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Table of Contents • Table des matières

Raymond Bradley, <i>The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism</i>	283
Gregory Landini	
Vincent Brümmer, <i>Speaking of a Personal God: an essay in philosophical theology</i>	285
Gary Colwell	
Peter Bürger, <i>The Decline of Modernism</i>	288
Deborah Cook	
David Cockburn, <i>Other Human Beings</i>	291
Ken Hanly	
Renato Cristi, <i>Le Libéralisme Conservateur</i>	293
Hermes H. Benitez	
Paul Crowther, <i>Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism</i>	295
Rob V. Gerwen	
Deane Curtin and Lisa Heldke eds., <i>Cooking, Eating, Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food</i>	300
John W. Bender	
Gilles Deleuze, <i>Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature</i>	302
Brian Beakley	
Marc Ereshefsky, ed., <i>The Units of Evolution. Essays on the Nature of Species</i>	304
Suzanne Cunningham	
John Martin Fischer, ed., <i>The Metaphysics of Death</i>	307
André Blom	
Robert Gibbs, <i>Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas</i>	309
Adriaan Peperzak	
Ronald N. Giere, ed., <i>Cognitive Models of Science</i>	311
Jeffrey E. Foss	
Christopher Hookway, <i>Scepticism</i>	315
H.B. McCullough	
Thomas Hurka, <i>Perfectionism</i>	318
Paul K. Moser	
Christopher B. Kulp, <i>The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectator Theory of Knowledge</i>	320
C.G. Prado	
George Lawson, <i>Politica Sacra et Civilis</i>	322
Anne K. Krook	
Jerrold Levinson, <i>Music, Art, & Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics</i>	325
Garry Hagberg	
James Mill, <i>Political Writings</i>	327
Brian Penrose	

Doris Olin, ed., <i>William James: Pragmatism In Focus</i>	329
Wesley E. Cooper	
Graham Parkes, ed., <i>Nietzsche and Asian Thought</i>	332
James R. Watson	
James F. Peterman, <i>Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Project.</i>	334
Kelly Dean Jolley	
Nicholas Rescher, <i>A System of Pragmatic Idealism.</i> <i>Volume II: The Validity of Values</i>	336
Mark Vorobej	
William L. Rowe, <i>Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction</i> , 2nd ed.	339
D.M. Procida	
David E. Schrader, <i>The Corporation as Anomaly</i>	341
L.B. Cebik	
Roger Shiner, <i>Norm and Nature</i>	343
Brenda M. Baker	
Tony Smith, <i>Dialectical Social Theory and its Critics</i>	346
Ulf Nilsson	

Raymond Bradley

*The Nature of All Being: A Study of
Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism.*

Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992,

Pp. xxi + 244.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-507111-5).

According to Bradley, the notion of 'tautologousness' Wittgenstein developed in the *Tractatus* was a robustly metaphysical, Leibnizian, notion of truth in all possible worlds (17). The notion he says is grounded in 'modal atomism' — i.e., the view that the internal, formal, properties of Tractarian objects are *de re* and essential properties (xviii). Rich with quotes from Wittgenstein's *Notebooks 1914-1916*, the defense of this interpretation as an historically accurate account of the *Tractatus* forms the heart of this five chapter book. Its final chapter takes up a careful and detailed comparison of this modal atomism with the respective positions of Carnap, Adams, Lewis, Stalnaker and Armstrong.

Tractarian orthodoxy has it that proper logical grammar precludes the formation of predicates such as 'entity' (or 'object'), 'identity', and 'existence'. Similarly, it precludes the expression of semantic predicates such as 'refers', 'believes', 'names' and 'truth'. Predicates for such are pseudo-concepts and the conundrums of philosophy are their progeny. They are not part of (what Carnap would call) the 'material mode'; and because the *Tractatus* rejects Carnap's meta-linguistic 'formal mode', adding them generates statements that are *unsinnig* (despicably meaningless). This notwithstanding, such notions are important in that they form the logical scaffolding for meaningful (truth-valued) discourse. The logical grammar itself shows the nature of 'truth', 'reference' and the like.

So also, according to orthodoxy, are the predicates 'necessity' and 'possibility' excluded from Tractarian logical grammar. The necessity of a proposition is not said, but is shown in its being a tautology (5.525). There have been soft breaks from orthodoxy here. One might introduce modal operators of logical necessity and possibility, (but not causal or temporal operators which are clearly material). One must then demonstrate that the operators have the same status as the logical constants; they are (to use Wittgenstein's phrase) nothing more than 'punctuation marks' — i.e., their ascription is not a genuine 'saying' but only a 'showing' which introduces no material content. This can be done if logical necessity coincides with logical truth. Moreover, where 'p' is an atomic proposition variable, '<>p' should be a thesis, for the contingency of an atomic proposition is necessary. (See, e.g., Cocchiarella, *Philosophia*, 1974, which suggests Kaplan's S13 — i.e., S5 plus the schema: If A is a modal free proposition that is not tautologous, then <>~A is an axiom.)

Bradley offers no soft break. His first two chapters find Tractarian passages suggesting an S5 modal logic (47f) with transworld identity and a rigid notion of 'actuality'. Recommending the propositional system S5A of Crossley & Hummerstone (54f), Bradley allows worlds which differ in the

cardinality of their objects (39). Concerns that logical necessity should parallel logical truth are dropped. Bradley seems even willing to embrace Kripkean models (xvii) where the Carnap-Barcan wff and its converse fails. These are violent breaks. Following Ramsey, *Tractarian* combinatorialism is commonly thought to maintain that every possible world consists of the same totality of objects that are the constituents of the atomic states of affairs constituting the actual world. The number of objects is a part of logical scaffolding. An object's existence at a world is not a state of affairs. Bradley disagrees, amassing evidence from the *Notebooks* and Wittgenstein's criticism of *Principia's* infinity axiom. (There is no such 'axiom', of course.) He takes Wittgenstein as rejecting Russell's treatment of existence and the theory of descriptions as well (58f).

Chapter Three examines the nature of *Tractarian* 'objects', and carefully distinguishes them as ontological atoms rather than epistemological simples. A concerted effort is made to clarify the long perplexing notion of an 'object' and the nature of the *formal* properties they are to have essentially. (An interesting geometric model is given at p. 221f.) Bradley argues that the 'formal/material' distinction should not be conflated with the 'internal/external' distinction (88). He continues with an argument that the *Tractarian* thesis of the logical independence of atomic propositions was an unfortunate 'myth' (101f). Contending (against Anscombe *et al*) that it is not required for determinateness of sense (i.e., the viability of truth-tables), Bradley shows it to be incompatible with the general modal atomist doctrines he takes the *Tractatus* to espouse (104f).

Chapter 4 presents an account of the *Tractarian* picture theory and doctrine of showing, and fits these into the modal realism Bradley finds there. Frege's puzzle of informative identity is taken up as well, and a new Wittgensteinian account is compared favorably to Frege's (140f).

Bradley's book is daring, interesting and provocative. It will be a valuable resource for students of the *Tractatus* for the bold new interpretation it presents. At the same time it is disquieting when it comes to many historical matters. An antiquarian when it comes to Russell — Bradley embraces Moore's claim that Russell commits obvious 'howlers' concerning logical modalities (16,21,24,48). This neglects Russell's own manuscripts and the new perspectives emerging from them. (See e.g., Russell's 'Possibility and Necessity', ms, [c1905] and N. Griffin, 'Russell on the Nature of Logic,' *Synthese* 45, 1980). Russell analyzed logical necessity as logical truth — i.e., truth in virtue of logical form. He captured logical form for predicate logic by means of *fully* general second-order propositions (whose denials yield contradiction). The proposition Fa is possible in that $(\exists \emptyset)(\exists x)\emptyset x$; the proposition $Fa > Fa$ is necessary in that $(\emptyset)(x)(\emptyset x > \emptyset x)$. There is an analogous move in Quine's account of logical truth. Making all but the logical constants of a wff variable, the open wff ' $\emptyset x > \emptyset x$ ' is logically true because every replacement for ' \emptyset ' and for ' x ' makes the wff true. There are no 'howlers' here.

To Russell, logical forms are 'objects' of logical intuition and logic is the science of them. (See Russell's unfinished 1913 book *Theory of Knowledge*

and his 1912 ms 'What is Logic?') Wittgenstein on the contrary, held that logical truths, are not self-evident 'truths'. They are not 'truths' and not objects of knowledge at all. (This was the focus of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's multiple-relation theory of truth — a matter Bradley does not take up in spite of its importance to his topic.) For all that, Wittgenstein agreed that logical necessity is logical truth, i.e., logical form. It is just that there is no *experience* of logical forms (5.522), no science of logic. Logic cannot form an axiom system with a set of inference rules (5.452). Logic is decidable — a tautology shows itself in the symbolism alone (6.113). His dedicated discussion of the doctrine of showing (127f) notwithstanding, Bradley seems to have made 'modal atomism' into a science after all.

If logic is not a science or body of knowledge, what does the *Tractatus* mean by proclaiming (2.0121) that logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts? How does Bradley's combinatorial theory of 'objects' with *de re* essential properties fit with the later *Tractatus*? Tractarian 'objects' have long been obscure. Admirably, Bradley seeks to rectify this with unabashed realism. The later *Tractatus* suffers. Others inverse the direction. For instance, McGuinness (in Irving Block ed., *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, MIT Press 1981) takes an 'object' (qua the reference of a name or simple sign) to be just the semantic shadow of the sign's capacity to be combined with other signs to form a truth-valued proposition. Language presupposes 'objects' on this view, and so they cannot be the subject of discourse. Bradley does not take up the issue. The question as to what interpretation best suits the *Tractatus* remains.

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Vincent Brümmer

*Speaking of a Personal God: an essay
in philosophical theology.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.
Pp. ix + 160.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0521-43052-6);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0521-43632-X).

An estrangement exists between philosophy and theology. This, says Brümmer, is because philosophers place epistemological demands upon religious truth claims which theologians find intolerable. The author tries to bring about a rapprochement between the two disciplines. First he examines the nature of philosophical reflection and then applies his insights to one of the

central truth claims of the Christian faith, '... that God is a personal being with whom we may live in a person relation' (3).

In chapter one Brümmer draws a comparison between the ideas of Plato, Hare and Gadamer regarding the nature of philosophy. Although there are marked differences between their views, each philosopher thinks of philosophy as a kind of conceptual recollection. However, '... philosophical reflection is not merely an exercise in recollection, but also ... an exercise in imagination' (19). Philosophy does not leave everything as it is: it is innovative as well as descriptive. The author briefly discusses four criteria for determining whether a proposed conceptual innovation is acceptable and ends the chapter with four conclusions about the nature of philosophical theology. The most basic conclusion is that religious truth claims must be internally coherent (25, 30).

The title and governing question of the second chapter is, 'Can we speak about God?' The importance of the question is brought to focus by the author's consideration of the paradoxes of belief. Religious believers often seem to make logically incoherent truth claims. For example, 'Believers speak of God as a Father, who is eternal, or as a Son, who performed actions in history ...' (34). Given the importance of logical coherence to philosophical reflection, shouldn't philosophical theology conclude that God-talk is fundamentally incoherent? This question leads the author into a discussion of possible factors which set the semantic limits of God-talk. He examines the alleged *infinite qualitative difference* between God and humans, the *analogy* between God and humans, *metaphorical language* and *conceptual models*.

If God is completely different from humans, such that no human concepts are applicable to him, it is futile to try to speak meaningfully of God (38). But if believers can successfully refer to God in their conscious relationship to him, as Brümmer suggests they can, then God '... cannot be beyond the range of all human concepts' (40). This does not mean of course that God is just like us. 'If our human concepts should be in part applicable to God and in part not, where does the boundary lie' (40)? This question leads him to consider the views of Crombie, Aquinas and Barth on the subject of speaking of God by analogy. After discussing the well known weaknesses of analogical predication he turns his attention to the semantics of metaphor and parable. The problem of analogy can be resolved if we abandon the *names model* of language and adopt the *tools model*. Instead of thinking of words as names which correspond to things in reality we ought rather to consider them as tools by the use of which we exercise our concepts or mental capacities. 'Analogy consists then not of a relationship between words and things, but in the relationship of the *conceptual capacities* which are expressed with the same word in different contexts' (54).

Here, as elsewhere in the book, the influence of the later Wittgenstein is admittedly strong. And the benefits which the meaning-from-use theory brings to Brümmer's philosophy of religious language are noteworthy. Not only will the theory help us better understand the biblical parables, but it will also help the religious enquirer understand the polymorphous character of such biblical words as 'faith' and 'love'.

Brümmer creates a games-theoretical matrix to indicate what the model of a personal relation with God might be like. The chief element in the model is freedom, which both God and humans have. Each 'player' in the divine-human 'game' can say 'yes' or 'no' to the other's 'yes' or 'no'. The adequacy of the model is tested in chapters three through six.

Can we resist the grace of God; is it impossible for us to say 'no' to him? Answering this question is the burden of chapter three. Brümmer distinguishes four senses of the word 'impossible' and concludes that, although it is not conceptually or factually or normatively impossible to resist God's grace, it is rationally impossible to do so. An experience of God's unmerited favour would make it unreasonable to reject it.

If God is both free and omnipotent, it would seem that he can do evil. Yet Christian faith rests secure in the knowledge that God is unchangeably good. Chapter four is devoted to resolving this paradox. A discussion of absolute and relative values, ultimate standards, and the modal distinction between impossibility *de dicto* and *de re* lead to the conclusion: 'For believers who claim that Yahweh is God, it is theologically necessary to affirm (*de dicto*) that Yahweh cannot sin (*de re*) in the sense that he is divinely disposed in this way' (107).

'According to the doctrine of double agency, God realizes his purposes in the world through the actions of human agents' (113). However, if God's will predominates over the will of humans, how can we say that humans act freely? And if God must wait upon humans to act, how can the outcome be God's will? Brümmer wrestles with this problem in the fifth chapter. After canvassing the work of Farrer and Wiles on the subject of divine agency, which he finds ultimately unsatisfying, he proposes a solution according to which God co-operates with humans and does not use them as tools. To preserve the traditional view that God is sovereign, he analyses what it means 'to cause an event' (115ff).

Those who give a free will defence in answer to the problem of evil appear to some — Ivan Karamazov, for example — to be morally insensitive. In the final chapter Brümmer asks: 'Is it not possible to state and defend the free will defence in such a way that it loses its moral insensitivity and succeeds in consoling the afflicted' (130)? Instead of arguing that freedom is intrinsically valuable, something which Ivan denies, one can argue that it is necessary in order for a personal relationship to exist between God and humans. But whether the prospect of entering such a relationship is morally sensitive and consoling to the sufferer will depend upon his or her moral perspective. Moral sensitivity and consolation are not 'absolute concepts'; they are relative to the 'ultimate moral universe in which we choose to stand' (147).

Brümmer raises many excellent questions in his book and addresses them with illumination; but sometimes his answers are less than complete. If all the criteria used to assess conceptual innovations in philosophy (25), including logical criteria (26), are person-relative (27), how can we evaluate the innovations without question begging?

In chapter four, unless 'divinely disposed not to do evil' means 'causally determined not to do evil', which equivalence of meaning Brümmer rejects, I can't see that the author has shown that God's disposition makes it impossible for him to *decide* to act out of character.

Brümmer's application of Wittgenstein, unless supplemented by a robust theory of factual reference, will not give us a clear understanding of what it means to speak of the personal Christian god. The problem of factual reference raises its quizzical head at several places, one of them being where the author says, 'God's factual characteristics are only known to us ... to the extent that they are constitutive assumptions for the way of life that we are to adopt in relation to God' (59). Aside from the problem of circularity that a theist would create in trying to speak about God this way to an atheist, it seemed an odd thing for Brümmer to say, in light of his previous conclusion that 'philosophical theology does not presuppose any confessional allegiance' (31). A direct confrontation with the metatheological scepticism of Flew or Martin or Nielsen would have improved the author's discussion of religious language.

The strengths of this book, however, far outweigh its weaknesses. It is clearly, concisely and systematically written. Simply a pleasure to read. Moreover, there is philosophical insight — not just analytic virtuosity — to be found in every chapter. It can be read with profit by the philosopher of religion as well as the novice. I warmly recommend it.

Gary Colwell
Concordia College

Peter Bürger

The Decline of Modernism.

trans. Nicholas Walker.

University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 1992. Pp. vii + 189.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-00889-X);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-00890-3).

After the alleged collapse of communism, the wholesale abandonment of Marxism has become the latest theoretical fad. It is now *de rigueur* to turn one's back on more than one hundred years of theory and to return to the more modest projects for reform made by a liberalism which has itself been moribund for nearly fifty years. Among the few who have not jumped on the 'Back to Kant' bandwagon is Peter Bürger. Bürger continues to use critical hermeneutics — his version of ideology critique and dialectical criticism informed by Gadamer's hermeneutics — even in his more recent discussions

of aesthetic theory and art. Not only has Bürger not sold out to the wishful thinking of disappointed and aging radicals, but he has not been seduced by the critical manoeuvres of deconstruction, or by any of the interpretive strategies which are its contemporaries. *The Decline of Modernism* is a relatively straightforward and unapologetic Marxian reading of trends within modernist aesthetics and artistic modernism.

Nonetheless, it is just this unabashed character of Bürger's Marxism which might leave even a reader receptive to it perplexed. Although Bürger devotes the first of the two sections of his book primarily to the aesthetic theory of the Frankfurt School, he by no means seeks to explain or to legitimate his nuanced *parti pris* for critical theory in the face of the proliferation of post-Marxist, postmodern, and deconstructive theories. Instead, in the first section he presents the reader with a collection of essays which, among other things, attempt to demonstrate the complementarity of Marcuse's ideology critique and Benjamin's redemptive criticism in the light of Havermas' critique of the latter, and to salvage elements from Adorno's discussion of modernism for the understanding of postmodernism. For all his concern with the historical dimension of aesthetic theory and modern art, he does not subject his own interpretive strategies to the same historical analysis; his Marxism, corrected by critical theory, appears to be beyond such analysis.

The idea of literary institution plays an important role both in the section on aesthetic theory and in the second section comprised of essays dealing primarily with works of art. Apart from a short discussion of this notion — which is Bürger's own and one of his major claims to fame — and a reference in a footnote to two texts where it is discussed in more detail, there is little in the text to help the reader grasp the idea. We are told that literary institution signifies 'the practice characterized by the following distinctive features: the literary institution serves special purposes in the social system as a whole; it develops an aesthetic code functioning as a boundary against other literary practices; it claims an unlimited validity (it is the institution which determines what in a given period is regarded as literature). The normative level is at the centre of a thus defined concept of institution, because it determines the patterns of behaviour both of the producers and the recipients' (6). The suspiciously circular character of this definition and the badly translated prose are not the only problem here; Bürger never answers the question of what makes the literary institution an *institution*. One is left wondering whether it is not just the Académie française hypostatized.

Bürger should have written an introduction to this collection of essays. In an introduction he could have clarified some of the central ideas in his text — including that of literary institution — and justified his theoretical stance. As it stands, the essays in *The Decline of Modernism* — all of which were previously published, one as early as 1977 — are left to float freely without a context. No attempt is made to explain why they were chosen for the book, and the reader has only the book's title to serve as a guide. The book is named

after one of its essays — also in *Telos* at the end of 1984 — which tries to make Adorno relevant for understanding postmodernism. But, in none of the essays, including 'The Decline of Modernism', is there a sustained attempt to define modernism — a problematic concept at the best of times.

With its uncritical acceptance of interpretive strategies derived from Marxian theory and its undefined central concepts, Bürger's book will probably be of interest only to dyed-in-the-wool Marxists and critical theorists. Yet, there are a few gems which deserve scrutiny by a wider audience. 'Morality and Society in Diderot and de Sade' begins with a discussion of the concept of application and its centrality for Bürger's practice of critical hermeneutics. From there, Bürger proceeds to question both the historical and the contemporary relevance of the Enlightenment attempt to ground morality on a rational basis after the collapse of religious authority. From de Sade he learns that Enlightenment thinkers used the concept of nature both as a norm and as a descriptive category. This use conceals 'the dominating character of the political power pursued by the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois domination appears as nature. In retaining the normativity of the concept of nature while also emptying it of all normative content, de Sade exposes the contradictory element in the concept itself' (88).

There are also other essays which occasionally shine with insight. 'Naturalism, Aestheticism and Subjectivity' demonstrates the dialectical relationship between naturalism and aestheticism. 'Both these movements are only two sides of a single problem which could rather drastically be characterized as the dissociation between a social experience without the subject and subjective experience without society' (126). But, without the necessary legitimization of his Marxian enterprise in the face of what many have called the bankruptcy of Marxism, Bürger's insights and conclusions fall flat. He is to be commended for not being taken in by the latest theoretical fads but he is also to be condemned for not situating his work in relation to them and for not attempting to shore his approach up against the rising tide of the self-proclaimed post-Marxist thinking which suspiciously resembles pre-Marxist thought.

Deborah Cook

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David Cockburn

Other Human Beings.

New York: St. Martin's Press 1990.

Pp. xii + 240.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-04846-7).

Other Human Beings discusses key aspects of what would traditionally be called the 'mind-body problem' and also related issues such as the nature of the self. It is significant that Cockburn speaks of other human beings rather than other minds. To speak of other minds would be to accept philosophical models of our relations with others which create philosophical puzzles. The entire book owes a considerable debt to the work of Wittgenstein, a debt which Cockburn makes no attempt to hide. The very first chapter is titled 'An Attitude towards a Soul'.

Cockburn rejects the view that ethics is grounded upon metaphysics. Ethics is grounded only in basic reactions to others, not in a recognition that others are beings of a certain kind. There can be no metaphysical grounding of our attitude towards others; on the contrary, our metaphysics expresses our attitudes.

