Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550
ISSN 0228-491X
© 1996 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year
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Mailed in July 1996.
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Kurt Baier
Cdn $69.75; US $44.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9263-2);
Cdn $30.95; US $19.95

The thesis of this book is that uncertainties and disagreements about how to distinguish correctly between right and wrong can be settled only by providing an accurate account of what moralities are, both those of the individual and societies. This account must not only describe, but also explain, the relationship between the individual and the social as spheres of moral discourse. To provide such an account, B. builds on three cornerstone ideas which control the work throughout. First, a person can have a morality only if she grows up in a society constituting a moral order; that is, in a society furnished with certain institutions and practices such as moral education, criticism, and reform. Second, a person’s morality consists primarily in dispositions to conform her behavior to directives she believes to be such that, by the best principles of justification, she would always be justified in following them and never justified in not doing them. Third, what makes them such directives is that they pass some test of acceptability; that is, the test of practical reason.

Given this foundation, understanding what moralities are then calls for a theory of practical reason which exhibits them as generating the best principles of practical justification and, so accordingly, a theory of reason in general and its relation to the particular kind of reason that is practical. This is why in a work that is principally about ethics, B. is required to make an extended foray into the nature, origin, and function of rationality. Accordingly, this single volume is organized into two books, the ‘Order of Reason’ and the ‘Moral Order’, of roughly equal length. Part One, the ‘Order of Reason’, begins with a brief sketch of reason in general. Following this, B. then develops a more detailed account of practical reason in which a crucial distinction is drawn between ‘self-anchored’ and ‘social-anchored’ reason. Part Two, ‘The Moral Order’, provides, at the highest level of generality, a theory of moralities which construes moral reasons as society-anchored. Then, in the second part, B. shows what is needed if morality specified at such a high level of generality is to be used for deriving answers to specific moral problems in concrete situations. Accordingly, Part Two is divided into an account of the concepts and terms employed by people growing up in English-speaking cultures to formulate their moral judgments and an account of the way that societies who accept his general theory could address a concrete moral question.
B. opens his general moral theory with a cogent and penetrating response to Hume's conundrums on practical reasoning. Logical entailment, B. argues, is not the correct model of the relation between reasons and that for which they are reasons. Hume's mistake, which B. calls the dominant view of rationality, is that he fails to distinguish between reasons and their bases. 'Once we distinguish between reasons and their bases, we need no longer deny the existence of reasons for actions and choice on the grounds that they cannot be based on entailment' (34). Indeed, the giving of reasons is in part, a social enterprise, and there is no necessary connection between rationality and self-interest (97). Thus, '... following reason is the best available way to attain certain very general ends which, ... we want to attain. It is the best method because it consists in following certain general guidelines made available to us by our culture' (50).

Just as the giving of reasons is a social enterprise taught to succeeding generations, so too is the moral enterprise, for the moral order is a social order of a certain sort. It is a moral order that encourages a critical stance toward, and permits the correction of, its mores. Moral precepts can be sound or unsound, and yet can be relative to a moral order. To support his case, B. distinguishes between a social order constituted by institutions, roles, and mores and a moral order which is a critical stance within the existing social order towards the mores, roles and rules of society. This critical stance is driven by a desire for improvement, for a betterment of the conditions of the individual and society. However, 'moral orders ... develop from different social starting points with different conceptions of soundness as guides for improvement.' Building on Hart's concept of law as a self-critical system, B. avers 'that there may be a number of equally sound social moralities, though they may have common cores' (222). It is here that B.'s argument is least satisfying because of his loose criterion of adequate reason being 'guidelines for attaining certain general ends.' This does not, on balance, provide a means of determining whether particular actions are transactions of improvement or decline.

In the concluding chapter B. shows that his theoretical framework can be used to address some of the moral problems people face, problems which have also exercised contemporary philosophers. Though there are many philosophers who believe that killing is worse than letting someone die, there are few who defend the view other than by intuition. B. displays the resources of his theory of morality in support of this widely shared but poorly defended point of view.

In this thorough, tightly reasoned, analytical effort, B. deals with virtually all of the problems that have taxed moral philosophers since Kant: rationality, responsibility, morality's relation to law, the relation of duty and freedom, the good life, the prisoner's dilemma, altruism and self-interest, moral motivation, and others. This book is an important, constructive contribution to contemporary moral theory and deserves to be taken seriously, especially in reference to the debates regarding the role of reason in morality. B. claims his book is written to be accessible to a wide audience. While it certainly
starts out with a broad based appeal (introduction and chapter one), it quickly falls into a technical language and analytical format that make it of interest primarily to advanced graduate students, moral philosophers, and legal scholars.

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Joseph Andrew Barash
188p. 148FF.

Le thème général autour duquel sont rassemblées les huit études de ce recueil de J.A. Barash concerne les ‘présupposés de [la] réflexion heideggerienne sur l'histoire et sur l'historicité de la pensée occidentale’ (9). Le but de cette analyse, qui se veut d'abord et avant tout critique, est double: si elle entend expliciter la réflexion heideggerienne sur l'histoire, elle vise aussi et surtout à ‘une mise en évidence des failles, des omissions et des incohérences inhérentes à l’optique heideggerienne elle-même’ (9).

Pour ce faire, l'auteur entend se démarquer de l'exégèse traditionnelle qui, selon lui, tend trop souvent à considérer Heidegger comme un ‘penseur isolé en communion solitaire avec quelques grands philosophes des siècles passés’ (10). S'opposant à ce courant, la démarche interprétative de Barash vise plutôt à replacer les analyses heideggeriennes dans le contexte historique des débats qu'il mena avec ses contemporains et ses prédécesseurs immédiats.

Or, Barash est bien conscient du problème auquel se voit confrontée sa démarche et se demande, à juste titre, si cette stratégie n'a pas pour effet d'occulter, en quelque sorte, la question directrice de l'œuvre de Heidegger, soit la question de l'Être. En effet, si on se rappelle le verdict de Heidegger au début de Être et temps selon lequel la question de l'être serait tombée dans l'oubli, on peut imaginer que ce jugement s'applique non seulement aux grands penseurs de l'histoire de la métaphysique mais aussi et surtout aux prédécesseurs immédiats et aux contemporains de Heidegger.

A ce sujet, Barash rappelle toutefois que l'interrogation heideggerienne ne porte pas tant sur la question de l'être méditée dans l'abstrait que sur
l'historicité de cette question et sur les transformations des critères de vérité que cette historicité fait surgir’ (11). Or, c'est à partir de cette notion hégélienne de l'historicité du vrai — notion qui fut reprise dans la critique de la métaphysique hégélienne, notamment chez Dilthey, Windelband et Simmel — que l'auteur entend situer Heidegger dans le contexte historique de son époque.

Selon Barash, cette perspective qui consiste à problématiser l'œuvre de Heidegger à partir de la notion posthégélienne de l'historicité du vrai s'avère tout particulièrement pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit d'examiner la question de l'engagement politique de Heidegger. A ce titre, l'auteur rappelle que, si la notion heideggerienne d'historicité se doit d'être problématisée, c'est qu'elle serait ‘selon l'aveu de Heidegger lui-même, ... “au fondement” de son engagement national-socialiste’ (13).

Le premier article du recueil ‘Existence et histoire’ s’intéresse à la critique heideggerienne de Jaspers des années 1919-1921. C'est à cette époque que s’engagerait le débat de Heidegger avec ses contemporains qui tentaient de trouver une méthode adéquate pour thématiser le monde historique de l'esprit, de la vie et de la culture. Déjà, le réponse de Heidegger s’articulerait autour de la notion de déconstruction de la tradition et ce, ‘afin d’ouvrir la voie à une réinterprétation fondamentale de l’héritage du passé’ (13).


Dans ‘Saint-Augustin et le néo-platonisme’, l’auteur fait référence à la critique heideggerienne de la notion de ‘validité universelle’ dans l'interprétation historique. Cette notion, qui est à la base du questionnement heideggerien sur le fondement même de la rationalité scientifique, parcours en filigrane l’ensemble des études du recueil.

A ce titre, l’étude ‘Sur le lieu historique de la vérité’ met en lumière la critique heideggerienne de cette notion de ‘validité universelle’. La question qui se pose est celle des rapports entre les notions d'objectivité et d'historicité des critères de vérité. Comment, en effet, prétendre à l'objectivité dans l'interprétation historique lorsque la validité des critères de vérité est elle-même historiale?

Selon Barash, ce qui se dégage à travers la critique heideggerienne de l'idéal d'objectivité et de scientificité dans l'interprétation historique, c'est ‘le caractère partiel et parfois partial des représentations heideggeriennes de l’histoire’ (16). Ce problème est examiné dans les deux études suivantes, soit ‘Heidegger dans la perspective du XXe siècle’ et ‘La deuxième guerre mondiale dans le mouvement de l’histoire de l’Être’. Dans ces études, Barash pose l'hypothèse suivant laquelle c'est précisément là où l'exigence d'objectivité
est mise à l'écart que l'interprétation risque de se voir contaminé par l'arbitraire du jugement partial. 

Dans 'Saint-Paul, Spinoza et l'absence de l'éthico-politique chez Heidegger', l'auteur examine les conséquences de cette partialité sur l'éthico-politique. L’abandon du critère d’universalité ouvrirait la porte au ‘présupposé mystificateur’ selon lequel un peuple ou une secte possèderait un accès privilégié à la vérité. 

A ce stade, il serait aisé de faire le lien entre, d’une part, la critique heideggerienne du critère de ‘validité universelle’ et le rôle que joue le ‘mode d’existence’ du chercheur dans l’enquête historique et, d’autre part, la partialité à l’égard du ‘mode d’existence’ du peuple allemand qu’aurait manifesté Heidegger dans son soutien au mouvement nazi. Or, si Barash, dans son étude ‘Temps de l’Être, temps de l’histoire: Heidegger et son siècle’ se garde bien d’établir une telle filiation, il note néanmoins que ce mouvement rompait lui aussi avec le présupposé d’universalité dans le domaine éthico-politique en revendiquant la suprématie ultime de l’Allemagne. 

Le recueil se termine sur un texte intitulé ‘La deuxième guerre mondiale dans le mouvement de l’histoire de l’Être’ qui demande dans quelle mesure cette partialité et l’arbitraire qui se fait jour dans la prise de position politique de Heidegger’ (17) ont trouvé leur écho dans l’interprétation heideggerienne du mouvement de l’histoire. 

En conclusion, l’auteur revient sur la position adoptée dans ses essais, soit la méthode d’analyse ‘contextualiste’. Or, cette analyse ‘contextualiste’ ne va pas sans poser quelques problèmes. A plusieurs reprises tout au long de ses études, Barash souligne le danger auquel se voit confronté la critique heideggerienne du critère de ‘validité universelle’. On sait que le danger de ce type de critique réside dans l’aporie du relativisme historique. Or, que doit-on entendre par la ‘méthode d’analyse contextualiste’ telle que préconisée par Barash? Cette méthode s’inscrit-elle dans le courant du relativisme historique? 

A cet effet, Barash soutient que si Heidegger n’a pas su, ‘à partir de ses analyses de l’être-au-monde, nous garantir un fondement approprié à la tâche de l’interprétation’ (184), c’est que ses analyses du ‘contexte’ et du monde public partagé sont insuffisantes. En réduisant, dans Être et temps, le monde public au ‘on’ de l’inauthenticité et, dans son œuvre ultérieure, à la volonté technique de domination, Heidegger n’aurait pas su rejoindre cette plénitude des possibilités d’interprétation offertes par la thématisation adéquate du ‘contexte’ et du monde public partagé. Or, ce serait, selon Barash, cette ‘plénitude dans les possibilités d’interprétation du monde historique commun que l’analyse contextualiste, … cherche à restituer.’(187)

Daniel Cayer
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*Mimes et Parades. L'activité symbolique dans la vie sociale.*

*Mimes et Parades* est un livre traitant des relations entre sens et pouvoir. S'inspirant principalement de la théorie de l'idéologie d'Althusser, tout en la critiquant, et de la théorie systémique contemporaine, l'auteure propose une réévaluation originale de l'activité idéologique définie, cette fois, comme activité socio-symbolique. Cet élargissement de la nature de l'activité idéologique permet deux choses: examiner, dans la vie sociale, le statut ontologique et la fonction des activités symboliques et analyser le processus d'idéologisation de ces activités. Les productions socio-symboliques à valence idéologique (idéologèmes) ainsi que leurs modes d'action dans le système social sont deux problèmes auxquels s'intéresse particulièrement l'auteure; le 'modèle de la mimèsis' étant la théorie de l'activité symbolique dans ses manifestations sociales où elle analyse un système symbolique idéologique dans les relations internes entre les éléments qui le composent et les relations externes qu'il entretient avec son environnement socio-culturel. Certaines catégories de ce modèle, dont le schème 'simulation / répétition des significations — originalité' règle le développement et les transformations de l'activité symbolique dans la vie socio-culturelle, sont transposées dans un modèle spécifique à l'activité symbolique à valence idéologique: celui de la 'mimèsis agonique', où sont étudiés les fonctions ou effets historiques de l'activité idéologique. Cette étude permet d'expliciter la 'sémiosis sociale', soit la signification dans le contexte socio-culturel, et ce, dans une perspective cognitiviste.

Dans la première partie du livre, intitulé *l'animal symbolique*, l'auteure procède à une redefinition de l'activité symbolique sous ses aspects socio-culturels et s'intéresse, par conséquent, au problème de la relation entre les activités symboliques et culturelles. Ce problème, 'le problème du sens commun ou les déterminations culturelles de la sémiosis sociale', est envisagé dans une approche pragmatique; la thèse étant que l'organisation culturelle concrétise des conditions sociales du processus de signification à des 'applications pertinentes' et des 'régularités' culturelles dans nos capacités intellectuelles et dans l'utilisation de nos facultés cognitives. En redéfinissant le concept de société et de culture par rapport à leur relation à l'activité symbolique et en étudiant les liens entre l'organisation du système social et culturel, l'auteure analyse la relation qu'il y a entre les actions symboliques et idéologiques; sa thèse étant que les activités idéologiques sont des formes particulières des actions symboliques. Ainsi, dans cette première partie, une conception nouvelle de l'activité symbolique est proposée; une conception qui intègre autant les aspects psychiques que sociaux des manifestations discursives et pratiques des fonctions symboliques-herméneutiques des activités socio-culturelles.
L'action idéologique, redéfinie comme une fonction particulière, la 'fonction agonique', de l'activité symbolique sous ses aspects socio-culturels, caractérise l'activité symbolique à valence idéologique. Cette catégorie d'analyse, la fonction agonique, permet de distinguer l'idéologème en tant que tel et de déterminer sa valeur sémantique-pragmatique propre et, par suite, son utilité sociale. Dans la deuxième partie de son livre, intitulé *l'animal agonique*, l'auteure développe, comme modèle général de la relation existant dans l'action symbolique entre les composantes individuelles et collectives, l'hypothèse de la mimésis sous l'articulation qui existe entre sémiotèse individuelle et collective, et ce, afin de rendre compte de la production-reproduction socio-symbolique. Elle explicite les liens de l'activité agonique avec l'activité symbolique-culturelle lorsque celle-ci présente des enjeux d'ordre polémique et politique. Les rapports entre sens et pouvoir sont alors analysés, et ce, tout en décrivant le fonctionnement de l'idéologème. Finalement, l'auteure démontre comment le sujet-agent-interprétant (SAI), ou groupe de SAI, lorsqu'il se trouve en rapport de force avec d'autres SAI, modifie le discours socio-culturel commun, ce qui explique le processus d'idéologisation des discours et pratiques socio-culturels. L'activité agonique, ses propriétés, ses mécanismes de fonctionnement ainsi que ses effets particuliers, est donc analysée dans sa relation avec l'ensemble des activités sociales et, afin de tester le modèle de l'activité agonique proposé, elle examine, entre autres, la production-reproduction de la porcelaine de la Compagnie des Indes, dans l'Europe du dix-huitième siècle, faite à l'imitation de celle fabriquée en Chine ou en Extrême-Orient.

L'activité symbolique à valence idéologique, 'le célèbre "moteur" de l'histoire dans la tradition marxiste' (168), affirme l'auteure, occupe donc une place unique sur la scène sociale et historique. 'De même que les SAI en vivent les contradictions et en prennent conscience, ainsi ils exploitent discours ou pratiques sociales et ils en bouleversent les valeurs, les vérités, les significations co-extensives, au cours de ces luttes de pouvoir qui déchirent mais qui aussi transforment les rapports sociaux' (168).

L'originalité des positions ontologiques et épistémologiques défendues par l'auteure, son monisme matérialisme, son discrédit de la valeur objective du savoir et sa considération des notions de mouvement et de processus que nous retrouvons dans la pensée marxiste, lui permettent d'analyser, dans l'activité représentative, la logique du mouvement liant le sujet et l'objet; cette analyse rendant possible la reconstruction du fonctionnement du processus de production de l'idéologème et la définition des critères d'idéologisation d'un discours ou d'une pratique socio-symbolique.

L'idéologie posée avant tout comme 'activité sociale' et sa valeur de 'savoir' relayée par la notion de valeur 'sémantique-stratégique', font que ses productions tirent leur valeur de leur fonction sociale, en tant qu'instruments de lutte, et leur utilité en regard des buts que se donne le producteur ou le manipulateur de l'idéologème dans un contexte donné. 'Bref, la valeur d'un idéologème se mesurera au degré de sa réussite; réussite qui, elle-même, est fonction tant de la configuration de la scène sociale (la conjoncture politique)
où apparaît l'idéologème que des objectifs de son producteur. C'est ce que je propose d'appeler la valeur kairique' (18). À cette valeur, est adjoinit l'adjectif 'herméneutique', car le SAI interprète une chose ou un événement social en fonction des enjeux polémiques et politiques qu'il poursuit; soit qu'il désire démontrer la 'vérité' de cette interprétation devenue idéologème, soit qu'il veut dénoncer la 'fausseté' d'un discours ou d'une pratique quelconque en affrontant un idéologème concurrent au sien.

À travers ce livre, une explication matérialiste dynamique du processus idéologique, ainsi que de son rôle social et historique nous est donc présentée. Un renouvellement du marxisme et de l'anthropologie culturelle, une contribution heuristique à la théorie générale de l'idéologie, voilà ce que propose cette auteure dont les préoccupations bien contemporaines tournent autour du problème du 'Sens et du Pouvoir'.

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*Bibliothèque et État. Naissance d'une raison politique dans la France du XVIIe siècle.*


Pp. 320. 178FF.


L'étude de l'A. aborde sous un angle original la problématique classique des relations entre philosophie et politique, celle particulière du conseil philosop-thique au Prince que peut constituer une Bibliothèque. Le fil conducteur de l'analyse suit le débat public-privé: faut-il privilégier une Bibliothèque à l'usage exclusif du Maître ou au contraire construire une bibliothèque universelle et publique, lien symbolique de la raison politique et lieu institution-nalisé où petit à petit s'édifiera pour tous les normes de l'action publique?

Dans l'ouvrage qu'il nous présente, première partie d'une thèse beaucoup plus volumineuse envisageant la figure du bibliothécaire et sa fonction politique jusqu'à la fin des Lumières, l'A. choisit de faire de Naudé, le paradigme du conseiller-bibliothécaire, et, de la bibliothèque Mazarine, l'instrument privilégié de l'émergence de l'*homo democraticus*. Nous sommes alors conviés à saisir comment au début du XVIIe siècle s'amorce avec ce contemporain de Galilée, ami de Gassendi et des libertins érudits, bibliothécaire de Mazarin, l'invention de la bibliothèque publique et universelle, telle que grâce à la Révolution, nous la connaissons aujourd'hui. En même
temps à travers l’histoire de Naudé, l’A. réussit à dégager de quelle manière s’élabora la Bibliothèque comme un dispositif socio-symbolique dont les enjeux philosophiques s’entrecroisent aux perspectives polémiques et politiques qui les activent et les réinjectent, à leur tour, à travers les inévitables combats ou les controverses de tout ordre que déclenchent son installation, son développement ou encore son éventuelle destruction. Ainsi avec le service de conseil philosophique au politique et le travail épistémologique, éthique ou civil qu’une bibliothèque prétend induire sont mis en place de nouveaux systèmes de savoir qui accompagnent ceux du pouvoir et que se jouent dans cette institutionnalisation progressive du bâtiment bibliothécaire leur sort social et leur reconnaissance collective.

Les différents chapitres de Bibliothèque et État étudient le passage, initié par Naudé, d’une bibliothèque privée à une bibliothèque publique; ils montrent les conditions pratiques de sa diffusion aussi bien que les différentes conséquences épistémiques et son importance stratégique dans la culture éthique et politique d’alors: la possibilité humaine d’une universalité dans la finitude, l’affirmation d’une vérité sans fondement ontothéologique, le rôle de l’État et le statut de la connaissance livresque, la nécessité de sa publicité ...

(18). L’action de Naudé (1600-1653) décisive à cet égard est analysée, d’abord, dans sa figure de conseiller-bibliothécaire et de défenseur de la raison d’État, ensuite, de bibliothécaire-bibliographe novateur de ces nouvelles sciences, telle qu’elle se fait jour à travers successivement deux textes de Naudé. Le premier, Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque, présenté à Monseigneur le Président de Mesmes (Paris, 1627) est consacré explicitement à la Bibliothèque qu’il est chargé d’établir. La raison d’État est inséparable d’un inventaire d’un état de la Raison. Le second texte, qui relève de la même inspiration, inaugure, avec le travail de rassemblement de textes de référence et une véritable mise à jour du concept de bibliographie comme instrument de formation du jugement et d’information, le chemin qui conduira de ce bibliothécaire d’un nouveau genre, à travers Bayle et La république des lettres, Diderot et l’Encyclopédie, puis Volney et la statistique, à un nouveau type de conseil propre à la France républicaine des Lumières: une science de l’État (185). Il s’agit, pour ce second texte, de la Bibliographia politica, publiée en 1633 à Venise et traduite en français en 1642 par Challine.

