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Theodor Adorno

Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music.

trans. Rodney Livingstone.

London and New York: Verso 1992. Pp. 336.

US \$29.95 (ISBN 0-86091-360-0)

As the volume of Adorno's writings in English translation increases, the more difficult it becomes to read him. He may well come to demand a re-reading; (first and foremost from the jazz enthusiasts). Though numerous aids to understanding Adorno have long been available to English speaking readers in the short-circuiting form of poor translations, Rodney Livingstone's adroit and, on occasion, eloquent transposing of Adorno's justly infamous prose properly impedes any rash attempt to actually hold it fast. *Quasi una Fantasia* is, now in English, the demand for a new, improvisatory interpretation.

Quasi una Fantasia originally appeared in German in 1963. It is the second of what would become three collections of Adorno's shorter works on music. The other two collections, *Klangfiguren* and the posthumous *Musikalische Schriften* have not been translated, though Adorno's three monographs on individual composers are now, as they say, available in English: *Alban Berg: Master of the Smallest Link* (1991), *Mahler: A Musical Physiology* (1992), and Livingstone's own 1981 translation of Adorno's *Versuch über Wagner*, unfortunately titled *In Search of Wagner*. Adorno seems to have regarded his 1948 book, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* as the central text of his musical writings (he also considered it an excursus to *Dialectic of Enlightenment*). But as fate of course has it, the translation of *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (improbably configured as *Philosophy of Modern Music*), is more or less abysmal. However, since Adorno construed the three collections on music as consisting of 'reflections' upon the 1948 book (and indeed this later collection contains contributions on each of the two composers, Schoenberg and Stravinsky, who are the subject of the earlier book), *Quasi una Fantasia* may be poised as that which might well rescue the earlier, pivotal text. This of course possible only in English.

Adorno's book, despite its wholly fabricated English subtitle, does not consist of essays in modern music. (More than half of the 14 pieces in this collection began as lectures or radio talks; and the texts of three of these talks were unpublished before their publication in *Quasi una Fantasia*.) The composition of *Quasi una Fantasia* instead obeys the imperative of its title, the key to which is perhaps to be found in the writings collected therein under the name 'Motifs' (which consists of some three or four dozen aphorisms selected by Adorno from his journalism music criticism, published between 1927 and 1951): 'Whereas Beethoven takes the cadenza, the last vestige of the freedom to improvise, and subjects it to the composer's subjective intentions, freedom nowadays is strictly required of the interpreter in order to soften the strictness of the interpretation which is specified by the freedom of the composition' (9). Beethoven's two sonatas (op.27) are titled *quasi una fantasia*. So too therefore is the first, and introductory, piece in the collection

not an essay but a fragment on the relation between music and language. Music comes to resemble language only by distancing itself from it, especially its intentionality and conceptuality: 'To interpret language means: to understand language. To interpret music means: to make music' (3). The imperative of Adorno's title, like making rather than reproducing, is a mythic attempt — by strictly following the prescribed freedom of Beethoven's composition (to say nothing of mimicking it literally) — to liberate itself from the spell of music precisely by subjecting itself to it. *Quasi una Fantasia* is a collection of subjections to music that reverberate in linguistic interpretations whose shape obeys rhythm and dissonance, counterpoint and the sound of the drum: 'Is the drum the successor of human sacrifice or does it still sound the command to kill? In our music it resounds as an archaic survival. It is the legacy of violence in art, the violence which lies at the base of all art's order. While as a spiritualized activity art strips violence of its power, it continues to practice it' (34).

Livingstone's translation doesn't always appreciate the dialectical nuances of subjection and determination. He renders the title of the essay *Musikalische Warenanalysen* as 'Commodity Music Analysed' (rather than 'Musical Commodity-Analysis'), which is to suggest that certain musical forms are already reified commodities waiting to be analyzed by the music critic. (It is difficult to sustain such a static, consistent notion of commodity music in the midst of an essay that respects no distinction whatsoever between Guy Lombardo's 'Penny Serenade' and Rachmaninov's Prelude in C-sharp minor.) This is to ignore in Adorno's title the contrary suggestion that it is the music itself, via a subjection to it, that performs its own (and thereby also enables) interpretation. Indeed, it may well be that it is thanks to the very commodification of music that the best performance of a critical analysis of that same music is possible, as in Adorno's evocation here of the knowledge and self-realization afforded by kitsch: 'The positive element of kitsch lies in the fact that it sets free for a moment the glimmering realization that you have wasted your life' (50). This explains the distaste, or perhaps more so, the taste for kitsch.

Adorno's essay on Bizet's opera *Carmen*, entitled '*Fantasia sopra Carmen*', reveals that the subjective register in which music impresses itself is anything but personal and idiosyncratic. That register is instead, just as it is in the tradition of Schiller's aesthetics, the place where nature and freedom, those most ideally objective of all things, are to be configured. And this most subjective figuration of what ought to be most objective is likewise revealing of the function of the music that performs, and thereby delivers the figuration: 'Carmen's fatalism, this gesture of alienation, the sacrifice of every assertion of the right to dominate, is one of those figures of reconciliation which have been vouchsafed to humanity. It is a promise of finite liberty. The prohibition on transcendence destroys the illusion that nature is anything more than mortal. This is the precise function of music in *Carmen*' (63). In short, *Carmen*, this most cultural of cultural goods, negates the founding premise of culture: its ability to transcend the mortal facticity of the every-

day. *Carmen*, if we're lucky, rescues us from the ideology of culture, from that which promises to save us.

The middle third of the book consists of four pieces on composers: Mahler, Zemlinsky, Schreker, and the aforementioned Stravinsky. As to the Mahler piece — or more correctly: pieces, since Adorno notes in his preface to the second German edition (1963) of the Mahler book that *Quasi una Fantasia* contains two texts on Mahler: one a memorial address delivered in 1960 (which was formulated after the completion of the Mahler book), and the other entitled '*Epilegomena*' (translated here as 'Afterthoughts'), both of which he offers as 'additional and complementary material to the book.' The two Mahler texts here are thus in substance distinct enough from the monograph to have induced Adorno not to include them in subsequent editions of the monograph. 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait' is a profound reflection on both his music and Adorno's earlier extensive critique of it. The dialectic herein registers at once both the objective nature of Adorno's prior criticism and the historically transient nature of musical form: 'If dissonance was once the expression of subjective suffering, its painful aspect now becomes the mark of social compulsion' (157).

The penultimate piece in the collection, 'Music and New Music', explains what Adorno means by that term; the final essay, '*Vers une musique informelle*', is a manifesto for the sound of music. In general, or rather particularly, a book for listening.

Thomas Huhn
New York City

Giorgio Agamben

The Coming Community.

trans. Michael Hardt.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

1993. Pp. vii + 108.

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-2235-3).

Agamben's slim tome is a curious blend of messianism and neo-Marxism served up as a lyrical ontology. Citing a welter of philosophical and literary sources, including Russell's paradoxes in set theory and Aristotle's discussion of synonyms and homonyms in the *Metaphysics*, Agamben redefines the human being as a singularity freed from the constraints of identity imposed by concepts. *Caveat lector*: Agamben's is an utopian project; salvation (in a quasi-religious sense) lies in the appropriation of our linguistic and singular being. Agamben believes that humanity can emerge whole from the ubiquitous triumph of the petty bourgeoisie and the reign of the commodity form

(Debord's spectacle) by seizing the opportunities now available in capitalist societies in order to subvert them. He envisages 'a community with neither presuppositions nor a State, where the nullifying and determining power of what is common will be pacified and where the Shekinah will have stopped sucking the milk of its own separation' (83).

From an advertisement for Dim stockings to the protests in Tiananmen Square, Agamben can already glimpse singularities which are 'radically devoid of any representable identity' (86). Singular being is 'whatever being...(*quodlibet ens...*)', where *quodlibet ens* is 'being such that it always matters' (1). Modelled after the example, it is 'one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for all' (10). Like the example, it is linguistic in character. It is defined by the property of being-called — the only property which calls all properties into question and it cannot, therefore, be subsumed under universal concepts which would constitute an identity.

Although 'there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize ... [t]here is in effect something that humans are and have to be ... : *It is the simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality*' (43). Agamben calls on humanity to define itself solely in relation to the totality of its possibilities (of being called whatever) or to what he terms the 'idea' (68). The idea is not definable. It is 'only expressed by means of the anaphora *autò*: the idea of a thing is the thing *itself*'. The relation to the idea draws singular being towards the name. The singular human would be 'that which, holding itself in simple homonymy, in pure being-called, is precisely and only for this reason unnameable: the being-in-language of the non-linguistic' (76).

I have quoted Agamben extensively here because his ideas are very difficult to paraphrase and many are obscure. Moreover, as I read his work, I had to wonder whether Agamben is a genuine visionary or merely cashing in on the latest philosophical fads. In either case, he raises the issue of community which has, for good reason, become central in diverse areas in contemporary philosophy. Following thinkers like Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, he also alludes to the problems which plague identity-thinking. But Agamben is bound to disappoint the more practically-minded reader. He confines himself to an evocation of a community without identity, making poetic use of imagery from numerous sacred texts including the Talmud, and even from advertising, without ever confronting the practical concerns his account raises.

Even as humanity moves towards its own destruction, there are, according to Agamben, opportunities which it 'must at all costs not let slip away'. In a one-sentence manifesto he writes: 'Selecting in the new planetary humanity those characteristics that allow for its survival, removing the thin diaphragm that separates bad mediatized advertising from the perfect exteriority that communicates only itself — this is the political task of our generation' (65). There is no necessity in the coming of a community of singularities without

identity; the task of forming it devolves upon singularity as the 'principle enemy' (87) of the state.

The peaceful protest by students, workers, and intellectuals in Tiananmen Square in 1989 symbolises the 'politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being red, being Italian, being Communist) ... but by belonging itself'. According to Agamben, the Chinese government's reaction to the protest took such a violent form because the protesters refused to be subsumed under an identity and no state could ever accept 'that the singularities form a community without any identity' (86). The 'coming' politics — which, it would seem, is already here — will be '*an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization*' (85).

Agamben's reading of the events in Beijing is, of course, highly contentious. He dismisses demands for freedom of assembly, free speech, and the democratisation of state institutions by characterising them as 'generic and broadly defined'. They were not 'the real object of the conflict' (85). Agamben implies here that he knows better than the protesters themselves what their demands really signified. Furthermore, the nature of his 'coming politics' remains unclear. If the students, workers, and intellectuals in Tiananmen Square are supposed to symbolise the stand of singularities without identities against the state, how, precisely, did they do so? Agamben never answers this or any other concrete political question. He seems to believe (to parody Heidegger) that only an ontology can save us now.

While recognising that people are alienated from their 'species being' — defined as their 'vital dwelling in language' — Agamben makes the further claim that 'the era in which we live is also that in which for the first time it is possible for human beings to experience their own linguistic being' (83). Apart from his problematic reference to Tiananmen, however, Agamben provides no evidence for this belief. Yet the most vexing problem with his redemptive *ethos* is the notion of the coming community itself. How might our vital dwelling in language provide the basis for the solidarity necessary for community? If '[w]hatever singularities cannot form a *societas* because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging to seek recognition', what are we to make of humans co-belonging 'without any representable condition of belonging' (85)? In the end, Agamben leaves the reader with more questions than answers. Although he writes beautifully and his work merits some study, those who are interested in the issues connected with communitarianism would be well advised to consult more prosaic sources.

Deborah Cook

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Seyla Benhabib

Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1992.

US \$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90546-X);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90547-8).

Seyla Benhabib is one of the leading figures in contemporary critical theory, particularly in its incarnation in Habermas' discourse theory. Her new book, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, consists of previously published essays that have been revised for this collection. Her goal in this book is to bring discourse ethics, with explicit roots in modernity, in direct dialogue with communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists, who have profoundly challenged the legacy of modernity, with its ideals of universality, the moral autonomy of the individual, impartial principles of justice, and democratic participation. She notes in her introduction that although many Western European and American intellectuals now consider these political ideals suspect, Eastern European intellectuals are turning to these ideals as the only viable alternative to the repressive systems many of them have experienced. Benhabib's agenda in this collection is to raise the question: what is alive and what is dead in the inheritance of modernity? Her answer is that it is necessary to defend much of this inheritance, although one must rethink aspects of it in the face of critics, charges that the ideals of modernity have operated by means of exclusion, repression, and violence. Benhabib wants to formulate a post-Enlightenment defense of universality in the face of the critiques raised by communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists. She argues that postmodernists ultimately rely on the very values of autonomy and rationality that they otherwise so blithely dismiss. This modernist inheritance, she argues is the precondition for the values of diversity, heterogeneity and otherness that postmodernists propound — but, 'as sons of the French revolution, they have enjoyed the privileges of the modern to the point of growing blasé vis à vis them' (16).

In her attempt to defend what is living in the project of modernity, she calls for a form of universality that is interactive, contextually sensitive, and inclusive of gender. Such a project entails saying a final farewell to some of the metaphysical illusions of the Enlightenment, including the 'illusions of a self-transparent and self-grounding reason, the illusion of a disembodied and disembodied subject, and the illusion of having found an Archimedean standpoint, situated beyond historical and cultural contingency' (4). Benhabib argues that a post-Enlightenment conception of universality can be defended along the lines of the Habermasian model of discourse ethics, where truth is located in the 'discourse of the community of inquirers' (5). Thus, truth-claims are historical and revisable, and are no longer considered to be rooted in the unchanging features of human consciousness, as Kant claimed. Benhabib departs slightly from Habermas in stating that moral conversation need not necessarily reach 'consensus', but rather strives to reach an 'agree-

ment' or understanding. When parties cannot reach an agreement (e.g., in the conflict between abortion rights defenders and Operation Rescue activists), it is the meta-norms of communicative ethics that must be overriding. But Benhabib's discussion is not primarily concerned with concrete instances of moral conflict, such as the abortion debate, where the issue of how to interpret universal moral respect is contested. Rather than pursuing empirical instances of moral conversations, she is concerned with how to defend the procedures of rationality and universality.

The value of universality in modernity has been one of the key targets of attack from both feminist and postmodernist quarters. Many feminists argue that it is Western philosophers' commitment to universality that has justified its masculinist bias. Although philosophers from Plato to Kant have argued for universal concepts of truth and morality, they have also viewed women as incapable of fully rational or moral existence. Therefore, many feminists have argued that 'universality' is no defense of human dignity and autonomy, but is rather an ideological mechanism of exclusion that justifies the perspective of those in power. Theorists loosely grouped in American debates under the rubric of postmodernism likewise argue against universality, creating some grounds for alliance between feminists and postmodernists. Postmodernists like Derrida and Foucault argue that the very concept of universal rationality depends on the exclusion of an other, defined as non-rational.

Benhabib carries on a dialogue with these positions, and in this intellectual context her defense of universality may seem anachronistic. But her motivation stems from her concern with what she sees as the insurmountable problems of a 'strong' postmodern position, and the dangers it holds for feminism. For example, if the resistance invoked by Foucault is not merely individualistic and done for its own sake, one must ask what norms and alternatives motivate and operate in social change? The absence of a satisfactory answer to this question in postmodernist debates feeds Benhabib's insistence, drawn from critical theory, that there be universally valid norms (based on the community of speakers), and that there be a utopian aspiration in philosophy. But although she seeks to historicize the content of universality, her fundamental frame of reference — including her insistence on universal forms of rationality, morality, and impartial notions of justice — retain the basic features of the Enlightenment project. Benhabib, like Habermas, fundamentally rejects the Nietzschean challenge to the Enlightenment, which has motivated the postmodern turn in philosophy. According to Nietzsche, the notion of impartial rationality is itself an anti-human pretense that aims to sever human intellection from individuals' perspectives, interests, and desires.

Benhabib's collection makes a significant contribution to contemporary moral theory. Her reformulation of Habermas' discourse ethics is based on the notion that the subjects of philosophy are concrete, embodied beings, not disembodied, disembedded subjects, as in Kant's and Rawls' theories. As she notes, 'subjects' are children before they become adults, who are born into particular cultural practices of nurturing, education, and gender differentia-

tion. Thus, the moral conversations she envisions take place as an ongoing process amongst actual individuals. Moreover, vis à vis contemporary post-modern debates about the death of the subject, she takes a clear position in defense of the notion of an autonomous, situated subject who is the author of her/his life. In contemporary feminist debates, she thus sides with a writer like Rosi Braidotti, who argues for the historical necessity of women affirming their subjectivity and articulating their experiences, as opposed to postmodern feminists like Joan Scott and Judith Butler, who argue for the dissolution of the subject, of the category of women, of the illusions of autonomy, and for a rejection of any utopian vision that is freed of power relations.

Despite Benhabib's attempt to reformulate a view of rationality and universality that is freed of the metaphysical commitments of the Enlightenment, in fundamental respects she remains within the Kantian commitments that typify Enlightenment philosophy. Although she claims that the ethical cognitivism she advocates, unlike ethical rationalism, is broad enough to encompass the role of emotion and embodiment in moral life, she does not explore the significance of emotion and embodiment in depth. Her concern with theorizing, as opposed to concrete analysis (evident in her reluctance to situate her own self as a concrete individual in her writing) reflects her concern with proceduralism in the public sphere, and her primary interest in concepts of universality and impartiality. Thus, her method of analysis maintains the formalist commitments of Enlightenment philosophy, that may itself reflect the gendered history of Western philosophy.

In my view, her insistence that *the* task of social theory is to develop universalistic normative theory is also problematic, along with her view that feminism is essentially a normative theory. The view that feminism must be normative is based on the interpretation of feminism as a movement for 'women's emancipation'. But critics influenced by postmodernism point out that the very category of 'women' might be problematic. Many women, e.g., African-American women, and lesbian women, have not been able to recognize themselves in the prevailing definition of 'women', and thus it functions as a normative and exclusionary category. Moreover, postmodernists point out that the very notion of emancipation is an Enlightenment legacy that naively assumes it is possible to be freed of power relations. Thus, Benhabib's advocacy of normative theory will find supporters amongst Habermasians, and liberal theorists, including liberal feminists. She will find her critics amongst postmodernists, postmodern feminists, as well as feminists who stress the multiplicity and diversity of women's experiences. For even feminists who reject a strong postmodern position are very critical of universalistic categories. Although one might well argue for the need for some historically-based standards of judgement and action, this position is far from claiming that norms should be universal within a 'community of speakers'. Not only must one ask who is excluded from certain definitions and operations of a given 'community of speakers', but even within 'sub-communities' there are radically divergent views. (Witness the debate about sado-masochism and pornography amongst lesbian women.) Benhabib's reformulation

of universality indicates that she sympathizes more deeply with the defenders of modernity than with its critics. But her book will be useful for scholars and graduate students interested in the important dialogue that has recently emerged between critical theory and postmodernism, and in the consequences of these theories for feminism.

Robin Schott

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Arnold Berleant

The Aesthetics of Environment.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.

Pp. xv + 218.

US \$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-993-7).

In this work Berleant develops a new aesthetics of the environment by challenging three groups: philosophers, planners and designers, and the general audience. His challenge to philosophers starts with the critique of Western aesthetics widely accepted since the eighteenth century. This tradition characterizes aesthetic experience as a 'disinterested' and 'contemplative' attitude toward an 'object'. As a result, the sense of vision is frequently singled out as a vehicle for aesthetic experience, as well as institutional settings such as museums, concert halls, and theaters which provide occasions for detached contemplation.

However, as Berleant point out, the environment is neither an object of passive and detached contemplation, nor is it separate from us. Rather, we are always continuous with and engaged with some environment in a reciprocal and integrative manner, whether it be a street corner or an industrial complex. Berleant's new environmental aesthetics therefore describes our aesthetic appreciation of the environment as an experience, whether rewarding or disappointing, that is lived with our whole body and directed toward any environment. Such an experience does not involve any felt distinction between subject and object, discrimination among different senses, or isolation of pure sense experience from various associations.

The most intriguing, and I believe debatable, aspect of Berleant's discussion is his further claim that this new environmental aesthetic should serve as the model for aesthetics in general, including our experience of art. He points out the similarity between the environment and art by reminding us that the aesthetic appreciation of both requires perceptual, as well as participatory, experience. The similarities are most convincing between the built environment and those art media which create the environment — notably architecture, landscape gardens, and more recently, earthworks and environmental art.

However, by emphasizing the similarities, I believe that Berleant de-emphasizes some important differences between art and the environment, nature in particular. First, contrary to Berleant's claim (162), the art object does dictate a certain conceptual, as well as physical, boundary for the constitution of an aesthetic object for our appreciation. For example, if we are appreciating a Rembrandt painting, we appropriately ignore cracks or our shadow on its surface (because it is not an antique or op art), its relationship to the wall paper, the sound of whisper among other viewers, or the chilling air from the air-conditioning duct. We exclude these factors, though they are fully present within our perceptual field, because of our art historical knowledge and conventional agreement. However, all of these factors become integral parts of our environmental appreciation of this particular space because we lack the equivalent considerations to limit our attention.

Second, appreciating art frequently involves our admiring (or deploring) its skill, ingenuity, originality, and insightfulness, as well as enquiring about its intended meaning. On the other hand, such considerations may not even occur to us in appreciating the natural environment. Instead, we may marvel at the regularity and order exhibited in nature precisely because we believe that they result from spontaneous activities or accidents rather than from intentional design. The knowledge whether something is art or nature is important in our aesthetic experience, not merely because it classifies the object, but because it engages us with the object in different ways and determines the content of our experience.

