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As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

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Louis Althusser
Sur la philosophie.
Paris: Gallimard 1994. Pp. 179.
Cdn $28.50 (ISBN 2-07-073894-9)

Le dernier livre paru du vivant d'Althusser vient enfin de paraître en français. Il s'agit d'une version composée de trois parties de différentes natures. Il comprend des 'Entretiens' avec Fernanda Navarro 1984-1987 (29-79); une correspondance (85-137) regroupant 16 lettres qu'Althusser a adressées à sa complice mexicaine et une à Mauricio Malamud; finalement, le texte français d'une conférence prononcée par Althusser à l'université de Grenade (1976), intitulée: 'La transformation de la philosophie' (143-178).

Les 'Entretiens' d'abord publiés au Mexique en 1988 (*Filosofia y Marxismo*) furent 'rédigés par Fernanda Navarro à partir d'écrits, pour la plupart inédits, que Louis Althusser lui avait laissé librement consulter' (15).

Ces pseudo-entretiens permettent au lecteur de saisir l'articulation de certains concepts clés de la pensée althusserienne. On en voit le cheminement et l'aboutissement. Pour quiconque n'aurait pas assimilé toute l'intelligibilité des définitions althusseriennes de la philosophie, de l'idéologie dominante (et de leur rapport qui les rattache), de la convivialité du pluralisme idéologique, du matérialisme aléatoire, des tendances idéalistes et matérialistes que toute philosophie possède, de la fonction hégémonique de la philosophie sur les sciences et les pratiques sociales. Ces entretiens sont la tentative ultime d'apporter les derniers éclaircissements.

La seconde partie qui regroupe les lettres contribue, à sa façon, à l'élaboration de la pensée althusserienne. Mais l'ensemble de ce corpus tient un rôle tout de même secondaire.

Pour ce qui est de la troisième partie, la conférence de Grenade, il s'agit d'un court texte joliment articulé, porteur d'une orientation (tendance) claire, où l'auteur élabore ses convictions de base sur la philosophie. Un texte, sur lequel il serait agréable de voir les étudiants disserter.

Si l'on reconnaît la valeur d'un philosophe à la polémique qu'il suscite, Althusser, fidèle à lui-même jusqu'à la fin, est resté provocateur, donc plein de promesses.

Claude Gratton
Centre d'Education Armand-Racicot

Elizabeth Anderson
Value in Ethics and Economics.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993.
Pp. 14 + 245.
ISBN 0-674-93189-0.

Elizabeth Anderson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. As the title suggests, her book has two main themes: the nature of value in ethics and the place of value in economics. The first six chapters deal with the first theme; the last three, with the second. The two themes are closely linked in that Anderson applies the theory of value that she elaborates and defends in the first six chapters to the three issues discussed in the final chapters: the ethical limitations of the market, surrogate motherhood, and cost-benefit analysis. The book includes a useful index and a ten-page bibliography.

In the first two chapters, Anderson elaborates her pluralist theory of value and expressive theory of rational action. She identifies the good with proper objects of positive attitudes. This is a rational attitude theory 'according to which the attitudes engaged when we care about things involve not just feelings but judgments, conduct, sensitivities to qualities in what we value, and certain ways of structuring deliberation concerned with what we value' (5). She distinguishes between valuing and evaluation. One values something if one meets certain standards for caring for it; one evaluates it when one measures it against certain standards. Modes of valuing are multiple and include use, respect, appreciation, love, and countless others. Anderson constantly criticizes the philosophical tendency to interpret value through 'thin' theoretical concepts rather than 'thick' practical concepts and to defend monistic theories of value. The whole of her fifth chapter is a critique of the monistic value theories of Moore, hedonism, and rational desire theory. Her own theory is pluralistic in four ways: with respect to the number of evaluative attitudes, to standards, to kinds of goods, and finally to the ideals by which we try to develop our attitudes, character, and values (14).

An expressive theory of rational action 'defines rational action as action that adequately expresses our rational attitudes toward people and other intrinsically valuable things' (17). A rational action 'expresses a way of valuing something in being governed by norms constitutive of that mode of valuation' (18). Anderson denies that her theory leads to conventionalism since a social order can be criticized for not having norms that adequately express its members' rationally endorsed valuations. In such cases, new norms must be instituted or invented. In a later chapter, titled 'Criticism, Justification, and Common Sense', Anderson shows that critical practices are already implicit in common sense intuitive reasoning and that these practices can meet all genuine demands for objective justification (104). An evaluation may be criticized by questioning the importance of the reasons offered for it, their relevance, or their authenticity. Although her view of justification has certain affinities to the theory of wide reflective equilibrium,

Anderson rejects that theory because she questions whether our evaluative intuitions can be systematized into an all-encompassing theoretical structure. She also finds the theory too subjectivist in contrast to her own. Rational attitudes are not a function of individual reflection but of dialogue with others.

Anderson devotes two chapters to a critique of consequentialism in which she tries to show the superiority of her own expressive theory. These chapters are closely argued, rich in detail, and defy any simple summary; however, her critique of the consequentialist position that values may be globally maximized can serve as a good sample of Anderson's criticism. The gist of her critique is that valuations are of different kinds and hence there can be no common measure of value. One can adopt pragmatic modes of evaluation that do not require a common measure; a point she illustrates through analysis of evaluative techniques used in figure skating. She even denies that transitivity of evaluations is a requirement of rationality (56).

The chapter on ethical limitations of the market illustrates Anderson's points that some modes of evaluation are plural and that a mode appropriate in one sphere may be quite inappropriate in another. She shows quite convincingly that political goods should not be evaluated by market norms. Market goods are goods to which the owner has exclusive individual rights. These exclusive rights allow an owner to exclude others from enjoyment of the good and also to sell the good at will. Such goods are valued precisely because they may be enjoyed and sold according to the individual's wishes. In contrast, goods such as public parks are valued because they are open to all. Goods such as gifts from friends are valued as part of the friendship. Their market value may be small, and to value them simply for their market values would be inappropriate. Anderson argues that autonomy cannot be reduced to its libertarian market form:

When individuals are supposed to be the automatic and self-sufficient bearers of autonomy theorists don't question the social relations of domination that exist prior to market transactions and that condition the choices individuals make there. Nor do they challenge the relations of domination the market creates when goods embodied in the person are commodified. (165)

The view in the final sentence resembles that of Marx. Anderson also writes in several places about commodity fetishism, yet nowhere in the entire book does she mention Marx.

Anderson's critique of surrogate motherhood and cost-benefit analysis demonstrates the power of her theory of value to reveal weaknesses in market modes of analysis and justification. Women's reproductive labor is not a commodity, or as Anderson succinctly puts it: 'The application of commercial norms to women's reproductive labor reduces surrogate mothers from persons worthy of respect and consideration to dominated objects of mere use' (175).

Cost-benefit analysis values a good as what an individual is willing to pay in the market for it or as some equivalent to that amount, and hence ignores the fact that some goods are valued collectively. We value collective goods precisely because we do not have exclusive rights to them and the value they have for us is not equivalent to their market values. People may value a species because it is unique. If an economist were to ask them what they would accept as a cash-equivalent for its destruction they may find the question inappropriate and offensive. According to the economist, to be rational we must always be mindful of the opportunity costs of not exploiting our national parks, of preserving species, and so forth. Anderson responds: 'According to this economic logic, it is equally irrational for pet owners to disregard the opportunity costs of not eating their pets or not selling them for laboratory experiments' (208).

As well as contributing to value theory, Anderson's book is a rich and rewarding contribution to the growing body of literature that explores the relationships between ethics and economics. I highly commend and recommend it.

Ken Hanly
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Robert Audi
The Structure of Justification.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-44064-5).

Robert Audi's *The Structure of Justification* is a vast work by a widely regarded, much published American philosopher — also, a good friend of Canada. His grasp of modern (analytical) American epistemology is striking. Fifteen, mostly republished essays, and an introducing *Overview* (1-48), accompany the four main Parts: (I) *The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy*; (II) *Knowledge and Justification*; (III) *Epistemic Principles and Scepticism*; (IV) *Rationality*.

I suspect that many of his sympathizers will be well-stimulated by Audi's enquiries about rationality, morality, justification and knowledge (as at 4-7, Chapter 23, etc.); about hidden bridges and forms of overlap for Foundational and Coherence 'theories' of knowledge (as at 2-7, 464-5, etc.); about self-knowledge (as at 182-3, etc.); about freedom and knowledge (as at 272, 460-2, etc.).

Here are two short passages which may help to give others a good pretaste of the book under review:

> A major source of support for coherentism comes from the sense that whereas foundationalism cannot account for the apparent dependence of all justified beliefs on other beliefs, coherentism makes this dependence expectable. The most salient cases are inferential beliefs. These typically depend for their justification on beliefs they are based on. But the latter are not the problem: it is *non*-inferential beliefs that anti-foundationalists have thought foundationalism must take to be 'independent' of others, including beliefs the person *would* form upon gathering new evidence. This, however, is a mistake. A foundationalist need not posit any indefeasibly justified beliefs, and moderate foundationalists countenance at most a few such (e.g., beliefs of simple logical truths). Their point is not that other beliefs are *irrelevant*: some might strengthen, others destroy, the justification of foundational beliefs. The point is that the *source* of the justification of foundationally justified beliefs is not other beliefs. How, then, could foundationalism be so misunderstood? (8, Para. 2.)

> Philosophy is a limitless domain of rational activity; unrestrainedly curious, relentlessly penetrating, boundlessly speculative. There are no limits either to the kinds of theories it can create or to its own ability to criticize its own results. To regard philosophy as a mere child of its times, to deny it the capacity to reach toward truth, to take its fallibility to warrant skepticism about its objectivity, is a temptation no less to be resisted than the dogmatism it would combat. There is a rational structure that can guide our inquiries; there are rational methods we can use in conducting them; there is a monumental array of inexhaustible philosophical texts, ancient, medieval, and modern, intellectual anchors which, though they lean with the currents of fashion, are never pulled up. And reason, the critical voice in conversation, the authority that subverts authority, the fabric of our excellences, the form of our forms of life, endures as a vital force in building theories of the reality it enables us to know. (468-9)

Robert Audi would want, naturally enough, to be judged by 'Internal Criteria', mainly ones of recent customs and habit among American analysts of the kind that he so generously cites. But Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Ockham, Spinoza, Mill, Hegel, Moore, Cantor, Marx, Neurath, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Buber, Marcel, Chomsky are all among those screened out of mention.

So let me very respectfully tip my best bowler hat to Audi and his own Internal Criteria. But, in a work on *knowledge* of nearly 500 pages, Audi could have properly given some central heed to more 'external criteria' for good, non-Philistine epistemology — to several kinds of problems which need to be seen by him as interwoven with his present objects of focus. Since his main concern here is knowledge by humans in Nature, then his duty might be to

come up with more colourful and mind-enriching examples and references for humankind. Relatively Philistine choices of some examples may be taken by those who hop to exhibit objective-mindedness. But we should not expect to do justice to human reality by draining most of the striking colours out of the ('objective') 'subjects'.

Please add:

(a) Tolstoy's long-groping believer, Levin, in *Anna Karenina*, once feared for his personal *knowledge* of the truth of the teachings of the Orthodox Religions. So for a while Levin could console himself with a (then popular) idea: An individual believer gets a kind of epistemic spin-off or sustenance from the vast collective knowledge of God, enjoyed by the Church as a whole. (And what of Spinoza on Divine Knowledge of The All as the One and human knowledge of the Many?)

(b) More recently, of course, spears from Hilary Putnam: we collectively have fluffy, but real *knowledge* about some hard topics in physics, biology, mathematics, high finance, etc. This precarious and so dependent, sometimes misty, collective kind of popular knowing continues to breathe, but, perhaps, only as long as these specialist figures exist, and are duly acknowledged, and are often available through messengers to the faithful. We, frequently, as knowers, can serve to broaden our minds and their human knowings. Even Jung's Collective Unconscious deserves a long assessing passage of analysis. So do Marxist accounts of Social Knowledge.

This new book is a notable one by a noted philosopher. But *epistemology* should reflect much more of the perspectives of *metaphysics*.

John King-Farlow
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Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed.
Friendship: A Philosophical Reader.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1993.
Pp. xii + 332.
US $44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2854-8);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8097-3).

Friendship is a topic which gives a philosopher delight. It wears on its sleeve its importance for all human beings, and since Plato it has characterized our vocation as friends (rather than, e.g., enemies, conquerors, purveyors or partners) of *sophia*.

Neera Badhwar has collected fifteen essays, all but two published since 1980, intending to show the range of current thinking on the subject. She divides her collection into three parts beginning with general discussions of the topic. The major portion is the middle section, 'Friendship and Ethics'. She concludes with a section examining some political dimensions of friendship. The arrangement is particularly well conceived, with topics and controversies being passed naturally from paper to paper.

General Discussions. A disconcertingly Victorian exhortation by C.S. Lewis begins the collection. He mentions women only in connection with friendships which may easily descend to erotic love (which, passionate and animalistic, is not an expression of our freedom and autonomy). Male friendship is a 'non-natural' quality, one which is subversive both of order (because it is essentially opposed to hierarchy) and of democracy (because it is 'a relation between men at their highest level of individuality ... [which withdraws them] from collective "togetherness"') (40). It is, I think, fascinating to begin the collection with this brief and passionate essay, for if it does not inspire heated discussion, then there is little hope. Lawrence Thomas's 'Friendship and Other Loves' more calmly discusses the provocative thesis that 'companion friendship' and erotic love *share* three salient features: that we *choose* friends, that neither friend has authority over the other, and that there is a bond of mutual trust between them.

A paper with which one might engage a beginning student is Nathaniel Branden's 'Love and Psychological Visibility'. What philosophers know as the dialectic of self-consciousness is introduced autobiographically through the author's relationship with his dog, Muttnik. In contrast, a paper of wonderful subtlety by Amélie Rorty discusses the ways in which love and friendship are historical. In one sense, friendship is historical because the 'psychological state' is living and changing; a feeling is only identifiable as love 'within the complex narrative of the living attitude' (75). Rorty is led to reflect that constancy in friendship is misunderstood if it is thought to be incompatible with changes in both friends as they recognize changes in one another, including those resulting from the friendship itself.

Friendship and Ethics. Nancy Sherman offers a modern reading of Aristotle. Friendships are the form which virtuous activity takes, and are intrinsically valuable because human well-being is not a matter of Platonic self-sufficiency but is ineradicably relational. Aristotle's striking phrase, the friend is 'another me', can be read so that acknowledging our friend's *differences* is a source of *self*-knowledge.

A paper I expected to skip was Robert M. Adams' consideration of Augustine's solution to the theological problem: how can I love another for his or her own sake if I owe total devotion to God? The problem turns on how friendship can be a means to other ends, and the paper is full of careful distinctions and good examples; I ended by enjoying it very much. It is followed by a trilogy of papers on Kant, whose reputation is encapsulated four papers later by Lawrence Blum: 'Friendship is a largely unfamiliar territory for modern moral philosophy, dominated as it has been by Kantian

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concerns, or with utilitarianism, neither of which is hospitable to [morally significant] particular relationships' (192). H.J. Paton attributes this reputation to our neglect of the second part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, where Kant acknowledges that a duty to love is an absurdity. We expect to complete a syllogism: morality is about duty, so loving friendship has nothing to do with ethics. But Kant's view is that the natural emotion of love is 'one of the subjective conditions without which our minds would be incapable of receiving the concept of duty' (137)!

Effi Briest is the eponymous protagonist of a novel by Theodore Fontane, the late nineteenth-century German realist. Julia Annas retells the story of Effi's adultery, and of her husband's discovery of it years later. The husband, acting against his inclinations, destroys her happiness and his own by dutifully exiling her from the family. Annas reads this, Paton notwithstanding, as evidence that 'to live successfully by the Kantian ethic is to risk destroying one's sources of love and concern for others, and that this not only hurts the others but leaves one's own life bare and meaningless too' (173). Marcia Baron replies, challenging both Annas's interpretation of the husband's character (she offers evidence that he is manipulative and over-ambitious, thus rather less than a Kantian paragon) and her claim that he instantiates Kantian morality. This entire discussion is a fine example of the philosophical usefulness of reading good novelists.

Peter Railton's long and careful contribution argues that consequentialism in ethics seems to imply a form of alienation which misdescribes proper relationships between lovers and friends. He argues for a sophisticated (and objective) consequentialism which can reduce such alienation, while Michael Stocker concludes the section with powerful strictures against thinking of friendship in terms of ends and consequences at all.

Friendship, Society and Politics. Mary Lyndon Shanley examines Mill's distinction between marriage conceived as a form of slavery ('there remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house') and conceived as the highest form of friendship among equals. Marilyn Friedman wishes to accept communitarian criticisms of liberalism's atomistic self while avoiding the anti-feminist implications of Sandel's and MacIntyre's work. She thinks of contemporary friendships as elective affinities, and argues that the 'communities of choice' in contemporary urban life can provide rootedness as well as a critical distance lacking in the unchosen 'communities of place' into which we are merely born.

The collection closes with John M. Cooper's thoughtful analysis of what it is about city life in Aristotle's conception of the *zoön politicon* which sustains the virtues of 'civic friendship' (which importantly can hold between strangers).

Introduction. Badhwar thinks highly of friendship, as is evident from her choice of Lewis's effusion as the opening paper and her eschewing of any contrary views, such as that friendship is a form of private priviledge, or a bourgeois self-indulgence better replaced by an adult virtue like solidarity. Her introduction very helpfully outlines the papers she has selected, some-

times arguing gently against them, and giving them a narrative unity within a general framework which identifies 'end-friendship' as the central form, which argues that it is morally positive rather than neutral, and which suggests that 'compatibility with the nature of end friendship may ... be a good test of a moral theory's adequacy' (16). There is much excellent material here for seminar discussion, and the book will find a place in the ethics classroom as well as on the moral philosopher's bookshelf.

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Seth Benardete
Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992.
Pp. ix + 238.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-04242-1);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-04244-8).

Plato's dialogues present Socrates in conversation with speakers of varying interests, dispositions, and philosophical abilities. The shifts and hesitations characteristic of such exchanges in real life are there. Speakers dissemble, misunderstand, sometimes scorn evident conclusions. The dialogues commit Socrates and his interlocutors to arguments and propositions, but they can undercut this commitment through irony, resentment, begrudging acquiescence, or humor. Closure on a topic remains unstable if the reader cannot affirm that the harmony Laches once sought between a speaker's words and deeds (*La* 188d2) has been attained. This situation is undoubtedly more critical for the early and middle period dialogues than for the later, but nonetheless the philosophical interpreter of Plato must adopt a reading strategy, even if by default. Some demote dramatic give and take to a kind of local color in searching to isolate Platonic arguments, for example on epistemology or ontology, that can be tested for logical sobriety. This was characteristic at one time of many analytic studies of Plato, though in its extreme form is discouraged of late. A contrasting response is to hold that arguments alone do not determine Plato's philosophical reach: the dramatic whole is greater than its individual parts. On this assumption, just as no single individual in the *Antigone* can represent Sophocle's personal views, so 'Plato's view' on a topic cannot be securely reduced to what a single character says, even when that character is Socrates.

