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# Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550
[illegible]

ISSN 0228-491X


Published six times a year

**Volume XII, No. 4**
**August • août 1992**

# Table of Contents • Table des matières



Mailed in October 1992.

**Robert Almeder**
*Blind Realism: An Essay on Human Knowledge and Natural Science.*
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1992. Pp. xii + 247.
US $47.50. ISBN 0-8476-7709-5.

Almeder thinks that we have knowledge only if what we know is true but that truth is not correspondence. He thinks that there is a world and that sometimes our knowledge corresponds with the way the world actually is, but not in virtue of the truth connection. So he is a realist who denies a correspondence theory of truth. His realism is blind, in the sense that he does not think we can tell when our knowledge corresponds with reality. And his realism is utopian, in the sense that he thinks that science, if pursued indefinitely, would produce final answers to all interesting questions about the world.

His arguments are clear, well-informed, provocative, and deserve consideration, especially by realists who are committed to truth as correspondence. Moreover, in the course of developing his arguments, he has helpful things to say in favour of basic knowledge and the dependence of our nonbasic knowledge on our being able to justify a belief. Antifoundationalists and reliabilists will find useful challenges in this part of his position. He also has a good discussion of how his theory provides a solution to Gettier problems.

He argues against a correspondence theory by utilizing the premise that all attainable knowledge is corrigible. Knowledge entails truth. So he thinks that, if what we know may be falsified by new developments, the truth of what we know must consist in our belief's being authorized by current acceptance rules, where our belief may cease to be authorized by future and more adequate rules. The upshot is that what is true at one time might turn out to be false at a later time because of a change in acceptance rules, even though the world has not changed. And then truth is not correspondence.

The problem with the argument as it stands is that a correspondence theorist can reply that, whereas the truth of what we now know is correspondence, the possibility of our belief's being 'falsified' is the possibility that new developments will defeat our justification for holding the belief, not the possibility that what is now true will later be false. This dictates the concession that we may not know what we think we know. But it does not dictate the concession that, even though we now know something, it may later be false. Either we know it now and it will remain true, or it will turn out to be false and we do not really know it now.

Almeder anticipates this reply by arguing that a belief cannot be completely justified (i.e., justified at a level required for knowledge) unless the belief is true. The corrigibility of knowledge implies the possibility that a belief that is now completely justified will cease to be completely justified. And we can take this notion one step further and hold that corrigibility also implies the possibility that a completely justified belief can become a belief

the contrary of which is completely justified. In that case, we get the result that a true belief can become a belief the contrary of which is true; i.e., truth can become falsity, independently of any change in the world. To avoid this result, a correspondence theorist must deny that complete justification entails truth. And the task can be surprisingly difficult. I won't try to engage Almeder on that issue here. But anyone interested in the issue is well-advised to examine this part of his defence carefully.

The argument for realism is basically that the truth of our beliefs, and especially the truth of our scientific beliefs, is best explained by the hypothesis that truths that survive inquiry over a long period of time correspond to the way the world is. He considers a number of competing explanations but pays little attention to the possibility of a theological explanation. Since he agrees that a realist explanation is not a scientific explanation but rather an explanation of scientific success, he cannot rule out a theological explanation on the ground that it is unnatural. And, since existing attempts (e.g., by Laurence Bon Jour and Paul Moser) to rule out unnatural explanations of our internal epistemic life are not entirely satisfactory, one should normally expect more discussion of such an option.

The argument for blindness is that we have no basis for picking out which of our true beliefs will definitely survive further inquiry. Whatever description we offer of a subset of our true beliefs, some beliefs of that description have turned out to be false. So we have no criterion for selection. Almeder seems to be on pretty firm ground here. He can even avoid preface-paradox difficulties by pointing out that, although some members of the set of beliefs that we individually take to be true will be falsified, they are not, at the time, false. So he does not have to admit that our continuing to hold the beliefs while conceding our fallibility generates an inconsistency, much less admit that his philosophical account involves an inconsistency.