Berleant's new environmental aesthetics is a challenge not only to the philosophers but also to the practitioners of environment-making. With rich illustrations and freedom from technical jargon, Berleant applies his new aesthetics to analyzing and solving the practical problems concerning various environmental designs of today. According to him, much of what plagues today's environmental design stems from the designers' preoccupation with producing certain 'objects', often utilitarian in nature, rather than providing rewarding, humane, or educational experiences for us. The result is user-unfriendly urban spaces where we feel alienated, or art museums which display objects without sufficient regard to the viewers' aesthetic and educational experience. He thus encourages environmental designers to always focus on our aesthetic experience, while urging them not to confuse this aesthetic mission with various face-lifting measures or imposition of rigid plans, irrespective of the site's unique sense of place. He even challenges future designers of outer space to develop a design specific to its own limitations and potential as well as its users' needs, instead of merely transplanting earth-bound designs.

Last but not least, Berleant invites all readers to experience and appreciate the environment with one's whole body, by developing a keen awareness of and sensitivity toward its every aspect. He illustrates the content of such an appreciation by phenomenological descriptions and analyses of his own experiences with different environments. Through these descriptions, which are themselves aesthetically written, Berleant shows firsthand how to liberate

ourselves from the monopoly of vision and disinterested contemplation in our aesthetic experience, and to restore the participatory and integrative stance toward our environment.

Perhaps the most provocative aspects of Berleant's aesthetic challenge are its ethical justifications. He is concerned with the negative consequences of uglifying our environment. The aesthetic aspects of the environment profoundly affect the psychological, social, and political dimensions of our lives. These encompass affection toward the community, communication and relationship among dwellers, fulfillment of aspirations, and the individual sense of well-being. A humane environment which satisfies our aesthetic needs ultimately empowers us toward human accomplishments and a flourishing civilization. In short, in the humane environment 'the moral and the aesthetic join together' (80).

In addition to this utilitarian argument, Berleant seems to suggest that we have an ethical responsibility to commit to this new environmental aesthetic. Engaging thoroughly with the environment makes us become aware of, and sensitive to, our continuity and integral relationship with it. Furthermore, while requiring our engagement, the aesthetic sensitivity to the environment also requires our surrender to whatever the environment offers us by not pre-determining a selective mode of perception (such as reliance on vision) or appreciation (such as dissociation from practical, functional or social considerations). This new aesthetic awareness helps us overcome the Cartesian and Baconian legacy of mind over nature, because we will no longer 'think it necessary to exercise ultimate control by objectifying and contemplating nature' (169). By developing a deep gratitude and humble attitude toward the environment, we will come to recognize the fact that our decisions regarding nature must be informed by our aesthetic experience, which in turn must be informed by various factors, one of which is ecological concern. Ultimately, Berleant seems to suggest (138) that our aesthetic criticism of the environment must depend upon our ethical judgment concerning the status of the environment.

While the human cost of an inhospitable, inhumane environment is relatively easy to illustrate, I believe that the relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical in this last sense needs more exploration. If I find exploitation of the natural environment to be aesthetically positive (perhaps because I believe it symbolizes human industriousness and progress, just as the early American settlers viewed the cultivated land), am I guilty of forming some inappropriate opinion? If so, is it because I am ethically misguided, or aesthetically insensitive? This relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical in the environment provides a fertile ground for further investigation in environmental aesthetics. I eagerly await the continuation of Berleant's project.

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On What We Know We Don't Know.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992.

Pp. vii + 232.

US \$41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-075397);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-075400).

This is a collection of nine of Bromberger's papers on explanation, theories, and linguistics. Seven of the nine papers, according to the collection, were previously published between 1962 and 1987. Four of those seven were published originally in the 1960s; they are: 'An Approach to Explanation', 'A Theory about the Theory of Theory and about the Theory of Theories', 'Why-Questions', and 'Questions'. The other three of those seven are: 'Science and the Forms of Ignorance' (1971), 'Rational Ignorance' (1987), and 'What We Don't Know When We Don't Know Why' (1987). The two concluding essays on linguistics are: 'Types and Tokens in Linguistics' and 'The Ontology of Phonology' (with Morris Halle). Bromberger contributes a short introduction interrelating the essays. Some of the essays overlap, and some show definite influence of the ordinary-language philosophy of the 1960s. The book lacks an index, but would have benefited at least from a subject index.

Bromberger interrelates his essays by the thesis that science seeks, as its defining goal, answers to questions that enable the overcoming of the intellectual difficulties it faces. Explanations express answers to the sorts of questions pertinent to science. The latter questions raise intellectual difficulties that Bromberger calls 'p-predicaments'. Roughly, 'a person is in a p-predicament with regard to a question *q* if there is *some* answer compatible with his knowledge and assumptions that that person cannot think of, cannot excogitate' (122; cf. 81). Bromberger notes that one can be in a p-predicament relative to questions to which one knows some correct answers. I might be in a p-predicament regarding, for instance, the question 'Why did my kitchen window break yesterday?' even if I know that the window broke because a baseball hit it. A p-predicament could still arise from my not being able to think of answers familiar, for instance, to physicists.

A p-predicament regarding a question is canceled by any direct answer compatible with one's knowledge and assumptions (122). Bromberger holds that 'a proposition is a *direct* answer to a question if, if true, it is a correct answer' (120). He also holds that 'nothing can cancel a question unless it is a direct answer to that question...', and that 'a question is canceled when one of its direct answers is confirmed' (121). Bromberger acknowledges that a question can be 'tentatively canceled' when one of its direct answers 'is shown to be probable or warranted'. It is unclear, however, what kind of 'confirmation' and what kind of 'warrant' Bromberger has in mind. This unclarity is a decisive obstacle to assessment of his account of explanation. It is also unclear what the *necessary* (rather than merely sufficient) conditions are for a direct answer and for cancellation of a question and a p-predicament. The

most accessible paper in the collection, 'Science and the Forms of Ignorance', is particularly unclear on these matters.

The quest for scientific explanation, according to Bromberger, is essentially the search for 'answers to questions that are unanswerable relative to prevailing beliefs and concepts' (82). He thus denies that the search for scientific explanation is a search for evidence that will decide which available answer is correct, and proposes instead that this search aims for 'the unthought-of'. This view about the quest for scientific explanation is provocative but puzzling and unconvincing. Much of the search for explanations in the natural sciences seems *not* to be a search for explanations in terms of new concepts. Explanations in terms of prevailing concepts often, indeed typically, serve the purposes of scientific explanation just fine. Conceptual novelty in science is advisable only when current conceptual resources fail to serve explanatory purposes; and that kind of failure seems atypical in the natural sciences. Conceptual expansions and revolutions do occur, of course, but they seem not to be the norm in scientific explanation. Bromberger's characterization of the search for scientific explanation applies, then, only to what we might call 'conceptually revisionary science'. That kind of science does not set the norm for what Thomas Kuhn has called 'normal science'. Science is not normally revolutionary or otherwise conceptually revisionary; nor does it aim to be.

Even if we had an adequate account of scientific explanations, or scientific answers to scientific questions, we would still need an account of when a scientific explanation is rationally acceptable. It would be a mistake to build a requirement of correctness into the conditions for a scientific explanation or for a rationally acceptable scientific explanation. Scientific explanations can be false, and the same holds for rationally acceptable scientific explanation. Truth is not a prerequisite for an acceptable scientific explanation, as the history of natural science amply illustrates. Truth is arguably part of the *goal* of scientific explanation, but acknowledged goals are not necessarily met by even the best-confirmed scientific explanations in circulation. The epistemological virtues of an explanatory theory can be unsurpassed, yet still fail to deliver a true theory: that is, a theory accurately representing how things really are, at least physically. A theory of scientific explanation, then, should be conjoined with a theory of scientific warrant, but should be fallibilist in a way allowing for false warranted scientific explanations.

A theory of scientific explanation representative of the actual natural sciences may have to depart from ordinary-language portrayals of explanation. At least, there is no obvious or *a priori* connection between ordinary-language portrayals of explanation and explanation in the natural sciences. In fact, Paul Churchland, in *A Neurocomputational Perspective* (MIT Press, 1989), chapter 10, has argued that the theoretically important factors for an account of explanatory understanding reside not at the level of propositions, but at the level of 'prototype activation'. It would have been useful for Bromberger to assess not only a position like Churchland's, but also general skepticism about reliance on ordinary-language considerations to illuminate

explanation in the natural sciences. Bromberger's collection can, nonetheless, benefit all readers interested in scientific explanation. It sheds light on what often occurs when one, in thoughtful ignorance, asks 'Why?'

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**Stephen H. Cutcliffe, Steven L. Goldman,
Manuel Medina and José Sanmartín**

New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues.

Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press 1992.

Pp. 223.

US \$36.50 (ISBN 0-934223-24-6).

This sixth volume in the series Research in Technology Studies also deals with issues related to the interactions between science, technology, and society. The fifteen essays herein are organized by the title: *New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues*. Each titular element is addressed by five scholars, with the total scholarship representing Columbia, Puerto Rico, Spain, and the United States.

Part 1: *New Worlds* is introduced by George Bugliarello, President of Brooklyn Polytechnic University. His point is that new worlds have been discovered with erupting new technologies bringing new issues to challenge us; but, we have not yet developed new philosophical perspectives that correspond to that reality. Guidance toward a desired future must focus on the human-to-machine proportion (*proportio*).

Albert Borgmann, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Montana, traces the rise of modern technology from its launching in the Middle Ages, through Modernism, Postmodernism, and into either a 'hypermodern' or 'metamodern' world. The former uses technology to achieve electronic hyper-reality, methodical universalism, and ambiguous individuality. The latter retains realism (via ecological movements, etc.), local pluralism (via natural and cultural particulars), and secure individuality (via communal, non-consumptive celebration).

Our present postmodern world is developing a 'culture of risk' according to Manuel Medina, co-founder of the Science and Technology Studies Center at the University of Barcelona. The societies of the First World should '...dominate technoscientific production in order to ensure that the latter matches the values embodied in the former.' Present risks (to environment, humanity, and meaning) result from assessment mechanisms imbedded in the technoscientific cosmovision.

José Sanmartín, Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Valencia, focuses on the above cosmovision. He examines four characteristics of industrial technology in the modern period: progress, technological imperative, technological determinism, and military application. In the post-modern world, 'synthetic technology' can mimic and replace nature, so the above four characteristics become more problematic. Against these, postmodern technologies should use diverse and renewable energy sources for decentralized and small-scale operations.

The final *New Worlds* essay is by Don Ihde, Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He illustrates that the dynamics of technological action are socially imbedded, by comparing the relative significance of Columbus' voyage with those of the Polynesians and the Chinese. He warns that as the acidity of modern technical culture dissolved the monoculture of the Middle Ages, now, postmodern technical pluriculture is dissolving monolithic ethnic cultures.

Part 2: *New Technologies* is introduced by Melvin Kranzberg, Professor Emeritus of the History of Technology at Georgia Institute of Technology. His central thought is that science and technology now dominate thought and action as did religion and the seasons. Many decry this, but — with few exceptions — technologically developed countries best promote fundamental human needs and rights. New technologies may even better fulfill human hopes.

Paul Durbin is a professor at the University of Delaware and at the Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia. Nietzschean, Marcusean, and Ellulean pessimism darken and deepen the beginning of his essay. After examining this abyss of prophesied nihilism, a ray of light is cast by looking at Dewey's work on wedding aesthetic and instrumental thought. The conclusion is that nihilism may win through new technologies, but not without struggle.

The debate concerning new technologies and development in Latin America is the subject of Margarite Peña, an undersecretary of education for the Colombian Ministry of Education. First World new technologies, according to some scholars, are bringing 'counterdevelopment' because the values of efficiency and the subordination of nature are impoverishing the populace, economically and culturally. Appropriate new technologies can bring 'development with siesta' in Latin America.

Richard Worthington, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, is also concerned about the quality of life concomitant with First World industrialism. He calls this 'globalization of production' through new technologies a form of imperialism. Additionally, faith in its resultant 'progress' is a superstition fostered by international economic policies, not by global societal concerns.

The last essay concerning *New Technologies* is by Steven Goldman, Professor in the Humanities at Lehigh University, who laments the lack of public representation in decisions about technological innovation. One reason is that such decisions are left to 'official' corporate or government agents;

another is that such decisions are perceived as automatic, Darwinian, or objective. However, these decisions are constitutive of a polis, and free people must have access to the innovative process of technology.

Part 3: *New Issues* is introduced by Elena Lugo, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Puerto Rico. She focuses us away from the general perspectives of Part 2 and toward several particular issues; made 'new' because of *New Worlds* and *New Technologies*. She calls for balanced value commitments regarding technology through the 'feminine principle' which is this: care, nurturance, and preservation can counterbalance the masculine commitment to domination, control, and efficiency.

Michael Zimmerman, Clinical Professor of Psychology at Tulane University Medical School, examines the deep ecology movement founded by Arne Naess. It does not work within the self-destructive logic of the technological system, as does reform environmentalism. Deep ecology must replace anthropocentrism with ecocentrism, atomism with wholism, dualism with unity, and utilitarian categories with those of being. Additionally, human dignity and democratic principles must be honored.

The issue of technology and the military is attacked by Carl Mitcham, Director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program at The Pennsylvania State University. He tests the 'necessary but destructive links' binding technological and military practice. Starting with Stone Age warfare, these bonds are philosophically inspected. The simultaneous enhancement of life and promotion of nihilism through technology is the fundamental enigma of the Postmodern Age.

Another new issue, the roles of government and the media in maintaining democratic institutions, is addressed by Miguel Quintanilla who is a professor of logic and philosophy of science at the University of Salamanca. He sees the legislature as 'the ideal place to make decisions regarding the social evaluation of technological development.' The media, however, needs to stress more strongly the social dimensions of scientific and technical development.

One final essay concerns the widening gap between the 'science-initiated' specialists and the 'non-initiated' general public. Antonia Ten, Professor of History of Science at the University of Valencia, suggests using 'science museums' to narrow the gap. He makes these proposals: they must not be extensions of the classroom; they must be a source of information, a means of mass communication, a prod to reflection, and a center for entertainment.

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Peter Danielson

*Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots
for Virtual Games.*

London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1992.

Pp. xiv + 240.

US \$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-03484-1);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-07691-9).

In *Morals by Agreement*, David Gauthier convinced many of us — including Peter Danielson — that morality is a set of intramental responses to patterns of dilemmatic game-theoretic interactivity. So, by both their lights, the 'fundamental' justification of morality — i.e. one 'that does not appeal to any of the concepts of [morality itself]' (19) — is that, conventional wisdom notwithstanding, nice guys finish first.

But, cautions Danielson, not necessarily the *niciest* guys!

Danielson's methodological departures from Gauthier are threefold. First, where *MBA* 'borrows techniques from game theory to reduce social problems to their abstract essence' (4), *AM* supplements these techniques with 'tools borrowed from artificial intelligence, to construct artificial agents that interact in a small, toy world called H*Land, [a world] roughly characterized by three features:

First, it promises to return benefits to those who co-operate to exploit its natural resources. But since it is initially barren of moral[ity], the returns to co-operation are only potential; agents may not co-operate and co-operators may be exploited. Second, a logically precise description of each player suffices to generate its described behaviour. And third, it is a *virtual* place; only software entities are permitted. (5)

Players are reduced to 'decision *functions* that return either "cooperate" or "defect" when asked to make a move in a game'; and these functions, in turn, are modelled 'in the computer language of Prolog.' (69)

'It is helpful,' advises Danielson, 'to understand the "logic" of co-operation and constraint in clear cases before wading into messier practical approximations.' (200) So whereas 'Gauthier claims his premises are *true* of people' (38), *AM* 'takes its source of constraint only from the limits of what is *procedurally* possible' (39), its methodological thesis being that '[p]rogramming artificial players to score well in tournaments of *various* players playing abstract non-iterated mixed motive games is a good way' to discover *which* moral dispositions are 'fundamentally' justified. (195)

AM's second and third departures are captured by this word 'various'. Gauthier gives too short shrift to both a) the *variety* of procedurally possible dispositions, and b) the impact on payoffs of dispositionally diverse populations. *AM* seeks to repair these shortcomings.

With these repairs in place (Chs. 1-3), Danielson's substantive contributions are twofold. The first (Chs. 4-8) is to give 'reciprocal co-operation' (RC) at least equal billing in the PD with Gauthier's 'conditional co-operation'

(CC). 'CC co-operates with and only with those who one expects to co-operate' (65), whereas 'RC co-operates when and only when co-operation is necessary and sufficient for the other's co-operation' (89); the critical difference being that CC will be kind to an unconditional co-operator (UC), whereas RC will exploit her.

Danielson's assault on Gauthier's privileging of CC is two-pronged. First, he dislodges it from its moral high ground — 'exploitation of the innocent [certainly] *appears* to be morally indefensible' (90) — by pointing out that by cooperating with UC, who in turn cooperates with an unconditional defector (UD), CC is transitively complicitous in the rewarding of UD (115). And second, Danielson acknowledges that 'without the presence of UC, RC does no better than CC. [So] if we can add contrived king-makers like UC, why not other contrived king-breakers?' (93). So he needs to show why RC's king-maker is admissible whereas its (logically possible) king-breaker is not. To which end he defines 'a rationally *non-arbitrary* addition to a population' as:

one which does as well as any member of the existing population (95).

He defines 'a strategy more successful than another' as:

one such that the first can invade a population consisting of the second, and yet the second cannot invade a population consisting of the first (95).

And he deems 'a population in equilibrium' when:

a new entrant receives the same payoff regardless of its type (160).

Once flexibility and information costs have been factored in (Chs. 7 and 8), Danielson reckons that, from an original homogenous population of CC, it will take only 32 program recursions for 'the ratio of CC:UC:RC agent-types to reach an equilibrium of 7:2:1.' (160) 'And,' he adds, 'if scrutiny costs are higher, the equilibrium population may include UD as well' (161). So what this shows, claims Danielson (161), is that Gauthier errs in supposing that 'equal rationality demands equal compliance' (*MBA* 226).

Danielson's second conclusion, arrived at by similar machinations (Chs. 9 and 10), is that the rational strategy in Chicken is 'less broad co-operation' (LBC) (194). I omit the details and say only that, like RC, Danielson touts LBC as narrowing the intractable gap between rationality and morality.

Danielson does not presume to teach his reader Prolog, referring her instead to a list of texts (228). But even though 'one of [his] theses is that the subject [of morality] is too complex to explore with book and armchair' (xiv), I am loathe (but relieved) to report that the attentive reader *can* follow the arguments well enough while persevering in her Prolog-illiteracy.

No doubt there will be controversies internal to the *AM* enterprise. But what's likely to worry the *external* critic is Danielson's own eschewing of any match-claims between H*Land and *human* lands, save for states and corporations (198). 'We humans,' claims he, 'are not cognitively transparent, we lack the discriminating means of commitment that rational morality re-

quires, and we cannot readily adapt our commitments, as our emotional mechanisms for fixing dispositions tend to have high inertia and momentum' (200). Thus one couldn't draw any conclusions from, for example, comparing agent-type equilibria in H*Land tournaments with agent-type equilibria in the real world. So, one might wonder, what *can* 'successful players in [his] world teach us about how to deal with our [own]?' (6).

I suspect we *can* get a match. But to get it we need to suppose, contra Danielson (5), that our H*Land representatives *do* have spatio-temporally extended bodies, or at least that the costs of flexibility and information are not *only* those of occasionally making the wrong move, but include as well hardware burdens and time constraints. (Cf. the first Russian roulette scene in the *Deerhunter*.) Once *these* considerations are factored in, we might see why we humans *are* as 'cognitively penetrable, discriminating and adaptive' as we are!

AM is not for the uninitiated. For that matter, neither has been this review of it. Still, even without Prolog, AM is at the cutting edge of contemporary meta-ethics. It will make as excellent grist for a graduate seminar as it has proved to be already for the growing cadre of researchers for whom instrumental contractarianism has become 'virtually' the only 'game' in town!

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Jacques Derrida

Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money,

trans. Peggy Kamuf.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1992.

Pp. x + 172.

US \$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-14313-9).

Jacques Derrida himself says that he 'doesn't mean anything' by what he writes; thus a review of his work cannot be of any ordinary sort. I chose, in this instance, to focus on what he 'does' in this text, since M. Derrida is *si gai* 'doing' things with words. *Given Time* gives itself by dividing itself into partial objects (53), gives itself as the circle in which gifts are annulled (24), in which the gift annuls itself (30). Baudelaire's *Counterfeit Money* forms a metonymic 'part', a morsel, a segment. 'The book being offered is a serpent in pieces, a long, elusive, segmented animal the "whole" of which' (88) is "something" like a sign, and even a false sign, or rather a true sign with a false value' (93).

Beginning by narrating the reader-critic as deconstructor of Mauss, of Benveniste, of Lévi Strauss, etc., the narrative, with the lure of a detective story, stages a trap in its holding itself open to reading. The 'interest' (packed with economic and psychological significances) comes from an enigma concerning the title. 'How should we take it?' (85). It can be understood 'naively' (85) as a narrative about 'the gift' or as 'a gift, that, for once, would not require restitution' (81). Or, 'perhaps' 'the story as literature is itself — *perhaps* — counterfeit money' (86).