Socrates' Second Sailing falls firmly in the second of these interpretive camps. The book is divided in the manner of a commentary (though hardly one for students new to Plato!) into 39 sections set in four parts entitled 'Book 1', 'The Beautiful', 'The Good' and 'The Just.' Benardete proceeds through and in a sense retells the *Republic*. He notes that the book originated in a lengthy review of Leo Strauss' *The City and Man*, but otherwise he shows little interest in contemporary debates and discussions on Plato. There is no bibliography, few footnotes, and still fewer references to other scholars. The format privileges exegesis over argument, and allows Benardete to effectively highlight themes he discerns running through the work. One of the most notable is the deep disjunction between the 'city-in-speech', formulated *within* the *Republic* through the words of Socrates and his companions, and the 'dialogic city' which '*is* the *Republic* itself' (47; my emphases). Of the latter, Socrates is the founder and his companions its citizens; this is 'the philosophic city in which Socrates is already king' (47). Other inconcinnities emerge: between justice and goodness (26), justice and happiness (123), happiness and the beautiful (80), the good city and the true city (103), and the philosopher's description of a city and his ruling it (152).

Rich insights can emerge, as when we are shown how Polemarchus' whisper to Adimantus in Book V threatens Socrates' proposal on communism (110). The whisper embodies private communications between lovers, the gap between the public reason for communism and the rulers' real reason, and ultimately the tension between the city and philosophy which rests on the philosopher's selfish, and secret, interests. Too often, however, deficiency of argument is a hindrance even, or perhaps especially, when important observations are made. No discernible argument prepares us for the statement on p. 140 that 'The sixth and seventh books bear to Socratic philosophizing the same relation the city in speech bore to the dialogic city.' Nor does any argument or analysis directly emerge from it. We are simply left with a provocative and insightful aperçu.

The second sailing to which Benardete refers is of course the renouncement in the *Phaedo* of teleology in favor of the theory of forms. He claims the deficiency of Anaxagorean philosophy was that it could not account for mind's beneficence for individual things while simultaneously accounting for its pervasiveness through all things. The good, says Benardete (4), is 'a complex … whose unity is as puzzling as its fragmentation'. Parts only masquerade as wholes or *eidê*, and the Socratic task is to reach the genuine *eidê*. Benardete calls this process 'eidetic analysis'. The *Republic* to him is the eidetic analysis of 'the beautiful, the good, and the just' which proceeds by setting 'the just alongside other things and … apart from other things' (5). This double movement naturally precludes linear progression in the dialogue's arguments, and consequently 'the way of eidetic analysis' is constituted by 'the unexpected break and the unexpected join in arguments' (5).

The search for unexpected breaks and joins in the *Republic* predisposes Benardete to regard Platonic thought as oblique, paradoxical, ambiguous, and willfully enigmatic. Rather than a Plato who pursues intellectual clarity

and sound reasoning, even if inadequately equipped with the technical resources of later philosophy, we are instead given a Plato committed to equivocation who communicates by allusiveness and verbal play in the manner of a fourth-century Heraclitus. Benardete says (152) 'To look past Plato the poet is to overlook the philosopher.' There is truth in this, though it would appear to overlook the fact that ancient poets do not rely on private reference in the way modern poets do. Regrettably, Benardete's response is to poeticize Plato further by compounding Platonic paradox and allusiveness with his own. The playful, allusive and ironic flavor of the book can be captured in Benardete's fondness for ending its sections with an epigrammatic twist: 'the falsity of the thumoeidetic is its truth' (102); 'the divergence from the truth converges with the truth only through the city' (117); 'the soul, which is somehow all things, is not all things' (156). The question any reader of *Socrates' Second Sailing* will eventually ask is whether its exploitation of the open-endedness of the *Republic* as a text leads to greater appreciation and comprehension, or is an instance of pursuing *obscurum per obscurius*.

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Casting his study in terms of crisis and responsibility, Buckley avoids the redundancy one might expect from yet another pairing of Heidegger and Husserl. Instead of emphasizing their technical disagreements over phenomenological method, Buckley interprets them from a cultural, political and ethical perspective. He argues that both Husserl and Heidegger considered Western culture to be in crisis, though they represent different conceptions of the crisis and different types of philosophical responsibility as a consequence.

The first part of the text reviews Husserl's interpretation of the crisis as a loss or forgetting attributable to scientific rationality. It is a separation of science from its origin in the life of the subject, resulting in the deficient rationalities of objectivism, naturalism and positivism. This loss is evident not only in the sciences, but in philosophy and culture as well. Husserl's solution to this, of course, is transcendental phenomenology as a science of

sciences, grounded in the constituting acts of pure subjectivity. As Buckley notes, this is not only an epistemological concern, but entails a rational ideal for politics and society. Citing a series of essays published during the 1920s in the Japanese journal *Kaizo*, Buckley notes that Husserl considered the life of science and philosophy to be fundamentally political and ethical in nature.

As a crisis of scientific rationality, Husserl finds the loss of origin to be symptomatic of the natural scientific attitude. This attitude dominates not only the sciences of nature but the human sciences as well, for the latter attempt to adapt the methods of the former in order to be truly scientific. Thus, where the human sciences should be mindful of their privileged relationship to subjectivity, they are cut off from it by an inappropriate self-understanding. They are also threatened from within by the equally destructive tendencies of historicism and relativism, based upon the faulty notion that once naturalism and objectivism are rejected, no reliable standard for knowledge could remain.

However, the forgetting of the origin of science and philosophy is never complete. As Buckley notes, their original meaning, the meaning of 'Europe', can always be recovered through a phenomenology of the life-world or through phenomenological psychology. Both lead to the subject as the origin of the life-world and acts of consciousness. Furthermore, transcendental subjectivity will become a foundation for a rational praxis in politics and society, where difference and conflict (symptoms of crisis and the failure of reason) will be overcome under the ideal of a 'community of love' (*Liebesgemeinschaft*). Appropriately, Buckley questions Husserl's assumption that agreement is the only authentic mode of relating to others, as well as the latter's emphasis upon acting in accordance with reason instead of a primary receptivity to reason. Buckley suggests this receptivity might also include an awareness of the fragility and limits of rationality even as we are responsible for its uses. This leads to his interpretation of Heidegger.

The differences between the two thinkers notwithstanding, Buckley insists it is more fruitful philosophically to look at the similarities in their descriptions of the crisis. According to him, both conceive it in terms of selfhood, where the true self is not dispersed into an anonymous mass or swept along by tradition, but chooses itself. However, Heidegger is more textual in his approach than Husserl. Where for Husserl textual mediation is inessential for original meaning, and can even threaten this meaning, Heidegger sees all meaning as rooted in textual possibilities. These possibilities require active, even violent, interpretation. The historical nature of the self is thus essential to Heidegger, while for Husserl it is an aspect of the crisis to be overcome.

Furthermore, where Husserl sees the crisis as ethical and epistemological in nature, Heidegger interprets the crisis ontologically. For him, forgetting the origin is not merely a human mistake, but an essential event — it is a matter of being itself. Forgetting empowers recollection, which is why in *Being and Time* Dasein's authenticity is a modification of its inauthenticity. For Heidegger, tradition and selfhood *require* forgetting as conditions for

their possibility. They are constituted as necessary mixtures of gain and loss, activity and passivity. This ambiguity lies behind Heidegger's fateful political commitment in 1933.

As Buckley notes, the early Heidegger rejects the *Führer* principle precisely because of the paradoxical relationship between 'fate' and 'destiny'. However, in the Rectoral Address the distinction between the two disappears. Instead, there is a new emphasis upon will and active resolve on the part of an entire community. This reverses the emphasis upon the active/passive nature of individual Dasein in *Being and Time*, as well as the inauthenticity of the They. In Buckley's view, Heidegger's political commitment of 1933 is based upon a theory of communal Dasein that 'too closely paralleled the existence of individual Dasein.' It relies too heavily upon the notion of a will, personified in the *Führer*, to master the current situation. This shows little regard for the differences between Dasein's resolve for the sake of its individual existence and that for the sake of an authentic community. Indeed, as Buckley insists, the lack of a coherent theory of community characterizes all of Heidegger's early thought.

On the other hand, Buckley reads the later Heidegger's critique of science and technology as a critical turn away from the ontology of will and resolve, as well as from Husserl's presentation of the crisis as something to be mastered. Heidegger's insistence upon an unbridgeable gap between science and meditative thinking is not a mere shift in attitude, a shift that would remain within the framework of a calculating subject. It is, on the contrary, a 'letting go' of such attitudes for the sake of a contemplative reception of beings and being. Where Husserl sees naturalism and objectivism in science as a blindness to be overcome for the sake of 'true' science, Heidegger sees the blindness of science as the thought of ancient Greece fulfilled, the 'destiny' of the West. Any attempt to eradicate or master this finitude would reinstate the calculative thinking that characterizes the crisis itself.

Buckley sees the notion of responsibility in the later Heidegger to be more appropriate to technology. Here, responsibility is not an attempt to control or manage, but to respond as recipients of the destiny of being. However, he continues to favor Husserl's 'habitus' of critique, as long as it can be freed from calculative thinking. By retaining the critical function of philosophy, he suggests, we can continue to *act* in concert with others, in response to technology as a 'burden and gift of our humanity'. Heidegger's tendency to eschew concrete action could thus be mitigated in favor of a critical practice that does not seek mastery and control.

Buckley makes this suggestion without showing exactly how a traditional notion of critique could, in fact, be joined to Heidegger's ontological thinking. However, as a possibility for further work, it ranks with the more thoughtful readings being offered today. The book will be of interest to specialists and students alike.

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Joseph H. Carens, ed.
Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The
Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1993. Pp. xi + 298.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1457-4);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1458-2).

This is a collection of papers originally presented at a memorial conference for C.B. Macpherson held at the University of Toronto in 1989. Contributors engage both Macpherson's historical and theoretical claims.

The anthology begins with three solid historical essays by James Tully, Louise Marcil-Lacoste, and Nancy Rosenblum. Tully criticizes Macpherson's possessive individualism thesis, arguing that Macpherson simplifies and decontextualises the thought of the early modern period making it seem as if it were focused on market society exclusively rather than on sovereignty and political stability generally. Marcil-Lacoste extends Macpherson's account of Hobbes to include his notion of equality, arguing that in Hobbes and the liberal tradition a notion of 'negative' equality has been operative. With regard to negative equality, Marcil-Lacoste writes, 'Human beings are thus fundamentally equal — all exposed, nay condemned, to errors, sufferings, and evils ... By means of negative equality, equality is thus asserted as a fact about human limitations rather than as a right about justice in human relationships' (46). Rosenblum is critical of Macpherson's interpretation of Bentham, arguing that his is an instance of a larger and more general confusion regarding the too crude distinction between individualism and holism. Bentham's individualism, according to Rosenblum includes an account of the social origin of desire and the social construction of self.

The remaining eight essays are directly theoretical and deeply contemporary in character. Many contain helpful explications of Macpherson's thought, though virtually all represent a rejection of the fundamentals of his position. The essays by Virginia Held and Mihailo Markovic are the most sympathetic and I will consider them separately. In contrast, William Leiss is perhaps the most provocative arguing in neo-Hegelian style that the dominant problematic of capitalism versus socialism that motivated Macpherson has given way to a new stage of history which will be defined by our ability to respond to global environmental crises. In the other essays by John Keane, Jane Mansbridge, Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, and Ernesto Laclau the criticisms are remarkably similar. Mainly Macpherson is taken to task for neglecting pluralism and for his vision of collective harmony.

Macpherson, of course, sees the realization of democracy as linked to the realization of human powers. The problem as he sees it is this realization is blocked by economic inequality and class division. The following passage in which Macpherson says something about his positive democratic vision is

cited by several writers. A basic assumption, says Macpherson, of his position is that in a democratic society

> the exercise of ... human capacities by each member of a society does not prevent other members exercising theirs ... men would live together *harmoniously* enough, that their remaining contention would only be creative tension ... (S)uch a proposition is basic to any demand for or justification of democratic society ... The case for a democratic society fails without the assumption of potential *substantial harmony*

(cited by Keane 122, Mansbridge 160, Connolly 203). Macpherson takes some very large hits for this.

According to Connolly this represents the 'ideal of unified identity' (209). Connolly aligns himself with Foucault and regards the presence of consensus as a sign of danger. In contrast to Macpherson's view, he writes, 'Because democracy contains the possibility of heightening the experience of contingency, it is through democratic politics that the care for difference can become more generally inscribed in the culture' (210). John Keane writes similarly 'To suppose the possibility of collective harmony is ... to whet expectations about the need for collective harmony, thereby encouraging (often unintentionally) the growth of authoritarian measures designed to eradicate disagreement and to enforce collective harmony' (123). No argument for this last inference is given. But for Keane, as for Mouffe, Macpherson does not pay enough attention to the procedural institutions of liberalism, that have the potential to check this authoritarian or normalizing tendency. According to Mouffe, Macpherson's sympathies lie in a direction that 'does not take account of the crucial importance of liberal political institutions for modern democracy' (178). Laclau, like Connolly, tries to conceptualize democracy as embodying the contingent and indeterminate: 'democracy increases as far as its values are more indeterminate ... if democratic logic operated to its last limits, we would have total indeterminacy. But in that case we would also have a total disintegration of the social fabric. Thus, the sliding of the political signified under the democratic signifiers has to be arrested at some point. This is why a society cannot be entirely democratic' (232).

Clearly, we have a recurring theme and a fundamental difference between these writers and Macpherson. Macpherson's thought runs in the direction of bringing democracy and commonality together, and away from the more traditional liberal definitions of democracy that would imply that we may need to be on guard lest we have too much of it. The above writers, though not entirely comfortable there, are closer to a part of the liberal tradition that Macpherson sought to transcend. It is something of a flaw that so many of contributors to this collection stake out such a similar left-liberal position.

Held's and Markovic's articles represent more of an extension of Macpherson's thought. Held points out that work in feminism shows that other factors besides external ones impede the realization of human powers. Internal, psychological impediments faced by women and others require different strategies than those that Macpherson considers. Also bucking the general

trend of the collection, Held argues that Macpherson's vision is too individualistic. 'A serious shortcoming of Macpherson's ideal of democracy is that with it, as with traditional liberal theory, the adequate evaluation of shared experience and of collective endeavors is impossible' (150).

Markovic, characteristically, tries to develop a notion of social property which contrasts with both private and state property. This he sees as a positive complement to Macpherson's possessive individualist thesis. More than most other contributors, Markovic follows Macpherson in his concern to understand the relationship between democracy and property.

With regard to Markovic's essay another issue surfaces which is, at best, peripherally connected to the rest of the collection. Included with Markovic's essay are two additional pieces, a note by the editor Joseph Carens, and a reply by Markovic. Carens expresses deep concern over Markovic's role in contemporary Serbia. Markovic served for a time as vice president of the Serbian Socialist party which is the ruling party headed by Slobadan Milosevic. For this reason Carens worries about whether Markovic's essay should even have been included. Markovic, for his part, cites distortions by the Western media about the relationship between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs. This is all quite fascinating and could easily have served as the focus of this review. I imagine that anyone who picks up this book will immediately turn to this section. But this is precisely the problem. My own view is that this is all out of place in a collection of essays on C.B. Macpherson. Markovic's role in Serbia has little to do with his essay. Perhaps this interruption could be better tolerated if the other contributors had their political activities critically analyzed as well.

Overall, this is a worthwhile collection. Carens' attempt to bring contemporary thinkers into dialogue with the thought of Macpherson is really a quite significant project. He deserves applause for organizing the conference and for the resulting book.

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Richard A. Chapman, ed.
Ethics in Public Service.
Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press 1993.
Pp. xii + 178.
Cdn $21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88629-191-7).

The International Political Science Association sponsored a meeting of a small group of international experts on public service ethics to discuss the causes of certain ethical dilemmas often faced by government administrators

in selected Western democracies. This fine text is the result. The authors hold close to the theme — how to avoid ethical dilemmas when making discretionary decisions, given constraints limiting bureaucrats' independent action and the ways in which they must advise their ministers. Several celebrated cases of officials who had to contend with the possibility of moral compromise are discussed. Possible remedies are assessed to see to what extent they can assist civil servants attempting to cope with the high degree of moral ambiguity that follows from the increasing complexity of governmental structures and the increasing plurality of functions.

The first several essays discuss whether formalized codes of ethics effectively promote responsible conduct. Sir Brian Cubbon, long-time Permanent Secretary of Britain's Home Office, thinks not. First because the British 'constitution' is incoherent and cannot ground a tidy code of professional ethics. Second because there is little disagreement about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The problems arise from clashes among moral imperatives and resolution is an affair of the individual conscience. Cubbon sanguinely believes that the British civil servant can fulfill a responsibility to uphold a flawed constitution, be loyal to the government of the day, and maintain moral integrity. This despite the fact that he queries the intelligibility of 'democratic government', as well as the idea of a morally autonomous servant of the crown. It is apparently a praxis relatively unconstrained by theory.

Kenneth Kernaghan (Brock University) would supplement a code of conduct with moral guidelines derived from the whole range of considerations that make ethical conduct desirable in an administrator. He concludes that people can be sensitized to the ethical dimension or even conditioned to ethical behavior by formal codes of professional ethics, exposure to model leaders, and especially moral training and education. He cites various studies that show moral education to be better studied and no more controversial than liberal arts education.

Michael Jackson (Sydney) takes up the theme of the necessity of moral education for a civil service closely scrutinized by a public grown intolerant of unaccountable and self-serving public officials. He draws an interesting parallel between the training leading to good management decisions and that leading to morally responsible decisions in a management framework. He shows that the argument that ethics cannot be taught parallels arguments against the possibility of teaching management. This article contains helpful advice on mounting a moral training program for managers.

Guy Peters (Pittsburgh) is interested in the whole range of criteria, over and above legal constraints, which guide administrators' moral choices. He presupposes that all management decisions can be seen as moral decisions, and that there are reasons for analyzing the latter within the same frameworks and with the same tools as the former. He sets moral action within the context of decision theory and recent work on risk analysis. He then analyses public bureaucratic decision making using as an heuristic device the logic of the extreme case, that of the tragic choice. From this perspective it becomes

clear that in extreme cases codes of conduct may be used to exonerate officials from accepting moral responsibility, rather than to promote proper conduct. Moreover a careful analysis of extant codes reveals that they tend to be about procedures rather than substance. His conclusion is that public servants should be educated to the necessity and the difficulty of choosing and using substantive criteria to make morally responsible, as well as legal, choices.

George Szablowski (York) is concerned with the way in which human rights legislation is or is not embodied in various constitutions as that relates to administrative decision making. Again, constitutions are seen as embodying unwritten professional codes of ethics. At worst, a constitution may oblige civil servants to prefer state interests to the rights of individuals, or in any case oblige administrators to rectify the wrong by duly balancing the state's and the individual's interests. The unsaid implication is that there are more and less moral states; a constitution embedding appropriate values perhaps is moral guidance enough.

The next three chapters trace the ways in which different forms of government generate different ethical problems for civil servants. Lennart Lundquist (Lund) notes that although Sweden would seem to be more friendly toward the moral sensibilities of its bureaucrats than most other cultures, having long since legitimated mechanisms like media access to government documents and principled whistle-blowing, there are still opportunities for crises of conscience. This is because the civil servant lives in a nexus of different ethical frameworks — of responsibilities to the organization, to the profession, and to oneself.

Richard Chapman (Durham), a political scientist and former civil servant, suggests the moral choices of the British civil servant are more onerous than most. This is the consequence of Britain's unwritten and amorphous constitution incorporating residual customs and values no longer generally acceptable to society (such as the notion of perogative power). The British civil servant must contend with a tension between state and public interest, as well as a tension between these and private interest. In this and in his concluding essay, Chapman obliquely makes the challenging suggestion that the British system is barely adequate to the moral requirements of contemporary society. The situation is exacerbated in that the cost driven transposition to a more businesslike administrative culture erodes the traditional bulwarks against misuse of power.

