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E.M. Adams

Religion and Cultural Freedom.
Pp. xiii + 193.

This book struggles with an important issue for western culture: to what extent are the scientific world view (which Adams calls 'naturalism') and the religious world view (which Adams calls 'humanism') compatible, and if they are not compatible, how is the conflict to be decided? Adams's answer is that there is a deep incompatibility, but that the religious view can be supported by respectable kinds of evidence. It would be wrong to conclude that the book is merely a work of Christian apologetics, since it is not concerned with defending particular doctrines against scientific criticism. Instead, its aim is to show that there are presuppositions to the scientific world view which are incompatible with any religious view, and that in fact, those presuppositions are internally inconsistent.

The first chapter gives a general account of the nature and purpose of religion, and how religions are related to the cultures in which they arise. Adams believes the function of religion is 'to integrate, to focus, to elevate, and to empower the lives of individuals and the life of a historical community or of humankind' (23). Religion, in his view, is concerned with finding meaning for life, and thus, everybody is religious; the atheist who thinks he has no religion is simply mistaken. Here Adams stakes out a position that is likely to leave both religious and irreligious frustrated. Ask the Catholic priest or Buddhist monk what the function of religion is, and you will doubtless be told it is the cure for sin or suffering. Only someone who takes no particular religion seriously can understand it as Adams does.

Chapter 2 proceeds from this understanding of religion to show that religions have a responsibility to seek consistency with their cultures. To his credit, Adams rejects the easy road of noncognitivism; religions are to be understood as making truth claims, and these claims can come into conflict with other claims the culture wishes to make. When that happens, the religious beliefs are no more immune to revision than any others. Religion has a responsibility to reduce its conflicts with science and historical scholarship, and shouldn't expect these other avenues of knowledge to yield to its authority.

The linchpin of the whole project is Chapter 3. Here Adams argues that whereas a religion can maintain some of its essential doctrines (57) after accommodating to science and history, a deeper and more important kind of conflict is possible; a religion can come into conflict with the metaphysical and moral beliefs of the society in which it finds itself. In illustration of this point, Adams gives us on pp. 80-93 a perceptive account of how Christianity throughout its history has adapted the current metaphysic to its uses (although there is a remarkable blunder on p. 83 concerning the force of the ontological argument; Adams confuses 'possibly false' with 'contingent', ap-
parently forgetting that the necessarily false is also possibly false). The modern Western world accepts a naturalistic metaphysic which does not countenance values, essences, necessity, truth, or internal mental states. We come to have this metaphysic because we have developed a science bent on understanding the world in order to manipulate it, and that practice presupposes such a naturalism. His argument for the claim that we do science only in order to manipulate, or that such a science presupposes so radical a naturalism, amounts to a few quotations from thinkers (not, for the most part, scientists) who fear or hope that's the way we're heading.

In Chapter 4 the final blow is dealt to naturalism by showing that it is internally incoherent. Adams claims if there is no value, there can be no knowledge. 'The claim that X know that P contains the claims that X is correct and justified in taking P to obtain in the world. These are value judgments' (112). Apparently Adams has never heard of reliabilist theories of justification. It is also difficult to see why to claim that P is true — which is what 'X is correct in taking P to obtain in the world' amounts to — is to make any value judgment at all. Adams is also concerned in this chapter to argue that humanism (the view that there are objective values, etc.) can be given positive support. He claims that our emotive experience gives us evidence of the existence of objective values. The argument goes like this: 1) Our emotions are all propositional attitudes, so 2) our emotive states are propositional in form, so 3) our emotive states can be evaluated epistemically, so 4) 'emotive states constitute a mode of epistemic encounter with reality; they uniquely ground our value language and provide a basis for our value judgments' (126). There is no good reason to accept the first premise (and Adams's attempt on p. 125 to translate emotive statements propositionally is laughable), and even if there were, each of the inferences is a non sequitur.

Whereas Chapter 4 attempts to give grounds for 'humanism' in general, Chapter 5 attempts to show what particular religions can do to give grounds for their own doctrines. According to Adams, such giving of grounds involves recognizing that all religions share a core of beliefs, including that the human spirit needs salvation. Spirit is defined, perversely, as 'the capacity to be moved by higher values' (141), on the strength of our use of the word in sentences like 'He's in good spirits today'. This recognition, coupled with a non-literalistic (and probably unacceptable to most religious people) reading of particular religious doctrines, yields the result that all religions are saying more or less the same thing. This common doctrine is confirmed by the fact that it 'works' in people's lives. There is a brief Epilogue by way of summary.

Although the issue is interesting on its own merits, and the positions Adams takes are also interesting, the work as a whole falls flat because Adams frequently uses words in Pickwickian ways, and the arguments for crucial theses frequently are invalid or have controversial premises, or both.

Mark Owen Webb
University of Nebraska
Barry Allen

Truth in Philosophy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

‘Truth’, says this engaging study, ‘has no power of its own, no utopian potential, no affinity for good, and will not make us free’ (182). Thoughts to the contrary stem from a fetishism of truth — a mistaken belief that truth has independent being that can sustain inherent value apart from contingent, historical practices. But while Marx deemed commodity-fetishism a result of capitalist modes of production, Allen locates the roots of our truth-fetish in the more distant past.

Chapters 1 and 2 trace ‘truth’s ontological a priori’ (31) from the presocratics to the moderns, arguing that classical philosophy displays an ‘onto-logic’ of four related theses: (1) being is radically independent of language, culture and history, (2) truth is a kind of similarity between signs and being, (3) signs are secondary to and derivative of being, and (4) truth is intrinsically good. Theses (1)-(3) appear as a recurrent faith in truth-makers, in the idea that the truth of signs has its ground in the independent being of beings. Truth, on this view, must be explained by a theory or analysis that says what the truth-makers are.

The modern era differs from the classical on this account by the 17th century’s response to the renewal of scepticism: subjectivity replaces natural substances as truth’s ontological a priori. This attempt to ‘comb[ine] the ancient idea that truth implies adequacy or fitness with the modern priority for self-reflective knowledge of representations’ (37), Allen suggests, leads ineluctably to idealism.

Insightful readings of Nietzsche, James, Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein and Foucault in the remaining chapters elaborate Allen’s central theme: the erosion of philosophy’s commitment to truth-makers and the value of truth. It is Nietzsche, says Allen, who first sees truth’s value as a question — one whose irony it is to be raised when modernity’s scientific search for truth undermines the theistic ground of truth’s value. With Nietzsche’s death of God comes a de-divinization of truth. We must now view truth pragmatically, and we cannot escape the perspectival, power-laden character of our truth-claims. Allen sees Nietzsche’s love of ‘untruth’ as a ‘mock inversion of Platonism’ (47) that is meant to illustrate the tenuous value of truth. But he criticizes Nietzsche’s ‘nostalgia[a] for the equally imaginary self-sufficiency of the Stoic’ (52). Nietzsche’s demand that we be true to the earth ‘preserves the priority of nature over convention’ (54), despite his perspectivism.

James also seeks refuge from truth-makers in the utility of beliefs but appeals to a ‘pseudo-Darwinian adaptivity’ (67) as a new ground for the good of truth and as a way to identify beliefs that are expedient but not true. Allen questions the pragmatic utility and the value of this notion. How can
adaptivity be assessed other than by norms of utility? And isn’t utility interest-relative (68)?

As Allen rightly observes, pragmatism is best understood as giving no analysis or theory of truth (62). And to reject theories of truth is not to reject truth. It is just to admit that all we can say about truth will be platitudinous reminders assembled to focus attention on the role that truth plays in discursive practice: truth is preserved in valid deductive inference; the statement ‘S is true iff S; truth is not reducible to warrant (17). But this third truism is worth noting, given Allen’s claim that ‘there is no pragmatic difference between the truth and what passes for true’ (69).

Allen’s treatment of Heidegger and Derrida sparkles with a lucidity from which anyone seeking an introduction to the ideas of these thinkers will benefit. But this clarity does not compromise the integrity of his material. Heidegger differs from the tradition of metaphysics by denying that truth is grounded either in natural substances or in the thinking subject and by distinguishing being as an event from beings. Truth for Heidegger is rooted in the ‘ontological difference’ between the being of human consciousness, or Dasein, which is never fully present and self-identical, and the being of extant beings, which are. Such beings are revealed only by our interests — a point that idealism mistakes for the subject’s constitution of beings. But such truth as aletheia, thinks Allen, clings to truth-makers, for Heidegger’s problem with truth-as-correspondence is only that it is shallow (89) and stands in need of a more basic account of the ‘ontological difference’.

Derrida avoids truth-makers by extending the non-self-identity of Dasein to things in general. A thing is what it is only through its differences from other things. Things are never complete or final because their identities are determined in their holistic relations to each other, and there is no totality of things. This lack of totality transforms Saussure’s principle of semiological difference into différence, the endless deferral of pure self-identity to another occasion. Derrida treats différence as an original difference for all beings, not just for signs, and denies the secondary role of signs relative to nature. But while this move opens ‘a different perspective on truth’ (111), freed from the adequation of signs to beings and respectful of the contingency and interest-
edness of human practices, it remains, says Allen, too ‘bound to the discourse it deconstructs’ (112). A critique of onto-logic requires an argument against pure self-identity that does not rely on the dubious importance of semiological difference.

So Allen turns to Wittgenstein’s remark that it cannot be said correctly of the standard metre either that it is or is not a metre long. The standard metre enjoys no metaphysical privilege, and nothing stops us from holding a metre-stick to it, but it has a special role to play in measuring-practices. All judgments of metric length are comparisons to the standard, and since a thing cannot be compared to itself, the standard metre cannot be measured within the practice that uses it as a standard. But if a spatio-temporal object can be of indeterminate length, given its role in a practice, then it seems that: (a) the ‘possibility of true or false description ... depends on the existence of
a perfectly contingent practice and nothing else besides’ (124), and (b) ‘[t]he identity, similarity, and difference of things is as thoroughly conditioned by the contingencies of symbolizing practice as anything one might call a sign’ (125). Thesis (a) says that there are no truths if there are no creatures capable of believing them. (This truth is not so ‘banal’ (6, 92) — it is denied by most metaphysical realists.) It forbids our saying that had there never been any creatures with beliefs, it might yet have been true that there were shrubs and trees. But it lets us say that it is true that had there never been ‘believers’, there might still have been shrubs and trees. Thesis (b), Allen thinks, denies even this. It ‘precludes any determinate “would-be’s” about what would be were there nothing of our evolution and history on the earth’ (129). Counterfactual conditionals have truth-values, says Allen, only if evaluative practices are part of the counterfactual situation.

Devotees of onto-logic will likely insist that a thing can be compared with itself. So Allen will need the more basic strategy of treating meaning as use. But for those of us suspicious of onto-logic, (b) is thought-provoking. Grant that shrubs and trees cannot exist apart from the real possibility of our describing them. Does (b) entail that it is indeterminate whether they could exist if we never described anything? Wouldn’t this subordinate being to signs, rather than set them on a par? Allen allows the determinacy of claims about prehistory (129). But is it so different to say that the earth might have been much as it is without belief-bearing beings?

Examining Foucault, Allen returns to Nietzsche’s question of the value of truth. Cease to hypostatize truth, he observes, and we will no longer see truth as a value in itself (179). Its value — like that of anything — resides in the uses to which it is put. Truth — or what passes for true — is a product of human practices and, like other products, may be good for some of us but not for others. Foucault offers Allen an account of how the institutional production of truth is linked with power and of how philosophy can help to ‘free thought from what it silently thinks’. Truth in Philosophy is a refreshing contribution to that liberation.

Michael Hymers
University of Alberta
Emmett Barcalow

*Open Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy.*
Pp. xii + 296.

Barcalow's book comes in a Concise Edition, and an alternate version that includes 20 excerpts from philosophical classics. This review shall deal with only the Concise Edition.

Barcalow is determined to provide an autonomous Introduction to Philosophy course based on his book. His purposes as set out in his Preface place an equal emphasis on a rational and informed discussion of relevant topics, and a maintenance of the students' interest throughout the book. He attempts to achieve these purposes through a clear structure and organization in his book: he starts from the investigation of topics in logic and metaphysics in the first five chapters, proceeds in epistemology and theory of knowledge, and closes with chapters on ethics and political philosophy. He includes Progress Checks and Questions at the end of every chapter and section, which make sure the students know not only the discussed theories, but also how to apply them in their own daily lives. B. also provides Summaries of each chapter, Supplementary Readings with notes, a Table of important dates and philosophers at the beginning of the book, and Appendices on how to read for and write papers in philosophy at the end.

Throughout his book he proceeds in his investigation with what he calls 'reasonable choice of an alternative based on its rational justification' (x). He explains this analytic in form and content methodology in the start of his book, where he discusses the nature of arguments, their deductive and inductive criteria of validity, and gives an account of what can be considered as the best explanation for a specific set of observations (6-13).

With this analytic methodology in hand B. guides the student through Aquinas's Five Ways, Paley's Design Argument, and the more modern arguments for the existence of God found in Davies, Adams, and Rowe; the Ancient roots of Physicalism and Dualism in Plato and Aristotle, and their contemporary counterparts in Descartes and Broad, Spinoza and Strawson; the connection of Mind and Body Theories with the Personal Identity Problem in Locke, and Reid; the connection of the Existence of God and Body-Mind Theories with the problem of Freedom and Determinism in Aristotle, Spinoza, and Locke; the Epistemology in Descartes, Hume, Locke, Kant, Moore, Russell, and Chisholm; how Ross, the Utilitarians, and Kant can escape the pitfalls of Moral Nihilism, Subjectivism, Relativism, and Conventionalism; the account of Justice and rights in the theories of Aristotle, Hobbes, Frankena, the Utilitarians, and Rawls; Mill's Principle of Liberty and the way Democracy can help in the preservation of Liberty and Rights.

His exposition of the relevant arguments is brief and introductory without in most of the cases a serious loss of credibility. His critique always tied with
his aforementioned methodology is succinct and efficient, always allowing for student creativity, and rarely muddled and cyclical.

From the numerous instances where issues for class discussion may arise from B.'s expositions and discussions, which are expected in the enormousness of the area covered, only three of the most evident shall be mentioned here. Firstly, his insistence on the Analytic tradition, with total disregard of any account stemming from non-Analytic traditions is seriously prejudiced. In many of his topics, such as Consciousness, Knowledge, and the Body-Mind Distinction, there is no mention of even moderate Continental philosophers such as Husserl and the Phenomenologists; in his discussion of political and moral issues however, this deficiency reaches its greatest depth through a disregard of Marxist or Marxist oriented philosophies such as the Frankfurt School, and his materialistic view of human well-being, which is inherently influenced and modified by pragmatic common sense views on life (253-83).

Secondly, his cyclical relation of rights to rationality, and his emphasis on rights as being products of society, and not independent from it, predisposes the readers in favour of a positivistic account of rights, and against any natural law account (253-86).

Thirdly, in rare occasions, he incorporates in his arguments hasty generalizations. These are evident in his careless mention of the word 'mind' instead of 'brain' in his treatment of the Body-Mind Distinction on p. 65, which makes his account cyclical and a little bit muddled from the beginning. Such generalizations, coupled with cyclical reasoning are also involved in his treatment of moral justification, evaluation, and moral principles and feelings, which make his classifications and observations untrustworthy (180-98).

However, since the book covers a vast area of philosophy both in topic covered and philosophers mentioned, such problems become unimportant and make mental alertness imperative from both the teachers and the students.

Barcalow's book shall not only be a worthwhile change in the normally uninteresting curricula of Colleges and Universities, but it will make student life more philosophy oriented and, hopefully, of a better quality.

Constantinos Athanasopoulos
University of Glasgow
When H.L.A. Hart died in 1992, legal philosophy lost its leading contemporary figure. It is difficult to imagine this today, when so much fine work is being done in the area, but at mid-century the philosophy of law was moribund. At best it was considered a marginal field of no significant or enduring value to the philosophical enterprise. Hart changed all that. His work spearheaded a burgeoning interest in legal philosophy, to the point where that discipline is now widely thought to provide one of the most fertile grounds for philosophical reflection. And the most fertile part of that ground is thought to lie in the writings of H.L.A. Hart.

When Michael Bayles died in 1990, legal philosophy lost one of its most thoughtful critics. Although it lacks the vision of Hart’s most important contributions, Bayles’s work — and the present book is no exception — displays many of characteristic virtues of Hart’s writings: clarity, carefulness, insight, thoroughness, good sense, and more often than not, utter persuasiveness. One always knows when dealing with the work of Michael Bayles, exactly what the point is and exactly what is at stake. It is appropriate, therefore, that Michael Bayles’s final work in legal philosophy should be an exhaustive analysis of the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, a philosopher he greatly admired. Hart’s Legal Philosophy stands as a tribute to both men.

With one exception, Bayles’s book covers all the major areas of legal philosophy in which Hart made substantial contributions. The exception lies in Hart’s influential work (in collaboration with Tony Honore) on causation which, for some unknown reason, is left untouched. But all the other areas are surveyed. Bayles presents, discusses and largely defends Hart’s positions on the nature of law (positivism), the theory of rights (the protected choice theory), liberty and the enforcement of morality (contra the legal moralism of Lord Devlin), and responsibility and punishment (a broadly utilitarian account qualified by elements which stress the value of free choice and protection from the state). Included in Bayles’s critical survey are Hart’s views on Austin’s command theory (which according to Bayles is not as devastating as many have thought), natural law theory, the separation of law and morals, the nature of obligation, the internal point of view, and the theory of social rules. Bayles also provides an extensive analysis of Hart’s differences with Ronald Dworkin in an excellent chapter previously published in a slightly modified form in Law and Philosophy 10 (1991), 349-82. Entitled ‘Hart vs. Dworkin’, this, the most valuable chapter of the book, brings together into one coherent and enlightening picture, the observations and arguments of a number of critics — Hart included — who have written on ‘the Hart-Dworkin debate’. This debate has been confusing, partly because Hart nowhere provides an extensive, fully developed defence against Dworkin’s critique. At the time of his death Hart was working on such a
defence but, regrettably, it was never completed. The defence is slated to appear as an appendix to a new edition of The Concept of Law and should shed light on how Hart viewed Dworkin's challenge. But for the time being we must rest content with piecing together what a fully-fledged Hartian defence would look like based on Hart's scattered criticisms of Dworkin and the many articles written by others keen to fashion a response on Hart's behalf. Bayles displays a complete mastery of this varied material and presents it in a form which displays just how little of Dworkin's attack withstands a close critical scrutiny.

For those interested in a painstaking presentation, interpretation and defence of Hart's legal philosophy, this is a book to be recommended. Its scholarly attention to detail is remarkable. But in this attention lies its major fault. Missing is an overall assessment of Hart's philosophy and its contribution to wider developments within legal philosophy and philosophy generally. Bayles sometimes hints at some such assessment, particularly in his concluding paragraph. There he points out that underlying much of Hart's work is an emphasis on freedom of choice and protection from the state. This liberal emphasis is not hard to see in Hart's discussions of legal moralism and punishment. But as Bayles points out, it is evident in other discussions as well: in Hart's criticism of the Austinian command theory for ignoring power-conferring rules that facilitate people making their choices effective and achieving their ends; in his defence of legal positivism against natural law theory, a defence which continually emphasizes that settling what the law requires does not conclude one's choice about how to act; and in his protected choice analysis of rights and the early defence of a natural right to freedom. Had Bayles provided us with more along these lines, and a little less of the fine-grained analysis of Hart's argument which occupy most of the book, we might have learned a bit more about Hart and the vision which inspired his monumental contributions to the philosophy of law.

W.J. Waluchow
McMaster University
I wish I could have integrated *Understanding Non-Western Philosophy* into my courses long ago. Daniel Bonevac and Stephen Phillips have chosen excerpts of classics in non-Western philosophy and, according to the editors, the controlling principle for their choices is to present historically influential works that have shaped entire cultures. Not only does the collection succeed in this respect, but its sensible arrangement also well suits the work for adoption both as an introduction to non-Western philosophy and as a supplement to readings in the Western tradition. The strength of this collection lies in its versatility.

