

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ROGER.A.SHINER@UALBERTA.CA

Andrew Light
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ANDREW.LIGHT@UALBERTA.CA

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8
E-Mail
R32740@ER.UQAM.CA

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
© 1996 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year

Volume XVI, No. 6
December • décembre 1996

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Linda Martin Alcoff, <i>Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory</i>	385
Stephen Maitzen	
Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington, David Hoyt, Michael Latham, and Allison Sneider eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	
Alison Assiter, <i>Enlightened Women: Modernist Feminism in a Postmodern Age</i>	389
Kevin M. Graham	
Zev Bechler, <i>Aristotle's Theory of Actuality</i>	392
David Bradshaw	
Andrew Dobson, <i>Jean-Paul Sartre and the Politics of Reason: a Theory of History</i>	394
Matthew Lee	
Robert J. Geis, <i>Personal Existence After Death</i>	396
Louis Marinoff	
Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, trans., <i>Plato: Parmenides</i>	398
Richard J. Ketchum	
Morwenna Griffiths, <i>Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity</i>	399
Majia Holmer Nadesan	
Ian Hacking, <i>Rewriting the Soul</i>	402
Andrew Brook	
Richard F. Hamilton, <i>The Social Misconstruction of Reality</i>	406
Robert Dow	
David W. Haslett, <i>Capitalism with Morality</i>	408
Lesley A. Jacobs	
Robert Hollinger and David Depew, eds., <i>Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism</i>	410
Matthew Stephens	
Terence Horgan and John Tienson, <i>Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology</i>	413
Robert J. Stainton	
Micheline R. Ishay, <i>Internationalism and its Betrayal</i>	414
Tibor Machan	
Jerrold Levinson, <i>The Pleasures of the Aesthetic</i>	416
Colin Lyas	
Lo Ch'in-Shun, <i>Knowledge Painfully Acquired. The 'K'un-chih chi' by Lo Ch'in-shun</i>	419
Steven J. Willett	

Timothy J. McGrew , <i>The Foundations of Knowledge</i>	421
Benjamin F. Armstrong	
F.C.T. Moore , <i>Bergson: Thinking Backwards</i>	424
Ronald M. Carrier	
Chris Nunn , <i>Awareness: What it is, What it does</i>	426
Thomas Bittner	
Joy A. Palmer and David E. Cooper eds. , <i>Just Environments: Intergenerational, International, and Interspecies Issues</i>	428
John Douglas Bishop	
Dennis Patterson , <i>Law and Truth</i>	431
Keith Culver	
Paul Redding , <i>Hegel's Hermeneutics</i>	433
David Sherman	
Alan D. Schrift , <i>Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism</i>	435
Lisa Phillips	
Richard Taylor <i>Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age</i>	437
Thomas D. Pearson	
Elizabeth Vallance , <i>Business Ethics at Work</i>	439
Ed Teall	
Nicholas Wolterstorff , <i>Divine Discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks.</i>	441
Andrew V. Jeffery	
Nicholas Wolterstorff , <i>John Locke and the Ethics of Belief</i>	444
Peter A. Schouls	

Linda Martín Alcoff

*Real Knowing: New Versions of the
Coherence Theory.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996.

Pp. x + 240.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-3947-X.

What can continental philosophers, particularly Gadamer and Foucault, teach Anglo-American analytic epistemologists about the coherence theory of knowledge? 'Plenty', Alcoff hopes to show. 'Practically nothing' is, however, the answer that emerges from her book.

Alcoff contends that the coherence theory has three advantages over its main competitor, foundationalism: its assumptions are closer to actual psychological and social facts about knowers; it explains how epistemic justification can depend on political and moral influences; and it accommodates the notion that truth inheres in, rather than transcends, human language. She also aims to encourage 'a dialogue between analytic and continental philosophy' (3) by showing how Gadamer, Foucault, and other continental figures can help solve three problems facing analytic versions of coherentism: (a) the difficulty of showing how the coherence of beliefs can contribute to the likelihood of their truth in a way that makes them epistemically justified; (b) coherentism's preoccupation with propositional knowledge over against the non-propositional knowledge embodied in social practices; and (c) the worry that striving for epistemic coherence is 'based on totalitarian impulses' (15). As Alcoff admits, only problem (a) has bothered analytic epistemologists, and so in discussing (b) and (c) it's not clear that she is still addressing an analytic audience.

Alcoff examines several positions familiar to analytic epistemologists: internalism and externalism about justification, coherentism about justification and about truth, global relativism, and global skepticism. Unfortunately, she shows signs of misunderstanding every one of those positions.

She misrepresents internalism when she suggests that only externalist theories require that justification be truth-conducive. 'If his is primarily an externalist theory ... then it is a theory which links justification to truth-conduciveness' (56), she says, as if internalist theories required no such link. No self-respecting internalist denies that justification must be truth-conducive; that's why coherentists recognize that problem (a) is a problem for them. She asserts that on 'an internalist account of justification ... for a belief to be justified a believer must be able to give an account of how the belief came to be justified' (92), a false assertion that ignores the crucial distinction her colleague William Alston has drawn between *having* a justification and being able to *give* one.

She misunderstands externalism when she implies that imposing a truth-condition on knowledge makes one an externalist: according to Alcoff, Michael Williams's contextualist theory 'has an externalist component' because 'Williams rejects the identification of knowledge with justified belief' (221),

a criterion that would make every analytic epistemologist on the planet an externalist. She classifies Foucault as an externalist 'precisely because Foucault relates justified beliefs not to the intentions of believing subjects but to the ways in which statements come to be labeled "true"' (133, emphasis added), in which case Foucault is an externalist of a stripe that few, if any, analytic externalists would recognize or welcome.

She also seems to misconstrue coherentism about justification and coherentism about truth, even while making them the focus of her book and even while arguing that the former gains plausibility when conjoined with the latter. For example, in her eagerness to portray Foucault as a coherentist of both kinds, she ends up claiming that 'even displacement and exclusion' count as relations of 'mutual support' among propositions or beliefs, 'in the sense that these disparate operations are grounded in specific forms of connection between elements' (128). But if a proposition and its negation can offer each other 'mutual support' simply in virtue of their specific connection (each logically excludes the other), then the notion of mutual support relied on by both kinds of coherentism has run amok: only logically independent propositions could fail to cohere. She contends that the coherence theory of truth enables coherentist epistemology to overcome problem (a), the problem of truth-conduciveness, but she never makes a persuasive case for that contention. Indeed, late in the book she concedes an important point without realizing how much trouble the concession makes for her: 'it confers little warrant on a justified belief to say that justification is conducive to truth if truth is simply defined in terms of justification' (196). Why isn't that claim equally true if we replace 'justification' with 'coherence'?

Global relativism, says Alcock, implies 'the all-encompassing suspension of belief' (180). It implies no such thing: the global relativist feels entitled to retain his beliefs because, on his view, they are as true as any beliefs get. She dismisses global skepticism, a position she calls 'arguably ... psychotic' (87): 'If radical skeptical doubts are generated without any specific reason, they cannot be addressed,' she asserts; 'to entertain skeptical doubts cannot improve our knowledge' (226). Both parts of her assertion are belied by an impressive recent literature in analytic epistemology that has addressed (if not resolved) such skeptical doubts and improved our understanding of knowledge.

Alcock's misreading of important positions will not inspire confidence on the part of the analytic epistemologists she hopes to convince. Neither will her frustratingly imprecise use of crucial terms. Without ever saying what she means by 'validity', for instance, she writes of the 'validity conditions for knowledge' (2); 'the validity conditions for justified belief' and 'the validity conditions for any serious speech act' (3); the 'valid' pronouncements of authorities (27); the validity of self-satisfaction (54), of ancient texts (54), and of the strands of a tradition (205); a 'criterion of validity for competing beliefs' (173); 'valid descriptions' (186); the 'relative validities' of beliefs (216); and 'skepticism's claim to validity' (223) — thus indulging in both vagueness and ambiguity, two concepts she conflates (173). Without ever explaining her

strange usage, she uses 'a priori' as a count noun (148), making the passage in which it occurs, like many others in the book, opaque.

Even in Alcoff's sympathetic treatment, Gadamer and Foucault don't look very relevant, and her conclusions about their value to analytic epistemology are surprisingly, but perhaps wisely, hedged (e.g., 114). Indeed, it's often hard to tell just where Alcoff herself comes down, since some of her pronouncements seem impossible to harmonize. She repeatedly endorses Gadamer's line that knowledge and truth are irreducibly linguistic (18, 36, 71, 73) but then says that 'belief ... in my view, need not be articulable in propositional or even linguistic form' (168). She never explains how knowledge depends on language even though belief apparently doesn't, but then much that needs explaining goes unexplained in this disappointing book.

Stephen Maitzen

Dalhousie University

**Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington,
David Hoyt, Michael Latham, and Allison
Sneider, eds.**

*Knowledge and Postmodernism in
Historical Perspective.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xi + 559.

Cdn\$97.95: US\$69.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91382-9);

Cdn\$38.95: US\$27.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91383-7).

This book explores over four hundred years of philosophical engagement with the nature of knowledge and attempts to place postmodern thinkers and thought in a historical perspective. The book presents key extracts from the works of thirty-one seminal authors, from Bacon to the contemporaries, with the idea that this selection will make clear to the reader not only what postmodernism is but also what it is not and what it is reacting to or against. Such a project is an obviously useful one and the book seems to be designed to appeal to undergraduate readers with a general interest in history or philosophy.

Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective consists of an introduction and a selection of pieces divided into five broadly chronological sections: *The scientific revolution and Enlightenment thought*; *Nineteenth-Century social theory*; *Challenges to Nineteenth-Century theory*; *Postmodernist thought*; and *Responding to Postmodernism*.

The opening chapter, written by the editors, serves as an introduction to the main themes of the book. The editors state that the book is intended as a documentary journey following 'the history of knowledge-production in the modern West' (2) and that much of the material is 'pointed towards postmodernism' (2). However, the introduction coupled with the introductions to each section and the brief biographies of each writer fail to fully bring anything more specific than a vague list of important benchmarks in the history of the philosophy of knowledge out. Nowhere are we presented with a full exposition of the thesis that the featured extracts, in the case of the first three sections, set the scene for postmodernism. This book is more a selection of, admittedly brilliant and central, revolutionary tracts than a clear and rigorous historical perspective on postmodernism. The breadth of the authors included leaves the reader with the analytically rather unhelpful thesis that every major philosophical attempt at coming to grips with the nature of knowledge is the context within which postmodernity must be located and analysed. Whilst this may well be true it does not help the general reader place postmodernism, or postmodernity, in the historical context of anything more precise than the last four hundred years of philosophical discourse. For example the section on nineteenth-century social theory lumps together writings by De Tocqueville, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber without the benefit of any underlying theme other than a presentation of their respective approaches to knowledge and the statement that '[t]hese writings remain some of the most profound and consequential statements on the problems engendered by modernity' (141). No mention is made, in the introduction to the section, of, for instance, the uses postmodern theorists have put Nietzsche to.

Due to the lack of a sufficiently delineated theme to judge the book by it is hard to tell if the pieces in the first three sections are indeed well chosen. Certainly the editors have compiled a collection of extracts that are of outstanding importance and immediate interest to any reader interested in the topic of knowledge. Appleby et. al. include such masterworks as Descartes *Discourse on Method*, Kant's *What is Enlightenment*, Marx's *Communist Manifesto* and *German Ideology*, Weber's *Protestant Ethic*, Geertz's *Thick Description*, Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, and Ricoeur's *Model of the Text*.

However, what we may expect to be the dominant section, the one on postmodern writers themselves, contains pieces from only five key authors — White, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty and West. Although the extracts here are certainly central to understanding postmodern attempts to redefine the nature of knowledge we might be left wondering where the likes of Lyotard, Jameson or Baudrillard are. The introduction of this section serves as a good chart of the general trends in postmodern thinking but fails to make certain essential distinctions that might help the reader better locate the texts. Principally, Appleby et. al. never spell out if it is a postmodern object or epoch — postmodernity — or a postmodern sensibility or 'attitude' they believe exists to be understood. On the one hand they talk of a 'collective present' and on the other talk of postmodernism as an attitude, a style or a narrative. In

short, they never fully differentiate or disambiguate exactly what sort of beast postmodernism is.

What is perhaps most helpful about the collection comes in the final section which addresses critical responses to and engagements with postmodernism. Here in a well chosen sample of critics of postmodernism — Harvey, Habermas, Calhoun and Benhabib — is to be found probably the best perspectives on historically locating postmodernism within the context of revolutionary approaches to the nature of knowledge. This section could have been strengthened by the addition of something of Callinicos' *Against Postmodernism*.

The book also would have benefited from a fuller bibliography and an index. It does, however, contain a useful glossary of terms that will help the 'uninitiated' reader.

In conclusion, *Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective* is a fat and absorbing volume that will allow readers to be stimulated by a collection of writings unusually broad in appeal. However, to succeed in presenting a coherent historiography of 'knowledge-production' its editors needed to have paid greater attention to issues of theme, structure and direction than they did.

Dominic Power

Wadham College, Oxford

Alison Assiter

*Enlightened Women: Modernist Feminism
in a Postmodern Age.*

London and New York: Routledge 1996.

Pp. x + 164.

Cdn\$63.00: US\$45.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-08338-9);

Cdn\$20.95: US\$14.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-08339-7).

Philosophers accustomed to understanding their inquiries as serving the Enlightenment ideals objectivity, rationality, and universality have been challenged in recent decades by postmodern critiques of modern philosophy. These critiques maintain that traditional conceptions of objectivity and rationality have not fulfilled their promise of protecting science and ethics from bias in favor of some social groups and against others. Instead, postmodern critics argue, these ideals have disguised how dominant social groups have shaped science and ethics to serve their ends and protect their power. These

critics have also pointed out how the pursuit of universal truths in the philosophy of human nature and the social sciences has often led to false generalizations about the essential characteristics of human beings based on characteristics peculiar to persons of a certain race, class, sex, or nationality. Enlightenment ideals explicitly intended to bring truth to light and to create greater freedom have thus tacitly served to create and reinforce oppressive social relations.

Postmodern critiques of the philosophical ideals of the Enlightenment have profoundly influenced recent feminist philosophy. Many feminist philosophers have become wary of any scientific or philosophical theory which claims to have achieved objectivity, rationality, or universality. This wariness has sometimes led feminist philosophers to hesitate even to appeal to these ideals as goals, to say nothing of claiming that their own theories embody these ideals. In *Enlightened Women*, Alison Assiter seeks to counteract this tendency. Assiter argues that the ideals of modern philosophy and science must not be abandoned wholesale. Rather, we must be more cautious in interpreting, appealing to, and applying these ideals than we have been heretofore.

The first half of *Enlightened Women* is a critical examination of the work of several thinkers who have strongly influenced the postmodern turn in feminist philosophy, including Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson in chapter one and Luce Irigaray in chapters two through four. Fraser and Nicholson have criticized various second-wave feminist theorists such as Shulamith Firestone, Nancy Chodorow, and the domestic labor theorists for making false claims about the nature and experiences of all women on the basis of hasty generalization from the characteristics and experiences of these theorists' white, middle-class, female contemporaries. Assiter responds to this critique by arguing that it applies to Chodorow only in a qualified way, and to Firestone and the domestic labor theorists not at all. Assiter concedes that there are significant problems with all of these theorists' work, but she denies that these problems stem from a misguided pursuit of the Enlightenment ideal of objectivity (23-8).

One of Assiter's main goals in her discussion of Irigaray's work is to determine to what extent her work requires the abandonment of Enlightenment conceptions of reference and subjectivity. She concludes (a) that Irigaray need not deny that reference plays *some* role in determining the meaning of statements in order to carry out her critique of phallocentrism (64-6), and (b) that Irigaray's deconstruction of the unified, transcendent, masculine subject need not preclude the possibility of conceiving of a non-transcendent subject-in-the-world (74-6). These arguments, together with Assiter's wide-ranging discussions of Continental philosophy of language (in chapter three) and Anglo-American philosophy of mind (in chapter four), open up the possibility that the subject and the referent may not be quite as dead and buried as they may currently seem.

The second half of *Enlightened Women* aims to chart out new vistas in epistemology (chapter five), moral philosophy (chapter six), and the philoso-

phy of human nature (chapters seven and eight) which feminist philosophers will be free to explore once the force of the postmodern challenge has been blunted. Building on the somewhat shaky foundation of Alisdair MacIntyre's ideal of the Greek *polis* as an exclusive moral community, Assiter challenges the dominance of individualism in epistemology by developing a conception of a community based on shared beliefs and values as the agent of inquiry and knowledge (79-83). She envisions such communities pursuing an epistemic ideal of strong objectivity similar to that developed by Sandra Harding. Assiter seeks, however, to relieve some of the tension implicit in Harding's conception by maintaining that a community can increase its objectivity by adopting beliefs and values more conducive to the greater emancipation of a greater number of persons without actually sharing the experiences of those persons whom their knowledge is meant to liberate (85-91).

In chapter six, Assiter develops a strong theme in recent feminist moral philosophy by trying to revitalize the Enlightenment ideal of rationality in ethics. She seeks to avoid the austere detachment of the Kantian conception of reason by incorporating emotion into an enriched conception of rationality as the ability to act so as to realize the potentialities implicit in human nature (103). Finally, in chapters seven and eight Assiter defends the possibility of developing a minimal biological conception of sexual identity which could identify features universally shared by all women and all men while avoiding the essentialist trap of falsely generalizing from one small, race- and class-specific group of women or men to the entire sex.

Assiter's detailed examinations of the writings of some of the leading proponents of the postmodern turn in feminist philosophy are a welcome contribution to the ongoing debate over the merits and drawbacks of that theoretical development. Moreover, her insightful discussions of the roles that reworked ideals of objectivity and rationality can play in epistemology and ethics are substantial contributions to those fields. Occasionally the reader may feel let down when Assiter glosses over a crucial point in a discussion by offering only a suggestion or a sketch of an argument in place of a thorough examination of the thorny philosophical issues at hand. Her defense of a realist conception of meaning in chapter three, for instance, seems to rest on four two- or three-sentence arguments described, but not examined in detail, in a single paragraph (59). Assiter has, nevertheless, done much to clarify the philosophical problems which beset the recent alliance between feminism and postmodernism. *Enlightened Women* is well worth reading for that reason alone.

Kevin M. Graham
Creighton University

Zev Bechler

Aristotle's Theory of Actuality.

Albany: SUNY Press 1995.

Pp. xi + 270.

US\$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2239-9);

US\$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2240-2).

Despite its title, this book is not a systematic study of Aristotle's theory of actuality. It is an attempt to recast our understanding of Aristotle's entire metaphysics, including not only the potency/act distinction but a wide variety of topics ranging all the way from the theory of four causes to Aristotle's natural theology and philosophy of mathematics. A reinterpretation of the potency/act distinction plays an important role in this project, as I shall explain, but its central premise is an idiosyncratic — and highly dubious — understanding of form. I will first explain this premise and then summarize what the book claims to follow from it.

According to Bechler, matter and form are no more than 'aspects' of the material entity in which they are found. As he explains early in the book, 'it is rather obvious that matter is not an entity dwelling "inside" or "within" any natural object, like marbles in a matchbox. Rather, the matter of such an object is the whole of this object seen in a certain manner. But if this is accepted, then the same must be true for the case of form, since it is the logically correlate [*sic*] concept, the whole of the object seen in a complementary manner. In this sense it must be concluded that the object, its matter, and its form are one and the same identical thing, "differently said" ' (3). Bechler applies this premise in an exceptionally literal-minded way. Thus one is startled to find, still quite early in the book, that he paraphrases Aristotle's definition of soul by the phrase 'the "first actuality" of the form of a body that is potentially alive' (7). Where did the words of *the form* come from? The answer seems to be that, for Bechler, since the form and the body are the same thing 'differently said', where Aristotle speaks of the body we can substitute the form of the body; the difference between them is negligible.

