

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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John Arras and Nancy Rhoden, eds.
Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 3rd edition.
Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing
Company 1989. Pp. xix + 585.
US \$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87484-889-X).

This massive text is suitable for a variety of teaching approaches in the field of medical ethics. It offers an overwhelming number of selections (close to seventy) within six main chapters (or 'parts') and 22 sections. Like many applied ethics anthologies, EIMM begins with an introduction to classical ethical theory: Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Natural Law theory, Marxism, and various theories of justice are all briefly but successfully touched upon. Each part begins with a thoughtful, informative discussion and overview of the subject. There are numerous examples of actual legal cases throughout the text which, for the most part (since some are quite tired and worn now) are successful in reinforcing the applied aspects of the topic. The number of issues covered is truly impressive, although the topics tend to be somewhat standard. These include: the health professional-patient relationship, euthanasia, abortion, new reproductive technologies, human experimentation and health care allocation. Within EIMM you will find also an impressive list of contributors, including but not limited to: Veatch, Rachels, Singer, Donagan, Callahan, Caplan, and Engelhardt.

Many of the contributors have contributed more than one paper (Veatch tops the list with five). Multiple selections by one author have their benefits and detractions. One possible benefit is that multiple readings not only provide valuable insight to the topic at hand but also valuable insight into the views of the author who is rightly considered important in the area. A detraction is that by having two or more contributions by one author you are limiting the scope of the debate. Given that many of the articles included in EIMM are of the 'classic' variety, some instructors may be disappointed and find the text not on the cutting edge and not very different from any numerous other anthologies out there. On the other hand EIMM may be the perfect text for some *because* of its inclusion of various classic articles.

Classics are 'must reads' but their usefulness in an ever-changing field diminishes as time goes by. For there are always new areas of concern ready and waiting just beyond the horizon and what was considered avant-garde five years ago may now be out of step in today's world. This is to be expected as we all try to play 'catch up' with various possibilities that modern technology has granted or cursed us with. This is not meant as a criticism of EIMM but rather it is simply an acknowledgment that anthologies in applied areas do have their limitations.

In the context of this concern over 'classics' consider Part Three of EIMM on Abortion. Here we find, amongst others, the work of Noonan, Warren and Thomson. Important works all, but has nothing new been added to this debate since these articles came out two decades ago? Thomson's rightly famous *A Defense of Abortion* shows its age more each year as its thesis has

to face the challenges of the advancements within the field of Obstetrics and Gynecology. With the latest technology Thomson's position has been weakened considerably as abortion in some late term pregnancies might now be plausibly viewed as excessive force (that is, if we buy into the conservative assumption regarding the moral status of fetuses). In the future, all abortions might be viewed as unjustified on grounds of self-defense given the research concerning liquid aspiration and artificial wombs (of course, this is not to say that abortions cannot be justified on other grounds). Indeed two pieces included in this third edition by the late Rhoden, 'Cesareans and Samaritans' and 'Trimesters and Technology' bring this problem to light.

The book has been laid out with the aim of satisfying a variety of pedagogical approaches. One notices for example that one part is devoted to defining death, foregoing life-sustaining treatment and euthanasia. Almost half of the sections within this part are concerned with the right to refuse treatment and proxy consent. One would think that the topic of informed consent would naturally arise here, but for that one must jump to another part of the text (for an excellent article by Buchanan and Brock). Instructors glancing at the table of contents will also notice that this issue of informed consent is raised again within the context of human experimentation. Now depending upon your needs, this 'leap-frogging' of issues may be appealing or annoying, appealing since it is sometimes useful to talk about competency within a defined problem (e.g., human experimentation) and annoying if one wishes to look at the big theoretical picture of 'What is competency?'

This is a huge anthology and it is safe to suggest that many of the fine articles will be left off of academic course outlines. Simply put, there is too much here to cover in a half-year course and thus the charge of wastefulness is not unreasonable. I also believe that many students will be quite disappointed in having purchased an expensive text of which only a few parts are discussed.

The textual buffet Arras and Rhoden present us with is an admirable Babette's feast of ethical issues in modern medicine. You won't find much missing from the table although a list of various professional codes would be useful as would be the inclusion of 'thought questions,' for further classroom discussion. More significantly, one is provided barely a whiff of the issue of inter-professional relationships. And as a whole, the topic of professional responsibilities appears to have been placed on the back burner. Indeed, the first part of EIMM is misleading. This part, entitled 'Foundations of the Health Professional-Patient Relationship' deals only with the *physician*-patient relationship (with one exception). Writings that exemplify the important movements in nursing are not offered for our consumption. This is unfortunate especially since the editors provide us with Ladd's article, describing the physician-patient relationship not in the legalistic terms of Veatch's contract theory but in terms of a healing relationship which draw upon the notions of fidelity, trust and care. For some, 'care' captures the essence of nursing ethics as well as the essential differences between nursing and physician ethics. So for those who are looking for an anthology in the

area of medical ethics, I suggest that *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* is on the whole, extremely well done but it sometimes falters in presenting too many articles in some areas, too few in others, and articles that are too long in the tooth.

Jeff McLaughlin

University of Alberta

François Bernier

Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi.

Paris: Fayard, 1992.

(Reprint of the 'seconde édition revue et augmentée par l'auteur', Lyons, Anisson, Posuel et Rigaud, 1684, in seven volumes)

FF1500. ISBN 2-213-02820-6.

François Bernier (1620-1688) had direct access to Gassendi's views, as he shared Gassendi's philosophy lessons for Chappelle along with Cyrano de Bergerac, and perhaps even Molière. He became intimate enough with Gassendi to have closed his eyes when he died in 1655. For the next thirteen years he travelled in the Middle East and especially in the Indian subcontinent, a trip whose account actually brought Bernier his greatest fame. (Judging from his notebooks, Locke for example was even more interested in this literature than in Bernier's philosophical work.) In 1674 he began the publication of his *abrégé* of Gassendi's philosophy, motivated to defend his former mentor against those who were making him into a mere follower of the ancient atomists or else a mere historian and philosophical skeptic.

At the time of Gassendi's death, it was unclear how his empiricist philosophy of atoms and the void would ultimately fare against Descartes' rationalist philosophy of the plenum. Hard as it may be to imagine now, the fame and stature of these near-exact contemporaries was near-equal, even though Gassendi's most important work, the *Syntagma philosophicum*, was to appear only posthumously, in 1658. Soon thereafter, Gassendi was in the decline that finally left him the status as only one from a number of objectors to the *Meditations*. There were a number of reasons for Gassendi's failure against Descartes. One was that Descartes wrote short, lively (apparently) comprehensible works, often in French, wherein Gassendi wrote interminable, dull, difficult works, always in Latin. When Bernier sought to reestablish Gassendi's position, Pierre Bayle gratefully remarked that with the *Abrégé*

in hand, no one would thereafter have to invest the effort of reading Gassendi's difficult tomes.

The *Abrégé* first appeared in very incomplete form as a single volume in 1674 and with another volume in 1675. The first complete edition appeared in 1678, in seven volumes amounting to some three and a half thousand pages in *duodecimo*. The text under review here is the second edition, which appeared, also in seven volumes, in 1684. The two editions differ quite considerably. In addition to stylistic alterations and more or less important changes in the ordering of the material, the second edition contains Bernier's own independent work. In volume three there is the *Eclaircissement sur le livre de M. de la Ville*, in which Bernier takes on the issue of transubstantiation *vis à vis* the Cartesians, and, more importantly, in volume two there is a version of the *Doutes* about Gassendi's philosophy that he had published two years earlier. These doubts, largely based on a nominalism more radical than Gassendi's own, attacked Gassendi's views on space, time, motion, matter and much else short of the core position on atoms and the void. The upshot is that, with Bernier's own views insinuating themselves, the editions differ in the emphases and sympathies they show in their interpretation, paraphrase and outright translation of Gassendi's *Syntagma*. Bayle's relief was not quite fully justified. Even so, this relatively easy French text is now, just as it was three centuries ago, a most welcome aid in dealing with Gassendi's sometimes impossible Latin text.

The text has not been reprinted since 1684 and here appears in the Fayard series, *Corpus des oeuvres de philosophie en langue française*, which has usefully, if expensively, made available rare texts from people like Mariotte, Cureau de la Chambre, Mersenne and others. The text was reviewed for publication by Sylvia Murr and Geneviève Stefani, and has a brief introduction by Ms. Murr of the CNRS. (Ms. Murr is also the editor of the special double issue of *Corpus: Revue Philosophique*, Nos. 20-21, 1992, which is devoted to Bernier and the Gassendists.) It also appears in seven volumes, but in fewer pages; the pagination of the original is indicated throughout by superscripts. Sensibly, the typography has been modernized and the original orthography has been preserved. Some corrections have been made, as when Bernier mistakenly quotes Gassendi's Latin or Gassendi's quotations from Lucretius. If this text contains some few typographical errors of its own, these seem to me far exceeded by the improvements that it introduces.

At the Conference called 'Gassendi: sa posterité' held at the Sorbonne in the fall of 1992, Richard Popkin recalled that as editor of the *Journal of the History of Philosophy* he expected a great flood of papers on Gassendi to be submitted when Craig Brush's translation of *The Selected Works of Gassendi* appeared twenty years ago, but that in fact none materialized. As I see it, part of the problem was that the quarter of Brush's book dedicated to the *Syntagma* contained a woefully small fraction of the whole. To be sure, very important work has been done in recent times, most notably by O.R. Bloch, L.S. Joy, M. Osler and a few others, but the Gassendi industry has been retarded by the lack of linguistic access to the principal text (even if the

French translation by B. Rochot of the *Exercitationum* and *Disquisitio Metaphysica* have been enormously helpful). A team is now at work in Paris at the CNRS translating the *Syntagma*. Until that work is done, likely at some distant date, we will have Bernier's *Abrégé*, which is an important philosophical document in its own right.

Thomas M. Lennon

University of Western Ontario

**Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang L. Gombocz,
and Christian Pilller, eds.**

*Metamind, Knowledge and Coherence, Essays
on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer.*

Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi (Grazer
philosophische Studien 1991.

ISBN 90-5183-277-X.

This book begins with an essay by Lehrer which presents his latest thinking on certain issues in the theory of knowledge — issues later addressed by his critics. His main thesis, 'that the human mind is essentially a metamind' (1), is assumed without proof. One role of 'metamental ascent' (1) — awareness of one's own thoughts and feelings — is to evaluate critically these first order states in terms of the background information we possess.

L states that for a belief that receives positive evaluation to constitute knowledge, '... I must be a trustworthy evaluator of the belief in question' (4). He adds, 'I must also be trustworthy about my trustworthiness' (4). Hence an infinite regress threatens. L addresses this problem through his concept of 'the metamental loop', which has also been called the reflexive character of consciousness. As L states the problem, 'That we are conscious seems to be something of which we are also conscious. Thus a regress of consciousness of consciousness threatens' (7). Consciousness, however, 'reveals and represents itself in revealing and representing other mental states' (7), so that a regress is forestalled. A belief which receives positive evaluation is, in L's terms, *accepted*; a desire is *preferred*. Conflicts among beliefs or desires can be resolved by such evaluation. Preference, acceptance, and acceptance of one's trustworthiness are characterized by the metamental loop. L argues that this property cannot be accommodated in a 'computational model of thought' (7).

In the first critical essay, Fred Dretske mounts a 'naturalistic' attack on Lehrer; D calls his own approach 'bottom-up', that of L 'top-down'. For D, '...

knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene' (15). D's examples are variants of, 'Fido knows that his food-bowl is ... by the table,' whereas L's examples, such as a scientific pronouncement by Einstein, require critical thought and a conceptual system. For L, Fido's knowledge of his bowl's location is either not knowledge at all or else knowledge in a different sense from that of Einstein. D insists that Fido has genuine knowledge and rejects the idea of different senses. L claims that D's approach must fail for the same reason that logical positivism failed — inability to account for theoretical terms, which are empirically underdetermined (see 34).

Secondly, Christian Piller analyses L's concept of acceptance; he interprets 'to accept that p' as 'to decide to believe that p' (40). L, however, rejects this interpretation, confessing that it is due, in part, to ambiguity in his past writings. His 'disambiguation' is: 'Acceptance is a state that arises from the activity of evaluation of first order beliefs or representations by a higher order system' (62-3). This is consistent with L's account of acceptance, summarized above.

Thirdly, Alfred Schramm argues that Lehrer's coherentist theory of justification is incapable of coping with the objections of a 'philosophical skeptic' who claims that, 'Any belief (or disbelief) of contingent propositions is *mere faith*, therefore any belief is as good as any other belief (just as any doubt is as good as any other doubt), and *therefore* any belief (or doubt) is *as bad*, that is *unjustified*, as any other belief (or doubt)' (73). I find Schramm's arguments too complex for quick summary. L's counter argument begins by noting that although S doubts all contingent propositions, he 'concedes logicity' (88).

Fourthly, Marian David questions the epistemic importance which L gives to the proposition T, 'I am a trustworthy evaluator of truth' (94). D goes on to embody T in a principle, which he attributes to L, as follows: '(R) For any p, if S accepts T and S accepts p, then it is more reasonable for S to accept p than to accept the denial of p on the basis of S's acceptance system' (94). D thinks 'that (R) is far too bold' (96); he argues this point in relation to two examples. L, in his response, accepts (R) and argues 'that D has presupposed ... principle (R) in formulating his counterexamples' (109). L goes on to suggest that some objectors to (R) make the 'unwarranted assumption ... that if it is more reasonable to accept that p than to accept the denial of p, then it is more reasonable to accept that p than not to accept that p' (110). L's example: 'it may be more reasonable for me to accept that I will live to age seventy [than not]. But, the vicissitudes of life being what they are, it is, I think, more reasonable for me to accept neither' (110-1).

In the fifth essay, Mylan Engel discusses L's coherence theory of epistemic justification. Although L holds that 'one element in coherence is consistency' (113), E thinks it unlikely that the set of propositions accepted by a person would be consistent. He sets out to argue 'that consistency is *not* necessary for coherence' (113), and that '... L's analysis of coherence does not rule out the possibility of coherently inconsistent acceptance systems' (114). Space does not permit a summary of E's main argument nor of L's reasons for rejecting it. L concludes, 'I agree that for some purposes it may be reasonable

to accept an inconsistent set of statements But the set of things that one is justified in accepting in the quest for truth and the attainment of knowledge must be consistent' (133).

The book also contains 'Reid and Lehrer: Metamind in History' (135-49) by Daniel Schulthess; 'Rational Consensus and Coherence Methods in Ethics' (151-62) by Elvio Baccarini; and 'Language as Fictitious Consensus: A Critique of Keith Lehrer's Conception of Language' by Dunja Jutronic-Tihomirovic. There follow three essays on Newcomb's paradox: 'An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb's Paradox' by Lehrer and Van McGee (197-220); 'Simpson's Paradox and the Fisher-Newcomb Problem' by Carl G. Wagner (186-196); and 'Comment on Keith Lehrer's and Van McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem' (221-232) by Christian Pillier. L and M claim to solve Newcomb's and similar paradoxes through 'The Good Observation Principle: If an agent is certain that performing observation O in no way influences whether P obtains, then the agent's probability of P given O ought to equal her subjective probability of P' (198).

Charles Ripley

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**Janine Brodie, Shelley A.M. Gavigan,
and Jane Jenson**

The Politics of Abortion.

Oxford University Press 1992.

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-540866-7).

Neither the Supreme Court's decision in *Morgentaler v. The Queen* (1988) nor the defeat of Bill C-43 in 1991 resolved the abortion debate in Canada. This central claim of *The Politics of Abortion* may strike one as obvious, rather dull, and in no need of argument. Yet placed in the context of a thorough historical, cultural and political analysis of the issues surrounding abortion, the claim becomes a lively and very relevant one. *The Politics of Abortion* is largely a clear and coherent overview of the topic, and although its authors do not pretend to be neutral, the book is so comprehensive as to be required reading for pro- and anti-choice camps alike.

Stylistically, manuscripts with multiple authors can be awkward; Brodie, Gavigan and Jenson use the effective technique of dividing their labour explicitly. All three composed the introductory chapter, while the remainder of the text (excluding appendices) is presented in three individually authored chapters. Perhaps as a result of this approach, the introduction is brief but

overwhelmingly dense, and deeply laden phrases like 'the state's legitimate interest in protecting the foetus' and 'realization of full gender equality' are turned loose without comment. This introductory ground, however, is covered in much greater detail in the substantive chapters. There is a drawback here, however. The jointly authored chapter announces the authors' intentions to 'employ discourse and ideology as analytic tools', in order to critically examine what are referred to as 'meaning systems'. The nature of meaning systems is not made explicit, although the role they play, serving to 'sustain power relations and inform the possibilities and limits of political struggle', is. I call this a drawback because none of the authors really follow through. Jenson's section makes the biggest effort in this direction, but the rather vague notion of 'meaning systems' clutters an otherwise clean presentation. Nonetheless, we are offered a road map of where the authors plan to take us, from the medicalization to the politicization of abortion in Canada, via history, theology, feminism and the rise of rights discourse.