The work is divided into four parts, according to geographic region; each part is then subdivided into philosophical topics represented by specific thinkers and readings. Part I, Africa, is composed of three sections: Ancient Egypt, Enlightenment Ethiopia, and a section of contemporary perspectives. The African tradition is represented by such selections from the ethical literature of ancient Egypt as *The Instruction of Ptahhotep*, *The Instruction of Any*, *Song from the Tomb of King Inef*, *The Dispute between a Man and His Ba*, and *The Book of the Dead*. The editors chose excerpts from the *Treatise of Zera Zacob* and the *Treatise of Walda Heywat* to exemplify an Ethiopian Enlightenment, notable for its emphasis on the primacy of reason and the possibility of knowledge which also is characteristic of the early modern European era. Part I is rounded out by excerpts from Frantz Fanon’s widely known *The Wretched of the Earth*, and Kwasi Wiredu’s *Philosophy and an African Culture*, contemporary perspectives from the African philosophical community. Part II, representing West Africa, North Africa, and Spain, begins with readings in Platonism typified by Philo, Origen, and Augustine. Readings from Al-Kindi, Saadia, Algazali, and Maimonides represent the creation doctrines of this tradition; Part II concludes with the rationalist doctrines of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroës. Part III, Asia, is composed of reading selections that trace the development of the Śāmkhya thought through the *Upanishads*, *Bhagavad Gītā*, *Yogasūtra*, and the Śāmkhyakārikā. Works in the early Buddhist tradition, outlining such essential doctrines as the Four Noble Truths, the dharmas, the notion of causal interdependence, and the insubstantiality of the self are represented by *Majjhima-Nikāya*, *Visuddhi-Magga*, and *Milindapañha*. The central Jainist doctrines of *ahimsā* and *Sapta-Bhangi* are presented in selections from the *Acarāṅga Sūtra* and *Vādi Devasūri*. Doctrines of Nāgārjuna and Madhyamika Buddhism are presented in selections from Nāgārjuna’s *Averting the Arguments* and Candrakirti’s *Reasoning into Reality*, and Buddhist idealist writings are drawn from *The Suraṅgama Sūtra*, Dignāga’s *Alambā-
napariṣṭā, and Dharmakirti’s Nyāyabindu. The editors also include selections from several competing schools of thought: the Mīmāṃsā tradition is represented by a selection from Ślokavārttika, Carvaka skepticism is represented by a selection from the obscure compiler, Mādhava, and several selections typify the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta traditions. Part III concludes with selections from modern thinkers J.N. Mohanty and B.K. Matilal, both of whom use classical philosophies to address questions in the Western philosophical tradition. For instance, Mohanty relies on non-Western insights to inform his view of Ryle’s concept of consciousness. Part IV, East Asia, contains selections that solidly represent Confucianism, including selections from Confucius’s Analects, works from Mencius and Hsun Tzu, the Taoism of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, with critiques of rivals Yang Chu (from the Lieh Tzu), Mo Tzu and Wang Ch’ung. Chinese Buddhism is represented by readings from the idealist Hsuan-tsang, and the developer of Hua-yen philosophy, Fa-tsang. Readings from Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-Ming, and their critic, Wang Fu-chih, exemplify the Neo-Confucian tradition. Japanese Buddhism, specifically the Kyoto school, is represented by selections from Kitaro Nishida, D.T. Suzuki, and Keiji Nishitani.

In addition to well-represented and well-ordered selections of the non-Western tradition, the editors include a useful timeline of the life spans of both non-Western and Western thinkers; the work also includes a pronunciation guide, glossary of terms, and index. Although the readings are ordered according to geographic region, the editors offer suggestions for ordering readings topically; for instance, instructors can assign readings within such discrete topics as ethics, ontology, causality, philosophy of mind, or political philosophy. The editors also suggest how their collection can supplement readings in Western philosophy. For example, existentialism, the empiricist views of Berkeley and Hume, the rationalist views of Descartes, and epistemological and political views of Plato and Aristotle, are all assigned complementary readings in the non-Western tradition. Several twentieth century readings are included to suggest a breakdown of a strict dichotomy between Western and non-Western philosophy and, I suspect, to display to students a flourishing non-Western tradition and the benefits of applying non-Western insights to Western philosophical topics.

Bonevac and Phillips have undertaken the large task of providing a collection of introductory readings in non-Western philosophy, and with good result. I suggest, however, two amendments to a second edition. The course in non-Western philosophy that uses this work as its primary source would be helped by a stronger, more directed beginning section of readings. Part I, the ancient Africa portion, presents instructional and didactic ancient readings in counterpoint to modern readings. Although the general orientation is reasonable, by not demonstrating clearly the influence of these most ancient writings on succeeding cultures — within and beyond the African continent — the opportunity is lost for readers to investigate immediately the interconnections among philosophic strains in the non-Western tradition. In addition, although Bonevac and Phillips have chosen and arranged a broad
scope of readings, they might have allowed themselves perhaps fifty pages more to their weighty but not hefty work. Expanded introductions to each chapter which elaborate on a selection’s arguments, discuss its historic, cultural, and philosophic influence, and which offer comparisons to Western works and thinkers, would be particularly helpful for courses in which the edition complements study of the Western tradition.

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Thomas Brante, Steve Fuller, and William Lynch, eds.
Controversial Science: From Content to Contention.
Albany: State University of New York Press
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1473-6);

Controversial Science: From Content to Contention grew out of the 1990 Dubrovnik seminar in the sociology of science. It ‘is meant as something of a challenge to the reigning orthodoxy in the newly emerging field of science and technology studies (STS) …’ (vii). STS began as a collaboration of philosophers, historians, and sociologists who saw themselves as developing ideas about science first developed in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Characteristic of this field is the twin commitment ‘to an empirical understanding of science and technology as a social phenomenon’ and to a ‘strong renunciation of traditional normative themes of the role that science ought to play in society and a corresponding emphasis on “relativism” as an appropriate methodological stance for the STS practitioner’ (vii). While the authors of Controversial Science believe that ‘this was a good posture to adopt in order to break away from some misleading idealizations about the nature of science’ (vii), they lament the fact that ‘despite the mountain of case studies that STS has produced over the last two decades, the field has yet to articulate aspirations that go beyond this deflation of philosophical pretensions’ (ix). The present volume is offered as a next step.

The volume’s subtitle, From Content to Contention, picks up on a picture of science that is frequently noted in the STS literature but whose import is yet to be explored. ‘Science is not simply a calm core of reason, or “content”, that is surrounded by socially generated controversy, or “contention”' (viii);
it is run through with controversy. STS fails to recognize this, and so likewise misunderstands the extent to which both science and our picture of science are politicized.

Collections of essays are always difficult to review. This volume is no exception. Not only are there seventeen papers, but they are linked by little more than the conviction that STS is incomplete, and that scientific controversy is a useful angle from which to explore what more needs to be said. As STS is a diverse and loosely organized field, it is not surprising that critical engagements of it (such as one under review here) are similarly diverse. To best capture this volume’s breadth, therefore, I will restrict this review to a brief summary of each of the volume’s essays.

_Controversial Science_ comes in two parts. I take them up in turn. The first part, entitled ‘Contents: Critical Perspectives and Theoretical Proposals’, considers the structure of science. Half of these papers consider ways that STS practitioners might address normative questions in science, the other half explore tensions between science and society as a way determining the goals of science.

Julia Loughlin leads off the first part with ‘The Feminist Challenge to Social Studies of Science’, a piece which criticizes STS for not welcoming feminist understandings of science. She explains that STS speaks only for those groups represented in it. In failing to listen to feminist thinkers, STS amounts to little more than a gendered, classed, and raced attempt to service the status quo.

Sal Restivo argues in his ‘Science, Sociology of Science, and the Anarchist Tradition’ that STS’s attempts to reform science have not been guided by the larger goals of society, hence they have been superficial. Restivo offers a corrective. He claims that ‘human inquiry’ will flourish only in a social anarchy.

Frans Birrer says that we ought not to confuse criticisms of science with discussions of the social role of science. His ‘Counteranalysis: Toward Social and Normative Restraints on the Production and Use of Scientific and Technological Knowledge’, offers a two-tiered framework for 1) publically discussing the ends of science, and 2) criticizing science. He calls this framework ‘counteranalysis’. Its objective is to eliminate the damaging effects of science by evaluating the actions of scientists according to a democratic understanding of what is undesirable.

Ullica Segerstråle says that the basic problem with some of the new schools of sociology of science is the way in which they take philosophical problems to be actual problems for practicing scientists. In so doing, STS takes the explanations scientists give of their subject matter as data requiring explanation, instead of as potential explanations themselves. In her paper, ‘Bringing the Scientist Back In: The Need for an Alternative Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’, she explains how this must change.

The importance of ethical considerations for sociology is the theme of ‘Biotechnology and Ethics’, by Henk Verhoog. Verhoog engages normative issues surrounding genetic engineering to argue: 1) that we are obliged to
respect the well-being or intrinsic value of other living entities that feel pain; 2) that individuals take an active role in shaping the direction of science; and 3) that STS practitioners should help resolve the value disputes between the scientists they describe, instead of retreating to a value-relativism where each position is evaluated only according to its own internal standards.

Steve Fuller’s ‘A Strategy for Making Science Studies Policy Relevant’ defends the claim that science policy has no clear direction or mandate. He recommends that STS practitioners take a leading role in shaping such policy, so long as they first fashion a more systematic understanding of their own research interests.

In ‘Science as the Continuation of Politics by Other Means’ Aant Elzinga tells us that if science is kept relatively independent of politics, it can form the basis of an ‘epistemic regime’ which can play a leading role in resolving political disputes.

The last of the theoretical papers, ‘Close Encounters of the Third Kind: Science and the Context of Relevance’ by Peter Weingart, proposes to integrate epistemology and the sociology of science in what he calls a context of relevance. He argues that by exclusively emphasizing either the context of justification or the context of discovery, present discussions of science distort the ways in which knowledge claims are relevant only within cultural, economic, and political environments.

The second part of Controversial Science, entitled ‘Contentions: Empirical Studies of Controversies’, contains six empirical studies of controversy in science and one attempt to justify such work. While scientific controversies were once considered to be just ordinary public debates in which science played a determining role, STS now tells us that scientific controversies are more a matter of politics than science. Against both these perspectives, the authors of this section explain that science plays a central role in both the development and resolution of scientific controversies.

Thomas Brante opens this section with ‘Reasons for Studying Scientific and Science-Based Controversies’. He explains both why scientific controversies have not been the topic of sustained study, and why such controversies would be an extremely fruitful domain for philosophical and social scientific research.

Sune Sunesson examines the controversies surrounding the use of neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs and the purported dangers of high blood cholesterol in her ‘Comparing “Tool Controversies”: Science, Contexts, Institutional Power, and the Development of Medical Controversies’. She finds that these debates invariably turn on the significance of some scientifically designed ‘tool’, (understood here as either a drug or a technique).

In ‘Causal Stories, Scientific Information, and the Ozone Depletion Controversy: Intrusive Scenarios in the Policy Process’ Andrew Weiss advocates what he calls ‘intrusive scenarios’ — a narrative technique that uses science as a political tool to challenge the status quo.

In ‘Value Communities in Science: The Recombinant DNA Case’ Tibor Szanto examines a scientific debate and finds that science, rather than being
a solution to controversy, is often the problem around which controversy arises. In the DNA case, debate is a result of the common information being organized differently according to divergent value commitments.

Margarita Jeliazkova argues in 'The Image of Man in Sociobiology' that scientific controversy sometimes arises when scientists give answers to problems traditionally handled by the humanities. The most public example of this today is sociobiology, she says.

Rob Hoppe and Rob Pranger's 'Cultural Bias and Regulating Risky Technologies: The Dutch Debate on Regulating LPG-Related Activities' tells us that three autonomous 'policy belief systems' are the cause of most policy debates. Each system is characterized by the way in which it would govern a capitalist welfare state. While each system offers a strategy for solving the policy-problem, they do so only by promoting their own particular political culture.

The final paper, written by Randall Collins is 'Ethical Controversies of Science and Society: A Relation Between Two Spheres of Social Conflict'. By re-interpreting the history of science as primarily motivated by controversy, Collins is able to draw a number of radical conclusions: 1) truth is an ethical rather than an epistemological ideal for science; 2) scientists are therefore united only by a way of life; and 3) scientific controversies are typically resolved on technological grounds.

Controversial Science can hardly be called a philosophical work. For the authors of this volume, (with the exception of Weingart and perhaps Segerstråle), science has almost nothing to do with 'reason', 'realism' or 'truth' and almost everything to do with sociology and politics. The work is not without philosophical import, though. Many philosopher's will find the whole notion of 'controversy' a good lens through which to explore scientific practice. But in the end, however, I suspect that many more will find the essays too brief, and as a result, rather more like programmatic pieces than well worked out positions.

Robert Pierson
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This work is a textbook for courses on ethics in the biological sciences. It is a collection of essays complemented by the editors’ pedagogical contributions. The editors of this text correctly point out that ‘researchers’ difficulties over the past decade in sorting out the ethical questions involved in their work make a strong case for explicit teaching about these problems in the course of professional training’ (ix). Examples to substantiate this claim abound. For instance, an American researcher, shortly after announcing to the media that he had cloned a human embryo, responded to ethical inquiries by saying that he would leave those questions up to the ethicists. It is such a cavalier attitude that the editors want to challenge because, in their words, ‘the lack of systematic teaching about the nature of scientific discovery and the scientist’s life in the context of ethics, leads to ambiguity about the moral aspects of gathering, interpreting, and reporting evidence; the social responsibilities of science; and the personal obligations of scientists to their colleagues, their discipline, and themselves’ (x).

After the preface, the text begins with a brief historical overview of the evolving relationship between ethics and the biological sciences, ‘The Ethics Movement in the Biological Sciences: A New Voyage of Discovery’. Authored by one of the book’s editors, Stanley Joel Reiser, this essay traces the ethics movement from 1945 to the present. Reiser divides the movement into four phases: 1945-1966 (Fathoming the human subject), 1966-1974 (The social engagement of biological scientists), 1975-1989 (Challenges to the process of creating knowledge), and 1990-? (Turning toward institutionalizing ethical discourse). I found this essay to be very helpful and illuminating, especially in light of the recent revelation that the United States government, during the decades after World War II, had conducted experiments with radiation on people apparently without their informed consent. The debate in the United States over this matter is not whether the experiments took place, but rather, whether there were adequate ethical guidelines in place during the time of the experiments to which victims and/or their legacy can appeal in order to justify being awarded reparations. But as Reiser points out, in 1948 the Nuremberg Code was formulated in response to the Nazi atrocities and human experimentation. And following on the heels of that code was the Declaration of Geneva, a statement of post-war medical ethics. It seems, then, that these newly discovered victims and their families in the U.S. can appeal to the fact that ethical guidelines were in place during the time of the experiments.

This text is divided into ten parts, each part devoted to a particular topic. These ten parts consist of 35 essays, some of which are important policy
statements on professional ethics and conduct, such as the ‘Guidelines on Authorship’ by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, the Nuremberg Code, and the Declaration of Helsinki. Each part begins with the editors’s introduction, which summarizes the topic under discussion as well as the contributors’s essays, ending with a set of discussion questions and a supplemental reading list. Part I deals with the conceptual and social foundations of science. The roots of honor and integrity in science are the focus of Part II. In Part III the editors provide us with two essays discussing the important epistemological/ethical issue of self-deception in research. Expanding on the theme of Part III, Part IV deals with the responsible conduct of biological research, including essays on fraud and deception. One of the most interesting parts of this text is Part V, which concerns the ethics of authorship and publication, an issue which should concern everyone in the scholarly community.

Part VI deals with the question of research on human subjects. This part includes an essay by Rebecca Dresser which deals with an issue raised in June 1990 when the U.S. Congress’s General Accounting Office ‘revealed that despite a 1986 policy to the contrary, women continued to be seriously underrepresented in biomedical research study populations’ (162). This is an important article (though not entirely unproblematic) because it raises the question of whether the responsibility of researchers should include not only the individual on whom the experiment is conducted but also the larger community of persons. The use of animals in biological research is the focus of Part VII. This part includes an essay by medical ethicist Arthur Caplan. In Part VIII the editors provide us with essays which concern the work of the academic scientist. This part includes two sets of guidelines for researchers, one by the Faculty of Medicine of Harvard University and the other by the National Institutes of Health. Part IX deals with the possible ethical conflicts between science and industry. The scientist’s place in society is the topic of Part X. Included in this part is an important essay by Thomas H. Murphy dealing with the ethical issues raised by the human genome project.

As with all anthologies, one can think of an essay or topic which one would have liked to see covered. For instance, I would have liked to see sections on the ethical issues surrounding organ donation, the definition of death, and fetal tissue research, as well as a section on ethical theory. But I must defer to the editors of this text, who, unlike me, are working daily with students, faculty, and researchers in the biological sciences and are engaged in the noble task of passing on to their colleagues and pupils an ethical framework which they hope will result in both moral reflection and social responsibility. This is an outstanding book. I highly recommend it.

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Just as, Cowper's *The Sofa* notwithstanding, it is easier to write an epic poem on the fall of man rather than the fall of a pin, so it must be easier to create a *Festschrift* marked by power, wit and importance if the name it honours has produced work signally marked by those qualities. That, I think, explains the sheer quality of this collection, which is a model of what a tribute should be. That it is so is in the last resort a compliment to one who is not merely a philosopher of the first rank but who is also, on the evidence of the warmth of the affection, if not love, that shines through this volume, an outstanding human being.

Cohen, Guyer and Putnam have produced not only a worthy tribute to Cavell, but have done so in a work whose essays are often themselves of philosophical importance and which, moreover, show none of the signs of the routinely dutiful that sometimes marks acts of intellectual homage. Their own introductions set the scene with lucid expositions of Cavell's far-ranging philosophy. Notable here is the characterisation of the treatment of scepticism, not as something to be laid to rest by philosophical endeavour, but something to be lived with and to be ignored only at the cost of the diminution of ourselves and, as Cavell has shown in his exemplary readings of such plays as *King Lear*, at the possible cost of tragedy.

The *dramatis personae* of this collection, including as they do such names as Cohen, Guyer, Nussbaum, Sesonske, Conant, Gould, and Bates are themselves a guarantee that this is a book to take seriously, especially given that they have turned their very best efforts to the task of honouring one who has been an inspiration to them. Each of the essays in this work, indeed, repays study and I have a sense of unfairness that I must, if a mere catalogue is to be avoided, single certain essays out for comment. For, although I do not comment on them in any detail, I profited from the work of Conant, Bates and Batkin on Wittgenstein, and notably the discussion, sometimes centred around Kripke's controversial claims, of the role of scepticism in Wittgenstein's philosophy. I add, too, that I was moved by the manner in which Snyder talked of photography, Sesonske talked of narrative in film and Gould talked about poetry. As always I was enchanted by Cohen's wise humour and his sensitive exploration of the notion of community. When discussions in aesthetics bog down in the sterile debates about subjectivity and objectivity, it might be wise to remember that the ways in which we do and do not share our lives might not only be a happier area of investigation but might also throw light on the way in which aesthetic understanding is intimately related to questions about our knowledge of and relations to ourselves and others.

Because of my own interests and ignorances three essays gave me particular delight and instruction. The first was a memorable piece by Arnold David-
son on Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, written with an erudition and passion that were deeply impressive. This essay left me, if nothing else, quite simply better informed about Kant, Kierkegaard and Luther. But more than that it argued, I think with conclusive effect, that Kant's account of faith, and of the way in which reason does not depend upon the scriptures, is more coherent than Luther's might be. Moreover it contains a convincing argument that the belief that we can justify ourselves before God through acts of worship that have no moral content can be associated with a sad fanaticism.

Next I wish to mention an essay by Francis Dauer which studies a use of the imagination that falls between belief, on the one hand, and fantasy on the other: the kind of imagination we are referring to when we say 'She still pictures him as the young man she met at the prom'. I mention this essay in part because of an admiration of a writer who can expound a complex account with such an extraordinary lucidity, but also because the imagination of which Dauer speaks is something which, if understood, throws light on much discussed questions about representation and how it is possible for the creation of art to affect life. For the imagination of which Dauer speaks can, by awakening dormant beliefs in us, move us to action. Given the nonsense that is often talked about the way art affects life, it is refreshing to have so clear, so precise and so original an account of one of the ways in which that can happen.

Finally I mention the *tour de force* of Martha Nussbaum's reading of Seneca's *Medea* which, among very many other things, explores the challenge to Aristotelian's account of the virtues posed by passionate love. 'The message to the Aristotelian, is, then, that there is no combining deep personal love with moral purity' (336). Some revision of Aristotelianism seems to be required since 'Aristotle cares too much about self-sufficiency and rational control to admit love in all its terribleness' (337). Philosophers rarely write about the deep passions of erotic love. In comparison *Swann's Way* offers a hugely deeper analysis. For that reason Nussbaum's work is welcome, and additionally so because of its close attention to the text and its erudite contextualisation of that text in the debates of Stoic moral theory. If I have doubts about the account it is about the extent to which Nussbaum is not writing of love but of infatuation, a condition which is often mistaken for love by those suffering the pangs of passion (pangs that have an additional force when the passion is unrequited). However, whatever taxonomical distinctions there are to be made between love and infatuation, a possible failure to get these distinctions absolutely right does not seem to me to undermine Nussbaum's claim that Aristotelianism leaves something out.