There are three main parts to Cockburn's book. I will describe and make brief critical comments on each part. Prior to these three parts there is a short overview and an analytical table of contents. The latter is most helpful since Cockburn's arguments are tortuous and complex at times and the analytical table enables the reader to check how a particular argument fits in with his broader agenda.

Part I deals primarily with the idea that 'our attitudes towards others must be grounded in a picture of what they are' (p. x). Cockburn claims that the view that we need some metaphysical justification for thinking of another as a person may reflect the assumption that things may be used entirely as means to our ends unless reason is given to think otherwise (p. 15). Cartesians may believe that the existence of the soul or mind in human beings provides a metaphysical ground or reason for treating them as ends rather than simply means to our ends. Human beings are not just material objects, and so it is not appropriate to treat them as mere instruments.

While it may have been a desire to show that there is a special reason not to treat human beings merely as means which prompted the development of dualism, other explanations seem equally plausible. The Cartesians, for example, may have arrived at their position through noting that human beings think, have pains, etc., and that these mental events are categorically different from physical events. Descartes' argument to demonstrate that we have minds or souls is based in epistemology rather than ethics. He argues that we can most evidently know that we are thinking beings. His interest seems to be in demonstrating what we can know about human beings rather than showing that we should not treat them in a certain way.

Cockburn's discussion of the weaknesses of the first person point of view as a basis for attribution of 'mental predicates' to others and for under-

standing the feelings of others and our own is often quite effective and adds considerably to the arguments found in Wittgenstein.

Part II criticizes much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Cockburn believes that attempts to describe persons solely through the language of science derive from the rejection of dualism. After dualistic talk is purged, only the language of science remains as a means to talk of people and their relationships. Some recent philosophers hold that our common speech embodies a folk psychology which is implicitly dualistic and would even purge our language of terms which purport to refer to beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.

Cockburn claims that to use scientific language exclusively in describing humans and their relationships is to imply that our sole concern is to predict and control behavior so as to produce desirable outcomes. Both dualism and contemporary third person points of view displace tangible, extended persons, and non-instrumental, natural reactions to these persons, from a central place in the understanding of our relationships with others.

Part III elaborates upon Cockburn's theme that the category of human beings is basic and is not to be explicated in more basic terms or facts about them. Cockburn is particularly effective in criticizing the idea that it is only the particular character and memory complexes of individuals which we love or like (p. 136). He rightly remarks that this position implies that anyone with the character and other psychological features that we love or like could replace anyone we actually loved or liked. He also notes that his love for his newborn child has absolutely nothing to do with the child's having any particular psychological characteristics that distinguish it from any other newborn (p. 139). Cockburn's discussion of the irreplaceability of persons displays his analytical skills at their best.

Cockburn does not discuss what implication his views might have for social philosophy, although he does criticize utilitarianism in several places. At times, his arguments give 'normal' reactions within our own society a privileged status. For example, he argues that it is part of our notion of human beings that they are not to be eaten when dead, even though he admits that one could imagine a recognizably human culture which did not react in this manner. As he puts it, 'it is the prevalent attitudes in our society which will be my primary concern in this discussion' (p. 111). Some views of those with attitudes quite divergent from the normal are dismissed by what appear to be *ad hominem* arguments.

As an example, I would cite Cockburn's reaction to Tooley's views on abortion. Tooley thinks that there is a genuine question whether any abortions are indecent. Cockburn suggests that he might not even discuss abortion with someone who did not admit that some abortions are indecent. 'Now I am not sure that I would even try to discuss abortion with somebody who did not take *that* for granted' (p. 114). He claims that someone who asks for a reason why we should not eat persons who are killed in traffic accidents is a moral defective (p. 113). Our unanalyzed immediate reactions are taken as basic. For those within the Socratic tradition radical questioning quite

offensive to general attitudes is a trademark of philosophy; but for Cockburn philosophy leaves everything as it is, and merely assembles reminders which show that things couldn't be as philosophers picture them.

Ken Hanly

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Le Libéralisme Conservateur.

Paris: Editions Kimé 1993. Pp. 133.

(ISBN 2-908212-41-2).

This is a well written, well argued and beautifully translated book. A collection of three different essays, it was originally written in English and Spanish. The essays have to do with the theories of three great political thinkers: Carl Schmitt, Friedrich A. Hayek and G.W.F. Hegel.

The book doesn't present a single argument and is not arranged along chronological lines, but it pursues three major themes of its 'conservative liberals'. The unity of the book stems from the fact that the essays were written to illustrate and defend a single thesis, i.e., that thinkers like Hegel, Schmitt or Hayek, who have been alternatively characterized as liberal or conservative, because their political philosophies contain both liberal and conservative components, are better understood if we conceive them as liberal conservatives or conservative liberals.

This is a view that, so far as we know, has not been explored in the anglo-saxon tradition of political thought, but this fact may have contributed by itself to make Cristi's interpretative attempt even more refined and tight, though controversial.

In the first essay of this book, in examining the evolution of Carl Schmitt's position towards liberalism, Cristi takes to task some of the more influential ancient and contemporary critics of Schmitt for their inability to transcend a view of him as a radically antiliberal conservative. This position was, certainly, characteristic of the first stage of Schmitt's thought, called 'conservative-revolutionary' by Cristi, but he subsequently abandoned it. In seeing Schmitt after 1923 as if he was simply the arch-enemy of liberalism, the author claims, most of his critics have missed the fundamental change that has already taken place in his thought when he wrote *Parlamentarismus* in that year. In this work, Schmitt's 'conservatism has been liberalized' (p. 11), or, he 'displays a more liberalized conservatism which has lost its trenchant

contrarevolutionary character' (p. 75), thus allowing him to reach a compromise with democratic legitimation.

In Schmitt's view parliamentarianism is not a political but a state form, which has incorporated throughout its history monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. The post-1923 Schmitt claims that the crisis of the parliamentary institution during the Weimar republic can be explained as a result of a betrayal of its original ideals as the result of excessive democratic aggregations. Therefore, in order to become a purely liberal institution, and thus able to preserve the unity of the state, parliament must be expurgated of its democratic elements, simultaneously with the reinforcement of the monarchical and aristocratic elements. As Schmitt defines it in his *Verfassungslehre* (*Theory of the Constitution*) there is no essential incompatibility between liberalism and authoritarianism because he conceives the first simply as a political framework, an ensemble of limits and controls to the state's action. Significantly enough, according to Cristi, it was the reading of Hegel which made it possible for Schmitt to abandon his original antiliberal conservative position. Thus, thanks to Hegel's 'relative rationalism' Schmitt was able to reconcile liberal civil society and a conservative state.

The second essay, the most polemical of the three, is dedicated to showing that the separation line that Hayek has tried to draw between his own position and Carl Schmitt's, with regard to the decisionist elements of his political thought, is actually spurious. This demarcation was politically crucial for Hayek, given Schmitt's association with nazism. But as Cristi demonstrates, beyond the apparent opposition of their respective political views some of the fundamental presuppositions of Carl Schmitt's political theory have penetrated Hayek's philosophy of liberty. For example, Hayek's preference for a strong but limited government whose main function would be to ensure the depoliticization of civil society. To illustrate the deep commonality that exists between Schmitt and Hayek's political views, Cristi brings to light an almost forgotten newspaper statement by Hayek. During a visit to Chile under Pinochet's dictatorship in 1981, Hayek showed his theoretically based support for that regime in declaring that 'a dictatorship that deliberately limits itself can be more liberal in its politics than a democratic assembly which doesn't have any limits' (p. 12).

But, undoubtedly, it is in the third essay where the power of the liberal conservative interpretation shows itself in all its force. Cristi examines here both the liberal and conservative interpretations of Hegel and finds them wanting. They correctly emphasize some important aspects of his political theory but also ignore other significant and equally important components of it. What is required, Cristi says, is a synthetic reading capable of transcending the limitations of these two one-sided views. Cristi fulfills that task in a detailed and complete reconstruction of the *Philosophy of Right*, in which he shows that Hegel succeeded there in reconciling the liberal and conservative components of his thought. Cristi sets out what he calls Hegel's 'theoretical reconciliation of freedom and authority', an account which is consistent with, but philosophically more refined and illuminating

than Raymond Plant's pioneering interpretation of Hegel's rational state as a synthesis of the Greek *Sittlichkeit* and the modern conception of individuality.

In spite of their obvious differences in scale and subject, Cristi's book reminds one of Victor Farias' influential book on Heidegger in its combination of interpretative daring and first rate scholarship. This is not a pure coincidence. Both authors are concerned with the roots of conservative and nazi political thought, and both can trace also their intellectual ancestry to the same Chilean philosophical tradition.

Unquestionably, the liberal conservative interpretation has found an able defence in this scholarly and groundbreaking book.

A final observation: an oversight in the bibliography of *Le Liberalisme Conservateur* (p. 129), has transformed Herbert Marcuse's book *Negations* into his... *Negociations*.

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Paul Crowther

Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism.

Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993. Pp. xiii + 214.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824037-6).

This is the first volume of an impressive project on the relation of art, philosophy and social change. In an on-going argument and reviewing several important aesthetic theories Paul Crowther in this book argues for the idea that aesthetics should be a kind of critical assessment of art works' experiential consequences. Although I go along with his resistance against postmodernist reasoning, which functions as the starting point of his book, beyond that, our ways often part. My disagreement, however, does not annul the evident quality of the argument in this work. It is recommended reading material for all those aestheticians who are interested in the cognitive and non-cognitive functionality of art works and in the possibility of any influence of art on societal change. I will now discuss the most crucial steps in Crowther's argument.

Postmodernists claim to have undone the alleged rigidity of modern categories, like that of the autonomous subject, but according to Crowther they reach this 'achievement' by overemphasizing the fluidity of modes of knowledge and experience, and of their status as social constructs, but there may well exist flexible constants. Aesthetics can help with the analysis of

these flexible constants, not by looking for the essences of art or aesthetic experience, but by supplementing our theoretical assessments with a critique of art. Crowther proposes to view aesthetic experiences as well as works of art as functions of critical awareness and of body-hold, an historicized version of Merleau-Ponty's much neglected notion of embodiment. Critical aesthetics actualizes the critical awareness involved in our aesthetic experiences. Art, defined in terms of originality, roots in the body-hold of the artist, who moulds his medium to solve technical problems traditional art forms confront him with.

Postmodernism involves only two theses, really. First, contemporary experience and sensibility are analyzed as imbued by the shocks generated by the rapid succession of mechanically reproduced events. This supposedly has alienated us from experiencing proximity to and reciprocity with objects. Although Crowther agrees with this analysis, his effort to heal alienation with critical aesthetics clearly involves a diversion from postmodern resignation. I will go into this shortly. The second trait of postmodern reasoning is its critique of categories as is, e.g., involved in Derrida's deconstruction of the subject as merely an effect of textual 'différance'. This deconstruction meets with relevant criticism from Crowther, who points out that neither language nor *différance* are sufficient conditions for the subject, since there is too much coherence in our attitudes towards the world for our subjectivity to be but a never ending trace of text. The *différance* of language, this eternal referring, rather is an effect of body-hold, and the subject may at all times claim to reach the presence of some or other referent if sustained by the context.

Regarding art's relevance for the mending of alienation, then, Crowther observes that shock-effects are readily sought out in art appreciation even though in daily life one tries to render them harmless. He criticizes the formalist positions of Bell and Greenberg for their lack of historicism, and proceeds with Kant's account of aesthetic experience. According to Crowther 'what Kant is describing are the logical and phenomenological outlines of a very fundamental experience. But he is describing the experience in its simplest and purest state — giving us, as it were, the prototype' (p. 60). In my opinion this interesting observation deserves more deliberation. Perhaps Kant does not merely describe a prototype experience, but rather an ideal that regulates aesthetic discourse.

Contrary to Walter Benjamin, Crowther thinks an artist is never just a producer, but one who in addition ought to be original (in the right way; a rightness we can only devise from a political and societal point of view, not from artistic ones). Traces of this originality deposit in his work, which clearly distinguishes art from normal artefacts where such traces of production normally disappear. It is the originality that informs our aesthetic experiences and that makes the relevant critical awareness politically effective as well. What the artist reproduces is his personal relation to socio-historical circumstances. Because of this in his work these circumstances are visible to the beholder in a transparent way. Crowther confines himself to the obser-

vation that some works 'engage us profoundly but others do not, in so far as they simply repeat established stylistic tendencies and methods' (p. 54). Inevitably, I think, the only criterion for artistic evaluation will be the beholder's own body-hold that, historically mediated though it may be, yet remains idiosyncratic. So the acclaimed transparency of the socio-historical meaning of a work of art we better conceive of as an interpretation to be extrapolated from some idiosyncratic experience in what appear to be rather strenuous ways, because if such interpretations are made 'on first sight', they will easily be superficial and irrelevant.

Crowther's aesthetics, then, is critical in two ways: the awareness involved in art analysis is critical, and so is the philosophical analysis of the possibility of aesthetic experience in general, albeit in a Kantian sense. I have two questions here. The first, as to how these two senses of 'critical' relate, and a further one, generated by the answer to the first, of why the critical awareness ought to be directed at some socio-political effectiveness. In my view a putting into perspective of one's body-hold would amply suffice to make art important for people. Perhaps the most crucial problem with Crowther's point of view, then, is this demand that art be politically effective in the first place.

The book then jumps to an analysis of that aesthetic value, the sublime, the existence of which, let alone its importance, I sincerely doubt. All the same, Crowther's treatment of the concept is sensitive and illuminating, and as we all know postmoderns such as Lyotard assign the notion a crucial place in their theory. So I will not keep it from you. Crowther elaborates on some crucial differences between the theories of the sublime of Kant and Burke. Kant analyzes the sublime in terms of our rational response, whereas Burke links it with psychologically intense feelings bound up with our sense of mortality. With Burke the sublime is existential. Crowther distinguishes mere shock, and pain from the aesthetic experience of them. Crucially, distance is said to facilitate our viewing a horrifying phenomenon as a spectacle for contemplation: it invests 'the object with the character of representation'. In short, the sublime admits of voluntary solicitation, which pain and shock do not, and its enjoyment 'does not presuppose the belief such states will issue in some specific kind of practical or sexual gratification' (p. 124). As regards its functionality, according to Burke's existential theory the sublime helps against monotony. Crowther thinks this explains why eighteenth century philosophers have started paying attention to the sublime: as a weapon against aristocratic boredom. I find a less vulgar explanation in the slow decline of religious experiential categories and the desire of mankind to possess some anchorage for discourse. The religious connotations of the German 'Erhabene' are by no means accidental. This might also, to some extent, explain the recent interest taken in the term.

At the end of his book Crowther exposes Lyotard's distinction between two modes of sublime, melancholic (a nostalgia for presence) and *novatio* (infinite experiment) as spurious in many ways, and as a misconstruction of the Kantian sublime. He does sustain Lyotard's argument that we can connect

the Kantian sublime with the Postmodern sensibility, as he sustains his analysis of postmodern sensibility: 'The basis of [Postmodern] sensibility arises from the fact that ... reality is ... deciphered as the intersection of various complex levels of meaning' (p. 163). According to Crowther in our postmodern days the sublime experience is subordinated to profit motives and to the demands of rapidly changing modes of transmission. Television facilitates disinterested enjoyment but at the same time diminishes the psychological impact of the sublime. Under its influence 'our response may become more orientated towards marvelling at the technological means by which the spectacle is achieved, rather than at the spectacle itself' (p. 131). Yet if Crowther is right in that the sublime invests 'the object with the character of representation', what can be wrong with this? Sublimity will always involve some measure of marvel about the means of presentation of the spectacle. This makes it aesthetic in the first place. Perhaps we need a different account of the kind of experience provided by television. Again, this makes me wonder if anything resembling the sublime has ever existed at all.

Crowther agrees with the postmodern analysis that we live in a new period characterized by the disappearance of certain experiences that are more authentic, but he adds to it the claim that somehow new forms and possibilities of experiences have risen as well. I am not sure, however, if one can coherently make a claim such as the former, because apparently it is impossible to assess its truth. If certain experiences have vanished we cannot possibly find out what they were like, since we can no longer have them, and experiences can only be known by acquaintance. I stand to be convinced of the postmodernity of today's world if we are to understand it in terms of some loss of experiential authenticity. The whole idea is a Romanticist sham. My psychological hunch regarding those who complain about the loss of authentic experience in contemporary culture, is that they may actually be grieving over their own lost childhood ingenuousness. I do not think alienated experience is a philosophical problem. Then again, I find it rather remarkable to find that those who think it is propose some form of critical art appreciation as a cure. If alienation is a kind of deprivation of critical awareness of the objects we come across surely critical awareness cannot restore the scope of our experience. Crowther does not seem to provide a way out of this paradox. Then again, the idea of alienation really is a soothing idea, and does not sustain a critical stance towards society at all. To know that one is incapable of experiencing properly relieves one from the need to even try. This belies the duty of happiness life puts us up with.

Regarding the political effect of art it seems to me that the bewilderment encountered in an aesthetic experience concerning the way we succeed to generate ever new meanings with limited symbolic systems may and will be of tantamount importance for the beholder, but only metaphorically will it be so for culture as a whole. Part of the reason for this restricted effectivity lies in the decisive role of the notion of body-hold. Crowther claims that body-hold is a basic, indeed the basic value in life, but he does not provide a clear definition of it. Is it the part played by the body whatsoever, as

distinguished from the part played by the intellect, the bodily versus the mental? Surely it must consist in some special aspect of bodily motion if it is to be the source of meaning as Crowther says it is. Crowther's example of a baby learning a language may prove illuminating in its drawbacks. Although at first it is the baby's body that gives a grip on the objects in the world, not every one of its movements is equally important in the process of creating meaning. I would propose an elaboration of Kant's remarks on this problem. Clearly only those moments of bodily movement make out body-hold that have an existential functionality, that is, those that are marshalled by the subject's feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Only those bodily impulses and reactions lead to understanding that appeal to this 'feeling of life', to borrow from Kant. So the ultimate basis of a meaningful grasp of the world is not the body but the emotional response to it: one's feeling good or bad. Perhaps the successful artwork, then, can be seen as enabling us an awareness of the ways our feeling of life is enhanced by the medium and subject matter of the work. Possibly Crowther will address this problem in his next book on 'Art and Embodiment'.

The last postmodern idea under siege is the so-called 'end of history' theme. Arthur Danto has argued that art has come to an end, because art's subject matter has changed to sheer self-reflection. Crowther, however, sees no reason for taking this self-reflection to imply that there can be no more creativity or development of art. He also thinks, secondly, that Danto is wrong in taking twentieth century art as a semi-philosophical endeavour. Crowther instead signals two main streams in Modernist art, neither one of which involves a discontinuity with the traditional 'legitimizing discourse' directed at an elevation of the subject, but only Concept Art and Minimal Art (p. 184). These latter do involve a break with this 'legitimizing discourse'. Aptly, Crowther does not find this 'legitimizing discourse' problematic at all, on the contrary, he thinks it is part of the concept of art as we know it in Western culture. Wanting ... 'To escape the legitimizing discourse ... would involve giving up art' (p. 195). Thus with art's aim of elevating the subject, in the end Crowther returns to the relevance of body-hold for art, and of art for body-hold.

Apart from the observed flaws of some of its key notions this book puts into perspective with clear and convincing argument the creation and appreciation of art and its relation to society, and it critically appraises several relevant philosophical theories heaping proper scorn on postmodernist frivolousness.

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Deane Curtin and Lisa Heldke eds.
Cooking, Eating, Thinking:
Transformative Philosophies of Food.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992.
Pp. xvii + 386.
US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-31599-9);
US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-207040-5).

This is an innovative and extremely eclectic collection of thoughtful and philosophical writings about food, including four anchoring essays by the editors which structure the book's chapters and put a focus on the other readings. Although all the readings belong to the 'philosophy of food', broadly speaking, it is the anchoring essays which are most philosophical in the narrower sense. Because the readings are so varied and numerous, I cannot comment on them individually, and will focus on the themes the editors highlight. To give the flavor of the book, though, I note that the selections range from excerpts of Plato, the Bible and the Rig Veda to feminist discussions of eating disorders; from chefs' writings on international and regional cuisine, and Buddhist, Native American, West Indian, and Black American ruminations on the growing, cooking, and rituals of food to arguments for vegetarianism and revisionary thoughts about our responsibilities to the land; from comparisons between recipes and theories to humorous pieces on finding the best barbecue and wondering how Burger King is able to cut a pie and leave no ragged edges!

This is not a book on gastronomy nor does it connect its discussion of food with the typical issues in the philosophy of art. Instead it attempts to show how thinking about food can be philosophically important, indeed, 'transformative'. And the book does succeed in interesting and unusual ways in prompting the reader to examine his or her attitudes toward the production, preparation, and consumption of food. But it quickly becomes obvious that the presentation of an innovative philosophy of food is subordinated to a related but different project: the presentation of a certain perspective on philosophy and the application of that perspective to our concerns with food. This generates something of a chicken and egg problem that ultimately is the central weakness of the book, in my view: must I have adopted the agenda first and simply come to see it reflected in our thought about food, or will I be led towards its general adoption by a careful consideration of particular thought-provoking issues surrounding food? My final impression was that there is too much chicken and not enough egg in the mix.

And the agenda is very '90s', and very politically correct. The authors write from a feminist and deconstructivist critical perspective on western philosophy, are influenced by Buddhist and 'process' thinking, offer readings that exhibit their concern for cultural diversity, and adopt an activist stance on food politics and related ecological and environmental concerns. Perhaps the best way to view the book is as an attempt on the part of two philosophers

with the particular inclinations and bents mentioned to bring food into the philosophical conversation, to 'demarginalize' this topic, and thereby learn some valuable (if negative) lessons about the western philosophical tradition and arrive at some new and important conclusions about self, values, theory and practice, and political consciousness. What are some of these conclusions that make food a philosophically important subject?

