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Martijn Blaauw, ed.

Epistemological Contextualism.

New York: Rodopi 2005. Pp. xvi + 253.

US\$75.00. ISBN 90-420-1627-2.

Epistemological Contextualism (Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 69) collects twelve new essays attacking and defending contextualist theories of knowledge. According to contextualism, whether 'S knows that *p*' is true can depend not only on S's evidence and circumstances but also on the context in which the sentence is uttered. This book is not an introduction to contextualism; though the introduction briefly summarizes contextualist theories, newcomers should begin elsewhere, with the classic contextualist papers by Keith DeRose, David Lewis, and Stewart Cohen. But it is well worth reading for its coverage of new developments in the debate over contextualism and their connection to other areas of epistemology.

Contextualism is motivated mainly by two kinds of case. First, skepticism: if I know through my senses that I have hands, then it seems that I can deduce that I am not a brain in a vat. But do I *know* that I am not a brain in a vat, since I would have the same sensations if I were? Contextualism holds that the standards for knowledge ascriptions rise when the possibility that I am a brain in a vat becomes relevant, so I then no longer can be said to know I have hands, though in ordinary contexts I can be said to know. Second, bank cases (BCs): in these the standard for knowledge ascriptions depends on the practical stakes (DeRose 1992). If more rides on *p* for me than for you, then evidence that is good enough for you to say that someone knows that *p* may not be good enough for me to say it.

This book is not a brief for contextualism. As Blaauw says in his introduction, most epistemologists reject the contextualist account of 'knows', and eight of these twelve essays criticize contextualism. Yet this reflects no crystallizing consensus, for the anti-contextualists offer a wide variety of alternatives. There are many ways not to be a contextualist — and several ways to be one.

If there is a trend in these papers, it is toward moderate invariantism: the standard for knowledge is invariant, independent of practical concerns, and non-skeptical. The question then arises: why are we more reluctant to attribute knowledge when skeptical possibilities have been raised or when practical stakes are high? Duncan Pritchard, Patrick Rysiew, and Jessica Brown defend what DeRose (2002) has called 'warranted assertability maneuvers' (WAMs). According to WAMs the disputed knowledge claims are literally true, but for practical reasons we are not warranted in making them. Pritchard proposes that our evidence and knowledge are invariant, but that raising a skeptical possibility 'restrict[s] ... what can legitimately be cited as evidence' [20] and thus what we can claim to know. Rysiew takes on the BCs, arguing that 'S knows that *p*' entails only 'that *S* is in a good epistemic position with respect to *p*', but when uttered conveys "S's epistemic position with respect to *p* is good enough ...', where the ellipsis is completed according to the interests, purposes, assumptions, etc. of the speaker' (53).

Adam Leite argues against WAMs without defending contextualism. As contextualists present the BCs, when the stakes are high we will say 'I don't know p ,' which moderate invariantists take to be literally false. Leite argues that WAMs fail to explain how uttering a falsehood conveys a truth here; we cannot model knowledge talk on other cases in which uttering a falsehood conveys a truth. Instead Leite holds that the contextualist presentation is wrong. Even in high-stakes cases we will say 'I know that p ,' unless the high stakes undermine our belief that p (in which case 'I know that p ' is false because knowledge requires belief).

Moderate invariantism (including other non-WAMs theories surveyed by Brown) faces problems besides Leite's objections in specifying the threshold for knowledge. If 'I know that p ' means 'I am in a good epistemic position', how good must the position be? The answer might reintroduce context- or subject-sensitivity. But these papers begin to explain how moderate invariantism can account for variations in our knowledge-ascriptions, and provide a good introduction to this interesting project. The other papers offer a range of alternatives to and developments of contextualism. Blaauw and René van Woudenberg argue that 'know' does not behave like a context-sensitive term. Blaauw argues for contrastivism: propositions are not known *simpliciter* but only in contrast to a set of alternatives. Van Woudenberg argues that 'know' has many senses, each with invariant extensions. This approach may have trouble dealing with BCs, in which it seems as though 'know' is being used in the same sense in the different contexts. These papers, like Leite's, pay attention to the variety of actual knowledge talk; Blaauw emphasizes that the formulation 'S knows that p ' is less common than other formulations like 'Jack knows what time it is', and van Woudenberg discusses cases where knowledge does not require a strong epistemic position. Among the contextualists, Ram Neta sees the context-sensitivity of 'know' as stemming from the context-sensitivity of what counts as evidence. Igor Douven grounds it in the varying stringency of our epistemic duties. Peter Baumann explores two dimensions of context-sensitivity: a context-sensitive standard for the reliability of our method of belief acquisition and a context-sensitive description of what that method is.

The papers also touch on other epistemological problems: deductive closure of knowledge (Krista Lawlor), the possibility of basic knowledge not based on any other knowledge (Neta), epistemic duties (Douven, Tim Black and Peter Murphy). The main gap in the collection is a discussion of subject-sensitive invariantism (John Hawthorne, *Knowledge and Lotteries*; Jason Stanley, *Knowledge and Practical Interests*), whereby the standards for knowledge depend not on the ascriber's context but on what is at stake for the knower. However, Blaauw's and van Woudenberg's criticisms of contextualism are akin to Stanley's.

That aside, this is a good selection of perspectives on the debate over contextualism and on other problems in epistemology.

Matthew Weiner
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Alexander Broadie, ed.

Thomas Reid on Logic, Rhetoric and the Fine Arts.

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2005.

Pp. 1 + 350.

US\$90.00. ISBN 0-271-02678-2.

The writings in this volume, the fifth in the Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid, are drawn primarily from Reid's notes for his advanced 12 noon lecture course. These lectures were delivered annually during his tenure at the University of Glasgow, from 1764, his arrival from Aberdeen, until his retirement from teaching in 1780. This, his 'private' class, was intended to build upon the content of the 'public' class, held at the rather earlier time of 7.30 a.m., which covered the philosophy of mind (resulting in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, 1785, and *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*, 1788), ethics, and politics.

On the aims of the advanced course, Reid writes, 'I intend to treat first of the Culture of the Human Mind, both in its intellectual & moral Powers. Secondly of the Connexions which Nature has established between Mind, & Body and of the influence which by the Laws of Nature each has upon the Other. And thirdly I propose to shew that all the fine Arts are grounded upon some of those Connections between Mind and body which Nature hath established; and that the noblest and most important Principles of the Fine Arts must be drawn from the Knowledge of the Human Mind' (22). The discussion of the fine arts will focus on 'the noblest of them, ... Eloquence'.

The volume is divided into three sections of roughly similar length, covering the culture of the mind, logic, and rhetoric and the fine arts. Despite Reid's stated intentions, and aside from some discussion of how character is shaped by causes acting on the body as well as those acting on the mind (see, e.g., 190-3), there is little on the connection between mind and body in the manuscripts included here. It is interesting to note in this context that an earlier volume edited by Peter Kivy, *Thomas Reid's Lectures on the Fine Arts* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1973), contains an extended discussion of the relationship between mind and body. Despite the fact that, as Broadie notes, the manuscript on which Kivy's book is based appears to be another's transcription of several of Reid's advanced lectures, it does suggest that Reid might have spent more time on this topic than is suggested by the extant manuscripts (or, at least, those collected here).

In the first of the three sections, Reid focuses on the cultivation of the mind, stating 'the Superiority of Man above the brute Creation, as well as the Superiority of one Man above another and of one Nation or tribe of Men above others is in a great measure owing to Culture' (10). The mind of an infant is not significantly different from that of an animal in terms of its abilities; 'we Receive at first from the hand of Nature onely the Seeds as it were of those Faculties which distinguish us from Brute Animals; ... those Seeds by proper

Culture may grow up so as to produce the Noble fruits of Wisdom & Virtue and every human Excellence' (48-9). Three sources of improvement are identified: nature, society, and education, each facilitating the development of successively nobler or higher powers. The solitary human, the 'wild man', is provided by nature with certain principles that enable him to develop acute senses, agility, endurance, and attentiveness. These principles of human nature — the ability to form habits, the drive towards constant activity, curiosity, and the tendency to form beliefs about the future based on past experience — will not, however, enable the acquisition of language, rational powers, religion, any notion of morality or duty, or 'any enjoyment but that of gratifying the cravings of his natural Appetites' (42). Human society is required for these. The opportunity in this context to challenge Rousseau's account of life in the state of nature is not overlooked by Reid (42-5).

The improvement of the mind was central to Reid's conception of the purpose of education. Education should prepare one for life beyond the university class; 'the purpose of Education in the Liberal Arts and Sciences' is 'to acquire those Qualifications that may fit [the student] to pass through Life with honour ... and with advantage to your Country & to Mankind' (5). More specifically, one's education ought to be directed towards one's expected profession. 'It becomes every man's concern to apply chiefly to those parts of knowledge and Learning that are most necessary for the particular Station and profession in which he is to appear' (7).

Reid's understanding of his own role as a teacher comes out in the extent to which the manuscripts collected in the remaining two sections take this point on board. Before turning to these, it is worth commenting briefly on the Introduction. Reid's lectures display a thorough familiarity with both classical and contemporary writings on rhetoric and logic; given this, the excellent account of the historical background to Reid's work in these areas that constitutes the largest part of Broadie's Introduction is to be warmly welcomed.

Reid's understanding of logic is wider than the modern idea of the subject, and encompasses all means of acquiring truth. So, for example, in the context of a discussion of logic we find him attempting to 'enumerate the various kinds of natural & original Judgments we form & reduce them to certain Classes' — this towards the very practical aim of 'the improvement of our rational Powers' (165). As Broadie notes, there is much common ground between Reid's writings on the mind and his study of logic.

For Reid, eloquence, the noblest of the fine arts, is excellence in communicating, or 'the Art of Speaking so as to answer the intention of the Speaker' (238). It is not mere 'Rhetorical Invention', 'the faculty of perceiving what is fit to persuade' (204), as Aristotle had it. All speech is merely a means to an end; whatever the end of the discourse might be in the particular case, 'its Excellence must consist solely in its propriety and fitness to answer this end' (205). Reid's comments on Rhetoric thus apply to all use of language, including that falling within mathematics and the sciences. His belief that education should be concerned with the student's intended profession, as well

as his conception of his own responsibilities as a teacher, can be seen clearly in his extended treatment of the 'Eloquence of the Pulpit' (240-50), a profession with which Reid himself was, of course, most familiar.

Chris Lindsay

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**Taylor Carman and
Mark B. N. Hansen, eds.**

The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Pp. v + 396.

US\$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80989-4);

US\$28.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00777-1).

If you were seeking a guide to the intricacies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's published writings, you could happily rely on Charles Taylor. One of the contemporary English-speaking world's prominent thinkers, Taylor has been influenced profoundly by Merleau-Ponty. As early as 1964 this influence lies at the heart of Taylor's *The Explanation of Behaviour*. More recently, in a preface introducing the francophone reader to a collection of his translated essays (*La liberté des modernes*, 1997), Taylor explains that it is appropriate that his thought should be expressed in French, because it was in this very language, as he read the works of Merleau-Ponty, that his own philosophical ideas began to take shape. 'Merleau-Ponty was my guide, so to speak', says Taylor. Furthermore, in *Sources of the Self* Taylor readily admits that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is amongst the most insightful of the twentieth century.

It is fitting, then, that the bastion of English-language philosophical publications that is Cambridge University Press should open this volume of its 'Companion' series with Taylor's 'Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture', an appropriate introduction that gives special consideration for the intellectual perspective afforded from Cambridgeshire. Taylor clearly situates Merleau-Ponty's work in relation to contemporary philosophy as it is often practised in the English-speaking world, and specifically to analytic epistemology. For those who feel more comfortable in the sheltering cloisters of Cambridge University than in the open, cobble-stoned, and occasionally turbulent courtyard of the Sorbonne, this is a lucid introduction, demonstrating how Merleau-Ponty, and particularly his *Phenomenology of Perception*, can be read in relation to 'the contemporary philosophical debate' (47) about the nature of knowledge and certainty, especially as carried out by Quine, Davidson, Sellars, and Rorty.

At the core of contemporary epistemology is what Taylor classifies as a 'mediational picture' (28), or a 'basic mediational structure' (27), according to which, first of all, '[k]nowledge of things outside the mind/agent/organism only comes about through certain surface conditions, mental images, or conceptual schemes within the mind/agent/organism' (27), and secondly, 'all our understanding of the world is ultimately mediated knowledge' (33). Whether this 'representational or mediational' model (32) is supported or repudiated, it is, Taylor claims, ever-present, working 'insidiously and powerfully' as a 'structuring framework' (28). Indeed, Taylor's essay begins with an apt quotation from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* — 'A picture held us captive' (*Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen*, 115) — and his aim is to explain how Merleau-Ponty 'helped to break the thrall of this mediational picture' (30). As Taylor astutely recalls — and it is a point that, unfortunately, is often overlooked — Merleau-Ponty does not merely deny this fundamental structural framework. Rather, in the *Phenomenology* he articulates it clearly and strives to argue a coherent way beyond it; he shows it to be unsatisfactory — Merleau-Ponty himself uses words such as 'inadequate' (*insuffisant*), 'unintelligible' (*inintelligible*); much more abruptly, Taylor prefers the words 'false' (29) and 'wrong' (30) — and to be in need of replacement. Against the tyranny of beliefs taken as 'the only accepted denizens of the space of reasons' (29), Taylor explains how the *Phenomenology* is articulated around the notion of a fundamental structure of meaning which arises from our inextinguishable bodily commerce with the world (46, 49), and which is held to underlie the type of descriptions and significance-attributions pertaining to conceptual systems.

Two other essays complement Taylor's work directly. In 'Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science', Hubert L. Dreyfus provides an enlightening and open-minded account of the relation of Merleau-Ponty's early work to research in contemporary neuroscience. Dreyfus explains that Merleau-Ponty's rejection of both the empiricist and intellectualist accounts of perception and behaviour, dismissing the primacy of sense-data and of cognitive representations in preference for an approach built around the motor-intentionality of the body, is in a certain sense vindicated by current research into simulated neural networks (132ff). One cannot help but wonder, however, whether isolated discussion of 'brain architecture' and 'neural-network modelers' (135) would jar with Merleau-Ponty, and this is a point Dreyfus deals with convincingly in his conclusion (142-4). His primary aim is not to show that Merleau-Ponty anticipated such developments; rather, it is to demonstrate that essential *principles* of Merleau-Ponty's conclusions, especially those of the *Phenomenology*, are indeed corroborated by current scientific research — a point well worth making. Both Taylor and Dreyfus draw heavily on Merleau-Ponty's critique of intellectualism and empiricism in the *Phenomenology*, and the reader will find details of these arguments outlined in Taylor Carman's 'Sensation, Judgement, and the Phenomenal Field', along with general comparisons and contrasts with thinkers such as Dennett (58ff) and, more briefly, Sellars (53, 60).

Another group of articles, concerning science, perception, and the body, although of course they stand independently, can be read as complements to these three essays. 'Motives, Reasons, and Causes', by Mark A. Wrathall, explains Merleau-Ponty's relation, at the time of the *Phenomenology*, to the general framework of Cartesian dualism. The essay examines Merleau-Ponty's concept of the 'lived body' (112) in comparison, first, to the concept of mind, and, secondly, to the concept of the body understood primarily as an object of sense. For Wrathall, it is essentially the employment of a particular understanding of the notion of 'motives' (or grounds, *motifs*) that enables Merleau-Ponty to account for human existence without recourse to modes of explanation that are essentially 'causal' or 'rational'. Wrathall also briefly attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty's relation to thinkers such as Quine and Davidson (122ff). Again, causality and rationality are at issue in Joseph Rouse's 'Merleau-Ponty's Existential Conception of Science', the focus is the *Phenomenology*, and an attempt is made to relate this work to 'Anglo-American' philosophers, especially philosophers of science (288, n. 1). Beginning from the acknowledgment that '[r]ealist interpretations of scientific theories have been widely discussed in recent philosophy of science', and that 'arguments for scientific realism acquire their force from critiques of idealism' (266), Rouse aims to show the relevance of Merleau-Ponty's arguments, which were often developed along the lines of similar discussion and critique, although arriving at very different conclusions.

The theme of science remains at the heart of 'The Embryology of the (In)visible', by Mark B. N. Hansen. Here, however, our companion moves beyond the *Phenomenology*, focusing on Merleau-Ponty's involvement during the mid-1950s with 'the biological sciences' (231), and arguing that this involvement was essential to the philosopher's formulation of 'a properly philosophical concept of embodied life necessarily situated beneath the division between consciousness and body' (231). Once more, a contrast with Dennett (and also with Francisco Varela) is sketched out in the essay's concluding pages (256ff). Although Sean Dorrance Kelly's 'Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty' does come back to the *Phenomenology*, he also draws from Merleau-Ponty's later works, attempting to interpret what precisely Merleau-Ponty means when he describes the act of seeing, yielding perhaps the most provocative essay of the collection — as Kelly appears to realise. The title itself has a double meaning; indeed, Kelly wonders if he might not be reading too much into Merleau-Ponty's work: 'what [Merleau-Ponty] does say [about seeing] points unequivocally in the direction of an overall view that he seems not to have been able to articulate himself. I leave it to the reader to determine whether the interpretation I give is reckless or responsible' (76).