'Perhaps' Derrida, in 'a certain madness of the gift' (55), *gives away the game* of deconstruction: It is a potlatch that reduces to ashes in a bidding war between rivals the accumulated legacy of a tradition (46). 'Perhaps' Derrida and friends have been deceiving us by deceiving themselves, paying us with words while talking a lot of hot air (counterfeit money) (61). Is this the *kairos*, the right occasion (133), for Derrida to stage his own potlatch, to show who is 'the richest and also *the most madly* extravagant' (46), destroying his own accumulated legacy — 'so as not to want even to appear to desire repayment' — in order to crush and to 'flatten' his rivals, to promote himself? 'Perhaps' this is an 'event as restitution or beyond restitution' (81). Derrida's 'revelation', like a gift, is structured by the aleatory; it *appears* chancy (122).

'Perhaps', however, Derrida's 'gift' is also poisonous, a *pharmakon* (36, 135). 'One has to be on one's guard to recognize the counterfeit money given by a friend' (71). Through a series of clever clues — controlling the other by reasoning (156) — 'the reader [is] caught in the game of interest: you, we, I who am speaking to you' (156). The surprise, 'that instant of madness that tears time apart and interrupts every calculation' (147) is the question whether 'the friend' lets the narrator believe the coin is counterfeit, so as to produce an effect (151). 'To overtake the other with surprise ... is to have a hold on him, as soon as he accepts the gift' (147). Once trapped, 'unable to anticipate, [the reader-critic] is delivered over to the mercy, to the *merci* of the giver' (147).

A 'perhaps' Lyotardian rhetorical 'lesson' permutes the roles of narrator-narrated. Author-'friend' takes the role of narrator; the narratee is involved in a trial (145) of the literary critic of today. Narrated as an indifferent 'prostitute', as one who has read so many works, betrayed so often the cause of art in favor of his friendships and his enmities, the critic 'reaches a state of disgust with everything and yet continues to judge' (71). Derrida has not yet 'not by a long shot — come to the end of [his] surprises and the folds of this text' (149): a fascinating, at-times vertigo-producing, carnival car-chase of reason through Baudelaire.

Clues to 'authorial control' appear throughout the text. 'The fictive narrator produces his narrative as a true narrative and therein consists the fiction — or the simulacrum produced by the author' (93). Not the dead but only a life can give, 'only a singular *surviving* can give' (102). 'Insofar as it tells the story of a gift, this corpus is going to say "in" itself, "of" itself the exceeding that frames it and that exceeds its frame. It is going to remark in a

supplementary *abyeme* that absolute dissemination that destines the text to depart in ashes or go up in smoke' (102).

What destines the text to go up in smoke? That Derrida's secret remain undetectable, unbreakable. 'What if with the *similacrum* of a confession, he were passing off true money as false?' (96) What if the theoretical and supposedly constative dimension of his essay is a *moment* of a performative (62)? What if this entire discursive gesture is from the outset an example of that about which it claims to be speaking (62)? The inviolability depends, for Derrida, on the device of being two-to-speak and the possibility of non-truth in which every possible truth is held or made (153).

Does the text remain, as Derrida argues, *eternally* unreadable, *absolutely* indecipherable (152)? Is the secret 'unreadable' by the inaccessibility of a certain intentional meaning in the consciousness of the author who remains, *in this regard*, in a situation analogous to that of the reader (152)? Does it refuse itself to any hermeneutic? (152) I think not. In the end, this serpent 'sings' (88).

'The text', as promised, departs in ashes, goes up in smoke: 'my consumed eyes see only/Souvenirs of the sun' (171). The critic as narrated, as 'Icarus', 'dies for having "embraced the clouds" there where "The lovers of prostitutes/Are happy, relaxed and satisfied"' (171). The reader-narrated-narratee could, 'looking for noon at two o'clock, read again, and this will be the end, the downfall' (171). 'Beneath some unknown eye of fire/I feel my wing breaking' (172).

The 'secret content of the story' (151), however, is 'not subjective or subjectible ... It is spread on the surface of the page' (170): 'The narrator has the last word, of course, always, and that is perhaps the gravest lesson of this literature' (164). 'The absence of appeal ... that is the narrator's sententious signature' (164). Derrida concludes, sounding like Merleau-Ponty: 'Nature, the meaning of nature, is reconstituted after the fact on the basis of a simulacrum (for example, literature) that it is thought to cause' (170). Derrida has 'given time' to a 'revenge' potlatch (47) for the author, who having lost face and died, 'now comes to life again' (47).

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Bradley H. Dowden

Logical Reasoning.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1993. Pp. xiii + 493.

(paper: ISBN 0-534-17688-7).

In one respect, this book is a welcome change from the usual run of informal logic texts filled with stuffy prose, stale examples, and failed attempts to appeal to students' tastes. Dowden's book is fresh and forthright: his style is light and contemporary, and his examples are varied, current, and obviously designed with attention to the cultural diversity of the modern student body.

The book is also equipped with all the modern pedagogical conveniences. The chapters are peppered with frequent 'concept checks' (elementary review questions inserted into the text, with answers provided at the end of the chapter); and a review, a glossary, and an extensive set of exercises are provided at the end of each chapter. Only a small number of the chapter exercises are answered in the text, but an instructor's manual is available which answers the rest and also provides supplementary exercises and background material. The multiple-choice chapter exercises are also available on disk for IBM and Macintosh computers.

The book has, however, considerable defects, which weigh at least as heavily as these virtues.

Dowden aims to hook students early. After the obligatory initial chapter on the importance of critical thinking in everyday life, he moves directly to the most colourful material in the book, with a chapter on deceptions in advertising and con games. This chapter is very entertaining, but serves little other purpose.

Dowden touts a focus on writing skills as one of the book's main virtues, and Chapters 3 and 4 include a good deal of material that one would be less surprised to find in a high-school grammar text. In fact, much of the book seems designed to remedy what Dowden sees as the flaws of the high-school system. However, Dowden's own prose is not always exemplary. For example, he writes: 'Newspaper headlines are a notorious place where the rules of grammar get bent' (55); 'You would be answering at too general of a level' (65); 'a carefully selected headline that pushes a stereotype on the readers'; and 'Bomber's [sic] can't fly to the moon' (7).

In Chapter 5 Dowden discusses burden of proof, and in Chapter 6 he explains a few of the most common informal fallacies. In Chapters 7 and 8 he sets out to teach the student to distinguish arguments from explanations, and then returns to the subject of writing skills, including much of the material that one would expect to find in an elementary composition course.

Chapter 9 is devoted entirely to consistency, contradiction, and counterexample, while Chapter 10 takes on the subject of implication. Oddly, Dowden presents deductive entailment and inductive support as varieties of one thing, implication. Moreover, he takes deduction in a very broad sense that allows entailment across rough synonymy, which has the result of making it very unclear just what entails what; yet he affects certainty in his discussion of each positive and negative case. Finally, he fails to distinguish

between objective and subjective probability, despite this conflation being a perennial source of confusion.

Dowden devotes Chapter 11 to premise- and conclusion-indicator words, and presents a simple technique for diagramming argument structure. In Chapter 12, he returns to the subject of induction. Oddly, this 40 page chapter contains no mention of either Hume's problem or Goodman's riddle; but it does contain a 15 page introduction to the basics of statistical sampling. Chapter 13 carries on in this vein. Although it is titled 'Reasoning about Causes and Their Effects', nearly all of it is devoted to an elementary discussion of statistical correlation and significance.

Finally, in Chapter 14, Dowden turns to the subject of scientific reasoning. He competently discusses the method of conjecture and refutation, devotes a few words to the evils of ad hoc rescue of falsified hypotheses, and then dashes off a few hurried words about scientific paradigms. Nowhere in the chapter is there mention of any philosopher of science, except where Dowden credits a passage quoted from Ronald Giere's textbook *Understanding Scientific Reasoning*.

Finally, the book has four appendices: a list of fallacies with examples; a discussion of the varieties of definition; a brief treatment of the sentential calculus (only truth tables are presented, without any derivation or refutation technique); and finally a brief treatment of Aristotelian logic and Venn diagrams.

Perhaps the greatest fault of the book is that it is almost completely cut off from the philosophical literature. Few philosophers are even mentioned, there is no bibliography or list of suggested readings, and ideas are regularly presented without attribution. For example, on pages 50 and 66 Dowden presents ideas clearly attributable to H.P. Grice, but Grice's name is not to be found anywhere in the book. Similarly, in Chapter 14 the ideas of Popper and Kuhn make an appearance, but neither is ever mentioned by name or description.

The book is loosely structured; many of the chapters are haphazard assemblages of distantly related ideas. It is also excessively long (about 500 pages). Dowden's colourful writing style is entertaining in small doses, but it has produced a book of indigestible bulk.

There are also some outright errors. On page 66 Dowden gets the truth conditions of subjunctive conditionals wrong, treating them as universal generalizations over the class of all times; on page 230 he writes that 'valid reasoning will never lead you to a false conclusion'; despite the competent chapter on scientific method, the rest of the book is full of talk of 'scientific proof; that is misleading at best — and proof turns out, in Chapter 14, to be a matter of degree; finally, in explaining the scientific method, Dowden writes that 'You have to think of all the reasonable explanations and then rule out everything until the truth remains.'

Overall, although it is entertaining, this is a quirky text with little to recommend it.

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Shaun Gallagher

Hermeneutics and Education.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1992. Pp. xvii + 402.

US \$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1176-1);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1176-1).

This is an erudite and well-organized book. It has the virtues of good scholarship and careful thought. As such this book is informative and helpful in certain respects. But it is neither original nor profound, and it does not deliver what it promises: A reconsideration of the theory of education on hermeneutical grounds.

But first to the commendable features of this work: Gallagher argues that there has existed, since classical times, a definite connection between interpretation and education. The activity of interpretation was once regarded as educational; this intimate connection between interpretation and its educational force or value was obscured, when the 'subtilitas explicandi' was excluded 'from the realm of hermeneutics' (1) and only the 'subtilitas intelligendi' remained.

Gallagher attempts to recover the suppressed educational dimension of hermeneutics, largely by relying on Gadamer and deriving from Gadamer's work a conception of 'moderate hermeneutics' which he distinguishes from conservative, critical, and radical hermeneutics (11-29). He also endeavours to transform Gadamer's universal and philosophical hermeneutics into a 'local hermeneutics'. The latter regards the activity of interpretation as dependent upon participation 'in conversations at various interpretive sites' (348). Thus this activity is educational or learning. Rather than a form of comprehensive and a priori or foundational discourse about the nature of interpretation in general, hermeneutics reflects on learning experiences. It lays out 'case by case' the essence of interpretation (352). Gallagher trans-verses a large and varied terrain, in order to arrive at his conclusion. Thus the four types of hermeneutics mentioned earlier are juxtaposed to four corresponding forms of educational theory, of which it is said that they can be accounted for in their structure as interpretations, or a 'hermeneutics' of the learning process and of educational experience. The central part of the book (203-318) consists of the discussion of these four types of educational theory (and of the respective forms of hermeneutics).

And this comparison itself depends on the validity of the argument, that 'if learning involves interpretation, then the hermeneutical principles which describe interpretation would also throw some light on educational experience' (168). Such principles are, e.g., those of distanciation (transcendence, objectification, productivity, project of possibilities) and of questioning, application, and self-understanding (124-68). These principles are derived from Gadamer and Ricoeur.

But as the author moves through a consideration of educational theories, it becomes increasingly clear that he is primarily interested in an account of

hermeneutics as a form of theorizing about *interpretation* (rather than education) which can withstand the deconstructionist critique. This argument is accompanied by and partially driven by the author's concern to also do justice to critical hermeneutics (Habermas) and critical theories of education. For Gallagher these theories are only partially right, because they absolutize emancipation as a goal of education. They fail to see that emancipation has to be worked out in the context of tradition and language (273), just like any other goal of education. Deconstructionist, poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers understand this better. They know that only the practice of determinate negation, of specific resistances to comprehensive meaning - claims, can preserve the (partial and finite) freedom of subjects from becoming absorbed into a particular discourse.

And a local and 'moderate' hermeneutics finds virtue in this practice of suspicion: As we refuse to let ourselves be absorbed into a discipline or learning institution ('the University'), a knowledge-tradition or school, we gain the ability to move freely — as the case demands — between a conservative reproduction of meaning and a radical negation of meaning etc. We can play along with/in various discourses and let meaning/understanding be determined by the specific characteristics of each one of them. Here Foucault and Lyotard become the parents of a new hermeneutics which at the same time remains loyal to Gadamer and conservative in tone.

All of this is suggestive, but terribly disappointing in the end. The complex and far from transparent manoeuvres described hardly suffice to make one forget, that this work neither properly addresses hermeneutics *nor* education, nor educational theory. We do not know, in the end, what is meant by education. Would a 'local hermeneutics' not have to consider that 'learning' never means the same, given that learning how to spell is not the same as having learned to understand philosophy?

Is there no sociological/cultural concreteness to learning and is there not much concreteness and reality to be found in its coordination with teaching? Relations between teaching and learning are different, dependent upon their location; human rights education, e.g. in an 'informal' situation in Guatemala, is different from being taught what it means to preserve the traditional values of the Armed Forces in a military academy etc., or from teaching social studies in a Canadian urban centre. It is only when one begins to talk about *specifics*, i.e., particular kinds of educational activity, or institutions, (schools, colleges, etc.) that one will be able to decide, whether something can be learned from hermeneutics *for* education.

As it stands, the book is most ambiguously situated between education (and educational theory) and philosophy/social theory. It is not clear, for example, whether the debate between moderate hermeneutics and poststructuralism has any relevance for education. And by encountering it in a form as if it did, the reader is distracted and misdirected. Obviously, both hermeneutics and deconstruction make reference to education (*Bildung*) in a general way, as did the metaphysical tradition (especially Hegel). But this

does not mean that they have anything to contribute to educational theory or practice in our times.

For the latter purpose to be achieved, the author would have had to be much more specific and detailed about the educational conceptions at issue. For the time being he has only given us a preliminary typology of hermeneutics, which may be useful for the further study of education *and* the development of theoretical arguments regarding the merits or lack of merits of different forms of hermeneutics.

Without doubt, many useful hints and observations are to be found in this book, which may help us move further in both directions. But as it stands, it will not become a bible of educational reform. Only devoted hermeneuticists will believe that it can. And they are less than a minority in the field(s) of education.

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La Logique interne des théories physiques.

Collection Analytiques. Paris: Yrin; Montréal:

Bellarmin 1992. Pp. 168.

ISBN 2-89007-739-X (Bellarmin) et

2-7166-9762-2 (Yrin)

Cet ouvrage, dit l'A, comporte peu de philosophie, sauf le constructivisme logico-mathématique, appliqué aux théories physiques (13). La logique interne de ces théories consiste en leurs structures logico-mathématiques, et le type de logique que propose l'auteur est 'la logique de l'interaction locale qui est essentiellement la logique constructive de la négation et de la complémentation locales appliquée aux situations physiques, c'est-à-dire à l'interaction d'un système observé et d'un système observateur dans la théorie générale de la mesure où observation est synonyme de mesure' (11). Dans cette logique, 'la négation n'est pas le contraire du même, mais son autre, sa différence innombrable' (18), et la formule $a = a$ est invalide. L'idée d'une logique formelle externe et commune à tous les discours est rejetée: il y a une pluralité de logiques dont chacune est 'théorie de la structure ou de la construction' (19) d'un discours spécifique.

Une théorie physique comporte selon l'A un appareil logico-mathématique Ap, une classe Mp des modèles ou interprétations visées, une classe \emptyset d'homomorphismes entre Ap et Mp, une *théoria mundi* Tp, c'est-à-dire un

ensemble de théories contenant les notions, concepts et objets communs aux théories physiques, et un autre homomorphisme ψ qui injecte M_p dans T_p . Il y a entre T_p et M_p des influences réciproques, résultant de la composition de φ et ψ , et variables d'une théorie à l'autre. L'ahistoricisme de l'A prend pour acquis que 'l'unification des théories antérieures est la seule logique du développement historique de la physique moderne' (44): une nouvelle théorie est un progrès si elle intègre et unifie des théories antérieures, mais il ne s'agit pas d'une série d'approximations successives dont chacune est plus proche que la précédente d'un réel donné.

Abordant ensuite (chap. 3) le problème de l'observateur local en MQ, l'A part de la théorie de Segal où la structure de la MQ 'est le treillis ... orthocomplémenté des sous-espaces de l'espace de Hilbert' (17). Il voit dans le complément local dont parle cette théorie l'homologue topologique de sa propre notion de négation locale, pour arguer ensuite que le complément local peut être construit en MQ, que l'observateur y a donc une 'place topologique et métrique' (52), et forcément aussi une réalité physique, qui se réduit à un système observateur en interaction avec un système observé.

A propos de la logique quantique (chap. 4), on revient sur la structure de treillis orthocomplémenté pour montrer que la logique interne de la MQ n'est pas booléenne. Comme la probabilité classique est booléenne, il faut modifier la notion de probabilité pour les besoins de la MQ. A la conception algébrique susmentionnée de la logique quantique, on substitue la logique de la négation et de la complémentation locales. La négation classique admet que $a = --a$ pour un domaine d'objets D et son domaine extérieur E , tous deux fermés; mais si D est fermé et E ouvert, alors $a \rightarrow a$ (négation intuitionniste); et si D et E sont tous les deux ouverts, alors $a \rightarrow --a$ (négation locale). Un espace de Hilbert de dimension infinie n'étant pas orthocomplémentable et contenant l'observateur exclu du domaine des observables, il faut une théorie des probabilités qui ne soit pas booléenne et s'accorde bien avec la logique locale susmentionnée. L'extérieur du domaine des sous-espaces devient 'comme le plus grand ouvert disjoint du domaine des observables dans l'espace (total) de Hilbert' (77).

Proposant l'abandon des notions sémantiques (chap. 4) l'A utilise une approche syntaxique 'qui va au coeur de la structure mathématique de la théorie' (80) et fait l'économie de structures empiriques. La confirmation empirique d'une théorie ne suffit pas à assurer sa validité, et son appareil mathématique doit aussi être testé par une renormalisation, i.e. une vérification de 'son ancrage logico-mathématique, sa morphologie et sa syntaxe' (81). La théorie des démonstrations de Hilbert, élargie par les soins de l'A, met en scène un texte (preuve), puis un test de validité de cette preuve (épreuve), et enfin une approbation des moyens de preuve ('approuve'). L'exemple de l'électrodynamique classique sert à montrer que cette théorie élargie s'applique à la dimension mathématique des théories physiques, et on conclut que tout en étant différentes, la vérification expérimentale d'une part, et la vérification d'une théorie mathématique par les

méthodes de la théorie des démonstrations d'autre part, se ressemblent en ceci qu'elles exigent des méthodes finitaires et une 'appreuve' qui les rendra acceptables à la communauté scientifique.

La théorie des probabilités possède une logique interne plus riche que la logique classique: c'est la thèse du chap. 6. Analysant la théorie fréquentiste des probabilités de Reichenbach tout en rejetant sa logique trivalente, l'A y trouve une logique probabilitaire irréductible à la logique bivalente classique. Il propose en outre une interprétation finitaire d'énoncés probabilitaires en utilisant la théorie des probabilités de Nelson, ce qui fournit un modèle non standard de l'interprétation finitaire des probabilités.

La manque d'espace ne nous permet que la simple mention d'une analyse des modèles standard et non standard en cosmologie (chap. 7), de la critique du principe anthropique (chap. 8), d'une analyse de la structure logique de la théorie des catastrophes (chap. 9), et de quatre appendices portant respectivement sur les mesures de probabilité pseudo-bouloennes et les inégalités de Bell, le paradoxe de Zénon en MQ, un paradoxe leibnizien dans la théorie des mondes possibles, et enfin la méthode axiomatique en MQ.

En conclusion, l'auteur identifie 'la logique de l'interaction locale de la théorie de la mesure' (127), comme logique minimale de la physique, et distingue, en MQ, entre la mesure et son interprétation, entre l'observateur-mesureur et l'observateur-interprète. Il réaffirme son constructivisme antiréaliste et sa mésestime de la métaphysique, soutenant avec raison que la physique et les mathématiques modernes ne sont pas fondées par la tradition philosophique, mais posent de nouveaux défis et enjeux à la philosophie. Il souligne avec raison aussi l'importance de la tâche critique de la philosophie de la science, rappelant le rôle qu'y jouent des facteurs extérieurs, notamment idéologiques, tout en refusant à la physique un rôle de Weltanschauung.

Les lecteurs ne seront sans doute pas tous convaincus de la justesse du constructivisme antiréaliste. Les analyses qui y sont faites sont souvent présentées comme justifiant ce constructivisme, mais on peut se demander dans quelle mesure ce dernier, omniprésent, a influencé le choix des objets et instruments d'analyse. Ce livre est cependant et sans conteste une contribution importante à l'analyse logico-mathématique des théories physiques.

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**Mark L. Greenberg and
Lance Schacterle, eds.**

Literature and Technology.

Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press; London
and Toronto: Associated University Presses,
1992. Pp. 322.

US \$45.00 (paper: ISBN 0-934223-20-3).