Comme l’écrit l’A., la Bibliothèque et l’État ... sont réciproquement et matrice l’un de l’autre (32). Cette thèse, qui veut s’illustrer du projet naudéen, se complète par une espèce de corollaire: l’avènement d’une bibliothèque publique telle que défendue par Naudé anticiperait sur la métamorphose de l’État souverain en une République qui s’appuie sur la volonté collective du savoir. Le projet naudéen se différencie des finalités éthiques et politiques mis de l’avant par les lettrés et les humanistes de l’époque, notamment Le Vayer qui développe la conception d’une bibliothèque-ermitage réservée à une élite sceptique. On retiendra comme particulièrement éclairant à l’appui de ces thèses, les développements que l’A. consacre à la promotion par Naudé de deux procédures rationnelles,
l’établissement d’un catalogue des catalogues et la mise en relation systématique des diversités, qui sont à la base de la construction de la socialité savante moderne (p. 67) ainsi que tout le chapitre quatre qui détaille les éléments de la bibliothèque naudéenne orientée par les principes nouveaux d’universalisation et d’exhaustivité qui implique la tolérance totale. La Bibliothèque laïque avec son ambition de plénitude, son refus de l’intégration apologétique et son défi à toute forme de censure apparaît ainsi l’exact inverse de l’Index et de la réorganisation par les Jésuites (voir la Bibliothèque curieuse et instructive du père Menestrier) de la Bibliothèque vaticane.

Les chapitres suivants sont davantage axés à mettre en évidence les relations entre les modifications heuristiques introduites par Naudé dans l’économie bibliothécaire et la réorganisation du travail intellectuel; l’A. s’attache à montrer de quelle manière ces modifications elles-mêmes peuvent se lire comme tour à tour causes et effets des mutations culturelles et sociales qui ont marqué l’avènement des modèles théoriques et pratiques de la modernité. Ainsi le chapitre 9 est particulièrement riche d’aperçus sur le rôle de la bibliographie comme épistémologie critique dans l’établissement de la science politique et comme la réponse au nouveau besoin de connaissances qui commande, comme le fait voir l’A., le rationalisme pratique du prince nouveau (217). C’est que le savoir politique nouveau doit se déployer pour être efficace à partir d’une bibliothèque qui ordonne pour lui les connaissances prioritaires en lui fournissant les instruments nécessaires au regard encyclopédique qui lui est indispensable (263).

Ce livre fort suggestif donne à lire, à travers Naudé, le portrait d’un genre nouveau de conseiller politique reposant sur l’utilisation bien conduite du nouveau modèle bibliothécaire qu’il inaugure. Désormais la reconnaissance de l’intérêt général devient le résultat fabriqué d’un travail (268) qu’aide à élaborer le travail bibliothécaire. Solidement documenté, avec une abondance de notes et de références, si la bibliographie sommaire ne les reprend pas car elle vise plutôt, semble-t-il, à les compléter, l’A. aura tout compte fait réussi, malgré un style tantinet ésotérique, une écriture souvent un peu trop allusive, à rendre justice au projet biblio-politique de Naudé, qui, comme il l’écrit, aura été de substituer à l’autorité spirituelle de l’Église l’autorité bibliographique de cette machine culturelle qu’est la Bibliothèque, machine qui inscrit désormais le développement de l’ordre politique dans la communauté dialogique d’un pouvoir politique et d’une autorité savante (306).

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La philosophie médiévale.
Pp. xvi + 527. 149FF.

‘La première chose que doit apprendre un étudiant qui aborde le Moyen Age est que le Moyen Age n’existe pas’ (xiii). Singulière entrée en matière pour un livre qui se veut un manuel d’histoire de la philosophie médiévale! L’étonnement est pourtant vite dépassé: le Moyen Age n’existe pas parce qu’il y a plusieurs Moyen Age et non pas un seul, comme une vision trop centrée sur notre propre tradition chrétienne occidentale le laisserait croire. Dégager la pluralité des formes du rationnel, pluralités historiques, géographiques, religieuses, culturelles et linguistiques, suivre les déplacements des centres d’études de la philosophie et la dérive des textes, montrer que la raison n’est la propriété exclusive ni de l’Occident ni des philosophes, tels sont les fils conducteur de ce livre qui dresse le bilan des recherches récentes.

Les préjugés négatifs hérités d’une longue tradition n’étant pas encore tout à fait éliminés, l’auteur s’attache à répondre avec toutes les nuances requises à ces trois questions: 1° Y a-t-il eu de la philosophie au Moyen Age? 2° La philosophie médiévale est-elle autre chose qu’une théologie rationnelle? 3° La philosophie médiévale a-t-elle apporté une contribution significative à l’histoire générale de la philosophie?

L’ouvrage, divisé en 10 chapitres, couvre toutes les périodes et toutes les traditions: philosophie à Byzance (44 p.), Islam oriental (84 p.), Islam occidental (50 p.), philosophie juive (58 p.), haut Moyen Age latin (34 p.), XIe siècle (28 p.), XIIe siècle (48 p.), XIIIe siècle (64 p.), XIVe siècle (52 p.) et XVe siècle (13 p.). On le voit, les divisions par traditions et par siècles et, au sein de celles-ci, la juxtaposition des auteurs sont inévitables, cela est pourtant contrebancé par des paragraphes sur le cadre historique, les facteurs géo-culturo-politiques qui ont déterminé les pérégrinations des centres d’études, les étapes de traduction des textes, les institutions scolaires, ce qui donne à l’ensemble du livre une unité. Un titre moins académique de cet ouvrage aurait pu être ‘Récit des voyages de la raison au Moyen Age’, petites ou grandes morts et renaissances successives de la philosophie.

L’auteur dégage les caractéristiques principales de chacune des traditions, fournit des repères historiques et culturels (parfois trop lourds, au détriment de l’exposé des doctrines), et ne manque pas d’insister sur certains thèmes qui lui sont très chers, comme l’importance de l’enseignement et le rôle du professeur de philosophie, le débat sur la vie philosophique, la mise en évidence de certains philosophes rebelles, surtout Ibn Bâjja et Averroès, auteur auquel il ne consacre pas moins de 20 pages, contre 13 pour Anselme et 7 pour Thomas d’Aquain. Un lecteur peu averti pourrait en conclure qu’Averroès est le philosophe médiéval le plus important...

L’ouvrage est parsemé de remarques qui sembleront évidentes, mais jamais assez pour qu’il soit inutile de les répéter, par exemple: ce n’est pas
parce qu'on commente Aristote qu'on est aristotélicien (34), il y a une distinction à opérer entre l'originalité d'une oeuvre et la fonction que remplit cette oeuvre, pour la perpétuation d'une théorie, la continuation d'une tradition… (35), les traductions jouent un rôle essentiel pour la survie de la philosophie (184).

Les exposés doctrinaux plus longs au cours desquels l'auteur expose les vues les plus récentes, les confrontant à ses propres thèses, trahissent le plus souvent (ou traduisent simplement) ses intérêts particuliers, ce qui est bien naturel. Quand, par contre, on constate que presque tous les exposés doctrinaux plus longs relatifs à des auteurs byzantins, arabes ou juifs, sont plus particulièrement centrés sur des débats ou des notions qui connaîtront des développements importants dans l'Occident chrétien, on pourrait se demander si ne point pas là un peu de cet ethnocentrisme dénoncé par l'auteur lui-même. Il en va ainsi, par exemple, du développement sur la querelle du monophysisme à Byzance (17-21), de l'exposé de la théorie de la prédication d'Abûl-Barakât al-Baghdâdi (124-129), de la théorie de l'intellect chez Averroès (195-199), des plusieurs pages sur Ishâq al-Isrâ'îlî sur le Fons vitae d'Ibn Gabirol, qui ont beaucoup influencé Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin.


Comme enseignante, il me reste un regret: l'absence de références bibliographiques dans le cœur de l'exposé même, le très petit nombre de textes, des notes doctrinales parfois noyées dans une abondance de renseignements historiques, des présupposés trop exigeants pour un étudiant débutant sont autant d'éléments qui me font hésiter à utiliser ce livre, non pas comme un instrument de travail extrêmement utile, mais comme un manuel.

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Keith Devlin

*Logic and Information.*

Pp. xvi + 308.
US $34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41031-4);

This is a book on situation semantics, extending the work of Barwise and Perry (*Situations and Attitudes*, 1983). Devlin’s project is to establish a mathematical science of information. He begins with standard mathematical logic, and aims to extend it to provide a general model of communication, taken as an exchange and processing of information, including rational thought, inference and proof. As regards rational thought, he denies that it is necessary to posit an internal language, or Mentalese, as a medium of mental processes (11). His basic assumption is that there is in the world *information*, and there are items of information which he calls ‘infons’. An *infon* is an abstraction, like a number or set, to the effect that objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ do or do not stand in a certain relation $P$ (22); as such, infons are propositional objects, and can be made true or false (or, as Devlin says, supported) by a *situation* in the real world. A situation is a part of reality occurring at a time and place; for example, a football match at such and such a time and place is a situation, and this can make true or false a variety of infons about the situation. An infon which is made true by a situation is a *fact* (23). Devlin distinguishes between *real* situations, such as a football match, and *abstract* situations, which are sets of infons. Abstract situations still support or verify infons; so it turns out for him that an infon is true (i.e., is a fact) just in case it is made true by a set of true infons (i.e., a set of facts) (35).

Later it turns out that in addition to infons, there are also *propositions*; a proposition is ‘a claim about the world to the effect that a certain object is of a certain type’ (62). Given than an infon is also a ‘claim’ to the effect that objects $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ do or do not stand in a relation (the relation being a certain type), one might wonder what difference there is between infons and propositions; it seems rather that Devlin *multiplies abstract entities beyond necessity*, the more so since in addition to infons and propositions he further posits *infonic propositions*, these being claims to the effect that a situation makes true a finite set of infons (63).

*Situation semantics* is an application of the theory of infons and situations to the semantics of language, whether formal or informal. Here Devlin distinguishes between two sorts of semantic property: ‘What is the *propositional content* of a given statement, i.e. what claim does it make? What is the *meaning* of the sentence uttered?’ (86). The propositional content of a statement such as ‘Mary is running’ is, surprisingly, what a proposition was said to be earlier: a claim that the situation of Mary’s running is of a certain type: *viz.*, the type of making true that Mary is running (88). The meaning of the sentence ‘Mary is running’ is
then said to be an abstraction which, taken together with the situation of uttering 'Mary is running', yields the propositional content of the utterance (89). More precisely, meaning is construed in terms of nomic relations, called 'constraints', between types of situation; thus smoke means fire because there is a constraint, or nomic relation, between smoke and fire. This account of meaning is an application of Dretske's 'information semantics'.

In his account of mental states and cognition, Devlin endorses the traditional view that the mind is a system of representations which are structured so as to reflect, more or less, the structure of objective reality, notably the particulars, aspects of particulars, and relations among particulars which comprise the mind's environment (145-6). He makes this very clear in saying that, for the semantics of a belief, 'account should be taken of the internal structure of the belief, in so far as it involves notions of objects' (158), with notions being construed as mental representations of external things. In short, here Devlin subscribes to the mental code, or language-of-thought hypothesis; yet, as I mentioned earlier, he also denies that view: 'I reject the necessity of positing some form of internal language ... as an underpinning of mental activity' (11).

Devlin applies situation semantics to the problems of conditional statements, and to logical paradoxes such as the Liar and Russell's paradox. As for conditionals, he offers first a notational variant of the strict implication account: 'if $\Phi$ then $\Psi$' has the content that the situation described makes it true that $\Phi$ and not $\Psi$ is precluded (274); Devlin says that this is a material-conditional account, but it is really the strict implication, since 'precluded' is a modal term. To cater for counterfactuals, he introduces hypothetical situations, which are just like possible worlds, but regarded as abstract situations. So this account is standard truth-conditional, quantifying over possibilia. Because of worries about the status of hypothetical situations, he then offers an alternative approach, which is that 'if $\Phi$ then $\Psi$' expresses a constraint, or nomic connection of some sort, between the situation $\Phi$ and the situation $\Psi$, allowing that the constraint may be conventional, or psychological, etc. A great variety of problems with either of these accounts he passes over in silence.

As for the paradoxes, Devlin reiterates the 'solution' to the Liar as in Barwise and Perry's Situations and Attitudes; but then, noting that that approach does not work, he takes recourse to Gricean communicative conventions: '... adherence to the normal conventions of communicative acts is not compatible with an utterance of the Liar sentence. That is to say, an utterance of the Liar sentence made in accordance with the normal conventions will not produce a meaningful proposition' (290). Concerning the Barber paradox, he 'resolves' it by saying that 'the barber does not live in the village' (292). These are rather astonishing moves, coming from someone aspiring to establish a science of information.
Logic and Information is a conceptually messy book, a profusion of criss-crossing, mostly superfluous abstract posits. But for those interested in situation semantics, it contains a useful up-to-date bibliography of the subject (xiii-xvi).

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Alan Donagan
The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan, ed.
J.E. Malpas. 2 Vols.

This collection spans more than thirty years, and provides an excellent representation of Alan Donagan's work in all areas except the philosophy of religion and medieval philosophy, which are to be covered in an independently edited volume. The first of the present pair, Historical Understanding and the History of Philosophy, consists of fourteen papers, three on the philosophy of history, and the rest on or about the history of philosophy. First is the previously unpublished, 'The History of Philosophy as a Discipline', which asks why professional philosophers should study the history of philosophy. The answer is that since philosophers inevitably seek to marshal historically important insights in support of their own positions, they are in conversation not just with each other but with the philosophical tradition. Insufficient grounding in that tradition leads to misrepresentation of it, an example being the failure of Ross and Sidgwick to appreciate Kant's conception of rational nature as an end.

There follow three papers in the philosophy of history. The first two, 'Explanation in History' and 'The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered', address the positivist thesis that historical explanations are at least sketches of deductive-nomological explanations, in which the events to be explained are represented as in principle deducible from strictly general laws. Donagan is sympathetic to the deducibility claim, but not the appeal to laws. Rather, he suggests, historical explanations appeal to the intentions of agents in particular circumstances — intentions which need not be held by other agents, or by the same agents at other times. Knowing Brutus
meant to save the Republic at any cost, we may deduce that he would join Cassius's conspiracy. But there is no implied law: on the contrary, historical explanations allow, though they do not affirm, that humans have free choice, and so will not display uniformity in their intentions. The third paper in this group, 'Popper's Examination of Historicism', is a fundamentally sympathetic but still critical treatment of Popper's rejection of the idea that human history proceeds through phases united by peculiarly developmental laws.

The papers in history of philosophy begin with 'Descartes's "Synthetic" Treatment of the Real Distinction between Mind and Body'. Donagan defends Descartes's claim that his argument in the Meditations for the real distinction does not occur until Meditation VI, on the ground that not until then is the reliability of clear and distinct ideas sufficiently established. But the argument itself he finds abrupt and unconvincing, which may explain why many have sought a complete argument in Meditation II. Next come four papers on the philosophy of Spinoza. The mind/body theme continues in 'Spinoza's Proof of Immortality', an interesting defense of the viability within Spinoza's system of his claim that the human mind is not completely destroyed at death. The core idea is that one constituent of my mind, my formal essence, has eternal reality in God's mind as well as forming part of my own being, and so survives my bodily destruction. 'Spinoza's Dualism' argues that although on the issue of substance he was a strict monist, Spinoza's treatment of extensio and cogitatio as distinct attributes both of Deus sive Natura and of individual human beings incorporates enough of the elements of dualism into his system to make it inimical to materialistic antidualism. The next two papers give excellent general expositions of Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology. 'Substance, Essence, and Attribute in Spinoza, Ethics, I' explores his views on such subjects as being, cause, and essence, as well as their relation to antecedents in ancient and medieval philosophy, and examines the controversy between Spinoza and de Vries over whether distinct attributes can be constitutive of a single substance. 'Language, Ideas and Reasoning in Spinoza, Ethics, II' considers the ways in which Descartes's theory of ideas is transformed by Spinoza, and the similarities and contrasts between their views and contemporary, linguistically oriented accounts of mind and thought.

The focus of the remaining essays is increasingly contemporary. 'Victorian Philosophical Prose: J.S. Mill and F.H. Bradley' is an interesting excursion into the rarely explored subject of philosophical style, examining the contrasting relations of content and form in the writings of the empiricist Mill and the idealist Bradley. 'Collingwood and Philosophical Method' catalogs the development of Collingwood's thought, from his early denunciation of realism as abstractionist falsification, to his eventual disillusionment with absolute idealism as itself concerned to elucidate the ultimate abstraction. In the end, Donagan argues, this progression left Collingwood without a coherent method of inquiry in core areas of philosophy. Next is the widely read 'Universals and Metaphysical Realism', an examination of the realism
of Moore and Russell, but also a full dress essay in metaphysics. Donagan rejects the denotative theory of meaning underlying Russell’s position, but also defends realism against classical and contemporary objections, and argues for its superiority over nominalist and conceptualist alternatives. ‘Wittgenstein on Sensation’ argues that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein was not, as is often claimed, defending a form of behaviorism. Rather, he accepted the idea that sensations are private, nondispositional processes accompanying pain behavior. He did, however, reject the introspectionist conclusions often drawn from this, insisting that mental states cannot be named or investigated independently of the observable circumstances in which they are manifested. The final essay in this volume, also previously unpublished, is ‘Ryle and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy’, a critique of the widespread midcentury view — Donagan says he himself once accepted it — that only science can discover truth, and that philosophy must confine itself to conceptual elucidation.

Volume II, titled Action, Reason, and Value, contains fourteen essays on action theory, theoretical and applied ethics, and philosophy of law. It opens with Donagan’s 1981 presidential address to what is now the Central Division of the APA, ‘Philosophical Progress and the Theory of Action’. Here Donagan charts the development of action theory, from Aristotle’s treatment of full-fledged human action as founded in rational choice, through Aquinas’s emphasis on means and intention, to contemporary explorations of the foundations of agency in terms of propositional attitudes and mental acts. This, Donagan argues, constitutes real progress — not just an illusion of it born of favoring the present philosophical milieu, as suggested by Rorty and others. ‘Determinism and Freedom: Sellars and the Reconciliationist Thesis’ gives a clear and patient analysis of Sellars’ version of compatibilism, and an historically informed critique of his claim that libertarians are confused in equating determinism with compulsion. ‘Von Wright on Causation, Intention, and Action’ is an exploration of some themes in von Wright’s Explanation and Understanding. It includes a Davidsonian argument to reconcile von Wright’s description of the ‘immediate outer aspect’ of action as muscular activity with the fact that we seldom intend muscular events as such, and a defense of Chisholm’s conception of agent causation against criticisms by von Wright and others. The latter theme is continued in ‘Chisholm’s Theory of Agency’, the last of the essays on action, where it is pointed out that complaints about the intelligibility of agent causation reverse the position of Reid, who raised the same objection against event causation. Chisholm’s view is criticized, however, for treating events as states of affairs, thereby misrepresenting their identity conditions, and for considering an agent’s causally contributing to an action as itself an event, which generates an infinite regress.

The fifth essay in this volume, ‘Real Human Persons’, is a valuable and sometimes humorous treatment of the problem of personal identity. Among other things, it counsels against the radical thought experiments that characterize some work in this area, on the ground that they may violate the
nature of the phenomenon being investigated, and so produce misleading results.

The papers on ethics, not surprisingly, are strongly Kantian in flavor. They begin with ‘Morality, Property, and Slavery’, an outstanding example of Donagan’s ability to ground discussion of contemporary issues in the historical tradition. The issue is the limits morality places on the institution of property. Fundamental here is the immorality of one person owning another, which for Donagan is grounded in the Kantian principle that rational nature must always be treated as an end. The other main focus is proposals like Rawls’s principle of difference, which seek to redress imbalances of wealth by assuring a flow of benefits to the least fortunate. Donagan opposes such principles in the case of adults able to support themselves. He does, however, endorse the view that ownership of natural resources should be viewed as common to all. The next two essays are narrower in scope. ‘Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?’ argues that rule utilitarianism cannot do justice to the phenomenon of supererogation, and unjustly subordinates the rights of individuals to the common good. ‘The Moral Theory Almost Nobody Knows: Kant’s’, the only previously unpublished paper in this volume, criticizes treatments of Kant which, following Hegel, fail to appreciate the formulation of the categorical imperative that calls for treating rational nature as an end. For Donagan, this formulation is crucial for generating duties of beneficence omitted by the formula of law. Next is ‘Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy’. At issue here is whether there are moral dilemmas that do not arise from an agent’s previous misdeeds. Donagan argues that rationalist theories of morality, which include both Aquinas’s and Kant’s, cannot countenance such dilemmas, although command theories can. He suggests the contemporary view that irreducible moral dilemmas are commonplace may be owing to a misunderstanding of Ross’s notion of a prima facie duty.