In 'Merleau-Ponty and the Touch of Malebranche', Judith Butler explores two important aspects of the act of seeing: sentience and the body. Here, although the discussion of the philosopher's early work continues, Butler focuses on lectures Merleau-Ponty delivered in 1947-48, concomitantly at the Sorbonne and the University of Lyon, within the context of a rigorous competitive exam with no definite equivalent in the English-speaking world,

known as the *agrégation*. Exploring the influence of Malebranche, Butler briefly develops a link to Merleau-Ponty's later ontology (193-7) developed in the unfinished manuscript known as *The Visible and the Invisible*. In 'The Silent, Limping Body of Philosophy', Richard Shusterman also deals with Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the body, but he is highly critical of it, drawing from what he calls Merleau-Ponty's refusal to acknowledge 'conscious somatic sensations' (151), and attempting a dubious reconciliation with pragmatism (165ff, 175ff).

Besides science, perception, and the problematic dualism of mind and body, the scope of Merleau-Ponty's work is vast, and Cambridge has tried to cover this diversity. Merleau-Ponty was concerned with and involved in debates about the pressing issues of his age, not just in philosophy, but in politics and art; he was a *philosophe engagé*. Three essays here take up these issues. In 'Understanding the Engaged Philosopher: On Politics, Philosophy, and Art', Lydia Goehr attempts to demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty's activity as a philosopher determined his dealings with political thought and art. After stating in her introduction that her essay is in part about what she terms Merleau-Ponty's 'lifelong intellectual partnership with Sartre' (318), Goehr disappoints the reader somewhat by not saying more about the early years of this partnership, a period Sartre described as the purest moment of their friendship. Also, towards the end of the article a confusion exists concerning the dates of Merleau-Ponty's writings, and this adversely affects the argument. (A confusion also exists, in the book's 'Introduction', concerning the title of one of Merleau-Ponty's unfinished projects [3-4]). The political aspect of Merleau-Ponty's thought is the main focus of 'Thinking Politics', by Claude Lefort, first published in French in 1963 and translated here, albeit partially, for the first time into English. Although the excerpt is quite intelligible in itself, and informative about Merleau-Ponty's engagement with and critique of Marxism, the work has been somewhat truncated, with the missing early section lending weight in the original to Lefort's style and ideas. 'Between Philosophy and Art', by Jonathan Gilmore, explores the rather curious thesis that Merleau-Ponty's various writings on art 'illustrate and extend his general philosophical views but generate no philosophy of art in themselves' (292).

Renaud Barbaras' 'A Phenomenology of Life' implicitly ties together many of the above-mentioned themes. In a series of searching analyses that take into account central concepts from all periods of the philosopher's work, Barbaras contends that the primary purpose of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is to give meaning to the Husserlian concept of the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) developed in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is understood most precisely as a phenomenology of *life*, where 'life' is understood not only in relation to a privileged subject (211), but also in terms of the specificity of life generally, 'of biological life, as the identity of reality and phenomenon' (212). It is, Barbaras argues, Merleau-Ponty's investigations concerning life which first allow him to pose the problem of the status of the phenomenon within the experience of consciousness. Later, turning to an examination of living

beings generally during his courses on nature, and finding his initial philosophical standpoint unsatisfactory, Merleau-Ponty finally moves beyond the framework of the *Phenomenology* to an ontological approach to philosophy (211), Barbaras contends, by questioning the ontological status of life. In the general context of Barbaras' thesis, the discussions of the body, seeing, perception, politics, art, and the practice of philosophy itself, are situated — implicitly, yet very precisely — as the essential attributes, functions, and activities of a striving, living creature. As Barbaras lucidly explains: 'The heart of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical inquiry is ... the movement by which a living being transcends its materiality and gives rise to meaningful existence and, conversely, the fact that every meaning, whatever its degree of abstraction, has its roots in corporeal life' (211).

Stephen A. Noble

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Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan

*Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument,
Structure and Myth in the Symposium.*

University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 2004.

Pp. xii + 266.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02462-3);

US\$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-271-02913-7).

This welcome study of Plato's *Symposium* is the offspring of a unique dialectic between its two authors. Kevin Corrigan has a Ph.D. in Classics and Philosophy, while Elena Glazov-Corrigan did her doctorate in Comparative Literature, focusing on Russian literature, English literature, and literary theory. Their fertile disciplinary union has borne an interpretation of the *Symposium* that takes scholarly understanding of the dialogue to a higher level.

The ambitions of this book might seem manifest *hybris*: to lay bare the complex structural design of the dialogue; to solve the problem of the relationship between the 'non-philosophical' details of the *Symposium* and the philosophical material in the middle dialogues, especially the *Republic*; to demonstrate a correspondence between each speaker's character and his or her vision of Eros; to analyze the relationships between each speech and all the others in the *Symposium*, as well as to other dialogues; to confirm the *Symposium* as the first novel in history; and to define a Platonic theory of the role of art in philosophical dialectic by reading the *Symposium* as a

companion piece to the *Republic*. These ambitious aims are approached with reference to the established scholarly responses to the dialogue, responses that are impressively mastered and respectfully incorporated within an interpretation that seeks to go beyond them. All of this seems an enormously ambitious task for a book of this size, and yet the importance of this work is that it goes far enough in meeting its goals, without tying every argument up into a neat bundle, to have opened many paths to further fruitful discussion.

A central problem, introduced in Chapter 1, is the apparent discrepancy between the criticism in the *Republic* of art as mimesis and the very artful presentation of the *Symposium* itself, a dialogue populated with artistic characters, illustrated by myths, and structured as an imitation of an imitation. Chapter 2 argues that the self-conscious destruction of an established factual narrative, that of Aristodemus, illustrates a distinction between barren mimesis and the 'hybristic' transformation that is part of a dialectical creative process. A relationship between the *Protagoras*, which introduces the major sophists, and the *Symposium*, portraying their students, is established as part of the focus in the *Symposium* on the problem of the transmission of wisdom. This relationship verifies Socrates' claim that wisdom is not a commodity that can be physically transferred or imitated.

Chapter 3 surveys scholarship on the significance of the order of speeches in the dialogue, and foreshadows the reading in Chapter 4 of the early speeches as representative not only of each speaker but also of different genres. For example, Phaedrus, as mythologue, is rehabilitated as an eager learner providing the impulse for the other speeches, not criticized as a poor teacher about love. Aristophanes receives lengthy attention as a representative of the class of poetic mythmakers. His particular myth illustrates the points made in the *Republic* that the natural object of mimesis, delightful as it may be, is the inferior part of human nature. At the same time his mythic narrative may be read as a parody of Platonic dialectic itself, while inviting questions about the nature of human identity in relation to the divine. Agathon, 'the child of plenty' whose highly refined art adorns thoughtlessness, is most tragic, the representative of the brilliance of Athenian manhood corrupted by a facile sophistic education and a mob of fans, thus illustrating the process of corruption of the good described in *Republic* 492a ff.

Chapter 5 interprets the speech of Diotima-Socrates, which introduces dialectic into the dialogue as a 'prism' through which the previous speeches are refracted and transformed. Diotima herself, as a faceless and absent other, is a paradigm for the dialectical process that constitutes the ascent to the divine, and her myth of Eros' birth enacts the activity of philosophy itself. Chapter 6 reads Diotima's account of the Greater Mysteries and the ascent as a 'multidimensional energy focus for the pulsating design' (5) of the dialogue, creatively destroying and transforming each of the previous speeches, and representing a positive idea of art as dialectic. Chapter 7 presents Alcibiades' disruption as an authentic confirmation of Socrates as a unique philosopher on the mystical ascent outlined by Diotima, while he

himself represents the failure of a mimetic, as opposed to a dialectic, search for wisdom. The eighth and final chapter is an overview of the dialogue as a transformative, liberating interplay of diverse voices and genres, all of which, while imperfect and monolithic in themselves, respond to and reflect on one another to yield a whole much greater than its parts. The authors follow Bakhtin in their claim that the *Symposium*, as a self-conscious, dialogical presentation of many voices and genres, infused with disruptive physical humour, is the first novel in history, one which dramatizes the dialectic outlined in the *Republic*. The book ends with a final flourish in which Plato is compared to polytropic Odysseus, that 'clever, angular-thinking Greek' (237), the storyteller who disrupts and transforms a monolithic epic past.

This book makes some big leaps that are usually well supported by argument, but some claims provoke a skeptical response, e.g., that 'thought' (rather than Zeus as a slow thinker) is ridiculed by Aristophanes at 190c1-3 (74). The problem (21), 'How are we supposed to read a Platonic dialogue if every incidental detail is potentially significant?', remains unresolved. Some details seem quite arbitrarily selected for interpretation. A much more productive failure, however, is of the sort inevitable for a single volume on such a complex subject: having elucidated the complex and important relationship between the *Symposium* and other dialogues, this book traces only a few of the many possible paths of connection, mostly to the *Republic*. However, in so doing it offers a paradigm and an open field for further work on Plato's dialectical play.

This book is essential for any serious reader of Plato.

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Donald Davidson

Truth, Language, and History.

Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. xx + 350.

Cdn\$139.50: US\$74.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-823756-1);

Cdn\$54.00: \$27.50

(paper: ISBN 0-19-823757-X).

This is the fifth and final collection of Davidson's essays published by Oxford University Press. The first two collections, *Essays on Actions and Events* and *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (ITI)* were published in the early-

1980s, while *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective* and *Problems of Rationality* were released in 2001 and 2004 respectively. As Davidson's work consists almost solely of journal articles, the publication of these volumes makes this the first time in more than twenty years that all of his most important essays are available in book form.

This volume contains twenty essays in four sections. The selection and grouping of these essays provide an insight into how Davidson viewed his own work and where he saw connections between seemingly disparate topics, but more importantly they allow us the opportunity to assess the evolution of Davidson's thought after the publication of the first two volumes. In the first section, 'Truth', he had two main projects. First, Davidson was always a proponent of the Tarskian theory of truth and he here tried to show the usefulness of that theory (e.g., in helping to articulate a theory of meaning), to defend it from various criticisms, and to explain how it differs in important respects from minimalist, disquotational, and redundancy accounts (labels frequently associated with Tarski's account). Second, Davidson argued against the idea that truth can be defined. According to him, 'the concepts philosophers single out for attention, like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right, are the most elementary concepts we have, concepts without which ... we would have no concepts at all. Why then should we expect to be able to reduce these concepts definitionally to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic?' (20). This may seem strange coming from someone who endorsed what is frequently called the Tarskian *definition* of truth, but Davidson was careful to show us that Tarski was in fact not defining truth in general, but rather characterizing and formalizing how it is that truth works in particular languages.

The second section, 'Language', is an interesting selection of essays, especially for those who associate Davidson's philosophy of language with the program to develop a formal semantics for natural languages, as articulated in *ITI*. It appears that Davidson was no longer pursuing that project, but had instead embarked on a program more in line with communication-intention theorists like Paul Grice. In this section he argued that if one were to define language as a conventional object which individuals first acquire in order to successfully communicate, a definition which he thinks many philosophers had indeed adopted, then he would (notoriously) conclude 'that there is no such thing as a language' (107). How then do we explain the success of communication? In developing his answer, Davidson adopted a theory whereby the speaker's intentions to be understood in a particular way play the primary role. These are exciting essays that encourage one to question whether Davidson had changed his mind with respect to the program he initiated in *ITI* or merely changed his interest and emphasis.

The third section, 'Anomalous Monism', contains two essays on Davidson's trademark brand of non-reductive physicalism that he first articulated in a series of essays in the early '70s. His goal here was to defend that theory and respond to criticisms. He suggested that many criticisms, in particular of his claim that there are no psycho-physical laws, are a result of his failure to

clearly distinguish between strict laws (which are exceptionless and contain no *ceteris paribus* clauses) and non-strict laws. Davidson came to agree with Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim that there are laws of some sort linking mental and physical events, but, he continued, 'what I have claimed is that such laws are not strict, and that mental concepts are not reducible by definition or by strict "bridging" laws to physical concepts' (194). It remains to be seen whether this is a clarification of Davidson's controversial thesis, or a rejection of those aspects of it that made it controversial and interesting in the first place.

The most unexpected section is the fourth, 'Historical Thoughts'. Davidson is not well known for his work in the history of philosophy, but, as he pointed out in interviews elsewhere, he had the opportunity to teach in almost every area of philosophy during his career as a university professor. This section consists of six essays dealing with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Gadamer. In general, the essays concern those aspects of their work that overlap with Davidson's own concerns. About Spinoza he said, 'I suppose it is inevitable what when we try to understand a philosopher whom we find altogether admirable, yet difficult and obscure, we are drawn to an interpretation which we find as consistent and congenial as charity prompts and honesty permits. Thus I do not feel abashed to admit that the reading I find plausible of Spinoza's ontological monism coupled with a dualistic (or multiple) explanatory apparatus is close to my own view of the relation between the mental and the physical' (308). This tendency to read the great philosophers this way is particularly evident in his essays on Plato's *Philebus*, where Davidson suggested that the Socrates of the *Philebus* agrees with him that we can discover moral truths through a careful and sympathetic conversation with a fellow truth-seeker. In this respect, he suggested that the Socratic elenchus is one way to reach communicative and conceptual consensus through what he saw as Plato's unarticulated appeal to what Davidson had elsewhere referred to as the 'principle of charity'.

Overall this is an excellent volume of essays coming from one of the most important philosophers of the last fifty years. It would be of interest to anyone interested in the ways Davidson's philosophy evolved after the publication of the first two volumes, and it is essential reading for anyone working in philosophy of language or philosophy of mind.

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Jane Duran

*Eight Women Philosophers:
Theory, Politics and Feminism.*

Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2006.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-03022-2);

US\$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-07265-0).

For the last thirty years, feminists have been engaged in the recuperation of the work of women philosophers from the dustiest, most-forgotten shelves of the most forsaken libraries. These efforts have shaken up the all-male canon without doing much lasting damage. Courses in the history of philosophy, reading lists for comprehensive exams, and the itinerary of intelligent grad students still feature lists of names that are too frequently all male, all white, all European — the failure of many to notice continues with intrepid persistence.

The feminist project of recovery also continues, marked in the dawning moments of our new century by the publication of a number of works on women philosophers, among which we find Duran's newest book. Her *Eight Women Philosophers* represents a vigorous push back against the resistance to recognizing thinkers like Hildegard von Bingen, Anne Conway, or Simone Weil as philosophers whose works are not only worthy of study in their own right, but can and should contribute to our discussions of contemporary philosophical questions. The eight women shared an 'awareness of their status as women' (5) that serves to unite their work across enormous gaps in time.

Duran insists that the work of each of her eight women thinkers can and should be recognized as philosophical. This insistence is strained at times, partly because Duran herself is apparently ambivalent about what 'philosophical' should mean. On the one hand, she seems to accept a narrow, masculinist definition, both by justifying her choice of thinkers on the basis of whether or not men of their time recognized them as philosophers (3), and by a somewhat forced focus on the moments in each thinker's work in which epistemological, axiological, or metaphysical concerns come to the fore or can be ferreted out of their explicitly social and political writings. At the same time, Duran is aware that serious study of the work of women like von Bingen and Harriet Taylor Mill produces countless fissures in such narrow notions of the 'philosophical' — and that philosophy is the better for it.

Duran argues that each of the thinkers she includes is a harbinger of more contemporary feminist concerns, in that each shows evidence of 'modes of cognition that can be deemed to be gynocentric' (96). By 'gynocentric' Duran means a pattern of conceptual organization that values 'interconnectedness, nonobjectification, identification with the other, and concern for one outside oneself' (64); here the particular is prized and relational structures are the object of philosophical attention. Duran's account of how such 'gynocentricity' is present in the work of each thinker is sometimes convincing (Edith Stein's shift from phenomenology to Christian faith, she argues, was motivated by her desire to give an adequate account of the Other [174]) and sometimes so

forced as to undermine her own project of taking these thinkers seriously (as when she argues that, despite her political conservatism, the 'gynocentricity' in Mary Astell's life is to be found in 'her choice of companions and the styles of interaction between them' (97)). She finds evidence of a 'gynocentric conceptual pattern' (138) in von Bingen's wholism (29, 37), Conway's sympathy to animals (59, 69), Weil's claim that human needs are sacred (199), and de Beauvoir's preoccupation with the Other (223).

At some points, 'gynocentric' seems to mean simply exhibiting a 'deep concern for the individual' (84), a virtue with which Duran credits Astell (84), Mill (157, 160), Stein (172) and Weil (201). It remains for the reader to discover how this concern for the individual is different from that in the masculinist liberal tradition, and how it makes peace with the relationality and interconnectedness that are also part of the 'gynocentric conceptual pattern.'

Duran credits von Bingen (40), Astell (95), Wollstonecraft (124-5) and Mill with a latent standpoint epistemology, arguing that they provide a kind of direct ancestry for contemporary feminist thinking. This claim is an important one, because part of what justifies the study of women philosophers *as women* is their marginalization and the wisdom it sometimes manages to produce. In the case of Mill, however, Duran is in danger of leaving the impression that her most significant contribution to philosophy is *merely* her standpoint (154, 156); she contributed 'a view of the world ... significantly different from John's because of both gender and self-education' (156), and she provided him with 'a new filter through which to see things' (155).

Part of what is produced by our contemporary marginalization as women and as feminist philosophers is a need to defend and protect those who have preceded us. This is part of the 'gynocentricity' in our own perspectives, our own valuing of interconnection and relation over the more masculine style of aggressive supercession. There are times, however, when we are not well served by such protectiveness, and we find instances in Duran's book. At several points, she speculates about how a thinker might have thought about or contributed to a problem she never addressed directly. She imagines that Conway's notion of gradations in the vitalistic mixture of spirit and matter would not have allowed her to *wholly* degrade and dismiss colonized people. She fantasizes a link between the conservative Astell's 'concern that women possessed virtues that might not be shared by men' (98) and contemporary claims that children of color must be educated in an environment in which their own abilities and cultures are respected. She speculates that Wollstonecraft would have developed a class analysis had she lived at another time (124-7). In each case, Duran hopes to find for the thinker in question a place on the right side of relations of power based on nation, race, or class. If we want to argue that these thinkers contributed to the development of Western culture, however, we will have to accept that they also bear responsibility for the ways this culture has been a culture of domination. Along with our compassionate and generous re-evaluations of their work, our enthusiastic reception of the liberatory impulses we find there, we must insist on rigor-

ously critical accounts of the ways that they also benefited by relations of power over other Others.