My reader might think that I have spoken in overly glowing terms of this work. All I can do is commend that reader to the book. There will indeed be much that will provoke dissent and debate. But that is compatible with the belief that this is an utterly worthy tribute to an admirable man.

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This book attempts to give a theistic interpretation to the so-called anthropic cosmological principle first proposed by Ramsey Carter, and to thereby articulate a probabilistic version of the Design Argument. The book is divided into twelve chapters, an epilogue, and an appendix. There is a substantial index. Chapter 1 discusses the various versions of the anthropic cosmological principle. Chapters 2 and 3 sketch the historical background of teleological thought and modern physics against which the anthropic and ‘biocentric’ cosmological principles arose. Chapters 4 through 8 form the core of the book in which the main thesis is developed and defended. Chapter 4 presents a lengthy roster of ‘coincidences’ involving physical laws and initial conditions necessary for the possibility of life in the universe, while chapter 5 gives a theological interpretation of that evidence. Chapters 6 and 7 then attempt to rebut non-theistic interpretations of this evidence, while chapter 8 defends the legitimacy of inductive arguments for theism. The remaining chapters tie up some theological loose ends, such as whether intelligence or just life is the raison d'être of the Universe, whether the argument presented supports classical theism over process theism, and the relation between faith and reason.

A probabilistic design argument of this sort must meet three criteria. First, it must supply grounds for supposing a universe such as ours to be intrinsically improbable. Second, it must show that the sort of improbability involved calls for an explanation other than simply that an unlikely event has occurred. Third, given that a special explanation of the universe’s anthropic features is called for, a design argument must also show that a theistic explanation of these features is equal or superior to the non-theistic alternatives. The present book meets the first criterion in Chapter Four, and partially succeeds as regards the second, but fails in regard to the third. There are numerous flaws of which space permits only a small, representative sampling; but these should be enough to show that the book's value is mainly as a study in how not to base a design argument on ideas from contemporary cosmology.

As regards the second criterion mentioned above, Corey cites Stephen Jay Gould’s version of the objection that the improbability of our biocentric universe is not at all surprising, its being no more or less probable than any other particular universe that might have existed, and therefore in no need of any special explanation (Stephen Jay Gould, The Flamingo's Smile [New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1985] 395). Unfortunately, Corey latches onto a single phrase of Gould’s — ‘something has to happen’ — and misses the real
point of Gould’s argument while beating this phrase into the ground. He first points out that, according to Aquinas, nothing happens without God as its First Cause. He attempts to support this move with an appeal to a rather strong version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but there is little discussion of the latter’s validity, and not the slightest trace of irony about the seemingly question-begging quality of appealing to theistic presuppositions in an argument for theism. Indeed, he then goes on to accuse Gould of circular reasoning, arguing that ‘something has to happen’ only in a universe that already exists, so that this idea has no purchase when it is the existence of the universe itself that is under consideration (Corey, 159). This conflates two separate issues. Gould’s point is that, given some universe’s coming into existence, the set of physical constants that actually obtain seems as likely as any other set that might have obtained. That a universe with some set of physical constants happened to come into existence is not part of the explanandum to which Gould’s point applies. (For a more salient discussion of such probabilistic considerations, see the chapter on design arguments in George Schlesinger’s New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988]).

If, despite Gould’s misgivings, the special features of our universe do stand in need of some explanation, there are still several alternatives to a theistic interpretation of the Anthropic Principle. One of these is the Participatory Anthropic Principle, the idea that cosmogenesis is a quantum event entailing the (eventual) existence of observers to measure its effects. Corey’s rejoinder to this proposal is that since life itself could not have begun to exist until the universe was already about ten billion years old, the first two thirds of cosmic evolution cannot be explained by appeal to any observer other than God (Corey, 168). But this response ignores the implications of the ‘delayed choice experiment’ which constitute the main motivation for offering the Participatory thesis in first place. The results of the experiment seem to suggest that the way in which an observer chooses to measure a quantum event at a later time can and does influence the probability of what took place at an earlier time (this experiment is discussed by George Greenstein in The Symbiotic Universe [New York: William Morrow, 1988], 216-22). The extrapolation is thus that the presence of observers at some later point in its history is necessary for the universe to have come into existence at some earlier point. Needless to say, such a view is radical in the extreme, playing havoc with deep-seated intuitions about the temporal direction of causality, and it is on this point that the theistic cosmologist should take a stand. But Corey, through inattention to the actual character of the view under consideration, misses this vital opportunity.

An especially egregious example of Corey’s penchant for question-begging occurs on page 170:

Of course, there are those who argue that the ... seemingly uncontrived nature of the world is itself somehow evidence against the existence of a Grand Designer. Such an assertion is fallacious, however, for the
following reason: as long as we characteristically judge the overall contrived appearance of a given created object to be inversely related to the artist’s creative skill, then we must conclude that the creative work of a perfect Artist must itself seem perfectly uncontrived (in the sense of not appearing to be the deliberate handiwork of a conscious designer), and this is precisely what we observe to be true in the natural world. Thus, the seemingly uncontrived naturalness of the existing world is itself evidence for the existence of a Grand Designer!

Such unadulterated casuistry ought to bring a blush to the cheek of any self-respecting theist. Corey will have his conclusion any way he can get it. The burden of his entire book is to argue that the universe absolutely appears to be contrived, and that this appearance of contrivance is excellent evidence for theism. But he lets us know that if, for all he says to the contrary, the universe really appears utterly uncontrived, then that is evidence for theism as well!

One more flaw deserves special mention for sheer ludicrousness. The key premise in one of the book’s most carefully formulated arguments, appearing on pages 182 to 185, is ‘Murphy’s Law is applicable to all physical systems and to all stages of cosmic history’. Yes, Murphy’s Law. There is no indication that Corey ever stopped to ask himself what sort of law this is. Yet it is easy to see that Murphy’s Law is literally false. If we accepted Murphy’s Law as any sort of real law, then we would have to accept its contrapositive, namely, that for any X whatever, if some particular thing does not go wrong with X then that particular thing really couldn’t have happened. Few people are so optimistic about the world. One hates to be the bearer of bad news, but someone has to tell Corey that Murphy’s Law is only an aphorism.

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George Crowder
Classical Anarchism.

Anarchism was and is first and foremost a movement rather than a theoretical position — a sprawling, romantic and theoretically ill-defined movement. George Crowder’s Classical Anarchism is anything but a sprawling and romantic book and its theoretical focus is very tightly drawn. It is not a book for the ages and it is not the one book about anarchism you would want if you wanted just one book about anarchism. For long vacations or extended shipwrecks on desert islands take instead George Woodcock’s masterful
Anarchism (and keep Daniel Guerin’s Anarchism: from theory to practice with its very good introduction by Noam Chomsky on hand for less leisurely occasions). This is nonetheless a book which has something to offer the serious student of the anarchist tradition. In Dr. Crowder’s hands the anarchists become the true heirs of Stoicism and of the Enlightenment. Crowder argues that the central theme running through the anarchist tradition from Godwin to Kropotkin (and to some extent even to Murray Bookchin) is that in Bakunin’s words ‘the liberty of man consists solely in this: that he obeys natural laws because he has himself recognized them as such’ [God and the State, quoted by Crowder p. 125]. Crowder finds three strands to this idea: 1) that moral norms are not invented but discovered through scientific study of nature and society 2) that the most important norm for human beings is to develop the capacity for self-directed action in accord with what science shows us to be our good and 3) that the forces which stand in the way of this are government, capital and religion. That the anarchist tradition opposes government, capital and religion is no surprise; that it does so to clear the way for a society of Stoic sages is somewhat more surprising. Even when we remember that the Stoic sage was the one who lived in accord with nature the air of paradox may remain. It is the aim of the book to dispel that air.

Crowder finds three sources of anarchism. The first of these — mentioned but not far explored — is the long tradition which holds that freedom is self-mastery and more precisely the mastery by Reason over the rest of the human being. Crowder finds the origins of this tradition in Plato and its development in a long line of thinkers from the Stoics to Kant and Hegel. The second source is J.J. Rousseau and the third is the enlightenment confidence in the triumph of science. Having identified these three sources, Crowder proceeds to show them at work in Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin. The result is a series of portraits, each interesting but together all-too-clearly painted by the same numbers. In the great struggle between formalist and narrative styles of political philosophy Crowder tries irritatingly, to have it both ways. He lays the same conceptual grid over each of the writers he studies but then treats them in chronological order as if telling us the story of the development of a tradition. Classical Anarchism began as a Ph.D. thesis and here it shows its lineage. It shows it too in the way in which the secondary literature is treated — often as if to convince the examiners that the secondary literature has been mastered. Fortunately most of it has been — and much of the primary literature too, especially where Godwin and Proudhon are concerned. Crowder has new and interesting things to say about Godwin’s debt to Rousseau and about Proudhon’s intellectual development.

As an historical work Classical Anarchism is best when dealing with Godwin. Because he is convinced that all the figures he studies think that social progress will be achieved principally through progress in scientific understanding and because he employs a very conventional notion of scientific understanding as the formulation of theory Crowder seems unable to
conceive of a coherent role within the tradition for the revolutionary practice. This matters little for Godwin and only a bit more for Proudhon but it matters a lot for Bakunin and Kropotkin. Kropotkin suffers especially because it is he, especially, who conceives of the kind of first-hand knowledge gained on the job or in confrontational politics as also scientific knowledge. Crowder is also innocent of much of what is going on in Kropotkin's work on evolutionary theory and the role within it of Mutual Aid. Within the late twentieth century debates about sociobiology Kropotkin's work takes on a new, if seldom appreciated, importance. Crowder ignores all this and thus gives the book a slightly dated air.

Crowder's central thesis is that classical anarchism embodies the ideas involved in following an objective social and moral law of one's own free will. A minor theme in the book is that anarchism embodies these ideas more consistently than does (say) classical liberalism. Crowder does suggest that the classical anarchists have underestimated the positive role government might play in providing favourable conditions for moral self-direction but he maintains throughout the book that the anarchist case is compelling relative to its philosophical assumptions. Yet while he thinks that classical anarchism has somewhat the better of the argument with classical liberalism relative to their shared foundation in Enlightenment ethics and social theory, he also thinks that that foundation is no longer tenable. Hence the debate between the anarchists and their statist opponents has to be reopened along new lines and anarchism itself will have to be formulated anew if it is to speak to us. Despite this somewhat deflationary conclusion Crowder grants anarchism an extraordinary theoretical victory. If he is right then the evaluative assumptions which lie at the heart of the Western social tradition point directly to anarchism and the only truly serious challenges to anarchism are challenges to these assumptions themselves!

Crowder takes up in his final chapter both the philosophical questions surrounding his thesis and the question of the future of anarchism. One major concern of the chapter is to argue that we can no longer take seriously the idea of an objective moral law accessible to reason because we have seen the validity of the fact/value distinction. Here the book is little more than handwaving. Far from being something we can take for granted, the fact/value distinction and the related issues about the relation between ethics and science are among the most controverted and most difficult areas of contemporary philosophy. Crowder does a service by forcefully pointing out that the classical anarchists thought we could discover moral truth and that these discoveries would be accepted by all appropriately disposed. But what kind of truth moral truth is and what kind of conditions have to be in place for it to be accepted are deeper and larger questions. There is a growing sense among contemporary philosophers that evaluative and descriptive languages are more closely connected than the classical analytic tradition has supposed and that science and ethics are not two radically different domains after all. This was always Kropotkin's claim and here he may yet have much to teach us. It is Crowder and not the anarchists who here seems oddly out of date.
Although he thinks classical anarchism to have foundered on our rediscovery of moral relativism, Crowder sees some future for anarchism. He looks on the one hand to Colin Ward’s efforts to work out a theory of anarchist activity on a local scale within and about existing social institutions and on the other hand to Murray Bookchin’s effort to argue that only anarchism can provide a political foundation for the ecological movement. These are interesting ideas and it is disappointing that more is not said about them. Crowder seems to have wanted to avoid presenting a merely historical study but what he offers us here is little more than teasing.

This book is certainly not a ‘must read’ but it does suggest connections between the anarchist tradition and the larger history of ethical and political thought which might not have otherwise come to mind and it will teach you new things about Godwin. There is a practical lesson in the book too. Contemplating the Can. $74.50 price Oxford has placed on its 208 pages may well help one see the force of Proudhon’s dictum that property is theft.

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Louis Dupre
Passage to Modernity.
Pp. x + 300.

Dupre’s evocative erudite book provides a comprehensive religious reflection on the roots of modernity, a tale told between the 14th and 17th centuries (11). Although Dupre indicates that this work is an incomplete essay, he has nonetheless charted a vast territory that has not been explored in such a synoptic and penetrating manner.

Disagreeing with Lowith, agreeing with Blumenberg, Dupre maintains that modernity is unique. It is not a slimmed down version of Christianity. Instead a profound discontinuity exists between the premodern and the modern. Modernity’s originality stems from its early manifold layers comprising Late Medieval Nominalism and Renaissance Humanism. To verify this thesis Dupre undertakes a hermeneutic retrieval of the themes of nature and transcendence which formed modern culture.

The central notion anchoring Dupre’s work is that of form. In the Greek cosmos, form united the factors of transcendence and immanence, thus defining being, and expressing the ancient synthesis of the divine, cosmic,
and human (24). Although Christianity questioned the origin of form, although the individual form of Christ stands in tension with Greek universal form, both Greeks and Christians affirmed the transcendence and integrating power of form for culture and nature.

However, Nominalistic voluntarism, rising from the doctrine of the absolute power of God, destabilized Greek form, splitting apart the orders of grace and nature. Dupre locates the disintegration of the Medieval synthesis in the Nominalistic severance of the bond between Creator and creation. Philosophically Nominalism separated the word from its object. The interior word (verbum mentis) no longer expressed the nature of the thing, instead it became an empty sign about the thing, composing a separate order of signs (103). (This is the remote nominalistic origin of Derrida’s doctrine of signifiers.) Crucially, this presaged the alienation of mind from being, and the breakdown of the ontotheological synthesis of form.

In a more positive light Dupre proposes that Nominalism broke open a linguistic space for Renaissance creativity, albeit a religious space, since the human word of the poet participated in the divine logos. Consequently the creative individual in early Humanism, while attempting to unify culture under a rhetorical ideal, remained within the fold of Being (111).

Dupre’s book is a poignant description of various efforts to deal with nominalism’s divisive effects. The 12th century recovery of the form of the Incarnation as all-inclusive, transforming both nature and culture, supplied a paradigm for these efforts. For the Incarnation substantiated the integrity of nature, giving birth to a Christian naturalism (33-4). To restore the integrity of nature in the face of Medieval Dualism some grafted Christianity onto Neoplatonism or Stoicism. Hence the novel stress on divine immanence in the various Renaissance systems of pantheism. The Early Renaissance Humanists sacralized nature, revealing its divine dimension (58). According to Dupre, the Renaissance experienced a constructive tension between nature and the mind (50). But Renaissance attempts at integration were doomed because the problem they faced — the separation of nature from grace, and immanence from transcendence — was specifically Christian. Its resolution had to be Christian.

Now mixing negative Nominalistic voluntarism with Renaissance creativity liberated the self from the context of Being, creating the culture of modernity (3, 11). The self came to see itself as a subject set over against a world of objects. Separated from Being, mind lost the experience of transcendence, which for Dupre, is the pivotal factor in overcoming dualism. The Humanists still strove to integrate culture based on form, but their form lacking an ontological context, degenerated into the formalism of an isolated subjectivity. What ensued was the opposition between mind and nature in modernity.

The Baroque period made one final attempt at a cultural synthesis overcoming nominalistic dualism. It intuit ed that there was no disincarnate solution to the problem of dualism. Genuine transcendence must unite both nature and grace in one order: a gratuitous nature. The art of the Baroque
expressed this inclusive spiritual vision, so establishing a continuity between the Renaissance and the Baroque, since both focused on form: one upon creative form; the other upon dramatic form (238).

However there is a dark quality about the Baroque. It embraced conflicting extremes, creating a precarious synthesis. In this finite order, truth and illusion need each other, as apparently do integration and disintegration (241, 244). Dupre seemingly admits that finite form cannot receive the divine content in a stable manner. The ontotheological synthesis of the divine, cosmic, and human, appears inherently unstable. Paradoxically the extremes threatening stability constitute the very depths of the Baroque and of human life (245).

In a Platonic mood Dupre remarks that only the Good beyond Being can complete Being (143). One is tempted to add the friendly amendment that only a transcendent God beyond the Good completes it. In this light, finite forms become transcendent by symbolizing the trans-finite form of the Incarnation. Consequently ontology and theology beckon us beyond the hermeneutical gains of the present work. One suspects that ontology, for Dupre, culminates in theology. Form is ontotheological; the present work places us at the edge of hermeneutics, facing the ontotheological quest.

Dupre’s emphasis on form, specifically the factor of transcendence embracing immanence, reveals the sacred dimension of the secular, so crucial for the integration of grace and nature and culture. However more explanation of the failure of form as an integrating factor in Medieval Nominalism is required. This failure casts a shadow on Dupre’s claim that theology, in the broadest sense, must be the foundation of culture (248). Can an ontotheology of form disclose the most comprehensive and appropriate form for human life? (See H. Urs von Balthasar The Glory of the Lord.)

Further was there ever an integral Christian humanism? But Dupre argues, not so much for its complete actuality, as for the dynamic potentiality that would permit us to recover an attitude open to the transcendent, and so allow for a modest mending of our own fragmentary world. This new wholeness demands a continual rethinking of transcendence, which is essential for the integration of nature and culture and grace. The danger we face is the possibility that eternal fundamental truths rooted in an all-inclusive integrating form are not expressible in our labile modern context (237)!!

Dupre does not examine the Enlightenment, judging it to be a ‘second, less fundamental transformation’ (253). While this may be true, the Enlightenment’s purported secondary status is still significant. Arguably it is the Enlightenment which supplies the optics to engage in an hermeneutical recovery of nature and culture. But pre-Enlightenment modernity, for Dupre, had already revealed a form of spirituality which disclosed the mind as actively relating to Being. Change, wrought by free human beings, changes Being. Indeed, in the wake of the Enlightenment, according to Dupre, the development of the modern principle of subjectivity has been one-sided (251-2). A deeper more receptive side, which the early moderns were sensitive
to, remains unexplored. Consequently we are still on our voyage to modernity; we have not yet arrived at post-modernity.

What Dupre set out to do he has done well. He has furnished a capacious vision of the life of the modern mind. With a disciplined openness to the totality of experience, he has made possible a mystical glimpse of the intimations of unity in the natural and cultural world of modernity.

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William Gay and T.A. Alekseeva, eds.
US $58.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7829-6);

The alienation between Russia and America is gradually beginning to disappear. One of the signs of this process is the publication of the first co-operative book of American and Russian philosophers devoted to the global questions of the modern world.

According to William Gay, one of the editors of this collection, it was not easy to publish this manuscript because of the many technical obstacles. Thanks to the tenacity of T.A. Alekseeva, another editor, and of course Mr. Gay himself, they nevertheless managed to assemble ‘under one roof’ the most competent philosophers and publish their joint efforts.

The essays in this collection address the following themes: 1) The Status of Political Realism; 2) The Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Alternative Approaches to Security; 3) The Prospects for the Left and for Russia in the Post-Cold War World; 4) Traditional and Emergent Values within Russian Society.

The authors are unanimous in their criticism of Realpolitik which denies morality in the conduct of domestic and international politics. Laura D. Kaplan (University of North Carolina at Charlotte) and Joseph C. Kunkel (University of Dayton) devoted their essays to this problem. Canadian philosopher Bob Litke (Wilfred Laurier University) considers that power as a domination in the concept of Realpolitik could defeat us. To counterbalance the concept of power he suggests creating ‘a general theory of restraints’ (76). For the Americans, this type of criticism has become traditional. The Russians see the problem of morality in politics as a new theme for discussion.
From the school bench, we Russians knew very well that 'politics cannot be done with white gloves' (Lenin). In modern Russia, politicians still do not think about morality. It is therefore encouraging to see such Russian philosophers as I. Kravchenko begin to tackle this problem, siding with Hobbes and Leo Strauss as opposed to Karl Schmitt. Incidentally, all Russian philosophers mentioned here are members of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow.

