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Table of Contents • Table des matieres

Richard Bodéüs <i>The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics</i>	227
Fred D. Miller, Jr.	
David Boonin-Vail <i>Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue</i>	230
Timo Airaksinen	
Keith R. Bradley <i>Slavery and Society at Rome</i>	232
Brian Domino	
Gilles Deleuze <i>Difference and Repetition</i>	233
James Williams	
Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr W. O'Connor <i>Critique of Applied Ethics: Reflections and Recommendations</i>	236
Laura Westra	
Alain Finkielkraut <i>The Defeat of the Mind</i>	239
T.R. Quigley	
Marilyn Friedman and Jan Narveson <i>Political Correctness: For and Against</i>	241
Karen Green	
Jean Grondin <i>Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics</i>	244
Bennett Lovett-Graff	
Robert V. Hannaford <i>Moral Anatomy and Moral Reasoning</i>	246
Susan Dwyer	
Barbara Hannan <i>Subjectivity and Reduction: An Introduction to the Mind-Body Problem</i>	250
Scott R. Sehon	
Richard Holmes <i>The Transcendence of the World: Phenomenological Studies</i>	252
Ted Toadvine	
Graeme Hunter, ed. <i>Spinoza: The Enduring Questions</i>	254
D.C.K. Curry	
Nicholas Jolley, ed. <i>The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz</i>	257
Leslie Armour	
Matthew H. Kramer <i>Critical Legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A Philosophical Reconception</i>	259
Annalise Acorn	

Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe <i>The Subject of Philosophy</i>	262
John Xiros Cooper	
Noah M. Lemos <i>Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant</i>	264
Douglas Odegard	
Diana Tietjens Meyers <i>Subjection and Subjectivity: Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Philosophy</i>	266
Trish Glazebrook	
Richard Norman <i>Ethics, Killing and War</i>	269
Conrad Brunk	
John O'Neill <i>Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World</i>	271
Gary Varner	
Jacob Owensby <i>Dilthey and the Narrative of History</i>	273
Hans Peter Rickman	
Stuart D.B. Picken <i>Essentials of Shinto: An Analytical Guide to Principal Teachings</i>	275
Walter E. Wright	
Theodore M. Porter <i>Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life</i>	276
Kristin Shrader-Frechette	
Tilottama Rajan and David L. Clark, eds. <i>Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Contemporary Theory</i>	279
Philip J. Maloney	
Harry Redner <i>A New Science of Representation: Towards an Integrated Theory of Representation in Science, Politics and Art</i>	281
David Clowney	
Alexander Rosenberg <i>Instrumental Biology or The Disunity of Science</i>	283
John Dupré	
Wesley Salmon and Gereon Wolters, eds. <i>Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991</i>	286
Alexander Rueger	
Barry Alan Shain <i>The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought</i>	288
William M. Sullivan	
Carlo Sini <i>Images of Truth: From Sign to Symbol</i>	290
Robert Burch	

Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly	
<i>The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction to Scientists, Values, and Society</i>	292
Robert G. Hudson	
Souren Teghrarian, ed.	
<i>Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy</i>	294
Heather J. Gert	
R. Jay Wallace	
<i>Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments</i>	296
Thomas A. Cavanaugh	
Joel C. Weinsheimer	
<i>Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics: Philosophy of Interpretation from Locke to Burke</i>	299
Jeffrey R. Di Leo	
Krzysztof Ziarek	
<i>Inflected Language: Toward a Hermeneutic of Nearness — Heidegger, Levinas, Stevens, Celan</i>	301
Silvia Benso	

Richard Bodéüs

The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics.

Trans. Jan Edward Garrett.

Albany: State University of New York Press
1993.

US \$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1609-7);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1610-0).

This fine translation makes accessible to English readers Bodéüs's erudite monograph, *Le Philosophe et la cité: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans le pensée d'Aristote*. Bodéüs argues that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Politics* share a unity of purpose which is fundamentally political. (Henceforth these works are abbreviated as *NE*, *EE*, and *Pol*; and *Ethics* refers to the *NE* and *EE* indifferently.) This interpretation involves three principal theses: first, that the *Ethics* cannot be properly understood in separation from the *Pol*; second, that the *Ethics* ought not to be viewed as inaugurating an 'autonomous science of ethics' as R.A. Gauthier and others have maintained; and third that the *Ethics* (or at least the *NE*) contains 'a political teaching which the philosopher aimed primarily at the "lawgiver" (*nomothetēs*)', and these writings are not intended 'to contribute basically or directly to the moral education of those whom [Aristotle] addresses and whom he supposes already to be essentially virtuous' (3-4).

Chapter 1 lays the foundations for Bodéüs's interpretation by arguing that the *Ethics* cannot be viewed as promulgating an independent science of ethics, and that these works are not intended to contribute directly to the moral education of the audience. Regarding the first point Bodéüs (25, 40) follows John Burnet, who observed that Aristotle says the *NE* is concerned with 'political science' (*politikē epistēmē*) and makes no reference to an 'ethical science' (*ēthikē epistēmē*). Although Aristotle refers to 'ethical discourses' (*ēthikoi logoi*) and 'ethical study' (*ēthikē theōria*), this is consistent with the interpretation that the discussion or study of character traits (*ēthē*) is a proper part of political science. Further, *Magna Moralia* I 1 (probably written by an early Peripatetic but for the most part in agreement with the *Ethics*) asserts that the inquiry about character traits is a part as well as a starting point of politics, and that the inquiry as a whole is justifiably called 'political' rather than 'ethical'.

This suggests that Aristotle did not use the term *ēthikē* to designate a distinct science and that he regarded the *NE*, *EE*, and *Pol* as all belonging to political science. However, Bodéüs's deeper arguments are more controversial. He contends that Aristotle was not a 'systematic' philosopher who elaborated a philosophical system whose constituent parts are reflected in the arrangement of the different preserved treatises. This is a misinterpretation by later ancient commentators who were misled by distinctions in Aristotle's text, most notably the division of science into theoretical, practical, and productive. Since Aristotle subdivides theoretical science into theologi-

cal, mathematical, and physical, one might be tempted to distinguish practical science in a similar way into ethical, political, and economic, and to understand the *NE* as expounding the first, and the *Pol* the second. (The third would be the subject of the *Economics*, ascribed to Aristotle but possibly by Theophrastus.) Bodéüs regards this approach as mistaken, not only because it erroneously hives off ethics from politics, but, more fundamentally, because it misrepresents ‘practical science’, which for Aristotle denotes a cognitive disposition to act and is not a proper subject for a treatise. To suppose that practical science was the subject of a treatise would be to suppose that for Aristotle the practical intellectual virtues — most importantly *phronēsis* (prudence) — could be acquired or at least reinforced by discursive teaching, which Aristotle denies (*NE* X 10). On the contrary, the *NE* is meant to instruct lawgivers in political science. This implies that there are two radically different levels of political knowledge for Aristotle: practical science, which is acquired through moral habituation under the laws; and political science or political philosophy, a higher order speculative knowledge concerning the aims and methods of legislation, which can be taught through discourse (25). Further, noting that Aristotle’s audience must be capable of universal knowledge as well as having experience, Bodéüs sees Aristotle, like Plato, as separating the lawgiver and the practical politician. The lawgiver operates on a more abstract plane and guides political actors but is not an agent in the strict sense, so that he is more receptive to Aristotle’s philosophical teaching (65-7).

A problem for this interpretation (which Bodéüs admits is ‘extremely thorny’) concerns the role of *phronēsis* or prudence. For many recent commentators argue that *phronēsis* involves not only an intelligent inquiry into the particular good to be realized here and now, but also a speculative inquiry about the ultimate end of human action (as found in the *Ethics*). Such an interpretation would undermine Bodéüs’s sharp distinction between two levels of political knowledge. Against this Bodéüs argues that *phronēsis* is narrowly concerned with identifying the means to ends which are revealed solely by moral virtue, which is itself the result of habituation.

The remaining chapters develop Bodéüs’s interpretation of the *Ethics* more fully. Chapter 2 analyzes the argument of *NE* X 10 concerning the essential role of legislation in producing moral virtue. Chapter 3 addresses issues of Aristotle’s development, contending that proof texts like *NE* X 10 should not be discounted as ‘archaic’, i.e., expressing an early political approach to ethics and moral education about which a more mature Aristotle grew less confident. Chapter 4 discusses the ‘public character’ of Aristotle’s ethical discourses, showing evidence that the *Ethics* was composed for oral presentation, and conjecturing that the *NE* at least was intended for an audience wider than Aristotle’s disciples at the Lyceum. Chapter 5 explores the *NE*’s requirement that its listeners be ‘educated persons’.

Individual readers will no doubt take issue with certain details, such as Bodéüs’s treatment of *phronēsis* or prudence. For example, *NE* VI 8 says that politics is the same as prudence, although they differ in being (i.e., essence),

in that politics is concerned with the polis (other forms of prudence deal with the household or the individual agent). This seems to conflict with Bodéüs's proposal to consign prudence to a lower level than political science, which is the subject of the *Ethics*. Bodéüs's apparent solution (cf. 25) is that Aristotle distinguished two different senses of 'politics' — viz., political prudence and philosophical political science — although there is scant textual evidence for such a distinction. But would Aristotle have regarded such a rigidly narrow view of prudence as plausible? What if philosophical speculation called into question the results of moral habituation? The arguments of the *Ethics* or *Pol* might lead a reasonable person to wonder whether the ends he had been habituated to pursue were really the best. Could one be persuaded to revise or correct one's ends as a result of such reflection (for example, to include philosophy along with politics as part of one's end)? If so, would this not be a clear case of philosophical discourse contributing to the development of prudence? Again, one might question Bodéüs's platonizing dichotomy between philosophically inclined, relatively inactive lawgivers and nonintellectual, workmanlike politicians. Assemblymen and jurists differ from lawgivers in that they perform more practical and particular activities, but it does not follow from this that Aristotle meant to relegate them to an inferior class like Plato's workmen. The bifurcation also seems implausible if, as Bodéüs maintains (95), the *Ethics* does not presuppose esoteric knowledge in contrast to Plato's lecture on the good.

Notwithstanding, this book offers a deep and comprehensive interpretation replete with valuable insights into Aristotle's text, and at the same time it is well organized, clear, and admirably concise. Bodéüs and Garrett have done an excellent job of making the book accessible to the English-only reader. The notes, bibliography, and indexes are very useful. The only item wanting is an index of modern authors cited, which would have been useful in locating the valuable comments on modern scholars. In conclusion, this book is highly recommended to scholars and advanced students of Aristotle's ethics and politics.

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David Boonin-Vail

Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. xiii + 219.

US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-46209-6.

Hobbes's ideas were firmly rejected during his life-time. He was perceived as an egoist and atheist whose work was truly scandalous. This is the starting point of Boonin-Vail's new book. Boonin-Vail then argues that Hobbes is a virtue ethicist whose 'science of Vertue and Vice' is so original and interesting that those philosophers who 'have grown disenchanted with this limited menu [of ethics] in recent years' and who 'by and large, sought an alternative in the works of Aristotle,' should also read Hobbes (201). This means that Hobbes has something original to say about ethics and virtue. This strategy also saves Hobbes from his more hostile critics.

Boonin-Vail provides a very readable, critical account of the recent work on Hobbes. The interpretations which make Hobbes a moral contractarian, an egoist, a Kantian or a divine command theorist are refuted one after the other. This part of the book is very clear, clever and interesting. It is amazing how many different interpretations of Hobbes's ethics have been presented. We may call the recent work on Hobbes 'Procrustean'. This is how you do it: select first a conventional ethical position X, claim that Hobbes was an X theorist, read Hobbes as an X theorist, and conclude that Hobbes is an X theorist, and nothing else.

I find it rather strange that so many of his readers dismiss the obvious conclusion that Hobbes presented a wide variety of views which were not always original and sometimes also mutually incompatible. Boonin-Vail refutes many of these Procrustean views quite convincingly, but then he himself claims that Hobbes is a virtue theorist. More specifically, Boonin-Vail tries to show that Hobbes's ideas about virtue were similar to those of Aristotle. At the same time it is clear that Hobbes criticizes Aristotle extremely harshly. Boonin-Vail's own point is that Hobbes misunderstood Aristotle, but at the same time he invented an ethical theory which very closely resembles Aristotle's actual views. It seems more likely that Hobbes knew his Aristotle well, hated his message, but could not avoid borrowing something from him.

Anyway, Boonin-Vail refutes some of the new Hobbes interpretations impressively. Boonin-Vail has read all of Hobbes's work and most of its interpretations. And he can use what he has read; for instance, Martinich in his new book presents Hobbes as a divine command theorist. Martinich claims that natural laws are real laws. He also says that if they are not, Hobbes should say so — but he does not. Boonin-Vail counters by quoting a sentence from *Leviathan* which says that the laws of nature are 'not properly Lawes, but qualities which dispose men to peace, and to obedience' (103).

Boonin-Vail argues that Hobbes is a virtue theorist in the following sense. The laws of nature should be followed. A virtuous or just person recognizes them and follows them because he has developed the habit of doing the right thing. He may do unjust acts but he is still a just person because he has acquired the relevant character trait. Such a person is a morally good person. Boonin-Vail is able to show that this view finds support in Hobbes's own writings.

As I have said, the merits of this book are many. Boonin-Vail's arguments are always very clear, he refers to all of Hobbes's writings (including the scientific texts), he discusses and convincingly criticizes a large number of well-known interpretations, and presents his own, challenging thesis. From this point of view, Boonin-Vail's book is a good introduction to Hobbes and it can be recommended to anyone interested in Hobbes, as well to beginners as scholars.

But there are problems. I cannot see the merits of Boonin-Vail's discussion of Hobbes's scientific method which makes him look like a good modern empiricist. Why can we not accept the fact that Hobbes's logic and methodology are quite strange to us, and approach them from their proper historical perspective? We should not oversimplify Hobbes. Another critical point is this: if Hobbes is able to show that there are natural laws and that people can be fully virtuous, in the sense that they gladly and habitually follow those laws, why do they need the sovereign?

Indeed, if Hobbes has a full-scale ethical theory and if he is able to show that people should and could be ethical, the threat of the condition of nature seems to vanish. In other words, Hobbes as political theorist is just a side issue, in spite of the fact that historically his theory of the commonwealth, the *Leviathan*, has been the focus of interest. Boonin-Vail's interpretation leads to more radical conclusions than he himself seems to notice.

In other words, the question is, do we need Hobbes's book *Leviathan* or do we need a real *Leviathan*? Boonin-Vail comes close to recommending the first medicine. This is to say that we read the book, we learn what to do and how to live, and thus we do not need the sovereign and his frightening sword of law.

Boonin-Vail discusses some explanations of the creation of the condition of nature, but it soon becomes clear that these explanations are not very good, and this includes also Hobbes's own ideas. Hobbes's thesis that the condition of nature is an anarchy and civil war is so radical that its derivation from any moderate account of human nature and ethics may be impossible. Thus, if one wants to appreciate Hobbes's political radicalism one perhaps needs to admit that Hobbes is an egoist and cynic. If, on the contrary, one emphasizes Hobbes's ethics, which obviously can be a good strategy, one tends to lose his political theory.

The next question is, of course, whether Hobbes's ethical theory is so strong that it can support our new interest in it? It is not quite clear that Boonin-Vail has been able to show that Hobbes has an ethical *theory* and this is a theory of virtue. Of course Hobbes discusses virtue, but whether it is an

independent, rich theory remains problematic. Or is it just a loan from Aristotle, whose other theories Hobbes wants to refute?

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Keith R. Bradley

Slavery and Society at Rome.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. xiv + 202.

US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-37287 9);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-37887-7).

Bradley attempts to show what it was like to be a slave, and to a lesser extent to own slaves, in ancient Rome. The work concentrates on the central period of Roman history, roughly from 200 BC to 200 AD, although Bradley freely leaves these boundaries, and draws numerous parallels between Rome and the New World in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By using not only traditional historical evidence, but also works of fiction, Bradley is able to present an amazingly detailed picture of the role of slaves in Roman society, and the daily life of the slaves themselves.

The work is divided into nine chapters, each addressing a different theme (e.g., 'The Roman slave supply', 'Slave labour' and 'To be a slave'). For philosophers, the seventh chapter ('Change and continuity') is of particular interest. There Bradley argues that the flourishing of religious and philosophical teachings that should have abolished slavery, only worsened the plight of the slaves. Because Bradley proceeds thematically rather than chronologically, it is difficult to disentangle the evidence he marshals for this claim. Nonetheless, his argument seems to be as follows. The Romans originally relied on natural law arguments to justify slavery. Many slave owners' everyday experience, however, contradicted the Aristotelian claim that some people were born to be slaves. The intellectual battle that ensued could have led to emancipation, but did not because of two successive philosophical movements.

First, the importation of Stoicism ostensibly improved the slaves' lot by teaching temperance as the route to moral perfection. Bradley, however, shows that Stoicism dehumanized the slaves. According to the Stoics, the slave owner should not beat or abuse his slaves, not because the slaves are humans and therefore demand ethical treatment. Rather, Stoicism focused

on the master himself. Abusing slaves, like drunkenness, was wrong because it strayed from the ideal of calm temperance. Worse yet, Stoicism dismissed the debate concerning the naturalness or unnaturalness of slavery as philosophically insignificant. The only important distinction was between the wise and the foolish, or the quality of the individual's inner life. As merely an external concern, the issue of slavery became trivial.

Whereas knowledge of Stoicism was confined primarily to well-educated slave holders, Christianity was taught to all, including the slaves. In addition to promulgating the same concern for inner rather than external life as Stoicism, Christianity was particularly insidious because it promised a better existence after death if one did not misbehave while on earth. Thus, Christianity merely added a metaphysical weapon to the slave-owners' already extensive arsenal of physical and legal weapons for keeping the slaves in line.

Readers familiar with Nietzsche and Marx may not see any novelty in Bradley's thesis, but unlike Nietzsche at least, he provides a wealth of historical evidence to support his claim. For philosophers, Bradley provides a rich ore that will help illuminate and recast much of the tradition. For example, many philosophers rely on a notion of slavery that Bradley shows is far too simplistic. To what extent we must rethink the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, or J.S. Mill's arguments against slavery, Bradley rightly leaves for others to determine. As a springboard for philosophical reflection, however, Bradley's work is exceptionally fruitful. He masterfully intertwines a rich narrative suitable for non-specialists with abundant citations that should sate more advanced readers. The work is both entertaining and informative, and for those reasons, highly recommended.

Brian Domino

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Gilles Deleuze

Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton.

New York: Columbia University Press 1994.

Pp. xxii + 350.

US \$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-08158-8);

US \$17.00 (paper: ISBN 0-231-??).

This book is essential for any sustained study of Deleuze's work. Here, the exegesis and interpretation of classic texts from the history of philosophy, allied to a reflection upon a series of scientific and philosophical problems, leads into a well-argued and complex exposition of an original position: a new

philosophy of difference. Deleuze's early and influential research on Bergson, Hume, Nietzsche and Spinoza becomes the basis for an attack upon a mistaken and dangerous conception of difference in classical and modern thought. An affirmative philosophy of difference comes out of this encounter and guides his later works, in particular, the work with Félix Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. Lane [New York: Viking Press 1977]) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (trans. B. Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987]) and the series of enactments of difference in *The Logic of Sense* (trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale [New York: Columbia University Press 1990]). The careful move from interpretation to creation is always latent in the earlier works and presupposed in the later. Inevitably, this has led to hasty criticisms and understandable confusion. *Difference and Repetition* resolves these lacunae and problems whilst developing some of the main arguments underpinning the philosophy. Thus, this book — Deleuze's most pure philosophical work — covers the following points in such a way as to explain all-important thoughts which remain enigmatic elsewhere.

First, an alternative to Plato's grounding of difference in the identity of the Idea is given in the context of a survey of the emergence of two conflicting traditions, 'The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism' (59). This conflict is taken somewhat for granted in *The Logic of Sense* and *What is Philosophy?* (trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson [London: Verso 1994]). Here, its genealogy and Deleuze's rationale become apparent through a series of critical readings. His philosophy is placed in a line of philosophers stretching from Heraclitus, through Duns Scotus and Spinoza, to Nietzsche. Their task is to oppose the philosophical mainstream where thought follows the form of a distinction drawn between the original and its reproduction.

Second, in terms of this historical development, Heidegger's philosophy is praised for its understanding of the importance of questioning and repetition in the affirmation of difference. Yet, Heidegger is criticized for failing to adopt the Nietzschean eternal return as a means to evade the error of subjecting difference to the rule of representation: 'Does [Heidegger] conceive of *being* in such a manner that it will be truly disengaged from any subordination in relation to the identity of representation? It would seem not, given his critique of the eternal return' (66). This book provides the most positive reference point for a study of the relation of Deleuze to Heidegger, in contrast to the tendentious critical remarks in *What is Philosophy?* For this reason, it is also an excellent place to start a comparison of Deleuze and Derrida's similar, yet far from identical, projects for a philosophy of difference.

Third, Deleuze's seminal work on Nietzsche is cashed out in terms of the importance of the theory of eternal return. Its role is to support an argument against a definition of being as identity, dependent upon representation, and in favour of the view that being is difference, dependent upon repetition: 'Only difference returns, for identity cannot allow for the necessary movement presupposed in the eternal return: *It is not the same which returns, it*

is not the similar which returns; rather, the Same is the returning of that which returns, — in other words, of the *Different*; the similar is the returning of that which returns, in other words, of the *Dissimilar*' (301). The great emphasis placed on intensity in Deleuze's philosophy can be understood on this basis: intensity returns, as the movement between states which allow them fleetingly to be identified, yet the states themselves do not, for they depend on a movement which must destroy them. Here, difference is the condition for identity and not the reverse.

