that we use to predict and explain behavior. Even if the promise of neuroscience came to be, we could not lose our talk of mental states, he argues, for they have functions other than those of predicting and explaining. Sehon writes, 'Much of our reason for caring about CSP categorization is only indirectly connected to prediction of a person's motor behavior' (225). What we care more about are things such as understanding other people, or morally evaluating a person's actions, says Sehon. If these other functions of CSP are as valuable as predicting or explaining, then it seems that Sehon's attempts to distinguish his view from an instrumentalist reading are undermined. The appeal to mental states in discussing other people *may* have some useful heuristic value for predicting behavior (as is widely assumed and not often argued for). And future neuroscience or evolutionary theory might offer us the explanation Sehon demands from the instrumentalist of why CSP predictions and explanations work as well as they do. But it seems that his fundamental reason for rejecting instrumentalism is that CSP works so well when it comes to predicting and explaining behavior. If, with respect to prediction, it turns out that CSP isn't any more reliable than other methods, such as Laplacean calculations, induction from past behavior, or brain scans, it is still instrumentally valuable for those very reasons Sehon cites in response to the eliminitivist's challenge; we use CSP to develop the kind of understanding of other people that allows us to create the kind of social bonds necessary for a functioning society.

Sehon's critique of the causal theory of action is a meticulous and important challenge to conventional wisdom, and it should be seriously considered. However, whether the teleological view can take its own unique position alongside realism, eliminativism, and instrumentalism remains to be seen.

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James K.A. Smith
Jacques Derrida: Live Theory.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. xvii + 157.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6280-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6281-2).

Introducing Derrida clearly and concisely is no small task, but this book does a fine job of negotiating the challenges involved. Clarity is particularly difficult when it comes to writing on Derrida, whose texts are notoriously abstruse; thus Jamie Smith does a great service for those struggling to find a foothold in Derrida's texts, writing with sanity and wit to render many of Derrida's more obscure notions understandable. In doing so, however, Smith also wants to correct those caricatures that depict Derrida as simply incomprehensible, decadent, or even dangerous. In response, he aims to 'demythologize' the mythical 'Derrida-monster' by side-stepping the second-hand interpretations and attending to Derrida's texts (3, 8-9).

Guiding the book is the claim that Derrida's texts, from the earliest to the latest, exhibit a governing concern with alterity, or otherness. Deconstruction has always been an ethical gesture, insofar as it attends to the excluded 'other'. Yet numerous readers of Derrida suggest that he underwent an 'ethical turn' in his later writings. Smith challenges this reading by demonstrating how even Derrida's early work revolves around the theme of otherness. Chapter 1 focuses on Derrida's treatment of language, and introduces such infamous notions as the 'metaphysics of presence', 'logocentrism', and '*différance*'. According to Derrida, the Western philosophical tradition prioritizes speech over writing, since the speaking voice seems to promise 'immediacy and pure self-presence', while writing threatens to introduce mediation. Derrida substantiates this claim through close readings of Plato, Husserl, Rousseau, and Lévi-Strauss. But he goes further than simply criticizing phonocentrism and/or logocentrism by demonstrating how this quest for pure immediacy is already compromised from within. Writing does not introduce mediation into language; rather, speech itself is already contaminated by mediation (43).

Derrida's assertion that meaning is never fully present, never given without remainder, is crucial to understanding his statement that 'there is nothing outside of the text' (44). Although Derrida's critics have often taken this statement as a denial that language refers to the world, what Derrida actually asserts is that our experience is always mediated by a linguistic context. This means that the subject is never an autonomous, self-enclosed master of language, whose meanings are transparently present to her. Instead, meaning is marked by absence. To be sure, meaning is not utterly absent or void; but it is 'never simply or fully "present" ' (45). Smith proposes that this notion of absence is synonymous with transcendence, since it denotes that which is exterior to the subject's consciousness (27). And it is the exteriority of the linguistic community that grants the subject the

capacity for speech and self-consciousness. Subjectivity does not originate in isolation and subsequently move into relations with others; instead, it is only constituted in relation to others. One might expect that this move entails a sort of linguistic determinism, which precludes the possibility of a responsible subject. But much to the contrary, Derrida argues that this fundamental relationality is in fact the opening for ethics. It is the condition of ethical responsibility (45).

This discussion sets the stage for the rest of the book, which continues to explore the way otherness 'interrupts' philosophy's ambitions (45). Chapter 2 explores Derrida's work on literature, particularly regarding the way literature acts as one of philosophy's non-philosophical others. As such, literature challenges philosophy's attempt to dictate the rules of all discourse, thereby providing the occasion for philosophy to examine itself (48). Smith also considers Derrida's work on the irreducibility of metaphor, as well as the ethics of interpretation. The latter discussion is helpful given deconstruction's reputation as the abolition of all interpretive criteria. Smith blames this misperception on Derrida's British and American reception (especially during the 1970s and 1980s), in which literature departments and radical 'assistant professors' mistook Derrida as a prophet of interpretive anarchy (61, 99). Deconstruction is indeed radical, but Smith points to the limits of interpretation — viz., *reference*, *context*, and *community* — as governing its ethical respect for otherness (64).