The editors argue that thinking about food uncovers sexist and elitist tendencies of western thought (intellectually discounting the value of workers' and womens' activities), and exposes its marginalizing of practice in contrast to theory, its mistaken and dichotomous conception of a person as an autonomous substance not essentially related to others or to its own bodily needs and practices, and its delusional penchant for metaphysical and moral absolutism, or at least, objectivity, when a more relativistic and 'optional' use of theories (rather as we use recipes) is indicated.

Clearly, the arguments for these broadly sketched positions (attitudes?) cannot be handled here in the detail that judiciousness demands, and I can say only that I found some of them provocative and interesting (e.g., their 'deconstruction' of our notions of famine and of charity) but others hyperbolic and implausible. Suggestions such as that we should view ourselves (and our food) in a more 'participatory' or 'contextual' fashion, recognizing and affirming the important relations we have with others, with our practices, and with our world, are unobjectionable even if revisionary to a degree, but it is another matter altogether to claim that western philosophy has been engaged in 'the substance project', whose masculine over-emphasis of autonomy leaves us victims of an objectifying and de-personalizing image of self and others. And there *is* a tiresome, though not universal tendency of the arguments in this book to be overstated, strident, and politicized in a fashion that is unnecessary to the topic. It is a feature that infects the book only because it (sadly) infects so much 'post-modernist' philosophy in general.

Characteristically, Plato and Descartes take enormous abuse, if not very penetrating criticism, for their 'dualistic' and 'hierarchical' thinking (as if one cannot use dualisms and still be sensitive to matters of context and degree). Perhaps a bit more surprising is the uncharitable and short shrift given to gastronomy and gastronomic theories of food, which get charged with elitism, over-intellectualism, and insufficient sensitivity to the participatory interactions we have with food. In many ways, haute cuisine is the epitome of *synthesis* between theory and practice, thought and action, between the desire to create and alter and the desire to appreciate the natural.

Although the book makes for interesting reading and is certainly diverse in its offerings, the editors do not convincingly establish that foodmaking and eating are deeply philosophically significant activities or the original source of 'transformative' philosophical attitudes. It is unclear that food 'defines who we are' in any more substantial sense than our selected pastimes or preferences in music might be said to define us. And, in fact, since it is part of the authors' view that we are capable not only of recognizing our relations,

whether to food, the environment, or to others, but of also affirming or retracting them, it would seem to follow that there is a wide range of relations and attitudes that we can (and do) adopt towards food, and their philosophical consequences or lessons — when there are such — are as variable as the daily menu at a three-star restaurant.

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Gilles Deleuze

*Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on
Hume's Theory of Human Nature.*

trans. C.V. Boundas.

New York: Columbia University Press 1991.

Pp. xi + 163.

US \$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-06812-3).

This early (1953) work on Hume attempts, like Deleuze's other historical monographs, to canvas a substantial philosophical corpus in a remarkably small volume. In certain ways its style mirrors its subject matter — e.g., while Deleuze stresses Hume's associationism, and his model of the mind as a 'resonating instrument' (112), the book itself often appears only an association of ideas which 'resonate' throughout: Deleuze orbits around a few central themes, each following from the previous only in the order of pages. These are clearly identifiable, however, and (happily) interrelated. Important among them is the distinction between atomism and associationism: *atomism* is simply a theory of the constituents of the mind, whereas *associationism* concerns the types of principles which govern the mind (26-7, 105). Likewise the *mind* itself is for Hume merely a chaotic concatenation of ideas, whereas the *subject* is the stable result of principles of association, which give the mind a 'nature' and render it a possible subject of science (22-3, 92, 98-9).

Since another of Deleuze's central concerns is how the subject is 'created' within the mind (64, 107), he naturally focuses on the principles. For Hume, unlike the rationalists, these principles are not intrinsic to the ideas themselves; hence they are not immediately given, but known only indirectly, by way of their *effects* in the mind (23-5, 132-3). While Deleuze's exploration of the principles serves as a springboard for his later, more speculative claims, the taxonomy provided in Chapter Two is useful in its own right, and — in light of its (relative) lucidity, perhaps the most fruitful part of the book. Here he clarifies the types of rules common to association and passion, and the

basic differences between them: knowledge *extends* from one idea to another, whereas morality *integrates* a collection of incompatible passions (36).

Deleuze rightly emphasizes the priority of the passions over knowledge for Hume, whereby scepticism is ultimately abated by the irresistible demands of practice. And since passions give an aim or purpose to the system of ideas, Deleuze traces the origin of subjectivity to this primacy of the passions (33, 63, 98, 104). But he also turns this discussion to speculations on how, in spite of himself, Hume might appeal to God as the author of the otherwise inexplicable principles: '... philosophy has nothing to say on what causes the principles and on the origin of their power. There, it is the place of God ... we can always think of God negatively, as the cause of the principles. It is in this sense that theism is valid, and it is this sense that purpose is reintroduced' (77). With this appeal to God as a constitutive principle — along with the ineliminable fiction of a 'world' involved in belief in enduring objects — Deleuze concludes that Hume ultimately grounds reason upon the vagaries of the imagination. But his bold 'reading' is at times remarkably un-Humean, and (not surprisingly) proceeds on slim textual grounds. Deleuze cites Hume's reference to a 'pre-established harmony' between nature and the train of ideas, and his claim that belief in miracles is itself miraculous — acknowledging, then dismissing, the possibility of irony in Hume's phrasing (76-7). And while recognizing Hume's claims to the contrary, he insists that for Hume belief in continued existence is itself an independent principle (80-1). The subversive reading's perennial appeal for the French is understandable; but since Deleuze here explicitly claims to be doing *history* of philosophy (107), one expects a certain textual fidelity which in this case seems lacking.

Moreover, while the translator emphasizes French philosophers' interest in empiricism, Deleuze entirely neglects the empiricist tradition informing Hume's work. The 'natural philosophy' of Isaac Newton served in particular as a model for Hume: in his essay 'Of the Middle Station of Life' Hume cites Newton as one of the two greatest philosophers of all time (Galileo the other); and in the opening section of the *Enquiry* Hume explicitly draws inspiration for his principles of association from the success of Newton's laws of motion. This inspiration is especially important if one wishes, as Deleuze apparently does, to comment meaningfully on the origin of the principles. Deleuze emphasizes repeatedly that for Hume principles of human nature are not intrinsic to ideas, and so, for an empiricist, their provenance is mysterious; but Newton likewise insisted that gravitational attraction was not intrinsic to matter — and so, as a good empiricist, 'framed no hypotheses' about its cause (see, e.g., Ernan McMullin, *Newton on Matter and Activity* [University of Notre Dame Press 1978]: 57ff). The historical influence is clear, furthermore, since Berkeley — undisputedly a major influence on Hume — himself mapped Newton's passive matter/active principle dichotomy into the phenomenal realm (McMullin: 114-15). But important as Newton is to this topic, Deleuze mentions him not once.

For the history of philosophy Deleuze purports to do, such neglect is serious. But clearly this work is published primarily as a Deleuze vehicle, making the subject matter practically irrelevant: as the Translator's Introduction illustrates, the real value of the text is taken to be the light it can shed on Deleuze's philosophy. Perhaps only this fact can excuse the *most* unHumean aspect of Deleuze's writing: the hopelessly contorted style which sometimes renders the text unreadable. (Worse yet, the Translator's Preface apparently seeks to *outdo* Deleuze's penchant for jargon and obscurity.) Hume himself so insisted on clear and sober writing that he took so plain a stylist as Benjamin Franklin to task for using the neologisms 'unshakable' and 'colonize' (see Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* [Penguin Books 1964]: 293). It is difficult to imagine what Hume — or anyone seeking an introduction to Hume — would make of Deleuze's writing, so intentionally cryptic that it is a dreadful chore to read. But as a shrine to Deleuze, what he has written here is no doubt secondary to the mere fact that he has written it.

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Marc Ereshefsky, ed.

The Units of Evolution. Essays on the Nature of Species.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992.

Pp. xvi + 405.

US \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-05044-7);

US \$27.50 (paper: ISBN 0-262-55020-2).

Charles Darwin, in 1887, noted that there were a laughable number of different ideas about what constitutes a species. He mentioned four. A century later, that number has increased to more than twenty. This collection of essays discusses eight of them.

Papers by biologists comprise the first half of the book. The centerpiece of their discussions is the 'biological species concept', as it has been proposed in various forms by Ernst Mayr, et. al. Mayr's 1963 paper, 'Species Concepts and Their Application', sets the stage for a significant portion of the debate. While his way of defining species shares some common ground with other definitions, it has at least two distinctive components. First, the defining criteria for species are reproductive, not morphological or ecological, etc. Second, the concept is taken to be relational; that is, species are defined by their reproductive *isolation* from other species.

Although the biological species concept (BSC) is currently the dominant view, it is not without its problems. For example, it fails to account for asexual populations, and it obviates the possibility that groups separated spatially and temporally might nonetheless, for all practical biological purposes, belong to the same species.

Most of the other papers in the biology section of the book consider the strengths and weaknesses of BSC, and offer emendations or outright alternatives to it. One paper (Sokal and Crovello) argues that BSC is not operational. Since it is not practically possible to observe reproductive relations among taxa, they argue, one ought to opt for a definition that makes use of accessible data like observable similarities. It proposes as an alternative a phenetic species concept, making use of morphological, physiological, biochemical, behavioral, ecological, etc., similarities. Another alternative is the recognition concept of species (Paterson). On this view, mechanisms operating *within* the population, namely common fertilization systems, are definitive for species. A third paper (Ehrlich and Raven) disputes both the BSC and the recognition concept, arguing that many species are not evolutionary units held together by gene flow at all, the latter operating within much smaller populations kept similar by similar selective pressures.

One criticism of BSC has been that it does not pay sufficient attention to the evolutionary dimension of species. An early revision, intended to amend this flaw, was G.G. Simpson's evolutionary definition of species, offered in 1961. He sees species as evolutionary lineages with distinct evolutionary histories, roles, and tendencies (69). One advantage of this approach is that it can be applied to asexual as well as to sexual populations.

Simpson's definition provides a second piece of the background for papers in this collection. Van Valen, for example, offers a variation on it with his ecological species concept. On this view, a species is an evolutionary lineage occupying an adaptive zone different from any other lineage in its range, and evolving separately from those outside its range. In a slightly different version, Wiley argues that a species should be seen as a *single* lineage, allowing it to be thought of as an individual rather than as a class. One other variation on the evolutionary theme (Cracraft) suggests a phylogenetic species concept: a species is 'the smallest diagnosable cluster of individual organisms within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent' (103).

Orthogonal to the debate about specific definitions, there are also considerations of general criteria for the formulation of an adequate definition: ought one to focus on the processes that generate species or on the product? Should plant species be defined in exactly the same way as animal species? Should asexual organisms be included in the species concept? Is the notion of species useful primarily as a classificatory category or as an element in evolution theory? Must there be *one* definition of species that covers all cases?

In connection with the final question, one paper (Mishler and Donoghue) argues for the necessity of definitional pluralism. Another (Templeton) provides a definition that blends portions of the evolutionary, BSC, and

recognition concepts — the cohesion species concept. It emphasizes genetic and/or demographic exchangeability, thus allowing for asexual as well as sexual species.

The papers in the second half of the book are philosophical, and although they give some consideration to the specific definitions proposed by the biologists, they also explore some more basic philosophic issues associated with the notion of species. The latter issues date back to at least the time of Plato and Aristotle, and they include the problem of universals, questions about the nature of definitions, essences, defining properties, and natural kinds (Hull and Sober). In addition, there is a discussion of the distinction between the sense and the reference of a term like 'species', (Beatty — although he doesn't use the Fregean terminology), as well as questions about the ontological status of species — whether they constitute logical individuals with parts (Hull and Ghiselin) or classes with members. Ruse argues that they are real natural kinds, but are picked out by consiliences rather than by some set of essential properties. And both Kitcher and Ruse make a case for a pluralistic approach to the definition of species.

Ereshefsky has put together a fine collection of papers, covering a broad spectrum of views on the nature of species. They amply represent not only the numerous issues that continue to surround the notion of species but also the extraordinary diversity of opinion on those issues. His use of material from both biologists and philosophers is particularly felicitous. It gives the reader access to both empirical and conceptual considerations.

One small feature might make the collection even more accessible to non-specialists. That is a glossary of technical terms. The general philosophical issues surrounding the notion of species should be of considerable interest to philosophers who are not specialists in the philosophy of biology. Metaphysicians and philosophers of language ought, for example, to find the discussions relevant and enlightening. They may, however, be unfamiliar with some of the more technical biological terminology. Nonetheless, Ereshefsky provides good introductions to both the biological and philosophical portions of the book. His account of the positions taken in the various papers is lucid and non-technical.

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John Martin Fischer, ed.

The Metaphysics of Death.

Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993.

Pp. 423.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2046-0);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2104-1).

Take Percy. Percy never even *thinks* about his own mortality. He lives his life as if he expects to live for a hundred years. Always acting so as to avoid pain and minimize regrets, he tries to stay healthy, cultivates friendships, and saves up for a comfortable retirement. On his 60th birthday Percy unexpectedly dies in his sleep.

Cyril worries about death all the time. The knowledge that his existence is limited affects him profoundly. Cyril's life is a frantic race with death, a race he cannot win, one long concatenation of vain attempts at ensuring that when the Grim Reaper finally catches up, Cyril will at least have accomplished everything he set out to do. Each new wrinkle, every new grey hair reminds him of all the pleasures of life he may never get to experience and of all the love he may never get to give. This casts a shadow over his activities. Cyril also dies in his sleep on his 60th birthday. Unexpectedly somehow.

The Epicurean believes that Percy's attitude to life is more conducive to happiness than Cyril's and points out that since you cannot experience non-existence anyway, you'll never get to regret that you have died, leave alone that you have died too soon. Your being dead simply never is, and never will be, a part of your life. So stop worrying about death, says the Epicurean, and be happy.

Most people fear death, some of them because they fear a life in Hell. But the ones who don't believe in life after death also fear death. One might think that this is because they have trouble seeing non-existence for what it really is, viz. nothing at all, and see it instead for what it is not, viz. a different *kind* of existence. With few exceptions, however, the philosophers who have written on this question say that death is feared because death really *is* bad. And they believe they can demonstrate that death, as post-mortem non-existence, is a harm; one that can be foreseen, but at the same time one that is never experienced by its victim. Of course, such a demonstration would not show that Percy's attitude to life is *not* preferable to Cyril's, only that Percy is a fool for not letting his mortality get him down.

The Metaphysics of Death is an anthology containing seventeen essays, including most of what has recently been published in American journals on the above topic: the question of whether death really is a harm and whether we are justified in fearing it. Contributors include Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Harry Silverstein, Jeffrie Murphy, Joel Feinberg, Derek Parfit, and, for comic relief, Woody Allen. Allen's inclusion seems superfluous; this is not a depressing book. Nor is it the Kuebler-Ross type of book you might give to your dying sister to make her feel better. The book is not about dying at all; it is about non-existence.

The selection by Thomas Nagel can be considered the key-stone of the book; his contribution is referred to by almost every other contributor. Nagel argues that good and bad are relational: 'A man's life includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life. These boundaries are commonly crossed by the misfortunes of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed' (66). In the case of death, of course, these boundaries are crossed by the misfortune of losing out on future goods.

In opposition to Nagel one might say that a person as he or she is remembered by survivors, and who is dead at the time of being remembered, is only the *history* of a person. Histories can be revised and re-evaluated. People's life-experiences cannot. When a man makes a promise to his dying father that causes the father to die happily, and then breaks the promise, this will cause observers to revise their description of the father's (and son's) history. But it cannot change the fact that the father died happily — it cannot alter the father's life as lived and experienced and *evaluated* by the father. Who determines whether your life is good or bad? You? Or some observer who applies his own values to what he observes (perhaps while claiming he is applying an 'objective' standard of good and bad)? When Nagel attempts to show that death is bad, he only succeeds in showing that *someone else's* death can be seen as bad by an observer (who is very much alive).

Many of the contributors (Williams on p. 80, Yourgrau on p. 140, Pitcher on p. 161, and McMahon on p. 240) agree with Nagel that a person can be harmed and not be consciously affected. Velleman suggests a person's life is like a story: a premature ending is bad for the entire story. Many contributors (e.g. Williams on p. 76) also seem to accept that a long happy life is better than a short happy life, ergo: the person leading the short happy life suffers a misfortune. (When exactly is the misfortune suffered? 'Eternally' says Feldman on p. 321.) On the other hand, Stephen Rosenbaum ably defends the Epicurean viewpoint in two contributions, while Jeffrie Murphy argues in favour of Spinoza's formulation of the Epicurean view. Murphy's piece is particularly interesting and worth the price of the book.

Even if one finds oneself in disagreement with many of them, the great variety of viewpoints contained in this book make it a pleasure to read and study, full as it is of intelligent, sometimes brilliant, occasionally infuriating, but always stimulating arguments. It provides the reader with a fairly comprehensive survey of recent developments in the debate on the value of existence and the evil of death-as-non-existence and as such it is certainly recommended.

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Robert Gibbs

Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas.

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992.

Pp. xii + 281.

US \$29.95 (ISBN 0-691-07415-1).

In concentrating on the work of Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas, Gibbs wants to show that the Judaism they represent offers a new orientation for philosophy (5). Notwithstanding their differences, they share 'an ethics understood as concrete responsibility for others, correlate with the radical transcendence of God' (4). The chapters 2-6 (34-154) give a careful explanation of Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption* and the next four chapters (155-254) offer an interpretation of Levinas' Jewish thought. The unity of the book is indicated in its first chapter: besides the common inspiration of R and L, it lies in the 'correlation' or 'reciprocal interaction' of two independent modes of thought: philosophy and Judaism (12).

G's aim is complicated by two other purposes: 1. He also wants to show how certain influences and similarities connect Rosenzweig with Schelling (*Weltalter*), Hermann Cohen, Meinecke, Weber, and Rosenstock-Huessy, while he does the same with Levinas vis-à-vis Cohen, Rosenzweig, Marcel, Buber and Marx. 2. He claims to propose an interpretation of both authors that differs from 'the familiar' or 'the standard interpretation' (155, 5) or 'the common reception' (10). What G means by the standard interpretation is not clear, except that it 'ignores the relation to religion in general and Judaism in specific' (155,5). A look at his rather thin bibliography of secondary literature does not clarify this question either. G formulates his major claim by stating that, contrary to the common (?) opinion that R is a religious existentialist, we should read him 'as a philosopher — specifically, a post-modern philosopher' (10), whereas Levinas, who commonly is read as a philosopher and who always insists on the philosophical character of his non-talmudic work, 'should be read as Jewish thinker in the class of Rosenzweig and others' (10). Therefore G 'will pair Rosenzweig with philosophers', while he 'will group Levinas not with Husserl and Heidegger, but with religious thinkers' (11).

Gibbs does clarify the content of *The Star* as a philosophical book, but neither he nor anyone else will feel tempted to deny its Jewish content and inspiration. He focuses on Levinas' talmudic lessons to make his point, but in what respect does his commentary on passages from *Totality and the Infinite* differ from other commentaries in the secondary literature?

His cautious exposition of R's notoriously difficult thought is helpful. Although he mentions other interpreters (12), he does not discuss their interpretations, which makes it difficult to see to what extent his major claim is justified. Of Stéphane Mosès' brilliant *Système et Révélation* he says that it is 'at times in accord with my readings, at times in sharp disagreement' (12), but he does not specify.

G does 'not provide a systematic account' of L's thought (23); he 'proceeds by a set of recontextualizations rather than by a systematic presentation' (15); and, indeed, the four chapters devoted to the method and content of his talmudic lectures, similarities with Cohen's thought, a commentary and comparison of some passages of Marcel and Levinas, and a comparison between Marx and Levinas read like fragments rather than as chains of an ongoing argument.

G is rather silent on the reasons why he selected Cohen, Marcel, and Marx for a comparison with Levinas. The similarities with Marx are superficial and Levinas was hardly influenced by Cohen or Marx. He did recognize a certain debt to Marcel, but why does the latter receive so much attention (192-204 and 222-27) in a book on the relevance of Judaism for philosophy? G points out that he discovered 'the asymmetry in my relation to an other' (15, 222) and declares that Marcel, too, 'belongs to this [Jewish] family of correlations, even though he works in a Catholic theological tradition' (15).

Since G chose not to 'pair' L with Husserl and/or Heidegger, it was hardly possible to show how his work grew out of his assimilation of their work. G's commentary (204-22) on passages from *Otherwise Than Being* can, thus, not do justice to the (trans)phenomenological mode of thought by which they are permeated. Some remarks are surprising: L has an 'idealistic reading of phenomenology' (8); his 'reading of Husserl [...] makes phenomenology into an analysis of ideality and not a response to empirical data' (177); his 'method is phenomenological, until he must turn to the other person' (181); he 'has made phenomenology into a transcendental idealism' (186).

In *Totality and Infinity* Levinas expressed his debt to Rosenzweig by writing that he had been struck by the opposition to the ideal of totality in R's *Star* and that this work 'was too often present in this book to be cited' (TI xvi/28, quoted on p. 24). G's book tries to establish to what extent *The Star* is present in L's oeuvre, although he is unwilling to accomplish 'the complex but somewhat superficial task of tracing the influence of Rosenzweig in Levinas' thought' (23) or to 'elaborate the precise nature of the adaptation and appropriation [of *The Star*] by Levinas' (155). Under 'Explicit Influences in Levinas' (24-6) he ranges, besides R's critique of totality, a number of R's theses explained by L in his essays on R, while 'Recurring Concepts' (26-30) sums up similarities between both thoughts. The question of L's depending on R's work is not taken up again after the nine chapters in which their thoughts are explained. G seems to think that the listing of similarities suffices to call L's thought an 'adaptation' or a 'drash' of R's work (12, 16, 17, 32). He also tries to understand the relation between R and L as a translation: in characterizing L's work as 'a French phenomenological translation of R's German existentialism' we come close to the truth, but G 'suspects that L's own creativity goes further than the freedom of a translator' (31, cf. 26). 'He does not merely repeat' (31), 'but the dependence and the creativity of adaptation seems a helpful image' (32). Thus 'he has reopened *The Star* [...] for philosophical appropriation' (21).