Fourth, a standard way of describing the contrast of continental and analytic philosophy is to point out the absence of the influence of science on the work of the former. In the case of Deleuze this analysis is unfounded. The main argument of this book depends on the study of differential calculus in mathematics (176-84) and of the distinction of species in biology (214-21). Deleuze's account of positive difference, as opposed to negative difference which is dependent on opposition or negation, turns on the definition of singularities as entities which cannot be satisfactorily related to any others in terms of negation or other functions. Singularities are seen as problematic in philosophy in the same way as singular points are in mathematics: 'Differential calculus is not the unimaginative calculus of the utilitarian, the crude arithmetic calculus which subordinates thought to other things or other ends, but the algebra of pure thought, the superior irony of problems themselves — the only calculus "beyond good and evil"' (182-3). This parallel, which shows Deleuze's enduring interest in Leibniz's mathematics, allows for an explanation of difference that does not fall back upon the metaphors and other secondary representations which would allow for a return to a mode of thought which cannot affirm difference as such.

Though *Difference and Repetition* is the second part of Deleuze's principal thesis for the French Doctorat d'Etat and despite the technical aspects of many of its main arguments, this is not merely a specialised exercise. The style of the book operates on at least four levels, interspersing precise philosophical definitions, insightful interpretation, inventive examples and poetic moments rich in productive ideas. This combination can be seen in his defence of philosophy as that which proceeds through paradox and in opposition to common and good sense: 'At the same time, however, paradox communicates to the broken faculties that relation which is far from good sense, aligning them along a volcanic line which allows one to ignite the other, leaping from one limit to the next' (227). All this makes for a classic of philosophy. It is therefore a great benefit to have this excellent translation by a Deleuzian expert.

James Williams

University of Dundee

**Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower and
Finbarr W. O'Connor**

*Critique of Applied Ethics: Reflections and
Recommendations.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1994.
Pp. 267.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-157-1);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 1-56639-158-X).

Critique of Applied Ethics is not a book of applied ethics; it is a serious and radical reassessment of its role, through a thorough understanding of that role's real nature, bases and goals. Starting with a painstaking analysis of moral theory, from Stoicism to Rawlsian justice, from Bentham and Mill to Kant, and arguing for the integral role of context, occasions, circumstances and perspectives that may surround our 'application' of moral theories, the book concludes by positing a novel role for applied ethics, that of corrective of ethical theories. Because I agree with the authors, my main problem with this important work is in the title: as the authors clearly demonstrate that moral theories and ethics dealing with major problems in a rapidly changing modernity neither are nor should be simply 'applied' as a pat formula to undifferentiated hence indifferent 'matter'. On the contrary, under the misnomer 'applied' ethics, we find *practical* ethical systems that can 'broaden our conceptions of ethical theory' and possibly even 'change our view of its nature and function' (247).

The function of all moral analysis is to help and provide moral guidance in the case of conflicting options and choices. When options and choices are both pressing and novel, the simple application of first-order principles and theories designed long before any of the present complex issues and problems existed, is insufficient. Hence perhaps 'practical' rather than 'applied' ethics might have been the better theme to employ, especially in view of the book's own conclusions. However, this is a semantic concern rather than a substantive one.

On the whole, the authors' argument is a refreshingly strong one on behalf of a field of philosophy that is, at best, tolerated, rather than understood in its full potential and implications, in too many philosophy departments. The first part starts with a description of 'Practical Moral Problems in an Age of Rapid Technological and Social Change!' The pervasiveness, complexity and gravity of these problems is unprecedented, as they arise in the context of medical, business, environmental, gender and racial issues. Contemporary men and women are expected to make conflicted decisions with consequences more far reaching than any in the past: as Scherer has argued (D. Scherer and T. Attig, *Upstream/Downstream* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990]), we are all living in an 'upstream/downstream' world, that is, in a world where everything we do may have serious global effects, and all human activities, globally, affect us in turn.

To help us steer our way through a veritable minefield of complex problems, we need to understand both morality with 'the resources that ethical theory offers' (22), and the factual parameters of the problem, so that we may judge what must be included within our 'jurisdiction'. Chapters two and three are devoted to an examination of moral theories. Chapter four instead, breaks with tradition as it explores carefully the role and the legitimacy of 'knowledge in moral theory'. Practical ethics needs knowledge and understanding of the facts, the circumstances and the context of the choices we are facing, and this may conflict with the expectations of moral theorists. Chapter four, the authors explain, aims 'to clear the decks' by exposing several 'pitfalls', including assumptions about ultimate authority and strict dichotomies of objectivity-subjectivity, relative-absolute, reason-emotion, and fact-value' (63).

An aside is indicated at this point. It is precisely the latter among the listed dichotomies that has provided the 'justification' for so-called 'pure' philosophers to take the position that 'applied ethics' are, at best, a necessary evil, to be administered to nonmajors by sessionals, graduate students, or new recruits, while their 'betters' concentrate on their purer pursuits, which don't introduce facts or, worse yet, smack of advocacy at times. Edel, Flower and O'Connor are to be commended for showing that these dichotomies may represent pitfalls, not absolute laws, on a par with the law of gravity.

Chapter four concludes the first part, intended to lay the foundation for the argument of part two. The next chapters deal with how the problems are best approached. Chapters five and six deal with the 'diagnosis' and the 'context', respectively. Far from simply applying a pre-established theory to a problem, its complexity and novelty requires a series of interrelated steps involving both theories and facts. The initial 'diagnosis' demands that we understand that the problem is always mediated throughout a specific situation, background and understanding framework. The 'context' introduces the facts of the case as integral components. The 'ethical issue', in turn, is formulated against the background of the moral categories we espouse. Somehow, we need to preserve universality without depreciating the factual realm or reducing it to the 'contingent' and this is the topic of chapter seven, 'Formulating the Ethical Issue'. The next chapter (8) is fundamental, as 'Jurisdiction, Roles and Occupations: The Regionalization of Morality' raises questions that go even beyond Alasdair MacIntyre's *Whose Justice? Whose Rationality* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), as it also questions the input of our multiple roles in arriving at moral answers, including the role of the institutions within which we live and operate.

The proliferation of codes of professionals ethics indicates both the major role occupations play in our life (171), and our common belief that 'the moral atmosphere (like the ozone layer?) is being thinned and is in danger of disappearing' (161). That is why both the role of our institutions and that of 'discovery and innovation' in modern life deserve careful scrutiny (chapters nine and ten). The important question underlying their analysis, is whether morality *can* be 'regionalized' in this manner. The authors recognize that

denying the very possibility of regionalization has some appeal: morality should be the same for all. But we must also learn to recognize the importance of second-order principles, which *can* be 'regionalized' even as we take certain basic norms, like respect for persons, very seriously indeed. We thus need in each case to use contextuality to help us lay out, specifically, what 'respect' might entail in each situation.

Chapter eleven examines the 'range of decisions' (236), including both long and short term dimensions, which may include 'many matters that were formerly taken for granted and are now subject to moral inquiry' (240). Chapter twelve concludes in an Aristotelian vein, by emphasizing 'the special conditions of the circumstances of time and place where applications take place' (241). Hence, it is for this reason, that 'practice must educate theory.' Aside from the usual 'tests' of the soundness of moral theories, practical considerations must be brought in as a 'litmus test' of their applicability. In this way, their insufficiency in regard to specific issues may come to light. Hence 'It should not be surprising ... that in the libertarian movements of minorities ... utilitarianism played no notable part' (245), and the same can be said about the immense environmental problems that confront us (Laura Westra, *An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity* [Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 1994]).

All in all, this is a thoughtful, careful, well-worked out book for the most part, in spite of a somewhat superficial treatment of some issues, such as truth-telling or abortion. But a difficult question remains. If we accept, as we must, the contextuality, regionalization and novelty of problems and conflicts, and we are led to question the role of basic moral theory, then we must be very careful that the resulting practical solutions do not lead to an unacceptable and immoral relativism, a topic which could have been addressed here in more detail.

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Alain Finkelkraut

The Defeat of the Mind.

Trans. Judith Friedlander.

New York: Columbia University Press 1995.

Pp. xix + 165.

US \$22.95. ISBN 0-231-08022-0.

Finkelkraut's essay, *The Defeat of the Mind*, is an impassioned and provocative attempt at refuting and discrediting what has been variously referred to as 'the politics of difference', 'identity politics', 'nationalism', 'multiculturalism', or often simply 'culturalism'. The central argument that unites all versions of culturalism is that one's membership in a cultural group shapes one's goals, values and sense of self. It is necessary for pursuit of 'the good life'. Thus, cultural identity has moral standing and deserves to be recognized and treated as a primary good. It is the government's responsibility to take this into consideration in the granting of rights and entitlements to its citizens.

Finkelkraut, on the other hand, defends a form of 'procedural liberalism' — the commitment of a government to deal equally and fairly with all persons without consideration given to their cultural, ethnic or religious backgrounds. Finkelkraut's liberalism (which he traces to Voltaire and the *philosophes* of the eighteenth century) assumes that personhood is grounded in what Sandel refers to as an 'unencumbered self' — a source of rational agency that is given 'prior to its ends' and not determined culturally. On such a view, all persons are (potentially) autonomous and equal. 'The life of the mind' is seen as a necessary condition for the possibility of realizing one's potential as a rational agent and for the creation of a society based on what unites us all.

Rather than to offer a positive defense of Enlightenment ideals, Finkelkraut uses his rhetorical skills to survey, (a) the historical tensions between French and German nationalists from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, (b) antihumanism in the social sciences and its influence in the debate over decolonization, (c) the uncritical acceptance of multiculturalism and the rise of the 'new right' in France, and (d) the leveling of cultural standards in the face of popular culture as part of the logic of consumption and the adoption of adolescent values. Finkelkraut's descriptive and explanatory account of the denial and mockery of liberal ideals is compelling, accessible and insightful. There are, however, several limitations.

Academic readers will no doubt find Finkelkraut's analysis lacking in documentation. The translator, Judith Friedlander, reminds the reader in her useful introduction that Finkelkraut's text is in 'the time-honored form of the French essay' and meant to be provocative. This may be true, but the citing of one's sources (Friedlander supplies, where possible, those left hanging by Finkelkraut) is a courtesy not only to one's opponents but one's colleagues as well. Given that one's citations are buried in the footnotes, one

can maintain the integrity of the essay without interrupting its rhetorical force and momentum.

But there are other, more substantive, complaints to be raised. In the first place, Finkelkraut presents both the French Enlightenment and German Romanticism as homogeneous and monolithic, giving no attention whatsoever to the complexity and divisions within these movements, nor to the tensions inherent in the thought of Herder, who is presented by Finkelkraut as Voltaire's primary antagonist.

Second, Finkelkraut gives little more than passing consideration to arguments that might be offered in *defense* of culturalism. Granted the original text was published in 1987 (the edition under discussion is a new translation), preceding many of the useful recent discussion by Charles Taylor and others. So we can't blame him for failing to do the impossible. But surely Finkelkraut could have summarized at least *some* arguments from Levi-Strauss, Franz Boas, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu. Instead he tends to take their statements out of context, presenting them as examples of extreme cultural determinism, antihumanism and racism. Such adversarial polemics do not promote the reasoned and open-minded debate to which Finkelkraut is (correctly) committed. What we need to do is look, if only briefly, at whatever support there may be for the assumptions of culturalism. Finkelkraut comes up short on this count.

Finally, Finkelkraut seems surprisingly unimpressed by the claim that there is no neutral position, liberal or otherwise, from which to govern. Thus, procedural liberalism seems to be based on a contradiction. The liberal state claims to take no position on the substantive question of what constitutes 'the good life' for its citizens. The values of impartiality and rational debate that are constitutive of liberalism are to be used only for providing a framework for individual pursuit of the good in any way one sees fit, provided it does not bring harm to others. Thus, a life lived 'from the inside', according to a person's own interests and purposes, is superior to a life determined from the outside, i.e., by the interests of others, whether individual or group (cultural, religious, ethnic, etc.). Finkelkraut declares his allegiance to such views when he says: 'As far as it is concerned, the spirit of modern Europe accommodates itself very well to the existence of ethnic or religious minorities, on condition that they conform to the model of a nation comprised of free and equal individuals. This demand carries along with it the rejection of all practices — including those whose roots go deep into history — that reject the basic rights of human beings' (108).

The culturalist objection is that such a liberal framework is not neutral in the sense that it imposes on its citizens certain values (rationality, open-debate, the freedom to change one's substantive commitments and conception of the good life, etc.) which they must accept or risk being excluded from the State. Liberal values and principles may in fact provide the best foundation on which to forge a common existence, but it's not self-evident. It needs argument.

In the end, Finkelkraut makes no positive attempt to support what seems to be his belief in universal moral and aesthetic values and natural rights. I say 'seems' because he declares his allegiance to such concepts only in the most general sense, never laying out his own assumptions for critical scrutiny and analysis. It is fine to accuse the advocates of identity politics of mischaracterizing the nature of 'Man', but quite another to give an argument in support of natural rights and radical autonomy. Yet this step is necessary if we are to be persuaded to adopt the Enlightenment ideals urged on us by the author.

Finkelkraut's attempt to bring to a broad public forum issues that go to the heart of what it means to live in a democratic state is both laudable and sorely needed. In spite of its shortcomings (or perhaps *because* of them, and the brevity and accessibility of the text), *The Defeat of the Mind* should be a useful catalyst in the ongoing 'culture wars' in which we all are conscripts.

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Marilyn Friedman and Jan Narveson
Political Correctness: For and Against.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1995.
Pp. viii + 153.
US \$56.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7985-3);
US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7986-1).

Ostensibly, this book involves a debate between Friedman and Narveson about political correctness, but appearances are misleading. Although Friedman defends some policies and movements — multiculturalism and diversity in academic life, affirmative action, and feminism — which have been dubbed 'politically correct', in each case she affirms the rationality of the policy or movement, but not the justifiability of political correctness. Since this term, originating in the Chinese cultural revolution, refers to the requirement that everyone espouse the dogma of the day, it is heartening to see that Friedman, like Narveson, does not consciously support it. Whether she is successful in avoiding all taint of it, is another matter, but more of that below.

It is a measure of the book's distance from any real advocacy of political correctness that the preface offers 'genuine dialogue — honest, open, engaged and mutually respectful' (vii). Moreover, on the issue of whether there should be formal speech codes, the authors are agreed that these are unacceptable infringements of free speech, or at least ineffectual means of discouraging

offensive speech. It is over multiculturalism, feminism and affirmative action that there is genuine disagreement.

The debate over multiculturalism strikes me as parochial. It hinges on the status of the 'Western canon' in education and whether it should be supplemented with, or replaced by, multicultural and marginalized works. The discussion is an artefact of a college system which requires students to take compulsory courses in 'Western Civ'. Even Friedman advocates scrapping the obligatory study of the Western canon altogether (13); she suggests, rather, the addition of compulsory courses in non-Western civilization and the inclusion of non-canonical works (16). Narveson defends the canon as 'a smallish set of works that one must know if one is to qualify as an educated person' (53) and thinks his opponent wants compulsory courses on the Western canon replaced by courses that give equal time 'for each distinct culture' (63). This is an idea that is easy to ridicule. But there are clearly other models for multicultural education, and a serious discussion ought to consider a variety of alternatives. Perhaps a multicultural society should provide students with the opportunity of studying the cultures represented in it without obliging them to do so. Neither author discusses this possibility. Yet the very existence of compulsory courses potentially introduces dogmatism and smacks of political correctness. If a liberal education involves the on-going, open minded, search for a truth, which we should never dogmatically assume we have discovered, a more liberal model might allow ideas to compete for student allegiance. Moreover, compulsory core courses go against the free market principles on which Narveson places so much faith in other areas. Outside North America many Arts Faculties give students the freedom to choose from courses provided by diverse departments. This makes multicultural studies available without coercion, and without lumping cultures as diverse as those of Japan and Central America together under a 'non-Western' label. Perhaps the result is that some Arts graduates are not 'educated persons' according to Narveson's criterion. But a while ago those ignorant of Latin didn't make that grade.

Another overlooked point is that it is not what is taught, but how it is taught, which is central to a liberal education. The Koran can be taught as dogma, or critically discussed. The 'Western canon' can equally be taught uncritically, or reflectively; in which case the universality of the values espoused will be up for questioning. Traditionally, when Plato's *Republic* or Rousseau's *Emile* were taught, their fifth books were ignored as marginal, but feminism highlights the centrality of the sexual politics of these works, and the bias in the traditional pedagogy.

The discussion of feminism and affirmative action is of more global relevance. Yet neither author does much to advance the debate on these issues. Friedman concentrates her discussion on defending feminism against the charge that it is illegitimately political, anti-man and anti-family. Narveson directs much of his polemic against the injustice and irrationality of affirmative action. Friedman's defence of the legitimacy of the political issues raised by feminism is well taken. These need to be discussed openly and

rationally, like other major political questions. But, when it comes to discussing the family Friedman slips into dogmatic feminism. She asserts that 'a family is, generically speaking, any group of persons who together form a household' (27). She concludes that gay and lesbian couples (with or without children) should be granted 'all the privileges of family life' (28). Her implication that all feminists should agree smacks of political correctness, for this is a contested issue. In any case, the argument commits a fallacy. The traditional privileges of family life were justified given a definition which assumed a dependent spouse and/or children. One cannot assume that these privileges carry over to groups which are families by the new definition. Narveson notices a similar fallacy in some feminist discussions of rape (99).

Part of Narveson's critique of affirmative action is quite surprising. Affirmative action, he argues, is irrational and unnecessary because discrimination doesn't exist. Employers are rational agents working in a free market to maximise output. To practice discrimination would be irrational since inefficient. Therefore discrimination doesn't exist (79-82). As they say, one man's *modus ponens* is another woman's *modus tollens*. And Narveson's own examples undermine his premises since they acknowledge that discrimination against black baseball players existed in the past. Friedman's response to Narveson on this issue is thorough and cogent. But Narveson's polemic does indicate the resentment aroused by affirmative action programs, and the possibility of injustice to individual young white men if strict quotas are put in place. As Narveson points out, most academic positions are taken up by tenured older men; thus if departments are required to hire members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, very few positions will be available for young, white, men (94-5). Yet, since Narveson places so much faith in the free market, I wonder he does not conclude that the tenure of older white men should be abolished. This would be fairer, since they are the ones advantaged by past discrimination.

This is not a book to come to for deep philosophical enlightenment, but the authors suggest that they were hoping to reach the wider public, and they have provided a lively example of the state of the current debate.

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Jean Grondin

Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics.

Trans. Joel Weinsheimer.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

Pp. xv + 231.

US \$25.00. ISBN 0-300-05969-8.

In his *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Jean Grondin sets himself the rather daunting task of explaining the history, from Plato to Gadamer, of philosophy's attempt to formulate a 'science' of interpretation — and this in roughly 144 pages. That Grondin is as successful as he is is a tribute less to his willingness to detail all instances of hermeneutic thinking than to the strictures he places upon himself on what is worth mentioning.

The guiding restraint on this journey through the shadowy history of philosophical hermeneutics is Grondin's emphasis on its universalization. Though he is careful to 'avoid presenting the history of hermeneutics as a teleological process' (3), suggesting that the transformation of hermeneutics from Plato to Gadamer was more stumbling than visionary, it is quite clear that its final fruition in Gadamer's *Truth and Method* more than makes up for its non-linear history.

Still there is something troubling about denying the teleological character of the history of hermeneutics while at the same time claiming for its most significant theorist and expositor the privilege of serving as the standard against which his predecessors are to be measured. Of course, this is not to deny the value of considering the piecemeal contributions made by such individuals as St. Augustine, Schleiermacher, and Heidegger to Gadamer's thought. But to treat these individuals solely in terms of their contribution to the development of Gadamer's thought is to diminish their status as self-coherent thinkers in their own right.

And the effect of this diminution can be somewhat disconcerting. Grondin, for example, credits Philo of Alexandria, Origen, and Johannes Cassianus with the first glimmerings of a philosophical hermeneutics in the allegoretic models each constructed for making the unintelligible passages of Scripture comprehensible, but faults them for restricting those models to Scripture alone (32). Only Augustine — a recognized major influence on Gadamer (33) — emerges unscathed, inasmuch as he dramatically expands the role of hermeneutic thought by arguing that because human utterances, unlike God's Word, can never fully contain the intended meaning behind them, they must always be interpreted (36-7).

Not surprisingly, in what for Grondin represents a wrong turn in the evolution of philosophical hermeneutics, what follows Augustine's conclusion is less in keeping with the philosophical spirit than the methodological letter of the enterprise as the next three chapters document the search for an accurate and comprehensive 'methodology' for objectivizing the otherwise notoriously messy practice of interpretation. As suggested in the title of Johann Dannhauer's *Idea of the Good Interpreter* (1630), this quest for a

transcendental, transhistorical methodology, capable of offering up interpretations, subject to neither charges of historical relativism nor the limitations of propositional logic, becomes for Grondin the tragic flaw in the work of the several proto-hermeneuticists who follow (Johann Chladenius, Georg Friedrich Meier, Friedrich Ast, Friedrich Schlegel, August Böckh, Johann Gustav Droysen, and Wilhelm Dilthey).