The argument for an eventual utopia relies heavily on the premise that the number of interesting questions about the world is finite, in the sense that they would all be answered in an indefinitely long investigative process. That may be so. But the issue is not simply whether answers to all our questions would be found. It is whether *final* answers would be found, in the sense of answers that at the time would not be open to subsequent refutation. And Almeder's own case for keeping realism blind seems to be equally a case for thinking that things will *never* change so radically that the empirical basis of the argument for human fallibility will disappear. So his own concession of protracted blindness seems to work against his notion of a real utopia.

**Douglas Odegard**
University of Guelph

**Seth Benardete**
*The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991.
Pp. 205.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-226-04240-5.

In *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy*, Seth Benardete puts together, following Platonic clues, what the dialogues keep apart: the exposition of erotic rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* and that of punitive rhetoric in the *Gorgias*. If rhetoric is an 'art of leading souls through speeches,' to understand it is to know what it is in the human soul which is susceptible to such an operation. Plato chose to address this question by means of two dialogues; yet rhetoric does not appear to belong essentially to either the experience of *eros* presented in the one or the strict moralism of the other. In dispelling that appearance, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy* shows why rhetoric requires a double treatment and at the same time why, in its integral connection with indignation against injustice, on the one hand, *eros* of the beautiful, on the other, it is a privileged path to disclose 'the problematic unity of a Platonic psychology' (2).

In each dialogue Benardete discovers a 'template' out of which to unfold the structure, and with that the argument, of the work as a whole: in the *Phaedrus* it is Socrates' image of the chariot-team of wing-growing black horse, white horse, and charioteer, in the *Gorgias* his eight-fold schematism of the arts presiding over body and soul and the parts of 'flattery' shadowing them. The *Phaedrus*' chariot-team depicts the structure of the soul as determined by the experience of *eros* and, in doing so, models the relations among the three love speeches, the last of which contains it; rhetoric, though at work all along, is taken up for examination only in the sober second half of the dialogue. The *Gorgias*' schematism, by contrast, has as its explicit subject 'so-called rhetoric,' identified as the phantom image of justice; what this means is exhibited in the sequence of three interlocuters who mirror, at increasing degrees of distortion, the Socratic understanding of justice, and the human soul which comes to light indirectly, through that distortion, is one which has the will to punish as its core. Behind the apparently fixed structure which is the key to each dialogue Benardete uncovers what might be called the 'metamorphoses' by which it is generated: a relation between individuals gets transposed into one between parts of a single self, which in turn prove to be, not independent and equiprimordial, but one a fictional production through the other's projection. This formal dynamic takes on two distinctive shapes as the work of erotic rhetoric and punitive rhetoric.

The lover, awe-struck by the sight of his beloved, is reminded of the beautiful itself which he glimpsed, among the hyperuranian beings, in a momentary ascent following in the tracks of the Olympian god whom he emulates; translating that vision into speech, the lover beautifies himself by holding up a mirror to the beloved as he perceives him in the image of their common paradigmatic god. This spoken image is precisely the white horse of

the psychic chariot-team, which thus shows itself to be nothing but a beautification the snub-nosed black horse has split off from himself, hoping to attract the beloved to him in unwitting self-motion; his own insistent motion forward toward the beloved is that which makes the charioteer deviate from the straight path, but that without which no growth of wing, hence no motion upward toward the beings, would ever be possible. The erotic experience, in its double motion, has been transformed by Socrates alone into an art; his first speech, which moves Phaedrus through the voice of a lover disguised as non-lover, is an unyoked white horse, whose appearance changes when inserted by the black horse into the second speech, of which it is shown to be a part. The *Phaedrus*' own instantation of the chariot image makes it the 'passkey' for every dialogue: Plato's written work, like a living animal whose members are arranged in perfect order, is a beautified white horse monstrously yoked to the defective black horse of Socratic knowledge of ignorance.