Jenson's section, 'Getting to *Morgentaler*: From One Representation to Another', is the first thorough history of Canadian abortion law written with an eye to explaining how the current stalemate arose. Much of the narrative is compiled from the public record, but is far from common knowledge. Jenson effectively strips away layers of legal and medical opinion to reveal representations of women and other assumptions that had been embedded in the law dealing with abortion up to the historic *Morgentaler* case. But hers is no abrupt attack; she lingers over the task long enough to analyze, to reveal ironies, and to tell tales of a rather wild nature. (The 1970 Vancouver-to-Ottawa Abortion Caravan, culminating in a group of participants chaining themselves to the Public Gallery in the Commons yelling for abortion on demand, is the best example of the latter.) The analysis is thorough, showing how the prevailing preference in the courts up to 1988 had been to treat abortion as a medical matter. This preference effectively limited the terms in which any *political* debate about abortion could be conducted, and any reform or reinterpretation of the law therefore addressed only the practical needs of doctors or technical legal concerns. (This is not to suggest, of course, that *moral* debate over abortion took place on such limited grounds, a point that Jenson does not always make clear.) But perhaps the most important contribution of this section is the establishment of what becomes a leitmotif for the remainder of the book: from the early focus on instruction for physicians and judges to the later, more spirited attention to foetal rights, women have been largely absent from the dialogue.

Brodie and then Gavigan pick up this thread and weave it seamlessly into their own narratives. Earlier in the book, the authors' views are presented subtly, almost invisibly. By the beginning of Brodie's chapter, 'Choice and No Choice in the House', this subtlety has begun to dwindle, and later disappears. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the work as 'not objective' because, as I suggest above, there are clear lessons here about how ground has been lost and won by both sides. Brodie's section, the longest of the book, begins nominally at *Morgentaler* (although she recapitulates some of Jenson's

history as a linking step). She places a particular emphasis on the question of accessibility to abortion which, because of effective political tactics in the anti-choice movement, had been seriously eroded in most parts of the country. Accessibility is also a critical issue for the pro-choice proponents, because it demonstrates that Criminal Code restrictions on when abortion can legally be performed may be used to restrict abortion in practice. This tension suggests that any compromise position that the Commons could propose would be doomed if it attended to practical restrictions at the expense of maternal and foetal rights. Nonetheless, political discussion did not (and still does not) directly examine the highly charged rights issues, turning instead to questions like the integrity of universal health care and the rights of the provinces to make medical determinations. (As Brodie points out, only one member of the Supreme Court that struck down the Criminal Code provisions for abortion claimed that women ever had a *right* to an abortion.)

By the time the Conservative government prepared to respond to the judicially-induced need for a new abortion law, women had become a presence in the dialogue, but in a very queer way. (The cases of Barbara Dodd and Chantal Daigle were fresh in the public mind, polarizing opinion.) Brodie demonstrates that neither pro- nor anti-choice supporters, within the House and without, offered a convincing representation of women upon which to base their political demands. The pro-choice movement tended to portray women either as passive and in need of protection from unscrupulous abortionists, or as victims of poor education and inadequate social services forced to abort only as a last resort. Only a small portion of pro-choice political rhetoric demanded the right for women, as rational moral agents, to control over their own bodies. The weaknesses of these representations of women were exploited by the anti-choice camp, which successfully used the opportunity to reiterate their own far more colourful imagery of innocence, murder, and morally bankrupt women. The impact of these images obscures what Brodie insists must not be obscured, namely the inadequacies and inherent contradictions of anti-choice discourse, especially over the ambiguous roles of science and medicine in abortion law and foetal rights, the imbalance of collective and individual rights, and the assessment of the natural and desirable condition of women.

It is against this background that C-43 was drafted and, given this background, Brodie shows its failure to be unsurprising. C-43 utterly failed to escape the medical approach to abortion, and indeed reinforced it by placing the power to decide whether abortion was warranted in the hands of individual doctors. This failure would merely serve to entrench the anti-choice anti-access strategy, and would allow individual doctors to be targets. It is no wonder that the Canadian Medical Association feared for its members. Furthermore, it was recognized almost from the beginning that C-43 could be seen as replicating the provisions of Section 251 (later 287) of the Criminal Code that had already been struck down in *Morgentaler*. C-43 may have been drafted as a compromise bill, but it neither resolved nor even addressed the concerns of either side. Brodie ends her contribution on a note

of warning: the decriminalization of abortion has in no way secured any reproductive rights for Canadian women. After more than twenty years of often bitter argument, the struggle over abortion is still anybody's game.

Gavigan's concluding chapter, '*Morgentaler* and Beyond: Abortion, Reproduction and the Courts', is a thoughtful and far-reaching summary. She comments on much of the material that Jenson and Brodie have already introduced, but where their approach was legal and historical, Gavigan's is legal and analytic. The introduction of the notion of 'feminist analysis and engagement with the law' seems a little abrupt this late in the text, but if the terminology is somewhat unexpected, the ideas are less so. Gavigan grasps the slippery issue of the relevance and power of rights-seeking as an appropriate strategy for feminists; she is clearly aware of the current import of this question for feminist legal theorists, and although her contribution here is not an original one, she does highlight all of the most significant considerations and connects them to the abortion debate. For example, the rhetoric of rights is one that the anti-choice movement has also embraced, and in the absence of an awareness of the relationship between law and State, and State and power, the competition for rights stands little chance of being resolved.

Gavigan also notes, in a somewhat ominous tone, the importance of extra-legal struggle for women's rights, since that is where the opponents of choice have had the greatest impact. Her analyses of foetal rights and paternal claims are deft and concise, and although one might presume that these are paradigm legal struggles, Gavigan shows that they have an extra-legal element that often goes unnoticed. Characterizations of foetal personhood are accompanied by images of pregnant women as 'menacing vessels', and paternal claims situate the pregnant woman as an unwanted mediator between father and child. Where women were once absent from the debate, anti-choice strategies have given them a minimal presence that can only be described as a threat.

After *Morgentaler* and C-43, the problem moved to the arena of provincial funding of abortion, with mixed results, but still with no real visibility for women. One's own views on the matter will determine whether this is seen as an injustice in urgent need of redress or a precarious but correct position in need of retrenchment. Brodie, Gavigan and Jenson make it clear where they stand, but they argue convincingly that neither side can afford to count the current stalemate as a victory. It is a measure of their even-handedness that they provide both sides with ample evidence and tacit instruction on how best to proceed.

Edrie Sobstyl

University of Alberta

Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, eds.
Feminists Theorize the Political.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1992. Pp. 485.
US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90273-8);
US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90274-6).

Editors Butler and Scott preface this impressive collection with rigorous self-scrutiny. 'What,' they ask 'qualifies as "theory"' in an age which apprehends systematic explanation as the illusory effect of tautologizing metalanguage? If theory is but a rhetoric of discursive ploys posing as a totalizing world view, a form of knowledge unconsciously suspended between enlightenment and mystification, how can it make epistemic advances beyond politic self-interest? 'Is "theory" an insidious form of politics? Can any politics be derived from "theory," or is "theory" itself a form of political nihilism?' (xiii).

Such questions have a history which links *Feminists Theorize the Political* to the inaugural publication in 1982 of *Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology*. As differences in titles suggest, the monolithic figure of 'feminist theory' has been replaced by a heterogeneous figure of agents ('feminists') in the service of theorizing whatever categorically represents 'the political' — power-brokers acting in the name of *the* state, *the* law, *the* subject and *the* sex. *To theorize* in the present means *to deconstruct* categories and positions judiciously expounded in political discourse, *to expose* the violence of exclusive representation hiding behind the propriety of discursive claims, and to make 'breathing room for the articulation of ... a new configuration of "the political"' (*Feminists Theorize*, 365).'

Both *Feminist Theory* and *Feminists Theorize* take 'ideology' to be the oppressor, although they differ in understanding what ideology is, how it works, and what strategies of intervention are to be deployed. The former aims to expose masculinism at work in supposedly disinterested scientific epistemology, in 'egalitarian' marxist and liberal theories of the state, and in 'natural' heterosexual behaviour so as to dispel sexual 'false consciousness' and replace it with a healing knowledge of the 'truth' of 'women's experience' in society and history. 'Feminist theory' establishes corrective re-readings of 'male-centered theory' through consciousness-raising, reality-testing, and ideological self-criticism.

Since 1982 standpoint epistemology has been subject to the devastating critiques of poststructuralism, postmodernism and postcolonialism, subduing if not shattering the hopes for a new Enlightenment founded on the 'truth' of 'female consciousness'. The shift to anti-foundationalism began when black, working-class, and lesbian feminists stormed the political arena forged and dominated by white, middle class, straight (or closeted) academic feminists. Confronting the white mythology of universal sisterhood, these *other* feminists forced a recognition of multiple, even conflictual, 'self-knowledges', and called for coalitional politicking rather than identitarian solidarity.

To circumvent the vicious circle of ideology and counter-ideology on 'the feminist agenda,' Butler and Scott present a large and colorful cast of contributors who work across a range of disciplines (pedagogy, literary criticism, law, history, political and social science, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis, women's and cultural studies), who deploy a mixed arsenal of discursive strategies against the category of gender and its hegemonic operations in ethnic, religious, national, postcolonial discourses, and who articulate variable affiliations with poststructuralism and postmodernism.

What distinguishes this present collection from others which explore the conjunction between feminism and the various 'posts-' is its emphasis on postcolonial theorizing. While neither *Feminist Theory* nor the more recent publication of *Feminism/Postmodernism* (1990) bring discourses of race and postcoloniality to bear on their analyses, *Feminists Theorize the Political* privileges these discourses in a number of essays, most notably Rey Chow's, 'Postmodern Automaton,' Mae Gwendolyn Henderson's, 'Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics, Dialectics, and the Black Woman Writer's Literary Tradition,' Zakia Pathak and Jajeswari Sunder Rajan, 'Shahbano,' and Ana Maria Alonso's, 'Gender, Power, and Historical Memory: Discourses of *Serrano* Resistance.'

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's 'French Feminism Revisited: Ethics and Politics' exemplifies the extraordinary complexity involved in theorizing the political *between other worlds*. Spivak stages a writers' dialogue between French feminists, Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Algerian feminist, Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas in exile in the U.S. Determined to engage both 'metropolitan' and 'postcolonial' feminists, Spivak directs an exchange in as inter-national a frame as possible. Rather than entertain a critique of French metropolitan feminism from the political perspective of postcolonial feminism, or present the poststructuralist strategy of *écriture féminine* as a paradigm for all writing-militants, she addresses the *ethical* imperative specific to each textual practice. She cites the troping of alterity in French feminist writing (e.g., Cixous' 'giving the woman to the other woman') and, conversely, the call for solidarity in Hélie-Lucas ('we should link our struggles from one country to the other for the reasons of *ethics*'), noting that while the style of each poses a profound rejoinder to the other in a double front against imperialism, neither inscribes the crucial figurative link or visionary *catechesis* which might read/reach the other *subaltern* woman living through her displacements 'at home' in the decolonizing nation. By asking how, in the process of intertextual negotiation, these different writing practices might figure an exchange in solidarity with the subaltern woman, while touching/moving her in her distinctive otherness, Spivak advances an ethical pretext for reading and writing the politics of global decolonization.

Theorizing at the juncture of postcolonialism, postmodernism and post-structuralism is no less pragmatic for all its complexity. Butler and Scott arrange their twenty-three essays to impress the reader with a sense of moving towards more material interventions — from the negative philo-

sophical critiques of foundationalism in 'Contesting Grounds,' to the affirmative activist propositions of 'Critical Practices'. This movement is repeated within each section. 'Subjects Before the Law,' for instance, begins with Mary Poovey's 'Abortion and the Death of Man,' a deconstructive reading of the 'rights of Man' as applied in rulings on abortion. Poovey reviews two precedent-setting cases, *Roe v Wade*, 1973 and *Webster v Reproductive Health Services of Missouri*, 1989, to show how such categorical notions as 'person' and 'viability' establish a contest of rights between women-persons and *potential* persons (fetus-cum-person), leaving it to the courts to judge in whose personal interest they will act. Shifting the grounds of interpretation from the humanist metaphysical to the materialist social, Poovey advocates that courts rethink abortion litigation in terms of public resources and social welfare, that, in short, they recognize the 'death of Man' so as to care for the life of the community.

In the chapter which follows, 'Gender, Sex, and Equivalent Rights,' Drucilla Cornell re-focuses legal attention on the discourse of rights. She argues that, in founding the concept and practice of 'equal rights' on the one, phallic, standard, the law (mis)judges the sexual priorities and gender norms of a heterogeneous body politic, including those of women and gay men, to be equal (or not) to those ascribed to straight men. Against 'equal rights,' she advocates the installation of 'equivalent rights' which would force courts to recognize different sexualities and genders without appeal to an abstract and exclusionary idea of the Same.

In the final chapter of this section, Vicki Schultz enters the domain of law and labour with the purpose of altering judges to ways they might help demystify 'women's work'. In 'Women "Before" the Law: Judicial Stories about Women, Work, and Sex Segregation on the Job,' Schultz alleges that judges themselves contribute to women's exploitation by telling stories which either presume that women are predisposed towards 'feminine,' low-paid, low-profile, work ('the conservative story') or that both sexes are/should be subject to the same conditions and aspirations as working men ('the liberal story'). She insists that judges recognize and abandon these stories, that in cases where managers defend their employment of women in lowest paid jobs, they reject as evidence the 'fact' that women themselves 'ask for less,' and that they call for a review and disassembly of the cultural-machinery installed in the work organization itself which produces and endorses disabling stereotypes.

Of the articles gathered under 'Critical Practices,' one of the most critically timely is Sharon Marcus', 'Fighting Words, Fighting Bodies.' With an eye towards rape prevention instead of punishment, Marcus introduces the notion of 'rape script,' a pervasive but unacknowledged social narrative directing women to read and present themselves as readily 'rapable'. Rejecting the opposition between real and textual, she deconstructs the 'grammar of violence' of the rape script which rapists and victims alike play out in a 'sexualized and gendered attack' on women. On the one hand, she advocates women's physical self-defense as a strategy of counter-discourse, implying

that the efficacy of women's 'fighting back' derives primarily from transgressing the norm of feminine passivity. On the other, she advocates fighting back through the medium of fighting words, cultural reinscriptions of women's capacity for legitimate self-defensive, self-empowering violence.

Possibly the most complex and compelling theorizing in this volume emerges in the essay jointly authored by Pathak and Rajan. 'Shahbano' takes as its subject the case of a destitute Muslim woman in her ten year (1975-85) battle with the Supreme Court of India for the right to alimony. Her name emblazoned in quotation marks, Shahbano is read by these authors as a sign of the disruptive effect the discourse of woman has made in the recent history of that nation. Positioned as female subaltern in a variety of registers — religious, legal, economic, political and familial — but speaking out 'as a woman' across them all, Shahbano was able to testify to the hegemonic and conflicting interests of patriarchy in its multiple domains. Mobilizing multiple confrontations over the status of Muslim women and initiating reformist thinking which resulted in 'the Muslim Women's Act,' 'Shahbano' supplied a rallying point for feminist coalitions who, while lobbying for attention to the suffering individual, were able to bring under national review laws which subject the entire female populace to patriarchal oppression.

In a volume so self-aware of its feminist strategizing, it can be no accident that 'Shahbano' appears at the center of its contents, an emblem of the 'decentered' subject. Pathak and Rajan conclude on a reflexive note, but not without qualifying emphatically what 'decentered' means for their style of feminism: 'It will now be clear that our decentered subject is not that "post-structuralist ideal ... the 'man without qualities' (Musil), the Reichian subject without 'character armour,' the Deleuzian schizophrenic subject." Instead by allowing a strategic redefining of her subject position in accordance with the exigencies of the shifting political situation, she engages with the collectivity' (275). To the readily engaged reader of this book it comes as no surprise that the poststructural subject should be so politicized by feminists theorizing (in) the decolonizing 'third world.'

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Robert E. Carter

*Becoming Bamboo: Western and Eastern
Explorations of the Meaning of Life.*

Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press 1992. Pp. xvi + 224.

Cdn \$29.95 (cloth:ISBN 0-7735-0884-8).

The subtitle captures the theme of this book. Carter's broad scholarship, drawing from a number of diverse sources, weaves many strands into an insightful investigation of meaning in human life. Yet the context of this poetic and thoughtful investigation is not merely personal or narrowly 'philosophical,' but includes the urgency of superseding those modern technological modes of thought that have dehumanized men and women and threatened the environmental framework of life on our planet. Using Heidegger's well known essay on 'Building Dwelling Thinking' as a theme throughout, Carter asks how we might come to 'dwell' in the world fully and richly as our home, cultivating a 'receptive awareness,' rather than simply 'existing' in the world as a result of our constricted 'manipulative awareness' (97).

Chapter One examines 'values and valuation,' mainly in the light of C.I. Lewis' arguments that values are found *within experience* as 'immediately given and indubitable' qualities of human awareness. To this is added a summary of John Macmurray's (and others) work on 'reason and emotion' which attempts to overcome this western dualism and discover a new wholeness in being human. The net result for Carter is a new engagement with the world in which sensitivity, feeling, and awareness are continually enlarged and provide ever richer, deeper, and more meaningful life as we move towards a 'sense of the whole of things' (28).