Clearly such a procedure will make nonsense of Aristotle's philosophy. And nonsense is precisely what one finds as one delves into the book. Bechler holds that since forms, essences, and natures are no more than aspects of the material entity in which they are found, any explanation in terms of them must be non-informative, a mere attempt to 'excite in us the proper mental reaction' (3) — meaning a feeling of satisfaction — rather than to identify actual causal principles. In particular, the vaunted Aristotelian *dunamis* is really just a particular type of condition revealed by analysis to be present prior to a given instance of change. It comes in two types. One, which Bechler calls 'nongenuine' potential, is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the change in question, and is therefore causally inefficacious. Worse than that, it is non-existent, for since it is a potency for contraries it is really two potencies, the joint presence of which

would violate the law of non-contradiction. About potencies of this type Bechler comes to the remarkable conclusion that 'Aristotle, fully agreeing [with the Megarians] as to their fictive, self-contradictory nature and hence as to their nonreality, nevertheless viewed them as necessary for our explanation of change' (27). The best analogy I can think of is how one might cite one's horoscope to explain a particularly bad day; one knows the explanation is absurd, but uses it anyway to achieve a certain mental satisfaction. According to Bechler, most of Aristotle's explanations are of this type.

The other variety of *dunamis* is 'genuine' potential. This is a condition whose presence is logically entailed by the occurrence of the change. It is therefore sufficient rather than merely necessary for the change, and so can be deemed causally efficacious. There is a fallacy here — the fact that A entails B does not make B a sufficient condition for A — but let us leave that aside. The truly bizarre claim is that, although these potentials are 'genuine', they too do not exist. Again it will be best to quote Bechler's own words: 'Since when all the necessary conditions exist the potentiality must actualize at once, this demand entails the disappearance of the genuine potentiality at the moment of its creation; that is to say, it entails its nonexistence for any time point. Consequently, genuine potentiality cannot possibly exist for any finite interval of time' (18). Bechler goes on to add that the genuine potential is identical with the ensuing actuality, although how this can be when it does not persist through time and the actuality does so persist, he does not explain. The main point is that 'genuine' potentials, like the nongenuine, are not real causal principles. An explanation couched in terms of them must therefore be vacuous.

It is unclear whether Bechler thinks that Aristotle knew he was giving uninformative explanations and somehow neglected to say so, or thinks that Aristotle believed that his explanations were informative although they were not. At first he seems to endorse the former view, crediting Aristotle with 'anti-informationism', the theory that a satisfactory explanation need not convey any information (3-4). As the book progresses, however, he has to chide Aristotle so often for failing to comprehend his own theories that on balance I would favor the latter interpretation. Still, the former is the more interesting. It makes Aristotle into a therapist concerned to rid us of the discomfort that comes from wanting informative explanations that we do not (and presumably cannot) have. Since his way of doing so is to provide explanations that seem to be informative and are not, he is also something of a con artist. On the latter view he is a philosopher of the traditional sort, although one of truly monumental incompetence.

Neither view is very flattering to Aristotle, and I am confident that neither will gain many adherents. The book as a whole is so poorly argued — so arbitrary in its assumptions, so full of obscurities and fallacies, and so implausible in its conclusions — that I would be surprised if a single reader who knows much of Aristotle were to find it convincing. In Bechler's favor, it must be said that the book is meticulously researched; the bibliography runs to

twenty-eight pages. How someone could read so much and understand so little is beyond me.

David Bradshaw

Indiana University Northwest

Andrew Dobson

*Jean-Paul Sartre and the politics of reason:
a theory of history.*

Cambridge University Press 1993.

Pp. xii + 195.

US\$54.95. ISBN 0-521-43449-1.

The book is divided into two parts. The first takes us on a tour, first historical and then increasingly textual, of Sartre's movement from *Being and Nothingness* (BN) towards the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (CDR). Initially it touches upon the lack of a direct Hegelian influence within Sartre's earlier work, in order to attempt to locate the beginnings of the role of method for Sartre within the 'coming to phenomenology' that is expressed in BN. The move from BN to CDR is, however, the focus of Dobson's attention and, moreover, a focus which he wants to make his own through a reading that prioritises the political behind or beyond or beneath the philosophical. In the second part of the book Dobson centres on Sartre's biographies, as a form of case study for the interpretation he is giving in Part one. The central thrust of Dobson's argument is that Sartre attempts to re-insert the individual into the totalising framework of Marxist theory and re-invigorate this theory in the process (150) but that the drive to do this arises on the basis of political and social involvement. In his concluding remarks, for examples, Dobson states (187) that 'Sartre was led to the theories of Marx and Hegel by his desire for useful action in the radical stream of French politics' and we undoubtedly see Sartre through the eyes of a political theorist in this work.

As a good rough guide Dobson's account is stimulating and quick moving and so provides us with a context often lost in discussions simply of the philosophical import of Sartre's work. Having said this, Dobson is attempting to stake out a position which locates a radical break from what might be crudely defined as an early idealist Sartre to a later materialist one, and here I found his arguments only partly convincing. On a political level the account he sketches is one that is clear and forces the role of Sartre's life during the Second World War into our minds. The philosophical themes Sartre pursues, however, are less clearly marked by Dobson as partaking of a radical break

between the early and late works. In particular the notion of projects that plays such a key role in the temporal structures of Sartre's philosophy is used in a way that suggests possible problems.

Dobson's argument is, all too briefly, that for the early Sartre of the BN era, the role of the concept of projects is idealistic. The interpretation begins in the pre-war works preceding BN where Sartre's theme is 'the rescue of consciousness from being just another thing in the world' (23) which develops into the dualistic ontology of the *en-soi* and *pour-soi*. Dobson develops the problematic of thought and action on the basis of this ontology and interprets Sartre's freedom through this approach, to investigate Sartre's notion of 'freedom's facticity' (27). Here Dobson argues that Sartre establishes 'freedom [as] originally a relation to the given' (27). With this relational notion of freedom the concept of projects takes on an idealistic tinge. 'In this context a rock will only appear unclimbable if my project is to climb it. Because that project is freely constituted, I can reassert my freedom by changing the project and, for instance, seeing the rock as a beautiful piece of scenery' (27-8). Dobson suggests that thus 'for the Sartre of 1943 ... freedom lies in the ability to redefine projects — providing for successful conclusions to these projects is irrelevant' (29) and goes on to conclude that 'as a theory of political freedom this is clearly inadequate'.

The idealistic role of the concept of projects in the early Sartre of BN shifts as we move to the later Sartre. The dualistic ontology and the phenomenological method of BN are replaced by a materialist ontology and the dialectic of the progressive-regressive method outlined in the work *Search for a Method* (SM). The comprehension of the connection between the regressive and progressive aspects of Sartre's method centres on the role of projects. 'If we are not merely the products of material circumstances, then how are we to understand the means by which we go beyond them in order to make history? At this point Sartre introduces a familiar notion — that of the project: "Only the project, as a mediation between two moments of objectivity, can account for history; that is, for human *creativity*". The project affirms that we are not mere things, pitched and tossed between sets of material circumstances, but rather creative beings whose character is one of "going beyond" ' (158). Yet this notion of projects is also identified by Dobson not as mediation but as one side of the mediated — 'defining the project of the subject *constitutes* (my emphasis) the *progressive* aspect of Sartre's method' (159) and some confusion as to quite how this concept can play a negative role in the ontology of BN and a positive role in the later materialistic and dialectical Sartre is unclear. Aside from noting the complexification of the concept of projects in the later Sartre (158) Dobson fails to note the peculiar duality this concept plays in his interpretation, both between the early and later Sartre and in the later Sartre between mediation and mediated.

Dobson's arguments and interpretation of Sartre touch on a key problem in historical, political and philosophical arguments, one that connects to a myriad of themes from philosophy, politics and the study of history; the problem of the *subject* of study. This theme re-appears throughout Dobson's

book, in terms of 'the relationship between thought and action' (24), analytic as against dialectical reason (Chapter 4 *passim*), the group and the individual (Chapter 5, *passim*), 'the nature of necessity' (103), of 'preserving particularity' (122), and of 'the Hegelian dialectic of being and knowing' (151). Dobson wants to attempt a placing of Sartre within certain ongoing debates around these questions and others. As such it is to be expected that it sails in busy waters, traversing disciplines that will each want it to emphasise either this side or that a little more or a little less. In so doing it charts an interesting argument from within one of these disciplines that will perhaps encourage inter-disciplinary study of a plainly inter-disciplinary thinker.

Matthew Lee

University of Sussex

Robert J. Geis

Personal Existence After Death.

Toronto: Scholarly Book Services (for Sherwood Sugden & Company) 1995. Pp. 130.

Cdn\$15.45. ISBN 0-89385-044-6.

This book is not, as its title perhaps suggests, a work of theological speculation. The subtitle, 'Reductionist Circularities and the Evidence', more aptly reveals its focus. Geis carefully weighs current evidence for physicalist reductions of mind to brain, and argues with force and clarity that said evidence does not warrant a reductionist verdict. He also ventures and supports stronger claims about irreducibility of mind to brain, and immateriality of personhood itself. Geis judiciously addresses a comprehensive sweep of issues in a concise book that is really a longish essay, and which may be read as a response to Churchland's eliminative materialism. Geis's thesis, by contrast, is one of inclusive dualism.

Geis aims to show 'that if the materialist account of consciousness were correct, consciousness could not take place' (15). He further argues that 'Consciousness is immaterial; The immaterial is indestructible; Therefore, consciousness is [indestructible]' (17). Geis's interest lies neither with ontological issues pervading dualism, nor with vexed questions of causal mediation between incommensurable dualistic domains. Geis simply defends the necessity of immaterialism on the heels of glaring inadequacies of materialism's account of phenomena at hand.

After stating the general case for his skepticism, and following some cogent remarks on what constitutes evidence and certainty respectively, Geis

sets forth his main arguments in five subsequent sections: 'The argument from concept formation' (21-37), 'The argument from memory' (39-57), 'The argument from consciousness' (59-96), 'The near-death out-of-body-experience' (97-110), and 'Other theories' (111-23). The first of these sections is possibly the least persuasive. It reiterates noteworthy philosophical positions of Plato, Aquinas, and Berkeley on the immateriality of concepts, and points out flaws in Hume's and Kant's objections thereto. This section is historically useful but could fall prey to accusations of 'folk philosophy', in which the term 'concept' — like 'phlogiston' — might turn out to be ill-conceived, and give way to some sounder account. In the second section, Geis raises serious objections to three contenders for the physicalist title of memory: trace-theory, the molecular (RNA) hypothesis, and the holographic model. Geis points out severe flaws that compromise each of these putative explanations. In the third section, Geis takes on the Churchlands, Dennett and the strong AI thesis. By artfully exposing circularities entailed by the materialist position, he places insurmountable hurdles before the proposition that electro-chemical events in the brain both cause and fully explain awareness. In the fourth section, Geis undertakes a sober discussion of near-death and out-of-body experiences which — in the face of reliably mounting evidence — admit of other-than-materialistic interpretation. In the concluding section, he briefly (and too superficially) treats reincarnation and parapsychology. But his valuable work in this section consists in a telling critique of Patricia Churchland, in which he demolishes a pillar of eliminative materialism via an astutely-handled argument from property dualism.

Geis's book is well-conceived and well-written. I recommend it unhesitatingly to anyone seeking concise yet robust arguments that refresh skepticism about avowed reductions of mind to brain. While Geis does not exactly demonstrate personal existence after death, he amply defends immaterial consciousness after neurophilosophy.

Louis Marinoff

The City College

The City University of New York

Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, trans.

Plato: Parmenides.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1996. Pp. vii + 175.

US\$32.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-329-8);

US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-328-X).

A short preface by M.L. Gill is followed by her long, 109-page, introduction the purpose of which is to assist the reader in understanding the difficult dialogue. A seven-page bibliography, is followed by an outline of the deductions. The book concludes with the translation. There is no index. The table of contents, however, is quite detailed and helps in finding where in the introduction a given passage is discussed.

The introduction is not intended to be an original contribution to scholarship on the *Parmenides*. Controversial claims are made without support. Gill directs us to discussions of controversial passages without becoming involved herself. The arguments against the theory of Forms are strong if not conclusive arguments. '[T]he puzzles in Part I ... should at least have convinced us that we have no accurate insight into what forms are like' (53). The arguments 'display a progression' which must be recognized to appreciate the force of the final argument. This argument assumes that there is no relation between physical objects and forms and the assumption is justified by the fact that the preceding arguments have shown Socrates to be incapable of explaining, 'how participation works' (46).

The errors in the deductions of Part II are probably deliberate. Their purpose is to provide us with material to practice spotting mistakes. Their subject matter are entities we can reason about but are not Platonic forms. There is 'one main issue which drives the deductions,' the assumption that the one can't be both one and many. Though it is the primary aim of the introduction to display how the deductions 'build upon one another' (65), I was unable to find such a display.

The main problem with the introduction is that too frequently the obscure is explained by the more obscure. For example, Gill thinks Socrates could have explained participation far more easily if he had been able to invoke Aristotle's concept of the universal (27). Then he would have been able to claim that forms are universals whose very nature it is to be present in many places at the same time.

Again, Gill tells us on several occasions that the theory of forms was developed to explain how sensible objects could have opposite properties (13, 17, 18, 22). Gill not surprisingly proceeds to grant that the theory does a very poor job of accomplishing the feat (15). But we have little reason to suppose that Plato thought that the theory of forms is needed to explain the presence of opposites and even less to think that he developed the theory for this purpose. Indeed an explanation of why a man is both one and many, a fact that is 'nothing astonishing but just what all of us would agree to,' is offered in the *Parmenides* (128a-d) as common sense. While it is true that forms are

mentioned here, they play no explanatory role. According to Gill, Plato would be astonished to find that the one is also many because then forms would have opposite properties and be an example of the problem they were supposed to solve (18). It is more likely that Plato thought of a discussion of forms as a discussion of what it is to be this or that and that to be, e.g., just, is in no sense to be unjust; nothing *qua* just is unjust.

Again, Gill acquits Plato of equivocation by pointing out that the verb 'to be' when no completion follows may be understood as 'is something or other' instead of 'exists', (70-1). She concludes: 'So Pegasus is, since we can describe him. There is no harm in translating "is" in this context as "exist", as long as we recognize that many more things exist for Plato than exist for us' (71). If we read this straight, Gill thinks we can avoid accusing Plato of equivocation by saddling him with the rather strange view that Pegasus exists.

The translation is quite good. Where decisions had to be made between a more literal or more readable translation the decision is usually in favor of the literal translation (exceptions occur at 127e and 134a). The desire for literalness on occasion leads to a translation which is ungrammatical. Perhaps speaking of 'a form, itself by itself, of just and beautiful ...' (30) does not jar too badly, but I see no excuse for the translation 'and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is?' (128) when 'that which is unlike' is available.

I recommend the translation highly. The introduction is at times thought provoking but it helps little in identifying and explaining genuine philosophical issues raised in the *Parmenides*.

Richard J. Ketchum

New Mexico State University

Morwenna Griffiths

Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity.

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. iv + 191.

Cdn\$69.95: US\$49.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-09820-3);

Cdn\$23.95: US\$16.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-09821-1).

Morwenna Griffiths' book, *Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity* is a compelling exploration of the social, political and personal processes involved in the constitution of individual identity. Griffiths is particularly interested in how social patterns of inclusion and exclusion affect individuals' sense of self and their relations with others. The book's strengths are derived from Griffiths' reflexivity and her innovative synthesis of Anglo-Saxon philosophy,

feminist philosophy and biographical experience. Conversely, its weakness stems from Griffiths' tendency to over-simplify theoretical arguments in her efforts to 'redraw the boundaries of mainstream philosophy' (5) by 'learning from experience' (11).

Griffiths divides her book into three sections, 'Learning from Experience', 'Constructing Ourselves' and 'Changing Ourselves'. In the first section, 'Learning from Experience', Griffiths develops a 'reflexive' epistemology that informs her critique and re-construction of mainstream accounts of identity formation. Arguing that most philosophical abstractions of identity are drawn from the experiences of western males, Griffiths draws upon feminist philosophy to justify use of auto/biographical material in her epistemology. Accordingly, she claims that a reflexive epistemology must incorporate heterogeneous experiences since knowledge always bears the marks of its producers. Moreover, it must be sensitive to the role of power relations as they affect those experiences. Finally, it must be viewed as a 'communal endeavor in which dialogue' is used to reflect on and re-think experience and perspectives and, concomitantly, it must give up desire for a 'stable, unchanging state of knowledge' (70). Griffiths claims that the recursive use of auto/biographical material to evaluate theory and, conversely, the use of theory to evaluate auto/biographical material, satisfy these epistemological conditions. Throughout the book, Griffiths uses this 'critical autobiographical' epistemology to reconsider how emotion, rationality, autonomy and authenticity are implicated in the social relations that predicate identity formation.

Griffiths is very sensitive to the difficulties associated with her epistemology. She reflects on the problems of understanding others, selecting who to listen to among others, and upon issues of translation and cultural tourism. One way that Griffiths addresses these difficulties is through her account of language. Griffiths argues that language is not a transparent description of experience because it is always/already revisable. Therefore, all accounts of experience are interpretations based on individuals' emergent systems of relevances. Since individuals who speak different languages (or dialects) may in fact share overlapping systems of relevance, it is possible for some level of understanding — some commonality of interpretation — to be achieved across 'tongues'.

In Part II, 'Constructing Ourselves', Griffiths uses her critical auto/biographical epistemology to theorize the constitution of self-identity. Griffiths begins her argument for a 'fragmented' view of the self by exploring relations of belonging to, and acceptance and rejection by, socio-linguistic communities. Fragmentation occurs because each individual is affected by an infinite number of inclusions and exclusions. Using auto/biographical material, Griffiths demonstrates how multiple relations ensure the revisability of personal experience as individuals encounter new ways of being and relatedly, experiment with new ways of articulating their identities.

Griffiths' move to found identity in relations of acceptance and rejection opens up her discussion of emotions and rationality, self-esteem and autonomy. In Chapter Six, Griffiths critiques mainstream views of rationality that

privilege the language and experiences of white, western men. In Chapter 7, she argues that this same group has monopolized the ways self-esteem is articulated in mainstream social and political theory. Griffiths rejoins that politically imbued social relationships, not individual achievement, are the primary source of self-esteem. Finally, in Chapter 8, Griffiths demonstrates how the relations of inclusion among, and socio-linguistic relevances of, white western men have affected mainstream perceptions of personal and political autonomy. She dismantles the public-private distinction in favor of a view of autonomy in which the individual's freedom to make him/herself is always coupled with recognition that being with others does not necessarily curb personal expression.

In Part III, 'Changing Ourselves', Griffiths completes her account of self-constitution by explaining how the relationship between language and experience — rooted in the fragmented self's relations of inclusion and exclusion — explains and promotes social change. Accordingly, in Chapter 9, Griffiths describes how communication among individuals enables development of new understandings 'melting' fixed, or 'frozen' (162) linguistic symbols and re-defining institutionalized rules of conduct which map a cultural geography of public-political spaces. In Chapter 10, Griffiths concludes that individual agency must be conceptualized within the dialectic of the individual's relational histories and his or her emergent communicative transactions with others. Authenticity, therefore, does not reside in the self's commitment to an essential or transparent core but resides in a reflexive process of coming to know and accept social polysemy both within the self and between selves.

Overall, Griffiths' analysis and her creative use of biographical material offer a fresh and insightful approach to individual identity formation. Her recursive use of theory and biographical texts to critique and reconstruct mainstream philosophical accounts of self-esteem, autonomy and authenticity is particularly innovative. Significantly, Griffiths manages to avoid exploiting the biographical material upon which she draws through her sensitivity to issues of translation and cultural tourism. However, the breadth of Griffiths' text costs her in terms of its depth. Her efforts to incorporate multiple voices and to make her text accessible through the use of concrete language limit her ability to discuss the theories she cites and critiques. This leads to a glossiness in the text. For instance, she makes a blanket claim that post-structuralists fail to adequately theorize agency but then approvingly references feminist post-structuralist theorists. This glossiness particularly problematizes her discussion of communication in Chapter 9 where her description of the relationship between language and experience suggests an unresolved dualism. While Griffiths strives to establish a dialectic relationship between the two, her contention that language 'constrains' experience (158) implies that the latter precedes the former. Further, her metaphor of language as a series of 'concentric circles' — each with a 'pure' center — connotes a form of linguistic essentialism that contradicts her efforts to blur the boundaries across 'tongues' (163-4). However, these difficulties appear to be largely a function of her stylistic choice and do not undermine her overall

contribution to our understanding of identity formation. In sum, Griffiths' text is definitely worth a read.

Majia Holmer Nadesan

(*Communication Studies*)

Arizona State University, West Campus

Ian Hacking

Rewriting the Soul.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1995. Pp. 336.