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Paul Fairfield

Public/Private.

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers 2005.

Pp. 160.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-4957-7);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-4958-5).

In this excellent, highly readable book, Paul Fairfield revisits the distinction between public and private spheres in ways that will be interesting and useful to students (graduate and undergraduate) and professional scholars in social and political philosophy, normative ethics, legal theory, and feminist theory. Beginning with a concise account of the displacement of classical Greek prizing of public over household life by the classical liberal expansion and elevation of the private sphere, Fairfield turns to what he regards to be the most compelling case for the obliteration of the doctrine of privacy, emerging from feminist legal and political theory, that insists it has lent moral credibility to the perpetuation of gendered inequalities by shielding politically relevant domestic violence and domination from institutional intervention. Sympathetic to this diagnosis, but not to the prescribed remedy, Fairfield argues against a more onerous public power, suggesting instead that we explore and rearticulate this political principle drawing on the field of social ontology or upon phenomenological reflection concerning the nature of intimacy and social distance.

Fairfield argues that public and private spheres are regulated by tacit and shared understandings of social distance that we become most aware of when personal boundaries are overstepped. Proximity between persons is contingent on the nature of the relationship they share, and respecting other human beings as such involves recognizing their sovereignty with respect to matters of social distance and the right to protect 'profound dimensions of [their] lives from invasions that would degrade them' (16). Private life, in other words, is a political condition of possibility and becoming for individual lives and selves that are fragile and engaged in formative processes in and through fashioning decisions. Privacy as a value safeguards against encroaching, condemnatory majorities by regulating the moral distance among

persons. It emerges, then, neither as limited to the domestic realm, family life, and property, nor as a place in which a 'will to tyrannize' runs unchecked. It is instead the 'the portable territory of the self' (28), a region that, unlike private property, erects boundaries in intersubjective and ethical, rather than physical, space (125).

Fairfield argues that the ambiguity that surrounds principles like that of privacy require 'concrete determination in particular acts of criticism' (35) as exemplified in his second chapter concerning privacy in the information age and the particularly strong third chapter, 'Political Philosophy in the Bedroom', which I hope will be widely used and reprinted in courses and texts exploring homophobia and sexual identity. Fairfield here skillfully takes on one instance of 'political moralism', or the fashioning of law to reflect what powerful majorities consider virtuous. Asking why there is so much investment by individuals of a majority sexual orientation in emphasizing themselves as normal, Fairfield turns to the most widespread attacks on homosexuality, those that draw on the authority of the Bible (exaggerating the significance of the proscriptions within it as compared with those that appear much more frequently against adultery or bearing false witness) and those that challenge the 'naturalness' of using sexual organs for anything other than 'their purpose' of reproduction. Fairfield shows that in both cases the arguments are not really arguments so much as rationalizations of raw animosity, the equivalent and counterpart to anti-sodomy laws that are not enforced but remain on the books with the sole purpose of insulting and expressing public hostility to gay men (83).

Probing further, Fairfield explores the tenor, specifically the shrill quality, of arguments against homosexuality and gay marriage, asking why the condemnation of both outstrips what might be directed at divorce, spousal abuse, or even child abuse. Contempt, he reflects, is a kind of hatred we feel for people or ways of being in the world that we could be or become that would 'contravene our present mode of self-understanding' (95). Homosexuality, in other words, threatens neither society nor marriage, but 'the psychological integrity of certain heterosexual personalities' (95) that resist seeing as assailable and contingent their own forms of sexuality and intimacy. The state or public power, concludes Fairfield, has no place in the bedroom, not because it is located within a piece of private property, nor even because sex can take place within it, but because privacy is a normative condition of interpersonal intimacy and strong mutuality born from an openness in which nothing is held back. What is required for intimacy is a set of consensual relations. The gender of the people involved is irrelevant.

The greatest weakness of this book is a function of one of its strengths: Fairfield reintroduces the resources that liberalism offers, in particular a refashioned doctrine of privacy emphasizing the dialectical and co-relative values of social and individual selves. This is highly useful in this political period in which liberal language is frequently used to undercut liberal practices. Fairfield's use of John Locke's and J. S. Mill's theory of harm to delineate the limitation of privacy, specifically that what might have been

private becomes public only when the sovereignty of another person is impinged upon, addresses a fundamental concern of Fairfield: that individuals should not have to give an account of their choices to conservative majorities, as well as satisfying the logical necessity that its limits are identified by that which establishes the right's necessity. Yet the conclusion, which limits the sphere of politics to the punitive, is the book's main weakness. It leaves the reader uncertain that purely administrative public institutions and private cultural norms could themselves sustain the values of privacy that Fairfield advocates. Resolving this uncertainty seems particularly urgent given the introduction of 'privatization' as the seeming panacea for the troubles of previously public institutions. The results have been at best mixed, but have, by definition, withdrawn such difficulties and a sense of responsibility for them from public view.

In sum, Fairfield's wonderfully sober reflections offer a rich formulation of privacy as an antidote to a culture of exposure and disclosure gone mad, reminding readers that — although the impulse to reveal is linked to scholarly projects of enlightenment — profundity, maturity, creativity, intimacy, and genuine mourning seek more shadowy alternatives to the glare of adolescent obsessions with surface appearances, conformity, and normalization.

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Alex Fisher

The Logic of Real Arguments.

2nd edn. New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp xii + 224.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-65241-3);

US\$22.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-65481-5).

This is a textbook of informal logic, treating what Fisher calls 'real' arguments, ones which are according to him not treatable with skills generally learned in a first course on argumentation (vii). It differs from most informal logic texts, treating in detail long challenging excerpts from texts both classic (Malthus) and recent (Dawkins). These excerpts are the only exercises; there are no short drill-type exercises (which in other books often use made-up examples) nor exercises testing terminology and technique.

The title of Chapter 2, 'A general method of argument analysis' (14), seems a little rich. Essentially the content is a rather small subset of standard methods presented in such texts as Trudy Govier's (broader) *A Practical Study of Argument*. As with that text, the methods presented are solid and well-tested, but not hackneyed or outdated. Simple formal methods (truth-tables, etc.) are presented in an appendix and drawn upon only where needed. This approach has some appeal, as in-depth presentation of these methods previous to their use may distract from the bigger picture. The rest of the book consists of very detailed analyses of scholarly arguments and of a few political opinion pieces, gradually becoming more complex as the book proceeds. The book ends with a series of excerpts as exercises for readers. Running commentary, marks, and diagrams intervene in the reconstructions and analyses of arguments to instruct students in the steps of the process. In these reconstructions Fisher's analyses of which conclusions purport to follow from which reasons are exceedingly clear and convincing. However, I have some qualms to which I will presently turn.

Formal argumentation is in no way primary in this text. Fisher's arguments are from reasons (not premises) to conclusions. His standard of argument is that the reasons cannot be true and the conclusion false 'judging by appropriate standards of argument or appropriate standards of what is possible' (27). These are taken on a case-by-case basis throughout the book, and Fisher notes that working out these standards is to be regarded as itself a key task of argument assessment (28). Not surprisingly then, there is more with which to disagree in Fisher's judgments of argument adequacy than in the initial reconstructions. There seem to me to be some very questionable, even some unfair, judgments here. For example, Fisher states baldly (95) that the existence of the universe is improbable; this kind of statement, with no account given of the meaning of 'probable' in the pertinent context, seems to mask an entirely personal, impressionistic judgment. However, these disagreements may actually increase the value of the text, since, regardless of one's opinion of Fisher's analyses, they will be useful for classroom discussion. Students also could take issue with the initial reconstructions, but plausible alternatives are likely to be minor variants given Fisher's highly perspicuous presentation.

In many if not most cases, reconstructions and assessments of arguments do not depend very heavily on particular views concerning the place of formality in good argumentation. Fisher might disagree, and if I am right that his analyses are not heavily dependent on such views, his presentation nevertheless is motivated by them. In particular he does not look for an argument pattern in which to fit reasons and conclusions, as do many authors. In some cases, though, assessments would have benefited from more attention to the logical structure of entailments.

Consider, for example, Fisher's analysis of Thomas Malthus' argument for the impossibility of a relatively leisurely, stable culture. Malthus appeals to a principle of geometric population growth as contrasted with an allegedly linear growth of food production. Fisher notes that the empirical evidence for

these growth curves is insufficient (45-6). He fails to note, though, that the argument has simple variants whereby the case can be made with alternative growth curves. Whatever other weaknesses Malthus' argument has, it can easily be strengthened by employing less specific (hence more plausible) models of population and resource extraction growth. It only requires that population increase faster than resource extraction. In informal logic we are not only concerned with whether arguments go through, but also with whether they have plausible variants.

I suggest that identifying abstract classes of arguments, while not necessarily precluded by Fisher's approach, is more easily grasped through formal analyses. More generally, formal methods are a more powerful tool for discriminating good from bad arguments than Fisher allows. This is particularly true for much op-ed material in newspapers, which is very prone to elementary fallacies. Fisher does not try to take on such material, confining his attention to more sophisticated arguments. While this allows Fisher's text to excel for his purpose, it ignores an important aspect of informal logic and critical thinking courses. As with Fisher's argument assessments, these matters invite class discussion, and thus may enhance, rather than diminish, the book's pedagogical value. In addition, Fisher's book has few real competitors, and given the rather sluggish pace of advanced publications in this genre, this will likely continue to be the case.

Everyone interested in informal logic should have a copy of this text, particularly those teaching informal logic courses. But I would not assign it to students in place of a text such as Govier's, and given textbook costs to students I would be reluctant to require Fisher's book as supplemental. It would be useful for a sequel course in informal logic, but these are rarely offered in North American universities. Together with Stephen Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument*, the book might be useful for an honours seminar on argumentative standards in philosophy. It also might be useful for specialist courses in disciplines other than philosophy, such as history and the social sciences. It uses little undefined jargon, and so can be read by students in any program. It would be an excellent reference work for any student.

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Joseph Fitzpatrick

Philosophical Encounters:

Lonergan and the Analytic Tradition.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005.

Pp. 233.

Cdn/US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-3844-1);

Cdn\$/US\$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-4884-6).

This book brings the thought of late Canadian Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904-84) into critical interaction with some major ideas from key thinkers in analytic philosophy. Fitzpatrick hopes to show that, while Lonergan shares many concerns with the likes of Hume, Polanyi, Wittgenstein, and Rorty, his thought is a fruitful source for augmenting strengths and overcoming weaknesses within important aspects of the empiricist and analytic traditions.

Fitzpatrick describes Lonergan's cognitive method in a short opening chapter. Lonergan developed a cognitive theory and a correlative 'critical realism' that achieved a remarkable synthesis of the Aristotelian/Thomist tradition with Kant, Hegel, and the methods of empirical science. His cornerstone was the development of a theory of cognition wherein knowledge of the external world is achieved through a dynamic process, a spontaneously operative method employing distinct levels of sensory and intellectual apprehension that together form a self-correcting spiral of learning. By leading readers through thought experiments and other verifiable analyses of our mental operations, Lonergan helps us discover what all of us are doing when we go about learning and knowing, though we rarely advert to the subtle distinctions at play in these subjective operations of consciousness. This is not, however, to base knowledge on a psychologism or behaviourism.

The book then unfolds in three general parts, though these are not quite the ones identified in the table of contents. The first part comprises chapters on Hume, Needham, Hampshire, and Polanyi that act as foils to develop, by comparison and contrast, Lonergan's position on such notions as sense experience and the empirical aspect of consciousness, the notion of belief and its distinction from knowledge, and the notion of objectivity and the possibility of knowing we have attained such a state.

The second section contains chapters discussing Russell, Wittgenstein, and Rorty, that are the real meat of the book. It is clear that Wittgenstein is the primary thinker with whom Fitzpatrick (lovingly) interacts, though Russell is well treated too. These chapters present fine overviews of Russell's logical atomism and his later theory of definite descriptions; Wittgenstein's earlier work in the *Tractatus* and his major shift toward a social and intersubjective theory of language and meaning; and finally, Rorty's demolition of the ocular theory of 'knowing as looking' that has plagued philosophy of mind and epistemology since Descartes.

Lonergan is brought into dialogue with these thinkers and others to show that logic and sense data, while not foundations themselves, cannot be

abandoned either. For they are still essential as *parts* of an underlying foundational process, a dynamic interaction of our several modes of intentionality that may produce insights and verify them as salient to our empirical interaction with the world. Lonergan subsumes key truths from the analytic philosophers within this higher order cognitive process that can be shown to be the actual operation that generates knowledge of facts and values. This dynamic cognitive process replaces a static foundation such as sense perception, or a tautological foundation such as logic, with a properly basic general method that includes recurring stages that are empirical, logical, reflectively critical, and self-consciously responsible. This same process operates across such diverse blocks of knowing as history, science, philosophy, ethics, and even common sense coping with the exigencies of practical life. The process also validates Wittgenstein's and Rorty's concern that social and culturally relative inception of knowledge be admitted as well.

The last three chapters form a fourth section of the work, a more focused project of applying Lonergan's ideas to some classic problems: the fact/value dichotomy emerging from Humean thought; a challenge to the lack of epistemic foundations in Wittgenstein's notion of 'forms of life' as context and basis for linguistic meaning; and a further discussion of subjectivity and what we mean by the term 'objectivity'. The upshot is that objectivity regarding what is real and what is good is never some impossible escape from subjectivity and preference, but is the grand accomplishment of the well-functioning human subject.

A problem with this otherwise fine book is one often found with attempts to make Lonergan accessible through a mere introductory work — the difficulty of trying to impart in twenty pages a system of thought that took Lonergan several hundred pages to work out himself. Lonergan's cognitive theory can seem almost obvious once one 'gets it', but getting it involves many reflective encounters with examples and exercises, as well as a critical historical investigation of past philosophical achievements, that cannot be adequately addressed or included in a book that is this concise.

Thus, while Lonergan coined terminology that is very precise, to the untrained ear it will often sound like new-age gobbledygook. Such terms as levels of consciousness, transcendental method, self-transcendence, self-presence in consciousness, among others may leave the novice feeling that some kind of slight of hand is masquerading as explanation. Other terms, such as the 'pure desire to know' and the 'generalized empirical method' would become clearer through more and better examples. A quick way to help the reader would have been to indicate just how close many of Lonergan's terms are to their classical correlates. A glossary of terms is provided that is of some help in this regard. Elements of his phenomenology of mind, for example, are largely taken from Aristotle's *De Anima* and Aquinas' *Treatise on Man*. These are at least more familiar starting points for the Lonergan novice.

Despite understandable shortcomings in presenting Lonergan's complex views, Fitzpatrick's book nevertheless provides a succinct and clear review of key points in the thought of popular analytic philosophers, and should

stimulate readers to investigate Lonergan's major work, *Insight*, for themselves.

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Gábor Forrai and George Kampis, eds.
Intentionality: Past and Future.
New York: Rodopi 2005.
Pp. x + 181.
US\$50.00. ISBN: 90-420-1817-8.

This is a collection of eleven papers on intentionality based on the proceedings of a conference organized by the University of Miskolc (Miskolc) and the Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest). The conference aimed to stimulate a broad examination of the issues of intentionality in the light of its past and in the context of contemporary research. Another aim was to use the discussion of intentionality as a platform to encourage greater interaction between the analytic and the phenomenological traditions, with the hope of bridging the gap between them.

One paper that stands out is 'Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality' by William Fish. Fish argues against the traditional view according to which emotions, in virtue of being targeted, have intentional properties, and moods, being general, do not. Instead Fish suggests that, like moods, emotions are characterized by a 'wide' intentional engagement with the world, and their being targeted is explained not by a difference in the intentional mode, but by the subject's awareness of the grounds for the emotional state. Fish manages to simplify the taxonomy of intentional states, while effectively explaining their differences by relating emotions to the underlying nexus of beliefs and justifications.

The volume also contains papers concerned with more traditional discussions of the nature of perceptual content. In 'Sense-Data, Intentionality, and Common Sense', Howard Robinson aims to reconcile the positions of the sense-datum theorists and the common sense realists. He argues for the understanding of perceptual contents on analogy with propositional contents — as a form of judgment. Understanding phenomenal contents on analogy with words within propositions avoids skepticism in relation to the objective world because the perceptual judgments are no more about the sense-data than the propositional judgments are about words. Extending the analogy, Robinson blocks the argument from hallucination by comparing perceptions to verbal statements which lack reference but remain meaningful.

Unlike Robinson, János Tozsér undertakes to resolve the conflict between the intentionalists and the sense-datum theorists by proposing his Disjunctive Theory. In 'The Content of Perceptual Experience', he argues that the traditional response to the argument from hallucination, based on analogy between beliefs and perceptions, fails, because the analogy fails. Unlike beliefs, perceptions do imply the existence of objects. However, the sense-datum theory is also unsatisfactory, since it cannot explain the fact that perceptual experience is transparent to its content — an object of the mind-independent world. The Disjunctive Theory solves this problem by rejecting the internalist assumption, common to these theories, that the indistinguishability of mental states implies sameness of mental states. If the individuation of mental states cannot be done in isolation from the subject's environment, then the commitment to the objective world is preserved, while the argument from hallucination is blocked.