Chapter 3 explores Derrida's more recent work on ethics, politics, and religion. Smith discusses Derrida's treatment of justice, forgiveness, cosmopolitanism, and hospitality, as well as the influence of Kierkegaard and Levinas. Smith has written extensively — and at times quite critically — about this side of Derrida. Despite the generally apologetic tone of this book, he has serious reservations of his own regarding Derrida. In this context, however, Smith brackets his criticisms in favour of expositing Derrida's texts. As a consequence, one will need to look beyond this book for critical analysis of Derrida. (Smith's own forthcoming book, *The Violence of Finitude: Derrida and the Logic of Determination*, takes up some of his criticisms).

Chapter 4 provides a selected survey of Derrida's engagements with major figures from the philosophical tradition, such as Plato, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. This chapter also briefly examines Derrida's reception by the so-called 'Yale school,' Habermas, Gadamer, certain analytic philosophers, and recent critics of postmodernism such as Žižek and Badiou. The final chapter consists of an 'interview' with Derrida. The interview format is in keeping with other volumes in Continuum's 'Live Theory' series, which includes interviews with such figures as Chomsky, Baudrillard, and Kristeva. In this case, however, Derrida was unable to participate, so Smith conducts an imagined interview with Derrida by drawing on previously published interviews and texts. The interview could probably pass as actually involving Derrida, but it is a little odd to read it knowing Smith has assembled it himself. Smith acknowledges the dangers involved with speaking for Derrida in this way, but he tries to turn these circumstances to his

advantage by interrogating the very idea of the interview, which is often taken as a means of accessing the unmediated truth by talking to the author-in-himself (104-5).

I opened by noting the clarity with which Smith writes, since this is a significant challenge in writing on Derrida. It is also a challenge to introduce Derrida concisely, and Smith manages to survey the vast scope of Derrida's corpus in a mere 120 pages. Needless to say, Smith does not cover every text or theme in Derrida's work, nor does he treat any particular aspect in the depth that a specialized study would. Smith candidly admits the limitations of such an approach. Nonetheless, for those seeking entry into Derrida's thought, this book is a good place to start.

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Alfred I. Tauber
Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2005.
Pp. xiv + 328.
US$62.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-20160-7);
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-70112-X).

At first glance, this is a work about bioethics, and its main theme is succinctly captured by Tauber's leading question, 'Where and how does patient autonomy fit into the framework of bioethics?' (15). In concert with a growing chorus of writers such as Beauchamp, Loewy, Thomasma, and Pellegrino, Tauber rejects an autonomy-focussed approach to bioethics and argues that it must necessarily fail in the clinical setting because, unlike the hypothetical patients who are the subjects of discussion in the mainstream bioethics literature, actual patients are not autonomous. Their autonomy, no matter how construed — and Tauber discusses a variety of possible conceptions — is severely compromised not only by their illness but also by the power imbalance between physicians and patients, by the patients' lack of medical knowledge, and by the patients' dependence and isolation in the heavily institutionalised modern health care setting. Moreover — argues Tauber — autonomy cannot account for the clinical responsibility of the physician. That is centred in trust.

According to Tauber, the contemporary focus on autonomy is the result of a general social evolution that increasingly construes the individual person in atomistic terms, rather than acknowledging the multiplicity of roles that

s/he plays in the social setting. As a result, medicine has veered away from its Hippocratic roots as a caring profession and moved in the direction of a scientifically grounded business that replaces trust with contract. Nevertheless, Tauber argues, modern medicine, even when practised in the economically dominated context of the Health Maintenance Organization, cannot escape its caring roots because, when all is said and done, the relationship between physician and patient is fiduciary in nature. This is grounded in the very nature of medicine itself. In Tauber's eyes, the physician/patient dyad constitutes a 'moral community' that is ineluctably characterized by loyalty, solidarity and trust.

Not surprisingly, Tauber portrays beneficence as being as integral to the physician-patient relationship as autonomy itself. While the patient is indeed a person — which calls for an acknowledgement of patient autonomy — the patient is also a person-in-need; and that calls for beneficence. Therefore in Tauber's eyes, there are two fundamental principles that structure the physician-patient relationship: autonomy *and* beneficence; and this duality sets up a tension that pervades all of medicine.