The focus then shifts to the practical. ‘Informed Consent in Therapy and Experimentation’ is a study of the recent emergence of consensus in the medical community that patients should not be subjected to risky therapies or to any experimentation without having been fully informed and consenting to the procedure. Among the factors responsible for this, it is claimed, are the development of a less paternalistic stance by physicians toward patients, and a related, growing realization that the dignity of each individual forbids their autonomy being preempted, or overridden in experiments aimed at the general welfare. ‘The Relations of Moral Theory to Moral Judgments: A Kantian Review’ is concerned with the Kantian notion of Recht as it applies to just war theory, and in particular to Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki — a decision Donagan follows Anscombe in claiming to have been unjustified.

There follow two papers in the philosophy of law. ‘Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System’ finds the adversary system to be grounded in the concept of individual dignity, which does not justify completely unrestricted attorney-client privilege, but does require that the defendant’s
interpretation of the facts be given a full hearing in legal proceedings. ‘The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself’ argues that a legal requirement of self-incrimination does not increase materially the success rate of prosecutions, but is often associated with serious abuses, and so is best avoided if proper regard for individual rights is to be preserved. Finally, there is ‘Philosophical Ethics: What It Is and What It Should Be’, in part a commentary on the development of ethical thought in this century, but also a defense of the Kantian perspective Donagan always upheld, and a rejection of the relativism of MacIntyre.

This is an outstanding collection, and is very well presented. There is a bibliography of Donagan’s published works, and forewords by Toulmin and Davidson which, together with the editor’s introductions, give a nice picture of Donagan’s philosophical development and outlook. The descriptions above can hardly do justice to the quality of the essays, which display great breadth and historical erudition, deep regard for the tradition of philosophy, and hope for its future. Add to that Alan Donagan’s independence of mind, his gentleness as a critic, and his plain good sense, and the result is a set of papers of truly lasting value and insight, which no one can fail to profit from studying.

Hugh J. McCann
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Adam Drozdek
The Moral Dimension of Man in the Age of Computers.
Pp. 162.
US $40.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-9983-4);

The title of Adam Drozdek’s book is a misnomer. Though he says quite a bit about computers in the first essay, he does so to punctuate his major contention; viz., that humans and only humans are persons. ‘Computer personalists’ and ‘animal rightists’ claim otherwise because they accept the common — yet mistaken — ‘rationalist’ view of man, according to which man is essentially a cognizer. The correct view, says Drozdek, is the ‘moralist’ one — the view of man (and persons) as ‘essentially moral creatures,’ beings who use their rational/cognitive abilities as a ‘tool’ toward moral ends such as goodness (earthly or otherwise).

Drozdek’s first aim is to show why computers are not and cannot be persons (Chapter 1). After sketching-out the anti-moralist assumptions underlying artificial intelligence (AI), he argues that AI and biology (along
with their progeny among the cognitive sciences) have seduced many people into privileging the cognitive dimension over the moral one. This leads to construing as a person (with ‘civil rights’) any entity that exhibits intelligence or rationality. This is a mistake, for while computers may be construed as intelligent or even rational, ‘only man is able to tell between good and evil’ (12). Hence, computers are neither moral creatures nor persons. The same holds for animals (Chapter 2): ‘animals are not humans and they should not be treated on an equal footing with them’ (29). To show that he is not alone in championing the moralist view, he catalogs a host of philosophers who express similar notions (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 he attempts to wed the moralist view with certain empirical theories of moral development. Since such theories show that ‘moral development is especially sensitive to outside influences,’ a proper educational atmosphere is indispensable (131). Chapter 5 details the requisite education so as to unlock the ‘dormant goodness in man’ (138).

Such is the story. I find it unconvincing. Here’s why. First, even ignoring Drozdek’s defining personhood in such a way so as to preclude there ever being nonhuman persons, his crucial arguments are invariably fallacious. In his attack against AI, for instance, he treats the extreme claims of unnamed ‘computer personalists’ as the received view among AI researchers. As such, it is the straw men that are doing most of Drozdek’s work. Second, Drozdek’s notion of ‘good’ is such that every goal directed act can be construed as a good for the agent, be it securing a mate, quenching a thirst, avoiding a predator, etc. This has rather dire consequences for his arguments regarding the amorality of computer robots and animals. Third, Drozdek has grossly mischaracterized the business of both AI and cognitive science. According to Drozdek, neither AI nor cognitive science is in the business of explaining human cognitive processing, but rather producing ‘workable systems for military and industrial applications.’ Indeed, connectionism owes its ‘resurgence’ not to any ‘philosophical interest in modeling man’ (14), but rather to military funding, without which AI and computational modeling would be just a ‘quaint academic curiosity’ (152). At best, there’s a genetic fallacy afoot. My main point is this: only someone caught in the grip of a dogma would claim that neither connectionists nor cognitive scientists are interested in using their ‘neural networks’ to model/explain human cognition.

Robert S. Stufflebeam
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Pascal Engel  
_Davidson et la philosophie du langage_.  
Pp. xix + 354. 198FF.  

Présenter et analyser les détails de l'œuvre de Donald Davidson en philosophie du langage n'est pas une mince tâche, les écrits de ce dernier étant la fois concis et denses. Depuis quelques années, Pascal Engel s'est efforcé de faire connaître à la communauté francophone une partie substantielle de l'œuvre d'un des plus importants philosophes de cette fin de siècle. _Davidson et la philosophie du langage_ s'inscrit dans le cadre de cette démarche; son objectif est double: premièrement, exposer le fond des thèses de Davidson en philosophie du langage tout en abordant certaines de ses positions en philosophie de l'esprit et de l'action, positions dont la présentation est nécessaire à la compréhension de la problématique du livre, et deuxièmement, examiner et contribuer au débat réalisme/antiréalisme qui eut lieu entre Dummett et Davidson.

La critique adressée par Dummett au projet davidsonien est bien connue: ou bien sa théorie sémantique est modeste, se réduisant ainsi à un manuel de traduction et ne pouvant donc expliquer ce qu'une personne connaît lorsqu'elle connaît un langage, ou bien sa théorie est robuste et holiste, rendant alors impossible, selon Dummett, toute tentative de construction d'une théorie systématique de la connaissance du langage. La critique de Dummett du holisme davidsonien est intimement liée, comme le note Engel (178), à son rejet du réalisme — qui dit que les conditions de vérité d'un énoncé constituent en quelque sorte la signification de celui-ci — puisque cette position nous conduirait présumément à maintenir que la signification transcende l'usage.

Dans la section 4.6, Engel critique les objections de Dummett face à Davidson. La théorie sémantique davidsonienne se réduit-elle effectivement à un manuel de traduction, au sens où elle présuppose ce qu'elle cherche à déterminer? Elle le serait, comme le remarque Engel, si les phrases-T, qui appartiennent au métalangage de l'interprète devrait être aussi partagées à l'avance par le locuteur qu'il cherche à interpréter. Mais, ce n'est pas le cas: 'd'une manière générale, cette confusion provient de la confusion systématique que fait Dummett entre le schéma tarskien (T), la thèse d'équivalence, et la thèorie de la vérité-redondance' (181). Quant à la portée du holisme davidsonien, Engel soutient qu'il n'est pas clair, _pace_ Dummett, que celui-là soit radical au sens où la signification d'une expression d'un langage dépend, d'une manière forte, de la signification des significations de _toutes_ les autres phrases du dit langage. Engel suit ici les pas de McDowell et Tennant; ce dernier défend en effet 'qu'il faut séparer les deux composantes d'une théorie davidsonienne de la signification — la théorie-T moléculaire et la procédure d'interprétation holistique — et que le holisme de la seconde est purement méthodologique' (183).
Il demeure toutefois que les critiques adressées par l'antiréalisme, malgré ses propres difficultés, sont sérieuses, et qu’une position réaliste qui se veut acceptable se doit d’adresser certains des problèmes auxquels elle fait face. C’est en effet l’intention d’Engel, en s’inspirant surtout des travaux de Peacocke, de montrer comment une position réaliste minimale, qui se base sur ce qu’il appelle les platitude de déflationnistes, peut rendre compte du fait que les notions de vérité et de signification sont objectives, et que cette dernière peut être en même temps soumise à des contraintes épistémiques. Le réalisme minimal ‘rejette une assimilation de la vérité à l’assertabilité, mais … souscrit néanmoins à des contraintes antiréalistes comme celles de surassertabilité ou d’acceptation rationnelle’ (223).

Le réalisme davidsonien est-il compatible avec le réalisme minimal? Engel soutient que, dans une large mesure, oui, même si la position de Davidson est considérablement différente étant donnée sa thèse de l’interprétation radicale et la place qu’occupe en son sein le principe de charité. Comme le note Engel, ‘selon Davidson, sa propre position n’est ni réaliste au sens où elle soutiendrait que la vérité est radicalement non épistémique ni antiréaliste au sens où la vérité serait épistémique, mais elle ne vise pas à concilier le réalisme et l’antiréalisme, les deux positions étant pour lui inintelligibles’ (239). Cette position comporte plusieurs difficultés, comme le remarque Engel, résultant surtout de la tension entre les relations causales que l’on entretient avec le monde et qui justifient le principe de charité, et le caractère normatif et holiste de l’interprétation radicale. ‘En particulier, il me semble que Davidson n’a pas montré que le scepticisme radical était impossible, et que les principes de la théorie de l’interprétation radicale suffisent à fonder une épistémologie réaliste’ (258).

Engel s’applique à développer une lecture de Davidson qui fait de son holisme, à la manière du chapitre consacré au réalisme, un holisme minimal, doublé d’une théorie du contenu, pour faire face au problème classique du mode de présentation. Cette position souscrit à ce que l’auteur appelle, les trois platitude du holisme minimal: le holisme méthodologique des attributions de croyance et de signification, le holisme de la phrase et le principe de compositionnalité, et la condition de généralité et de productivité — sans souscrire au holisme radical de la signification et des croyances, et sans adopter une forme radicale de holisme ou de molécularisme’ (281).

Ceci ne nous dit pas en quel sens la théorie davidsonienne de la signification doit être une théorie de la compréhension. Il est clair que Davidson considère qu’un locuteur n’a pas besoin d’internaliser la théorie que celui-la propose pour que l’on dise qu’il est linguistiquement compétent. Engel propose timidement l’idée que la connaissance du langage est en fait une connaissance tacite, et qu’une théorie de la signification pourrait la représenter, quoiqu’indirectement.

En tant que synthèse des thèses de Davidson en philosophie du langage, le livre d’Engel réussit à relever le défi de reconstituer les idées d’un auteur souvent difficile. Mais il subsiste une tension entre cet aspect du livre et l’apport que fait Engel aux débats auxquels il entend contribuer. Le lecteur
Rivka Feldhay
*Galileo and the Church: Political Inquisition or Critical Dialogue?*
Pp. viii + 303.

In this important new study, Rivka Feldhay challenges the predominant scholarly and popular view of the conflict between Galileo and the church. Such conventional views are based on the notion of ‘conflict’ between the Church and Science or, more generally, reason and irrational faith. In the place of these conventional accounts, Feldhay provides a convincing narrative that situates Galileo’s eventual silencing ‘as a plausible result of the pursuit of rational truth, forever entangled in power play of groups with competing interests’ (8). A review of this nature can provide no more than an outline of her argument. In support of the argument, Feldhay provides rich historically nuanced information that allows the reader to see the trajectory of conflicting elite cultures active during the early seventeenth century.

The first part of the book provides an overview of the official interactions between Galileo and the Church beginning with the first ‘trial’ in 1616 and concluding with the second ‘trial’ in 1633. In trying to uncover the conditions behind the inquisition’s decision of 1633, Feldhay points out the importance of the conflicting interpretations of Pope Paul V’s decision concerning Galileo. Paul V had decided that, in accordance with traditional inquisitorial control, Galileo should be officially ‘warned’ (*moneat*) to abandon his views concerning the position of the sun and the movement of the earth. If Galileo refused to abandon these views, he was then to be issued an injunction (*praeeptum*) to abstain from teaching, defending, and discussing the views. If Galileo refused to acquiesce in the injunction, he was to be imprisoned. Feldhay points out that what was crucial in this decision was the requirement that Galileo abandon the views held. In the context of educational practice, this would only limit Galileo from claiming the truth of these views, but would not prevent him from teaching and discussing them. Accordingly, it was only
in case Galileo refused to acknowledge the mere probability of these views that he was to be enjoined and effectively silenced. Despite the apparent unambiguous nature of the pope's decision, Feldhay shows that in the communication of this decision to Galileo, not only was he told to abandon his views, but immediately he was enjoined not to hold, teach or defend the views in any way. This apparently clear violation of the pope's decision, marks the point of departure for the remainder of Feldhay's study. She remarks that it is important to notice that in the warning issued to Galileo, Cardinal Bellarmine, a Jesuit, only reported the admonition concerning holding the views as true, while Cardinal Segizzi, a Dominican, actually issued the injunction. While this injunction did not consist of a complete silencing, it explicitly ruled out any possibility that the Copernican views could be true. It is noteworthy that Bellarmine's report of the admonition to Galileo omits any mention of the further injunction. Feldhay's compelling central thesis consists in delineating the conflicting attitudes towards new knowledge claims among the Dominicans and Jesuits prior to 1616 and also showing what caused a change in the Jesuit position between 1616 and 1633.

The remaining two sections of the book provide an account of the competing interests of the elite cultures of the counter-reformation Church. Particular attention is focused on the Dominicans and Jesuits. Feldhay shows the challenge presented by the Jesuits to the traditional Dominican position as the intellectual elite of the Church committed to a fairly strict form of Thomism. In contrast, the Jesuits as a recent group active in the education of those members of society with essentially secular interests provided an alternative to the traditional Dominicans. Central to Feldhay's account of the differing outlooks of the two elite groups is the controversy De auxiliis concerning God's knowledge of future contingents. Feldhay argues that the Dominican position that developed out of the controversy involved the claim that God's knowledge of contingents, based on absolute omnipotence that involved both the will and knowledge of God, provided a 'transcendental limit' on the possibilities of human knowledge. Since knowledge of the order of the universe can be non-hypothetical only if the order necessarily proceeds from God's knowledge and will, the only thing that constrains God's creative possibilities is the principle of non-contradiction. Thus, Copernicanism becomes unprovable and hence cannot be true.

By contrast, the Jesuit position allowed for the possibility of separation between God's knowledge and his will through the notion of scientia media. According to Feldhay, this fit nicely with the claims of Jesuit mathematicians and astronomers to have certain knowledge of hypothetical entities through causes. These knowledge claims also led Jesuits such as Clavius to urge a reorientation in educational practice that in effect would upset traditional thomistic boundaries between mixed sciences such as astronomy and natural philosophy. Feldhay believes that Bellarmine's position in 1616 is ambiguous in the sense that he both upheld the thomistic boundary but at the same time encouraged Jesuit astronomers to continue their dialogue with Copernicanism.
The events between 1616 and the second ‘trial’ of 1633 are the result of the continuing dialogue between Jesuit mathematicians and astronomers and Galileo. In this dialogue, exemplified by the exchange with Christopher Scheiner, Galileo does not merely ‘transgress’ the fixed boundaries of disciplines erected by the Jesuit ratio studiorum of 1599, but actively defies them. Jesuit astronomers were careful to try to carve out a place for themselves in the educational hierarchy, but deferred to the preeminent place of natural philosophers. Galileo’s ridicule of institutional boundaries made possible by his position as court philosopher to Cosimo II, as well as his emphasis on the importance of the astronomer as philosopher left the Jesuits in a real bind. Feldhay concludes that there was real ‘affinity’ between Galileo and the Jesuits. At the same time, the Jesuits were unable to defy the boundaries of their educational practice without becoming themselves subject to Dominican claims of unorthodoxy. Ironically, on this reading, Galileo himself forced the Jesuit reaction by acknowledging the real progress and advancement of Jesuit scientific practice. Due to the watchful Dominicans, the Jesuits were forced to modify the approach set out by Bellarmine and sided with the Dominicans in condemning Galileo.

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Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, eds.  
*Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists.*  
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Pp. lxix + 324.  
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43192-1);  

The study of Greek political thought earlier than Plato and Aristotle has long been hampered by the extreme diversity of the sources. They cover some 300 years, down to ca. 400 BC, and are scattered in numerous authors (over 30 are excerpted here), who write in widely varying genres and styles and for very different purposes. The texts are often fragmentary, and call for reconstruction and exegesis; they are not always easy to track down in libraries, and some few have rarely if ever been translated. Most crucially, many are acutely difficult to interpret. From this vast mass of material Gagarin and Woodruff have made a selection so generous that one could easily carve out one’s own more limited selections, according to one’s special theme or purpose.
To set the scene before the ancients come on stage, the editors provide: (A) a brief Preface; (B) An Introduction (23 informative pages on the historical background, esp. of Athens and Sparta, and thumb-nail sketches of the principal genres of literature and their leading themes); (C) Principal Dates; (D) Bibliographical Note, in two parts: Further Reading (very select indeed), and Textual Details (learned, and admirably useful for tracing the numerous modern commentaries and editions of texts); (E) Glossary; and (F) Table of Equivalents (i.e. as between the numbering system of certain material in this book and in others). The sources themselves have succinct notes on authors and texts, and are grouped in 5 parts (311 pages): Early Poetry (41 pp.), Tragedy (33 pp.), History and Folklore (73 pp.), Philosophy and Science (22 pp.), Sophists (139 pp.). Socrates is reserved for a later volume. A 12-page Index of topics and names rounds off the book. All translations are new.

So far, so business-like. But generosity apart, what are the principles on which the selection has been made? It seems to me that the editors have been over-impressed by the fact that early Greek thought in general is a tight tangle of topics we nowadays would regard as more or less distinct disciplines. Consider one, and you rapidly find yourself slithering into another. Hence their understanding of ‘political’ is justifiably hospitable to a degree: they take it to embrace inter multa alia law, religion, ethics, anthropology, psychology, rhetoric, penology, and education. But the primary issues of politics are surely the distribution and limits of wealth and power in the light of the aims of a given society or state — what Aristotle calls their ‘hypotheses’; the other issues are ancillary and secondary. I believe the editors have given us too much of the secondary at the expense of the primary.

My worry is best illustrated from the last and very much the longest of the parts, on the Sophists. ‘For completeness we have included in Part V all the surviving works of the sophists, whether or not they deal with political themes, with some exceptions …’ (xxv, my italics). So we find ourselves reading, e.g., ‘The most beautiful form among males is the female, but among females the opposite’ (Critias, Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, B48). This is a waste of print; so too the report of Gorgias’ On Not Being (3 pages). The Part embraces also the whole of the Dissoi Logoi (‘Double Arguments’, a systematic study of equivocation), and all Antiphon’s Tetralogies (3 sets of four speeches for ‘hypothetical homicide cases’, 218). These two works alone occupy no less than 38 pages, about 1/8 of the entire space devoted to sources. I do not urge that such secondary matter ought not to be there: it demonstrates opinions, arguments, values, and practices that feed into political debate. But there is a surfeit of it: extracts would have sufficed.

The editors have ransacked the fragments of the tragedians, and print a surprisingly extensive selection, of some 14 pages. Some are genuinely political, and it is good to have them made accessible; others are only tenuously so (apophthegms, bits and pieces of folk-wisdom etc.).

What ought to have been included instead of such material? A fuller selection from Homer (only 6 pages): perhaps something from Il. I, e.g. 245-84, old Nestor’s ‘political’ role in attempting to mediate conflict among
the Greek leaders (note 275, implied limits to the power of an aristocrat); XVI 384 ff. on Zeus and justice; XIX 86 ff. on the nature and limits of responsibility in a leader; Od. XXII 407 ff., power reasserted by savage retaliation moderated by some sense of decorum. The early lyric and iambic poets need fuller quotation (e.g. Solon’s important fr. 4 West is given only in part, and Semonides’ dyspeptic but revealing poem on women is omitted entirely). The most startling omission is Antigone’s speech (Soph. Ant. 450 ff.) defending a familial religious rite against Creon’s edicts relying on the power and authority of the state, a highly political issue; nor are we given anything from Aeschylus’ Oresteia, on the tension between private vendetta and state law. On p. xvi both controversies are indeed summarised, but we are simply recommended to read the plays ‘in their entirety’. Aristophanes too is left out, with a similar recommendation (xvii). Nor is there anything at all on the politics of the Pythagoreans. The celebrated ‘political’ fragment of Anaximander, DK B1, is also missing. On the other hand the section on Thucydides is, rightly, very full (47 pages); for here is political theory and motivation a-plenty.

There are brief introductions to each author, and often to the individual passages; further detail is given in footnotes. This is all neatly and helpfully done. In the text, technical terms or concepts are sometimes followed by the Greek word transliterated in brackets; and certain of the more familiar transliterations are allowed to appear in their own right in the text itself (e.g. hubris, démos). Used in conjunction with the Glossary, such information enables the reader to begin to think in Greek terms. Indeed, equivalents and supplementary notes could usefully have been provided more lavishly. In the description of the ‘trial’ scene on the shield of Achilles (II XVIII 497 ff.), the renderings ‘refused’ (anaineto) and ‘referee’ (istōr) are hugely controversial; yet not only are no transliterations supplied but not the slightest hint is given of the desperate difficulties of the passage as a whole.

Despite its eccentricities of selection this volume deserves a cordial welcome.