US\$24.95. ISBN 0-691-03642-X

Rewriting the Soul is a fascinating book but also an exasperating one, certainly for anyone sympathetic to realism about the psychological. It is about Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), what used to be called Multiple Personality Disorder before the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, 4th edition (DSM IV), made the new name (and a new conception) canonical in 1994. But it is about DID as an example of something bigger, namely, 'attempts to scientize the soul through the study of memory' (6). Hacking addresses these issues using Foucaultian archaeology — 'I want to know how [the] configuration of ideas [that make up our contemporary conception of DID] came into being, and how it has made and moulded our life, our customs, our science' (16). He has clear views about what the archaeology will reveal — DID is a small but revealing product of memory having 'become a surrogate for the soul' (260); 'multiple personality is a paradigmatic, if tiny, memory-concept' (3).

The book has four parts. The first two chapters introduce DID and open the issue of its reality. Next Hacking takes an extended look at the dissociation movement that has sprung up in the past twenty years. In the third part, Hacking does the archaeology, locating the roots of the movement in developments in Europe in a very narrow span of years, 1874 to 1886. The final part draws out implications, for the politics of memory, philosophy of mind, and other things.

Foucaultian archaeology always generates a tension. What is that status of the objects of knowledge such as multiple identities and recovered memories that a new 'science' makes possible? What is the reality of these new entities, in one or another of the uses of that protean term? The new objects are creations of the new knowledge structures; but pure creations, or also in part discoveries? Hacking carefully isolates questions of genesis from questions of reality: 'The fact that a certain type of mental illness appears only in specific historical or geographic [or, he could have added, conceptual — JAB]

contexts does not imply that it is manufactured, artificial, or in any other way not real' (12). He picks his way through the minefield of reality concerns with care (Ch. 1). Nevertheless, there may be more to the 'soul' and therefore to the pathologies of the soul such as DID than Hacking admits, even allowing for the social context in which the relevant concepts came into being. Moreover, virtually nobody conceives of DID as merely a 'pathology of memory'.

In a prototypical case of DID, we find:

1. More than one personality, each with unified consciousness and unified focus on self and world.
2. The personalities appear either *seriatim* or together (*co-consciousness*); the former is more common.
3. The multiple personalities lack either (a) memory 'from the inside' of one another (*seriatim*) or (b) introspective access to one another (*co-consciousness*).
4. The personalities have different identities (in the psychological not the philosophical sense of 'identity').

However DID originally came to be articulated as a separate condition, is it in fact real? We don't ask if measles is real. What gives rise to this very question about DID is that DID is both culture- and time-specific, appearing with any frequency only twice in history, in Europe in the late 19th century and in North America and Holland in the last two decades. Second, DID is linked to hot social issues such as childhood sexual abuse of girls, and a politically potent movement has grown up around it. Third, DID is very gender-specific. Adolescent-onset schizophrenia is gender-biased — it afflicts many more young men than young women — but to nothing like the extent to which DID is (however, anorexia and bulimia are gender-specific, too).

When we ask, Is it real?, what are we asking? Hacking is right that this question can be taken in a number of ways. Ignoring the complications, I will take it this way: In patients diagnosed as DID, or at least in enough of them, is there a condition that has the features 1) through 4) above, or enough of them? Note: so far as this question is concerned, it does not matter how DID arises. It could be iatrogenic (a product of the treatment), caused by early childhood trauma, induced hypnotically, a way we can learn to structure distress, or whatever, and still be perfectly real, a real split in the patient's cognitive/affective system(s).

Hacking's attitude to this reality question is not easy to determine. He does say that DID is not usually iatrogenic (12) and that 'multiples are real' (148). Yes, but real what's? He tells us at the start of the book that one of his aims in the book is to make us disinclined to ask exactly the original reality question (16), but he never returns to this idea (others of his works do). Instead, he offers us ideas such as the following: (1) DID is a way of acting; in place of mood swings, the notion gives women in distress something more specific to do: they can switch alters, etc. (236). (2) DID is a story, and a good one: 'Multiple personality provides the best available narrative frame for

recovered memory' (256). (3) DID is a self-misdescription: someone who believes she has DID is 'not a person with self-knowledge, but a person who ... [has] a glib patter that simulates an understanding of herself' (266; to be fair, it is not clear that Hacking is speaking in his own voice here). As he puts it in a passage aimed against Humphrey's and Dennett's idea that DID cases are experiments of nature from which much can be learned ('Speaking for ourselves', *Raritan* 9 [1989] 68-98):

It is not as if nature produces for us adults on desert islands who [manifest the symptoms of DID]. The events involve a patient who is in therapy, often for several years, and who comes to say the things she says. The experiment is so strongly controlled that if she does not say these things, she may even be released [in an earlier version, Hacking had, "she will commonly be released"] from therapy for being too resistant, for denial. Is ... prototypical multiple behaviour one of nature's experiments? Or is it rather the way in which a certain class of adults in North America will behave when treated by [certain] therapists? (227)

These passages together leave little doubt where Hacking stands on the traditional reality question.

Now, Hacking is by no means suspicious or blasé about the reality of human suffering: about child abuse, for example, he says that 'it is a real evil and was so before the concept was constructed' (68). He insists, however, that '[the concept] was nevertheless constructed' (68). It is good to take a long, cool look at the concepts and practices within which we shape and express suffering. Moreover, ways of acting, narratives, and glib self-misdescriptions are all real things. But they are not the kind of thing that people have in mind when they say that DID is real. So is Hacking missing something?

Yes. In many cases of DID, there are well-individuated personalities that really do lack introspective access and/or memory access 'from the inside' to the contents of other well-individuated personalities in the same body. How this comes about, how stable these configurations are, how deeply they penetrate into other aspects of affect and cognition, how early they appear, how easy they are to induce, whether they can be self-induced — all these are open questions. But whether features of the right kind exist is not.

Compare other, similar dissociations. Though also often psychically induced, trances, post-hypnotic suggestions, blackouts and other amnesias, and depersonalization episodes all involve genuine alterations to consciousness and the representational system. If them, why not DID? (These other forms of dissociation also exist in many cultures and times and preexist 19th century interest in memory by centuries.)

Or compare commissurotomy (brain bisection) patients. In commissurotomy patients in laboratory conditions, a genuine split in consciousness can be induced, with genuine failure of reciprocal introspective access. Again, if here, why not in DID patients? Not all cases diagnosed as DID will be genuine, of course, and there will be a whole host of cases between genuine split-

ting and amnesia at one end and mere acting out at the other; but there are borderline cases of all disorders.

To head off a possible misunderstanding, let me say that I need not and do not disagree with Hacking that DID is to a considerable extent an 'historically constituted illness' (12), certainly in its current manifestations. I just think that historical constitution is compatible with changes that go a lot deeper in consciousness and cognition than Hacking wants to allow.

Even if DID is a real split in consciousness and cognition, it will only be as real as consciousness and cognition are real. And about this latter, there is now considerable disagreement. Think of the wildly differing accounts of Fodor, the Churchlands, Dennett, the Wittgensteinians, and Searle. I suspect that Hacking's elusiveness about the reality of DID reflects deep views about the bigger question.

I turn now, more briefly, to three of Hacking's major claims about memory. (1) The sciences of memory first appeared between 1874 and 1886. (2) Memory thus conceived became a 'surrogate for the soul'. (3) DID is one manifestation of this substitution. I think that questions can be raised about each of them.

Re (1), Hacking shows that there was an enormous upsurge of interest in memory starting about 1875, especially in France, but it is not clear that the sciences of memory came into existence then. The idea of a neuroscience of memory, for example, goes back a lot further than 1874, as, in one form or another, does the psychological study of memory. Even interest in pathologies of memory goes back at least as far as Locke, Hume and Schopenhauer (and Plato?).

Re (2), has memory become a surrogate for the soul in contemporary articulations or treatment of psychopathology? By no means always. Consider just one example, childhood sexual abuse. Children are thought to induce forgetting as a defense against the abuse sometimes, but they also thought to develop borderline disorders, malignant narcissism, anxiety disorders, and a whole host of other problems in which memory plays no special role.

Re (3), is DID always conceptualized as a pathology of memory? Again no. First, serial amnesia is not even a feature of all cases of DID; it is not a feature of the co-conscious variety. Second, even where amnesia is a prominent feature, it is never the whole story. There is also the distinct personalities.

If DID is not a pathology of memory, what is it? It is a pathology of consciousness, specifically of consciousness of self. DID is a split or splits in unified consciousness of self at a time and over time. Nor is DID the only such pathology of consciousness; there are the other dissociations mentioned earlier and there is Greta and Freda, the (biologically) identical twins who act as though there is one mind in the two bodies (Hacking and Humphrey and Dennett both discuss her/them).

In sum, Hacking has written a book that engages the reader. But his major claims are much more controversial than he acknowledges.

Andrew Brook
Carleton University

Richard F. Hamilton

The Social Misconstruction of Reality.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1996.

Pp. xiii + 289.

US\$32.50. ISBN 0-300-06345-8.

'Misconstruction' implies that constructions can be mistaken rather than, as some postmodernists assert, merely different. To prove the point, Hamilton summarily debunks popular myths regarding Columbus' first proof of geosphericity, Mozart's ultimate poverty and neglect, and Wellington's high regard for Eton's playing fields (ch. 1 and 2). Hamilton then examines three more complex cases in greater depth: Max Weber's claim that protestantism was mainly responsible for the rise of capitalism (ch. 3); the thesis that Hitler's electoral support derived primarily from the lower-middle-classes (ch. 4-5); and Michel Foucault's revisionist account of the history of punishment and the origins of modern prisons (ch. 6). In each case Hamilton documents flaws in the uses and interpretations of evidence contained in original sources.

The aim of the book, however, is not mainly to set the historical record straight, but to diagnose how such errors originate and persist. Hamilton offers two kinds of explanation: sociopsychological and epistemological. In chapter 7 Hamilton suggests five sociopsychological factors that hinder the production of empirically supported knowledge: 'first, a trained concern with the "inner logic" of a paradigm; second, a trained attachment ... [to] given viewpoints; third, conformity ... regardless of evidence ...; fourth, the role of gatekeepers in directing the flow of information; and fifth, ... the development of permissive standards for judgment' (201). A sixth point (known well to tabloid editors) might be added: some ideas have aesthetic or emotional appeal independent of evidence. These factors promote intellectual compartmentalization and fashion, an overweighting of social clues (appearances, mannerisms, political orientation, vocabulary), deference to authority (voluminous citation chains), but not necessarily the truth (as determined by the evidence).

Hamilton's epistemological explanation derives from his suspicion that relativistic excess promotes uncritical thinking by self-identified critical (postmodernist) intellectuals. Extreme relativism asserts that all knowledge is socially constructed and that there is no objective reality. This view is patently false, Hamilton argues (ch. 1), because it entails that we can reconstruct 'reality' and thus, absurdly, eliminate the Holocaust, world hunger, and gravity. Hamilton's own position is that reality exists independently of our beliefs and that knowledge of it involves both direct apprehension and social construction.

Hamilton's discussion of Foucault's theory of penal reform addresses the epistemological question most directly, juxtaposing the positivist ideal of evidential coherence and comprehensiveness against the relativists' 'laissez-faire attitude' (223). The conventional view of penal reform over the last two

centuries is that the shift from public physical punishment to imprisonment represents humanitarian progress. Foucault, however, reads the shift as the subtle response of a sinister power to humanitarian resistance to grotesque punishments. By shifting targets from bodily punishment to the surveillance and discipline of the soul, 'power' became less visible yet more deeply and pervasively controlling. Prison regimentation, Foucault proposes, is but one example of how this power has permeated society and possessed us all.

Hamilton finds problems with the evidence from which Foucault arrives at this conclusion. For instance, Foucault contrasts a punishment in 1757, a horrific public two-hour torture and execution, to prison surveillance and discipline eighty years later. He uses the comparison as evidence that power shifted its attention from body to soul. However, the crimes in Foucault's examples, and therefore the punishments, are not comparable: a physical attack on Louis XV in the first instance and more mundane crimes in the second. Hamilton challenges Foucault's conclusion more directly by citing a comparable case, a bomb attack on Louis Napoleon in 1858 that killed eight bystanders. The punishment: public execution; no discipline, surveillance, nor torture. In this case, punishment 'proceeded as the liberal reformers wished and as the subsequent liberal histories of punishment have represented their case' (174). Hamilton concludes from this example and others that Foucault's scholarship is dubious and his conclusions unconvincing.

Foucauldians may remain unmoved by Hamilton's arguments, arguing that Foucault's use of evidence is not subject to Hamilton's positivist standard and that relativistic social epistemology is superior to or incommensurate with positivism. From this perspective (and perspective is crucial), Foucault cannot be criticized for using his conclusions to guide his selection and spin of evidence, if that is what he did. Foucauldians could argue — with some justice — that Hamilton begs the epistemological question: he simply presumes the superiority of his own method.

The fact is, however, that evidence manipulated and sifted (consciously or not) for ulterior ends loses its epistemic credibility. Positivist 'hegemony' is in fact rational ineluctability regarding the use of evidence. Now, it is important to emphasize that competing theories may be underdetermined by even quite good evidence. (Is 'power' using discipline against us or are we using discipline for our own expected benefit, and how could we tell the difference?) Underdetermination means that some competing theories may be undecidable, but not that all theories are; some theories are plainly better at modeling the world (i.e., the evidence, all told) than others are. The positivist ideal that we may not pick and choose evidence is, for epistemic purposes, unattainable. Now, Foucauldians and other postmodernists might defend their methods by arguing that moral reasons can override specifically epistemic ones (e.g., telling a lie to protect an innocent). However, when the apparent purport is explanatory rather than ethical, ulterior uses of evidence place credibility at risk. Through case studies more than through explicit argumentation, Hamilton demonstrates the appropriate use of evidence.

Chapter 8 suggests ways in which scholars might better fulfill their critical responsibilities. They should (i) ask whether a claim's negation might be defensible, (ii) pay more attention to alternative theories, and (iii) replicate results as appropriate to the discipline (e.g., natural sciences, social sciences, literature, history). '[T]he responsibility, initially at least, lies with the individual scholar. One must continually ask the question: Am I doing my own thinking, or am I drifting along with some groupthink notion?' (223)

This book is historically fascinating. Its sociopsychological points are important and persuasive, and it makes its epistemological case. It sounds a warning without being sensational, and is for the most part refreshingly constructive, well-written and easily read. It should interest anyone interested in history, political science, postmodernism, trends in academia, or detective stories.

Robert Dow

Northern Arizona University

David W. Haslett

Capitalism with Morality.

Don Mills, ON & New York: Oxford University Press 1994. Pp. xii + 280.

Cdn\$75.00: US\$24.00. ISBN 0-19-828553-1.

The important issue of what sort of economic system is entailed by indirect utilitarianism has rarely been given careful and systematic attention by political philosophers. David Haslett in *Capitalism with Morality* makes a significant contribution to the literature on indirect utilitarianism by addressing precisely this issue. The perhaps unsurprising conclusion Haslett reaches is that indirect utilitarianism provides the moral foundations for some variant of so-called 'welfare capitalism'. The strength of the book lies, however, not in its general thesis nor in its rather dense statement and defense of indirect utilitarianism but in its fine-grained analyses and arguments about topics like economic incentives, worker control, fighting poverty, and inheritance.

In order to lay the groundwork for his case for welfare capitalism, Haslett provides an explanation for why neither a libertarian capitalist economy nor socialism are compatible with indirect utilitarianism. His critique of libertarianism and its insistence on an absolutely minimal state is multi-faceted. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his critique focuses on libertarian justifications for economic incentives. For Haslett, the principal libertarian justification for incentives is that it maximizes the productivity of society (73). In his view, however, this justification is deficient because it neglects

the importance of opportunity to maximizing productivity. He concedes that economic incentives may be necessary to encourage individuals to maximize their output but maintains that individuals must also have genuine opportunities to contribute to productivity and that the state has an important active role to play in facilitating these opportunities. In other words, 'with the laissez-faire capitalism of libertarian morality, there no doubt would be ample incentive to be productive. But for all too many people the opportunity to be productive would be absent' (75). While Haslett is probably right in this regard, presumably many libertarians would respond that their justification for economic incentives rests not on some sort of concern for maximizing the productivity of society but on the idea that each person is the rightful owner of their labour power and hence to whatever financial rewards he or she might attract in the labour market.

The broader problem here is that Haslett in his discussion conflates the libertarian views of philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson with the more aptly described classical liberal views of philosophers like Frederick Hayek. Hayek rejects welfare capitalism in favour of a much more limited state, but he does not embrace the ultra-minimal state that libertarians do. The relevant point is that a number of recent commentators on Hayek, most notably John Gray, have emphasized that Hayek's views rest implicitly on indirect utilitarianism. It seems to be a significant oversight in Haslett's argument in chapter two that he does not explain why Hayek is mistaken to conjoin indirect utilitarianism and classical liberalism. This seems especially ironic, given his heavy tacit reliance on Hayek and von Mises's contribution to the famous 1930s calculation debate to reject socialism in chapter three.

Haslett's vision of welfare capitalism has three principal and controversial components: (1) worker control (2) no poverty (3) a maximum inheritance quota for each individual. While his defense of these three components is interesting and sometimes compelling, I shall emphasize some problems with the first two components. The stumbling block for what he calls 'worker control' capitalism is how to transform existing capitalism into an economy where most firms are worker-controlled. The solution Haslett proposes is a buy-out requirement which stipulates that, 'any existing, traditional enterprise can remain in the hands of its current owners as long as these owners please, but whenever the owners either die or, alternatively, decide to sell, then the enterprise is to be bought by the workers and the workers only, and, from that point on, is to operate as a worker-controlled enterprise' (161). How this requirement would actually work with joint-stock owned firms is a bit mind-boggling. Putting this complication aside, however, I think that Haslett fails to appreciate the effects of such a buy-out requirement. What it presumably will do is result in inefficient, low profit firms being turned into worker-controlled firms since their owners are guaranteed a buyer. Indeed, it has been shown by defenders of market socialism such as David Miller that this already happens in capitalist economies. Most real examples of worker-controlled firms have precisely this history and, therefore, do not give a true indicator of what an economy where worker-control prevails would be like.

Haslett imagines in chapter five capitalism without poverty and defends a series of specific measures to fight poverty. Some of his measures rely uncritically on conventional economic theory. For example, he proposes abolishing the minimum wage on the grounds that it costs jobs (195), but there is now a considerable empirical literature that challenges that assumption. The more substantial difficulty with chapter five is that I lost sight of how the fine-trained proposals for fighting poverty could be grounded on indirect utilitarianism. Haslett follows many others in saying that because of diminishing marginal utility, utilitarianism has a special interest in the least advantaged in society (106). This underlies his concern with poverty. However, at the core of his social policy prescription is the idea that in-kind benefits such as health care, education, and legal aid as well as cash benefits such as earned income credits should be distributed on a principle of universal access. Now, as someone who has argued at length that universal social programmes are invaluable for fighting poverty, I think that Haslett is right to link the two. However, what he fails to address is the tension between the principle of universal access and indirect utilitarianism. Universal social programmes are well known for their 'leaky bucket' effect and helping those who are not among the disadvantaged. For those who maintain a rights-based approach to social policy, these features are not necessarily problematic. For an indirect utilitarian such as Haslett, they would seem to make a case for targeted social programmes that deny universal access.

Lesley A. Jacobs

(Philosophy/Law & Society)

York University

Robert Hollinger and David Depew, eds.

*Pragmatism: From Progressivism
to Postmodernism.*

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1995.

Pp. xviii + 348.

US\$69.50. ISBN 0-275-94882-X.

This volume is a significant contribution to the literature by and about pragmatist philosophers, and as such it stands out in a field increasingly overpopulated by collections of essays and re-tellings of the familiar histories of pragmatism. This collection is a complex and well-integrated assembly of writings about the phases of pragmatism, the relations between its proponents, major and minor, and its links to the larger intellectual history of America and to contemporary philosophy. This is ambitious stuff: the great surprise is how well these goals are met within these pages.