G underestimates the irreplaceable seriousness of phenomenology in L's enterprise when he thinks that 'Levinas' phenomenology [...] is an intrinsic medium for his thought, *because* [my emphasis] his French intellectual audience demands that sort of methodology if it is to treat Levinas as a philosopher' (32). He sees L's 'segregating his philosophical work from his Jewish work' (21) as a strategy (22), and even attributes L's insistence on the philosophical character of his non-talmudic work to the fear that 'the regnant postreligious consciousness, combined with a never completely absent anti-Semitic scent', would 'make the reception of boldly Jewish thought by the philosophical community difficult' (22). 'The Christian theological community', too, 'might [...] be suspicious' (22). Doesn't G know how much the world wide reception of L's work is due to *Christian* philosophers and theologians?

In his short Epilogue (255-59) G draws 'an agenda of seven rubrics for contemporary Jewish philosophy' (255). He concedes that they can be shared by non-Jews, like Plato and Kant (256), but he does not clarify how Jewishness and universality (or philosophy) can coincide rather than, as he repeats in the last sentence, be related and distinguished by a 'correlation'.

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Ronald N. Giere, ed.

Cognitive Models of Science.

Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press

1992. Pp. xxviii + 508.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1979-4).

Maybe one expects too much of a volume (this the 15th) in the richly-pedigreed Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, but this book left me wondering: Is that all there is? Quine's call to naturalize epistemology was heady with promise as it liberated us from the strictures of positivism, formal logic, and fine-grinding analysis. On the other hand it was depressing to hear Quine tell us that epistemology must be displaced by the psychology of research. Philosophers, after all, are in the pursuit of wisdom, not knowledge as such. Philosophers of science want to gain wisdom about science, not to *become* scientists (if that's what psychologists are). Had philosophers of religion been told to pack it in and fall to their knees in worship, they would have unceremoniously refused. Yet, such is the philosophical authority of science that many philosophers have heeded the call to engage in psychology of research. Giere gathered together some of the species who subscribe to the

currently dominant *cognitive* style of psychology for a conference in October 1989, and this volume is the result.

Churchland's essay is the best of the 15 in the book because he not only directs his offering towards our understanding of philosophic questions, but shows how and why he would revise those questions as well. He supports five themes of Feyerabend (theory ladenness of perception, displacement of folk psychology, incommensurability, proliferation of theories, and proliferation of methodologies) from a connectionist (or 'neurocomputational') point of view, with apologies to Feyerabend for providing arguments he never intended. This essay, like others of his, is a paradigm of naturalized epistemology: bringing arguably the best (though he doesn't argue it here) of the cognitive theories of mind to bear against philosophical problems. Thus Giere's hope, 'that the cognitive sciences might come to play the sort of role that formal logic played for logical empiricism' (xv), is realized in at least one instance.

A bonus is Glymour's colorfully skeptical (even jaundiced) rebuttal of Churchland, titled 'Invasion of the Mind Snatchers', which is just the sort tradition needs both in content and tone; e.g., 'One awaits the time when Churchland's opinion [that a theory is "an assignment of weights within a neural network"] will triumph and theorists will routinely present their heads for examination' (466). Churchland is provoked to effective riposte, noting in passing 'my aims are those of an empirical scientist' (476) — but only in the sense that his claims are empirically testable, since his work here (like most of it elsewhere) consumes science to nourish philosophy, rather than adding to science itself. Not that Churchland would care for such a distinction, thus warranting my empirical worry that his inferring the epistemic character of our mind from the simplistic neural net simulacra now available is as risky as inferring the character of a computer from basic knowledge of the transistor. However, when the day for testing his theory comes, he will no doubt be happy to present us his head.

The paper of Nowak and Thagard is a radical blend of computer science research report, philosophy, and history of science. Unlike Churchland, who applies connectionism to epistemology via a theory of mind, they apply Thagard's connectionist ECHO program directly to historical cases of competition between scientific theories, here those of Ptolemy and Copernicus. The philosophical thesis (none too clearly delineated) is that 'explanatory coherence' is (descriptively? prescriptively?) a main or decisive (which?) reason for a theory to be preferred over its competitor. ECHO models contests of explanatory coherence between theories. The research report is that ECHO shows Copernicus' theory besting Ptolemy's, and this is taken as empirical support for both the philosophic thesis and the fidelity of its modelling by ECHO — not that we can pry these two apart. What is meant by 'explanatory coherence' is whatever it is that ECHO models as contested between theories. But how is this any better than saying, e.g., that goodness of theory is whatever it is that competing researchers model in the path towards general acceptance of one theory over the other? Is studying weight matrices and

decay rates any better than studying what scientists thought and why? Well, let a thousand flowers bloom.

One problem among several pointed out by Glymour, whose warm attention turns from Churchland to Nowak's and Thagard's 'dog and pony show' (468), is the tacit and undefended philosophic analysis of the competing scientific theories and the salient evidence into their essential propositional components and explanatory relationships as required by ECHO. Yet another problem is nicely presented by Tweney (psychologist), who observes in his tests of ECHO that it always favors the theory which 'simply has a larger number of explained facts than the alternate' (85). That would account for it all right. He wryly notes that connectionism, 'the new holy grail of cognitive science' (78), may lead us to 'get so carried away with the method that we will do very simple things in very complex ways and not notice that that is what we have done' (85). Further problems are evinced in the work of Freedman, whose employment of ECHO to model the Hull-Tolman debate in the rise of behaviourism reveals how easily ECHO can be tweaked to get different results. He goes on to discuss the interplay between cognitive and social factors in *explaining* theory acceptance, thereby unintentionally emphasizing the ambiguity between description/explanation on one hand and prescription/justification implicit in the employment of ECHO.

Bradshaw's 'The Airplane and the Logic of Invention' is brief, persuasive and satisfying. He brings together the history of the Wright brothers' great success, and the concepts of 'design-space search' and 'function-space search', to account for their triumph over their contenders. Langley, Chanute, Lillenthal, Pilcher, and others attempted to search the design-space of possible flying craft. But this space is exceedingly large, and cannot be efficiently searched directly. The Wright brothers recognized 'the natural independence of aerodynamic factors' (248) such as lift, lateral control, drag, etc., and dealt with them one at a time. The rest is history. However, this nice essay vindicates traditional historical analysis rather than the 'cognitive' approaches Giere wants to promote, and Bradshaw's Parthian remark that the cognitive sciences ought to follow the Wright brothers' example doesn't change that.

That's as good as it gets, though there are other items of interest. Three essays are supposed to address the current tension between the 'social constructivists' and 'rationalists'. Two of these provide intriguing views of the last century of philosophy of science and psychology, intriguing because of the novelty of their perspective rather than the cogency of their theses or arguments thereto. Houts and Haddock (psychologists) disinter a crude Skinnerian theory of meaning in order to show that logic and 'so-called cognitive norms of science' (368) draw their authority from natural and social 'contingencies of reinforcement' — though the contingencies their essay provides fail to move me. Gorman (a humanities professor) labors over his reasonable suggestion that experiments could be made to test certain hypotheses within the history and logic of science, while Fuller (philosophy and sociology) has a number of axes to grind, notably that the individual scientist

is not the relevant unit for the history and logic of science (who said s/he was?). These essays do not so much argue, as raise a hue and cry of historical episodes and/or experimental results which hopefully harmonize well enough with the theses in question to encourage our assent.

Grandy, his eyes open for the abiding concerns of epistemology, acutely addresses observation and measurement from Quinean behaviorism on one hand and information theory on the other — though the two never quite come together.

Savage's 'Foundationalism Naturalized' works hard to define a level of sub-conscious 'ur-sensations' which are 'in [empirical] fact independent and infallible' (230) and which serve as the foundation of our perception and empirical knowledge. He doesn't claim to have *shown* this — that's an empirical matter. But, why should ur-sensations, say the firings of retinal cells, be 'in fact always accompanied by what they represent' (228)? After all, neurophysiology says they occasionally fire when no photon is incoming. And why raise the mouldering head of incorrigibility here among epistemology naturalizers, where it wouldn't be welcome even if spotless? He's not trying to 'defeat skepticism' (228), nor to address any traditional question in philosophical epistemology. Savage is aware of the apparent absurdity of his exercise, and works to address it, but not successfully.

Nersessian's and Gooding's essays are long on exhortation, and short on delivery. Nersessian's 'cognitive-historical' method aims at nothing less than 'to reconstruct scientific thinking by means of cognitive theories' (7) thus to replace a historico-philosophical debate which 'had become increasingly sterile' with 'solid analyses' (8). She then provides a mental mechanics model analogous to Locke's, interrupted by a nicely informative bit of history of Maxwell's work, followed by the conclusion that it vitally involved images and analogies. Such is 'the power of cognitive-historical analysis' (27)! Gooding similarly provides a nice bit of history of some of Faraday's work, and also embellishes it with a theory of discovery far less clear and compelling than the theory of electromagnetism it is about. Why this concern for the workings of the scientist's, particularly Faraday's or Maxwell's long-decayed, mind? Philosophy drops from sight, and psychology loses by being at a historical distance from its subject, though the historical interludes are intriguing.

The hypothesis that Reichenbach, Carnap, Popper, et al., were right about the paucity of philosophical interest in the context of discovery was also corroborated by three other essays meant to demonstrate the opposite. Chi (a psychologist) in particular piles one precis of psychological studies upon another for fifty pages, without offering any unifying, non-trivial insights. Her conclusion — wonder of wonders — is that 'there are basically two kinds of conceptual change: one within an ontological category, one across ontological categories' (178). That would cover the logical possibilities, alright. Given her misrepresentations of physics and the crudity of her categorical schemas, the discussion leading to this analytic truth is hardly more informative. Physical concepts, for example, are not always, or even generally, [of] 'con-

straint-based events' — indeed, length, velocity, mass, force, energy, ... are not events at all. Carey (apparently also a psychologist) hefts loads of data to prove that, in the development of the child, at least, 'Concepts change in the course of knowledge acquisition' (122). Imagine the shockwaves in the philosophical community when this gets around! Sadly — or perhaps not — she doesn't show its relevance to the philosophy of science. Darden's 'Strategies for Anomaly Resolution' offers just that, though her commonplace suggestions, such as altering, deleting, or adding a new component to 'the' theory, are apt to be of negligible help to those struggling with, say, the multi-theoretical domains of the solar-neutrino anomaly, or x-ray bursters, or missing transitional forms in the fossil record, or

Those who await the long-prophesied breakthroughs of naturalized epistemology will find in this volume only some skirmishes, some interesting, some not, with mixed results. Their vigil continues.

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Christopher Hookway

Scepticism.

London and New York: Routledge, Chapman
and Hall 1990.

Pp. viii + 251.

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-08764-3).

This is a book which will be of interest to philosophers wishing to examine the subject of scepticism within the history of western philosophy. Christopher Hookway carefully and for the most part clearly traces the path of scepticism from the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus in the first century A.D., to the deep scepticism of Descartes in the sixteenth century, to Hume's mitigated scepticism of the eighteenth century, and finally to the anti-scepticism of Thomas Reid of the eighteenth century and more recently of Wittgenstein and Quine of the twentieth century. Hookway's attempt to show the history of scepticism should not mislead the reader: the book is primarily a book in epistemology not one in the history of philosophy. It is a book that requires attentiveness in spite of the fact that it appears non-technical.

By his own admission (x), Hookway adopts a position that falls in the common sense or pragmatist tradition especially as shaped by Charles Peirce. Accordingly he maintains that scepticism raises a philosophical problem only if it acts as a threat to our cognitive achievements which he thinks it does, not by challenging the possibility of knowledge or certainty, but by questioning our ability to participate in the activities involved in

inquiry. This is a point to which I shall shortly return but for the moment I wish only to note that Hookway attempts in the last pages of the book to offer a way of avoiding — not evading — the ‘impact of sceptical challenges’.

There appear to be two undercurrents at work as Hookway conducts his thoughtful investigation of scepticism. It is important to note that while each of these plays a role in his analysis he does not explicitly recognize them as undercurrents nor does he in a transparent way show how they are related to each other. The first undercurrent is his pragmatic interpretation of the problems of scepticism as posed by Sextus Empiricus, Descartes and Hume, though especially by Descartes. Hookway points out that Peirce claims ‘the Cartesian method is psychologically impossible; denies that the legitimacy of these doubts flows from our pre-philosophical understanding of truth, justification, or inquiry; and holds that there is nothing in the character of modern science which requires us to adopt the Cartesian strategy’ (59). These comments do not imply that Hookway is deferential towards Peirce simply that the pragmatism of Peirce is never far below the surface in Hookway’s construction of the problems of scepticism.

The second undercurrent has to do, surprisingly, with the problem of free will. He says ‘... I have argued that the challenge of scepticism can be viewed as a special case of the free will problem’ (215). At times Hookway’s comments suggest that there is simply an analogy between the problem of scepticism and that of free will, but in fact he means much more than this. The reason for this is — not so simply — that ‘sceptical challenges question our ability to participate in inquiries while retaining the sense that we are autonomous, responsible agents’ (215). In discussing the Pyrrhonists and Descartes he makes a similar remark in saying ‘... sceptical arguments challenge the possibility of carrying out certain sorts of activity in a reflective self-controlled manner’ (81). The importance of scepticism then lies in its challenging our ability for inquiry; therein lies its connection with free will. Some remarks on the second undercurrent are in order.

Work done by G.E. Moore in *Ethics* in the early part of this century and by Chisholm, Lehrer and Aune in the 1960s and 1970s made clear that there is a logical connection between ‘free will’ and ‘ability’. So if Hookway can make good the claim that scepticism threatens our claims to knowledge and knowledge itself is connected in some way with a set of abilities, then he may well be able to establish the connection between the problem of scepticism and the problem of free will. Hookway does not develop these ideas as he could but he does begin to raise some considerations that bear upon the matter. Briefly what he does, rather cleverly, is to focus upon what he calls Q-claims rather than P-claims (198). Q-claims embrace the following:

- x knows who committed the murder.
- x knows why water expands on freezing.
- x knows whether the atomic weight of sodium is 29.
- x knows when the train will come.
- x knows how the prisoner escaped.

P-claims, in the spirit of Nozick, embrace the following:

x knows that the cat is on the mat.

Hookway then proceeds to develop what he calls the knowledge inference which has the following structure where 'q' represents an indirect question complement as found in the Q-list and 'p' represents a proposition like that found in the P-list:

x knows q
x believes that p
p is an answer to q
so p.

The point according to Hookway is that confusion regarding knowledge is encouraged if we focus upon P-claims rather than Q-claims (209). He may be right and Nozick may be wrong in this though Hookway needs further argument to win the day. This aside, what is regrettable is that Hookway does not convincingly show how a study of Q-claims addresses the problem of scepticism and does not develop explicitly a connection between Q-claims and ability. The first of these he needs to do by demonstrating that a study of Q-claims shows that we possess knowledge (209) and the second he needs to do by analysing Q-claims, for example, 'the doctor knows whether the patient's temperature is 37 degrees C' in terms of the doctor's ability(ies) to respond to a variety of counter-factual situations. Analysing knowledge this way would have shown the connection between it, scepticism, and free will most transparently and would also have had the virtue of making more explicit the attractiveness of Hookway's account of knowledge over that of Nozick's (and his tracking account), Goldman's (and his causal account) and Lehrer's (and his rationally justified account).

Hookway ends on a somewhat tentative note. While acknowledging the force of some of Neurath's, Quine's, and Wittgenstein's arguments, Hookway remains troubled by the brain-in-a-vat experiment (224). He suggests adopting a kind of naturalism that focuses upon local (not global) inquiries, but doing so in light of the fragility of our confidence (239). What he thinks this leaves us with is 'the possibility of a defensible response to scepticism' (240).

This is a fine book and one that epistemologists and historians of philosophy should read and reflect upon. The book is replete with examples of good scholarship made evident by his use of and reference to the works of other scholars in the field including Williams, Penelhum, Stroud, Popkin, Putnam, Davidson, Montaigne, and Gassendi. There is much that I have left unsaid about the book including some nice comments on Hume, realism, internalism and externalism. Generally the book is free of typographical errors, one unhappy exception to this occurring on p. 198. Finally there is a judiciously constructed bibliography that can serve as a sound basis for further reading for those who wish to be brought up to speed in the field.

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Perfectionism.

New York: Oxford University Press 1993. Pp. xi + 222.

US \$39.95 (ISBN 0-19-508014-9).

Hurka formulates and defends an approach to morality and rationality that acknowledges an ideal of human perfection, a standard of goodness requiring the development of human nature. Part I of the book gives a general characterization of perfectionism, considers how 'human nature' should be defined, and rejects some traditional formulations of perfectionism on the ground that they involve troublesome 'accretions'. Part II develops a version of perfectionism that relies on an Aristotelian account of human nature; it recommends a kind of consequentialism that acknowledges perfection in whole lives and societies. Part III relates perfectionism to topics in political philosophy, such as liberty and equality.

Hurka distinguishes 'broad' and 'narrow' perfectionism. Broad perfectionism recommends the development of some of our capacities and specifies an ideal of excellence. Narrow perfectionism is a moral theory implying that human goodness is based in human nature. Hurka claims that 'perfectionism, either broadly or narrowly understood, has an *objective* theory of the good' implying that 'certain states and activities are good, not because of any connection with desire, but in themselves' (5). The good, on Hurka's view, is what we 'ought to desire', not what we do desire or would desire under hypothetical circumstances (58, 109). Hurka's objectivism about goodness is coupled with a Kantian approach to the status of moral ideals. According to Hurka, 'the perfectionist ideal is a *moral* ideal in the following sense: It is an ideal people ought to pursue regardless of whether they now want it or would want it in hypothetical circumstances, and apart from any pleasures it may bring' (17). In Kant's terms, the perfectionist ideal is a categorical rather than a hypothetical imperative.

The ideal of perfectionism is the development of human nature, that is, 'whatever properties are essential to humans and conditioned on their being living things' (16). Hurka denies that fetuses and brain-dead human bodies are humans, on the ground that 'the properties essential to humans are present in their entirety only when rationality has emerged, and remain only as long as it does' (47). The kind of rationality in question concerns our capacity to form and act on beliefs and intentions. More specifically, humans 'are rational because they can form and act on sophisticated beliefs and intentions, ones whose contents stretch across persons and times and that are arranged in complex hierarchies' (39). (Hurka claims that such 'sophisticated rationality' is found only in humans.) Humans develop their rationality, on Hurka's perfectionism, 'by having more of the relevant [belief- and intention-] states or by having [such] states that are more sophisticated' (100). Hurka devotes three chapters (8-10) to clarifying the latter two ways of developing theoretical and practical rationality.

Hurka recommends his perfectionism on the ground that it coheres, or is in reflective equilibrium, with our 'intuitive moral judgements at all levels of generality' (31). He maintains that perfectionism must have intrinsic appeal, have attractive consequences, and work systematically by having its particular claims explained by its general ideas. The goal of developing human nature, according to Hurka, does have intrinsic appeal, and supporting evidence for this comes from the 'widespread acceptance' of the goal. Hurka reasons that 'if, despite [certain] differences, these philosophers [Aquinas, Nietzsche, Green, and Marx] all ground their particular values in a single ideal of human nature, that ideal must have intrinsic appeal' (32). However questionable that conditional is (and it does seem in need of argument), talk of 'intrinsic appeal' here is not just psychological, but also epistemological. Hurka claims, accordingly, that the perfectionist ideal does not require a justification in terms of more basic principles: 'It is of sufficient depth and generality to be in itself the basis of all moral claims; in human nature we have something that can be ethical bedrock' (32). Hurka recommends, nonetheless, that we test our claims about what is essential to human nature both intuitively and against established explanatory theories.

A troublesome question about the epistemological basis of Hurka's perfectionism merits attention. How can one justify, for all parties to the dispute, the alleged objectivity of Hurka's perfectionism (including its aforementioned claims about what is objectively good and about perfectionist categorical imperatives), especially given the kind of epistemological relativism facing coherentist, or reflective equilibrium, approaches to justification? Hurka's own 'intuitive' beliefs may support perfectionist categorical imperatives, at least for theorists with similar 'intuitive' beliefs. In contrast, theorists with different, non-perfectionist 'intuitive' beliefs can coherently, and thus justifiably, endorse an alternative to Hurka's perfectionism; and that alternative could even have explanatory value relative to their 'intuitive' and other beliefs. By the same coherentist standards used to support Hurka's perfectionism, relative to his perfectionist 'intuitive' beliefs, theorists with contrary 'intuitive' beliefs can justifiably reject his perfectionism. Such epistemological relativism is compatible with Hurka's coherentism about justification, but it raises doubt about the kind of objectivity Hurka claims for his perfectionism, including its claims about objective goodness and categorical imperatives.

Given the epistemological relativism facing coherentism, one must wonder how Hurka could even begin to convince or to defend against theorists with coherent opposing intuitive beliefs that figure in an explanatory belief-system. The so-called 'intrinsic appeal' of Hurka's perfectionism is relative to the beliefs of some, but certainly not all, philosophers. Clearly, Hurka's appeal to what some philosophers (e.g., Aquinas, Marx) find intrinsically appealing does not settle what is intrinsically appealing for all philosophers. Some philosophers, consequently, will demand from Hurka a cogent answer to the following question: Why should I care to develop the kind of 'sophisticated rationality' recommended by Hurka's perfectionism? It would not do,

from the standpoint of cogent argument, for Hurka to reply that such rationality is essential to human nature and that the ideal of developing human nature is intrinsically appealing and categorically binding. The philosophers in question do not find perfectionism intrinsically appealing; they thus demand reasons for perfectionism that can answer their 'Why care?' question. Failure to answer that kind of question leaves a moral theory at the level of dogmatism, at least from the standpoint of those raising such a question. Hurka does not face worries about normative relativism.