**Trevor J. Saunders**

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University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Alan H. Goldman
Aesthetic Value.
Pp. 208.
US $48.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2018-6);

In Aesthetic Value, Alan Goldman provides a rigorous, insightful exploration of the sources and normative force of aesthetic value. The book is aimed at advanced undergraduates; it would be good reading for anyone who wants a serious introduction to a number of current debates in aesthetics. The book assumes prior exposure to prominent theories of art, as well as some grasp of the vocabulary of analytic metaphysics. Goldman’s account of aesthetic value is intended to capture a distinctive kind of value common to great works across the fine arts: aesthetic value, on this account, lies in a work’s ability to sustain challenging, complex engagement of our capacities. A great work fully absorbs us in its ‘world,’ leading to a satisfying interaction of perceptual, cognitive and affective responses. Goldman identifies this view as following Kant and Dewey in their appeals to harmonious and full engagement.

Against other accounts of the sources of aesthetic value, appealing to expressive power, representational content, formal properties and historical significance, Goldman nicely presses the question of why these things are of value. He ultimately subordinates them to his broader conception of aesthetic value: expression, representation and the rest have value in art primarily through their mutual interaction, as that supports a multiply demanding experience for the audience. Some of Goldman’s most eloquent passages spell out what this valuable interaction can be like, when form, expression and representational content work together. He does not take on many harder cases for his view, focusing on works of music and painting which obviously involve a complex interaction of features. He offers an account of some apparently simple works, such as Rothko paintings, to argue that they can indeed support complex experiences, but other challenges, in particular those of conceptual art and literary examples in which intellectual values seem dominant, are not addressed.

Goldman goes on to link interpretation of art to evaluation, defining interpretation as a form of inference to the best explanation. We interpret elements of a work so as to explain how they contribute to the value of the work. Interpreters give works ‘their best run for the money,’ as he puts it, and so carry out inferences to ‘value-enhancing explanations’ (107). There is some interesting discussion of how the value-enhancing approach might conflict with a goal of honesty to the work; even more attention to how an interpretation can end up supporting criticism of a work would have been helpful.

In the course of developing his account of aesthetic value, Goldman defends a nonrealist position on the nature of aesthetic properties. His position is designed to allow both for irreconcilable aesthetic differences
among judges, and for a form of reason-giving in aesthetic judgment. According to Goldman, when I attribute an aesthetic property to an object, I claim that ideal critics who generally share my taste would react in a certain way to the object’s base, nonevaluative properties. The reference to ideal critics gives the judgment some normative weight, making room for error in actual judgments, and the relativization to tastes makes for nonrealism and allows for incompatible judgments to be equally defensible, within different communities of taste. My reasons for an aesthetic judgment are thus aimed at influencing the experience and judgment of those who share my taste.

While defending the need to relativize to tastes, Goldman also argues that we can compare tastes and find some to be better than others. Better tastes are those which approve of works which go further in satisfying the common aesthetic goal of sustaining complex, full engagement. Goldman predicts, not surprisingly, that this test will allow us to judge that a taste for rock or country music, for instance, is worse than a taste for classical music.

The most disappointing aspect of the book is that, while attention is given scrupulously to more specialized debates in aesthetics (e.g., arousal versus cognitivist expression theories, resemblance and representation, supervenience relations for aesthetic properties, generation of fictional truths), not enough is done to explore and defend the large claims concerning ideal critics, taste and the self-contained nature of aesthetic value. The question of whether an appeal to ideal critics resonates with our intuitions about what we do when making aesthetic judgments is not clearly raised; it is assumed that we are interested in approximating the judgments of ideal critics. The tastes of ideal critics are generated from the tastes of actual people, improved by education, sensitivity, and lack of bias, where the improvements are not supposed to appeal circularly to ideals of taste (e.g., being unbiased does not mean screening out ‘preferences in taste or social point of view,’ but involves only ‘such obvious disqualifications as personal relation to the artist’ [22]). When Goldman then claims that ‘some art viewers or listeners will not have taste shared by any ideal critic,’ this needs defense (38). Why might my taste not generate a corresponding ideal critic? Even if there are no ideal critics I can call my own, it seems I can still offer reasons for my aesthetic judgments, perhaps aiming them at other taste-outcasts. Would such discourse count as reason-giving, for Goldman?

The conclusion that some tastes are better than others is used to argue in favor of aesthetic education: educating people to have better taste can be justified by the value of the rich, complex pleasures they will derive from appreciating more complex art. In linking better taste with education, Goldman seems to be thinking of straightforward arts education, as in studying music theory (176). But this does not do enough to acknowledge taste’s sources in less tractable things like needs and desires. It seems clear, for instance, that Western classical music does not answer to all people’s spiritual and sensual needs (such as, a need to rage against social convention or oppression or lack of opportunity, or a need to hear sounds which reflect insistent and not very smooth feelings). If we think of taste as having those

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kinds of sources, and accept that what can engage us depends in this way on who we are and what we need, then the point of saying some tastes are better than others becomes murky. Even if we agree that some tastes are better than others, it may be because we are thinking of the easiest comparisons (perhaps, middle-class well-educated American adults versus middle-class well-educated American teenagers) and are not trying out the implications of comparing tastes across bigger social and cultural divides.

In general, it would be nice if the book combined its embrace of a relativization to tastes with a more experimental attitude toward tastes for things other than the greats of Western fine art. While Goldman follows Dewey in the emphasis on rich experience, the book also has an un-Deweyan spirit in its emphasis on the self-contained value of art and its quick dismissal of many more popular forms. Whether or not you find this wrong-headed, it might work well for teaching, by riling students up and pushing them to develop their own views. Since Goldman consistently makes interesting claims and builds up an extended, often compelling position, it will put students and other interested readers in the thick of the issues with an excellent interlocutor.

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Marjorie Grene
A Philosophical Testament.
Toronto: Scholarly Book Services; La Salle, IL:
Open Court 1995.
Cdn $62.95/US $52.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9286-1);

There are several ways for a book to be philosophical. It can refer to specific arguments by other philosophers, mention famous philosophers, follow historic philosophical arguments, present a history of the development of a philosophical position or school, or present new arguments and insights. Grene’s book is a philosophical book on all counts.

Grene’s introduction begins, ‘What is this book about? It’s an apologia pro philosophia sua ...’ (1). She adds (2) ‘I still hold ... to the maxim ... that the more eminent a person is in academic philosophy, the more likely it is that he (or she) is a fraud. ... And the same goes, in my idiosyncratic view, for “fields” or “problems” in philosophy: the more fashionable they become, the more likely it is that they’re phony’ (3). Her refreshing (she says she has been

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called ‘chatty’) style makes A Philosophical Testament a joy to read. Grene’s ability to present serious philosophical discussion in a conversational and intimate way makes her book both valuable and readable for professional philosophers and for the general reader.

Grene’s book is divided into three sections titled, Knowing, Being, and Coping. The sections are connected by the common theme that drives her discussion: what is it for a person to make a knowledge claim? In Part I she reviews epistemology since Descartes and points to difficulties with the justified true belief formula as a way of providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. After an interesting review of the standard textbook problems, she argues for elimination of the truth condition. For her then knowledge is justified belief. So, when a person asserts P what the person is doing is asserting P with universal intent in confidence that anyone with the same evidence and the same standard of objectivity would make the same assertion. ‘But this is always an intent, not a guaranteed fulfillment’ (19). Grene’s emphasis throughout is on the agent — agents make knowledge claims. And, of course, agents are not figments of possible world imaginations but embodied persons in an actual world. ‘There is an actual world that we happen to be a part of and philosophy is, or ought to be, the practice of asking questions, at a reflective level, about it and about the activities and interests of us who are in it’ (37). Her conclusions at this point in the book are based on her rereading of Kant’s Analytic yielding her three essentials: the active role of the knower in making experience objective, the inexhaustibility of the known, and the indissoluble connection between knower and known’ (44). Grene wraps up this section on knowing with the urgent request that we ‘put what we feel, what we do, what we apprehend around us, back into the living world, where it belongs. Only by such a move, indeed, made carefully and wisely, can we evade the blinkers that still seem to confine our vision’ (64).

From her existentialist roots Grene takes the idea that ‘to know ourselves as knowers, we need to know we are alive’ (67). Arguing that we are not pure Cartesian separable minds in unfeeling mechanical bodies, she draws on Plessner’s philosophical anthropology for the notion of ‘positionality’. Since we both are and have bodies we need to pay attention in our philosophizing to the biological as well as the logical. Her criticisms of Heidegger and Sartre in this section are first rate.

Grene reports that she has learned much from Polanyi (with whom she worked for several years), from Merleau-Ponty and from Plessner. Her interests and the contingencies of life have taken her from study in pre-Hitler Germany to research in biology and Darwinism. A thoroughgoing realist, she has much to say in defense of a sophisticated realism. As she says (114): ‘two things are real: 1. that we exist within a real world, are surrounded by it and indeed shaped by it; and 2. that we ourselves are real.’

In the final section of the book Grene talks about the lessons of the ecological approach, arguing that ‘out of the infinite complexity of available information, organisms can discriminate information that is species-specifically relevant to their survival in their environments’ (139).
As a philosophical testament Grene's book is an excellent display of a keen and intelligent woman placed firmly in this world who has coped in a time when philosophy was primarily a male profession. She tells a fine and moving story in the best sense of the word 'story'. Grene's *A Philosophical Testament* is an interesting combination of argument, insight, description and review, reminiscence, getting even, personal report and lived experience.

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**H.S. Harris**

*Hegel: Phenomenology and System.*
Pp. x + 118.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-282-8);

Primarily, Harris attempts to provide guidance for the beginning reader of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This little book, which he presents as a by-product of the research for his forthcoming two-volume study of the *Phenomenology, Hegel's Ladder* (Hackett), does that quite well. In a focused format, he lays out the essential points of Hegel's argument without much involved terminology, while taking care to highlight the points at which misreading Hegel's intentions is a significant peril. The bibliography lists available translations of Hegel's major works, as well as commentaries of use to the Hegel novice.

In addition, Harris sketches the history of the *Phenomenology's* place in the system, by providing a very brief account of Hegel's intellectual development concentrating on the change in his attitude to the book. But also, he treats the *Phenomenology* as the key to the system as a whole, connecting the speculative logic conceptually with the real philosophy, and thereby reveals its more-than-introductory status. In the final chapter, Harris describes his views on how, when Hegel found it necessary to downgrade the *Phenomenology* from its status as the introduction and first part of the system, the book never the less remained essential to the completion of the task of the philosophical system. The task of real philosophy in the *Philosophy of Right* was the comprehension of its own time and the task of speculation in the *Science of Logic* was the comprehension of eternity: but for these temporal and eternal standpoints to achieve 'true infinite' circularity, the conceptual comprehension of time as such in the *Phenomenology* is required.
Similarly, the speculative logic is intended to systematically interpret the real community of knowers and to conceptually reveal its ideal structure. This seems to mean that the eternal standpoint of the Logic must be put in relation to time-bound real philosophy, but what guarantee is there that abstract logic can truly describe the structure of a concrete, historically-changing community? Hence, the scientific integrity of speculative logic turns on the feasibility of this relation. Again, in its analysis of conscious experience, the Phenomenology provides the link, by making the structure of embodied human life the ultimate criterion for the logically necessary. Thus, Harris tries to show how the Phenomenology can complete the system by forming a circle of its three aspects: conscious experience, logic and real philosophy.

Certainly, this is a topic that can be barely hinted at in the few pages permitted by this little book, and one looks forward to the larger study. What the novice audience of the book will make of it, however, is uncertain, though Harris's presentation could certainly provide incentive to the further study of Hegel's philosophy, and that can only be an unqualified boon. Although it cannot take the place of the major commentaries, the book is welcome for its basic degree of depth and detail, and for the ease and clarity of its exposition.

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Howard Kamler
Identification and Character. A Book on Psychological Development.
Pp. ix + 350.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2211-9);

Kamler's main thesis is that we acquire character only when we are capable of identifying with features of the external world or indeed with ourselves. It is because we are identifiers that we are persons. The book is divided into two parts. In the preliminary Part I, Kamler clarifies and criticizes psychoanalytic views on identification. In the main Part II, he builds on the discussion in Part I and develops an account of identification and character. Although the style of the book is at times irksome and the analysis is frequently philosophically unsatisfying, this ought not to detract from the author's interesting and often insightful discussion of issues at hand.
In Part I, Kamler shows that the early development self constructs proposed by two psychoanalytic theories (Object Relations Theory and Narcissism Theory, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively) need to be supplemented by yet another self-construct — ‘latency self’ (Chapter 4). The discussion serves as an introduction to and foreshadowing of some themes considered in Part II and also as a useful clarification of some claims made by psychoanalytic theories.

In Part II, Kamler sets to describe the process of character formation. He believes that we acquire character relatively late in our development. Prior to having character proper, we have ‘character’ in a merely causal and unreflective sense. He thus envisages our psychological lives as having two levels or stages. At first, we merely have what Kamler calls a ‘causal identity’ (Chapter 5). Causal identity has two components: personal and social. Personal causal identity comprises the agent’s early unreflective habits, behavioral responses to which the agent is genetically predisposed, etc. Social causal identity consists of the sorts of responses to which the agent is unreflectively predisposed in various social environments. The concept of social causal identity merits further discussion. In particular, it would be interesting to hear more about the sort of causation that is involved when our behaviors are caused or conditioned by social structures.

We acquire character proper only when we are able to identify with elements of the external world and, more interestingly, with elements of our own causal identity. The process of identification (sketched in Chapter 6) consists in the agent’s reflectively choosing what to value (Chapter 7). The idea that we reflectively recognize some of our predispositions and thus elevate them to the status of being a part of our self is intriguing. Less clear is the status of the predispositions that we do not choose to so recognize. Would it not be possible not to choose but to be forced to recognize some of them, as is particularly plausible for socially obnoxious predispositions? And in any case, is the agent who does not recognize some of his less flattering predispositions not involved in a form of self-deception?

The process of identification begins with the agent’s choice of what to value, but it is consolidated when the agent is prepared to take responsibility for such choices (Chapter 8). It is only then that the agent can be said to psychologically own his character or to have become such a character as he has chosen to be. Just as there are two components to the agent’s causal identity so there are two components to the agent’s character identity: personal character identity and social character identity. To the extent that the agent is concerned with ‘meeting the primitive prime directive of becoming an individual’ (229) and thus seeks to be distinct from others, he shapes his personal identity (Chapter 9). But we also seek to belong to the social world and identify ourselves in terms of it, thus acquiring a ‘collective uniqueness,’ or social identity (Chapter 10).

A fundamental concern with Kamler’s overall picture can be brought out by asking a simple question. Who is it that builds up character identity over causal identity? In view of the fact that Kamler envisages us as having gone
through a stage where we only have causal identity, the first identificatory choice must be made by a subject with only a causal identity. But this would imply that our making the (first) identification is an exercise of our causal identity. We make our first identificatory choice as ‘causal psychological automata’ (117). If so, then must we not suppose that our character identity really is our causal identity?

Kamler considers something like this objection (157ff). He attempts to dissipate it by appealing to an apparently analogous account by Frankfurt. According to Frankfurt, we act autonomously if we act on higher-order desires but the fact that higher-order desires cause us to so act does not usurp our autonomy. Some causes are ‘less offensive’ (156) than others. Kamler does not seem to realize that the problem takes a different shape for him. For he offers a story about how we come to acquire character identity having only had the non-autonomous causal identity, having been ‘causal psychological automata.’ By contrast, Frankfurt does not aspire to be offering an account of how we come to have or act on higher-order desires in terms of having or acting on first-order desires. The problem for Kamler is accordingly not that our character identity is threatened by causality but rather that it is threatened by the ‘offensive’ kind of causality.

Kamler introduces in his story a means which can be brought to bear on this problem. He considers taking responsibility for one’s valuational choices to be the way in which one’s character identity is consolidated and affirmed. But the notion of responsibility can play a much richer role for Kamler. For it can be used to drive a wedge separating character identity from causal identity. Our character identity first comes into being when we take responsibility for what happens to us. And although an agent’s taking responsibility would have to be construed as part of the agent’s causal identity, we would not necessarily be returning to the same problem. For the notion of responsibility presupposes normative structures that are external to the agent. In making first steps that can be recognized as taking responsibility the individual is elevated to a socially constructed plane of agents who take responsibility for their lives and recognize one another as such. Kamler’s story about the individual character captures only what can be seen from within the perspective of an individual. In order to construct the perspective of an individual, it needs to look without.

Katarzyna Paprzycka
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Low-Beer is a lawyer rather than an academic, and sometimes what might be called the language of the 'real world' rather than that of the 'ivory tower' comes through in his book. Thus, we are told, for example, that objectivity can be positively characterized as a matter 'of taking the outside world seriously, of staring reality in the face' (53). But, in general, although many of Low-Beer's examples are drawn from diverse sources within practical life, the book assumes a scholarly air.

Low-Beer distinguishes two broad philosophical traditions. One is concerned primarily with knowledge and certainty. Here we find Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and others. A second tradition flows from Aristotle and includes such figures as Erasmus, Montaigne, Voltaire, Emerson, and Dewey. Here, the focus is on judgment and human conduct.

Low-Beer works mainly in this second tradition. He offers a view of judgment that he applies to both professional judgment and judgment in more ordinary contexts. He describes judgment as a cognitive process that presupposes a certain amount of intelligence and imagination. As a mental process, judgment involves making a decision and commitment to a belief. Moreover, the belief is fallible. It is judgment that distinguishes outstanding professionals from other professionals, even if the others are competent and knowledgeable.

It is a curious fact indeed that although judgment is a rather high-order intellectual achievement, people often call something a 'question of judgment' by way of dismissing its intellectual importance. Moreover, as Low-Beer points out, to say of something that it is a 'question of judgment' is often a cognitive put-down.

Low-Beer, on the other hand, stresses the widespread role of judgment in human life — even in matters of cognition and knowledge, with which it is often contrasted.

Low-Beer is against a cognitive dualism that would accept only certain (supposedly 'judgment-free') cognitive items as objective and hence as truly worthy of the name knowledge, while relegating anything that involves judgment to a lesser, subjective realm. On the contrary, he argues, judgment has a rightful place even within the exclusive set of objective pieces of knowledge; furthermore, this recognition on our part should not lead us to draw the conclusion that these supposedly objective items are really subjective after all, but rather the conclusion that the things banished to the realm of subjectivity (because they were not judgment-free) need to be reunited with objective knowledge. Judgment turns out to be an integral
part of both what has been called objective and what has been called subjective. Nothing is really judgment-free.

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Mohan Matthen and R.X. Ware, eds.
Biology and Society.
Pp. vi + 308.
Cdn $30.00/US $30.00. ISBN 0-919491-20-0.

This collection derives from a conference held at the University of Alberta. It consists of nine essays concerned mainly with methodological and conceptual issues relevant to biology and its role in understanding broader social questions. The contributions in this volume can be divided into two general categories. The papers by Okruhlik, Ruse, and Holmstrom deal with the sociology of science. Their main theme is the extent to which science is contaminated with social and cultural biases. The remaining six papers belong to the second category, which is devoted more directly to methodological concerns. Three contributors, Levine, Bechtel, and Dupre, take a decidedly anti-reductionist stance, while de Sousa and Thompson argue in favor of methodological individualism. Wimsatt’s paper attempts to stake the middle ground between the two positions.

Turning to the sociological category first, the paper by Okruhlik states, as its central thesis, that science is seriously, if not hopelessly, distorted by cultural prejudice. Okruhlik is particularly worried about the gender bias. She believes that scientific theories are not compared against nature, as once thought, but against other theories. And since all theories may well contain this ubiquitous sexist slant, there is no guarantee that the ‘appraisal machinery will completely “purify” the successful theory’ (34). To correct the problem, Okruhlik proposes to replace the androcentric bias with the gynecentric one. Despite the evident strength of Okruhlik’s conviction, the proposal seems to be doomed from the start by her own premise. If the choice among competing scientific theories is ‘irreducibly comparative’ (34), then it is hard to see on what grounds can one bias claim for itself a greater objectivity than another.

Ruse takes a more charitable view of science in general and of evolutionary biology in particular. He argues that evolutionary theory has a built-in mechanism whereby it rids itself of non-epistemic cultural values. As it
matured, it has gradually put aside everything, or almost everything, that was not objective. Its cultural biases have been peeled away and what remains is 'too beautiful to be false' (62), as exemplified by Hamilton's kin selection theory. Regrettably, Ruse does not elaborate the inner workings of this mechanism and, having made a number of cogent observations, he ends 'on a somewhat unresolved note' (68), quite possibly leaving many readers with more questions than answers.

Holmstrom's contribution is an examination of the doctrine she calls essentialism — the view that there are biologically based essences determining behavioral traits of a group. She analyzes the concepts of race, gender, and human nature. Her tripartite conclusion is that races do not exist; that genders, if they exist at all, are biologically indeterminate; and that there is such a thing as human nature. This last part may seem surprising given Holmstrom's antipathy to biological determinism. But on closer scrutiny, it turns out that her conception of human nature consists of nothing but virtually infinite plasticity. Of course many readers will find this conclusion hard to swallow; nonetheless, Holmstrom's arguments are provocative and intellectually stimulating.

The paper by Levine marks the transition to the second group of articles whose main concern is with levels of organization. Levine takes it as a given that 'methodological individualism is almost certainly wrong' (109) and goes on to dislodge normative individualism from its dominant position in political science. Using Rousseau's concept of the general will as his model, Levine postulates the existence of general interests which he attributes to supra-individual social entities. These general interests, he argues, are distinct from and not reducible to the private interests of their constituent individuals. The argument is weakened, however, by his failure to define or identify these general interests. And his baffling assertion that 'it is premature, at this point, to specify more precisely what a general interest is' (118) does not seem very helpful.