Tauber maintains that it is a fundamental failure of contemporary medical education that it does not equip the budding physician with appropriate tools for dealing with this moral duality and the tensions it produces. However, even though Tauber comments on the fact that contemporary medical education does not include much formal training in ethics, and although he does advocate the inclusion of ethics courses in the medical curriculum, he believes that the real solution does not lie in more formal ethics teaching but in fundamentally restructuring the medical curriculum. Among other things, and importantly, it should disabuse physicians of the notion that medical facts are value-neutral and that medical decision-making is purely scientific in nature. From the very beginning, physicians should be taught that scientific facts are embedded in competing and distinct domains of physician- and patient-values, and that an ethically appropriate physician-patient relationship is not captured simply by adhering to ethical principles — not even by adhering to the dyad of autonomy and beneficence. Instead, it is a covenant that involves negotiation between the dependent patient and the physician-gatekeeper who is motivated by a sense of responsibility. In Tauber's mind, trust is the key, and he proposes restructuring of the physician's role along the lines of an advocacy model that is similar to one already familiar from the nursing literature. In his mind, this would allow physicians to accept a psycho-social construction of illness that does justice to both the scientific and the cultural aspects of illness and health care.

Therefore this really isn't a book about bioethics: it is a book about the ethical nature of modern medicine. To be sure, Tauber draws heavily on contemporary bioethical theory — and he shows remarkable erudition in this regard; and he does cast his arguments in terms of the opposition between autonomy and beneficence. However, his real focus is the practice of medicine itself: how it was practised in the past, how it is practised at present, and how it should ethically be practised. Therefore the question, 'Where and how

does patient autonomy fit into the framework of bioethics?' is really misleading. It should be recast as the question, 'Where and how do patient autonomy and physician beneficence fit into the practice of medicine, and what role should the notion of physician responsibility play?'

Is this a good book? That all depends. On the one hand, it states the obvious: medicine has become a technologically dominated profession whose practitioners are selected on the basis of demonstrated ability to absorb and deal with scientific facts, and whose training is essentially confined to a scientific — what Tauber calls the 'positivistic' and 'reductionistic' — mindset that provides technical expertise but little sensitivity for the ethical parameters of actual practice. There is ample literature on this subject, and there really was no need for another book. On the other hand, Tauber addresses these issues in a thought-provoking way that is framed in the context of the social evolution of modern medicine and of the development of bioethics. That makes it unusual and worth reading. Tauber also makes recommendations for integrating ethics not merely into the medical curriculum but also into everyday practice by incorporating an 'Ethical Concerns' section into the standard medical record that accompanies every patient. That is even more unusual, because it brings bioethics out of the classroom into the clinic. For the reader with an interest in the ethical practice of medicine, the book is worthwhile; for the reader interested in pure bioethical theory, it is a disappointment.

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Michael Theunissen
Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair.
Trans. Barbara Harshav and Helmut Illbruck.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 159.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-691-09558-2.

Due to the all too common tendency to read Kierkegaard as little more than a religious fanatic, theological polemicist, impassioned (as opposed to 'reasoned') existential skeptic and/or anti-philosophical mysologist, it is with great relief that philosophers interested in Kierkegaard receive the recent translation of Michael Theunissen's *Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair*. Through a careful explicative analysis of Kierkegaard's *Sickness Unto Death*,

Theunissen implicitly demonstrates that Kierkegaard's work is deeply philosophical and surprisingly cogent.

More specifically, Theunissen aims to elucidate Kierkegaard's theory of despair. Rather than focusing on the form of Kierkegaard's presentation or being preoccupied with the hidden significance of Kierkegaard's pseudonymity (*Sickness Unto Death* is ostensibly written by Anti-Climacus), Theunissen is primarily turned toward the content of the text. Nonetheless, this is not a mere textual interpretation that is satisfied with the disclosure of the hidden meaning and structure of the text. Instead, Theunissen provides a properly philosophical study, which considers the 'analysis of despair as a piece of philosophy which can be taken out of the whole to a certain extent' (viii). Thus, Theunissen is focused more on the issue of despair in an increasingly nihilistic world (Kierkegaard's *and ours*) than on Kierkegaard or *Sickness Unto Death* as such. The latter is the means by which to view the former.

In two focused studies, Theunissen follows two related lines of critique. The first is an immanent critique, an internal critical reconstruction of Kierkegaard's theory of despair around a single premise. Here Theunissen wants to both present Kierkegaard on his own terms and reconfigure Kierkegaard's view as consistently as possible, whether Kierkegaard's ostensible presentation is fully consistent or not. As he puts it, 'the reconstruction is aimed primarily at exposing Kierkegaard's hidden intentions and facilitating a rational debate with his analysis of despair through a cautious correction of his conceptualization' (1). Herein lies one of the most noble-minded elements of the text: Theunissen engages Kierkegaard with sober and balanced intellectual charity. In other words, Kierkegaard is treated as an authority, but never as a divine authority; his view is taken seriously on its own, but only insofar as it stands up to the criteria of truth, internal consistency and ontological plausibility. This teaches us that intellectual charity does not preclude critical evaluation. On the contrary, a reconstruction moved by charity demands a serious attempt to render the original fully intelligible, correcting whatever outward confusions are present. The second strand of critique is transcending, or evaluative. Here Theunissen aspires to assess the overall plausibility and value of Kierkegaard's theory of despair in order to 'discover to what extent the analysis burdened with all these premises does justice to its subject matter' (3). Put differently, the plausibility of the basic premise that is uncovered through the prior analytic reconstruction is scrutinized in this second strand. Whereas an immanent critique sets out to extract the overall position to which Kierkegaard is committed given the basic premise of his theory, a transcending critique goes further by uncovering all the hidden premises of the text and examining them through a strict philosophical lens.