The same theme is touched upon during the discussion of the Nuclear Deterrence theory. Ron Hirschbein (California State University at Chico) examines the conflict between the declared American nuclear policy and their real policy. In spite of the break up of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons remain and, moreover, continue to be developed. Hirschbein explains this 'surrealistc' phenomenon by the psychological orientations, and political intentions, of the American leaders. In the opinion of N.S. Yulina, the theory and practice of reliance on nuclear weapons are founded on human 'aggression as natural', theoretically justified by social Darwinism and Hobbesian political rationality.

This theory, however, does not bear in mind that the instinct for survival '...embraces not only an egoistic struggle for power but also altruism, co-operative efforts, and sacrifices' (106). The development of these aspects of human nature allows Yulina to be optimistic about achieving a complete ban on, and elimination of, nuclear weapons. Another Russian philosopher, V.S. Stiopin, putting forward the concept of 'technogenic' civilisation, calls for a search for a strategy of non-violence that, to his mind, is 'not just a good dream, but the paradigm of human survival' (147).

William Gay (University of North Carolina at Charlotte) puts forward interesting ideas to solve the same problem. He proposes to replace the theory of 'military defence' with the 'concept of “civilian defence”'. He proves that the latter is no less effective for defending security than the former (124).

The problem of the future of socialism is analyzed by V.M. Merzuev. His perception is that socialism as a total sum of ideas should not necessarily be tied to Bolshevik experiments in the USSR. Socialism and liberalism have similar historical roots and refract in practical politics into the common problem of 'freedom and equality'. In Merzuev's opinion, there is every reason to think that 'with the modernization of Russian society, interest in the goals and ideals of socialism will increase' (162). Dick Howard (State University of New York at Stony Brook) analyses close interconnections between democracy and totalitarianism. Based on the practices of the 1960s Left Wing, and theoretical concepts of Marx and Rosa Luxemburg, he writes: 'Totalitarianism is not beyond democracy; it is immanent within the logic of democracy ...' (187). He persuasively shows the shortcomings of both systems. Hence, relying on the principle of rights, or of the right to have rights, Marx's approach to democracy also has the right to exist.

The essay of T.A. Alekseeva deals with Russian nationalism, while comparing the Russian empire and the Socialist empire, that is to say, the USSR. After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union the main problem became that of the 'identification' of the Russian people. This one became the impetus
of splashes of different nationalistic currents within Russian society. At present the future of Russia depends on 'what type of nationalism will prevail' (209). V.I. Tolstykh, referring to great Russian writers and philosophers, contends that traditional Russian culture includes global human values. Those reflected in 'the Russian idea' may yet have to enrich the world.

James Sterba (University of Notre Dame) lectured a lot in the Soviet Union and Latvia and, to his surprise, discovered that women of those countries were disinterested in feminism. However, he feels that recently there has been some development in that direction. This may appear to be true, but I have doubts that the feminist movement will fully develop, at least in Russia. I would only like to express my hope that Russian women will preserve their femininity and beauty.

L.N. Mitrokhin focuses on the tradition of Christianity in Russian society that survived even under socialism. This tradition will remain 'as a base of future culture' (238), but it will be enhanced by 'cosmism' — the assumption about the special place of human consciousness in the Universe — that has had strong support in Russian tradition.

The most valuable aspect of this collection is that each essay provokes a polemic and provides a basis for discussion. I think this should be the purpose of all scientific writings.

Alex Alraf (Rafik Aliev)
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Alvin I. Goldman
*Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science.*
Pp. xiii + 182.
US $44.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-8039-1);

This book provides an excellent service to philosophers unfamiliar with cognitive science by informing them of recent empirical research relevant to various philosophical disciplines. Although a broadly empiricist orientation is common in contemporary philosophy, Goldman's project takes this approach one step further.

Goldman includes chapters on the applications of cognitive science to epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and ethics. In each case Goldman provides a brief introduction to the field (more suitable for philosophical novices than practicing philosophers or graduate
students), followed by an account of some relevant cognitive science research. Perhaps more in the tradition of cognitive science than philosophy, Goldman has generally chosen to take a descriptive, rather than critical, approach. The exception to this rule appears in the middle chapter which deals with the philosophy of mind.

In this chapter, Goldman first briefly covers some of the areas one would expect to find in an introductory philosophy of mind course (dualism vs materialism of various sorts) before concentrating on two important areas of interaction between cognitive science and philosophy of mind — functionalism and folk psychology. Goldman argues that consideration of first-person attributions of mental states, particularly sensations such as headaches, suggests that functionalist interpretations of folk psychology ought to be discarded in favour of a more Cartesian conception in which the intrinsic properties of mental states are introspectible, since none of the relational or dispositional properties of an agent’s mental states appear to be accessible to that agent. Broadly speaking, Goldman’s argument here is a species of qualia-based objections to functionalism.

Goldman then considers the issues of how we ascribe mental states to, and predict the behaviour of, other people. Goldman cites empirical evidence which suggests that the popular functionalist model (known as the ‘theory-theory’), which presents folk psychology as somewhat like a scientific theory, is wrong, thus depriving Churchland-style eliminativism of an essential first assumption. The rejection of eliminativism which follows from this falsification paves the way for realism about propositional attitudes based on the ‘simulation-theory’. Goldman’s contribution to this debate is clear and concise, but ultimately does not offer the reader a definitive solution, as the empirical evidence offered in support of the simulation-theory is far from conclusive.

In the other chapters much is made of the empirical nature of many philosophical questions. We learn that epistemology needs to re-orient itself around the recognition that people are not, in general, rational, and perhaps they cannot be. Studies of memory suggest that knowledge is not a simple relation — we can know something and yet have only intermittent and partial access to this knowledge. Since rationality in part depends on acting in accordance with our knowledge, assessment of rationality must take account of the different ways in which we have knowledge.

In the chapter dealing with philosophy of science Goldman explains that the theory-ladenness of scientific observation is in part denied by modular theories of mental functioning, while the innateness of numerical knowledge finds some confirmation in experiments with infants. Goldman suggests that aspects of the metaphysical problem of essence might be dissolved by the discovery that our intuitions about essential properties can be explained in psychological terms, thus undercutting the evidence supporting realism about individual essences. The ontological status of colour might also be determined by evidence from cognitive science about what physical facts translate into colour identifications.
The application of cognitive science to ethics helps in understanding moral language. The observation that concepts appear to be structured around exemplars or prototypes, rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, suggests that the traditional attempts to analyse moral concepts in terms of such conditions will not conform to our moral intuitions, since actual moral strictures could have evolutionary, anthropological and psychological explanations, and thus not follow from a unified concept of what is moral. Utilitarian theories are shaken by the discovery that people are apparently bad (or at least inconsistent) judges of their own happiness and well-being, suggesting a practical difficulty in utilitarian calculations.

My lingering concern is that Goldman merely presents empirical evidence that has bearing on philosophical ideas, rather than exploring in depth the consequences of the connections he has made. Normative philosophy of various sorts — epistemological study of rationality and right reason, philosophy of science’s worries about the theory-ladenness of observation, metaphysical investigation of what ontology we ought accept, ethical accounts of morality — appears to be undercut by descriptions — descriptive accounts of the causes of irrationality, of how observation actually works, of the psychological basis of our ontological intuitions, and of the inconsistency in the use of concepts such as happiness. What is missing is an explicit acknowledgement that philosophy is about more than understanding human psychology. While this book will be a useful tool for philosophers, I'd be concerned if it were a student’s only introduction to philosophy, as it presents philosophy as little more than a highly speculative study of cognition whose errors are readily corrected by empirical study.

Nonetheless there is much of value here. The bigger project, only just begun in this work, is to bring philosophy to a recognition of some of its empirical constraints. Many more topics of philosophical interest are addressed in this work than I have mentioned here, and I recommend this book as a useful starting place for philosophers interested in exploring the results of cognitive science.

Hugh Clapin
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This book is not easy to characterize, because it does not fit neatly into any standard category of moral philosophy. It is a contribution to the growing field of virtue ethics; a critical synopsis of some of the major currents in moral philosophy today; a recovery of American pragmatism, especially Dewey, as an ethical tradition; and an effort to justify moral pluralism as a mediating position between moral absolutism and relativism. With such a broad sweep, G runs the risk of appealing to many and satisfying no one.

G's main argument is that moral philosophy needs a radical reorientation, because the abstractions of moral philosophers fail to engage the subject matter, moral life, that give ethical theory its pertinence and moral direction its relevance (11). The purpose of moral philosophy is not the maintenance of academic conventions, but the pursuit of a 'usable moral world view' (28). Thus, what is important for moral philosophy is not moral theory, abstractions, models, etc. but the moral life itself: the actual values, conflicts, ambiguities, and resources resident in human life for moral living (31, 40). The sources of moral direction and aspiration are found in moral living, not in moral theory (65). With wide ranging analysis, G carries out this project of discerning and appropriating these resources, arguing as he does so that he is returning moral philosophy to its purpose of understanding the fundamental character of human perplexities and ambitions. Only in reference to the conditions of ordinary everyday living can moral philosophy regain the vitality and pertinence lost in its ivory tower (29) and return it to a subject matter of consequence (25).

G develops his thesis in five interlocking arguments. Chapter two sets up the ground of inquiry, the human condition from which arise moral interests. G argue that the fundamental moral interest is the relationship of man (sic) and the world. The distinctive activities of human existence, knowing, valuing, aspiring, cooperating, struggling, fearing and rejoicing, is the distinctive starting point of philosophy engaged in understanding the human condition (65). In the next three chapters, G sets up the multi-dimensional understanding of the moral life in conversation with the major preoccupations of contemporary moral philosophy. He argues that the moral life (i.e. moral understanding) is simultaneously cognitive ('knowing and valuing'), intersubjective ('moral judgment and discourse'), and interpersonal ('moral relations'). The pivotal chapter, 'Moral Philosophy and Human Nature', is more a plea than a sustained argument for renewed attention to be given to philosophical anthropology, because 'understanding the ways of man (sic) ... is understanding the most critical factors of the moral condition' (191).

G believes that his presentation of the conditions for moral life are sufficient to allow him to use it to evaluate 'typical' ethical theories such as
Kant, Rawls, Habermas, and Rorty, in terms of their ignorance of the moral condition. He argues, ‘A philosophy that obscures such conditions is of no help in the moral life’ (280). Nothing is more threatening of our endeavors than to disregard, wilfully or not, the lessons, efficacies, and possibilities or moral existence. Inquiry into the conditions of life ... is an invaluable constituent of moral philosophy and the moral life’ (282). Thus, G argues, he has demonstrated that moral theory is not just wrong, but prejudicial simplifications of moral living.

In the last chapter, ‘Ways of Life’, G turns to the final movement of his ambitious program to reconstruct moral philosophy by setting forth the virtues that are most suitable for contending with the moral condition (287). These are rationality, courage and respect for persons. Such virtues, G argues, are suited for the processes of moral life in all of their variation, uncertainties, and demands. Virtues do not yield an ultimate rational principle or a moral system, but an efficacious way of life that supports, fosters, and maintains a humane living (325-6).

There are many problems with this book. First, while G is very conversant with the broad sweep of literature, he is not always fair with the issues. For example, his treatment of Habermas does not appreciate that Habermas’s concern is with the ‘rules’ for public discourse in situations of actual and potential conflict. Moreover, G does not acknowledge that ‘ways of life’ regularly do conflict and a virtuous ‘good will’ does not in itself provide a means of solving difficult public conflicts and debates. G is prone to broad sweeping generalizations without adequate support. For example on p. 32, he argues that James, Dewey and Santayana are ‘non-existent’ in the 20th century literature on this history of ethics. While he does pick five good representatives of this literature, a quick survey of the volumes in my library provided ample references to all three. There are large lacunae in G’s work. He ignores the recent literature on justification debate. He is not conversant with Habermas’s recent work in ethics or the communicative-communitarian debate in Europe. For the most part, G identifies the classical position in moral philosophy with deontological and utilitarian theories. However, except for A. MacIntyre and M. Waltzer, he ignores the communitarian position, which bears some resemblance to his own, and their dialogue in the justification and verification debates.

G’s book, however, has value. First, he has skill in reducing complex debates, like the fact-value debate, to simple, but not simplistic terms, and summarizing major positions within the debate. This synoptic skill helps those who are not familiar with the territory get a grasp of the subject in short order. For example, I would use his chapter on the fact-value debate with upper class undergraduates to initiate a study of the fact-value problem. For the professional philosopher, G provides a set of arguments that are clearly presented, elegantly stated, and coherently argued in a way that sets up a genuine conversation, but I do not believe that he will advance anyone’s particular project in moral philosophy. His argument is too far ranging, inadequately nuanced, and too often invective, vituperative, and promoting
a neo-conservative agenda. In the last analysis, one concludes that G's book is not successful in either providing a 'usable moral world view', or adequately grounding a reorientation of moral philosophy.

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M.E. Hawkesworth

Beyond Oppression:
Feminist Theory and Political Strategy.

Any feminist committed to a transformational politics based on the complex relationship of race, sex and class and aimed at eradicating all forms of domination will find Beyond Oppression disappointing. It is disappointing insofar as Hawkesworth writes from an unacknowledged liberal perspective where patriarchal domination is ultimately reduced to prejudice (to be overcome through rational argumentation), and where an oppressive state is ultimately reduced to the unequal representation of men and women (to be overcome by instituting equal representation). It is also instructive. Situating herself beyond all existing feminist frameworks, Hawkesworth includes an excellent critique of liberalism which can be applied to her own solutions to oppression. Furthermore, although alternative feminist perspectives are not always fully explicated, more radical visions and strategies than Hawkesworth herself adopts are discussed in some detail. Finally, in hoping 'to capture the allegiance of a popular majority' (14), Hawkesworth provides arguments that could be valuable in persuading nonfeminist readers to reconsider their views on gender relations.

In the first two chapters Hawkesworth's efforts are directed towards 'defending the feminist project against its detractors' (12). This involves examining misconceptions of gender in political theory (from Plato to Derrida) and criticizing feminist responses that fall short of dispelling those misconceptions. The social consequences of gender misconceptions discussed in chapter two include undervaluing women, creating the illusion of equality, and perpetuating various forms of violence against women (what Hawkesworth terms 'persistent harms'). Hawkesworth's summary of harms is likely to bore the feminist reader who needs no convincing of the prevalence of harms such as rape. Assuming readers who believe equality is already a
reality could be persuaded to read a feminist text with the word oppression in the title, such readers would certainly find this chapter challenging. (On the tendency to deny inequality, see M. Cully, ‘Anger and authority in the introductory Women’s Studies classroom’, in M. Cully and C. Portuges, eds. *Gendered Subjects: The Dynamics of Feminist Teaching*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.)

In chapters three and four Hawkesworth examines explanations for women’s oppression that demarcate theoretical differences among feminisms, and presents four types of feminist rhetoric that ‘transcend theoretical differences’ (111). Despite a tendency to reduce explanations of oppression to theories of the origin of patriarchy, Hawkesworth’s discussion of both insights and defects is well done. Associating herself with none of the feminist theories discussed, Hawkesworth claims the causes of oppression are multiple and that no single explanation leads to a solution capable of addressing ‘intergenerational’ equity and the distinctive problems of sexual, racial, and class inequality’ (108). Similarly, Hawkesworth distances herself from the four feminist rhetorics, those of oppression, of difference, of reason, and of vision, exposing their strengths and weaknesses but claiming none of them are sufficient to an adequate feminist politics. And why not? Because they ‘may not pose as great a threat to patriarchal conceptions of gender, nor provide as solid a foundation for politicization as feminists may wish’ (129). These two chapters suggest Hawkesworth will propose a feminist theory more radical than the existing models, one capable of overcoming all social inequalities and effectively subverting patriarchal institutions and practices.

In a very slightly revised version of an earlier essay (‘Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth’, *Signs* 14, Spring 1989), Hawkesworth argues in chapter five that ‘a critical feminist epistemology can identify, explain and refute persistent androcentric bias ... without privileging a putative “woman’s” perspective and without appealing to problematic conceptions of “the given”’ (133). Rejecting epistemologies based on assumptions of a woman’s standpoint or of empirical givens, Hawkesworth seeks to preserve important insights of postmodernism by adopting a conception of ‘cognition as a human practice’ (133). Feminists are urged to adopt this conception, although Hawkesworth explains (unconvincingly) in a footnote that ‘limitations of space’ preclude thorough exploration of the concept (readers are referred to Alastair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* and Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism* among others). The epistemological assumptions of cognition as a human practice recommended are: 1. there is no unmediated knowledge (facts are contestable); 2. there is no transparent subject (the self is ‘an unstable constellation of unconscious desires, fears, phobias, and conflicting linguistic, social, and political forces’); and 3. there is no privileged mode of rationality (141-3). In contrast to the uncited postmodern thinkers accused of sliding into relativism (146), Hawkesworth argues a critical feminist epistemology should be nonrelativist. She must therefore claim that truths must be argued for, facts being contestable, human beings complex and fallible, and modes of reasoning multiple.
Hawkesworth’s epistemology appeals to me insofar as it affirms the need to argue for beliefs rather than presupposes agreement. But I am puzzled when she argues that ‘objective grounds upon which to distinguish between truth and falsity’ exist, that ‘standards ... allow us to distinguish between partial views (the inescapable condition of human cognition) and false beliefs’, and that ‘standards of evidence ... and norms of truth ... inform such distinctions’ (146-7). Does Hawkesworth not presuppose the agreement her epistemology assumes is to be achieved?

The question I share with feminist critic Debra Shogun (‘Comment on Hawkesworth’s “Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth”, Signs 15, 1990) is, given the contested nature of facts, the instability of human subjectivity, and the variety of modes of reasoning, how much weight can be placed on feminists’ ability to convince the unconvinced that our arguments are more rational? If we inhabit a world where standards of evidence and norms of truth have been established by a privileged few to their benefit (intended or not), what justifies Hawkesworth’s belief they will concede the superiority of feminist arguments, however astutely or persistently they are made? In her chapter on rhetoric, Hawkesworth chides liberal advocates of the rhetoric of reason for believing in ‘a set of objective facts that everybody could see if they just tried hard enough’ (121). But how different is her rhetoric? Moreover, if, as Hawkesworth suggests, patriarchal prejudice operates ‘through language and custom [to] mold individual attitudes at a preconscious level’ (122), and if appeals to a woman’s standpoint are illegitimate, why should we expect women would be more likely than men to take feminist claims seriously (183)?

Hawkesworth has high hopes that feminists can ‘use knowledge and rational argumentation ... to transform oppressive institutions and practices’ (148). Dismissing liberal feminist strategies of social change for legitimizing a ‘hierarchically organized society’ that entrenches social and economic inequality (160, 159), and radical feminist strategies (referring to all other feminisms) for advocating intolerance and/or new forms of privilege, Hawkesworth announces her proposal: the 50 percent solution. In other words, feminists are supposed to use their knowledge and rational powers to promote the proposal ‘that women hold 50 percent of all elective, appointive, and bureaucratic offices’ (181).

I see no good reason to oppose such a proposal, should it ever go to a vote, but neither do I see how it would lead to any substantial social change. Hawkesworth’s arguments for the 50 percent solution are the least convincing and the most disappointing of all, especially given her earlier critique of the limits of liberal feminism. In a telling generalization she claims that ‘what feminists want is a world ... that affords women opportunities for freedom, creativity ... and love on the same terms as men’ (171). But as Hawkesworth is aware, no feminists except liberals want the same terms as men now have, and for reasons she has already discussed. Hawkesworth’s arguments fall apart in the attempt to defend the 50 percent solution as anything other than the ‘ineffective liberal feminist panacea’ she fears (189),
since all proposals to change the status quo are purely conditional. That is, equal numbers of men and women might transform assumptions about the public/private split; women in power might preclude 'victim-blaming rationalizations of male violence'; sex parity might contribute to the creation of innovative solutions to gender-related injustices, and so on (190-1). But as Hawkesworth repeatedly tells us, there are no guarantees.

That feminists need to engage more seriously with the patriarchal state is clear (R.W. Connell presents a more convincing argument for this than Hawkesworth in 'The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics', Theory and Society 19, 1990). To claim that the 50 percent solution promises 'significant benefits for women', even though 'pernicious inequalities related to race and class' (197) will not necessarily be eradicated, is a rather disheartening conclusion. Hawkesworth's construal of increased privilege to already privileged women (not necessarily feminists, of course) as 'significant' strikes me as indicative of how little progress has been made to raise feminist consciousness of race and class privilege. As such, it may do more to alienate much needed minority support than to gain the allegiance of a popular majority.