This awareness of 'the whole of things' is developed further in terms of Lawrence Kohlberg's 'stage seven' in which a sense of 'faith' or 'life's higher meaning' is understood as foundational framework for moral development through the first six stages. The question and problem of meaning in life is developed in a related way through a chapter on Viktor Frankl's 'logotherapy,' which arises from a western and 'existential' encounter with the threat of meaninglessness and 'inner emptiness.' The mystery of a 'self' perpetually in process, always hermeneutically alternating between 'prescription and description,' (82) and forced to take responsibility for its own meaning, lends insight into the dynamics of the struggle and difficulties of the quest for meaning.

Meaning, as an ever richer sensitive awareness and an ever growing sense of the whole, is enriched still further through 'relatedness' (Chapter Four). Feminist understandings of being human and ethical life, by such thinkers as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, point to relatedness and relationship as another dimension of both sensitivity and wholeness. Relatedness tends to grow beyond family and community, and even the human community, to a wider caring for animals, plants, rocks, water, and even 'outer space' (109). It finds an ultimate expression in Zen Buddhism in which we '*become* a raindrop, flower, or gnarled pine' (109). Here the most immediate and concrete things in

their 'suchness' are seen as expressions of the whole, of the 'undifferentiated source of things' (117). Ultimately we are moving 'beyond morality' to a transcendence intimately connected with Zen, Shintoism, Native American spirituality, and deep ecology (Chapter Five). It becomes clear that our own spiritual transformation towards relatedness and sensitivity is intimately connected with our ability to flourish and even survive on the earth.

Through these skillfully woven strands of thought, Carter leads us towards a philosophical vision of meaning in human life. Does this vision have any claim to truth or finality? The closing chapter, 'Deconstructing Meaning,' explores the issue of 'scepticism' and 'relativism' in the light of modern thought (deconstruction, Albert Camus, Heidegger), ancient western thought (Heraclitus, Protagoras, Socrates), and eastern thought (Zen and Dogen). What is valuable in deconstruction and these other sources is an insight into the 'open' character of human life, into our need to resist final 'closure,' and to learn a 'playful' and 'postmodern' approach not only toward texts but towards the process of living itself: so that our own unending hermeneutical 'reflections' on life constitute part of the very meaning of our lives (184).

This thoughtful and beautifully written book deserves to be widely read. Yet there are two dimensions which might further enhance its vision. Many scholars of eastern thought omit the first of these: the necessity of including within a vision of life a western 'critical consciousness' as primarily developed through the neo-Marxist tradition. The 'awakened' awareness of Buddhism is clearly a 'revolutionary' awareness in the sense that the aggressive and acquisitive ego is transcended through direct realization of the 'oneness' and mutual interpenetration of all things. Our present social systems promote the antithesis of this awareness. They promote, as Carter expresses it, 'the commodification of existence' and even treat 'men and women as commodities': 'men and women have become a resource to be used, and possibly to be used up' (12). Carter argues that we must undertake 'legal and political reform' now, even though ultimately the only real hope is an 'alteration in world consciousness' brought about through 'consciousness-raising' (135).

Yet here lies the great fallacy of 'legal and political reform': our worldwide social, political, and economic institutions reproduce themselves through culturally conditioning new generations whose awareness is structured around the 'aggressive and acquisitive ego'. Consciousness-raising leading to 'alteration in world consciousness' through personal contact with awakened people, whether Zen masters or western philosophers, is utterly hopeless without a revolutionary transformation of those cultural structures which *mass produce* our constricted ego-awareness. A truly critical consciousness understands this production of false awareness by the social institutions themselves, a production which leads to a general 'commodification' of existence and a strangulation of our human potential for freedom, love, and community.

Carter's book articulates a revolutionary and transformed mode of human awareness, yet its lack of critical consciousness ultimately drags down its view of society into a self-defeating and bourgeois point of view.

Secondly, even though its emphasis on the need for deconstructive openness and tentativeness in formulating our philosophical visions is well taken, Carter does not do full justice to the Zen insight through this conclusion to his book. Our philosophical visions are formulated *within language*, within the limits, forms, and horizons of articulated meaning. Yet those who have directly realized their 'Buddha nature' are neither tentative, searching, nor relativistic but utterly transformed, clear, and certain. To break-through beyond language is to *break through* beyond all perspectivism and relativism. 'Suchness' and 'emptiness' are neither concepts nor ideas, but a direct realization of the groundless-ground prior to all thought and language.

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William S. Cobb, trans.

(with introduction and endnotes)

Plato's Sophist.

Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1990.

Pp. 126.

US \$46.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7652-8);

US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7653-6).

The existing bibliography on *The Sophist* contains some of the best executed attempts to shed light on a Platonic dialogue. So, the stakes are very high for the scholar who undertakes a comprehensive study of the work with a view to contributing significantly to the understanding of the dialogue. It seems that Cobb has such a task in mind since he appeals to the subtleness and complexity of the dialogue and points out, e.g., that 'most scholarly discussions focus on one or another part of the text without giving much attention to the context provided by the dialogue as a whole' (4). To remedy this and presumably other faults of his predecessors, he provides a detailed outline of the argument which precedes a new translation of the text. The volume also contains a glossary of Greek terms, endnotes and a selective bibliography. I shall comment on each part of the work separately.

The introduction contains a little more than the summary of the text. The latter is mostly accurate, with a few problematic spots. E.g., I do not know of any early Platonic dialogue entitled *the Charmenides*, and I assume that this is a typographical mistake (3). Cobb meant to refer, probably, to *the Charmides*. Cobb claims that 'the Visitor examines two less carefully thought out (245 E) ways of speaking about what is' (21), while in fact the Visitor intends to 'look at those who speak about it in a different way (*tous allos legontas*)'. He assumes that being, rest, etc. are the Platonic Forms and gives no

indication that this claim is controversial (24-5). He uses 'sameness' and 'the same' interchangeably, without making clear why (25). He overinterprets 'speaking' as 'gathering the world' on account of a root-metaphor related to *legein*, creating the misleading impression that this is in the text (27). He draws a dubious parallel between the Sophist and Socrates, on the grounds that the latter is commonly characterised as 'ironic and suspecting that he lacks knowledge' (31). In fact, the irony of the Sophist consists in the fact that, although he suspects that he himself does not know, he presents himself to others as a knowledgeable man (268 A) — which can hardly be said of Socrates. The most helpful feature of the introduction, although by no means an original one, are the diagrams which present the various divisions by which the nature of the Sophist is finally grasped. Overall, it is regrettable that the introduction contains no exegetic or philosophical comments and no references, let alone discussion of secondary literature.

The glossary is very short and yet contains mistakes. The Greek infinitive γίνεσθαι occurs as γινέσαι, although it is correctly transliterated by *gignesthai*. *Medamōs* is written as an adjective but translated as an adverb.

The translation is usually clear and accurate. However, it contains a few awkward passages and some mistakes. For example, 220 E ('then of the hooking type ... I assume'), 234 C ('Shouldn't we expect ... everything'), 243 C ('and though we say ... cases'), and 256 A ('motion and the same are and are not the same') deviate from ordinary English and are not readily understood. The view that being, motion, rest and the like blend together so that they have something in common is rendered by the somewhat pedantic expression that 'they have commonality' (251 D, 252 A). Depending on the context, Greek verbs such as *epikoinōnein* (251 D), or *proskoinōnein* (252 A) can be translated by verbs or phrases which give less peculiar English. For example, one can say that the kinds or Forms are 'combined with each other' (Campbell), that 'they are capable of association with one another' (Cornford), or that 'they participate in one another.' The translation of *logos* in 258 E by 'definition' is too narrow; Cornford's 'account' is preferable. *Mimēsis doxomimētikē* (267 D) is translated by 'opinionated imitation', thus creating an ambiguity about the Sophist's attitude towards his own art, i.e., whether he is stubborn or conceited about it. This ambiguity is not implied by the Greek (see Cornford, p. 330, note 1) and blurs the point of the argument.

The endnotes are either too few or too many. Sometimes they are related to the translation, but they often dwell on points of no philosophical significance. Elsewhere they offer literary parallels and venture historical identifications. These appear to be made unsystematically and at random. For example, we are told that in 242 E the reference is to Heraclitus (note 43) and to Empedocles (note 44), but we are not explicitly told who, in Cobb's view are the Friends of the Forms, or whether the various divisions refer to different Sophists and to whom, or who is attacked in 251 B. Most importantly, none of the major controversies about the interpretation of the text is mentioned, never mind discussed. Such questions are, e.g., what is the usefulness of division as a methodological tool, whether some divisions are questionable, the importance

of the distinction between *X* having a quality and *X* being identical with that quality, whether the most important *genē* are Forms and how important this point is for the deployment of the argument, and what is the relation of motion and rest to reality and to the world of becoming. Cobb does not claim to offer a thorough philosophical treatment of *the Sophist*, but even so he owes it to the reader to set forth the main philosophical issues of the dialogue more systematically than he does and to outline the most important interpretations. He should also provide references for the views he adopts. The absence of this sort of apparatus and of an adequate bibliography for those who wish to study the dialogue in greater depth (his list of selected readings fails to mention, for example, Guthrie's *History of Greek Philosophy*, and Ackrill's fundamental articles) are unfortunate.

I do not think that Cobb's book is a bad book, but it is not a very good book either. If Cobb's purpose is to help 'beginning readers to get a sense of the structure, development and conclusions' of the dialogue (4), he succeeds well enough. But this volume is no better introduction to *the Sophist* than any of the classic translations and commentaries. And it brings to the scholar little that is original.

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Benedetto Croce

The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General, trans. with a foreword by Colin Lyas.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.
Pp. vii + 172.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-35216-9);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-35996-1).

Colin Lyas' translation of *Parte prima: teoria of Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale*, (Adelphi, 1990) by Benedetto Croce, is its third published rendering into English. The first English translation of the *Estetica* (third edition revised, Bari, 1908), without its notes and bibliographical appendix, was rendered by Douglas Ainslie. It was published in 1909 and included a summary of Part Two on the history of aesthetics, as well as Croce's Heidelberg lectures, 'L'intuizione pura e il carattere lirico dell'arte,' (translated as 'Pure Intuition and the lyrical character of art'), which were delivered in 1908. Due to important errors and omissions, a revised translation of the entire fourth edition of the *Estetica* (1912) appeared in 1922 under

the name of Douglas Ainslie. It omitted the essay 'Pure Intuition and the Lyrical Character of Art.' In a note, Ainslie acknowledged the assistance of Mrs. Salusbury, but scholars have proposed that the translator was in fact R.G. Collingwood.

Colin Lyas' rendering of the theoretical part of Croce's *Estetica* does indeed supersede the defective translation by Douglas Ainslie. It is more accurate than the earlier one and thus presents a reliable guide to Croce's early thinking on intuition and art. The Lyas translation, moreover, uses present-day language, which makes it easier to understand than the previous, now more than seventy years old, rendering; and it is based on the most recent Italian edition of the *Estetica*, which was published in 1990 by Adelphi. Lyas promises us that a translation of the *Parte seconda: storia* will follow, and we look forward to reading it. The second part confirms the brilliant insight of Crocean theory, when considered in the historical context of what little had been accomplished in philosophy of art before the first publication of the *Estetica* in 1902.

Lyas' foreword provides its reader with a useful description of the methodological problems that he encountered. The connotations of terms can rarely, if ever, be perfectly translated from one language into another; and Croce's mode of expression belongs to a generation much earlier than our own. Nevertheless, Lyas chose the role of *traduttore* rather than that of *traditore*; and he tried to render both sense and style as well as possible.

Along with the methodological problems that belong to all translations, there are those that arise from Croce's conception of philosophy and the logical relationships that exist between its disciplines. The Crocean assumptions that systematic philosophy, in the sense of *Wissenschaft* and *scienza* exists and that aesthetics must be explicated in its relationship to other philosophical subjects, such as, logic, economics, and ethics, sound alien to much of the contemporary Anglo-American world. Nevertheless, an understanding of the *Estetica* requires a sense of the logical location of aesthetics within Croce's entire philosophy of the human spirit.

In 1902 Croce, moreover, had not clearly differentiated aesthetic expression from historical and philosophical judgment. Nor had he worked out the differences between the pure concepts of philosophy and the empirical and abstract pseudoconcepts of the inductive and deductive sciences. He would not do so until subsequent to his discussions with Giovanni Gentile on the Hegelian identification of philosophy and history, he had clarified his conceptions of concept and judgment. These developments in Crocean thought were published in the second edition of his *Logica come scienza del concetto puro*, 1909 (translated as *Logic as Science of the Pure Concept* [1917]).

Lyas follows his summary of methodological barriers to translating and understanding the *Estetica* with an elaboration of what Croce meant by the aesthetic synthetic *a priori* activity of consciousness. He explicates important Crocean terms such as, 'estetica,' 'scienza,' 'fantasia,' and explains why he chose to translate *estetica* into 'the aesthetic' instead of 'aesthetics.' In so doing, he reveals the great value of his contribution to Crocean scholarship, which lies in comparisons occurring in the foreword and in notes throughout

the text, between Croce's concept of the cognitive power of aesthetic intuition with present-day Anglo-American and European thought — with the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Nelson Goodman, and Jacques Derrida.

Lyas chooses not to explicate Croce's first major statement about intuition-as-art within the context of important additions to his theory that occurred over the next four decades. Although an understanding of Croce's pioneering achievement in aesthetics does require comparing the theory presented in *The Aesthetic* with earlier philosophies of art, the reader should not be misled into believing that it presents Croce's last word on this subject. Later significant embellishments include his concept of art as lyrical feeling in 1908, as cosmic totality in 1918, and his elaboration of the differences between art as pure concept and literature as pseudo-concept in 1936. Nevertheless, Lyas does direct the reader to reliable interpretive works such as Gian Orsini's *Benedetto Croce: Philosopher of Art and Literary Critic* (1961), M.E. Moss' *Benedetto Croce Reconsidered: Truth and Error in Theories of Art, Literature, and History* (1987), and Giovanni Gullace's translation of *La poesia: Introduzione alla critica e storia della poesia e della letteratura* (1936), into English, *Benedetto Croce's Poetry and Literature: An Introduction to its Criticism and History* (1981).

By his rendering of Croce's *Estetica*, Colin Lyas seeks to excite new interest in Crocean aesthetics. Many of us share his belief that Croce's thought merits a full-scale revival. We hope that by linking Crocean concepts with fashionable contemporary ideas, Lyas will fulfill his goal.

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Keith Graham

Karl Marx Our Contemporary.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1992. Pp. x + 182.

Cdn \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2921-3);

Cdn \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7424-3).

In this interesting book, Keith Graham suggests that Marx's social theory is best understood by recognizing that it incorporates three conceptually distinct, but interlocking, materialist perspectives. The first of these, what Graham calls 'basic materialism', expresses Marx's commitment to a theory of human needs (that is, those things which permit humans to survive and reproduce themselves — food, drink, housing and so forth). Needs are philosophically significant because human beings have a fundamental inter-

est in ensuring their satisfaction which, in turn, leads them to enter into certain objective social relations with each other. Precisely what one can appropriate to satisfy one's needs depends on one's position within the ownership structure of society.

The second aspect of Marx's theory, 'synchronic materialism', refers to the hierarchical ordering of productive forces, social relations of production and state superstructure which constitute the structure of particular social formations. In this ordering of the material over the non-material several important issues arise. First is the problem of definition. Graham is effective in responding to those critics (such as Plamenantz) who have argued that Marx's distinction between these concepts (especially production relations and superstructure) is incoherent. More serious problems arise concerning the explanatory ordering of these concepts. Graham correctly endorses primacy for the productive forces rather than the intellectually more fashionable position of awarding it to class struggle. He is less forthcoming, however, when it comes to specifying the mode of determination exercised between these concepts. Graham recognizes (as did Marx) that although the productive forces enjoy explanatory primacy in the analysis of social formations, both the relations of production and institutions of the state superstructure exercise a reciprocal determination on the productive forces and on each other. This raises a number of important questions that are not fully considered by Graham. In particular, he does not address the issue of how we are to specify the theoretical limits within which productive force determinism and reciprocal determination occur.

For Marx, the key problem concerned the process of revolutionary change from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. Curiously, commentators rarely accord his theory of 'diachronic materialism' the attention it demands. Those who do have been puzzled by the enigmatic nature of his comments. In his famous 'Preface' of 1859 Marx argued that capitalism's productive forces would eventually develop to a point at which they would be 'fettered' by the prevailing set of bourgeois relations of production. In order for further development to occur, the productive forces must be 'freed' by the instantiation of a new set of socialist relations of production.

This process is open to a number of different interpretations. For example, did Marx intend that the productive forces would develop to a point where they were fettered 'absolutely' (thereby implying no further development *at all* given the current set of social relations)? Alternatively, did he mean to suggest that fettering only occurs when the productive forces are under-utilized relative to their possible path of development in the context of some other set of social relations? For his part, Graham settles for a version of the latter claim arguing that fettering occurs whenever 'capitalism dictates a less rational use than would be possible in some alternative system, rather than ceasing to allow any further rational use of resources at all' (152). As Graham recognizes, this interpretation is not without difficulties. For instance, it is not clear how it accommodates some of Marx's other claims, particularly those regarding the 'inevitability' of social transition.