Theunissen's first study is primarily concerned with a two-dimensional (both constructive and destructive) reconstruction of Kierkegaard's theory of despair. The premise upon which *Sickness Unto Death* is constructed is the existential-dialectical principle that 'we do not will to be directly what we

are' (5). This either means that in despair I will to be other than I presently am because I am dissatisfied with what I am or that in despair I will to be my true self but only insofar as I do not actually and presently manifest my true self. In either case, Theunissen shows that despair is premised on what we might refer to as an essentially ambiguous account of the self. In other words, the self is such that it can at once be itself and not be itself because it can *will* to be other than it truly is. Insofar as the self is capable of despairingly willing to be other than itself, what is disclosed is the essentiality of will as an/the underlying element of selfhood. In short, the self is not a *res cogitans* — it is, in some sense nothing (no-*res*). Moreover, though despair is treated by Kierkegaard as a disease to be healed (through faith), Theunissen's analysis also shows that despair in Kierkegaard's sense (and against Kierkegaard's outward condemnation of despair) is a sign of the height of human intentionality and active spiritual selfhood.

However, despair is ostensibly a sort of suffering, which presumes to be passive: I undergo despair. As such, the premise upon which Kierkegaard's theory of despair depends is compromised. If I passively undergo despair, how can despair be grounded on an assumption of willing selfhood? In this light, the second study assesses the overall consistency of the text. In effect, Theunissen seeks to discover what if any basic assumptions need to be added in order for Kierkegaard's account of despair to be fully illuminating. What he tries to show is that the ostensibly passive weakness of suffering that is common to despair is always also an active defiance. Thus, Kierkegaard's division of different levels of despair, both conscious and unconscious, both ostensibly active and passive, are only intelligible as originally active. In other words, all despair is rooted in action: 'any despair is an act' (61).

Michael Theunissen has produced a complex and learned book. However, because Kierkegaard was always preoccupied with the form of his writing and the significance of his pseudonyms, and because content is necessarily modified and affected by its form of presentation, Theunissen's decision to avoid a formal analysis is unfortunate. Let's not forget, as he reminds us in *The Point of View of My Work as an Author*, Kierkegaard's writing is always deliberately ironic, deceiving us into the truth by saying what it does not say. As such, a careful attention to the mode of presentation is needed in order to locate the irony, and thus the truth into which we are supposed to be deceived. Nonetheless, the self-imposed limits of any text may be lamented but must be respected. Thus, within its limits, *Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair* is highly successful and will certainly help to illumine *Sickness Unto Death* for both students and scholars.

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Iain D. Thomson
Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. 222.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-85115-7);
US$29.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-61659-X);
US$20.00 (e-book).

This book is a substantial achievement, exhibiting both scholarly erudition and philosophical sensitivity at virtually every turn. Thomson's subject is the so-called 'later Heidegger,' i.e., the Heidegger represented by works composed (roughly) after 1930 (1). Put briefly, his thesis is that underlying and unifying Heidegger's work on technology, education, and much else besides, is a view that might be called 'ontological historicism,' i.e., the claim that macro-level cultural and historical phenomena can best be made sense of in the light of changing historical 'constellations of intelligibility.'

In Chapter 1, Thomson presents this unifying framework with precision. He clarifies the pivotal role played by the concept of 'ontotheology' in Heidegger's later work. Perhaps most interestingly, he offers a rational reconstruction and defense of Heidegger's famous 'history of being', which has often come in for harsh criticism from historians of philosophy.

In Chapter 2, Thomson argues for the thesis that 'Heidegger's critique of our contemporary age of "enframing" follows directly from his particular understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology' (44). In other words, the views articulated in Chapter 1 comprise the framework within which Heidegger's famous criticisms of technological modernity become intelligible. Thomson goes on to argue that both misleading caricatures and more thoughtful critiques of Heidegger's views of technology stem from a failure to take seriously these deep *philosophical* motivations. In particular, by way of an engagement with the work of the Marcusean philosopher of technology Andrew Feenberg, Thomson is able to demystify both what Heidegger means by the 'essence of technology' and his revolutionary vision of a non-nihilistic, post-technological future.