Again, like Augustine, only Schleiermacher really stands out because he fits the Gadamerian frame of Grondin's history. Schleiermacher's particular contribution was to formulate the need for an historically self-conscious vigilance by reconceiving the act of understanding (that is, of interpreting) as anything but the automatic apprehension of another's seemingly transparent, transcendental meaning. Instead Schleiermacher 'premised that misunderstanding was in fact the normal state,' with the result that 'the interpreter must be on guard against possible misunderstanding' (70). Though Schleiermacher would also commit the grievous error of pursuing a methodology whose purpose was to transcend the facticity of Being implicit in his notion of misunderstanding-as-norm, his notions eventually would find their proper place, according to Grondin, in Heidegger's meditations on the phenomenological fore-structure of human understanding.

Capitalizing upon Schleiermacher's notion of misunderstanding as the normal state of affairs, Heidegger's fore-structure provides the foundation for hermeneutic's redirection by drawing the interpreter's attention from the object of his inquiry to his own subjective understanding of it. Of course, there is a danger in the accepting as a forward step to Gadamer's hermeneutics Heidegger's situation of Being before consciousness, a danger Grondin is quick to neutralize. Arguing that 'we are not blindly at the mercy of this fore-structure of pregiven interpretation nor inescapably imprisoned in our prejudices,' Grondin sees less hindrance than spur to historical self-conscious criticism in 'Heidegger's hermeneutics', whose goal is 'the explicit elucidation of the fore-structure pregiven by history' (95). Our job as such is thus not merely to interpret the Other, but to interpret *our* understanding of the Other through a constant monitoring of our prejudgments, biases, mis- and preconceptions: and from here it is but a short step to the Gadamerian formulation of universal hermeneutics grounded in an historically self-conscious criticism.

Forever questioning our understanding of the Other (but always with the intent to understand the Other better), we are moved less by any will-to-truth or will-to-power than by the will-to-understand: a natural corollary, as Grondin would have it, of the facticity of Being (121-2). But with Gadamer, Grondin can finally go that longest yard, since it is Gadamer who fully universalizes an historicist hermeneutics by arguing the impossibility of any methodology to surpass its historical limits. Consequently, the only means by which we achieve an hermeneutically sound understanding of self and Other is through the disjunctive intersection of differently 'historically-effected consciousnesses' (113-14). That is to say, we know truth not by prostrating ourselves before some absolute (but illusory) ahistorical stand-

ard, but by taking account of our own historicity in our encounters with the historical specificity of the Other. In fact, as Grondin notes, it is by paying too great an homage to ahistorical absolutes that we fail to engage in any true self-critique, because such absolutes excuse interpreters from having to guard against the intrusion of their personal (that is, historically constructed) prejudices. In a strange but cogent reversal, for Gadamer and Grondin alike, the enemy to truth is not historicism, but transcendental idealism.

Self-criticism and dialogue: these for Grondin are the catchwords of the hermeneutic enterprise, as they are the ways by which he handles in a final chapter, really too short for its own good, the counterclaims of hermeneutics' critics, Emilio Betti, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida. In each, Grondin finds commonalities and differences both fruitful and barren — not that it matters all that much, since, for Grondin, that the dialogue should take place at all is sufficient justification of the hermeneutic enterprise. For a whirlwind tour of the history of this branch of philosophy, Grondin's work, even in spite of the fond wish for a less laconic treatment of the topic, comes highly recommended for his grasp of hermeneutics' core issues and his willingness to take a position on the contributions of past thinkers and present critics rather than pretend an impossible objectivity in discussing them.

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Robert V. Hannaford

Moral Anatomy and Moral Reasoning.

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1993.

Pp. x + 197.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0607-6.

Robert Hannaford's project is to put considerations of moral agency at the centre of moral philosophy. His aim is to convince us that 'understanding the nature of the moral person — understanding moral anatomy — is fundamental to understanding moral reasoning and moral education' (4). He claims that twentieth century ethicists have paid insufficient attention to moral psychology, and contends that his own account of our moral anatomy leads to a 'new view of moral theory' (1). Since human beings are morality's clientele, there is something right about the idea that the form and content of moral theories should be constrained by facts about the kind of creatures

human beings are. And so we might welcome an account that purports not only to tell us about what moral agency consists in, but also claims to delineate the set of empirically adequate moral theories. Unfortunately, Hannaford's book is a rather superficial and muddled effort in this direction.

Here is the basic argument. We begin with the notion of moral responsibility: 'responsible persons must engage in moral reasoning and language use' (5). Next we ask how such reasoning and language use is possible for creatures like us. Hannaford's answer is that 'the process of talking and reasoning about people in moral situations ... depends on each of us seeing others as persons like ourselves' (5). This is so because (i) linguistic communication depends upon the recognition of speaker/hearers' intentions (chapter 4), and (ii) moral reasoning essentially involves recognizing and accommodating others' interests (chapter 2). Hannaford's point is that in order to be a moral agent, each of us must grasp a particular conception of the person which we recognize applies to ourselves and to others. Crucially, he thinks that a certain responsiveness — that is, a concern or caring for others' interest and needs — tracks this recognition. He suggests that the capacities required for moral responsibility, namely, 'reciprocal awareness and concern for others' (5) 'seem to be universal' (7) across the species, and that this explains why 'the Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have others do unto you")', or one of its variations, is a prominent feature of the world's religious and ethical traditions' (6). Hannaford also believes that direct empirical support for his hypothesis about moral agency is to be found in the work of developmental psychologists (chapter 4). And, finally, given his emphasis on caring for others, it is not surprising that Hannaford is attracted to a kind of particularism in ethics. Indeed, he claims that the plurality of our interests and attachments to each other, as manifested in our moral talk and reasoning, make it the case that no monistic ethical theory will properly capture our moral lives.

The book usefully resuscitates some insights of P.F. Strawson, and contains some interesting discussion of moral relativism. However, it has three major weaknesses.

First, after claiming that moral responsibility entails being willing to act in ways of which others can approve, Hannaford writes,

to be prepared to act in ways that others could accept is to be willing to accommodate others' interests in our actions. Thus, in addition to pursuing self-interest, as responsible people we must also be prepared to consider acting in behalf of the interest of others and in behalf of the agreements we can reach with them. ... To be prepared to accommodate others' interests means that we take an interest in others as persons and that our responses reflect concern for them. (2-3)

However, Hannaford provides no argument for the idea that taking another's interests into account in moral reasoning essentially involves *caring* about that other. We can agree with him that in order to engage in moral thought and talk, individuals must be presumed to operate with some conception of

who (and what) falls within the scope of moral concerns. But there is an important ambiguity in the notion of taking another's interests into account. Smith may take Jones's interests into account in his reasoning just by recognizing that Jones *has* interests; by having some idea of what those interests might be; and by realizing that Jones's pursuing those interests has implications for him (Smith) pursuing his own. Alternatively, Smith can take Jones's interests into account in a more substantive way — namely, by being concerned that Jones's interests are protected and/or advanced (perhaps by his own actions). It is plausible that any kind of practical reasoning requires taking persons' interests into account in the former sense. But it is not at all clear that practical reasoning in general, or moral reasoning in particular require caring about others in the latter sense.

The second major weakness is related to the first and to Hannaford's expressed interest in answering the question 'What motives lead us to act morally?' (1). Hannaford nowhere explicitly discusses the now substantial arguments in the literature concerning externalism and internalism about reasons for action. Roughly, internalists claim that moral demands carry their motivational force intrinsically, while externalists argue that an agent can always sensibly ask why she should conform to some particular moral imperative. Put another way, the externalist, but not the internalist, can make sense of the amoralist. That Hannaford is committed to a type of internalism is evident in the following remarks: 'persons who can describe their moral situation and reason about their choices are thereby shown to have felt, and acted on concern for others' (83). Having recognized a demand as a moral demand, an agent already reveals that she is motivated to care for others, and this motive, Hannaford assumes throughout the book, is sufficient to bring about right action. Now the problem the amoralist presents is that he recognizes moral demands as moral demands but fails to be moved by them. Therefore, Hannaford owes us an account of why it only appears that sociopaths, for example, fully understand and exploit the importance of moral norms in others' lives, but do not hold themselves accountable to those same norms.

Finally, while Hannaford admits that his arguments are 'partly conceptual and partly empirical' (5), it is never clear whether Hannaford is offering causal explanations of our moral behaviour, or whether he is simply speculating about how the concepts of moral responsibility and personhood hang together. Consider his central question, 'How is the reasoning and language use required for moral responsibility possible?' The question already implies that some conceptual questions have been settled. More importantly, it appears to admit of both a conceptual and an empirical answer. We might say that the practice of moral reasoning is rendered intelligible just to the extent that we presume moral reasoners to deploy a concept of the person — that is the conceptual answer. Or, we might investigate directly the kinds of cognitive and affective capacities that come into play when people engage in moral reasoning — thus providing an empirical answer. Both routes are worth pursuing, but we must be careful to distinguish conceptual and

empirical inquiry. For it is unclear to what extent the categories of conceptual analysis have psychological reality. And strict adherence to a particular philosophical story can result in the uncritical acceptance of empirical findings.

Here is an example. In chapter two, 'Feelings, Reasons, and Persons', Hannaford draws heavily on P.F. Strawson's well-known account of the reactive attitudes in his paper 'Freedom and Resentment'. Strawson's suggestion that we might think of the scope of the moral community as circumscribed in terms of who are the proper recipient of feelings of praise and blame is a model of imaginative philosophical analysis. But it is not, and Strawson did not intend it to be, an exercise in empirical psychology. Nonetheless, Hannaford appears to think that armchair speculation of this type does provide us with a veridical picture of adult moral competence and he proceeds in chapter four, 'Moral Reasoning and Action in Young Children', to discuss some work in developmental psychology by way of showing how this competence emerges in children. Not surprisingly, Hannaford is extremely selective in his sampling. Since he takes reciprocity and mutual awareness to be fundamental to moral agency, he focuses only on a handful of studies which assign a role to infants' grasp of their caretaker's intentions. Hannaford says 'we notice at once that the child's capacity for seeing what its mother is doing and responding to it require that the child see her intent and reciprocate, knowing that she will see its intent and respond to it ... the infant knows how to take the mother's intention, knows what she has in mind for it, and knows that she will also know how to take what it does' (68). One problem is that Hannaford appears to be completely unaware of more recent work in developmental cognitive psychology which suggests that it is not until age *four* that children grasp the idea that others have beliefs and desires whose contents differ from their own beliefs and desires. If this is right, then it is utterly implausible that infants grasp the intentions of their caregivers.

Hannaford is to be commended for insisting that moral philosophers pay more attention to moral psychology. The notion of moral agency is underdiscussed, and we might hope for a more fruitful dialogue between philosophers and psychologists. It is unfortunate, therefore, that *Moral Anatomy and Moral Reasoning* is as unsatisfying and superficial as it is.

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Barbara Hannan

Subjectivity and Reduction: An Introduction to the Mind-Body Problem.

Boulder: Westview Press 1994. Pp. xii + 140.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-1996-X);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-1997-8).

Subjectivity and Reduction aims to be a 'reasonably accessible introduction to the mind-body problem' (ix), and Hannan suggests that her book, along with a particular anthology, 'could be used to teach an excellent course on the philosophy of mind' (ix). As is, happily, the norm with introductory texts in philosophy, Hannan is not shy about presenting and arguing from her own perspective on the relevant issues. She claims that the mental is essentially subjective, and primarily on this basis she argues for a version of non-reductive materialism.

Hannan begins by rounding up the usual suspects: Cartesian dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory and functionalism (Chapters 1-3). Her summaries of these philosophical standards are generally good. After rejecting Cartesian dualism, Hannan argues that the reductive theories cannot capture the essentially subjective nature of the mental. With substance dualism and reductive materialism ruled out, Hannan says that we are left with either eliminative materialism or some form of non-reductive materialism. Both of these views agree that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties; the eliminativists conclude from this that 'mental properties do not belong in serious descriptions and explanations' (44). The non-reductive materialists claim instead that mental properties, though irreducible to physical properties, 'cannot or should not be eliminated' (44). In Chapters Four and Five, Hannan argues against eliminative materialism, leaving non-reductive materialism as the only standing option. After rejecting two extant versions of non-reductive materialism (Davidson's and Dennett's) in Chapter Six, she ultimately puts forward a view she calls 'content internalism' (Chapter Seven). As the label suggests, the view includes the claim that, contra Putnam and Burge, mental content supervenes locally on the brain. She adds to this claim the further thesis that mental properties are essentially subjective. In Chapter Eight she defends her version of non-reductive materialism against charges that such views make mental properties causally inert or epiphenomenal.

As a text for a philosophy of mind course, the book has some strong points. For example, before proceeding from Descartes to the more technical, twentieth-century views, Hannan patiently and accurately explains many technical terms that undergraduates typically find baffling: *intentional*, *intensional*, *reference*, *sense*, *reduction*, *type*, *token*, *natural kinds*, etc. Also, Hannan's treatment of behaviorism points out a subtlety that is lost in many philosophical caricatures of the leading behaviorist: it is not at all clear that Gilbert Ryle himself thought that mental states could be operationally defined in purely behavioral terms.

However, the book also has a considerable number of flaws, both as a work of philosophy and particularly as an introductory text. Although I found a number of Hannan's argument to be rather weak, I will concentrate on the issue of paramount importance to her approach, the subjectivity of the mental.

Consider Hannan's argument against functionalism: 'It seems easy to imagine a creature (or a machine) that responds to what we would regard as painful inputs (pokes with sharp objects, electrical shocks) with outputs we might consider appropriate (squeals, withdrawal, avoidance) and yet *feel* nothing at all' (31). Whether one could imagine such a creature or not, the falsity of functionalism would not follow. Hannan has only claimed that a creature could *behave* as if it were in pain while feeling nothing; while this might work as an argument against behaviorism, functionalism emerges unscathed, for functionalism defines mental properties in terms of a state's causal relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. Particularly in an introductory text, where all arguments should be as explicit as possible, this sort of sloppiness is regrettable. Of course, Hannan could revise her claim about the creature without qualia so as to make it relevant to functionalism; however, especially in that stronger form, the claim is much more contentious and in need of support than Hannan's text acknowledges.

However one feels about purported subjectivity of sensations, Hannan goes much further yet by maintaining that *all* mental properties, including propositional attitude states, are essentially subjective. She supports this claim by appeal to Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment (I won't rehearse the details of this familiar thought experiment), which aims to show that 'the possession and formal manipulation of symbols does not suffice for the possession of genuinely intentional states such as understanding' (38). Whether or not one agrees that this really follows from Searle's example (I don't), Hannan leaps to a surprising further conclusion: the 'essential feature of intentional states' is that they are 'consciously experienced, from the subjective point of view, by selves or agents' (38). Even if one grants that the possession of formal, syntactical features does not suffice for intentional states, it certainly does not *follow* that some form of conscious experience is necessary. Again, this sort of lacuna is particularly regrettable in an elementary exposition.

In fact, it becomes rather hard to understand what Hannan even means by 'subjectivity' once it is taken to apply to propositional attitude states as well as perceptual states and sensations. I can make some sense of the idea that sensations have a qualitative feel that is experienced solely from the agent's perspective; however, as Hannan herself admits, many beliefs 'have no qualitative dimension at all' (59). Of course, there is a *prima facie* asymmetry regarding self-ascriptions of proposition attitudes and third-person ascriptions, in that one does not generally appeal to evidence when self-ascribing beliefs. But this sort of asymmetry is presumably not what Hannan means by the subjectivity of the propositional attitudes. That same asymmetry could presumably arise in the case of an appropriately pro-

grammed, purely syntactical machine, and whatever subjective awareness is, it is supposed to be something that a purely syntactical machine could not have.

Hannan cannot be expected to provide a fully rigorous defense of her view in a relatively short introductory text, and the text does succeed in its aim of providing a relatively accessible introduction to philosophical theories of mind. However, in the end, I think that one could hope for more clarity and precision, particularly in a text intended for use in teaching undergraduates.

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Richard Holmes

The Transcendence of the World: Phenomenological Studies.

Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1995. Pp. x + 110.

Cdn \$24.95: US \$29.95.

ISBN 0-88920-241-9.

This short work offers a bold reconciliation of phenomenological accounts of the world with recent discoveries in quantum mechanics. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Holmes argues that the transcendent world is neither fixed nor determinate, but rather 'becomes what it is as we enact our project' (1). Against the postmodern view that the world lacks a 'definite sense', he suggests a return to 'fundamental consciousness' and the examination of the intentional relation by which the world and its objects are granted meaning. Following a brief analysis of mental telepathy which illuminates the development of objectivity and the interlocking horizontal structure of the world, Holmes suggests that the paradoxes entailed by Bell's Theorem disappear with the acceptance of a phenomenological account of the world's transcendence.

After walking the reader through the fundamentals of transcendental reduction in the first chapter, and rigorously distinguishing psychological from transcendental consciousness in an appendix, Holmes develops his theory of consciousness in chapter two by formulating a Husserlian appropriation of Sartrean non-egological consciousness. Fundamental consciousness is unified passively by a positional yet non-objectivating synthesis based on the protentional and retentive temporal structure of intentionality. While the partial extents of the conscious flux which are engaged in active intentional acts may manifest an egoic quality, thematization of an ego is a secondary possibility.

Chapters three and four spell out Holmes's reading of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre on the transcendence of the world and its objects. For Husserl, objects present themselves as independent of consciousness and as involved in the system of all possible objects, the world as correlate to the system of all possible consciousnesses (23). Such objects, by their intrinsic reference to other objects and to other appearances of themselves, manifest 'transphenomenality' (26). Here, Sartre and Husserl are found to concur that fundamental consciousness reveals the *sense* of objects as transcendent and involved in the world's horizontal field. Heidegger treats the world as a fluid pattern of possibilities, in contrast to concrete and determinate entities within the world, because of the world's foundation in the horizontal structure of temporality. The condition for the appearance of any determinate entity from among the world's possibilities is the attention of a spectator situated in-the-world (42). According to Holmes, Husserlian phenomenology and the Heideggerian question of Being converge when 'both see the world as a field in and from which objects emerge as we carry out our projects' (45).

Holmes identifies two important strands in these accounts. First, subject and object arise from the 'flux' of 'the intentional stream of consciousness and its objects' (48). Secondly, what arises is 'given as identical with itself and as transcending the consciousness of it' (48). This transcendence essentially requires that the emerging entity be a potential object for a plurality of mutually-incompatible transcendental conscious lives; the object becomes salient against the world, i.e., the background of possibilities constituted by transcendental intersubjectivity. Since this world, according to Heidegger, is founded on the ecstatic unity of temporality, our projections into the future can be understood as the crystallization of present possibilities.

The penultimate chapter buttresses this conception of consciousness and the world by means of an analysis of telepathy. Telepathy shares memory's reliance on what cannot be extracted from current experience, and aesthetic experience's reliance on what cannot be explained in physical terms. To be 'genuine', telepathy would need to mesh with our holistic experience, but this possibility is excluded by our natural conceptions of causality. The 'character of origin' of such experiences may require different laws of fulfillment than other types of experience, but these differences can be accommodated by, and even require, an intentional conception of consciousness.

Bell's Theorem raises a paradox in quantum theory not unlike the problem of telepathy, in that both stem from our natural propensity to conceive the world as a fixed and determinate physical system. Insisting on the objectivity of photons requires recourse to either superluminality or nonseparability. Holmes concludes by suggesting, alternatively, that we alter our conception of objectivity 'so that objects are not believed to exist or have properties independently of consciousness' (77). Objects are *meant* as independent due to our retrospective interpretation through future possibilities which appear in the present. But this 'construction' of objectivities includes the positing of all possible observers of the object, and must cohere with our experiences in the past and future. Thus, the object both differs from consciousness, since

it is given as independent, and defers its objectivity by relying on what is not presently experienced. According to Holmes, this is a manifestation of Derridean '*différance*' which 'takes place on the metaphysical foundation of our experience of consciousness and its objects' (85). By means of this return to fundamental consciousness, the paradoxes of the world's independence and quantum mechanics vanish; the latter are 'products of our memory and reflection' (88). The self and objects are 'all constituted by us as we have enacted our projects' (88).

The intended audience for this book is unclear. While the first few chapters are introductory, the appropriation of jargon quickly multiplies to the point where the uninitiated would find it impenetrable. Scholars, on the other hand, will find Holmes's readings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre open to debate and sketchy in textual support. Although Holmes's strong suit is traditional phenomenological analysis, he glosses over such fundamental problems as the relation between the transcendental and the mundane ego, and the difficulties involved in the constitution of intersubjectivity — problematics which can't be avoided in light of Holmes's appropriation of Derridean *différance*. The superficiality of this appropriation is underlined by the failure to discuss any of Derrida's extended writings on Husserl, although Holmes continues to make unproblematic use of themes which Derrida has submitted to close scrutiny. By avoiding these difficulties, Holmes paints phenomenology as the final solution for both philosophical and scientific paradoxes. But Holmes should note the remarks of Merleau-Ponty, conspicuously absent from his study, at the 1957 Royaumont conference on Husserl: if phenomenology is to be 'lasting' and 'fecund,' it must remain 'a difficulty and a tension.'

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Graeme Hunter, ed.

Spinoza: The Enduring Questions.

University of Toronto Press 1994.

Pp. xviii + 182.

Cdn \$70.00. ISBN 0-8020-2876-4.