Aside from relativism, Hurka's book is a clear formulation of perfectionism. It is historically informed and philosophically sophisticated. All readers will benefit.

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Christopher B. Kulp

*The End of Epistemology: Dewey and
His Current Allies on the Spectator
Theory of Knowledge.*

Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press 1992.

Pp. viii + 210.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-313-28536-5).

Professor Kulp's book is an exposition of Dewey's anti-epistemological position, an examination of how that position has been taken up by three contemporaries, and a defense of a limited form of what Dewey rejected as the Spectator Theory of Knowledge. On the up-side, Kulp's is one of few rigorous attempts to clearly articulate the philosophical theses in Dewey's decades-long but rather diffuse war on epistemology. I am grateful for a reliable treatment to refer to in discussions of Dewey's instrumentalist conception of knowledge, his opposition to traditional epistemology, and his near-scientistic admiration for scientific method. On the down-side, the book is flawed by a crucial over-literalness. It is also burdened with irritating symbolism and confusing initials. I quickly grew impatient with paging back to check just what was meant by 'E1', 'E2', 'S1', 'P2', 'SD', 'D-activity', 'H-STK', 'CH-STK', etc. Page 134 is a paradigm of what Jon Wheatley called 'physics envy' on the part of philosophers. Nonetheless, Kulp's is a worthy contribution to the Dewey literature.

The book's structure is straightforward: five chapters deal with exposition of Dewey's epistemological views and particularly reconstructions of Dewey's arguments against the spectator theory of knowledge; a sixth chapter deals with Dewey's 'allies'; a concluding chapter defends a limited version of the

spectator theory. Basically, Kulp rightly criticizes Dewey's 'hands-on' instrumentalist conception of knowledge as too restrictive, and defends what we might dub 'hands-off' reflective knowledge. But Kulp's careful surveys of the explicit and implicit points in Dewey's theses, his assessment of those theses, and his own arguments against them, are too detailed to cover in a thousand-word review, so I will try only to convey the book's character.

The book's most convincing treatment of a basic Deweyan thesis is the characterization of Dewey's instrumentalist conception of knowledge. Kulp offers a sympathetic account of Dewey's position, but then makes the basic point against it that while Dewey had a lot to say 'about what is involved in *acquiring* knowledge', he had remarkably little to say 'about what it is to *have* knowledge' (58). This is not a criticism original to Kulp, as he acknowledges, but he does an admirable job of articulating what, on reflection, appears to be a gross lapse in otherwise sophisticated thought about knowledge. In fact, it seems reflection is precisely what Dewey radically underestimated. As Kulp shows, the utterly operationalist account of knowledge which Dewey offered, the account of the acquisition and exercise of knowledge as essentially problem-solving, does not allow for what we might call 'idle' reflective speculation. Dewey somehow missed that initially directionless reflective speculation on what is known enables us to *theorize*, to reorganize and rethink 'the data' we have acquired in dealing with technical problems. Without explorative reflective speculation which is precisely *not* directed on the solution of technical problems arising from particular presumptive and methodological matrices, acquisition of knowledge — and particularly of scientific knowledge — would be *only* fact-gathering. Without explorative reflection we could not have the benefit of the Kuhnian paradigm-shifts which gave us Newtonian mechanics and Einsteinian relativity.

Kulp also does a good job of treating Dewey's faintly embarrassing use of Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Principle regarding interactive effects between knower and thing known, a use which Dewey described as 'the final step' in the defeat of the spectator theory of knowledge (74). Kulp considers *a priori*, introspective and historical knowledge and points out that even if we concede most of Dewey's claims, they apply only to empirical knowledge-acquisition '*as embedded in Newtonian physics*' (80). Kulp's reliance on introspective and historical knowledge, however, seems risky in light of the work of another — possible — Deweyan 'ally', namely, Foucault.

The Deweyan allies include Rorty, but not other prominent likely figures like Putnam and Davidson. Instead Kulp discusses Georges Dicker and Robert Meyers. But it is in discussing Rorty that Kulp reveals the over-literality I mentioned. Kulp stresses Rorty's claim that without the 'ocular metaphor' — the putative heart of the spectator theory — the history of philosophy might have been free of what we now know as epistemology. Countering Rorty's historicism, Kulp asks: 'Given that we are the sort of beings we are, which includes ... being sighted [and] interested in knowing, is the optical metaphor optional?' (174). Kulp describes the ocular metaphor as 'natural' (175) and, though not *necessary*, not as historically accidental as

Rorty claims. But Kulp takes Rorty's condemnation of the ocular metaphor too literally, thereby neglecting what it supports and reveals and what Rorty is really concerned to reject, namely, 'representationalism' or the idea that knowledge consists of internal facsimiles 'in the mind' of 'external' things and events. After all, it is not difficult to imagine our *same* representationalist, foundationalist epistemology based not on sight but on touch or hearing. The claimed 'naturalness' of the ocular metaphor only shows that once we think of knowledge as possessing (accurate) internal representations, the operant metaphor is likely to be visual.

Kulp leaves open whether the spectator theory is viable if about the acquisition *and* the having of knowledge, and defends the theory as an account of having knowledge, claiming 'something right about what the [ocular] metaphor connotes' (187). Kulp insists that in knowing — in *having* knowledge — 'there must be something present to the mind' (188, 191). He links this intuition to internalist theories of knowledge, and claims that the ocular metaphor captures the essence of knowing as *possession of something* because knowing requires 'that the knower mentally "grasp" the known' (191). Kulp acknowledges it will look as if he is only reiterating commitment to the spectator theory, (194) but clearly feels the power of the intuition precludes question-begging. In the end the reader is left with the choice of taking Kulp's book as a persuasive restatement of what underlies representationalist epistemology, or as a case-in-point of the persistence of a metaphor.

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George Lawson

Politica Sacra et Civilis.

Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Conal Condren, ed.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. li + 283.

US \$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39248-9).

In this useful new edition of *Politica Sacra et Civilis*, editor Conal Condren provides students and scholars of political theory, philosophy, and seventeenth-century English history and literature with the principal work of George Lawson (?1598-1678). In his own day, Lawson was a widely influential political theorist, a monarchist also committed to preserving the powers of the Anglican Church. He wrote the *Politica* '[i]n the time of our divisions' to 'enquire into the causes of our sad and woeful condition, and to think of

some remedies to prevent our ruin [T]he subject of our differences was, not only the state but the church' (3). Published at two crucial moments in seventeenth-century English history, 1660 and 1689, the *Politica* appears on the cusp of massive changes in the relative powers of the monarchy, parliament, and episcopacy. As ecclesiastical and civil forms of English government grew further apart throughout the century, Lawson's work, along with that of Hobbes and Locke, provided vocabulary for the debate over the proper relation between church and state. Lawson draws on both 'such authors as write of government' and 'the political part of the holy Scriptures' (3) for his own theories of government that consider the civil and ecclesiastical powers closely analogous. The link between those powers makes the British monarchy powerful but not absolutist, so that it gives the widest protection to Protestant interests without assuming papal powers. Restoring civil order after the civil war and interregnum depended, in his view, on civil and ecclesiastical powers being brought back into balance, which for him meant closely linking their purposes.

Like the other volumes in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, the edition of the *Politica* is intended for both scholarly and classroom use. Its reasonable price, well-organized index, brief biographical notes on the principal figures whose works Lawson cites, and good introduction will serve both advanced undergraduates and graduate students well. The bibliography on Lawson is brief because little has been published, partly owing to the lack of readily available editions; Condren himself has published a biography (*George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution*, Cambridge University Press 1989) that is also the fullest critical treatment to date. His introduction to this volume is lucid and helpful on the work's immediate historical context and the theories of government that underlay Lawson's. Both the introduction and the bibliography are stronger on the historical context of Lawson's work at its first publication, in 1660. The context for the 1689 printing needs expanding, especially on the importance of Charles II's relative tolerance of Roman Catholics and James II's Catholicism. Lawson refers throughout the *Politica* to 'the Protestant English interest' (19), and notes that '[t]he interest of England is twofold, civil and ecclesiastical; ... [t]he interest ecclesiastical is the Protestant religion and the preservation of the substance thereof' (112). Fear of Roman Catholic influence, whether from James II or, through him, Louis XIV, was a much more prominent feature of English politics in 1689 than in 1660, a difference that would have renewed interest in Lawson's link between (Protestant) church and state. By 1689, moreover, issues of scriptural hermeneutics had become more important and more divisive in discussions of civil and ecclesiastical forms of government than they had been in 1660, so that Lawson's scriptural basis for his theories would have been more closely questioned at the *Politica*'s second printing. Some information on Spinoza's influential critique of scripture as a source of historical information in *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670), or on Locke's critique of Filmer's *Patriarcha* and its reading of Genesis, which drives much of the first of the *Two Treatises of Government*

(1690), would therefore have been helpful. Given the relative brevity of the introductory essay (whose length may have been dictated by requirements beyond Condren's control), it presents historical and philosophical context well, but a work as little known as this one requires fuller introduction to make the case that it should be better known.

Most of Condren's editorial decisions have produced a clear, well-annotated text, though two of those decisions also change its character. First, Condren notes in the introduction that '[t]he most substantial deviation from previous editions concerns [Lawson's] ramist diagrams' (xxix), which he has either recast into sentences or omitted entirely if they also appear as subheadings. Though those diagrams and headings are cumbersome and repetitive, they also indicate the extent of Lawson's reliance on Ramist, synchronic forms of logic for deducing and ordering the property relation between God and human beings, monarch and subjects, monarch and bishop, and his affinities with earlier theorists who also used such diagrams. In the chapter entitled 'Of power ecclesiastical', for example, Lawson claims the Power of the Keys is divisible into various categories, analogous to those he has already discussed in the chapter 'Of a commonwealth in general, and of power civil'. Seeing those divisions as Lawson organized them would give a still stronger sense of the analogies Lawson drew between civil and ecclesiastical powers, analogies that are the essence of his treatise and of his theory of monarchy. Second, while Condren has provided translations for the Latin citations that appear in Lawson's text, it would have been better also to have provided the Latin, even if only in footnotes. As Condren himself notes in the introduction, the 'citations and allusions should be seen not as incidental to his argument but, as it were, a text function within it' (xiii). When Lawson chooses to buttress his authority with classical and continental authors, he implicitly privileges synchronic resemblance within the scholarly context of (mostly) Latin over diachronic difference; in this edition, it's difficult to tell where he does so. Despite these omissions, however, Condren has produced an edition that will help reveal a fuller context for developing theories of monarchic government in their period of greatest flux.

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Jerrold Levinson

Music, Art, & Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990.

Pp. xi + 419.

US \$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2341-2);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9591-1).

What follows is a very small discussion of what is, in terms of importance to the field of philosophical aesthetics, a very big book. This volume brings together the bulk of Levinson's work of the past decade, providing a context in which the many strengthening interrelations between the essays (sixteen in all, four of which are published here for the first time) can be easily seen, as well as showing the collective force of the whole.

That force, bringing together historical and contextual issues in ways that are compatible with Levinson's underlying objectivism concerning aesthetic content and artistic meaning, is felt where aesthetic and metaphysical matters intersect. The problems given rise at these intersections are traditional and familiar ones: the possibility of giving art a definition — but here treated in a way that is both respectful of contextual detail and free of definitional vacuity or circularity; the nature of legitimate interpretation in contrast to its undesirable opposite — but here argued and elucidated rather than stipulated; the problem of the ontology of art — but here pursued in a way that acknowledges historically and culturally entrenched modes of aesthetic experience; the relation between aesthetic properties and the physical or non-aesthetic structure 'beneath' them — but here analyzed in a superb essay displaying a full awareness of the subtleties of the thorny topic of supervenience; the stability of such aesthetic properties over time — but here explained without reversion to any variety, explicit or otherwise, of ahistorical or autonomous formalism.

If one were forced to select from these many contributions the most fundamental essay, both within the context of Levinson's work and within the larger field of aesthetics, it would have to be 'Defining Art Historically'. In it Levinson shows how it is possible to preserve from the institutional theory the understanding that the essential defining feature of an artwork will not be an intrinsic exhibited property, and yet advance beyond that theory to incorporate intentional considerations without becoming subjectivist or mentalistic, contextual considerations without becoming relativistic, and historical and social considerations without becoming sociological. It is, for Levinson, crucial to explain what has been essential to the perceptual act of regarding an object 'as-a-work-of-art' without recourse to what have heretofore been adumbrated as aesthetic attitude theories. The basic idea (very nicely both refined and applied in a number of these essays) is that 'a work of art is a thing intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, regard in any of the ways works of art existing prior to it have been correctly regarded' (6). And to be regarded in this way, the object must be 'necessarily backward

looking' and 'must *involve*, as opposed to merely *follow*, that which has preceded it' (4), because 'currently the concept of art has no content beyond what art has been' (7). These, for Levinson, are the objective truths that must be incorporated into a successful definition of art. Are these truths circular? No, Levinson says, because to eliminate the reflexive aspect of the concept 'art' would be to eviscerate it 'of the only universal content it now retains' (14), and we ought not in any case conflate circularity and reflexivity. Are these truths empty, in that we have to already know what art is to apply Levinson's definition? No, because what it is to be an artwork at a given time can be elucidated and given explanatory content only through reference to what it was to be an artwork, or better to the body of things that were artworks, prior to that given time. Indeed, one cannot know, on Levinson's account, what it is to be an artwork without this historical knowledge, but that, rather than severely limiting the definitional project being undertaken here, in fact serves to make salient the essential historicity and reflexivity of the concept. Lastly, what if we ask: And are these truths self-evident? It is not clear from the book how Levinson would answer this, but I for one would hope for both negative and affirmative answers. Negative, in that within the larger context of aesthetic and interpretive debate the actual detailed facts of our aesthetic practices are very often unwittingly concealed behind theoretical generalizations; affirmative, in that once one is prepared to investigate our practices and the critically-descriptive facts Levinson has a distinctive talent for bringing to light (e.g. see his harmonic, rhythmic, and melodic analyses of Mendelssohn's *Hebrides Overture*, op.26 in connection with the expression of the higher emotion of hope, and his acute defense of 'emergentism' and his construal of the aesthetic/non-aesthetic problem and condition-governed aesthetic attributes) as well as demonstrating their philosophical or conceptual significance, then yes, these truths are (within the context of that kind of analysis) self-evident, i.e. they are for Levinson plain aesthetic facts, and not the tenuous result of educated interpretive guesswork.

I have tried to sketch out Levinson's foundation; the rest of the book is built upon it. On the matter of distinguishing between correct from incorrect forms of 'regarding', Levinson is wisely agnostic — there may be no general account, but we do not now know. Nevertheless, he uses the details of historically informed accounts of 'regarding-as' to very great effect. He relies on the fact that art is intentional activity; this idea, even if it does require ultimately a fuller analysis, successfully takes a central place. Context, if not everything, is certainly rather a lot: composers who produce sonically indistinguishable works in different contexts produce different works. 'Structural' (i.e. perceivable and intrinsic but non-aesthetic attributes), 'sub-structural' (i.e. physical, intrinsic attributes but not perceivable as such), and 'contextual' (i.e. relations of the object to the context that are interpretively significant) features are used finely — even if they are perhaps made to appear categorically more distinct than they are. Asymetries between titles of works and names of persons are clearly articulated, yet the very importance of the

comparison calls for more analysis. Justifiably sceptical remarks are made about the possibility of proving that a work expresses a given emotion; the recognition that the concept of proof is misapplied prevents Levinson from going down blind alleys, but still one wants more than the cautionary remarks given here. But these are not complaints, they are requests, and it is good to learn from the notes in this volume that much more from Levinson is in the works. All in all, one can easily say with complete confidence that everyone working in Levinson's areas will want to read this excellent collection.

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James Mill

Political Writings.

Terence Ball, ed.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xxxvii + 317.

US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-38323-4);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-38748-5).

In the past few years Cambridge University Press has launched an excellent series of editions of historical political writings, its 'Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought'. While the series includes new editions of classics like Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Aristotle's *The Politics*, its forté is scholarly editions of more obscure and arguably understudied works like Filmer's *Patriarcha* or Pufendorf's *On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law*. While many of these texts contain under-appreciated contributions to political theory, they are indisputably essential to our understanding of the acknowledged masters such as Locke, and their appearance in such accessible form has made for welcome additions to many libraries.

Terence Ball's edition of James Mill's political writings is no exception. Mill's finest achievement was probably his *The History of British India*, but his influence is probably most felt today (excepting the powerful indirect influence through the writings of J.S. Mill) via his essay on government. Until now, the most accessible version of *Government* was in the edition of Jack Lively and J.C. Rees under the title *Utilitarian Logic and Politics*. That earlier collection supplemented the essay with T.B. Macaulay's famous reply, as well as an exchange of arguments between the respectively partisan Westminster and Edinburgh Reviews.

Ball's edition also begins with *Government* and contains, as part of an appendix, Macaulay's critique. While the Ball edition will not *replace* the Lively and Rees edition, it supplements it in important ways. First, Ball has included Mill's 'Fragment on Mackintosh', a piece not included by Lively and Rees but the one which constitutes Mill's most explicit, though indirect, reply to Macaulay. But secondly, Ball follows *Government* with Mill's essays *Jurisprudence* and *Liberty of the Press*, an arrangement which reveals that the three pieces form, quite deliberately, a sort of trilogy. Among other things, *Liberty of the Press* supplements the argument in § X of *Government*, a defense of the crucial claim that people are capable of genuinely recognizing their best interests, by arguing for fairly robust freedoms of the press to publicize the activities of elected representatives and other governmental officials. *Jurisprudence* spells out very broadly the legal principles which Mill takes to satisfy a utilitarian regime, principles governing both the civil and penal codes, as well as the code of procedure. In the context preserved by Ball's edition, these principles give shape to Mill's form of representative government introduced and defended in *Government*.

In addition to this trio of essays and the Macaulay appendix, Ball has included three other essays: *Education*, *Prisons and Prison Discipline*, and 'The Ballot'. Ball regards the first two of these to be 'particularly important' (xxxi), but I found *Education* to be very programmatic and even a little bizarre, incorporating the most naive versions of classical empiricist theories of knowledge and psychology into a very abstractly pitched prolegomenon to education theory. 'The Ballot', while enriching our picture of Mill's vision of representative government, is a murky written, and sometimes confusing defense of the secret ballot, much debated at the time it was written in 1830.

Mill is an incredibly tedious writer; as Macaulay aptly puts it, '[Mill's] arguments are stated with the utmost affectation of precision; his divisions are awfully formal; and his style is generally as dry as that of Euclid's Elements' (273). So it's the sort of collection which one only dives into with fairly specific purposes in mind and as such, is a scholar's book. Moreover, I think the scholars to whom it will be of most interest are non-philosophers for in many pieces there is, philosophically, a very bad signal to noise ratio. While it could be used for teaching in say, a very specialized course in 19th C. utilitarianism, it is most interesting as a kind of time capsule of the period. In reading 'The Ballot', for instance, I found myself most interested in the allusions and revealed presuppositions of the debate into which Mill was entering (as well, I suppose, as the contrast with J.S. Mill's contrary position in *Considerations on Representative Government*). Similarly, pieces like *Jurisprudence* are as interesting for the fact that Mill finds it necessary and desirable to argue for full codification, for instance, as it is for his actual arguments and position. Much of this kind of revelation would be very useful to an intellectual or political historian, though often of limited philosophical significance.

That said, however, the collection is by no means philosophically empty. Mill's *Government* is an important contributor to modern democratic theory,

and this collection is important for adding detail to our understanding of his view. Moreover, Mill's persistent attack on aristocratic political thinking, to which all these pieces contribute in one way or another, bears interesting attitudinal similarities to some contemporary debates. The issues are often deep: to what extent, for instance, should we or can we regard political arrangements at the deepest level as humanly and rationally manipulable as opposed to given and, to some extent, natural reflections of our very natures? What are our natures, for that matter, of which politics must take cognizance and the science of politics come to understand? And as the editor himself observes, the current debate between rational choice and more empirical accounts of politics is foreshadowed in the dispute with Macaulay and others. Mill's answers are sometimes explicit, but are more often to be found between the lines, as premises in arguments for other sorts of conclusions and so forth. But they clearly emerge as one digests Mill's more explicitly defended positions, and this adds to the undisputable 'utility' of this collection as a document of 19th C. Utilitarian radicalism.

Ball provides an excellent brief introduction, discussing in part the historical and contemporary significance of Mill's work. And there is a chronology, a very useful bibliographical discussion, and a set of 'biographical synopses' giving brief biographical sketches of some of the people Mill alludes to in the essays. The index is somewhat spartan, but useful all the same for tracing certain themes through various of the essays.

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Doris Olin, ed.

William James: Pragmatism In Focus.

London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1992.

Pp. viii + 251.

US \$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-414-04056-6);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-04057-4).

Olin is to be commended for making James' series of lectures *Pragmatism* available in an especially helpful format, including not just James' text but Olin's introductory essay and a half-dozen critical pieces by Robert G. Myers, James Bissett Pratt, G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Moreland Perkins, and D.C. Phillips. The resulting clash of philosophies and temperaments will edify and intrigue the reader.