A political philosopher, Colin Campbell (Georgetown) continues the theme of how constitutions and administrative ideologies determine beliefs about administrative propriety. Campbell is particularly interested in balancing accountability and moral agency in the US political system. He focuses on the relationship between politicians and public servants, and analyses the benefits and the limitations of locating accountability higher up in the hierarchy, specifically and finally with legislators rather than executors, and also the opposite position that would make public officials as accountable as politicians. Like Chapman, he sees the move of government toward a business model as posing more moral challenges to the government's administrators.

The next two articles look at how public service ethics is affected by the moral perspectives embedded in the law and in trade union ideology. Paul Finn, a philosopher of law from the National University of Australia, argues that any formalized code of professional ethics should be read off whatever notion of personal responsibility is encoded in the law of the land, whereas a management expert, Barry O'Toole (Loughborough) would require consistency with union values. O'Toole also notes the salubrious impact of civil service unionization on the behavior of politicians. He too is very disturbed by more businesslike government, fearing that civil service ethics will per force become the ethics of consumerism.

In the final essay the Editor (Chapman) underscores the necessity for senior administrators to be sensitive to the threats of moral compromise that arise in the day to day activities of their subordinates, to assume responsibility for enough moral education to help subordinates discriminate real from merely perceived threats of compromise, and to help them on the way toward acceptable resolution. This is in the interest of retaining the best in the public service — those who are now preferring resignation to moral compromise.

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Kelly James Clark, ed.
Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology.
Norwall, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992. Pp.
vi + 230.
US $99.00. ISBN 0-7923-1485-9.

This collection presents the work of some of the leading scholars in the philosophy of religion on natural theology (here described as concerned with the nature or possibility of evidence for theistic belief) and philosophical theology (here, the philosophical discussion of the divine attributes). Several of the papers are of high quality. Nevertheless, as a whole, they often reprise positions and arguments already well known, and the volume has neither a clear focus nor breadth. On the technical side, there is an unacceptably large number of typographical errors. It is, in short, a disappointing effort.

Some of the essays are, admittedly, quite useful. In the first selection, 'Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism', Norman Kretzmann argues that the attack of 'reformed epistemology' on evidentialism employs too narrow a concept both of evidence (as exclusively 'ulterior' evidence that is propositional in form) and of belief (i.e., one that fails to distinguish between how belief arises and what it may be based on) and succeeds only so far as it

misconstrues the relation of evidentialism to foundationalism. Kretzmann draws attention to a number of important distinctions in his paper, though his discussion of them is hidden largely in the endnotes (32-8). He concludes that Plantinga has not disproven evidentialism, that there is no logical inconsistency between foundationalism and the insistence that 'God exists' is a (properly) basic belief (though Kretzmann does not develop this point), and that, if we are to be rational in holding a belief, we must still have sufficient evidence.

Next, Alvin Plantinga ('Epistemic Probability and Evil') resurrects a number of his arguments concerning what he calls 'the epistemic problem of evil'. He maintains that there are no grounds for claiming that, given the presence of evil, God's existence is improbable and, even if there were, it would still not follow that belief in God is irrational (56). In the end, Plantinga says, the rationality of religious belief is not an epistemological, but an ontological or religious question (60).

In a rather dense piece (not helped by the presence of several misprints and typographical errors), Peter Forrest ('Reference and the Refutation of Naturalism') argues that if naturalism is false, it is plausible to maintain that basic knowledge is not tied to the senses (82) and, thus, we have an indirect support for the possibility of a pre-rational understanding of God.

In the fourth essay, William Alston ('The Place of Experience in the Grounds of Religious Belief') advances a defense of religious belief, analogous to that for the justifiability of certain perceptual beliefs. Religious belief is plausible, then, based on cumulative evidence and the putative mutual support (111) of direct awareness of God with the existence of God as a good (or best) explanation of religious experience. While there is little new here and while somewhat repetitive, Alston's account is admirable for its clarity.

Richard Swinburne ('Revelation') asks how a revelation of propositional truths could arise and be known by us. This is largely a summary of his recent work, particularly of his book of the same title. Its highly contentious claims are only cursorily defended, with the reader continually being referred to other texts for the argument.

Nicholas Wolterstorff's paper, 'Divine Simplicity', raises the question of how divine simplicity is compatible with the predication of other attributes to God. But rather than provide an answer, Wolterstorff busies himself instead with trying to make sense of the mediaeval lack of puzzlement concerning this notion. He argues that, to understand the mediaeval view, one must adopt its alternative 'ontological style' (136), but concludes that we may have good reason to reject such an ontology.

The issue of omniscience is raised by Tom Flint ('Prophecy, Freedom and Middle Knowledge'). Specifically, Flint argues that God's middle knowledge (i.e., knowledge of contingent truths independent of the free act of the divine will [153] — for example, God's knowledge of all possible results in all possible worlds) and his decision to create one of the worlds that he envisages are compatible with human freedom, prophesy, divine foreknowledge and divine simplicity.

The three final essays are particularly weak. Kelly James Clark ('Hold Not Thy Peace At My Tears: Methodological Reflections on Divine Impassibility') asks whether the classical understanding of God, as never affected by creation, is consistent with the view of most believers. He suggests that any decision here depends on certain methodological assumptions about which sources of information (e.g., Scripture, religious experience, philosophy, tradition, historical and social context) are appropriate to discerning theological truth. While lengthy (indeed, sometimes repetitive) and clear, Clark's catalogue of methodological points shows little direction and is highly tentative. Clark admits that the impassibilist view is logically defensible, but still concludes that the 'best explanation' of the data supplied by Scripture (187) and religious experience is that God is not impassible.

Marilyn McCord Adams ('Julian of Norwich on the Tender Loving Care of Mother Jesus') raises such questions as 'How can we account for evil?', 'What is the relation of God to us?', 'What is sin?' and 'How does God forgive sin?' and examines the responses to them found in the mediaeval mystic, Julian of Norwich. McCord Adams argues, for example, that, on Julian's view, our relation to God is at the psychological stage of an infant to its parent (201-4). While this allows us to view sin as 'incompetence' and not 'rebellion' (204-5), it also justifies God in withholding certain information from us. In this disjointed presentation, one finds no argument that we should find Julian's account plausible and it is not clear what conclusion McCord Adams wishes us to draw from this.

Finally, George Schlesinger ('The Scope of Human Autonomy') argues that one can justify punishment after death (or, at least, that some may not receive a reward of eternal happiness) because of the nature of human freedom. Schlesinger claims that our freedom concerns not just our present life, but any future life, and thus has an infinite value. This suggests that humans have great dignity and that, if God interfered (e.g., by granting everyone eternal happiness), the value of our autonomy would be undermined. Schlesinger's arguments here are, however, extremely brief and undeveloped, and do not obviously address the initial question — namely, the justifiability of eternal punishment.

The editor of this collection has tried to introduce some unity among these ten essays by means of a short introduction and a somewhat forced organization of the papers. Even though it provides a useful summary of the contents, this introduction is rather disjointed and its 'concluding remarks' pose questions that are never taken up in the pages that follow.

In short, this collection has little unity and, despite the reputations of the authors, is of uneven quality. Not only do several of the essays simply restate (albeit in a condensed form) well-known positions, but they are not suitable except to those already familiar with the current debates in the philosophy of religion.

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Correctness is a desirable property for computer programs, hardware, and algorithms. What it means is that the item in question behaves as its design specifications require; it does what it's supposed to. There are various means of establishing or verifying correctness. One is by testing or experiment, seeing whether the program or hardware or algorithm produces the required outputs with various different inputs. For most practicing computer programmers and hardware engineers, this is the standard method. Some theoretical computer scientists have urged that analytical means, in particular formal deductive proofs of correctness, would be much better. In response, other computer scientists and some philosophers have argued that correctness proofs wouldn't be better. This volume collects together all or most of the important papers and certainly all of the important ideas in the debates on this matter.

Here is an example of more or less what the verification debates are about, one that should be familiar to readers of this journal. Formal logic courses and textbooks commonly introduce at least one procedure for determining the validity of arguments expressed in a formal language. A design specification for this procedure might be that it (terminate and) output 'invalid' when an argument's premises can all be assigned true while its conclusion is false and output 'valid' otherwise. A typical example of such a procedure is a truth-tree test. While not presented as a computer program, this is often presented as a mechanically executable algorithm, one that could be translated into a program. The metatheory section of the course or text gives a correctness proof, a deductive proof showing that the procedure lives up to its design specifications. The metatheory section doesn't offer, at least normally, a summary of results showing that for a suitable selection of test arguments, the procedure performs as required and so (by statistical induction) is correct. This would be to follow standard engineering verification practice. The normal logic text or course does what one side in the verification debates says can and should be done for computer software and hardware, viz., provide a deductive proof of correctness rather than a statistically inductive one.

As philosopher Jim Fetzer points out in one of his contributions to this volume ('Philosophical aspects of program verification'), different topics are tangled up in the verification debates. Some of the debates merely or mostly reflect lack of carefulness in saying what either deductive or inductive verifications of correctness show. The loose account, especially of deductive verifications, is that they show that programs, hardware, and algorithms never behave in undesirable ways. It is easy to read non-technical articles as

claiming this about program correctness proofs. (For example: C.A.R. Hoare, 'Maths adds safety to computer programs', *New Scientist* vol. 111 [18 Sep. 1986]; Donald MacKenzie, 'The fangs of VIPER', *Nature* vol. 352 [8 Aug. 1991]. Computer scientist Hoare is one of the advocates of deductive verification; two of his papers are included in the volume.) But this isn't quite right, as Brian Smith's and Bertrand Meyer's essays explain. Correctness verifications, both inductive and deductive, show only that the items verified comply with their explicit specifications. As every software developer and probably every engineer knows, a large problem is getting adequate design specifications. Software and hardware which performs as inadequate specifications require can still be correct. Consider the design specifications listed above for the procedure to assess the validity of arguments. Suppose a procedure outputs 'valid' for input arguments containing non-sentences. This may not be desirable behavior; nevertheless, there's nothing in the explicit specifications blocking it. So the procedure is not, at least for this reason, incorrect.

Some other topics in the verification debates are of perhaps more theoretical or philosophical interest. Two main objections to deductive verifications of correctness have been widely discussed. Chronologically the first is mostly due to computer scientists Richard De Millo, Richard Lipton, and Alan Perlis in a 1979 essay included in the collection. They allow that it may be possible to provide correctness proofs, but say it's pointless to do so. Because they are boring and unreadable, deductive software or hardware correctness proofs won't achieve what their advocates want. Jim Fetzer, in a 1988 essay included here, is primarily responsible for the second objection. He argues that it is theoretically impossible to provide deductive proofs of software or hardware correctness. Thinking it is possible is a result of confusing theoretical models with their physical software or hardware realizations. There can be deductively obtained results about the former but not the latter.

A fuller version of De Millo, Lipton, and Perlis's objection is this. In mathematical disciplines, the goal aimed at by deductive proof is the reasoned conviction or knowledge that what is proved is true. In first-order logic, for example, the point of a proof of the undecidability of validity is to guarantee the belief or knowledge that there is no algorithmic procedure for determining every argument's validity. Similarly, deductive software or hardware correctness proofs must aim at producing the justified certainty that hardware or software performs as its design specifications require. Unfortunately, correctness proofs for realistic programs are so long, involved, and tremendously uninteresting that they will never produce this rational conviction or knowledge. No one will ever pay them any attention. Although the proofs are perhaps possible, it is pointless to construct them.

Without disagreeing with the claim about the purpose of deductive proofs, advocates of correctness proofs can reply that it is enough if the proofs are constructed and checked by computer. Many of those with a belief in the undecidability of validity, rationally acquired the belief without going through a proof. They trust an authority which did so; for example, a respected metatheory text. Trusting a machine as the provider or checker for

a long, intricate, and tedious proof seems in principle no different as a source of reasoned conviction about a program's correctness. As it happens, in one of the very few cases where a correctness proof was even partly constructed for a commercial product, the British VIPER chip, the proof was largely done by an automated theorem prover. Some of the details of that case are in Avra Cohen's paper included here.

The second objection to deductive correctness proofs, Fetzer's objection, should also be explained a little more. The problem Fetzer points out can be illustrated in a different domain, classical mechanics. Suppose a grandfather clock has design specifications calling for its pendulum to swing from one side of the case to the other in one second. This is apparently a normal requirement; it means that the clock makes ticks and tocks one second apart. A clock is built to meet the specifications by making it with a pendulum length of one meter. Can it be deductively verified that the clock behaves as required? Typical physics texts make it look like this is possible. They deduce that a pendulum with a length of one meter must have a period of two seconds. So the clock will behave as the design specifications require. But the deductions make idealizing assumptions about the pendulum in the clock. One is that its length stays constant: variations in temperature or humidity don't expand or contract or bend the pendulum. Another is that the distance the pendulum swings through in a period is exactly 4 times its starting displacement: there is, for example, no grit in the pivot mechanism making its motion wobble. And so on. In fact, the texts are deducing conclusions about a theoretical model of the grandfather clock, not the actual one in the factory. The model satisfies the assumptions by stipulation. Of course, the idealizing assumptions may be pretty much satisfied by the real clock. Then the physics textbook pendulum is a good model for the clock. But it is a nondeductive empirical matter that these assumptions or anything deduced from them are satisfied by the real clock.

Deductive program and hardware correctness proofs are similarly not about the software and chips on computer store shelves. They are also about idealized theoretical models. This is what advocates of deductive program and hardware verification often overlook. The idealizing assumptions here are, for example, that there are no interaction effects between a program and the operating system of the computer it is running on, that there are no nearby magnetic fields changing the contents of memory locations, and so on. These assumptions may be satisfied by the items on the computer store shelves. In that case, they can be identified with the models. But it is a nondeductive fact about the physical software and hardware that the assumptions or anything deduced from them are true. The mistake of confusing the theoretical model with the physical thing modelled is plain in the grandfather clock example. It is harder to spot with software and hardware verifications. The virtue of Fetzer's paper is not so much in discovering this kind of mistake. For instance, the grandfather clock example is really just an elaboration of a discussion of the confusion in an undergraduate philosophy of science textbook (Ronald Giere, *Understanding Scientific Reasoning*,

sec. 5.4 [New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1984, 2nd ed.]). Rather, the achievement is in noting that it occurs in the deductive correctness proofs proposed for computer engineering practice.

Who will or should find this volume worthwhile? Those with an interest in the program verification debates may. As noted above, the volume contains many or all of the important papers on the issues and there is an extensive bibliography of other relevant material. There isn't a competing collection. However, setting aside the introduction by one of the editors, there aren't new pieces in it. And perhaps anyone with a new interest in program verification will want also to look at a relevant chapter or two in a software engineering text. Those with an interest in the new field of philosophy of computer science may find the volume worthwhile. Deductive program verification is a standard subject in software engineering and proving hardware correctness is a common specialist conference theme. So philosophical problems in these areas are obviously important to philosophy of computer science. Philosophers of mathematics or science may also find the collection worthwhile. Some of the program verification debates are twists on familiar topics and positions: the purpose of proofs and the possible role of computers in constructing them, for one, and the way in which abstract mathematical models apply to parts of the physical world, for another.

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William H. Dray
Philosophy of History. Second edition.
Foundations of Philosophy Series.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1993.
Pp. 146. n.p. ISBN 013012816-3

The philosophy of history is ignored by most prominent historians of contemporary philosophy. Thus, in his classics *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (1957 & revised ed., 1965) John Passmore mentions this field in passing, and so he refers to one of its leaders, W.H. Dray, only once (539-40); in his supplemented book *Recent Philosophers* (1985), Passmore admits and apologises for the exclusion of serious treatment of philosophy of history and some of its post Second World War influential representatives such as Dray (1). This exclusion is excused by Passmore who then confines his later book (1985) to subjects such as epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophical logic (1). I shall not dwell here on the long list of introductory, intermediate and

advanced works in the philosophy of history for the layman and academics alike, but I shall mention in passing R. Aron, R.G. Collingwood, W.B. Gallie, E.H. Carr, K.R. Popper, W.H. Walsh. My focus will be on Dray. In contrast with Passmore's exclusion, the editors of the *Foundations of Philosophy Series* included the philosophy of history in their series. Dray was, then, invited to write the first edition of *Philosophy of History* published in 1964, as well as to contribute an article with the same title to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. This reflects recognition of the emergence of this important field in philosophy as well as Dray's position as a leader in this field. His numerous contributions to the philosophy of history are significant; in his Festschrift *Objectivity, Method and Point of View*, Rubinoff and van der Dussen, eds. (New York: Brill 1991), there is an updated list of his publications.

Dray begins by directing our attention to the distinction made between 'speculative' and 'analytical' philosophy of history (cf. also in his entry 'Philosophy of History' in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*). Pre-Second-World-War philosophers of history focused on what is termed 'speculative philosophy of history'. Their aim was, Dray says, 'to discover in past events an overall pattern or meaning which lies beyond the ordinary purview of the historian [Collingwood is the exception to this]' (1). Yet, Post-Second-World-War philosophers of history focused more on analytical philosophy of history. Their aim was, Dray says, to 'make clear the nature of historical inquiry, to elicit and examine its fundamental assumptions, its organizing concepts, and its methods of research and writing, with a view to locating it on the map of knowledge' (1). Dray suggests that it was Hempel's paper 'The Function of General Laws in History' (1942) in which he offered, following Popper, a model of historical explanation, that has contributed significantly to the change in focus. In light of this change, says Dray, earlier writings were seriously reconsidered, e.g., Collingwood's posthumous manuscript *The Idea of History* (1946). Dray was noted for his sharp criticism of the Popper-Hempel model of historical explanation as well as for his criticisms of Collingwood's view of the role of the historian. Dray's contributions to the philosophy of history became new items on the agenda, which significantly contributed to a further change in the focus of this field. The issues on the agenda are reflected in the content of the first 1964 edition of his book. The first half is devoted to analytical philosophy of history, the second to speculative philosophy of history. In the last two decades, however, Dray explains new items reached the agenda such as bias in history, the importance of narrative etc. Massive studies on narrative indicate the need for a new edition of the *Philosophy of History*, and thus the revisited edition is justified. The second edition of this book is substantially revised. Whereas the speculative portion of the first edition occupied half of the book, now it is shrunk to less than one chapter and the analytical portion has become dominant. This is, then, a new book which discusses current issues in the philosophy of history and as such warrants a new review.

The book is comprised of six chapters. The introduction (Chapter 1) presents the debate over the scientific status of history (6). The debate

involves two issues which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3: historical explanation and the scientific status of history, that is 'the sorts of conclusions historians claim to establish' (6). Chapters 4 and 5 discuss 'two well-known historical techniques, causal analysis and narration, the first often seen as providing some basis for scientific pretensions on the part of the historians, and the second frequently regarded as a residue of unscientific thinking that many historians have not yet managed to escape' (6-7). Chapter 5 discusses the scientific and cognitive status of historical narrative. The final chapter discusses a group of issues under the topic 'Determinism', a set of issues which belong to speculative philosophy of history. A list of books for further reading is offered on p. 141. There is neither a full bibliographical list nor a comprehensive subject index.