The papers which make up *Spinoza: The Enduring Questions* are dedicated to the memory of David Savan of the University of Toronto. Savan's reputation for first-rate historical scholarship is well deserved and these papers serve both as a fitting tribute to Professor Savan's memory as well as a useful addition to the secondary literature on Spinoza.

As with most collections, particularly those, like this one, which grow out of a conference, the contributions vary greatly in quality. Not surprisingly, Savan's own contribution is one of the most notable.

The first three essays address Spinoza's cryptic remarks concerning immortality in Part 5 of the *Ethics*. Savan, in a fascinating essay entitled 'Spinoza on Duration, Time and Eternity', sets out to analyze and clearly distinguish among these three notions in Spinoza's texts. Through this analysis he hopes to shed light on how, consistent with Spinoza's metaphysics, mind can be eternal; how it can feel, aid and abet its own eternality; and how, given Spinoza's parallelism, mind, but not body, can be said to be eternal. The key to resolving these difficulties, Savan suggests, lies in taking seriously the identification of God with *natura naturans*, nature's productive or generative activity. Although Savan's account does not completely answer the charge of obscurity often leveled at these parts of the *Ethics*, he does go a long way towards making sense out of a section many commentators have found riddled with contradiction.

James Morrison's contribution, 'Spinoza on the Self, Personal Identity and Immortality', is an analytical exegesis of the notion of immortality in the *Ethics*, with particular attention to the issue of how Spinoza's doctrine bears on the traditional problem of personal identity. Morrison does a good job of laying out the basic difficulties and relevant texts, although there are certain unclarities and ambiguities that run throughout the piece. His use of the term 'individual', for example, seems quite ambiguous, and often undermines the clarity of his exegesis.

Leslie Armour's essay, 'Knowledge, Idea and Spinoza's Notion of Immortality', is an overly ambitious attempt to find a coherent and meaningful doctrine of immortality in Spinoza's obscure remarks. Armour suggests that it is God's idea of each individual which is eternal, yet never fully expressed in time in our ideas of ourselves. What is left over, unexpressed, are (1) the idea of us that God has — if God's idea of us is the idea of a being who has an idea of himself, then 'if we simply ceased with our deaths, we would no longer be such beings, and this is a contradiction' (56), and (2) our potential, though never actual, goodness, which is similarly part of God's idea of us. What is immortal, then, is 'God's idea of all the goodness of which a human being is capable' (58). Armour suggests that this understanding of immortality has 'something positive, interesting, and ... comforting to say about what happens after death' (48). In fact, it is barely interesting, not too positive, and hardly comforting at all.

The fourth essay, by Edwin Curley, 'Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece: Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics', is a discussion of Spinoza's place in the history of hermeneutics, the hermeneutical principles at work in the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, and a brief defense of hermeneutical inquiry as a science. Curley's treatment of each of these issues is insightful and thought-provoking. We learn much about the hermeneutical principles at work in the field of biblical interpretation prior to Spinoza's work in the area, about Spinoza's own sophisticated interpretational principles, and about

Curley's own position on the difficulties of historical interpretation. This essay should be read not just by those interested in biblical interpretation or Spinoza scholarship, but by all those whose work involves interpreting texts.

Manfred Walther's 'Spinoza's Critique of Miracles: A Miracle of Criticism?', also focuses on the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, in particular, on the critique of miracles found in chapter 6 of that work. Walther, like Curley, emphasizes Spinoza's hermeneutical sophistication. He argues that this sophistication is displayed throughout Spinoza's critique of miracles, and that his critique 'created the paradigm that modern and liberal Protestant theology was to follow all the way to the "theology of demythologization"' (110).

In 'Reason and Emotion in Spinoza's *Ethics*: The Two Infinites', Laura Byrne argues against Winnifred Tamm and Savan who, according to Byrne, make receptivity, feeling and sensation central to the teaching of the *Ethics*. Byrne argues that both of these philosophers place Spinoza on his head. To show this, Byrne makes use of Hegel's distinction between 'false' and 'absolute' infinites. While her critique of Tamm seems to be well directed, Byrne never makes it clear why Savan's comments concerning the importance of empirical evidence in Spinoza's scientific method imply that he sees Spinoza as ultimately placing feeling and sensation above reason. This unclarity runs throughout the paper, leaving the reader with the strong impression that Byrne has simply misunderstood Savan's position.

The last two papers treat of Spinoza's theory of truth. Douglas Odegard, in 'Spinoza and Cartesian Skepticism', argues that Spinoza's combined internalist/externalist account of truth goes further than Descartes' to address the problem of skepticism, but still not far enough to remove all ground for skeptical maneuver. This is what one might expect, of course, of any account which, no matter how precariously, seeks to preserve something of externalism in its theory of truth. Externalism and skepticism, one might suggest, are as inseparably intertwined as father and son.

The final paper in the collection, 'Spinoza's Theory of Truth' by Dan Neshier, is a rambling and pedantically technical 'reconstruction' of Spinoza's account of truth. Neshier is keen to argue that Spinoza's account has significant parallels with Pierce's 'pragmaticist' account, and he is at pains to make this connection wherever possible. This leads Neshier to some rather bizarre readings of Spinoza's texts (e.g., his reading of the 'or' in the passage at *Ethics* 2P43, on page 170). This closing paper is by far the most painful of the collection to read.

Overall, then, *Spinoza: The Enduring Questions* is a useful, though uneven, contribution to contemporary Spinoza scholarship. It does the scholarly community a great service by making available the papers of Savan and Curley, in particular.

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Nicholas Jolley, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. xi + 500.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36588-0);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36729-7).

This is a book Leibniz buffs can curl up with and one in which novices can find their bearings. For those who are neither, but find they must mention Leibniz, it will provide reassurance.

Overall, the historians who set the context shine most brightly. Roger Ariew's succinct account of Leibniz's life manages to entertain us with tales of Leibniz's hoodwinking the alchemists and of his encounter with a talking dog. Catherine Wilson's analysis of Leibniz's reception in the eighteenth century breaks a little new ground, arouses our sympathy for Christian Wolff and whets our curiosity about the theologian Joachim Lange who thought reason was a 'lewd whore' (but who nonetheless turned out to welcome Wolff home to Halle). Stuart Brown conforms more nearly to our image of what goes in such companions, and his essay on Leibniz's seventeenth-century background, with its neat schematization, will come as a relief to essay-writing students.

Unsurprisingly, those who write about specific and hotly disputed issues in Leibniz's philosophy have a harder time of it. Leibniz scholarship needs a guide, for it still rests on a variety of incomplete and frustrating texts. The complex strands of Leibniz's thought and interests involve a never-ending balancing act. In the nature of things, a single volume cannot be that guide, but this book, which includes contributions by many of the best known figures in the English-speaking circle of Leibniz scholars, contains very valuable signposts. Its contributors span a couple of generations from G.H.R. Parkinson to Daniel Garber, and include, besides Ariew, Wilson, and Stuart Brown, Christia Mercer, Robert McCrae, Donald Rutherford, David Blumenfield and Gregory Brown. It would have been interesting to have added at least one contributor from among the French philosophers who have been coming at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a very different perspective — Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Marion, or Jean-François Courtine.

Some of the work is original scholarship in itself. David Blumenfield's essay on perfection raises important questions which have not been pursued in depth by anyone. (The reader, whose excitement has been aroused, will feel somewhat let down by Gregory Brown's more pedestrian article on Leibniz's moral philosophy, but Brown does marshal facts that we need.)

Some of it, too, drops hints which might have been more fully explored. Simon Foucher gets mentioned six times — which suggests that he is of importance — but nowhere do we get any systematic account of his work or why Leibniz (almost alone?) took him very seriously.

The articles on Leibniz's logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, are not easy to assess, for in the nature of things they tend to pose problems

which cannot be solved within the scope of the essays. Donald Rutherford does a brilliant job of summarizing the state of things regarding Leibniz's late metaphysics — the metaphysics of monads. He leaves us with what must perhaps always remain a mystery, the final outcome of Leibniz's reflections on the proposals of Des Bosses who urged that the composite nature of corporeal substances is only possible given some notion of a union of monads. Leibniz tended to stick to his notion that monads with internal complexity are enough, but there are reasons to think that he was finally uncertain. The notions of simplicity and complexity — in this essay and elsewhere — are never explained with quite enough precision and clarity, but it remains a question as to whether or not such explanations can be had.

The problem about the early metaphysics, of course, is to decide how to relate Leibniz to the various figures of his period and just before. Suarez was probably very important and he is mentioned by Stuart Brown in the essay on Leibniz's intellectual background, but Suarezian ideas are not followed up in the later essays. Christia Mercer and R.C. Sleight, Jr. in the article on Leibniz's early metaphysics ignore Suarez. Brown also makes the Neoplatonist connection, but the extent to which Leibniz's system is influenced by a kind of Neoplatonism is not made clear. This influence has connections to Suarez, too, and these connections played a crucial role in the development of modern philosophy.

Though one would have liked more history from them, Mercer and Sleight do a good job of clarifying the basic concepts and principles in Leibniz's early metaphysics and, in particular, exhibit clearly the origins of some of Leibniz's deepest puzzles about mind and body as well as his struggles with notions of causality in an age when causal explanation was paramount. Here again a kind of sub-motif which runs through much of this book surfaces: Leibniz is constantly troubled by mind-body relations and this has a bearing on the relation between his philosophy of science and his metaphysics. This relation in turn is Daniel Garber's special territory, and his essay will be a major reference point for those concerned with metaphysics and science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

One of the most difficult topics is the relation of logic and language in Leibniz's philosophy. A richer account of the relations between Leibniz's detailed theses and contemporary ideas of language would have been welcome as would more about Leibniz's disagreements with Descartes on language, but Donald Rutherford does a very good job of opening up the questions which need to be discussed and his essay makes a good starting point for anyone who needs to pinpoint Leibniz's problems and interests.

Related to the language question is the question of logic and metaphysics. This has perhaps been more fully explored than any other facet of Leibniz's philosophy, and Professor Parkinson lays out what is known and what is at issue authoritatively, though there are metaphysical questions which he only touches upon.

The book does have one weakness: Whoever made up the bibliography should try again. It contains neither the best book published on the context

of Leibniz's thought (Leroy Loemker's *Struggle for Synthesis: The Seventeenth Century Background of Leibniz's Synthesis of Order and Freedom*, Harvard, 1972) nor the most trusty guide for the novice (Ruth Saw's *Leibniz*, Penguin, 1954). Some celebrated names in Leibniz scholarship are missing — Carr, Guitton, Joseph, and Stammler. Two papers by Loemker are in the bibliography, so why not his book? Somehow J.L. Austin who doesn't appear in the index and whose fame as a Leibniz scholar has not reached Ottawa, does get into the bibliography. True, *Philosophical Papers* contains one mention of Leibniz in the text and three footnotes contain his name, but is this enough?

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Matthew H. Kramer

Critical Legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A Philosophical Reconception.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1995.

Pp. 330.

US \$62.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7981-X);

US \$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7988-8).

Kramer's primary focus in this volume is on metaphysics. His description of the central question of metaphysics is broad and colloquial: 'How do things hang together?' (6) The cardinal principle of his own metaphysical theory is: 'not-A if and only if A.' His claim is that metaphysics can only be understood by courageously and relentlessly embracing the ubiquitousness of the paradox. The principle 'not-A if and only if A' is always already implicated in the hanging together of all things. Much of the book is given over to explication of this idea. The text is replete with more or less entertaining and poetic descriptions of the inevitable spiral of the working of the paradox. Statements such as:

Each must turn out to rest on what it precludes, and to compel what it outlaws. In a paradoxical quandary, solutions that are completely irreconcilable are also tenaciously intertwined. (76)

and

As aporias spin unceasingly through their dislocations, they throw up forms of *prima facie* coherence in a profound incoherence that result quite seldom in keeping sharply manifest the aporias that have always already disarticulated and overrun them. (169)

and

Double binds will always already have entailed and perpetuated whatever they destroy in the process. (201)

are peppered throughout the text and routinely appear in the explication of virtually every other point made in the course of the enquiry.

The substance of the rest of Kramer's discussion deals with the relationship between metaphysics and politics. At a general level Kramer argues that metaphysical positions do not entail political positions. He makes this point interestingly by arguing that a metaphysics that posits fluidity as a value could be equally useful to egalitarian feminists seeking to bring about a reordering of society through the undoing of gender hierarchies and to right-wing libertarians attempting to protect the privileges of existing hierarchies by disallowing interference in the market. Kramer notes that both Toril Moi and Robert Nozick invoke flux as a value to support their theories. Moi seeks fluidity in the sexual signifier to destabilize the gender hierarchy and Nozick seeks fluidity in the market in opposition to the rigidity of government intervention. (14-16. See Toril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* [London: Methuen 1985] and Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* [New York: Basic Books 1974]).

While he defends this view that metaphysical premises bear no necessary relation to political conclusions, Kramer also argues that the linkages between metaphysics and politics have received culpably scant attention by political and legal theorists. He argues that closer attention to metaphysics and, in particular, explicit recognition of the metaphysical ramifications of the pervasiveness of paradoxes is a valuable element of any theoretical explication of a political position (269). The value is in the strategic advantage to be gained by using Kramer's prescribed tactic — explicit focus on the paradox.

Seemingly arbitrarily then, Kramer chooses critical legal studies (c.l.s.) and feminism as examples of political positions that could benefit from a recognition and explicit statement of the governing metaphysical principle of the paradox. It should be noted however that the book devotes a great deal more time and space to c.l.s. than it does to feminism. The book is divided into three chapters, one introductory chapter (35 pages), one chapter on c.l.s. (124 pages) and one chapter on feminism (51 pages). The disproportionate length of the chapter on c.l.s. may be explained in part by the time spent in explanation of the metaphysical theory there. Kramer vaguely and briefly endorses both c.l.s. and feminism as politically sound and admirably adventurous (39, 265). However, he retains a tone of detachment from the political aims of both movements throughout and assumes a god-like stance of one who could destroy or assist any theory and who (for no deeply important reason) has chosen in this instance to help instead of crush. This self-described chivalry is more pronounced in his discussion of feminism than in his discussion of c.l.s. In relation to feminism he describes his project as a

beneficent and rehabilitating rewriting of the theory incorporating the metaphysical truth about paradoxes (269).

The strategic advantages that Kramer claims are to be found by making explicit the metaphysics of paradox are essentially in the anticipation and defusing of critiques exposing illogic. By highlighting the inevitability of one's own illogic — and by noting that one's theory is based on both its own impossibility as well as its own certainty one nips in the bud criticisms about the theory's impossibility. If c.l.s. and feminism preemptively, brazenly, and explicitly embrace the contention that their theories (along with everything else) are incoherent, they will deal a knock out punch to those detractors who seek to embarrass by exposing that incoherence. Kramer writes:

No one *has* to resolve to make explicit the economy of enjoining, and no one *has* to succeed in having made it explicit in any of its myriad forms, but someone who does succeed in highlighting that economy should expect to gain strategic leverage therefrom. ... [h]aving shown that the all-engulfing power of incoherence will have entailed the general role of coherence as the very frequent de-emphasizing of incoherence, we have positioned ourselves to reap advantages from the stark incoherence of our enlightenment. Not only do we not have to dread such incoherence, but we should look to it for strategic advantage. (181)

and later: 'To maximize strategic acuteness and adroitness, one should maximize the extent to which one highlights the sheer unthinkability of what one is doing' (201). Thus, Kramer's primary thesis echoes Derrida's claim that: 'The most rigorous deconstructions have never claimed to be ... possible. And I would say that deconstruction loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible; and also that those who would rush to delight in that admission lose nothing from having to wait' (*Reading de Man Reading*, trans. C. Porter [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989], 36).

Kramer's clearest and most successful attempts to illustrate the incorporation of explicit discussion of the metaphysics of paradox in political theory are in the areas of c.l.s.' espousal of neopragmatism (151-208) and feminism's debate over whether authentic representation of women by women is possible given male control over the means of representation (270-8).

The evangelical zeal of Kramer's advocacy of the strategic benefits of his metaphysical insights at times gives him the air of a travelling salesman of a medicinal tonic. What Kramer does not explain, however, is the precise quarter in which the strategic advantages of his metaphysics is to be obtained. If he believes that the focus on paradox that he describes would yield strategic advantage in the *political* arena then his position is implausible. If, on the other hand, his position is that all theories could gain greater *scholarly* credibility by announcing their own unthinkability then, his theory is only slightly less idiosyncratic and difficult to buy.

Despite the eccentricity of Kramer's primary claims, the book remains a fascinating and rich exploration of countless themes and contentions in both

c.l.s. and feminist theory. While the book is tediously turgid and indulgent it is also intensely stimulating and brimming with insight and intelligence. Another paradox? Probably not. Nevertheless, Kramer merits the Job-like patience required to slog through his truly peculiar text.

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Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe

The Subject of Philosophy, ed. Thomas Trezise,
trans. Thomas Trezise and others.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1994. Pp. xx + 202.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1697-3);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1698-1).

Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe's *The Subject of Philosophy* (five chapters from his *Le Sujet de la philosophie* [1979] plus a previously uncollected essay 'The Unpresentable') offers unashamedly Nietzschean speculations by way of Freud and deconstruction to the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and literature. His thesis is relatively straightforward; his presentation elusive, gnomic, and thoroughly self-absorbed. There are a number of terminological difficulties that will stop most philosophers from getting very much past the opening pages (although these obstacles will not hinder most critical theorists). For example, by 'philosophy' Lacoue-Labarthe actually means 'metaphysics' and then, more narrowly still, the idealism normally attributed to Plato. He doesn't acknowledge that a good many readers might object to this unwarranted confinement of the subject. This is a shame because he has an arresting argument to make, although he might be offended to hear his sumptuously deployed psychoanalysis of the 'form of philosophy' pedestrianly referred to as mere argument.

He claims that one of philosophy's principal tasks has always been its obsessive need to distinguish itself from literature. Returning to the primal scene of philosophy among the ancient Greeks, he asserts, with the early Nietzsche, that 'Socratism' defined itself in opposition to Attic tragedy. In fact, this opposition took on obsessional characteristics, resulting in the manic repression of tragedy (10) in every nook and cranny of the new Socratic/Platonic house of philosophy. The problem is, of course, that repression is not the equivalent of refutation, nor of displacement. Repression, in the psychological sense, occurs as a kind of burying of the undesirable datum

in the unconscious, where it remains as a core element in the constitution of the subject. It is the source of powerful psychic energy always threatening to re-assert itself in new, more disturbing forms. To sustain its dominance, philosophy requires a strict disciplinary regime which comes into being as the exacting antithesis of literature and the literary. As a result we cling to philosophy and try to pretend that it constitutes 'the discourse of truth' as against literature's shameless fictiveness, its irrational, deceitful, dangerous enthusiasms. In this way philosophy's most anxious moments occur when the repressed threatens to return and overwhelm its mastery of the psyche.

But philosophy has no reason to exist except as the antidote to literature, has in fact raised itself up against this 'other' language which it has itself constituted, while engaging in its debasement. So these two antagonists are inextricably entwined, very much like Hegel's account of the 'master-slave relation' (11). In the end, or should I say 'in the beginning', the separation of 'Socratism' from tragedy, of reason from myth, obscures the primordial 'difference' between being and thinking, a difference elided by the fateful error of Parmenides when he identified being and thinking (3) and provided the (fictional) foundation by which philosophy designated itself as the discourse of truth.

In the context of an account such as this, Nietzsche is never very far off. Indeed he pervades the whole of *The Subject of Philosophy* and the book is as much a commentary on Nietzsche as it is an argument about its stipulated subject. Nietzsche was the first to notice the effects of the repressed subject of philosophy, but could not put his finger on it exactly. His constant fretting about style and genre (52) is all too obviously the agitated gyrations of a mind made anxious by the inaudible scream of hysteria heard behind the calm deportment of traditional metaphysical discourse.

Of the major philosophical responses to Nietzsche in the twentieth century (that is before Derrida) only Heidegger's grasps the importance of Nietzsche's frenzy. This is so because Heidegger glimpses in the work of his predecessor his own vexations about the consequences of the end, or completion, of Western metaphysics, as the final explosive return of the repressed. He absorbs the import of Nietzschean anxiety, but is temperamentally incapable of following the implied path of 'difference' out of the forest of error. He cannot bear to let go of the sovereign authorial subject, nor of the integrity and unity of the work. As a result, he 'obliterates' (95) the deconstructive Nietzsche, by renewing the repression of philosophy's other.

But Heidegger is not the final word on the matter; deconstruction is. Fiction displaces truth and the figuration that follows, when the veil drops from our eyes, suddenly renders philosophy as that very thing which philosophy has struggled for centuries to avoid becoming, namely one more 'aesthetic phenomenon' (153). Lacoue-Labarthe ends with a short feminist envoy (155-7) that appropriates the figure of 'Woman' as the fabulous truth which the male 'paranoia' of metaphysical speculation has always hidden from view. Woman, or Aphrodite, embodies the 'truth of the sensuous' as some irreducible datum of being before thought or, even, in spite of thought.

Philosophy, on the other hand, must veil this sensuous figure or else put the metaphysical at risk. Philosophy will not risk this, finding the alternative intolerable. The absolutism of 'thinking' (which the author occasionally employs as a synonym for philosophy) will not stand for it.