The volume includes Alberto Voltolini's illuminating paper 'How to Get Intentionality by Language', in which he criticizes the traditional acceptance of referential opacity and the failure of existential generalization as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for intentional, and specifically, directional contexts. He argues that such criteria are too wide and too narrow to capture directional contexts, and they fail to match the elements of their purported folk-psychological counterparts: existence-independence and aspectual character of intentional objects. Better criteria would be represented by referential pseudo-opacity and the success of existentially unloaded particular quantification, which would separate intentional contexts from modal ones, and provide for existence-independence and the aspectual character of reference within directional contexts.

In 'The Intentionality of Reference in Husserl and the Analytic Tradition', Shannon Valor deals with failure of substitutivity within certain linguistic contexts, and traces its roots to the exclusion of intensions from logical analysis of expressions within the analytic tradition. He suggests that the solution lies with recognizing that intentional action is an essential and irreducible feature of linguistic reference whose contribution can be directly assessed only through phenomenological reflection and cannot be fully rendered by a third-person objective account.

Analytic philosophers might be interested in 'Normativity and Mental Content' by Jussi Haukioja, in which he argues that Kripke's skeptic could be satisfied if normativity is explained without appeal to platonic intermediaries, such as sets or properties. A form of non-platonic dispositionalism, which relies on meta-dispositions to secure the notion of 'favorable conditions', could provide for standards of correctness. This becomes possible because of our meta-dispositions to discount certain dispositions as false. Whether a first order disposition is correct depends on whether it survives the 'discounting practice' when the question is raised.

The past of the phenomenological tradition is illuminated by papers from such authors as Philip Bartok and Greg Jesson. In 'Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental', Bartok argues that Brentano's work is misun-

derstood, particularly within the analytic tradition as represented by Chisholm. The phenomenological tradition, which views Brentano as engaged in the project of empirical descriptive psychology rather than metaphysical theorizing about the ontological status of intentional objects, represents his work more successfully. In 'The Ontological and Intentional Status of Fregean Senses', Greg Jesson is engaged in a somewhat similar revision of Frege's work. He argues that the analytic tradition, as represented by Michael Dummett and others, misreads Frege by viewing him as being concerned with language rather than ontology and intentionality. Given the proper reading, Frege faces an insurmountable dilemma: either senses are incorporated into the psychological realm to explain the intentionality of mental acts, in which case they are incapable of accounting for objectivity, or they are objective, in which case the grasp of sense and objective reference becomes inexplicable.

Historically-minded philosophers could also find insightful Gábor Forrai's daring interpretation of Locke's ideas as intentional contents, while proponents of the language of thought theory could relate to Laird Addis' treatment of mental contents as a subcategory of simple monadic properties that intend by their inherent nature. Those looking for an insight into the future of intentionality could gain it from a tentative program to naturalize phenomenology presented in a paper by Kenneth Williford.

However, in the end, while doing justice to its title, *Intentionality: Past and Future* does not contain any serious attempts to establish a viable dialogue between the analytic and phenomenological traditions. Conspicuously absent from the volume are any serious discussions of intention-based semantics and the related issues within the philosophy of mind. To that extent, an opportunity was lost.

Anton Petrenko

**Stefano Franchi and
Güven Güzeldere, eds.**

*Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds:
Artificial Intelligence from Automata to
Cyborgs.*

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2005.

Pp. viii + 538.

\$95.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-06243-7);

\$45.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-56206-5).

The editors of this bulky volume tell us that an issue of the *Stanford Humanities Review* 'constituted the seed of the project that culminated in this book' (vii). They don't say that it was the Spring 1995 issue of that pioneering open-access e-journal, nor do they tell us which of the 19 papers in this book derive from it. But since that issue is still online (as of August 28, 2006, at <http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/toc.html>), the reader can see that twelve of its fifteen papers have been reprinted almost unaltered here, a decade later, as is almost all of the editors' 1995 introduction. Whatever the quality of these twelve papers, then, what is the rationale for reproducing them? The editors give no account, nor do they explain their choice of additional material. Why have they reprinted Dretske's 'Machines and the Mental' from — not ten — but twenty years ago? It is an important paper, after all, although the reader wouldn't know from this volume that it has elicited a huge amount of commentary since 1985, or that it predates Harnad's (1990) similar arguments on 'symbol grounding' — they don't even tell us *that* it is a reprint, or *what* its provenance is.

The source of the 1997 *Slate* debate between Dreyfus and Dennett about Kasparov's defeat by Deep Blue is acknowledged (it too is still online, at <http://www.slate.com/id/3650/>). But the mishandling of Evelyn Fox Keller's interesting paper will cause more confusion. It is titled 'Marrying the Pre-modern to the Postmodern: computers and organisms after World War II'. This sounded familiar, as Fox Keller has an excellent paper of this title in a 2002 volume *Prefiguring Cyberspace: an Intellectual History*, edited by Tofts, Jonson, and Cavallero. No problem so far: that volume too is published by MIT, which (I assume) must have some good reason for reprinting it here, and indeed it would fit nicely with Andrew Pickering's strong paper, 'A Gallery of Monsters: cybernetics and self-organization, 1940-1970'. But the paper in the current volume, it turns out, is not *that* paper, and indeed is mis-titled — there is nothing here about the postwar biology and cybernetics. More detective work reveals this mis-titled paper, which discusses cellular automata and artificial life, as the final chapter, 'Synthetic Biology Redux', of Fox Keller's 2002 book *Making Sense of Life* — reprinted without acknowledgement.

Of course delays and setbacks can occur in the arduous process of collecting essays for publication or republication, and errors can creep into the most careful editors' work. But it is disrespectful neither to tell the reader explic-

itly that most of these papers are ten or more years old nor to explain their selection. The project could have been justified by a more thorough culling of the original journal issue, by inviting more new pieces, and by having the authors of those 1995 papers add updates or commentaries on subsequent developments.

The subtitle of the 1995 e-journal issue, *Artificial Intelligence and the Humanities*, more accurately indicates the editors' intent than the current title. Their joint contribution is a sprawling 134-page chapter that is the most substantial addition to the 1995 publication. It bears the same marks of hurry and inattention as the whole, with disconnections of content, multiple repetitions of theme, and incoherent organization. It is particularly regrettable that this chapter has not been radically edited and tightened, because there is an important project at its heart. Franchi and Güzeldere first seek to establish a distinction and a dialogue between 'AI', understood as a narrow research program established in the second half of the twentieth century, and the 'broader intellectual project' of 'artificial intelligence' which spans the whole history of 'human attempts to create intelligence' (16). They then suggest the use of this dialogue to forge a 'direct, close engagement between the sciences and the humanities' (123). Amidst a farrago of second-hand historical and philosophical anecdote, they mount a passionate defence of Philip Agre's call to transform AI into an 'interdisciplinary switchboard for the constructions of principled characterizations of interaction between agents and their environment' (78-9). The dramatic shifts within the cognitive sciences over the last decade, by which cognition is increasingly seen as embodied, dynamical, situated, and distributed, are briefly surveyed. But it is odd that, despite their rather vague hopes for 'the study of cyborgs', Franchi and Güzeldere glance only in passing at Andy Clark's significant post-connectionist efforts to realign the cognitive sciences from within. And it is bizarre that their invocations of phenomenology's importance for cognitive science are backed by no more than the briefest references to the work of Dupuy and Petitot, and none at all to that of Shaun Gallagher or Evan Thompson. Readers who are all in favour of specific, telling, and better mutual interactions between AI and history (or anthropology, or sociolinguistics, or developmental psychology, or media theory, or sports science, or cognitive archaeology ...) will sadly not find anything precise in the volume to justify the bare claim that 'the professional AI community ... failed to comprehend the magnitude' of their project, or that this project should be relocated 'in a much broader intellectual framework' (66-7).

Grumps (finally) aside, some of the 1995 papers are excellent. Philip Agre's 'The Soul Gained and Lost: Artificial Intelligence as a Philosophical Project', Douglas Hofstadter's 'On Seeing A's and Seeing As', and Harry Collins' 'Humans, Machines, and the Structure of Knowledge' can each serve as a fine introduction to its author's body of work. Bruno Latour and Genevieve Teil's 'The Hume Machine: can association networks do more than formal rules?' is a remarkable and undernoticed intervention in the methodologies of social science. Stephen Wilson's 'Artificial Intelligence Research as

Art' describes some of his interactive artworks of the 1980s and early 1990s, reflects sanely on the aesthetics of what's since become known as android science, and could well serve to structure a course on AI and art along with related MIT books such as *The Robot in the Garden* (ed Goldberg), Mitchell Whitelaw's *Metacreation*, and Wilson's own *Information Arts* (2001). But barring Dretske, Fox Keller, and Pickering, the other contributions, both old and slightly less old, are disappointing.

The readers most let down will be those who would advocate the relevance of the crucial fields in question — feminist philosophy, literary theory, philosophy of language, pragmatist social theory, phenomenology, theology, and philosophy of technology — of which these essays are not worthy exemplars. The effect of this volume as a whole may then be counter-productive, ceding ground to a narrower, universalizing, classical computationalism which rejects theories in philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences as 'too incomplete and too vaguely stated' (Winston and Brady, quoted by Franchi and Güzeldere, 67). This would be sad at a time when there really are enough clues around in the interdisciplinary mix to signal productive dialogues and interactive collaborations between robotics and affect, neurobiology and narrative, connectionism and culture, memory and social ontology.

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Jesse Goldhammer

*The Headless Republic: Sacrificial
Violence in Modern French Thought.*

Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press 2005.

Pp. x + 205.

\$45.00. ISBN 0-8014-4150-1.

In our age of religiously-inspired political violence, Goldhammer's *The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought* is a timely examination of the sacrificial motif in the French Revolution and its aftermath. It is a lucidly written and illuminating intellectual history. He discerns in the Revolution various types of sacrificial violence and shows how this typology flows through subsequent French reflection. Although Goldhammer links the revolutionaries' notion of sacrifice to contemporary political events, he unfortunately does not explore these implications in any depth. In short, this is a useful — but quite narrow — exercise in history of ideas.

After an introductory chapter defining sacrifice and laying out the general design of the book, *The Headless Republic* treats the theme of sacrificial violence in the French Revolution (Chapter 1), Joseph de Maistre's reactionary politics (Chapter 2), the anarcho-syndicalism of Georges Sorel (Chapter 3) and Georges Bataille's transgressive surrealism (Chapter 4). Goldhammer selects these three thinkers because they are 'the most important contributors to this tradition of thought' (7). Furthermore, 'Maistre's, Sorel's and Bataille's work is distinctive because it forms a modern contribution to the long, unresolved debate in Western political thought about the necessity of violence for political foundation' (8). But by this latter standard, they are hardly distinctive voices. Goldhammer could also have treated Frantz Fanon or Michel Foucault, or reached beyond the French tradition entirely.

While the focus of his study is not well justified, the concept of sacrifice is. Since it is the ancient notion of sacrifice that is resuscitated by the French tradition, Goldhammer attempts, first, to get beyond the modern distinction between mere violence and force (legitimate violence) to its ancient roots. In the ancient meaning of the term, violence can be "good" or "bad," depending on the context'. Sacrifice is, thus, good violence 'that renders holy or sacred ... setting apart from the quotidian or profane' (12). The sublimity of sacrificial violence allows for communal ritualizing, for religiously establishing or purifying the body politic. The French Revolution borrowed from this tradition: 'sacred terms of exchange, such as catharsis, expiation, and redemption, were typically used to describe the effects of sacrifice' (15). Purification, salvation, and power were all aims of the exchange. The kind of sacrifice employed by the Revolution took, typically, two forms: scapegoating and martyrdom (18ff.). Scapegoating is a form of sacrifice deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, where 'the scapegoat is to resolve communal crisis through a sacrificial economy based on two principles: substitution and exchange' (19). Martyrdom also bears the imprint of Christianity: the ancient Latin *martys* for 'witness' becomes *martyr*, for the 'one who suffered or died for his or her religious beliefs' (22). Denuded of their original religious context and meaning, scapegoating and martyrdom became, in effect, the way the Revolution sought to make up for the loss of sacred legitimacy accorded the divine right king, Louis.

Crucially, in Chapter 1, Goldhammer shows how one person's scapegoat can be another's martyr. It thus perpetuates a cycle of political violence even while it establishes power. But first he links the revolutionary discourse on sacrifice back to Machiavelli and the ancient republican tradition of Rome to which he was heir, while the subsequent thinkers are all in dialogue with the revolutionary motifs. As Machiavelli cautioned, history teaches us that political instauration seems inevitably tainted by violence; but the problem for modernity, and the French Revolution in particular, is to use violence to establish the Enlightened values of liberty, equality, and the rights of citizens. So when the Revolution faced crisis, its leaders reached for sacrifice as a way to channel violence into political power and legitimacy. Eventually, the streets were drenched with blood, as sacrificial violence begat retribution

and counter-revolution. Goldhammer tells this story through an exposition of several key historic events of the Revolution and related writings, including the Insurrection of 10 August 1792, the September Massacres, and *La Terreur*.

Chapter 2 explores the striking way that royalist Joseph De Maistre transformed the sacrificial rhetoric of the revolutionaries into a counterrevolutionary manifesto. Viewed as an act of divine providence, 'Maistre contends that the purpose of revolutionary violence was to regenerate the morality of the French people, leading them from republican sin to monarchist salvation' (72). Ultimately, blood sacrifice may effect moral and political renewal, but not political foundation, which only God can do. Not surprisingly, Goldhammer contends that Maistre's position was inconsistent and instead of tempering the discourse of sacrificial violence, continued to inspire it.

Paradoxically, the Marxist Georges Sorel later agreed with Maistre on the salutary effects of sacrificial purification, though Goldhammer argues (in Chapter 3) that the controversial theorist of class violence largely condoned 'the power of sacrificial violence' (112). During his anarchosyndicalist phase (ca. 1889-1909), Sorel justified proletarian martyrdom for the way its symbolic power can steel the will of the workers and alert society to their plight. Goldhammer thus contests the prevailing interpretation of Sorel as a blood-thirsty Marxist intellectual.

Finally, Bataille turns to sacrificial violence not to establish and ground community as the tradition before him, but to contest and delegitimize the modern political project as such. 'Bataille argues that erotic and textual self-loss will undo the bourgeois self and thus allow for the forging of new, metapolitical community whose 'foundation' remains permanently desecrated' (153). Sacrifice tends always to excess and remains unexpiated, so that a politics based on it is 'an impossible task' (190). Ultimately, Goldhammer offers the modest lament that for Bataille community "begins" with the violation of the limits that make politics possible, and, tragically, it must exist in a permanent state of violation' (191).

The Headless Republic is a nuanced work of descriptive intellectual history and as such, eschews normative political theory almost entirely. But Goldhammer hews so closely to French intellectual history that he fails to explore its significance for us today. Given the evidence presented, the book could easily substantiate a thesis that the French Revolution continues to this day in French thought, in repetitive cycles of modernist versus anti-modernist violence. Ultimately, Goldhammer could have shown how radical French thought's dalliance with sacrificial violence — especially Bataille's generation — appears to have influenced a generation of Islamic thinkers, most notably Sayyid Qutb, the reputed intellectual forefather of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. That would have been a conclusion worthy of an otherwise worthy study.

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Lawrence J. Hatab

Nietzsche's Life Sentence.

New York: Routledge 2005.

Pp. xix + 191.

US\$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0415967589),

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0415967597).

Nietzsche's 'life sentence' suggests two readings: sentenced to live or being condemned for life. Specifically, Nietzsche's 'life sentence' is from the celebrated section 341 of *The Gay Science*: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more...'. Given this, could one affirm life on its own terms or would one be crushed by it? The question arises, Hatab tells us, only in the wake of Nietzsche's earlier teaching of the death of God, and the consequent transformation of Western thought. This presents us with two alternatives: either affirm life itself with all its conditions and presuppositions, or confront the specter of nihilism (where the highest values devalue themselves) and the prospect of a meaningless world of opprobrium, bereft of all truth and value.

Hatab's itinerary is not just to pursue a particular modernist or postmodernist thought that arose towards the end of the nineteenth century. Rather, he emphasizes at length and in detail how Nietzsche retrieves eternal recurrence from the pre-Platonic tradition of Greek tragic thought. Thus, at a stroke, Hatab argues forcefully for a rigorous continuity in Nietzsche's published and unpublished works, while at the same time demonstrating how thoroughly Nietzsche engaged the prephilosophical, religio-mythic tradition of Greek tragic thinking. By stressing Nietzsche's retrieval of tragic thought Hatab focuses on two dramatic points of interpretation.

1) Given the bleak worldview of the pre-Homeric period, Nietzsche analyzed the resources of Greek culture and found its creative — indeed, fully affirmative — response in the notion of the contest or agon. Ever threatened by foreign invaders and natural forces of overpowering magnitude, the Greeks had learned to contest, to fight and overcome, such adversaries. The culture of the victorious contest came to serve as a model in other areas as well — the Olympian games, political competition, and indeed, the competition in tragic dramatic festivals. All this yielded what Nietzsche called the great tragic culture of the classical period — a period of unheralded greatness and success. Indeed, the agonistic struggle would be played out, for Nietzsche, in the opposition between Apollo (basically, on Hatab's reading) as form-giving and creative forces, and Dionysus as form-destroying forces and the joyous, frenzied display of natural and psychological drives. All this would find its highest artistic (and communally ecstatic) expression on the stage of Greek tragic drama — in the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Philosophically it was expressed in Heraclitus' metaphysics: an endless, strife-filled world of tension, flux, and becoming.