The importance of this interpretation for Graham lies in its concern with rationality. Throughout, he argues that the guiding thread linking the various materialist perspectives of Marx's theory is the proletariat's rational interest in overthrowing a system premised on the production of commodities for profit and replacing it with a system of non-commodity production directed at the satisfaction of human needs. Whether this presently constitutes a feasible goal for a radical political practice is open to question. In any event, before any type of fundamental social change could occur it would require the development of a revolutionary class-consciousness amongst the class of direct producers.

Marx's claims regarding the development of class-consciousness have often been criticized. For instance, he seems to assume that the development of such a consciousness will come about 'automatically' as the result of a developing contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Moreover, he often downplays or ignores other interests which humans have (for example, sex roles or ethnic divisions) which may militate against the emergence of a revolutionary political consciousness. Although Graham doesn't minimize this latter difficulty, he argues that the long-term rational interest which direct producers have in satisfying a richer level of needs than is presently attainable within a capitalist framework will eventually act to promote the requisite type of class-consciousness and render a transition to socialism feasible.

This is too optimistic. As it stands, Marx's theory provides no grounds for postulating any necessary connection between the type of economic concerns which engage the proletariat at the point of production (for instance, higher wages and a shorter working week) and a political concern to inaugurate a new form of society.

The Leninist alternative, in which a small group of professional revolutionaries act on behalf of the working class is rejected by Graham in favour of Marx's concern with revolution as the self-conscious movement on the part of a majority of direct producers. Unfortunately, Graham does not discern the deeper structural similarity between Marx and Lenin on this point. Both argued for a process of revolution in which the development of class-consciousness (in the masses or party) was to be followed by a political revolution and then the establishment of a new socialist productive infrastructure. The fact that Marx might also have held another view of the transition process (grounded in an initial establishment of co-operative enterprises under working class control 'within' the framework of capitalism) is not recognized by Graham.

Despite these reservations, it must be emphasized that this is an engaging and clearly written book. It would serve as a good introduction to Marx's thought for advanced level students.

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Reinhardt Grossman

The Existence of the World:

an Introduction to Ontology.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall

1992. Pp. vii + 139.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-451-07303-0).

On page one, Grossman asks what a category is. But instead of an answer, he gives an account of Empedocles' theory of the four elements in order to establish that any classification rests on a distinction between individual things and their properties. From this it appears that not just Empedocles' elements, but elements as understood in modern chemistry, and no doubt compounds too, are in the category of individuals. He has no category of kinds of stuff or matter, a basic one in the vulgar ontology. At a later stage he remarks that though he has treated a billiard ball as an individual thing it is really a complicated structure consisting of individual things, these being temporal phases and spatial parts. Structures in his account are a distinct category, but a structure is nevertheless a complex individual (47-8). A lesson in the naming and possibly in the numbering of the parts of a billiard ball would seem to be in order here.

If it is not quite clear just what falls into the category of individuals, it is even less clear where the limits of the category of properties lie. Colours, shapes and sizes are properties — so much is clear. But in Grossman's terms, human beings are not only human beings, but have the *property* of being human beings. Everything not only is, but has the property of being, the kind of thing it is. And a son, likewise not only is, but has the property of being, the son of his parents. This is not, of course, just Grossman's idiom. But he no more than countless others observes that it treats kinds of individuals as properties of individuals, and leads to the traditional inane conundrum of what it is that has all the properties. It is hardly surprising since kinds of stuff get short shrift that properties in the serious vulgar sense — the way substances act and react under various conditions — find no place in this ontology.

The great thing about properties in Grossman's account is that they do not change and are therefore atemporal. He also insists that they are not located and hence not spatial. They are abstract and what that means for him is simply 'not temporal or spatial'. This division of individuals and properties is the basis for a distinction between the physical universe and the world. Everything belongs to the world, but whereas individuals belong to the physical universe their properties do not. Strange? Wait. The relation that connects things with their properties is called exemplification. Relations are themselves abstract — beyond time and space — and it follows that they are themselves exemplified. Hence every red apple exemplifies red and also exemplifies the relation of an apple to red. Though in the ordinary sense an example of kindness, say, is a case or instance of kindness, exemplification is not instantiation. A main part of Grossman's doctrine is that there is no

such thing as instantiation — there are no instances or cases of properties. The green of a leaf is not an instance or case of that shade of green. How then can we see a green leaf or anything green? Grossman holds that we perceive abstract things, non-spatial, non-temporal things, which are not located where many people innocently suppose they see them. We do not see green leaves. We see that the leaves are green. Perception is judgmental. There is of course no way of demonstrating this peculiar view and no reason to try.

Grossman maintains that 'the instance view' is usually nominalistic. But this is not so. Particulars are instances or cases of types or kinds, which strict nominalism does not admit. He takes the concept of a type or kind to be the same as that of a universal. If that were so, the noun 'universal' would long ago have fallen out of use, since it cannot grammatically be employed in the same way as 'type' or 'kind' or 'sort'. The problem of universals is essentially Plato's problem. If there is any problem of kinds it is not that one. Grossman considers kinds or types in two places and each time he uses the example of a word. The printed word 'red', he says, is really a shape and any inscription with this shape is a token of the type 'red'. The shape is the property that all tokens of the type share (11). In the later passage Grossman repeats this, but then he says, as anyone would, that the same word occurs in many places in a book (36). But on his view, he cannot say this. Since properties are abstract and not located, the very same word — the word itself — cannot occur in many places, or indeed in any. To be consistent with his thesis concerning properties, he should say that the property is exemplified, not instantiated, in each inscription and it is this that makes them all tokens of a type. But this is not so and will not do. As a shape, every 'red' is a token of a type. As an inscription, likewise. But 'RED' and 'red' are not tokens of the same shape or the same inscription but of the same word. Any case or token of *the* word is *a* word. Only so could one possibly say that *it* occurs in many places. Point to this very case, instance, or occurrence of 'red' and you point to the word itself. Likewise a case of the colour itself.

If you ask as Grossman does, what the relation of universal to particular is, you are committed to giving a certain type of answer. The copula 'is' in 'This apple is red' and no doubt 'has' in 'Tom has asthma' are then categorial terms signifying the relation of the subject to the universal, the relation of exemplification in Grossman's account. The relation has two terms: the apple and the colour red, red itself as Plato would say. The original meaning of 'abstract' is then lost. Grossman like so many people foists this word on Plato in translating a phrase from the *Phaedo* 'abstract equality'. But the expression literally translated is 'the equal itself' or 'equality itself' (*to auto ison*) which is perfectly satisfactory in English. Abstract things in the proper, traditional sense are those things — properties, qualities, relations, actions, affections, etc. — which are not parts of concrete things nor the stuff of which they are made, but which are distinguishable — distinguishable but not separable, in the traditional phrase. This is precisely *not* the concept of a Platonic Idea or universal.

If one takes particulars or individuals to be a category as Grossman does, one cannot take categories to be, as they are generally taken to be, the broadest, most comprehensive but irreducibly distinct kinds of things. Though every particular is of course a particular of some kind or, in common parlance, some kind of particular, particulars are precisely *not* kinds. The distinction of kind and particular is absolutely fundamental and indispensable but it is not a categorial distinction.

Besides individuals and properties, Grossman's categories are an odd bunch — relations, structures, sets, quantifiers and facts. Numbers are in the category of quantifiers — they are definite, where all, some etc. are indefinite. Again, 'all' and 'some' are categorial terms in this account signifying all and some, just as '64' signifies 64 or sixty-four. Like other abstract things they are exemplified, 64 in 64 sheep and doubtless all in all the King's men. Not only the copula and quantifiers are turned into categorial terms, but also the logical connectives. They are in the category of relations and serve to relate facts in compound facts. Grossman is clearly some kind of idealist. Perhaps that accounts for his failure to distinguish things that belong to logic and language from things that are independent of them. It is a strange book.

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James Franklin Harris, ed.

Logic, God, and Metaphysics.

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1992.

US \$77.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7923-1454-9).

This is a no-nonsense *Festschrift* in honor of Bowan L. Clarke who has retired from the University of Georgia's distinguished Philosophy Department. The title tells us what we get, the Introduction is excellent, and there is a sensitive response by Clarke to the issues and problems raised by the contributors. Most important there are the contributions themselves, which provide a critique rooted in the analysis: primarily of Alfred North Whitehead's cosmological scheme, thought by him to be

adequate for the interpretation of the ideas and problems which form the complex texture of civilized thought, ... a system of ideas which bring(s) the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. (*Process and Reality*. pp. v, vi);

and secondarily, of Clarke's own attempts at 'logical construction' to make Whitehead's categories more precise and systematic.

But there is a methodological problem here. At its base it has to do with the general strategy by which philosophers have approached explanation. It underlies the history of epistemology and is the strategy which most of the contributors to this volume employ. I am referring to the domain-independent procedural pattern of deductively valid arguments, its set of basic truths or axioms, and its surviving constituent elements or ideas upon which philosophers reason 'by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex.' The method extends all the way from Euclid's axiomatized geometry and Aristotle's mapping of topic-invariant themes of valid deduction, through Descartes' use of the geometric method, to the positivism of our own century.

However, as we noted, these essays are particularly bound together by their specifying a family of structures, a set of basic truths or axioms from which the contributors generate their explanations; that is they refer to Clarke's contributions to 'logical construction' and more generally, to Whiteheadian scholarship.

Now, the quality of these contributions makes evident the considerable advantages of this strategy. There is clarity, precision, the systematic advancement of the argument and the affirmation of the sense of being correct. There is also a hint that unless you can say what you mean in terms which either have self-evident transparency, or shed some light on them, you are liable to mean nothing.

But at the same time the essays point to the problem, both from within the method the authors employ, and from outside it. From within, the very existence of their related analyses, rooted in Whitehead's cosmology, witnesses to the fact there is no functioning, single, complete cosmological scheme; the concept of analyticity has not been satisfactorily defined much less applied. There are no effective criteria for sameness of meaning, no privileged set of meanings so simple, clear and distinct, that its self evident status is self evident.

This is not to suggest that as a consequence the essays bog down over the conditions, content and ground of 'properly basic beliefs' which by definition cannot be further defined and which philosophers must immediately recognize. The well argued essays by Lewis Ford, Rem Edwards, William Powers and James Harris attest to this. Readers interested in further exploring the vitality of Whitehead's cosmological scheme will find good company here.

Rather it is to suggest the essays win a reprieve from bogging down, by fiat, by simply assuming a privileged set of meanings from which the explanations are to be generated. They constitute as Professor Harris puts it, 'a continued effort on the part of philosophers (within the tradition of Whitehead's cosmology) to provide a more complete and satisfying account of the area of philosophical inquiry where logic, god, and metaphysics meet' (4).

I dare say it is only a reprieve because the axioms provided by Whitehead's cosmological scheme do not only ensure acceptable rules of inference or lack

of contradiction, they also are systematizations relative to the meanings of the terms in which they are cast. Their meaning is relative to the relations in that cosmological system. Clarke says 'I do not see any alternative to this situation,' and significantly adds, 'Whitehead, likewise, recognizes this fact of the relativity of the formulation ... and the proof ... to the cosmological framework in which they are formulated' (145).

The problem from within then, is that the methodological domain-independent procedural approach generally employed in these essays is not domain independent. It is a methodology rooted in a cosmological system which recognizes its relativity of formulation and proof. It is a methodology which would have no trouble in acknowledging, for instance, the meanings of 'force' or 'mass' in physics are given and known *only* by and through their place *in a theory*.

This suggests the problem which arises from the outside. If the contributors wish to extend their analysis beyond providing a more complete account of their own procedural presuppositions and hence inquire into the satisfactoriness of their presuppositions, it may be the words, sentences, and groups of sentences employed by that extended area of inquiry may be relational, that is, they may have meaning and be intelligible, yet resist translation into Whitehead's terms. It therefore may be more fruitful to approach that structured language in terms of what is going on rather than in terms of the privileged previously defined structural language deemed to provide the certainty upon which to reason further. The precedent is Darwin's — to replace typological thinking with population thinking.

Of all the contributions 'celebrating' Bowan Clarke, only Eugene Thomas Long's interesting paper 'Religious Pluralism and the Ground of Religious Faith,' makes the attempt to solve the 'outside' problem. He does so by widening his understanding of Western theism which the other contributors so narrowly explore.

Now of course as Clarke recognizes, this entails a shift to understanding a different cosmological framework and considering which framework 'better satisfies the criteria of logicity, coherence, applicability, and adequacy' (143). But is this not what an inquiry into logic, god and metaphysics should be doing? It is disappointing that Long alone is beginning to collect the data necessary for that inquiry into satisfactory criteria to begin. It is for this reason I particularly recommend his exploratory essay.

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David Hume

Writings on Religion. Antony Flew, ed.
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1992. Pp. xi + 304.
US\$7.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9112-1).

Flew's anthology of Hume's writings on religion is a welcome addition to the growing number of student editions collecting major philosophers' works on specific topics. It joins Alasdair MacIntyre's *Hume's Ethical Writings* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, n.d.) in bringing together for interested students Hume's writings on a particular issue. In a single volume, Flew has assembled Hume's major texts on religion as well as a selection from other works that help to extend and develop the reader's understanding of Hume's perspective on religion.

The core of the anthology, and rightly so, is *The Natural History of Religion* and *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, presented here without abridgment. Two posthumously published essays, 'Of the Immortality of the Soul' and 'Of Suicide' are also included, the latter especially welcome given the currency of the ethical debate about physician-assisted suicide. A further essay, 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,' and a long footnote from 'Of National Characters,' which Flew here presents as a single selection entitled 'A Note on the Profession of Priest,' provide amplification of Hume's views on the psychology of religion and on the relation of religion to moral character. Added to these essays are two of Hume's letters that provide some further background: one setting out Hume's arguments against the efficacy of prayer owing to the 'Incomprehensibility of the Deity' (18), the other commenting on an early draft of the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* in which Hume identifies his own position with that of Philo.

More controversial inclusions, according to Flew, are the two chapters from the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, 'Of Miracles' and 'Of a particular Providence and of a Future State'. Flew has collected them together in a section entitled 'Two Scandalous Sections'. No understanding of Hume's views on religion could be complete without familiarity with these two important chapters. The hazard of including them as solitary chapters comes from presenting them outside the context of the *Enquiry's* philosophical program. Flew recognizes the problem and provides an introduction to the two selections, giving the necessary background for seeing them as together forming an interrelated argument for 'Hume's aggressive agnosticism' (61).

The inclusiveness of Flew's anthology is no small virtue in an educational text. Richard H. Popkin's edition of the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1980) introduces the student to Hume's most famous work on religion and additionally offers the same two posthumously published essays; however, the student must look elsewhere for Hume's *The Natural History of Religion* and for the previously mentioned chapters from Hume's *Enquiry*. Another virtue of Flew's anthology is his helpful introduction to the collection, in which he presents Hume as 'a

complete unbeliever, the first major thinker of the modern period to be through and through secular, this-worldly, and man-centered' (vii). It is important to point this out to students for they sometimes interpret Hume's critique of 'the religious hypothesis' as something less than 'an aggressive agnosticism'. Students do not always grasp the ultimate direction and significance of Hume's line of argument. One reason is that few students are familiar with the dangerous religious climate in which Hume wrote and so miss the subtlety and irony with which he frequently stated his position. They do not realize how far ahead of his time he was, not knowing, as Flew points out, that 'the first openly and explicitly atheist book in the English language did not appear until six years after Hume's death' (vii).

Also helpful for realizing the religious climate in which Hume wrote are Flew's many footnotes identifying for the contemporary undergraduate the obscure sects and creeds Hume mentions, as well as Hume's many references to classical antiquity. An index allowing students to cross-reference topics appearing in the various selections and a bibliography are also included. My one disappointment with the anthology was that the bibliography was not a little more extensive. Flew does cite twenty-five books and a half-dozen general collections of articles on Hume, but he offers no list of individual articles specifically discussing Hume's writings on religion.

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Ivan Gaskell and Salim Kemal, eds.
The Language of Art History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. 245
US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-35384-X).

The Language of Art History is the first volume in a new series, edited by Kemal and Gaskell, called 'Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and the Visual Arts.' It is a collection of good essays by Jean-François Lyotard, Stanley Rosen, Richard Wollheim, Michael Baxandall, Catherine Lord and José Benardete, Carl Hausman, Richard Schiff, David Summers, and Andrew Harrison. Whether or not this is a good collection of essays above and beyond the strength of the individual contributions is somewhat less clear to me; indeed, the opening lines of the editors' introduction point to the difficulty quite directly: 'The purpose of this volume ... is to offer a range of responses by philosophers and art historians to some crucial issues generated by the relation of the art object and language in art history' (1). 'A range' and 'some crucial issues' is not quite enough to hold the volume together, and one may find one's

sense of the disparateness of the book oddly enhanced by the evident editorial decision to have the essayists refer to their contributions as 'chapters'.