Unfortunately none of this is very new. Most of Lacoue-Labarthe's ideas are anticipated in Derrida's seminal essay on the same subject, called 'White mythology: metaphor in the text of philosophy' from *Margins of Philosophy* ([1972] 1982). Indeed *The Subject of Philosophy* might be best read as a very long and obscure footnote to Derrida's more elegant text. One might also mention the work of Alexander Nehamas and Henry Staten on Nietzsche, authors who take on the highly pertinent question of Nietzsche and 'literature' with a lucidity and passion that puts to shame Lacoue-Labarthe's turbid speculations. Only his final pages seem to cross new ground. The linking of literature and the feminine as the two names of the single figure of the repressed in Western idealist metaphysics marks out a new path of inquiry, if one could be sure that inquiring is what all this is about.

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Noah M. Lemos

Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. xv + 215.

US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-46207-X.

Lemos defends judgments of intrinsic value by analyzing what they are and explaining how they can be epistemically justified. So he divides his book into two sections, one analytic, the other epistemological. The analytic section is developed with care and offers an extremely useful response to the literature. But the book's main contribution resides in its epistemological section. It treats intrinsic-value judgments as *a priori* and combines a foundationalist account of *a priori* justification with an extended criticism of coherentist alternatives.

He analyzes intrinsic value as the fittingness of an emotional attitude and defends the analysis against predictable objections. For the most part, I liked his defence. But I think one argument needs more work. His only answer to the key objection that fittingness judgments cannot explicate intrinsic-value judgments because they are based on such judgments is to say that it is

'strange' to base fittingness judgments on intrinsic-value judgments when value judgments are based on nonevaluative judgments (19). For anyone who sympathizes with the objection, there is nothing strange about the difference and Lemos owes the reader an additional argument. Also, the objection occasions the further concern that even if fittingness judgments are not based on intrinsic-value judgments, the latter are not based on the former either. If this is the case, one of the standard benefits of an analysis is missing from his account. Part of the point of analyzing intrinsic-value judgments is to improve one's grounds for making statements about intrinsic values, and there is little chance that his analysis will serve this end. Indeed, this prediction is to some extent confirmed by the fact that his analytic hypotheses play no substantial role in the subsequent development of his moral epistemology.

According to his modest foundationalism, an intrinsic-value judgment is justified *a priori* if (i) we accept it because we understand it, (ii) it is intrinsically acceptable, and (iii) we have no defeaters (156). A judgment is intrinsically acceptable if its being understood by us is a reason for us to accept it (155). The theory is noncoherentist because of (ii), modest because of (iii), and nonreliabilist because it treats reasons for acceptance as having their source in the understanding and not in the verific track record of a belief-forming mechanism.

His introduction of defeasibility is healthy. He thereby allows us to understand an intrinsically acceptable judgment without having to accept it and without having to be justified in accepting it. Yet he does not allow us to understand such a judgment unless there is a reason for us to accept it. And the way he develops this connection still causes trouble for his position, given the way some philosophers think. My own view, for example, is that the fact that I understand a judgment is not itself a reason for me to accept it, not even if this involves — to use Lemos' language — 'grasping and considering' the judgment. There are many cases when I have 'grasped and considered' a judgment and there was no reason for me to accept it. Therefore, unless I change my philosophical position, I shall never satisfy his analytic conditions of being justified *a priori* in accepting an intrinsic-value judgment. And I think several other philosophers are of a like mind. So his analysis deprives several philosophers of first-hand epistemic access to such judgments. This is an anomalous result, and a significant reworking of his analysis is needed in order to avoid it.

He does not explain his reasons for dropping reliabilism, since he thinks this job has already been done by others. But he spends a good deal of time finding problems in coherentism, taking as his chief adversaries David Brink in metaethics and Laurence Bonjour in epistemology. The critique is thorough and can add a good deal to one's understanding of coherentism. But one part of his treatment of Bonjour misses the mark (168). He thinks Bonjour uses what he calls the 'doxastic presumption' to avoid generating an infinite regress of higher-order beliefs for each observation belief (168). But in fact Bonjour uses the presumption to solve a more general problem, one that

arises in connection with the belief that adding a given belief to one's beliefs forms a coherent set. The meta belief has a contingent element, since it presupposes that one has the beliefs referred to as one's own. So for BonJour justifying this presupposition would involve establishing that its addition to one's beliefs forms a coherent set. But this is to presuppose the very thing to be justified, viz. that one has the beliefs referred to as one's own. BonJour therefore classifies the presupposition as a 'presumption' in an attempt to establish that it does not itself need justifying. As Lemos makes clear, this tactic probably will not appeal to anyone except the converted. But the problem it is designed to solve is not the one he identifies, since it is not confined to observation beliefs.

The book examines several other issues as well, including whether non-naturalism is defensible, whether special experiences provide reasons for making moral judgments, and whether emotions are a source of reasons. In each case the discussion is controlled and acute and the conclusions provide significant challenges. Although resolute anticognitivists, naturalists, and coherentists probably will not feel seriously threatened by the results, philosophers who are inclined to think that some moral judgments supply modest *a priori* foundations will find reassurances in many of the arguments. It is to that audience that the book can be most highly recommended, as well as to those who are just beginning to think seriously about the issues.

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Diana Tietjens Meyers

*Subjection and Subjectivity: Psychoanalytic
Feminism and Moral Philosophy.*

New York: Routledge 1994. Pp. x + 199.

US \$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90471-4);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90508-7).

Meyers's book is well worth reading. It undertakes a timely task, the integration of psychoanalytic feminism and moral philosophy. Her strategy is 'to appropriate feminist reformulations of psychoanalysis to enrich moral and political philosophy in ways that will facilitate resolutions of seemingly intractable forms of the dilemma of difference' (10). The dilemma is how to recognize diversity without resentment. She begins with the example of equal opportunity for mothers who are returning to the workforce. Is affirmative action viable? The dilemma arises: 'As equals, [these women] do not

measure up; as recipients of special favors, they would be despised and resented' (5). Meyers's solution consists in empathy against a background of dissident speech.

The book consists in seven chapters. The first chapter lays out the challenge the dilemma poses to moral reflection. Chapter 2 shows how 'Kantian impartial reason' (20), and utilitarianism are inadequate to that challenge. In Meyers's view, their assumptions make them strategies of assimilation that do not respect difference that is central to identity. When impartial reason resorts to empathy in response to difference, it 'stigmatizes, at the same time as it accommodates' (30). Meyers offers 'broad empathy' (34) as an antidote.

Dissident speech is introduced in chapter 3. Meyers shows that prejudice is a culturally normative impediment to empathy. She argues that prejudice is not an 'individual cognitive dysfunction' (51), but rather a social problem transmitted through '[c]omplex behavioural and psychological imperatives [that] are condensed into memorable, emotionally compelling figurations' (52). Prejudice thus enters a kind of social unconscious for which the remedy is dissident speech, 'the activity of giving benign figurative expression to nonconscious materials that would otherwise distort moral judgment' (59).

It is in chapter 4 that the discussion gains momentum. Here Meyers draws from psychoanalytic feminists (Benjamin, Chodorow, Kristeva and Irigaray) to show how dissident speech is a resistance strategy to prejudice. Benjamin's notion of rational violence does exactly what Meyers defines dissident speech to do: it shows where prejudice is surreptitiously entrenched. But Chodorow's revalued mother, Kristeva's Third Party and Irigaray's two lips do more. They provide counterfigurations. Irigaray's metonym, for example, seeks not just to displace the phallus, but to replace it with a metaphor based on mutual responsiveness, reciprocity and distinction within inseparability. These lips provide an alternative model for social interaction and a basis for moral behaviour in Meyers's account.

In chapter 5, Meyers shows that dissident speech belongs in moral and political philosophy. Dissident speech cannot succeed alone since its popularity depends on social and economic gains, but 'without dissident speech, social and economic gains are unlikely to dislodge prejudice' (94). Meyers assigns the political task of dissident speech to mothers. She draws on Kristeva to argue that mothers are 'in a position to pose a profound challenge to the political and economic status quo' (96). Maternity destabilizes the mother as subject, so she is capable of challenging the unified rational subject, yet her love for her child gives her a preservative interest. Mothers 'can be relied on to be provocative, but not crazed dissidents' (96).

Meyers objects to the implied reverse sexism and gender essentialism in Kristeva's view, but she uses the latter to ground dissident speech in love anyway. Love is developed through Nussbaum as a source of imagery for dissident speech, but ultimately, Meyers's account of love settles on Maria Lugones's notion of solidarity. Meyers owes a greater debt to Lugones than is perhaps acknowledged, since Lugones's contribution to Meyers's thinking

is often explicit but never thematic. Here in chapter 5, Lugones on solidarity is foundational to Meyers on love. This love is the empathic basis of dissident speech. The latter as a moment of solidarity leads to a 'self-generated identity' (106). It is therefore emancipatory, and its basis in a non-unitary moral subject makes it adaptable to different kinds of difference and capable of generating solidarity within and across diverse social groups.

Chapter 6 develops the notion of empathic thought and counters objections. The model is once again childcare, which Meyers suggests promotes recognition of both the self and others in children. Hence it leads to healthy, empathic moral subjects capable of making their moral ideals and identity work together. Meyers argues that she need not construe ethics too narrowly, appeal to superordinate criteria of right and wrong, or give up moral identity in the face of a non-unitary subject. The fragmented subject as dissident speaker is adaptable to resist various oppressions in a variety of circumstances unsubsumable under such criteria precisely in virtue of the heterogeneity of fragmentation.

Chapter 7 shows how empathic thought is compatible with a politics of rights. Meyers argues that 'rights are not alien to empathic thought' (155), but rather, empathy is about ensuring that socially excluded groups also get them. Responsible moral subjects can therefore use Meyers's position as a basis for moral reflection. Those who do not already tend to the moral will presumably give no heed to Meyers. She is not the first moral theorizer to preach to the converted. More importantly, dissident speech shows its worth not in redeeming the fallen, but in conducting a generation that celebrates difference rather than reproducing prejudice.

The most damaging criticism to Meyers's position is that her regular appeal to childcare reinstates women as mothers. Yet there is no reason to assume that Meyers means motherhood. She followed Chodorow in arguing 'to distribute childcare responsibilities equally between fathers and mothers' (82), in her call for a refiguration of gender. And she suggests that women's dissident speech would 'reduce distortion in men's empathic understanding of caregivers' (149), hence making them better caregivers. It is women's social exclusion and not biology that gives them moral insight and makes them dissident speakers.

Meyers describes a position that is subtle and complex despite the clarity with which she writes. Her deftness in using examples gives her work a concreteness that makes it just as practical as it is theoretical. Her text offers accessibility to the untried moral theorizer, and challenge to the adept. It is thus a book that can be taught at several levels and should be read by both feminists and ethicists.

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Richard Norman

Ethics, Killing and War.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. x + 256.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-45539-1);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-45553-7).

This very readable book poses some incisive challenges to the attempts of contemporary writers to resurrect and refine the theory of the 'just war'. The author rejects the theory of the just war and defends a position he calls 'pacifism', located in the moral space between pacifism and traditional just war theory. 'Pacifism' Norman characterizes as the moral rejection of all killing as a matter of absolute principle. Modern 'just war theory', on the other hand, attempts to justify the resort to war and the means of its conduct under restrictive conditions (e.g., as a defence against aggression, respecting noncombatant immunity, etc.). 'Pacifism', is the position that war cannot be in the strict sense justified, although it may be sometimes 'tragically necessary' as the lesser of evils. It rejects the use of all aggressive wars, and all defensive wars which hinder the political reforms necessary for the eventual elimination of the need for war. It insists upon the moral imperative to develop non-violent means of defence and international institutions for non-violent conflict resolution.

Norman's argument begins by developing a general theory of the morality of killing, and the considerations sufficient to overcome the 'strong presumption against the taking of human life.' Various contemporary versions of the just war theory are then examined to see if they meet the conditions established by the general theory as sufficient to overcome the presumption against killing. Norman concludes that the just war arguments do not succeed.

In developing his own general theory of the morality of killing Norman considers, and rejects, three widely held principles: Sanctity of Life, Respect for Autonomy, and Utilitarianism. In place of these he defends the principle of 'Respect for Life', which he explicates in terms of respect for the right of persons to 'live out their lives' according to a normal or chosen life plan. Respect for life cannot be reduced to mere respect for autonomy, since the life plans of individual persons include more than their consciously formed and autonomously chosen desires and ends. The latter excludes, in Norman's view, the possibility of moral censure for killing any human beings who do not have the ability to exercise 'autonomy' in the fullest sense (e.g., newborns, the severely retarded, etc.).

Neither can respect for life be equated with a generalized notion of the 'sanctity of life'. The latter notion reflects a kind of reverence for life in general (human, animal, and plant), which lacks the specific content of 'respect' for the individual's own unique biography as a 'plan of life'. 'Respect for life' applies only to beings capable of actually formulating and living through a plan of life. Though there may be some question about certain

higher species, for the most part it is only human beings that clearly have this capability, and who are deserving of respect in the full sense.

Norman does not claim that the principle of 'respect for (human) life' is 'absolute'. He argues only that it establishes a 'strong presumption against killing.' In Norman's view, there is only one kind of consideration sufficient to meet this challenge — that of self-defence. A paradigm situation of justified self-defence is one where the attacker can be said to be responsible for imposing an immediate forced choice upon the defender between two lives ('It's his life or mine.'). In such a situation Norman says, the defender really has 'no choice' but to respond with the means necessary for defence, including lethal violence. Thus, he says that the case for self-defence is more properly understood as an appeal to 'necessity' than an appeal to 'justice'. Despite this characterization, he refers to this exception throughout the book as a 'right' of self-defence.

Contemporary just war theory appeals to this same 'right of self-defence' as the primary justifying condition for resort to war. Norman argues that this argument for just war depends upon an analogy with individual defence of life which does not hold up under scrutiny. Defence of territorial boundaries or of political sovereignty does not constitute the same forced choice of 'life for life' as the individual self-defence situation. The lives of individual persons are threatened in the case of war only as a result of a decision to defend other values, such as territorial integrity or political sovereignty. A case might be made that the cultural life of the community is as morally significant as the life of individual persons, but this cannot be established by appeals to the abstract values of political sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Critical to just war theory is the principle of noncombatant immunity, which depends upon the validity of a conceptual distinction between those who are 'guilty' (and hence lose their right not to be killed) and those who are 'innocent' (and who do not lose this right), or a distinction between those who threaten my right of self-defence and those who do not. Norman argues that attempts to defend either of these distinctions in just war theory fail. The truth of the matter is that, in any relevant sense of 'guilt' or 'aggression', those usually identified as combatants (soldiers) are often less guilty than those identified clearly as noncombatants, and that war by its very nature involves the indiscriminate killing of persons who are innocent or non-aggressive, whether combatants or noncombatants. Norman does not deny that there are varying degrees of guilt and innocence among different persons killed in wars, nor that it is worse to kill the relatively innocent than the relatively guilty. He insists that this is, however, only a difference in degree, not in kind, as the just war theory assumes. Thus, the justification of war itself always remains problematical.

One of the strongest philosophical contributions of the book is the defence of the distinction between 'killing' and 'letting die'. Norman finds both the 'act/omission' and the 'intended/non-intended effect' accounts insufficient. But he combines insights from both accounts with a social-role concept of

'responsible agency' to construct a plausible defence of the distinction against the usual consequentialist objections.

This book makes important contributions to the contemporary debates on euthanasia and abortion, as well as the morality of war.

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John O'Neill

Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World.

New York: Routledge 1994. Pp. x + 227.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-07299-9);

Cdn \$22.50:

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-07300-6).

O'Neill rejects both the biocentrism of deep ecology and the narrow anthropocentrism of cost-benefit analysis in favor of an enlightened anthropocentrism. On his view, human beings can and should value nature intrinsically, and the well-being of contemporary humans is tied to the well-being of both non-human nature and future generations of humans.

After an introductory chapter, O'Neill argues that both non-human individuals and ecological systems have intrinsic value in two senses. First, some things are good or bad for them independently of the valuations of conscious valuers, and second, humans can value their existence and flourishing independently of their usefulness to humans. He denies that having intrinsic value in the former sense suffices to give a thing moral standing: 'One can recognize that something has its own goods, and quite consistently be morally indifferent to these goods or believe one has a moral duty to inhibit their development' (23). But he argues that humans will live better lives if they value much of non-human nature in the second sense: 'care for the natural world for its own sake is a part of the best life for humans ... The flourishing of many other living things ought to be promoted because they are constitutive of our own flourishing' (24).

In chapter three, O'Neill embraces the view that our well-being can be affected by events after our deaths. In particular, he compares lives and societies to narratives with 'an evaluative component ... which is visible only from the viewpoint of the end of the story' (30-1). He concludes that if 'the products of modern society will be mindless consumers, with no interest in knowledge of the natural world, ... no sense of what it is for public life to

thrive, no concern with the natural environment,' etc., then we will not have lived as well as we could have (34-5).

O'Neill rejects cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a policy-making tool, since it will tend to underrepresent the interests of non-humans and future generations (chapter four). He then devotes two chapters (five and six) to criticism of the metaethical, utilitarian, and liberal justifications of CBA. And he argues (chapter seven) that because multiple, incommensurable standards are applied to the evaluation of habitats, landscapes, ecosystems, and places, CBA's reduction to a common coin distorts these values.

In place of CBA, O'Neill envisions (in chapters eight and nine) a highly participatory democracy of citizens with 'good practical judgment'. He finds it 'distressing to note the widespread hostility to science amongst some green theorists and activists' (148). 'A general scepticism about science undermines the possibility of rational and well-informed action' (123). We need to cultivate citizens' critical thinking skills, force scientists to make explicit the value claims in their expert assessments, respect local practical knowledge, and resist the commercialization of science.

The book ends with a chapter (ten) urging us to readopt Marxist suspicion of the market economy, without condemning partial, non-market associations as does the Rousseauian tradition in socialism. The market multiplies ephemeral material needs, but non-market associations are the 'institutional settings [in which] individuals often develop conceptions of their interests at odds with those in the market' (179).

Although CBA is the focus of most of the chapters in this book, the text is sprinkled with a series of interesting criticisms of deep ecology and biocentrism. For instance, O'Neill observes that an expanded conception of self (like Arne Naess's 'ecological self') provides for relatively weak duties in regard to the environment. 'Duties to oneself are in significant ways *less* stringent than duties to others. ... to say that [cleaning] a dump is like filling your own teeth is to permit ourselves much weaker grounds for so doing than if the dump is considered a part of an independent world inhabited by others' (150).

O'Neill is a careful thinker, a clear writer, and he has done an exceptional job of tying his discussion of issues in environmental ethics to contemporary theoretical discussions in other fields, like political theory and aesthetics. Five honors and graduate students who worked through the book with me said they found the number of references to authors they had not heard of themselves tedious, but O'Neill's citations can serve as a bridge to contemporary work which the student of environmental ethics might miss otherwise.

This book was constructed around four previously published articles, and although O'Neill is always careful to spell out arguments explicitly and his first chapter explains the place of subsequent chapters in the context of his overarching thesis, the defense of one absolutely central claim of the book is spread out so much that it loses its focus. In chapter two O'Neill acknowledges that 'the claim that care for the natural world for its own sake is a part of the best life for humans requires detailed defence' (24), referencing

chapters five and nine. As part of his critique of CBA in chapter five, O'Neill invokes 'an Aristotelian account of the goods of human life' to show how 'discovering and contemplating what is true' is 'good *for* me and not just *of* me' (73), and in chapter nine he discusses how the study of the biological sciences specifically are in this way constitutive of the human good. This argument is the very core of O'Neill's defense of an environmentally benign anthropocentrism with a place for valuing nature intrinsically, and it should have been developed as a whole early in the book. Even if studying natural biological processes were the only way to exercise our distinctively human capacities and thus a necessary component in the good life, it would be hard to see how this could justify the range of environmental regulations we have. O'Neill's brief remarks in his final chapter do not alleviate this worry.

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Jacob Owensby

Dilthey and the Narrative of History.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1994.

Pp. x + 193.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-8014-3011-9.

This book testifies and responds to a continuing, indeed, increasing interest in Dilthey. Progress with a comprehensive edition of Dilthey's writings, including work not previously accessible and incidentally used by Owensby, confirms and fuels that interest as does a six volume selection of Dilthey's works, which is being brought out by Princeton University Press, the most massive translation into English so far. Quite a number of monographs on Dilthey, several by American authors, have appeared in the last two decades.

The use of the phrase 'the narrative of history' in the book's title signals Owensby's intention to relate Dilthey's views to modern narrative theory. Indeed it is one of the distinctive features claimed for the book, that it makes cross references to contemporary or near contemporary authors. How to understand the past and present it in a meaningful story was, certainly, one of Dilthey's prime concerns prompting him to confront the problems of interpretation. How can we establish facts from old records, how select what is relevant and, crucially, how link them into a meaningful sequence?

Owensby has produced a painstaking and comprehensive account of Dilthey's approach to the understanding of history, based on extensive knowledge of Dilthey's writings and of the secondary literature. He gives a

very detailed account of the development of Dilthey's thought and specifically of the psychological phase which he considers not rejected but absorbed in the later hermeneutic phase.

Owensby is a little more sketchy on those later writings, i.e., the concept of 'Geist', the 'categories of life', etc. A few minor points apart, the exposition is sympathetic rather than critical.

One omission is surprising. In view of the book's title, one might have expected a discussion of Dilthey's *practice* as a historical narrator. After all, Dilthey's theoretical concern with historical understanding arose quite early in his career — from his bewilderment when trying to write about the early Christians, he continued to produce biographical and historical works throughout his life and even theoretical subjects he approached historically.