This densely informative anthology (Volume 5 in the Research in Technology Studies series) presents a cross-section of issues and ideas that arise when approaches to the relationship between literature and science are applied to the literature-technology relationship. Attention to texts remains a constant, the texts in this instance being fairly well known, most but not all originally written in English, published from ancient times till today. Analyses of the status and function of technology in these texts are provided by eleven scholars most of whom are engaged professionally in print media (mainly literature) studies. The exceptions are Carl Mitcham and Timothy Casey, each of whom is a philosopher directing a Science Technology and Society program. Together they conduct an 'archeological' dig into ideas old and not so old that yields four 'approaches' to philosophy of technology: engineering-based pro-technology, as exemplified by Germans Kapp and Dessauer; humanities-based inquiries into the impact of technology on human affairs, e.g., the work of Mumford and Heidegger; social science-based studies, usually in the form of a critique of technology, e.g., the writings of Marx or Ellul; and a classics-based approach that looks especially to Plato and/or Aristotle for leads. Some authors of the more narrow-gauge studies that follow associate themselves with one or another of these approaches, but most are more intent on locating their texts of choice along the pre- to postmodern spectrum.

Six articles in this collection deal with technology in deliberately literary texts, but several explore how the genre of technical writing evolved in early modern texts. Kenneth Knoespel shows how Renaissance writers introduced new machines to their readers by inserting them graphically into stage settings or literally into descriptions of technologically landscaped gardens. Robert Markley discovers the birth of scientific objectivity in successive accounts of how to create a vacuum with an air pump. From Robert Boyle's original discovery-oriented accounts to a later market-oriented redaction, the explanatory text was purged of theological and epistemological concerns and came to present almost exclusively 'a transhistorical view of science' (151) that respected the then emerging canons of objectivity. The resulting science/humanities dichotomy can be transcended, according to David Porush, by shifting to an open systems model of reality as espoused by chemist Ilya Prigogine's theory of dissipative structure and Eric Auerbach's 'Olympian survey of stylistic change' (296). In retrospect, these studies suggest viewing the history of technical writing as a branch of the history of ideas, as exemplified by such works as Edwin A. Burt's *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*. But they are also linked to culture studies, as are

even more self-consciously so the studies of how technology is treated in texts intended primarily as literature.

Authors of fiction whose treatment of technology is considered include writers of graphic books for children, writers of spy novels, poets Geoffrey Chaucer, William Blake, and Jules Romains, and contemporary novelist Thomas Pynchon. Though otherwise disparate, each account asks how and against what background the writer being studied assesses the impact of technology on culture. Thus they are contributions to culture studies; and, perhaps for this reason, view technology broadly as including human organizations and institutions. At issue throughout is what attitude humans should have towards the technologies they encounter in their lives.

Sylvia Tomasch, viewing cartography as a type of information technology, finds in Chaucer a case study of theologico-environmentalism. In the Middle Ages maps though presented as factual were 'tools of conquest' and 'technologies of control' (68), notably in their establishment of Jerusalem as the earth's center and thus of the spiritual Jerusalem, Christianity, as the political center of authority. With Canterbury serving as the equivalent of Jerusalem, such cartographical theologizing enables Chaucer in 'The Knight's Tale' to fault King Theseus for modeling an amphitheater after a map with no Jerusalem. No less theological in his view of the function of art, Blake, who was also a skilled printer, rejected the then new print technologies in favor of more primitive methods that still left the artist in control of the media. Thus does Mark Greenberg guide the reader through Blake's artist-directed production of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. Rosalind Williams, by contrast, finds more technophilia a century later in Paris. Living in a very different world in which humans with no theological constraints were progressing towards technologically perfected environments, Victorian era poet Jules Romains, inspired by urban architect von Haussmann, touted the ability of incidental groups of people to bring out the organic best in a technologically transformed city and, in time perhaps, continent as a whole. His ultimate disillusionment is a microcosm of the ambiguity and ambivalence towards technology characteristic of serious writers today.

Though light years apart in subject matter, writers of picture books for children (as analyzed by Judith Yaross Lee) and writers of spy novels (as presented by Joseph Slade) share a common goal, namely, to salvage respect for and appreciation of humans in the face of technological onslaught. Writers of 'kid-pic' books do so by focusing on people-friendly machines; writers of spy novels, by focusing on human agents as information gatherers rather than on the sophisticated technologies that have reduced them, like cowboys romanticized in the western novel, to obsolescence. Thomas Pynchon, according to Lance Schacterle, reiterates Heidegger by showing in his novels that people need to be assessors as well as users of technologies, because these technologies are not only our context but in part our very selves. From the perspective of human choice, then, the real conflicts are not between humans and technology but among different technologies or between the same technology used well or badly. Useful but woefully inadequate advice, as we stand

on the threshold of sweeping new culturally transformative information technologies.

These word-bites taken from richly researched pieces barely convey the extent to which each study merits more attention to details, though each reader will find a favorite or two among them. The overall effect is a sense that culture studies has much to teach philosophers who take technology seriously.

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Lawrence E. Johnson

Focusing on Truth.

London & New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1992. Pp. 279.

US \$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-07252-2);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-07253-0).

Lawrence Johnson, who teaches at The Flinders University of South Australia, sets out a critical survey of correspondence, pragmatist, coherence and deflationary theories of truth, together with his own positive thoughts on the question. He includes a chapter on Tarski's 'Concept of Truth' paper which is quite detailed, considering his overall non-formal approach, and which may be a help to those unprepared to digest the genuine article. But Johnson rejects Tarski's claim that 'true' is a metalinguistic predicate applying to the sentences of some formalized object-language. He is disposed to doubt that the proper use of the word 'true' has been reserved for a handful of logicians. Instead he will conclude that statements, or sentences-as-used in natural language are the appropriate bearers or subjects of truth and falsehood (130ff, 167). His view is that such uses of language cannot be 'fixed' or 'frozen' into a formal system because they cannot be adequately understood without allowing for the changing intents and purposes of speakers (110ff). It is further observed that there are statements of many different sorts: for instance, tautologies, negatives, existentials, and general statements. An inference drawn is, that we must beware of adopting too robust or too strong an account of what it is for something to be true (14, 81, 224f, 252, 262, 265f). Nevertheless, the claim that we cannot find anything definitive of true statements if held to err in another direction, for we are told that there is a single concept of truth to be explained (13f, 260, 262).

Johnson spends a few pages on the prosentential theory of truth, which denies that 'true' reveals any universal common to truths. According to this

position, the phrase 'That is true' does not function as a subject-predicate structure, metalinguistic or otherwise, but operates instead as a *prosentence*, somewhat in the manner of pronouns. In brief, a prosentential analysis treats the claim 'That is true' as a unit which stands in for some original sentence. Prosentences are said to provide a special way of repeating assertions, and the theory claims that all truth talk can be accounted for by positing only prosentential uses of 'That is true' and 'It is true'. One may object with Johnson that the structure of '*p* is true' looks similar to that of '*p* is interesting' or '*p* is absurd/profound/exaggerated' etc. (220ff). If the latter utterances say something about a truth-bearer, then it appears arbitrary to treat '*p* is true' as being of a different form. However, granted that '*p* is interesting' says something about a statement, prosententialists will still maintain that the similarity of its surface structure to '*p* is true' is misleading. Even those who share Johnson's view that truth claims reveal something common to truths may wish to have an argument more conclusive than those he sets out against prosententialism.

Perhaps when considering whether truth is something common to truths we ought to look more closely at simple predication. If one way to assert that 'Snow is white' is true is to repeat the sentence with emphasis on the verb, we should ask at the most general level what it is for snow to be white. What is it for white to be exemplified, and what are we saying when we assert that it is exemplified? Knowing this will allow us to say why it is true that snow is white, and may yield a definition of truth itself. It is clear that with reference to the stuff in question an application of the word 'white', following an established precedent or path of use, is adequate to complete an inquiry and to further our knowledge in a certain way. This happy use of 'Snow is white' shares its adequacy for knowledge with other truthful uses of language: we ought to consider whether or not it shares anything else.

A principle to which Johnson keeps returning is, that for any statement to be true or false, it must be about something (e.g. 131, 189, 227, 262). If what it is about is as the statement says it is, then the statement is true. Employing these formulas as a touchstone, the author sets forth his own account: 'A statement is true if and only if it is correlated with referential foci, established through our use of linguistic conventions, which are of types of referential foci with which we correlate it through our descriptive use of linguistic conventions' (188, 266). This formula follows the lead of J.L. Austin, while departing from Austin's version in some significant respects. Roughly, Johnson is saying that linguistic conventions correlate statements with referential foci, or those matters upon which our attention is focused. When we speak truly, the type associated with our use of language is identical with the type exemplified by whatever we are talking about. The focusing in question is likened to the training of a spotlight on a stage (178), an analogy which suggests independently existing structures awaiting the limelight of perception and thought. It is emphasized that 'what we are talking about' can designate a great variety of situations, world-features or demonstrative correlates.

Like Austin, Johnson has begun with a correspondence theory and tried to remove its objectionable elements. Have they all been purged? And what remains if they have been? He holds that there are no abstract propositions mapping onto facts, nor does he posit any structural isomorphism between parts of statements and elements in the world. Instead, the burden of explanation falls on the notion of correlating. The problem is, that we don't really know what (correct) correlation amounts to. Johnson seems to think he has said enough in this regard, and that further inquiry is superfluous or belongs to some other project. But what he says isn't enough: it won't do merely to observe that correlation is a matching, by convention, of some statement with a type of correlate. Again, if all we know is that language use, when correlated, gives us knowledge of antecedently existing structures, then we still don't know (1) what the nature is of the structures in question (snow's being white, or maybe white snow); or (2) how information about these structures is imparted by predication.

Johnson never explains the matching or sameness relation he postulates. Nevertheless, many will find his recent book a useful guide to the literature on truth, for it accurately summarizes, and puts forward clear objections to, a range of influential views.

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Immanuel Kant

Lectures on Logic,

trans. and ed. J. Michael Young.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xxxii + 695.

(ISBN 0-521-36013-7).

This is the latest publication in the proposed fourteen volume Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant in English translation. When complete this edition will include all of Kant's published writings, plus a selection of some of his unpublished material. In keeping with the other volumes in this series, there is substantial editorial information, including a translator's introduction, linguistic and factual notes, glossaries of key terms (both German-English and English-German), and concordances relating Kant's lectures to Georg Friedrich Meier's *Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason*, the logic book on which Kant lectured throughout his life and in which he left copious notes.

Kant's views on the nature of logic and on various points of logical theory are fundamental prerequisites to a proper understanding of his Critical work. This is especially true with regard to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which Kant

characterized as an essay in transcendental logic. As such, the primary concern of this work is the concepts and principles that govern knowledge of objects in space and time — a subject outside the province of logic proper, which deals only with the general forms of thought. However, an appreciation of the architectonic and much of the central argument of the *Critique* demands a familiarity with Kant's views on logic. Indeed, transcendental logic is supposed to build upon the framework of formal logic: in dividing transcendental logic into an Analytic and a Dialectic, deriving the table of categories, classifying the inferences of pure reason, and in numerous other instances, Kant assumes the reader is knowledgeable of his views on logic.

Since Kant published only one short, early essay on logic, a comprehensive picture of his views on this topic must be gleaned from additional sources. This material consists of his numerous remarks about logic in other published works, especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; handwritten notes to his former student Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, who prepared a manual for teaching logic at Kant's request; and finally, texts derived from Kant's lectures on logic. This last category of material includes various surviving transcripts of Kant's lectures, as well as the manual prepared by Jäsche (which, given its origin, Young considers a 'privileged' transcript). All of the texts in this volume are from this last group, hence the title, *Kant's Lectures on Logic*.

The texts themselves represent four different periods in Kant's career, and provide a record of what Kant taught about logic over the last twenty-five of the forty years he lectured on the topic. The first three are previously untranslated transcripts of his logic lectures: the *Blomberg Logic* from the 1770s; the *Vienna Logic* (supplemented by the recently discovered *Hechsel Logic*) from the early 1780s; and the *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic* from the early 1790s. The fourth text is Jäsche's manual *Immanuel Kant's Logic*, which was published in 1800 and is here retitled *Jäsche Logic*.

This volume thus provides a wealth of material on Kant's views on logic, along with a record of the evolution of his ideas on this subject. One can see, for example, that Kant closely followed Meier's textbook in the *Blomberg Logic*, but that he increasingly deviated from this work in his later lectures. Nevertheless, none of the texts in this volume may be taken as the definitive statement of Kant's views on logic; for they do not generally contain precise, carefully worded statements on fundamental issues. Rather, they should be approached as a source for knowledge of the logical topics that concerned Kant, and of the stance he took on these matters.

These texts also provide abundant data on Kant's thoughts on the relationship of logic to other disciplines, and a variety of other topics vital to his Critical philosophy. Of particular importance are Kant's reflections on concepts and judgements, which are essential to a proper understanding of the various meanings of his distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic'.

There is even more to be found in these lectures, as Kant often touches on subjects other than logic or the theory of knowledge. There are splendid presentations of Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical, which often lead to remarks on moral philosophy. Details of Kant's aesthetic

philosophy can be found in discussions of the distinction between the logical and aesthetic perfection of cognition, which frequently include remarks on literature and the arts. There are also deliberations on history, including the history of philosophy and of science, as well as on mathematics, law, religion, politics, and education. These texts are thus an invaluable display of what Kant knew and thought about these topics. They also provide a revealing portrait of Kant as a lecturer, a position in which he was held in high regard.

A note on translation. Young states (xxvii) that his aim in translating these texts was to 'render them as literally as possible, so that the English reader will have a reliable representation of what the German text says, and a good feel for what that text is like.' Technical terms are uniformly translated by a single English term throughout. As a result, the English is sometimes a bit awkward, although this is offset by the knowledge of what terms are present in the German text. It also makes clear the connections between the various passages in which Kant uses these terms. Interpretation is kept to a minimum, and is clearly indicated when necessary to give a passage intelligible English meaning.

In sum, this volume represents the most scholarly and up-to-date English translation of Kant's logical views available today. Most importantly, it gives a consistent translation of transcripts that present Kant's views on logic at different stages of his career. Young's choice of texts also gives us a feel for the character of Kant's lectures. This volume, and indeed, the entire Cambridge edition of Kant's works, are sure to become indispensable tools for the serious Kant scholar.

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**Charles D. Laughlin, Jr, John McManus
and Eugene G. D'Aquili**

Brain, Symbol and Experience.

New York: Columbia University Press 1992.

Pp. xvi + 403.

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-231-08139-1).

The authors set out to understand consciousness by integrating diverse disciplines: anthropology, neuroscience, physiology, Husserlian phenomenology, shamanism, zen, tantrism and philosophy. They reject mind-body dualism and adopt a monistic stance which treats neurophysiological, mental and cultural events as parts of one unified process. Their aim is to find cross-cultural invariances in human experience.

For the authors, the nervous system is a community of cells, each with its own teleology. This community, or part of it, produces consciousness which

is essentially intentional, i.e., about some object. The brain adapts to the real world by setting up its own internal models, its 'cognized environment', and it is these objects, not external ones, that the individual actually experiences (163). Symbols are the basic patterns which organize experience around objects, and society, which has its own interests, controls such symbols, primarily through cultural rituals. Hence much of the ritual drama reported by anthropologists serves to pattern the neural networks that give rise to individual experience.

The authors describe various 'phases' of consciousness, such as wakefulness, dreaming, trance or meditation, each phase integrating its own characteristic pattern of neurons. The ego-system is one such stable pattern. Shamans, however, transcend the habitual bounds of ego consciousness and experience multiple realities, which are alternative patterns of neural activity. There are also extraordinary neural developments which permit 'mature contemplatives' to attain transcendental phases of consciousness beyond that attained by most shamans (336).

Traditional Western approaches to understanding consciousness are criticized by the authors not just as ethnocentric but as monophasic, that is, as overemphasizing waking ego-states and neglecting alternative states. They recommend a conjoint study of consciousness using both scientific method and contemplation.

I admire the authors' interdisciplinary project and agree that we need to integrate the findings of many disciplines if we are to understand the relationship of consciousness to the brain. Yet there is a danger that those in one field may misunderstand methods and concepts within specialized disciplines not their own. Perhaps because the team of authors, which includes an anthropologist, a psychiatrist and a psychologist, lacks a philosopher, there are a number of dubious philosophical interpretations.

Kant's noumenon, for example, is presented as the molecular level of physical reality, explainable by physics and chemistry, and 'encountered' by the 'organism' (250), in contrast to both the 'molar' level of everyday reality and the entire phenomenal world, which is a mental representation constructed by the brain, and which is all we ever experience (83, 110). Whatever the merits of this approach, it is an unlikely interpretation of Kant.

Husserl's phenomenology, a focus of the book, is presented as a 'spiritual discipline', phenomenological description as introspection, and the phenomenological reduction as a method for training the mind (26). By means of the reduction 'the mind liberates itself from the chains of delusory misapprehensions, thus replacing the naive personal ego with knowledge of the transcendental ego' (27). This misconstrues Husserl's project.

Searle is criticized for claiming that intentionality relates to an object 'which he *incorrectly* lodges out in the world' (170). Rather, say the authors, 'consciousness produces its own content ... The object of perception is constructed wholly within the nervous system' (170-1). If this is right then recent debates about the enigma of intentionality are quite redundant.

The book rejects mainstream mind-body functionalism on the grounds that it is epiphenomenalist and that 'mental phenomena are inconceivable in the absence of a neural substrate' (51), neither of which I consider to be fair assessments. Perhaps as a result of these misinterpretations, the philosophical debate about the foundations of cognitive science (Fodor, Dennett, Churchlands etc.) is almost completely ignored. The options for the study of the mind are therefore reduced to either behaviourism or introspection ('phenomenology') (342) and so the book can rather facily defend the latter against the former.

The authors' own solution to the mind-body problem, *structural monism*, views consciousness as an integration of neural functions, as 'mediated' by a particular neural network ('conscious network'). That is, 'consciousness refers to function, and conscious network refers to [neural] structure: *conscious network is the structure of consciousness, and consciousness is the function of conscious network*' (94). But little is said about why some networks are 'conscious networks' and others are not, how consciousness can be produced by the brain, or why their own position is not functionalism.

The core of the book is its thesis about method. It challenges the ethnocentric monophasism of Western investigation of the mind. The authors' point that non-Western approaches to consciousness are often neglected is surely a useful reminder for all of us.

The alternative proposed is a new 'neuroepistemology' (334) which is based on the assumption that ego consciousness is not the most mature mode of consciousness. 'Transcendental phases of consciousness are attainable only by mature contemplatives [who reach a development of consciousness] beyond that attained by most shamans. ... Transcendence is a process of extraordinary neural development, which may require arduous dedication and lengthy maturation to produce a fundamental reorganization of the nervous system in just the same neurognostic way as does the construction of a stable ego' (336). Mature contemplation combined with neuroscience is the most comprehensive (but not the only) approach to the study of consciousness, they claim (338, 345).

While I meditate a little, I am neither a shaman nor do I dream lucidly, and I am clearly not a mature contemplative, so I may well be unqualified to comment on the validity of the authors' methods. But this itself raises a problem: does the esoteric nature of such mysticism not render it unscientific? No, claim the authors, for science too is esoteric. 'In fact, science is as vulnerable to charges of nonobjectivity, nonreplication, appeal to authority, tautological propositions and ideological reverence as is mysticism' (343). While there is some truth to this, the book would need to offer more argument to justify this perfunctory analysis of science.

More elaboration is also needed on the crucial question of what would count as evidence in their new approach to consciousness. Take for instance the claim that 'the sensorium is composed of innumerable, almost infinitesimal, and momentary particles ... sensorial *dots*.' The book claims that most people miss this due to lack of training, but with enough calm and concen-

tration within a 'phenomenological reduction' these dots are directly perceivable (108). However, the authors do not address the possibility that training might create the experience of dots rather than discover them, so it is hard for me to see why we should grant trained experience more validity than untrained.

Similarly, I am unclear about the methodological alternatives to monophasic consciousness. While it might be true that trance, dream, contemplative or other phases of consciousness have been neglected as *objects* of study, the authors seem to be proposing that investigation can be performed by a *subject* in such states. It is one thing for wakeful consciousness to interpret remembered dreams, as Freud for instance does; it is quite another to propose that 'the meaning inherent in myth and dream are [sic] apprehended directly in the lived experience of them' (289). Is wakefulness not a precondition for understanding?

The book is written in difficult language. Neologisms abound, often unnecessarily: 'neurognosis'; 'penetrate' (= have an effect); 'entrainment' (= linking); 'homeomorphogenic'; 'ergotropic-tropotropic tuning'. Ritual 'SYMBOLS' are distinguished from 'symbols' which categorize the whole neural system. A dubious analysis of cause as necessary and sufficient condition requires the introduction of 'producer' for a more common-sense notion of cause. 'Structure' is restricted to neurological networks and disallowed for mental or cultural patterns. 'Transcendent' and 'transcendental' are used interchangeably. 'Alternate' and 'alternative' are often confused. The result is at times enigmatic, or, when translated, occasionally trivial. For instance, having defined 'conscious network' as the set of neurons related to consciousness, they say: 'experience is everything which is constituted within conscious network' (108) and 'Conscious network is a changing pattern of entrainment among the neural networks potentially entrainable to conscious network' (95).