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Barbara Herman
The Practice of Moral Judgment.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Barbara Herman is widely recognized as one of the most sophisticated defenders of the Kantian approach to morality. This book collects eight of her previously-published papers, together with two pieces that are published here for the first time. Of the previously-published papers, only the first — 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty' — has been substantially revised for this collection. But cross-references have been added in footnotes, and there is an excellent index, making it easy to follow up themes across the different chapters. The quality of the individual chapters is uniformly high, and the collection as a whole ought to be required reading not only for Kant specialists, but for anyone interested in moral philosophy.

Herman's work is an excellent example of the way in which critical engagement with an historical figure can yield philosophical rewards. Her
main aims are philosophical rather than scholarly. Her project is to recon-
struct Kantian ethics in ways that will test its power to illuminate the
phenomena of the moral life, and if this means that she must take issue with
some of the things Kant says, or develop his views in ways that go beyond
the letter of the texts, this is something Herman is quite willing to do. At the
same time she does not merely want to pick and choose among the various
Kantian claims, but takes seriously the systematic connections between the
different parts of Kant’s theory.

Work of this kind will seem unintelligible to those who (unaccountably)
persist in thinking that philosophy and the history of philosophy are funda-
mentally disparate activities. But the rest of us have much to learn from
Herman’s book. Her writing is elegant and clear, attentive to the complexities
of the issues without being weighed down by them. Several of the chapters
are written as responses to criticisms of Kant, but there is none of the glib
factualism that often leads Kantians and their opponents to talk past each
other. Whether she is considering Bernard Williams’s concerns about the
effects of Kantian morality on integrity (in chap. 2), traditional worries about
the success of the *Groundwork* argument for beneficence (chap. 3), or recent
claims about the moral value of partiality and personal attachment (chap.
9), Herman always takes her opponents, and the issues, very seriously.

Three large themes run through the different chapters. The first is the
idea that Kant’s ethics presupposes a distinctively anti-empiricist conception
of agency. On this conception, moral agents are not merely the subjects of
inclinations that cause them to act in certain ways. They are active with
respect to their motives, choosing for themselves whether to include the
incentives to which they are subject in their maxims, as determining grounds
of what they do. Herman calls on this conception of agency in her revision of
‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty’ (chap. 1), explaining in terms
of it how the overdetermination of incentives to virtuous action can be
reconciled with Kant’s claim that morally worthy actions must be done from
the motive of duty alone (11-12). Later chapters elaborate this basic concep-
tion of moral agency, drawing out its implications for issues of moral person-
ality and virtue. Herman argues, for instance, that an ethic of maxims need
not be narrowly preoccupied with the quality of an agent’s will at a given
time. Genuine commitment to a moral end is in the nature of an ongoing
project; this can help us to understand both why morally good agents will be
concerned with the consequences of their actions (chap. 5), and how their
particular attachments and relationships can be structured by moral princi-
ple (chap. 9, sec. 2).

A second important theme is a concern to locate the function of the
categorical imperative within the context of a realistic account of moral
deliberation and judgment. Herman argues that the categorical imperative
cannot provide effective moral guidance if there are no restrictions on the
maxims that are to be tested in terms of it. In chap. 4, she proposes that
deployment of the categorical imperative in deliberation requires the avail-
ability of ‘rules of moral salience’, which enable us to tell in advance when
prospective maxims raise issues of moral significance. This proposal is interestingly revised in chap. 7 (new to this collection). Retaining the basic idea that we must bring moral knowledge with us to the situations we encounter, Herman here suggests that the role of the categorical imperative is precisely to generate these prior 'deliberative presumptions'; deliberation is only called for in situations of conflict, and it will not involve any further application of the categorical imperative. This is an extremely appealing picture, assigning to the categorical imperative a role in moral judgment that it seems well-suited to play.

The final theme concerns the role of value concepts in Kant’s ethics. Herman’s new interpretation of moral judgment requires that the deliberative presumptions it grasps should yield a conception of value, one with sufficient content to guide moral deliberation in cases of conflict. This might seem to be at odds with the deontological character of Kant’s theory. But in chap. 10 — the other new essay in the collection — Herman contends that it is a mistake to suppose that Kant’s concern with principles of right is incompatible with his having a ‘grounding concept of value’ (209). The Kantian project can only succeed, she suggests, if the regulative norms of rational agency can themselves be shown to articulate a conception of value; this is necessary both in order to vindicate the authority of those norms, within our system of ends, and to provide the terms in which we are to deliberate about concrete cases of moral conflict (216). Herman handles this important topic with the kind of sophistication that comes from deep and systematic reflection not only about Kant, but about the shape of moral philosophy more generally. More remains to be done to make out Herman’s suggestion that the value of rational agency can guide us concretely in situations of deliberative conflict; but further progress in understanding Kant’s ethics can only be made by building on Herman’s results, and emulating her qualities of philosophical insight and good sense.

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Mette Hjort, ed.
*Rules and Conventions: Literature, Philosophy, Social Theory.*
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8018-4394-4);

This volume consists of 13 papers written primarily by philosophers and members of departments of English literature. The aim, according to the editor's introduction, is to 'enhance our understanding of rules and conventions through dialogue across the disciplines'.

George Wilson's 'Again, Theory' is by far the best paper in the volume, and comes closest to achieving the editorial aim. Wilson's paper is a sustained critique of recent discussions of the role of 'theory' in literary studies, in particular, the arguments of Knapp, Michaels, and Fish to the effect that the generation of theoretical problems results from 'the mistake of separating the inseparable'. Wilson discusses their views on intentionalism about the meaning of a literary text, and skillfully displays how their central contents merely gloss over the distinction between speakers meaning and linguistic meaning that has achieved great currency in contemporary analytic philosophy of language in the light of the work of Paul Grice. After showing how Knapp and company have nothing of substance to say against the Gricean distinction that undercuts their position, Wilson concludes that their position in literary studies rests 'upon a rejection of theory in the philosophy of language, a rejection that takes the less happy form of pretending that it does not exist' (12). Wilson's paper is an excellent example of how analytic philosophy can be used to clarify, and evaluate, controversial positions in literary studies.

Paisley Livingston's 'Conventions and Literary Explanation' is also impressive. After an intelligent exposition of David Lewis's account of convention, Livingston goes on to provide a sensitive and entertaining investigation of the possible application of Lewis's account to literature, with special reference to Lars Lønroth's analysis of *Njáls Saga*. The conclusion reached is that 'in regard to cases of modern, aestheticized receptions of an ancient text, we can hardly speak of any features of the text as functioning as conventional solutions to a coordination problem in Lewis's sense' (94). This is perhaps unsurprising, but as often happens, the route to the conclusion is more instructive than the conclusion itself. Livingston's paper provides an excellent example of a student of English taking an influential piece of analytic philosophy with the seriousness it deserves, and even though he eventually concludes that its application to literature is limited, he certainly gives it a fair run for its money.

Charles Taylor's 'To Follow a Rule' will be of interest to those philosophers acquainted with the literature that has sprung up in response to Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Harvard 1982). In
effect, Taylor sides with those philosophers (such as John McDowell) who see the avoidance of Kripke’s sceptical paradox as necessitating a move away from semantic internalism towards some form of semantic externalism. Taylor, however, does not quite express his position in these terms. His position is expressed in terms of a distinction between an epistemology which views all acts as monological, and an alternative epistemology (which he favours) which allows for the possibility of acts which are instead dialogical. But reaching an evaluation of Taylor’s claim that a move to this latter sort of epistemology solves the rule-following paradox is hampered by the fact that he doesn’t adequately explain the monological-dialogical distinction. As examples of dialogical acts, Taylor cites sawing a log with a two-handed saw and ballroom dancing. These are acts where ‘we only succeed when we place ourselves in the common rhythm that subsumes our individual contributions to the shared action’ (175). This sort of act is distinguished from monological acts which at most involve simply coordinating ones actions with those of others, such as ‘when I run to the spot on the field where I know you are going to pass the ball’. But is there really a principled distinction here? Even in this latter case, the success of my action — attempting to intercept the ball — depends on the success of the other persons attempt to pass the ball to the appropriate spot. At the very least, Taylor needs to say more about how the crucial distinction is to be drawn before we can go on to investigate its relevance to the rule-following problem. (Incidentally, those interested in the topic of Taylor’s paper, and in his general approach, will find much of interest in John McDowell’s forthcoming book Mind and World. It is also an interesting question of how Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, which Taylor frequently alludes to in the course of his paper, relates to the distinction between environment and world which McDowell adopts from Gadamer.)

‘Challenging Conventions in the Fine Art of Rap’, by Richard Schusterman, is a very interesting and enjoyable paper, on a topic that is obviously dear to its author’s heart. Looking at concrete examples of rap music, Schusterman quite skillfully shows how good rap music can perfectly well satisfy the most important criteria that have been thought necessary for aesthetic excellence. However, there is a self-defeating aspect to Schusterman’s argument, insofar as he sees himself as ultimately arguing that rap can rightfully inhabit the space of a ‘postmodern aesthetic’. This is because his argument generally proceeds by showing that, initial appearances to the contrary, rap music is capable of satisfying all of the distinctively modernist conditions for aesthetic legitimacy (or at least variants thereof). But this is more a quibble with Schusterman’s description of the conclusion of his argument, rather than with the argument itself. The paper will be of interest to both devotees and enemies of rap music; and the originally indifferent may find themselves stimulated to join one or other of these opposing camps. The papers by Wilson, Livingston, Taylor, and Schusterman were the most interesting in the collection. The other contributions were less successful, though to varying degrees. Peter McCormick’s ‘Linguistic and Literary Conventions’ is an attempt to get a handle on the dispute between Donald
Davidson and Michael Dummett as to the role of convention in linguistic communication, by looking in detail at a famous passage from Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*. This seemed promising at the start, but in the end didn't really go anywhere: we get a discussion of the passage from Shakespeare, and not terribly clear expositions of Davidson's and Dummett's views, but are left wondering at the end precisely what all of these have to do with each other. Claudia Brodsky-Lacour's 'The Temporality of Convention: Convention Theory and Romanticism' was worse, and her attempted discussion of analytic philosophers such as Strawson, Lewis, Quine, and Kripke, indicates nicely how dangerous a little analytic philosophy can be in the wrong hands. But at least she tried to live up to the ideal of interdisciplinary interest that the editor espoused. The papers by Pavel, Dumouchel, Boyer, Schmidt and Hemmeren were beyond the pale from the point of view of the analytic philosopher, and so obscure most of the time as to defy intelligent discussion and appraisal.

So overall, a very mixed bag. There is thus still just as much of a need for a volume that achieves a genuine measure of rapprochement and mutual understanding between the fields of analytic philosophy and literary and social theory.

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Peter Johnson

Pp. ix + 212.

As a sociologist interested in the problems of trust and secrecy, I welcomed the opportunity to review Peter Johnson's philosophical investigation into the nature of trust in public and private life. Frankly there should be more of this going on: sociologists need to read more philosophy, and philosophers need to read more sociology.

Why? Because if we put aside our intellectual turf wars and other boundary maintaining devices just long enough, we realize that sociologists and philosophers are actually studying the same thing, namely human social life, and that we have plenty to learn from each other because of it. Our methods of inquiry may and often do vary, and the level of rigor we demand in
conceptualizing the social world — especially on the metatheoretical levels of epistemology and ontology — may cause our works to seem incommensurable one to the other. I have in this review strived to avoid such problems of interpretation, and hope that this spirit of interdisciplinary stocktaking will contribute to a greater understanding, among both sociologists and philosophers, of what Johnson is really up to.

Johnson tackles the problem of public and private trust much like a sociologist might, as he suggests that such an inquiry must go beyond viewing individuals as merely units of uniform psychology. Rather, any investigation into the nature of trust in political life must also be able to incorporate in some systematic fashion the experience of personal trust as well. For example, how are we to best understand the nature of morality and trust among actors who happen to be political office holders, especially those confronted with the dilemma of having to dirty their hands for a perceived common or societal good? And how does this public relationship compare with what happens between private individuals engaged in similar episodes of the loss and recovery of trust in their everyday lives?

A sociologist might very well pursue such a research agenda by working from some extant general theory of trust, such as those offered by Parsons, Luhmann, or even Goffman, and then collect pertinent data via any number of methods, be it survey, ethnography, historical or cultural analysis, or perhaps even experiment. Johnson’s own method owes more to literary criticism than to sociology however, as his data is derived from textual analysis, in particular literary classics like Sophocles’s Philoctetes, Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, and Zola’s Therese Raquin. The texts provide a narrative whereby the conduct of actors facing the dilemma of dirty hands, and the reaction of audiences to such episodes, serve to concretize the abstract or general theory of trust.

The problem of impersonal public trust emerges in societies as a function of increasing population density, whereby the state is tasked with coordinating the variety of activities which it is institutionally vested to oversee. Bourgeois populations create spatial and temporal distances between persons such that actors are ever more reliant on unfamiliar and distant others for their day to day necessities. As a consequence professional classes arise in a variety of institutional settings, their members acting as intermediaries or agents to facilitate transactions and other discretionary duties ostensibly in the service of their principles.

Political leaders are one such class of public agents or servants, and Johnson is interested in how morality — conceptions of the good — inheres in or remains coherent within such impersonal role structures. That is, what criteria is available by which actors in these roles are impelled to act in the best interests of their constituencies? And if a particular social good (or goal) is identified, what is the nature of the morality and trust guiding the choice of means for its achievement?

Johnson rejects a utilitarian solution to the problem of political morality. Simple cost/benefit calculations by agents acting on behalf of their principles
cannot provide a moral foundation for ensuring public trust. This is because utilitarianism makes possible expediency as a viable alternative for political agents, especially in cases where morally undesirable means are used to achieve legitimate ends, that is, the problem of dirty hands. (A good example is the Reagan administration’s decision to illegally trade arms to Iran in return for a perceived social good promoting the general welfare, namely the funding of the counterrevolution in Nicaragua.) This then is no longer an instrumental, means/end dilemma as utilitarian thinking might suggest, but a moral dilemma facing public servants.

The discussions up to this point have admittedly remained at a high level of theoretical abstraction, and Johnson attempts to illustrate in more concrete terms the nature of morality and trust in both public and private life through the analysis of the texts mentioned above. Johnson argues that trust does not originate from a neutral point devoid of social attributes and ethical meaning, but ‘from concrete historical circumstances in which goods have a substantial, but not contestable worth’ (78). In Sophocles’s Philoctetes, the Trojan war illustrates the fragility of public and private trust and the complexity of human agency in this regard. In order to serve the common Greek cause of defeating Troy, Odysseus must wrest the bow from Philoctetes. Since he cannot obtain it by force, Odysseus requires a ruse whereby Neoptolemus’s friendship with Philoctetes is used to obtain the bow. Neoptolemus is hence confronted with a moral dilemma, that of deceiving his friend for a greater political end, the defeat of Troy. How Neoptolemus faces himself after bringing ‘guilt into the world’ sits at the heart of the interplay of trust and political morality.

Johnson turns to Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida to illustrate another dimension of trust, namely the process by which value or worth is attached to objects of human allegiance. Helen’s value, once considered an intrinsic and stable feature of love, is now dependent on the contingencies of political negotiation and bargaining. This opens up the relativity of the ‘inner life’, as Cressida later expresses the fear that Troilus’s love for her may simply be lechery, that ‘trust may be no more than the need of the moment’ (94). This transgression, this dualism between intention and desire has deep implications for moral character and social self in both private and public conceptions of trust.

Contract is a social artifice which suggests guidelines for action as well as appropriate reactions to any transgressions which may occur, yet how is trust formed in such a context? Johnson uses Zola’s Therese Raquin to explore this theme through the adultery of the story’s title character. Therese’s adultery, wherein love unsatisfied is displaced by lust and sexual indulgence is a means of revenge, illustrates the tenuousness of trust, and the insufficiency of contracts in assuring such trust when persons are exposed to difficult circumstances. (From the sociological side, Emile Durkheim has explicated the problem perhaps more fruitfully by noting for example the noncontractual elements of contract. See his The Division of Labor in Society.)
Johnson's exposition of these and other literary works opens up new ways of thinking about the process by which public and private trust is lost and recovered. Readers who can appreciate the scope and complexity of the problems Johnson is confronting will probably find this a rewarding read. Philosophers, and particularly those working in the fields of political and moral philosophy, are the most likely beneficiaries of Johnson's efforts.

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Mary Jeanne Larrabee, ed.  
*An Ethic of Care.*  
Pp. 310.  
US $49.95 (cloth; ISBN 0-415-90567-2);  

In this recent addition to Routledge's *Thinking Gender* series, editor Mary Jeanne Larrabee brings together key contributions to the debate on an ethic of care, first theorized by Carol Gilligan's, *In A Different Voice* (Harvard, 1982). The collection includes 17 previously published essays from moral and political philosophers, historians, sociologists, and moral and developmental psychologists, each addressing the thesis that an ethic of care represents a distinct voice in moral reasoning and a compelling alternative to an ethic of justice. More than a decade into debate on justice and care, it is useful to have a survey of the different arguments on this theme.

The book is divided into four sections: one addresses methodological questions, and three focus on theoretical issues. With one exception — Gertrud Nunner-Winkler's essay — the strongest and most philosophically interesting essays are found in sections one and four. A central theme of these latter essays is the proper relation of an ethic of care to an ethic of justice. Some of the authors reject justice thinking altogether: Annette Baier stresses the limitations of obligation theory, and suggests that an ethics of love, incorporating the notion of 'appropriate trust', should be the guiding concept for feminist moral theory (21). Although Baier's essay is stimulating and speaks more broadly to the idea of a feminist ethic than other contributions, her argument relies too heavily upon generalizations; for instance, Baier collapses modern and contemporary strands of contract theory under the
rubric of ‘obligation theory’, and mistakenly assumes that obligation provides the exclusive framework for contract theorists’ moral thought.

Gilligan’s essay also defends an ethic of care, but in terms different from those of Baier. Gilligan contends that her critics have misunderstood a fundamental point: her intention, she claims, was not to show that women’s voices differ from men’s by conventional measures of moral development, but more radically, that this ‘different voice’ in moral reasoning registers a ‘shift in perspective’ vis-à-vis ‘key terms of moral discourse — such as the concept of self, the idea of relationship, and the notion of responsibility’ (208). Yet Gilligan’s view that ‘the justice and care perspectives are distinct orientations that organize people’s thinking about moral problems in different ways’ (212) differs from her earlier position, in which care was conceived as a corrective to an ethic of justice, and both in turn viewed as essential features of mature moral reasoning; that Gilligan fails to note this shift leads to some confusion.

The view that care and justice are inextricably linked is shared by several contributors. Lawrence Blum’s essay suggests eight different ways of viewing the relation between ‘impartial morality’ (justice) and a ‘morality of care’ (53). Blum is persuasive in his argument that justice reasoning — for instance, the application of principles — typically requires care, in the sense that ‘particularized, caring understanding is integral to an adequate meeting of the agent’s moral responsibilities’ (59). Similarly, Mary Brabeck argues that combining care’s emphasis on particularity with aspects of justice reasoning results in a more satisfactory conception of morality (48). Owen Flanagan and Kathy Jackson assert that justice and care are not ‘fundamentally incompatible’ frameworks (74), and reject the idea that a single principle (either care or justice) structures moral personality (78). Nunner-Winkler gives an effective account of ways in which perfect duties — which she equates with an ethic of justice — require that agents consider the particular contexts surrounding moral decisions (146-8). John Broughton conflates the positions of Kohlberg and Gilligan and imputes political conservatism to Gilligan (123-4), but provides a useful clarification of Kohlberg’s conception of justice and its points of overlap with the ethic of care (122). Finally, Marilyn Friedman argues (contra Gilligan) that care and justice are practically and ‘conceptually compatible’ and that ‘the relevance of justice to close personal relationships’ has been overlooked by proponents of care (263-4). By illustrating the importance of justice reasoning to relationships based on care, and the relevance of care to the public domain, Friedman gestures towards one possible resolution of the care/justice impasse.

Several essays caution against situating an ethic of care within a gendered moral ontology on the grounds that this is both perilous for women and ignores the ethical practices of racial and ethnic minorities. On the former point, Zella Luria puts forth a poorly formulated version of the most pressing question from the early days of the care/justice debate, namely, whether it is in feminists’ interests to assert that women think and reason differently from men (202). Linda Kerber compares the ethic of care with 19th and early 20th
century discourses on ‘the cult of true womanhood’, and goes so far as to state that Gilligan’s argument ‘is congruent with claims made in the 19th century in defense of a separate sphere of women’ (104). Misconstruing Gilligan’s position and drawing implausible parallels with conservative women’s movements, these two essays do little to contribute to debate. A better treatment of this theme is offered by Bill Puka, who draws attention to the similarities between care maturity as developed by Gilligan and the ‘slave morality’ discussed by critical theorists (221). Joan Tronto’s essay, perhaps the best in the collection, offers well-informed criticisms of the ethic of care from numerous vantage points — empirical, philosophical and political — and argues that it is crucial that feminists consider ‘how an ethic of care might be situated in the context of existing social and political theory’ (251).