There seem to be roughly three centers to the volume: an implicit exchange between Lyotard and Rosen around the topic of 'presence'; a more explicit and sustained conversation among Wollheim, Baxandall, Lord and Benardete, and Hausman that seems to find its focus in questions about the role of metaphor in art and our talk about it; and two explorations of the pertinence of linguistic analogies, with Summers' contribution seemingly written in at least partial light of Harrison's piece. On this view of the volume, Schiff's study of Cézanne's 'touch' appears the odd man out. On another view, the odd man out would appear to be Lyotard, whose vocabulary and intellectual assumptions seem to share relatively little with those of the other contributors. On any view, the odd man out can appear to be Barbara Kruger, whose much reproduced photomontage 'Your gaze hits the side of my face' adorns the jacket but has no apparent relation to the volume's contents (except perhaps to point out how peculiarly pertinent the concern with which men are in or out might be). Of the ten contributions, seven are clearly philosophical, and only two are strongly rooted in directly art historical concerns (here Summers is, I suppose, the o-m-o-).

I presume that the initial focus of the volume was to have been provided by Baxandall's essay, initially published as 'The Language of Art History' and revised in this volume under the title 'The Language of Art Criticism.' The Lord and Benardete essay is an explicit response to Baxandall's piece, arguing that Nelson Goodman makes Baxandall's points better than Baxandall himself. Hausman likewise takes off from Baxandall's essay, although he moves on to consider Baxandall's work more broadly, as well as Svetlana Alpers' *The Art of Describing*. While Wollheim's essay on projective properties and expression does not refer to Baxandall's essay, its concerns with metaphor and expression (as well as with Goodman on these topics) bind it to the others.

The transformation of Baxandall's title between the original version of his essay and the one that appears here is of some apparent concern to the editors: The possible relation between 'art criticism' and 'art history' is the first topic they take up, and in two quick paragraphs they manage to navigate their way through a chain of preliminary definitions, supplements, reminders, conclusions, and reversals that effectively leave the reader nowhere and which are nonetheless offered as providing some sort of transition to a discussion of Lyotard and Rosen on 'presence' — which quickly opens out in a detour through Peter Fuller and Roger Scruton before returning to capsule summaries of the two opening essays. This sets the general tone of the introduction, which moves from essay to essay, summarizing and drawing local contrasts without ever really bringing things to any sharper point than that 'the common interest of all the contributors to this volume is with applying language to the object to account for visual art fully' (8) — but for Summers and Harrison 'applying language' means developing a linguistic model for art works, whereas for Baxandall, Wollheim, Lord and Benardete, and Hausman it means 'talking about art,' and for Lyotard and Rosen it

means something about taking account of the presence of the visual either within (Lyotard) or beyond (Rosen) the discursive. It may be possible to pull all of these concerns together into a coherent pattern of arguments (I imagine that the question about the applicability of a linguistic model is the most natural hinge), but that would entail a firmer editorial hand than is on display here.

Of the two most marked disparities within the volume, the one between Lyotard's way of doing philosophy or aesthetics and that of most of the other contributors, is too long-standing and too rooted in concerns that go well beyond the narrowly aesthetic to be usefully commented on here. More tractable in a short compass and certainly closer to the volume's explicit concern for greater exchange between philosophy and art history, is the disparity between Baxandall and his various respondents. The oddity here, at least as I understand these essays, is that Baxandall takes the problem of talking about art to have to do with the apparent gratuitousness of so much of what we typically say (and, with this, the peculiar adequacy of words palpably inadequate as description), while his philosophic respondents want to take him as talking about the inadequacy of our words to works that are inherently 'ineffable'. Thus Baxandall writes, 'The specific interest of the visual arts is visual' (67), and Lord and Benardete read, 'if, platitudinously enough, "the specific interest of the visual arts is visual" and not verbal, that interest would appear to be, as a point of principle, ineffable, or so we dare fill out the argument of Baxandall's subtext' (77). It seems to me that this gets Baxandall's 'subtext' wrong — takes it just the way Baxandall is working not to put it. And once one takes it this way, Wollheim and Goodman command the ground of the discussion in ways they perhaps ought not to.

Hausman takes things this way too, although not without displaying a certain appropriate unease: 'In fact, the very idea of description seems proper to the idea of using the medium of words to refer to visual or audible qualities.... Why should Baxandall, then, "worry" about matching language with visual interest in works of the visual arts?' (126, fn. 1). What's missing here is any registration of Baxandall's core point — that the art historian's words 'are not so much descriptive as demonstrative' (67).

Interestingly, Summers' essay takes off from what I take to be a different way of stating a worry significantly close to Baxandall's — Michael Fried's tendency to use the phrases 'primordial convention' and 'primitive condition' as interchangeable. Summers himself wants to separate these two terms, while I tend to take Fried's conflation of them to be his way of marking out the same ('platitudinous') worry about the peculiar salience of visual art within the visual more generally that animates Baxandall (and that I suspect animates Lyotard as well). It is perhaps this remarkability of the visual that is the occluded center of *The Language of Art History*.

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Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus eds.
Women in Western Political Philosophy.
New York: St. Martin's Press 1987. Pp. 224
US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-312-00425-7);
US \$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-00425-7).

The first thing one needs to say about Kennedy's and Mendus' collection of feminist essays is that the title lends itself to an ambiguity — an ambiguity which speaks loudly on the place of women in philosophy. Is this a collection of essays about women writing in the tradition of western political philosophy or is it about how the subject of women comes up in that tradition? In fact, the pieces in this volume do not chronicle the writing of women in the tradition of western political philosophy, presumably because there is virtually none to chronicle. They do, however, examine the thoughts which popular male philosophers in the tradition have had about women.

The book contains seven essays: 'Kant: An Honest but Narrow Minded Bourgeois?' by Susan Mendus, 'Virtue and Commerce: Women in the Making of Adam Smith's Political Economy' by Jane Rendall, 'Rousseau's Two Concepts of Citizenship' by Margaret Canovan, 'Humbolt and the Romantics: Neither Hausfrau nor Citoyenne' by Ursula Vogel, 'Women and the Hegelian State' by Joanna Hodge, 'Utilitarianism and Feminism' by Lea Campos Boralevi and 'Nietzsche: Women as Untermensch' by Ellen Kennedy. In each essay (with the qualified exception of Campos Boralevi's), the thoughts which this or that male philosopher has had about women account for the public silence of women at any point in human history in terms of their putatively justified exclusion from the political realm.

The explicit grounds of justification are not always exactly the same from thinker to thinker: women are not rational; are too calculating; are not capable of abstraction from particulars; are uncertain in their loyalties; are too easily overwhelmed by the passions; are naturally disposed to the hard work of bearing and caring for young which is in turn opposed to the disposition required for political life bla, bla, bla. In spite of the surface tensions here, the consequent role for women in terms of western political philosophy has always been 'Keep out unless you've brought sandwiches'.

Now, there is nothing new in these claims about the history of silly justifications used to prop up the belief that women must be kept in check. What is interesting and provocative about this particular collection is that the essays in it consistently and relentlessly challenge any preparedness to excuse the 'silliness' on the grounds that alternative views of women were not available to male political theorists prior to the 20th century.

Although the essays presented here do not use the jurisprudential distinction between justification and excuse explicitly, that distinction and the further one between guilt and innocence of which the former is a part works to the writers' advantage throughout. Kant et al., saw themselves as offering *justifications* for the claim that women must be excluded from political life and restricted to domestic life. Only the stupid are prepared to entertain the

possibility of justifying or showing the rightness of such claims today. But given that such claims cannot be justified since they are false, can the claimers nevertheless be excused or forgiven for their 'mistakes' through some notion of necessity?

Excusing in this case would require evidence that alternative views about women were not conceptually available to the thinker — that he was, in some sense, handicapped. Each essayist shows, however, that based on the whole of the specific philosopher's works, there is, in fact, good evidence that alternative views either followed directly from their otherwise guiding insights or were explicitly acknowledged and then rejected by them. We may not then, given this evidence against their *having* to hold the views they did, excuse these thinkers for the familial, social and political harms done through their promulgation of distorted images of women.

In jurisprudential terms, where there is no justification and no excuse, the defendant must be found guilty as charged. This is the impression with which one is left in the case of the philosophers canvassed in this collection even before one has reached the final essay dealing with Nietzsche's notorious pronouncements on the female question. This last piece sends Nietzsche over the top as that 19th century thinker who dared to blare the real feeling of his predecessors towards women in the world: 'Keep out and leave the sandwiches at the door'.

Every essay in the book is written in a very accessible style with plenty of historical background and clear exegesis. As such, the book would make a good entry level text. In addition, Kennedy's and Mendus' well-written introduction makes plain the historical and contemporary issues at stake in this sort of study. The two ideas organizing the material in the collection are the 'Public-Private Distinction' and 'Women's Nature'. The editors note that the conclusions which follow from the consideration of these ideas are shaped by the feminist response to their practical consequences — 'woman's exclusion from the public realm works to her disadvantage' (14). Finally, Kennedy and Mendus write, 'We know that more often than not it is a woman who cooks the feast and pays the bill [reference to B. Brecht] but life is such that there will always be *someone* who must cook the feast and *someone* who must pay the bill. This is unavoidable. What is avoidable is the belief that cooking feasts has no value or, worse, that it precludes having valuable opinions about anything other than cooking. It is this avoidable mistake which occurs over and over again in the history of Western philosophy. If we are not to repeat the mistake, this is the lesson its history must teach us' (19).

In spite of its many merits, there is cause for one substantive and one 'formal' complaint. With respect to the book's content, the essay on Utilitarianism — 'Utilitarianism and Feminism' by Lea Campos Boralevi — seems curiously out of place. The discomfort does not arise because, in a sea of claims against women, the Radical movement was notorious for its *defense* of female equality. It arises because Campos Boralevi runs afoul of the *raison d'être* of the collection when she sidelines, for example, Bentham's less than enlightened remarks about women. Campos Boralevi argues that Utilitarianism is,

in fact, the de facto progenitor of feminism. That may be so, but the actions of the Utilitarians on behalf of women in the world give us no reason to 'excuse' their, however casual, sexist remarks about women's nature — no reason to excuse, that is, unless you are a Utilitarian.

Clearly, what makes the views of women with which we are presented in this book objectionable is that those views are maliciously false and in themselves maintain the conditions under which women en masse are materially disadvantaged. Insofar as they are equivalent to the views held by the non-Utilitarian philosophers studied, the views of women held by Utilitarians are the same ones which work to women's disadvantage elsewhere and so also stand in need of our explicit and sustained repudiation. The suggestion implied in this one essay is that false beliefs here are only contingently connected to resulting harms — that in the case of the Utilitarians, a few errant remarks about the 'weaker sex' can be ignored in light of the consequence that universal suffrage becomes an active concern. This in turn suggests that it is not so much his beliefs about women which should invite our wrath, but rather the philosopher's behaviour towards and on behalf of women which should concern us. None of the other essays in the collection seriously attend to this end of things and, on the contrary, point a finger directly at the level of belief. Without going into the philosophical problems which are immediately called forth at this point in the book, the inclusion of Campos Boralevi's essay may at least be said to disturb its overall integrity. This in itself, however, might make the text an interesting choice for advanced study.

Finally, a 'formal' objection. The principle of charity would demand that the book's bright pink jacket and titillating cover art (Paul Delvaux, 'Phases of the Moon' 1939) be appreciated tongue in cheek or forgiven as poor judgment on the part of some unenlightened publisher. Clearly, though, what lies between the sheets of *Women in Western Political Philosophy* demands that we dispense with this sort of charity.

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George Klosko

*The Principle of Fairness and
Political Obligation.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1992.

Pp. xiii + 204.

US \$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7718-4);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7719-2).

Civil society, noted Hume, was based upon 'necessity, inclination, and habit' rather than on any cogent account of political obligation. But as tradition, coercion, and divine right have become discredited as good reasons for individuals to obey the laws of a state, the question of why one ought to submit to any given law has become more pressing. For all the references to 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' states which carry so much rhetorical force, we still do not have a thorough, coherent account of the conditions under which obligations arise.

Klosko argues that the 'principle of fairness', first articulated by HLA Hart and later employed by Rawls, can satisfactorily ground a convincing account of political obligation. Klosko's thesis is that the 'moral basis of the principle of fairness is the mutuality of restrictions ... [i]ndividuals who benefit from the cooperative efforts of others have obligations to cooperate as well' (34). The key point here is that obligation is not grounded upon consent, but on the receipt of benefits.

First, Klosko notes that there exist certain public goods which 'can be presumed to be necessary for an acceptable life for all members of the community' (39). Because these goods are indispensable, no one can reasonably say that they do not want them. Thus, benefiting from such public goods as physical security generates a strong obligation to help provide these goods. Next, Klosko explains that obligations hold 'only as long as the costs and benefits of the schemes in question are distributed fairly' (63). A 'fair distribution' is one that is chosen through 'tolerably fair procedures' and can be defended 'with reasonable arguments' (66). Finally, Klosko argues that the principle of fairness can be expanded to justify an obligation to contribute to 'discretionary' public goods in addition to 'presumptive' (or essential) public goods. If a certain package of discretionary public goods (e.g., educational institutions, transportation networks, research and development grants) are required to provide presumptive public goods (i.e., the 'sophisticated modern weaponry on which national defense depends' (88)), then these discretionary goods are 'indirectly required for A's well-being,' and '[t]he fact that he does not believe that he benefits from various discretionary goods does not free him from an obligation to support them' (92).

This is an intriguing argument, and it does address the concerns of those who, like Nozick, ask why they must contribute to public goods which they neither need nor desire. Where the argument falters, however, is in the tenuous empirical assumptions that must be made for the argument to work. Each step of Klosko's argument requires that we agree with his use of

subjective terms ('indispensable' goods, 'tolerably fair' procedures, and 'indirectly essential' goods); and, while the author makes an effort to address the issue of subjectivity, the problem remains.

In the first place, who is it that is presuming that any particular 'presumptive goods' are essential, or even beneficial? And what if there is disagreement here? Klosko depends heavily upon the concepts of 'national defense' and 'law and order', which he declares are 'obvious' (49), 'indispensable' (48), and 'unquestionably necessary' (87) benefits which are 'enjoyed by all alike' (73). But is this really as uncontroversial as the author maintains? What if I am a pacifist, and believe that the development of 'modern weaponry' will lead to an arms race that will jeopardize my life? Or what if I, as a Canadian, believe that a Canadian military force is simply redundant because the United States, through its own self-interest, would protect Canada in the face of any significant threat?

The same problem characterizes 'law and order' as a presumptive good: do we all benefit equally? Many of those on the Left argue that laws protecting private property unfairly benefit those who have a significant amount of private property to be protected. Klosko's discussion of 'tolerably fair procedures' exhibits similar problems. What are such procedures? They are 'democratic', with 'fair conditions for individual participation (such as freedom of speech and association) [65]'. But this is surely too vague. 'Democracy' itself is a fuzzy term, referring to a multitude of different systems and institutions. Are all of them 'fair'? Are some of them fairer than others? A common argument made against 'liberal' democracy, for example, is that striking economic inequalities frequently overshadow limited political rights.

The discussion of 'legitimate political institutions' is by far the weakest section of the book. Klosko insists repeatedly that we all have 'clear convictions about procedural fairness' (67) and that 'we clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate governments' (128). Moreover, we are told that 'most individuals believe that they have political obligations', and that 'most individuals believe that their governments are legitimate and so, by implication, are acceptably fair' (68). But who are these individuals? Surely not inner-city Black youths in Los Angeles, or Native people living on certain reserves in Canada. Although Klosko offers an appendix of sociological data supporting these assertions, the irony here is that those who are most likely to agree with Klosko's account of political obligation are those who generally do not raise difficult questions about obligation in the first place. Those who *would* raise such questions — i.e., the politically and economically marginalized — probably would also reject the assertion that 'some existing governments, including that of the United States,' provide presumptively beneficial goods whose benefits and burdens are fairly distributed (130, 39).

The same empirical tenuousness seeps into Klosko's argument that many presumptive benefits depend 'indirectly' upon the existence of 'discretionary' goods. But who is to determine the causal accuracy of, say, the claim that technological advances in health care depend upon military research and development? It is uncertain who, precisely, bears the burden of proof. We

are told that while the burden of proof rests with the proponents of cooperative scheme 'X' to 'demonstrate that the goods they supply satisfy the necessary conditions' (114), it falls on the individual to show that 'a given law does not provide significant benefits' for her (105, 122). What if any particular individual and the proponents of scheme 'X' simply do not believe each other's evidence?

This is not to say that Klosko's argument does not work, only that it requires the existence of a very homogeneous society where racial, linguistic, religious, and economic differences do not affect individuals' perceptions of what is 'fair' or 'beneficial'. It is moot whether the United States is sufficiently homogeneous to meet this condition. But it does raise the hard question whether any state, however 'democratic', can offer a satisfactory account of political obligation with too diverse a demos.

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Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit

Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics.

Stanford: Stanford University Press 1990.

Pp. xii + 169.

US \$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1768-0);

US \$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1769-9).