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Gareth B. Matthews

Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992.

Pp. xx + 217.

US \$28.95 (ISBN 0-8014-2775-4).

In this excellent book Matthews explores the role of first personal questions in the philosophies of Augustine and Descartes. Such questions are said to be more important to Descartes than to Augustine because he recognizes a skeptical problem about the external world and because he is an epistemic individualist who rejects epistemic authority.

The book is organized as a comparison of answers to first personal questions. The Cogito is presented as an answer to the question 'Can I doubt that I exist?', and the responses to skepticism as answers to 'How do I know that I am not now dreaming?', and 'How do I know that not all life is my dream?' Other questions discussed include 'What can I know or be certain that I am?', 'Am I morally responsible for what I do or think in my dreams?', 'How do I know that there are minds in addition to the one I have?', and 'Who should guide me in the search for all that I can know?'

Matthews aims to reconcile the three main interpretations of Descartes' Cogito. He holds that Descartes himself, at various times, thought of the Cogito as a single intuition, an argument, and a performance, and that he was untroubled by this variety of kinds of certainty because he desired to show only that 'I exist' cannot reasonably be doubted (27). Augustine's view is that one knows one's existence 'immediately and directly', and his *si fallor, sum* reasoning merely answers a skeptical challenge to this claim to direct knowledge (34).

Matthews distinguishes two skeptical problems, the 'epistemological dream problem' (How do I know that I am not now dreaming?) and the 'metaphysical dream problem' (How do I know that not all life is my dream?). Augustine addresses only the first, and so fails to consider solipsism, but Descartes attempts to answer both. Augustine failed to notice the metaphysical dream problem because he did not fully identify himself with the immaterial self whose existence can be known with certainty. He took it for granted that he was in part a bodily being, and so he did not think of everything apart from himself as comprising a dubitable 'external' world (196-7).

Descartes' answer to the first problem, that one can know one is awake by the coherence of one's experience, is indefensible. But this is not disastrous for Descartes' reconstruction of knowledge, for his scientific theses can be known even in dreams. This 'immunity' response is also adopted by Augustine.

'Present-moment dream skepticism' is the response to the skeptical questions that Matthews finds implicit in Augustine, and natural for Descartes (if we set aside the concluding paragraph of Meditation VI). Present-moment dream skepticism holds that we cannot know whether we are now dreaming, and thus cannot know contingent facts about the current status of the

external world. We can know however that not all life is a dream, and so we can know that there is an external world. Matthews argues that these views are compatible with each other. They are also said to be compatible with claims to knowledge of general propositions about the external world, except on the assumption that such general propositions must be supported by others known through observation. Descartes is not committed to this variety of foundationalism (89).

In addition to taking solipsism seriously, Descartes' philosophy is more first personal than Augustine's for another reason: he does not allow assertion by recognized authority as an adequate epistemic justification. This 'epistemic individualism' Matthews traces to Descartes' demand for a 'blue ribbon' connection between the knower and the known: connections through fallible authorities, fallibly recognized, won't do.

Augustine's contrasting acceptance of epistemic authority is offered as a partial explanation of his failure to attempt a rational reconstruction of knowledge (150). As Matthews illustrates, Augustine's philosophical projects typically consist of attempts to find philosophically acceptable readings of statements that he has previously accepted as true on religious authority. But the Augustinian arguments for accepting authority cited by Matthews do not show whether Augustine accepts such authority as a source of epistemic justification. Thus Augustine's argument that we must accept authority as to which persons are our parents, on penalty of failing in our duties to them, is explicitly offered as a counter argument to the claim that 'nothing which is not known is to be believed' (144). So the view seems to be that, although we don't know that these persons are our parents, we should, for moral reasons, believe that they are. This is no reason to think that acceptance on authority ever constitutes knowledge. The other argument holds that some religious propositions must be accepted as true as a prerequisite to understanding them. The acceptance urged is apparently not regarded as knowledge however, since it temporally precedes understanding (145).

On the other side, Descartes evidently would not deny that we should often, for religious, moral, or practical reasons, accept propositions that we cannot properly be said to know. So Matthews has not shown that there is a difference in doctrine about epistemic authority, or about some more general propriety of believing on authority, which could help explain the difference in Augustine's and Descartes' philosophical projects.

Matthews brevity is remarkable, and generally praiseworthy, but one sometimes wishes for a little more discussion. For example, he asserts that Descartes' epistemic individualism ('All the knowledge I can attain is to be found in myself and my own experience') is a version of internalism, which holds that we can always tell, by reflection, whether or not a belief we hold is justified for us (134). But the relation between these doctrines requires more clarification. As they have been characterized, it seems that an epistemic individualist might fail to be an internalist, by holding, for example, that some beliefs ultimately derived from experience count as

knowledge, even when the believer can no longer tell by reflection whether they are justified. So in what sense is epistemic individualism 'a version of' internalism?

The title and introductory matter may lead readers to expect more philosophical discussion than Matthews provides of the obscurely exciting issues regarding the first person. He sticks firmly to his tasks of interpretation and comparison however, and the result is worthy of careful study by anyone interested in Descartes or Augustine.

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David MacGregor

Hegel, Marx and the English State.

San Francisco: Westview Press.

Pp. 345.

US \$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-1221-3).

The most interesting and themal feature of this book is its radicalization of Hegel's political theory. For MacGregor, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is a guarded but unequivocal argument for state regulation and control of the selfish interests of private capital, for the necessity of workers both to own property in their products and to participate in the management of their production by workplace democracy, and for the full elevation of women into human personality by the transformation of patriarchal rule.

I know of no book in which the reputedly arch-reactionary Hegel is made a founding exponent of these causes, but MacGregor marshalls a great deal in favour of his strikingly progressive interpretation, much of it by inferences and text weavings which may be difficult for a more rigorous exegesis to accept.

An important subtheme of the book is MacGregor's identification of Hegelian influence on Marx in a place where this is not normally seen — namely, in Marx's support and advocacy of state legislation in the development and emancipation of the working class. Marx, argues MacGregor, is not only deeply indebted to Hegel's conception of the state in his work for state-regulated factory laws, working-day limits, child education and so on, as well as Hegelian in his respect for the English government factory inspector Leonard Horner, who was a 'universal class' hero of such state interventions, but, suggests MacGregor, this Marx rather than the 'apocalyptic revolutionary' is the Marx worth taking seriously. For what he judges to be the more fully developed and consistent position on the necessity of

state intervention in the marketplace and on the need to curb the purely private interests of capital from enslaving the rest of society to its particular wants, however, MacGregor prefers Hegel. Indeed, he even claims (my emphasis): '*Hegel is more radical than Marx*' (70).

MacGregor's detailed argument begins with a long account of Hegel's criticisms of English civil society in the period of the Reform Act of 1832, seeking to show that Hegel was — with due regard to Prussian censors — disdainful of England's class divisiveness and extreme aristocratic privileges, its treatment of the working class as an inhuman rabble, and its lack of codified law and a rationally developed state (Chapter 2). MacGregor then moves in Chapter 3 to an Hegelian interpretation of Marx's political analysis after the heady days of *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848, arguing that the mature Marx drew deeply on Hegel's idea of the universal interest of society being articulated and enforced by the State in his sustained commitment to factory legislation and in his little known view that revolution 'might be effected entirely [through state elections and laws] by peaceful and legal means' (59).

Chapter 4 argues that Hegel was no apologist for, but a profound critic of capitalism who conceived of its destruction of the personality of working people as 'criminal' and 'insane'. The employment contract, says MacGregor, was seen by Hegel as 'an insane agreement to make one person a slave for wages and the other rich' (73). 'Hegel was saying that the rich are guilty of the kind of crime Engels would later call "social murder"' (76). The Hegelian solution, says MacGregor, is to make the workers personal 'property holders' in their production who can thereby actualize 'the substance of their being', their 'personality', in self-creating labour for the communal whole.

Chapter 5 argues that Hegel was opposed to patriarchy, and that because his concept of person 'is the founding category of *The Philosophy of Right* — regardless of gender or marital status — Hegel's theory treats women and men as equal property holders in the family' (103). As elsewhere, MacGregor relies a great deal on other authors than Hegel — here in particular Hegel's contemporary T.G. von Hippel — to support his readings of Hegel's texts. That Hegel also said that 'women have their "substantive destiny" in the family and men have their "substantive life in the state"' (136), for example, does not deter MacGregor from pressing his case for Hegel as a thoroughgoing support of feminism.

Chapters 6 and 7 further develop Hegel's theory of private property, its three moments of 'taking possession', 'use' and 'alienation', and its rights as ultimately the individual's 'claim to her own body and mind' (145). MacGregor argues that Hegel conceived of business life as producing 'reflection' or 'understanding' in its concretizing projects (159) and thereby the structure of substantial freedom, but he goes further than Hegel in ascribing to him the view that workers too are clearly 'members of the business class' in Hegel's conception (159-65). MacGregor goes on to argue that Hegel's theory 'entails the workers rights to the fruits of her labour' (170), implies capitalist relations are a 'fraud and crime' (181), and justifies 'revolt [as] necessary' if the 'political administration is not strong enough to curb the abuses of capital' (182).

Chapters 9 and 10 return to the Hegelian elements in Marxism, in particular the 'dialectical inversion' of the 'free contract' from the abstract right of free persons to exchange their goods to the actual power of the capitalist class to reduce the working class to objects of its arbitrary dictates: a contradiction which, says MacGregor, Marx seeks to resolve on the concrete level not by apocalyptic workers' revolution, but by factory legislation to which he devotes major attention in *Capital*. Marx's state-interventionist approach, claims MacGregor, is thoroughly Hegelian in its recourse to the 'universal class' of government agents like the factory inspectorate to impose the interests of the social whole on the particular, selfish wills of capitalists. MacGregor characteristically provides extensive historical documentation in his description of factory owners (and even parents) incanting violations of their 'property rights' and 'freedom', and economists preaching ruin, if laws limiting child labour, unlimited working days, and life-endangering working conditions were enforced by the state (234-62).

MacGregor's concluding chapter is a summary argument on behalf of state regulation of the free-market economy for Hegelian reasons. 'The final end and aim of the state is that *all* human capacities and *all* individual human powers be developed and given expression in every way and every direction' (MacGregor's citation of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, p. 276). But since the market economy deprives non-owners of their freedom as persons and apocalyptic revolution will not work, it must be by Hegelian-style state law that private property rights are 'extended to include the workers right to the product of her labour' (284) that 'the workplace [is to] be democratized' (291), that 'welfare, education and health' for all persons must be provided (288), and that a tenured, impartial 'universal class' of educated civil servants is to be developed to carry out these tasks (288).

The central technical problem in MacGregor's case for a radically progressive Hegelian social theory is that he is inclined to infer from Hegel's texts what they do not themselves claim, loading the argument with copious citations of other thinkers to justify his reading of Hegel, and ignoring the darker side of Hegel's proto-fascist statements about the eternal necessity and health of international war, history's need of innocent victims, the impossibility of Parliamentary democracy in a rational state, and so on. In many places, for example, MacGregor infers from Hegel's hard descriptions of the worker's propertylessness and impotence Hegel's denunciation of these conditions, when what Hegel seems in fact to be affirming is that the embodiment of the free will of others more universally-minded requires precisely this ruling order whatever its costs to the victims (e.g., 75-6, 86, 154, 160-3).

On a more basic level, MacGregor unqualifiedly accepts Hegel's foundation of 'human personality' in private control over regions of the external world as exclusively 'mine' (77-91). Yet one might argue that this premise is not quite so self-evident as MacGregor seems to assume — either as true (is one's 'free personality' in social dialogue or in relating to nature really dependent on one's external property?), or as good (is not Hegel's idea of

endowing another being with a 'new soul' by its becoming private property a kind of outmoded bourgeois egotism?). Such questions do not occur to Professor MacGregor in this book.

These problems in MacGregor's argument do not mean the book is not a valuable one. As many of his historical texts show, idolatry of the 'free market' economy has long been a kind of fundamentalist madness whose management by private owners of capital is badly in need of some kind of state control. Consider this citation by MacGregor from an internal memorandum by World Bank chief economist Laurence Summers in 1991:

"The World Bank should be encouraging *more* migration of the dirty industries to the L(ess) D(eveloped) C(ountries)." Since labor is cheaper, and life expectancy shorter in poorer countries, "the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable." Moreover, initial increases in pollution "probably have low cost. I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly *under*-polluted; their air-pollution is probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City." *The Economist* (1992b:66) magazine which scooped the memo, admitted that "on the economics, his points are hard to answer." (281-2)

Hegel and Marx certainly agreed in principle that the 'universal interest' could only be promoted against selfish private interests by state legislation and action. Barring belief in divine intervention, it is difficult to think of any other solution than inspected enforceable standards imposed by states and, especially now, by nation-states acting in concert, which could work to at least *prevent* gross violations of human and planetary health by multinational capital seeking the lowest costs and largest profits for itself. But such preventative politics is a more modest project than Hegel's or Marx's more positive notions of state power. I suspect David MacGregor knows this, but as a diffident Canadian still roots his conceptions in historical forbearers, which is both a strength and a limitation of his provocative book.

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Kevin R. Murphy

Honesty in the Workplace.

Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company 1993. Pp. vii + 252.

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-534-15492-1).

Kevin Murphy is a psychologist writing for an audience of businesspersons and management consultants, as well as students and scholars in business and the social sciences. Despite occasional allusions to philosophers, he does not enter substantially into philosophical issues (even in places where he deals with conceptual and moral issues). Surprisingly, Sissela Bok's book *Lying* is not even listed in the extensive bibliography. What importance, then, does the book have for philosophers?

First, the book brings together a plethora of information relevant to philosophical reflection on a wide array of issues in business ethics. The information is culled primarily from recent work in psychology, sociology, and management research, as well as some direct research on corporations. The information is not all facts and figures. There are many useful distinctions, such as between different kinds of dishonesty ranging from theft (property deviance) to goldbricking (production deviance). There are also interesting discussions of methodological complexities in gaining reliable information about the extent of and solutions to dishonesty. Murphy successfully integrates a vast amount of research and presents it in a readable yet rigorous format.

Teachers of courses on business ethics will benefit most. For example, instead of vague pronouncements about the need for corporations to change organizational climates which encourage dishonesty, teachers will be equipped to present students with a variety of practical suggestions, together with sketches of their moral pros and cons. They will be able to convey to students a detailed understanding of what is involved in using polygraphs, graphology (handwriting analysis), and 'integrity tests' (written and oral exams). And they will discover the superficiality of commonsense explanations of why employees engage in dishonest conduct.

Second, Murphy systematically distinguishes between honesty as a character trait and honesty as an episodic response to particular situations. He organizes his discussion of the scientific literature in terms of these alternative emphases and works toward a synthesis of the two approaches in developing an operational definition of honesty at the workplace. The synthesis takes seriously the role of character while soberly concluding that everyone is susceptible to wrongdoing given the 'right' circumstances. Murphy's insights are often as relevant to the philosopher struggling with abstract concepts as to the manager trying to establish an ethical organizational climate.

Third, Murphy distinguishes between strategies for discouraging dishonesty and encouraging honesty. Perhaps this distinction might be more clearly drawn as one between discouraging failures to meet minimum requirements

and encouraging higher aspirations of truth-telling and integrity. In any case, he reveals how corporations generally emphasize maintaining the minimum honesty necessary for meeting corporate goals, rather than instilling an aspiration to higher ideals: 'Honesty in the workplace is like Tabasco sauce — more is not always better' (2). His point is not just the usual one about the harm done by ruthless candor in criticizing the flaws (in dress or conduct) of one's boss and colleagues. It also concerns the sometimes beneficial effects of inflated employee appraisals in lifting morale, and it bears on the knotty issues surrounding truth-telling in the form of whistleblowing.

Despite these contributions, Murphy's approach to honesty at the workplace is limited by a largely conventional approach to values. He defines honesty as abiding 'by consistent and rational ethical principles related to obligations to respect the truth' (9). When we ask what 'rational' means, an appeal is made to 'widely held ethical standards regarding truthfulness' (8). What are those standards? The morally-justified standards of morally reasonable persons, as established through philosophical inquiry? The sometimes idealistic demands of consumers in criticizing business practices? Or the lowest common denominator of ordinary business practice? Unfortunately, the latter often seems to be what is meant.

For example, the discussion of whistle-blowing is largely in tune with management's hostility to insubordination. There is relatively little discussion of how the public benefits from professionals who maintain trust with clients and consumers by meeting their professional responsibilities. In fact, the concepts of professionalism and trust are largely absent from this book. Murphy tries to reduce all moral issues concerning honesty to matters of *truthfulness* rather than *trustworthiness*. Perhaps in a future edition he might do more with the concept of managers as professionals whose responsibilities are to promote the public good as well as to maximize profit for stockholders. Even as is, however, the book has much to offer philosophers engaged in applied ethics.

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David Novitz

The Boundaries of Art.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.

Pp. xii + 276.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-928-7).

The boundaries David Novitz challenges here are the conceptual boundaries that separate and, ultimately, isolate art from 'the transactions of daily life' (2). Such boundaries derive, in Novitz's view, from a network of philosophical errors and unfortunate historical developments that Novitz proceeds to unravel and undermine. In the end we are 'to see that art deeply affects, and is reciprocally affected by, ordinary life — despite the boundaries that we misleadingly draw about it' (17).

The book's eleven chapters present a variety of ways Novitz attempts to 'destabilize' these distorting boundaries (14). There are challenges to the high art - popular art distinction (20-41) and to the theory of an autonomous aesthetic experience (64-84), each of which supposes the appreciation of art to require a refined aesthetic sensibility, freed from the 'contaminants' of everyday life. There are examinations of how skills needed for creation in the 'fine' arts derive from everyday practical skills (54-62, 78-80); of how aesthetic terms (such as 'garish', 'gracious', 'beautiful', or 'ugly') may be used to assess not only artworks, but the lives of real people (128-45); and of how concepts from dramatic and narrative art may illuminate cases of personal identity and moral conflict found in ordinary experience (85-104, 146-88).

There are several other topics I have not mentioned; but this will give a fairly good idea of the rich scope of Novitz's book. His discussions, moreover, present well-argued and invariably provocative proposals on some issues of traditional and more recent vintage in philosophical aesthetics: they should provide rewarding material for specialists to consider. In addition, since the book is written in a remarkably lucid and conversational prose style, it should be of value to both nonspecialists and students.

From a substantive standpoint, there is much to admire in Novitz's case. One can agree with his view that many of the boundaries that sever art from life are undesirable in the ways they are presently delineated and that they should be redrawn. One need not agree, however, with all the ways Novitz proposes to redraw those boundaries. I can think of two places where this sort of concern may surface.

1) Consider his criticism of the distinction between high and popular art, where artworks that are part of the daily experience of large numbers of ordinary people are scorned largely by virtue of their wide appeal (20-41). Novitz is correct to point out that popularity is no indicator of artistic inferiority. D.W. Griffith and Duke Ellington, for instance, produced some works of high aesthetic distinction, according to any relevant yardstick of aesthetic excellence. Yet these works had wide popular support in their day and were produced, furthermore, in media that we have come to think of as popular art forms, namely, motion pictures and jazz music, respectively.

Novitz's complaints about the high art - popular art distinction are less plausible, however, when they shift attention from the works and forms that comprise popular art and become, what amounts to, a populist defense of ordinary, uncultivated and uncritical *responses* to art. Consider how Novitz contrasts the art of the last hundred years, when 'the broad mass of people in European society could no longer understand the work of their artists' (32), with earlier periods, when 'even the lowly peasant could understand and enjoy most of the paintings that were hung in the manor house' (33). We can only wonder what sense of 'understand and enjoy' Novitz can mean here, if we assume the peasant was uneducated and uncritical. Surely it cannot be a sense that involves a reasonably discriminating appreciation of the psychological, iconographic and formal dimensions of the representation. Yet if this is so, Novitz must tell us why this ordinary (and aesthetically primitive) response of an uncultivated person deserves classification as an instance of *understanding, enjoying or appreciating* art. These concepts, after all, have an important normative element and may therefore be denied application to subjects where we feel standards have not been met. For example, it would not be unreasonable to say that, because they lack appropriate levels of cultivation or critical disposition, most voters can neither understand, appreciate nor (properly) enjoy the outcomes of significant economic or political events, whatever they might say to the contrary. Why shouldn't a similar set of standards be applied to responses to art? But if such standards were applied, this would reinforce the idea that proper responses to art are not part of the battery of ordinary responses to everyday matters, and require, instead, some *extraordinary* qualities. In the end, then, far from redrawing the boundary between a special (or 'refined') response to art and the unsorted (or 'unrefined') responses to daily life, we would be, in this instance, maintaining it.

2) Another question about boundary modification relates to Novitz's discussion of the art for art's sake, or autonomist, ideologies of the last hundred years (64-84). These theories advanced the idea that there was a special 'aesthetic' way to experience genuine artworks, one which was not dependent on ordinary psychological, cognitive, moral, political, religious or economic ways found in everyday life. Novitz correctly points out how absurd such theories are when applied to a Jane Austen novel or a Raphael painting, where the appreciator's moral or religious values play crucial roles in shaping the response (81). But this is not where the main challenge of these autonomist theories lay, since they were attracted (often exclusively) to the formal elements of an artwork, to 'textures and grains rather than messages or themes' (82). One wonders what these elements have to do with ordinary life. Novitz offers two suggestions.