To refresh your memories of the lectures: Lecture 1 houses James' categorization of philosophers as tender-minded or tough-minded, tender-foot

Bostonians or Rocky Mountain toughs. Lecture 2 introduces the pragmatic method with the conundrum, 'Does the man go round the squirrel or not?' when he chases it 'round a tree. And James puts forward the pragmatic solution, 'It depends on what you *practically mean* by "going round".' The method leads to a theory of meaning, 'the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism', that the meaning of a thought is the conceivable effects of what the thought is about. And after Peirce, James says, Dewey appears with a pragmatist account of truth: that ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience; and so, as James styles it, 'The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything.' Lecture III extracts the 'cash value' of the dispute between materialists and theists, and between determinists and free-will exponents, finding it in the *promise* involved in believing in God, the *relief* of believing in free will. Lecture IV introduces the problem of the one and the many, eschewing absolute pluralism as well as absolute monism in favor of the view that 'our world is incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its unification better organized'. Lecture V recommends 'the pragmatistic view that all our theories are *instrumental*, are mental modes of *adaptation* to reality', rooted ultimately in ways of thinking about things that were discoveries of our 'exceedingly remote ancestors'. Lecture VI recommends thinking of truth in terms of processes of being led to (verifying) experiences. The agreement between a proposition and reality is not the static correspondence endorsed by James' intellectualist opponents, but rather 'Agreement turns out to be essentially an affair of leading — leading that is useful because it is into quarters that contain objects that are important'. In Lecture VII James defends Schiller's 'butt-end-foremost statement of the humanist position', namely, in Schiller's words, 'The world ... is what we make it. It is fruitless to define it by what it originally was or by what it is apart from us; it *is* what is made of it. Hence ... the world *is plastic*.' The limits of what we can do with this plastic material are defined by sensations, which 'are neither true nor false; they simply *are*'; but 'even in the field of sensation, our minds exert a certain arbitrary choice'.

The first of the critical essays in the second half of the book is Robert G. Myers' splendid 1971 essay 'Meaning and Metaphysics in James', a model of constructive and illuminating interpretation. He takes up the question whether the meaning of a proposition, according to James, is a matter of its experiential consequences, on one hand, or rather the consequences of believing it, on the other hand. Sharply distinguishing James' pragmatism about meaning from the fideism of his 'will to believe' doctrine, Myers shows that the meaning of a proposition is a matter of its experiential consequences, while also showing that this doesn't have the anti-metaphysical implications that the logical positivists found in it. Against Lovejoy, for example, Myers asserts that for James the Monistic hypothesis of the One has practical consequences, distinct from the consequences of believing the hypothesis. Moreover, the evidence for Monism yielded by these practical consequences is about even with the evidence for Pluralism yielded by its practical consequences. This

saw-off brings James' fideism into play, and here the consequences of believing a proposition are relevant. The 'will to believe' doctrine holds that one has a right to believe that p when the evidence is insufficient, just in case one desires X and believing p will help to bring about X . But Myers emphasizes: 'Effects of belief, however, relate not to meaningfulness, but rather to the question whether we ought to believe when the evidence is insufficient.'

James Bissett Pratt's early article (1907), 'Truth and its Verification', attempts to tie James' pragmatic theory of truth to actual verification rather than verifiability. Truth is just as much an actual experienced process as saying the multiplication table, whereas 'the conception of truth as *verifiability* seems by its very nature essentially non-pragmatic.' Pratt seems to think that one can't be actually led by such 'non-actuals' as 'if you pick up this letter-bomb it will explode', because verification and verifiability are '*toto coelo* apart', in that verifiability is 'transcendent of experience'. But this over-states the difference. Having verified that similar letter-bombs have exploded, I can be led now to avoid touching the letter-bomb by reflecting on the verifiability of its exploding if picked up. There is no reason why a Jamesian pragmatist should not be led by similarities in this way.

G.E. Moore's celebrated critique, 'Professor James' "Pragmatism"' (1907-8), is a classic example of criticism which turns on studied failure to comprehend. Moore neatly divides James' claims into two categories, first, those that are obviously true but philosophically banal ('so indisputably true as fully to justify the vigour of his language'), and second, those that are philosophically interesting but obviously false ('intensely silly').

Bertrand Russell holds that there would be much less to be said against pragmatism if it affirmed utility only as a criterion of truth, in the way that an entry in a library's card catalogue is a criterion for a book's being in the system. But from utility as a criterion of truth it does not follow that utility is the meaning of truth, just as it does not follow that a library's accurate card catalogue system renders its books otiose.

Moreland Perkins' 'Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth' doubts that James equates truth with verification, holding rather that 'the definition of truth to which James adheres when he is seeking formal rigour is one which identifies truth and verifiability.' Perkins diagnoses confusion on this score as being caused by James' usually trying to forward three different but related projects simultaneously: first, to explain truth in terms of a certain relation of an 'idea' to *verifiability*; second, to develop a new theory of *actual verification* and hence of knowledge (the 'utilitarian' theory); and third, to champion an extreme nominalism which analyzes concepts in terms of the *concreta* (sensations, pure experience) to which they ultimately refer.

D.C. Phillips' suggestive defense of James against Moore's objections, 'Was William James Telling the Truth After All?', re-examines Moore's 'no-holds-barred' criticism and concludes that 'none of Moore's arguments are convincing, and most are quite wide of the target'. Phillips expands on Richard Hertz's thought that James was interested in the 'art of good believing', and Moore misunderstood because his interests lay 'in the art of

good defining and logical precision'. Phillips classifies James as an 'ascriptive instrumentalist' rather than a 'relativistic instrumentalist'; so his instrumentalism is compatible with realist commitments, in that he could endorse the Popperian notion of 'approach to the truth' ('Perhaps Popper was a neo-Jamesian', Phillips says).

William James: Pragmatism in Focus can be highly recommended for graduate seminars or senior-level undergraduate courses. The notion of bringing a philosopher together with his critics in this way is a good one. I hope we see more such editorial efforts in the future.

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Graham Parkes, ed.

Nietzsche and Asian Thought.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991.

Pp. 253.

US \$27.50 (ISBN 0-226-64683-1).

Nietzsche liked a very taut bow, drawing what others could only safely handle as contradictions into powerful tensions. Not for the sake of evoking dialectical mediations or *Aufhebungen*, but rather to 'smell-out' the signs of ascent and decline: 'ich bin der Lehrer par excellence hierfür — ich kenne beides, ich bin beides' (*Ecce Homo*, 'Warum Ich So Weise Bin'). In 1935, a time of tremendous tension, Heidegger proclaimed that Nietzsche was a victim of the traditional/metaphysical opposition between Parmenides and Heraclitus, and, because of this, Nietzsche's 'metaphysics' falls short of the decisive question. That decisive question, for Heidegger, was the *Seinsfrage*. It was decisive because it 'mit dem eigentlichen Geschehen in der Geschichte eines Volkes im innigsten Einklang stehen' (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*).

This short review is not the place to deal with Heidegger's reductionistic and 'political' reading of Nietzsche. Suffice it to say that Heidegger's reading fails to hear the many Nietzsches, the many voices, and the richly textured undecidability of the Nietzschean text. *Nietzsche and Asian Thought* counters such reductionistic readings 'by bringing a number of voices from East Asia as well as from Europe into the dialogue' (9). Not only has Graham Parkes assembled a very fine collection of essays on Nietzsche, their diversity sounds differently than Heidegger's 'innigsten Einklang' of the Being question and Germany's historical destiny. Nietzsche(s) would have been joyous about such a transnational state of affairs among thinkers.

The essays composing this volume are set forth under four headings: I, Others; II, India; III, China; and IV, Japan. The three essays under the first heading all interpret Nietzsche in ways that open his texts to the readings that follow. The limitations of Nietzsche's understanding and knowledge of Eastern thought are discussed while still showing that some of his thoughts have clear affinities with Eastern thought. But as Eberhard Scheiffele's essay 'Questioning One's "Own" from the Perspective of the Foreign' points out, Nietzsche's primary purpose did not lie with the foreign itself, but rather with the foreign as a way of looking 'back at his own situation from the perspective of the foreign' (44).

Johann Figl's essay 'Nietzsche's Early Encounters with Asian Thought' is a careful examination of Nietzsche's modest acquaintance with the Indian tradition, noting, however, that Nietzsche did compare the Indian epics with the *Niebelungen Lied*. On the basis of Nietzsche's unpublished manuscripts of his lecture notes on the history of philosophy, which evidence his early exposure to Indian thought, Figl points out that there is 'practically no mention of such a general acquaintance with the great cultures of Asia' (60) in the thus far published notes of this period in the 'Historical-Critical Edition' of Nietzsche's works.

Michel Hulin's essay is concerned with Nietzsche's understanding of Buddhism and its monastic asceticism, concluding that Nietzsche's treatment of Buddhism 'downplays its properly religious aspects' and thus laicizes it. In a similar vein as Scheiffele, Hulin argues that Nietzsche's primary concern with Buddhism was 'as a foil in his interminable polemic against Christianity' (73).

Mervyn Sprung is also concerned with Nietzsche's generally inadequate understanding of Buddhism and Hinduism. Nevertheless, because Nietzsche rejected the entire edifice of Greek concepts, together with the Kantian *ich* and the grammatical subject of the *cogito*, his thought does indeed share a great deal with Indian thinkers. Perhaps, then, Nietzsche has made access to Indian thought easier.

Glenn T. Martin's essay compares Nietzsche's 'deconstructive' writings with those of the Vedanta and the early Mahāyāna Buddhist Nāgārjuna. Comparing Zhuang Zi and Nietzsche, Chen Guying comes up with an impressive list of similarities between these two thinkers 'from utterly different cultural and social backgrounds' (128).

Roger T. Ames' essay is an especially good comparative study of Nietzsche's notion of *der Wille zur Macht* and the early Chinese conception of *de*. Drawing upon J. Hillis Miller's description of Nietzsche's field of force/power, Ames' remarks Nietzsche's rejection of the unified self/subject by emphasizing that any and all attempts to unify the self do so at the expense of breaking with the continuous process of existence itself. This is why Nietzsche's later description of the will to power is cosmological rather than psychological. However, unlike the earlier Chinese conception of *de*, which emphasizes mutuality and interdependence of centers of force, Nietzsche places emphasis on their antagonistic relationship. Ames concludes: 'The

attitude of the Nietzschean *Übermensch* who engages his world by asserting his will to power against both his environments and himself might be regarded by the person of virtuality [*de*] as one who squanders his considerable energies by failing to respect the complementarity and synchronicity of things. Energy spent in contest is energy lost to harmony' (148).

David Kelly's essay deals with the Nietzsche reception in China from 1907 to 1989, noting that recent Chinese Nietzscheanism 'reveals much about the metaphysical hunger which fuels both dictatorship and dreams of liberation' (168). The remaining four essays by Graham Parkes, Ōkōchi Ryōgi, Arifuku Kōgaku, and Sonoda Muneto all concern Nietzsche in the context of Japanese thought.

Graham Parkes has provided us with an excellent introduction to the broad ranging reception of Nietzsche among Asian thinkers. It is perhaps no accident that both Nietzsche and Heidegger share the distinction of evoking considerable interest among Asian thinkers. Given Heidegger's emphasis on German centrality and its historical destiny and Nietzsche's rejection of nationalistic/anti-semitic thinking, one should suspect that Asian thinkers might also be 'smelling-out' the signs of ascent and decline. If so, does this point in the direction of antagonism or complementarity?

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James F. Peterman

*Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation
and Defense of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical
Project.*

Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. xiv + 158.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0981-3);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0982-1).

Maybe too much has been made of Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophy with therapy; maybe too little. At any rate, Peterman's book does not make the comparison completely clear.

Peterman's subtitle indicates that the book is to be both an interpretation and a defense of W's later philosophical project. This is puzzling: while W might need some interpreting, I do not think he can explicitly be defended, although the temptation to try is awfully strong; *mea culpa*. That W cannot explicitly be defended is part of what Cavell (who shows up frequently in *PaT*) is getting at when he talks of the need for *conversion* to W's philosophical project. And of course W did not explicitly defend his project: the few

remarks in *PI* that can be seen as defenses — like *PI* 129 or 600 — are shibboleths or questions or both. Peterman knows this. He points out that by giving a justification of W's project he is 'in danger of violating its very spirit and limits' (1). But this does not deter Peterman; as he puts it, by way of quieting his or his reader's misgivings, 'there are important conceptual issues in thinking of philosophy as a form of therapy' (1). So there are. But it is not clear that Peterman needs to (try to) justify W's project in order to consider these important conceptual issues.

PaT contains seven chapters, among which are chapters on 'Confession and Dialogue', 'The Role of Similes in Illness and Health' and 'The Conflict between Philosophy and Science'. The book is pretty well-written. One constant stylistic problem is repetition: Peterman uses a great deal of space telling his reader what is coming and what has been done. This would be okay, except that each chapter is already broken into short sections with headings, and so the transitional material often just repeats the function of the headings. Many of the key claims of the book are not investigated in detail and so it is a shame that Peterman chose to use so much space directing traffic that is not too heavy to begin with.

There are a few confusions in the book. I will mention two. First, 'philosophy as therapy': Peterman thinks that the conception 'signifies a kind of philosophy' (2). This is off-target. When W talks of philosophy as therapy, he is offering a construal of philosophy *itself*, a way of looking at it as a whole (e.g. *PI* 133: 'There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.') He is not offering another kind of philosophy. Peterman has put the claim on the wrong level, so to speak. W's conception is a kind of conception of philosophy, not a kind of philosophy. (And this is part of the reason W's project cannot explicitly be defended.) This mistake leads Peterman into thinking that W meant to invoke the *entire* grammar of 'therapy', instead of only a portion of it. Invoking the entire grammar would commit W to the view that philosophy *is* therapy, a view that he denied (Cf. Malcolm's *Memoir*). For W, philosophy is like therapy, but it is not therapy. (Bear in mind Austin's claim that one thing can properly be said to be like another only if we know that they are different.)

Peterman's discussion of 'philosophy as therapy' also suffers because he pays so little attention to the philosophers who have taken that conception seriously. Cavell, as mentioned, does make it into the book, but Wisdom is mentioned only once and O.K. Bouwsma gets no attention at all.

Second, reasons and causes: Peterman wants to show that W's strict distinction between science and philosophy is not so strict after all. He attempts to do this by calling W's distinction between a reason and a cause into question. Peterman argues that we can think of some causal hypothesizing 'on the model of a black box problem' (85). Solving a black box problem, he claims, requires the description of 'a way of representing the input and output so that they are correlated'. This is accomplished by appealing to an analogy between inputs and outputs. Thinking this way, says Peterman, is quite similar to giving a reason.

This is a complicated business, and Peterman hurries through it much too quickly (it gets about three pages, 84-6). Is a person who is thinking this way engaged in causal hypothesizing at all? The person attempting to solve the black box problem might best be seen as giving reasons for offering a particular causal hypothesis; he or she need not be seen as offering one. Peterman is certainly right that scientists often face black box-ish problems and so often think this way, but not all thinking by scientists is scientific thinking (or causal hypothesizing). Perhaps scientists sometimes think like W's sort of philosopher — but even if they do, that does not make science philosophy or philosophy science. Nor does it make the distinction between the two less strict.

The book has a couple of strong points. Peterman's view that philosophical health, from W's perspective, consists in achieving agreement with the form of one's life is a useful one. Also, the discussion of Spengler's influence on Wittgenstein is quite good.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of *PaT* is that Peterman defends a project he does not adopt — *PaT* is not itself a contribution to philosophical therapy. Because the book is not both concerned with W's project and a *product of that project*, the book has the feel of a forensic exercise. At the end of the day, Peterman attempts to defend merely the *plausibility* of W's later philosophical project, he does not defend the project or put it into practice; and this puts Peterman about two steps from where the action is.

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Nicholas Rescher

*A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume II:
The Validity of Values.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

Pp. 264.

US \$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07393-7).

One recurrent theme of this uneven, loosely structured and maddeningly repetitive work is an idealistic thesis to the effect that values are grounded in a mind-dependent reality. Values are valid, Rescher argues, because of the *conception* we have of ourselves as free, rational beings. Since we cannot avoid thinking of ourselves in these terms, we are under an unconditional 'ontological obligation' to be rational. Since rationality is an inherently evaluative enterprise, values are an integral feature of any cogent understanding of the world accessible to us.

Key to the development of this argument is a set of anthropological claims about how we ineluctably conceive of ourselves. The 'we' in question is the set of persons and Rescher more or less stipulates that a person must be capable of free agency and rational thought, he must conceive of himself in these terms and he must value himself on this basis. A person, that is, will appreciate that 'reason demands respect' (119) and that our inherent capacity for rational thought is a capacity for something inherently good. To be a person is to 'see oneself as a unit of worth' (119).

It follows that persons are constrained by an 'ontological duty of self-realization' (214). Persons are under an obligation to make the most of the opportunities available to them to realize the good. Since 'we are creatures who can realize certain goods ... we ought, for that reason, to work toward their realization' (215). Can-implies-ought, if you will. Persons ought to promote the values inherent in rationality by realizing themselves as fully as possible *qua* rational beings. To deliberately violate this ontological directive for self-development is one of the worst injuries one can inflict upon oneself (23). It is also 'perverse and actually wicked' (214).

The plausibility of this argument hinges on the claim that the particular self-conception which Rescher attributes to persons is in fact deeply rooted in human nature. Unfortunately, by Rescher's own tacit admission, human membership in the class of persons is an essentially contingent affair. Determinists as well as small children, for example, are not persons. Rescher's *ad hoc* proposal that out of 'professional courtesy' (121) they deserve to be acknowledged as such is hardly compelling. His claim that those who have the capacity to become persons deserve to be acknowledged as persons now is contentious, similarly unmotivated and fails to address the status of 'the mentally handicapped' or 'the incapacitated old' — individuals whom Rescher also wants to regard as persons.

My intent here is not to quibble about the nature of personhood but to point out a serious implication for Rescher's overall argument. Rescher claims that anyone who proposes to exclude women, children or foreigners from the class of persons has so flawed a conception of personhood that they thereby compromise their own claim to having an adequate grasp of this concept. And since being a person requires having the concept of personhood, these individuals 'cast their own personhood into doubt' (121).

By this reasoning, some of my colleagues and more than a few of my neighbors are not persons! One also wonders whether Rescher would say the same thing about someone who doubts that merely potential persons are persons. If a human being's claim to personhood is as tenuous as all that, then it is difficult to take seriously Rescher's claim to have captured the universal and unconditionally binding character of reason's counsel.

Other problems run deeper yet. Rescher never explains to my satisfaction why, for example, reason demands respect in the way he says it does. Consider a rational agent who neither values rationality as an intrinsic good nor, in light of her ability to reason, views herself as an item worthy of respect. Such a being is surely possible. She also appears to constitute a serious

counterexample to Rescher's argument since she is presumably under no obligation to (continue to) be rational. To claim that human beings cannot be like this is not credible. To stipulate that she is not a person (and therefore someone to whom the argument is just not directed) makes the argument appear question begging and contrived. What is missing is a forceful positive account of *why* things such as rationality and human flourishing are intrinsic goods.

Analogous questions can be raised at other stages of Rescher's argument. Why is there an *obligation* to promote the value of rationality? Rescher suggests that this is a conceptual matter (215). But normally the fact that something is valuable establishes only that there is some defeasible reason to promote it. Again, what are we to make of a rational agent (or person?) who values rationality but opts to promote other values incompatible with rationality which are themselves also grounded in features of that agent's ontological condition? Must that choice profoundly tarnish that agent's integrity and self-respect? Is that choice necessarily wicked?

This book covers a multitude of topics — ranging from tangential platitudinous homilies on the power of ideals and the meaning of life, to elucidating discussions of problems associated with measuring values and inferring values from facts. Nonetheless, Rescher's arguments repeatedly invoke some pretty dubious claims about human nature. Rationality is inherently evaluative, for example, because reason can evaluate the ends of action and inform us, in particular, that knowledge too is an intrinsic good. This is so because 'the need for information ... is as pressing a human need as that for food itself' (102). 'To be ignorant of what goes on about us is almost physically painful for us' (101). Happily, in spite of my abounding ignorance of many things, I believe I have been spared this particular need, as well as the alleged pain attendant upon its frustration. I trust that I am not alone in this regard. And so as I grappled with this book I became increasingly curious about the strange and marvelous exotic creatures which are no doubt faithfully described within its covers.

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William L. Rowe

Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 2nd ed.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company
1993. Pp. xi + 206.
(paper: ISBN 0-534-18816-8).

This second edition of Rowe's book (the first appeared in 1978) incorporates some minor changes, and several new sections to reflect some of the more important work in the field since then. The scope of the book is for the most part limited to discussion of traditional western theistic religion, and the philosophical questions to which it gives rise.

The book's format is very much in the tradition of such introductions to the field. Opening chapters discuss the major reasons advanced for belief in the existence of God; the cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments, and the case of religious experience. The ontological argument in particular — that traditional nightmare of undergraduate philosophy — is explicated with an admirable clarity, and the difficult issues which surround it are rendered as simply as they are likely to allow. Rowe's chapter on religious experience is another that sets out clearly and carefully before the beginner a terrain which is otherwise liable to foster several varieties of confusion.

The chapters following engage with some of the arguments levelled against theistic religious belief: the problem of evil (once again, an area that is handled particularly superbly), the Positivist's attack on the meaningfulness of religious language, and the Freudian attempt to explain away religious belief in psychological terms. One notable omission though is any account of religious language beyond the problems raised by Positivism and the attempts to answer these difficulties. Even the barest treatment of some of the approaches spawned by (for instance) Wittgensteinian considerations would alert the novice reader to an important area of the philosophy of religion that has received much attention in recent years.

In his discussions of the arguments for and against theistic belief Rowe picks carefully at the problems in order to demonstrate what *sort* of considerations are relevant to the topic, and to give the beginning student a sense of what are and are not appropriate lines of reasoning. For the greatest part he succeeds in avoiding the two pit-falls inherent in the writing of an introductory philosophical text of on the one hand being so careful not to unfairly prejudice the novice that a lack of critical rigour detracts from its worth, and on the other of sacrificing even-handedness to strongly-held philosophical beliefs. Any suspicion on the part of the student that he is being asked to take seriously ideas undeserving of this or that the author has a particular philosophical line to sell — and such suspicions are easily aroused in the alert student — is likely to taint, in the student's eyes, those parts of the text even where the author has been able to approach the ideal of critical even-handedness.