Tronto’s and Puka’s essays, as well as those by Linda Nicholson and Carol Stack, show why questions of race and cultural identity should be central to discussions of alternative ethical practices. Stack disputes the notion that the ethic of care is a mainly female form of reasoning and points to her own research as evidence that there exists a distinct ‘African-American model of moral development’ (110). Tronto discusses the possibility that white women and minority men and women share an ethic of care and responsibility for caretaking by virtue of their subordinate social status (245), and offers a good survey of writings on this theme.

Also deserving mention are Lawrence Walker’s controversial essay refuting Gilligan’s analysis of Kohlbergian studies in moral development, and Diana Baumrind’s response to Walker. A conclusion to be drawn from these pieces, reiterated by several contributors, is that there is a pressing need for continued empirical research into moral reasoning by men and women.

I have only one general criticism of this book: because these essays were not written for the collection, most of the authors summarize Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s arguments, the result being a good deal of repetition. This criticism aside, the essays are generally well chosen, and Larrabee provides a lucid summary of the debate on justice and care in her introduction. Of the feminist ethics texts available to date, none addresses the ethic of care more directly than this one, and it is thus a particularly useful collection for teaching.

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Christopher Macann, ed.

Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments (in four volumes).
The Routledge Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers.
Volume I, pp. xviii + 397.
US $600.00, Cdn $750.00 (ISBN 0-415-04982-2).

Martin Heidegger may well be the most influential philosopher of the present century. Whether we think of existentialism or deconstruction, hermeneutics or postmodernism, we are led back to Heidegger for basic inspiration given to these trends. The profound challenge he threw out to the western philosophical tradition is far from having run its course.

The present, handsomely bound four-volume set, bringing together many of the major interpreters, translators and commentators on Heidegger, should do a lot to give shape to future discussion of this philosopher. The four volumes are titled, respectively, 'Philosophy', 'History of Philosophy', 'Language', and 'Reverberations'.

Each volume will be dealt with in separate reviews. The first volume, reviewed here, contains articles by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Thomas Sheehan, Jean-François Courtine, Christopher Macann (who also wrote the introduction), Maria Villela-Petit, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Françoise Dastur, Alfons Grieder, Joseph O'Leary, Reiner Wiehl, Otto Pöggeler, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Jean Greisch, Michel Henry, Kohei Mizoguchi and Samuel Ijsseling.

Two of the sixteen essays were written in English specially for this volume. Two others (originally French) were re-written, one extensively. Of the remainder, nine are translations, from German, French, Italian and Japanese. Close to half of these translations so far as I can tell, have not previously been available.

The essays are largely exegetical, though philosophical issues are generally kept in sight. Despite the title 'Philosophy', this volume is far from providing a direct, overall evaluation of Heidegger's philosophy. There is critical treatment of his views on philosophy but it tends, with some exceptions, to be indirect. Recurring attention is given to the question concerning the nature and extent of Heidegger's later departure from the basic philosophical views set out in Being and Time. One view of the difference, expressed by Kockelmans in simplified form, is that in the later works the privileged position is given to Being as distinct from the human being (154).

All but two of the essays make a reference either to Heidegger's Kehre (turn, reversal) or to his related emphasis on das Ereignis (event, appropriation of being). Central to this discussion are Der Satz vom Grund (The Principle of Reason) and the Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), volume 65 in the Klostermann (Frankfurt) Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works), edited by von Herrmann. In 'Way and method: hermeneutic phenomenology in
thinking the history of being' von Herrmann describes the *Beiträge* (Contributions) as Heidegger's 'second major work' after *Being and Time* (324). O'Leary seems not to share this view, saying it should 'rather be seen as the magma from which his masterly later writings were to emerge' (245).

Greider argues concisely and with admirable clarity that Heidegger's notion of 'essence' did undergo a fundamental change, but that the change was 'regulated by some relatively constant, though initially not fully clarified, philosophic intentions' (202).

O'Leary's erudite 'Theological resonances of *Der Satz vom Grund*', is one of two articles specially written for this volume and, at 44 pages, the longest. He focuses on pluralistic tendencies in Heidegger's thought, showing how they resonate with a theological pluralism that O'Leary clearly favours. Heidegger's sense of historicity, he says, is in tension with the universality of being. But he notes that Heidegger of all people has no need of being wedded to universality, because reason is undercut in the 'wonder at the coming to presence of beings' (215). Mizoguchi provides a useful tie-in here. He brings out affinities between Heidegger and Japanese thought, particularly Zen Buddhism, but suggests that the Greek orientation of the later Heidegger may be a prejudice that needs to be reconsidered (381).

O'Leary criticizes Heidegger for lapsing into more unitary thought with *das Ereignis*, accusing him of showing an 'immoderate ambition to think time, space and being from their unifying origin' (216). But maybe the search for a possible underlying unity, including that related to the different manifestations of religious inspiration in the world, is highly desirable. Thank God (sometimes) for immoderate ambitions! O'Leary is right, though, to call for thinking in a dimension in which 'all great religious texts can speak their essential truths with the maximum resonances' (249), and to seek the release of the essence of religion from 'its counter-essence of sectarianism, intolerance, fanaticism, fundamentalist sclerosis' (249).

O'Leary's article is provocative and insightful. There are nice turns of phrase, such as the somewhat irreverent 'Heidegger is always on the alert for the great world-shaping forces indicated by a mere rustle in the language of the texts he studies' (229).

Gadamer's 'The beginning and the end of philosophy' includes personal testimony to the effect that Heidegger already had the insight of the *Kehre* in 1924 (27). Sheehan examines *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* with a view to determining the extent to which it might be viewed (following a clue from Heidegger) as supplying the unpublished Division Three of *Being and Time*. Sheehan does not find much in the way of additional material, but he makes a good case for concluding that the so-called *Kehre* was 'built into Heidegger's program from the start' (48), and that the turn was away from a certain kind of metaphysical language only.

Villela-Petit illuminatingly draws attention to differences between the spatiality of dwelling and that of everyday *praxis*, treating the former as far removed from *Sein und Zeit* (132-3). But non-manipulative dwelling does at least get a mention in s. 13 of that earlier work. Wiehl takes note of Gadamer's
contention that the 'absolute priority on the question of Being before all other
questions of metaphysical thought' was already to be found in Being and
Time (273). Similarly, Pöggeler treats the Kehre as not a turning to a new
position but rather a return to the original point of departure (291).

Macann tries to reconcile the approaches of Husserl and Heidegger by
treating the phenomenology of the former as providing a necessary reflective
detour (113) for an adequate ontology. He also cautions against approaching
Heidegger's later work without first having studied Being and Time. The
danger is that those who start out from the Kehre run the risk, he says, of
'lapsing into arbitrariness and unassailable, because inaccessible, idiosyn-
crasy' (13). This danger may exist anyway: Villela-Petit views Heidegger as
idiosyncratic for rejecting the city even though there, too, 'the Gods, as well
as poets, may very well be present' (138).

The essays are all meritorious, though varying in readability. There is
unfortunately no index. It would have been nice to know more about the
academic affiliations of the contributors. Only two mis-spellings caught my
attention: 'Greider' (xviii) and 'salta' (342). Reading translated material can
put a strain on comprehension. Referents of pronouns such as 'it' may be
easier to identify in the original language. It can be hard to sort out:
'Trancendence is what discovers the world in the very act whereby it projects
it beyond a being as its horizon' (355).

Macann concludes his introduction with a passionate call for philosophers,
in these turbulent political and ecological times, to apply their talents to
socially responsible tasks, rather than to debate questions about the end of
philosophy (14). Following IJsseling, Macann looks to the rediscovery of
recollective thinking as a way of coping with the 'global unification of the
human species under the compulsive thrust of contemporary technology' (13).
There may be hopeful prospects for unity to be found in Heidegger's thought,
despite the disastrous and repugnant political choice made by the man
himself.

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This latest work of Ralph McInerny is the text of four lectures 'published as they were given' which the author says are intended to be intelligible to non-experts so that 'it goes without saying' professionals will find them dissatisfying, as McInerny, himself, also does. He does not surely need to apologize for publishing talks on serious subjects that are intelligible to non-experts, but, since they concern matters that are part of ongoing serious discussion among scholars, he does well to include this disclaimer at the outset.

The titles of the four lectures are, 'Is Philosophical Ethics Possible?', 'Does Man Have a Natural Ultimate End?', 'The Role of Faith in Moral Philosphizing', and 'Faith, Philosophy, and Theology'. The author is Catholic and a Thomist. The Catholic church's position on moral and doctrinal matters is referred to with sympathy as normative. The positions of Gilson and Maritain on the question of the nature of 'Christian philosophy' and the possibility of an adequate moral philosophy independent of religious belief is the occasion for the main argument of the lectures. That argument begins with the observation, 'It must come as a surprise ... to find that some of the most eminent Thomists of our day have called into question the very possibility of a philosophical ethics' (7). Most notable among these are Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, 'two of the most eminent Thomists of our time' (54). It is to Maritain's position that McInerny directs most of his comments.

The reason Maritain is led to deny the possibility of a philosophical ethics has to do with the de facto ultimate end of human existence for a Christian for whom this end or goal of life is in some sense an immediate vision of God, a consummation devoutly to be wished but one that is beyond the implications of the purely human condition and accessible only by reason of divine gift. That being so, philosophers as such will not know about it, nor as such discover how it could come about. Believing in the Christian religious tradition anyone can come to know of it; and, knowing of it, he or she must somehow incorporate it into his or her account of ethics. But how would one do that without changing philosophy into theology? Maritain believes that there is an adequate moral philosophy but that it is 'subalternated' to theology. The reader is referred elsewhere for Maritain's elucidation of the crucial issue of 'subalternation' of one science to another, but for the purposes of these lectures and McInerny's argument that is not crucial because it is already, for him, to say too much about the dependence of ethics on revelation. The lectures are concerned with showing that Maritain's position is not in conformity with what has gone on in scholarly work in the field of ethics, is not consistent with Thomas Aquinas's position, is not in harmony with the
implied position of the Catholic Church, and is, in short, not true. In all of this, the argument seems well-founded, and McInerny is on solid ground; I can well appreciate the possibility that some scholars will not care, but I found it helpful to have the matter clarified in this fashion.

The argument against Maritain’s position takes its beginning from his own admission that the principles from which a metaphysical account of God’s existence and something about his nature begin are accessible to all by reason of common human intelligence, though the knowledge reached in this area is imperfect. But, McInerny asks, is that not also the case with ethics? The ten commandments as practical norms can serve as the principles on which moral arguments can be based. They are adequate to our lives whether one is a Christian or not in the sense of being true moral norms if not the whole truth. Yet these norms are not strictly matters of faith. One person may, indeed, accept them to be true by believing in the revelation made to Moses and recorded in the Book of Exodus, but another can known that they are true from the implications of humanity and the inclinations humans typically have. They are, that is, part of the ‘natural law’ as it would be understood by Maritain. How then is any (even imperfect) philosophical ethics impossible as Maritain has said it is? That lying is wrong is known to anyone, McInerny says, provided his judgment has not been ‘twisted’ by immoral habits of life.

The nub of the argument to show that Maritain’s position is not Aquinas’s rests on the latter’s notion of what he calls praeambulae fidei, that is, divinely revealed truths that are also knowable by natural reason for those who have the time and ability to investigate them. The existence of God is such a proposition, revealed and believed, but capable of being discovered independently by reason alone. So says Maritain concerning speculative issues. He ought, argues McInerny, to have treated the practical norms of the Decalogue analogously and admitted that, given such principles which are naturally discoverable, philosophical ethics is possible for the Christian even though the end to which humans aspire is beyond what their own efforts could achieve or even discover.

In McInerny’s view ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ is a desperate linguistic solution to the charge of the meaninglessness of religious talk. ‘That avenue is closed to the Catholic’ for whom faith is intelligible. Reason does not take a holiday nor leap into the absurd when speaking of God or of godly living; it is rather stretched, and its range is broadened beyond what certain cautious philosophies would have us believe is possible. This is the final theme of these lectures and it is of a piece with what has gone before.

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This is an introductory textbook, directed primarily to university and community college students, and probably even ambitious high school students. Its most striking feature is its design. It actually looks like introductory texts of other disciplines: a rather busy collection of exegetical passages explaining and comparing ideas, highlighted boxes focussing on particular concepts and issues, short excerpts from original works, attractive illustrations and topical cartoons. Each chapter suggests questions for discussion, reviews the philosophers and concepts, and offers a nicely annotated bibliography.

The authors’ primary goals are to make philosophy accessible without oversimplifying it. This is achieved with a clear and simple presentation of various philosophical ideas, interspersed with highlighted boxes that provide elaborations and variations on the central themes. For example, the chapters on ethics contain boxes devoted to skepticism, relativism, the good life, current controversies in metaethics, etc. Also included are biographical sketches of particular philosophers, which personalize the philosophical issues and provide some historical context.

The book is intended to be an historical introduction to philosophical ideas. The introductory chapter, ‘Dangerous Stuff’, forcefully argues for the historical importance and contemporary ubiquity of philosophical concerns to the lives of students. The historical concern is most clearly reflected in two large sections of four chapters each, which trace from ancient to modern times the development of ideas in Metaphysics and Epistemology, and Ethics. One of the ethics chapters focuses on feminist philosophy (and is written by Ellen Fox). Two chapters focus on arguments for and against the existence of God. Other chapters are devoted to Continental philosophy, philosophy of mind, and eastern philosophy. Three appendices (on logic, truth and knowledge) are also included, as well as a glossary, and a comprehensive index. This is a busy book.

Does the design work? It does have its drawbacks. Most significant is the degree to which the original writings of philosophers get crowded out. In the chapter on Modern Epistemology and Metaphysics, only 11 of the 35 pages are devoted to original texts, while 6 pages are devoted to biographies, illustrative cartoons, questions for discussion and review, etc. In the book’s 624 pages, Plato’s writings comprise only 8 pages and Aristotle’s only 6. This may be sufficient reason not to assign the text — unless one believes one’s students will be served better by learning about the ideas and their progression than by walking carefully through the original arguments. This is probably true in some cases. But the obvious risk is that students will read too little of the arguments to sustain rigorous discussion, thus missing a signal opportunity to develop and hone their critical thinking skills.
Some of the editorial choices are questionable. The section on Contemporary Political Philosophy gives more attention to the words of Benito Mussolini than John Rawls. And there are two small, but particularly bothersome features. First, the table of contents is an incredible 14 pages long, which makes it extraordinarily difficult to quickly get a sense of the text as a whole. Second, the references for quoted passages are inconveniently placed, at the end of the book, with no page references. The text thus fails a standard by which every student paper should be judged, and it presents unnecessary problems for teachers wishing to familiarize themselves with material outside their specialty.

This second edition of the textbook differs from the first only in the emphasis it gives to some ideas. Epistemology is now treated concurrently with metaphysics. And more space is provided for the more contemporary Continental philosophers.

Like the first edition, Philosophy: The Power of Ideas tries very hard to provide an accessible and interesting historical introduction to philosophical ideas, particularly for students who have not had either access or interest in these ideas before. Moore and Bruder exhibit an admirable facility for presenting a broad range of philosophical issues simply and clearly. But the dearth of passages from original works of philosophy means that this book is of primary benefit to audiences who are more interested in or better served by developing an acquaintance with influential philosophical ideas than by grappling with the arguments that motivate them. It is interesting to wonder how often this is true of one's students.

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Marilyn Pearsall
Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, 2nd ed.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company

Women and Values is the pile of articles I have on the floor in my basement. That pile has many important pieces on recent feminist thought, represented in various voices; so does Women and Values. And you don't have to get your knees dirty looking for something in it.

Pearsall claims that 'Women's moral theory is an expression of the collective efforts of feminist thinkers, past and present' (vii). She has assembled articles, based on suggestions arising from her first edition, to be used
as a text in an introductory women’s studies class. This collection is divided into categories: feminist aesthetics, political science, sociology, psychology, ethics, religion, and law. Although this collection is not explicitly American, all of the contributors are in mainstream American feminist thought. Pear- sall has selected articles that deal with ethical issues from a feminist perspective. She considers these essential writings of feminist philosophers of the last twenty years. Her criteria for selection were that they be readable, interesting and have high academic merit. Since this book is intended to be a text for a class, my review focuses on this book as a textbook used in an introductory women’s studies class in a Canadian setting.

Many of the classics are here, articles I would consider necessary for inclusion in an overview textbook. Some of the voices are women I have not heard from or of for a while, such as Shulamith Firestone, and so it is useful to have them together once again, to inform the student who may have little or no knowledge of foundational works of the seventies.

We have Thomson’s classic argument for choice in abortion; Firestone’s anti-mothering polemic; Catherine MacKinnon’s articulation of the philosophy underlying her proposed anti-pornography legislation; Jeffrer Allen’s admonition that motherhood be vacated by women, some the earliest enunciations of radical feminist lesbian perspectives; one of the earliest and arguably one of the best discussions of Gilligan’s central tenet; a late 80s article by Noddings that defends the positions on an ethic of caring articulated in Caring; and so on. With bell hooks, Ti-Grace Atkinson, Marilyn Frye and Sandra Bartky, this is truly a commendable anthology. There is always a danger that one’s favourite article would be left out, but to quibble about inclusion seems unproductive. Most of the academically-oriented articles I would use in an introductory women’s studies class are here. In the absence of an article by Spelman and/or Lugones, Pearsall needs to point to those places where white mainstream feminists write about ‘women’ as a coherent category, neglecting the later criticisms of essentialism. As it is, while reading the articles by Flax and Hartsock, I find myself inquiring marginally ‘Who is this we?’

Pearsall provides a brief introduction and suggestions about how to use the text in an introductory classroom, study questions and a linking commentary. The introduction and linking commentary are useful, setting the context for the selections.

The study questions after each article are less than satisfactory. Sometimes, indeed, the questions are down right funny. Most of the time they were not questions I would direct students to use, and I would probably have to create study questions of my own; the questions seemed either too vague or far too pointed to be much use to the student, and they would not be useful to get classroom discussion started.

This anthology is missing many of the notes published with the original articles. In some cases, we are told that notes have been deleted, and in some of those cases the notes haven’t been deleted, such as the article by Russo and Christ, so confidence in the editorial eye begins to falter. Furthermore, lack of adequate citations in the introductory and prefatory material creates
a mystery; Dorothy Dinnerstein's book is given a full reference (89) but Pearsall mentions 'Chodorow's paper' and does not supply title, date or other material (67). One of the objectives of most research oriented introductory classes is how to cite references. Without a bibliography for the collection as a whole, this lack is a serious drawback in the book.

Some of the articles are dated and American-centric, which would also make me reconsider before selecting for a Canadian introductory class. The section on women and the law is definitely directed toward an American reader. There are not many different perspectives, few writings from Afro-American, Latina or South Asian theorists, which is a serious lack. The last article, almost an afterthought, appears to be out of place, discussing 'Moral Wisdom in Black Women's Literary Tradition'. There are also no Canadian authors, which is surprising, considering the contributions to feminist philosophy by Kathryn Morgan, Lorraine Code and Susan Sherwin, to name only a few. Particularly in the area of pornography legislation and reproductive technology, ignoring Canadian sources is regrettable. Considering also the interest in feminist philosophy of science, to find no article on that subject also creates a gap.

I had one disappointment. Flax, whose writing I enjoy and admire, has a very flat article, 'Women do theory', and it is the first in the first section. Unlike her usual writings, this article is awkward and unilluminating. She also appears to be unnecessarily apologetic: 'I think that's one of the problems of women's studies programs. They are too often developed as though they are mere intellectual exercises; some may be, but the study of women is not' (5). On the other side, however, Pearsall includes a wonderful essay from Hélène Cixous, whose style is usually ponderous and oblique. I had one discovery: Stenstad's 'Anarchic Thinking', which will become part of any subsequent curriculum developed by me in this area.

The classics do not appear to become dated, and endure through many readings. Some articles do suffer the wear of time, such as Donchin's article on reproduction technology, published in 1986. More intertextual references, such as Case's reference in 'Toward a Butch-Femme Aesthetic' to the preceding piece by Russo, would have made this collection stick together; most of these authors were writing within the academic milieu informed by each other's works, and Pearsall could have made selections that, however artificially, speak to each other.