Owensby's cross references to other authors are relevant in different ways. Husserl corresponded with Dilthey and the two philosophers both criticised and influenced each other. Heidegger acknowledged Dilthey's influence and took up some of Dilthey's ideas but claimed to have radicalised them. Though the accounts of these two thinkers are, naturally sketchy, they help the understanding of Dilthey. Merleau-Ponty is shown to have developed ideas anticipated by Dilthey. A number of authors are mentioned briefly — mostly in footnotes as expressing similar or contrasting views and merely provide a reading list for further study.

More extensive and more central to the thrust of Owensby's argument are accounts, covering several pages each, of thinkers — namely Nietzsche, Gadamer and Derrida — who held views explicitly or implicitly critical of Dilthey's position. In each case, Owensby tries to show that they do not really damage Dilthey's case.

To establish or consolidate the contemporary relevance of a thinker who died eighty-four years ago it is, obviously, important to confront him with contemporary movements of thought. The question is is there a genuine confrontation if the complex thought of men such as Nietzsche or Derrida are summarised — though neatly enough — in a few pages, comprehensible only to people well acquainted with the subject. This raises a further worry — which a fuller treatment might or might not have allayed. Is deconstruction really to be taken seriously? Do we need an elaborate defence against it? Need we cower in our bunkers?

Here finally, are some minor criticisms: It is surprising to see (22) the realisation that hermeneutics is anti-fundamentalist attributed to Makkreel. It has been discussed by, for example, Boll now. Owensby contrasts (138) an epistemological to a philosophical level as if epistemology were not philosophy. Owensby is wrong in suggesting (154) that Dilthey points to poetry as an escape from relativism. It is *deception* which is overcome in poetry. Lastly, a niggle about the translations of Dilthey: here are just two examples. To translate '*Geistiges*' as 'spiritual meaning' is misleading as we might be referring for example to a dirty joke. '*Mehrseitig*' should not be translated as 'multi-dimensional' but as 'many sided' or 'multi-faceted'.

However, in spite of some faults or limitations this is a serious and useful contribution to the literature on Dilthey, which helps to place his thought squarely into the context of the late twentieth century.

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Stuart D.B. Picken

Essentials of Shinto: An Analytical Guide to Principal Teachings.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1994.

Pp. xxxiii + 400.

US \$85.00. ISBN 0-313-26431-7.

Shinto is the least well known of the world's great religious traditions. For most of its history, it existed as a network of small and large shrines, with their associated ceremonies. It had no ecclesiastical body representing the religion as a whole and no clear creed or body of doctrine. Shinto is sometimes discussed as a holdover from primitive Japanese animism or regarded as identical with the militaristic imperial cult of the Meiji Restoration, but until very recently no English language discussion has done justice to its full wealth. Picken's 1980 book, *Shinto: Japan's Spiritual Roots*, provided scholars with the basis for a better assessment of this tradition. His new book *Essentials of Shinto* is a reference work that provides the documentation for more thorough study. Rather than telling a single story, the chapter are independent essays that can usefully be studied separately. Taken together, they form an encyclopedic compendium on this complex socio/religious phenomenon. The book also contains a good glossary of Japanese expressions together with a guide to bibliographic and research tools available in English.

After a helpful introduction, the book divides into four parts. Part I, 'History and Mythology', (chapters 1-3) outlines the development of Shinto in relation to Japan's history, the importation and growth of Buddhism, the particularities of Japanese mythologies, and the Imperial Household (its regalia, ideology, and ceremony). Part II, 'Jinja Shinto', (chapters 4-6) discusses shrines and ceremonies. The term 'Jinja' means 'place of the kami' and is the name for the shrines and cults forming the core of the mainline Shinto tradition. 'Kami', often translated as 'god' or 'spirit', names a quality of sacredness as manifested in an object or person. *Kami* are the primary religious objects within Shinto, but the worship of *kami* is not in itself evidence for polytheism, since Japanese does not distinguish singular and

plural in the way Indo-European languages do. This section describes the major *kami*, the shrines with which they are associated, the most important styles of shrine as well as the configuration of buildings at Isé, various styles of *torii* (the characteristic gateway at Shinto shrines) including some historical styles of which examples no longer exist, and also the rituals, ceremonies, implements, tools, and priesthoods associated with these shrines. Part III, 'Shinto Sects', (chapters 7-8) examines the connection with classic Shinto of various cults and groups, including the so-called 'new religions'. Deeply rooted in local folk life, Shinto has given rise to innumerable groups which, even if not connected directly with Jinja Shinto, certainly grow from the same spiritual ground. They include mountain sects, ascetic groups centering on pilgrimage, fasting, and retreats, as well as local cults focusing on often very popular unofficial *kami*. Picken sees the proliferation of new religions in contemporary Japan as a continuation of the shamanistic, nature-oriented spirituality that also gives rise to Shinto and rejects theories explaining them as a response to postwar crisis. Part IV 'Shinto Thought', (chapters 9-10) provides sketchy outlines of various 'academic Shinto' movements (schools with explicit intellectual and philosophical focus) and offers a terse account of Shinto vis-à-vis Western philosophy. As befits a reference work, these sections give only the briefest indication of topics calling for much fuller treatment. Picken has created a reference work that is indispensable for scholars of Asian, and comparative, religion and which is helpful for improving our understanding of this neglected tradition.

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Theodore M. Porter

*Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in
Science and Public Life.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1995. Pp. xiv + 310.

US \$24.95. ISBN 0-691-03776-0.

Porter's volume discusses why we employ quantification. He says we place trust in numbers because we seek objectivity and are unable to trust experts or elites. Divided into three parts, the first section of the book covers how we standardize numbers, such as when we use physical measures for trade. The second part surveys social and economic quantification, particularly in engineering, and attempts to show that quantification arose out of a desire for objectivity rather than better decisions. The third section of the book aims to

show how bureaucracies and regulatory agencies have used quantification to respond to distrust and scientific weakness.

Several assets make Porter's book important. First, he deals with two concepts — objectivity and quantification — that are central to science and policy. Second, Porter offers a number of insights about public life, such as the prevalence of the 'accounting ideal' and the opposition between expertise and standardization, profession and precision, technocracy and democracy, elites and objectivity (112-13, 146, 213 ff.). Third, the volume is rich with a number of historical details, many gleaned from research in archives and European publications. For example, Porter reveals that French demographers' emphasis on quantification caused them to count the number of widowers (3498) crossing Pont Neuf during 1860 (84). Another asset of the book is an occasional turn of phrase that is apt and well formulated. For example: 'method was a religious ritual that would permit free thinkers to expel the demon of interestedness' (75).

Despite its strengths, *Trust in Numbers* could be more rigorous and complete in analyzing its main concepts — quantification and objectivity — and in defending its philosophical assertions. The rigor problem may arise because the author is an historian but claims to be doing philosophy (x). As a result, the volume is somewhat disorganized and scattershot rather than comprehensive and even-handed in offering its insights; there are major temporal, factual, and geographical gaps in the discussion. For example, Porter claims that chapter one of the volume is about how numbers are made valid in the natural sciences (xi), yet his only examples here (beyond one-sentence assertions) are about sundials, calendars, measures used in trade, and drug testing.

Likewise Porter ignores virtually all but the most practical, applied, and social sciences in the book, then draws sweeping conclusions about the nature of science in general (200, 224, 228, 230). For instance, he concludes: 'We seem now to have reached the point where science is identified with a negotiated local private kind of knowledge, or really of skill' (193, 224). Although his general claim may be true, Porter's detailed discussions draw only on medical drug testing (ch. 1), applied economics (chs. 1-3), insurance (ch. 5), accounting (ch. 5), and engineering (chs. 6-7). He speaks of accounting and 'the business of the actuary' as 'science' (94, 101), but without appearing to realize that accounting is different from theoretical physics.

Porter's main conclusion is that if people use quantification, then this is a sign of a weak scientific community that has not generated trust and needs credibility (xi, 200, 228). However, Porter ignores the problematic logical inference following from his claim: if there is a strong scientific community that enjoys trust, then its members will tend not to use quantification. Porter's simplistic, psychologistic reduction of quantification (to factors associated with trust) is problematic for at least four reasons: First, many external factors (such as the type of scientific data needed and the problem being addressed) also determine use of quantification. Second, Porter has ignored virtually all of the extensive psychometric literature on trust and

scientific communities. Third, he has no detailed examples of scientific communities that are trusting, strong and not quantitative. Fourth, Porter has focused only on very practical and applied sciences.

The analytical and bibliographical incompleteness of the book likewise threatens Porter's views about objectivity. When he discusses accounts of objectivity (3ff., 89ff., 193ff.), he considers only two groups: positivists and those who hold a consensus-based account. He completely ignores the post-positivists who have dominated philosophy for the last three or four decades and who tie objectivity to epistemic values such as consistency and predictive power. Porter fails to take account of the contributions of Carl Hempel, Larry Laudan, Helen Longino, Philip Kitcher, Michael Scriven, and dozens of other philosophers. Their works are not even in his bibliography.

If Porter knew the philosophical literature on objectivity in science, he might not have said 'most philosophers, too, have not known quite how to embrace a social conception of rationality' (217). Such conceptions have been well known since the late 'fifties. They have dominated philosophy since at least the early 'seventies. Similar problems occur throughout the book, as when Porter asserts: 'quantification has not yet become a topic in political philosophy' (73). Social, political, and moral philosophers, however — such as Alisdair MacIntyre, Douglas MacLean, Deborah Mayo, Mark Sagoff, and Derek Parfit — have been discussing quantification in benefit-cost analysis, public ethics, risk assessment, statistics, and public policy, at least since Sidney Hook's 1967 classic, *Human Values and Economic Policy*.

Whether Porter's book is philosophy, history, or science studies, its causal assertions and sweeping generalizations require argument and documentation that is frequently missing. On p. 76, for example, without giving relevant statistical data, Porter says that 'the net effect of the modern emphasis on quantification has probably been to open up professional cultures to women and ethnic outsiders.' Yet, if the assertion is correct, why are there fewer women and minorities in scientific and engineering areas dominated by quantification, but more women and minorities in the disciplines where there is less quantification? Likewise Porter claims that 'whatever validity scientific laws and measures may claim with respect to the external world, this has never been enough to make them operationally valid across boundaries of culture, language, and experience' (32). Yet, despite the value-ladenness of all facts, aren't Maxwell's equations, Newton's laws, and a few conservation laws and physical constants nevertheless operationally valid across cultures and languages?

Porter has a thought-provoking book, but one in which anecdotes, vague assertions, and sweeping generalizations sometimes take the place of careful, complete arguments and precisely defined concepts. Despite its insights and its important topics, the work falls short of the conceptual rigor of good philosophy and the factual rigor of good history.

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Tilottama Rajan and David L. Clark, eds.
*Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy
and Contemporary Theory.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1995. Pp. viii + 386.
US \$64.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2257-7);
US \$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2258-5).

The fact of the influence of nineteenth-century thought on contemporary critical theory can hardly be disputed. If one needs more than the testimony of thinkers like Derrida and de Man, both of whose work evidences a protracted engagement with the literary and philosophical giants of the age, a brief perusal of the secondary literature in literary theory and philosophy gives indication of the extent to which contemporary theory understands itself within the context of the nineteenth century. The fact of this influence may be evident; however, the character and significance of this influence, and thus of theory's self-understanding, remain in question. It is towards an answer to this question that Rajan and Clark have collected the essays which comprise *Intersections*. And, if after reading *Intersections*, the person interested in this question remains unconvinced that the editors have sufficiently clarified the terms of the answers suggested by themselves and the other contributors, she will nonetheless have benefited from the attempt.

In an introductory essay which serves as the principle of articulation of the unfailingly thoughtful contributions, Rajan and Clark claim their own ground in this increasingly complex field precisely by focusing the question of the confluence of nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought on its implications for the problem of the self-constitution of theory. This focus is possible because the editors refuse the terms of the traditional treatments of this confluence, which have tended to take up with the relation between nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought either by isolating specific thinkers from their place within the currents of nineteenth-century thought, or by treating this thought as merely an anticipation of contemporary theory. Instead, they insist on the importance of 'construct[ing] "post-enlightenment" theory as a discursive field in its own right' (1). Such a construction allows for considerations of the relationship between nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought which avoid the pitfalls and limitations of discussions of mere influence, allowing instead, as their title suggests, an examination of the intersections between two in some ways independent theoretical fields. Starting from this intersection, the essays collected here take advantage of the points of convergence and divergence of these separable but intertwined traditions to illuminate the various ways in which the participants in these traditions have understood or failed to understand their practices and the fields which these practices constitute. For the most part (and this is an indication of the hesitation referred to above), this illumination has a distinctly contemporary emphasis. The editors have arranged the collected essays along current theoretical 'fault

lines': 'Between Idealism and Deconstruction', 'Rethinking the Subject', 'Reinscribing History' and 'The End(s) of Theory'. At its best, as it often is in this book, this approach results in a heightened appreciation of both the singularity and limitations of the theoretical horizons in question, as well as theory in general.

Essays by Mark A. Cheetham, Clark, Paul Hamilton and Christopher Norris exhibit the positive critical and interpretive possibilities of this approach. Each strives to demonstrate the advantages of thinking the two theoretical horizons together, while demonstrating that such thought can only proceed on the basis of an engagement with the determinate elements of each. Andrew Bowie and Jean-Pierre Mileur, on the other hand, demonstrate the corrective advantages of this sort of intersection, locating in the lacunae of certain contemporary theorists' readings of nineteenth-century thinkers, not interpretive failures as much as failures to adequately conceive their own theoretical horizons. Though less successful at engaging the nineteenth century in its singularity, essays by Stanley Corngold, Eric Meyer and Arkady Plotnitsky do find in that period suggestive indications of how we could better understand the contemporary theoretical scene.

Perhaps the finest pieces in the book, those which best exhibit the results of this intersection of theoretical fields, are those which least resemble the project articulated in the introduction. Essays by Judith Butler and John Sallis, though unquestionably immersed in the medium of contemporary theory, exhibit a remarkable sensitivity to the particularity of the thinking which they take up (in both instances, Hegel's). Indeed it is perhaps because of their immersion in contemporary theory that they do not fall prey to a certain naiveté at work in the introduction. Reading the introduction, one is struck by the fact that, though Rajan and Clark are sensitive to the problems which would arise from reading contemporary theory back into the nineteenth century, they conceive 'post-enlightenment' theory and even its Kantian foundations in exclusively contemporary theoretical terms. Though they recognize in Kant the impetus towards theory, Kant remains, 'pretheoretical inasmuch as he neither historicizes the categories nor places them in a context attuned to the relationship between the apprehension of knowledge and what we now term "language" or "writing"' (4). Certainly the questions of history and language were of increasing importance to the thinkers of the nineteenth century; however, to determine them as theory is to determine them in their context from the perspective of the contemporary understanding of these issues, to decide, in other words, for the nineteenth century how these questions are to be understood, and as such, to risk dehistoricizing them. Perhaps it is Butler's and Sallis's willingness to listen to the nineteenth century, rather than determine a field of proximity which it is not clear the nineteenth century can approach on its own terms, that makes theirs the most suggestive accounts of the possibilities opened by the intersection of the theoretical horizons of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Despite these hesitations concerning the project of 'constituting "post-enlightenment" theory,' at least as that project is characterized in the introduc-

tion, Rajan and Clark are to be applauded for bringing together in *Intersections* a group of essays which individually and collectively constitute a new and demonstrably significant space of inquiry into the relationship between nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought.

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Harry Redner

A New Science of Representation: Towards an Integrated Theory of Representation in Science, Politics and Art.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994.

Pp. x + 486.

US \$59.50. ISBN 0-8133-2211-1.

To read *A New Science of Representation* is to cross disciplinary boundaries on nearly every page. Perhaps the book's home discipline is sociology; Redner claims to follow in the footsteps of both Vico and Comte. But there is something for everyone here. Redner's theme is representation, which he sees as essential to culture. The analogies between mythic, ritual, economic, artistic, political and scientific representation are in his view strong enough to ground a 'science of representation' that talks about them all together.

Redner identifies four stages of representational style through which cultures may pass in their development. In the fetishistic stage, that which represents (the *representamen*, in Redner's Peircean term) is identical with that which is represented. Thus in his trance the growling shaman literally is the jaguar. In the iconic stage, exemplified by the medieval doctrine of the Eucharist, the *representamen* is also identical with the represented, but only under limited conditions or respects. In the mimetic stage, the *representamen* is a symbol which faithfully resembles and can participate in the reality of what it represents, although the two are not identical. In the representationalist stage, the connection between *representamen* and represented is either conventional or causal, and is not based on similarity at all.

Though Redner discusses the ancient past, his eye is on the present. By examining changing forms of representation during the last half century, he hopes to discover what we may expect in the next decades. He chronicles the death of *European* modernity in politics, science and the arts. But he denies that ours is a 'post-modern' age. We are still 'representationalist'. However, modern technology and popular culture may be producing a global revision of European modernism, a representationalist world civilization. Its devel-

oping characteristics appear to be 'multi-representation, complexity, and complementarity' (453). These developments are clearest in 'world science', whose sometimes troublesome links to big business, big technology, and computer representation have nevertheless enabled science to deal with complexity in ways that were never possible before (373ff).

In politics the emergence of a productive world culture is less clear to Redner. He sees contemporary democratic representation as deeply confused, more show business than actual representation. It certainly fails to represent the individual citizen adequately. But he thinks a kind of political 'multi-representation' might develop, through the proliferation of grass roots groups, through which the diverse and complex voices of modern people might be represented.

Redner's chapter about contemporary art is his most pessimistic. His title, 'The Snakeskin ...', comes from Ingmar Bergman, who once described the state of art as like 'a snakeskin full of ants. The snake is long since dead, eaten out from within ... but the skin moves, filled with meddlesome life' (quoted on p. 414). In an art world 'driven by the imperatives of the art-institutions and the market forces of art-business', 'artists of ability [like Australian landscape painter Fred Williams] work in obscurity, those in the limelight [like Andy Warhol] are most frequently without it' (431).

I found this chapter unconvincing and narrow. The problems and artificialities of the art world and its economics are certainly real, as is the neglect of good artists and the honoring of poor ones (hardly a new phenomenon!). I also agree, as does Arthur Danto in *Beyond the Brillo Box*, that a certain linear history of western art, with its inner logic of inevitable next stages, has ended. But why view the subsequent proliferation of styles as a 'snakeskin full of ants'? Many artists and musicians are creating fine work now, and some are being recognized for it! If anything, 'multi-representation, complexity and complementarity' are just what characterize the modern art world.

I conclude with an example of interest to philosophers, Redner's critique (taken from his first chapter) of 'the linguistic turn' in philosophy.

Redner distinguishes between the meaning of symptoms, signals, signs and symbols. Linguistic meaning, he says, is the conventional meaning of signs, whereas cultural meaning is symbolic. Partly because of this difference, languages are not 'primitive' or 'advanced'. Languages change, but they do not develop. In principle, any language is capable of expressing any human thought. Cultures, by contrast, do develop. They arrive at new ideas and meaning systems which people at an earlier historical stage of the culture would not have understood.

Philosophers following the linguistic turn, says Redner, have acted as if all kinds of meaning were the same. British and American philosophers have reduced cultural meaning to linguistic meaning, while continental philosophers have treated linguistic meaning as cultural meaning. The result, suggests Redner, is philosophies of 'the idiot, the child, and the foreigner' (83). The *idiot* has linguistic but not cultural competence, and therefore is

the model for a philosophy like Structuralism that treats cultural meaning as a system of conventional signs, a 'language'. A *child* might think (as Speech-Act theorists seem to) that uttering the words 'I marry you' under the right circumstances constitutes the act of marrying. Adults understand that marriage is a culturally complex symbolic act.

The *foreigner* often understands a language, but misunderstands the cultural meanings it carries; thus *for the foreigner* much linguistic understanding is like the interpretation of a distant text, involving the 'fusion of two horizons'. But, says Redner, it is nonsense to mystify ordinary speech in this fashion. For native speakers of a language, much linguistic meaning (though of course not all) is basic and straightforward.

This critique exemplifies both the strengths and the weaknesses of Redner's work. He slights the contributions of the philosophers he mentions: this is a serious weakness (contrast the methods of Paul Ricoeur). On the other hand, the core of his critique is original, strong, and plausible, and worth the attention of the philosophers at which it is aimed.

On balance, Redner discusses diverse fields carefully and with understanding. He builds a general argument which I found interesting and worthy of attention. Anyone who takes on the task of the generalist in our times, and does it this well, deserves our gratitude. To those interested in taking the measure of modern culture as a whole, I recommend *A New Science of Representation*.

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Alexander Rosenberg

Instrumental Biology or The Disunity of Science.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.

Pp. x + 193.

US \$36.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-72725-4);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-72726-7).

This book is the apologia of a frustrated reductionist. The frustration derives from Rosenberg's clear perception that the project of physicalist reduction, the reduction of all the sciences of complex objects to physics, is impossible, at least, as he often says, for beings hampered by our limited cognitive and computational abilities. The reductionism that survives this realisation is purely metaphysical. It is the firm commitment to the view that ultimately whatever happens happens because of the universally lawlike behavior of

the physical particles of which everything is composed. What holds these theses together is supervenience. The physical correlate of a higher level property or kind is typically massively disjunctive. Thus, although the intrinsic properties of a complex thing are fully determined by the properties of the physical particles of which they are composed, the physical property necessary and sufficient to determine such a higher level property is too complex and disjunctive for our feeble minds to grasp. The underlying physical heterogeneity of the properties or kinds we distinguish at higher structural levels is such as to make it vanishingly unlikely that these will enter into the kinds of universal laws characteristic of physics or chemistry.