When discussing the scientific status of history Dray compares it to the status of natural science. Further, he admits that he follows the model of another book in this series, Hempel's *Philosophy of Science*. Furthermore, Hempel, following Popper, suggested a model historical explanation. The debate over this model was the central issue for analytic philosophy of history. Of the contentions of many philosophers, one contention was that if historical explanation resembles scientific explanation, then history is scientific, and can be studied with respect. One example will suffice. The focus of the first chapter is Hempel's model of explanation. Hempel's debt to Popper's discussion in the *Logik der Forschung* (1935) is recognised by Hempel but is ignored by Dray. The validity of this model for science is not even aired. Suppose it is not valid. Then why would it be useful to apply it to history?

Some background is necessary here. In the early 20th century, Georg Simmel focused on issues concerning historical knowledge. The central question he studied was, 'What is the meaning of history?' This question has become central to most philosophers working in the philosophy of history. (This is well reflected in Mourice Mandelbaum's Doctoral thesis of 1936 which was slightly modified in his *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* [New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1938]). Logically and historically, three standard possible answers obtain: (i) 'History has no meaning; rather it is the chronicle of past events'; (ii) 'History is the plot behind these events'; (iii) 'History is our reading of our own plot into the course of past events'. Whereas answer (i) was popular amongst 19th century thinkers, Turgot, Herder, Hegel and Marx hold answer (ii), and each of them suggested a different plot. This presupposition, that history has a special meaning characterised the speculative philosophy of history. It was severely criticised by many, including Collingwood and Popper. Both offered different reasons for rejecting the assumption that history has any special meaning. This criticism may explain the shift towards analytic philosophy of history. They both endorse answer (iii), 'History is our reading of our own plot into the course of past events'. The controversy over this question, 'What is the meaning of history?', was advanced by Collingwood and by Mandelbaum. In their publications at the end of the 1930s and 1940s, both presented the historian as the narrator of past events.

I would suggest that leaving the question of the meaning of history aside should have prompted the need to formulate a new question: 'What are the presuppositions of adequate writing of history?' This question was not formulated. There are three possible answers to it: (a) 'History is written as a chronicle of past events'; (b) 'History is written to describe (while perhaps discovering) its hidden plot'; (c) 'History is our own writing of our own plot into the course of past events'. In this regard, Dray attributes the origin of the specific usage of the word 'plot' to Morton White (92), and I think he is in error. Forster defined a story 'as a narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence [in my words "a chronicle"]. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. "The king died and then the queen died" is a story. "The king died and then the queen died of grief" is a plot. The time-sequence is preserved, but the sense of causality overshadows it' (E.M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* [London: Penguin Books 1927], 87).

The new question refers to different structures of narrative. Again, the focus around narrative is by no means a new one. Collingwood was working on the epistemic and methodological aspects of narrative already in the late 1920s and Mandelbaum in the late 1930s. The criticisms of the idea that history has special meaning, and the works on narrative by Collingwood and Mandelbaum, no doubt could have helped to refocus the study of the philosophy of history. But this was not the case. None of these philosophers, Dray included, bothered to reformulate the central question of this field. In the last two decades, the study of narrative becomes central to any discussion on philosophy of history. The substantial changes of the book under review reflects the emergence of the study of narrative.

Despite these flaws, the merits of the book should not be overshadowed. It is worth reading for the student of philosophy of history and the expert alike. It is a wonderful introduction to philosophy of history as it was discussed — roughly — in the present century since it reflects the history of the subject in the last forty years. The footnotes, many of which mention and annotate recent literature, are quite useful for the beginner and professional alike.

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Gerald Dworkin, ed.
Morality, Harm and the Law.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994.
Pp. x + 197.
US $46.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-8710-8);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-8711-6).

A perennial problem for the liberal is to say precisely what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate liberty-restricting laws. She accepts laws against murder and theft, but balks at those prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy between adults and against the private consumption of pornography. Since justifications for the latter almost always invoke moral considerations, it is tempting to see the liberal rationale as that of distinguishing laws whose grounds are moral considerations from those whose justification lies elsewhere. But as the papers in this collection amply demonstrate, things are a trifle more complicated than that. The difficulty with those laws that the liberal rejects is not that they are morally inflected; the law cannot avoid embodying moral considerations and thus, to some extent, enforcing those considerations. 'The interesting question [and the one to which the liberal owes an answer] is what parts of morality ... [the law] ought to enforce' (4). As editor Gerald Dworkin reports, Joel Feinberg has provided one answer to this question: 'the law should be limited to the protection of *particular* values, namely personal autonomy and respect for persons' (4). Once the liberal concedes that *some* values can play a substantive role in the formulation of laws, however, how is she to argue which the chosen few shall be?

Morality, Harm and the Law brings together a fine selection of papers which speak to this problematic. (All but one have appeared elsewhere.) Part One — 'Principles' sets out a number of theoretical positions on the central topic, and Part Two — 'Applications' — showcases the deployment of these arguments by legal scholars and the (U.S.) courts. In the theoretical part there are papers by Joel Feinberg, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel alongside an excerpt from Mill's *On Liberty*. These are cleverly juxtaposed with papers by Irving Kristol, John Finnis, Gerald J. Postema, and an extract from James Fitzjames Stephen's 'The Doctrine of Liberty and Its Application to Morals', respectively.

That the state ought to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good is a familiar liberal refrain. Among the world's citizens there is a wide range of substantive views concerning the content of a morally good life, and if the state were to legislate on the basis of just one of these conceptions, it would fail to treat its citizens as equals — a minimum condition on a just regime, we may assume. But the liberal cannot defend an unmitigated neutrality, a pure impartiality, nor an unrestrained toleration. John Finnis argues that the liberal argument which repudiates legislation on the grounds that it restricts the activities of those whose 'conceptions of human good fall outside the preferred range ... is self-stultifying' (43-4). If, in rejecting certain

laws and the preferences which underpin them, the liberal fails to treat her opponents with equal concern and respect, then she is hoist by her own petard. If she denies, however, that she does so fail, she cannot criticize her opponents on these grounds.

One way in which the liberal might attempt to extricate herself from this snare is to appeal to a substantive conception of impartiality, where impartiality is to be understood roughly to involve 'treating or counting everyone equally in some respect — according them all the same rights, or counting their good or their welfare or some aspect of it the same in determining what would be a desirable result or a permissible course of action' (Nagel, 60). But this simple and laudable idea is notoriously difficult to spell out and defend in detail. Moreover, as Nagel notes, the liberal faces a credibility problem: 'liberals ask of everyone a certain restraint in calling for the use of state power to further specific, controversial moral or religious conceptions — but the results of that restraint appear with suspicious frequency to favor precisely the controversial moral conceptions that liberals hold' (61). Thus, the liberal's rhetoric of impartiality serves to protect her own moral convictions.

Of course, there is a world of difference between opposing laws prohibiting abortion and endorsing that practice, or saying that it is morally permissible. But — as Sandel and Garvey show — when what is at issue is the justification for legislation which restricts certain activities, it can appear disingenuous of the liberal to eschew any moral assessment of the conduct in question. For any conduct C, an argument against state restriction of C might proceed on the grounds that C itself is valuable. That is unlikely to be the liberal argument, for it straightforwardly relies on a premise concerning the moral worth of C. Rather the liberal will argue against state intervention on the grounds that the availability to individuals of the *choice* to engage or not to engage in C is what is of value. (Correspondingly, the disvalue of a prohibitive law is that a choice previously available to citizens is no longer available.) Unembellished, this is unsatisfying. The availability of choice has value only with respect to the value of what that choice concerns. Thus the liberal is either thrown back on the necessity to judge the value of C, or must argue that the availability of choice is in itself valuable because, for example, it is only under this condition that human beings can exercise their essential rationality and thus flourish. Either way, she relies on some normative assessment or other in her argument against certain liberty-limiting laws. Thus, the liberal must concede that there is some truth to what Sandel calls the 'naive view' — the view that 'The justice (or injustice) of laws against abortion and homosexual sodomy depends, at least in part, on the morality (or immorality) of those practices' (109). Sandel's contrastive examination of the reasoning in *Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird* (contraception), *Roe v. Wade* (abortion), and *Bowers v. Hardwick* (anti-sodomy law) reveals the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court has appealed to this view.

The same theme is played out in the exchange between Kristol and Feinberg. Kristol's argument against permissive obscenity laws is a solid

example of the conservative's 'shocking counterexample strategy'. As Feinberg puts it, 'the legal moralist offers *counterexamples* to the liberal thesis that personally harmless transactions between consenting adults in private cannot be evils of sufficient magnitude to justify preventive coercion' (49). If the conservative can get the liberal to agree that public gladiatorial contests to the death between consenting adults (Kristol's example) are fit candidates for prohibitive legislation, then he will claim to have shown that the liberal is, despite her protestations, taking into account the value of the activity in question. But, as Feinberg's careful argument shows, the liberal need not be backed into *that* corner. If the evil of the gladiatorial contest is a *'pure free-floating evil'* (56) — that is, one that 'neither violates any one's rights nor causes any setback to interests the risk of which had not already been voluntarily accepted by the interest-holder' (56) — the bold liberal can say that, horrible as that conduct may be, there is no ground for legislation against it. What Feinberg brings out is that the shocking counterexamples that cause the liberal to waver are not cases of pure free-floating evils. What causes the liberal to concede of some activity, 'Well, okay, *that* is so horrendous that there ought to be a law against it' is likely to be some example in which the evil is precisely not *free-floating*. And if that is so, then she may appeal to the threat or harm to individuals' interests as her justification for state interference.

Part Two — 'Applications' — comprises papers and case law on familiar and not-so-familiar topics. Amongst the well known material are excerpts from and discussion of *Bowers v. Hardwick, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton* (obscenity law), and *Texas v. Johnson* (flag desecration). But of particular interest are the sections on blackmail and commodification (of babies and organs). These topics are underdiscussed in the philosophical literature concerning the proper role of moral considerations in the law, and it is to Dworkin's credit that he includes them. In different ways, both blackmail and commodification force us to think hard about coercion and free choice. What assumptions about human agency underpin laws against blackmail? Ought these assumptions carry over into our considerations about commodification? An unreflective reliance on a free-market conception of individual autonomy and choice masks the relevance of certain oppressive political and economic structures, which taken into account can lessen the credibility of the liberal account of agency. For instance, is the homeless person who sells his blood in order to eat merely exercising his liberty to participate in the marketplace? Does the impoverished single mother act voluntarily when she contracts with others to bear their biological child? To my mind, it is these cases — rather than those like Kristol's gladiatorial contest — which ought to concern the liberal. This is not to say that the liberal will have to give up on her commitment to neutrality. But they do make clear where she needs to provide more argument.

In the last decade, liberalism's adherence to neutrality, tolerance and impartiality has come under considerable attack especially from so-called communitarians and from feminists. But these critics often rely upon slogan

versions of liberalism's central theses. To be sure, it is difficult to say precisely what it is for the state to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good; certain types of pornography and instances of 'hate-speech' present the liberal with real challenges. But the liberal can say something more about what neutrality, impartiality and tolerance amount to, and on this basis she can argue against anti-pornography legislation, for example, without biting any unpleasant bullets. To the extent that the papers in *Morality, Harm and the Law* show how this is possible, the anthology represents a spirited defense of liberalism. Liberals and their critics would do well to reflect carefully on what the writers here have to say.

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Frank B. Farrell
Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism —
The Recovery of the World.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. xii + 290.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-521-44416-0.

When Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God he wanted to abandon, not only the central strand of Platonic Christian metaphysics, but the conceptions of subject, object and other, interwoven with it. The thesis of this book is that much recent philosophy still relies, in spite of itself, on the religious structures of thinking that Nietzsche wanted to transcend. Purging the remnants of late medieval and modern theology — 'disenchanting' the world and subjectivity — says the author, will dull the temptations of 'anti-realism' and 'post-modernism' and save realism from its own excesses.

Chapter 1 outlines the logical space of debates about essences and God's freedom to create. Much the same space, Farrell holds, is later filled by disputes over subjectivity, the objectivity of the world and the determinacy of intentional content. Just as the independent existence of natures or essences was held by some medieval thinkers to constrain God's creative power, so the prior determinacy of the world is held by contemporary 'anti-realists' to place unwarranted limits on the willing and intentional contents of subjectivity. In the first case God's power is given free reign by an appeal to nominalism. In the second case the world becomes a projection of individual or collective subjectivity or is subject to advance-limitation by the *'demiurgic* role of the modern subject' (13). Hegel, says Farrell, 'is the

most interesting modern figure who rethinks the structure of subjectivity and its relation to the world' (16), struggling to overcome the divine model without falling back into scepticism.

Chapter 2 pursues the theme of intentional content with emphasis on recent externalist accounts. Putnam's Twin-Earth example and Burge's related considerations are examined, as Farrell argues against narrow psychology — determinate in meaning without reference to the subject's actual environment. Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following are recruited (hesitantly) for this task. As a reading of Wittgenstein, Farrell's account grants too much to Kripke's textual fantasies, but the argument itself is intriguing, if diffuse in presentation. Determinate semantic content, says Farrell with a nod to Derrida, depends on 'an insertion in a chain of possible repetition' (42). I cannot even *take* myself to mean something determinate, unless I *do* mean something determinate, for what the absurdities of rule-scepticism show is that the world is active in fixing, not only what I mean, but 'what I *think* I mean' (50). The sceptic cannot reply that what I think I mean *is* indeterminate, because the original sceptical worry can get started only if what I mean is indeterminate, *given* what I think I mean. (Kripke confuses the two problems; so applying the argument to his position is less simple.)

Farrell's treatment of Davidson in Chapter 3 is clear and justifiable for the most part, and it is satisfying to read once again that Davidson's 'technical suggestions about the shape of a theory of meaning will not be what is most lasting in his philosophical output' (73). Davidson's work, says Farrell, offers a way of curing realism of its theological hangover. By abandoning the firm distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, Davidson lets us 'return to the world and recognize how it must have already been taken into consideration in the securing of content for any utterances, of speaker or interpreter or whomever' (84).

Farrell thinks Davidson's 'weakly realist' (113) views have been hijacked by the 'conversational idealism' (149) of Richard Rorty. Indeed, he hopes to provide 'a counter-narrative to Rorty's' (xi) — an ambitious undertaking, given the breadth, depth and style of the latter's work since *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (a book rarely cited by Farrell). With respect to style, Farrell is at a clear disadvantage, but what is more disappointing is his critique of Rorty's work. The charitable spirit that animates his discussions of Hegel, Davidson, Wiggins and Derrida vanishes in Chapter 4 when he confronts Rorty's 'dangerous' (143) pragmatism. Here we find little that has not been said before with comparably poor justification, and Farrell fails to see how little substantive disagreement sets his 'realism' apart from Rorty's 'pragmatism'. Their difference in rhetoric is, of course, significant, but the nature of that difference seems lost on Farrell.

I advise readers to hurry on to Chapter 5 where the author deals with realism more directly. While he caricatures logical positivism (150), his brief discussions of Wiggins, Stich, Wright and Dummett in this chapter are clear and competent. And his treatment of Putnam's internal realism merits notice

for his suggestion that we separate the Kantian and Davidsonian strands that Putnam sometimes carelessly weaves together.

At times Farrell seems to conflate realism with the correspondence-theory of truth (113, 167), but it is hard to say whether this reflects a deep commitment, for there is no sustained discussion of truth in any of the book's eight chapters. More apparent is that some mystery is afoot in Farrell's efforts both to align himself with Davidson's 'modest realism' (127) and to allow some kind of real vulnerability to sceptical doubt (109-16). 'A satisfactory realism', he says, 'will hold ... that our beliefs must accommodate themselves to, or "track", the contours of the world, and that even with the full exercise of our abilities we might fall short of grasping what is the case' (149). This formulation is ambiguous between the claim that we can have false beliefs and the claim that the scenarios of the external-world sceptic are, not merely logical, but real possibilities. But of relevance here is his commitment to the argument that a 'realist' account of truth is needed to explain the success of science (132). If one is a metaphysical realist, *i.e.* if one thinks it is a real possibility that the sceptic is right, then this explanatory use of 'true' will be tempting (though it is unclear why the correspondence of scientific beliefs should explain their 'success' if sceptical scenarios *are* real possibilities: their falsehood, says the sceptic, would explain their 'success' just as well). But if, like Davidson, one denies any real chance of massive empirical error, then it is not the truth of beliefs that explains the 'success' of science, but the holding of particular beliefs in particular contexts.

Chapter 6 deals sensibly with moral realism by challenging the assumption that a belief in the reality of grounds of value could be justified only by abductive inference. But again Farrell's positive view seems based on a correspondence-theory of truth. With the demise (or sublimation) of emotivism and prescriptivism, it is this picture of truth that has let a scientistic scepticism about values persist — by pressuring the moral 'realist' to find the objects or properties that serve as truth-makers for moral claims.

Chapter 7, 'Self-relating Selves', takes up subjectivity, professing sympathy for Dennett's suggestion that consciousness is a kind of internalization of intersubjective practices of communication (228), but drawing back from the suggestion that 'There seem to be qualia but there are not' (230). Farrell's scruples at this point are not unusual, but it seems little advance to refer every *quale* to 'the special kind of self-presence that an embodied consciousness makes possible' (238).

Farrell's final chapter criticizes the work of such 'postmodern thinkers' (245) as Lyotard and Fish, which is dismissed as 'ludicrous' (252) or 'foolish' (267). But this rhetoric is accompanied by substantive criticisms. The most interesting is Farrell's answer to the charge that reason, truth and other central ideas and institutions of the Enlightenment are inherently oppressive. Such a claim can seem plausible, he argues, only against a background-assumption of the 'divinized model of subjectivity or of reason' (248) that he criticizes in earlier chapters. Both Derrida and (equivocally) Foucault are judged free of such an assumption, but Farrell concludes by echoing Rorty's

charge that 'Foucault's antihumanism accompanies a severe underestima-
tion of the human goods brought about and maintained by the institutions
we owe to the Enlightenment ...' (277).

This book might have been better, but it is not bad. It achieves some
important goals that Farrell sets for it, providing a survey of recent philoso-
phy that renders some relatively difficult work reasonably accessible to the
non-specialist and brings together the practices of continental and analytical
philosophy with the history of philosophy in a way that displays their mutual
relevance for one another.

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Paul Feyerabend
Against Method, 3rd edition.
London: Verso 1993.
Pp. xiv + 279.
$18.95 paperback. ISBN 0-86091-481-X.

Had Paul Feyerabend called this book 'Against some philosophers' ideas
about method' or 'What the scientific method is not' it would have caused less
of a stir when it was published in 1975. But its importance would have been
better appreciated and its arguments more carefully examined. The critics
would not have jumped, at least not so quickly, to the conclusion that he was
defending 'subjectivism' and 'irrationalism', and they would have been much
less inclined to pillory his slogan that in science 'anything goes'. I should like
to think — though this is doubtless unrealistic — that with the appearance
of another edition of the book, and the passage of time, Feyerabend's argu-
ment will be given a more sympathetic hearing and his critique of profes-
sional humbug and pretension at long last be accorded the attention it
deserves.

This edition of *Against Method* contains nowhere near as many changes
as the second one. The first fifteen chapters of the book, in which two
widely-defended methodological principles are compared with Galileo's prac-
tice and found wanting, are the same apart from the addition of a number of
footnotes and various other minor modifications. The famous chapter on
incommensurability (chapter 16 in this and the second edition; chapter 17 in
the first edition) is — with the exception of some inessential remarks —
likewise taken over virtually unchanged, as are the next two chapters on
'reason and practice'. Finally the revisions to the two remaining chapters are

relatively inconsequential; here Feyerabend mainly confines himself to embellishing his criticism of the idea that there is some one thing that counts as science and to bringing his autobiographical remarks up to date.