In Chapter 3, Thomson applies the same framework to the arduous task of confronting Heidegger's actions during the Third Reich. His position, in brief, is that Heidegger's later claims, that his actions in 1933-4 as the first Nazi rector of Freiburg University stemmed from his concerns about the university, actually contain an important grain of truth, however much Heidegger's broader exculpatory efforts have been discredited (84). Thomson shows how, beginning as early as 1911 (while he was still a student), Heidegger attempted to articulate a revolutionary view of the role of the university in the broader culture. He offers a vivid and compelling portrait of the explosive *Zeitgeist* of Germany in the 1920s and Heidegger's place within it. He argues that Section 3 of *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger outlines his view of the relation between philosophy and the sciences,

provides the philosophical underpinning for Heidegger's actions as rector in 1933-4 (106-9). He also argues that Heidegger's authoritarianism as rector derives from his conviction that a 'single common foundation', a 'fundamental ontology', underlies the common ontological assumptions of all the particular sciences (115-16). He then describes how, by the mid-1930s, Heidegger had abandoned this view, maintaining instead that there is no 'fundamental ontology beneath Western history' that would provide some justification for Heidegger's earlier 'apparent readiness immediately to legislate new academic disciplines from on high' (116, 118).

Finally, in Chapter 4, Thomson undertakes a positive articulation and development of Heidegger's 'deconstruction [*Destruktion*]' of Western ideas about education. He argues that, for Heidegger, the *locus classicus* for these ideas is Plato's famous 'allegory of the cave'. Thomson shows how Heidegger offers a profound and prescient diagnosis of what many regard as today's crisis of higher education, and that he sketches out an alternative that lies buried in Plato's ancient insights.

Among the many achievements of this book, three are particularly worthy of note. First, like other recent scholars, Thomson successfully 'demystifies' Heidegger's idiosyncratic views and obscure language, without rendering Heidegger unrecognizable *as* Heidegger, i.e., as the controversial, revolutionary, and maddeningly vague thinker that he was. Second, Thomson reveals Heidegger as a deeply *systematic* thinker, one who patiently and deliberately develops a stable framework from which to give a unified account of contemporary culture, of education, of history, and of much else besides. Finally, Thomson presents genuinely new, or at least largely undiscussed, ideas about Heidegger's work. For example, Thomson challenges the truism that Heidegger was 'silent' about the Holocaust, the terrible fruit of the regime he had so actively supported (83). Another example is the claim that Heidegger maintains an 'ontological realism', that is, that he views human beings as fundamentally *receptive* or *passive* towards what Thomson calls 'constellations of intelligibility', a view which might surprise some who read Heidegger as being a kind of idealist (63).

As with any work of such boldness on such a vast topic, there are things that Thomson leaves out of his account, as well as things that are eminently disputable. Among the former is a missed opportunity to finally dispel another myth about Heidegger, the myth that there is a radical caesura between his work before about 1930 and his later writings. Perhaps a more glaring lacuna is the absence of any discussion of the significant role that Hölderlin (and other poets and artists) played in Heidegger's attempts to criticize, and sketch an alternative to, the dominant cultural paradigms of late modernity. Thomson discusses the importance of the pre-Socratic Greeks in Heidegger's thought, but he fails to note how, by Heidegger's own admission, it was Hölderlin's visionary poetry that first intimated this possibility to him. Finally, one might dispute Thomson's claim that Heidegger's political activities are best explained by his view that a single, trans-historical 'ontotheology' underlies all the sciences and all of Western history. Thom-

son's account belies Heidegger's relentless critique, beginning as early as 1914, of the philosophical tendency to abstract away from the 'anxious worry' of life in order to achieve a timeless 'logic' of 'categories', or his equally sustained assault on the attempts to derive some kind of trans-historical conceptual scheme for the interpretation of culture. If, as Thomson may suggest, Heidegger suddenly changed his views regarding 'fundamental ontology' between 1927 and 1933, we are owed an explanation of this radical about-face.

All of this notwithstanding, Thomson has created a lively and engrossing portrait of Heidegger's thought, setting a high standard by which future studies of Heidegger will have to be judged.

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Gianni Vattimo
Dialogue with Nietzsche.
Trans. William McCuaig. New York: Columbia University Press 2006.
Pp. xviii + 247.
US$29.50. ISBN 0-231-13240-9.

This translation of Gianni Vattimo's *Dialogo con Nietzsche. Saggi 1961-2000* will likely be of interest to two (by no means mutually exclusive) groups of people: Nietzsche scholars, and those interested in Vattimo's own thought. Vattimo, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Turin, is a renowned Italian philosopher and public intellectual. He has never achieved a reception in the English-speaking world reflective of his status in Europe, but there has been enough interest in his work to have produced a steady stream of translations, of which *Dialogue with Nietzsche* is the latest. Collecting essays written over a span of nearly four decades, this book charts the development of Vattimo's thinking about Nietzsche, who — along with Heidegger — is a principal influence on his own philosophy of 'weak thought' (*il penserio debole*).