Bechtel begins with the unexceptional observation that systems generally accomplish more than their individual components. But from here he goes on to build an upward-looking methodology that requires us to identify organizing principles appropriate to each successive level of organization. It would be a mistake, he warns, to think that the principles that govern individual behavior can be used to explain the functioning of social systems. Although some explanatory gains can be made by descending to a lower level, he allows, something is invariably lost whenever we try to explain the behavior of a system in terms of the behavior of its components. We are simply asking a different question.

Dupre continues the same line of reasoning but adds a few specifics. In the first part of his paper, he outlines theoretical arguments for the limits of reductionism, and in the second he applies this conceptual framework to the theories of natural selection and population genetics. The latter bears the brunt of Dupre's attack on reductionism. 'At least substantial parts of population genetics are misconceived,' he writes (181). As for the role of genes
in evolution, he urges us to see microscopic changes as 'epiphenomenal to the causal processes at the macro-level' (180). This is a familiar argument, one unfortunate consequence of which is that it leaves most of what organisms do not only unexplained but essentially unexplainable, 'a simple consequence of being alive,' as Niles Eldredge put it in Reinventing Darwin. Dupre tries to reinvigorate this argument by giving it a new theoretical foundation in the form of the non-transitivity of reduction.

The papers by de Sousa and Thompson take a different tack. De Sousa uses Cellular Automata to illustrate how complex systems emerge out of a straightforward set of local instructions. While he seeks to undermine anti-reductionism with his local-control model of emergent complexity, Thompson challenges the notion that there are inherent differences between biological and physical phenomena. He attributes the success of reductionism in the physical sciences to the use of idealized mathematical models, which, he argues, should be equally beneficial to the biological and social sciences. Both papers score some points against the onslaught of anti-reductionism, but they admittedly fall short of a comprehensive reductionist program.

Finally, the paper by Wimsatt offers an interesting taxonomic analysis of levels of organization and their attributes. Unfortunately, it is written in a language the uninitiated reader will find virtually impenetrable. Here, for example, is Wimsatt's definition of levels of organization: 'Levels of organization can be thought of as local maxima of regularity and predictability in the phase space of alternative modes of organization of matter' (238). Those who are left in the dark by this passage will probably find little solace in the rest of this long paper.

As can be gleaned from this all too brief overview, Biology and Society deals with highly contentious subjects, where it is often hard to separate scientific thesis from ideology. This suggests that possibly the best overall approach to this collection is not to look for profound insights, but to view it as a representative cross-section of issues that arise when scientific and social interests become intertwined. It is a good introduction for anyone seeking to become familiar with the debate on this frontier, but it can also be recommended to those who wish to stay abreast of its more recent developments.

Arthur J. Miller
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In order to gain a full appreciation of this book, it is important to understand what it is not. The slimness of the volume reveals that it is not a comprehensive analysis of privacy theory or law. Although some might find this disappointing, it does not detract from the important contributions which Deckle McLean makes within these pages.

McLean begins with the proposition that privacy has always been important but largely ignored by scholars (1). The second part of this submission is indisputable. The initial statement is somewhat unique and challenges the more widely-held notion that privacy concerns are products of a modern age. Support is provided by a consideration of privacy within several cultural and historical contexts. The attention given to the various primeval uses of physical boundaries is less interesting than McLean’s treatment of privacy in the customs and behaviors of ancient Greece, Israel and China (13-17). Although characteristically brief, the persistence of humanity’s need for privacy is well conveyed as is the antisocial stigma which often accompanies its presence.

In addition to outlining privacy’s distant roots, the more frequently cited trends in industrialization and technology are not ignored. The roles of the printing press, governmental expansion, corporate competition and urbanization are all considered as actors in the dynamics of decreased privacy. Significantly, they are not proposed as necessarily constituting the root causes of this erosion (19-25).

Poverty, political isolation and the legacy of slavery are set forth as conditions which not only immediately deny the availability of privacy to disenfranchised groups, but continue to generate a legacy of bitterness for years after remedies are instituted (37-8). Urban stress, narcotics abuse and crime are likewise linked to deprivations of privacy, bringing to the fore the pragmatic dimensions of this often theory-bound subject (40-5).

Against this social, political and historical background, McLean turns to definitions of privacy. He examines a variety of popular characterizations and notes their respective strengths and weaknesses. Privacy defined simply as the control of access to personal domains can be problematically narrow, excluding such issues as harassment, persecuting behavior and reproductive decisions (47-8). Alternatively, interpretations which extend privacy to the regulation of personal zones and transactions may be ‘so comprehensive as to be unmanageable as tools for law, policy or ethics’ (49). Regardless of their theme, McLean notes that these definitions are perennially subject to entanglement with other concepts such as liberty, solitude, secrecy and autonomy (50).
In order to sift through these ambiguities, McLean enlists the resources of psychology to outline four functional and 'philosophically manageable' types of privacy (52). The primary category, termed 'access-control' is derived from a behavioral need to regulate interaction. The experience of privacy as 'room to grow in' is posited as necessary to provide an environment for individual growth and differentiation. Privacy as a 'safety valve' exists to create respite from societal expectations. Privacy as 'respect' confirms personal dignity (53-5).

Although advocating privacy as a social and psychological necessity, McLean does not hold it to be an 'unqualified good' (61). Too much access control privacy may detrimentally limit information required to assess an individual's threat to public safety or may undermine efforts to encourage community interaction (62). Privacy as room to grow may at some stage deny a person the opportunity to meet social obligations (63). The attenuated effects of safety-valve privacy may work to discourage participation in the public sphere (64). In its extremes, privacy as respect could render society a place in which 'conversations would always be platitudinous, encounters etiquette ridden, and news reporting shallow' (65).

Balanced against these concerns are the contributions which privacy bestows upon individuals and society. In what is arguably the most important section of this work, McLean provides a powerful narrative of these benefits, beginning with observations of what occurs in its absence. 'An environment that reduces privacy produces a hardened yet emptied person' (73). Without privacy, ethics cannot be developed in any personal sense as ethical reflection requires 'thoughtful isolation' (74). The ability to control oneself is 'even more clearly based on privacy' (75) as it is a product of inner forbearance. Likewise, the abilities to resist social pressures, reject extravagances and to develop self-confidence are grounded in private moments (76-7).

Pursuing these arguments, McLean sets forth what is at stake as we debate the role of privacy within our social and legal domains. His argument can perhaps best be described as advocating objective recognition and to the extent possible, the encouragement of fundamental instincts which if nurtured, will develop into skills for personal and community integrity.

McLean acknowledges that the traits which privacy fosters seem to be in decline in contemporary society yet wisely avoids placing simple blame upon the advances of technology. Rather, he leaves open the culpability question and concentrates directly on patterns of behavior which indicate people 'lack something that privacy provides' (82). Inconsistent or nonexistent application of ethical codes, impatience in the pursuit of individual and corporate goals, and the attraction toward immediate economic gratification point simultaneously to a depletion of our experience of privacy and more disturbingly, to our decreased need for its benefits.

In the remainder of the book, McLean addresses the specific privacy issues of sexual assault and news-reporting ethics. His treatment of both issues is characterized by his aforementioned concern with the dignity of the individual. In the area of news-reporting ethics, this translates into the urging of
civility in reporting private affairs (112-13). When this thesis is used as a call to change defamation law and curb the right to report facts about public figures (115), it has arguably passed beyond the limits of reasonable solicitude. At the very least, this section would be improved by a more comprehensive analysis of the legal precedents supporting such coverage.

By emphasizing the social, cultural and psychological aspects of privacy, McLean has contributed to a field which is in need of cross-disciplinary examination. Although the work contains little analysis of current privacy law, it nevertheless presents useful resources and suggests potential directions for future development.

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Dick McCleary
The Logic of Imaginative Education:
Reaching Understanding.
Pp. 192.
US $43.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8077-3302-4);

The intellectual history of this century's final decades will, no doubt, be marked by the emergence of scholasticism. This phenomenon is manifested, among other things, by the methods and procedures of processing and disseminating information by echelons of experts, who report exclusively to the powerful and to complex research and corporate trusts.

At the university level, this stifling preponderance of scholasticism is reflected by the fact that research, quite narrowly defined, assumes the role of the only legitimate vehicle of academic assertion and promotion. Teaching, in contrast, becomes equated with training. Training, in turn, is equated with aligning basic education with the needs of the market.

John Ralston Saul, in The Unconscious Civilization, predicts the following: 'Concentration on technology — computers for example — will simply produce obsolete graduates. The problem is not to teach skills in a galloping technology, but to teach students to think and give them the tools of thought so that they can react to the myriad changes, including technological, that will inevitably face them over the next decades' (John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization [Toronto: Anansi 1995], 66).
Dick McCleary’s *The Logic of Imaginative Education* is a rare example of a book written to promote creative teaching in higher education. Good teaching, according to McCleary, involves understanding and helping others. This ability to understand and help others, however, requires yet another, more fundamental ability: imagining. This ability, according to McCleary, may have many facets: bodily imagining, historical imagining, metaphorical imagining, etc.

McCleary’s book introduces a special method of teaching: ‘dialectical teaching’. ‘In the dialectical method, teachers may become learners being taught by students who have become teachers, and no one at the outset knows the answers or even clearly understands the questions’ (xx). This method of teaching will help students recognize that they ‘can make sense out of the alternative contexts of understanding and coexistence about which they are being taught only if they can somehow relate these contexts to their own familiar world’ (xxii).

This book has four parts: *Standing on Shoulders* analyzes teaching methods that invoke Socratic concerns in modern terms; *Imagination’s Body* explores the roles that our body’s existence plays in imagining; *Metaphorically Speaking-and Teaching* examines how metaphorical dialogue can be used in education, and *Breaking Through* deals with some inherent contradictions in a teaching system that treats people as ‘meat machines’.

I was particularly interested in parts two and four, partly because I have a strong interest in the notion of ‘bodily imagination’, i.e., the belief that our imagination is, to a large extent, embodied: ‘The logic that structures our basic sense of the world is a practical logic of bodily distinctions, complementarities, and analogies’ (52). McCleary makes some very astute points in these chapters but, having finished reading them, one if left wanting more. It would be particularly interesting to see more descriptions of ‘dialectical teaching’ developed along the lines of imagination, fantasy, and socially informed body.

McCleary’s treatment of ‘negative fantasizing’ is just one example of this sort. One of the most important tasks of modern day pedagogues is to break free of the spiraling dialectic of often opposing perspectives in which both teachers and students are entrapped. Quite frequently, this dialectic is generated ‘by their fantasizing interpretation of their experiencing of one another’ (63). Both teachers and students need to invest concerted effort, according to McCleary, in order to humanize a huge social fantasy system we seem to be more and more entrapped in.

McCleary’s treatment of metaphor is also quite engaging and novel, although he occasionally appears to be defining metaphorical discourse too widely. For example, the great thought experiments devised by Einstein and Galileo, quoted by McCleary in this section, clearly belong to discussions on imagination, fiction, and fantasy. To employ these thought experiments to illustrate metaphorical discourse is a mistake; there are much better and much less controversial examples.
This brings me to the strongest point of this book: McCleary's masterly employment of case studies, illustrations, and concrete examples. McCleary's work is quite interdisciplinary: one recognizes immediately that the author of this book is a very experienced, versatile, and competent teacher himself. McCleary is at home drawing lessons from Socrates, from the Mt. Zion Veterans' Rehabilitation Clinic, from researchers associated with *Synectics Education Systems*, and from public school teachers in New York. One can not avoid noting how much learning and how much personal and professional development it would take to produce a good 'dialectical teacher'.

The most important lesson of this timely and deeply insightful book is this: to teach dialectically is not to present oneself as an expert, as a keeper of arcane and minute truths. To teach dialectically is to strive to know oneself by redefining the shape of one's imagination helped by the imagination of others.

**Nebojsa Kujundzic**

Wilfrid Laurier University

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**Robert C. Moore**

*Logic and Representation.*

CSLI Lecture Notes, number 39.


Pp. xiv + 196.

US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-881526-16-X);


This volume collects published papers spanning research from 1979-93 at California and Cambridge (CSLI and SRI). Its themes are the analytical use of formal logic in knowledge and belief representation, and the semantics of Natural Language. The collection is organised as follows: (I) Logic in Artificial Intelligence, Cognitivism, (II) Propositional Attitudes, (III) Autoepistemic Logic, and (IV) Natural Language Semantics.

(I) The first chapter is intended to establish the central role of logic in AI — as an analytical tool, in knowledge representation, and in logic programming. Only logical representations, Moore argues, are capable of expressing incomplete information. Controlled deduction may, he argues, make intelligent reasoning about large bodies of background knowledge possible — the only alternative being a radically new approach.

Next arguments are rehearsed, contra the behaviourism of Skinner and Quine, to the effect that mental representations form the core of a truly explanatory 'cognitivist'/computational theory of mind.
In section II Moore presents a formal theory (in first-order modal logic) of
the interaction between an agent’s (incomplete) knowledge and its actions.
Moore’s framework is based on Hintikka’s pioneering work in epistemic
modal logic. Both knowledge and action are given an analysis in Kripke
structures, and interaction between the two is axiomatized. Moore demon-
strates how epistemic problems with identity and quantification can be
handled in this framework. This chapter has the merit of concentrating on
the dynamics of information and action. The next (co-author G. Hendrix)
presents a semantics for belief sentences inspired by a computational model
of belief, which avoids difficulties with the possible-worlds approach. The
main argument criticizes the identification of the truth conditions of a
sentence with a competent speaker’s knowledge of its meaning. A distinction
between computational models and conceptual arguments is intended to deal
with Wittgensteinian arguments against Fodor’s ‘Language of Thought’
(LOT) hypothesis, as well as Quine’s indeterminacy of translation argu-
ments. Discussing the computational metaphor they ask, ‘if truth-conditional
semantics is not required to perform “psychological explanation” for ma-
chines, why should it be required for humans?’ (74). A computational, and
supposedly psychologically plausible, model of belief is supplied (whereby
‘belief’ is a computational relation to sentences in an internal modal predi-
cate language), and distinguished from the relation of the word ‘belief’ to the
model — such semantical issues are addressed later. This syntactic approach
avoids the logical omniscience problem of intensional logics (for beliefs are
individuated by their form rather than their content), and the assumption of
an intrinsically self-referential constant in an innate LOT tackles the circu-
larity of T. Having posed this model, the authors claim to have solved (via
demonstration) some conceptual problems, although strangely, the reverse
(that conceptual analysis has implications for modelling) is denied. Discuss-
ing Partee and Woods, for example, on possible-worlds and procedural
semantics, Moore (and Hendrix) claim that ‘unlikely theories result from
trying to say that it is truth conditions that are in the head, when all that is
required is that what is in the head have truth conditions’ (90). Chapter 5 is
a clear presentation of problems in the semantics of the attitudes, and their
potential solution using a Russellian theory of propositions. A number of
problems are discussed intelligently and thoroughly here, covering ap-
proaches in possible-worlds semantics and situation semantics, and culmi-
nating in a ‘Russellian Logic’ intended as the parallel of Montague semantics
(Moore confesses that his account is underdeveloped). Finally, problems
involving proper names in belief reports are addressed.

(III) Autoepistemic Logic is a model of an ideally rational agent’s reason-
ing about its own incomplete beliefs — a variety of non-monotonic logic which,
it is claimed, avoids peculiarities of the non-monotonic systems of McDermott
and Doyle (MD). These logics have a notion of consistency which is too weak
and collapse to monotonic systems upon its strengthening. Moore accuses
MD of conflating default and autoepistemic reasoning, arguing that their
systems model the former; ‘whereas default reasoning is non-monotonic

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because it is defeasible, autoepistemic reasoning is non-monotonic because it is indexical’ (128). Stalnaker’s ‘stable’ belief states are shown to correspond to complete autoepistemic theories, and Moore locates MD’s difficulties in their lacking the (reflective) condition that if sentence $P$ belongs to a theory, then the sentence $LP$, stating that $P$ is believed, does also. Two technical notes follow, showing, via a possible-worlds semantics, the existence of sound and complete autoepistemic theories based on premiss sets, and a finite model property. Moore also discusses some open problems involving first-order extensions of his system.

(IV) Chapter 9 steers a course between the accounts of adverbial modification in event sentences offered by Davidson and Perry — the task being ‘to identify the metaphysics embedded in the language, not to decide whether that metaphysics is true’ (164). Davidson’s account of manner adverbials (as extra predications of events) is accepted, but (considering adverbs) Moore argues that events consist of collections of situations. The final chapter explores the idea that unification-based formalisms (familiar to computational linguists) can be employed in the semantic interpretation of Natural Languages. Moore aims to give a theoretical analysis of such systems as SRI’s Core Language Engine, discussing long-distance dependencies, gap-threading, and the (partial) elimination of lambda terms.

The main contributions of these quite technical and substantial pieces are analytical and formal. Some arguments, particularly in the philosophy of mind, are of largely historic interest. The book should serve as a good high-level introduction to some current research issues, and Moore highlights points which are often overlooked: the partiality and dynamics of information, its links to action, and some arguments against situation/possible-worlds semantics.

Moore generally tackles issues clearly and comprehensively, but he takes one of the central concepts of the collection, that of representation, for granted. A clear conception of representational systems in general is lacking here — such formal systems would benefit from a deeper understanding of representation, and particularly its dynamics. While the collection is a useful compendium of Moore’s research, perhaps more would have been achieved had the material been organised as a coherent book.

This volume will be of interest to logicians, computer scientists and theoretical linguists. It is often challenging, and neither suitable (nor intended) for readers without a background in logic and semantics, although philosophical issues are discussed. Advancing the research issues of a decade, this is a competent, often engaging and enlightening, compendium.

Oliver Lemon

(Department of Computer Science)

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Stephen Nathanson
*The Ideal of Rationality.*
Pp. xv + 256.
US $44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9261-6);

This is a book appropriate for any reader seriously interested in issues regarding the nature and value of practical reason. Nathanson not only discusses difficult philosophical problems with great subtlety, but also offers a clear, accessible, non-technical presentation that makes it appropriate for undergraduate courses in epistemology or ethics.

Nathanson's primary interest is the debate between rationalists and anti-rationalists, 'those who champion rational ideals and those who deplore them' (xiii). His goal is to provide 'ways of thinking that allow us to understand what is at stake in the debate and to see how we can combine the insights and discard the errors of the competing views' (x). To achieve this, he sets out to determine the nature of rationality in order to eventually consider its value. His ultimate proposal is a 'reasonable form of rationalism' which recognizes numerous ideal goods.

The book is divided into five sections. The first two sections, six chapters, comprise about half the text. This first half focuses on what Nathanson believes to be historically the most powerful and pervasive conception of rationality, the 'classical ideal.' Central to this view, according to Nathanson, is the idea that rationality involves maximizing the role of deliberation and knowledge in one's life. Knowledge is the sole and supreme good. The best way to acquire knowledge is through reasoning. Thus, the best life is one where reason is most fully used and developed. Rationality becomes the impersonal search for truth and this links rationality with other important ideals such as autonomy and objectivity.

Nathanson attacks the classical ideal by rejecting the claim that reason, in the sense described, ought to play a preeminent role in the way we live. For classical rationalists, the more often a person deliberates the more rational that person will be. But Nathanson shows that deliberation can be excessive; too much thinking can lead to paralysis of action, apathy, or even self-deception. Further, the absolute objectivity required by the classical account is also undesirable. The view suggests that a purely rational person has no needs, desires or goals. But being rational generally requires us to meet our needs, satisfy our desires and realize our goals. Finally, by placing a supreme and exclusive value on the pursuit of knowledge, the classical rationalists devalue other important aspects of human life such as close relationships or emotions like sympathy and benevolence. By forsaking the goal of maximizing knowledge, a conception of rationality could acknowledge that other things besides knowledge possess value.

In the second half of the book Nathanson considers a pragmatic view which does acknowledge a plurality of interests: the means/end conception of ration-
ality. According to this view, the rational action is the one with the highest probability of bringing about the agent’s desired ends. The ends themselves are neither rational nor irrational; rationality simply consists in the efficient pursuit of an agent’s goals. The view is attractive not only because it allows for the rational pursuit of a variety of individual aims, but also because it explains why rationality is valuable: because we want to achieve our ends.

Nevertheless, Nathanson rejects the means/ends view as unsatisfactory. Utilizing the work of Gilbert Harman, Nathanson first argues that means/ends theories of rationality imply a motivational internalism and therefore an unacceptable moral relativism. Leaving moral concerns aside, he continues to argue that means/ends accounts cannot accommodate the notion of irrational desires. Drawing from the works of Bernard Gert and Kurt Baier, he offers examples of irrational desires intended to reduce the theory to absurdity. But this leaves open the possibility that a more sophisticated version of the theory could allow us to classify some desires as irrational. To show that this cannot be satisfactorily achieved, Nathanson carefully critiques the relevant works of John Rawls and Richard Brandt. His ultimate proposal is a conception of rationality which claims that to act rationally is to act for the best. ‘The rational action in any situation is the one with the best foreseeable consequences’ (190). The view is different from means/ends theories, since it limits the goals an individual can rationally seek. At the same time, it allows that unless our ends are ‘defective’, actions that can reasonably be expected to advance them will be rational. ‘Defective’ ends are those that are inconsistent, too costly in terms of an agent’s well-being, bizarre, or based on beliefs an agent should know to be false.