2) Nietzsche's retrieval of pre-Platonic thought shows that the tradition of Western philosophy, religion, and morality stood precisely as an antidote

to the earlier tragic worldview. Socrates and Plato brought about the demise of tragic wisdom by creating a transcendent world of pure being, absolute truth, and divine goodness, which stood opposed to the temporal world of flux and becoming — an otherworldly world that would grant immortality to the soul and a fixed, absolute reference for reason, truth, and value in a world of eternal 'ideas' beyond space and time. At the core of this ontotheological construction is what Hatab terms a profound 'chronophobia', a fear of time and the temporal world of transience, suffering, ignorance, and death. Transcendent reality, absolute truth, logical identity, causal necessity, free will, rational autonomy, universal moral judgments, etc., are largely seen as convenient anthropomorphic fictions, intellectual evasions, or ideological compensations for our human-all-too-human condition: we are born into time, we are carried along by time, and we are indeed dead for a very long time. Such is the natural world as given by eternal recurrence, a world we are called upon to affirm: for Nietzsche, the only world, shorn of God and his shadows.

Hatab generally follows a moderate reading of eternal recurrence: 'What eternal recurrence describes is actually simple and straightforward: the continual repetition of life in all its details'. He argues two principal claims following this. On the one hand the point of eternal recurrence is to provide the incentive to affirm natural existence as it is given to us, directly, in our own personal experience. Eternal recurrence on this level should be taken literally, and Hatab argues forcefully that Nietzsche himself 'was dead serious about eternal recurrence and saw it as the climax of his philosophy, particularly with respect to life affirmation'. Hatab's second claim, following his earlier remarks concerning the metaphysics of chronophobia, is that eternal recurrence is 'a default argument' against the intellectual evasions it motivates.

To his credit, Hatab seriously argues out Nietzsche's critique of the many positions that could be construed as being in opposition to eternal recurrence. By framing his account so broadly, however, Hatab sidesteps some of the issues that typically plague discussions of eternal recurrence. In 'the continual repetition of life in all its details', what, exactly, gets repeated? The single life of a single individual, in exactly the same social-historical context? Unclear. Not verifiable. Or, does life itself, the biological life of different species members, recur, generation to generation? Plausible. Do the details of one individual's life recur? The problems with the latter formulation are many, and at various points Hatab seems to suppose it, at others, not. As for the cyclical nature of recurrence, Hatab acknowledges that it would be difficult to discern the nature or the extent of the cycle.

Those expecting a neat conceptual closure of these many problems will be disappointed. Why? In reply, I will afford Hatab the rare luxury of self-review. In the book's closing remarks, he notes that Nietzsche insisted 'that the philosophical tradition itself, in its deployment of these terms, carved out polarized conceptual divisions that are not faithful to the actual complexity of experience and that are symptomatic of fugitive aversions to this complex-

ity. For this reason, it may be that the habit of philosophical concept formation cannot help but be divisional in some way, and thus cannot avoid the vexation of sensing its own limits in relation to lived experience'(151-2). So it goes.

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Thomas Heyd, ed.
*Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature:
Theory and Practice.*
New York: Columbia University Press 2005.
Pp. x + 230.
US\$45.00. ISBN 0-231-13606-4.

This collection of ten essays and a conclusion explores whether the idea of autonomy may be applied to nature. Most contributors seem to agree that nature is, or should be considered, autonomous, but either way it remains rather unclear how. Heyd suggests that the expression may be useful to ground other philosophically controversial ones like 'intrinsic value'; he writes: 'valuing a thing for itself requires recognition of it as autonomous' (5). To make things harder, the question of autonomy is by itself a major philosophical issue that does not have a unique development.

The authors of this book seem to assume mainly two concepts of autonomy. The first explores the etymological 'self-law' in an ontological sense, following the theory of autonomy as 'autopoiesis', which understands living systems as necessarily 'self-produced' or made by themselves, and not by others, thereby creating their own identity. If nature is autonomous in this way, then it should be self-generating and self-organizing, so that some form of self or agency emerges. Several contributors conceive the autonomy of nature like this, especially Lee, who attempts a characterization. But it is not easy, for either the strong identity generating aspect, essential for autonomy, is dissolved (as in this view: 'what has come into existence, continues to exist, and finally disintegrates/decays, thereby going out of existence, in principle entirely independent of human volition or intentionality, of human control, manipulation or intervention' (59)), or else, it cannot be applied to the abiotic. Aware of this difficulty, Lee tries a possible solution through the notion of a 'trajectory', coined to express the historical and individual aspect of autonomous systems, which can be applied both to biotic and abiotic systems. The problem is that although it is possible to individualize some abiotic things

like a river, a mountain or even the entire biosphere, it is difficult to delimit nature or an ecosystem (Throop and Vickers) or to provide observer-independent definitions (Sandlos). Moreover, entities that lack will, sense of self, or intention resist the ontological notion of autonomy (Woods).

The second major sense of autonomy concerns the human relation with nature; it is an appeal to respect the self-rule of nature, to leave it wild and free. As in medical bioethics, where autonomy expresses concern for the free choice of patients, the goal here is to develop an ethical attitude of respect for nature. Thus, for Jordan, autonomy 'offers an interesting and useful way of articulating the perennial question of how to construe or construct or respond to the relationship between our own species and the rest of nature' (189). In this, Katz's position is a keystone, for many of the chapters revolve around it. Katz is extreme: 'nature itself is open to a revolution, a liberation, a release from human domination' (77). He says that the autonomy of nature does not require a metaphysical foundation, it deserves to be considered a subject (or an agent), and the recognition of this should guide our praxis. As a consequence, any natural system that was somehow manipulated by humans (restored ecosystems, genetically modified organisms ...) becomes an 'artifact'.

Responses to Katz appear in many of the remaining chapters, notably that he only provides negative clues for how humans should relate with nature. In fact, what Katz proposes to do positively to 'liberate nature' (after Marcuse) is to stop doing anything. That is why so many others pose the problem of how to engage in a positive relation with nature. Although there seems to be a consensus that non-civilized ecosystems (wilderness) should remain untouched, most of the discussion surrounds the restoration of damaged environments. Hettinger defends restoration as an education that can help build a healthy relation with nature; Throop and Vickers think that there should be a difference between moral and industrial agriculture; Light supports 'benevolent' restoration as a repair that need not be dominating; Woods believes that even wild and free terrains can be restored in cases such as Everglades National Park of Florida (179). There are many questions surrounding how to restore. Is it necessary or possible to recreate the past? Can wilderness be managed, restored, or repaired by humans? Bavington contends that current practices of management of the wild have created a conception of a 'needy nature' that produces what, using Illich's work, he calls 'iatrogenic damage' and counterproductive effects.

Other recurrent topics are nature, human concepts of nature, and the nature/culture distinction. Authors appear to be mostly against post-modern accounts of nature as a social construct. Plumwood appeals to a 'progressive naturalism' to build a positive image of nature, because conceptually nature is often left for the oppressed: nonhuman beings, women, non-Western people, or manual workers who are considered to be closer to it.

Further examination is needed of the issue of the power and resilience of nature in contrast with human capabilities to influence it. We may presume that if nature were truly autonomous, like living systems are, humans would

not be capable of altering it substantially. The ontological notion of autonomy is very strong because humans cannot produce it: even organisms modified in the laboratory are only altered within the limits of their viability; their biological autonomy cannot be generated nor eliminated (unless they are killed). This consideration is not intended as a defense of human modification of life, but as recognition of living autonomy and the difficulties of extending it to nature. Yet, although probably nature is not autonomous in the strong ontological sense, the scientific and philosophical exploration of the possibility conditions for its autonomy, and the different degrees in which it may exist, is worth pursuing. This would enjoin a study of the dynamic conditions of stability of ecosystems (Throop and Vickers).

On the whole, the book makes a very inspirational read, as most of the chapters are intense and innovative, and reflect sufficient internal debates among environmental views to constitute an excellent illustration of the field.

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Carl A. Huffman

*Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean,
Philosopher and Mathematician King.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.

Pp. xv + 665.

US\$180.00. ISBN 0-521-83746-4.

Most people's knowledge of Archytas is limited to the tradition that he rescued Plato from slavery, and that he came upon a method of doubling the cube. One might be excused for such limited knowledge, given the scarcity of authentic fragments and only scattered references to Archytas in the ancient literature. Huffman's book, the first extended treatment of Archytas in any language, has painstakingly arranged the extant fragments and testimonia into an impressive compendium that is sure to be an important resource for scholars of ancient philosophy, history of mathematics, and classics. The book sheds important new light on a shadowy figure who, as Huffman convincingly illustrates, had a significant influence on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. This is a stellar piece of scholarship, displaying a profound sensitivity to content, context, and methodology.

Part I of the book contains extremely valuable introductory essays, comprising 97 pages. These provide a well rounded picture of Archytas' life, reception, and philosophy, anticipating themes that recur throughout the

book. The brief essay on authenticity offers, beyond its import for the understanding Archytas' reception, fascinating insights into the logic of forgery for the Greek corpus in general.

Part II contains chapters dedicated to the four received authentic 'fragments' of Archytas (along with corroborating texts) in Greek, accompanied by translation and extensive commentary. Huffman delves deep and with surprising erudition into issues of the fragments' authenticity, context, and implications, and then goes on to offer a detailed line commentary taking on issues of Doric and Attic Greek, pertinent emendations in the manuscripts, as well conceptual frameworks for word usage in other authors. Those not specifically interested in philology will still find much of great value in Huffman's line commentaries, which deal at length with tracing the use of concepts like *pleonexia* and *logistike*. These remarkable and learned expositions reveal the range of Huffman's knowledge of the Greek philosophical, political, and literary traditions.

Part III, the longest part of the book at 340 pages, organises genuine testimonia into chapters on Archytas' life and writings, moral philosophy, and character, contributions to geometry, music, metaphysics, and physics, as well as miscellany regarding Archytas' reputed invention of a mechanical dove and Aristotle's three books on his philosophy (no longer extant).

The book closes with two brief appendices, one a compilation of remarks on spurious writings and testimonia, the other on the length of the upsilon in Archytas' name. The accompanying 16-page bibliography is a valuable resource, as is the 3-page index of Greek words, 9-page index locorum, and 15-page general index. The indices would be an important way into the text for those working on specific issues; as it stands the commentaries, full of interesting details as they are, can get a bit repetitive if one reads the book from beginning to end. Those consulting the indices will find their way into unexpected aspects of Archytas' world and a good sense of his impact on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, as well as cautious and well reasoned speculation on a wide range of philosophical and contextual issues.

There are far too many themes and concepts in this rich text to be addressed in any depth in a review of this length. At the most general level, one continuing theme is Plato's orientation to Archytas with regard to the perceived purpose and direction of stereometry and geometry in the wider context of philosophy. This theme emerges both in the introductory essay and in the chapter on doubling the cube, around which a sizeable ancient tradition has grown. Huffman demonstrates convincingly that Plato's dual-world interest in geometry for the purpose of reaching abstract universal knowledge stands in sharp contrast with the more practical pursuits of an Archytas who does not subscribe to metaphysical dualism. Most striking in this regard is Archytas' apparent employment of actual musicians' methods of tuning and playing their instruments in developing his theory of harmonics, something for which Plato has no use. That Aristotle, who builds a model of form and matter grounded in concrete particulars, would find Archytas important

and appealing is bolstered by attention to the tradition which ascribes to Aristotle three books on Archytas.

Also notable in this regard is the fact that Aristotle never calls Archytas a Pythagorean, and clearly distinguishes him from the rest of the Pythagorean tradition. These observations are not aimed at suggesting that Aristotle excludes Archytas from that tradition; rather, given that Aristotle composed three books about him, the weight of Archytas' influence becomes evident. Considering that Aristotle wrote one book about Speusippus and Xenocrates together, one gets a sense of the extent of Archytas' impact on classical philosophy in general.

We have, of course, no indication of how long these books were or the full extent of their contents, and in the absence of very much to go on, it is clear enough that the bulk of Archytas' contribution to the history of philosophy must inevitably be cast in terms of his influence on Plato and Aristotle. Huffman does an admirable job of placing Archytas in this relief; at times the argumentation of Archytas' influence is of necessity very speculative, but Huffman is always frank and cautious where this is the case. The need to reconstruct Archytas' genuine thoughts on the premise that inauthentic reports of Archytas' thought would tend to show him anticipating Plato or Aristotle, shows just how lamentable is the state of our knowledge of Archytas, forever it seems in the shadow of surviving giants.

Like his previous book on Philolaus, *Archytas* is truly a labour of love. Huffman has given us a comprehensive assessment of an important figure in the history of philosophy, an invaluable resource for those who dare to enter into the murky regions of *Quellenforschung*, philology, and doxography. Huffman's impressive range of knowledge, in technical mathematics and harmonics, in language and history, and above all the range and warp of the ancient philosophical and doxographical tradition, felicitously culminate in a monumental work of focused scholarship.

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Gail McNicol Jardine

Foucault and Education.

New York: Peter Lang Publishing 2005.

Pp. 129.

US\$18.95. ISBN 1-8204-7439-8.

Foucault and Education begins, appropriately, with a Foucauldian question: 'How can the subject tell the truth about itself' (1). How, that is, is self-consciousness related to the pursuit, or 'discourse' of truth. The question is asked not in a general way, however, but from a specific location and to a specific end. Jardine wishes to understand more precisely the place and role of the educator in the complex relations of power and knowledge that have been institutionalized in our modern Western educational systems, in order ultimately to critique and transform them. This is the pedagogical aim and central theme of the book.

The first two chapters, then, present a very general overview of Foucault's life, work, and ideas, accessible enough for a sophisticated reader unfamiliar with Foucault to gain a working understanding of them. Jardine even includes in her self-described 'primer' a glossary of terms at the end of each chapter, and definitions of Foucauldian terms in the margins, which, while surely useful for such a brief introduction to such a complex thinker, are sometimes misleadingly simplified, and even occasionally misguided (see, for example, her elucidation of 'discursivity' as 'everything verbal' (20)).

The later chapters are the more interesting ones, where Jardine applies Foucault's 'analytic tools' to the techniques and practices of education, including student surveillance, standardized testing, ranking and evaluation in general, and of course, discipline. Here Jardine gives a Foucauldian analysis of the methods by which subjectivization occurs in the educational contexts: how students (and teachers) are 'produced' as effects of disciplinary power, in both the traditional sense of academic 'disciplines' and the more general sense of education itself as a discipline. In addition to the normalizing practices mentioned above, she also outlines the regimentation of space and time utilized by our educational system: classroom arrangements, the inculcation of bodily restraint (i.e. 'sitting still'), the many controversies revolving around the number of days in a school year, the number of school hours in a day, the number of minutes devoted to this or that subject or task, all to the end of producing 'trained' individuals — or as Foucault said, 'docile bodies'. For anyone, educator or otherwise, who has thought about or participated in the intense struggles around such educational strategies, this discussion is perhaps the most interesting the book has to offer (66-76).

The last chapter of the book, 'Real Possibilities for Resistance and Struggle', attempts to show that systems of power like those detailed by Foucault are not immutable — that, over time, they can be transformed and even overturned. She criticizes Foucault for pursuing his genealogical projects 'in a passive voice ... with no mention of any agent for change' (117). To correct this, she gives some suggestions as to how the educational system could be

transformed so as to 'renew our understanding about how to live well on Earth with each other' (122). Her suggestions, however, amount to 'vastly increased conversations' (120) amongst teachers, students, parents, and other involved parties; amongst different cultures; in short between the administrators of this type of disciplinary power and its multiple subjects.

No doubt such conversations are important, but in light of Jardine's detailed analysis of the pervasive powers of educational systems, one is left wanting more in terms of 'real possibilities'. Further, the project of transforming the educational power system suggests that one can have access to a position of knowledge outside of this system. As anyone familiar with Foucault knows, it is far from clear that Foucault's analytical system is compatible with such an assumption. Jardine acknowledges this difficulty, but fails to provide a convincing argument against it, or even a very detailed picture of what an alternative 'active' genealogy might look like. Perhaps the book itself is supposed to provide this example, but if this is the case, the genealogical strategy should be made explicit earlier in the text.

In general, though, Jardine's text is a valuable contribution to a surprisingly small literature applying Foucault's ideas to educational theory and practice. For its brevity, it provides a fairly accessible introduction to some of Foucault's main ideas, and does a good job of extending these ideas to develop a realistic picture of the techniques of control employed by and embodied in educational systems. Though one will not find any particularly groundbreaking work on Foucauldian theory itself, the fairly straightforward interpretation and application of Foucault's ideas raises interesting questions for Foucault scholars as well. Are there other strategies or locations for transforming disciplinary power? Is the type of humanism that Jardine flirts with throughout the book compatible with Foucauldian analysis? Is Foucault's genealogical project really as 'passive' as Jardine suggests? So, though the book is aimed at educators, it might also be a nice supplement to an introduction to Foucault for upper level undergraduates, or even for a graduate course focused on pedagogical theory. And as a work of praxis, it is undoubtedly an important thrust in the movement of educational reform.

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Noretta Koertge, ed.

Scientific Values and Civic Virtues.

Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. 245.

Cdn\$122.50:US\$70.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-517225-6);

Cdn\$43.95:US\$24.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-517224-8).

This anthology explores how scientific values might have a positive impact on the development of civic virtues within a society, and why this development is not easy to achieve. It does so in three ways: by making explicit the nexus between scientific values and civic virtues, by revealing certain positive values in the work of particular scientists, and by identifying 'sites of struggle' where those values are at risk, such as postmodernist universities or fundamentalist schooling. Some of the contributors to this volume are veterans of the 'science wars' in the wake of the Sokal hoax ten years ago, now with a stronger emphasis on the biological sciences. The editor, Noretta Koertge, Emeritus Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at Indiana University, published two substantial contributions to what are also known as the 'culture wars'.