While 'the spell of the city is broken by *eros*' (152), it haunts Gorgianic rhetoric, whose end is freedom and enslavement of others, not the soul's ascent to the hyperuranian beings. Gorgias dreams of the omnipotence of the rhetorical art, while calling for the execution of its abuser, whose art cannot protect him; Callicles, embodiment of the imperial city, indulges in a fantasy of desire unrestrained by conventional justice, while railing at Socrates' inability to defend himself. What links them is Polus' transformation of the rhetorician into the tyrant, whose presumed injustice arouses Polus' indignation and presumed happiness his envy. These assumptions, which rhetoric must adopt when it appeals to the nobility of punishing the unjust while gratifying the envious punisher, are unacceptable to Socrates, who is too aware of the invisible 'inside' of the soul. His strategy is to turn the will to punish against itself by assigning to rhetoric the role of self-denunciation; its goal would be to effect, through blind submission, a certain political moderation, and its tool the fiction of a more noble self, as the agent which could get the pleasure of punishing, split off from a worse, as the patient which should derive the benefit. Callicles, whose resistance leaves Socrates talking to himself, seems to be the failed test case.

Benardete's reading of the *Gorgias* radically overturns received opinion: the moral fervor of the dialogue, in which the tradition finds *the* portrait of Socrates the moralist, belongs rather to rhetoric as phantom image, which operates on and through the vindictiveness of the will. The moral idealism cast on this ghostly mirror is as distorting an image of Socratic self-knowledge as the *Republic*'s city in speech, ruled by the philosopher-king, is of the dialogic city which joins Socrates with his interlocuters. 'The rhetoric of philosophy,' on the other hand, is not one side but the whole of such a double structure, hence, as the title of this book may suggest, not other than philosophy itself; it is precisely that paradoxical erotic art Socrates claims to possess, by which the philosopher yokes himself to the non-philosopher in the hope of shared ascent, and therefore, while at work in the *Gorgias* and perhaps every Platonic dialogue, is thematic only in the *Phaedrus*.

This bare sketch of the argument of *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy* as I understand it cannot indicate the book's rich texture and fluidity of thought, sensitivity to the nuances of Greek, originality, and difficulty. Benardete's work is the sort which opens itself up by degrees; it requires and rewards moving from commentary to dialogue and back again, and from one dialogue with its commentary to another — from the *Gorgias*, for example, to Benardete's reading of the *Republic*, in *Socrates' Second Sailing* (Chicago 1989). The *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* are linked in particular to another pair: the Platonic psychology they jointly express has its prefiguration, Benardete suggests, in the Olympian gods, who are appealed to for justice and admired as perfect beings, hence they should have their 'theological counterparts' in the *Protagoras*, set in a Homeric Hades, and the *Symposium*, devoted to praise of Eros. 'The Gods of the Poets', Benardete's proposed study of those dialogues, will be eagerly awaited by appreciative readers of *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy*.

**Ronna Burger**
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**Murray Bookchin** and **Dave Foreman**
*Defending the Earth.*
Montreal: Black Rose Books 1991. Pp. 147.
Cdn $31.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-921689-89-6);
Cdn $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-921689-88-8).

This book is based upon a debate between the social ecologist Murray Bookchin and the deep ecologist Dave Foreman. The debate was organized by Learning Alliance, a New York based alternative education and action organization, and took place in 1989. Several figures play a minor role. Linda Davidoff, executive director of New York City's Park Council, presents a reformist view critical of the radicalism of both main participants; and Jim Haughton, a leader of a black community group in Harlem, raises the thorny issue of racism in the ecology movement. Paul McIsaac, a reporter for National Public Radio, questions the major participants as to their views on the role of the radical left tradition in the ecology movement. There is an introductory essay by Steve Chase, who edited the debate, and a final set of two essays in which both Foreman and Bookchin set forth their more recent positions on the issues raised.

Both Bookchin and Foreman belong to the radical 'dark green' environmental groups rather than the reformist 'light green movement' (7). Among

the former group, Arne Naess, who introduced the term 'deep ecology' is one of the best known figures. In a very wide sense 'deep ecologists' are those who at least share the following views: i) that the natural world has an intrinsic value of its own — not merely instrumental value; ii) that industrial society's attempted domination of the biosphere must be stopped; iii) that society must be radically restructured along ecological lines (8). By the mid-1980s 'deep ecology' tended to be used in a more restricted sense to stand for a set of ideas developed by Naess, Warwick Fox, George Sessions and Bill Devall and carried out in action by a number of militant activists associated with the journal *Earth First* including Dave Foreman. It is these latter activists that draw the ire of mainline media commentators who seem to delight in assigning to them emotively negative terms such as 'eco-terrorists'. Foreman seems to enjoy the notoriety. One of his books is sub-titled *A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching*, another is titled *Confessions of an Eco-Brute*.