In his discussion and critique of means/ends theories, Nathanson confronts a crucial issue in contemporary debates about practical rationality: whether a complete theory of practical rationality must include a theory of value (a theory by which ends are evaluated to determine whether they are rational). But though he notes the possibility of a Humean response, he does not try to offer a plausible version of it. It is always open to means/ends theorists to simply maintain the theory and assert that if it implies that certain actions are not irrational, so be it. The examples of irrational desires designed to show that means/ends conceptions are inadequate simply appeal to our intuitions and many will not share Nathanson’s intuitions in all cases. Moreover, the intuitive appeal of means/ends accounts may be bolstered if it is emphasized that they do not permit the pursuit of every fleeting desire, but rather those which individual agents themselves deem to be most important.

There is also a difficulty in Nathanson’s discussion of the classical ideal. It surely seems unlikely that the extreme version of rationalism Nathanson attributes to the classical theorists is one that anyone ever held. Further, rationalists actually defended subtle and varied views, and it is unfair to group them together under a single label. However, Nathanson’s discussion is interesting in its own right, and his presentation of the view, though historically questionable, has considerable philosophical and heuristic merit.
Though not always convincing, this revised and much improved edition of *The Ideal of Rationality* is always clear, always focused and always engaging. It is well worth reading.

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**Marc-Alain Ouaknin**

*The Burnt Book: Reading the Talmud.*

Trans. Llewellyn Brown.


Pp. xviii + 336.


This remarkable book (published originally in 1986 as *Le Livre brûlé: Lire le Talmud*) is rich in suggestive ideas, including the proposal that thought has its highest ethical function when it refuses wisdom in favor of ‘asking a question that [it] cannot answer’ (164). Ouaknin (who is a rabbi and an associate professor of comparative literature at the University of Bar-Ilan) initiates his project with the question: ‘What is the Talmud?’ and concludes it with: ‘When will the Messiah come?’ The former is unanswerable because the interpretive tradition that produced and continues the Talmud resists conceptual closure: ‘Interpretation implies the bursting open of the literary space’ (61). The latter is unanswerable because, surprisingly, ‘The messianic era is not the time when the Messiah is here. On the contrary: it is the time during which the Messiah is awaited’ (302). The patient reader of *The Burnt Book* will discover multifarious connections between these two questions, between the issues of interpretive and temporal closure. In general, Ouaknin reads the Talmudic tradition as a ‘transcendent’ dialectic that ‘always aims to go beyond the already-given meaning’ (91) and that, thereby, preserves the messianic dimension in man by producing a ‘dissemination that restores life, movement, and time’ (294).

*The Burnt Book* requires patience. It is by turns obscure, far-fetched, and incogent. In this, it is itself part of the Talmudic tradition and intentionally contrasts itself to Socratic or ‘immanent’ dialectic and ‘philosophic wisdom.’ If ‘intelligibility’ is etymologically ‘inter-legere’ or the ability to choose among and collect together, to decipher or make legible, then Ouaknin plausibly makes the case that Talmudic thinking is in some basic respects unintelligible. Quoting Vladimir Jankélévitch (*Quelque part dans l’inachevé*), he insists that the peculiar rigor of Talmudic study ‘must sometimes be attained at the cost of an illegible discourse’ (62).
He offers his text to us as three books. He also warns us in the preface that ‘the same book, exactly the same, with another project would be a different book’ (xi). What is Ouaknin’s project? At its simplest, The Burnt Book is an introduction to the Talmud for readers unfamiliar with this tradition. At a more sophisticated level, he offers a revisionary interpretation of this tradition, aimed at ‘classical’ halakhic Talmudists who read and comment on the Talmud for ritual, congregational, and devotional purposes. At its most provocative, The Burnt Book is part of a much larger project, centered on the work and teaching of Emmanuel Lévinas, to accomplish the judaization of Western (or ‘Greek’) wisdom in the name of human freedom.

Read as an introduction to the Talmudic tradition, ‘Book One’ of the text schematically surveys ‘landmarks’ of the tradition from the originating distinction of Written and Oral Law through the history of the Talmud’s composition and reception to the esoteric numerological (Gematria) and transpositional (Notarikon) techniques of interpretation by which even individual letters of words in the Torah are given significance. ‘Book Two’ offers Ouaknin’s illustrative—and rather astonishing—commentary on two short, apparently unconnected passages from the Talmud, one from the tractate governing activities on the sabbath, the other from the tractate on the rituals of Yom Kippur. After these detailed examples of ‘talmudic’ commentary, ‘Book Three’ develops a general ‘philosophy of the question’ that Ouaknin finds in the enigmatic Hasidic master Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav. The title of The Burnt Book alludes to an esoteric book by R. Nahman that he ordered burned before his death, lest, according to Ouaknin, his immense knowledge of the Torah become incarnate, the word of God made legible, and thus an idol or false messiah: ‘Holy books that exist as books are of the same nature as the idol, the “golden calf”’ (299).

Ouaknin identifies the genius of rabbinic Judaism as the refusal of idolatry: ‘The system of interpretation … is founded on the will to refuse idolatry’ (65, emphasis in the original). Even the Torah can be read idolatrously. Thus, he claims paradoxically that ‘the Jewish people is not the people of the Book!’ (xiv). Conventionally, the Talmud appears to be a way of maintaining and extending the authority of the Torah, the Written Law, by elaborating a positive science of governing applications. And Ouaknin concedes that this ‘thematic’ approach is ‘most important for the durability of Judaism’ (82), but nevertheless the authentic transmission of the Law requires ‘its incessant destabilization’ (85), which is his reading of the Talmudic expression ‘the abolition of the Law is its very founding’ (300).

At the heart of the Talmudic project, conceived as a ‘problematic’ approach to the Torah, are Mahloket (polemical discussion) and Gezarah shavah (semantic analogy). Mahloket is the irreconcilable disagreement of masters and their rival certainties. Gezarah shavah, a traditional rule of interpretation, allows the play of a radical intertextuality within the Torah. In the ‘interrelational space’ of Mahloket and the ‘voluminal … network’ of Gezarah shavah, the ‘thinking thought’ or ‘transmission of opening’ becomes possible: ‘There is no such thing as passive receiving of Tradition … Handing on is
"resumption, life, invention, and renewal, a mode without which revealed thinking, that is to say, thinking which is authentically thought, is not possible" (15, quoting from Lévinas L'Au-delà du verset). Ironically, this fantastically close reading, which in some respects exceeds post-structuralist destabilizations, depends on the utter faith that the Torah is the word of YHVH: ‘not a word, not a syllable or even a letter is there by chance’ (71).

Unlike the classical philosopher, the Talmudic master or Talmid Hakham (disciple-wise man) ‘refuses absolute knowledge and self-satisfaction’ (165). He seeks in the Book the question that ‘thinks more than the doxical proposition of the answer’ (164, quoting from Lévinas De Dieu qui vient à l'idée). This vocation rescues the Book for the dynamics of meaning and the questioner for the time of history: ‘Time defined as incessant renewing of the instant is subordinated to the incessant renewing of meaning’ (182). The historical freedom of the subject is the freedom to speak one’s own word and not simply be ‘spoken’ by religious tradition or political ideology or philosophic truth. Such prophetic speech must be judged not by what it secures for its hearers, but by the ways it dispossesses them. The Talmud and The Burnt Book move from the objective scene of truth and reason and disclosure toward an inward attitude of response — and responsibility. For Ouaknin, the hope of spiritual renewal lies in thus resigning the desire for philosophic justification.

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Nickolas Pappas
Plato and the Republic.
Pp. ???.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-09531-X);

In his recent book Plato and the Republic, Nickolas Pappas wrote that his intention in writing yet ‘another introduction to the Republic’ was to provide something a little different from what is found in many other commentaries on the Republic; he wanted to provide ‘an overview of the terrain covered’, the premises of some of Plato’s arguments in isolation in order to determine ‘which ones are doing the work’, and a guide to some of the more obscure arguments (Pappas, xi). I think that he has not only accomplished what he set out to do, but his presentation of the material is interesting and makes
compelling reading. Published (1995) by Routledge as part of their 'Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks' series, Plato and the Republic will, I believe, prove to be an important resource for students coming to the dialogue for the first time. Furthermore, I believe that it deserves a spot on the bookshelves of those who are more familiar with the Republic; Pappas' book will be valuable both as a teaching aid and as a reference book.

Plato and the Republic is divided into three parts. It begins with a general introduction which places Plato in his social and political context. The life and political aspirations of Plato are described in an engaging manner, and there is an interesting section that argues for a common style and a similarity in content between Aristophanic comedy and the Republic. There is also a section on the characters and setting of the dialogue. The final section of this part outlines the structure of the dialogue. Pappas gives an explanation of the 'central argument' of the dialogue, and a flow-chart of the themes, arguments and digressions of the Republic as they correspond to the traditional 'book' divisions.

The second part of Pappas' book is composed of eight chapters in which he treats either individual books of the Republic or, where more appropriate, particular topics that are spread throughout several books. These chapters, although they do stay close to the text of the Republic, offer much more than exegesis. Nickolas Pappas situates the individual arguments of the Republic in their immediate context, shows how they relate to other individual arguments in the Republic, and discusses what, if any, part they play in the central argument of the dialogue. In addition, Pappas discusses Plato's ideas with both a sensitivity to the original Greek context and an openness to their relevance in today's society. Plato is met head on, yet the treatment is not at all anachronistic. Pappas gives the reader the necessary information in order to judge more fairly the success or failure of both individual arguments and, more generally, the development of certain ideas through the ten books. The consequence of this sort of approach is a discussion that should prove to be engaging to the philosophically minded undergraduate. Plato's ideas emerge in his own philosophical context, and yet he is treated as a thinker who is presenting possible solutions to problems that are still with us.

One of the most unique elements of Pappas' book is his use of numbered premises/conclusions or presuppositions. As he works his way through the Republic in Part Two, he points out the most important or frequently recurring premises, which either have been argued for or are merely presuppositions. When later arguments use or expand these earlier judgements, Pappas is then able to direct the reader's attention to its earlier occurrence, and discuss the similarity/dissimilarity of the two or more contexts of the premises, how they were established, and what Plato later made of them. Furthermore, in an appendix at the end of his book, Pappas lists these numbered premises, along with a reference to where each premise was discussed in Part Two.

Part Three of Plato and the Republic, called 'General Issues', is comprised of three essays on topics that were flagged as problematic or controversial in
part two. Questions that are considered in this section fall under the general headings of ethics/politics, metaphysics/epistemology and Plato’s views on poetry. Under these headings, Pappas presents the traditional puzzles that are associated with each of the topics; for example, he points out the real or apparent contradictions between Plato’s censorship of the poets in Books II and III, and his views on poetry in Book X. This last section will serve as an excellent introduction to the perennial problems of the Republic for first time readers. Each chapter is clearly written and treats the issues directly, without unnecessary detail or jargon.

At the end of each chapter there is a list of books and articles suggested for further reading. The list is broken up according to the topics that were discussed in the preceding chapter. In addition, there is a detailed bibliography at the end of the book that distinguishes those books and articles especially suitable for those who are getting acquainted with Plato, books that contain extensive bibliographies of their own, and those books from which Pappas drew much of his interpretation. The final bibliography is also broken down according to subject matter.

The index is quite short, but given the nature of the book, its brevity is not limiting. Because of the nature of the subject matter, it is quite easy to find Pappas’ discussion of a topic, using the index in tandem with the table of contents.

In summary, Plato and the Republic is an excellent guide book to the dialogue. It will not only be helpful to newcomers to the Republic, but it will also be useful to those more familiar with the dialogue. Pappas makes Plato accessible to first time readers and relevant to their ideas and concerns, yet he also provides fresh insight to some of the more perennially problematic passages.

Heidi Northwood
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Between the middle of the second and the middle of the third centuries, the Western Church underwent a decisive period of transition which was to underpin the institution for the next thousand years. For the first time the Church became fully self-conscious as a permanent hierarchical structure, as a result, no doubt, both of the recession of millenarian expectations of a Second Coming and of ever closer integration with the secular Roman world. In this crucial period the Church came of age as a core feature of late Roman imperial society.

The life and work of Tertullian falls squarely within this period. He was probably converted in his native Carthage in AD 190 at the age of thirty and immediately entered the ministry. It must have seemed likely that his proven gifts as a rhetorician and apologist would conduce to his rapid rise within the steadily consolidating Carthaginian establishment. By the end of the century, however, according to the received story, things had gone wrong. He had come to feel that the Church he had entered was going astray and forsaking its fundamental moral commitments, notably to the implacable exclusion of adulterers and the licentious from communion. He fell in with the adherents of Montanus in Africa and devoted his talents for the remainder of his career to excoriating condemnations of the disciplinary laxity of the prevailing ecclesiastical order. He remained, on this picture, which stems ultimately from Jerome, an intemperate and unreconciled outsider, a position which precluded his making a constructive contribution to the evolving ecclesiological debate.

This whole picture of Tertullian’s relations with the Church is challenged by Rankin. He contests the claim that Tertullian’s Montanist adherence made it impossible for him to contribute to the developing conception of the Church and shows that at least in Tertullian’s case Montanism was in general far more compatible with Catholicism than has usually been thought. Having established this change of perspective he is able to proceed, by mounting a formidable array of textual evidence, to show that there is a great deal in Tertullian’s later writings that does bear directly on the central issues of the nature of the Church. He shows that it is far from absurd to ascribe to Tertullian not only a fully developed conception of the Church but also a doctrine of office and ministry that was to have far reaching consequences for developments of the Cyprianic period.

Altogether this amounts to a remarkable rehabilitation of Tertullian as a participant in one of the major intellectual developments of his era, the emergence of an understanding of the Church as a permanent purveyor of apostolic authority. One can only admire the way in which Rankin is so consistently prepared to take on a formidable array of scholars, all of whose
views he treats with consummate fairness, even deference. His argumentative style relies perhaps a little too much on sheer volume of citation, but in so far as I have been able to follow up his references they seem to bear well the interpretation that he puts on them and to justify his usually rather reticent comments.

This, then, is a serious attempt to alter profoundly the accepted assessment of Tertullian. It is a dense read and I suspect that it will start hares that will take a considerable amount of chasing down. What is especially compelling is his location of Tertullian in the historical context not only of earlier patristic thought but of intellectual and even literary trends within the wider lay, and even secular, community. It is striking how much falls into place once Rankin’s core contention is accepted. This, of course, is only circumstantial evidence for his position, which will undoubtedly come under fire. But whether or not his case can ultimately be sustained, he has made a most valuable contribution to our understanding of the development of Tertullian’s thought in many areas and of the relations of the New Prophecy movement to orthodox Catholicism. Anyone seriously interested in the emergence of an institution that was to shape the whole course of medieval European history would be well advised to read this book.

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Raphael Sassower
Cultural Collisions: Postmodern Technoscience.
Pp. xiv + 156.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-91109-5);

Don’t be put off by the cover blurb, which says the author S. ‘...completely understands the role of politics, economics and culture in scientific discovery...’. The author himself is far more modest and tentative in the claims he makes in attempting to open a dialogue between Popperian philosophy of science, postmodernism [pomo] and feminism. The work is the first book-length study to do this, and is a useful beginning, not an endpoint of the process.

S. bases himself on the skeptical ‘Popperian left’ of J. Agassi, and I. Jarvie, an appropriate orientation, since Agassi’s version of Popper is true to the openness and critical approach of the middle Popper without the reified
objectivism of the later Popper’s Third World or the dadaism of Feyerabend. Thus dialogue, rather than the usual polemics against subjectivism or relativism of pomo, is possible. One surprising omission is the lack of analysis in detail of the definition of ‘technoscience’ and articulation of the detailed relations between science and technology. Popper strongly distinguished science and technology. Agassi and Jarvie developed philosophies of technology, which in Jarvie’s case at least subsumes all of human activity (in the aspect of efficacy) under technology. Although technoscience is subtitle and major theme of the work, a detailed confrontation between Latour’s technoscience and the Popper-Agassi-Jarvie treatments of technology in relation to science is strangely lacking.

An excellent choice is made in Ch. 1 of the Superconducting Supercollider (SSC) to characterize pomo shifts in attitudes toward science. S. went to press before two Harvard scientists blamed multiculturalism and deconstruction for the cancelling of SSC. Doubtless, emotion rules the convoluted logic behind such accusations, but they show the link made between pomo attitudes and loss of a blank check for science funding. The most interesting chapter of the book is a dialogue between Popper and D. Harraway. S. concludes that Harraway’s ‘situated knowledge’ and Popper’s ‘situational logic’ are similar. S. downplays the more constrained conception of logic of the situation found in C.S. Peirce and Popper (the latter under major influence of Hayek). Harraway’s situated knowledge emphasizes the social situation of the knowledge in a way which Popper is quite critical (for instance in Popper’s dismissive remarks about K. Mannheim). Popper claims that examining one’s own biases is less likely to lead to self-correction than the empirical and logical criticisms made by others. It is true that both Popper and Harraway reject essentialism. However, Popperians (i.e., Judith Agassi and N. Koertge) have for the most part rejected the notion that different social, particularly gender, situations of the knower contribute to different knowledges.

S., like many others who relate pomo to analytical philosophy, uses Lyotard as pomo paradigm. One unfortunate effect of this choice is an acceptance of L.’s model of language games as hermetically sealed and monadologically isolated. Some (mis-)interpretations of Wittgenstein agree with this, but Lyotard retains too much of the formalist-axiomatic conception of language, leading to his radical incommensurability claims. Ironically, this conflicts with the pomo emphasis on crossing disciplinary boundaries. If the language-game/incommensurability thesis were correct, such cross-disciplinary transgression would be impossible (S.’s lumping of Whorff, Quine and Davidson together in a few paragraphs on p. 51 will make philosophers of language cringe, but his treatment of Popper and of R. Rorty’s pseudo-tolerance is on target.)

The left-Popperian description of science has a tendency to make it all ‘fun and games.’ This fits with the playfulness of pomo. This also fits with S.’s plea for ‘science for science’s sake’ parallel to l’art pour l’art. Although this fits with pomo’s ironic acceptance of all sorts of sleaze, it hardly fits with a
critical social analysis of technoscience in terms of the economic and political influences. S.'s educational proposals for fostering the imagination of technoscientists through a freer, more arts-like education, as well as his advocacy of 'displacement' as the co-existence of both feminist and establishment science has a streak of utopianism. This neglects, despite the author's bows to Marx and Foucault, the valuable insight of those writers, that empty proposals advocating morality are at best ineffectual, and, at worst covers for cynical power-hungry behavior on the part of the agents of the state. There are reasons that education is conformist (analyzed at length by theorists of social reproduction). There are reasons of power (gender and professional) why establishment science ridicules proposals of feminist alternatives. Any politically serious attempt to foster innovative education or pluralism of alternative sciences has to take these power structures into strategic account.

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David Schmidt
Rational Choice and Moral Agency.
Pp. xii + 283.

In a sea of attempts to defeat skepticism about being moral, David Schmidt's Rational Choice and Moral Agency offers yet another. His conclusion: most people most of the time have reason to be moral. The book is a compelling, commonsensical look at a difficult issue over which much ink has been spilled. Schmidt displays familiarity with the main literature on the topic and draws on it at relevant points. But what strikes the reader most starkly is that he approaches these deep philosophical issues entrenched in their own history from the perspective of someone who, to put it simply, has lived.

The book is clearly written, and should be of interest not only to professional philosophers, but to graduate and advanced undergraduate students. It avoids obscurity and technical terminology so as to render it intelligible even to those unfamiliar with the issues. It contains useful summaries at critical points to remind the reader of the strategy of the book and to show how its main points are connected.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I, 'Rational Choice', aims to establish that many of us have reason to adopt other-regarding ends because having them gives us more to live for than we would otherwise have. Schmidt arrives at this view by first challenging the means-end instrumen-
tal model of practical reason, the view that rational choice and/or action consists in choosing effective means to one's ends (and so maximizing expected utility), where those ends are not themselves subject to rational scrutiny. He offers two main arguments against this view of practical reason that is prevalent in economics and the social sciences, and which is traditionally adopted as the moral skeptic's view that moralists aim to defeat. One kind of argument is that maximizing expected utility is a strategy, and as such, whether it is accomplished is an objective and contingent matter. Yet strategies, according to Schmidt, cannot be rational; but only acts that in fact maximize utility are rational (20). But surely supporters of the instrumental view of practical reason would judge separately the rationality of an agent's acts, and the rationality of the agent.

The second argument consists of a series of objections designed to show that the means-end model of rationality needs to be supplemented so that it accords with our beliefs about a number of cases in which we think maximizing utility is not the rational way to act. Sometimes, instead of deliberating and calculating, it is rational to be spontaneous or unconcerned (20). Sometimes it is rational to satisfice — settle for the first satisfactory outcome — instead of maximize, such as when buying a house or even when selecting toothpaste (34, 36). Indeed, satisficing and optimizing are interactive strategies. We ought to satisfice when we view our lives from a global perspective, stepping back as it were to reflect on all compartments of our lives, with the aim to making our lives as a whole go best. Sometimes it is rational to choose one option or another instead of sitting on the fence, even though none are utility-maximizing, since indecision means making our lives better in ways we otherwise could (42-3). Moreover, since our ends change, we should not lock ourselves into only our present ends because doing so is likely to cause us to overlook opportunities to further our ends (19). In the end, an embellished theory of rationality, one which takes into account such situations, dictates the way we should act so as to make our lives as a whole go best. Thus Schmidt rejects the skeptic's theory of practical reasoning, and so does not have to meet the skeptic on the skeptic's own terms. He will not have to show that acting morally is rational because it is utility-maximizing.