In the first chapter, Koertge identifies some positive values within science, such as heuristic power, conceptual simplicity, mathematical tractability, and explanatory depth. She also identifies some social concerns with their application: that a scientific account of nature will destroy our aesthetic appreciation of it, that the use of scientific methods are detrimental to the mental health and moral character of the individual scientist, that the products of scientific advance will endanger civilization. These fears still operate today, and Koertge addresses each of them, remembering that ever since Nuremburg scientific societies have systematically adopted codes of ethics. However, adding an ethics code to the scientific profession is not enough, as the task to achieve what Philip Kitcher called 'science without legend, objectivity without illusions' has become all the more complicated because of the complexity of contemporary Big Science (20-3).

The most obvious connection between scientific values and civic virtues is found in Enlightenment thinking, and therefore the discussion has to take into account the work of Kant and his contemporary followers, such as John Rawls. In the second chapter, Steven DeLue provides a detailed account of their ideas on 'Public Reason and Democracy'. This is an important essay — one that provides a philosophical attempt to link scientific values with civic virtues, while the others rely more on historical commentary, case studies, and downright condemnation. Going further into the past, the essay by Edward Grant argues that, in the Western medieval university, training in Aristotelian natural philosophy and in the practical sciences of ethics and politics helped to establish a 'scientific temperament' (52) that emphasized

organization, analysis, and rational persuasion. But, although mathematics thrived for a while, in Islam such an institutionalization of natural philosophy never occurred, and all the sciences declined. This coheres with John Moore's description of the slow evolution of ideas of civic virtue in pre-revolutionary Europe. Afterwards, the Scientific Revolution led by Francis Bacon brought us experimental knowledge and the conviction that science should be a cooperative undertaking. In her essay, Rose-Mary Sargent reminds us that, although Bacon often wrote of the power or utility of knowledge, he saw it tempered by intellectual modesty and charity.

The central part of the book is devoted to case studies of the epistemological and ethical behavior of particular scientists, such as P. W. Bridgman, N. Bohr, E. O. Wilson, E. Konopinski, and A. Kinsey. These essays will be more interesting for the historian than for the philosopher, but nevertheless illustrate the complexity of the decisions that scientists are forced to make and the pressure they experience from their peers and from society. Of special interest is the piece by Michael Ruse, in which he reprises various cases from the history of modern biology that, in some sense or other, might be seen as having involved violations of trust. But the thesis of this book is that public debate on issues of government is a central feature of liberal democracy, and that this debate is most effective when it assumes a form of rational inquiry resembling the practices of science. What then about those who find the traditional values of both science and liberal democracy to be dangerously mistaken?

In the first essay of the last part of the book, Keith Parsons defends science's 'radical center' against criticisms from both the religious right and the postmodernist left, including here feminist critics who argue that the scientific ideal of disinterested, impartial inquiry is a delusion that produces biased results, and recommend adopting an epistemology centered on the experiences and political needs of the oppressed. In his reply, Parsons points out that oppression is unlikely to confer cognitive benefits and that in a pluralistic society there is unlikely to be agreement on which standpoint should be privileged. On the other hand, Parsons criticizes recent arguments that science should become more friendly to religion, including those affirming that science is committed to a philosophical naturalism that biases it against old creationism and the newer Intelligent Design (ID) theories, and those arguing that Christians should pursue science by taking for granted what they 'know as Christians' (165). The essay by Barbara Forrest and Paul Gross traces in detail the political agenda of a group of ID creationists called the Wedge, one of the most remarkable examples in our time of public relations management substituting successfully for knowledge.

Philip Sullivan then asks whether postmodernist education is undermining modern democracy. He argues that universities, the traditional standard-bearers of rational inquiry, are suppressing debate in order to avoid offense on religious, political, or other grounds, and finds the first cause of this erosion of rational inquiry in a growing tolerance of shoddy scholarship and pseudoscience. He emphatically denies the claims of constructivism and

relativism, and concludes that universities and colleges must renew their commitment to rational enquiry before this 'strange complex of epistemological and political doctrines' (185) spreads completely, as it already has begun to do, from academia into the larger society. He warns (quoting Popper), 'the belief in the possibility of a rule of law, of justice, and of freedom, can hardly survive the acceptance of an epistemology which teaches that there are no objective facts' (188).

Two examples from Pakistan and India show the global character of this struggle. Pervez Hoodbhoy describes the present situation in countries where Islam is officially declared to be above the constitution, and religion is considered the source of all wisdom, including scientific knowledge. In a more philosophical essay, Meera Nanda describes the relationship between post-modernism, Hindu nationalism, and 'Vedic science', arguing that the anti-science rhetoric of postmodern intellectuals has given philosophical respectability to the eclectic patchwork of science and Hindu metaphysics that goes under such a name. Paradoxically, while all these intellectuals and movements have their roots in movements for social justice, environmental protection, and women's rights, 'the social constructivist and postmodernist attacks on science have proven to be a blessing for *all* religious zealots, in all major faiths, as they no longer feel compelled to revise their metaphysics in the light of progress in our understanding of nature in relevant fields' (223). Nanda also suggests that the traditional eclecticism of Hinduism, which sees other faiths as other versions of the same truth, could be a mere disguise for its narcissistic obsession with its own greatness (226); but this eclecticism sits at odds with the violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims that are part of the history of India and still happen today.

Due perhaps to the background of the contributors (only two out of fifteen are Professors of political science), nothing is said here about a promising line of research, namely the connection between epistemic virtues and the justification of democracy: the more democratic a society is, the more general is access to reliable knowledge. Nor is anything said about legal studies, which is a field where the link with scientific values, such as the standards of inference and evidence, is more visible than in ethics or politics. Thus the clear message of this book is that it is time to draw a clear dividing line between science and myth, but the scope of contributions makes it difficult to extract a similarly clear understanding of the link between scientific values and civic virtues.

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Chrysostomos Mantzavinos

Naturalistic Hermeneutics.

Trans. Darrell Arnold and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos. New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.

Pp. xiii + 180.

US\$68.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-84812-1);

US\$54.00 (e-book: ISBN 0-511-11206-8).

Mantzavinos' thesis is that there is no fundamental methodological difference between the natural sciences and the humanities. His central argument is that the hypothetico-deductive model employed in the former, according to which phenomena are explained by formulating hypotheses and deducing predictions from them, applies equally to the latter. Thus the 'problematic' of comprehending meaningful actions and texts can be successfully tackled using the same technique employed in explanations in physics, chemistry, and biology. This is an ambitious, two-part project. The first is a critical attack on Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer as representatives of traditional philosophical hermeneutics. The second presents Mantzavinos' alternative naturalistic hermeneutic, and discusses its application to both human actions and texts.

Mantzavinos gives both Dilthey and Heidegger rather short shrift. He identifies the principal failure in Dilthey's hermeneutics as the mistake of trying to answer the question 'What is x ?' (for some x) *before* deciding on the proper method to do so — a methodological 'dead end', Mantzavinos asserts, as it makes it impossible to show how x is connected to other facts in the world (20), in particular how 'meaningful' mental facts are connected to 'natural' scientific ones. Why it *must* be impossible is not elaborated upon, and it seems that without further argument the strongest claim that can reasonably be made, following Dilthey's method, is that whether connecting these facts is possible will only emerge in the course of investigating them.

Mantzavinos rapidly dismisses the ontological conception of hermeneutics Heidegger presented in *Being and Time*, which takes understanding to be a mode of existence rather than a mental process. The first part of the text, we are told, offers no more than the 'banal description' (28) of man as existing in an environment, and the second the 'trivial' claim that man is oriented toward the future (29). The ground for these claims is largely exegetical, including numerous quotations, and while they are perhaps questionable as interpretations of Heidegger's work, Mantzavinos' argumentative strategy here is particularly worrying. On a favourable reading, he could be seen to be offering a critical counterpoint to Heidegger's views without engaging with or arguing directly against them. Heideggerians would, perhaps, respond that his charge that *Being and Time* trivialises its subject matter (76) is a clear case of the pot calling the kettle black — but so be it. Unfortunately, Mantzavinos is quite explicit about having *shown* Heidegger's hermeneutics as misguided, 'practically devoid of information' (155), and Gadamer's con-

ception as having 'a very low problem-solving capacity'. It is difficult to see how these more ambitious charges of the first part of the book can be maintained.

Gadamer's hermeneutics are examined in somewhat greater detail, with the three tenets supporting his claimed universality of hermeneutics receiving the most criticism: 1) the primacy of questioning in hermeneutics, 2) the language-dependency of understanding, and 3) the basis of this universality in Aristotle's rhetoric and practical philosophy. The treatment of these tenets is very much in line with that of Dilthey and Heidegger, however, so I will not dwell on it. The overarching complaint about Gadamer's position is that, like Heidegger's, its methodology is anti-naturalistic, that both 'presuppose' that the subject-matters of the human and natural sciences are not continuous, and only on this basis conclude that they 'require entirely different research methods' (81).

The naturalistic alternative developed in the second part applies the same schema for analysing the meaningfulness of both actions and texts. In both there are publicly available regularities, or 'invariances', which may be genetic, cultural, or personal. Once these have been discovered, 'nexuses' of meaning can be transformed into causal ones. These '*can be explained, and thus the hypothetico-deductive method can be applied to [them] without any difficulty*' (123). That explanations can be offered for causal regularities is no doubt the case, but it is a great pity that Mantzavinos does not work through any detailed cases to illustrate how his technique might flesh out in practice. It bears at least a strong superficial resemblance to Dennett's method of 'heterophenomenology', which tackles conscious phenomena from a third-person perspective, but despite citing Dennett on intentionality (89), Mantzavinos shows no awareness of this closely-related project.

Other pertinent issues are passed over without mention as well, whether deliberately or otherwise. Language learning through ostensive definition is given as an illustrative example of meaning invariance (127), employing the so-called 'Fido'-Fido principle which takes the meaning of a word to be the object it stands for. In the light of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* it seems bizarre to invoke this principle without any discussion of its controversial status, yet this is exactly what Mantzavinos does. Perhaps most strikingly, while he is careful to emphasise that he takes the hypothetico-deductive model to be the dominant — rather than necessarily correct — method in natural science, no mention is made of the possibility that the sciences have no method at all. This might be more forgivable, were it not for Feyerabend's sustained and well-known attack on the very idea in his *Against Method* over thirty years ago, which, if right, would undermine Mantzavinos' entire project.

Even without such a concern, the project is already on shaky ground. Mantzavinos seeks to replace traditional hermeneutics by offering a rival, *naturalistic*, description of meaning (a 'reconstruction' in causal terms; see *xiii*, 118), but he misunderstands the phenomena Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer were dealing with: it is simply false that "talk of a hermeneutic

circle" does nothing more than imprecisely depict the search process that is activated if the interpreter of a linguistic expression does not understand something immediately' (46-7). The circle doesn't concern individual cases of misunderstanding, such as Mantzavinos', but how the whole enterprise of understanding can get off the ground at all. Whether the hypothetico-deductive method can complement traditional hermeneutics is a genuinely interesting question, and one that deserves wider attention, but to ask whether it can replace hermeneutics is misleading at best.

It is interesting to note that at the time of printing this book has been published in English, but not in its original German. If the publisher's motivation for this were that while its argumentation is weak, the content is topical in Anglo-American philosophy, it would not be far wide of the mark.

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Paola Marrati

Genesis and Trace:

Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger.

Trans. Simon Sparks. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005.

Pp. xiv + 258.

US\$57.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3915-3);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3916-1).

As Paola Marrati points out, from 1967 'Husserl disappears, or very nearly so, as a proper name in Derrida's work' (180), but in Part 1 of *Genesis and Trace* she seeks to demonstrate that 'to consider Husserl as ... an initial "object" of a deconstructive approach that would itself be prior to and exterior to Husserl ... risk[s] failing to recognise the importance of Husserlian questions for Derrida, [and] turning deconstruction into a formal and empty structure, a method that one might indifferently apply to all sorts of texts in order to investigate their undecidability' (180-1). In Part 2, she goes on to show the continuity between this early thinking on Husserl, and Derrida's subsequent work on Heidegger. Unlike certain American literary critics, then, who have adopted deconstruction as a methodology and have applied it to whatever texts have taken their fancy, Marrati is faithful to the originality of Derrida's thought. This can be read in a double sense: faithful to what is original in Derrida, and faithful to Derrida's contribution to a philosophy of the origin.

In Derrida's very early, but lately published, *The Problem of Genesis*, 'genesis always refers to the absolute emergence of an originary sense, insofar as it is irreducible to anything that precedes it, but a sense that is *also* carried along by a past, produced by something other than itself' (3). Hence as early as 1953-4 (some ten years before the term 'deconstruction' was coined), Derrida is already discerning a "dialectic without synthesis" of the movement of temporalisation and a certain empiricity — in other words, the originary is 'contaminated', and it is this sense of contamination 'that will guide all [Derrida's] subsequent reflections' (25); it 'traverse[s] and underpin[s] his entire thinking' (123). Already, while still reading Husserl and before approaching Heidegger, Derrida is both calling for a 'new ontology' to replace Husserlian transcendentalism, and thinking of a concept of writing that is 'irreducible to the Heideggerian question of being' (25). Thus when Derrida comes to write *Speech and Phenomena*, in which he demonstrates the contamination of the purity, logicality, and grammaticality of Husserl's 'pure logical grammar', for him the 'same capacity possessed by writing not only frees ideality but also discloses its irreducible origin in the relation to *empirical death*' (82): for example, the word, 'I', 'finds itself in the same situation as all statements about perception that depend neither on the actuality nor even the possibility of a perception: the signifying *I* does not depend on the life of the speaking subject' (81).

There is therefore a continuity between Derrida's establishment of 'writing' as an alternative to Husserl's pure logical grammar, and his analysis of Heidegger's concept of being-for-death, which Part 2 of Marrati's book addresses. Here she takes some lengthy excursions of her own into Heidegger, which she considers necessary to understanding Derrida's work on him. For example, she describes how Heidegger 'brings out the reciprocal implication of the three dimensions of time' (117), which places him in opposition to the 'vulgar' concept of time as found in, say, Aristotle. This is important to Derrida because 'the originary now, which appears by way of a passive synthesis of time with itself, through a retention ... of the past, is constituting only because rooted in a constituted past' (123-4). But 'the past is constituted *before* the present can be constituting: the genesis of time points toward this fundamental passivity that the very concept of origin would seek to deny' (124). Hence 'subsequently, ... everything that [Derrida] has elaborated thus far by way of the concept of passive genesis ... will be taken up once again in the notion of trace' (124).

This opens the way for a reading of Derrida's later work *Aporias*, which in turn engages in a patient reading of Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's being-for-death in *Being and Time*. Heidegger, we recall, uses the term, 'Dasein', to avoid any presuppositional definitions of 'Man', and in so doing, he arrives at a 'proper and authentic being-able of Dasein', whereby it can die properly. This authentic dying is facilitated by language: Dasein can testify to its own being in anticipation of death, unlike the animals. However, as Marrati points out, Derrida 'push[es] this logic to its limit' (158). If 'the experience of death as such is only possible *in language*, ... the best that

language can do is give us the *illusion* of the experience of death and not death as such' (159). In and through language, 'death loses its as such' (159). Consequently, Heidegger's 'boundary between the animal and the Dasein of the speaking human ... would become unassignable' (159). But this does not only question the traditional philosophical elevation of Man above the animals, of which Heidegger's thought is the zenith, but also questions the universality of Heidegger's Dasein, the alleged fact that it transcends (or effaces) all historical, cultural or sexual differences. But it is death, rather, that is universal, not Dasein, and it is for this reason that 'my "own" mortality is indissociable from that of the other' (167).

Marrati reminds us in conclusion that it is 'Derrida's notion of writing' that allows us to think 'this contamination of the finite and the infinite, of life and death' (185). This conclusion reiterates the central hermeneutic of Marrati's close reading of Derrida's texts hitherto, and from it it may be seen that her book is an exposition rather than an argument.

Unfortunately, however, the book as a whole is denser than the material it is elucidating. Its readability is seriously compromised by its tortuous and convoluted style (bizarrely described by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in the cover blurb as 'elegant and limpid'). There are enough subordinate clauses to make Henry James blush, and 197 pages of text are supported by 52 pages of notes. In this Marrati is served ill both by her publisher (the notes are unhelpfully collected at the end, without an index) and by her translator (who is prone to such freshman errors as confusing 'principal' with 'principle', and taking 'phenomena' to be singular). In short, the book allows no concessions to its readers, making it a not very expository exposition. As Marrati writes of language in general, so it could be said of her own text: 'what we have here is the paradox of a productivity that produces nothing' (57).

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Adi Ophir

The Order of Evils:

Towards an Ontology of Morals.

Trans. Rela Mazali and Havi Carel.

New York: Zone Books 2005.

Pp. 699.

US\$38.95. ISBN 1-890951-51-X.

Can a philosophy be moral as well as postmodern? Adi Ophir shows how this tension can be explored to combine a contextual political critique with the universal question of evil. The title, *The Order of Evils*, sheds light on the method as well as on the contents: Ophir's interest is not the origin of evils but their functioning. His phenomenological analysis is directed by the moral commitment to prevent or reduce avoidable evils. This is why the mechanisms of multiplication of evils are to be examined, and not origins of (or motivations for) evil.

The treatise develops from precise descriptions of common human occurrences such as 'disappearance' and 'presence' to discussions of the two main effects of evil actions on human beings: damage and suffering. The transition from disappearance to loss is a matter of intensification (as is the transition from loss to damage): 'When disappearance is the problem of someone who is interested in what has disappeared and in the fact of its disappearance, and when the disappeared has no substitute and cannot be restored, this is a loss' (87).