For those interested in Vattimo's thought and its development, the essays of most value here are the earlier — and in general, more rigorously scholarly — essays (Chapters 1 - 4, 6, and 7). Vattimo's more recent writings are often summary in nature, and can appear sketchy in their argument unless related back to the more careful scholarly work on which they build. Of particular note here is the extended treatment of the problem of historicism in

Nietzsche's thought, a problem to which Vattimo attempts various responses in his later writings. Some of the essays also allow the Anglophone reader an insight into the principal arguments of Vattimo's major work on Nietzsche which remains untranslated, *Il soggetto e la maschera. Nietzsche e il problema della liberazione* (*The Subject and the Mask: Nietzsche and the Problem of Liberation*). In this book, published in 1974, Vattimo appropriates Nietzsche's thought for a dialectical, revolutionary Marxism, a stance which he later abandons. Most of Vattimo's works that have thus far appeared in English translation have dated from the late seventies onwards, and these insights into his earlier thought deepen our perspective on his development as a thinker.

It is undoubtedly difficult for the English-speaking reader, approaching *Dialogue with Nietzsche* in 2006, to gauge the level of originality and impact that Vattimo's work on Nietzsche might have had in Italy in the 1960s and 70s. From a contemporary perspective, the Nietzsche which emerges from Vattimo's work is a recognisably 'postmodern' Nietzsche, with certain key themes now quite familiar. The postmodern character of Vattimo's Nietzsche is distinguished by two emphases in the interpretation of his thought: the critique of *truth*, and the critique of *the subject*. Vattimo, rejecting any 'naturalistic' interpretation of Nietzsche which attempts to ground his philosophy in truths concerning our instinctual drives, insists on the importance of Nietzsche's dictum that there are no facts, only interpretations, and emphasises that *this too* is only an interpretation. Likewise, he rejects any interpretation of the *Übermensch* as a wilful, unified subject, emphasising a radical break with any prior conception of the subject, and even suggesting that the concept of the *Übermensch* has no positive meaning beyond the dissolution of bourgeois-Christian subjectivity (160).

These themes are of course familiar to Anglophone scholars due to the considerable influence of the 'French' Nietzsche. However — and this will be perhaps one of the most interesting points of the book for Nietzsche scholars — Vattimo takes pains to distinguish the 'Italian' Nietzsche from the 'French' Nietzsche. Indeed, while acknowledging the importance of their contributions, Vattimo is frequently critical of two of the exemplars of French Nietzscheanism, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. His major criticism of Deleuze is that he espouses a 'vitalist' metaphysics, in which life, the will to power, and the eternal return are taken to be true descriptions of the world as a process of energetic becoming (75-6; 137). For Vattimo, this amounts to a failure to understand Nietzsche at the deepest level (24), where any metaphysics must be understood as nothing more than an interpretation made from a particular perspective. However, Vattimo's major criticisms are mounted against Derrida and his 'disciples', such as Bernard Pautrat, Jean-Michel Rey, Sarah Koffman, and Alexander Nehamas, who have produced interpretations of Nietzsche inspired by deconstruction. For Vattimo, the primary trait of the Derridean line of interpretation is that it aestheticises Nietzsche's thought in a way which simultaneously depoliticises it. In Vattimo's assessment, the Derridean strand of French Nietzscheanism, through

its focus on Nietzsche's style of writing as a response to the problems of metaphysics, has resulted in a general depoliticisation of Nietzsche in contemporary scholarship.

It is on this very issue of the political that Vattimo suggests the Italian Nietzsche may be most clearly distinguished from his French counterpart. While some French interpreters have paid attention to the political, Vattimo asserts that in Italy the political importance of Nietzsche has always been foregrounded. This political dimension of Nietzsche has not been sought in his own questionable views on politics, but rather in his critique of bourgeois culture, his reflections on science and technology, and his attempts to formulate a post-metaphysical form of thought. Vattimo reports that Italian interpretations of Nietzsche (the most significant, aside from his own, being that of Massimo Cacciari) developed in the 1970s in close contact with movements of the extreme Left and political events of the times. Moreover, Vattimo points to the political significance of the Italian interpretation of Nietzsche as given by the attempt to go beyond the critical value of Nietzsche's work (where, he believes, the French often remain), to think Nietzsche's positive import for our current cultural situation. Indeed, Vattimo *applies* the lessons he learns from Nietzsche's critical engagements with philology and the problem of historicism to his own reading of Nietzsche, and always seeks to understand the relevance of Nietzsche's thought for contemporary, *living* problems in philosophy and culture. Such an approach makes the Italian Nietzsche a rich subject of interest, a subject which has generally been neglected in the Anglophone world. *Dialogue with Nietzsche* certainly brings the Italian Nietzsche into a sharper focus; perhaps it will also help to heighten his profile.

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Arne Johan Vetlesen
Evil and Human Agency:
Understanding Collective Evildoing.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 313.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-85694-9);
US$34.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-67357-7);
US$28.00 (e-book).