The common, everyday counterexamples Schmidt offers to the instrumental theory of rationality are intuitively appealing, and cast doubt on the plausibility of instrumentalism, despite its widespread acceptability. But Schmidt does not offer a full-blown defense of a theory of rationality accounting for these different strategies. In fact, he believes there is none, since he remarks that sometimes we do not know what to do. Of course, the disadvantage is that we do not have a well-worked out theory that competes with the skeptic's (allegedly well-established) theory of practical reason, so some are likely not to accept this first step of the argument. A more rigorous account of this crucial step in the argument is called for, since it would be much easier to defeat skepticism if we reject rather than accept the skeptic's view of practical reason. But the advantage is that the counterexamples speak to common sense and the complexity of life.
The idea that it is rational to choose ends (versus taking ends as static, as in the instrumental model) plays a significant role in Schmidtz’s argument against skepticism. First, some terminology. We all have instrumental and constitutive ends, and these are means to final ends. One has an instrumental end when one does some action for the sake of some other goal. One has a constitutive end when one does some action that constitutes achieving some goal (59). Such goals are final ends, and constitute the end of the hierarchy for instrumental reasoning. But not so for reflective rationality. Maieutic ends are the further ends for which we choose final ends. Final ends are chosen as a means to maieutic ends, but they are not pursued as such; they are worth pursuing for their own sake, because they have a life of their own. A maieutic end is an end achieved through a process of coming to have other ends (61). For instance, the end of choosing or settling on a career is a maieutic end — settling on a career comes with goals that the career represents and we come to choose the career by having particular career goals. Further, ‘we pursue maieutic ends ... as constitutive ends relative to the overarching maieutic end of finding something to live for’ (70). The end of having something to live for is grounded in survival. Most of us have the end of survival. Though survival is a biological fact, we find that we do not seek merely bare survival, but must find something to live for. We realize that finding reasons to live improves our survival prospects, and thus is instrumentally justified (74). Moreover, survival turns out to be a means whose fulfillment is necessary for the sake of other ends such as our constitutive and instrumental ends with which we began, and our final ends. Thus, all of our ends are connected, some being justified for the sake of others. No loose ends, no ‘ends at the top’ exist in the reflective model of rationality, unlike in the instrumental model which stops at the level of final ends. The important point is that final ends can be rationally chosen as a means to maieutic ends, especially the end of having more to live for. Thus, if one lacks certain final ends, rationality may require one to choose them (or, at least it would be consistent with rationality were one to choose them). Indeed, to be reflectively rational is to do what one can to become the sort of person one wants to become (70). This might mean that one must acquire new ends.

This last point sets the stage for the model’s allowing moral ends. We can choose ends so that we have more to live for; we measure ‘how much’ we have to live for by the intensity with which we pursue our ends, not just their number (82). Since reflective rationality allows for many final ends (Schmidtz’s argument for this is that it most accurately describes humans — 91), being moral can be one final end among others. This indicates Schmidtz’s strategy in aiming to defeat skepticism: he is not going to aim to show that we always ought to pursue the end of morality because doing so rationally beats out pursuing self-interest. Rather, since being moral is likely to be one final end among many, we might have competing reasons for action. Such a view seems similar to Sidgwick’s view that there are two disparate sets of reasons for action, moral (utilitarian) reasons and self-interested reasons, and when they conflict we are left to ourselves to choose which to follow.
But first Schmidtz must establish that we ought to have morality as one of our final ends. He makes many claims like these: ‘... we have preferences directly relatively to the welfare of others’ (96, emphasis mine); ‘... we might care about other people ...’ (98, emphasis mine); ‘... there may be limits to what we are willing to do to others in the course of pursuing our goals ...’ (98, emphasis mine); ‘... sometimes we prefer to act on our concern for others, so sometimes altruism is rational’ (101, emphasis mine). Of course, none of this shows that we ought to adopt and act on moral ends, which for Schmidtz amounts to having integrity and respecting others by adhering to certain constraints (99). It merely states an empirical claim that sometimes people take morality to be one of their ends. Schmidtz goes on to say that our developing new preferences throughout life ‘creates the possibility that we become other-regarding’ (102). But this still does not show that it is rational to develop new ends, let alone other-regarding ends.

The argument, which is elaborated on in Parts II and III, is given in its basic form at the end of Chapter Five. Cultivating new ends gives us the possibility of deeper and broader satisfaction, and is a crucial way to nurture our self-regard because doing so gives us more to live for than we would otherwise have (104). But what is so special about cultivating a concern for others? Surely the skeptic could insist that acquiring new self-regarding ends is likely to achieve the same result. The difference is that having a regard for the interests of others is necessary for us to be peaceful and productive and to have a sense of belonging to a community (104). Thus we have self-regarding reasons to have other-regarding ends. Yet Schmidtz denies that other-regarding ends are purely instrumental. Morality, for Schmidtz, is categorical: it becomes an end worth seeking for its own sake. Like other final ends, moral ends come to develop a life of their own.

But suppose, our skeptic responds, that we can get these rewards without coming to value morality for its own sake. Suppose we can dupe others and merely go through the motions, acting as if morality is one of our ends. Schmidtz’s response: we not only want to achieve our goals, but we want to deserve to achieve them (110). We want the respect of others, and to deserve their respect and to be liked by them (112). Without integrity (being true to oneself), we would have less to live for. Of course, sometimes altruism involves self-sacrifice, but this is the rare case, he says. In most cases the costs of satisfying other-regarding ends are not enough to characterize acting this way as self-sacrifice.

The upshot, then, is that it is prudent for one to adopt other-regarding ends because having them gives one more reason to live than one would otherwise have. The amoralist such as Thrasymachus who refuses to adopt such ends has fewer reasons to live than the rest of us (119).

One problem with the argument is that Schmidtz assumes that we value peace, productivity, a sense of community, and integrity. These are moral values. So the argument for our developing moral ends presupposes that we have these moral values. The argument is circular. Another problem is that

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we might not have these moral values, so we might rank more self-regarding ends above other-regarding ends to give us more to live for.

Part II defends moral dualism, a theory of morality that has both a personal and an impersonal ‘strand’. I have just described the personal strand, which involves ‘having something and being something worth living for’ (192). Morality has what Schmidt calls ‘recognition rules’ (e.g., act utilitarianism’s rule that one ought to maximize utility). One such rule applies to internal effects, that is, to how agents affect themselves (e.g., character traits). These rules govern the personal strand of morality. They give us reason to become persons of integrity and to cultivate other-regarding concerns so that we have more to live for.

The other strand of morality is the interpersonal one, which deals with constraints imposed on us in our pursuit of having more to live for. This strand of morality concerns institutions which are social arrangements that affect people by affecting how they interact (155). Moral institutions are those which serve the common good, which involves making people better off but by nonexploitative methods (160). Of course, most moral institutions will not make everyone better off, but they make people better off in general. They constrain an individual’s pursuit of her own good because generally people do not pursue their own good in an impartial way but favor themselves (167). If moral institutions serve the common good, they must do so by inducing people to act in ways that serve the common good (168-9). They can do this by making it advantageous for people to act in ways that make each other better off, in particular, by imposing constraints against causing harm (173). Since moral institutions aim to serve the common good, they give people reasons to be moral. Thus, the constraints they impose are collectively rational because they make people in general better off. This completes Schmidt’s moral dualism.

The two strands of morality are related: ‘Morally, one seeks to make oneself a better person — a person with more to live for — within constraints imposed by social structures that serve the common good’ (203). Collective rationality — reasons for following these constraints — is defined in terms of reflective rationality, as it involves helping people to flourish as reflectively rational beings. Yet the two strands of morality can at times conflict. In most cases, according to Schmidt, the personal strand takes a back seat to the interpersonal strand. But abnormal cases in which the considerations of personal morality are so overwhelmingly important that obeying a moral constraint would actually defeat the constraint’s purpose, do arise on occasion (209). Here reflective rationality trumps collective rationality. Schmidt concedes that there will be times when it is unclear which strand wins out over the other, and urges us merely to pick one and get on with the moral life (211). This is unlike the traditional conflict between self-interest and morality, because reflective rationality which governs the personal strand is not instrumentalism.

Part III addresses the why-be-moral issue, the heart of the book. It brings together the components in Parts I and II. In Part I, Schmidt argued that we have prudential reasons for developing new ends, including other-regarding ends, so as to give us more to live for than we would otherwise have. He
does not show that having other-regarding ends is rationally required; he concludes merely that 'beings like us have powerful reasons not to regret our tendency to be other-regarding' (252). This view, he admits, does not defeat the amoralist like Thrasymachus, but it gives us reason to be glad we are not like him.

In Part II he argued that reflectively rational agents who do develop such ends have reason to act on such ends, i.e., have reason to be moral. The personal strand of morality has reflective rationality built into it, since it deals with integrity and first-person singular reasons for becoming an agent with integrity. The interpersonal strand gives us reasons to constrain our behavior in ways that make us generally better off by avoiding causing harm. Thus, we have reasons from a first-person plural perspective to constrain the pursuit of our self-regarding concerns. We can also have reasons from a first-person singular perspective which are provided by external sanctions to constrain the pursuit of our self-regarding concerns, though admittedly such reasons are not compelling for all (256). But Schmidtz says he is not concerned to address the amoralist, nor is he concerned to show that all of us always have reason to be moral. He merely wants to show that for most of us, being a moral person, versus always acting morally, is rational. In sum, the best we can show is this: 'From a singular perspective, we have reason to embrace personal morality, and indirect, incomplete, and contingent reasons to embrace interpersonal morality, to pursue goals within constraints imposed by structures' (258). Thus, morality and reflective rationality are 'fairly well-reconciled' (262).

Overall, I think Schmidtz's view of reflective rationality is a step in the right direction for defeating skepticism. It frees us from having to show that being a moral person and acting morally is rational because it is in one's interest in the sense of being utility-maximizing. Yet his argument could be improved on the following points. He needs to defend his view that we need to defeat skepticism at the level of character or disposition, but not at the level of actions. That is, we do not need to show, in order to defeat skepticism, that every morally required action is rationally required. Further, his division of people into those with a moral character and those without one, is too simple. People are complex, and characters come in degrees. Even people who want to be morally disposed, who have the values of peace, integrity, etc., do not always want to act on their disposition. Even moral people, I suspect, question from time to time not only acting morally, but why they should be so disposed. Schmidtz admits that even for moral people, moral ends are just one on a list of many ends they might have. So why choose to act on moral ends? I suspect that even moral people on enough occasions will find it rational to let ends other than other-regarding ends take precedence. I wonder in the end exactly to whom and on which occasions Schmidtz's argument speaks.

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This intriguing book crosses a gulf between two camps in social philosophy that rarely address one another. Sciabarra (also author of Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical) uses his broad knowledge of both libertarian and Marxist literature to argue that Marx and Hayek actually share substantial common ground: they both employ a ‘dialectical’ (as opposed to ‘dualistic’) methodology that interprets human interaction as forming an entire social dynamic context extending beyond finite human understanding. As a result, Marx and Hayek become surprising allies against Sciabarra’s real target: Cartesian ‘constructivist rationalism’ (35) and its attempts to impose ‘utopian’ solutions on evolving social contexts from an ‘external’ or transcendent perspective. ‘Radical’ theory, by contrast with utopianism, is dialectical, ‘seeks a more integrated view of social reality’ (3), and looks for immanent possibilities of change (118).

By ‘utopian’ theory, Sciabarra appears to have in mind contemporary ‘rationalistic liberalism’ (48) (read: deontological theories of political justice). But the book is clearly written from a social theory perspective, and it unfortunately makes little contribution to contemporary debates in political ethics. Sciabarra does not emphasize the ethical contrast between Marx’s substantive theme of emancipation (59) and Hayek’s negative account of freedom and near-total disregard for the justice of spontaneous outcomes.

Rather, Sciabarra argues that ‘the prime difference between Marx and Hayek is not ethical or political but epistemological. Though both thinkers recognize the organic link between goals and context, between potentiality and actuality, they differ in their comprehension of the nature of epistemic limitations’ (118-19). Hayek believes that human reason is inherently so limited that effective central planning can only be distortive (48), while Marx believes that even if omniscience is impossible, human efficacy (60) in controlling social conditions and reducing unintended consequences can be dramatically increased as capitalism is transcended. Thus Sciabarra presents their disagreement as within an embracing agreement on ‘the dialectical’ conception of social phenomena.

But this thesis — defended in the first three chapters — that Hayek’s critique of constructivism is essentially ‘dialectical’ in a way comparable to Marx’s critique of utopianism (6), is the most controversial aspect of this book. Sciabarra’s analysis seems to depend on assuming that Hayek’s ‘invisible hand’ is a dialectical model simply because it describes a ‘whole’ that is more than the intention of any of its parts (19), and regards individual activities as ‘internally’ or constitutively affected (24) by emergent ‘structural relationships’ (18) they can neither predict nor intend. But such a functionalist
account of intrinsic interrelatedness is not dialectical in the Hegelian or Marxian senses. It seems that if Hayek’s ‘spontaneous order’ can be called an ‘organic unity’ (115-6), than so can blind evolutionary trends in an ecosystem, which are not affected by agents’ more and less adequate understanding of the whole and its internal relations, as dialectical processes are.

The first three chapters also compare Hayek’s concerns about the limits of human reason with themes in Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge and with the Frankfurt School’s fear of bureaucratic ‘instrumentalism.’ The next three chapters describe Marx’s theory of capitalism, his dialectical method, and his ‘epistemic utopia’ (respectively), and the last treats the New Left challenge to Hayekian thought. The chapters on Marx are helpful and interesting on the whole. The first of these, which includes a revealing section tracing Marx’s and Hayek’s joint roots in Scottish evolutionist thought, could also serve as a useful introduction to Marx’s whole project for undergraduates. The next chapter on ‘Marxian Dialectics’ begins with an intriguing non-determinist interpretation of Marx’s material ‘base’ of society, though it ends with a rather simplistic account of the opposition-resolution scheme. The last chapter on Marx explains the stages of communism and argues that Marx’s account of ‘utopia’ requires perfect knowledge of social systems of the sort Hayek rules out (yet some of the key quotations backing up this claim are from Engels. Cf. p. 89).

In the final chapter, Sciabarra briefly evaluates the Frankfurt School tradition and considers Hilary Wainwright’s and Jürgen Habermas’s visions of radicalism as transformative democracy. This last chapter is especially important, because the whole book seems to be intended as a partially-sympathetic response to Habermas and Wainwright, pleading for today’s New Left (a) to recognize Marx’s own proto-Hayekian emphasis on spontaneous historical development; (b) to accept what is right in Hayek’s analysis of the invisible hand and human rational limitations; and (c) to incorporate these themes in a new radical theory (120-1). Sciabarra even sees the possibility of a ‘non-Marxist’ (5) yet non-conservative ‘libertarian radicalism’ (50-1) — though he does not explain what this could mean specifically.

Yet there are several severe problems with Sciabarra’s response. He misinterprets Habermas’s universal presuppositions of dialogue expressed in the regulative ideal speech situation as a utopian requirement that the tacit component of knowledge would be fully articulated’ (107). Nor does he seem to appreciate that Habermas’s emphasis on overcoming strategic intentionality depends precisely on the possibility of a kind of cooperative motivation for the sake of normative legitimacy that Hayek tries to rule out a priori through his Burkean model of evolving mores and his account of social outcomes as mainly the result of rational-egoistic interactions. In response to Wainwright’s critique that Hayek has an overly individualistic conception of knowledge, Sciabarra argues that she ‘fails to appreciate Hayek’s understanding of the social character of knowledge’ (113). But the ‘information’ aggregated by floating prices is not social knowledge in Wainwright’s sense: like Habermas, she has in mind cognitively shared (rather than ‘dispersed’)
knowledge gained by democratic deliberation, which enables intentional cooperation for mutual goals, rather than the social interaction (114) that market actors achieve only unintentionally by trying to maximize their own utility. Finally, Sciabarra misreads Habermas's and Wainwright's proposals as mainly 'therapeutic' psychological ideals rather than normative in significance (114-15).

Overall, the book is based on an impressive diversity of research for its size (the 20-page bibliography is a valuable reference). Yet the strength of the connections alleged between Marx and Hayek often depends on Sciabarra's selective focus on certain very general similarities in their attention to sociality; the effect is to downplay fundamental oppositions between Marx's and Hayek's explanatory systems and the moral psychologies on which they depend. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from this book, and Sciabarra should be praised for forcing us to give up our comfortable caricatures of Marx and Hayek as figures in absolute 'dualistic' opposition.

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Sextus Empiricus.
Outlines of Scepticism.
Pp. xviii + 249.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-30950-6);

If Sextus Empiricus was not the greatest Greek philosopher, he nonetheless left an influential body of writing. Despite this, translations of his Outlines of Scepticism (also known as Outlines of Pyrrhonism) have not been plentiful. Previously the most readily available complete English translation was that published by R.G. Bury in 1933 as part of the Loeb Classical Library. This translation is long outdated; in addition, Bury's work was intended for classicists rather than philosophers, and his infrequent notes reflect this audience's concerns.

The Annas-Barnes translation updates and improves upon the Bury translation. Annas and Barnes have the advantage of working from the 1958 Teubner Greek edition of the text, which suggests some readings and textual emendations not available to Bury. Where emendations to the Greek have been suggested, Annas and Barnes have provided notes to indicate their
choice of readings. When the two readings are significantly different, translations of both versions are provided.

It is the readability of the Annas-Barnes translation, however, that forms its greatest virtue. The translation is at once smooth and literal. In this it is an improvement over Bury, who frequently employs philosophical terms which are inappropriate to Sextus. The Greek of Sextus Empiricus, unsurprisingly, does not use many terms familiar to philosophers today; Annas-Barnes have preserved this in their translation, whereas Bury anachronistically supplies technical philosophical terms as he deems appropriate. Thus Bury writes: 'The Sceptic School, then, is also called "Zetetic" from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and "Ephetic" or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and "Aporetic" or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and "Pyrrhonean" from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors' (1.7). Annas and Barnes translate the same passage more simply: 'The Sceptical persuasion, then, is also called Investigative, from its activity in investigating and inquiring; Suspensive, from the feeling that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation; Aporetic, either (as some say) from the fact that it puzzles over and investigates everything, or else from its being at a loss whether to assent or deny; and Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have attached himself to Scepticism more systematically and conspicuously than anyone before him.' The Annas-Barnes translation is closer to the Greek text and translates Sextus' terminology without jargon. Where a technical term of particular interest to the philosophical reader occurs, it is usually given a footnote where the Greek term is listed with its translation and modern cognates.

In addition to avoiding inappropriate technical terms, Annas and Barnes provide the reader with a closer sense of Sextus' style. Sextus Empiricus was a writer whose Greek was clear and straightforward, for the most part avoiding complicated constructions or elaborate terminology. It is ironic that Bury, writing for an audience of classicists, apparently saw fit to 'improve' Sextus' philosophical diction by translating his short, descriptive phrases as single polysyllabic terms, while Annas and Barnes, writing for an audience of philosophers, see no difficulty in retaining Sextus' occasional circumlocutions. Bury's misplaced enthusiasm not only gives the reader the impression that Sextus was working out of a tradition that included any number of impressively obscure technical terms and a fair quantity of jargon, but it also unfortunately obscures Sextus' meaning. What Annas and Barnes translate as 'differences in the ways in which they are affected,' Bury translates as 'contrariety of sense-affection' (1.43). 'Animals ... bred from the same species' becomes, in Bury, 'animals ... from homogeneous parents' (1.42). We must be grateful to Annas and Barnes for saving future philosophers from the need to quote awkward constructions such as 'homogeneous parents' or 'contrariety of sense-affection'. Annas and Barnes are not only more faithful to the
Greek and to Sextus’ understanding of philosophical writing. They are also easier to understand. And when the Annas-Barnes translation makes Sextus easier to understand, Sextus becomes more accessible to the non-Greek reader: surely one of the most important goals for any translation.

Annas and Barnes also provide a substantial critical apparatus designed for philosophical readers. A glossary contains all technical terms, indexed both by Greek and by English. This is particularly useful inasmuch as certain technical terms are (necessarily) translated differently at different times; the glossary allows the reader with some Greek to be able to discern the cases where the same Greek word has been differently translated. Moreover, the Greek is printed legibly and without misspellings. More important, perhaps, are the footnotes which refer passages in Sextus to those in other ancient authors. The Bury translation seldom provides reference to similar passages in other authors, so this addition is most welcome and would probably be of considerable use to the scholar who wishes to see Sextus in the context of other Greek writings on scepticism. Annas and Barnes also offer useful cross-references for passages in the Outlines.

The volume also contains a brief introduction and a bibliography. The latter is useful, though limited mostly to articles and books in English. The introduction provides only a brief history of scepticism and a discussion of some decisions made by the translators of the best way to approach their task; those interested in biographical data on Sextus or the transmission of the text will have to look elsewhere. An index of subjects and an index of persons mentioned in the text are also included. Sometimes the index of persons is overly discreet when referring to non-philosophers, although the understatements can be enjoyable. Tiberius, for example, is obliquely referenced as ‘Emperor, of legendary personal habits’.

Annas and Barnes have published earlier work, separately and together, on Sextus Empiricus and know whereof they translate here. Their accurate and elegant translation must be a welcome addition to scholars of both ancient and modern scepticism.