A while back, in these pages, I wrote of Thomas Pogge's *Realizing Rawls* that it was not 'Rawls Made Easy'. Well, this little textbook is; and intentionally so. Sticking close to the texts of Rawls and his two most famous critics, Nozick and Sandel, the authors have provided undergraduates with an account of some of the major figures and debates of recent political philosophy which is unrevisionary yet fresh. Their book expresses an unabashed admiration for Rawls' 'revolutionary ... intellectual contribution of magnificent ambition' (8 & 10). And their exposition and (limited) defence of it is as sympathetic as anything yet produced by the Rawls industry. This book certainly deserves a prominent place on any 'Recommended Reading' list for undergraduate courses dealing with Rawls. But apart from providing a source from which to crib introductory lectures, it will not, as apparently the publishers believed, have much to offer those readers who come to Rawls 'well seasoned' (ix).

After a useful historical introduction — which sees in Rawls the post-positivist renaissance of the grand tradition of political thought — the authors devote two chapters to explaining the theory, primarily as it is presented in the 'big book'. Although their précis maps out all three parts of *A Theory of Justice*, it concentrates on the structure and role of the celebrated contractual argument. These two chapters are the best part of the book. They are followed by its most expendable chapter which is devoted to a defence against unnamed critics (from Honderich and Barry to Kymlicka, and perhaps including Rawls himself) who have questioned whether the contractual argument really does any substantive justificatory work for Rawls. Their apology disappoints. They claim no more than that the contract in the original position 'is a device Rawls uses to ensure that the preferred basic structure is identified as one which would fully satisfy the constraints on the concept of right, in particular the publicity constraint. If we set out to select a structure in a direct non-contractarian fashion that constraint is unlikely to figure prominently' (65). But that qualification 'unlikely' concedes all that the critics were demanding. The critics may agree with Rawls that the contractual allegory serves as a good expository device; but hold nevertheless that it does not gain primary justificatory status just because of the supposed psychological fact that without it we are *likely* to lose our way. It is puzzling that the authors decided to make so much of this issue given their (debatable) choice to ignore most other 'internal' liberal criticisms involving, for example, 'the priority of liberty in Rawls, the role of the notion of equality, the precise significance of the difference principle, and such matters' (x).

The next two chapters rehearse the well-known (to the well-seasoned) 'external' objections of Nozick and of the communitarians. They do an admirable job of stating both the objections and the basic theories of these critics. In fact, they may well provide all the information on Nozick and Sandel that an undergraduate in the 1990s is likely to need. These chapters nevertheless lack some of the drama of a good intellectual debate since in both cases the defence of Rawls rests mainly on the (I believe largely sound) claims: (a) that these critics have unsympathetically misinterpreted Rawls, or failed to 'allow for all the moves at Rawls' disposal, or indeed for all the moves he actually makes' (xi); and (b) that neither Nozick nor the communitarians offer an independently credible or philosophically plausible alternative. It is regrettable that the chapter entitled 'Libertarianism' focuses exclusively on Nozick, ignoring entirely the more searching and sophisticated (and up-to-date) challenges from contractarian libertarians like David Gauthier and Jan Narveson. The critique of communitarianism owes much to Gutmann and Kymlicka.

The book concludes with a chapter on the developments in Rawls' theory since 1971, suggestively entitled 'The Self-Critique'. They divide this period into a Kantian movement (1971-1982) and a Hegelian/Hobbesian movement (1985-1989). On several occasions they yearn nostalgically for the 'bravura of the earlier Rawls'. The well-seasoned readers, to whom they also hoped to appeal, will be disappointed by the somewhat dogmatic textbook style here

which seems to preclude the kind of scholarship necessary to sustain their fairly bold exegetic claims. As the authors themselves surely recognize, it is an oversimplification to imply that Rawls' theory makes such decisive and unified shifts in direction. Both the Kantian element, including the two powers of moral personality, and the Hegelian/Hobbesian concern with stability, were already strongly present in *A Theory of Justice*. And the 1985 article cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as Rawls' coming 'to abandon Kant — or at least the Kantian interpretation of his enterprise' (139), since its first half is devoted to restating that Kantian interpretation. Rawls clearly thought that these Kantian elements were wholly consistent with the 'Hegelian' elements in the overlapping-consensus theory that he introduced later in that article. Of course, in describing the modifications to his theory as 'shifts in emphasis' with a slightly different vocabulary, Rawls may be mistaken about his own theory. But the authors have not even begun to argue this case. Nobody, in short, denies that there are genuine revisions in Rawls' theory, but the textbook approach here does not do justice to the more subtle and important task of explaining how extensive, how consistent and how significant they are.

Similarly, it would have been interesting to see them develop further their claim that the later 'Rawlsian philosophy can no longer see itself as just one among many competing political philosophies. Its aim, ultimately, is not to challenge or repudiate such competitors but to *subsume* them....' (149). At this point it is far from clear that Rawls is, as they put it, 'announcing that the conversation is not worth the candle and that we should look for practical accommodation of different viewpoints, not intellectual exchange on fundamental issues' (150). Kukathas and Pettit may be guilty of some sort of category mistake here. Rawls sees himself as primarily engaged in a special sub-enterprise in political philosophy (a political conception of justice for a constitutional democracy), but they interpret his methodology and strictures as if it were to apply to all of moral and political philosophy.

It must be emphasized that none of these criticisms, even if sound, undermine the usefulness of this text as a secondary source which makes Rawls easy for those who do not already find him easy enough.

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Mark Kulstad

Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection.

München: Philosophia Verlag (Analytica) 1991.
(cloth: ISBN 3-88405-069-9).

This hard-working volume does pretty much what its title announces: it considers where Leibniz's neologism 'apperception' fits in the hierarchy building from mere perceptions (contained in all monads) to the consciousness of distinct perceptions and then to the reflection on self and on innate truths that characterizes spirits. The study for the most part is devoted to tracing the development of Leibniz's understanding of these and related notions, especially after his encounter with Locke's thought. But Kulstad finds a touchstone in Leibniz's efforts to make a place for 'beasts' that would neither relegate them to the status of mere machines nor dissolve the distinction between animal souls and rational spirits; the strains of this twofold task, Kulstad argues, make Leibniz's use of 'apperception' unsettled, even erratic, but perhaps more interestingly complicated than is usually appreciated. Still any reader contemplating the distinction between animals and humans in general would be well-advised to have more than a passing interest in early modern philosophy before taking up the book; it takes a long time to reach any detailed account even of Leibniz's view on the matter.

Kulstad takes his cue from a passage in the *New Essays on Human Understanding*. There Leibniz describes the rush of an enraged boar at a human target as an example of an animal faculty of apperception: responding to a person foolishly shouting at it, the boar moves from having a 'bare perception' to 'apperceiving' this 'more notable and distinct' impression (19; NE 173). Against the claims of this passage, Kulstad sets the 'standard view' (as expressed by, e.g., Robert McRae, *Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought* [Toronto 1976]), which proposes that apperception is the privilege of spirits, and can be associated with reflection and self-consciousness. This view draws much of its plausibility from the *Principles of Nature and Grace*, where simple perception is distinguished from 'Apperception, which is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of [the] interior state [of the monad]' (18; G VI 600). While acknowledging the strength of the 'standard view,' Kulstad argues that it must at the very least be modified in the light of the boar passage. More strongly, Kulstad proposes that we can distinguish between mere reflection, or the second-order perception that allows attention and memory, and the 'focused reflection' that involves attention to what is properly 'in us,' i.e., the self and its operations (24). Mere reflection seems necessary for the distinct perception characterizing sensation; it might be identified with consciousness and seems one form of apperception. Focused reflection, on the other hand, is apperception directed at the self and its operations (self-consciousness) and gives rise to the capacity for reason. Although the distinction is not drawn by Leibniz himself, Kulstad suggests that it is at work in those passages where apperception is granted to beasts;

it is constrained by Leibniz's inability to make a clean separation between the second-order perceptions that attend simply to images of sense and those where a 'shift in the focus of attention' would constitute reflection on what is 'in us' (167). Kulstad traces Leibniz's struggle between the competing considerations in various drafts of the *Principles of Nature and Grace*, suggesting that the final version of the crucial passage is a compromise.

Kulstad's work certainly succeeds in warning us against blithely denying apperception to beasts. And Leibniz scholars will find useful his inclusion of many passages from manuscripts and drafts that were eliminated in print (not always by Leibniz himself). Also useful is his treatment of secondary sources that might be unfamiliar to contemporary audiences. (The cost of this attention, however, may be too little discussion of recent works.) But the narrow focus of the work means that many issues relevant to those that form the subject of the book may not be given their due. For instance, general treatments of the metaphysical distinctions between spirits, the souls of beasts and bare monads, on the one hand, and of the clarity and distinctness of perceptions, on the other, might serve to ground some of Kulstad's specific remarks. And some readers might find the discussion of apperception in the *Monadology* to be given rather short shrift.

Still Kulstad's account of apperception raises an issue that is important throughout early modern philosophy: what it is to attend to some particular feature of a perception. (This issue may well be important, for instance, in understanding what can constitute both the clarity and distinctness, and even the object, of an idea for Descartes). But Kulstad's association of attention with reflection and of reflection with second-order perceptions (perceptions of perceptions) is not fully convincing as it stands. Attention and the focusing of attention seem *prima facie* much simpler acts than the forming of a second-order perception. And it is not clear here whether 'reflection' need imply a reflexive act. So the description of 'apperception' Kulstad offers that focuses on these acts does not make it an indisputably second-order perception. Even if 'apperception of what is in us' always depends on second-order perceptions, it may not need to be identified *as* a second-order perception, having an intentionally structured object. Might 'apperception' be generally described as *any* sharpening of a perception by attention to distinct features of it? To be sure, this would be a considerable deflation of what seems quite a robust notion. And Kulstad may work to eliminate this possibility by arguing for the necessary involvement of some sort of memory, itself a second-order perception. But he needs to address this issue further, especially in light of what he claims (rightly I think) is the danger for Leibniz that any second-order perception could, in principle, become consciousness of self.

The book is written in a rather labored manner. Even its considerable virtues of caution and attention to detail may end up playing it false; it is often hard to see the shape of this particular forest, narrowly focused as it may be, for the number of trees it sprouts. Indeed the many comments Kulstad includes to orient the reader sometimes prove more of a distraction

than a guide, as when he begins a sentence: 'the work of the preceding subsection, or more precisely, the work of the preceding subsection combined with that of the earlier subsections of section II of this chapter, ...' (132). This is not as perspicuously put as one might wish. In short, the book does not give up its secrets without a fight.

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Helen S. Lang

Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties.

Albany, NY: State University of New York

1992. Pp. ix + 322.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1083-8);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1084-6).

This is an excellent monograph concerning several central features of Aristotle's physical theory and their various interpretations in the Middle Ages. The first half of this study treats of the definition of nature in book two of the *Physics*, the problem of the natural motion of the elements, and the much disputed conclusion of book eight concerning the first cause of motion in the universe. The second half of the book consists of four acute chapters in which the author shows how John Philoponus, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan, and Duns Scotus used and interpreted parts of the *Physics*. The two main sections of the book are preceded by a thoughtful introductory study of the nature and structure of an Aristotelian *logos* or 'study'. This is a particularly important issue for the last two books of the *Physics*, the unity of each of which is anything but clear. The book contains extensive notes and a fairly comprehensive bibliography. About half the chapters in the book appeared in earlier versions in various journals.

Lang argues (6) that 'the immediate object of Aristotle's writing and of his thought is not constituted by the corpus as a whole but by particular problems expressed in individual *logoi*'. Thus, in understanding what Aristotle is doing in any 'unit' of writing, we must first identify what is usually a quite specific problem and then read the remainder of the *logos* as addressed to subordinate arguments, questions, and definitions intended to support the solution to the original problem. Thus, if, for example, we focus on book eight of the *Physics*, we should understand each of the many seemingly disconnected discussions in that book as logically related to the main thesis which is that motion is eternal. The main thesis always comes first and subsequent arguments are

'progressively more specialized and narrower within each book (164)'. And if we focus on the entire *Physics*, we can see that the thesis beginning book two, namely, that motion is a principle of change and of coming to rest, governs the entire remainder of the work. For in order to understand nature as principle of motion and of coming to rest, we need to understand motion; and in order to understand motion, we need to understand the continuous, the infinite, place, void, time, and the relation between movers and moved things (163).

Realizing that the work is structured in this way is especially important for addressing the vexed issues of how books seven and eight are related, the explanation of why the elements are not self-moved, and the apparent reference to an unmoved mover at the end of the work. Briefly, Lang thinks that books seven and eight constitute independently sound arguments for the theses that everything that is in motion is moved by another and that there must be a first member of a series of movers which itself is unmoved (54). They differ in that seven treats of motion as a whole of parts and eight treats of motion as a cause and principle of substances (61-2). She argues further that the mover in the case of the natural motion of the elements is their actuality, that is, their (natural) place (77). Finally, she argues that the first mover is not the subject of book eight; rather, the text should be read as referring to the first *moved* and the first motion (93).

Having thus interpreted Aristotle, Lang turns in the second part of the book to a fascinating series of 'case studies' in which she shows how various assumptions and problems brought to the reading of the *Physics* in the Middle Ages subtly and sometimes not so subtly alter Aristotle's account. Whether or not Lang is correct about the role of book seven, she is undoubtedly correct that Aristotle did think he successfully defended the thesis that motion is eternal in book eight. And if she is also correct about the end of book eight, important consequences follow for understanding how Aristotle believed physics and theology are related. The medieval commentators, however, brought to their reading of the *Physics* Christian assumptions about creation and nature. And these assumptions lead them, as Lang shows, to accounts of motion that are not those of Aristotle, but have been for centuries represented as Aristotelian. In short, they did not or chose not to take account of the structure of Aristotle's *logoi*. Rather, they used the *Physics* for their own purposes.

One illuminating example of this must suffice. John Philoponus understands Aristotle to hold that nature is an intrinsic mover rather than an intrinsic source of being moved. The difference is crucial. For in the former case, the understanding of motion is rooted in the Platonism that Aristotle was most concerned to reject in book two of the *Physics*. Philoponus actually supposes that the intrinsic mover in the elements must be analogous to the soul in animal motion. This he identifies as 'inclination' (114). And thus he is led to reject Aristotle's concept of natural place and of elemental motion. Indeed, he arrives ultimately at a restructuring of the concept of nature. We need only add here that Philoponus as an expositor and critic of Aristotle was

enormously influential on the medieval Arabic philosophers and through them on the Latin philosophers of the 12th and 13th centuries.

It is of course not possible in a short review to discuss in detail the complex philological and philosophical issues raised by a book such as this. Certainly, Lang makes a number of controversial claims. I think it might be fairly said in criticism that the somewhat episodic character of the book produces truncated discussions in several places. Nevertheless, this book deserves careful attention both by Aristotle scholars and by those specializing in the history of science.

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Richard W. Miller

*Moral Differences: Truth, Justice and
Conscience in a World of Conflict.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992.

US \$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07409-7);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02092-2).

This book marks a number of about-faces for Richard Miller. In *Analyzing Marx*, he was a Marxist and a consequentialist; here he is a liberal and contractarian. In *Fact and Method* he was a scientific realist, and a great deal was made to hang on the defensibility of realism; here he offers a 'mixed verdict' about moral realism, and doubts that much hangs on it at all. But unlike other prominent philosophical changes of heart, (think of Putnam) Miller does not announce the difference. We find only one reference to Marx in almost 400 pages, and that occurs in a footnote about David Gauthier, in a section headed 'A Minimal case for Capitalism'.

Other than being full of surprises, the book is disappointing. It talks about too many things, many of the arguments are underdeveloped, and the parts don't fit together in any obvious way. It begins with a discussion of moral truth. Miller argues that there are moral truths, and that they can be reliably detected. Of course, to be a reliable detector of moral truth, one must show equal concern and respect for all, and have had the right sort of loving upbringing, in circumstances in which parties are roughly equal in power. If these conditions for moral judgment sound morally loaded, they are. They themselves require little by way of moral argument in their favor, and the aim of moral argument is more often establishing common ground than truth. Still, we may be unable to convince some of moral claims (Aristotle and the

Tiv, a farming people in Nigeria, are offered as examples of those with whom rational disagreement may be possible). But abandoning moral concerns altogether, as a nihilist might, is apt to be too costly even in the nihilist's terms, because cooperation with others is aided, rather than hindered, by recognizing them as having some sort of claim. Still, there is room for reasonable disagreement — reasonable in the sense that Aristotle or the Tiv may be reasoning perfectly well, but from premises we regard as flawed.

If we look at moral truth in this way, we gain a certain leverage on concrete moral issues, because we come to better understand the nature and sources of moral disagreement. One important case for Miller is seeing justice in terms of rational agreement, which he calls 'justice as social freedom'. Of course, we might disagree about what this requirement amounts to, but Miller insists that this is the proper subject of political debate, at least for 'we modern industrial folk'.

Justice as social freedom admits of two basic interpretations, one Hobbesian, the other restrictive. The former identifies justice with a system in which all give up their right to rebel on noncoercive grounds. The latter protects advantages stemming from differences in innate abilities. Miller opts for the former. Along the way (largely) familiar criticisms of the political positions of Nozick, Gauthier, and Utilitarianism are rehearsed. Miller goes on to offer his own argument, appealing to 'concrete facts about our effects on one another' (274) for a Rawlsian conclusion — rational persons would overwhelmingly choose to protect their fundamental interests against bad outcomes. This requires an acceptance of a capitalist system that best cares for the needs of the worst-off.