First, an appreciator's taste for textures and grains is not realized in a state of splendid formalist isolation, but is the social product of an artworld's singling out these elements for attention and praise, and educating an emerging audience accordingly (39, 74-7, 82, 84). Second, the appearance of 'textures and grains' is not (as Urmson thought) a pure sensory experience

cut off from our beliefs about reality. On the contrary, the 'soft pink glow on the cheeks of a young child' will *appear* differently to us depending on whether we *believe* the child is sick or healthy (67-9, also 117). Both of these criticisms by Novitz undermine the boundaries of art in important ways. However, they may not go far enough. The first criticism only points to a causal dependence between the artworld and the appreciator's formalist tastes, not a conceptual one. For an analogy, we can note that a state of Zen meditation *also* may have social origins (in Buddhism, for example); yet this fact has no adverse effect on the character of the experience, which is still that of suspending one's attention to everyday concerns — including attention to those very origins themselves. As for the second criticism, Novitz weakens his point by linking his examples too closely to *recognizable* represented objects, where appreciators are able to import their beliefs about the world. Artists, however, often challenge appreciators to respond to *unrecognizable* represented objects, where correlations to real world expectations are short-circuited. Does a Cézanne apple look edible, or inedible? Does a Picasso face look sick, or healthy? We probably cannot answer such questions very well (in contrast to easier cases, found in, say, a Renoir or a Manet). What this suggests is that there may be something irreducible in our response to 'textures and grains' in art, after all, and that Novitz must offer further reasoning to relieve one of this suspicion.

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Bertell Ollman

Dialectical Investigations.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1993.

Pp. ix + 191

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90679-2);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90680-6).

DI is an 'interim report' (4) and one of four projected volumes intended 'to show how thoroughly dialectical Marx is' (5). It contains a short introduction to dialectics (9-19); an advanced dialectics (23-83); and the dialectical investigations proper, the practical application of dialectics to the state, the US Constitution, *perestroika*, academic freedom, historical materialism, and class consciousness (87-179).

Ollman's goal is to clarify dialectical method and counterpose it to the distortions of 'bourgeois ideology' (11) and 'what Marx calls [...] the common sense approach' (13). According to Ollman, 'the subject of dialectics is change

... and interaction' (23), while common sense is about appearances, parts, and the status quo.

On metatheory, *DI* is comprehensive and imaginative, but vague, inconsistent, and implausible. As political commentary it is perceptive, suggestive, original, and very plausible — and a model of good theory.

The development of the theory of dialectics by Ollman is complex. As in *Alienation* (1971), Ollman adheres to the philosophy of internal relations, but in *DI* he focuses on the concept of abstraction in its three modes of extension, level of generality, and vantage point. In order to understand the change and interaction (or 'development'), the theorist must abstract with a focus on changing, reciprocal relations rather than simple, inflexible cause and effect.

Abstraction of extension, for Marx on Ollman's interpretation, involves flexible, overlapping classifications of things in contradiction, which itself has five kinds of movement (51f). Abstraction of levels of generality has 'seven major levels' (55) from that of the unique individual to material nature in general. Finally, there are any number of vantage points depending on one's position and the problem to be solved. Even with that complexity, he says much is left out (81n).

Unfortunately, much that is said in *DI* about ordinary complex phenomena is put in extraordinary and convoluted ways. First, the criticisms of mainstream theory, which is often suspect, are overstated. Non-dialectical thinkers are accused of focusing only on appearances and not being able to grasp the underlying forces (11 and 17). Common sense and bourgeois ideology are said to be 'based on a conception of reality divided into separate and independent parts' (16), and for various reasons non-dialectical thinkers are unable to 'think adequately about change and interaction' (81). The dominant social science, Ollman contends, says that 'things exist *and* undergo change' while Marx takes account of a social form's 'transient nature *not less* than its momentary existence' (29), where the emphases are supposed to indicate that the former, but not the latter, treats the two as logically distinct.

About dialectics, Ollman says that "abstraction" functions as a noun as well as a verb' (26) and that 'the basic unit of reality is not a thing but a relation' (50) — although the textual evidence is about 'things in ... their reciprocal influence on one another' (51). I suspect an underlying false dichotomy between bourgeois theories with only external relations and Marxism with only internal relations.

A problem lurking behind Ollman's philosophy of internal relations is constructivism. As Ollman says, 'Marx constructs his subject matter as much as he finds it' (39) or, more strongly, 'conceptual distinctions ... are social and mental constructs' (11-12). Class distinctions apparently are constructed rather than real differences to be found in social conflicts.

In my view, much of his dialectical theory is metatheory and metaphysics gone astray. The important thing is that Marxism studies change and interaction, and *pace* Ollman, that is common sense thinking. Social theorists need to be reminded that it is common sense to see connections, contexts, and

change — that change and interaction are common and social forms are transient. That is why Marx said ('Afterword' to *Capital*) that the rational use of the dialectic is 'critical and revolutionary', which is exactly what Ollman shows in the third part, the dialectical investigations.

His seven studies at the end are admirable exercises in showing, as he often puts it, 'the dynamics of who is doing what to whom and why, together with the structural reforms needed to change things' (128). He constantly indicates the structures, the tendencies, the interconnections, and the contradictory forces which are responsible for some benefiting richly — in the United States, '1 percent of the population own 50 percent of all wealth' (108). These studies are rich in new observations about structures and change.

He first looks at the particular nature of the American capitalist state and its increasing role in serving the needs of the changing capitalist class. Capitalists 'require what amounts to state planning on their behalf — and they get it' (98) in the form of investment, monetary and tax policy, research, training, etc. But this is not to suppose that capitalist states in general have a permanent nature. According to Ollman, the national state is now increasingly reduced to 'repressive and socializing functions while most of the help rendered capitalists ... is provided at the world and regional levels' (100).

Especially interesting is Ollman's persuasive argument (from October 1990) that the Soviet Union was a 'regency of the proletariat' in which the Communist Party played the role of the regent which then tried to take the sovereignty from the immature monarch. Ollman's thesis is that the party functionaries are engaged in an 'idealist attempt to build capitalism' which will inevitably fail because Russia lacks a class with sufficient capital, a downtrodden and malleable working class, and accessible foreign markets (117).

Ollman's most 'theoretical' investigations are on 'studying history backwards' and on how to study class consciousness. In the former, he shows ways in which we can understand the present by studying the preconditions from which it unfolded. Ollman's longest, but still 'preliminary' (177n), investigation is about the dialectical way of studying class consciousness as opposed to using attitude surveys of individual workers. He gives a plausible account of 'a kind of "group think," a collective, interactive approach to recognizing, labeling, coming to understand, and acting upon the particular world' (156). He argues that since 'class consciousness can develop and spread with the speed of a forest fire', it is important to study the objective conditions of consciousness (167).

Ollman's investigations are rich speculative studies of structure, context, change, and interaction — models for 'revolutionary politics' with 'fire in the belly' (93). *DI* has much of what I would simply call 'common sense'. I can agree with Ollman's theoretical practice without agreeing with his philosophy of internal relations and dialectical abstraction.

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Benjamin B. Page, ed.

Marxism and Spirituality:

An International Anthology.

Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey 1993.

Pp. xxiv + 224.

(ISBN 0-89789-291-7).

On the one hand, Page's Introduction is intended to defend relationships between Marxism and spirituality by pre-empting recent historical facts and obvious philosophical problems. Thus he acknowledges, at the start, that 'Events in East Europe and the Soviet Union raise questions about the failure or abandonment of the communist project and the relevance of Marxist philosophy ...'. And he admits that including Marx's atheistic materialism and spirituality 'under one cover may seem like an exercise in contradiction.'

On the other hand, this pre-emptive strategy, which is both echoed and rejected by some of the contributions to his *Anthology*, fails to distinguish Marxist philosophy from Marxist ideology. Though Marxist philosophy holds that a deterministic material order is the sole basis for explicating the human condition, for example, Marxist ideology admonishes philosophers to freely change the world and not to merely interpret it differently.

Many intriguing insights, together with the conflation of philosophy and ideology, pervade the four parts of Page's *Anthology*: Classic Visions by Leon Trotsky, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, and Vivian Gornick; Background and Overviews by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Costanzo Preve; Contemporary Marxist Views by Herbert Aptheker, Nancy Bancroft, Zbynek Fiser, M.S. Kagan, Boris Majer, Thomas Mongar, and Helena Sheehan; and Dialogues by Milan Machovec, Milan Opocensky, Jose Miguez-Bonino, and Christopher Titmuss.

Page's assertion (x) that spirituality refers *inter alia* to consciousness, will and choice, and freedom and justice reflect the ideological side of Marx and Marxists. The Classic Visions of Part I echo this ideology. Hence, notwithstanding the reference to a deterministic 'molding of new generations' (6), Trotsky says that the 'new man will love in a better and stronger way' (5). The new man will 'make it his purpose to master his own feelings, to raise his instincts to the heights of consciousness, ... to create a higher social biological type, or, if you please, a *superman*' (my emphasis, 8). The parallel to Nazi (National Socialist) notions of an *Übermensch* and a 'higher' biological type of human being, if not of a 'life-affirming positive Christianity', is disquieting.

Trotsky's essay, as the first of the contributions, is important for going to the heart of a philosophical problem which is never addressed in Page's *Anthology*. The concepts of 'creation' and 'superman' are not merely noteworthy because they are indebted to Nietzsche's anti-Marxian 'choice' of metaphysical freedom over determinism. (While Nietzsche is referenced throughout the book, pages 46, 62, 159, and 182 are missed in the Index — p. 182 stating that 'we could attempt to write off Marxist atheism as a case of

Nietzschean revolt against God.) Nor are the concepts of 'creation' and 'superman' merely interesting because they were incorporated into the radical relativistic philosophies of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, mentioned on p. 55, and by New-Left feminists in order to give a 'credible' twist to social-political agenda.

The concepts are most interesting because many post-Kantian philosophers thought that the judgments 'All events have causes' (supposed by science) and 'Persons are free agents' (supposed by moral praise and blame) were claims whose truth could not be established empirically or logically. If all scientific and moral theories presuppose these unknowable metaphysical claims, what is the source of knowledge? An influential answer is that knowledge is *relative* to Nietzschean supermen who create truth or to Marxian historical epochs that are determined by dialectical movements of matter.

The disregarded problem with this epistemological relativism is that a given statement, whether scientific or moral, may incoherently be both 'true' and 'false' — depending on the superman or epoch in question. Now the 'classic visions' of Trotsky, Guevara, and Gornick share with Marx the deterministic and scientific *Weltanschauung* of the Enlightenment. The latter is acknowledged as a primary foundation of Marxism by Herbert Aptheker in Part III (79) and by Christopher Titmuss in Part IV (198). But these visions need a metaphysics of freedom, consistent with relativism, in order to paradoxically generate moral coherence: of a 'creation of a new man' who has a 'big dose of humanity' (Guevara, 12, 14); and of a 'religion in the image of the new socialized man' who is nevertheless 'formed by political history' (Gornick, 16, 18).

In many ways, the neglect of philosophical problems in Part I anticipates an *anti-intellectualist* ideology in Parts II, III, and IV. Guevara's assertion that the 'ideological motor force' needs to be distanced from 'cold scholasticism' (14), for instance, finds expression in the views of Aptheker who is an Afro-American historian. Formerly a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, he remarks that 'exploitative societies' promulgate ideas that are 'anti-scientific' and 'elitist' (73). Ideology must not be elitist or cold. The *defenses* of a warm egalitarian ideology, which is intellectually *indefensible* in terms of Marxist philosophy, invites the idea that intellectual challenges are to be discouraged by *ad hominem* attacks. What is unique about Marx, however, is that his philosophical theory 'legitimizes' such attacks: 'Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates *ad hominem* ...,' Aptheker quotes Marx as saying (71).

Marx's 'scientific' theory, in this sense, is characterized by a circularity in which the theory supports irrational ideological attacks and the attacks suppress criticism of the theory. A Marxist strategy, adopted by many academics who promote politicized agenda, is to disavow the philosopher's ability to question 'science' and to attack critical questions as reflecting 'elitism', 'intellectual arrogance', and 'moral indifference.'

The danger to spirituality and religion of such a closed politicized circularity is recognized by Rosenthal in Part II. In warning that it is a 'dangerous

illusion' to think that a more God-seeking approach to Marxism would have prevented the Stalinist gulags (45), he collides head-on with Page's notion that the abandonment of Stalinist Marxism frees us for a more spiritual approach to Marxism.

One might, in the end, contrast the *religious faith* of a Czechoslovakian minister who has suffered under East European communism to the *secular spirituality* of Page who felt himself 'coming alive' during the New-Left university movement of the late 1960s. Milan Opocensky says that during the years of communist suppression in Czechoslovakia, in which the Roman Catholic Church was most persecuted, 'The most relevant questions were whether the church was still really the church of Christ and whether we were really ready to live by grace' (181). By contrast, Page doubts the meaningfulness of a bishop's struggle to 'confirm people and celebrate communion with them ...' (xx).

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Ladislav Robert

Les Horloges biologiques.

coll. 'Nouvelle Bibliothèque Scientifique',
Paris, Flammarion 1989. Pp. 289.

Cdn/US \$39.95 (ISBN 2-08-211190-3).

Dans ce livre, l'auteur, d'origine hongroise, s'inspire des réflexions initiales de Leibniz à propos de 'l'analyse causale des événements organisés en succession'. Le projet du Docteur Ladislav Robert vise à comprendre comment et pourquoi le temps affecte les organismes vivants. Autrement dit, quels sont les mécanismes qui régissent l'évolution et le vieillissement des humains?

L'ouvrage nous introduit à l'idée que tout organisme vivant serait réglé comme une multitude d' 'horloges biologiques'. Le premier chapitre, intitulé 'Temps et vieillissement', annonce déjà les enjeux de ce processus: 'Pour l'homme, le vieillissement peut-être défini par la baisse de la capacité à s'adapter à un environnement changeant et à coordonner ses réactions aux sollicitations extérieures (P. 31)'.

Le lecteur y trouvera une réflexion complexe et interdisciplinaire, faisant le point entre la biologie et la gérontologie, afin de mieux comprendre ce passage mystérieux et implacable de la Vie vers la Mort.

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Tom Rockmore and Beth Singer, eds.
Antifoundationalism Old and New.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.
Pp. x + 251.
US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-881-7).

This is a lively and varied collection of essays whose distinctive feature is the reexamination of a series of historical figures in the light of antifoundationalism. Let me run through the contents with a view to seeing what antifoundationalism has become and whether it is a passing fad or a genuine advance in thought.

Joseph Margolis finds an unexpected hint of antifoundationalism in the Anaximander fragment, for the *apeiron* lies beyond the contraries that emerge from it. 'Conceptual analysis cannot but be radically provisional, historical, constructivist, praxical, existential, moderately incommensurable, contextual — and privative. Indeterminacy is as much a feature of what is as of what we believe. There you have the key to Anaximander's inkling' (36).

Margolis opposes antifoundationalism to any kind of foundational fixity; Ronald Polansky opposes it only to the logistic method, exemplified by Euclid, in which each step is justified by the preceding steps. Hence he can argue that Plato's method is antifoundationalist because principles 'are justified insofar as they can be by that for which they must account' (53).

Gary Calore argues that Augustine's paradoxes concerning time arise from his foundationalist commitment to an unchanging reality and would be avoided by Buchler's principle of ontological parity.

Fred and Emily Michael argue that Gassendi's theory of ideas, unlike Locke's, is non-foundational: 'Gassendi's theory of cognition is hierarchical; its foundation is, however, not in cognitions intuitively apprehended, but on uninterpreted data from the senses. Locke's theory of ideas is foundational; Gassendi's is not' (103).

Tom Rockmore contrasts the linear method of foundationalists with the circular method of Hegel: 'Hegel's enormous merit is to have clearly seen that, despite the inadequacy of foundationalism, another, antifoundationalist, circular approach to knowledge is possible' (121).

Wilhelm Wurzer returns to the broader meaning of antifoundationalism when he commends Nietzsche's rejection of ground as reason, but laments his failure to liberate us altogether from metaphysical grounding: 'Even though ground has fallen from the power of noumenal rationality in Nietzsche's genealogy, presence (of ground) is nonetheless affirmed in the terrain of imagination's play of the wills to power' (136).

Charlene Haddock Siegfried gives an excellent account of William James that identifies characteristic positive features of his antifoundationalism: our appropriations of experience are perspectival, varying according to personal temperaments; reality is reality-for-us, since phenomena do not mean the visible appearances of an underlying noumenal reality but the very reality

itself as grasped in our interactions; the logistic or building-block theory of sensations is dismantled; starting points are provisional and chosen by each of us.

The final three essays propose three kinds of antifoundational metaphysics. Sandra B. Rosenthal combines the independent real of Peirce (foundational) with the creative principles of Mead and Dewey (antifoundational) to create a variety of pragmatism that countenances speculative metaphysics and is neither foundationalist nor antifoundationalist. 'The alternatives of foundationalism or antifoundationalism have been seen to ignore, respectively, the dimension of free creativity or of ontological presence, which are unified at the heart of human existence' (184).

Beth J. Singer gives a summary account of the metaphysics of John Herman Randall, Jr., which seeks the traits of existence as existence, but seeks them in the context of changing historical experience. His metaphysics is therefore antifoundational in the sense of lacking closure or finality.

Kathleen Wallace presents a conception of metaphysics as the constructing of categorial frameworks with the aim of achieving conceptual orientation or reorientation together with generality or comprehensiveness. She points out that her metaphysics is nonfoundational not only in not following a method of beginning from secure starting points, but also in the sense that categories or frameworks, though subject to validation, are neither true nor false, and need not invalidate one another. Here, I think, the true significance of antifoundationalism appears.

Those who espouse a metaphysical antifoundationalism that rejects all fixed foundations sometimes claim to represent a new and unprecedented turn in the history of thought, an overcoming of the whole metaphysical tradition. This form of antifoundationalism carries on the familiar sophistic or skeptical tradition in a new guise. We should not forget that antifoundationalism was already the dominant mode of thought in the Hellenic period, and that the foundationalists were few and often marginal. That man is the measure of all things is what 'they' say, according to the Athenian in the *Laws* (iv.716c), and Socrates repeatedly notes that he is almost alone in his views (e.g. *Gorgias* 472a, *Crito* 49d). Isocrates boasts that he has had more pupils than all the rest put together who are occupied with philosophy (*Antidosis* 41). Plato in this situation undertook the heroic task of subverting antifoundationalism from within by working with its traces of rationality. Democritus used foundational principles to account for antifoundationalism, but when he came to Athens no one knew him (DK 68 B 116). Aristotle uses examples from the antifoundationalists in his *Rhetoric*, refutes their pretensions to philosophy in the *Metaphysics*, identifies their fallacies of argument in the *Organon*, and in all the special sciences generally ignores them as having contributed nothing to the subject. But Aristotle was a latecomer and his treatises were largely unknown until the second century AD.

What of the methodological antifoundationalism that rejects the logistic method? The logistic method is one of the great methods, and has produced

success after success in many different fields. We are presently witnessing one of its triumphs in the computer revolution. To simply reject it is silly.

Considered in terms of what it explicitly says, therefore, antifoundationalism makes no substantial contribution to the history of thought and must be viewed as a passing fad. Nevertheless, so general a movement can hardly be without significance, and Kathleen Wallace's paper indicates what it is. Antifoundationalism reflects an awareness that philosophy today cannot continue to produce foundational constructions like those of the past. Neither can it simply repudiate them. By reflecting on them, it can move to a level at which the reasons why they are both valid and multiple become clear.

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John Sallis, ed.

Reading Heidegger: Commemorations.

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1993.

Pp. 418.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-35053-0);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20712-6).

The twenty three essays presented in this volume represent the collection of papers presented at a conference held in Chicago 21-24, 1989 which commemorated the one hundredth anniversary of Martin Heidegger's birth. Those interested in Heidegger's thought will welcome them because the level of scholarship brought to bear on the themes dealt with is, without exception, of a high order indeed. The contributors represent some of the most distinguished interpreters of Heidegger's thought from the United States, England, France, Belgium, Germany, China and Japan. The constraints of space do not permit me to give a detailed evaluation of each of the twenty-three essays individually, so I am obliged to restrict myself to quite general remarks.

The essays are typically 10-15 pages in length, although the piece by Derrida 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology,' whose length is 55 pages, is an exception. An idea of the wide range and richness of the material presented in these essays can be gathered from the nine themes which organize and structure this book. The first of these sections 'In the Wake of *Being and Time*' analyzes themes from *Being and Time* such as *Stimmung* and its derivatives in the essay by Rodolphe Gasche. 'Everydayness' by Michel Haar takes us up to what many (including Heidegger himself as he says in the 1969 interview in *L'Express*) take to be the *Kehre* or turn in his thought which

occurs in *On the Essence of Truth*. John Sallis in 'Deformatives' traces the development of this essay on truth from the first public lecture of 1930 to its publication, with its alterations in 1943.

In the second section 'Heidegger and Psychiatry' William Richardson gives a most interesting and illuminating account of Heidegger's friendship with the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss, founder and proponent of the daseinsanalytic method of psychotherapy. It was at Boss' invitation that Heidegger gave a series of seminars to Psychiatrists in Zurich during the years 1959-1969. Although these Zollikon Seminars have now been published by Boss (1987) they are still not translated or well known, so Richardson's bringing them to our attention is especially valuable.