The most important revision (actually the only major significant change of doctrine) is that the earlier defence of relativism has been dropped. Whereas in the second edition Feyerabend had nothing but praise for relativism, in this one he candidly admits that he has changed his mind and that some of his earlier recommendations were misplaced. In particular he has withdrawn his observation that he differs from Kuhn 'by being a relativist' and has suppressed the chapter in which he maintained that objects are 'not found [but] shaped by special groups, cultures, civilizations' (pp. 230 and 260 in the second edition). As he explicitly states in a new 'Postscript on Relativism', since writing the second edition, he has come to see that relativism is 'only a first step towards understanding live traditions' and come to appreciate that the position he had been defending is 'as much a chimaera as absolutism, ... its cantankerous twin' (268).

These amendments are to the good. Not only does the relativism of the second edition labour under enormous difficulties, it deflects attention from the important business of the book, which is to expose the bankruptcy of rationalistic theories of science. Disentangled from relativism, Feyerabend's case against rationalism — that it is overly simplistic and counterproductive (see especially chapters 3 and 16) — gains in power as well as clarity. It can no longer be dismissed on the grounds that it leads to an untenable philosophical position (or worse still viewed as revealing the absurdity of anti-rationalism). There can now be no excuse for failing to recognize that Feyerabend is challenging the project of developing a general philosophical theory of science and overlooking that his anarchism is meant to be 'medicine for *epistemology*, and for the *philosophy of science*' (9, Feyerabend's italics).

Also it now becomes clear that what primarily motivates Feyerabend's polemic is his belief that 'the chauvinism of science is a much greater problem than the problem of intellectual pollution [and] may even be one of its major causes' (163). While Feyerabend is certainly no apologist for science, neither is he the enemy of it he is usually supposed to be (this should have been obvious all along given his comparison of the importance and depth of Galileo's and Einstein's science with what he takes to be the monotony and triviality of contemporary philosophy of science). The plain fact is that Feyerabend is against scientism (including scientism within the sciences themselves), not science itself, his target being the mindless, albeit common, assumption that scientists know best. As he puts it in a new footnote, 'I am not against science. What I object to is narrow-minded philosophical interference and narrow-minded extension of the latest scientific fashions to all areas of human endeavour' (122).

If I have a criticism of this new edition, it is that Feyerabend seems to have mellowed and is now more willing to allow that the opposition has a point. I was surprised to learn that he approves of recent efforts by historians, sociologists and philosophers to develop a new conception of science (see pp.

x-xi) and that he takes comfort from the 'dramatic political, social and ecological changes' that have occurred since he first published the book (ix). Also I am sure I will not be the only reader to raise an eyebrow when reading his concessions to the rather lame complaints of one of his critics about his tendency to generalize (268); in the old days he would have unceremoniously sent him packing. Still there is still plenty of wit and irreverence in the book (not least in the new preface where Derrida is compared unfavourably with Nestroy, p. xiv). *Against Method* remains one of the few recent books of philosophy, worth reading for the sheer pleasure of seeing an exceptional mind at work; indeed it is an even better read now that the relativism has been removed.

Note: After drafting this review I learned that Feyerabend had died. While it may seem odd to say in view of his supposed lack of seriousness, it seems to me that we have lost a great champion of truth and square dealing, not just a major critic of intellectual fraud, bombast and quackery. It is, I think, a great tribute to him that a leading logical empiricist could say to me some years ago that he had learned more from reading Feyerabend than from reading almost anyone else.

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John Mark Fischer and **Mark Ravizza, eds.**
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993.
Pp. 347.
US $41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2943-9);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8159-7).

This collection of fourteen essays by eleven philosophers covers virtually every question concerning responsibility that has interested analytical philosophers in the last two decades. The essays are without exception of the highest quality with respect to philosophical substance, contemporary significance, and readability. Unlike most collections of essays, this book's structure is integral to its presentation. This collection is not simply a set of contributions to a single theme. It is rather a selection of inter-related perspectives contributing to a single critical discourse about the meaning of moral responsibility and the conditions under which responsibility can be imputed to a person. The various contributors are in real, not incidental, dialogue. The introduction by Martin and Ravizza sets up the issues and

surveys the field with the order and insight that characterizes genuine competence and control of the material. They provide an exceptional map to this conversation about moral responsibility that is readily accessible to any reasonably sophisticated reader but which will at the same time satisfy even the philosophical specialist.

The book opens the question of moral responsibility by developing the particularly pertinent case study of Robert Alton Harris. Harris was executed in 1992 for killing two innocent teenagers 'for the fun of it'. Given Harris's casual insouciance and the brutality of the crime, Harris was a prime candidate for the moral community's full indignation, resentment, and blame. But an easy (pre-philosophic) certainty of Harris's moral responsibility for the crime is called into question by the fact that Harris's childhood was a horror of physical and mental abuse. Reflection on the meaning of responsibility in this case provides the three pivotal questions that drive these essays forward: 'What is required in order for someone to be a morally responsible agent?' 'What conditions must be met for a person to be held responsible for particular events?' 'Does freedom-of-action imply alternative possible actions as a necessary condition?'

The perplexing questions concerning moral responsibility that Harris's case gives rise to are addressed through a tightly organized three-part structure. In the first section, the focus is the 'reactive-attitudes' allegedly constitutive of moral responsibility: resentment and indignation, love, respect, praise, gratitude, etc. Peter Strawson's seminal essay 'Freedom and Resentment' serves to organize this and subsequent sections. In the second section, various positive accounts of moral responsibility are investigated; that is, various approaches to specifying the conditions of application of the concept of moral responsibility are presented and evaluated. The two general approaches discussed in this section are the 'hierarchial' theory identified with Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin and the 'reasons-responsiveness' theories of Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and Fischer and Martin. In the third section, the traditional problem of freedom, choice, and responsibility is addressed. This is done by considering the crucial issue of the relationship between moral responsibility and requirement of alternative possibilities.

The variety of contributors and the tight organization of the book make it impossible to criticize in a short compass. The book delivers on its promise to present 'perspectives on moral responsibility'. One must keep in mind, however, that the organizing viewpoint is analytical. Currents of similar discussions in other philosophical traditions are not even acknowledged in footnotes or bibliography. So, the conversation here is very much 'in-house', but no room in the house is left unexplored.

The strength of the book is its address of the problems in a larger framework than the 'determinism-free will' debate that is typical of older analytical literature (*eg.* Bernard Berofsky's *Free Will and Determinism*). These essays join the problem of moral responsibility to on-going issues in philosophy of action and the intentionality of the human subject. J. David Velleman's essay, 'What Happens When Someone Acts', is a good example of

this move. These approaches to the problem through philosophy of action have the potential to open a link between the concerns of analytical philosophers and philosophers of other philosophical traditions. For example, Strawson's argument that the foundation of moral responsibility is practical not theoretical or Susan Wolf's essay criticizing the 'real self view' of Frankfurt's hierarchical theory press toward but never engage a dialogue with (Neo)-Aristotelian, communitarian, hermeneutical, and personalist positions in the manner of Paul Ricoeur's recent book, *Oneself Like Another* (Chicago, 1992), but such a survey-synthesis never develops in any of the essays. This is a decided weakness given the contemporary importance of the book's theme, but the book cannot be faulted for what it never claims to do.

This is an absorbing book even if one does not share its analytical foundation. The book is particularly helpful in situating recent analytical discussion of moral responsibility. Its careful construction and development would help non-specialists acquire basic control of the primary issues and relevant debates. The book's arguments are easily accessible to those in fields like law, sociology, or political science whose primary interests are not philosophical. However, the book will also be of interest to scholars and graduate students in philosophy doing research in moral theory, philosophy of mind, theology, and legal theory because of its comprehensiveness and coherence. There is little question that Fischer and Ravizza organize their literature well and are able to distinguish what is important from the merely interesting. The bibliography, which reflects the analytical tradition, is exceptionally complete. The book could also serve as a collection of readings for a course or seminar on responsibility.

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This book (henceforth RTT) is an important contribution to the recent technical and more broadly philosophical literature on truth and paradox. It contains a nice mix of formal and informal chapters. The informal Chapters 1, 4 and 7 can be read as an independent sequence which

motivates and discusses RTT's treatment of truth in an accessible and philosophically interesting way. The remaining chapters fall into two pairs: Chapter 2 presents and Chapter 3 criticises Kripkean treatments of truth; and Chapters 5 and 6 develop the technical details of RTT's treatment.

RTT's 'fundamental intuition, formalised in Tarski's Convention T' is 'that the meaning of truth [T] is fixed by the T-biconditionals' (20): the biconditionals 'Ta iff A' where 'a' names the sentence 'A'. This intuition must be refined if the language under study expresses the Liar's paradox: if some names 'l' names '$\sim Tl$', the relevant T-biconditional is inconsistent, and hence false.

So 'T' cannot always be assigned a classical interpretation, i.e. an extension. RTT's task is to give an account of *how* to interpret 'T', if not classically. RTT narrows its task by focusing on languages whose T-free fragments are classically interpreted first order languages.

Suppose that, in some such language, the name 'l' names the sentence '$\sim Tl$'. Since the sentences l and 'Tl' cannot have the same classical truth value, they might have *no* truth-value. We might consider a three-valued logic, so that 'Ta' can have the value **t**(rue), **f**(alse) or **n**(either). In 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' (*Journal of Philosophy* 72 [1975] 690-716), Kripke shows that if our scheme for assigning truth-values to complex sentences is *monotone*, then any interpretation of the T-free fragment of a language can be extended to a *fixed point*: a three-valued model assigning the sentences 'A' and 'Ta' the same truth value whenever 'A' is named by 'a'. In any fixed point, liar sentences have the value **n**. A *fixed point* theory (FPT) assigns to 'T' its interpretation in some fixed point.

RTT presents its theory in contrast to Kripke-inspired FPTs. Chapter 3 consists of a battery of arguments against FPTs, and is of significant interest independently of RTT's positive programme. The most interesting considerations stem from an uncommon take on a common observation: there are semantic notions that fixed point languages cannot express, for example, *exclusion negation* for which $\neg$**n** = **t**; and the Lukasiewicz biconditional $\equiv$, for which (**n**$\equiv$**n**) = **t**. This gap between the resources of object language and metalanguage have made some worry that FPTs do not yield universal languages. This is not RTT's worry: after all, *no* natural language can express everything that can be expressed. Natural languages can be *enriched*, perhaps so as to express a new semantic concept, C. In giving a semantics for a language L that expresses its own C-concept, nothing bars us from introducing new semantic concepts not expressed in L.

RTT's objection is that 'there is a gap between the resources of the language that is the original object of investigation and those of the languages that are amenable to FPTs' (101). The language that is the original object of investigation *can* express exclusion negation. Further, this is the *source* of our ability to express genuinely paradoxical sentences, whose behaviour is unstable. A fixed point language cannot, in the end, express genuinely paradoxical sentences — even '$\sim Tl$' behaves stably. So

FPTs do not deliver an analysis of the unstable phenomenon that we are trying to understand. 'There are appearances of the Liar here, but they deceive' (96).

RTT's strategy is to understand the 'iff' in T-biconditionals not as the classical biconditional, but as '$=_{Df}$'. The T-biconditionals

$$T`A' =_{Df} A$$

are interpreted as partial definitions of truth. These definitions are circular: in some cases, the definiendum T occurs in the definiens. RTT develops general *revision* theories of circularly defined concepts, and applies these to the circular concept of truth.

Consider a circular definition of G, where F and H have fixed extensions:

$$Gx =_{Df} Fx \vee (Hx \& \sim Gx).$$

This definition does not specify an extension for G. But given the *hypothesis* that G has some extension, the definition generates a *revision rule* for revising the hypothesis, delivering a new extension. A single hypothesis generates a *revision sequence* of hypotheses, that can be extended into the transfinite. A sentence is *stably true (false)* if it eventually stabilises as true (false) in every revision sequence. Some sentences never stabilise: these are the paradoxical sentences whose unstable behaviour we are trying to model.

The application of revision theories to truth is straightforward: the Tarski biconditionals, together with the non-semantic facts, generate a revision rule for revising hypotheses about the extension of T. The *interpretation* of T can be identified with the revision rule itself. RTT argues that, in so interpreting T, we do not shy away from the genuinely unstable nature of paradoxical sentences; rather, we formalise it. Further, like FPTs, revision theories give an account of which sentences we can categorically assert (the stably true ones) and deny (the stably false ones). RTT argues that revision theories also do more: they 'specify how [we] are to work with the concept of truth in hypothetical contexts' (199), contexts in which we do not know whether a particular sentence is paradoxical.

What I find most exciting about revision theoretic ideas is that they promise to have applications well beyond the concept of truth. Circularity arises in many branches of philosophy, and here we have a clear and precise treatment of circularities that previously seemed intractably vicious. Already, revision theoretic ideas have been applied to the issue of non-well founded sets. (See Antonelli, *Revision Rules: An Investigation into Non-monotonic Inductive Definitions*, PhD dissertation, 1993, Pittsburgh.) RTT suggests that they can be applied to reference, satisfaction, membership, exemplification, necessity, belief and knowledge.

What I find potentially worrying about revision theories is this: the semantics tell us when an object-language sentence is *stably true*, or *stably false* or somehow paradoxical. But they do not tell us when an object language sentence is simply *true*. Even for unparadoxical sentences involving T, we are given no metalinguistic notion of truth. But if we are interested in truth,

then we might want a metalinguistic notion of it. Perhaps there *is* a perfectly manageable metalinguistic notion of truth, but it's a circular notion that must itself be given a revision theoretic semantics. It would be nice to see this thought developed, and to see how *truth* is related to *stable truth* and how each of these is related to human concerns.

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Michael Heim
The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality.
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993.
Pp. xxiii + 175.
Cdn $29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-508178-1).

Michael Heim is the philosophical futurist of virtual reality, inspecting the meager augurs in current research and entertainment for portents of things to come. His official posture is Heideggerian reserve about technology, an attempt at continuity with Heidegger's dark ambivalence about 'the language machine' (the word-processor) and other artifacts of technological instrumentality. But Heim is an enthusiast at heart, expecting VR to mature into a vehicle for total works of art that will transform our experience of reality: 'Perhaps the essence of VR ultimately lies not in technology but in art, perhaps art of the highest order'.

Heim distinguishes seven features of VR: simulation, interaction, artificiality, immersion, telepresence, full-body immersion, and networked communications. But he is not concerned here simply with virtual reality in the sense defined by these features, but more broadly with the consequences of the computer revolution for language, thought, and personality. He deplores the 'infomania' that has rendered the English language 'manic', yet he notes, 'I have yet to find a single writer who learned word processing and then abandoned it for pen or typewriter', and indeed he wrote this book on a word-processor. He is concerned that features of computer programming, which he sums up under the rubric of 'Boolean logic', are acting as subconscious agencies to affect our mental life. 'Boolean logic cuts off the peripheral vision of the mind's eye', he writes, and he urges that we retain our attachment to books because of the musing, meditative relationship to information that they make possible. Modern logic furthermore, 'as the code that connects computer programs to the logic of circuits', is paving the way for 'the postmodern mentality' characterized by the jumps of thought that hypertext

environments encourage. (This discourse about the malign influence of the logic of programming on our thought processes is overblown. Most of the time, for most computer users, that logic is working silently and invisibly in the background, posing no threat to the relationship between user and text, which may be as 'musing' and 'meditative' as any traditional scholar's.)

Heim defines his general philosophical position by reaction to Marshall Macluhan's student Walter J. Ong, who 'sees the electronic media sublating the earlier oppositions, the oral and the literate, so that electronics achieves an encompassing synthesis'. Instead of this 'Christian optimism' Heim recommends Heidegger's awareness of 'the inevitable trade-offs in history', history as 'a series of ambiguous gains bringing hidden losses'. The potential losses are epitomized in the movie *Lawnmower Man*: There is the threat of losing ourselves in postmodern irrealism, giving up the notion of the real world and degrading the integrity of human experience. As an antidote Heim recommends that virtual realities be created in such a way that a strong contrast is maintained between them and the real world. In particular, he identifies three 'hooks on the reality anchor' which should be banished or minimized in VR: birth and death, built-in carryover of events from the past into the future, and the sense of fragility or precariousness that pervades the real world.

This is by no means a perfect book. It is more a series of loosely related lectures and occasional pieces than an integrated essay, and consequently the Heideggerian 'trade-off' position that he poses as an alternative to Ong's 'Christian optimism' is not developed fully enough at all. Also less developed than one would have hoped is Heim's exploration of the 'inner connection' between VR and space exploration. 'The essence of the American space program, its heart and soul, comes from "Star Trek"', and correspondingly the Holodeck from 'Star Trek: The Next Generation' is the Holy Grail of VR researchers: 'the Holodeck draws the research onward'. But this is only one of three Holy Grails that Heim seems to have in mind in his discussion of the U.S. and American space programs. If entertainment is the telos of the Holodeck grail, then control of nature is the VR suggested by the Russian model of space exploration (on Heim's account of it, and assuming the 'inner connection'). He characterizes Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1828-1903) as the spiritual father of the Russian space program. He argued that Russia should marshal its military and national strength toward the conquest of nature, including colonization of other planets and the resurrection of all our dead ancestors (sic), discovering laws of nature to such a depth that we can eventually reconstitute the bodies of past human beings from their remaining physical particles still floating about in the universe. Heim doesn't cash out his 'inner connection' analogy between space exploration and VR at this point, but he might have done so. There is a familiar science fiction theme of people recreating their identities on the programs of powerful computers of the future, 'controlling nature' by turning our backs on it and living in virtual nature, and 'bringing people to life' not by reconstituting their bodies but by coding the algorithms of their minds in the computers that drive the virtual

world. Heim seems to want an alternative to what he calls West Coast VR, geared towards entertainment and symbolized by the Holodeck, and East Coast VR, geared towards work and perhaps symbolized by the Russian imperative to control nature. This alternative is art: 'Rather than control or escape or entertain or communicate, the ultimate promise of VR may be to transform, to redeem our awareness of reality — something that the highest art has attempted to do and something hinted at in the very label *virtual reality*, a label that has stuck, despite all objections, and that sums up a century of technological innovation. VR promises not a better vacuum cleaner or a more engrossing communications medium or even a friendlier computer interface. It promises the Holy Grail'. A large problem with this idea, and with the whole discussion of these grails, is that there is a vast chasm between the current reality of VR and the Star Trek 'holodecks', reconstitutions of nature, and hyper-Wagnerian total works of art that Heim has in mind when he envisages the future. It would be easier to entertain seriously his concern to 'keep virtual reality virtual' if he could draw the reader's attention to some current or near-future virtual worlds that pose a threat to our sense of reality, virtual worlds sufficiently like the envisaged Holodeck, or the artificial duplication of personhood, or the transforming total work of art. (Nintendo won't do.)

The philosophy of virtual reality is in its early days, and Heim is one of the first explorers. He helps begin to show how to do philosophy in this area. Future explorers will see a bit farther by standing on his shoulders.

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Dieter Henrich
Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1992.
Pp. ix + 99.
US $29.50. ISBN 0-8047-2054-1.