The volume divides into three sections, reflecting the editors' conviction that pragmatism has developed dialectically from the early progressivism of Peirce, James and Dewey, through the positivistic pragmatism of C.I. Lewis, Quine and Davidson, to the postmodern neopragmatism of Richard Rorty. The editorial work deserves special attention here. This division of the pragmatist tradition into phases certainly meets the pragmatists' *summum bonum*: it works. This division allows the story of pragmatism's development to unfold, without giving undue emphasis to either the agreement between phases or the reaction of the more recent against the old and more shopworn versions of pragmatism. Considerable time is also devoted to an important issue: the waxing and waning of pragmatism's political dimension. This volume is rich in historical and philosophical detail that helps give the reader a sense of why various themes developed as they did. Not only have the editors gathered together essays of above average quality, they have contributed no less than four introductory essays (one for each section, plus a general introduction) that surpass the role of lending shape to the collected material. These essays are among the most lucid written about the development of pragmatist thought, and are on their own extremely valuable. Readers well versed in pragmatist philosophy will find much that is new and interesting here, and should find this dividing of the movement into phases a useful and thought-provoking innovation.

As for the specific essays, despite the variety of content, some general criticisms can be made. To begin, the ghost-like presence of Richard Rorty (who does not contribute to this volume) is a bit worrisome. Selections from all three sections seem preoccupied with his writings, and lamentably, a fair amount of time is devoted to comparing him to earlier figures, to wondering how well he fits into the pragmatist canon, and to figuring out what to do with him if he is the contemporary inheritor of the mantle of Peirce, James, Dewey and company. With the exception of Isaac Nevo's essay on Rorty, the criticisms offered of the latter's thought are not new. The postulating of Rorty's work as the best exemplar of postmodern pragmatism is well justified, but one might wish that more time was spent including figures like Richard Bernstein or Stanley Fish into the narrative.

Fortunately, Cornel West is part of the contemporary story, and he contributes one of the best selections in the book. His 'Theory, Pragmatism, and Politics' is a breathtaking combination of public-mindedness and imaginative philosophical insight: truly pragmatism at its best. Strangely, he is one of only a handful of contributors that speaks, not about pragmatism, but *as* a pragmatist. In so doing, he serves as a legitimate alternative to Rorty (much needed, one would think, given the clamour over Rorty's writings) and helps to end the book on a high note.

Pragmatism's relation to Continental thought is tackled by Bernd Magnus with a thorough, if baroque, account of what it means to be 'postmodern'. Strangely, the thinkers from Europe who are most closely aligned with pragmatism, viz. Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, get the occasional mention but no real scrutiny: disappointing, but necessary perhaps to keep this

already complex treatment under control. This brings up another point: the more conservative variations of pragmatism do get underemphasized in this attempt to tell the story of the growth and dynamism of pragmatism. Hilary Putnam, for example, is notable by his absence from this collection: only Ralph Sleeper takes time to paint a quick portrait of Putnam as Yesterday's Man. It would be wise to remember David A. Hollinger's counsel, 'If pragmatism has a future, it will probably look very different from its past, and the two may not even share a name' (31).

Some contributions from familiar commentators do disappoint. Larry Hickman's essay, for example, exhibits the dryness of prose for which Deweyans have become infamous: a poor tribute to a philosopher often unfairly accused of being unduly technical. David Hollinger, on the other hand, contributes a lively historical account of the milieu of the early pragmatists. His is also one of the most philosophically perceptive contributions to this book. Similarly, Daniel J. Wilson offers an engaging account of the fusion between logical positivism and the pragmatism of the thirties and forties, showing how the new ideas from Europe shaped not only pragmatist thought but the larger self-image of professional philosophy.

This middle period marks the decline of social activism among pragmatists, and this abandonment of its progressivist heritage is explored by Bruce Kuklick in 'American Philosophy and Its Lost Public'. His treatment, and that of other contributors, of this shift in pragmatism's sense of social calling is handled in a very balanced fashion: a refreshing change from recent debates. Rickard Donovan's treatment of 'Richard Rorty and the Linguistic Turn' nicely rounds out the transitional moments of pragmatism's changing face. These essays chronicling such transitions constitute some of the most useful parts of the book from a pedagogical point of view.

There are some interesting essays contrasting various personalities in the pragmatist family, but they are less appealing, perhaps because they embody a continuation of family squabbles: George Cotkin's psychobiographical approach to the differences between the philosophies of James and Rorty is particularly hard to swallow. Isaac Nevo does a better job resuscitating James against Quine's claims to be the first holistic empiricist, but in the end he brings Rorty into the fray and his own position seems to cloud the debate unnecessarily.

To judge this volume as a whole, one must applaud the ambitious project undertaken by the editors: they clearly deserve a good deal of the praise for the success of this collection. A balanced representation of 'tender' and 'tough-minded' pragmatic writers, a blend of historical treatments and consideration of specific pragmatic themes and thinkers makes this one of the most well-rounded books on pragmatism in recent years. A meagre index is offset by an exceptionally complete bibliography, and the book's single noticeable typo suggests further editorial industry. This one is definitely worth one's time.

Matthew Stephens
University of Alberta

Terence Horgan and John Tienson
*Connectionism and the Philosophy
of Psychology.*
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1996.
Pp. xiii + 207.
US\$35.00. ISBN 0-262-08248-9.

Horgan and Tienson (H&T) have produced what is simultaneously a compelling introduction to connectionism, a philosopher-friendly guide to the details, and a platform for their own promising and original ideas.

The central thrust of the book is this: classical cognitive science has some things right, and some things wrong. (A familiar tune, I agree — but whistled well.) What classicism has *right* is that mental representations must have syntactic structure, where said structure bears upon cognitive processing. Otherwise, Fodor and Pylyshyn's worries about systematicity, semantic coherence, etc. will go unanswered; in addition, H&T argue, the ability to track enduring individuals through changes of properties/relations would be lost without mentalese 'subjects' and mentalese 'predicates'; and, finally, they maintain that deductive reasoning demands mental syntax.

But, they charge, classicism gets it *wrong* in supposing that cognitive processing is achieved by hard programmable rules — cognitive transitions, they insist, are not tractably computable. In brief, H&T want classicism's representations, but not its rules: they'll take the Language of Thought, but they have little use for the Computational Theory of Mind. (Note however that, as becomes clear in Section 5.1, H&T's notion of syntactic structure, and hence their variant of LOT, is importantly non-classical: it allows for constituency, but not via the part-whole relationship. This section of the book, even taken alone, is worth the price of admission.)

Of course an obvious question arises with respect to their representations-without-rules picture: how does syntax do its causal work, if not by means of exceptionless rules which avert to structure? H&T's response to this challenge, though sometimes sketchy, is intriguing. They suggest that there are 'cognitive forces' interacting in a 'dynamical system'. These forces sometimes compete, and sometimes cooperate — and each is overridable. The result of this complex interaction are 'soft laws' for the system as a whole — the only kind of laws psychology can have; and, they argue forcefully, the only kind it needs. Put in terms of Marr's three levels, their idea is this: algorithms, the so-called 'middle level', are replaced by mathematical state transitions of a dynamic kind. The result is that, at the top-most conceptual level (Marr's 'computational level') the state transitions are non-deterministic — hence all generalizations at this level are ineliminably *ceteris paribus*. This, they insist, is precisely the result we want.

However plausible their proposal, H&T's reasons for rejecting old-style rules will not convince the committed classicist. The central premise of their argument against strict classicism is that human cognition exhibits a kind of open endedness which, H&T submit, cannot arise from hard rules. They

write: '... paraphrasing Descartes, it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different programs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act' (35). But, first, they never make clear precisely *why* programs cannot give rise to such 'open endedness'; nor do they explain why *Descartes'* polemics, against materialism, go wrong. How, one wonders, do Descartes' arguments fail, if their argument works? And yet, while they fail to show that it *cannot* succeed, H&T ably demonstrate the disappointments and broken promises of rule-based cognitive science — enough anyway to justify exploring an alternative.

In sum, *Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology* offers an engaging and plausible mixture of classical and connectionist insights. If you've ever wondered what connectionism was all about, but didn't have the time to get the background; or, if you've thought about teaching connectionism, but didn't know how... Buy this book. If you know the basics, but get lost in vectors, tensor products and threshold functions... Buy this book. Finally, if you're familiar with connectionist systems, but fear that they could never achieve systematicity, productivity, etc.; if you suspect there's something right about classicism, but something wrong as well... Buy this book.

Robert J. Stainton

Carleton University

Micheline R. Ishay

Internationalism and its Betrayal.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

1995. Pp. ix + 180.

US\$44.95. ISBN 0-8166-2469-0.

Internationalism — or, as some prefer to call it, universalism — is once again under attack. Perhaps the most explicit challenge comes from the likes of Richard Rorty, of the University of Virginia, who has recently defended a form of epistemological parochialism, the view that truth and meaning derive from the community of which one who thinks and uses language is a member.

Ishay, who is on the faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver University, traces the development of the internationalist movement from early Greek thought through the ensuing 25 centuries, arguing that in the last analysis the natural law, natural rights way of understanding politics and diplomacy has been betrayed in Western intellectual circles. In the end it is Hegel who best illustrates Ishay's thesis. As she notes, 'by viewing the Volkstaat as the panacea, Hegel ended up promoting the

Prussian state over the claim of the international project, the particular over the universal' (128).

This observation is pregnant with the gist of Ishay's broad claim: what undermined the universalist or internationalist project is the reaffirmation of the particular, especially via individualism. Even though Ishay acknowledges that collectivist internationalist ideas such as socialism also collapsed, so that she ends on an utterly pessimistic note to the effect that 'internationalism remained an empty illusion, an idea condemned to the life of abstraction, a dream betrayed by even its staunchest defenders' (129), she tends to hold individualism responsible for the movement's alleged demise.

As is rather typical of books that grow out of dissertations, this work is rather dry and lackluster as far as bold theses are concerned. Talk about abstraction: everything in this work takes place on the intellectual plane, as if human politics had no chance of being influenced by the concrete facts of nature! Furthermore, there is a habit of painting with an incredibly broad brush that's displayed in this book. Grand sweeps of ideas — by Aristotle, Vico, Burke and Fichte, to name just a few — govern human history. If ever there is someone who abrades Hegel's notion of the work of Absolute spirit, whether intentionally or not, Ishay appears to be a good candidate. So without any bold thesis argued up front, what we have is occasional hints at Ishay's own ideology — as when she laments, albeit rather quietly, Kant's, Paine's and Robespierre's refusal to banish private property rights from their universalist agenda, which she claims 'implicitly privileged the position of the initially advantaged bourgeois' (72). Had the book been a bit more ideologically gutsy, we might have learned how Ishay would avoid the tyrannical implications of every attempt thus far of redistributing property so that no such privilege would obtain. What about the privilege of those who would accomplish the redistribution? And what else but the right to private property manages to be so accommodating to the universalist agenda of tolerance for diversity? These would have been valuable themes to explore but the book leans too far toward the low key approach to launch into these matters.

Internationalism and Its Betrayal is divided into Preface, Introduction, and three parts, with a foreword by Craig Calhoun that tries to relate the subject matter of the book to certain concrete current events. Part One considers mostly Grotius, Vico, and Rousseau, Part Two Kant, Paine, and Robespierre, and Part Three Burke, de Maistre, and Fichte. The conclusion focuses on Hegel, arguing that it is in him that we are able to witness the full and tragic demise of the internationalist project.

This is an informative work, with thinkers treated very fairly and even rather thoroughly, given the scope and length of the project, both of which render that task quite challenging. The way Ishay makes it happen is to bring out a side of many of the major players that we do not usually find discussed, for which the reader must be grateful. Indeed, this is a big virtue of the book: it lets us in on seldom discussed aspects of the views of major political thinkers, ones that are nevertheless of recurring concern to all who hope to find

some solution to the problems of ethnic, national, racial and related rivalries without at the same time threatening human cultural diversity.

My major substantive qualm about the work is its failure to advance a hypothesis about a possible solution to the difficulty it documents. The challenge of universalism is in earnest: human beings have the capacity to think past the particular experiences of their lives and times and this presents them with the responsibility to attempt to understand and guide themselves by reference to principles that unite the species, even as the reality of particularity is undeniable. What may have been useful for Ishay to do is to forge a metaphysical solution to the issue of the inescapability of both the universal and the particular. Reality is individual *and* intelligible, thus subject to universal laws that human beings can come to grasp, albeit never totally, finally — the impossible but often gripping dream that seems to me to have undone the project Ishay wishes to understand and maybe even promote, much more so than individualism.

In the political and diplomatic realms we can perhaps appreciate this by considering that the most powerful tool of universalism is the idea of individual rights — evidenced not only by various thinkers from Aristotle on (see, on this, Fred D. Miller, Jr., *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* [Oxford, 1995]) but also by the practical works of international watch dog agencies. This suggests that there need be no dichotomization between the individual and the universal but, instead, a proper harmonization of the two in a coherent philosophical framework, one that will produce for us a feasible approach to dealing with the reality that human life is lived in its particulars but needs to be guided by very broad principles.

Tibor Machan

Auburn University

Jerrold Levinson

The Pleasures of the Aesthetic.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996.

Pp. xiv + 312.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3059-3);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8226-7).

The best characterisation of this work is Levinson's own: 'This book brings together fifteen essays that, with one exception, ... were written during the six years 1990-95. We have (i) "essays on the notion of the aesthetic", notably on the notion of aesthetic pleasure; (ii) "essays on the aesthetics of music", including the very important and hitherto unpublished "Musical Expressiveness"; (iii) "essays on the definition and ontology of art", including further

thoughts on the author's attempt to define art historically; (iv) "essays on intention, interpretation, and meaning in art", which reprints the summarising article from Iseminger's important *Intention and Interpretation*; and (v) "essays on the notion of fiction and our response to it".

That tells you what is in the book. If the further question is raised, 'Should I bother with it?', I can only answer that there are certain contemporary philosophers whose name on a book is an indication that the work demands and will reward detailed attention. Levinson is one of those philosophers. Each of his essays displays an analytical intellect of the highest order. To that I add that, philosophy aside, the remarks on particular works of art are always worth reading and sometimes, especially when directed to particular works of music, extraordinarily illuminating. I note from the jacket that Cornell quite rightly offers this book as a contribution to the study of music as well as philosophy.

Although every essay deserves attention I select two for comment. First, Levinson offers a certain kind of answer to the question of the relevance of authorial intention to the determination of the meaning of a work. On that, following Tolhurst, he writes: 'The view I defend is ... what might be called *hypothetical* (or *constructive*) intentionalism' (175), or, as Tolhurst (quoted p. 178) put it: 'utterance meaning is best understood as the intention which a member of the intended audience would be most justified in attributing to the author'. Levinson is emphatic that this meaning might not coincide with the actually intended meaning (179).

I have never been happy with the suggestion that the Tolhurst formula allows a gap to appear between actually intended and hypothetically imputed meaning. If talk of 'hypotheses' about what the author meant is to make sense, then when we find that the imputed hypothetical meaning is not the actual meaning, the hypothesis is simply disconfirmed, and the gap that Levinson wants can never open up.

Here I wonder why Levinson does not simply avail himself of the notion of defeasibility. The meaning we ascribe to a work reflects our best guess about the actually intended meaning. However, that ascription can be defeated and, what is more, is defeated by the discovery that the author could not have had or did not have the ascribed intention. (I understand that Iseminger is to address this issue in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, though I have no idea of the line he will take.)

My second point is about the account of musical expressiveness that is offered in this work in an essay which, whatever its positive merits, is outstandingly worth attention for its comments on the theories of others, up to and including important recent contributions by Davis and Ridley. Levinson writes: 'musical expressing is music heard as doing something like what humans do in manifesting emotion, but with different resources' (115). I construe this thus: suppose, we were allowed only instrumental sounds with which to articulate the feelings, moods and emotions we now express with the more extended repertoire of word and gesture. Could we do it? If the answer is 'Of course we could!', then those sounds would be expressive, and

there would be no more mystery to that than about the expressiveness of our present repertoire of language and gesture.

This tells us how music is expressive, but, although I am inclined to accept that account, there are two things at least lacking in it. The first is revealed in a certain shiftiness in the formula I have quoted from page 115. Musical expressing is music heard as 'doing something like what humans do in manifesting emotion'. What is the word 'manifesting' doing here? Not all the things humans do in manifesting emotion are cases of the expression of emotion. So we need a more focussed term than 'manifesting'. Unfortunately the only one to hand seems to be 'expressing'. That shows one shortcoming of the Levinson account: musical expressing is 'something like' non-musical expressing, but until we are told what that is, we are no nearer to understanding expression in music or anywhere else. Here Wollheim's work, for all the criticisms that Levinson makes of it, at least attempts to say how expression fits into any account of the mind's economy.

Second, suppose musical expressing to be a matter of doing with an attenuated apparatus what we can and do do with a fuller apparatus of gesture and expression. Then a pair of questions arises: first, why on earth would people want to express via an attenuated apparatus what they can express with one that is less attenuated and, second, why should others take such a passionate interest in expression via the attenuated apparatus. That is related to what Levinson says is a pre-requisite for any satisfactory account of musical expression — that it should 'make intelligible the value of such expressiveness' (124). Here he remarks 'The value ... is the value of confronting images of human experiences ... (and) ... it is open to us to identify with the imagined act of expression and make it our own ... rehearsing inwardly its gestures and experiencing through empathy its inner aspect' (125). Here the formula 'The value is ... the value of confronting images of human experiences etc.' reads suspiciously like 'the value is the value of confronting images, etc. *whatever that is*', for we are certainly not told why such encounters should loom so large in the economy of our mental lives, only that they do. So, although Levinson's remarks on musical expressiveness quite rightly find it of a piece with human expressiveness generally, lacking an account of what this latter is, we are still left in the dark about what expression is and why it is so important to us.

Colin Lyas

University of Lancaster

Lo Ch'in-Shun

Knowledge Painfully Acquired. The 'K'un-chih chi' by Lo Ch'in-shun.

Trans. and ed. Irene Bloom.

New York: Columbia University Press 1987.

Pp. ix + 226.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-06408-X);

US\$19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-06409-8).

Near the beginning of this book, which is an irregular collection of reading notes and reflections accumulated over more than twenty years (6n19) of intense study, Lo Ch'in-shun notes that 'fondness for the sublime and the desire for speed are among the common failings of scholars' (I.8:57). It's a trenchant observation even today, and one he took to heart with a vengeance. Lo (1465-1547) was an important scholar-official of Ming China and the most philosophically astute member of the Ch'eng-Chu school of NeoConfucian thought during the period. He published the first two parts of *K'un-chih chi* in his early sixties (1528) and then continued to supplement it until the year before his death. Irene Bloom has provided the first English translation of the original version in two parts, containing 81 and 75 sections respectively, along with excerpts from the third part and two important letters to Wang Yang-ming included in the addendum of 1538. The translation is a marvel of fluency given the nearly complete lack of correspondence between Chinese and Western philosophical terminology. B. has tried to render that terminology as consistently as possible, following the standard translations of Wing-tsit Chan (12), and resorts sparingly to Romanized Chinese words or phrases. A detailed introduction supplies the historical context to Lo's argument and a full — one is tempted to say heroic — annotation of all his sources (there are 340 references, mostly to quotations, in the 60 pages of part one alone) opens up the immense range of reading he so painfully scoured for wisdom.

Lo records his critical reactions to books (probably soon after reading them) in everything from brief notices on general themes to densely-argued philosophical statements several pages in length. He quotes extensively and accurately from his sources, so much of the *K'un-chih chi* is mere transcription. This habit is natural to Chinese scholars, who find a seamless continuity between writing of the past and present, but quickly defeats any western expectation of reading Lo as a kind of oriental Montaigne. There are no sustained essays here of the sort Montaigne was to pioneer in the West a few decades later. We hear a lively and personal voice speaking, as in Montaigne, but Lo is neither the matter of his own book nor a skeptical inquirer for all his argumentativeness. What gives the book a certain continuity is Lo's creative engagement with the evolving Confucian tradition as he met it in his own day, respectful of received opinion but quite willing to criticize orthodoxy when it lacked cogency and consistency. In the course of this dialogic confrontation with his predecessors and his contemporaries, Lo worked out po-

sitions on the nature of knowledge and of material reality that had great influence not only in China but in Korea and Japan.

Lo's philosophical confrontation resolved itself into three main thematic strands of varying interest to nonspecialists.