More academically oriented questions, including all citations and a bibliography, and more commentary from Pearsall would make this a must. As it is, it is a definite maybe. This book is a good overview, and would be a possibility for a collection of the greats and answer to 'what was all the fuss about' questions often heard from undergraduates who feel 'we are beyond all that now, aren't we?'

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Stanley Rosen is an Anglo-American philosopher who stands somewhere between ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’ philosophy, and who acknowledges uneasiness about both. For instance, he says that “[A]nalytic” philosophy is at bottom a kind of pallid Nietzscheanism (200), though he also has unflattering things to say about Heidegger and Derrida. Thus it has been difficult for either side to embrace Rosen, say in the way Stanley Cavell’s work has found some listeners among those who study Continental philosophy. Doubtless some stop reading Rosen once they learn about his affinities to Leo Strauss, at least with regard to Rosen’s adoption of Strauss’s reading strategy of differentiating between philosophers’ exoteric and esoteric teachings. The key text here is Strauss’s ‘Persecution and the Art of Writing’. Rosen mentions his connection to Strauss in the preface (vii). Some people react to Straussians the way some people used to react to lepers. (For anyone who plans to dismiss Rosen as a spokesman for the political right, that person should first read the end of Rosen’s Hermeneutics as Politics [1987].)

The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry contains some previously published material, and while the subtitle mentions ancient thought, there are two essays among the ten that deal with Nietzsche and Heidegger, though Rosen reads those two with Plato in mind. The book’s title serves as a thematic base, for Rosen sees the quarrel between philosophy and poetry as a way of mapping out the history of philosophy. There are those who shun poetry in favor of philosophy (analytic philosophers), those who opt for poetry and creativity (Nietzsche and some postmodern thinkers), and those who maintain the tension between the two (Plato). One of the strengths of this book is Rosen’s willingness as a philosopher not to privilege philosophy while denigrating everything that is not-philosophy, particularly rhetoric and poetry.

Rosen seems to want to occupy some middle ground here, somewhere between Plato’s forms (paradigmata) and the worldly copies we humans live with, between eros and sobriety, between the always-sober Socrates and the nobly nihilistic Nietzsche. For Rosen, Plato shows the way by not choosing, but presenting in characteristically dialectical fashion two poles of being. For instance, in the Symposium we have the sober Socrates and the drunken Alcibiades, and in the Phaedrus, which Rosen positions as a companion dialogue, the discourse of the lover and the non-lover. ‘[T]he quarrel between philosophy and poetry seems to be essentially a quarrel between sexual restraint and sexual license’ (4). One of Rosen’s complaints about Heidegger turns out to be that Heidegger is too much like Socrates, too sober (‘Heidegger makes no jokes’ [1991]), and apparently too aversive to discourse about sexuality. Rosen says, ‘So far as I am aware, the Greeks made love at least
as frequently as they made wine. And yet, if I am not mistaken, Heidegger never mentions the sexual meanings of such related words as synousia or dialego...' (140). Heidegger's emphasis on the earth, on agriculture, irritates Rosen, because Heidegger seems to have blocked out eros. '[E]ros normally relates human to human in a situation in which speech is a natural component. Performatory utterances are proper between lovers ("with this ring I thee wed") but not between man and the grape ("with this press I do thee crush")' (141). Rosen makes jokes, though not continually, because he gives the impression of leaning more than a little toward sobriety.

While aware of the gravitational pull of desire and creativity that manifests itself in poetry and rhetoric, Rosen keeps his distance. One never senses that Rosen will get out of control (the way Alcibiades does). The sense of humor he does occasionally show in these essays is never on the verge of turning into a free-wheeling Marx Brothers routine, for that sort of verbal chaos would remind Rosen of Nietzsche and decadence. Discourse needs to be regulated if we are to call it philosophy. Those of us who have not been hypnotized by the injunctions of the later Wittgenstein to "keep talking" will remember from Hegel (if not from the earlier Wittgenstein) that indefinite discourse leads to the "bad infinity" of self-canceling chatter' (98). Contrast that statement by Rosen with some of Cavell's comments about the Marx Brothers in a recent piece in The London Review of Books: 'If we take Bergson's theory of comedy as bespeaking a form of madness, of men behaving like machines, and vice versa, then we can say that the Marx Brothers turn this theory on the world, showing themselves to remain improvisatory, original, in a setting of absolutely mechanical reactions to them ("This is an outrage"); "I've never been so insulted in all my life"; "Beat it"; "Oh!"; "Just what do you mean?"; "Hey. Hey. Hey."; "Are you crazy or something?"). Their madness is a defence against madness, and neither is something over which they claim control; it is a struggle to the finish, in which the question is which side will create the last word, or destroy it'. Faced with the Marx Brothers, Rosen would likely choose to stay with Harpo, for Rosen values the silences in Plato, which is where the esoteric teachings can be found.

The point here is to see that in the quarrel between philosophy and poetry the Marx Brothers might be said to be pushing poetry toward philosophy while Rosen seems to be prodding philosophy (in North America) toward poetry in an effort to make his colleagues see that philosophy is more than propositional discourse or the analysis of arguments. ['O]ne must be a poet as well as a philosopher in order to determine what are the Platonic arguments' (11), says Rosen. He will permit mixture, but that is where he draws the line. Anything more than mixture smacks of decadence. Rosen's idea about Gelassenheit (letting-be or openness) does not include opening the door of the House of Philosophy to the Marx Brothers' monkey business, for fear that it will be transformed into a Fun House, a place where desire has gone out of control, the sort of control Rosen will not relinquish.

Bruce Krajewski
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Stanley Rosen's reflections over the past quarter-century have left him well-equipped for this dogged pursuit of Heidegger through the foxholes of the history of philosophy. Throughout the chase Rosen sounds the same tocsin: Heidegger neglects our desire to live well, and instead attempts to think of a nebulous 'Being' that, insulated from our everyday experience of beings, loses its significance and invites nihilistic irresponsibility. Rosen's wrath is reserved especially for Heidegger's later turn toward the event of the sending of Being. For Rosen, Heidegger's Kehre is the very opposite of Socrates's turn away from the things above and below, toward the human things. Rosen sides with Socrates: the primary question of philosophy is not 'what is it to be?' but 'what is to be done?' (xxiii). Heidegger's fundamental flaw is that he 'has nothing to say of any value for our attempt to live a good life, other than to issue the injunction to listen to the voice of Being, which unfortunately does not seem to be saying anything in particular' (217).

Rosen attempts to demonstrate the emptiness of Heidegger's discourse by attacking his notion of a Being that is phenomenologically prior to beings — Being as the 'process of emergence' that makes beings accessible (xiv). For Rosen, we can experience particular beings and their general characteristics, but not the 'event' of Being as such. Since 'apart from what we encounter, there is no encounter' (26; cf. 209-11), talking about Being 'without referring to the being of beings ... is like trying to talk about the fishiness of fish without referring to fish' (119). To try to think of a non-reified Being is to fail to think anything determinate at all (xx).

This line of attack is reminiscent of the old analytic jibe that Heidegger meaninglessly hypostatizes the existential quantifier, although (despite the rather glib formulations above) Rosen's argument is far more complex and historically informed. Such an attack, rather than claiming that the opponent's claims are wrong, claims that the opponent is not claiming anything. The effect is disconcerting: the reader is expecting a knock-down, drag-out fight, and instead is treated to a display of shadowboxing. I found the display impressive but not conclusive. Every good phenomenologist would agree that all encountering encounters something; but Rosen does not quite convince me that this fact prevents us from meaningfully raising the transcendental question of how it is possible for us to encounter things.

Rather than trying to think about Being, Rosen proposes that we think about the beings that are given to us in everyday life (122). The tentative attempt to articulate the unified identities of beings is 'metaphysics', of which Rosen offers a sample in a commonsensical reflection on presence and absence (99-122). If metaphysics remains grounded in the everyday world it will recognize that this is a world in which we must try to act well (94, 179);
hence we must make distinctions between noble and base uses of beings (265) as we ‘carry out the task of making a life’ (133). Metaphysics thus demands reflection on ‘the implications of our capacity to do what we believe to be best’ (315).

One should not be misled into thinking that Rosen is simply berating Heidegger for failing to help us do the right thing; his real point is that Heidegger does not recognize that our need to make good decisions is a genuine need that cannot be satisfied by ontology — or indeed, Rosen implies, by any philosophical theory. Rosen insists that a universal or a general rule is not enough: phronēsis — experienced, practical judgment of particulars — is indispensable (287). (Here he arguably agrees with both Plato — Republic, 484d, 517d — and at least early Heidegger — Sein und Zeit, 294.) It follows that no work of philosophy can directly assist us in our attempts to act well. Heidegger’s flaw, then, is not that he fails to assist us, nor even that he fails to exhort us to be good — for theory is not essentially edifying (xxiii). The trouble is that Heidegger does not acknowledge that concrete attempts to act well cannot and should not be replaced by the activity of ontological speculation (284-8).

Rosen performs his reversal of the Heideggerian turn in the course of skillfully rereading the two poles of Heidegger’s history of metaphysics: Plato and the supposed ‘reversed Platonism’ of Nietzsche. Heidegger has his grounds for reading philosophical texts violently and trying to wring their ‘unthought’ from them, and Rosen never directly challenges those grounds; but he does show that much of what Plato and Nietzsche did think points to important questions that Heidegger neglects. According to Rosen, when we keep in mind the distinction between esoteric and exoteric teachings, we can see that both Plato and Nietzsche offer some seemingly ontological doctrines whose import is in fact primarily moral. Rosen argues for the provisional and political nature of the ‘theory of Ideas’ by analyzing the Phaedo, where Socrates clearly says that this theory is a second-best, questionable ‘hypothesis’ with moral motivations. Rosen claims it is necessary to hypothesize the Ideas in order to distinguish between just and unjust cities (268). He makes comparable claims about Nietzsche’s doctrines of the will to power (232) and the eternal recurrence of the same (283-4).

My main reservation about Rosen’s book is that its selection of Heideggerian texts seems somewhat arbitrary. For instance, although Rosen adds an appendix on the Sophist lectures of 1925-6, he says next to nothing about the lectures on the allegory of the cave and Theaetetus of 1931-2. More surprising is the fact that, amidst extended discussions of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl, Rosen hardly mentions Being and Time. Since Heidegger never unambiguously repudiated this work, it would seem that any criticism of the later Heidegger that accuses him of neglecting everyday life, moral responsibility, and the distinctions between high and low should take a stand on his earlier interpretations of everydayness, guilt, and authenticity, and argue explicitly that these analyses either are inadequate or are completely irrelevant to his later thought. Furthermore, since Rosen is not the first to
charge that Heidegger neglects ethics and that his ‘Being’ is empty, it seems that Rosen should have detailed the failings of Heidegger’s specific responses to these charges (e.g. in ‘Letter on Humanism’).

Nonetheless, the great virtue of this book is that it transcends mere detestation or adulation of Heidegger in order to struggle with the topic of Heidegger’s thought — for even shadowboxing is a form of engagement in the gigantomachia peri tês oustias. The Question of Being is rich, learned, and rewarding.

Richard Polt
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Kurt W. Rothschild

*Ethics and Economic Theory.*
Pp. xi + 163.

Kurt Rothschild is a Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Linz, Austria. This European background is reflected in his book. Although he draws mainly upon sources commonly referred to in North American and British literature, he also utilizes works written in German, including material from Myrdal, Menger, Gustav Schmoller, and G. Gabisch. Rothschild is concerned solely with the relationships between economics as a science and ethics, not with broader questions such as those considered in business ethics. Rothschild writes as an economist rather than as a moral philosopher; however, he has a brief but reasonably accurate survey of ethics in his initial chapter. In a few passages he does not say exactly what he means: ‘Statements of desires ("Open the window") are simply communications to other persons which cannot be subjected to a "true/false" criterion’ (8). Presumably he means ‘commands’ rather than ‘statements of desires’. Rothschild assumes that value judgments cannot be described as true or false ‘on any objective ground’ since they are not cognitive but ‘emotive’ (9). Except for an illuminating discussion of Rawls’s difference principle, Rothschild ignores recent analytical work in moral philosophy. Following his survey of ethics, Rothschild considers the ways in which ethics and economics are related.

In his second chapter, Rothschild discusses the ethical norms governing scientific research and the dilemmas researchers face when their work has consequences that seem morally evil. Mentioned specifically are the physi-
cists who worked on the development of the atomic bomb, and the social scientists who worked on the CAMELOT project. He notes that much past economic research contained value judgments. Adam Smith was a founder of modern economics but also a professor of moral philosophy. Neoclassical economists, however, sharply separate economics as a science from ethics. This 'scientification' of ethics reaches its apogee in twentieth-century mainstream economics. A whole chapter critiques this attempt to make economics 'wertfrei' or free of value judgments.

Rothschild gives a brief but interesting account of the debates between those who argued that economics must become value-free and those who claimed that economics must be pursued through historical understanding and evaluation of economic data and processes. Carl Menger and Max Weber, both on the wertfrei side, ultimately triumphed. Rothschild is sensitive to the fact that a wertfrei approach may be impossible, and applauds Myrdal's suggestion that value preferences should be openly declared. He also recognizes that to consider wertfrei economics an ideal is itself an evaluation, one that can conflict with other evaluations. In some areas, such as welfare economics, some value judgments seem inevitable. The next chapter considers value implications of the economic concept of Homo oeconomicus.

Rothschild contrasts the sociologist's concept of Homo sociologicus with the economist's concept of Homo oeconomicus. The former concept stresses the role of conventions and norms in guiding and constraining behavior. The failure of economists to consider these factors weakens the capacity of economic theory to explain and predict economic behavior. Drawing upon the work of S. Lindberg, Rothschild sketches a decision model in which the agent weighs the utility of a typical economic aim, such as maximizing wealth, against that of realizing moral values. A person who strongly values telling the truth will not lie simply to maximize an economic value or to advance his or her self-interest. Rothschild does not develop this argument; instead, he turns to an analysis of the relationship between morality and markets.

The chapter 'Moral Aspects of the Market' sets the stage for the final sections on welfare economics, cost-benefit analysis, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the relationship of income distribution to justice. Rothschild exhibits a keen appreciation of the ideological implications of the economist's concentration upon the market as an ideal mode of economic development. He devotes much of the chapter to a critique of Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Nozick. At the end of the chapter, he lists various theoretical positions critical of markets; Marxism, curiously, is not mentioned here nor elsewhere in the book.

The remaining chapters detail Rothschild's critique of specific domains of contemporary economics. Since modern welfare economics eschews interpersonal comparison of utilities, it faces a difficult problem. If utilities are not comparable, they cannot be aggregated. This problem is circumvented, claims Rothschild, only by 'some ingenious and to some extent questionable "tricks"' (59). He is critical of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the Bergson welfare function and concludes: 'No stratagem, however clever, can build a
solid bridge between positive and normative statements' (76). Nevertheless, in the following chapter, Rothschild suggests methods by which economists could make plausible interpersonal comparisons of utility.

Utilities may be compared through understanding one's own feelings and those of others, a process Rothschild terms 'verstehen'. Through verstehen most people will come to agree that a loaf of bread brings more utility to a starving person than to a person who is well fed. Where utility differences are less extreme, however, no agreement may be reached. Revealed preferences as measured by purchases in the market may also be used to compare utilities. However, Rothschild is aware that this method ignores differences in purchasing power. At the end of this chapter, he examines a sociological study of different dimensions of work satisfaction and concludes that it generates utility measurements that could be helpful to economists.

*Ethics and Economic Theory* is an excellent introduction to ethical problems associated with economic theory. Rothschild's critique of contemporary economic theory is lucid and compelling. Even though he neglects recent analytical work in ethics, he has positive and interesting suggestions for improving welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis.

*Ken Hanly*

Brandon University

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**Conrad Russell**

*Academic Freedom.*

US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-03714-X);

Money is tight. Governments are cutting how much they allocate to public universities and how much they give to individual scholars. Sometimes cuts are defended as a way to preserve other services (transportation, medicine, police), and perhaps are meant to increase both private-sector involvement in education and consumer responsibility for its cost. In any event, universities and faculty that depend in any manner on public financial support resist cuts, and since universities lack the powers of law, taxation, and the gun, resistance often takes the form of learned pleas. Serving this purpose is *Academic Freedom* by Conrad Russell, a professor of history (King's College, University of London) and Member of Parliament. What does academic
freedom have to do with the economics of higher education in a time of handicapped governmental budgets? According to Lord Russell, a great deal.

The book's first chapter defines academic freedom in a standard way: 'the freedom for academics ... to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy. It is the freedom to follow a line of research where it leads, regardless of the consequences ...' (18). Russell provides a handful of well-expressed reasons for protecting academic freedom in this Millian sense: the political, cultural, and economic benefits of free intellectual inquiry. And in the following chapter, Russell lays out the academic duties that accompany academic freedom: truthfulness, fair play, self-scrutiny. But the rest of the book has little to do with academic freedom in this sense.

Instead, Russell presents an extended argument that (the British) government should not interfere in a large area of university business; government is in principle as incompetent to decide academic matters as it is to decide medical or theological matters (62). By itself, this view about academic judgment and professional autonomy is not unusual or provocative; only academics have the expertise required to grade a student paper, and so only academics should have the power to do so. Russell, however, goes farther. He acknowledges that government has the right to decide how much total public money should go to the universities, if any (46-7); yet Russell argues both that it is a matter solely of academic judgment how much money per student should be allocated (86, 92-3, 96) and that university sovereignty over this component of 'unit costs' is justified by academic freedom itself. I shall return to this astonishing claim.

Russell argues plausibly from the assertion that 'few forms of academic freedom are more central than the freedom to choose research topics' (76) — else the ability of research to discover what is new, or to uncover facts in an area sensitive for entrenched power, is lost — to the conclusions that (1) governments that fund universities should not set time limits on the completion of advanced degrees (70-1), since such a policy could squelch the investigation of certain questions; and (2) it is preferable for government to allocate funds for research blindly, in 'blocks' for all faculty at once, rather than by judging a large number of separate research proposals and then issuing grants to individual applicants 'on their merits' (36, 77) — the latter procedure allows governmental control over topics. Considerations of academic judgment, university autonomy, and academic freedom are here woven together nicely. But elsewhere Russell incautiously conflates academic freedom and the freedom of academics, i.e., their professional autonomy (despite recognizing the distinction; see p. 91). Thus: 'to require Universities to take in people they believe incapable of doing the work is an abuse of academic freedom' (66); 'fixing the amount of work required for a degree by ministerial decision [is] an interference with academic freedom' (69). Now, such governmental decrees might be ill-conceived and demean academic judgment and professional autonomy. But Russell claims, beyond
this, that such measures threaten the value of a university degree and thereby violate academic freedom (70). The argument is weak.

Russell's main contention is that the 'unit cost' of amount allocated per student is a matter solely of academic judgment, and governmental policies designed to pressure universities to reduce this ratio by admitting more students are violations of academic freedom. In particular, the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 and a new funding formula 'have taken a very substantial measure of academic judgment out of academics' hands. They thus constitute a further significant erosion of academic freedom' (105-6) — beyond the erosion due to the loss of tenure (Education Reform Bill of 1988). Even if Russell is right that this 'unit cost' is a matter of academic judgment (i.e., that the proper faculty-student ratio is decidable only by faculty [89]), not every case of the government's ignoring academic judgment is a violation of academic freedom. Russell asserts that a severe reduction in the opportunity for academics to do research, brought about by an increase in the number of students, the satisfaction of whose needs leaves little time for research, 'constitutes an assault on academic freedom' (107). Hence Russell contends that academic freedom entails not only a negative freedom to be left alone — to do one's research without fear of punishment — but also the positive freedom to be given the enabling resources (time, money, materials) of research (108-9). That is a bold, unMillian move, but a stretch. Academic freedom is not a right to do research; it is the right to do it, if it is done, unmolested. When my university, during a financial crisis, eliminated all institutional-level research funds, indiscriminately making none available for anyone, it did not violate academic freedom. (Even if it did, the decision was not necessarily unwarranted; in some circumstances academic freedom may be sacrificed.)

Russell is on firmer ground with his splendid arguments throughout Academic Freedom that, in effect, academics have not merely a right but a duty to do research, because doing research is in various ways essential for excellence in teaching (27-8, 39, 87-8) and faculty have a professional, if not contractual, obligation to teach effectively. Hence faculty must have the opportunity to do research. This argument does not appeal to academic freedom, 'positive' or otherwise; it invokes, instead, the larger goals of education and the role of faculty in that process. In a no-win situation, my university regretfully had to shoot itself in the foot, hoping to hop along well-enough on the other.