Rosenberg has an explanation for this sorry state of affairs: complex objects in biology, at least, came into being through natural selection. And selection sees only function and is blind to structure. Thus selection has produced properties and kinds that are functionally homogeneous but structurally diverse. And being structurally diverse, they will be more or less unreliable in their behavior. Therefore biological kinds and properties cannot be natural kinds in the sense that physical and chemical kinds are, and biology should be viewed at best as instrumentally useful rather than realistic.

Somewhat surprisingly, Rosenberg does think that a sufficiently abstract version of evolutionary theory is nevertheless universally true in just the sense that the laws of physics are. The problem is that in the sense it is true it is largely inapplicable to cognitively impoverished beings such as us. Following Mary Williams's proposed axiomatization of evolutionary theory, Rosenberg endorses the idea that every organism has some 'positive real number that describes its fitness in a particular environment.' This number, however, supervenes on a host of genetic particularities of the organism, and we have no chance of identifying a class of sufficiently similar organisms to which it applies even holding constant the continuous flux of environmental change. Thus this law, while expressing the objective reality of natural selection, is at best of heuristic value in application to the study of real evolutionary processes.

Rosenberg harbors no doubts about the universal reign of law at the microphysical level. No doubt he shares this assumption with many other philosophers. Nevertheless it would have been nice to see a bit more argument for this view. The only such argument I could find was the claim that the predictive accuracy of physics and chemistry 'had persistently increased in range and depth over the last four hundred years' (36). No doubt this is true, though, as Rosenberg adds in a footnote, Newtonian mechanics has reached a severe obstacle with the three-body problem (a problem attributed to our limited computational powers), and chaos theory shows that even universal determinism cannot guarantee predictive improvement. The trouble with all this is that, whatever are our grounds for believing that the laws of physics and chemistry apply uniformly everywhere, they are not empirical. Only in quite special and very carefully controlled circumstances are they predictively accurate, however impressively so. It is true that we

express our knowledge of the laws of physics in universal form, but the assumption that they apply in all the increasingly complex circumstances far beyond our computational capacities to verify requires a vast inductive leap of faith. It is striking, in this connection, that Rosenberg seems to take this kind of imperialistic physicalism to be intricately connected with empiricism (10). No doubt another ground for Rosenberg's view is his assumption that the macroscopic world is fully deterministic, as quantum indeterminacy becomes increasingly insignificant and 'nature ... has long since asymptotically approached determinism' (61). This, again, can be no more than an act of faith in view of Rosenberg's continued insistence that we can never expect to discover the deterministic laws governing macroscopic behavior. (I cannot pass up the opportunity of protesting the quite inexplicable attribution to myself of concurrence with this claim of macroscopic determinism on p. 61n.)

In two concluding chapters, Rosenberg extends his arguments to the human and social sciences. Here the outlook is considerably more pessimistic than for biology. For the human mind not only carries all the problems of being a biological phenomenon, but adds a whole level of complexity through the phenomenon of intentionality. The psychological, thus, is doubly supervenient: it supervenes on neurophysiology, which itself supervenes on the physical. The analysis, whatever one thinks of the metaphysics, is plausibly deployed against the more scientific pretensions of some parts of psychology and social science.

In reading this book, I found myself agreeing with many of the premises but disagreeing with most of the conclusions. Where Rosenberg sees limitations to biological knowledge as revealing its instrumental character, I see arguments against the empirical tenability of the mechanistic metaphysics Rosenberg assumes. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that Rosenberg draws attention to many of the fundamental issues in understanding contemporary biology, and he faces with unusual honesty the difficulty of sustaining mechanism in the light of current biological knowledge. I found the book stimulating to read. Rosenberg generally has interesting arguments for the claims he makes, and with occasional exceptions (as that noted above) treats the authors he argues against carefully and fairly. The book makes an important contribution to the central debates in philosophy of biology.

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Wesley Salmon and Gereon Wolters, eds.
*Logic, Language, and the Structure of
Scientific Theories. Proceedings of the
Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of
Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991.*
Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy
and History of Science, vol. 2. University of
Pittsburgh Press/Universitaetsverlag
Konstanz 1994. Pp. x + 363.
US \$59.95. ISBN 3-87940-477-1.

Why would anybody celebrate the supposedly dead philosophies of Carnap and Reichenbach, two prominent representatives of Logical Empiricism, in the beautiful setting of Lake Constance? Many younger philosophers know Logical Empiricism only through the criticisms it received since the late 1950s. The impression one acquires on this basis is that of a school with a fairly unified and hardened doctrine. The recent interest in the development of the school, pioneered by Alberto Coffa, Michael Friedman, Joelle Proust and others and documented in a number of commemorative publications, has re-directed our attention to the debates within the movement, reminding us of many surprising connections with post-positivist philosophy of science, with the philosophical tradition of neo-Kantianism, and with early 20th-century physics. Since much of the dissatisfaction with Logical Empiricism in its later stages has been motivated by the feeling that this philosophy had no connection with real science, one of the exciting results of recent historical research has been, as Don Howard puts it in his contribution, that

in studying the history of the philosophy of science, at least that of the early part of our century, we must always remember the context in which that philosophy of science was emerging. More often than not the relevant context was constituted by specific controversies concerning the most important new physical theories of the day. (98f.)

In this perspective Logical Empiricism emerges as an attempt to provide an *empiricist*, as opposed to a neo-Kantian, answer to the question of how objective knowledge is possible in the face of radically changing scientific frameworks, that is, the transition from Newtonian physics to general relativity. Philosophers of science today, it appears, can only envy the intensity of the debates in which Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap engaged with leading scientists of their day.

Although this theme figures in many of the contributions to the volume, it is elaborated in most detail in Friedman and Howard's essays. Friedman studies the notion of the 'relativized a priori', prominent in the early Reichenbach as a response to the neo-Kantian attempts to cope with the general theory of relativity. The notion itself is a symptom of the links between early Logical Empiricism and neo-Kantianism. In one form or other the relativized a priori has attracted later philosophers of science; repercussions of it can be

found in Kuhn's paradigm-relativization of scientific debates. Friedman argues that the notion makes sense only if something like Carnap's program of logical syntax succeeds, a program which establishes peaceful coexistence of a (language-dependent) distinction between empirical or synthetic and non-empirical or analytic propositions and Duhemian holism, the claim that what can be tested are not individual hypotheses but only our whole system of hypotheses. If such a framework is not provided, Duhemian holism can be used to collapse the analytic/synthetic distinction — we end up with Quinean holism which doesn't tolerate anything like the relativized *a priori*. Howard tries to show in great detail that it was in fact Einstein who had reached by the mid-1920s, in debates with Schlick and Reichenbach, a radically holistic position which looks surprisingly like the view advocated in 1951 in Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'.

In a beautifully clear essay I. Pitowsky traces and criticizes the significance of the distinction between conventions and facts in Reichenbach's interpretation of quantum mechanics. Salmon discusses Carnap and Reichenbach's differing attitudes towards scientific realism and instrumentalism, emphasizing Carnap's attempts to take a neutral stance by distinguishing between questions that are 'internal' to a linguistic framework and 'external' questions about the choice of such a framework. To the latter kind of questions the 'principle of tolerance' applies, giving us apparently a free choice between, for instance, realist and instrumentalist languages. Salmon suggests, however, that there may not be much actual freedom here. (He attributes the suggestion to John Earman; cf. pp. 250, 285.) The main candidates for linguistic frameworks, besides the 'normal' language of physics, to choose from are 'phenomenal' languages (like the one in Carnap's *Aufbau*) and 'physical thing' languages (preferred, for instance, by Neurath in the debate about protocol sentences). Now, the first kind has frequently been shown to be inadequate; but so has the second by C.G. Hempel in 'The Theoretician's Dilemma'. Thus, only the 'normal' language of physics, containing all kinds of theoretical terms besides terms for physical things, remains as a viable candidate; we don't really seem to have a choice. But if there is no real choice, the distinction between questions answerable within a linguistic framework and questions concerning the choice of framework can't amount to the sweeping relativism many philosophers have seen in it.

I can only indicate that there is much more of general interest in this volume, in particular on issues in the philosophy of language and on the connections and differences between Carnap and Quine. It is appropriate that the introductory essay by Wolters emphasizes the 'other side' of Logical Empiricism. The 'scientific world-view' was not meant to be primarily a philosophy of science but involved engagement with broader social and political issues, reflected in the anti-fascist and socialist leanings of the Logical Empiricists.

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Barry Alan Shain

*The Myth of American Individualism:
The Protestant Origins of American
Political Thought.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994.

Pp. xix + 394.

US \$39.50. ISBN 0-691-03382-X.

G.K. Chesterton, the English Catholic writer, famously remarked that the United States was a nation with the soul of a church. Barry Shain has gone a long way toward demonstrating that, at least in its 18th-century origins, the United States had the soul of a sect, specifically, the soul of a variety of Protestant, largely Calvinist, local communities highly concerned with impressing their moral order on the lives of their members. The Reformed Protestant spirit which Shain finds most formative of American political thinking was caught by an Anglican divine in 1807 when he noted, from a British point of view: 'Whether Anglican or separatist, we have a notion of Church and nation. In the American states, even Anglicans speak only of village and congregation' (52).

If this suspicion of institutions and others unlike oneself sounds eerily similar to strains currently prominent in American political culture, Shain argues that the echo is not fortuitous. Indeed, an important part of Shain's argument is that 18th-century Reformed Protestant moral thinking — democratic, communal, intensely local, but more concerned above all with the maintenance of moral order than in defending individuals — has persisted in American political thought and behavior, despite the subsequent rise of powerful individualist and nationalist currents, so that even today it can be said to constitute the nation's 'most enduring political tradition' (xix).

Shain's purpose is to articulate and defend for political philosophy an understanding of the American past which has been developing for several decades in social and intellectual history. In this effort he is remarkably effective. Part of his effort necessarily requires debunking the view, widespread in both scholarly literature and popular understanding at least since Louis Hartz's work in the postwar era, that liberal individualism has characterized the only operative American political culture. On the contrary, argues Shain, the nation was born of a 'Protestant communal society' in which only a small elite, and they only to a very limited degree, would have understood the basic notions of contemporary liberal political philosophy. One of Shain's most interesting points is that it was this Christian understanding of divinely-ordered community, far more than the republican notions of Renaissance humanism, which animated public life in colonial and early federal America.

Shain organizes his argument around what he identifies as the key ideas of the 'political class', a broad range of notables who left records of their engagement in public debate. Everywhere Shain finds two central themes: the notion that the public good precedes and outweighs private good in

virtually all circumstances, and the idea of liberty, which 18th-century Americans used in seven identifiable positive senses, none of which corresponded to the widespread contemporary sense of individual autonomy.

The idea of the public good derived directly from the tenets of Protestant communalism, especially its insistence that the primary purpose of civil society was to foster godly living and deter sin, giving the community vast oversight of individual *mores*. The other outstanding feature of this tradition was its face-to-face, local and democratic quality, at least for those who adhered to its demanding principles of order, which entailed suspicion of distant authorities and hierarchies of power outside the community. Shain notes that this order was, by contrast with contemporary Europe, primitive and backward-looking rather than in any way self-consciously 'progressive'.

The second key 18th-century political theme was liberty. Here the discontinuity between dominant 20th-century liberal meanings and the past is most striking. While Shain divides the 18th-century arguments into three contending traditions, including republican humanism and 'early modern rationalism' as well as Reformed Christianity, he finds that all agreed that liberty was to be understood in something akin to Isaiah Berlin's positive rather than negative sense: 'freedom to lead one prescribed form of life' and to glorify God thereby (118).

The second major organizing device is a historical narrative which operates on both the cultural-intellectual level and in the realm of social-political change. Shain contends that liberal individualism only gradually spread and for most of the nation's history remained counterbalanced by a continuing tradition of local communalism. It was only after the success of 'aggressive nationalist public policies' in World War II and implementation of Supreme Court desegregation decisions that the balance finally tipped away from the old, narrow communalism as 'the individualist ethical vision' finally supplanted, at least in national policy, an 'often intolerant communalist ethical tradition' (324).

Shain's striking conclusion is that the U.S. virtually backed into liberal modernity. That is, individualism, tolerance, and the procedural republic is what is left after the failure of a succession of efforts at self-transcendence in an order of righteousness. While more convincing on 18th-century texts than in establishing broad historical parallels, the book raises a host of important and in many ways novel questions. It not only calls out for scholarly criticism but also suggests comparative studies of the career of 'Protestant communalism' in European societies, as well as efforts to understand better the careers of the liberal and nationalist currents which provide the backdrop for this pathbreaking study.

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Carlo Sini

Images of Truth: From Sign to Symbol.

Trans. Massimo Verdicchio.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities

Press 1993.

US \$45.00. ISBN 0-391-03763-3.

With this translation of Carlo Sini's *Immagini di verità* (1985) — ably rendered by Massimo Verdicchio, who provides an introduction, footnotes, bibliography and index — not only for the first time does a text by this important contemporary Italian philosopher become available to English-speaking readers, but also in the event an original attempt to think through and beyond the fate of metaphysics and its distinctive questioning of truth is brought before a wider public. 'Born out of the living experience of courses taught at the University of Milan' and deliberately retaining the 'presentational style of the original lectures,' *Images of Truth* narrates an inevitable 'stage' in Sini's on-going philosophical 'journey' involved with 'questioning interpretation and the sign' (xxvii), inevitable since the question of the meaning of interpretation and the sign belongs together with that of truth.

Ostensibly, then, philosophers ought to have common cause with the intent of this text, as 'the philosopher is first of all the friend of truth' (xxviii). But there are friends and then there are friends, and not all philosophers will recognize let alone champion the cause of truth as Sini portrays it. On the one hand, to those philosophers who, like Hegel and Heidegger, take seriously the notion that the metaphysical *ratio* has an historical fate, that its history is the essential history of being and truth, and therefore that the history of philosophy as such has ontological significance, Sini's radical rereading of the concept of truth will be accessible on its own terms, if not persuasive. For the same reason, *Images of Truth* is perhaps the best introduction for such readers to Sini's overall project, even though the texts which exemplify the other main stages in Sini's journey (i.e., *Semiotica e filosofia* [1978], *Passare il segno* [1981], *Kinesis. Saggio di interpretazione* [1982]) antedate this one. On the other hand, to those philosophers who deny any peculiar fate to the metaphysical *ratio*, who regard all questions of truth as an occasion for more exacting epistemological calculations, and who read the history of philosophy as a suite of (hitherto largely failed) attempts to 'get things right', the project of *Images of Truth* (original or translation being a matter of indifference, since truth is propositional) will doubtless seem unintelligible and irrational, to be dismissed out-of-hand with the usual *risentimento*. Yet, ironically, such a reaction belongs essentially (albeit unknowingly) to the metaphysical fate that Sini is concerned to assess and get beyond.

The thesis of this text, if one may speak in such terms, is that 'truth may lie in the thorough thinking of nihilism, ... of what in nihilism, as Heidegger would say, "makes us think" ' (xxviii). The hesitation in talking about the thesis in this way derives from the thesis itself. 'When interpretation takes

on the form, as in this case, of “infinite semiosis”’ (xxviii), such that ‘*what* occurs in the interpretation is not *the* absolute truth’ (137), then any singular statement of a thesis cannot be circulated free and clear. Yet it is precisely in the recognition of this interpretive liability — ‘that where the question of truth is concerned we are all debtors’ (xxviii) — that the crucial truth of Sini’s own interpretation lies. To the metaphysical ideal of ‘well-rounded truth’ inscribed in the perfect identity of thinking and being, Sini juxtaposes the thesis that ‘the world “contains infinite interpretations” [Nietzsche].’ Yet merely to affirm this thesis against metaphysics is to remain in nihilism and thus to ‘say “no” to what metaphysics has for centuries said or tried to say “yes” to, but ... on the same premises’ (80). Hence it is to affirm a ‘no’ that ‘is equivalent to the metaphysical “yes” it wants to destroy’ (110). To assert with absolute authority that in the matter of truth there is no absolute authority is not then so much self-contradictory as nonsensical. ‘On the strength of its logic, conceived as the only possible one,’ nihilism is an answer to the metaphysical question ‘What is truth?’ that robs the question itself of its very sense. Moreover, ‘nihilism contradicts common experience and the very structure of experience’ (80) by leaving in the dark the enigma that there is for us an ‘object’. On the one hand, then, Sini accepts a version of the standard critique of relativism that runs throughout our tradition from Plato to Husserl, yet on the other hand accepts also the relativist insight into the hegemony and undecidability of interpretation.

Situated in this way, Sini’s specific task is to provide ‘an assessment of the images of truth that have ... characterized and founded our overall history, ... to show the *reasons* behind this history and to explain eventually what new image of truth supports it’ (xxviii-xxix). The first part of the book examines truth’s images in the thinking of selected ‘great authors’ (esp. Parmenides, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger) in order to show by these examples that the founding presupposition that constitutes the sense of metaphysics — the absolute identity of thinking and being — contains in all its ‘images’ its own ‘catastrophe’ (lit. *kata-strophe* ‘over-turning’). In our own age, this holds both of the nihilistic pursuit of unlimited knowledge and power and of the Heideggerian ‘thinking of being’ that is meant to point beyond this fate and to leave metaphysics to itself. Yet such thinking ‘continues to wander around and within the “public places” (truth, error, being, nothing) instituted by the public *logos* of metaphysics,’ without ‘eyes for the *non*-metaphysical [and the non-public] “sense” of experience’ (144-5). Sini’s own quest for a ‘new image’ of truth is not meant to shore up the fated metaphysical project in a new way, but to renew non-metaphysically the philosophical commitment to the sense of experience and to knowing what we are doing and why. To effect this non-metaphysical renewal, Sini draws upon the tripartite semiotics of C.S. Peirce, leading to a new notion of ‘symbol’ beyond the binary semiotics of both the metaphysical tradition and current ‘deconstruction’. In place of the ‘metaphysical will to dominate experience totally and to “resolve it” completely in “public” truths that are functionally effective and symbolically senseless’ (153), Sini ventures to discover the original constitutive ‘finiteness

of experience,' precisely not as its imperfection but as its 'enchantment', that is, its original 'symbolic' character as 'finite and perfect part' that 'lacks nothing' (123-4). It is in this discovery, he thinks, that the origin, justification and destiny of philosophy as friend of truth now lies.

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Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly

The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction to Scientists, Values, and Society.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995.

Pp. xii + 257.

US \$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2016-X);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2017-8).

Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly (S&B) in their *The Many Faces of Science* set themselves two tasks: first, to describe the many ways in which scientists, presently and in the past, have made non-epistemic value judgments; and secondly, to argue that scientists, in spite of their pretense to neutrality, cannot help but make non-epistemic value judgments in their day-to-day work. It is fair to say that they succeed, to varying degrees, at both tasks.

In defense of their first claim, S&B recount in brief detail the life histories of over forty scientists. These histories form the bulk of the book; out of ten chapters, they take up chapters four to nine. Generally, these short biographical sketches are highly illuminating as regards the non-epistemic dimensions of a scientist's life. They describe, for example, what scientists are wont to do or say in the name of money and fame, how they covet power, and how they periodically lapse into sexism and racism. A few instances, cited by S&B, are: Galileo's attempt to profit from his discovery of Jupiter's moons by selling to the royalty of Europe the privilege of naming them (135); Fleischmann and Pons' highly premature announcement that they had discovered cold fusion, as motivated by their desire to ensure their place on the Nobel podium (as well as to guarantee any lucrative patent rights — see 152); Newton's unscrupulous use of his political power to 'subpoena' Flamsteed's observational data so that Newton could control its editing and publication (95-6); the scandalous treatment of Jocelyn Bell who is largely responsible for discovering pulsars, but who failed to share in the awarding of the Nobel prize because of the chauvinism of her fellow researchers — as Antony Hewish, who *did* win the award, supposedly remarked about her work: 'Jocelyn was a jolly good girl, but she was just doing her job' (94); the

hideous anti-semitism expressed by the Nazi physicists Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark — Lenard writes in his 1937 book *Deutsche Physik*: 'In reality science, like everything man produces, is racially determined, determined by blood' (158). These are some of the seamier examples mentioned by S&B which illustrate how (non-epistemic) values have intruded on the work of scientists. In fairness to S&B, they also discuss instances where scientists have been 'moral heroes' — the Curies, Einstein and Rachel Carson, to name a few. Nonetheless, we can grant S&B their point: scientists appear to be influenced by more than just the pursuit of truth. They, too, have their human side.

S&B's second task (taken up in their final chapter) is to explain why the (non-epistemic) value-ladenness of scientific research is no accident. As they conclude their book: 'the process of scientific research cannot be value-neutral. The general reason for this is that like any human activity, it involves choices of how to spend time, energy and resources. The special reasons are peculiar to the high costs, institutional control, and social applicability of scientific research' (230). However, these reasons only appear to suggest that scientific work is value-laden in a *passive* sense: scientists are constrained by the values of others, e.g., their families, their host institutions, their funding agencies, and so on. Stronger than this, S&B suggest in section 10.4 that scientific work is value-laden in an *active* sense; scientists have the power — a power, indeed, they cannot avoid invoking — to shape the values of the society in which they live. They have this power because scientific research is intellectually and technologically sophisticated; and so, when scientists describe their work to the uninitiated, they are bound to put a rhetorical spin on a description of their work that, inevitably, shapes public policy and opinion. For instance, S&B write, 'consider how the Strategic Defense Initiative was presented to the American public as "Stars Wars", thus associating it in the public mind with movies in which the goodies beat the baddies by clever technology' (217). Related examples, perhaps, are 'cold fusion' — an unlimited source of clean power —, or 'genetic engineering' — the ability to create potentially harmful, mutant life forms. Like it or not, S&B are claiming, scientists in making their ideas accessible to the general public find themselves shaping the public image of their work and, quite unintentionally, inducing the public to make value judgments about this work (e.g., cold fusion is good, genetic engineering is bad).