While criticism from mainstream media was regarded by the deep ecology activists as to be expected, they were stunned and angered by Bookchin's keynote address in 1987 at the second National Green Gathering in Amherst Mass. Bookchin suggested that deep ecology had potentialities for anti-social and anti-human development, some of which seemed on the point of being actualized. Bookchin claimed that his own social ecological viewpoint was not consistent with this developing deep ecology. This set the stage for heated rancorous debates between deep ecologists such as Foreman and social ecologists such as Bookchin. Ed Abbey declared that Bookchin was a 'fat old lady' and that he did not care if this sounded sexist! Bookchin remarked that the leading lights at *Earth First*, which included Dave Foreman, were 'barely disguised racists, survivalists, macho Daniel Boones, and outright social reactionaries' (11). With this degree of flaming preceding the debate one might expect that the event itself would turn into an environmental version of a World Wrestling Federation match. Fortunately, this is not the case. Although Bookchin and Foreman disagree upon many issues, they usually show considerable respect for each other's opinions and both remain united against attempts by the powers that be to co-opt or blunt the effect of the radical environmental movement.

Perhaps the main point of disagreement between Bookchin and Foreman is on the importance that each places on social structure as a cause of the destruction of the earth and its biological resources. Foreman takes what Bookchin calls a 'biocentric' position which tends to blame 'humanity' in general for ecological problems without a proper understanding or analysis of the social structures involved. As a result deep ecologists have often made statements which reflect no sympathy at all for the worst off and wretched of this world. Bookchin notes that Foreman had once said, 'the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid — the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve' (124).

Dave Foreman apologizes for his remarks about Ethiopia, and agrees that Bookchin was correct in his criticism. Nevertheless, it is clear that Foreman still considers the preservation of wilderness and biodiversity against the

predatory acts of the human species the first order of business. Foreman claims that the pressures of population growth upon earth's resources are a problem which probably cannot be solved simply by a more equitable distribution of resources or more advanced techniques of exploitation. Certainly, the old Marxist idea of a post-capitalist society where scarcity is abolished through greater production seems naive. This hardly suffices, however, to blunt Bookchin's basic argument that many deep ecologists lack a coherent analysis of the socio-economic causes of ecological problems and as a result may ally themselves with or be themselves a primarily reactionary social force.

This book would provide excellent collateral reading in courses on environmental ethics or related areas. I highly commend it.

**Ken Hanly**
Brandon University

**J. Alberto Coffa**
*The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap; To the Vienna Station.*
Edited by Linda Wessels.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 445.
US $49.50. ISBN 0-521-37429-4.

J. Alberto Coffa died late in 1984. He was almost finished with this book, needing to complete editorial work, which has been finished by Linda Wessels, and a final concluding chapter, which we must do without. The book is a history of what Coffa dubs the 'semantic tradition' in Philosophy beginning with Bolzano (chapter 2) and continuing through Brentano, Meinong and on through early analytic philosophy with Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein and finally the early years of the Vienna Circle.

Coffa begins with an account of Kant's notion of *a priori* synthetic truths (chapter 1) establishing several themes that run through the book. He argues that Kant was only one of a long series of philosophers who ignored contextual and holistic sources of meaning and saw conceptual analysis as the only source of analytic truth. Kant was led from seeing that the trivial inclusion of one concept in another could not ground our knowledge of mathematics and science to look to intuition and beyond meaning for a proper account of that knowledge. Coffa's subsequent semantic tradition is motivated by the self-conscious goal of rejecting Kant's view of the role of intuition, as well as