Further chapters consider other central issues in the philosophy of religion: miracles, post-mortem survival, divine knowledge and human freewill, and the relation of faith and reason. The first of these, a chapter entitled

'Miracles and the Modern World View', is almost wholly concerned with Hume's treatment of the subject, while Hume's is a conception of the miraculous that much modern theology is eager to disdain. Alternatives have been provided (the miracle as a 'sign-event' upon which the faithful are able to place special significance, for example), and the struggle that theology has made to counter the attacks made by Positivism has (as in the case of religious language) not been limited to attempts to do this on Positivism's terms; it is therefore unfortunate that Rowe does not deal with other conceptions of the miraculous.

The chapters on post-mortem survival and on divine knowledge and human freedom are as satisfactory an introduction to the issues as it is reasonable to expect from a work of this size and scope. Similar comments can be made regarding his chapter on the nature of faith and its relation to reason, in which he considers positions put forward by Aquinas, and especially Clifford and James.

While for the greatest part Rowe's book proceeds with a treatment limited to fairly traditional positions, chapters on 'The Idea of God', 'Many Religions' and 'A Glimpse Beyond Theism' (to the ideas of Tillich and Wieman) provide starting points for students concerned to investigate the philosophy of religion outside these bounds. This is particularly invaluable at a time when theology has been looking beyond western traditions, and the wane of the influence of Positivism has meant that philosophical writers feel less obliged to answer to its demands to restrict the use of language to the literal.

Each chapter draws upon appropriate sources in such a way that Rowe can make a number of important points in any of the arguments in question with the quotation of a judiciously selected passage from the great texts in the philosophy of religion. References are provided in endnotes, and each chapter ends with a short study guide which will serve to direct the student to new ways of approaching the problems raised in the text.

The vast number of similarly pitched introductions to the philosophy of religion makes this an area where any such work has to be of extremely high quality to stand out in a favourable light. Rowe's book is written superbly, and all that he touches upon is given a clear, careful and suitably critical treatment. While one or two sins of omission have been noted in this review, an introduction to the philosophy of religion of this size is unlikely to include all that its critics would like to find, and while its scope limits it to the western theistic tradition, this does enable the author to avoid merely scratching the surface of the problems with which it deals. Both its size and scope make it an ideal text for the novice, to whom it will prove as helpful and useful an introduction as he is likely to find, and partnered with a suitable anthology — for example Rowe and Wainwright's *Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1989, 1973) — it will certainly provide the greater part of the material that any beginner in the subject is likely to require.

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David E. Schrader

The Corporation as Anomaly.

Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press

1993. Pp. xi + 202.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41241-2).

With painstaking care, David Schrader establishes his thesis that the firm, a concept that 'includes such diverse entities as the small town insurance agency and the giant, multinational managerial corporation' (23), represents a fundamental but hidden ontological shift in economic theory since Adam Smith. Indeed, perhaps the only constant throughout the history of marginalist theory of economics has been an unswerving commitment to what we nowadays call methodological individualism, 'a belief that economic agents are self-interested' (173). To this constant one might add the marginalist's preference in their theories for nonconscious coordination of economic activity, that is, freedom from consciously placed controls.

Not until the 1930s did a marginalist theory of the firm arise, a turn which Schrader marks as revolutionary. Critical to the marginalist theory of the firm is its insistence upon treating the firm as an individual with a single interest, namely, to maximize profits. Unlike behavioral and managerial theories of the firm, which include elements of behavior far removed from price and profit, marginalist notions of the firm remain rooted in their commitment to individualism. As such, the marginalist theory cannot take into account the collective character of the firm, which Schrader holds is 'absolutely essential to understanding its practice' (119). Moreover, this theory opens the way to serious confusions and shortcomings as a predictive instrument. Yet, the marginalist theory continues to hold sway.

In the end, Schrader contends that the marginalist theory's failure to recognize the managerial corporation as a genuine collective that involves conscious coordination of economic activity represents a shortcoming calling for 'changes in our understanding of what constitutes the laws by which the economic world operates' (174). For indeed, corporate economic leadership in the form or person of the manager marks the end of the traditional entrepreneurship and potentially the entry of a new kind of feudalism, with the 'manager-bureaucrat' (163) at its head.

It would appear on the surface that in trading in the firm as a fictional or nearly-fictional individual for the real feudal baron — the modern chief executive — Schrader might have made a case for reality following theory, that is, for the realization of the marginalist's assumption of the firm as an individualism. However, the move would stand against his thesis on the grounds of admitting to the marginalist formulae motivations other than purely economic ones. Rather, economic theory must treat the firm or corporation as a genuine collective. Moreover, 'economics cannot have the kind of independence from politics that has been assumed by neoclassical theory' (164).

With that, Schrader closes his case, leaving his reader with a studied review of the place, or nonplace, as the case may be, of the firm within marginalist economic theory. Should one wonder what the nature of a proper treatment of the firm might be within a marginalist or other economic treatment, Schrader only thinly alludes to the work of Williamson in works such as *Corporate Control and Business Behavior*. He offers nothing on his own toward the theoretic reconstruction.

From one perspective, Schrader is fully justified in his silence. He set out to examine the ontological foundation of the problem within marginalist theory. Having satisfied himself argumentatively that the firm is an ontic anomaly within the theory, he may cease. Indeed, the details of his arguments may prove of use to others as they attempt to reconstitute the concept of the firm in theories and variants yet to come.

From another perspective, the result raises conceptual problems undressed by Schrader. For example, it is unclear whether he ultimately believes that the marginalist theory can survive as a theory in the face of the need to treat the firm as a collective. The methodological individualism, indeed the ontological individualism that lies at the heart of marginalist theory cannot in principle move beyond the collective as anything more than an aggregate. A genuine collective, whether it is the firm or whether it is a class action or interest, is not a mere aggregate. Treating a collective as a collective and not as an aggregate would likely leave marginalism without its individualism intact.

Moreover, incorporating noneconomic motivations into the theory, either in the form of CEO managerial power for its own sake or in the form of internal or external political actions to coordinate economic activity, would seem equally problematic for marginalism. Conscious, noneconomic direction of economic activity for ends other than profit seems at odds with everything marginalism has held dear.

What Schrader has left over, then, in his unwillingness simply to discard marginalist theory in favor of others that might better analyze and predict corporate economic action, are a collection of logical anomalies. His only reason for not turning elsewhere seems to be the continuing dominance of marginalist theory in economics. While that motivation might suffice within corporate headquarters, it seems to fall short of the mark in a study in the philosophy of economics.

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Roger Shiner

Norm and Nature.

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Norm and Nature makes a substantial and valuable contribution to contemporary theorizing about the nature of law. It exposes new dimensions of the debates between positivists and their opponents and explores these with some precision, often in an absorbing and provocative way. One good effect of its discussions is that we are pressed to refine our views of exactly what presuppositions and implications are essential to a positivist outlook, and of how the concept of law is best connected with ideas of purposeful human action, practical reasonableness, and a good human social order.

The original idea of the book is that legal theory should be viewed as a continuing dynamic conversation between certain basic ways of approaching the law (positivism, anti-positivism or natural law, and realism), each of which brings insights about the true nature of law. Shiner focuses on the interactions between the first two of these. Legal positivism captures our central familiar understanding of law as an institutionalized normative system, but its analysis is too strongly descriptive to be philosophically illuminating, and it does not step back far enough to give us a deeper understanding of law. That deeper understanding involves our seeing law as conceptually connected with fundamental value, independent of law and conventions; this understanding is expressed in anti-positivism. Rather than simply juxtaposing these two perspectives as opposed 'still pictures' of the law, Shiner is interested in the movement between them, in the way that each perspective ('Norm' and 'Nature') generates its opposite. He claims that through this interplay of thought we reach a fuller understanding of the law.

The movement proceeds from simple positivism (P) to sophisticated positivism (SP), which is generated by dissatisfaction with the former. The insights on which SP builds are shown, in their turn, to generate anti-positivism (AP). However, AP's positive claims turn out to have taken us too far away from law so that it is really not offering us a theory of law at all, thus necessitating a return of our thought to P. As Shiner conceives of this dynamic, there is no tenable intervening position (compatibilism), which captures the main insights of both P/SP and AP without their deficiencies. Shiner argues against compatibilism in both its individual versions and as a theoretical enterprise. The movement of legal thought is continuous and inevitable.

The book traces this pattern of movement by looking at seven issues that have occupied legal theorists over the last several decades: how law provides a reason for action; what the authority of law consists in; what is the point of view of legal thought; what is the relation between the existence of law and its acceptance; how are judicial discretion and legal principle related; what kind of semantics should be adopted for propositions of law; and how is law related to (conceptions of) the common good. Shiner examines the views

of P, SP and AP on each of these seven issues, devoting half of the book to the last of these. Very good summaries of the developing argument can be found on pages 39-40 (P), 97-9 (SP), and in Chap. 10, 261-9 (AP).

The opening movement consists of a masterful exposition of SP as a response to P, in which the ideas and arguments of Hart, Raz, MacCormick, Dworkin, Postema and others are selectively used as exponents of SP. To illustrate. SP improves on P's conception of how law gives a reason for action by replacing a 'balance of first-order reasons' approach with an exclusionary reasons story. SP rejects P's emphasis on obedience as coercively-grounded conformity and acknowledges the centrality of citizen acceptance and the internal point of view to our understanding of law, while maintaining that acceptance can embrace a range of passive and unreflective attitudes that fall far short of moral commitment. SP replaces P's two-step model of adjudication (strong discretion) with more subtle explanations of the role of legal principles as constraints in adjudication, using ideas such as judicial custom and narrative coherence to explain judicial discretion as weak discretion, compatible with a positivist view of such legal materials as pedigree. And SP can repudiate the realist semantics of crude 'social fact' positivism by accepting an interpretive semantics which holds that propositions of law are acceptable if they are 'warrantably assertible'. In all of these, the movement from P to SP is a movement away from the use of a purely contingent test of independent moral standards to explain the authority, normativity and legitimacy of law to the affirmation of some tighter more conceptual connection between law and authority, normativity and legitimacy.

Part III, Anti-positivism (AP), constitutes the heart of the book. It consists of seven chapters devoted to showing, chapter by chapter, that on each of the seven issues the position of SP rests on assumptions or insights that are in fact NOT compatible with positivism. The arguments of these chapters are complex, subtle, sometimes difficult and quite elaborate. These chapters are not intended for a popular or broad audience; only those who have carefully read their Hart, Raz, MacCormick, and others will be in a position to appreciate Shiner's interpretations of these author's positions (both their virtues and their limitations), and to assess his often ingenious use of theses in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language to throw light on the implications of these positions for debates between positivists and anti-positivists.

A few examples from these chapters will convey some sense of the aspirations of AP. One major line of argument concerns how we should understand law as creating reasons for action for its subjects — the normativity of law — and how the law's claims to authority are warranted. Shiner thinks that SP's attempts to explain the law's claim to our obedience, by the notion of an exclusionary reason or by distinguishing claiming authority from having authority, rely on deeper assumptions about how law is (ideally, at least) related to certain values which give it authority; these assumptions imply that we cannot but accept as authoritative that which we see as law. The positivist may reply that the authoritative character of law depends on

its satisfying certain moral criteria, so law is not *necessarily*, but only *contingently*, authoritative. Against this, Shiner sets the idea that law has certain important social functions — to prevent undesirable behaviour, to facilitate the making of private arrangements, to provide services and settle disputes. It is internal to law that it is designed to fulfill these functions and it is 'part of the concept of law that law normally performs these functions well' (128). Our concept of law is that of an institution designed to secure certain elements of human well-being, and thus internally related to the possession of authority. Because law is the kind of intentional object that is essentially directed at a good condition of human beings, our judgment that such and such is a legal system is one that draws on our evaluative and moral sensibilities.

Another chapter takes up SP's commitment to the centrality of the internal point of view in understanding the concept of law. Shiner claims that there is a deeper inseparability between levels of volitional commitment to the goals and values of a practice and levels of understanding of a practice than is appreciated by positivists like Raz or MacCormick. The theorist must try to reproduce the way in which the law functions in the lives of those who have the internal point of view, and this 'means that the theorist too must display the internal point of view, commitment to law' (159), and eschew an evaluatively neutral stance.

Another discussion (Chap. 7) takes SP's acknowledgement of a role for legal principles as constraints on judicial adherence to valid rules, and argues that it relies on a more fundamental assumption that such principles are not content-independent but have some independent claim to soundness or truth. The reason why SPs find it important to give a role to principles in legal justification has to do with certain ideals of justice that are internal to the idea of law, namely, the ideals of getting the particular case right and of reaching decisions which embody justice in the sense of treating like cases alike. These ingredients in what counts as a justified decision cannot be understood in terms of merely formal consistency or coherence, but require the further idea that certain principles embody some correct background political morality. A major implication of the argument is that good reasons in legal adjudication cannot exclude the possibility that the strongest reasons for a decision may be reasons of justice which do not have ANY instantiation in the particular legal system through its existing valid rules or related principles — so that the law is penetrable by extra-legal reasons of substantive moral justice.

Given ambitious claims such as these, the book offers plenty of scope for criticism. Some elements of the book's structural argument are unconvincing, such as the return movement to P from AP, and the construal and rejection of compatibilism. As a critic of SP Shiner is generally fair-minded, but sometimes his criticisms are misplaced, for instance, his claim (Chap. 6) that Hart's acknowledgement of a relatively passive aspect to everyday life under law is attributable to the adoption of a dualistic view of mind and a failure to distinguish episodic from dispositional mental states. Rarely is it shown

that SP *must* adopt some position that is then taken to task. And the case for AP tends to conflate, or to too closely identify, the 'perspective' of legal theory with the perspective of the legal subject.

That said, there is a wealth of careful and subtle reasoning in this book which deserves attention from legal theorists simply on its own merits, and which will be of special interest to positivists because it raises doubts about how comprehensive and illuminating a positivist account of law can be.

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Tony Smith
Dialectical Social Theory and its Critics.
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Smith claims that Marx's mature works are best understood in terms of the dialectic of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, and defends this interpretation of Marx as a systematic dialectician against the Kantian critique of Colletti, the analytical Marxism of Elster and Roemer, and the post-modern critique of Baudrillard. The book is clearly written: it demystifies the notion of dialectics, and it takes on critics in a straightforward manner.

Part one of the book, along with some crucial elaborations in the chapters on Colletti and Elster, explicates Marx's systematic dialectical theory. Systematic dialectical theory consists of a hierarchical ordering of categories which systematically comprehends the concrete social world. The theory is constructed in two phases: first, 'simple and abstract' categories are derived from the 'real and concrete' given in experience. Second, 'dialectical logic' is used to derive ever more 'complex and concrete' categories, until 'the initially given concrete has been grasped by thought in a systematic fashion' (36-8 and 72-4). The resulting theory comprehends capitalism in categories ordered according to Hegel's theory of the syllogism. Hegel's theory claims that objects are 'individuals mediated by particularities that are essential to them qua individuals, and these particularities in turn are mediated through a universal that is essential to the particularities' (12). In terms of Marx's theory, capital is the moment of universality, the 'distinct structural tendencies' which can be derived from it 'form the moment of particularity', and the moment of individuality consists of 'the acts of individual capitalists [and] individual wage laborers ... whose acts are structured by those particular

tendencies and thus also mediated with the inner nature of capital' (16). These dialectical categories are both conceptual and ontological, since 'if we think that these principles do indeed help us make sense of the world, then ... the structure of an explanation and the structure of what is to be explained must map onto each other' (8).

The relationship between dialectics and empirical science remains a bit unclear. On the one hand, Smith sometimes casts dialectical theory as superior in kind to empirical science. Dialectical theory distinguishes essential from external relations, and establishes claims of necessity. 'If reasoning can establish a systematic connection between two categories, say "capital" and "exploitation", this is equivalent to showing that one sort of structure is necessarily connected with another' (44). Since, according to Smith, such claims cannot be justified inductively from empirical data, dialectical theory must bear some different relation to the empirical world. Smith is aware of this: he points out that while 'for Hegel, a thought system can account for its own validity within itself', Marx proposes to seek 'verification through material praxis' (88). However, Smith does not elaborate on this method of verification, and in particular does not explain how it verifies the claims about necessary consequences characteristic of systematic dialectical theory.

On the other hand, and perhaps predominantly, Smith explicates a modest conception of dialectics as a guide to theoretical work in social science, evident in two sets of claims. First, Hegel's theory of the syllogism does not lead directly to 'substantive theoretical positions', but only to 'canons to follow in theoretical work': theories should not attempt to explain phenomena in isolation but should be systematic in nature (13), and there are 'reasons for supposing *prima facie*' that reductionist theories will be inadequate to the 'concreteness and complexity' of the object (16). Second, in his arguments against Elster, Smith emphasizes that the dialectical progression of categories is not some mysterious *ad hoc* procedure, but rests on structural tendencies in social forms. A simple category defines an abstract social form which conditions the behavior of individual agents in such a way that a second, more complex category or social form is produced. 'A transition from one social form to another can be introduced only if it can be shown that agents operating under the first social form necessarily would tend to act in a manner that brought about the second' (99). Hence, dialectical theory is concerned with the microfoundations of social explanation. Moreover, dialectical social theory is 'parasitical on social science, because arguments establishing necessary structural tendencies demand considerable empirical knowledge' (109). Both these sets of claims seem to indicate that dialectical theories compete with other scientific theories on the same terms.

In the chapter on Elster, Smith notes that Elster's impatience and lack of sympathy with systematic dialectical theory often leads him to prematurely dismiss such theory. In response, Smith explicates dialectical concepts in a way which shows that they are not intrinsically incompatible with empirical investigations or concerns with microfoundations, and points to instances where Marx at least addresses these concerns. But as Smith himself points

out, the arguments in this book show 'only that this sort of theory is both permissible and significant' (110). The real work is to develop and defend such a dialectical theory in detail, and show how it is superior to alternative theories; that work is begun in Smith's *The Logic of Marx's 'Capital'* (SUNY, 1990).

In part two, Smith responds to critics who argue either that Marx did not engage in Hegelian systematic dialectic, or that, to the extent he did, that aspect of Marx should be rejected. Against Colletti's neo-Kantian critique of Hegelian Marxism, Smith argues effectively that Colletti's account of Hegel as an idealist and Marx as a materialist seriously misunderstands both thinkers, sometimes as a result of taking too seriously remarks made by Marx himself. Smith claims that his interpretation of Marx as a systematic dialectician shows that the two are quite close 'on the level of philosophical principles', and that their differences 'arise in the process of applying these principles to the empirical realm' (79) — aside from the question of verification, they disagree about explanatory primacy in history and about the possibility of individual autonomy in capitalist society (88-90). In the chapter on Roemer, Smith argues that Roemer's formal definition of exploitation, and his attendant thought experiments designed to undermine its central position in Marxist thought, are too insensitive to the context in which Marx levels the charge. Smith's arguments are convincing, but don't address the question behind Roemer's formalism, namely whether exploitation is a unique wrong or a violation of some deeper value like justice or freedom. The final chapter, on Baudrillard, is the most polemical and the least satisfying. Smith rightly refuses to succumb to the exasperating evasiveness of Baudrillard's postmodernism, quickly deflates his 'dizzying' hyperbole, and finds the remaining substantive position an easy target. While Smith on one level seems quite right, on another level one wonders why, if this is all there is to Baudrillard, he bothers.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOL. XIII (1993)

Listed alphabetically by author of book reviewed.

Répertoire alphabétiquement par l'auteur du livre faisant
l'objet d'un compte rendu.