Overall, then, S&B present us with a valid perspective on the (non-epistemic) value-ladenness of scientific research. Moreover, since their book is intended solely as an introduction to the role of scientists in society, we need not, necessarily, expect from them much more; clearly, the scope and thoroughness of an introductory book has to be abridged. Nonetheless, it is regrettable that they ignore almost completely the *epistemic* values of scientists, those values pertaining to the rational justifiedness of scientific beliefs (they discuss such topics only briefly in section 1.1). This is an enormous omission. For regardless of what one thinks of the morals, hubris or emotional incontinence of scientists, what makes them *scientists* is their ability

to reason about the physical world (be this reasoning practical or theoretical); and what makes them *good* scientists is their ability to reason at a highly sophisticated level. Thus, it is a worry that the neophyte will walk away from S&B's book with an image of Newton as a vain, egotistical squabbler, Galileo as a money-hungry profiteer, Pasteur as a politically ambitious fraud, and so on. Such a neophyte will have completely missed the point about why we read and emulate these thinkers.

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Souren Teghrarian, ed.

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy.

Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press 1994.

Pp. xi + 296.

(cloth: ISBN 1-85506-355-7);

(paper: ISBN 1-85506-356-5).

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy is a collection of ten essays, seven of which are published here for the first time. Apart from the fact that they all concern Wittgenstein's later work — some discussing middle-period and later work — there is no unifying theme. All of the essays are well-written, although some provide more novel insights than others. Due to space limitations, I will focus on four essays which I found particularly interesting, and which can be joined by a single theme: they all concern Wittgenstein's observations about the interconnectedness of language and human activities.

In the collection's first article, "Die Wende der Philosophie", Hintikka's project is to understand what drove Wittgenstein's philosophical development in his middle period. In particular, he explains how Wittgenstein's early atomistic view of meaning developed into the holistic view in which meaning is dependent on language-games. Hintikka provides convincing textual support for his claim that what troubled Wittgenstein around 1928 was his realization that truth-functional logic was not complete, and thus could not provide a foundation for his picture theory. In response Wittgenstein replaced truth-functional logic with a calculus. This switch brought a couple of changes which eventually led to the language-games of his later philosophy. For Wittgenstein numbers were 'irrevocably connected with calculation' (15). In switching to a calculus Wittgenstein switched from a view of meaning as static to a view of meaning as necessarily involving human activity. Moreover, because the elements of the calculus are intrinsically intertwined there

are no pure linguistic simples. Thus, according to Hintikka, Wittgenstein's worries about the completeness of truth-functional logic pushed him to adopt a calculus in which intertwined elements derive their meaning from the roles they play in a larger system, a system that involves human activity.

In 'Naturalism and Transcendentalism: The Case of "Form of Life"', Garver considers the transcendental nature of a form of life (FOL). When Garver says that FOLs are transcendent he means that: a) they are not subject to justification or explanation, b) they are prerequisites for all other understanding, and c) they are reflexive; it is part of our FOL to be concerned with our FOL. For Wittgenstein, the key to much of what is philosophically puzzling is understanding our FOL. It is tempting to think that this requires scientific understanding but, as Garver points out, there is a vast difference between natural history and natural science, and what we need to know is a matter of natural history. Science and history — like everything else we do — are conducted from within our FOL. Therefore it is impossible for science to provide a non-circular explanation for our FOL. But natural history produces descriptions, not justification or explanation, so it does not need to worry about circularity. Moreover, as Wittgenstein was fond of saying, explanations must end somewhere. They must end with a description of that of which we are certain, even if it is not clear that we know it, and in describing our FOL we describe precisely this.

In 'Wittgenstein and Scepticism with Regard to the Senses' Butchvarov presents a Wittgensteinian response to the sceptic. This response nicely illustrates some points mentioned by Hintikka and Garver. Butchvarov begins with what he takes to be the most plausible sceptical scenario, the possibility that one is dreaming. He points out that if one takes this scenario seriously, one considers oneself to be engaged in solo dream-reasoning. One cannot, for instance, appeal to the great thinkers of the past. Moreover, commonsense tells us that insofar as one accepts that one's beliefs are the result of a dream, one is not warranted in accepting those beliefs. Hintikka noted the holistic nature of language-games, and to talk about the possibility of dreaming without taking into account the entire dream language-game is to ignore the holistic nature of that language-game. Similarly, as Garver points out, to accept without thought certain aspects of our FOL while rejecting others for lack of justification is to misunderstand the way our FOL grounds our thinking.

Glock compares Wittgenstein's grammatical/empirical distinction with the analytic/synthetic distinction rejected by Quine. He begins with a number of criticisms of Quine; primarily explanations of and expansions on criticisms originally offered by Grice and Strawson. But Glock agrees that there is something right about Quine's view that any statement can be retained or rejected in the face of empirical evidence, as long as compensating adjustments are made elsewhere in the 'web'. What he rejects, on Wittgensteinian grounds, is Quine's claim that this shows that all statements play the same kind of role, that they are equally empirical. As Wittgenstein points out, at any given time there are sentences within our language-game that play

different roles: we allow some to reflect empirical evidence, and some we do not. The ones that do not are what Wittgenstein calls grammatical sentences. We might come to treat what had been a grammatical sentence as subject to empirical verification, but to do so is to change its meaning. Although there is a sense in which no sentence is irrevocably immune to empirical evidence, at any given time there must be some sentences which ground the meanings of others which are empirically evaluable. Insofar as a sentence plays this role it is a grammatical sentence and not subject to empirical justification.

The remainder of the essays are as follows: 'Wittgenstein on Grammar and Essence', by Hunter reconciles Wittgenstein's assertion that, '*Essence* is expressed by grammar', with his denial of essences. In 'Wittgenstein on Psychological Verbs', Vesey explains that, for Wittgenstein, statements containing psychological verbs are not descriptions of a person's state of mind. While both of these papers are quite readable, neither presents significant new ideas. In 'Wittgenstein and "Mainstream" Contemporary Philosophy', Schwyzer presents a somewhat confusing illustration of Wittgenstein's project of dissolving philosophical problems. By recounting the very different 'phenomena' that come under the heading of thinking, Canfield's 'The Phenomena of Thinking', helps the reader to appreciate Wittgenstein's point that thinking is not a single phenomenon. Margolis compares Wittgenstein and Derrida in, 'Vs. (Wittgenstein, Derrida)'. And the editor, Teghrarian, criticizes Kripke's discussion of Wittgenstein on rule-following in 'Wittgenstein, Kripke and the "Paradox" of Meaning'.

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R. Jay Wallace

Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1994. Pp. xii + 275.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-674-76622-9.

R. Jay Wallace's philosophically elegant book will interest those working on freedom of the will, and — as the apt title suggests — responsibility and the moral sentiments. Moreover, it will appeal to action theorists and students of P.F. Strawson's thought.

In a compatibilist account, Wallace partially relies on resources found in the works of Strawson and Kant. Using Strawson's British Academy lecture 'Freedom and Resentment', Wallace presents an account of responsibility in

which reactive attitudes play a central role. He construes these emotions more narrowly than Strawson by focusing on resentment, indignation, and guilt as paradigmatic of the moral sentiments in accordance with which one holds agents responsible. By so narrowing the sentiments associated with responsibility, Wallace achieves a theoretical unity insofar as such emotions can be classified as a kind in virtue of their distinctive connection with expectations. In cashing out the expectations peculiar to these emotions, Wallace relies on broadly Kantian conceptions of moral agency which highlight the salient roles obligations, justifications and choices have in defining our expectations concerning agency. With this framework in place, Wallace argues his primary thesis that being a moral agent is not so much having freedom of the will in the traditional sense of *able-to-do-otherwise*; rather, responsibility is having the normative competence 'to grasp and apply moral reasons, and to govern one's behavior by the light of such reasons' (1). Thus, he understands one to be responsible if one has the general capacity for reflective self-control: 'the capacity to step back from one's given desires and to assess the ends they incline one to in the light of moral principles' (13). Here, Wallace's approach displays its reliance on a Kantian account of the nature of moral agency. Wallace, however, thinks that the importation of strong freedom of the will (*able-to-do-otherwise*) into an account of responsibility is to be resisted, primarily because certain criteria surrounding agency which need to be explained — the conditions which vitiate responsibility (e.g., excuses, force, ignorance) — do not require strong freedom of the will insofar as they can be fully explained without reliance on alternate possibilities. Wallace presents a theoretically robust, yet conceptually disciplined account in which he articulates responsibility as *able-to-do*.

Wallace's argument has two parts. In the first part, chapters 2-4, he presents an account of what we do when we hold people morally responsible. In chapter 2, he discusses the reactive emotions of guilt, resentment and indignation and associates this account with holding people to expectations. In chapter 3, he argues that to hold someone morally responsible is to be subject to these reactive emotions under certain conditions, namely, when an obligation which one accepts as justified (an expectation) is violated. In chapter 4, he offers a diagnosis of what is at issue between compatibilists and incompatibilists using a distinction between what he calls 'accountability' (A-) and 'blameworthy' (B-) conditions. A-conditions establish that a given agent is generally morally accountable while B-conditions establish that a morally accountable agent is to blame for some specific moral wrong. Thus, chapters 2-4 establish the issues in detail and set up the problematic which Wallace resolves in the second part of his work, chapters 5-7.

In chapters 5-7, Wallace argues against what he calls the incompatibilist's 'generalization strategy' of arguing that excuses which shield from blame (B-conditions) and exemptions which partially comprise A-conditions are really instances of the lack of alternate possibilities. He argues in his positive account that what is at issue in A-conditions is the agent's general powers of reflective self-control, while what is at issue in B-conditions is the (perhaps

analytical?) truth that it is not fair to blame another for what he has not *done*. That is, Wallace argues that B-conditions do not ground the incompatibilist's arguments for alternate possibilities. Rather, such conditions show that we hold accountable agents blameworthy when they have done something wrong. The locution 'doing something wrong' is shorthand for 'intentionally doing something wrong' where all doings are intentional and what is not intentional is not a doing. Thus, Wallace relies on the tenability of the intended/foreseen distinction common to deontological accounts to argue that the incompatibilist's generalization strategy, at least in cases of B-conditions, is not the only nor the most tenable explanation of most of the cases in which we do not blame accountable agents.

Wallace's account could be strengthened by further refinement of the relation between B-conditions and deontological and other expectations which we have of agents. One distinction worth further attention is that between what the agent does voluntarily (with knowledge, not by force) and what the agent does intentionally (what goals the agent pursues and the means chosen in deliberation to achieve these goals). For example, in a justified war, bombers are thought to be obliged to not intentionally kill noncombatants, no matter what (always obliged not to terror bomb), while they are not thought obliged not to do something like bomb an artillery installation when they know that by so doing they will also kill noncombatants (strategic bombing). Nonetheless, although the strategic bomber does not intentionally kill noncombatants, he still is responsible for voluntarily killing noncombatants and is subject to expectations. Thus, by the intended/foreseen distinction one notes different depths of responsibility. In discussing the distinction, one discusses the various ways in which an agent can be responsible for a doing, where a doing is, first and foremost, something voluntary, and, second, something intentional. Such considerations provide further grounds for Wallace's account.

By focusing on some of the nitty-gritty issues of action theory and the scope of obligations, Wallace brings the discussion to concrete issues the analysis of which can explain the truth in deep intuitions about responsible agency which ground the appeal of able-to-do-otherwise accounts without embracing those accounts. This is a significant corrective to the dispute and neither compatibilists nor incompatibilists should — whether or not they are able to do otherwise — fail to read this work.

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Joel C. Weinsheimer

Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics: Philosophy of Interpretation from Locke to Burke.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1993.

Pp. xii + 275.

US \$30.00. ISBN 0-300-05280-4.

There has not been much work done on hermeneutic philosophy in eighteenth-century England despite the fact that a number of thinkers from Locke to Burke have carefully pondered various issues concerning interpretation. Weinsheimer, co-translator of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode*, and author of *Imitation* (1984), *Gadamer's Hermeneutics* (1985), and *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory* (1991), eloquently fills this gap in hermeneutic research with a closely argued and meticulously researched study. This book is a comprehensive, though by no means exhaustive, survey of literary, political, historical, legal, interpersonal, scriptural and textual interpretive issues from the Restoration to the Regency. Weinsheimer selects Jonathan Swift, John Locke, John Toland, Henry St. John Bolingbroke, David Hume, Thomas Reid, William Blackstone, and Edmund Burke as his subjects. He wisely forgoes more obvious choices like Edward Gibbon for lesser figures like Bolingbroke because the latter present their interpretive principles more explicitly than the former.

The general problem of eighteenth-century (and contemporary) hermeneutics is cleverly and effectively framed through Swift's dichotomy of 'knaves' and 'fools' from *Tale of a Tub*. Knavish interpretation understands everything as 'dark and deep' and posits 'two or more levels of understanding,' whereas the foolish view of interpretation understands everything as 'plain' and defends a 'monistic' notion of interpretation (2). The problem then is to establish a notion of interpretation that avoids these interpretive extremes, yet does not exclude one or the other from its account of interpretation. By focusing in successive chapters on Locke on human understanding, Toland on reason, Bolingbroke on history, Hume on others, Reid on common sense, Blackstone on equity, and Burke on taste, Weinsheimer is able to reveal how each of these thinkers contends with this problem. In the process, each of them, with the exception of Locke, is shown to be sympathetic to hermeneutics.

Weinsheimer presents Locke's epistemology as monological, and unresponsive of the view that understanding is generated through dialogue. Locke's advocacy of toleration as a response to difference is indicative of an epistemological individualism that rejects dialogue as a means to knowledge. The 'blind spot governing Locke's thought' is the unrecognized possibility of 'understanding and interpreting what other human beings think and say and write' — in short, human understanding. Locke's philosophy typifies and generates 'the widespread eighteenth-century reaction against interpretation in all its venues' — 'a sympathetic study of eighteenth-century hermeneutics must open with a less than sympathetic account of Locke, since he,

more than any one else, represents the impediments which hermeneutic self-consciousness had to overcome' (26-7).

The chapter on Toland was one of the more provocative, and contains an extensive discussion of Spinoza — a welcome inclusion despite his lack of geographical and temporal fit. In describing how Toland overcomes Locke's anti-hermeneutics, Weinsheimer argues that Toland's conception of interpretation is 'superior at points even to that of Spinoza's' (47). Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious* (1696), claims Weinsheimer, 'inaugurates the epoch of universal hermeneutics' by perceiving 'a hundred years before Schleiermacher, that interpreting is understanding, not just an aid to it' (58).

The general conclusion of the book is that 'the task of eighteenth-century hermeneutics was to understand historical reason' (226). The plurality of thinking and interpretive issues revealed in eighteenth-century hermeneutics find a common ground in the aim to overcome the dual extremes of the barren laws, principles and rules of rationalist formalism on the one hand, and the capricious and arbitrary accounts of history offered by antiquarians and annalists, on the other. The task then of eighteenth-century hermeneutics was 'to reconceive reason and history in such a way that reason does not consist merely of clear and distinct but empty forms, nor history of actual but chaotic and opaque contingency' (226).

All tolled, even though eighteenth-century England was probably more engaged in pursuing the extremes of antiquarianism and rationalist formalism than a hermeneutic mediation of them, Weinsheimer's account of this time and place as the cradle of the nineteenth century's universal hermeneutics is convincing. Weinsheimer's clear presentation, detailed argumentation, and copious use of quotation make this book attractive reading. It deserves to be noted that while this study is heavily influenced by the thought of Gadamer, Weinsheimer only explicitly draws upon Gadamer once — in his chapter on Reid. In conclusion, Weinsheimer's study is so graceful and persuasive that one wonders how anyone could have ever thought that issues of understanding and meaning were not a vital part of eighteenth-century British speculative thought.

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Krzysztof Ziarek

Inflected Language: Toward a Hermeneutic of Nearness — Heidegger, Levinas, Stevens, Celan.

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Ziarek's provocative book situates itself in the context of post-structuralist debates engaged in rethinking the ethical significations of language (1), specifically within the debate on the question of the poetic in its relation to the philosophical as staged in the dialogues between Derrida and Gadamer, Heidegger and Levinas, Levinas and Derrida, and the early and later Heidegger (3). The work has ambitions to novelty in its effort to develop a post-Heideggerian, post-Levinasian "hermeneutics" of otherness' (2) formulated apart from 'the metaphysically invested notions of difference and interpretation' (11). A full elucidation of the meaning of the intriguing title is left to an endnote: 'inflection indicates ... that ... there is nothing under, beside, apart or beyond language that could be identified in terms of a subject, substance, or even word. The title *Inflected Language* suggests that language unfolds as always already inflected: it can detect the commitments that such inflection impose upon it without ever being able to recognize or bring into words what effects this inflection' (207-8).

As the subtitle indicates, the work builds on readings of Heidegger, Levinas, Stevens and Celan; however, by proposing 'an engagement between Levinas and Heidegger that takes us into the often unexplored aspects of Heidegger's work: the ontologico-ethical dimensions of his work on poetry and the place of otherness in it' (7), it privileges Heidegger in order to highlight 'the ethical possibilities' (7) in his thought. Following the subtitle, the body of the work can be divided into four parts. First, the two initial chapters on Heidegger: developing Heidegger's considerations on the closeness of poetry and thinking to the saying of manifestation, here called the 'infold' (41), Ziarek retraces in the notion of nearness (*Nähe*) Heidegger's attempt to attend to otherness otherwise than through ontological difference. In other words, nearness, thematized as *Gelassenheit* (62), would be Heidegger's ethical refiguration of otherness: a way to approach otherness in a non-conceptualizing manner that lets it be thus preserving its alterity. The second part, which owes much to Derrida, is an expository chapter on Levinas: the notion of proximity (*proximité*) as trace is seen to underscore and radicalize the ethical significance implicit in Heidegger's nearness, whereas the notion of non-indifference emerges as Levinas's most valuable contribution to the debate about language and otherness.

The next two parts of the work enter the neighborhood of poetry and thinking on the poet's side (but isn't Ziarek already on the side of philosophy?). Third is thus a chapter on Stevens. This is probably the philosophically least successful part, since the role assigned to Stevens in the economy of the book seems marginal and even superfluous. In the 'Introduction', which best articulates his philosophical agenda, Ziarek recognizes that it is Celan who plays the unique (18) role of 'the

third party who mediates between Levinas's conception of alterity and Heidegger's thought of Being' (7). In any event, Ziarek's interesting thesis, worth a separate, more sophisticated philosophical analysis, regards Stevens' recurring theme of a poem that eludes words, 'a "non-poem" withholding itself from writing' (105) as a poetic counterpart of Heidegger's departure from metaphysics (114). Finally, the last two chapters are on Celan: his increasingly halted, self-silencing poetic, and particularly the notion of *Atemwende*, 'the turning of breath toward the other, in an attempt to let the other's breath mark language' (195), are revealed as a place of differentiation between the otherness of Being (Heidegger) and the alterity of the other (Levinas), so that 'the rupture of language in Celan indicates the "ethicity" of language, that is, a linguistic inflection, a displacement from its semantic and cognitive functions toward the acknowledgement and silent respect for the other' (174).

Ziarek hopes to foster 'dialogue and exchange between those interested in philosophy, those engaged with poetry, and those preoccupied with the ongoing critique of modernity' (19). As far as philosophers are concerned, despite its lengthy, convoluted sentences, Ziarek's book provocatively and suggestively addresses issues that have become urgent and unavoidable for contemporary continental thought. Curiously, however, from a philosophical perspective the most valuable parts seem to be not those constituting the body of the book, which often retain an introductory, sometimes expository character, but rather the margins, namely, the 'Introduction' and the 'Coda'. In the 'Introduction' unescapable problems are proposed: the presence of poetry as the most important moment in refiguring language's relation to the other (2); the correlation and maybe overlapping of the ontological and the ethical thematics in Heidegger's later writings (3); the modality of the 'perhaps' as 'the only modality of discourse in which the figurations of otherness ... could be maintained' (15). In the 'Coda', containing the conclusions of the book, Heidegger and Celan are read together in conformity with 'the ideal of an ethical encounter prescribed by Levinas himself' (18). The encounter illuminates the proximity between poetry and thought via the correspondence between Celan's notion of *Atemwende* and a Heideggerian sense of listening shaped by friendship, in the light of which 'as we turn toward the language (of Being) we are already turned toward others, or ... when we listen to the saying of language we have already been listening to others' (199). Both in Heidegger and in Celan, and both in accordance with Levinas, language is indexed by ethical alterity. The conclusion is provocative: 'the subject, before it can speak, is already "all ears"' (205).

Ziarek's intentions are laudable, and the book deserves reading. But, as Levinas's criticism of Heidegger (of which Ziarek is aware) reveals, being ethically all ears remains different from being ontologically all ears: the voice of alterity is not simply the voice of Being. 'When we listen to the saying of language', although we may 'have already been listening to others', we may not be hearing their voice: the ethical space in language may thus reveal its emptiness.

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