an unconscious movement toward a holistic theory of meaning. The logicists Frege and Russell attacked the claim that intuition is needed in arithmetic, while much of the rest of the semantic tradition — Helmholtz and the early Reichenbach and Carnap — were reacting to Kant's views on geometry, first in relation to non-Euclidean geometry (chapter 3), but also later in relation to relativity theory. All were motivated by reaction to the notion that intuition and not meaning is the source of the supposedly *a priori* synthetic. They differed, however, on the extent to which meaning is determined by systems of axioms as opposed to the atomistic composition of concepts. Another of Coffa's organizing themes is that Kantian philosophers, and later Russell and even the early Carnap, were given to an idealist conflation of mental acts, or ideas and their contents, which had been sharply distinguished early on by Bolzano and then later by Frege. Thus even Russell, who is famous for this very criticism of idealism is derided for his sense data, for Coffa nothing more than 'reified experience'.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide a quick but reliable survey of Frege's philosophy, putting emphasis on the context principle as an indication of the correct way of viewing meanings as a rich source of analytic truths. He champions Frege's semantic 'dualism' with its sense and reference against Russell's regressive monism. With his discussion of Frege, Hilbert, Russell and the early Wittgenstein (the rest of part I), Coffa establishes his place in the recent development of 'early analytic philosophy' as an independent subject. Some of his views on Frege and Russell have been surpassed by the large recent literature on both but Coffa's work stands alone as a systematic overview of this period, and, crucially, its relations to the later logical positivism.

It is Part II 'Vienna 1925-35' (chapters 9 to 19) that breaks new ground. First Coffa devotes chapters to Schlick (9), Reichenbach (10) and Carnap (11) before Vienna, which stress the influence of Kant's philosophy on the origins of the movement. Reichenbach's early *The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge* (1920) is presented as an extended analysis of Kant's philosophy of space in the light of relativity theory. Carnap's '*Aufbau*', (*The Logical Structure of the World*) is presented as a straightforwardly idealist and Kantian work, aiming at a theory of the 'constitution' of objects from the reified experience of Russell (chapter 12). It is useful just to remind us that these works preceded the genuine beginning of what we know as the Vienna Circle. This way of seeing the *Aufbau* is illuminating, and also suggestive for the interpretation of Goodman's subsequent *The Structure of Appearance* and his more recent anti-realist philosophy. Coffa makes several allusions to anti-realism which might have been developed in the concluding chapter that was to have discussed the moral of the story.

This view of the great positivists before Vienna is one of the distinguishing features of this book. A second is the original work that Coffa did in trying to establish what it was that the Vienna Circle learned from its extensive discussions with Wittgenstein which extended from 1927 to 1932 (chapters 13 and 14). Coffa suggests that while nominally discussing the *Tractatus*, the content of the talks were Wittgenstein's 'middle' views, in particular views

about logic and meaning as syntactic rules that were to have a tremendous influence on the circle. This leads to Coffa's careful reading (chapters 15 and 16) of Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language (LSL)*, seeing it not as a shallow anti-metaphysical tract as it is so often portrayed, but rather, as a representation of the richer views about language rules and use that were beginning to dominate Wittgenstein's thought. *LSL* invokes the notion of logical form from the *Tractatus*, as well as precursors of the later Wittgenstein's notion of meaning rules. This would seem to be the culmination of the account of analytic truth in the semantic tradition, a notion of the rules of syntax which seems 'contingent from the outside, but necessary from the inside'. Quine's later attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction and truth by convention would seem to have been long anticipated by Carnap and Wittgenstein. Coffa also finds an account of truth in (*LSL*) which contains the elements of Tarski's semantic conception, showing just how close Carnap was to getting the notion himself, and thereby explaining the reason why Carnap so quickly realized the import of what Tarski had done.

Coffa makes the familiar distinction within the Vienna Circle between the empiricist wing including Reichenbach and Neurath and the logicians' side, including Carnap and Schlick. He presents the empiricists as combining the idealist's confusion of the contents and justification of beliefs with a Kantian transcendental approach to epistemology, seeing philosophy as presented with successful scientific knowledge, and having only to make inferences about the world that explain how that success is possible. Coffa clearly favors the logicians' side with its view that one can find an independent subject matter for philosophy in logic and semantics, and judge the epistemological status of science. The final chapters (17 to 19) are devoted to the issue of the problem of induction, favoring Popper over both his fellow empiricist Reichenbach and Carnap, whose notorious 'principle of tolerance' is one of the main targets of Coffa's acid sarcasm throughout this book. Coffa finds no heroes in this story (except perhaps Frege), but rather presents a refreshingly whiggish history full of anticipations of later developments, but also a great deal of regression and advances that were repeatedly lost.