In the third section 'Questioning Ethics' Charles Scott examines the problem of the foundation of ethics and values in *Being and Time* and what, at least at first glance, appears to lead to ethical and value nihilism. Robert Bernasconi's essay examines Heidegger's understanding of *Dike* (justice) and the development which occurred in Heidegger's understanding of it. This section is completed by David Krell's reflection on human mortality in 'Where Deathless Horses Weep'.

In the fourth section 'Thresholds' Jiro Watanabe shows the centrality of a categorial intuition of Being in Heidegger and how his understanding of the categorial intuition differed from that of Husserl. In his essay '*Being and Time* and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*' Friedrich-Wilhelm Von Hermann examines the problem of the missing third section of the first part of *Being and Time*, 'Time and Being', which had been written but rejected by Heidegger at the time of the publication of *Being and Time*. His attempted reconstruction of this missing third section from the Summer Seminar of 1927, 'The Basic Problems of Phenomenology', is most helpful in trying to imagine what the completed first part of *Being and Time* would have been. David Wood in 'Reiterating the Temporal' takes a very critical look at some of Heidegger's favored notions such as 'dwelling', 'granting', 'appropriation', etc. He maintains, correctly in my view, that there is a fundamental intellectual obligation to retain a certain exteriority in reading Heidegger. This, of course, Heidegger, or at least the later Heidegger, would reject, since he insists he is trying to lead his reader into the experience of something, e.g. language. Thus for Heidegger to maintain an exteriority to his thought would be to misunderstand him essentially. And thus the problem of trying to examine Heidegger's thought critically.

In section five on 'Philopolemology' Jacques Derrida provides an excellent example of a phenomenological showing in his analysis contained in 'Heidegger's Ear'. Section six deals with the theme 'Heidegger and the Greeks', in essays by Kenneth Maly, Jean-François Courtine and Adriaan Peperzak. These essays take up what, to be sure, has been the central task of the later Heidegger — interrogating Being as it opened, and at the same time concealed itself, to the early Greeks, particularly Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. The essay by Shi-Ying Zhang 'Heidegger and Taoism' shows the

universality of Heidegger's appeal and how it is possible to bring it into fruitful dialogue with another, quite different, tradition, i.e. Taoism.

In section eight on 'Heidegger and Translation' the essays by Parvis Emad, Eliane Escoubas and Samuel Ijsseling examine the problems of translation in relation to what is a central concern especially in later Heidegger, the question of the opening of Being in language whether the translation occurs in one's own language, i.e. translating the experience of Being to language, or in another language from one's own.

In the final section 'Language and Art' Françoise Dastur in her essay examines the notion of language as the *Ereignis*, that is an event in the coming to pass of Being. Walter Biemel examines how the art work originates in relation to the emergence of Being as *physis* and asks us to consider whether a transformation of dwelling in the world is possible originating with art. Dominique Janicaud takes up the problem of the overcoming of metaphysics. He shows that as late as 1935 in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* metaphysical presuppositions are still present in Heidegger, but by the time of the first course in Hölderlin, *Germanien*, Heidegger claims that Hölderlin has already founded a new epoch. The concluding essay by Jacques Taminiaux examines the shifts and developments in Heidegger's thought as it revolves around the origin of the work of art. Taminiaux examines this development particularly in the three versions of Heidegger's *Origin of the Work of Art*. He argues that the turn or *Kehre* was not yet present in the first draft of this essay which Heidegger wrote in November of 1935 and that it seems clear, at least to Taminiaux, that Heidegger here still remains within the framework of Fundamental Ontology. This work underwent a revision in 1936 which, according to Taminiaux, is a voluntarist proclamation of the German *Dasein*. And finally in the third version, which was the published one, a change, of quite considerable dimensions has taken place, and the turn, or *Kehre*, is apparent. In a word, *Dasein* is no longer the locus of Truth.

Such, in a very sketchy way, may give some indication of the wide range of themes treated in this very valuable addition to Heideggerian scholarship. These topics are especially interesting, and make this book especially valuable because they represent themes that have appeared for the first time with the newly published volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

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Joachim Schulte and Göran Sundholm, eds.
Criss-Crossing a Philosophical Landscape.
Graz: Grazer Philosophischen Studien 1992.
Pp. v + 264.
(ISBN 90-5183-409-8).

This is a festschrift for Brian McGuinness, professor at Queen's College Oxford for thirty-five years, co-translator of the *Tractatus*, co-editor and co-translator of the *Prototractatus*, biographer of Wittgenstein, and author of numerous articles on Wittgenstein. Because of McGuinness' focus on the *Tractatus*, nearly half the essays deal with Wittgenstein's early work. Because of lack of expertise or space, I am unable to comment on three chapters dealing with Tractarian logic, the article on the composition of Part II of the *Investigations*, the essay on philosophy of mathematics, and the piece on knowing in PI.

The volume begins with an interesting analysis of what Wittgenstein meant by the phrase 'the happy man'. Joachim Schulte believes that the key to understanding human happiness is connected to Wittgenstein's mysticism, a topic to which McGuinness addressed himself in a seminal essay. For Wittgenstein the happy man is in harmony with the world, or, in religious terms, in conformity with God's will. Schulte rejects Hacker's interpretation that the subject of happiness is a Kantian transcendental subject. The 'I' is simply that point from which the world is perceived, not beyond the world but at the limit of the world. Schulte does concede that Schopenhauer's influence can be seen in Wittgenstein's belief that the bearer of happiness is the willing subject. This self is also identified as the *Weltseele*, and this pantheism Schulte attributes to the influence of Goethe and his poem by that title.

With regard to the influence of other thinkers on Wittgenstein, Schulte offers a good rule to follow: '[Wittgenstein] merely employed and assimilated formulations, images, attitudes, and examples taken from [Schopenhauer] for purposes of his own. But it may be useful to remind the reader of the fact that this was invariably Wittgenstein's way of using authors he liked and respected, for instance, Frege, Russell, Weininger, Spengler, and William James. The most he ever did was to take a problem from these thinkers and transform it into a problem for himself, immediately turning it into something that was eminently characteristic of himself' (8). For those commentators who still place Wittgenstein in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, it is significant to note that Wittgenstein's most profound influences were continental, more specifically *Lebensphilosophie* (Schopenhauer, Spengler, Brouwer, and others), Viennese intellectuals, and German romanticism in general.

The thesis of Rudolf Haller's contribution that Wittgenstein's philosophical goal was always 'clarity for its own sake' is ambiguous and misleading. One would have to have a rather broad and ultimately empty concept of clarity to encompass the traditional analytical exactness of the *Tractatus* and the later synoptic view (*Übersichtlichkeit*), which comes about as a 'poetic composition' (CV, p. 28). In *Zettel* Wittgenstein declared: 'I strive *not* after exactness, but after a synoptic view' (§464). Haller also neglects to see the methodological

shift that comes from giving up the Tractarian doctrine of external relations for the internal relations of the later work (PR, pp. 63, 66, 268, 317; PI, 212).

In one of the best essays of the volume, David Pears rejects the common view that the Tractarian doctrine of showing disappears along with the picture theory of language. First, Pears demonstrates that the doctrine of showing definitely survives in the later works: e.g., the truth of induction must be shown (OC, *passim*); the incompatibility of colors can be proved only in practice (Z, §§354-59); and the rules of language and math can only be lived not said (PI & RFM, *passim*). Second, he shows how the later doctrine of showing is connected to a resurrection of the synthetic a priori, viz. that both human thought and nature together have something to say. (In the *Remarks* and *Grammar* Wittgenstein supports Kant on $5 + 7 = 12$ [p. 129; p. 404]; and in *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics* he says that 'A patch cannot be at the same time both red and green' is synthetic a priori [p. 232].) This means that Wittgenstein is neither the conventionalist nor the relativist that some commentators take him to be.

Gordon Baker's excellent piece is a warning to all those who would associate Wittgenstein with any particular philosophical movement. (Incidentally, Baker's Oxford dissertation 'The Logic of Vagueness' would serve as the definitive answer to Haller's article.) The main problem, he believes, is the 'constant danger of endowing quite specific comments with a spurious appearance of generality' (111). He contends that the standard English translations of '*die Sprache*', '*die Grammatik*', and *Übersichtlichkeit* mislead the reader to think in ways contrary to Wittgenstein's very specific intentions. Baker disputes the widely held interpretation that Wittgenstein believed that we could 'bestow on our grammar a property which it now lacks by constructing perspicuous representations [*übersichtliche Darstellungen*] which will henceforth make the use of our words perspicuous' (113). Wittgenstein's actual goals were much more specific and modest than this. For example, the use of the color octahedron in the *Remarks* (pp. 273-80) was not meant to achieve a bird's eye view of a universal grammar of color, but to offer a *different* perspective on the impossibility of combinations such as greenish-red. Baker's approach would take each remark as 'context-relative', 'purpose-specific', and 'person-relative' — centering 'on the dynamics of somebody's thinking, not on the geometry of thoughts' (129, 130); and 'what brings about somebody's "knowing her way about" in the language is often the judicious choice of a new object of comparison, a creative analogy, or the revelation of a new aspect of the use of our words' (131).

In 'Meaning and Actions in Wittgenstein's Late Perspective' Rosaria Egidi demonstrates how Wittgenstein uses an internalist view of intentionality to reject Russell's view that fulfillment is somehow external to expectation. Egidi then shows how Wittgenstein breaks free of this view, one that is correctly attributed to Brentano and one that is still bound to the distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer'. Egidi's careful analysis fails to mention the role of 'forms of life', a crucial concept in PI, which allows him to overcome all residues of psychologism and which leads to the brilliant fusion of intentionality and behaviorism in the later work. Anger, for example, is

neither merely what I *feel* when I am angry nor merely what I *do*, but it is a fusion of the inner and the outer in a form of life.

In his article A.G. Gargani reminds us how much Freud influenced Wittgenstein's work. Gargani establishes an intriguing parallel between repetition of the 'primal scene' in Freud and rule following in Wittgenstein. For both the reenactment is not mere repetition as mechanical causality, but involves an aesthetic unfolding of various aspects in many different contexts. For both the right approach is not an explication of causal behavior, but the use of perspicuous representations. When Gargani says that neurotic 'actions delineate something which was not there before: in their aesthetic development they trace the physiognomy of their origin' (219), he throws light on Wittgenstein's famous 'meaning is a physiognomy' (PI, §568). Gargani also discusses the more familiar connection to Freud: philosophy as therapy. He makes the interesting point that Tractarian therapy required a theoretical ladder, which is kicked away when all philosophical problems are solved. But in the later work, specifically *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein declares: 'You don't stand on stilts or on a ladder but on your bare feet' (p. 33) — and on the 'rough ground' of ordinary life. Gargani concludes with an observation, still not widely appreciated, that Wittgenstein's very personal philosophical method had much to do with the full integration of the aesthetic and the ethical found in many contemporary Austrian intellectuals.

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Susan Sherwin

*No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics
and Health Care.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.

Pp. xi + 286.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-889-2).

This book is an introduction to feminism and how feminist theory can and should inform ethics and health care ethics. It was difficult for me to review; Sherwin's arguments that women are oppressed hit hard. I don't feel oppressed. I resent the suggestion that I have allowed myself to be oppressed — consciously or not. I want to defend my husband, my teachers and my male friends and colleagues against the evidence that they are oppressors. This book made me squirm; it made me question my professional and personal values and it has caused me to think more carefully about issues in health care ethics. Because it challenges the reader in this way *No Longer Patient* is a valuable book.

Part One provides the theory and concepts which support what will follow. We are introduced to a variety of feminist claims, and to a critical analysis of ethics and moral relativism (Sherwin provides a feminist view of both). Here Sherwin gives hard evidence for the claim that women are oppressed. Economically we earn and own less. Women and children form the largest proportion of the poor, and are frequently victims of abuse and violence. Women hold little power, and traditionally things which are important to women are not reflected in society's norms and values. Sherwin's arguments in this part are thorough and extensively researched. (The footnotes should be read along with the text, and the publishers do a disservice to their readers by banishing them to the back of the book.)

After providing the theoretical underpinnings for what will follow, Sherwin provides a transition to specific bioethical issues by placing feminist ethics in the context of health care. She shows how medical practitioners have failed women, and ways in which bioethicists have failed to point this out. Similarities between feminist ethics and bioethics are drawn, as is our attention to the importance of the clinical context of ethical problems and the political context of oppression.

Part Two looks at some traditional problems in health care ethics, the way these problems have been formulated in the past, and how they may be reformulated in a feminist context. The question of whether or not abortion is ethically permissible, for example, usually focuses on the moral status of the fetus, ignoring women's experiences and the stake women have in this issue. A number of claims are made that I would have liked to see supported: for example that because of its complete biological dependence, 'the responsibility and privilege of determining a fetus' specific social status and value must rest with the woman carrying it' (110). Also, that the right to abortion and to financial and support services for the care of their children are *positive* rights held by women (114, 116).

Other topics considered in this part are New Reproductive Technologies (NRT), Paternalism, and Research. Sherwin disputes the typical nonfeminist view that NRTs have provided options for women that they would not otherwise have had. As most feminist writers do, she outlines the relative ineffectiveness of the procedures and ways in which women are viewed as incomplete or unnatural if they cannot or will not reproduce. The sections on paternalism and research suggest that our worship of science, rationality and technology has created the mistaken belief that physicians and scientists know more about us as patients and research subjects, and therefore also know what is best for us as persons.

Part Three looks at ways in which medicine shapes the way we view ourselves and our perception of illness. Society tells us what is 'normal' in areas of sexuality, body image and menstruation and that anything different is illness. Sherwin discusses the interrelatedness of society and health and the social causes of illness, and we are reminded that those in positions of power and control are usually of a certain gender, race and/or class (as are philosophers and bioethicists).

There are some inaccuracies in fact, and some misleading implications made in *No Longer Patient*. For example, Sherwin states (121) that during IVF (in-vitro fertilization) ova are removed by the surgical procedure laparoscopy when in fact the less invasive use of ultrasound has been standard practice since 1985-87. She claims (121) that some programs require a woman 'to remain immobile for forty-eight hours after the fertilized eggs are introduced to her womb (including up to twenty-four hours in the head-down position).' I know of no clinics that practice this kind of voodoo medicine. Also, she points out (125) the chemical similarities between the fertility drug chlomid and the cancer-causing drug DES without noting that the former is used in small doses in women who are not pregnant, while the latter was used in very large doses in women who were already pregnant (a significant difference).

Finally, the tone of the book often seems confrontational and accusatory, although Sherwin says right from the start that she does not mean to attack individual health care practitioners but the system. She criticizes nonfeminist bioethicists for areas that they fail to address, such as the impact of unwanted pregnancy on women. On her part, she fails to address a huge area of concern which is the way older adults, most of whom are women, are perceived and treated in our culture and by the health care system. We might look on this as an area which she chose not to address at this time, rather than adopt her tone and make the claim that she deemed this unworthy of consideration or that her focus on reproductive issues reduces women to their biological function.

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François Sirois

Les Névroses.

Sainte-Foy (Québec), Editions Le Griffon d'argile 1991. Pp. 639.

Cdn \$65.00: US \$69.00 (ISBN 2-920922-34-3).

Les ouvrages de base et les manuels publiés ailleurs qu'en France reçoivent souvent une diffusion beaucoup plus restreinte, et ce, dans plusieurs domaines dont la psychanalyse. Ce premier livre de François Sirois mérite pourtant de recevoir l'attention des spécialistes. Cet excellent ouvrage propose une étude précise sur le thème de la névrose, selon une perspective historique et classificatoire. Le lecteur, psychiatre, psychanalyste ou étudiant, y trouvera une somme de renseignements, dans un style clair et descriptif.

Dans son historique, l'auteur remonte jusqu'au 18^e siècle pour retracer les origines et l'évolution de la notion de névrose. À l'opposé, les recherches les plus récentes sont également citées, tout comme le *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, réédité plusieurs fois aux Etats-Unis et tenu pour la référence des psychiatres américains. Toutefois, l'auteur laisse place aux théories freudiennes sur le sujet, si vaste, de la névrose.

Après l'historique, l'ouvrage propose des descriptions cliniques, une théorie particulière des névroses (phobies, obsessions et hystérie). D'autres chapitres, portant sur 'la dépression névrotique', sur 'l'espace social des névroses' et sur les différentes méthodes d'intervention complètent ce volumineux manuel.

Chaque chapitre est complété par de nombreuses références européennes et américaines, de livres et surtout d'articles. Le lecteur trouvera en fin de volume un glossaire de dix pages et un index des noms et concepts utilisés.

L'ouvrage sur *Les Névroses* répond à un besoin. Comme l'explique dans sa préface le Professeur Noël Montgrain, les manuels de base sont fréquemment publiés aux Etats-Unis, mais il existe trop peu de ces livres de référence accessibles et complets sur un sujet précis. Plus qu'une étude sur la névrose, le livre de François Sirois offre un excellent exercice de dynamique psychanalytique, qu'on peut qualifier d'exemplaire du point de vue méthodologique.

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Lawrence Sklar

Philosophy of Physics.

Boulder: Westview Press 1992. Pp. xi + 246.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0599-3);

US \$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0625-6).

Intended as a textbook, Lawrence Sklar's *Philosophy of Physics* concentrates on the three traditional areas in the philosophy of physics: space and time, statistical mechanics, and quantum mechanics. *En passant*, he touches upon many of the traditional foci of philosophy of science such as determinism, explanation, reduction, the status of theoretical entities and the nature of probability.

The introductory chapter skillfully sets out the interplay between philosophy and physics, employing on the one hand examples such as the influence of epistemology on the development of the special theory of relativity and of notions of observability on that of quantum mechanics, and on the other hand

the influence of relativistic theories on our conceptions of space and time and of quantum mechanics on our conception of causality. The discussion here is elegant and stimulating, bound to whet the reader's appetite for the deeper analysis to follow. A brief final chapter returns to the same theme, the discussion now more informed by the three intervening chapters.

A chapter on space, time and motion begins with a brief history of theories of space and time from Plato through Mach, followed by a thorough exposition of Minkowski spacetime and some of the familiar paradoxes of relativity theory. There follows an exceptionally clear introduction to the basic concepts of the General Theory and an equally clear discussion of the epistemological status of geometry. Less successful are discussions of the metaphysical aspects of geometry and an account of the debate between substantivalism and relationalism, the latter of which is very fast-moving. The chapter concludes with the hole problem and a discussion of topology and causal structure.

Much of the chapter reads like a good mystery, the reader eager to turn the page to find the next piece of the plot revealed. At times, however, the explanatory success is diminished by Sklar's eschewal of equations, of which there are no more than a handful in the entire book. Even the discursive account of the Michelson-Morley experiment leaves it less than evident why the effects of light moving with and against the aether don't simply 'cancel one another'; an equation or two would go a long way here. The lack of equations is a bit of a mystery: readers with no background in relativity theory will be unable to follow much of the chapter in any case; those with some background would no doubt be aided by a little more mathematics.

The third chapter addresses foundational issues in statistical mechanics. It begins with the formal theory and variant interpretations of probability and the nature of statistical explanation. All is very lucid. Discussion then turns to the main issue: what grounds the probabilistic assumptions used in deriving thermodynamics from the microtheory? The focus is on the problems of equilibrium and ergodicity, with an excursion through the arguments of the principal players: Boltzmann, the Ehrenfests, Gibbs. Again much of the story can be followed only with some background, yet the exegesis is light on mathematics. The chapter concludes with discussions of cosmology and irreversibility and of the direction of time. The latter (in the context of entropy) is left unrelated to its earlier discussion in the context of relativity theory; the omission is hardly unusual, but Sklar's insights on the matter would have been welcome.

A chapter on quantum mechanics approaches the subject historically, through the ultraviolet catastrophe, the photoelectric effect, De Broglie's hypothesis and electron diffraction. There are marvelous discussions of the two slit, the delayed choice, and the Stern-Gerlach experiments. The essentially discursive exposition of the rest of the familiar territory is as clear and accessible as can be found anywhere: the Copenhagen interpretation, the uncertainty principle, the measurement problem, the cat paradox, Wigner's friend, quantum logic, hidden variables, determinism. Next is an account of

early no-hidden-variables proofs, followed by a discussion of contextuality in the context of the Kochen-Specker argument. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper serves to introduce Bell's Theorem, which is seen as a severe challenge to determinism and as grounds for giving greater due to the radical sort of reconceptualizing of reality that is associated with Bohr.

Although one of the real strengths of Sklar's work is his meticulous consideration of arguments and counterarguments on the issues he addresses, there are a couple of oversights in the chapter on quantum mechanics. One is the lack of discussion of corpuscular theories of interference phenomena, as championed by Landé in particular; although historically these are of marginal significance, they are noteworthy here because Sklar makes much of interference effects as showing that waves must have a 'real' aspect, to the detriment of both ensemble and idealist interpretations of the wave function. More surprising is the lack of attention to the issues of randomness or 'experimenter freedom' in the Bell arguments; even Bell noted that 'super-determinism' — which includes a denial of free will — can survive his proof (*The Ghost in the Atom*, P.C.W. Davies and J.R. Brown, Cambridge University Press 1986, p. 47).