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Keith Tester
*The Inhuman Condition.*
Pp. xiv + 152.
US $50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-10731-8);

In *The Inhuman Condition,* Keith Tester explores the possibility for meaningful human action in a world where monolithic economic and social structures and institutions come to be seen as natural, and therefore essential, elements of our existence. It is a fittingly millennial topic, as Tester argues that the dominant paradigm of production and disenchantment, which emphasises the way in which we relate to the world as something we make, is no longer relevant to our lives. Rather, he says that we now experience the world as found, or ‘enchanted’, and we see that enchantedness of the world as a necessary precondition for our lives having legitimacy and meaning.

As the title of his book indicates, Hannah Arendt, and in particular her book *The Human Condition,* plays an important role in Tester’s book. Yet *The Inhuman Condition* is not just an exegesis of Arendt, nor is it a straightforward criticism of her work. Rather, Tester uses Arendt as both a jumping-off point and a foil for his analysis of our existential situation. His main conceptual tool is what he calls ‘the dialectic of reification’. He begins with Arendt’s understanding of reification, which he says stresses our nature as workers and as makers and users of tools. Arendt, according to Tester, sees the human condition as constituted by our ability to make things and therefore to violate and do violence to nature. But for Tester, reification also means the way in which the products of fabrication come to be seen as natural, standing ‘apart from and over and above the circumstances of their fabrication’ (57). As this second aspect of reification comes to dominate, the play between the two gets pushed into the background and our culture becomes naturalized, where what is in fact historical and contingent comes to be seen as necessary.

As a result of the emergent dominance of the naturalizing force of reification, Tester argues that the possibility for human action is diminished. the more the human sphere is seen as natural, the less chance we have of remaking and revising the institutions and relations within it. Tester wants to put the irony back into our perceptions of the world, in order to fend off what he sees as the flattening and homogenizing force of reification.

After setting up the argument, Tester sets about exploring the implications of experiencing the world as we find it. In a discussion which ranges from Marx and Weber to shopping malls and John Kenneth Galbraith, Tester provides a strong case for his contention that we have lost our ability to come to terms with the world we have made. Particularly acute is his observation that the emotional and environmental sense of ‘quiet’ which is a precondition for contemplation is becoming increasingly unobtainable. As the pervasive unquiet of our existence itself succumbs to the dialectic of reification, we find
ourselves fearing its absence. 'Quiet oppresses too much,' he writes. 'It is too empty and too demanding' (101).

The Inhuman Condition is one of those rare books that manages to be at once clear and accessible as well as provocative and well-argued, and the degree to which Tester’s insights resonate with the facts of the modern world makes one wish that this slim book were more substantial. Readings of theorists like Heidegger, Simmel, Benjamin and Weber (not to mention Arendt) take up a significant part of each chapter, while many of the author’s more original insights remain largely unexplored. While Tester acknowledges that he has made an effort to keep his account at as abstract a level as possible, a more involved examination of a few well-chosen examples would have put some meat on the solid frame he has erected.

Still, this does not prevent the book from having considerable bite. The last two chapters contain a sobering account of the difficulties we encounter in trying to free ourselves from the trap of reification, as Tester shows how even the intimacy of the private sphere can fail as an authentic means of escape. Love itself, he argues, is a reification, in that it comes to be seen as an enchanted, transcendental force. If our only refuge is the bad faith of relationships, then perhaps it is no refuge at all.

The Inhuman Condition ends on an ambivalent note, where it is not obvious that Tester is confident that we have much hope of regaining an attitude of healthy irony and scepticism towards the world around us. This penetrating book raises far more questions than it answers, and it is here where the reader is really left wanting more. In bringing out how the dialectic between experiencing the world as made or as found is an analogue to the way in which the notions of irony and authenticity reflect competing and ultimately incompatible existential aspirations, Tester has identified a crucial source of conflict. But if he is right in holding that the force of reification tends toward the bad faith of a ‘categorical agreement with being’ (136) which only serves to reduce the possibility for human action, he fails to address or account for the varying ways in which large segments of society are finding ways of working against it. The recent revitalization of Greenpeace and the capitulation of Shell over the Brent Spar issue in the North Sea, the student and workers strike in France, and the benignly anarchic evolution of the Internet are three examples which come readily to mind. We may still have more control over our lives than Tester allows, but that does not entirely diminish the importance of what he has to say. The Inhuman Condition is a serious book for serious times, serving as a sharp reminder of the dangers of complacency in the face of alienating processes.

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Leslie Paul Thiele

Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics.
Pp. xii + 263.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-08659-1);

It is a challenging task to develop a politics based on Heidegger's thought. In Timely Meditations, Leslie Paul Thiele undertakes this challenge in a way which will arouse controversy among Heidegger's most vehement critics. Specifically, Thiele argues that despite the record of Heidegger's involvement in National Socialism, the germ of a democratic political outlook can be found in his meditations on Being. 'My claim is that there is politics to be discovered in Heidegger's philosophy, one quite at odds with the politics that Heidegger had occasion to champion ... The democratic vision developed in the following pages is offered as that political nonpresence that belongs to, but remains largely unclaimed and occasionally betrayed by, the philosophic presence of Heidegger's work' (9).

Thiele's opening statement not only constellates his thesis, but also identifies his method. In a way which could be elaborated more completely, he redirects Heidegger's plan of undertaking a destructive-retrieval of the tradition back upon his own ambivalent approach to politics. Through a strategy which engages Heidegger the thinker, and yet is equally alert to the criticisms launched against Heidegger the statesman, Thiele attempts to outline a politics to meet the challenges of our technological age. As reflected in his title, the author strives to recapture the 'timeliness' of Heidegger's philosophy as speaking to the crisis which threatens to engulf civilization. 'The goal is to integrate technology within a bounded worldly dwelling no longer structured by possessive mastery. The task before us is cultural and political no less than philosophic in nature, even though Heidegger tended to emphasize the latter and ignore the former aspects of it' (215).

The attempt to root a political outlook in Heidegger's description of a disclosive freedom, in contrast to the technological drive of possessive mastery, defines the heart of Thiele's investigation. If one could trace the evolution of Heidegger's development of freedom as 'letting be,' one could provide a map to negotiate the labyrinth of his thought. In this regard, Heidegger follows in Schelling's footsteps, who maintained that freedom constitutes the beginning and end of philosophy. Ironically, Thiele says little about Schelling's profound influence on Heidegger. Instead, Thiele couches Heidegger's project in a dichotomy in which Nietzsche appears as the chief opponent. According to Thiele, Nietzsche detaches freedom and responsibility in a way that Heidegger must later recouple. 'If politics is defined by the exercise of freedom and responsibility in tandem, then a freedom gained at the expense of responsibility is a freedom ill suited to
political life. Yet this is the raw, unrestricted, and often debilitating freedom that Nietzsche delivers to us at the grave of metaphysics’ (17).

In Part One, Thiele establishes the antithesis between Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will as extreme individualism and Heidegger’s emphasis on community in Being and Time. The author correctly recognizes that Heidegger’s analysis of human being’s historical situation plants the seeds for a subsequent recovery of ethics as a concern for the ethos. ‘Expanding the etymology of “ethics” (ethos) to include not solely a customary way of being with others but a characteristic way of being in the world, Heidegger considers his work an “original ethics”’ (54).

In Part Two, Thiele explores the intricacies of Heidegger’s approach to freedom as pointing toward a ‘post-modern’ political context. Thiele counters a prominent trend in modernity to bifurcate individual and society and to view freedom as unconstrained liberty. By contrast, Heidegger recognizes that choice must always be accomplished in compliance with the larger claim of openness, as reflected in his concept of resoluteness. ‘Resoluteness is the very renouncing of subjective willfulness and, by implication, the renouncing of willful decision making ... Resoluteness or Entschlossenheit, which literally means unclosedness, is an opening of the self to the questioning, not the controlling, of (its) being’ (74). Though many of Heidegger’s critics have taken him to task for voluntarism, and pointed to his concept of resolve as prefiguring his ‘decision’ to support the Nazi regime, Thiele demonstrates why this argument falters (74n). He then proceeds to outline the role which language plays in facilitating the process of openness and in delimiting the domain of political action. ‘The gift of language is the gift of freedom’ (131). Language points to humanity’s dependence on Being’s unconcealment, and thereby brings to fruition our role as ‘stewards’ rather than ‘masters’. With his famous remark that ‘language is the house of Being’, Heidegger provides the clue to humanity’s inhabiting a domain where it can exercise political freedom. To engage in ‘free speech’ is to cultivate language’s potential for disclosure, rather than employing it as a device to manipulate opinion (128). Given this backdrop, the author then confronts the thorny issue of why Heidegger fell prey to the fascist rhetoric of world dominance despite his thought of disclosive freedom. ‘No truly philosophic corpus is reducible to a singular politics’ (140). In a way which requires further clarification, Thiele adds: ‘When all is said and done, Heideggerian philosophy is importantly Socratic. Heidegger is a gadfly worrying the steed of contemporary Western society. In this respect, Heidegger is a cultural critic, and his philosophy, like Socrates’, is an interminable questioning that assails cognitive and behavioral conventions’ (140).

In Part Three, Thiele lays out the key elements of a Heideggerian politics. For example, he effectively argues that any politics which serves the welfare of human beings in their communal dwelling must also safeguard the earth’s ecological habitat. ‘In advocating a disclosive, caretaking orientation toward nature, Heidegger supports what in ecological circles is
called bioregionalism’ (187). The more we resist the Western tendency toward ‘anthropocentricism’, however, the more we are drawn into a dialogue with our Eastern counterparts, with Taoist and Buddhist traditions. Scholars have often made the connection between Eastern practices of withdrawing the will and Heidegger’s notion of freedom as ‘letting be’. According to Thiele, the crossfertilizing of Heidegger’s thought with Eastern philosophy is not accidental, but rather defines a key step in rooting his thought in an everyday context. ‘To be authentic is resolutely to re-enter the marketplace with helping hands. These hands of flesh and blood may then be made available for the ongoing tasks of building and preserving — the tasks of dwelling’ (250).

For those who wrestle with the tragic dimensions of Western history, however, Thiele’s appeal to the harmony of Yin/Yang may appear too visionary and utopian. No doubt this is the opposite political outlook which the author hopes to cultivate. But the most troubling part of his book occurs with his initial formulation of the problem of freedom. Indeed, Thiele too quickly identifies Heidegger’s view of freedom with his later notion of ‘letting be’. Thus the author overlooks the double relation holding between care and the event of unconcealment, the attuned response through which humanity receives the claim of Being and assumes responsibility for today’s crises. As a dialogue between thought and Being, disclosive freedom must include its own form of governance, which awakens individuals to their place within a larger community.

Heidegger emphasizes that we should approach his philosophy in terms of ‘ways’ rather than ‘works’. Thiele travels along a crucial path in addressing the essence of freedom. But there are many paths intersecting with his which need to be explored before a question as elusive as Heidegger’s politics can be developed.

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Challenges to Enlightenment-inspired liberalism in the name of difference, otherness, contingency, and particularity have taken center stage in recent English-language moral and political theory. It is thus no surprise to find that this recent collection of papers on the wide-ranging work of Jürgen Habermas focuses on his strong defense of rational universalism immanent to public discourse. With nine of the thirteen contributors being political scientists, one will find here few in-depth treatments of Habermas' contributions to epistemology, sociology, psychology, philosophy of history, and philosophy of language. Rather, this volume serves as a good introduction to the impact of Habermas' theories of democracy, law, social criticism, and ethics for those who are not familiar with Habermas' work, his dense writing style, and the three-century tradition of continental thought upon which he relies.

Readers of Habermas could hardly do better than by beginning with Max Pensky's lucid intellectual biography which sheds light not only upon the main directions of Habermas' philosophical project but also on the specifically post-World War II German motivations behind his project. Pensky demonstrates the interconnections between Habermas' role as 'Germany's most prominent intellectual' (67) through considerations of West German debates over the Basic Law (its constitution), historical revisionism, neo-conservatism, nationalism, the 1990 unification, political asylum, and post-Nazi 'normalcy', and his role as the foremost theorician of 'a democratic way of life in which commitments to postnationalistic, postconventional institutions and values are firmly rooted within the lifeworlds of political agents' (68). Readers could then turn to White's brief introduction to the collection for a cogent overview of Habermas' main theoretical concerns and developments since the early 1960s.

Georgia Warnke's article features a particularly clear presentation of the central, reciprocally-defined concepts of communicative action, discourse, validity, and rationality. This summary is followed by a number of provocative, but perhaps over-hasty, critical engagements with Habermas' moral theory concerning the application of moral norms to concrete situations, the priority of the right over the good, the abstractness of liberal principles, and the understanding of other cultures and values. Donald Moon takes up the theme of pluralism from the perspective of political theory rather than moral theory by arguing that, given the inherent agonism and irresolvability of value conflicts which make it difficult to reach determinate consensuses, Habermas ought to adopt a bracketing strategy akin to Rawls' for narrowing the scope of discursively tested norms. The essay suffers somewhat due to the significant development of Habermas' and Rawls' positions with the
publication of Faktizität und Geltung, Political Liberalism, and their 1995 exchange in The Journal of Philosophy. Simone Chambers, after a lucid account of discourse ethics, raises problems of closure, inefficiency, and motivation when that theory is translated into democratic practices of legitimation. Her use of the recent Canadian constitutional debate is particularly effective in bringing out the relevance of these abstract issues.

All three of these articles on pluralism and democracy would have benefited from more familiarity with Habermas' 1992 work on democracy, constitutionalism, and legal theory Faktizität und Geltung, which has just appeared in English. Kenneth Baynes does an excellent job of laying out the basic arguments and themes of this formidable and broad work, but it will be of most use to those already familiar with the Habermasian system and vocabulary.

Continuing in the early Frankfurt School tradition, Habermas has always insisted that normative-ideal political theory needs to be grounded in an empirically adequate social theory. Nancy Love, in an analysis of Habermas' relation to Marx, provides a clear presentation of his communicative action paradigm and how it highlights tensions between lifeworld and systems forms of action coordination. Her criticism that Habermas' liberalism is closed to a 'socialist' politics of difference where 'justice would require applying different standards to different people' (62) is less convincing because of its brevity. John Dryzek provides a helpful literature review of the impact of Habermas' work on concrete social scientific research in diverse domains, and explores the interesting possibility of using rational choice theory as a component of critical theory. Mark Warren clearly articulates the originality of Habermas' version of the radical democratic thesis that there is a reciprocal relation between democratic participation and autonomous self-realization. Warren suggests that, properly understood, Habermas' social psychology and model of discursive democracy ought to lead us to look to workplaces rather than new social movements for the possibility of productive, democratic transformation.

Habermas' 1985 engagement with poststructuralist thought has generated a great deal of heat, though perhaps little insight. Tracy Strong and Frank Sposito argue that 'Habermas, by not engaging in a critique of Kant, has avoided the confrontation of problems in his own thought' (296). Unfortunately, their article may only contribute to the bedazzlement by relying on highly idiosyncratic readings of Kant and Habermas. In his article, Romand Coles argues that Adorno, in foregrounding a responsible receptivity to others in their nonidentity, provides a more satisfying normative standpoint for critical theory than Habermas' discourse ethics. While Coles leaves the specific understanding of this responsibility undifferentiated, Axel Honneth's impressive treatment of the distinct forms such a claim would take should greatly contribute to the productive furtherance of the debate over discourse ethics and the ethics of care. He argues that Lyotard's call for sensitivity to ostracized language games and White's articulation of the virtue of respecting the concrete particularity of others both need to be
grounded within a universalistic frame of equal respect, while Derrida and Levinas' call for an asymmetrical, non-reciprocal ethics of care is in essential conflict with the formal equality presupposed by discourse ethics. Using the latters' analysis, Honneth shows how a full moral theory requires accounts of the perspectives of care and solidarity as counterpoints to the core moral notion of equal respect.

As the only Cambridge Companion dedicated to a living philosopher, this collection is limited by the continuing development and productivity of its subject. But with its select bibliography and straightforward, non-technical articles, this volume should provide a possible point of entry to the variety of English-language debates surrounding Habermas' theories of politics and morality.

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Ellen Meikins Wood

Democracy against Capitalism.


Pp. xii + 300.

US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47096-X);


Ellen Meikins Wood represents a growing voice within Marxism that is conscious of its competitors on the left and seeks to answer them. As a result, she, much like Marx, takes as her tasks a critical defense of historical materialism and a critique of other available oppositions to capitalism. These projects constitute the two parts of this book. Before she is through, she has presented a view of historical materialism that is contrasted both with the main trajectories of Western Marxism (of which she regards Althusser as the final example), and with Analytic Marxism (Cohen, Roemer). In addition, she engages critically with proponents of identity politics and civil society.

The book features essays published between 1981 and 1994 which have been combined and reconfigured so as to create a kind of hybrid work through which discernible arguments progress, but which still reads much like a collection of essays. The approaches in the two parts of the book differ somewhat. In the first, Wood develops her own views regarding historical materialism through detailed commentary on particular debates largely within British Marxism. Her reflections on democracy, post-modernism, identity politics and civil society are more wide ranging, though they suffer
somewhat from a lack of specificity with regard to who exactly her opponents are. Still, the arguments of both parts are stimulating and significant.

In the book’s first part, Wood develops an interpretation of historical materialism that emphasizes the specificity of capitalism. She argues that there is a ‘widespread tendency, almost universal in non-Marxist accounts of capitalist development and shared by some varieties of Marxism, to read capitalist principles and laws of motion back into all history and to explain the emergence of modern capitalism by assuming the very thing that needs to be explained’ (10). Within Marxism, Wood has in mind both the overly mechanical versions of historical materialism offered up by Stalinist orthodoxy and the more complex accounts given by Cohen and Althusser. All, according to Wood, presuppose a mistaken notion of rigid economic or technological determination, though for Althusser, this occurs only at the theoretical level. The rise of capitalism is explained through reference to this determination, when such determination is actually a characteristic of capitalism.

For Althusser and his adherents, ‘while a rigid determinism prevailed in the realm of social structure, it turned out that this realm belonged for all practical purposes to the sphere of pure theory, while the real, empirical world ... remained ... effectively contingent and irreducibly particular’ (50). According to Wood, by maintaining the bifurcation between absolute determination and absolute contingency, Althusser sets the stage for those who opt for the latter, criticize Marxism for the former, and move on variously to post-Marxism, and post-modernism.

With Cohen’s technological determinism comes the implication that ‘the object of socialism is to perfect the development of the productive forces’ (141). Wood disagrees, arguing instead that the important general trend in history for Marx is ‘the increasing separation of direct producers from the means of their own labor, subsistence, and reproduction.’ The specificity of capitalism is exhibited in its being the culmination of this tendency which, for Wood, suggests a different project for socialism: the reappropriation of the means of production by direct producers. This, in contrast to the project of perfecting productive forces, contains in it ‘the highest democratic aspirations.’

Democracy, accordingly, provides the pivotal theme of the book’s second half. Because the political sphere is separated from the economic under capitalism, ‘only in capitalism has it become possible to leave the property relations between capital and labor fundamentally intact while permitting the democratization of civic and political rights’ (202). Wood argues that in pre-capitalist formations, by contrast, acquiring political power meant increasing economic sovereignty. So, democracy has been expressly opposed by successive ruling classes. With the founding of the US, however, liberalism (a set of ideas designed to limit state power) became a substitute for democracy. According to Wood, this was part of what was essentially a counterrevolution: ‘The reconceptualization of democracy belongs, it might be said, to the new climate of political hypocrisy and duplicity’ (227).
For Wood, far too many social theorists of the left move within the orbit of this essentially liberal conceptual apparatus. For example, many theorists of civil society, she says, seem to have learned from liberalism about the dangers of state oppression, but seem to have forgotten the lessons taught by socialism regarding the oppressions of civil society. They employ a simple bifurcation between state and non-state, the latter including voluntary associations, churches, households, hospitals, and the whole of the capitalist economy, thereby focusing attention on the dangers of state oppression while attempting to celebrate difference and diversity. Wood argues, however, that from this perspective one is unable to see the totalizing power of capitalism. Consequently, a more formal democracy is defended in which class is, as such, invisible.

Similar problems plague the new social movements. While peace and ecological movements are truly anti-capitalist in the sense that capitalism cannot provide such goods, they cannot be real social forces because ‘they have no specific social identity’ (266). Issues of race and gender can, on the other hand, generate social forces, but they are not, according to Wood, essentially anti-capitalist. Since capitalism happily exploits all equally, formal equality is compatible with capitalism. For example, slavery took on a racial dimension in the late seventeenth century because only if slaves were less than human could they be denied equal status. Previously, slavery had simply been defended as useful, and was even thought by most Greeks (contra Aristotle) to be contrary to nature. Ultimately, though, capitalism can survive the end of slavery and the equality of the races. Likewise, she argues, capitalism actually tends to promote gender equality since the unit of exploitation is the individual, rather than the patriarchal family unit, as was the case in feudalism.

Ultimately, her’s is an argument, designed to call the left back to revitalized historical materialism and the importance of class politics. This is all the more important, she argues, in the context of a world economy in which advanced capitalist states, in order to compete with third world capitalisms, push the terms and conditions of work increasingly toward a third world standard. The right, she says, seems to have come to the realization that capitalism has limitations: profit and decent conditions of work may be incompatible. In a role reversal, it is the left, in defending the welfare state, that believes in capitalism’s adaptability. She hopes that socialism can come to serve as an alternative to ‘capitalism with a human face.’ Wood stakes out a strong and clear perspective here. It is an important one and should receive a wide hearing.

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