This timely study of collective evildoing takes as its paradigms of evil the Holocaust and the 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia, with special attention in the second case to genocidal rape. The approach is secular, the focus on perpetrators, and evils are understood as intentional inflictions of suffering against the victim's will and causing serious foreseeable harm (2). By 'collective evils' Vetlesen means evils perpetrated by one group against another. His basic question appears to be: How do ordinary people come to be capable of participating in the collective evils of genocidal atrocity? His very sensible answer is that there is no one unified explanation that will illuminate all the behavior of all perpetrators, but that multi-faceted explanations that include psychological, situational, and structural factors are worth pursuing.

The first three chapters examine three thinkers who attempt to answer the above basic question with a comprehensive single explanation. Vetlesen seeks to draw out what is valuable in each approach and to expose its limitations. He describes his overall result as a 'synthesis between functionalist and intentionalist approaches to collective evil' (3).

The first thinker he takes up is Zygmunt Bauman, whose sociological approach to the Holocaust finds its mass killings to be facilitated by distancing between perpetrator and victim made possible by modern technologies. The second is Hannah Arendt, whose philosophical approach defines radical evil as dehumanizing (perpetrators as well as victims) and who finds the worst evils perpetrated not by sadists but by banal functionaries like Eichmann, who exhibit the deep failure of an inability to think. For Bauman and Arendt, collective evildoing seems a function more of situations in which people find themselves than of their inner motivations and character. Third is the American philosopher C. Alfred Alford, who counters with an approach that centers the perpetrator's motivations and character. According to Alford, evil results from attempting to transport to others our unchosen human vulnerabilities and dependencies when these things become intolerable, so we can feel that we have some control over them.

Two driving forces behind this book appear to be a nagging dissatisfaction with the legacy of Stanley Milgram (*Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* [New York: Harper & Row 1974]), whose studies present evil as '*an — often unintended — byproduct of obedience to authority*' (5, Vetlesen's emphasis), and the strong belief that the failure exhibited by mass murderers such as Eichmann is not basically intellectual but one of feeling, a failure of

empathy (on which Vetlesen has also written). An opposite extreme to Bauman and Arendt is Daniel Goldhagen's account of the Holocaust as a product of German eliminationist anti-Semitism (*Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, New York: Vintage 1997). But Vetlesen does not defend Goldhagen. Rather, he seeks an intermediate view that acknowledges a role in a significant range of the behaviors of collective evildoing for intentional causing of major suffering as an end in itself, not simply to please or pacify others.

To make his case, Vetlesen invites us to consider the up close and personal rapes and low-tech killings in the 1990s by former neighbors in the former Yugoslavia (the subject of Chapter 4), the machete slayings by former neighbors in Rwanda, and survivors' accounts of gratuitous tortures and humiliations inflicted, often face to face, in the Nazi camps. Bauman's distancing and modern technology do not illuminate these deeds. Nor does Arendt's idea that evil dehumanizes always capture what happens here. It is important, if the infliction of suffering is to be an end in itself, that victims *retain* their humanity and that perpetrators be able to appreciate (or think they appreciate) the sufferings that their victims experience.

Chapter 5, on responses to collective evil, picks up on an unresolved problem in Arendt's account: how to make sense of holding individuals accountable for their roles in collective evildoing. If evil dehumanizes even perpetrators, what becomes of responsibility? What sense does it make to punish dehumanized perpetrators? At her most extreme, Arendt maintained of Eichmann that he had no way of knowing that what he did was wrong. Yet she concluded unequivocally that it was just to hang him. If Alford is right that there is an individual motivational component to the behavior of participants, which, Vetlesen argues, can be mobilized in collective evildoing, and if individuals have choices about how to deal with their unchosen vulnerabilities and dependencies so that their attempt to control these things by laying them onto others is not inevitable, then Arendt's conclusion regarding Eichmann can make sense. It makes still more sense if Vetlesen is right that Eichmann's failure was more one of empathy than of thinking. Eichmann, then, however banal, was not dehumanized — inhumane, but unfortunately all-too-human. Vetlesen's position is that for purposes of law individuals should be held accountable, but that for purposes of understanding, collective evildoing should be understood as not simply reducible to an aggregate of individual deeds.

The sixth, and last, chapter is a brief recapitulation and a plea for alertness and early response to collective evildoing globally.

Examples discussed in this book are a few well-chosen large-scale atrocities. How might that focus affect the plausibility of the theories considered? Would those theories also illuminate such smaller-scale collective evildoing as the violence of the Ku Klux Klan, organized crime, or inner city gangs (whose victims are also groups)? How about corporations that knowingly market unsafe products or inadequately tested drugs, or market poisonously addictive ones (such as tobacco) to teenagers, or hospitals that cover for

unscrupulous doctors, or churches that relocate unscrupulous clergy? Or, are these not instances of 'collective evildoing', on the ground that the victims are not groups? (But aren't they?)

This book is an excellent and brave contribution to a complex topic — balanced, well-argued, informative. I recommend it to all philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists who have research interests in understanding large-scale atrocities.