Russell often points out that bureaucratic interference with university affairs and cuts in financial support have undesirable effects: as the quality of academic working conditions declines, teaching suffers, the value of the institution's degree is undermined, and good faculty leave for greener pastures ('off the sinking ship, to America' [110]). But why frame this objection to cuts in terms of academic freedom? How is making the argument turn on such a (nowadays) suspicious idea advantageous? Why emphasize the tenuous connection between cuts and academic freedom, when cuts to universities could very well (as Russell is aware) endanger the local economies that
depend on their leadership, their instruction of the population civically and vocationally, their research, their cultural enrichment? This argument might tickle the ears of legislators, while talk of academic freedom encounters only deafness.

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Stuart Sim
Beyond Aesthetics: Confrontations with Poststructuralism and Postmodernism.
Pp. ix + 181.
Cdn $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2951-5);

Sim hopes his book will keep open the lines of communication between ‘the worlds of deconstruction/postmodernism and the left’ (136). He makes an important contribution to this project in taking a stance that is neither dismissive nor uncritically accepting of the postmodern thinkers he considers, particularly Derrida. Derrida is the major focus of the book, and the dominant figure in five of its eleven chapters (one is nominally devoted to Hartmann). Three chapters are devoted to Lyotard, and one to Baudrillard. Sim stages his investigation of Derrida, Lyotard and Baudrillard as a confrontation between their antifoundationalist thought and socialist foundationalism.

All three figures are investigated with an eye to uncovering the political dimension of their thought. Sim convincingly argues that while Derrida is politically evasive, and Lyotard politically naive, Baudrillard entirely abandons the political dimension. Sim quotes extensively from Baudrillard’s recent works and offers incisive criticisms. This chapter is one of the best brief descriptions and criticisms available of Baudrillard’s themes and style, although it would be strengthened by explanations of the meaning of key terms including ‘simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’.

Sim’s explorations of Derrida and Lyotard show that in both cases ‘We start with a challenge to authority and hierarchy: we end with the problematisation of communication’ (136). Sim demonstrates an elision of the collective dimension of politics in both thinkers. Both emphasize instead individual guerrilla tactics against institutions and authorities. Sim is concerned that antifoundationalist thinkers such as Derrida and Lyotard replace belief in foundations with rhetoric and the personal charisma of the rhetorician. Both
criticisms are well-founded. He is, however, too quick to make what he calls the 'usual superficial criticism' (41) that if foundations are not taken as certain and secure then aimlessness must result.

The book has two important faults. The first is a slipperiness regarding definitions of core concepts. Such slipperiness is more in keeping with Derrida than with Sim's critique of postmodern rhetoric. Sim makes many references to Nietzschean nihilism, but for a definition we are told that nihilism 'of course' is in the eye of the beholder (67). Despite the reference to postmodernism in the title and throughout the early chapters, Sim doesn't define postmodernity until the seventh chapter. He tells us it is not the easiest of terms to define (84). We are given Lyotard's definition of postmodernity as incredulity toward metanarratives and directed in footnotes to articles which point to evasiveness in the use of the term. Yet Sim continues to operate throughout the book as if its referent were clear.

'Aesthetics', another term that appears in the title of Sim's book sometimes refers to the whole arena of value judgment (1), sometimes more particularly to the arts (44). It is not always clear whether the broad or narrow meaning is intended, including when Sim speaks of socialist aesthetics (25, 68). Moreover it is hard to tell if Sim is arguing that aesthetics in the narrow sense plays a special role in understanding aesthetics and postaesthetics in the broad sense. His many references to the arts indicate this is most likely, but Sim never makes explicit reference to the connection between the arts and value judgment more broadly.

The second major flaw of the book concerns the inadequate characterization of Sim's own position, his 'reluctant foundationalism' (32) and his commitment to socialist politics. He states there are problems with foundationalism, which make his own foundationalism 'reluctant', but he doesn't tell us what those problems are or what his reluctance amounts to. Similarly he makes vague references to the 'socialist mind' (80) and the 'left wing perspective' (108), but is elusive when it comes to giving a positive characterization of the socialist mind. This is particularly troubling since Sim himself acknowledges that there are a plethora of competing characterizations of the political left (117).

From Sim's critique of postmodernism and poststructuralism, we know he is concerned with possibilities for grounded collective action, but that does little to differentiate amongst modes of collective action. We know too that he speaks approvingly of feminism, but are left wondering which of the many different aspects and varieties of feminism he means to champion. (Sim clearly locates himself as a socialist, but is less clear about his relation to feminism. He generally treats it as a monolithic movement.)

The vague characterization of Sim's reluctant foundationalism is detrimental to his attempt to open lines of communication between the left and contemporary antifoundationalist thought. His failure to adequately characterize his vision of the left is in turn tied to a failure to develop more specifically how antifoundationalist thought can be useful to the left. We are
given little to appreciate beyond the former's generically anti-authoritarian tendencies.

Given that the book is staged as a confrontation between antifoundationalism and foundationalism (however 'reluctant'), it is disturbing to read near the end of the book that 'foundationalism and purity of theory cease to mean much anyway' (141). Two pages later, on the last page of the book, Sim writes of Derrida and Lyotard that 'Perhaps we are expecting too much of these theories, taking their rhetoric at face value rather than as an invitation to re-examine the limits and procedures of one's own theory' (143).

Perhaps, instead, he expected too little, and diagnoses here his own failure to take them seriously enough. To take them seriously would require taking his own reluctant socialist foundationalism seriously. He tells us only that poststructuralism, feminism, and postmodernism have 'taught socialists to search for hidden assumptions in their own theories' (138).

This does not indicate how in particular antifoundationalist criticism might be pertinent to Sim's brand of leftist foundational discourse. Sim skirts away from the specific. We hear only that a 'not unreasonable' (107) charge has been made or that there is a 'certain justification' (99) for antifoundationalist suspicion. All we get are claims that foundationalists should learn more flexibility (117), and must remember the individual while focussing on the collectivity (99, 111). Such pronouncements are still too general to count as the beginning of a dialogue between the left and poststructuralism, although Sim has achieved something very close to his initial aim. He has, in the end, made a convincing case for the need for such dialogue. Socialist foundationalists and poststructuralist antifoundationalists have much still to learn from each other.

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Cornel West
Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America.

One might compare Cornel West's *Keeping Faith* to a military spy satellite whose camera suddenly shifts from a wide-angle view of an entire continent to a close-up snapshot of the postage stamp someone attaches to a secret romantic missive. Reading West's book is exhilarating, but in the same way a bit disorienting.
Keeping Faith is an exploration of many divergent areas of contemporary theory. The four sections deal with cultural criticism, political philosophy, legal theory and practice, and race-theory. To each of these philosophical areas, rarely so unified in the same thinker, West brings a common set of conceptual tools and traditions, developing and refining these common tools through these various diverse applications.

The central goal of Keeping Faith, however, is to situate West himself — a late-20th century, black, Christian, Marxist, American philosopher and intellectual — within his historical and philosophical milieu; and beyond this to formulate how he can, within this position, adopt an effective politics of resistance to racism, sexism, homophobia and class-oppression. West’s method of self-situation is an alternation between broad characterizations — perhaps even homilies (though homilies of a particular post-Marxist sort) — of some major portion of world history of the last five hundred years and poignant, detailed analyses and criticisms of particular idiosyncratic figures within this history. For example, in the first chapter, whose goal is to characterize, grandiosely, the intellectual ramifications of historical ‘European breakthroughs in oceanic transportation, agricultural production, state consolidation, bureaucratization, industrialization, urbanization and imperial dominion’ (5), the characterization is performed by a series of snap-shots of a few important, but decidedly singular, intellectuals such as Matthew Arnold, T.S. Eliot, Lionel Trilling and Franz Fanon.

Where West’s brilliance really shines is in the details, not in the somewhat generic descriptions of broad areas. The second chapter provides a short introduction to the meanings of literary canon formation, and particularly to contestations surrounding the meaning and creation of an African-American canon. The chapter is useful as such — perhaps usable in a literary theory course. Hidden inconspicuously within this, West remarks (without even mentioning The Signifying Monkey by name) that Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ‘goes astray because [he] proceeds on the dubious notion that theories of criticism must be developed from literature itself — be it vernacular, oral or highbrow literature — a religious belief in the magical powers of a glorified set of particular cultural archives’ (42). This must be read as a fundamental critique of Gates’s pivotal book — and yet it is delivered as no more than an offhand comment, occupying a single paragraph. The shock is that West is probably right.

As insightful as the almost aphoristic analyses liberally sprinkled throughout Keeping Faith are, West is best when he does not operate in this manner. Rather than alternate between overview and microscopic detail, the best chapters adopt a middle-focus which provide more substantive and argumentational criticism. The best of these are within the division, Philosophy and Political Engagement, and the best chapter within this division is that on Fredric Jameson. As well as allowing West to consider a recurrent theme of his through the lens of Jameson’s theoretical work — the relation of ethics to epistemology — West enters into a critical, but sympathetic,
dialogue with Jameson over the meanings and working of such Marxist fundamentals as ideology and history.

West is clearly drawn to a close link between ethics and epistemology, particularly to a prioritization of the first over the second. We can see West wrestle with this equation both in his sympathy towards Dewey and Royce who conclude that ‘truth is a species of the good’ (110) and in his discussion of Jameson’s and Northrop Frye’s use of such an equation. However, West wishes to resist this equation, and such makes up his central criticism of Jameson. The problem with deconstructing epistemological presuppositions to arrive at ethical conceptions, even if these ethical conceptions are ones which go beyond good and evil, is that these efforts just do not go far enough. West scolds Jameson — but simultaneously scolds the post-structuralists whom West thinks Jameson does not succeed in distancing himself from — that Jameson has failed the Marxist (and Pragmatist) lesson of taking history seriously. West remarks on p. 186, against both Jameson and post-structuralism, ‘What is distinctive about the Marxist project is that it neither resurrects, attacks nor attempts to “go beyond” metaphysics, epistemology and ethical discourses. It aims rather at transforming present practices ... Marxism admonishes us to “let the dead bury the dead.”’

Stylistically, West seems overly enamored with taxonomic devices — as if simply saying there are three possibilities in a given matter does the necessary philosophical work (it is usually three, perhaps in homage to Peirce). Sometimes such listing clarifies the discussion, but other times the distinctions are peculiar enough to serve merely as distractions. One finds taxonomies everywhere from a breakdown of materialist analyses of racism into genealogical, microinstitutional and macrostructural (268); to distinguishing Marxist thought, Marxism and Marxist theory (what one might more ordinarily call vulgar Marxism, actually-existing socialism and Marxism, respectively) (258); to breaking the three models for left-intellectuals into oppositional professional, professional political and oppositional intellectual groupings within the academy (98). The last of these taxonomies, for example, is simply difficult to get a grasp on, despite ample examples and explanations of each; perhaps the vocations of left-intellectuals are just not divided so neatly as West wishes. The shame here is not that West may be wrong in his categories, but that an excess concern with arbitrary categorization might distract the reader from his important discussion of the role of left-intellectuals.

The topics impossible to mention in this review are myriad and fascinating. They range from political critiques of architecture, to the role of African-American artists, to several chapters treating the Critical Legal Studies movement in various aspects, to contemporary post-Marxist theories of race. *Keeping Faith*, I believe, truly establishes West as one of North America’s premier philosophical minds.

David Mertz
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Robert E. Wheeler

In his vividly written book, Dragons for Sale, Robert Wheeler offers up a variety of dragons and malignancies that have left their imprints in Western Civilization. Every epoch has had its own follies that have had tremendous contagious impact on the masses, yet, Wheeler shows convincingly that there has been little intellectual progress to overcome various forms of unreason. He worries that there is no remedy against psychic contagions, except in taking on the fierce looking dragons themselves and exposing them as empty vessels.

Unreason is defined as a ‘destructive, life-corrupting force, militating against those values and ideals necessary to human happiness and fulfillment’. Furthermore, unreason causes a ‘resurgence of primordial chaos, with an inevitable loss of self-control and moral perception’ (16). Wheeler thus makes clear that his project is guided by Enlightenment ideals rather than a Nietzschean celebration of Dionysian forces or an Althusserian ideology critique. He challenges his reader to mature, to break free from the various guises of follies, from ‘witch-cults’, ‘fringe religions’, and other ‘mumbo jumbo’. This theme is repeated, e.g. in the chapter ‘The Snares of Belief’, where he states that ‘as a rule, unexamined beliefs preclude understanding and militate against intellectual and emotional maturity’. Being faithful to such lofty goals, Wheeler undertakes a critical analysis of the declarations of synods against heretics, of the Inquisition, the attraction of millenarianism, racist mythology of Nazism, and briefly, he looks at the witch-hunts of McCarthyism.

Wheeler’s chapter ‘Saints, Sinners, and Synods’ is imaginatively written and captures well the frenzied spirit of the Middle Ages. He states that the persecution of heretics, witches and other marginalized persons took off rapidly with the sudden proliferation of religious sects between 1000 and 1200. Prior to that period, the Church did not recognize heretic acts as being caused by Satan, who merely was regarded as trickster and charlatan but not God-like. However, in the thirteenth century, Rome saw its authority threatened and reacted by linking heresy and witchcraft, and ‘the ubiquitous Devil was believed responsible for both’ (52). Wheeler points out that severe punishment was at first directed against heretic groups, such as the Cathari and Albigensians, who were charged with committing diabolic acts. But in the fourteenth century, more and more women were accused of being witches who ‘confessed’ their grotesque activities with Satan. Those graphic descriptions culminated in the Malleus Maleficarum, (‘Hammer of the Witches’) of 1486, which states that due to defective intelligence and ‘inordinate passions’ women are more prone to become witches than men.

Yet, this discussion of witch-hunts is a fairly standard account of the Inquisition. It focuses heavily on the repressive tactics employed by the
Church and does not adequately address the role of other ideological state apparatuses. In particular, what is missing is a contextualized analysis, a consideration of the socio-economic histories, e.g. the widespread practice for targeting poor and older women and accusing them of witchcraft. Instead Wheeler talks in a cursory fashion about the 'ill-fed masses' and the 'outbreak of mass hysteria'. A notable exception is his account of the unjust accumulation of wealth of the inquisitors. Wheeler states that the relatives of the burned witch were obliged to pay for court expenses, litigation, and often were left destitute. Here, it would have been illuminating to consider these facts vis-a-vis the class position of the victims and their relatives. Surprisingly, Dragons for Sale does not draw upon important materials on witches, such as Cohn (Europe's Inner Demons, 1975), Larner (Enemies of God: The Witch-hunt in Scotland, 1983), Macfarlane (Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England, 1970), and Thomas (Religion and the Decline of Magic, 1971).

Dragons for Sale suffers in particular from the alarmist prophecy of the 'closing of the American mind', exemplified by the following quote: 'Irrationality is on the increase; in all walks of life men and women are succumbing to fear and unreason' (14). Why is it necessary to stress the decline of reason in our days? This type of statement seems to contradict Wheeler's general thesis that every epoch has had more or less the same share of follies, even the so-called Enlightenment Century. And in a particularly illuminating passage, we are told that the unreason of the 'Dark Ages' is still with us (64). Instead of lamenting the irrationality of our post-industrial age, would it not be more challenging to investigate the absurd itself? As a starting point one could for instance ask with Adorno, why it should be still possible to write poems after Auschwitz, the ultimate irrational and unthinkable.

Despite some of the shortcomings of Dragons for Sale, it is a useful introduction into the history of 'unreason' in Western Civilization, and should provoke the reader to investigate further some of the areas Wheeler touches upon.

Mechthild Nagel
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It can easily seem clearly true that a particular tree’s leaves are green. Does appeal to truth in such contexts commit one to a strong realism about a mind independent world? In this book Crispin Wright develops a position which allows one both to say that color ascriptions (among others) can be true and to disavow a heavily metaphysical realism about such features. He develops what he calls ‘a minimalist conception of truth’ which is to be ‘metaphysically neutral and hence ... available common ground in disputes between realism and anti-realism in different areas of discourse’ (76). In so doing, he constructs a set of critical and classificatory tools which give us a very useful taxonomy for the many different debates that the realism/anti-realism dispute has consisted in. The resulting insightful and often original discussion is drawn from lectures and has the fortunate accessibility that such a source can provide.

The minimalist conception of truth is developed in opposition to ‘deflationism’, the view that all there is to truth is captured by the Disquotational Schema: ‘P’ is true if and only if P. Wright maintains that truth is a norm which coincides in normative force with warranted assertibility, and allows that this much may be captured by the deflationary view. However, Wright elegantly argues, truth cannot be equivalent to ‘is warrantedly assertible’. Rather, contrary to deflationism, truth must be another, additional norm.

Wright’s contrasting account also adds that truth is governed by what he takes to be platitudes. Among the platitudes are: (1) To assert is to present as true; and (2) Every truth-apt content has a significant negation which is truth-apt. Platitudes get on the list, it seems, if they are basic features of the way we talk about truth. A notable member of the list, surprising in an account of truth which is to be neutral between realism and anti-realism, is: (3) To be true is to correspond to the facts. Wright’s somewhat Wittgensteinian (post-Tractatus) point appears to be that ‘corresponds’ occurs in a way of speaking and thinking about truth which is separable from any substantial theories.

Wright allows that more than one predicate may meet the minimalist conditions and be a truth predicate. He argues that Putnam’s ‘would be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances’ is not a truth predicate, while his own superassertibility is. ‘A statement is superassertible ... if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information’ (48).

For Wright, at its most general level, a realism advocates that a local truth predicate (a truth predicate operative in some subsection of discourse) exceeds any minimalist truth predicate. Wright argues that there are four
general kinds of debate to be considered (85). The first two sorts of debate focus on the relation between the discourse’s truth predicate and superassertibility as understood in terms of the standards for warrant in the discourse. The first debate is Dummettian; the question is whether the truth may reside beyond anything secured by meeting the standards for warrant; this debate occurs most naturally when we lack any assurance that truth (as it seems to be understood) and superassertibility coincide in extension. The second, ‘the Euthyphro debate’, occurs in a context in which an extensional coincidence between truth and superassertibility is expected; it concerns whether superassertibility tracks an independent truth or, rather, constitutes what there is to truth. The third and fourth debates focus on the Correspondence Platitude; the question here is whether there is more to correspondence than its embeddedness in our ways of characterizing the true. The third debate is about the relation of ‘corresponding’ and the fourth about one kind of relatum, ‘the facts’. One of the many interesting upshots of Wright’s delineation is that Mackie’s error theory and Blackburn’s quasi-realism cease to be contenders in the debates; they are faulted for their misconstruals of the question of truth.

Wright’s account of what correspondence should look like if it is more than platitudinous addresses the vexed issue of whether a realism in a disputed territory (for example, moral discourse) must demand a convergence of competent opinion. Wright argues that this debate is actually motivated by intuitions about a different issue; namely, what representation requires. For Wright, a (moderate) realist notion of representation requires a priori that a divergence of opinion, in the absence of vagueness, signals a cognitive defect. Wright’s account of representation here compares us to a camera, a fax machine and a mirror (91-2.)

There are still more topics addressed in Wright’s work than have so far been mentioned. Among these are those of the linkage between realism and the best explanation of belief, and of a ‘quietism’ attributed sometimes to Wittgenstein. Quietism is understood as the view that significant metaphysical debate is not possible. Among other things, Wright problematizes the attribution of this view to Wittgenstein.

Wright’s discussion is distinctly circumscribed. For example, from the outset Wright assumes agreement with his view that semantic contents are determined, at least in part, by public rules regarding warrant. There is no recognition of the recent industry to establish causal and teleological accounts of content involving, among many others, Fodor and Dretske. At the same time, despite his non-Cartesian constraints on content, Wright’s work displays some Cartesian traits. For example, Wright leaves unconsidered the possibility that some beliefs/contents and some kinds of objectivity are more strongly social than the existence of public rules would guarantee. Among the philosophers recently advocating the stronger views are Longino and Gilbert. Perhaps most surprising is the fact that Wright’s discussion of representation is substantially motivated by his attraction to what is a recently highly criticized Cartesian model (given one standard interpretation
of Descartes). The model has us getting our story of the world right when we are mirrors of reality. Wright appears often to assume we should want to vindicate this model. Nonetheless, Wright explores the costs of giving up the model often enough to make his discussion interesting to those who have abandoned it.

Wright explicitly maintains that he is not trying to answer all the important questions. What he has given us is an original, illuminating and unified framework. Working one's way through Wright's arguments should be fruitful to anyone who is thinking about these topics.

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

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is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for electronic mail on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

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W.E. Cooper