(1) He regarded the influence of Buddhism, in decline since the Sung period (960-1279), as extremely dangerous to the integrity of the Confucian tradition. 'Generally speaking,' he says, 'the Buddhists have insight into the mind but lack insight into the nature' (I.5:52). (B. translates *'hsing'* as 'the nature,' meaning objective reality, but *'t'ien'* as 'nature' or 'heaven' depending on context.) Their radical idealism confuses subjective mind with objective nature and undermines Confucian emphasis on the intellectual study of nature and the cultivation of social relationships. Some of this antipathy stemmed from his own brief involvement with Buddhism. As Lo explains in a fascinating biographical aside (II.41), he briefly practiced Ch'an (zen) meditation after encountering an old priest in the capital and experienced a kind of vision not uncommon among those in the early stages of meditative discipline, but later rejected it as spurious and began the long process of painful study that came to fruition near the age of 60 when he finally did gain 'clear insight into the reality of the mind and the nature and truly acquire the basis for self-confidence' (II.41:138). Despite some insightful remarks on the terminology and translation of the sutras (II.70-5), however, Lo's understanding of Buddhism is too shallow for his criticism to have anything more than a passing historical interest.

(2) In opposition to Chu Hsi, Lo worked out a monistic philosophy that identifies the endlessly fluctuating cycle of *'ch'i'* (material force), which penetrates heaven and earth, creates reality, produces phenomenal diversity and is yet unitary, with *'li'* (principle), which is 'a detailed order and an elaborate coherence' (I.11:58) we can observe in *'ch'i'*. *'Li'* is a pattern of unregulated regularity or concordia discors we observe in the spontaneous energy of *'ch'i'*, distinct from it and yet neither ontologically prior nor superior to it. Lo repeatedly stresses that *'ch'i'* is *'li'* (notably at II.21-3, 35, 46, 51 and 62), but in a section of great difficulty (I.14) explains how he reformulated it in a way that lets him meld external and human nature with *'ch'i'* by means of an aphorism borrowed from Ch'eng I: 'Principle is one; its particularizations are diverse' (I.14:65). This becomes a philosophical Open Sesame that is supposed to solve all problems of explaining the unity in diversity of natural and human events. *'Ch'i'* is *'li'*, but *'li'* is also the underlying coherence in the changing pattern of human development and behavior. It follows that human desires, as expressions of nondual human nature, are one and in harmony with principle: 'The fact that man has desires definitely derives from heaven' (II.14:121). They aren't inherently selfish, therefore, and only require moderation.

(3) Lo strongly reaffirmed the importance of studying nature, which the Confucians call 'the investigation of things,' by means of sensory knowledge. His formula 'Principle is one; its particularizations are diverse' also supports such a study by heightening rather than nullifying the awareness of phe-

nomenal diversity. But B.'s attempt to suggest that this represents a kind of protoempiricism on its way to modernity (38-42) fails under Lo's insistence that the investigation of things is designed not for the disinterested analysis of nature but for the 'corresponding illumination of things and the self, perfect interfusion of inner and outer, and complete integration of subject and object' (I.7:55). This is wise, but not empirical in any modern sense because Lo denies the validity of an objective perception that does not find a human reflection.

B. has given us a major contribution to NeoConfucian studies and restored a philosopher in whom we may, she hopes, 'find something of value for our own efforts to relieve the pains of modernity through reinterpreting ... the relation between knowledge and morality' (47).

Steven J. Willett

(*Department of English*)

University of Shizuoka

Timothy J. McGrew

The Foundations of Knowledge.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1995. Pp.

xiii + 150. US\$48.50 (cloth: ISBN

0-8226-3042-7); US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN

0-8226-3043-5).

Timothy J. McGrew's perspective in *The Foundations of Knowledge* is a familiar one: Cartesian skeptical arguments and epistemic regress arguments reveal obstacles that theories of epistemic justification show how we overcome. McGrew's response to these 'theory-shaping arguments' is '... strong foundationalism is capable of meeting the legitimate skeptical challenges posed by Cartesian scenarios and the epistemic regress problem where other versions of foundationalism must fail' (ix), and the seven chapters of the book are an extended defense of this claim.

In the first chapter, 'In Defence of Traditional Epistemology', McGrew explains (a standard 'ambiguous' sensory data interpretation) and he defends the role of Cartesian argumentation in shaping 'traditional epistemology'. His defence provides a helpful understanding of why this perspective has attracted so many adherents.

Also in Chapter 1, by way of clearing ground for his own constructive efforts, McGrew aims some general remarks at coherence theories of truth and justification, suggesting that these seem to turn out to be either founda-

tionalist in a moderate sense (the notion 'moderate' is discussed later in his book, and clarified a bit, below) or unacceptably relativistic.

Ground-clearing continues Chapter 2, 'Relativism and Epistemological Behaviorism'. Here McGrew offers an interesting discussion of a challenge to foundationalism that he finds to be implicit in the work of Thomas Kuhn. McGrew also addresses Rorty's well-known objections to the foundationalist enterprise.

Chapter 3, 'The Regress of Reasons and Classical Foundationalism' turns to standard regress arguments contending that 'Classical Foundationalism' is required to stop the regress of reasons he sees generated by such regress arguments. McGrew's 'Classical Foundationalism' requires that, (1) There are basic beliefs; (2) There are justified nonbasic beliefs; (3) Every branch of the evidence for a justified nonbasic belief terminates in a basic belief; and, (4) Every synthetic basic belief is incorrigibly justified. Foundationalism of this 'classical' form is 'strong' in virtue of the incorrigibility required by condition 4. McGrew's presentation of key issues in Chapter 3 is especially clear, as it is throughout most of the book.

Specific objections to *strong* foundationalism are addressed in chapter 4, 'A Dilemma for Moderate Foundationalism' where the necessity of *incorrigible* basic beliefs is defended against the 'moderate' requirement that basic beliefs are required to be (only) less than certain.

In Chapter 5, 'Epistemic Authority and Minimal Privileged Access', and in Chapter 6, 'Incorrigible Foundations', argues that there are incorrigible basic beliefs of the kind he thinks (chapter 4) necessary. As the title of Chapter 5 suggests, McGrew's basic beliefs are 'internal world' propositions.

Finally, in Chapter 7, 'The Ascent to Realism', McGrew argues that the incorrigible basic beliefs supported earlier do indeed provide epistemic justification for the empirical propositions that have been the focus of skeptical arguments.

Throughout the discussions, McGrew's critical efforts are sophisticated and clear. As is often the case in works in this enterprise, readers with sympathy for his perspective will no doubt find insights here and helpful nuances there. However, whatever success McGrew's critical remarks might enjoy, his defence of strong foundationalism turns ultimately on the respective cases he can make for *his* foundation and for the evidential capability of this foundation with respect to the 'external world'. Because of the particularly problematic nature of this latter defence, and because of space limitations, the remainder of this review will be devoted to a small but critical aspect of this defence.

McGrew's defence of an evidential connection between (his) basic beliefs and the propositions they are to justify is that, (a) 'the notion of a real, external world in C(lassical) F(oundationalism)' ... 'provide(s) a testable, confirmable explanation for the data of our experience' (129) and, (b) the hypothesis that there is such a world is better confirmed than the hypothesis that we are being deceived (by a demon) into thinking that there is such a world.

Further narrowing our focus to just his defence of (b), it is, in effect, McGrew's view that 'simplicity' considerations make the case for the 'real, external world' hypothesis over the 'Demon' hypothesis. According to McGrew, the skeptic's 'Demon' hypothesis must '... attribute my subjective sensations to *discrete* mental states of the deceiver (whatever this may amount to) in order to account for the fact that there are discrete features in my perceptual field' (136). Hence, in postulating a mental state for each real 'object', the skeptic must postulate at least as many 'items' as the realist. But, the skeptic must postulate one additional 'item' as well — the demon bearing the mental states. Hence, the skeptical hypothesis is more complex, and simplicity favors the 'real world' hypothesis.

Any appeal to simplicity must defend, (a) *particular* criteria as a measure of 'simpler', and (b) the epistemic preferability of *these* criteria. The difficulties here are notorious. Questions that bring out these difficulties are easy to formulate.

Is it true that in postulating an evil demon with mental states, one is postulating 'more than one thing'? Even if the answer to the last question is 'Yes!', is it more likely that a hypothesis appeal to n 'realist objects' is more likely to be true than one appealing to a demon + n mental states? Why are we counting these 'things' rather than, say, molecules, anyhow? Does a similar assessment involving a 'dream' hypothesis rather than a 'demon' hypothesis still favor the 'real world' hypothesis? Are simpler explanations more likely to be true than complex explanations?

It is hard to imagine helpful answers to these questions, as well as others that could be formulated, the answers are not obvious and McGrew provides virtually nothing helpful here. Given the obviousness of the questions, one would like to have been given more.

In spite of what I take to be insurmountable obstacles to the success of the overall argument, McGrew's book can be recommended as introduction to a significant strain of contemporary epistemology. It is clearly written, and it provides important background information along the way, about why particular elements in this enterprise have occupied justification theorists.

Benjamin F. Armstrong, Jr.
Central College

F.C.T. Moore

Bergson: Thinking Backwards.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xx + 152.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41340-0);

US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42402-X).

Moore wishes to show that Bergson is a philosopher who 'pose[s] radical challenges to certain fundamental assumptions commonly made within the analytic tradition ... [that] are intelligible, important and interesting' (xi). He reconstructs Bergson's positions and arguments with respect to a variety of present-day issues, turning around the assumption that there is a radical distinction between thinking and doing that gives thinking the higher priority.

Moore begins with the issue of precision. Precision is not a matter of a general methodology, since an account is precise only if the method employed is adequate to the matter at hand. Much philosophical thought is imprecise due to an overly abstract approach that is indifferent to the facts of the matter. Moore demonstrates Bergson's approach to precision by taking up his account of pure perception, reconstructed as a critique of the idea that cognition depends essentially upon representation. Bergson's approach is precise because it is a critique within, and responsive to, the particular context of perception. For Bergson, the problems coordinate with the claim that perception involves representation are factitious and arise from 'utilitarian assumptions which ... blinker our apprehension of experience over time' (22). In pure perception, what is perceived is a world of images, of things that are picturable insofar as they are perceivable but which nevertheless exist in themselves. Images are not represented but are rather directly apprehended by the perceiver, who is an agent that is selectively in contact with the world. The perceiver does not picture to herself a perceived object, but selects some of its properties in virtue of her pragmatic concerns and capacities. Perception apprehends the world as it is, but from the perspective of specific possibilities for action. Pure perception, then, is no representing, since there is no perception distinct from and representative of what is perceived. But the contextual selection in pure perception requires a capacity for recognizing an object as the same across time. Recognition is not recollection of past (and so absent) perceptions, since this reintroduces representation into perception. It is rather a 'habit-memory' acquired through and along with the development of capacities for action as repeatable. One has a memory, and so can recognize an object, because one can repetitively exercise one's capacities for action. Moore notes in conclusion how Bergson's position renders vacuous various problems in the philosophy of mind and suggests a new approach to cognitive science.

Two kinds of knowledge arise from perception and memory, the relative knowledge of the world with respect to one's capacities for action and the absolute knowledge of one's experiencing of the world. This distinction rests

upon Bergson's account of time. Ordinary experience gives rise to the pragmatically necessary conception of time as the quasi-spatial succession of discrete events. Bergson notes that representing time in this way makes possible branching models of events and decisions. Such models are required by human capacities for action but nevertheless misrepresentative of experience, for they represent sequences of events and decisions by agents as already given and past and not as presently experienced. They segment the process of deciding to act thus or thus in a way counter to the continuity of the lived process. Experience itself involves a temporal structure that accounts for the continuity of experience and the absolute knowledge of it. This is *durance* (Moore's translation of *durée*), which is not a discrete period of time within experience but the rhythmic enduring of experience. Absolute knowledge of experience depends upon an intuition of *durance*. This intuition requires effort, since it requires a struggle against the everyday practical habits that create the relative conception of time as segmented into before and after.

Moore clarifies the nature of the opposition between the pragmatic approach and lived experience by means of a discussion of Bergson's work on laughter. According to Moore, the significance of laughter for Bergson is that it inhabits a middle ground between immersion in everyday life and the direct encounter with experience as such. Making something funny involves imposing the mechanical upon the living, and for Bergson this is precisely what happens when one enters into the pragmatic approach of everyday life. Humor reveals the opposition between the pragmatic and lived experience as an opposition, and so has a kinship to philosophy, which itself requires an awareness of this opposition. Moore concludes his book by examining Bergson's accounts of the *élan vital* and of the evolutionary origin of magic and religion. He shows that the concept of the *élan vital* follows from Bergson's claim that *durance* is not only phenomenologically real but also an ontological feature of the world, and he relates it to issues in the philosophy of biology. And he explains why Bergson thinks that magic and religion are ways in which Nature solves the social problem of living according to intelligence alone.

Moore acknowledges from the outset that his book is partial, both in that it does not intend to account for the whole of Bergson's *œuvre* and in that, as a reconstruction, it follows 'a plan and perspective of [Moore's] own' (xiii). In the course of justifying this approach, Moore warns the reader against attributing more order and purpose to a philosopher's works than is actually there. But Moore's reconstructive approach runs precisely the opposite risk, that of attributing less order and purpose than is actually there. By presenting Bergson 'in the light of philosophical questions and interest some of which would have been foreign to him' (xiii), Moore tends to obscure the continuities of thought which Bergson tried to make clear and precise. Moore's rather disjointed discussion of *durance* especially suffers from this defect. As a result, Bergson's opposition of pragmatic action (presenting Bergson to the analytic community through partial reconstruction) to contemplation of lived

experience (giving a thorough critical exposition) is transposed into Moore's reconstruction. I find neither Bergson's explicit opposition of practice and contemplation nor Moore's implicit opposition of reconstruction and exposition plausible. Partiality and thoroughness can go hand in hand: witness Gilles Deleuze's work on Bergson, which is both explicitly partial and thorough in its treatment of duration, especially in relation to memory.

Although in virtue of its defects Moore's book makes sense only after the second or third reading, it is nevertheless a useful introduction to Bergson. It reveals Bergson as not only part of the history of philosophy, but as rightly participating in present problems.

Ronald M. Carrier

Northwestern University

Chris Nunn

Awareness: What it is, What it does.

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. viii + 167.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13226-6);

Cdn\$23.95: US\$16.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-13227-4).

Chris Nunn's new book is a brief survey of contemporary scientific approaches to the study of consciousness. Some philosophers may find it a frustrating read, because of the lack of attention paid to conceptual issues and, even more, because of the deprecating attitude taken toward the value of philosophical reflection on the nature of mind and experience. Nevertheless, the book is worth reading for philosophers with an interest in consciousness, because it covers many provocative topics clearly and because it strikes just the right balance between technical detail and intelligibility to the non-expert.

After reviewing current progress in a variety of areas relating to brain function and anatomy, experimental psychology, and psychiatry, Nunn inserts a chapter on some aspects of quantum theory in preparation for the main dialectical purpose of the book: the description and comparison of two types of theories of consciousness, 'the Hofstadter/Edelman (HE) paradigm and ... the Penrose/Marshall (PM) paradigm' (77). Nunn discusses how well theories in each paradigm are (or will be) able to account for the essential features of consciousness.

Both HE and PM are scientifically respectable in the sense that each assumes that a complete scientific account of mentality and consciousness

is, in principle, possible. Both say that investigation of the brain is the key to success in this project. Their main difference is that the PM paradigm assumes that a necessary component of the correct account of mind will be quantum theory.

Ultimately, Nunn decides that greater promise lies with the PM paradigm, although the issue is far from settled by what we now know. In the final chapter, he changes his description of the two views as competitors and instead says, 'the relationship between them is analogous to that between Newtonian gravitational theory (for HE ideas) and General Relativity (for PM ones)' (148). In other words, HE is correct as far as it goes, but a full explanation of consciousness will only be possible by supplementing conventional brain theory with quantum theory.

Two points may be made about Nunn's confidence in the PM paradigm. First, Nunn assumes that scientists know exactly what it is they are seeking to explain by developing a theory of consciousness. It seems that this assumption is encouraged by the further assumption that in trying to explain consciousness we are trying to explain *experience*, itself. In every other area of scientific inquiry the aim is to get beyond our experiences (the appearance) to the nature of the underlying objective reality (including an explanation of why it has the appearance that it does). But, in the area of consciousness, this line of thought goes, there is no appearance/reality distinction. So, there is no need for reflection on what it is that we are attempting to explain, because we know what it is perfectly well. In my judgment, this line of thought is in error; it is a long-standing myth. Second, the assumption that we are looking for an explanation of something that we know perfectly well leaves us with the burden of explaining features that consciousness seems to, but may not in fact, have. I will mention three.

Freedom of the will: our conscious decisions seem to us to be metaphysically special events unlike any other; they are not determined by the conditions that preceded their occurrence. Quantum theory allows that genuinely random events do occur; so, if we can only identify our free choices with the indeterminate collapse of wave functions or some other kind of quantum event, we may have an explanation of how our choices are free.

Unity of consciousness: our stream of consciousness seems to have a special sort of unity which raises a problem for conventional brain science (the HE paradigm), because the brains in which experiences occur have no such special unity. Architecturally, brains are massively parallel and have no special unity function, no place in the brain (nor moment in the processing of experience) where 'it all comes together', in Daniel Dennett's words. Quantum theory offers the possibility of unification. It is even possible, with the resources that seem to be available in quantum theory, to explain out-of-body experiences, group minds, and extra-sensory perception. It only remains to show how the experience of biting into a sausage is in fact a Bose-Einstein condensate.

The soul: it seems to the average person that she must be a kind of *thing* that persists through time and changes and that this thing couldn't simply

be a brain and body. Personal identity seems to be closely associated with experiences, but if this were all there was to us, we wouldn't be a *thing* but only a kind of series of events, like a game of golf or an election. These reflections lead to the idea that a person is a soul, a persisting thing in which a succession of experiences occurs. The vindication of the concept of the soul is the greatest prize that quantum theory offers. It is unclear from what Nunn says how the addition of quantum theory to our conceptual repertory offers hope of scientific respectability to the belief that souls exist, but his conviction that this is so is clear.

The strength of Nunn's book is in its willingness to consider data of almost every sort. It takes seriously, for example, the possibility that Olympians Torville and Dean exemplify a group mind when they skate together and that the practice of transcendental meditation has an effect on local crime rates. The weakness of the book is in its unscientific unwillingness to question the data of immediate experience. If it happens that consciousness is neither free nor unified nor lodged in an immaterial soul, even though it may seem to be, then there is no need for a special appeal to quantum theory to explain it.

Thomas Bittner

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Joy A. Palmer and David E. Cooper eds.

*Just Environments: Intergenerational,
International, and Interspecies Issues.*

New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. 199.

Cdn\$69.95: US\$49.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-10335-5);

Cdn\$23.95: US\$16.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-10336-3).

Just Environments is intended to be the first serious encounter of undergraduate students with the ethics of humanity's impact on animals, the environment, and future generations. A multi-disciplinary team have each contributed a short essay highlighting key issues in their area, often with one or two extended examples or case studies. Order is imposed by a strict structure of four sections; the first provides 'framework' (i.e., a discussion of principles); the others deal with intergenerational, international, and interspecies issues. Each section has three papers; the first by a philosopher, the other two by contributors from appropriate areas of the social sciences such as politics, geography, demographics, or tourism.

The first section, on principles, is the weakest. Almond fails at the (admittedly impossible) task of outlining major ethical theories (utilitarianism, virtue ethics, formal, and distributed justice) in less than twenty pages. She tries to apply these theories to the issues in the rest of the book, but unless students had previous knowledge of ethics, her account would need to be supplemented. Palmer uses three cases (San Francisco tidal flats, the Sahel drought, and rabbits in Australia) to highlight the moral issues of human impact on the environment. Clarke's paper on population and the environment seems to rattle off lists of facts, issues, and concerns; but these are exciting lists which would generate discussion and curiosity. He argues for no single point of view; he wants to and will get students thinking about local and global environmental issues, the impact of human populations, and the perplexities of sustainability.

Gower, a philosopher, begins the next section with a paper on 'the environment and justice for future generations'. This paper is interesting, but a poor paper as an introduction for students. Gower discusses questions of meta-justice and ignores the task of explaining basic principles of justice. The only particular principle he uses is Locke's proviso, and neither the principle nor its context is explained.

Simmons, a geographer, contributes a paper on the history of humanity in terms of energy use and population. There is much useful information here. He concludes that the concern for future generations and sustainability is greatly complicated by the unpredictability of the future. This paper should cause students with naive ideals to stop and think.

'Population prospects' is well discussed by Tabah in an excellent overview of current thinking on population trends, especially the current status of 'transition' theory which underlies most population projections. There is no identification or discussion of ethical issues, but this should not stop informed ethical debate with students who have made it this far.