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Kenneth R. Westphal
Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. x + 299.
US$80.00. ISBN 0-521-83373-6.

Westphal argues that Kant's transcendental idealism is destroyed by Kant's own transcendental proofs. Kant, according to Westphal, is an unqualified realist (a realist 'sans phrase,' as he expresses it), and his system contains a wholly effective response to global perceptual scepticism. This is a tough, scholarly work, impressively broad in scope, and lacking nothing in minute analysis of the full range of Kant's texts. It contains much that will be of interest to the specialist, and little or nothing for the generalist.

The most original and useful material is presented in the first half of the book. There is an illuminating discussion of Kant's method, stressing the importance of transcendental (narrow) and epistemic (broader) reflection for grounding Kant's philosophical proofs in the first *Critique*. An analysis of four thought-experiments shows that epistemic reflection is not simply an act of introspection by which we take stock of the *contents* of consciousness, but a process in which we reflect on our cognitive *abilities* in light of various counterfactual states of affairs, crystallized in examples from Kant — which is not to say the categories are entirely devoid of content when the conditions of application to the sensory manifold are omitted. Here we get a coherent account of noumenal causality that does not involve a 'double affection' theory of the relationship between things-in-themselves, the transcendental self, or appearances and the empirical self. Westphal (strangely) combines an idealistic reading with a 'dual aspect' interpretation of the relationship between phenomena and noumena.

Bold claims are made for Kant's argument concerning the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold. Westphal's discussion of transcendental affinity does bring the relation between transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism into sharp focus, but, contrary to Kant's express view, transcendental arguments are not, according to Westphal, only possible on the basis of transcendental. The analysis of the conditions for conscious experience stemming from the affinity of sensory input implies that transcendental reflection is not methodologically linked to transcendental idealism, since we have here at least one substantive (non-trivial) argument that does not draw support from idealistic premises. This suggests that Kant's method of proof may be of interest to realists: The disjunction — either the laws of nature are derived from experience, or nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience — which serves as the major premise in Kant's argument for idealism, neglects a third alternative, viz., we are cognitively sensitive only to objects having certain kinds of properties, even though the objects have those properties whether or not we cognize them. This is a realistic alternative that Kant overlooks, and which is entailed by his analysis of affinity. Specifically, while intellectual synthesis may reconstruct the transcendental affinity of the manifold, the affinity is a relational property *given* in sensation, not constructed by the subject. The objects themselves must exhibit a certain amount of regularity if we are to have experience of them.

In addition to these novel reflections, Westphal argues persuasively that the three Analogies of Experience form an integrated set, and that Kant's answer to Hume requires support from arguments first provided in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Westphal's examination of the latter work exposes circular reasoning in Kant's case against corpuscularism, and shows that Kant's proof of the law of inertia is flawed. This has negative implications for his efforts to transcendentally justify even commonsense causal judgements.

Westphal's painstaking analysis culminates in the claim that Kant's transcendental idealism should be rejected, not only because the arguments supporting it are defective, but also — and more importantly — because Kant's transcendental proof of the affinity of the sensory manifold yields genuinely realist conclusions from the resources of transcendental reflection. So Kant's method appears to be more philosophically fruitful than his metaphysical stance. (Further non-idealistic implications regarding rational agency and everyday judgements about physical objects and events in the world around us are squeezed from the clever exposé of Kant's mistakes.) Westphal's recommendation is this: Jettison transcendental idealism. Kant should let it go, since his own principles can't justify it, and we should do the same, making use of Kant's method of transcendental proof in the service of unqualified realism.

The scholarly armature Westphal raises in support of his conclusions is imposing. There is no general objection to be made on that score. My worry is with the position itself. That Kant is an idealist, and means to be, 'deep

down', seems undeniable. But, as Descartes warns in the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, 'in the common philosophy there is nothing to be found whose certitude is so apparent as to be beyond controversy' (Rule III). Kant wants to be an idealist, according to Westphal, but comes out a realist in spite of himself — not an empirical realist (the sort of parasitic realism made possible by an underlying idealistic framework), but a realist *without qualification*. But what sort of a position is this? What view, exactly, is Westphal attributing to Kant?

The initial impression Westphal gives is that of the honest scholar trying to master the system of an historical figure. In the end, this figure is transformed (twisted and turned, perhaps) into a champion of the metaphysics he combated. The *very opposite* of what the philosopher wanted to represent is credited to him as his *real* or *best* position. So is Westphal trying to do history of philosophy here or just wishful thinking? We may not *want* Kant to be an idealist. But if he says that he is, why not believe him? Westphal 'proves' that Kant didn't understand himself. If Kant is such a confused thinker, then perhaps we should look elsewhere for strong arguments in support of realism. Surely there are better arguments for realism than transcendental reflection on the affinity of the sensory manifold. Westphal fails to convince that it *matters* whether or not Kant's system can be made compatible with hard realism.

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