The study of that process is detailed and many examples are given. Ophir's world of examples is an interesting study in itself, composed of daily images and human situations seldom met with in philosophical works. One example of the phenomenon of loss is a girl's loss of her doll. Can it be replaced? But a new doll of exactly the same kind will not have the same smell. If the replacement is not accepted by the child, compensation has not fully succeeded. These many human examples, deliberately chosen and well observed, make for a 700-page philosophical treatise that is not only readable, but even enjoyable, even though most of it is about the dark side of the human life, about loss and suffering: loss of a home or a loved person, suffering from suppression or from pains. Out of love for detail a postmodern text is created that is open for universal human identification. The gender of the subject pronoun changes every other chapter, which is another detail of justice in language, expressing care and recognition without making gender an issue itself.

Ophir pays most attention to the harmed person, whose suffering is described minutely but without making a psychological point. His focus on the suffering person presents the deepest connection to Levinas, to whom Ophir sees himself deeply indebted. But unlike Levinas, Ophir is not interested in the otherness of an other, but in his or her distress. The smooth and gradual move from general human experience of pain and loss to damage and evils arouses the question of where exactly evil begins. However, under-

standing evil as a matter of intensification entails the impossibility of exact judgment. Here the category of 'superfluous suffering' is important. While the term is taken from Levinas, Ophir defines suffering as superfluous when it could have been prevented but was not. But according to Ophir, 'not judgement but effective care should be the utmost concern of the moral philosopher' (394). Care is an important term for Ophir, and is not to be mistaken for consolation or mere solidarity, nor to be contrasted with justice (as in Carol Gilligan's ethics). It is an active care, directed at the concrete person in need and, if necessary, politically organized. Caring in this moral philosophy means to act in order to prevent, or at least reduce, the other's suffering.

While Ophir never loses sight of the suffering person, the Israeli philosopher does not idealize suffering. Rather the dynamics of suffering are explored, applying such unusual perspectives as the economical and the political: suffering is not synonymous with helplessness. Included in the analysis are 'politics of the representation of suffering' (285) with local examples: 'Palestinians and Israelis alike have become experts in exploiting suffering for political purposes' (284).

Ophir communicates with his readers not only through numerous examples, but through turning to the reader directly to explicate his understanding of the writer-reader relation, which he does at an important landmark of his way, between his description of 'what is there' and his discussion of the 'superfluous' (311-19). At this point Ophir seeks agreement for his account of 'what is there' as pains and losses, in preparation for the subsequent discourses that might leave him with less support: his presentation of the 'superfluous' will contain controversial discussions of modernity, the end of modernity, globalization, the Israeli occupation, the nuclear threat, and the end of the world.

The Shoah is discussed extensively (519-79), and here Ophir does not ask for agreement but for forgiveness, turning to the survivors among his readers, whom he does not want to offend. The chapter starts with a list of places of horror, the last of them Auschwitz. Catastrophes are usually remembered by the names of the places. This is a simple but remarkable insight. Ophir criticizes what he calls 'sanctification', which in the Israeli context is the reiterated claim that Auschwitz cannot be understood by someone who has not been there. But what can 'understanding' mean in the context of this claim? His approach works against 'sanctifications', 'naturalizations', and other schemes used to immunize evils against analysis. The deconstruction of the catastrophe is a moral one, as is the research led by interest in prevention: 'The denaturalization of evils has a crucial part in representing the possibilities of prevention, which in turn has a crucial part in the preventive action itself' (335).

There is less empathy for the suffering person in the chapter on the Shoah, and fewer individual examples are presented. This is probably due to the immense effort it takes to formulate an original, independent ethics of memory in the Israeli context. Particularly striking is Ophir's questioning of

the uniqueness of the Shoah, fully aware that the uniqueness claim has different implications in different contexts, as it is considered a critical point of view in present Germany and, on the contrary, describes a consensus of the Israeli establishment. Unfortunately Ophir does not refer to Avishai Margalit and Gabriel Motzkin in this respect, who maintained the combination of humiliation and annihilation exercised by the Nazis was unique. This chapter on the whole suffers from a lack of discussion with other representatives of post-Shoah thought. In a marginal reference to Emil Fackenheim, his metaphor of the 'commanding voice' is superficially deciphered as 'quasi-revelation', and the discussion following this famous proclamation is simply ignored. The complex post-Shoah discourse in western Christian theology is ill-represented in one single footnote (666) that misunderstands A. Roy Eckardt and Alice Eckardt, though the latter especially could have contributed to the issue of suffering.

According to Ophir 'we are not just after Auschwitz, but always also before it' (625). With this statement he succeeds in presenting the post-Shoah situation as generally committed to transcending victim-status: the responsibility for prevention applies to everybody, as everybody is a potential victim, perpetrator, or bystander. Though dissolving victim-hood as identity, Ophir stays close to the suffering person, due to his approach of examining the effects of evils rather than looking at motivations or psychological structures of single perpetrators or groups of them. This unique combination of listening to those who have lost someone or something — while at the same time addressing them as agents responsible for prevention — presents the inner factors that warrant calling this a magnum opus of Israeli philosophy.

Staying close to Levinas by giving priority to the other person in distress, Ophir's moral philosophy takes responsibility for representations of suffering — and for causing damage in a different historical situation, given the new chapter in Jewish history marked by the sovereign state of Israel. The way responsibility is taken is humanistic in the best sense of the word and precisely in this humanism very Jewish: neither reconciliation nor forgiveness is in the center of discourse, but rather the intellectual effort to provide differentiated compensation that includes recognition for what cannot be compensated for. The main emphasis and declared aim of Ophir's analysis is prevention in future of preventable evils as an applied version of the traditional *zakhor*-imperative.

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Fred Rush, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. xx + 376.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81660-2);

(paper: ISBN 0-521-01689-4).

One of the most fruitful currents of 'Continental philosophy', from the interwar years up to the present, Critical Theory first emerged in the work of the early Frankfurt School (notably, T.W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse). It introduced a potent mixture of neo-Marxism with radicalized Freudianism on the one hand and pessimistic culture criticism on the other. By the 1960s it began to take a new and fruitful direction in Jürgen Habermas' innovative research program, culminating in his theory of communicative action. Today it continues to evolve in the socio-political theories of Axel Honneth, Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Fraser, among others, playing a central role in debates about social movements and, even more so, in deliberative-democratic theory. Extending as it has across these 'three generations' of theorists, and still generating innovative and influential ideas today, the Critical Theory tradition has been a rich one indeed.

But just what *is* Critical Theory? There are good reasons to hesitate before offering a definition, given the diversity of aims and methods that distinguish its various versions. And yet, there is something to be said, too, for working with a provisional picture of what unifies participants in a movement like Critical Theory. Here, then, is one characterization, about as plausible as any: Critical Theory is a cluster of philosophically informed, politically engaged, interdisciplinary social science research programs, associated historically with the Institute for Social Research founded in Frankfurt in 1923. Its subject matter is a society in which injustices are insulated from public scrutiny by their tendency to block insight into, or distort communication about, social reality. An important effect of this self-concealing feature of modern relations of inequality and domination is that the capacity of the victims of such injustice to discover the nature of their situation is systematically impaired — a fact which motivates the 'consciousness-raising' aspirations for which Critical Theorists are well-known.

Rush's selections reflect his aim of both introducing and critically assessing the Critical Theory phenomenon, especially in its earlier phases, when it was most closely associated with the Institute, and the circle of ex-Institute émigrés produced by the Nazi rise to power in the 1930s. The contributions fall into three partly overlapping categories. First, there are a number of historical surveys of how Critical Theorists, over the years, addressed a certain theme. These include Joel Whitebrook's lucid discussion of the series of Marx/Freud syntheses attempted by Critical Theorists ('The marriage of Marx and Freud'), Raymond Geuss' fascinating review of the vicissitudes of the concept of revolution in the Frankfurt School's work and in radical thought generally ('Dialectics and the revolutionary impulse'), and Simone

Chambers' attempt to evaluate the contributions of Critical Theorists to political theory, notably democratic theory ('The politics of Critical Theory'). Second, there are a number of reinterpretations of particular works or debates drawn from the history, above all the early history, of Critical Theory. These include Michael Rosen's recounting of the different conceptions of the relationship between art and politics held by Adorno and Walter Benjamin ('Benjamin, Adorno, and the decline of the aura'), as well as Julian Roberts' review and reassessment of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, one of the central (and most politically ambiguous) texts of the Critical Theory tradition ('The dialectic of enlightenment'). Finally, there are a few essays, mainly toward the end of the book, that attempt to situate Critical Theory in relation to contemporary intellectual debates. These include Kenneth Baynes' systematic elaboration of Habermas' self-description as a 'Kantian pragmatist' ('The transcendental turn'), Beatrice Hanssen's review of the Habermas/Foucault debate ('Critical Theory and poststructuralism'), and two tendentious projections of possible futures for Critical theory, one by Stephen K. White ('The very idea of a critical social science: a pragmatist turn') and one by Axel Honneth ('A social pathology of reason: on the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory').

In matters of detail, that is, in exploring various conceptual innovations and key debates within the Critical Theory tradition, the volume is very strong. Rush's own major contribution ('Conceptual foundations of early Critical Theory') offers a useful review of just how the notion of 'critical theory' was understood in the early days of the project, notably in contrast to various negative reference points like Vienna School positivism and Dilthey's and Heidegger's 'irrationalism'. If nothing else, this reminds us of how far Critical Theory and its central concerns have traveled since then. And Baynes' paper on Habermas' 'Kantian pragmatism' helpfully introduces the concept of 'the deliberative stance' (200) — a variation on Brandom's discursive score-keeping stance — to develop a systematic elaboration of how Habermas' notion of context-transcending validity claims raised in utterances relates to contemporary work in ethical theory (notably Korsgaard) and the philosophy of mind (notably Davidson and Brandom). The chapter by Chambers captures well the implicit political project of Adorno and Horkheimer — 'a Socratic enterprise of cranky admonishment and moral dressing-down' (223) — and intelligently explores the dilemmas of contemporary democratic theory, defending Habermas' questionable credentials as a *critical* theorist, given that his main project is now the defense of the central institutions of liberal capitalism against their radical critics.

The greatest weakness of the book, however, is not to be found in flaws affecting the chapters individually. Rather, it is a problem of the book taken as a whole, and in that sense an editorial defect. The overall picture of Critical Theory that emerges from the *Companion* is that of a museum artifact, fascinating from a nostalgic or antiquarian perspective, but doing little to demand serious attention from contemporary philosophers. Obviously, much of the important work in Critical Theory was published in the 1930s and

1940s, and Axel Honneth is right to point out that much of those early texts exude 'an atmosphere of the outdated and antiquated, of the irretrievably lost' (336). The historical and political context, not to mention the intellectual context, has been massively transformed in the intervening decades, and this is bound to open up a certain distance between these works and today's reader. But why not balance the backward-looking stance of the intellectual historian with a similar insistence on presenting Critical Theory as a *living* tradition, with important contemporary achievements to its credit, and constituting a distinctive voice to which contemporary political thinkers must respond. The *Companion* fails in this respect. One reason is the almost complete omission of any discussion of the work of two of the leading contributors to Critical Theory today: Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib. Both are briefly discussed in the contribution by Simone Chambers, but beyond that neither is acknowledged in the book as an important contributor to the ongoing vitality of Critical Theory.

This book should be read, certainly, but it should be read alongside such important works of contemporary Critical Theory as Nancy Fraser's exchange with Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (Verso, 2003). Otherwise one could get the impression that Critical Theory is *primarily* and not just *among other things* an important 'movement' in the history of twentieth-century philosophy, alongside existentialism and logical positivism.

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Suvi Soininen

*From a 'Necessary Evil' to the Art of
Contingency: Michael Oakeshott's Conception
of Political Activity.*

Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic 2005.

Pp. viii + 247.

US\$49.90. ISBN 1-84540-006-2.

The later writings of Michael Oakeshott (1901-90), especially *On Human Conduct* (1975), emphasized that the rule of law lay at the heart of liberalism, while avoiding any grander foundation for it than the historic and contingent quality of all human action and association. He is thus rightly regarded, Soininen observes, as a precursor of post-modern attempts at an anti-foundationalist theory of politics, and so she begins by exploring Oakeshott's relationships with a variety of liberal, conservative, and Idealist theorists

with whom he also had significant intellectual affinities. She compares him with modern figures such as Berlin, Rorty, and Raz, and with prominent names in the history of political philosophy such as Hobbes and Hegel from whom, by his own admission, he learnt a great deal.

Arguably, by avoiding the attempt to ground liberalism on unconditional platforms such as Christianity or natural law (which proved susceptible to the corrosive criticism of historical relativism) and avoiding the temptation to rely on instrumentalist justifications of liberalism in consequentialist or welfare terms, Oakeshott skirted many of the pitfalls that swallowed liberalism's other would-be defenders. Liberal or 'civil' association for Oakeshott rested on the active maintenance of a framework of rules that had been publicly debated, agreed upon, and enacted within an institutional framework (this was 'politics' in the strict sense of the term).

So long as executive authority was restricted to enforcing what Oakeshott called the 'adverbial qualifications' that this framework imposed on the actions of individuals, a genuine freedom, compatible with the acknowledgement of limits to choice, was possible. It left room for people to combine to pursue all manner of public and private purposes — business, religion, education, or even communal living simply for the sake of it. Politics had the positive purpose of ensuring that the altering circumstances constantly thrown up by a changing world did not disrupt this framework, at least not to the extent that the unity of the community dissolved into violence.

Since the sixteenth century, the greatest threats to this freedom had arisen when the state itself began to act as what Oakeshott called an 'enterprise association', forcing all its members to adopt a single purpose — salvation, racial purity, the five-year plan — from which there was no possibility of dissociating oneself. Modern European political history, as Oakeshott came to understand it, was the ambiguous product of a tension between the 'civil' and 'enterprise' models of association, only the former of which had proved itself truly compatible with freedom in the modern state.

Oakeshott, however, had not achieved this sophisticated grasp of the nature of the liberal state and of modern European political history in his early writings. Indeed, as Soininen shows, in the 1930s he held a rather negative view of politics as the 'necessary evil' mentioned in her title. How and why Oakeshott came to change his mind about the relative worth of political activity is the central theme of her book, and she claims to take an approach not yet pursued elsewhere in the rapidly growing literature on his work by analysing what he had to say in particular about politicians and political actors. She argues that Oakeshott's rather parochial immersion in English politics of the 1940s and 1950s, involving pessimistic tirades against the 'Rationalism' of the Labour (and Conservative) governments of the day, was gradually replaced by a much more measured and European outlook. Politicians were no longer simply vain and lazy, or the *demos* composed mainly of mass men willing to be their dupes; instead, an appreciation of the difficulties involved in establishing a constructive relationship between politician and people in an age of universal suffrage came to the fore.

Like other recent contributors to this monograph series, Soininen is inclined to see similarities between Oakeshott and continental philosophers of politics. On several occasions she likens him to Foucault in particular on the grounds of his sensitivity to the importance and inevitability of power in political relationships. Also like other commentators, Soininen emphasizes Oakeshott's use in his later thought of the linguistic analogy for what he called the traditions or 'practices' of societies that both constrain and enable politics. This analogy again served to underline his conception of politics as always taking place in shifting historic circumstances.

Overall, Soininen's grasp of Oakeshott's ideas is sound, although he was in his early years more concerned with politics, and utopian about its possibilities, than she acknowledges. His negative view of politics in the later 1930s was due to the disappointment of his romantic hopes for it in the 1920s, and this early part of the story is entirely missing from her work. It is simply not true, as the book-length manuscript on 'A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy' written around 1925 proves, that politics was not a 'major concern' of Oakeshott's during the 1920s (3). Nevertheless, although the gradual shift in his thought towards a more positive concept of politics from the late 1930s onwards has been noted before, Soininen deserves credit for being the first to document its twists and turns in such detail.

It is regrettable, then, that the structure of the book is somewhat unbalanced, with the third chapter taking up over 130 pages while the final two account only for twelve. It is doubly regrettable, however, that the whole work has not been properly proofread for grammatical and typographical errors. The awkward style can be forgiven in an author whose first language is not English, and the deficiencies in organisation at least do not prevent the argument coming through, but the state in which the book has been allowed to appear is seriously distracting for the reader and does justice neither to the author nor to the quality of the other volumes in the series. It must be hoped that this will prove to be an isolated case.

Luke O'Sullivan

Andreas Vieth

Richard Rorty:

His Philosophy Under Discussion.

Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2005.

Pp. 147.

US\$34.95. ISBN 3-937202-71-4.

Richard Rorty is, as most know, one of the foremost contemporary American philosophers, having laid out over the past thirty years some of the most widely discussed views on epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the role of philosophy. This amalgamation of the proceedings of a 2004 conference at the University of Münster includes a paper by Rorty himself, as well as a number of interrogations of his philosophy by students and professors at the University.

Rorty's own paper is an attempt to transcend the impasse between the 'Neo-Carnapians' who await the day when cognitive science is able to give us complete insight into the mind and all its representations, and the 'neo-Wittgensteinians' who believe that the expedition to specify linguistic (or other) behaviour in such minute terms is philosophically misguided and bound to be empirically fruitless — perhaps a bit like looking for soul-atoms. Rorty's 'Solomonian' solution is to cleave the notion of mind between that bit 'inside our skulls' firing synapses in accordance with millions of years of natural selection, and that which is cultivated and operates only in a cultural milieu — the kind of collectively-informed entity that apprehends works of art or social events *as such*. To the neo-Carnapians, naturally, go the first half, while the neo-Wittgensteinians are given the latter.