The philosophical paper in the section on international issues is a peculiar argument by Luper-Foy. He starts with libertarian and Rawlsian assumptions, but instead of the usual libertarian defense of private property, he concludes that all the world's natural resources should be owned by the World Bank and leased on a competitive open market for sustainable uses. He also concludes that justice requires that we should reduce the world's population. This can be achieved, he thinks, by issuing sellable rights to have one child. Should students be exposed to philosophers who spin this sort of abstract utopian model disconnected from empirical research and experience (such as China's experience with a one child policy, which is nowhere mentioned)? Placed in the middle of overviews of current empirical theories, the speculative nature of Luper-Foy's approach is clear, and some student is bound to ask about the unpredictable human reactions to such utopian policies as sellable parental rights (especially when it is realised that this might mean a significant transfer of wealth from the straight to the gay community).

The other two papers on international issues are more empirically based. Prosser provides a case study of competition and co-operation of nation states

in Antarctica. This is a great case study; a nice combination of history, issues (such as mining, tourism, and science), possible solutions (such as current multi-national agreements), and threats. Plus he conveys a sense of urgency about moral issues, especially preservation.

Barber and Dickson use environmental issues to question the global system of nation-states. The possible clash between environmental ethics and state 'rights' is made clear, and though this article appears to defend the nation-state system, students will inevitably start wondering if there are alternatives.

The articles in the section on interspecies issues work the best in tandem. Cooper both sketches and questions the 'mainstream' approach to animal ethics in which rational consistency is thought to require extension of human morality (rights, utilitarianism or other) to animals. The second article is a factual account of how current technologies of animal farming cause environmental damage. The final article gives a thoughtful discussion of barriers to ethical treatment of animals such as the difficulty of knowing what other species want, cultural and psychological barriers, and institutional resistance.

There is no concluding article to the collection; none would be possible for such an eclectic selection of views.

As a student text, the chief merits are first that the writing is nowhere patronising or excessively preachy. Second, it is full of ideas and claims that will provoke great ethical discussions, and there is enough information to make a good start on informed discussion. Weaknesses include the failure of the philosophers' contributions to come to grips with the realities revealed in the other papers, but this disconnection could itself lead to useful discussion. Second, there is some confusion over what students are expected to come to the book knowing. This is not a problem for the excellent surveys such as those on population or animal farming; but to take a trivial example, there is no indication for neophytes of original dates of publication; are the intended students of this book expected to know that Hume did not publish in 1985, or Abelard in 1929? More seriously, Gower's paper on justice for future generations is conducted at the meta-justice level, and other papers are similarly weak on clearly explaining basic ethical principles; (though some, such as Cooper on ethics and other species, are clearer).

Overall, the excellent cases and factual surveys, and the weaknesses (as introductions) of the philosophy discussions, mean that this book would be best used with philosophy students already familiar with ethics, or it could be supplemented with a good basic introduction to ethical theory.

John Douglas Bishop

(Administrative Studies Program)

Trent University

Dennis Patterson

Law and Truth.

New York: Oxford University Press 1996.

Pp. 189.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-19-508323-7.

Law and Truth asks 'What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is true?' Patterson argues that all current answers to this question fail, largely because they rely on realist or anti-realist theories of truth which are inappropriate in the context of this question. According to the 'postmodern jurisprudence' Patterson prefers, 'the answer is not that [a proposition of law] is true if it names a relation between a proposition and some state of affairs but that it is true if a competent legal actor could justify its assertion. Doing this requires the speaker to employ the forms of legal argument. In short, "true" is a term of commendation or endorsement. The forms of argument are the answer to the question "What is the justification for saying the proposition in question is 'true'?"' (152). Patterson holds that there are just six forms of argument characteristically used by legal actors: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential (137).

The book falls into three parts. The first chapter explains realism and anti-realism as they relate to theories of law. The second through seventh chapters evaluate seven theories of the truth of propositions of law, and in the final chapter Patterson advances postmodern jurisprudence as the best answer to the book's motivating question. The bulk of the book is by Patterson's own admission 'a work of demolition' (181). He explains that, '...Each author views propositions of law as true in virtue of "something"; each theory is an effort to identify the "truth maker". My effort has been to show the fruitlessness of such an approach to law and to point the way to a different approach' (181). Patterson examines seven positions: the legal formalism of Ernest Weinrib, Michael Moore's ontological realism (with an excursion into David Brink's 'natural kind semantics'), H.L.A. Hart's positivism, Ronald Dworkin's view of law as 'integrity', Stanley Fish's reader response theory, and Philip Bobbitt's 'modal' account of legal argument. Patterson argues that all but Bobbitt wrongly suppose that propositions of law are made true by something other than the practice of those internal to the discourse of law.

For Patterson, following Bobbitt's lead, what makes a proposition of law true is *not* its justification 'from the point of view of some other enterprise (for example, political theory, history, or moral philosophy)' (132). For explanation of what it is for propositions *of* rather than *about* law to be true, only a legal point of view is appropriate. All other approaches explain what makes propositions *about* law true, while mistakenly supposing that they are explaining what makes a proposition *of* law true. Patterson supposes that to say, legally speaking, that it is true that, e.g., murder is prohibited by law, is nothing more than to say that this proposition is generally accepted by competent legal actors as having a settled meaning arrived at by the six ways or 'modes' of argument. To say anything more is to read a practice outside

the discourse of law onto the discourse of law and to diverge into propositions about rather than of law. The view Patterson advances here is postmodern in the sense that it abandons what he takes to be the distinctively modern preoccupation with the truth conditions of propositions of law, in favour of justified assertability, where justification consists in acceptance of the assertion by other competent participants in the practice. (This might be called 'local' as opposed to 'global' justification.)

The origins of this view are in Philip Bobbitt's position that constitutional argument in the United States relies on only six types of argument, frequently interleaved by lawyers or judges in their arguments directed toward establishing the meaning of a given proposition of law. Patterson claims explicitly that while 'the specific context for this chapter is constitutional argument ... the argument under consideration sweeps far more broadly than — and is in no way limited to — constitutional law' (128). Bobbitt supposes that law, like any discipline, has specific 'modalities' or forms of argument it accepts for assessment of the truth of substantive claims internal to the discipline, and claims that 'there is nothing more to constitutional law (or any other body of doctrine) than the use of the six modalities of argument' (137). So, Bobbitt argues and Patterson agrees, 'the law, it turns out, is an activity — the use of the six modes of constitutional argument. Decision is an activity in which one reaches the conclusion that some proposition of law is true or false' (137). The truth of a proposition of law, then, is not a matter of truth conditions, but a measure of the acceptability of a 'modal' argument for the meaning of that proposition to participants in legal discourse.

Unfortunately, little space is devoted to development of these important and intriguing claims. Rather, Patterson spends much of his time pointing to other writers' failure to acknowledge the variety of arguments used by legal actors (in American courts at least). In the last chapter Patterson traces the misfortunes of the modernist views underlying other theories of law and truth, and looks at various postmodern solutions offered by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Rorty. Patterson turns, finally, at p. 169 to apply the collected ideas to law, and the last ten pages of the book provide argument justifying Patterson's anti-foundational explanation of legal language as a social practice. Here Patterson opens many complex questions which are left unresolved. This is not necessarily bad, since the way is left open for Patterson and others to explore further the possibilities Patterson has opened; but those who expect a fully worked theory of the truth of propositions of law will be disappointed, especially if they do not share Patterson's confidence that American constitutional argument is representative of all legal argument.

These caveats aside, the book is tightly focused and written with admirable clarity. It is essential reading for anyone concerned with these issues in analytical jurisprudence.

Keith Culver

University of Guelph

Paul Redding

Hegel's Hermeneutics.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996.

Pp. xvi + 246.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3179-9);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-3180-8).

Paul Redding's *Hegel's Hermeneutics* is nothing if not ambitious. Most hermeneutic philosophers, such as Gadamer, embrace Hegel's views on the historically conditioned nature of knowledge, but would cleave this insight from what are purportedly the more 'metaphysical' aspects of his thought. Redding, on the other hand, who contends that Hegel successfully 'extend[ed] Kant's project of a modern postmetaphysical philosophy' (1), argues that Hegel was nothing less (or more) than a 'hermeneutic philosopher *avant la lettre*' (2).

Redding's treatment of Hegel moves dialectically. After an Introduction in which he anticipatively defends his thesis and then gives a clear outline of what is to follow, Redding spends the first three chapters panoramically surveying various currents within pre-Hegelian philosophy. Much like Hegel himself, he sees them as all culminating in Hegel. Descartes, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling are depicted as progressively moving towards Hegel's view of the fully concreted subject. The pantheistic immanentism of Spinoza, within which particular determinations cannot occur, is sublated by Hegel's philosophy along with the Leibnizian monad (shorn of its transcendent Creator), which contains the absolute within itself as reflected from a distinct perspective. And, the progenitors of hermeneutics, such as Chladenius and Herder, who themselves were influenced by pantheism, provide the philological tools for Hegel's turn of Kant's philosophy towards hermeneutics. Redding even finds the time to critique post-Hegelian hermeneutic philosophers such as Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer in terms of their inclination to read Hegel as a metaphysician.

The conceptual core of this book lies in chapters 4-6, which deal with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. After touching upon the Preface and part A ('Consciousness'), Redding argues that Hegel's crowning achievement lies in his 'recognitive theory of spirit', which apprehends that the ability to recognize the self in others includes an epistemic dimension with hermeneutic overtones. Each combatant in the Master-Slave parable understands the intent of the other because he shares it, albeit from an inverted point of view. This first pattern of reciprocal 'recognition' gives rise to the 'doubly structured intentionality of self-consciousness,' in which consciousness comes to recognize that objects also exist independently of its own point of view. This insight, Redding contends, moves Hegel beyond the shortcomings of Fichte's one-sided 'subjective Subject-Object', and enables him to effectively respond to Kant's metaphysical skepticism: 'As the existence of another embodied and located subject is a precondition to the achievement of self-consciousness, the limits to the constituting power of a single subject's intention is provided for

without the need for metaphysical recourse to the thing-in-itself ... The limits are now provided by another intentional being, within the world' (113). Redding then proceeds to examine four paradigmatic forms of recognition in the *Phenomenology* from the hermeneutic perspective: Master-Slave, Unhappy Consciousness, Spirit Certain of Itself-Morality, and Absolute Knowing.

In response to those who distinguish the 'good' Hegel of the *Phenomenology* from the 'bad' Hegel of the *Science of Logic*, and then sever the *Philosophy of Right* from 'the system' altogether, Redding aims to show in the third part of the book that the *Logic* is built upon the *Phenomenology*, and that the *Philosophy of Right* sidesteps many of the problems inherent in historicism because of its 'systematic links' with the *Logic*. Accordingly, in chapter 7, which surveys the *Logic*, Redding claims that consciousness and 'the concept' are homologous. 'Like objects of consciousness,' he says, 'thought determinations are "double-sensed" and contain an internal perspectival "contradiction" between the singular first person point of view and the communicable universal aspect' (146). Moreover, what brings the singular and universal together in both cases is a mediating particular, whether it be the priest within the 'unhappy consciousness' framework or the particular term within a syllogism. Redding asserts, however, that Hegel's recourse to Aristotelian logic involves a crucial twist. Unlike Aristotle, Hegel views the syllogism's premises as conclusions of other syllogisms. For Aristotle, this was unacceptable because it implies an infinite regress. But for Hegel, this model points to the mediated nature of all knowledge; it replaces the linear model of formal reasoning from certain premises with a concrete circle of reciprocal presupposing in which the very terms of the syllogism exchange places in the process of thought's categorial movement. Redding thus asks: 'Does not the notion of dynamic spirit as a structure of reciprocal recognition consist of such a circle of reciprocal positings of presuppositions?' (156).

In chapters 8-11, Redding examines the *Philosophy of Right* in rich detail, which, unfortunately, cannot be considered here. Generally, Redding argues that as opposed to empirical historical accounts in which a logic is situated within the described system (and which thus correspond to the 'essence-logic'), 'the logical shape of the *Rechtsphilosophie* ... conforms in some overall way to the logical structure of the subjective logic' (168). And, more specifically, as Redding progresses from 'Abstract Right' to 'The State', he tries to show that paradigmatic forms of consciousness from the *Phenomenology* and categories from the *Logic* (along with the dynamics of the syllogistic model), are repositied within the very marrow of each stage of this work.

Space limitations do not permit the critical appraisal that this book deserves. Generally speaking, however, the question that this new interpretation of Hegel raises is whether its own ambitiousness is made good at the expense of the ambitiousness of Hegel's own project. One can embrace Redding's unwillingness to see Spirit as God (or any other non-human Subject), as well as his interpretation of absolute knowing as 'the (tragic) insight that particular and determinate bodies of knowledge are always conditioned and so perspectival' (140), without buying into his hermeneutical interpretation.

Indeed, by defining 'objectivity' as an intersubjective determination reached dialogically, which smacks of a sort of Fichtean 'macro-subjective Subject-Object', Redding does not do justice to Hegel's account of the relation between our objective nature as self-determining beings and the world of which we are a part. The rich notion of *bildung*, which for Hegel is intertwined with dialectic, goes by the boards, as do Hegel's vital notions of Truth and Freedom. Thus, although even Redding's qualified view of absolute knowing can provide a regulative standpoint from which reflection can grasp a deviation between the reality created by intersubjective determinations and 'the actual', Redding's hermeneutic approach can discern no such discrepancy; provided history is "integrated" into the present' (246), we are always-already reconciled.

Nonetheless, this is a thoughtful and well-written work that repays a close reading even by those who are not persuaded by its main thesis. After reading a flood of wooden poststructuralist diatribes against Hegel, it serves as an excellent chaser.

David Sherman

University of Texas at Austin

Alan D. Schrift

*Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy
of Poststructuralism.*

New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. xviii + 198.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91146-X);

Cdn\$24.95: US\$17.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91147-8).

If nothing else, this book offers a careful, lucid account of poststructuralism's Nietzschean lineage. Amid this modest history of ideas, though, Schrift's bipartite project frequently surprises with playful experimentation. Schrift addresses the twin problems of poststructuralism's own superficial recognition of its links to Nietzsche and Nietzsche scholarship's neglect of the philosophical positions of poststructuralism. In this way, the book's audience is already divided between those who interpret and those who use Nietzsche, thus rendering its goals all the more ambitious. Namely, Schrift aims to show how Nietzsche's work prefigures certain poststructuralist motifs. Assuming Nietzsche to be a significant shared reference, he closely analyzes the views of certain recent French philosophers. This genealogy of poststructuralism,

in turn, provides ample opportunity for more subtle readings of Nietzsche's ideas.

Possessed of Nietzschean spirit, Schrift's comparative method favours exploring poststructuralism's realms of invention rather than its contributions to the historical storage room. Indeed, he devotes only a short portion of the Introduction to a potted history of poststructuralism — situating it chronologically after such post-Nietzsche movements as existentialism and structuralism. Although brief, this account frames the body of his investigation, which is more dynamically arranged by theme and author. Generally, Schrift covers the usual signposts of Nietzschean scholarship — binary language, perspectivism, will to power, and the autonomous subject. Still, these topics alone create enough overlap between the discussions of the French philosophers as to spark a detailed exegesis of poststructuralist philosophies. Although he limits his inquiry to Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and Cixous, he often gives other favourites, such as Bourdieu, Lyotard, Bataille, and Adorno, more than passing acknowledgement. He introduces them (along with other non-French philosophers such as Heidegger, Rorty, Gadamer, and Butler) in order to elucidate the larger project, without making them appear as secondary players. Quotations abound in generous length, bringing broader philosophical contexts to bear on the point in question. This is both informative as an introduction to recent French thought and delightful as a reminder of what may already be familiar.

At its most benign moments, Schrift's book merely baits its own philosophical double hook. Rather disappointingly, there are several such moments. Simply put, the analogy he wishes to explore between Nietzschean and poststructuralist motifs is often already rigidly in place in his analyses of the French philosophers. What results is a diminishing of Nietzsche's role as a distinct, yet prime, mover of poststructuralism. For example, in the chapter on Derrida, Schrift describes similarities between Nietzsche's transvaluation of values and Derrida's deconstruction. He points out the critical suspicion each casts on the binary language of metaphysics. Interestingly, his descriptions of Nietzsche's views borrow heavily from Derrida's strategy of critique, frequently substituting transvaluation with 'deconstruction' and perspectivism with 'active interpretation' or 'style of reading' (23). In his haste to arrive at the conglomerate of ideas, he glosses over important differences in connotation each term imports from its original context. Indeed, does Derrida's neutralization of metaphysical opposites into 'non-concepts' (21) reduce unequivocally to Nietzsche's insistence that language will continue to talk of opposites where there are many subtleties of gradation (23)? In the absence of an explicit account of their differences, Schrift abandons the less presumptuous association with Nietzsche as 'protodeconstruction' (21). Thus, it is no surprise that Nietzsche sounds like Derrida. While a seemingly finicky point, to leave his presuppositions unexamined in this way is to alienate his audience further — for he inadvertently trivializes the division between interpreting and appropriating Nietzsche that initially spurs his project.

By contrast, the chapter that comes closest to achieving his aims is that on Cixous and Nietzsche. In struggling to find common ground between their conceptions of the economy of gift-giving, Schrift's account becomes less descriptive and more analytical. Hence, he ventures into philosophical speculation. In the gaps in the analogy, he contrasts exchange with gift-giving — a discussion which raises dynamic distinctions between learning and receiving, masculine and feminine economies, and gratitude and revenge. In this way, a dialogue unfolds between Nietzschean and poststructuralist motifs.

Less consistently, patches of keen observation also arise in the chapters on Deleuze and on the Anti-Nietzscheans (i.e., Ferry, Renaut, Descombes). Deleuze's philosophy of 'becoming' is Schrift's springboard for a charitable, complex commentary on Nietzsche's dangerously ambiguous notion of 'ubermensch'. Schrift defends the compelling idea of *ubermensch* as a work in progress rather than as a destiny (73). It is a distinction whose significance resonates in the final chapter's inquiry into the recent death of Nietzsche's French legacy. In his wry response to Anti-Nietzschean trends, Schrift envisions Nietzsche's own scholarly destiny as eternal return. Insofar as it explores the possibility for the continued critical engagement of Nietzsche's works with shifting contemporary philosophical and political centres, Schrift's reply circumvents being another cliché of the 'Nietzsche industry' (123). Rather, it credits Nietzsche's far-reaching influence as impressive.

Overall, Schrift's choice of authors and his treatment of themes are felicitous. At its most reserved, this book is a thorough introduction to Nietzsche and poststructuralist scholarship that frequently challenges the presuppositions and knowledge of its readers.

Lisa Phillips

University of Toronto

Richard Taylor

Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age.

Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books 1996.

Pp. 232.

US\$23.95. ISBN 1-57392-024-X.

Richard Taylor is a patriarch — teacher and mentor to many philosophers for some 50 years now, author of a wide array of articles and monographs covering metaphysics to political philosophy to logic to theism, contributor to op-ed pages and participant in numerous public forums. He writes well and often, and his latest offering revisits themes he has made his own over

the last two decades — metaphysics, ethics, and the depiction of a life well lived.

Taylor has regularly described himself as a humanist, and *Restoring Pride* is something of a humanist manifesto. His humanism might be described as an updated Enlightenment version of that outlook; he is a kind of twentieth-century Adam Smith. Pride is a virtue for Taylor, an 'elitist' virtue (21) that belongs to the morally robust individual. His identification of pride as 'essentially, a matter of how you think of, and how you treat, yourself' (151) situates him within a tradition that honors the individual as the center of moral reflection and activity. When an individual has acquired the virtue of pride, she will be governed by a vision of her own well-being in her dealings with others.

If this sounds like something you would more likely find in the 'Self-Help' section, rather than the 'Philosophy' section, of your local bookstore, you are not far wrong. More than half of the book is devoted to brief descriptions of how such a life filled with pride is to be lived. There are three pages devoted to vulgarity, a page and a half to 'Highway Manners', a longer section on coping with divorce. Often, 'pride' simply means 'self-esteem', and Taylor's *exhortations to acquire it are by now thoroughly familiar in our culture.*

Familiar, too, is the metaphysical grounding for this program, which is the 'self' portion of 'self-esteem'. In passages reminiscent of another Taylor (Charles), this Taylor invites us 'to reinvent (our) own lives' (71), and provides a section on 'Creating Your Own Life'. Limits on the identity and development of the self turn out to be mostly conventional obstacles we are encouraged to overcome. The self, Taylor thinks, is assembled a piece at a time, by means of the decisions we make. 'Has your marriage become loveless, a routine going through familiar motions? Then leave it and start another ... Has your work lost its meaning, so that it simply repeats itself day after day? — Consider that you are not compelled to stick with it' (72). From where does the capacity to make such wrenching decisions come? From the prior inculcation of pride, which equips us to undertake the construction of our own particular self.