As the dust-jacket notes correctly, this is a collection of four essays on aesthetic, ethical, and political issues by Dieter Henrich, the preeminent Kant scholar in Germany today. The first two, styled as 'interpretations' of Kant's thought, were given as the Kant Lectures in 1990 at Stanford University. The third and fourth, intended as 'applications,' also had their origin in lectures. The result is a compact, very accessible, richly suggestive discussion

of several main themes in Kant's practical philosophy that bear on our understanding of the Enlightenment and of the liberal, democratic tradition to which it gave rise.

The first essay, on 'The Moral Image of the World', is the most important. In it Henrich argues two theses, that the fourth book of Rousseau's *Emile*, the profession of faith of the priest from Savoy, provided the framework for almost all of Kant's reflection on moral matters, and that this reflection issues in rather different moral theories as it developed.

What Kant mainly took from Rousseau was a conception of a moral order or 'moral image of the world', independent of a natural order and in which we locate ourselves as rational agents or persons, the problem of reconciling a life of virtue with our desire for happiness, and a moral theology on which God centers the moral order and immortality provides the promise of a reconciliation. In Henrich's very plausible view, Kant's continuing aim was to clarify the grounds of this moral order, in the process defending its independence, legitimacy, and coherence. Eventually he was led to changing the character of his moral theology and the terms in which the reconciliation between happiness and virtue is to be achieved.

According to Henrich, Kant's first explanation of the moral image of the world came in a theory he never published. Unfortunately, Henrich does not indicate the sources of his reconstruction or the grounds on which he attributes it to Kant. It is called the 'worthiness of happiness' theory and takes as its main claim that 'the fulfillment of the moral law is the *only* way in which our unrenounceable hope for happiness could be realized — albeit in a way we cannot conceive of.' What Kant realized during the writing of the *Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals* was that this 'hope for happiness' account of moral motivation is incompatible with the autonomy of the moral life; only respect for the moral law can properly motivate a truly good will.

The rest of the story is so familiar to readers of the *Grounding* that Henrich spends little time on its details. What he does add is the claim that the *Critique of Judgment* has importantly to do with a further clarification and modification of the notion of a 'moral image of the world', and with it a deeper reflection on the character of moral motivation and the ends of human activity, both of which are grounded (not simply abstractly, but as we concretely come to terms with how we ought to live) in this notion.

There is little specific commentary on the texts, but anyone familiar with them will come with a fresh series of questions, and the idea of a 'moral image of the world' will be important for anyone interested in moral philosophy.

The second essay, on 'Kant's Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment', has a more limited aim. It is to understand what Kant means by the 'harmonious play of the faculties of imagination and understanding', an idea that anchors his aesthetics. Henrich has some interesting things to say about the imagination, but his claims on behalf of the idea, like Kant's, are tentative, and his over-riding purpose seems to be to revive interest in Kant's theory as a better alternative to the formalist critical theories so much maligned in the second half of this century.

The last two essays are entitled 'The Contexts of Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of the Comprehensibility of Human Rights' and 'The French Revolution and Classical German Philosophy: Toward a Determination of Their Relation'. The second is a useful contribution to the history of ideas but, other than urging once again the case for the importance of Rousseau to Kant's thought and rallying to the cause of the Enlightenment, it is here a kind of addendum and could have been omitted.

The essay on autonomy, however, is an important development of the notion of a moral image of the world. Henrich argues, against the background of contemporary multicultural and environmental sensitivities, that the notion of human rights can be justified only within a universal context and then attempts, by way of a moral image of the world and of ourselves that is the expression of these new sensitivities and thus reflects our ability to restructure experience, our autonomy, to carry out this justification (the notion of autonomy supplying the context). These are broad brushstrokes, and many questions are left unanswered, but I do not know of a more forceful and enlightened attempt to relay the cornerstone of our own liberal, democratic tradition.

Throughout the book, particularly in this third essay, there are hints of the fact that Henrich is not only the preeminent Kant scholar in Germany today, but that he also plays a large role in Germany in the discussion of public policy issues generally. So the book is not simply about main themes in Kant's thought. It is also a model of how a philosopher engages a larger audience on topics of contemporary concern without condescending to it.

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Paul Hoyningen-Huene
Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions:
Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.
Trans. Alexander T. Levine. Foreword by Thomas S. Kuhn.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993.
Pp. xx + 310.
US $40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-35550-0);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-35551-9).

One might have some doubts about the contribution a new book-length study could make to the vast literature on Thomas Kuhn's work in the history and philosophy of science. Hoyningen's book, however, has several features that distinguish it, as far as I can see, from any other work in the genre: (1) His

interpretation covers all of Kuhn's career, not only the debates centered around *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*; (2) he benefited from extended discussions with Kuhn about how to understand Kuhn's philosophical position; (3) these dialogues achieved, as Kuhn testifies in the Foreword (xi), the ideal end of all hermeneutic work — the interpreter understands the author better than the author understands himself. For all these reasons, and some more, the book is important.

The picture of Kuhn that emerges from Hoyningen's richly documented study will not come as a surprise to those philosophers who thought they knew it all the time and now Kuhn, or his interpreter, is confessing: He is an idealist (268). But this is, of course, much too coarse a characterization, and Hoyningen devotes chapters 2 and 3 to a more careful and adequate formulation of Kuhn's views on the relation of world and subject. What results is, roughly speaking, a Kantian epistemology with some ingredients borrowed from Husserl. The members of a scientific community live in a 'phenomenal world', the sum of all experiences possible within the conceptual system that characterizes the community; this world is 'constituted' through the cognitive practices of the epistemic subjects. But it is not constructed arbitrarily: the 'world-in-itself' imposes constraints in the form of a 'resistance' which the subjects, however, cannot conceptualize, a resistance 'whose nature is indeterminable by us' (239). Chapter 3 provides more detailed support for this position by reconstructing Kuhn's theory of concept acquisition which is based on processes of learning and mastering sets of similarity and dissimilarity relations. These relations influence perceptions and the formation of empirical concepts which, in turn, embody empirical knowledge as well as the ontological commitments that are characteristic of the respective phenomenal world. Much of this theory has been developed after 1962 and it is one of the merits of the book to bring these more recent ideas together in a systematic way.

With the distinction of appearances and things-in-themselves, or 'subject-sided' and 'object-sided moments' in the constitution of phenomenal worlds, it becomes possible to clarify, for instance, Kuhn's notoriously difficult claim that the existence of multiple phenomenal worlds doesn't commit him to a relativist or social constructivist view of scientific knowledge. I say 'clarify' rather than 'support' because, although Hoyningen's quasi-Kantian framework allows for a systematic presentation of Kuhn's views, it is obvious that the presentation itself does not solve the basic problems philosophers have had with such frameworks. How 'objective' knowledge is possible after the Kantian position has been deprived of a unique transcendental subject, or a universal set of categorizations underlying the different phenomenal worlds, remains an open question, just as problematic as the status of the 'world-in-itself'.

More conclusive perhaps are the clarifications of long-standing problems with (or misunderstandings of) Kuhn's ideas on incommensurability, theory comparison, and scientific progress across paradigm shifts in chapters 4 to 6. Hoyningen points out that Kuhn never thought that scientific revolutions

involve a change of meaning of *all* concepts or a complete change of methodological standards. Such changes are typically 'local', they don't affect the whole edifice of knowledge at once, thus making comparisons between successive theories possible (236ff.). These chapters outline a picture of revolutions as processes much more continuous than the secondary literature usually conceived of them; a much more plausible picture, I should add.

Such clarifications are not only valuable for historical and philosophical studies of science but will also provide a sounder basis for locating Kuhn's work in relation to the views he originally responded to, in particular Logical Positivism. Recent research on the development of the Vienna Circle has emphasized that Kuhn shared more insights with Carnap and especially Neurath than the debates of the 1960s and 70s recognized. Neurath's 'encyclopedias', for instance, look, at least *prima facie*, quite similar to Kuhnian paradigms, and when Carnap read the manuscript of *Structure* he felt deep affinities to his own ideas on theory change. In this respect Hoyningen's book will be an indispensable source for future work on reconstructing the Kuhnian revolution in the philosophy of science.

It is regrettable that the book's index is often not reliable and in many cases I found it not detailed enough to be helpful.

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Anthony Kenny
Aquinas on Mind.
London: Routledge 1993.
Pp. 182.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-04415-4).

Aquinas on Mind is part of the series 'Topics in Medieval Philosophy'. Anthony Kenny insists at the outset that what he intends is not merely an exercise in the history of thought. He also wants to support the continuing relevance of philosophy of mind. That subject, he believes, will not have its questions contained, its concepts domesticated and decision procedures standardized on the way to a new life as cognitive science. 'Rather than arguing against [this view]', writes Kenny, 'I will try to refute it by showing, through a close reading of text from Aquinas, that medieval thinkers do indeed still have much to teach us about the philosophy of mind' (20).

Kenny is at least illuminating on the subject of Aquinas on mind. He takes little for granted, beginning with a contrast between the pre-Cartesian,

Aristotelian conception of mind (a set of capacities), and that entrenched by Descartes (the realm of the introspectible), then offering a concise introduction to the technical apparatus of Aristotelian/Thomistic analysis. The exposition of Aquinas's views and arguments which follows is clear and succinct, and at the same time nuanced. He tells us, for instance, that for Aquinas the soul is the substantial form of the human body, but emphasizes that it is not, strictly speaking, matter which has the form, but the substance — the particular 'matter-form composite' (26) — that stands in this relation.

Two capacities are (for Aquinas) central to what constitutes the human mind: the intellectual and the volitional. The intellect is 'receptive' in its power to receive thoughts; active in its ability to provide objects of thought. It is the latter capacity which allows for the development and use of language, as well as the activities of understanding and reasoning. The will, on the other hand, is the capacity for distinctly human wanting; i.e., wanting in which the intellect plays an essential role. Intellect and will are bound up with each other in that 'the intellect understands the will's willing, and the will wills the intellect's understanding' (73). Not surprisingly, Aquinas holds that humans possess free will. Interestingly, he turns out to be a soft determinist, in that he believes freedom of choice is compatible with at least divine determination, and perhaps even with psychological and physiological causation.

Concerning sensation and its relation to the intellect, Aquinas steers a middle course between Platonic idealism and empiricism. The active intellect cooperates with sensation in forming ideas. The notion of 'phantasms' plays a crucial but uncertain role in all this. Whether these turn out to be something like sense-data, and are thought to be involved in all instances of sense-experience is unclear. Thomas does argue that phantasms, whatever those turn out to be, are necessary for both acquiring and applying concepts.

Where Kenny's explication and discussion connects most clearly with modern philosophy of mind is in the concluding two chapters, where he discusses the nature of the soul, and the relation of the mind (presumably identical with the soul) to the body. St Thomas begins with the premise that the soul is whatever it is that distinguishes living from non-living things. (Recall that human souls are only one kind of soul.) He argues that this distinguishing something must be a non-bodily something, and recognizes, with further argument, the need to establish that this something is subsistent, i.e., has independent existence. It is this latter and un-Aristotelian move that allows Aquinas to adhere to the orthodox Christian doctrine of life after death. He did not hold, as many Christians have and do, that the immortal soul *is* the person who was formerly embodied. Thomas insisted that humans are, by definition, embodied; but he also believed that the soul could survive the death of the body, could think and will in its disembodied state, and then animate the embodied person once again at the resurrection.

What, then, is the relation between soul (mind) and body? Aquinas uses the Aristotelian notion of 'form' to elucidate the relationship. A substantial form is that which preserves a thing as the sort of thing it is even in the face

of 'accidental' changes. In the case of humans, the defining difference is a set of intellectual powers. It is these capacities, therefore, which constitute the form of humanity. My soul is a particular instance of that substantial form. I am a specific subject, individuated by my body and en-formed by being an instance of a human being. My soul, Thomas's supporting argument suggests, is that by means of which I live; and since I am a human, it is specifically my intellectual powers and operations which are the vehicle of my *human* living.

All of this is embedded in a rich amalgam of exegesis, analysis and argument. Kenny frequently, and winningly, defends Aquinas against misunderstanding or apparent inconsistency. But he is clear in criticism where he thinks it applies.

In this connection, Kenny thinks that Aquinas makes a fundamental mistake in holding that the soul/mind is capable of independent existence. Such a view appears to Kenny inconsistent with Thomas's own view of the soul as Aristotelian form. It is bound up as well with a risky inclination on the part of Thomas to hypostatize those powers which he takes to distinguish humans.

While Kenny is highly instructive on the geography of Aquinas's views on mind, it is not at all clear that he has as much success with his second objective: the defense of philosophy of mind.

Kenny's argument appears to be that Aquinas can be shown to be illuminating on the subject of mind, and this is possible only if, contrary to what the revisers think, mind remains a proper object of philosophical enquiry and in no need of being redone as cognitive science. But Aquinas's position would need to be more carefully summarized, and the connections with debates about the status of the subject would need to be far more explicit, for this part of the project to be convincing.

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Philip Koch
Solitude: A Philosophical Encounter.
LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1994.
Pp. xiv + 375.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9242-X);
US $27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9243-8).

This is an intense discussion of the possibly liberating role of solitude. Phil Koch writes out of a healthy solitude in order to free us from the picture of the pathetic loner, incapable of relationship, and to see the steady solitary, capable of living vigorously and nobly in and out of relationships.

Many of us think of solitude as a problem to be overcome rather than as a resource for unparalleled self-improvement. Unhealthy solitude is possible, of course: 'It can happen that the more solitude becomes your way, the more you crave; and that craving can lead farther and farther away from human warmth until you find yourself in a seclusion that is too great, a pit of loneliness too deep to escape' (225). So Koch argues for a life that balances engagement and disengagement from others and carefully distinguishes loneliness from solitude and its virtues.

Loneliness is an *emotion*, in particular, *'the unpleasant feeling of longing for some kind of human interaction'* (31). When pining for companionship, we define ourselves with reference to other people, who represent structures of demands and need-schedules that undermine our autonomy. Loneliness is thus a trap that distorts singularity into an experience defined, conditioned and structured by others.

Solitude is *not an emotion*, however, because it 'does not entail any specific desires, feelings or attentional sets' (33). Whereas loneliness always involves painful feelings, 'solitude is equally open to both pleasant and painful feelings' (33). Koch defines solitude in a progression of interlocking concepts. It is a 'compound of space and self and silence and time' (1); 'an experiential world in which other people are absent' (15); 'a time in which experience is disengaged from other people' (27); 'a consciousness-without-other' (43); *'the state in which experience is disengaged from other people'* (44); and 'a time in which the individual disengages from society in order to express individual freedom, attune to individual nature, bring the spirit into harmony with nature, engage in individual reflections and explore individual creativity' (275).

In this way, Koch expands our consciousness of solitude decisively. He combines straightforward analysis with a meticulous reading of the long history of solitary writing. He discusses both male (Defoe, Thoreau) and female (May Sarton, Alice Koller); poet (Rilke, Wordsworth) and philosopher (Emerson, St. Augustine); Western (Richard Byrd) and Eastern (the *Tao Teh Ching*). He does not say much or anything about Nietzsche, Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein, but he struggles mightily with Heidegger and Hegel. Though agnostic, he wields religious and secular sources equally skillfully in drawing out the motives and consequences of taking solitude

seriously. For example, he peers carefully into the lives of the anchorites and anchoresses who had themselves sealed into the outer walls of medieval churches, and finds a solitude structured by social connectedness, a service to the community that was recognized and revered by the people, rather than a voided life.

Koch argues that we must find a balance between solitude and encounter, and that finding that balance is an individual project that must respect individual differences. His strategy is to show that solitary reflections find a *completion* in encounters and that encounters can only be fully appreciated when re-interpreted from the reflective distance of solitude.

Objections to solitude are given a prominent place, in particular, the claim that solitude is evasive of social responsibility. To respond, we could first deny that we have any such responsibility, but that is moral isolationism and implausible. Second, we could accept some responsibility, but set limits to it. Someone who has already served society greatly may be excused to solitary withdrawal. If we distinguish between social obligations and benevolences, and reject the principle that 'every possible beneficence is a duty' (239), then we can put a legitimate cap on our social consciences. Third, we can say that solitude is a way of fulfilling social responsibilities because it is a way of resting or preparing to serve later or that pursuing solitude is a way of being responsible to others (by not polluting their world, or encouraging them to withdraw from superficial relations into more meaningful ones).

However, when Koch argues that solitude is not *an* emotion, because it is ambivalent, he overlooks that this could mean that solitude is a *complex* of emotions, a set of mixed feelings that can include loneliness and desires for authentic independence. Why assume that solitude names one kind of thing or experience? He may be trying to draw a line too sharply between solitude and loneliness. Second, do intellectuals tend to overemphasize the need for the greater thinking space provided by solitude? Koch argues that solitude should be healthy for almost anyone (farmers, the elderly, the sick, women) but it is better to say that one's solitude is only as good as the uses to which one puts it. Does everyone need to follow a plan of life requiring extraordinary reflective space?

Third, Koch ends the book with this beautiful, hopeful note: 'there can be a love that brings the fruits of its solitude to the togetherness, a togetherness that fashions out of itself the materials and the strength to send forth the lovers into fruitful solitude' (300). This is the truly balanced life. But how do we *know* when we are so balanced? Is it a matter of asking each other or self-evident? Does the metaphor of balance disguise our irreducible ignorance?

Those who are disturbed by their solitary tendencies will find this book most enlightening; those who live without any need for solitude will find its questions prickly to their ears. Some philosophers have the uncanniness to change your way of seeing your life *at its sources*, and this is one. Koch's model is not Rip Van Winkle and his social sleep, but Thoreau defending

his right to not conform. He teaches you to be comfortable with your solitude, to see it as the existential source for autonomy and an adventure in self-improvement. He works like a water-witch, finding an underground river in solitude that may wash against our crowded and tumultuous city-centered worlds.

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Bruno Latour
We Have Never Been Modern.
Trans. Catherine Porter.
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993.
Pp. ix + 157.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7450-0682-5);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7450-1321-X).

At the core of *We Have Never Been Modern* lies an argument familiar from Bruno Latour's earlier work: coming to terms with science requires abandoning a pair of distinctions — that between humans and non-humans and that between society and nature. The discovery of the rabies vaccine by Pasteur, about whom Latour has written a great deal, is best understood if we put Pasteur, viruses and the City of Paris on equal explanatory footing. In Latour's words, we make the explanation thoroughly symmetrical: each of these 'actants' enrolls the other across a single network that links scientists, microscopic entities, and government agencies.

Sociologists of science are troubled by the role non-humans play in this story. They have accused Latour of committing what Schaffer calls the 'heresy of hylozoism,' namely attributing human characteristics to non-human entities and in so doing downplaying the important role of specifically human agency. Perhaps in response to these critics, Latour's earlier vocabulary of actant-network theory is all but absent in this book; networks remain, but in place of actants we have 'quasi-objects' or 'hybrids,' objects at once natural and social. Realist-minded philosophers of science are troubled by the role humans play in this story. Perhaps in response to these critics, Latour presents his position in contrast with the strong programme in the sociology of science. The Edinburgh School version of the principle of symmetry — that good and bad science and truth and falsity have to be explained on the same terms (i.e., sociologically) — only goes half-way. 'Society', Latour argues, is as much (or as little) constructed as 'nature'.

But why, from the heartland of science studies, do we get an essay about modernity? The short answer is that science as we now understand it is intimately tied up with both the concept and period designated by 'modernity'. Much of *We Have Never Been Modern* is given over to developing a longer answer. Latour argues that we are in the grip of the view — reflected everywhere from Library of Congress call numbers to the sections of our daily newspaper — that the world may be divided into things and events, and things and events into aspects, each of which may be the object of a specialized form of knowledge. However, Latour suggests, this view can mislead. While the moderns were busy carving up the world they were simultaneously populating the world with objects that straddle the distinction between nature and society, the distinction at the root of this compartmentalization.