The last part of the book considers problems of conscience. Miller argues that for a morally serious person, it is never unreasonable to avoid wrongdoing. His target is plainly Bernard Williams' arguments that are supposed to show that morality sometimes makes unreasonable demands. Miller's basic strategy is to show that such demands can never be entirely unreasonable for a morally serious person, even if in some circumstances such a person might reasonably do wrong. For moral principles enjoy a special sort of claim, because of their connection with self-respect, which is in turn related to the need to be answerable to others. But morality doesn't always demand impartiality. Political morality does, but it is a mistake to extrapolate it to other moral domains where partiality is appropriate. Both utilitarianism and a generalized consequentialism fall into this trap. But morality is about the standards we use to guide our actions. An act is wrong just in case 'it would be excluded by the least demanding system of terms of self-reproach and reproach that is compatible with the virtues at which everyone who is capable of self-regulation should aim' (367). Thus the moral point of view should be a matter of common, rather than mutual acceptance. As such it will leave room for particular attachments, even if space for those attachments cannot be impartially justified. The discussion of what Miller calls 'person centered morality' is the most novel and interesting part of the book. It is not entirely clear how it is related to the earlier sections, for political morality is not

presented as a special case of morality more generally, and truth and disagreement are not central issues. As a result, we are not left with a single view of morality, but with a collection of arguments addressing apparently distinct questions about morality.

I began by noting some substantive changes in Miller's views. Readers may differ as to whether these changes mark improvement or decline; there is more likely to be a consensus about the stylistic features of the book. Gone is Miller's clear and jargon free prose. In its place we find cumbersome sentences (for example, 'But do the innately productively inferior suffer when the innately superior receive more, for the same trying, solely because they can produce more with the same trying?' [221]). There is a new technical term every few pages (often for what turns out to be a familiar concept) and a new topic almost as often. Some differences, moral or otherwise, are sure to disappoint.

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Daniel T. O'Hara

*Radical Parody: American Culture and
Critical Agency after Foucault.*

New York: Columbia University Press 1992.

Pp. xiv + 311.

US \$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-07692-4).

Radical Parody is a collection of thirteen essays; all but one of them were published between 1990 and 1992. The cohesiveness of this collection — which is somewhat problematic — may be attributed to O'Hara's unwavering critical target and to his use of radical parody as a method. Taking his lead from Foucault's later notion of subjectivity, O'Hara stylizes himself as a Foucauldian agent who has reclaimed a creative aesthetico-ethical autonomy in order to attack, through radical parody, the politically correct and self-parodic epigones of contemporary American literary criticism and philosophy, including Stanley Fish, Harold Bloom, and Richard Rorty. O'Hara views these 'neo-pragmatists' as self-serving and self-justifying. They fail to take into account 'the grander movements of social history' (x). O'Hara bases his own critical agenda upon these 'grander movements'. He wants to provide 'literary examples of imaginations in action instructing their societies, in

order to counterbalance the neglect or dismissal of this literary function in contemporary critical culture' (xii).

Although O'Hara gives more straightforward definitions of his method of criticism — radical parody — the following description will give the potential reader some idea of the degree of difficulty s/he should expect: 'Visionary apotheosis of the friend self and its savage demonization occupy the extreme poles of possible self-interpretation. Learning to balance these extremes by occupying the middle ground between is the practice of criticism as radical parody' (101). For a writer with the sort of critical agenda O'Hara claims he has, such prose is surely counterproductive. Of course, O'Hara is attempting to parody the people he criticizes, but he also seems to consider them his sole audience. This is unfortunate since those of us who find something of value in the Foucauldian project of resistance need to be addressed as well. We can do without the self-aggrandizing, self-indulgent, why-I-am-so-clever prose. It is unclear whether O'Hara has himself overcome the self-celebratory individualism of which he accuses his latter-day Emersons.

Speaking of himself and other younger critics, O'Hara writes: '[W]e tend to see the work of others and even our own work as chronically self-contradictory to the point of intentional self-parody. We see ourselves, in other words, as self-conscious avatars of that hero of the Nestor chapter of Joyce's *Ulysses* — that is, as figures of sublime parody — as, at best, *holy fools* of the various discourses that distort us' (59). Foucault's later notion of the self, which O'Hara finds in the last two volumes of the *Histoire de la Sexualité*, serves as the agent for this 'sublime' parody. The Foucauldian self is 'a discursive phenomenon of style, playfully produced, shaped, and reshaped intertextually among authors, readers, and their masks' (91). Although the Greek polis allowed for more autonomy in self-formation, according to O'Hara, Foucault believed that even in the modern age the subject is 'a mobile, plural, and agonistic structure of interdictory moral codes and resistant ethical practices of self-stylization. We are produced by our culture to be, to a greater or lesser extent, self-fashioning individuals' (64). As a self-styled Foucauldian subject, O'Hara 'stands in opposition to the conventional ideological framework of critical humanism, with its endorsement of an imaginary individual nature' (91).

Although his discussion of Foucault's notion of the self is far too brief to justify such a move, O'Hara refers to ideas Julia Kristeva has put forward concerning identification and identity-formation in order to elucidate the parodic, Foucauldian self. At the same time, however, he claims that Foucault and Kristeva are 'two of the strangest theoretical bedfellows ever imagined' (153). Indeed they are. For O'Hara, Kristeva's model of the mentor-pupil relationship exemplifies the relation of self to self (the *rapport à soi*) which makes self-formation possible in Foucault's work. The choice of such a model, however, is arbitrary. O'Hara needs to do some more work on the Foucauldian idea of self-reflexivity before casting it in this mold. For example, he might just as well have paired Foucault with Freud, whose theory concerning the formation and operations of the superego seems to lie

as much behind Foucault's idea of identity formation — even if Foucault would never acknowledge this — as it does behind Kristeva's.

At the beginning of the review, I mentioned O'Hara's allegedly critical agenda. In a sketch of a more far-reaching project which is far too brief to be really useful, O'Hara writes: 'By turning to the literary tradition ... we can recuperate the idea of a collective project yet to be realized, which can give shape and direction to the future of the profession and, more important, of society, and so provide a more viable basis of comparative judgment on the present state of things' (142). This is an interesting idea. (David Gross, in his *The Past in Ruins* [Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press 1993], recently said something similar in a more detailed and interesting fashion.) But, relying on what he claims is Foucault's idea of the collective archive, O'Hara never does anything more than to tender this critical social project.

According to O'Hara, the collective archive is 'the cultural site for the conscious preservation of the often repressed history of humanity's collective projects, all its supposedly "nonrational" models of community, tradition, and change, both canonical and subversive' (142). But, one can find no such notion in Foucault. In his preface, O'Hara explains that the Foucault, and Kristeva, who appear in his book 'do not pretend to be anything other than my own revisionary developments for purposes of "essaying" the contemporary practice of American critical theory "after Foucault" ' (xiii-xiv). This disclaimer ought to alert more serious readers of both Foucault and Kristeva. O'Hara's Foucault is sometimes no more than a literary device which allows him to make a fashion statement. Not only should the idea of a collective archive be attached to a different monicker, but O'Hara's primarily aesthetic, parodic, Foucauldian 'mask' is also highly problematic because the Foucauldian subject is essentially ethical. Its self-formative activity involves identifications with and resistance against prevailing social norms and practices. Because O'Hara does not take what he himself recognizes as the necessary leap from the aesthetic to the ethico-political, his radical parody of politically correct thinking lacks the necessary critical edge and remains largely ineffective.

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Ferdinand Schoeman

Privacy and Social Freedom.

Cambridge University Press 1992. Pp. xi + 225.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41564-0).

This long awaited book is marred only by the fact that the author never saw its final form. Ferdinand Schoeman died on June 12, 1992 after a long fight against leukemia. In the late 1970s I first met Professor Schoeman at an American Philosophical Association meeting where he was the scheduled commentator on a colloquium paper. When his turn arrived he rose and announced that he was not going to follow the standard practice in our discipline of ripping the main paper to shreds. Instead, he said, he would talk about the positive themes of the paper and then expand on these themes. Several people in the audience stood and cheered. In the intervening years, our profession is slowly coming around to Schoeman's way of thinking. In many ways, this book provides the theoretical justification for Schoeman's view that the quest for understanding is a cooperative rather than a combative enterprise. The editors at Cambridge University Press have provided a fitting testimony to Schoeman's vision and they deserve much credit for getting this manuscript to press just before Schoeman died.

The book is mainly about privacy, but there is an important sub-text. The central thesis in this sub-text is that moral philosophy, as currently practiced, has embraced an unrealistic account of human nature by centering on the isolated individual reasoner who must break free of his or her cultural blinders. Instead, Schoeman argues for 'the interdependence of morality and culture'. In this endeavor he allies himself with feminists and communitarians in recognizing the species and historical character of the human mind. As he says in the Introduction, 'I propose an understanding of moral philosophy that seeks to integrate, rather than exclude, our experience as socially dependent beings. An important aspect of this understanding is showing that culturally embedded is not the same as ritually and unreflectively mimicking whatever others do' (5). While others have recently argued for a communitarian approach to ethics, I found Schoeman's arguments to be some of the most persuasive.

As the title indicates, there are two main focuses of the book: freedom and privacy. Schoeman presents an account of freedom that is at odds with most of the recent philosophical literature. Schoeman correctly identifies a traditional theoretical strain that sees individuals as most free when they are most protected from governmental and social forces. This theoretical position which extends back at least to Mill embodies a seriously mistaken understanding of human nature, Schoeman contends. Humans are not supremely rational, independent beings; rather they are interdependent.

Schoeman argues that freedom is best understood as social in the sense that it is based on allowing the most interaction between groups and individuals. 'Social freedom cannot mean immunity from social influence and pressure. Rather, social freedom is available to the extent that there are

options among associative ties, each of which appropriately exploits social force to maintain coherence and effectiveness for social action' (7). According to Schoeman 'people are socially free to the extent that two conditions are met. Their culture provides them with alternative, function-specific associative prospects; and the sorts of control mechanisms used on these people within their associations are fitting, given the ends of the association' (9).

Privacy has been misunderstood to involve 'letting people be'. It is thought that left to their own devices people would respond rationally and choose what is best for themselves. Schoeman is at pains to show that rationality makes little sense unless it is understood within the context of shared goals and practices through which we support and motivate one another. In this connection, there are many forms of social pressure that are useful, even necessary, to free us from certain forms of dependency. If people were left alone they would actually be more prone to be dominated by subtle social pressures than if we allow for 'appropriate forms of social manipulation' (90). Privacy is thus seen as protecting us from inappropriate social forces, but not from all forms.

In an intriguing set of discussions, Schoeman argues for two very original theses: a) that gossip is consistent with privacy, and b) that groups as well as individuals need to have privacy protected. Concerning gossip, Schoeman contends that 'we all fully expect to be discussed by others, with no sense of impropriety' (145). Schoeman sees gossip as 'a primary means of maintaining and reinforcing social norms; it is a primary means of holding those in high status to the same standards that govern those not so situated' (146). Gossip is in some respects better than public censure, since it operates privately and is a less serious form of social control. But therein also lies the problem, it seems to me. For the very informality of gossip also means that the person gossiped about has little recourse. Schoeman does admit that when gossip is used as a means of conveying information to those who could act to the detriment of the person gossiped about, then it can involve a serious breach of privacy. But, I would ask, how can one ever be sure that beginning a gossip chain will not lead to someone who could act detrimentally. The informality of gossip means that there are no rules and very few controls. Contrary to Schoeman's claims, malicious gossip is a serious violation of privacy, and, unfortunately, we have very little means of preventing any gossip from becoming malicious. Schoeman is a bit too quick to dismiss standard privacy concerns even for those like myself who share most of his communitarian commitments.

Schoeman contends that groups, especially minority groups, need to have their privacy protected. This, he argues, is crucial for a group's ability to provide support for its members, especially when the members have socially aberrant lifestyles. I am quite sympathetic to this point which Schoeman persuasively defends with reference to various gay communities. But there is another side to the coin that Schoeman barely mentions. Under the cloak of privacy, groups can exert quite oppressive forms of social force on their members.

The difficult task is to strike the right balance between protecting us from forms of socialization that oppress and promoting forms of socialization that provide socially needed support and sustenance. Schoeman's book marks the first serious attempt to strike this balance, and it also provides a thoroughly plausible critique of the current views of privacy which focus exclusively on protecting us from governmental and social forces.

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A. John Simmons

The Lockean Theory of Rights.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1992. Pp. ix + 387.

US \$39.50 (ISBN 0-691-08630-3).

Simmons' book is much more than a study of an important aspect of Locke. It is, among others, an attempt at rehabilitating Locke as a political and moral thinker, an attempt successful in more than its debunking the persistent claim that Locke is the champion of individualistic entrepreneurs for whom a state's social justice regulations are unwarranted interference with inalienable rights.

This study is deeply rooted in both the history and the contemporary discussion of rights. Simmons has an excellent grasp on Locke's writings as well as on the relevant secondary literature. He engages both commentators on important aspects of Locke's thought (e.g., Tully and Waldron on property rights) as well as contemporary theorists generally assumed to be followers of Locke (e.g., Nozick on justice). The great merit of the book is its critical stance in both instances: it regularly shows that there is more to Locke, or that Locke is better, than both commentators and followers might have led one to believe.

Against Tully, for example — in a context of deep appreciation for his *A Discourse on Property*: 'the most important work yet produced on Locke's theory of property' (222) — Simmons argues that for Locke labor does ground rights over one's good (234ff); that in civil society the ground for property rights is natural not conventional (270); and that property does not just serve self-preservation but also makes possible self-government (332ff). Against Nozick (whose position is far less congenial to Simmons than is Tully's) he argues both that there is more to morality than rights and that rights are not absolute and can conflict; and he then shows this position to be at least

congenial with a Lockean theory of rights (324ff) which 'accept[s] some fuller notion of justice than Nozick's, or defend[s] competing considerations that limit or override the claims of justice' (327).

The book's title intimates Simmons' concerns: he deals with Locke's *theory*, thus opposing standard views to the effect that Locke has no coherent body of theory on rights (353). But he also considers subsequent developments as he argues that this theory 'anticipated ... a host of important points and distinctions emphasized in contemporary philosophical literature on rights' and is 'far more interesting and persuasive than is commonly supposed' (ibid). Some of the most interesting of these points and distinctions concern the family (rights and duties of parents and children), property (its limits), social justice, and charity (as a right and as a duty). The title is also meant to convey that the book is not just about Locke's theory but about the Lockean theory, that is, about 'the *best* Lockean position' (331) we may fairly ascribe to Locke even if he does not always literally articulate it.

Ascription of a 'best position' may place a commentator on thin ice. Simmons, however, remains convincing as he ventures beyond Locke's precise text and argues that if 'the Lockean program on punishment ... is not ... an acceptable position, there is at least more to be said for it than most contemporary commentators have allowed' (166); or that 'Locke's remarks on familial morality' allow for 'certain natural extensions' which make it plausible 'to defend a Lockean position on natural parental rights and filial duties' (177); or that 'plausible bases for many of Locke's claims about property rights can in fact be articulated' once we realize that Locke's position 'amounts to neither a defense of unlimited capitalist appropriation ... nor ... of purely conditional property and radical redistributionism' (222-3); or that 'As a matter of theory ... the Lockean theory of rights ... must include a stronger right to charity than the one literally described by Locke' (331).

Simmons' book is an excellent interpretation of and extrapolation from Locke; it is also a substantial contribution to contemporary discussions on rights. Although written lucidly and concisely it is, however, not an unmitigated pleasure to read. There is a quirk to Simmons' style: it is the *ad nauseam* use of the phrase 'of course' which occurs as often as three times per page (as on 97, 103, 154, 165, 187, 197, 300, 334, 335) and the extremely frequent use of words like 'clear,' 'simple,' 'easy,' 'obvious'. Some passages then become irritating, such as 'My own view is that ... such theories ... are not at all obviously inadequate simply in virtue of embracing a plurality of irreducible moral principles. (I shall not argue for that view here.) Nor need the diverse grounds for moral duty and right obviously point in conflicting directions ...' (59), and 'As we have noted earlier, of course, Locke's rule-consequentialism allows him to blend deontological and consequentialist notions in his theory with reasonable ease. It may be, of course, that Locke is simply (and not very carefully) following the lead of Grotius ...' (128). This frequent use makes problematic their perhaps innocuous appearance, as in 'Locke's need for a natural, nonconsensual ground of private property rights, then, was clear; and labor seemed, then as now, an obvious choice. Labor is not, of

course, the only ground of private property allowed by Locke' (224). In his discussion of points on which Nozick insists when defending the claim that there are no 'rights that might conflict with or limit ... free market rights,' Simmons objects that 'these points are precisely what need showing; appealing to their obvious truth will not do. And there is little reason to accept any of them as obvious' (324-5). Simmons here puts his finger on a weak spot in more than Nozick's work.

Nevertheless, suffering this irritation is a small price to pay for the intellectual dividends returned upon reflecting with Simmons on Locke and on rights.