On the subject of quibbles, one more should be noted. While there are excellent discursive bibliographies at the end of each chapter, these tend to touch only on the principal themes. Within the text, there are many phrases such as 'doubts have been raised' or 'it has been proposed' without any accompanying references. Students and others lacking Sklar's exceptional command of the literature will find themselves frustrated that so many pearls have dropped from anonymous oysters.

Nonetheless, this book is a fine introduction to the philosophy of physics, graced throughout by the author's lucidity, perspicuity and evident command of the subject matter. While complete novitiates will find it difficult, it should serve well as an intermediate text.

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Paul Thom

*For An Audience: A Philosophy of the
Performing Arts.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1993.

Pp. ix + 239.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-991-0).

Thom's carefully argued book is rich both in insights and in references to performance pieces classical and modern. Without explicitly separating them out in this way, the book sets itself at least two tasks that roughly correspond to its title and subtitle. In other words, while Thom argues for a reevaluation of the significance of performance and audience in relation to work and author in the aesthetic appreciation of the arts for performance, he also pursues the resolution of a number of puzzles of interest to a philosophy of the performing arts.

Thom begins by laying out what he takes to be the 'traditional valorization' of the performing arts, and the 'traditional structure' according to which they have generally been understood. According to the 'traditional valorization, of the performing arts either the work or (the genius of) the author should be the focus of aesthetic attention; performers, performance, and/or audience can, at most, aspire to be *ancillae* to the appreciation of work or author. To illustrate Thom quotes James K. Feibleman who claims that 'The aim of the performing artist is to put the appreciator in contact with the work of art. To do so well means for the performing artist to do it as unobtrusively as possible, to make of himself a medium of communication through which the work of art can have its greatest effect' (11). The 'traditional structure' supposes that authors make works of art; the function of performers is to execute works, but not to make anything; the function of the audience is not to make or do anything, but merely to 'receive' the work in beholding the performance. The 'traditional valorization' prompts Thom to propose an alternative hypothesis about the relations among work, performance and audience; the 'traditional structure' leads him to consider various 'radical' proposals intended as modifications of it.

Thom's arguments against the undervalorization of performances in relation to works, and of interpretation on the part of performers as well as audience, are primarily based on a rejection of the supposition that works for performance are merely sorts of (quasi-Platonic) facts waiting to be transmitted to audiences. In contrast, starting out from a suggestion made by John Searle, Thom proposes that works for performance be understood 'in terms of directives for action' (40); more specifically, the author of a work for performance 'takes an illocutionary stance' in relation to the content of the directives (37) and 'makes an address to performers' (rather than to cooks, for example) (42). Given this analysis, Thom makes it plausible that performers and audience play significant roles in the interpretive instantiation and comprehension of works, respectively, since directives can never be specific in every detail. As a result, moreover, performances turn out to have aesthetic

standing of their own, since they can render a work in more or less aesthetically excellent ways.

When Thom considers various 'radical' modifications of the 'traditional structure', his approach turns out to be problematic, however. Thom's careful analysis convincingly shows, for example, that there may be performance without a work, an author, performers, or an audience, and that there may be performance without representation. He denies, though, that any such practice is as 'valuable aesthetically as is artistic performance within the traditional structure' (17). Such non-traditional events and processes 'turn out either to lack significant dimensions of aesthetic complexity, or not, properly speaking, to be artistic performance' (17). I see two problems with this approach to non-traditional performance. First, it is unclear whether performances of a non-traditional structure necessarily incur a loss in complexity relative to counterparts featuring the traditional structure. Second, Thom's approach overlooks the *point* of much non-traditional performance by assessing it on the standards of traditional performance.

Focussing here, for example, only on Thom's account of 'performance without works', we may note that he supposes that 'it is difficult to imagine that anything having the complexity of an interpreted work of art could be conceived and executed *sur le champs*. At any rate, it seems clear that performers who had been trained as executants would be most unlikely, in performing without works, to produce an aesthetic object comparable in value to what can be produced in the performance of a work' (71). Thom gives no good reason, though, for his expectation that we should share his difficulties in imagining that improvisers could be so capable. Indeed, only five pages earlier, Thom himself produces a counterexample to his stated view when he mentions 'J.S. Bach's improvisation of a three-part *ricercar* on Frederick the Great's "royal theme" at Potsdam in 1747' (66), which seems to be the basis of the score of J.S. Bach's *Musical Offering*. If the score of J.S. Bach's *Musical Offering* indeed is a faithful reflection (if not even a transcript) of his improvisation at Potsdam, then the event of Bach's improvisation is evidence that aesthetic objects 'comparable in value to what can be produced in the performance of a work' *can* be executed *sur le champs*.

To be fair, Thom's claims to the effect that performance of a non-traditional structure is not as aesthetically valuable as counterparts patterned on the traditional structure are often couched in the context of their imagined, thoroughgoing cultural generalisation. He asks, for example, 'what if Cage's radical proposal [for workless performances] were to be implemented, so that we had ... no works at all? ... The price ... is the loss of those art forms that are collectively designated as the performing arts' (70-1). Thom's attempt, however, to make his point by appealing to the total extinction of works-based performances should be seen as illicit, since it is not founded on some argued principle but merely consists in a suasive appeal to our fear of giving up the range of performances that constitute the familiar classics of our culture. It also brings me to my second problem with Thom's approach to radical

performance, namely his tendency to assess the latter by the standards of traditional performance.

Even if, for the sake of argument, it were granted that a performance that does not adhere to the traditional structure were perceived to lack certain 'significant dimensions of aesthetic complexity', it should remain an open question whether we should judge it, for this reason, to be of lesser aesthetic value than works fitting the traditional structure. Rather, 'radical' performance practices should be seen as experiments that should be assessed for their aesthetic value, at least partially, on the criteria that they have set out for themselves, and within their contexts of execution. Notably, Thom discusses John Cage's composition *Variations VII* as an example of performerless works: 'The audience of *Variations VII* gathers like the audience of a work for performance. The members then go outside and listen. Finally they return to the gathering space. They do all this by way of response to a directive, whose content can therefore be regarded as a work' (189). *Variations VII* likely lacked certain aesthetic dimensions generally available in rehearsed performances (unless the audience of *Variations VII* fortuitously was directed towards a coincidental performance), but Cage's intent in this work surely was not only to forgo certain aesthetic dimensions but also to draw attention to other, non-standard ones. Hence, we should reserve our judgements regarding the work's aesthetic merits until we know more about the actual sounds listened to by the audience, since many unrehearsed sound sequences produced by human and other beings (e.g. human speech and song; birdsong; the sound of water flowing), as well their combination, can be of considerable aesthetic interest.

Given that the performing arts occupy a large space in contemporary life, the aesthetic value of performance, whether experienced virtually through electronic media or live in established and alternative/peripheral spaces, whether produced according to the traditional structure or produced as experiments in aesthetic appreciation, calls for concerted philosophical attention of the kind that Thom devotes to it. *For An Audience* sets out the central issues of a philosophy of the performing arts in a clear, highly informed, wide-ranging, and frequently entertaining, manner. This is a book that deserves very careful study by philosophers and other theoreticians of art.

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J.O. Urmson, trans.

Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5, 10-14.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992. Pp. 225.

US \$47.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2817-3).

This latest addition to the series of translations of Late Antique philosophy edited by Sorabji is a companion to Urmson's translation of Simplicius' Corollaries on Place and Time and so includes only Simplicius on Aristotle on Place and Time. Thus, an important gap, Simplicius on Aristotle's *Physics* 4.6-9 (the void), which one hopes will soon be filled. Urmson departs rarely and moderately from the text of H. Diels CAG 9 (1882) and supplies few notes (some by Sorabji), in keeping with the aim of the series to make the philosophy accessible in a modern language (191-200). A brief bibliography (188-90) is provided, an English-Greek glossary (201-3), and a more useful Greek-English glossary and index (204-220), though unfortunately the Greek is transcribed.

Although the subject index (221-5) includes ancient philosophers, there is no list of passages cited, and only the citations of Plato, Aristotle, and poets are identified in the text (poets other than Homer and Hesiod are omitted from the index). E.g., Anaxagoras is cited thrice: his school denies φθορά (13: cp. fr. B1 DK⁶), homeomerics are proximate to compound bodies (25: cp. fr. A43-6), and the ἀκίνητον is unmoved because it holds itself firm and contains itself (48). The last is surely *not* Anaxagoras but Anaximander (cp. fr. A11.3), and Simplicius or a scribe has mistakenly expanded an abbreviation. A similarly erroneous ancient expansion involves ΣΤ read as οἱ Στοικοί (68 n. 92) instead of correctly as Στράτων. Here Straton is cited on the void: Sorabji rightly compares fr. 59-60 W. from Simplicius *Corr. Loc.* The poet cited after Sophokles is not Sophokles again (151: 'he'), but Menander *Georgos* fr. 5 Sandb.

The translation where checked has proven accurate, and flows smoothly while retaining the flavor of Simplicius. Urmson successfully confronts difficulties by careful choice of words, by 'transforming' the language, or when all else fails by the use of insightful notes. Some examples. The translation of κίνησις, which means both locomotion and change, is a famous difficulty — Urmson's solution is satisfying (9 n. 1). Prepositions are notoriously difficult, and Urmson treats sensibly the discussion of uses of ἐν by retaining the imprecision in English (44-5, n. 59). Nor is he averse to clever and useful neologisms when necessary: 'somanyth' for τοσούδε (47); 'I tongue' = 'I kiss' and 'I utter' to explain ἐρῶ = φιλῶ and λέξω (n. 63: but λέξω = 'I will say' not Urmson's 'I say'). For ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ he rightly renders literally but unidiomatically 'in the same' to avoid 'place' where there is no τόπος (65 n. 85, 66 n. 88). For ἐν ἀριθμῷ he rightly paraphrases with Ross as 'in the numerical system' (149 n. 206). Further careful distinctions concern ἑκστασις and ἀμαθέστατον (166 nn. 234-5) and ἔξις and ἔχεται (171 n. 241).

Three minor points require correction but do not detract from the overall quality. Supplying 'measure' with καὶ ὁ χρόνος τὴν κίνησιν is not 'awkward'

(144 n. 200) but normal Greek. The passage Urmson does not understand (147 n. 203) is readily comprehended with the simplest of emendations: for δὲ ἢ read δὴ ἢ and for 'not being change, are also not measured by time' (147) translate οὐ κινήσει δὴ ἢ κινήσεις οὐδὲ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρεῖται as 'they do *not* change or their change is not measured by time.' Urmson should have yielded to the temptation (158 n. 221) to read for ἐκλειψις (at 746,18) the more sensible κατακλυσμός as at 750,17 (there also opposed to Homerica): although not 'flood' but the (Stoic) cataclysm is meant.

The 262 notes are meant to be brief (most are textual or give references) and they are usually helpful. A few could have been better. Two concern astronomy. Simplicius makes the sphere of Mercury the outer bound of the moon's sphere (77, n. 98: Sorabji). This shows Simplicius (a) followed not Ptolemy but the middle and neoplatonic tradition that the Aristotelian spheres were physical, and (b) accepted the planetary order favored by some astronomers before Ptolemy (*Alm.* 9.1, cp. *Vitr.* 9.1.5), and all since, but notably not by Plato (*Tim.* 38d, cp. *Macr. Comm.* 1.19, 21). When Simplicius mentions the sun cyclically returning to the Ram (Aries) and the Plough (Libra), Sorabji only says 'constellations' (142 n. 198): more precisely they are the constellations of the Spring and Fall equinoxes. Similarly there are two apparent connections to platonistic Christian thought. To Simplicius' distinction between eternal (αἰώνιος) and everlasting (ἀίδιος), the influential Dion. Areop. *Divin. Nomin.* 10.3 (fifth century A.C.) seems similar, but Simplicius more precise (111 n. 160, 148 n. 204, and 150 n. 209) — what is the relation? Orpheus is cited for the 'procession' (ἡ πρόοδος) of the gods using the technical neoplatonic term (20 n. 21). But how is this related to the identical long-established Christiana neoplatonic use, as in Origen in *Iohan.* 1.38 (III A.C.) and Greg. Naz. *Orat.* 20.10, 23.7 etc. (V A.C.)?

Aristotle's place, a two-dimensional surface enclosing the body, will probably not be of great interest other than historical. But it is intimately connected with Aristotle's denial of void, for on Aristotle's view there is no room for void since there can be no place without body. Straton's doubts influenced Heron (I A.C.), and apparently even Galen (70), but until the early modern period most of Aristotle's synthesis prevailed.

The discussion of time may however prove to be of more contemporary interest. Simplicius reports Alexander of Aphrodisias relying on Eudemos (*Phys.* 3, fr. 46 Sp.) to attribute to Plato a view that before regular ordered time, some sort of disordered 'time' existed (110). As Simplicius argues (110-2) that is not in Plato, but such a 'disorderly time' is found from Eudemos to Galen (cp. Sorabji *Time Creation and the Continuum* 270-1), and philosophically may be connected to the ideas of the physicist Wheeler on chaotic time in the early universe. Second, Simplicius in discussing Aristotle's 'now' raises a query (134): if magnitude is limited by points, and time by the now, what is analogous to these limits for change? This would be the modern physical concept of 'state' (*status*), for which we would expect (κατά) στάσις or ἔξις. But Straton fr. 70 W. (119) uses στάσις for quantised change (which he denies) and Simplicius uses στάσις for 'stationariness'; while ἔξις is of

course 'condition' (κατάστασις has many meanings, but *status* does not seem to be one, though compare Hippokrates). Simplicius himself gives movement (κίνημα) as the corresponding concept (135). Third, the reciprocity by which time measures change and change time (143): is that uniform? A similar difficulty arises in modern physics with 'gravitational' time (orbits) and 'atomic' time (cesium clocks): are they the same? Fourth, the passage of time wears away (κατατῆκει) and time itself is a cause of decay (151). The problem of the arrow of time is still acute — micro-level events seem perfectly reversible, yet larger-scale events all display irreversibility (entropy increases). Aristotle and Simplicius said time itself was the cause; but in fact the connection seems subtler — what is it?

All in all, a good translation of an important book, which should find a place on the shelves of all interested in ancient philosophy or in time.

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(Classics)

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Stephen A. White

Sovereign Virtue.

Stanford: Stanford University Press 1992.

Pp. xiv + 337.

US \$35.00 (ISBN 0-8047-1694-3).

A crucial point in Aristotle's conception of happiness (*eudaimonia*), is the relation between virtue and the other components or instrumental aids to happiness. In what sense exactly is virtue sovereign (*kurios*) over those other components? White's book is a thorough, careful and judicious treatment of a question profoundly important both in the interpretation of Aristotle and in ethics generally.

White focuses on concerns most definitively treated in *The Nichomachean Ethics*, but draws freely on *The Eudemian Ethics* and the entire Aristotelian corpus, most particularly *Politics* and *Rhetoric*. He also draws liberally on historical and literary sources, to the book's great advantage.

The first section works through Aristotle's formal analysis of happiness as a final, unconditional and dominant end — a comprehensive end which can comprise a variety of intrinsic goods as components and by reference to which we can 'arbitrate among our major concerns' (15).

He then turns to the data with which Aristotle starts in filling in this sketch with specific content: received opinion, whether common or eminently reputable. Aristotle tries to save the good of these views by purging them of

inconsistencies, exaggerations and (as far as possible, which is not always very far) imprecisions. White poses the fundamental question of why such a system of opinions, even when thus tidied up, should have a claim to be thought true. He usefully compares Aristotle's procedure with Socratic elenchus, adapting an argument of Vlastos' about the latter to support Aristotle's position that a suitably purged and revised compendium of reputable views will be (roughly) true.

White then turns to the specific content of traditional and reputable views, particularly the great weight given prosperity or good fortune as conditions of happiness. He examines Solon's paradigms of happiness and the question whether a person can be called happy before death. Aristotle and tradition agree that happiness must be stable and secure, and that virtue alone does not suffice. But Solon gives good fortune too large a role, in part because he mistakes liability to misfortune for likelihood of misfortune, and in part because he assigns misfortune too much power to overthrow happiness.

White next spells out the general sense in which virtue is sovereign over other components of happiness. '... The way in which happiness depends on virtuous activity differs crucially from the way in which it depends on anything else: all other needs are "additional" because they are necessary either for virtuous activity in the first place or for that activity to suffice for happiness' (123). In those unfortunate circumstances in which virtuous activity and other intrinsic goods are, in the circumstances, an inconsistent set, virtue will always prevail with the virtuous.

White next discusses the complex relations between the human animals' animality and the virtue-governed ideal of human happiness, treating (briefly but suggestively) the function argument, the structure and function of the virtue of temperance, and the role in happiness of health.

In the final section, perhaps the most interesting, White discusses the role within Aristotle's system of the main competitors to virtue in popular, and to some extent in reputable, conceptions of happiness: wealth, power and honor. For each class of external goods, White provides thorough and interesting discussion of the Aristotelian virtues defined in terms of the rational deployment or enjoyment of these goods. The discussion of wealth is particularly good. His closing chapter explicates the sovereignty of virtue in terms of the virtuous agent's self-love, and argues for a classification of the virtuous agent as egocentric rather than either egoistic or altruistic as these categories are usually understood.

As with any book working such well-worked territory, both the devil and the angel are in details. Different readers with different interpretive hobby horses to ride will have different nits to pick. Here are a few.

(1) White notes that Solon's recommendation to 'see the end' before calling someone happy can be regarded as epistemologically based. The problem is not whether a happiness ascription can be *true* of someone living but whether it can be *secure*. According to White, Aristotle did not share with Solon the equation of security with certainty.

Though this is all right as far as it goes, White misses a trick here. He seems to accept the view that happiness is something that can come and go, not only in extreme but in normal circumstances. 'Happiness can never last from beginning to end...' (100). This neglects the interpretive possibility that Aristotle regarded happiness as properly ascribed to a complete life, not to bits and pieces of such a life. Thus X's life, from cradle to grave, *can* be called happy — not because some state, condition or activity lasts continuously from beginning to end but because of the shape of the whole. X, when young, can accurately be called a happy youth — either retrospectively with certainty or, according as nature and upbringing are propitious, with more or less reason contemporaneously. Undoubtedly Aristotle does speak of happiness being lost and regained, but I think without distortion one could recast this in epistemic terms. White does successfully emphasize the basic point that a happy life will be stable and durable when happiness is understood in terms of the sovereignty of virtue.

(2) White seems to conflate natural virtue with the proto-virtue of successfully supervised nonage. These can overlap but are quite distinct conceptually in Aristotle.

(3) White errs in interpreting Aristotle as regarding health as an instrumental rather than an intrinsic good. Thus he pairs health with wealth as 'a natural good ... that is valuable not for itself but as useful in the pursuit of other ends ...' (218). 'Health is sought not for its own sake but rather for its uses' (176). This line unduly instrumentalizes health by separating it from the activities it enables as means to ends. This is undoubtedly true for some important activities. But some activities are actualizations of health rather than distinct consequences of it. Health, like virtue, is intrinsically valuable because it is actualized in intrinsically valuable activities.

(4) White describes as virtues states which Aristotle would not and to people to whom he would not (e.g. slaves and youths); and is not sufficiently sensitive to Aristotle's powerful attraction to the Socratic thesis of the unity of the virtues.

(5) The attempt to orient Aristotle's views with respect to such distinctions as obligation/supererogation and altruism/egoism is somewhat clumsy and not all that helpful. Those whose great actions manifest dignity are not perspicuously described as going beyond the call of duty. And White avoids putting the Aristotelian virtuous person on the altruistic side of the line only by devising a straw altruism.

(6) White occasionally goes overboard in his enthusiasm for the theme of the book's title and extols virtue's sovereignty in terms inconsistent both with Aristotle and with his own comments elsewhere. Sometimes, for instance, he tends to formulations which suggest that virtue *is* sufficient for happiness, contrary to his own official exposition of Aristotle's views. '... If happiness depends primarily on character and virtue, then it is as secure as virtuous character' (97). This goes too far. What follows (which is quite enough) is that happiness is *very* secure. The eudaimonistic applecart will not be upset by few or trifling misfortunes. Aristotle clearly envisions the possibility (though

not the likelihood) of misfortunes so great and enduring as to preclude happiness while leaving virtue intact (though perhaps impeding the *exercise* of some virtues). And so too, in numerous passages, does White. Priam was not a happy man.

As another example, dignity (White's rendering of 'megalopsuchia') is explicated in the chapter largely devoted to it in terms of a combination of virtue and the capacity for great things. But at the end of the chapter White seems to suggest that the difference between persons of dignity and those with garden variety virtue is in the nature of their subjection to virtue as sovereign: 'The place of dignity ... is to sketch a model not of how the virtuous must act but rather of how nobly they can and might act if the exercise of rational virtue is wholly their sovereign concern' (271).

Although the work amounts to a systematic survey of Aristotle's ethical theory, the primary focus on the role in happiness of fortune and external goods induces differential treatment of topics that would make it unsuitable as a general introduction to the subject. (For instance, there is nothing on the practical syllogism, little on *phronesis*, and the function argument receives short though trenchant shrift.) Classicists and philosophers familiar with the basic texts will find White's book a thought-provoking and responsible survey of a great deal of the territory. Those with extensive knowledge of the secondary literature as well, and so able to feast on the footnotes, will definitely want to read *Sovereign Virtue*.

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