So, to use one of Latour's examples, is the hole in the ozone layer natural or social? Both, and neither; it is a hybrid, a quasi-object. It is of course a matter of chlorine bonding with oxygen, but it is also a matter of the Montréal Accord. Looking over Latour's shoulder as he reads the daily paper, we see that a single article on the ozone layer

> mixes together chemical reactions and political reactions. A single thread links the most esoteric sciences and the most sordid politics, the most distant sky and some factory in the Lyon suburbs, dangers on a global scale and the impending local elections or the next board meeting. The horizons, the stakes, the time frames, the actors — none of these is commensurable, yet there they are, caught up in the same story (1).

This is why the ozone layer s fit study for economists and meteorologists, United Nations sub-committees and chemists working for Coppertone. But none of these persons can tell the whole story. To do so, argues Latour, you have to accommodate all these things and events, interests and mandates, without privileging any particular vocabulary and ontology. As it turns out, there is a model for such an enterprise in our culture.

> [E]very ethnologist is capable of including within a single monograph … the distribution of powers among human beings, gods, and nonhumans; the procedures for reaching agreements; the connections between religion and power; ancestors; cosmology; property; plant and animal taxonomies. The ethnologist will certainly not write three separate books: one dealing with knowledge, another with power, yet another with practices. She will write a single book (14).

But how can this help us in the modern world, where we do, in fact, draw sharp distinctions among human beings, non-humans and all the rest? Look to what we do, not what we say. Like the ethnographer writing about Mayan civilization (and the journalist writing about the ozone layer), we find ourselves in an *amodern* world populated with objects neither natural nor social, discovered nor constructed. So, if Latour is right, academics interested in science should become ethnographers of sorts. Instead of studying texts,

they observe scientists at work — but not just in labs: in Latour's earlier words, they follow scientists and engineers through society (Latour, Bruno, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1987]). By Latour's account, there are broad political implications as well. Questioning the nature-culture distinction means questioning a common goal of capitalism and socialism, namely overcoming the tyranny of nature.

That science and its study has political implications is not a novel claim, but to read Latour as saying merely that is to underestimate the scope of this work. He shows us that there are shared assumptions informing both how we understand the world and how we govern ourselves. But to move from principles of explanation to a manifesto for a post-socialist post-capitalist society of people and things (with only a footnote to economics along the way) seems rather heady, and very modern: this kind of argument — from methodology and ontology to politics — puts Latour in the company of Enlightenment thinkers like Hobbes and Marx.

Nonetheless, the methodological arguments that remain at the book's core should give pause to some persistent misreadings of Latour's work. On the one hand, it is misleading to say Latour grants human properties to non-humans; rather, he asks us to look at how the distinction between people and things is made and re-made. On the other hand he does not deny that we appeal to the non-human world to settle debates; instead he asks us to think about such appeals without the distinction between truth-makers and knowers of truths in place.

But an old criticism of Latour seems unanswered here, and perhaps unanswerable. As Simon Schaffer argues, 'symmetry' as a virtue of explanation is itself content-free (Schaffer, Simon, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Bruno Latour', *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 22:1 [1991], pp. 175-92). From another perspective, Latour is himself asymmetrical, privileging, for example, Pasteur's struggles with his microbes over his struggles with his fellow scientists, and their struggles with various orders of government. But if Latour's line remains only one take on the principle of symmetry among others, it is certainly one worth taking seriously.

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Bernard J.F. (Joseph Francis) Lonergan
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan.
Volume 10, Topics in Education. The
Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy
of Education. Robert M. Doran and Frederick
E. Crowe, eds. Revising and augmenting the
unpublished text prepared by James Quinn
and John Quinn. Published for Lonergan
Research Institute of Regis College.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.
Pp. xix + 308.
$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-3440-3);
$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-3441-1).

During the period, 3-14 August, 1959, L offered an 'Institute on the Philosophy of Education' held at Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. This volume contains an edited version of the ten lectures given there.

The first chapter addresses the problems of a philosophy of education in terms of the rise of 'the masses', specialization, and the new learning that had occurred in mathematics and natural science, in languages and literatures and history, and in the human sciences, especially advances in depth psychology, genetic psychology, and post-Depression economics. Rather than arguing a theoretical position with respect to the concept of a Catholic philosophy of education, L begins with a discussion of John Dewey's philosophy of education, and what a Catholic philosophy of education *is not*, i.e., a secularist philosophy, a separate discipline distinct from Catholic religion and theology, or a medieval philosophy *simpliciter*.

The next three chapters take up the human good as object with an invariant structure, i.e., the particular good or Aquinas's *bonum particulare*, the good of order, and value; the differentials of the human good, i.e., intellectual development, sin, and redemption, and the differentiation of levels of integration, i.e., undifferentiated common sense, differentiated common sense, classicism and the differentiation of consciousness, and historical consciousness; and the human good as the developing subject. What is interesting about these chapters is not so much their difference from what L had already set forth in Chapter XVIII of *Insight* on the possibility of ethics and the good, but the way in which he now links his notion of the good, especially his consideration of the horizon of the subject, to active methods in education, moral development, and the idea of vocation. The reader finds here a clear development in his thinking away from a faculty psychology framework to 'flow of consciousness' (83) or intentionality analysis that figures so clearly in his later *Method in Theology*.

The fifth and sixth chapters tackle the 'new learning' in mathematics and in science. L begins with a treatment of scholastic theories of intellect, siding with St. Thomas against Duns Scotus on the question of whether or not the *intellectus possibilis* has an understanding that regards phantasms. L af-

firms that 'the intelligible in act is identical with the intellect in act' (109), and, in turn, draws out the implications for teaching of this notion of insight grasping the intelligible in the sensible as a *conscious* human process, and thus, an important epistemological educational concern. Because what differs from one historical period to another is not inquiry, experience and imagination, but the *expression* of insights learned, L attends to differences in expression as found in the Greek intellectual pattern of experience, Euclidean geometry, Lobatchevski's discovery of hyperbolic space, the differential calculus, Newton's first law, and Einstein's special relativity. Crucial to the new mathematical learning is the abstraction involved in group theory. What is abstracted from is the operations of the subject. To think of mathematics in terms of group theory is to think of the operations that are involved. Here L illustrates the point with the example of a young child who can build a square from a heap of 1764 marbles and, by physically counting the marbles on the side, determine as a concrete operation that there are 42. Or again, one might merely seek the square root of 1764 which is an intermediate operation upon numbers; or, again, one could operate most remotely in algebraic symbols such as a square with the sides $a + b$ or $10a + b$. This notion of the new learning as an entirely new form of science, as an isomorphic group of operations, is crucial for understanding L's idea of learning as an act of judgment. In this respect, these lectures are an applied instance of the thesis set forth in *Insight*, which is a study of operations in which the universe of 'proportionate being' is understood as isomorphic with the three basic operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

L defines the transformation of the notion of science as a shift from the certain (*certa rerum per causas cognitio*) to the probable. Science is not certain because the human mind can affirm absolutely only when an 'unconditioned' is grasped. The unconditioned is of two types consisting of the 'formally unconditioned' which has no conditions whatever (i.e., God), and the 'virtually unconditioned' which is a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled and whose formal expression is the syllogism. Because modern science is probabilistic, a set of operations governed by a series of canons (e.g., canons of selection, operations, relevance, parsimony, complete explanation, and statistical residues), it cannot be separated from wisdom. Wisdom governs the selection of basic terms and first principles that govern conclusions and is thus necessary for good judgment and knowing whether there are further relevant questions to be asked. What is lacking in these two chapters, however, is a development or discussion of L's understanding of statistical residues and emergent probability.

The final four chapters range from a theory of philosophic differences (foundationally expressed as empiricist, idealist, or realist), to Piaget's theory of psychological development and the idea of a general education, to sign, language, and art as aspects of the new learning (drawing upon the work of Suzanne Langer), and a discussion of the general problem of history, the history of specialized science, and the history of philosophy and theology. Perhaps most germane for educators in these final lectures is L's idea, which

draws heavily from Piaget's idea of development as a sum of adaptations whose two poles are assimilation and adjustment, of a general education as opposed to vocational training, technical education, and professional education.

While based on an earlier version of the education lectures prepared by the Quinns, this text is greatly improved since it contains data from a small loose-leaf binder that contained L's notes written for the education lectures previously unavailable to the Quinn's edition. The editors have done a Herculean job of preparing these lectures for L's *opera omnia* by adding a word, phrase, clause, or even a sentence that was not originally spoken by L, but which appears in his notes, and by introducing new division and subdivision headings and other organizing devices. Bibliographical data for various German and French works is given in the footnotes often with corresponding English translations. A short appendix includes longer quotes from L's notes for the lectures on education, and the editors have even included a lexicon of Latin and Greek words and phrases.

Given recent, renewed interests in 'the idea of the university' and the debates surrounding the meaning and role of higher education and academic freedom, the serious scholar will certainly want to read this volume despite its original parochial setting. L's works are unknown to many (post) modern philosophers, and as such, his genius has largely gone unrecognized by thinkers outside Catholic philosophy. This volume will hopefully aid in the wider dissemination of L's thought on the perennial questions of education.

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Larry May and **Shari Collins Sharratt, eds.**
Applied Ethics: A Multicultural Approach.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1994.
Pp. xii + 553.
n.p. ISBN 0-13-068842-8.

Applied Ethics: A Multicultural Approach is designed as a textbook for use on courses aiming to introduce multicultural perspectives to issues arising in applied ethics. It contains 55 essays, many written within the last five years, on topics including abortion, euthanasia, hunger and poverty, war, gender roles, human rights, racial and ethnic discrimination, AIDS and environmental ethics. While these topics are broadly standard for a collection

on applied ethics, this book is distinguished by the number of contributions from less standard perspectives. Many articles originate in Asia and Africa; some are written from feminist standpoints, and others from those of indigenous peoples.

The rationale for this multicultural perspective is discussed in the Introduction. The editors affirm their belief in the need for diversity of opinion, quoting John Stuart Mill: 'Only through diversity is there in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth' (3). In addition, the editors claim that multicultural approaches help to combat racism by reducing ignorance about other cultures. In a world of 'global interdependence', they argue, the need to learn about and to respect other cultures has never been greater.

It is hard to disagree with this analysis. However, it is worth pointing to a difficulty which could arise in this context. It is possible that a student using the book, on reading an essay such as 'On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the C'hi', might conclude that 'this is what Taoists think about environmental ethics' rather than realising that this is just one of a multiplicity of possible perspectives from within that tradition (as one would expect to find within, say, Western philosophy or Christian theology). In other words, this book could expose students to a range of views from many cultures but simultaneously produce a very narrow view of each. Some of the authors however (such as Baird Callicott in 'Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes towards Nature') guard against this, pointing out at the beginning of their papers that theirs does not represent the only possible view from the tradition in which they are working. This would certainly be an important point to make when using this book with students.

Applied Ethics: A Multicultural Approach begins with a short introduction to applied ethics in general, followed by an introduction to multicultural ethics in particular. It is then divided into the respective topic areas, each of which have a short introduction, followed by six essays. Broadly, for each topic the essays consist of a standard 'classical' text, a response to that text, and four 'multicultural' contributions. Thus, essays from widely diverse and frequently deeply opposing points of view, are laid alongside one another.

The collection includes and makes accessible a number of essays of importance within their field, such as Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence and Morality' in the section on Hunger and Poverty, and Ronald Dworkin's essay 'Taking Rights Seriously' in the section on Human Rights. Several essays, including Gregory Kavka's 'Was the Gulf War a Just War?' and Lillian Li's 'Famine and Famine Relief: Viewing Africa in the 1980's from China in the 1920's' are interesting case studies, particularly welcome in a teaching context.

The editors also do not back away from including essays which could be regarded as highly controversial. In the section *Abortion* for instance, three Chinese philosophers, Ren-Zong Qui, Chun-Zhi Wang and Yaun Gu defend the practice of late abortion in China; whilst in the section *Gender Roles and Morality*, Bruno Bettelheim develops the implications of his view that 'the

completion of womanhood is largely through motherhood, but fulfillment of manhood is not achieved largely through fatherhood' (282). Both of these essays (amongst others) may provoke extreme reactions from students reading them — but could generate a good classroom debate!

Applied Ethics: A Multicultural Approach is an impressive collection of essays, and could be a valuable teaching tool. However, it would probably not be ideal for use as the only, or the main, textbook of a group of applied ethics students. The focus on the diversity of multicultural perspectives means that by necessity, the book often does not have space for the more mainstream debates within these areas of applied ethics. For instance, interesting as the essays in the section *Environmental Ethics* are, none of the really major essays in this field are included. The supposedly 'classic' first essay by Bernard Rollin 'Environmental Ethics and International Justice' is not all that classic; and whilst J. Baird Callicott is an important environmental ethicist, his paper 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' is of more significance within the field than 'Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes towards Nature' which is included in this collection. However, this is a note of caution about how the book should be used, rather than a criticism of its actual content.

In conclusion, then, this is an interesting and stimulating collection, containing a large number of essays from widely diverse standpoints. By bringing together into one book essays from such a variety of sources, the editors have potentially made a contribution both to the ease, and to the breadth, of teaching in applied ethics.

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Justin Oakley
Morality and the Emotions.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1991.
Pp. 253.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-05661-6);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-4150-9341-4).

The traditional picture depicts emotions as incidental, intrusive mental events that just happen to us, over which we have no control. As Kant puts it: 'To be subject to both affects and passions is probably always an illness of the mind, because both affect and passion exclude the sovereignty of reason.' This picture has moral implications. It impoverishes and devalues our

emotional life by obscuring the nature of emotions and by preventing us from appreciating their moral importance.

Contemporary philosophers have done much to repudiate such a philosophical caricature. They have been busy deconstructing the reason/passion dichotomy and showing us that our passions are intimately linked to our understanding of the world and of one another. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the issue of the relevance of emotions for morality.

Justin Oakley aims to restore the emotions to their proper place in our lives, to bring out their moral significance. He wants to reshift the focus in ethics from an obsession with action evaluation to character evaluation. Contrary to the traditional picture, Oakley argues that our emotions are essential and enduring features of our moral character and that therefore we have a fundamental reason to seek to develop them in ways that enrich us.

But to gain a proper appreciation of the moral significance of emotions, we first need an adequate account of their nature. So Oakley begins by sketching and defending a theory of emotions as 'complex phenomena involving dynamically related elements of cognition, desire and affectivity.' No theory is deemed adequate unless it has these three elements. The cognitive element should be broadly construed as ranging over beliefs, judgments, thoughts and imaginings.

How then are the emotions to be rehabilitated? How are their associated moral values to be retrieved from the long confinement in the gulags of Kantian and utilitarian ethics, where all that really matters is *doing it right*? Oakley adopts an Aristotelian approach. A humanly flourishing life is an emotional and spirited life. It requires not only acting well, but also having the right emotions in the right way towards the right objects and to the right degree.

Oakley argues that an emotionally deficient person is to some extent morally flawed. Emotions are necessary in achieving such great goods as psychic harmony, strength of will, love and friendship, knowledge and understanding and our sense of self-worth. It is through our emotions that we constitute ourselves — through our emotions that we bestow meaning on our lives and invest ourselves in the world. It is through such constitution and involvement that appreciation of our self-worth can be reached. Psychic goods can be achieved by such emotion types as sympathy, compassion, care, concern and courage — while other emotions like fear, resentment, envy and self-pity are obstacles to the acquisition of such goods (38-78 passim).

Kantianism is the classic source for the devaluation of emotions in ethics. Given Kant's picture of emotions, the obvious objection to Oakley's thesis is that, since emotions are unreliable, capricious and transitory, they cannot be summoned and controlled. Hence, unlike duty, which is dependable and stable, emotions cannot be morally good motives for action. Oakley's response: the sense of duty is no more nor less difficult to summon or to educate than emotional motives such as sympathy or compassion. So there is no compelling reason to privilege the sense of duty in the sphere of moral motivation.

What are the practical bearings of Oakley's views on how we live our lives? The critical issue is the nature and extent of control we have over our emotions. Our practices of crediting and blaming people for their emotions presupposes responsibility. Oakley argues that major conditions of responsibility, avoidability and foresight, obtain not only in the case of actions but also in the case of emotions. We can cultivate, affect and control many of them. For example, we can identify the type of situation where a particular emotion of ours characteristically arises, and then try to put or avoid putting ourselves in such situations. Here is Oakley's tool-kit for emotional retraining: identify the constitutive ingredients of the emotion and try to cultivate or eliminate them; develop or avoid certain emotional capacities by reading and practice; order your emotions to reflect your basic values, and encourage or discourage them accordingly; interpret what you perceive, so that you are led to respond properly (136-40).

This is a well-organized book. Its thesis sensible and clearly argued, its counsel wise. In each chapter the author presents his positions, argues for and defends them against rival theories. This makes for an excellent text to teach from and the additional bonus of a comprehensive bibliography of recent work on the emotions is a spur to further research.

Now the downside. There is an almost palpable incongruity between thesis and style. Oakley's tone is laconic, matter-of-fact, his writing somewhat repetitious and dull. This makes the reader wonder why the thesis that the humanly flourishing life is an emotional, spirited life is not extended to the style and mode of his own philosophical work. Is the message that the philosophical life is outside everyday life? That its job is to make cool observations on hot matters? Not a message I would want to sponsor.

Two nagging afterthoughts suggest what is missing or lost in this book. The first centres on the politics of emotions. When Oakley invokes the motto 'The right emotions, in the right circumstances, to the right extent', he unwittingly raises the issue of politics. There are too many *rights* here. Whose rights are we talking about? If emotions are partially socially constructed and cognition, as Oakley holds, is essential to them, then the dominant political ideology shapes how we feel. Race, class, gender will affect our emotional constitution as well. Then 'inappropriate', 'ambivalent', 'wrong', 'rebellious' emotions may signal not only a dissonance in the individual but also in our social world. The exploration of such 'wrong' emotions offers us the possibility of a fresh moral basis for social and political criticism. Oakley's insistence on simple rightness tends to suppress such exploration and hence recruit the unwary reader to a social and political quietism. This way an opportunity is lost to retrieve the values that resonate with the so-called wrong emotions of subordinated groups on the political margins. Recovering such values would help efforts towards a more inclusive and flourishing society.

A second, perhaps related thought. Oakley is not sufficiently attentive to certain undervalued particular emotions and sometimes says misleading things about them. For example, he says 'From a moral point of view, there

is an important difference between compassion and resentment on the one hand, and embarrassment on the other. Compassion enlarges our understanding of the world and plays an important role in love and friendship. Resentment undermines interpersonal relationships and one's sense of self-worth. But embarrassment has no such relation to human goods. It is not essentially involved in, nor a serious threat to achieving psychic goods'. Yet think of the loss of face, agency, self-esteem and confidence, of revealed vulnerabilities, of the cringes and blushes involved in our embarrassments. A moral psychologist is well-advised to beware of generalizations in this area.

The author should have the last words. So I leave you with Oakley's suddenly inspired closure: 'Our emotions seemed to be related to us in a similar manner as are our children — we can sometimes exercise control over them, and they may reflect both credit and blame on us. But at other times they see to have an uncontrollable life of their own. Nevertheless, we must not abrogate our underlying responsibility for them, because they are both so important in our lives, and in both cases they need to be trained and educated in order to flourish and reach maturity'. Right on!