Rorty elaborates and defends his solution by use of an analogy, outlined in the title, 'The Brain as Hardware, Culture as Software'. It is a thesis that should sound familiar enough, though Rorty's version of it is naturally more sophisticated than most. Ultimately, one suspects that the neo-Carnapians against whom Rorty sides will retort that culture itself will eventually be explained in physicalist terms — as the evolutionarily adaptive product of certain material circumstances. To this, Rorty has essentially already replied that such a discovery (should it even prove possible) would be as irrelevant as any conclusive argument for determinism, seeing as, in spite of it, we will still have to grapple with questions of how we *ought* to live. All in all, the way the article re-parses the issues while keeping questions of value close-by is a nice illustration of why Vieth bestows credit on Rorty for bridging the analytic and continental approaches.

Appended to the article is a thematically parallel essay, also from Rorty, titled 'Philosophy-Envy', which questions the notion that progress in biology or cognitive science will soon produce a better account of human nature, upon which philosophers may then ground future discussions of ethics and politics. Rorty notes that no matter how great their predictive power, or how successfully they enable us to manipulate human behaviour, those sciences will never manage to tell us what kind of behaviour is ethically and politically

appropriate or desirable. The mini-essay will be an enjoyable read for philosophers as it reminds them that, in the push to make so many areas of inquiry take their cues from the hard sciences, there remain some questions that only philosophical contemplation can answer.

The students' and professors' entries do not respond to either of Rorty's essays directly; rather, they cover a wide swath of his writings, including recent and less celebrated works such as 1998's *Achieving Our Country*. By consequence, the subject matter ranges all the way from Rorty's conception of selfhood as self-authorship to his pragmatist views on epistemology. That scope, combined with the quality of the writing, result in an engaging, albeit incomplete, tour of his philosophy (missing are any specific references to Rorty's opus *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, and to his later work on continental thought).

As Rorty acknowledges, the students' papers are indeed impressive, combining 'detailed knowledge of [his] writings' with 'penetrating criticisms of [his] views'. Of particular note are the entry by Henning et al. problematizing Rorty's notion of the 'strong poet', and Kompa's et al. article with its very carefully constructed attempt to refute Rorty's repudiation of the skeptic. Vieth himself has an entry (with Attila Karakus) discussing how Rorty's naturalism commits him to behaviourism, and Ludwig Siep suggests to Rorty that one can reclaim some sort of realism about the world in the name of ethics.

Fortunately, the book satisfies our curiosity with a section in which Rorty responds, albeit very briefly, to his interlocutors. The responses sometimes attempt to vacate a criticism merely by clarifying his position on an issue, and other times engage the other author more directly. In some cases Rorty earnestly acknowledges the critics' views but simply reiterates why he holds his own. In fact, some of the most interesting responses to read are those in which one can sense the gap between Rorty's *Weltanschauung* and that of the students — his veteran, let's-get-on-with-it epistemological pragmatism versus their enthusiasm for debating realism/anti-realism for its own sake ('Pragmatism, Realism, and Science'); his vision of the nation-state as the locus of solidarity and the main political agent on the world stage versus their global village outlook and skepticism about the state's motives ('The Liberal Ironist Between National Pride and Global Solidarity'). One imagines some of the students left unmoved by Rorty's replies, but edified by the exchange all the same.

As a contribution to the areas of philosophical debate with which it engages, the book contains solid pieces of writing, but nothing, arguably even in Rorty's case, that will really push the boundaries of the field. More than likely, it will be picked up as a resource for those interested in Rorty himself, and in that regard it is a worthwhile read — mostly because it demonstrates how he can be taken, and how he himself would like to be taken. Perhaps just as important, however, is that the book serves as a model of something to be encouraged: a direct dialogue between juniors and seniors in the field of philosophy; an encouragement to students to bring forth their honest

criticisms of even the most established figures, and the honouring of their views with a direct and reasoned response.

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Eric Watkins

Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.

Pp. xi + 451.

US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83567-4);

US\$32.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54361-4).

In the Second Analogy of Experience of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant argues that our knowledge of the succession of changes in objects — as opposed to the succession of our representations — presupposes thinking of such changes as causally related. Although there is little agreement among interpreters about how precisely to understand Kant's claim and the supporting arguments, it seems clear that they form one of the central and novel contributions of the 'critical' philosophy which Kant had been working out since the 1770s, apparently as an alternative and replacement of 'dogmatic' metaphysics. It is the main aim of Eric Watkins' book to show that an adequate understanding of the Second (and Third) Analogy depends on realizing that Kant is arguing not only for a claim about the conditions of the possibility of objective knowledge, but at the same time for a 'model of causality', a metaphysical picture of the causal relation and its relata that has strong affinities with his own 'pre-critical' views on the topic. These earlier views, in turn, need to be seen as the result of Kant's reception of the dogmatic metaphysics of the first half of the eighteenth century.

The first part of Watkins' book, accordingly, is devoted to the background of debates about causation during Kant's early philosophy and to detailed analysis of his pre-critical account up to 1770. Kant's account was first presented in the *Nova dilucidatio* of 1755 as a version of a physical influx theory, the type of theory that was, besides occasionalism, the main alternative to Leibnizian theories based on pre-established harmony. While these latter theories, in effect, denied causal relations between substances, influx theories postulated some sort of real causal interaction between the relata of the causal relation. One of the most pressing tasks was to rebut Leibniz's well-known objection that influx theories incoherently require the transference of accidents from one substance to another. Kant's response, roughly,

argued that if substances were causally isolated from each other (as Leibniz held), a substance could not change: because change consists in replacement of one (earlier) 'determination' of a substance with an incompatible (later) one, there must be (by the Principle of Sufficient Reason) a 'determining ground' in the substance for the later determination; but positing a substance implies positing all its essential grounds — hence, in the absence of relations of this substance to determining grounds in other substances, change in an isolated substance cannot have a determining ground (114f.). Therefore, all change requires causal relations between substances. Watkin argues that this thesis, the *Nova dilucidatio*'s 'principle of succession' (together with the 'principle of coexistence'), stayed firm in Kant's mind and was the predecessor of the *Critique*'s Second (and Third) Analogy.

Between 1755 and the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant encountered Hume's analysis of causation, which led to an important modification of his original account. Although Hume based his discussion on events, rather than on substances, as the causal relata and had no use for grounds or causal powers, Kant agreed with him that one substance cannot induce change in another with logical necessity. But Kant insisted on a sort of metaphysical necessity for the causal relation by distinguishing 'real' determining grounds from 'logical' grounds: given a real ground in one substance, change in another is necessary according to (what Watkins calls) the 'principle of determining real grounds' (170). Still lacking the distinction between synthetic a priori and analytic judgments, Kant believed that real grounds could not be represented by judgments at all but must correspond to special 'unanalysable concepts'. It is tempting to speculate that further investigation of such concepts ultimately led Kant to the pure concepts of the understanding, including the category of causality (168f.).

Why should we believe that Kant's pre-critical views on causation have left significant traces in the *Critique*'s treatment? Didn't Kant in 1781 directly respond to Hume's deflationary analysis and thereby adopt the 'event-event model' of the causal relation that Hume had used? In response, Watkins argues that Kant could not consistently hold the claims of both analogies if he were indeed committed to a theory that takes events as the causal relata; in other words, the older model *must* still be operating.

Watkins' interpretation of the Second Analogy has deflationary and amplifying aspects. (1) The argument is understood as 'regressive', stemming from the question: given that we do have knowledge of objective succession, what are the necessary conditions of such knowledge? Under this aspect, Kant's aim in the *Critique* is not to answer the global skeptic who does not grant that assumption. (2) The conditions for the possibility of knowledge Kant attempts to identify are not, according to Watkins, epistemological conditions — conditions on our justification for beliefs — but genuinely metaphysical conditions. The question for Kant, under this interpretation, is not primarily what relations between beliefs we need to assume in order to justify certain beliefs; the question is what relations between our beliefs and the structure of the world need to obtain for us to have knowledge. The

analogies 'are concerned with the kind of ontological structure that is required for our empirical knowledge to be true' (202). Watkins takes this way of setting Kant's agenda to be the result of the development from the pre-critical period to the Critical Turn. Kant's view in the *Critique* is characterized by a novel intertwining of epistemological and ontological problems wherein the Critical Turn provides a new epistemological framework in which to restate and answer old metaphysical questions.

It is the interpretation of the Third Analogy that provides decisive clues to what Watkins calls 'Kant's model of causality'. If mutual interaction of objects is necessary for knowledge of their simultaneity (rather than their succession in time), and if this interaction, as Watkins argues, has to be understood as 'two-way causation', then the relata of the causal relation cannot be events because it is incoherent to regard one event as the cause (i.e., the condition of the occurrence) of a second and also the second as the cause of the first. So Watkins suggests that even the critical Kant takes the relata of the causal relation to be substances rather than events. More precisely, in a causal relation between substances A and B there is a 'real determining ground' in A which brings about a change in the state of B, and this change is to be understood as determining the temporal succession of states in B. In order to avoid an infinite regress, the determining ground in A itself must be 'unchanging', i.e., the ground itself cannot consist in a change in A (hence the ground is not an event) and is in this sense 'temporally indeterminate' (244). This model avoids the incoherence of the event-based model of causation in the case of mutual interaction because the grounds, as parts of the essential natures of the substances, are not ontologically dependent on each other in the way that an effect event is dependent on a cause event. Kant's mysterious phrase 'the causality of the cause' is thus reconstructed as 'the ground that determines a substance to become a cause'.

Watkins later argues that the causal principle applies to 'phenomenal substances' (349ff.), and hence the metaphysics can be understood as one of the phenomenal realm. (But the model also serves to deal with causal relations involving noumena where the category of causality is used in its unschematized form.) One might have thought that the 'causality of the cause', being temporally indeterminate, has to be noumenal; surely it seems an unusual feature of anything in the realm of phenomena to lack temporal determination. But Watkins insists that causal activity, in Kant's model, operates in time since it is 'unchanging und thus unrestricted in its duration' (263n.40). Some mysteries remain here because it is not clear how something temporally indeterminate, the cause, could produce something that is determinate in time, viz., the effect (cf. 264, n. 41). The temporal indeterminacy of causal activity is essential in Kant's model because it allows him (or Watkins on his behalf) to sketch a view of how freedom at the noumenal level can be effective in the phenomenal world, given that the activities that determine events in the phenomenal realm are not temporally determinate events and are themselves not caused by preceding events. Watkins quotes Kant from a lecture transcript, 'If an event ensues from a cause which is no

event, then it is said to occur spontaneously ... from it' (348). One wonders, though, why this wouldn't make *all* events spontaneous occurrences, and not only those that are caused by free agents, insofar as they are caused by grounds rather than by other events.

There is a wealth of further topics discussed in Watkins' book which cannot be adequately mentioned here, in particular, a detailed discussion of 'Kant's Reply to Hume' which concludes, unsurprisingly but appropriately, that Kant did not really reply to Hume rather than develop an alternative theory.

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James K. Wright

Schoenberg, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.

New York: Peter Lang 2005.

Pp. 191.

US\$45.95. ISBN 0-8204-7028-7.

Wittgenstein's writings, particularly his early *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, have attracted the attention of artists, novelists, composers, and film-makers, for a good number of years and to a degree very unusual for philosophers, with many citing his early gnomic utterances as a source of creative inspiration. But in too many cases one wonders what exactly served as the inspiration — hoping for something more specific than the fact that his early Tractarian sentences exhibit a sense of metaphysical profundity layered beneath a surface-level incomprehensibility. And in some cases, like Laurie Anderson's song, 'Language is a Virus from Outer Space', one reasonably wonders if the inspiration is merely that Wittgenstein wrote about language, this is about language, so In these circumstances, this volume arrives as a particularly welcome contribution.

James K. Wright considers in detail the deep affinities he sees between Schoenberg's serial compositional ideas and the writings of the early Wittgenstein, arguing persuasively that the musical achievement of the former can be much better understood when positioned next to the philosophical achievement of the latter. Wright thereby uncovers a specific and, as he shows, quite common misconstrual of Schoenberg's position: as a radical relativist of all things musical, who thought that any system of tonal organization (particularly his twelve-tone system) is as good (structurally viable, generative of sense, productive of coherence) as any other. But this is

only half of what is for Schoenberg a rather Kantian divide. In his theoretical writings (very well used by Wright), Schoenberg distinguished between the 'demands of the material' (elements of composition) on the one hand, and 'the demands of the subject' (mind of the listener) on the other. It is, contrary to the position of harmonic traditionalists, the structure of the listening mind that exemplifies a kind of universality — the need for order, structure, coherence, development, sense, and closure. The actual outward or non-subjective materials of music were for Schoenberg far more variable, and far more conducive to compositional freedom, than traditionalists (who would limit composition to only what the overtone series and diatonicism implies) could even imagine.

So, given his respect for the structuring power of the listener's mind, Schoenberg is not, as Wright shows, given over to an indiscriminate relativism his popular image might suggest. Schoenberg's relativism concerning the materials is itself circumscribed: he often respects what are called the 'laws' of harmony within his compositional practice — by negation. For example he carefully avoids the diatonic-system-generating major fifth in the intervallic design of his twelve-tone rows (the sequence of pitches upon which the composition is built and through which it must proceed in serial order), or prevents rows from internally generating stacked-third (i.e. conventional) harmonies. Wright employs a helpful analogy: Schoenberg acknowledges the harmonic 'gravity' of tonality in overcoming it just as the aeronautical engineer acknowledges gravity in making flight possible. This is, as Wright mentions, particularly evident in Schoenberg's central employment of the tritone (the interval that, seen one way, is as far from dominant-tonic relations as one can get) in his first fully twelve-tone composition, the *Piano Suite*, opus 25.

Wright neatly describes the protracted debate between Schoenberg and the great Viennese musical theorist Heinrich Schenker, who famously argued for a kind of deep structure of all composition (or all great composition) where there is — however elaborated or variegated on the musical surface — a fundamental progression from the tonic to the dominant and then back again. (This — like *some* of Wright's discussion — makes it sound considerably simpler than it is.) Schoenberg sharply (and reasonably) said that if you can only see or hear a tonic and a dominant chord, you will thus necessarily misunderstand every other chord you encounter. But then even what counted as a chord was in question, Schenker arguing that vertical structures that embody internally-unresolved dissonance and that occur as the vertical accidents of horizontal linear movement are not chords, Schoenberg arguing that *of course* they are, even if they pointedly fail to fit the analytical paradigm of conventional harmonic analysis.

How does all this square with the early Wittgenstein? It is here that Wright moves into his detailed answer. Given Wittgenstein's deep distaste for modern music, indeed for anything much after Brahms, one might quickly and conveniently put Wittgenstein on the side of Schenker: Wittgenstein's early philosophy seeks to uncover the logical structure of language beneath

the highly-variegated surface and to reduce it to its pristine essence (rather like the I-V-I deep structure), and sees language as a complex of atomistic elements that, fitted together into sentential combinations according to organizational rules, make sense. But the matter, as Wright admirably shows, is not so straightforward. He works through elements of Viennese logical positivism, the bounds of sense and the limits of the expressible (particularly in connection with Schoenberg's *Moses und Aaron*), the importance of nonsense, the close relations between ethics and aesthetics, the misunderstanding of the logic of our language and its negative consequences, and other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy for which he finds direct correspondences in Schoenberg — and, with impressive discernment, he shows the deep commonality between the two in terms of the need to see the art object *sub specie aeternitatis*, in a way lifted out of time and seen utterly unto itself. Schoenberg's theory and practice both show that he saw the musical work as a kind of solitary world of elements standing in internally-contained relations only to themselves.

Such transcendent, seemingly timeless gazing into an internally-contained aesthetic microcosm is indeed very close to how Wittgenstein described the distinctive way we see (or should see) works of art at one point, but then, even with Wright's persuasive study, one wants to ask if there is not at this very point a profound *discontinuity* between the composer and the young philosopher: Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* articulates a 'picture theory' of language, where the relation between word and world is given by isomorphic parallel between the logical structure of the state of affairs in the world and the logical structure of the sentence that (allegedly) depicts it. Is Schoenberg's thoroughgoing insistence on the internal-containedness — the referential autonomy — of the musical work deeply parallel to that? And apart from this affinity-threatening question, Wright underscores the fact that Wittgenstein and Schoenberg both strongly emphasized the priority of practice over theory — but that is of course only true of the *later* Wittgenstein, from the *Blue Book* onward. Similarly, much of what Schoenberg saw as the expansive possibilities of musical composition seem plausibly more in line with the conception of language-games (of the later philosophy) than with logical atomism, and his abhorrence of explicitly rule-governed composition (as displayed, as Wright shows, in his contempt for Schillinger's formulaic, rule-governed, generative method) seems more connected to Wittgenstein's profoundly important and much discussed rule-following considerations in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wright's own humorously inventive suggestion that we illustrate the dangers of theory-driven falsifying reconstructions of compositional processes by thinking of the musical work as an 'invisible man', over whom we throw a blanket in order to see him and then end up describing the blanket rather than the music, comports very well with, in language use, the problem Wittgenstein diagnosed involving falsified retrospective reconstructions according to alleged or posited explicit rule-applications. In short, for all the impressive, helpful, and stimulating work undertaken here — and particu-

larly since Wright is discussing affinity, not direct influence between the philosopher and the composer — one wonders, on concluding this lucid and welcome volume, if Schoenberg was not perhaps more of an aesthetic fellow-traveler of the mature, post-*Blue Book* Cantabridgian philosopher than of the young Viennese atomistic modernist.

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