This may be effective motivational rhetoric, but the metaphysics is muddled. It presumes that human beings are fundamentally choosing things, decision-making entities. If we are not such, the entire project dies a-borning. Nearly every other important thing about us as human beings is 'up to us,' as Aristotle might have said; but it is necessary that we possess 'by nature' a prior capacity to choose. We are vacuous creatures save for a decision-making mechanism. This is what gives *Restoring Pride* its common resonance with the genre of self-help literature. But to this metaphysical commitment is added an allegiance to a strong version of libertarian freedom, such that the human capacity to choose is unfettered by a nexus of natural or 'given' conditions under which those choices are made. We are not merely choosing machines; we do our choosing in a contextual vacuum.

This is a therapy for creatures without selves, without souls, without limits. Although Taylor invokes virtue as the therapeutic remedy for our

artificially shackled existence — ‘willingly slavery’, he calls it — this is not what the Greeks would have understood by *therapia*, nor the way they would have construed the character of virtue. This is virtue in its postmodernist guise, moral sentiment dressed up as virtue. It is in this way that *Restoring Pride* looks back to the language of Adam Smith. But it is difficult to imagine what kind of genuine restoration of virtue is being advocated if there is no substantial self to restore.

Thomas D. Pearson

The University of Texas-Pan American

Elizabeth Vallance

Business Ethics at Work.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xi + 191.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-40535-1);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-40568-8).

This book presents an ethical framework relevant to business moral decision making. This is developed not from the perspective of one or several ethical theories but through an analysis of the nature and aim of business itself. It is innovative because the perspective advocated is not one an ethicist would prescribe but a framework a business person can use when she feels the pull between good business sense and basic morality. This book is divided into three sections. The first develops the ethical framework; the next applies this framework to specific moral issues; and the final section considers how any business can use these ideas.

The first part of the book explores the basic ideas behind the ethical framework. The ethical decision model (EDM) is presented in the third chapter after Vallance has discussed two other topics: 1) the place of ethics in business and 2) the nature and aim of business. The first chapter considers the role of ethics in business. The extreme views claim either that ethics has no place in business since all decisions are technical matters or that ethics is one of the most important considerations. Noting that the primary aim of business is to make money, Vallance argues that neither view is correct: making money involves more than making technical decisions, but all business decisions do not revolve around ethics. Thus, the role of ethics is identified as one of providing a framework for making decisions about moral problems related to business.

The following chapter examines one of the author's central claims: business ethics must begin by looking at the aim of business. This aim is to secure '... the maximization of long term owner or shareholder value' (31). It is claimed that business ethics should be part of the strategy to reach this aim, and the ethical business is the one that does this.

The framework for making moral decisions in business, the EDM, is presented in the third chapter. The model has four steps: 1) determine what the question or problem is; 2) determine how it affects the business; 3) identify external constraints such as laws and markets; and 4) apply the basic moral principles of justice and common decency. The purpose of this framework is to provide a model for determining whether a particular problem is a moral one and reaching a judgment that is consistent with the aim of business and the principles of justice and common decency.

The second part of the book applies the EDM to specific moral issues. Two of the issues are potential internal problems. One is in the area of human resources. Workers are a primary need of the company, so the treatment of them in recruitment, training, motivation, and elimination is a moral issue. It is argued that employers must be treated with common decency and justice. The second issue revolves around questions of finance. Particular issues include takeovers, management buyouts, junk bonds, insider trading, and banking. When these areas affect the success of reaching the business aim of securing long-term shareholder value they become moral issues. Following the EDM, it is noted that the specific problem must be identified in order to make a proper moral judgment.

The next two chapters consider issues surrounding the external affairs of businesses. Advertising and marketing is one of these. It is argued that the question to be asked is whether or not these activities should be manipulative and untruthful. It is shown that when advertising and marketing are done according to principles of common decency and justice, the business aim will be secured. The other area of consideration is environmental issues. Here it is important to consider the aim of business, and it is not to clean up the environment. It is argued that the business person must determine how outsiders will view the company if they do not show concern for the environment. This is what provides a basis for determining the morally correct actions.

The final chapter of section two examines the place of the EDM in corporate governance. It is argued that ethical accountability must lie with the board of directors who have the role of defining the corporate strategy. It is advocated that a non-executive director serve as both an advisor to the board and a mediator between employees and the board. This would provide a mechanism for resolving ethical issues within the company while making the business's ethical commitment clear to both those inside and outside of the business.

The final part of the book examines what might be done to implement these ideas. For now it is claimed that what is necessary is to make the ethical framework visible and active since only then will business ethics lead to

achieving the aim of business. The claim is that an ethical audit would aid in this process. This audit would force the business to consider the role of ethics in the company and evaluate whether it is achieving its goals. The final chapter argues that this view of business ethics will provide a basis for evaluating the role of business. In the end, it is restressed that the role business ethics must take is to emphasize the aim of securing long-term shareholder value while adhering to the principles of justice and common decency.

This book offers a unique perspective of what business ethics should be. I agree that one must look at what business is when examining what business ethics ought to be, but two questions remain. First, is it important to do the morally right act or just appear to do so? Second, is one begging the question if what one claims that what business ought to do is determined by what it is? These questions point to some shortcomings, but the book does provide an insightful and new direction for business ethics.

Ed Teall

Mount Saint Mary College

Nicholas Wolterstorff

*Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections
on the claim that God speaks.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. 326.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47539-2);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47557-0).

In *Divine discourse*, Nicholas Wolterstorff has written a world-class work in the philosophy of religion, incorporating elements from, and making original contributions to, analytic philosophy of language, Continental and Biblical hermeneutics, Biblical theology, and epistemology. While several forms of divine speech are dealt with, the book principally offers an original, well-developed, and multi-faceted underpinning for the traditional Christian practice of reading the Bible as communication from God. Part of the originality of Wolterstorff's approach lies in his initial distinction between divine speech and divine revelation in the second chapter. For instance, Wolterstorff argues that a good deal of what Christians have historically identified as God's speaking through Scripture cannot properly be called revelatory, *revealing* being only one kind of speech-act among many that have been attributed to God. This distinction takes Wolterstorff in a direction unexplored by previous theological analyses.

Drawing on the Austinian distinction between locution and illocution, Wolterstorff notes that the same locutionary act may be used to perform more than one illocutionary act by more than one speaker. One way this can occur is when one speaker appropriates the speech or text of another, as when, for example, an executive signs a document drawn up by a secretary. Wolterstorff then suggests that this is the best model for understanding the traditional Christian claim that God speaks through the whole of the Bible; parts of the Bible might be deputized discourse, or even dictated discourse, but the claim that God speaks throughout the Scriptures is best understood, Wolterstorff thinks, by supposing the Bible to be *divinely appropriated human discourse*, supplemented by some doctrine of divine inspiration (53-4).

In the chapter entitled 'What it is to speak', Wolterstorff asks how it is that through simple, locutionary utterings speakers are able to perform other illocutionary speech acts such as declaring or informing. After canvassing several alternative theories, Wolterstorff offers his own normative account: 'To institute an arrangement for the performance of speech actions is to institute a way of acquiring rights and responsibilities' [84]. The next two chapters ask whether God could have or acquire the rights and responsibilities of a speaker, and whether God could cause the events of discourse. That God could acquire rights or responsibilities is chiefly problematic for those who also endorse some kind of divine command theory of ethical wrongness, such as the theory articulated by Robert Adams. Such theories seemingly imply that god cannot have obligations, but this would mean that whole categories of speech-acts such as promising are impossible for God — an awkward result, since in the Judaic, Christian, and Islamic traditions, 'the language of promising and covenanting is as prominent in the discourse of the writers about God as is the language of commanding' (101).

Wolterstorff next turns to the defense of interpretation for authorial intent against such notable critics as Ricour and Derrida, devoting a whole chapter to each. He insists that interpreting for authorial intent need not involve a return to the Romantic school wherein one strives to ascertain the inner states of the author's mind. To suppose that it does, he thinks, involves a failure to distinguish between asking what an author *said* and asking what an author *meant to say*. Wolterstorff also argues that there is no such thing as 'the sense of a text' — any text will have indefinitely many possible senses; it follows that one must either interpret for authorial intent or else engage in 'performance interpretation,' where one essentially appropriates a text to say something without reference to original meaning. [Not that Wolterstorff regards the latter is necessarily inappropriate, even when interpreting for divine speech. He remarks, 'We must be careful ... not to exclude the possibility that God would speak to us not only by way of authoring the text of Scripture but by way of our interpreting it, be our interpretation within a tradition, or original to the point of bizarre' (182).]

Having laid the conceptual groundwork in the first ten chapters, Wolterstorff proceeds to elaborate on how the Bible could be read as God's opus. In cases of appropriated discourse such as Wolterstorff claims the Bible to be,

interpreting the speech of the appropriating speaker usually depends on interpreting the original meaning of appropriated discourse. Thus Wolterstorff speaks of a 'first and second hermeneutic,' the first seeking to discern the authorial intent of the Biblical writers, and the second building on the first to discern mediated divine discourse. The fundamental principle for this second hermeneutic is to assume the stance and content of the appropriating discourse to be the same as the appropriated discourse unless there is 'good reason to do otherwise' (204). Since it may be assumed that God would never say anything false, unintentional, or inconsistent with his nature, this two-tiered hermeneutic gives Wolterstorff a new way to acknowledge the humanity of Scripture, including errors, inconsistencies, and less-than-divine sentiments, while still insisting that Scripture mediates God's speech. Two more chapters deal, respectively, with the problems arising from the differing moral and metaphysical assumptions interpreters may bring to a text, and the 'illocutionary stance of Biblical narrative.'

In the last two chapters Wolterstorff turns to more straightforwardly epistemological issues. Chapter fifteen asks whether human beings are ever entitled to suppose that God is speaking to them, while Chapter sixteen more specifically asks whether there is good reason to believe that the Bible is a medium of divine discourse. Secular readers are apt to find the last chapter particularly frustrating, however, because when Wolterstorff discusses competing interpretive practices to the one he proposes, he seems exclusively concerned with alternative *Christian* hermeneutics! The secular reader is apt to feel cheated, as if the most important point has been overlooked. Those familiar with Wolterstorff's other work, however, may interpret this omission as reflecting a Reformed epistemological stance which ultimately denies that Christians are under any intellectual obligation to evidentially support their basic beliefs. Wolterstorff may simply be concerned to do the best philosophical work he can for an audience that shares his basic presuppositions. Nevertheless, the sheer breadth of material covered, the incisiveness of Wolterstorff's analyses, and the lucidity of his prose make this book deserving of a wider audience than, perhaps, Wolterstorff himself may have intended.

Andrew V. Jeffery

Seattle Pacific University

Nicholas Wolterstorff

John Locke and the Ethics of Belief.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xxi + 248.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-55118-8);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-55909-X).

'Locke is not the philosopher in the tower rendering judgments on who knows what and how, but the philosopher in the street offering advice to his anxious combative compatriots on how to overcome the cultural crisis engulfing them' (x). This theme of Locke-the-practical-philosopher is hardly new in contemporary interpretations; Richard Ashcraft is one of a number well advanced along this way. Wolterstorff, however, makes this the *leitmotif* of his study and (unlike earlier treatments primarily restricted to politics) develops it in terms of Locke's epistemology.

The crisis in which Locke and his contemporaries found themselves is that 'of having to govern our belief in general, and settle our moral and political quandaries in particular, when our once-unified tradition has fragmented into partisan quarrels' (181; see also xix, 3, 7, 246). To overcome it Locke 'described a new doxastic practice' and 'argued that we are all obligated to apply this practice in all cases of maximal concernment — in particular, to matters of religion and morality' (227; also xvii). Given the nature of the crisis and Locke's proposed remedy, it makes sense for Wolterstorff to focus on Locke's epistemology. For Locke's foundationalist position (xvii, 68-9, 90) a question such as how one knows whether it is legitimate to oppose a king cannot be answered unless one has answered the question of how one knows. It is the relationship between statements like these which indicates the genesis of Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Wolterstorff does justice to Locke's intentions when, in his book, he connects Locke's *ethics* and *theory of knowledge and belief*.

Wolterstorff's discussion of Locke's 'ethics of belief' requires him to focus on Locke's epistemology, primarily as presented in Book IV of the *Essay*. This approach relegates the first three Books to a propaedeutic role — an eminently sensible reading of which, in view of the relationship he draws between under-labouring and master-building in the *Essay*'s 'Epistle to the Reader', Locke would have approved. This focus does not relegate 'ethics' to peripheral status, for throughout Book IV Locke's questions are: what are we permitted to believe, and on what grounds? and what grounds do we need to make responsible knowledge claims? That the theory of 'entitlement' which grounds claims to belief and knowledge has strong and explicit ethical dimensions is clear enough from especially chapters XII, XVIII, XIX, and XX of Book IV. Locke's epistemology attempts to free people from prejudice, superstition and tradition. The very fact of the latter's irreparable fracture precipitating partisan battles (xix, 3, 4, 7, 181, 246) in which all parties claim absolute rightness of their cause indicates the pervasiveness of prejudice and superstition. Locke's epistemology was meant to help inaugurate the epoch

of prejudice- (hence tradition-)free autonomous individuals. Again, the connection between epistemology and 'morals' is clear. As Wolterstorff writes: 'In Locke's epistemology, as well as his political thought, the sovereign individual occupies center stage' (151). I would say: because of his epistemology, the individual is sovereign in Locke's political thought. Wolterstorff probably agrees with this formulation; he holds that 'At the very heart of Locke's model of the responsible believer' there is the dictum that 'We ought so to discipline ourselves that, for those propositions of sufficient "concernment" to us, we take Reason as our guide' (148).

'That there is a general ethic of belief, and that in this ethic Reason has a central role — once these convictions had been clearly formulated and persuasively propounded by Locke, they became prominent in the mentality of modernity ... My thesis [is] that Locke was the first great philosopher to propound this vision ...' (180). These last phrases indicate another interesting feature of the book: it is not just about Locke, but about Locke in relation to Hume (159-79) and Descartes (180-218).

The relationship drawn between Locke and Hume helps to show how Locke is mistaken to the extent that he makes his doctrine of warranted beliefs about nature rest on a peculiar view of the role of reason. The relationship between Locke and Descartes is meant to make plausible the claim that Locke (rather than Descartes) was the first who persuaded modernity of the ethic of belief and of the role of reason in it. This claim remains unconvincing. Wolterstorff fails to establish that it is primarily Locke who 'shaped the modern mind' (xi) and was 'the father of modernity' (xiv) whose 'innovation' was to insist that 'in the governance of *beliefs* ... we are to listen to the voice of Reason' (241). This sort of 'novel' interpretation is not new. Gilbert Ryle, too, saw the *Essay* as a watershed: were we to be transposed to the England of 1600 'we should gasp like fishes out of water' while, in 1700, after the *Essay*'s publication, 'we could already converse with our new acquaintances there without feeling lost' ('John Locke', *Critica*, 1, 2, 1967, p.3). And to the extent that it is supported by a 'novel' interpretation of Descartes (190, 207, 211, 215-18) it fails because (as I show in a forthcoming article in *Philosophia Reformata*) it rests on a misinterpretation of Descartes.

Excessive claims to novelty aside this is an excellent study to the extent it focuses on Locke. It is thorough, pays careful attention to the text, and is rich in critical engagement with both the most recent work on Locke and recent work relevant to some of Locke's central concerns. It is a culmination of interpretations which began to argue for Locke as an 'engaged' philosopher. It is, itself, an engaging book — the kind of work which ought to receive wide readership among historians of philosophy in particular and, in general, among those interested in our intellectual roots. We share with Locke the situation of living with 'fractured traditions'. To understand how one of the chief progenitors of modern Western culture attempted to deal with such a situation is of interest to anyone concerned about our present cultural condition. For 'there is no viable alternative' to the 'vision of a society in which

persons of diverse traditions live together in justice and friendship ... slowly altering their traditions in response to their conversation' (246).

Peter A. Schouls

Massey University

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOL. XVI (1996)

Listed alphabetically by author of book reviewed.

Répertoire alphabétiquement par l'auteur du livre faisant
l'objet d'un compte rendu.

No. 1: February	1 - 78	No. 2: April	79 - 156
No. 3: June	157 - 229	No. 4: August	231 - 307
No. 5: October	309 - 384	No. 6: December	384 - 446

Peter Abelard , <i>Ethical Writings: His Ethics or 'Know Yourself' and His Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian.</i> Trans. Paul Vincent Spade. J.J. MacIntosh	1
Linda Martín Alcoff , <i>Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory.</i> Stephen Maitzen	385
T.A. Alekseeva and William Gay , <i>Capitalism with a Human Face: The Quest for a Middle Road in Russian Politics</i> William L. McBride	162
Robert F. Almeder and James M. Humber, eds. , <i>Reproduction, Technology, and Rights</i> Elisabeth Boetzkes	171
J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison eds. , <i>World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams.</i> David Glidden	231
Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, eds. , <i>The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy.</i> Charles Ess	236

J. Annas and J. Barnes, trans., <i>Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism</i>	143
Suzanne Abram	
Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington, David Hoyt, Michael Latham, and Allison Sneider eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	
John Arthur, Words That Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory	238
Amy Ihlan	
Alison Assiter, Enlightened Women: Modernist Feminism in a Postmodern Age	389
Kevin M. Graham	
Susan E. Babbitt, Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination	309
Eldon Soifer	
Kurt Baier, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality	79
James B. Sauer	
Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds., <i>Punishment and the Death Penalty</i>	3
Jordan Steiker	
Joseph Andrew Barash, Heidegger et son siècle. Temps de l'Être, temps de l'histoire.	81
Daniel Cayer	
J. Barnes and J. Annas, trans., <i>Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism</i>	143
Suzanne Abram	
Marcia W. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology	313
Grant Sterling	
Margaret Pabst Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide	6
Denise Meyerson	
Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., Intending Death: The Ethics Of Assisted Suicide	157
Robin Tapley	
Zev Bechler, Aristotle's Theory of Actuality	392
David Bradshaw	
Ronald Beiner and William James Booth, eds., <i>Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy</i>	241
Brian Orend	

Gérard Bergeron , <i>Tout était dans Montesquieu.</i> <i>Une relecture de L'esprit des lois</i>	243
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub	
Ronald Beiner and William James Booth, eds., <i>Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy.</i>	241
Brian Orend	
Christopher Biffle , <i>A Guided Tour of Five Works by Plato</i> , 2nd. edn.	245
James Crooks	
William James Booth and Ronald Beiner, eds., <i>Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy.</i>	241
Brian Orend	
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub	
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub , <i>Mimes et Parades.</i> <i>L'activité symbolique dans la vie sociale</i>	84
Sonia Deragon	
David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter Schotch (with two chapters by Laura Byrne), <i>Logic on the Track of Social Change.</i>	315
Peter Vallentyne	
Linda Marie Brooks , <i>The Menace of the Sublime to the Individual Self</i>	159
Albert W.J. Harper	
Bryson Brown, Peter Schotch, and David Braybrooke (with two chapters by Laura Byrne), <i>Logic on the Track of Social Change.</i>	315
Peter Vallentyne	
Wendy Brown , <i>States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity</i>	7
Ian Hunt	
Sandra Burt and Lorraine Code, eds., <i>Changing Methods: Feminists Transforming Practice.</i>	317
Barbara S. Andrew	
Dana E. Bushnell, ed., 'Nagging' Questions: <i>Feminist Ethics in Everyday Life</i>	247
Edrie Sobstyl	
Laura Byrne, David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter Schotch , <i>Logic on the Track of Social Change.</i>	315
Peter Vallentyne	
Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., <i>Theories of Theories of Mind.</i>	319
Brian Jonathan Garrett	
Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck and Thomas Uebel, <i>Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics.</i>	322
John Preston	

Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck, Thomas Uebel and Nancy Cartwright, <i>Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics.</i>	322
John Preston	
Sue L. Cataldi, <i>Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment</i>	9
Duane H. Davis	
Peter Caws, <i>Ethics from Experience</i>	12
Susan M. Turner	
Simone Chambers, <i>Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse.</i>	325
Evan Simpson	
Jean-Pierre Changeux and Alain Connes, <i>Conversations on Mind, Matter, and Mathematics.</i> Trans M.B. DeBevoise	16
Valerie Gray Hardcastle	
Lorraine Code and Sandra Burt, eds., <i>Changing Methods: Feminists Transforming Practice.</i>	317
Barbara S. Andrew	
Murray Code, <i>Myths of Reason</i>	17
John McGuire	
S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C. Reeve, eds., <i>Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy From Thales to Aristotle</i>	19
Eric W. Snider	
Alain Connes and Jean-Pierre Changeux, <i>Conversations on Mind, Matter, and Mathematics.</i> Trans M.B. DeBevoise	16
David E. Cooper and Joy A. Palmer eds., <i>Just Environments: Intergenerational, International, and Interspecies Issues</i>	428
John Douglas Bishop	
Frédéric Cossutta (sous la direction de), <i>Descartes et l'argumentation philosophique.</i>	327
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub	
Elizabeth Covington, David Hoyt, Michael Latham, Allison Sneider, and Joyce Appleby eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	
Patricia Curd, S. Marc Cohen, and C.D.C. Reeve, eds., <i>Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy From Thales to Aristotle</i>	19
Eric W. Snider	
Robert Damien, <i>Bibliothèque et État. Naissance d'une raison politique dans la France du XVII^e siècle</i>	86
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub	

Thomas Dean, ed., <i>Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion</i>	249
William Sweet	
Alain de Libera, <i>La philosophie médiévale</i>	89
Fabienne Pironet	
David Depew and Robert Hollinger, eds., <i>Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism</i>	410
Matthew Stephens	
Jacques Derrida, <i>Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International</i> . trans. Peggy Kamuf.	329
Jay Drydyk	
William Desmond, <i>Being and the Between</i>	331
George E.A. Williamson	
André De Tienne, <i>L'analytique de la représentation chez Peirce</i>	251
Pierre Poirier	
Keith Devlin, <i>Logic and Information</i>	91
Peter Novak	
Andrew Dobson, <i>Jean-Paul Sartre and the Politics of Reason: a Theory of History</i>	394
Matthew Lee	
Alan Donagan, <i>The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan</i>	93
Hugh J. McCann	
Adam Drozdek, <i>The Moral Dimension of Man in the Age of Computers</i>	97
Robert S. Stufflebeam	
Louis Dupré, <i>Passage to Modernity</i>	253
Robert Piercey	
S.W. Emery, <i>Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito</i>	245
James Crooks	
Pascal Engel, <i>Davidson et la philosophie du langage</i>	99
Michel Désy	
Lorne Falkenstein, <i>Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic</i>	333
Mark T. Conard	
Rivka Feldhay, <i>Galileo and the Church: Political Inquisition or Critical Dialogue?</i>	101
James B. South	

Frederick Ferré , <i>Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics</i>	336
Eugene C. Hargrove	
Gail Fine and Terence Irwin , trans., <i>Aristotle: Selections</i>	29
Arthur E. Falk	
John Martin Fischer , <i>The Metaphysics of Free Will</i>	340
Michael J. Zimmerman	
Kevin L. Flannery, S.J. , <i>Ways into the logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias</i>	345
Ignacio Angelelli	
Lola Fleck , Thomas Uebel , Nancy Cartwright and Jordi Cat , <i>Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics</i>	322
John Preston	
William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter , <i>Duns Scotus, Metaphysician</i>	254
Martin M. Tweedale	
Patrick Fuery , <i>The Theory of Absence: Subjectivity, Signification, and Desire</i>	160
Laura Anders Canis	
Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff , eds. <i>Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists</i>	103
Trevor J. Saunders	
William Gay and T.A. Alekseeva , <i>Capitalism with a Human Face: The Quest for a Middle Road in Russian Politics</i>	162
William L. McBride	
Robert J. Geis , <i>Personal Existence After Death</i>	396
Louis Marinoff	
Judith Genova , <i>Wittgenstein: A way of seeing</i>	257
Pierre Poirier	
Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan , trans., <i>Plato: Parmenides</i>	398
Richard J. Ketchum	
Hans Goetz , <i>To Live is To Think: The Thought of Twentieth-Century German Philosopher Constantin Brunner</i>	259
David Westbrook	
Alan H. Goldman , <i>Aesthetic Value</i>	106
Eileen John	
Daniel Goleman , <i>Emotional Intelligence</i>	21
Christine P. Watling	
Alfonso Gómez-Lobo , <i>The Foundations of Socratic Ethics</i>	24
Naomi Reshotko	

George Grant, <i>Philosophy in the Mass Age</i>	165
Steven Burns	
George Grant, <i>Time as History</i>	165
Steven Burns	
Kent Greenawalt, <i>Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech</i>	348
Samantha Brennan	
Marjorie Grene, <i>A Philosophical Testament</i>	108
Robert D. Lane	
David Ray Griffin and Sandra B. Lubarsky, eds., <i>Jewish Theology and Process Thought</i>	360
M.S. Lane	
Morwenna Griffiths, <i>Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity</i>	399
Majia Holmer Nadesan	
Ian Hacking, <i>Rewriting the Soul</i>	402
Andrew Brook	
Richard F. Hamilton, <i>The Social Misconstruction of Reality</i>	406
Robert Dow	
H.S. Harris, <i>Hegel: Phenomenology and System</i>	110
George E.A. Williamson	
Ross Harrison and J.E.J. Altham eds., <i>World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams</i>	231
David Glidden	
Van A. Harvey, <i>Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion</i>	350
Tinu Ruparell	
David W. Haslett, <i>Capitalism with Morality</i>	408
Lesley A. Jacobs	
Lawrence Hatab, <i>A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy</i>	167
Drew A. Hyland	
Robert Hollinger and David Depew, eds., <i>Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism</i>	410
Matthew Stephens	
Terence Horgan and John Tienson, <i>Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology</i>	413
Robert J. Stainton	
Daniel Howards-Snyder and Jeff Jordan, eds., <i>Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Philosophy of Religion Today</i>	355
Jerome I. Gellman	

David Hoyt, Michael Latham, Allison Sneider, Joyce Appleby, and Elizabeth Covington eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism</i> <i>in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	
James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder, eds., <i>Reproduction, Technology, and Rights</i>	171
Elisabeth Boetzkes	
Roberta Imboden, <i>The Church: A Demon Lover</i>	28
Ed Teall	
Luce Irigaray, <i>thinking the difference: For a Peaceful Revolution</i>	174
Kathleen A. O'Grady	
Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, trans., <i>Aristotle: Selections</i>	29
Micheline R. Ishay, <i>Internationalism and its Betrayal</i>	414
Tibor Machan	
Oliver Johnson, <i>The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I</i> <i>of A Treatise of Human Nature</i>	353
Christopher Belshaw	
Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howards-Snyder, eds., <i>Faith, Freedom,</i> <i>and Rationality, Philosophy of Religion Today</i>	355
Jerome I. Gellman	
William Jordan, <i>Ancient Concepts of Philosophy</i>	176
Christopher Byrne	
Howard Kamler, <i>Identification and Character.</i> <i>A Book on Psychological Development</i>	111
Katarzyna Paprzycka	
Mark Kaplan, <i>Decision Theory as Philosophy</i>	179
Paul Weirich	
Daryl Koehn, <i>The Ground of Professional Ethics</i>	181
Kenneth F.T. Cust	
Blandine Kriegel, <i>The State and the Rule of Law</i>	260
Mary Hawkesworth	
Laurence Lampert, <i>Leo Strauss and Nietzsche</i>	183
Robert Burch	
Charles Larmore, <i>The Morals of Modernity</i>	357
Susan M. Turner	
Michael Latham, Allison Sneider, Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington, and David Hoyt eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	

Hugh Lehman, <i>Rationality and Ethics in Agriculture</i>	185
Paul B. Thompson	
Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, eds., <i>On Quine: New Essays</i>	30
Rod Bertolet	
Remy Lestienne, <i>The Children of Time:</i> <i>Causality, Entropy, Becoming</i>	263
Gregory R. Mulhauser	
Barbara Levine, ed., <i>Works about John Dewey, 1886-1995</i>	188
Douglas Browning	
Jerrold Levinson, <i>The Pleasures of the Aesthetic</i>	416
Colin Lyas	
Miles Little, <i>Humane Medicine</i>	265
Keith Joseph	
Lo Ch'in-Shun, <i>Knowledge Painfully Acquired.</i> <i>The 'K'un-chih chi' by Lo Ch'in-shun.</i> Trans. and ed. Irene Bloom.	419
Steven J. Willett	
Bernard F.J. Lonergan, <i>The Collected Works of Lonergan.</i> <i>Volume Six. Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964</i>	189
James B. Sauer	
Peter Loftson, <i>Theories of Human Nature</i>	33
Roderick Nicholls	
F.H. Low-Beer, <i>Questions of Judgment: Determining What's Right</i>	114
Stephen Satris	
Sandra B. Lubarsky and David Ray Griffin, eds., <i>Jewish Theology and Process Thought</i>	360
M.S. Lane	
Tibor R. Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds., <i>Liberty for the 21st Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought</i>	192
Laurent Dobuzinskis	
Mohan Matthen and R.X. Ware, eds., <i>Biology and Society</i>	115
Arthur J. Miller	
James McAllister, Renée Van De Vall and Caroline Van Eck, eds. <i>The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts</i>	215
Rupert Read	
Dick McCleary, <i>The Logic of Imaginative Education:</i> <i>Reaching Understanding</i>	120
Nebojsa Kujundzic	

Timothy J. McGrew, <i>The Foundations of Knowledge</i>	421
Benjamin F. Armstrong	
Deckle McLean, <i>Privacy and Its Invasion</i>	118
Brian M. O'Connell	
Fred D. Miller Jr., Jeffrey Paul, and Ellen Frankel Paul eds., <i>The Just Society</i>	280
Andrew Cunningham	
Ray Monk, <i>Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude</i>	267
Andrew Lugg	
F.C.T. Moore, <i>Bergson: Thinking Backwards</i>	424
Ronald M. Carrier	
Robert C. Moore, <i>Logic and Representation.</i> CSLI Lecture Notes, number 39	122
Oliver Lemon	
Edouard Morot-Sir, <i>The Imagination of Reference II: Perceiving, Indicating, Naming</i>	270
Andrew Aberdein	
Terry Nardin, ed., <i>The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives</i>	362
Conrad G. Brunk	
Stephen Nathanson, <i>The Ideal of Rationality</i>	125
Jonelle Depetro	
Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, eds. and trans., <i>Plato's Phaedrus</i>	35
Tim Mahoney	
Adam Zachary Newton, <i>Narrative Ethics</i>	36
Anthony J. Cascardi	
Kai Nielsen, <i>On Transforming Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry</i>	39
Robert M. Martin	
Chris Nunn, <i>Awareness: What it is, What it does</i>	426
Thomas Bittner	
L. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith, <i>Time, Change and Freedom: Introduction to Metaphysics</i>	297
Nick Huggett	
Anthony O'Hear, ed., <i>Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems</i>	365
Michele Marsonet	
Frederick A. Olafson, <i>What Is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View</i>	271
Taylor Carman	

John O'Neill, ed., <i>Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Texts and Commentary</i>	195
John G. Stevenson	
Marc-Alain Ouaknin, <i>The Burnt Book: Reading the Talmud</i>	127
Peter C. Brown	
Joy A. Palmer and David E. Cooper eds., <i>Just Environments: Intergenerational, International, and Interspecies Issues</i>	428
John Douglas Bishop	
Nickolas Pappas, <i>Plato and the Republic</i>	129
Heidi Northwood	
John Papworth, <i>Small is Powerful</i>	277
Drew Christie	
Dennis Patterson, <i>Law and Truth</i>	431
Keith Culver	
Richard Patterson, <i>Aristotle's Modal Logic</i>	278
Allan Bäck	
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul eds., <i>The Just Society</i>	280
Andrew Cunningham	
Jeffrey Paul, Ellen Frankel Paul, and Fred D. Miller Jr. eds., <i>The Just Society</i>	280
Andrew Cunningham	
Terence Penelhum, <i>Reason and Religious Faith</i>	197
Kenneth L. McGovern	
Béla Szabados	
W. Gunther Plaut, <i>Asylum: A Moral Dilemma</i>	41
Virginia Black	
C.G. Prado, <i>Starting With Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy</i>	44
Mark Jackson	
W.V. Quine, <i>From Stimulus to Science</i>	367
Robert Kermode	
David Rankin, <i>Tertullian and the Church</i>	132
Hugh Lawson-Tancred	
Douglas B. Rasmussen and Tibor R. Machan, eds., <i>Liberty for the 21st Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought</i>	192
Laurent Dobuzinskis	
Paul Redding, <i>Hegel's Hermeneutics</i>	433
David Sherman	

Michael Redhead , <i>From Physics to Metaphysics</i>	48
Leemon McHenry	
C.D.C. Reeve, Patricia Curd, and S. Marc Cohen, eds. , <i>Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy From Thales to Aristotle</i>	19
Eric W. Snider	
Sheldon Richmond , <i>Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the Philosophies of Science of Popper and Polanyi</i>	50
Richard Woodfield	
Kevin Robb , <i>Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece</i>	282
Jonathan Lavery	
T.A. Robinson , <i>Aristotle in Outline</i>	369
Joseph A. Novak	
Stanley Rosen , <i>The Mask of Enlightenment</i>	284
Jonathan Salem-Wiseman	
Stuart E. Rosenbaum and Robert M. Baird, eds. , <i>Punishment and the Death Penalty</i>	3
Jordan Steiker	
Michael S. Roth , <i>The Ironist's Cage: Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of History</i>	52
Shawn Smith	
Paul Russell , <i>Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility</i>	371
Kenneth A. Richman	
Donald Rutherford , <i>Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature</i>	287
Catherine Wilson	
Paul Ryan and Mary Louise Gill, trans. , <i>Plato: Parmenides</i>	398
Richard J. Ketchum	
Marco Santambrogio and Paolo Leonardi, eds. , <i>On Quine: New Essays</i>	30
Rod Bertolet	
Crispin Sartwell , <i>The Art of Living: Aesthetics of the Ordinary in World Spiritual Traditions</i>	55
John W. Heintz	
Raphael Sassower , <i>Cultural Collisions: Postmodern Technoscience</i>	133
R. Valentine Dusek	
Stephen Savitt, ed. , <i>Time's Arrow Today: Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time</i>	57
Craig Callender	

William H. Schaberg , <i>The Nietzsche Canon: A Publication History and Bibliography</i>	201
Lawrence J. Hatab	
David Schmitz , <i>Rational Choice and Moral Agency</i>	135
Anita M. Superson	
Frederick F. Schmitt , ed., <i>Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge</i>	60
Edrie Sobstyl	
Peter Schotch , David Braybrooke , and Bryson Brown (with two chapters by Laura Byrne), <i>Logic on the Track of Social Change</i>	315
Peter Vallentyne	
Alan D. Schrift , <i>Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism</i>	435
Lisa Phillips	
Chris M. Sciabarra , <i>Marx, Hayek, and Utopia</i>	141
John Davenport	
Richard Sclove , <i>Democracy and Technology</i>	203
Thomas C. Hilde	
Drusilla Scott , <i>Everyman Revived: The Common Sense of Michael Polanyi</i>	206
Eric B. Dayton	
Joan Wallach Scott , <i>Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man</i>	289
Mary Hawkesworth	
Alan P.F. Sell , <i>Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief</i>	210
Mark Owen Webb	
Sextus Empiricus , <i>Outlines of Scepticism</i>	143
Suzanne Abram	
Arvind Sharma , <i>The Philosophy of Religion; A Buddhist Perspective</i>	292
Simon Ross Harrison	
Sun-Joo Shin , <i>The Logical Status of Diagrams</i>	208
Philip L. Peterson	
Barry Smith , <i>Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano</i>	62
B. Richard Beatch	
Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith eds. <i>The Cambridge Companion to Husserl</i>	294
R. Philip Buckley	

David Woodruff Smith and Barry Smith eds. <i>The Cambridge Companion to Husserl</i>	294
R. Philip Buckley	
Peter K. Smith and Peter Carruthers, eds., <i>Theories of Theories of Mind</i> , . . .	319
Brian Jonathan Garrett	
Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, <i>Time, Change and Freedom: Introduction to Metaphysics</i>	297
Nick Huggett	
Allison Sneider, Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington, David Hoyt, and Michael Latham eds., <i>Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective</i>	387
Dominic Power	
Jordan Howard Sobel, <i>Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice</i>	64
Mark Vorobej	
Tom Sorell, ed., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes</i>	374
Robert Shaver	
Lynne Spellman, <i>Substance and Separation in Aristotle</i>	67
John F. Heil, Jr.	
Robert J. Stainton, <i>Philosophical Perspectives on Language</i>	376
L.W. Colter	
James S. Stramel, <i>How to Write a Philosophy Paper</i>	211
Hugh Clapin	
Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks, eds., <i>The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy</i>	236
Charles Ess	
Richard Taylor <i>Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age</i>	437
Thomas D. Pearson	
Keith Tester, <i>The Inhuman Condition</i>	146
Andrew Potter	
Leslie Paul Thiele, <i>Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics</i>	148
Frank Schalow	
John Tienson and Terence Horgan, <i>Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology</i>	413
Robert J. Stainton	
James Tully, <i>Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity</i>	213
Bruce Toombs	

Thomas Uebel, Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat and Lola Fleck, <i>Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics.</i>	322
John Preston	
Suzanne Uniacke, <i>Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence</i> <i>Justification of Homicide</i>	69
Wayne N. Renke	
Elizabeth Vallance, <i>Business Ethics at Work.</i>	439
Ed Teall	
Renée Van De Vall, Caroline Van Eck and James McAllister, eds. <i>The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts</i>	215
Rupert Read	
Caroline Van Eck, James McAllister and Renée Van De Vall, eds. <i>The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts</i>	215
Rupert Read	
Peter van Inwagen, <i>God, Knowledge, and Mystery:</i> <i>Essays in Philosophical Theology.</i>	218
Erich von Dietze	
Enrique Villanueva, ed., <i>Naturalism and Normativity</i>	71
Karl Hepfer	
Enrique Villanueva, ed., <i>Truth and Rationality:</i> <i>Philosophical Issues 5.</i>	220
Tina Wood	
Gregory Vlastos, <i>Socratic Studies</i> ed. Myles Burnyeat	24
Naomi Reshotko	
Gregory Vlastos, <i>Studies in Greek Philosophy.</i> Daniel W. Graham, ed.	378
Asli Gocer	
Jules Vuillemin, <i>Necessity or Contingency:</i> <i>The Master Argument and Its Philosophical Solutions</i>	299
Richard Bosley	
W.J. Waluchow, ed., <i>Free Expression.</i>	382
Tom D. Campbell	
R.X. Ware and Mohan Matthen, eds., <i>Biology and Society</i>	115
Arthur J. Miller	
Ernest J. Weinrib, <i>The Idea of Private Law</i>	302
Pauline C. Westerman	
Michael A. Weinstein, <i>Culture / Flesh: Explorations of</i> <i>Postcivilized Modernity.</i>	304
Kevin M. Graham	

Allison Weir , <i>Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity</i>	305
Mechthild Nagel	
Stephen K. White, ed. , <i>The Cambridge Companion to Habermas</i>	151
Christopher F. Zurn	
Bernard Williams , <i>Making Sense of Humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993</i>	231
David Glidden	
Patricia Williams , <i>The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice</i>	223
Annalise Acorn	
Robert A. Wilson , <i>Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind</i>	227
Agustin Vicente	
Richard Dien Winfield , <i>Law in Civil Society</i>	74
Christopher Berry Gray	
Richard Wolin , <i>The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, and Poststructuralism</i>	76
Jane Chamberlain	
Allan B. Wolter and William A. Frank , <i>Duns Scotus, Metaphysician</i>	254
Martin M. Tweedale	
Nicholas Wolterstorff , <i>Divine Discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks</i>	441
Andrew V. Jeffery	
Nicholas Wolterstorff , <i>John Locke and the Ethics of Belief</i>	444
Peter A. Schouls	
Ellen Meikins Wood , <i>Democracy against Capitalism</i>	153
Michael A. Principe	
Paul Woodruff and Michael Gagarin, eds. <i>Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists</i>	103
Trevor J. Saunders	
Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas, eds. and trans. , <i>Plato's Phaedrus</i>	35
Tim Mahoney	