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J.L. Schellenberg
Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1993.
Pp. x + 217.
US $34.50. ISBN 0-8014-2792-4.

In this book, J.L. Schellenberg presents theism with a challenging argument. While the problem of divine hiddenness is rather well-known, it has not been thoroughly discussed in the analytic philosophy of religion literature until now.

The question of the hiddenness of God is generally taken to be the question of why a universe created by an omnibenevolent, omnipotent being would contain relatively little evidence of His existence (if indeed it does). The book doesn't directly address this issue. Schellenberg's concern is not with the epistemic markers of God's existence; rather his attention is focused on what he calls 'reasonable nonbelief'. Schellenberg contends that the existence of reasonable nonbelief provides the grounds for a powerful argument against the existence of God.

The first chapter is a defense of the main premise of the argument, viz., if a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur. Schellenberg explores the implications of the theistic claim that God is perfectly loving. He argues that if God is perfectly loving, then God desires the well-being of his human creatures. But the flourishing of his creatures would be greatly enhanced by their having an explicit, reciprocal relationship with the divine. Not only would such a relationship promote ethical betterment, it would also help us realize our greatest well-being. Furthermore, there is something intrinsically good about such reciprocal relationships and that would provide God with an additional reason to pursue them.

A necessary condition of an explicit, reciprocal relationship with God is a belief that he exists. Because human belief formation is not a voluntary process, if God desires to have such a relationship with us, he will bring it about that we will believe in him, unless we have culpably put ourselves in a contrary position. Given the way the human cognitive system functions and God's non-deceiving nature, God would bring belief about by making each of us aware of evidence that would make his existence probable (again, unless we had culpably put ourselves in a contrary position).

As one might suppose, this is the crux of the matter and we shall shortly return to consider it. Chapter two is a defense of the claim that there is nothing impossible about God's pulling off what chapter one claims a loving God would do, i.e., God could put all humans in what Schellenberg calls 'a strong epistemic situation'. Chapter three then argues that there are cases of reasonable nonbelief. Chapter four offers a summary of the argument. Schellenberg spends the final three chapters defending the case for the second premise made in chapter one.

As stated in chapter four, the book's main argument is:

1. If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.

2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

3. Reasonable nonbelief occurs.

4. No perfectly loving God exists. (from 2 and 3)

5. There is no God. (from 1 and 4)

A standard theist will have no trouble accepting the first premise. While there are some who might wish to dispute premise three, it is nevertheless quite plausible. The action, one might suppose, is to be found at step two.

As early as the book's introduction (8), Schellenberg lets on that he will construe step two in a surprising way. Schellenberg notes that the well-trained analytic philosopher of religion will be tempted to show that [2] is false by employing a strategy used by Alvin Plantinga in his famous free will defense against the logical problem of evil. If one can plausibly argue that there is a possible world in which a perfectly loving God allows nonbelief, then one will have plausibly argued that the antecedent of [2] is logically consistent with the negation of its consequent, and that will show that [2] is false. Schellenberg correctly points out that this argumentative strategy will

work only if [2] is construed as a necessary truth. However, he says, that isn't crucial for his argument. He doesn't need [2] to be necessarily true in order for his argument to work, he needs only its truth. That there is a possible world in which a loving God exists and there are humans with reasonable nonbelief doesn't do anything to show that the actual world might be that way. Schellenberg says that his argument is then to be construed as akin to the empirical, rather than the logical, problem of evil.

This construal of the argument's key premise significantly weakens Schellenberg's case. If Schellenberg is going to dismiss objections that depend on taking [2] to be necessary, then he must be construing it as contingent (at least for the sake of the argument). Indeed, it looks like [2] if contingent should be viewed as a material conditional. But if that is how it is to be read, then what reason do we have for believing it? While Schellenberg does argue for [2] in the book's first chapter, the argument there is conceptual in nature and so is clearly an argument for a necessary truth. The claim is that of conceptual necessity, any being who is divine and loving will bring it about that there is no reasonable nonbelief. So the argument depends upon reading [2] as a necessary truth. But one who claims [2] is not to be construed as necessary can't use a conceptual argument to support [2]'s truth, since such an argument helps only via supporting the claim that [2] is necessarily true. So the question then becomes, what reason is there for believing that it is the case that the existence of a loving God materially implies that there is no reasonable nonbelief? There is no hint of an answer to this question anywhere in the book.

Schellenberg could avoid this objection by including in the antecedent of the argument's second step whatever contingent features of the actual world he deems relevant, and then claiming that necessarily, any world that includes those features and a loving divine being is a world in which there is no reasonable nonbelief.

Despite this technical problem with the argument's key premise, this is a clearly written and interesting book, and it is recommended for anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of religion.

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Francis Sparshott
Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the
Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1994.
Pp. xviii + 461.
Cdn $60.00. ISBN 0-8020-2953-1.

Francis Sparshott shows, by example, just how usefully quite *differing* books on Aristotle's particular works may be written. The present text, he tells us, has emerged from forty years of teaching at least one course on some or all of the *Nicomachean Ethics* — *EN* — almost every year (xvi). In the teeth of many philosophers' showing indifference, Sparshott has finally come out with an enormous work to which he gives an idiosyncratically *pedagogical*, as opposed to a very *scholarly* twist. I would suppose that *Taking Life Seriously* is mainly helpful for high school students (passionate about Greek), very intelligent, hard-slogging (lay) generalists, B.A. and M.A. students in philosophy or classics. Sparshott has contrived to offer students who do, and those who don't, care for Greek the equivalent in two volumes.

Take good, overlapping sets of readers: Take the original Aristotelian text. As with a number of translations, it is not easy for readers to digest long passages or to grasp tactical manoeuvres as elements of a strategic single project. Moreover, Sparshott expresses a conviction that present teachers of the Stagirite widely discourage attempts to see this masterpiece as a rough, but integral, harmonious progression of thought. We read: 'The purpose of this book is to display a continuity of thought in the text' (xiv). Therefore, Sparshott's effort and *opus* should be commended for such interesting attempts to form new initiates and reform the experts.

Sparshott tells us: 'My project is to show by paraphrase and comment how it might have seemed sensible to write just this text in this order ... ' (xvii). 'I should assume that the reader has text or translation of the *Ethics* at hand ... to see how the text actually goes it is necessary to use my work as a guide to a reading of the text, not as a substitute for it' (xviii). Let me add more praise and some words of caution — both concern the extent to which intended readers may enjoy *this* Sparshott.

Looking back on my needs as an undergraduate at Oxford — stumbling through philosophy and classics, including *EN* in the Greek — I've become convinced, after some time of musing, that S.'s blend of much paraphrase and some comments would have been of real assistance. For even the study of other Greek authors can leave one ill-prepared for the first wrestles with Aristotle. On the other hand, these paraphrases, though illuminating, sometimes have a pedestrian and flat-footedly bucolic — Hesiodic? — mode of moving along. Attention to the pages of this so well-meant work may suffer on occasion. It is as if a schoolboy's awe of the great Aristotle and his sacred pages blinds Sparshott to his own admired literary gifts on occasions. The use of paraphrase allows more scope and grace than translation. S. should think of a young scholar's time when he could translate the most dreary or

stuffy British editorials into rhythmic and *charming* Roman or Attic elegaics. But many can especially enjoy Sparshott's treatments of *Weakness of the Will* and of *Friendship* — see Chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, generalists wanting to start grasping Aristotle could do much worse than begin with these two chapters. They articulate the mind of a very broad genius at his very practical best.

Because of the character of Sparshott's aims, reference to other commentators is kept within stark limits. His arguments against Anthony Kenny, who incurs Sparshott's displeasure by giving the *Eudemian Ethics* large 'priority' over *EN*, offer stuff of interest to cerebral bullfighters (3-4, 153-4, etc.). Apart from the paucity of input from commentators, we should be concerned about the relatively ignorant, or confused, under-prepared, groping mentality of numbers of likely readers. Not least, we should, if S. reaches a good supply of non-specialists and fairly early students approaching such an oddly charismatic, even hypnotic writer. Sparshott could have done well to insert a small introductory section, providing more ideas about what Aristotle's background and preferred society would have been like. Let S.'s edition explore (i) how 'progressive', by more modern standards, Aristotle, Athens and Macedon really were; (ii) how harsh the restrictions were on slaves, metics, women, tributary states, etc.; (iii) related forms among Greeks of national banditry, blackmail and bloody conquests; (iv) about denial of the franchise.

Such widely circulated points have sometimes been well made by Sir Karl Popper against Plato. Sparshott's book excludes Popper. Instead, Sparshott should have done for *EN's* inexperienced readers something faintly like what Popper did for overawed, bewitched half-blinded readers of the *Republic*.

Have these passages and topics already been too drearily well-covered by liberal and socialist critics? No: tyranny and oligarchy are too resilient. Certain features of imperialism, racism and, especially, modern fascism, should be kept close to our attention, not least to our own and to new students' attention. After all, one of the most profitable approaches to teaching or studying *EN* today is that of seeking to extract glorious wheat from poisonous chaff in legacies of the Ancient World. Strip away, openly, the worst cavemanic roots and strive to nurture what remains.

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Elmer John Thiessen
*Teaching for Commitment: Liberal Education,
Indoctrination, and Christian Nurture.*
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press 1993.
Pp. xiv + 332.
Cdn $44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-0998-4);
Cdn $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-1162-8).

Thiessen's book challenges the prevailing wisdom about the goodness of liberal education and the badness of religious education and draws attention to the need for commitment in every system of education. His aim 'is to defend Christian nurture and the teaching *of* religion against the frequent charge of indoctrination' (26).

Christian nurture, says Thiessen, 'involves the initiation of children or adults into the Christian world-view with its particular beliefs, values, and sentiments', and its goal is 'to develop Christian commitment' (29). The activity of teaching for the purpose of encouraging Christian commitment forms a significant part of Christian nurture, and as such, has been subject to a good deal of criticism. Most of the criticisms, however, are charges of indoctrination which vary according to the criteria which the critic uses to define indoctrination. Thiessen does a convincing job of dismantling five different varieties of the charge of indoctrination which have been directed against the activity of teaching for commitment. In the process he exposes the weaknesses of the Enlightenment ideal of liberal education which, he argues, is the context from which all the charges of indoctrination stem. He doesn't abandon the ideal of a liberal education, even though it is faulty, but instead proposes a reconstruction of it that both eliminates the weaknesses of the Enlightenment view and accommodates the practice of teaching for commitment. In the opening chapter Thiessen reviews 'some historical examples of the charge of religious indoctrination' and makes a first approximation at stating the objectionable features of religious education which are said to be indoctrinatory (18).

Charges of indoctrination must be made against a standard of non-indoctrinatory teaching. That standard, argues Thiessen in the second chapter, has been determined by the assumptions and values of the Enlightenment version of liberal education with its emphasis upon science, rationality, autonomy, critical openness and suspicion of authority, among other important assumptions.

Whichever assumption is taken by the proponent of liberal education to form its essential core, that one is used to define the criterion by which indoctrination is identified. There have been no less than five such criteria defined in the scholarly literature well canvassed by Thiessen's book. Thus, in chapters three through seven he analyses respectively the *content* criterion with its scientific ideal, the *methods* criterion with its ideal of rationality, the *intentions* criterion with its ideal of autonomy, the *consequences* criterion

with its ideal of critical openness, and the *institutional* criterion with its democratic ideal of liberal institutions. All are examined carefully and found wanting.

Thiessen's criticisms of these criteria of indoctrination are reminiscent of the criticisms which Hempel and others have levelled against the multiple versions of the positivists' verification principle. Either a version was too restrictive, excluding from meaningful discourse even the cherished statements of scientists, or it was too inclusive, accepting as meaningful more than the scientist intended, including the most opaque kinds of nonsense, or self-referentially incoherent, or some combination of these. A brief description of two of Thiessen's criticisms will reveal the similarity.

According to the *content* criterion the essence of indoctrination is the teaching of 'doctrines', and whereas religion teaches doctrines, science does not — indeed, it cannot (59). Following Leahy, Thiessen argues that all thinking rests upon 'epistemic primitives (i.e. doctrines)' and that not only does science teach doctrines, but the danger of indoctrination in science may be greater because of the hiddenness of its doctrines (84). Thus, the supposed paradigm of non-indoctrinatory teaching itself succumbs to the criticism of the content criterion. (Thiessen makes the same kind of logical move in discussing the *consequences* criterion, where he argues that science cannot be held up as a model for non-dogmatic teaching because in science, to quote Popper, there is 'the need for some dogmatism' (157).)

'The educator, according to Hare, is trying to turn children into adults while the indoctrinator is trying to make them into perpetual children. In other words, the indoctrinator intends to stop growth toward autonomy' (117). Thus, the *intentions* criterion of indoctrination places great emphasis upon the need for autonomy from the earliest years of education. Thiessen finds this emphasis to be unrealistically excessive. Supported by findings in the social sciences he argues that normal development towards autonomy requires dependency and stability during the early years of education. A child will not become secure enough to exercise his autonomy unless the initiation stage of education has the stability which human psychology requires. 'In fact, nurture within such a stable and coherent primary culture, whether that be Christian, Buddhist or atheist, is a prerequisite to normal development toward autonomy' (143). Thus, the intentions criterion is too loose as it stands.

In order to correct the unbalanced assumptions of Enlightenment liberal education Thiessen proposes a 'normalized' view of each, e.g., 'normal autonomy' and 'normal rationality'. With these adjustments he is then able to draw some significant conclusions in his penultimate chapter. One conclusion is that the charge of religious indoctrination is confused. Another is that 'Christian nurture and liberal education are not necessarily incompatible' (207). Liberal education and its parasitic notion(s) of indoctrination both need reconstruction, a proposal for which Thiessen boldly puts forward. A corollary is that, if his proposal is correct, many university professors may need to change their approach to teaching (225,6).

With chapter nine Thiessen concludes his study by setting forth thirteen practical principles which can be used to guide parents and teachers through both the initiation and 'liberation' phases of Christian nurture.

The biggest of my few little worries about this book concerns its abridged treatment of ideological neutrality in teaching. Thiessen is correct to imply that often, when the liberal educationist points an accusing ideological finger at the teacher who encourages religious commitment, there are three fingers pointing back at him. And he may be right in claiming that complete ideological neutrality is unrealizable (195). But, it is one thing to say that no teacher *is* achieving this goal, and quite another to say that no teacher *can* achieve it; and still a third to say that no teacher *ought to strive* to achieve it. A goal which is impossible to completely achieve may still be a valuable goal to have. More argument is needed on this theme and its detail should include a discussion of three elements in the educative process: ideological biases which may, but need not be intrusive, non-ideological biases which may share the same possibilities, and, not just critical openness but also critical distance.

Minor reservations aside, this stimulating, clearly written and well sign-posted book should have broad appeal among members of the academic community and teaching profession. I hope that it stirs up a good deal of controversy. It deserves at least that much.

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Morton White
The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.
Pp. x + 137.
US $19.95 (ISBN 0-691-03317-X).

Morton White is aware of the fact that his new book, as every book on free will, is devoted to an 'antique and supposedly antiquated' question (3). He does not seem to be aware, however, of the fact that his conception of the question is, indeed, antiquated. Throughout the book White struggles with the problem of how to analyse the conceptual relations between 'ought', 'can', 'can choose', 'free', 'causally necessitated', etc. as if G.E. Moore is *the* philosopher dominating the field. Though there are references to, for example, Strawson and Frankfurt, White seems to be unaware of the existence of the former's 'Freedom and Resentment' (1962!) and the latter's 'Freedom of the

Will and the Concept of a Person' (1971!) — two essays that radically changed the subject, pre-empting the linguistic kind of philosophy that was popular once, by showing that the concept of freedom is rooted in our reactive attitudes and practical deliberations that form an essential part of our moral life.

There are three topics of interest in the book: (A) an analysis of sentences containing the phrase 'free to'; (B) an exposition of the holistic way of comparing opposing theories of free will; and (C) the suggestion that 'ought implies can' is a moral principle. I shall discuss them in turn.

(A) The main contribution of the book is an analysis of sentences like 'Cicero is free to kill Caesar'. White's first step is to analyse P's being free to X in terms of the following conjunction: (a) If P chooses to X, he will perform X, (b) P can choose to X, (c) If P chooses not to X, he will not perform X, and (d) P can choose not to X (8). The presence of (b) and (d) makes clear that according to White the possibility to choose is of crucial importance. He proposes to analyse it in terms of 'P's choosing not to X, is not causally necessitated by Y' (36-9). This leads to the final step in the analysis: to find a proper substitute for Y. Arguing against antideterminists who think that 'anything' is the only possible substitute, White introduces the concept of an 'appropriate precluder of choice' (39). The upshot is that 'Cicero is free to kill Caesar' means that 'Cicero's not choosing to kill Caesar, is not causally necessitated by an [appropriate] precluder of Cicero's choice' (97).

It seems to me that this analysis is obscure and question-begging, if not to say empty.

It is obscure because throughout the book it remains unclear what White means by the unanalysed phrase 'causally necessitated'. Although White deals (rather loosely) with Davidson's worries about causal conditionals (76-9), Van Inwagen's Ancestorial Determination argument (107-17), and a criticism of Berlin (130-4), he does not seem to feel the need to clarify the idea of causal necessitation.

What is more important, however, is that the proposed analysis is question-begging. In order to know whether a person is *free* to X, we need to know whether he could choose to X, which means that we need to know that the person is *not under the influence of an appropriate precluder of choice*. Well, big news! How are we supposed to find out about that? What would be an appropriate precluder of choice, and what does it mean not to be under its influence?

White does not address these questions, claiming that a debate over the nature of appropriate precluders of choice will itself be a moral affair (46-50). I agree with this claim, but it makes me wonder why we should pay so much attention to an apparently pointless analysis.

(B) White's holistic defence of his analysis is old news. In line with the views of Quine and Duhem he claims that we cannot justify the belief that we have free will in isolation. He then presents two conjunctions that differ only in that the one he prefers contains a statement mentioning the absence of an appropriate precluder of choice whereas the opposing, antideterminist

package contains a statement mentioning the absence of *any* causal necessitation. Using James's criteria White argues that the first package is better at organising our sensory and emotional experiences and better at avoiding excessive tampering with 'the older truths' (100-4). Although the second package is simpler, this fact should not go against the first, according to White, because the data to deal with are not simple either (sic!): 'people do, as a matter of fact, differ in their views about (...) what precluders or sorts of precluders of choice remove obligations' (105).

(C) This leads me to White's suggestion that 'ought implies can' is a moral principle. It took me over 100 pages to understand what White means, initially being misled by the following obscure passage: 'Both of the principles: "Whatever choice one ought to make, one can make" and "Whatever action one ought to perform, one can perform" are moral because they link obligatoriness with descriptive attributes just as other moral principles do. And although I accept them and am reluctant to surrender them, I am more reluctant to surrender principles of formal logic and statements like "Every bachelor is unmarried"' (18-9). Now that I have read the entire book, I think White means that what he claims to be the descriptive fact of having free will can only be discovered in a domain that is constituted by taking a moral point of view. If I understand White well, he seems to think that the fact of having free will is created by the moral act of identifying obligatory actions, actions one is responsible for in the absence of appropriate precluders of choice, actions one can identify only by presupposing a view about what would be an appropriate precluder of choice.

If this is indeed what White means, his book is at best an anachronistic advise to read Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'.

Jan Bransen
Utrecht University

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