John Abbarno, Peter A. French, Jeffrey Nesteruk with David T. Risser, <i>Corporations in the Moral Community</i>	No. 2 - 91
Ken Hanly	
Theodor Adorno, <i>Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music.</i>	No. 5 - 207
Thomas Huhn	
Giorgio Agamben, <i>The Coming Community</i>	No. 5 - 209
Deborah Cook	
Robert Almeder, <i>Death & Personal Survival: The Evidence For Life After Death.</i>	No. 4 - 129
Carl R. Hahn	
Eugene G. D'Aquili, Charles D. Laughlin, Jr and John McManus, <i>Brain, Symbol and Experience</i>	No. 5 - 241
David L. Thompson	
John Arras and Nancy Rhoden, eds., <i>Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine</i>, 3rd edition	No. 3 - 67
Jeff McLaughlin	
John Bacon, Keith Campbell and Lloyd Reinhardt, eds., <i>Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong</i>	No. 4 - 131
A.D. Irvine	
David Bakhurst, <i>Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov</i>	No. 4 - 134
Taras D. Zakydalsky	
James Barry, Jr. and Hugh J. Silverman, eds., <i>Texts and Dialogues: Maurice Merleau-Ponty</i>	No. 1 - 59
Wayne J. Froman	
Gregory Bassha, <i>Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study.</i>	No. 1 - 1
Joseph Ellin	
Kenneth Baynes, <i>The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls, and Habermas</i>	No. 2 - 67
Tony Couture	
Rodger Beehler, David Copp and Bela Szabados, eds., <i>On the Track of Reason: Essays In Honor of Kai Nielsen</i>	No. 2 - 69
H.B. McCullough	
Seyla Benhabib, <i>Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics</i>	No. 5 - 212
Robin Schott	
Andrew Benjamin, ed., <i>Judging Lyotard</i>	No. 1 - 3
Raphael Sassower	

Irwin M. Berent and Rod L. Evans, <i>Drug Legalization: For and Against</i>	No. 2 - 89
Jonathan Schonsheck	
Arnold Berleant, <i>The Aesthetics of Environment</i>	No. 5 - 215
Yuriko Saito	
François Bernier, <i>Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi</i>	No. 3 - 69
Thomas M. Lennon	
Richard J. Bernstein, <i>The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity</i>	No. 2 - 71
Paul Fairfield	
Deryck Beyleveld, <i>The Dialectical Necessity of Morality</i>	No. 2 - 75
Edward D. Sherline	
Vernon J. Bourke, ed., <i>Augustine's Love of Wisdom: An Introspective Philosophy</i>	No. 1 - 6
John King-Farlow	
Raymond Bradley, <i>The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism</i>.	No. 6 - 283
Gregory Landini	
Walter Brand, <i>Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment</i>	No. 2 - 77
Fay Horton Sawyer	
Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang L. Gombocz, and Christian Piller, eds., <i>Metamind, Knowledge and Coherence, Essays on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer</i>	No. 3 - 71
Charles Ripley	
Harry Brod, <i>Hegel's Philosophy of Politics. Idealism, Identity and Modernity</i>	No. 4 - 137
Renato Cristi	
Janine Brodie, Shelley A.M. Gavigan, and Jane Jenson, <i>The Politics of Abortion</i>.	No. 3 - 73
Edrie Sobstyl	
Sylvain Bromberger, <i>On What We Know We Don't Know</i>	No. 5 - 218
Paul K. Moser	
Vincent Brümmer, <i>Speaking of a Personal God: an essay in philosophical theology</i>.	No. 6 - 285
Gary Colwell	
John W. Burbidge, <i>Hegel on Logic and Religion</i>.	No. 2 - 80
Clark Butler	
Peter Bürger, <i>The Decline of Modernism</i>.	No. 6 - 288
Deborah Cook	
Leslie Burkholder, ed., <i>Philosophy and the Computer</i>	No. 2 - 82
Stan Godlovitch	
Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, eds., <i>Feminists Theorize the Political</i>.	No. 3 - 77
Dianne Chisholm	
Keith Campbell, Lloyd Reinhardt and John Bacon, eds., <i>Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong</i>.	No. 4 - 131
A.D. Irvine	
Peter Carruthers, <i>The Animals Issue, Moral Theory in Practice</i>	No. 4 - 140
S.F. Sapontzis	
Robert E. Carter, <i>Becoming Bamboo: Western and Eastern Explorations of the Meaning of Life</i>	No. 3 - 81
Glen T. Martin	

Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski, <i>The Computational Brain</i>	No. 4 - 142
Michael Losonsky	
William S. Cobb, trans., <i>Plato's Sophist</i>	No. 3 - 83
Voula Tsouna McKirahan	
David Cockburn, ed., <i>Human Beings</i>	No. 2 - 84
Kenneth Rankin	
David Cockburn, <i>Other Human Beings</i>	No. 6 - 291
Ken Hanly	
S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews, trans., <i>Ammonius On Aristotle's Categories</i>	No. 4 - 144
Richard Bosley	
David Copp, Bela Szabados and Rodger Beehler, eds., <i>On the Track of Reason: Essays In Honor of Kai Nielsen</i>	No. 2 - 69
H.B. McCullough	
John Cottingham, ed., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Descartes</i>	No. 4 - 146
Thomas L. Prendergast	
Tim Crane, ed., <i>The Contents of Experience:</i> <i>Essays on Perception</i>	No. 1 - 8
Brian McLaughlin and Gene Witmer	
Renato Cristi, <i>Le Libéralisme Conservateur</i>	No. 6 - 293
Hermes H. Benitez	
Benedetto Croce, <i>The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression</i> <i>and of the Linguistic in General</i>	No. 3 - 85
Myra E. Moss	
Paul Crowther, <i>Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism</i>	No. 6 - 295
Rob V. Gerwen	
Deane Curtin and Lisa Heldke eds., <i>Cooking, Eating,</i> <i>Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food</i>	No. 6 - 300
John W. Bender	
Stephen H. Cutcliffe, Steven L. Goldman, Manuel Medina and José Sanmartín, <i>New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues</i>	No. 5 - 220
Richard Deitrich	
Peter Danielson, <i>Artificial Morality:</i> <i>Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games</i>	No. 5 - 223
Paul Viminiz	
Jean De Groot, <i>Aristotle and Philoponus on Light</i>	No. 1 - 13
Donald N. Blakeley	
Gilles Deleuze, <i>Empiricism and Subjectivity:</i> <i>An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature</i>	No. 6 - 302
Brian Beakley	
Jacques Derrida, <i>Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money</i>	No. 5 - 225
Ingrid Harris	
William Desmond, <i>Beyond Hegel and Dialectic:</i> <i>Speculation, Cult, and Comedy</i>	No. 4 - 149
John W. Burbidge	
Bradley H. Dowden, <i>Logical Reasoning</i>	No. 5 - 228
Richard Reiner	
John Earman, <i>Bayes or Bust?</i>	No. 4 - 151
Patrick Maher	

Pascal Engel , <i>The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic</i>	No. 2 - 86
Norman Swartz	
Marc Ereshefsky, ed. , <i>The Units of Evolution. Essays on the Nature of Species</i>	No. 6 - 304
Suzanne Cunningham	
Rod L. Evans and Irwin M. Berent , <i>Drug Legalization: For and Against</i>	No. 2 - 89
Jonathan Schonscheck	
Jan Faye , <i>Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy</i>	No. 1 - 16
Niall Shanks	
Michael Ferejohn , <i>The Origins of Aristotelian Science</i>	No. 1 - 18
Robin Smith	
John Martin Fischer, ed. , <i>The Metaphysics of Death</i>	No. 6 - 307
André Blom	
Peter A. French, Jeffrey Nesteruk, David T. Risser , with John Abbarno , <i>Corporations in the Moral Community</i>	No. 2 - 91
Ken Hanly	
Michael Friedman , <i>Kant and the Exact Sciences</i>	No. 1 - 21
Kenneth R. Westphal	
Shaun Gallagher , <i>Hermeneutics and Education</i>	No. 5 - 230
Dieter Misgeld	
Ivan Gaskell and Salim Kemal, eds. , <i>The Language of Art History</i>	No. 3 - 96
Stephen Melville	
Yvon Gauthier , <i>La Logique interne des théories physiques</i>	No. 5 - 232
Maurice Gagnon	
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Jane Jenson, and Janine Brodie , <i>The Politics of Abortion</i>	No. 3 - 73
Edrie Sobstyl	
William Joseph Gavin , <i>William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague</i>	No. 4 - 153
Wesley E. Cooper	
Robert Gibbs , <i>Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas</i>	No. 6 - 309
Adriaan Peperzak	
Ronald N. Giere, ed. , <i>Cognitive Models of Science</i>	No. 6 - 311
Jeffrey E. Foss	
Wolfgang L. Gombocz, Christian Piller, and Johannes Brandl, eds. , <i>Metamind, Knowledge and Coherence, Essays on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer</i>	No. 3 - 71
Charles Ripley	
Lenn E. Goodman , <i>Avicenna</i>	No. 4 - 155
R.J. McLaughlin	
Steven L. Goldman, Manuel Medina, José Sanmartín and Stephen H. Cutcliffe , <i>New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues</i>	No. 5 - 220
Richard Deitrich	
Keith Graham , <i>Karl Marx Our Contemporary</i>	No. 3 - 87
Dave Baxter	
Mark L. Greenberg and Lance Schacterle, eds. , <i>Literature and Technology</i>	No. 5 - 235
Edmund F. Byrne	

A. Phillips Griffiths, ed., <i>The Impulse to Philosophise</i>	No. 4 - 158
Barry Allen	
Reinhardt Grossman, <i>The Existence of the World: an Introduction to Ontology</i>	No. 3 - 90
Fraser Cowley	
Edward C. Halper, <i>One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Central Books</i>	No. 2 - 93
Thomas M. Tuozzo	
Cornel M. Hamm, <i>Philosophical Issues in Education: An Introduction</i>	No. 2 - 96
Kevin McDonough	
Chad Hansen, <i>A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation</i>	No. 4 - 160
Richard Bosley	
James Harrington, <i>The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics</i>	No. 2 - 98
Charles Stewart-Robertson	
James Franklin Harris, ed., <i>Logic, God, and Metaphysics</i>	No. 3 - 92
T.R. Martland	
Lisa Heldke and Deane Curtin eds., <i>Cooking, Eating, Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food</i>	No. 6 - 300
John W. Bender	
Stephen Cade Hetherington, <i>Epistemology's Paradox</i>	No. 1 - 24
Anne Jaap Jacobson	
Kathleen M. Higgins and Robert C. Solomon, eds., <i>The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love</i>	No. 1 - 61
Robert Ginsberg	
Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., <i>Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment</i>	No. 1 - 26
Tony Couture	
Christopher Hookway, <i>Scepticism</i>	No. 6 - 315
H.B. McCullough	
Harro Höpfl, ed., <i>Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority</i>	No. 1 - 31
Richard J. Mouw	
David Hume, <i>Writings on Religion.</i> Antony Flew, ed.	No. 3 - 95
Kevin W. Sweeney	
Thomas Hurka, <i>Perfectionism</i>	No. 6 - 318
Paul K. Moser	
Jane Jenson, Janine Brodie, and Shelley A.M. Gavigan, <i>The Politics of Abortion</i>	No. 3 - 73
Edrie Sobstyl	
Lawrence E. Johnson, <i>Focusing on Truth</i>	No. 5 - 237
Glen Koehn	
Immanuel Kant, <i>Lectures on Logic</i>	No. 5 - 239
Robert A. Holland	
Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell, eds., <i>The Language of Art History</i>	No. 3 - 96
Stephen Melville	
Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus eds., <i>Women in Western Political Philosophy</i>	No. 3 - 99
S.M. Turner	

George Klosko , <i>The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation</i>	No. 3 - 102
Katherine Fierlbeck	
David Kolb, ed. , <i>New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion</i>	No. 4 - 163
John King-Farlow	
Arnold Koslow , <i>A Structuralist Theory of Logic</i>	No. 1 - 33
George Englebretnsen	
Julia Kristeva , <i>Strangers to Ourselves</i>	No. 1 - 35
Kelly Oliver	
Christopher B. Kulp , <i>The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectator Theory of Knowledge</i>	No. 6 - 320
C.G. Prado	
Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit , <i>Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics</i>	No. 3 - 104
Wayne J. Norman	
Mark Kulstad , <i>Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection</i>	No. 3 - 107
Amy M. Schmitter	
Paul Kurtz , <i>The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge</i>	No. 2 - 101
Leo Groarke	
Helen S. Lang , <i>Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties</i>	No. 3 - 109
Lloyd P. Gerson	
Charles D. Laughlin, Jr, John McManus and Eugene G. D'Aquili , <i>Brain, Symbol and Experience</i>	No. 5 - 241
David L. Thompson	
E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley , <i>Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture</i>	No. 1 - 38
John King-Farlow	
George Lawson , <i>Politica Sacra et Civilis</i>	No. 6 - 322
Anne K. Krook	
Donald C. Lee , <i>Toward A Sound World Order: A Multidimensional, Hierarchical Ethical Theory</i>	No. 2 - 103
Doug Simak	
G.W. Leibniz , <i>De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers 1675-1676</i>	No. 1 - 40
Catherine Wilson	
Jerrold Levinson , <i>Music, Art, & Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics</i>	No. 6 - 325
Garry Hagberg	
David MacGregor , <i>Hegel, Marx and the English State</i>	No. 5 - 247
John McMurtry	
J.E. Malpas , <i>Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning</i>	No. 4 - 165
Michael Hymers	
Gareth B. Matthews , <i>Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes</i>	No. 5 - 245
Steven L. Reynolds	
Gareth B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, trans. , <i>Ammonius On Aristotle's Categories</i>	No. 4 - 144
Richard Bosley	

Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds., <i>Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics</i>	No. 4 - 168
Margaret Gilbert	
Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, Albrecht Wellmer and Axel Honneth, eds., <i>Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment</i>	No. 1 - 26
Tony Couture	
Robert N. McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson, <i>Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture</i>	No. 1 - 38
John King-Farlow	
John McManus, Eugene G. D'Aquili and Charles D. Laughlin, Jr, Brain, Symbol and Experience	No. 5 - 241
David L. Thompson	
Ladelle McWhorter, ed., <i>Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy</i>	No. 4 - 171
Véronique M. Fóti	
Manuel Medina, José Sanmartín, Stephen H. Cutcliffe and Steven L. Goldman, <i>New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues</i>	No. 5 - 220
Richard Deitrich	
Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism	No. 4 - 173
Hans Oberdiek	
Susan Mendus and Ellen Kennedy, eds., <i>Women in Western Political Philosophy</i>	No. 3 - 99
S.M. Turner	
James Mill, Political Writings	No. 6 - 327
Brian Penrose	
Fred D. Miller, Jeffrey Paul, and Ellen Frankel Paul eds., <i>Economic Rights</i>	No. 2 - 106
Kenneth F.T. Cust	
Richard W. Miller, Moral Differences: Truth, Justice and Conscience in a World of Conflict	No. 3 - 111
Arthur Ripstein	
Kevin R. Murphy, Honesty in the Workplace	No. 5 - 251
Mike W. Martin	
Jeffrey Nesteruk, David T. Risser, John Abbarno with Peter A. French, Corporations in the Moral Community	No. 2 - 91
Ken Hanly	
Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud	No. 1 - 43
Andrew Brook	
Lutz Niethammer (in collaboration with Dirk van Laak), <i>Posthistoire: Has History come to an End?</i>	No. 4 - 176
Peter Loftson	
Doris V. Nitecki and Matthew H. Nitecki, eds., <i>History and Evolution</i>	No. 1 - 45
Paul Thompson	
Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki, eds., <i>History and Evolution</i>	No. 1 - 45
Paul Thompson	
David Novitz, The Boundaries of Art	No. 5 - 253
Ira Newman	
Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations	No. 1 - 47
Wesley E. Cooper	

Claus Offe, Albrecht Wellmer, Axel Honneth and Thomas McCarthy, eds., <i>Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment</i>	No. 1 - 26
Tony Couture	
Daniel T. O'Hara, Radical Parody: American Culture and Critical Agency after Foucault	No. 3 - 113
Deborah Cook	
Doris Olin, ed., William James: Pragmatism In Focus	No. 6 - 329
Wesley E. Cooper	
Bertell Ollman, Dialectical Investigations	No. 5 - 255
Robert Ware	
Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time	No. 4 - 179
Linda Zagzebski	
Benjamin B. Page, ed., Marxism and Spirituality: An International Anthology	No. 5 - 258
Robert C. Trundle	
Graham Parkes, ed., Nietzsche and Asian Thought	No. 6 - 332
James R. Watson	
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul eds., Economic Rights	No. 2 - 106
Kenneth F.T. Cust	
Jeffrey Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Ellen Frankel Paul eds., Economic Rights	No. 2 - 106
Kenneth F.T. Cust	
Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being	No. 2 - 108
Nicholas Denyer	
Terence Penelhum, David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System	No. 4 - 181
John Bricke	
James F. Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Project	No. 6 - 334
Kelly Dean Jolley	
Philip Pettit and Chandran Kukathas, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics	No. 3 - 104
Wayne J. Norman	
Christian Piller, Johannes Brandl, and Wolfgang L. Gombocz, eds., Metamind, Knowledge and Coherence, Essays on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer	No. 3 - 71
Charles Ripley	
Edward Pols, Radical Realism, Direct Knowing in Science and Philosophy	No. 2 - 111
Lois Pineau	
Lloyd Reinhardt, John Bacon and Keith Campbell, eds., Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong	No. 4 - 131
A.D. Irvine	
Nicholas Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume II: The Validity of Values	No. 6 - 336
Mark Vorobej	
Norvin Richards, Humility	No. 1 - 50
Eamonn Callan	

David T. Risser, John Abbarno, Peter A. French with Jeffrey Nesteruk, <i>Corporations in the Moral Community</i>	No. 2 - 91
Ken Hanly	
Ladislav Robert, <i>Les Horloges biologiques</i>	No. 5 - 260
Yves Laberge	
Julian Roberts, <i>The Logic of Reflection</i>	No. 2 - 113
Michael Hymers	
William S. Robinson, <i>Computers, Minds & Robots</i>	No. 2 - 116
Stan Godlovitch	
Steven C. Rockefeller, <i>John Dewey, Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism</i>	No. 1 - 52
Andrew J. Reck	
Tom Rockmore and Beth Singer, eds., <i>Antifoundationalism Old and New</i>	No. 5 - 261
Walter Watson	
Bernard E. Rollin, <i>Animal Rights and Human Morality</i>	No. 1 - 54
Doug Simak	
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., <i>Essays on Aristotle's Poetics</i>	No. 2 - 118
David Konstan	
Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, eds., <i>Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered</i>	No. 4 - 184
Alexander von Schoenborn	
William L. Rowe, <i>Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction</i>, 2nd ed. . .	No. 6 - 339
D.M. Procida	
John Sallis, ed., <i>Reading Heidegger: Commemorations</i>	No. 5 - 263
Thomas A. Fay	
José Sanmartín, Stephen H. Cutcliffe, Steven L. Goldman, and Manuel Medina, <i>New Worlds, New Technologies, New Issues</i>	No. 5 - 220
Richard Deitrich	
Lance Schacterle and Mark L. Greenberg, eds., <i>Literature and Technology</i>	No. 5 - 235
Edmund F. Byrne	
Thomas J. Scheff, <i>Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure</i>	No. 4 - 186
Steve Fuller	
J.B. Schneewind, ed., <i>Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. An Anthology</i>	No. 4 - 189
Craig Walton	
Ferdinand Schoeman, <i>Privacy and Social Freedom</i>	No. 3 - 116
Larry May	
David E. Schrader, <i>The Corporation as Anomaly</i>	No. 6 - 341
L.B. Cebik	
Joachim Schulte, <i>Wittgenstein: An Introduction</i>, Trans. William Brenner and John F. Holley	No. 4 - 191
Jan Zwicky	
Joachim Schulte and Göran Sundholm, eds., <i>Criss-Crossing a Philosophical Landscape</i>	No. 5 - 266
Nicholas Gier	
Joan W. Scott and Judith Butler, eds., <i>Feminists Theorize the Political</i>	No. 3 - 77
Dianne Chisholm	

John R. Searle , <i>The Rediscovery of the Mind</i>	No. 1 - 56
Stewart Nicolson	
Terrence J. Sejnowski and Patricia S. Churchland , <i>The Computational Brain</i>	No. 4 - 142
Michael Losonsky	
Percy Bysshe Shelley , <i>The Necessity of Atheism and Other Essays</i> . .	No. 4 - 195
Elmer John Thiessen	
Susan Sherwin , <i>No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care</i>	No. 5 - 268
Christine Harrison	
Roger Shiner , <i>Norm and Nature</i>	No. 6 - 343
Brenda M. Baker	
Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry, Jr., eds. , <i>Texts and Dialogues: Maurice Merleau-Ponty</i>	No. 1 - 59
Wayne J. Froman	
Stuart Sim , <i>Beyond Aesthetics: Confrontations with Poststructuralism and Postmodernism</i>	No. 2 - 121
Gregg M. Horowitz	
A. John Simmons , <i>The Lockean Theory of Rights</i>	No. 3 - 118
Peter A. Schouls	
Beth Singer and Tom Rockmore, eds. , <i>Antifoundationalism Old and New</i>	No. 5 - 261
Walter Watson	
Georges E. Sioui , <i>For an American Autohistory: an Essay on the Foundations of a Social Ethic</i>	No. 4 - 197
Tom Pocklington	
François Sirois , <i>Les Névroses</i>	No. 5 - 270
Yves Laberge	
Lawrence Sklar , <i>Philosophy of Physics</i>	No. 5 - 271
W.D. Sharp	
Tony Smith , <i>Dialectical Social Theory and its Critics</i>	No. 6 - 346
Ulf Nilsson	
Francis Snare , <i>The Nature of Moral Thinking</i>	No. 3 - 120
Phil Gosselin	
Elliott Sober , <i>Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference</i>	No. 3 - 122
Marc Ereshefsky	
Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds. , <i>The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love</i>	No. 1 - 61
Robert Ginsberg	
John B. Stewart , <i>Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy</i>	No. 2 - 123
Marie A. Martin	
Göran Sundholm and Joachim Schulte, eds. , <i>Criss-Crossing a Philosophical Landscape</i>	No. 5 - 266
Nicholas Gier	
Christine Swanton , <i>Freedom: A Coherence Theory</i>	No. 4 - 200
Lawrence Haworth	
Richard Swinburne , <i>Revelation</i>	No. 3 - 124
Murdith McLean	
Bela Szabados, Rodger Beehler and David Copp, eds. , <i>On the Track of Reason: Essays In Honor of Kai Nielsen</i>	No. 2 - 69
H.B. McCullough	

Paul Thom , <i>For An Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts</i>	No. 5 - 274
Thom Heyd	
A.S. Troelstra , <i>Lectures on Linear Logic</i>	No. 3 - 126
Alasdair Urquhart	
Yusuf K. Umar, ed. , <i>George Grant and the Future of Canada</i>	No. 2 - 125
Elizabeth Trott	
J.O. Urmson, trans. , <i>Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5, 10-14</i>	No. 5 - 277
Paul T. Keyser	
Gregory Vlastos , <i>Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher</i>	No. 2 - 128
Carol A. Mickett	
Douglas Walton , <i>The Place Of Emotion in Argument</i>	No. 4 - 203
Doug Simak	
Martin Warner, ed. , <i>Religion and Philosophy</i>	No. 1 - 63
Donald Wiebe	
Albrecht Wellmer, Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy and Claus Offe, eds. , <i>Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment</i>	No. 1 - 26
Tony Couture	
Stephen A. White , <i>Sovereign Virtue</i>	No. 5 - 279
McKee G. Lee	
Elizabeth Wolgast , <i>Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations</i>	No. 2 - 130
Roger A. Shiner	
Richard Wolin , <i>The Terms of Cultural Criticism. The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism</i>	No. 1 - 26
Tony Couture	
Michael Wreen and Philip J. Rossi, eds. , <i>Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered</i>	No. 4 - 184
Alexander von Schoenborn	

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W.E. Cooper