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Francis Snare

The Nature of Moral Thinking.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1992.

Pp. 176

Cdn \$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-04708-0);

Cdn \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-04709-9).

This book, which grew out of Francis Snare's first-year lectures in ethics at Sydney University, is designed as an introduction to moral philosophy. It has, I believe, a number of important deficiencies as an introductory text; however, it also has certain virtues which make it most suitable as a secondary resource for moral philosophy students.

To begin with the deficiencies, its organization is not such as to be of maximum benefit to the student. A useful discussion of the distinction between normative ethics and metaethics is provided in the opening chapter; however, subsequent chapters move from normative ethics to metaethics and back again in a manner that is apt to bewilder someone approaching moral philosophy for the first time.

A second problem concerns the emphasis of the discussion. The discussion of normative ethics distinguishes questions about right action, non-moral value and moral responsibility, but says virtually nothing about the latter two topics. Perhaps that is not a serious lack, but what is, is the very brief discussion provided of the classical theories of moral rightness: Kant receives a page and a half, utilitarianism even less, and ethical egoism is given only a passing mention. By contrast, approximately one-quarter of the book is devoted to metaethics, and the three longest chapters (together representing 38% of the book) are devoted to matters peripheral to moral philosophy:

psychological egoism, genetic accounts of morality, and relativism about truth in general.

A third problem has to do with the complexity of the argumentation. Distinguishing concepts that are commonly confused by the layperson is an essential part of an introduction to moral philosophy; however, it is possible to introduce too many distinctions and to complicate the argument unnecessarily — especially in an introductory textbook. I believe this occurs at several points in this book. For example, in the second chapter the author distinguishes and discusses at some length both a definist version of the divine-command theory and a cognitivist, but nondefinist version, of the same theory; at this point, the student probably is not yet in a position to appreciate the difference. Furthermore, there are arguments that might have been advanced that would have been effective against both versions. Another example occurs in chapter ten where twelve different versions of normative relativism are discussed — some of them plausible and important theses, but others merely variations on eminently implausible views. Compare, for example, 1) the view that what makes an act morally right for P is P's believing it to be morally right, and 2) the view that what makes an act morally right for P is P's having committed himself to a moral code which requires it.

Finally, the last chapter of the book contains an important confusion. The chapter is devoted to setting out three methods that have been proposed for testing normative ethical theories: 1) testing the theory against the particular moral judgements we do make (or would make) in certain actual (or hypothetical) moral choice situations; 2) testing it against the judgements that would be made by an ideal observer (*à la* Roderick Firth); and 3) testing it against the judgements of impartial choosers (*à la* Rawls). The confusion is that of thinking that the last two 'methods' are methods of testing normative theories to be set up alongside the first. Rather, they are themselves normative theories to be tested by the first method, or a modified version of it such as Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. (Incidentally, Snare provides a clear explanation of how the first method will be interpreted differently if one is a cognitivist than if one is a noncognitivist.)

In spite of the above deficiencies, this book might serve as a useful secondary resource for a moral philosophy course. Snare's discussion is very careful, and he writes clearly (though, as indicated above, what may sometimes confuse the student are unnecessary distinctions and the unnecessary complexity that results). The chapters on Socrates's Euthyphro attack on authoritarian ethics, Socrates attack on Protagorean relativism, and Butler's attack on psychological egoism are very thorough and well-written and could be most helpful to a student doing a paper on one of those topics. Also, chapter nine provides a clear introduction to Nietzsche and Marx on the institution of morality. Finally, there is a useful annotated bibliography at the end of each chapter.

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Elliott Sober

Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988.

Pp. xiii + 265.

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-69144-2).

Suppose two scientific hypotheses equally account for the phenomena at hand. The principle of parsimony tells us to choose the simpler of the two. The familiar philosophical refrain is that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. But what is the justification for this principle? According to such philosophers as Quine, Goodman, and Popper, the preference for simplicity is purely methodological. Its justification lies in logic and math, not assumptions about the empirical world. Sober, however, thinks otherwise. The justification of any inductive inference, including the principle of parsimony, cannot be purely methodological. Substantive assumptions about the empirical world must come into play. Sober's target is not merely philosophers' use of simplicity, but also their use of the principle of common cause. In addition, he conducts a full analysis of the use of parsimony in biological classification. The end product is a careful examination of parsimony that brings insights to both philosophy and biology.

Chapter 1 introduces the use of parsimony in biology (more on that shortly). Chapter 2 takes up the philosophical problem of simplicity. Various philosophical justifications of the principle, from Newton to Goodman, are surveyed. Sober describes how ontological justifications have given way to purely methodological ones. It is these more recent *a priori* justifications that Sober wants to blunt. His line of reasoning is far-reaching. Our employment of simplicity is an instance of inductive inference (specifically, a type of confirmation). All instances of induction, according to Sober, must involve three elements: observation, hypothesis, and empirical background assumptions. Consider the hypothesis that all ravens are black and the observation of one black raven. With Hempel, we tend to think that this observation confirms the hypothesis. But Sober argues that it all depends on our empirical background assumptions. Suppose we believe the following empirical background assumption (originally from I.J. Good): either there are lots of ravens, of which 99% are black, or there are very few ravens, of which 100% are black. Given this assumption, the more black ravens we observe, the less confidence we should have in the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Sober concludes, '[a] set of observations confirms, disconfirms, or is irrelevant to a hypothesis only relative to a set of empirical background assumptions' (59). Moreover, '[t]he fact that confirmation is a three-place relation tells us that simplicity cannot be 'purely methodological' (60).

Chapter 3 focuses on Hans Reichenbach and Wesley Salmon's principle of common cause. That principle instructs us to posit a common cause whenever two or more events occur more frequently together than is expected if they occurred independently. Just as Ockham's Razor tells us not to multiply

entities beyond necessity, the principle of common cause tells us to posit single rather than multiple causes. Again, according to Sober, it all depends on one's empirical background assumptions. The perfect anti-correlation of particles implied by the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen thought experiment should by the principle of common cause indicate the existence of an underlying common cause. But Bell's Inequality Theorem shows that according to the appropriate empirical background theory, namely quantum physics, there is no common cause. Consequently, one is wrong to assume *a priori* that the principle of common cause applies universally. Moreover, when the principle does apply is determined by consulting local empirical assumptions.

Chapters 1 and 4 illustrate the empirical assumptions that come into play when biological taxonomists use parsimony. One task of biology is to construct a classification that reflects the evolutionary tree of life. Parsimony allegedly helps in that construction. In particular, some biologists claim that '[t]he most plausible estimate of the evolutionary tree is that which invokes the minimum net amount of evolution' (115). An *a priori* justification for this use of parsimony is given by invoking Popper's notion of falsifiability. Among competing phylogenetic hypotheses, these biologists argue, the least falsified one is the most parsimonious one. Sober, however, is quick to point out this is not an instance of the Popperian doctrine. For the biologists in question, the least falsified hypothesis is retained; where for Popper, the least falsified hypothesis should be rejected because it is false. The justification for using parsimony in biological classification must come from other quarters. Sober suggests that this use of parsimony turns on certain empirical assumptions, namely whether evolutionary change is improbable, whether it is uniform, and so on. Chapter 6 is an exploration of what empirical assumptions would make parsimony a correct principle for constructing biological classifications.

Chapter 5 is my favorite of the book. According to the principle of statistical convergence (or consistency), an inference procedure should pick the true hypothesis as the corresponding data set is made larger without limit. Sober, on the other hand, contends that acceptable inference procedures need not be statistically convergent. An inference procedure may be perfectly good though the evidence we apply it to is misleading. For example, suppose Descartes' evil demon exists. We don't know that and assign an extremely low probability to his existence. A perfectly good inference procedure would be to believe most of our sensory experiences even though this procedure is not statistically convergent. Sober's argument here is philosophy at its best: a persuasive argument that causes the reader to give up deep-rooted intuitions. Sober's arguments against the *a priori* justification of parsimony and the principle of common cause achieve the same effect. I highly recommend this book. I am not the only one. *Reconstructing the Past* was awarded the 1991 Lakatos Award for best work in the philosophy of science.

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Richard Swinburne

Revelation.

Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. Pp. 236.

US \$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-823969-6);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-823968-8).

Suppose that 'revelation' is a propositional truth or set of truths revealed at God's behest and by means apart from the usual course of nature. What reason might anyone have for supposing that he/she is faced with an instance of revelation?

Richard Swinburne's answer is that you should look for two things: (1) 'internal' indicators in the message's content, such as being vital to deep human needs and (so far as we can tell) true; and (2) 'external' indicators of something like a divine 'signature' — specifically, evidence of a miraculous origin. This book contains, of course, much elaboration of both question and answer, and considerable supporting argument. But beyond this analytic enterprise is an apologetic one. Swinburne attempts to show that Christianity, and Christianity alone, can plausibly be argued to possess a true revelation.

Swinburne introduces his analytic task by assembling a sophisticated apparatus for describing the host of ways in which a message may be conveyed, and for discerning the message behind the method. From the nuts and bolts of 'sentence', 'statement' and 'proposition' he moves through more elaborate notions of 'presupposition', 'analogy' and 'metaphor', to the concept of 'genre' and the centrality of 'context'. In all this he draws upon and contributes to current discussions in philosophy of language. Clearly, the point of this exercise is to allow him to deal with candidates for the status of 'revelation' such as the Bible, which are complex documents of various times and cultures and plainly (in Swinburne's view) in need of subtle interpretation.

With these tools in hand for getting at the message, Swinburne proceeds to argue that given the existence of God (for which he has argued elsewhere) there are good *a priori* grounds for expecting divine revelation. At the same time there are good reasons for anticipating that a way will be given for maintaining and interpreting the revelation, but also that status and content of revelation will never be irresistibly evident.

What makes 'deep' and true content, and miraculous provenance, the (mistakable) marks of revelation? Well, messages concerning the necessities of human well-being at the deepest level are the sort of thing we would expect to receive from God as traditionally understood. And the source in some non-repeatable exception to the laws of nature is needed as a kind of parallel to a signature; a sign no one other than the author could have provided, and provided in order to authenticate. This is where Swinburne's remarkable contention emerges that only Christianity merits serious consideration as a *revealed* religion. His claim is that other faiths make either no claim, or a less patent claim than Christianity — with its appeal to founding miracles,

especially the Resurrection — to miraculous authentication of their central messages as revelation.

The remainder (more than half) of the book is devoted to considering the core Christian message in the light of all this. The 'original revelation' is said to be the words and actions of Jesus. A canonical text reflecting these, and complex means for interpretation, are developed by the Church, the latter recognizable by its continuity in doctrine and organization with the earliest Christian community. Anyone appraising the Christian claim to revelation will need to weight the evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus — the alleged authenticating miracle — and to make a judgement about the probable truth of the purported revelation.

To determine what the alleged revelation is, however, it is necessary to determine which present-day body or bodies should be regarded as (part of) the true Church. The role of the Church is crucial in identifying the content of the message, for Swinburne infers from his introductory arguments concerning meaning, especially the importance of genre and context, that the meaning of the Bible is not to be determined by locating the original meaning of its component parts, however those are specified and however their original sense is arrived at. Its meaning is determined by what the Church took it to mean in giving it canonical status, and what the Church has unfolded from there by way of further interpretation. Indeed what forms the basis of doctrine is not just scripture, but scripture with a particular tradition of interpretation. Thus a non-literal interpretation of many passages, including many that are historically or morally troubling *prima facie*, is not only permitted but required by the standing tradition of the Church.

Swinburne's approach is, as usual, painstaking and perspicuous; his style typically spare. (The style includes what some will consider a perverse insistence on using 'man' and 'men' as representing humanity in general.) Arguments are assembled brick by brick, and there is detailed consideration not only of philosophical underpinnings but of the history of Biblical interpretation. Dissenters from Swinburne's position — whether outright sceptics or objectors in detail — will find it easy to identify their differences. Swinburne is clear, for instance, that he intends to deal only with 'propositional' revelation. But there is a nagging worry throughout that he identifies revelation more completely than he needs to with specific token utterances, especially when he considers with evident sympathy the claim that God might be considered in some strong sense the author of the Bible. Swinburne's account of the content of revelation depends heavily on a distinction between message and pre-supposition which not everyone will find as easy to draw as he does. Swinburne's view that what texts mean is determined by the message of the Bible as a whole, and that message is determined by what the Church takes it to mean, leaves one wondering what he would do with the suggestion, made on textual grounds by reputable New Testament scholars, that Jesus never intended to found a Church or sacraments. And his contention that Christianity alone has a

plausible claim to revelation will simply cause some to question his tests for revelation.

But this is a sophisticated discussion of a fundamental concept in philosophical theology. Others considering the subject will disagree with Swinburne, but they will not be able to ignore him.

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Lectures on Linear Logic.

CSLI Lecture Notes No. 29, Center for the Study of Language and Information 1992.

Pp. ix + 200.

US \$45.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-937073-78-4);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-937073-77-6).

Linear logic, the invention of Jean-Yves Girard, is a 'resource-conscious' logic in which the formulas represent types of resource, and resources cannot be used *ad libitum*. It can be thought of as a logic of actions, where classical logic is a logic of truth. It seems to have some promise as a way of representing and understanding parallel computations.

In classical logic, the lack of consciousness of resources manifests itself in the fact that an assumption in a proof, once introduced, can be re-used indefinitely many times. In proof-theoretical terms, this corresponds to Gentzen's structural rule of contraction. In linear logic, assumptions can be re-ordered freely, but not re-used indefinitely; one may think of assumptions as resources that once used are destroyed or unavailable.

If we start from a sequent system for classical logic in the style of Gentzen with introduction and elimination rules for each connective and omit the rule of contraction, the result is an interesting and important subsystem of linear logic. Conjunction and disjunction bifurcate into four different connectives. Conjunction, for example, becomes two connectives, a parallel conjunction and an additive conjunction. A similar phenomenon occurs in relevant logics, where 'and' comes in both intensional and extensional flavours. Girard distinguishes between 'multiplicative' and 'additive' operators; this corresponds roughly to the distinction drawn by Anderson and Belnap between 'intensional' and 'extensional' operators. The resulting calculus is elegant and possesses many appealing symmetries. For a reader familiar with

relevant logics, it can be described as the result of omitting contraction and distribution from the logic **R** of relevant implication.

The omission of the contraction rule, though, results in a logic lacking in sufficient expressive power. In compensation, Girard introduced special connectives restoring the possibility of re-use of resources. These operators, somewhat resembling modal operators in their behaviour, are one-place sentence operators $!A$ and $?A$. The formula $!A$, read as 'store A ', is a formula allowing the indefinite re-use of the assumption A ; the operator $?A$ is the dual of $!A$. The addition of these two connectives, called 'exponentials' by Girard, results in a richly expressive logic in which both classical and intuitionistic logic can be exactly embedded.

Troelstra's lectures, written in the lucid style familiar from his earlier books and papers, is the best available introduction to the rapidly expanding field of resource-conscious logics. In the first part of the book, Troelstra introduces the basic sequent calculus for linear logic, gives some elementary syntactic results, including cut elimination, then proves the embedding results for classical and intuitionistic logic mentioned above. Accounts of natural deduction systems and Hilbert-style axiomatic systems follow.

The second part of the book is devoted to semantical interpretations of the system and of its computational aspects. Troelstra begins with algebraic semantics; linear logic is complete with respect to certain algebraic models defined on complete lattices. There follows a chapter describing the close connection with certain categories. Next Troelstra explains what are perhaps the most interesting of the models for linear logic, the type-theoretic models he calls 'Girard domains'. Here propositions are interpreted as 'webs', sets with a reflexive symmetric relation representing compatibility between atomic bits of information. The connectives are certain natural operations on these webs; the approach is closely related to the Scott domains used in denotational semantics of programming languages.

The great interest aroused by linear logic is in part due to its apparent promise as a tool for analysing computations. Troelstra devotes four chapters to computational aspects of the formalism. The 'propositions as types' idea, due to Curry and Howard, provides the link to computation. Following this idea, we can think of an implication $A \rightarrow B$ (for example) as a set of constructions, each of which maps a construction in A into a construction in B . A proof of a logically valid formula will then be a closed term in a certain language of functions. Troelstra discusses the evaluation of terms in this language, also a kind of abstract machine in which the details of this evaluation can be implemented.

The book concludes with some proof-theoretical material. Proof-nets, a way of analysing proofs in linear logic in terms of paths through the derivations, are described. A short and elegant proof of the undecidability of propositional linear logic is given; a clever coding is used to mimic the actions of an abstract computer in the derivations of linear logic. The last chapter, written by Dirk Roorda, is a proof of strong normalization for linear logic.

Linear logic since its first publication by Girard in 1987 has aroused a considerable degree of enthusiasm among many logicians and category theorists. The response among computer scientists has been mixed. Many European computer scientists have embraced it with fervour, but the research community in North America has not shown comparable enthusiasm, with the exception of people strongly influenced by category-theoretical methods. The literature on the subject is already diverse and expanding rapidly. Troelstra's monograph is clearly written and an ideal introduction to the field for logicians, philosophers or computer scientists anxious to know what all the fuss is about.

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