This is an important book. It sets a standard for discussions of early analytic philosophy, sets the problems for the emerging subject of the history of Positivism and it makes a strong claim for the place of the 'semantic' tradition as an equal to Kantianism and Positivism in 19th-century philosophy and as the direct ancestor of Analytic philosophy. Coffa demonstrates the richness of the views of the Vienna Circle, and a continuity with earlier neo-Kantian philosophy, that should put to rest the caricature of Positivists as attacking a tradition they did not understand. This is all done with carefully crafted and argued discussions of the relevant philosophers, and presented with a lively, if searing, wit.

**Bernard Linsky**
University of Alberta

**John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch** and **Anthony Kenny**
*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III: The Correspondence.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xviii + 412.
US $65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-40323-5);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42350-3).

This volume completes the recent Cambridge edition of the complete collection of Descartes' philosophical works, already known simply as CSM (Vols. I & II, 1985). The importance of this translation and the significance of its contribution to Cartesian scholarship after so many years of dependence on the old Haldane and Ross translation can hardly be overstated, and has already been widely recognized. An enormous amount of work has been done on Descartes' philosophy since the H & R version appeared in 1911. Individual translations have appeared since then and have undoubtedly overcome some of the misconceptions which H & R embodied (or spawned). But a complete revision and coordination of the entire set was vitally needed.

The contribution of the present volume to this project is that it provides all of the previously translated correspondence which had been provided by Kenny in his separate work (*Descartes: Philosophical Letters* [Oxford 1970]) and adds a great deal more. In addition, the editors have been careful to correct or improve the Kenny translations where necessary. The result is therefore a significant improvement over the earlier version. Not only is the additional material very helpful in clarifying aspects of Descartes' thought; the revisions to earlier translations have provided the much needed precision in the usage of related terms such as 'perception' and 'conception'. In addition, Descartes' original diagrams and illustrations have now been included in the text. All in all, then, the editors are to be thanked for work well done.

Nonetheless, as one might expect, there are still problems. In some cases the effect of inaccurate translations is not really very important. For example, during the last twenty years students have been reading in Kenny's translation that something is known 'by the senses' (*par les sens*) (77). Obviously Descartes would insist that nothing is known by the senses, and it would have been better if the new version had substituted 'through the senses'. This is especially curious since a corresponding Latin phrase *was* corrected (64, n.1). But a problem of this sort is not likely to lead anyone seriously astray.

There are more serious problems, however. In another letter, Descartes discusses the intuitive awareness which we will have of God after death. In assuring his correspondent that such awareness is possible, he continues: 'Why, even in this body the senses give it such knowledge of corporeal and sensible things, and our soul has already some direct knowledge of [*de*] the beneficence of its creator without which it would not be capable of reasoning' (33). The point here is subtle. Descartes *does* often insist that a benevolent

God would not deceive us, and that without knowledge that God *is* benevolent it would be impossible for us to know anything else with certainty. But that is not the point at issue here. What is at stake, rather, is the third class of simple natures listed in Rule XII of the *Regulae* (CSM, I 45): the *vinculae* or links which connect other simple natures together, and whose evidence supports 'all the rational inferences we make.' This is obviously the knowledge to which Descartes is referring, and it is not knowledge *of*, but *from* the beneficence of its creator that the soul has received. This point is petty, but important.

Finally, there is the problem of the term '*mathesis*'. At least since the work of Jean-Luc Marion (*Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes*, 1978), it has been recognized that Descartes does not simply use this term to convey 'mathematics'. After all, he often uses the term 'mathematics' in both its French and Latin forms. When he uses another, quite special term, he obviously intends to convey something different. This point is recognized in the earlier volumes of CSM, at least in the translation of the *Regulae*. There (CSM, I 19) a footnote is added to indicate that Descartes is actually employing a Greek term, and in a second instance '*mathesis universalis*' is simply included in the text. In the present volume, however, the term is consistently translated as 'mathematics', both in Letter 821 (144-5), and in the *Conversation with Burman* (350-2). At very least this renders the translation inconsistent; at worst, it blurs a distinction which has been the object of considerable commentary over the last fifteen years. In spite of these problems, however, Volume III of CSM is a most welcome addition to our English-language resources. Students, especially, will be pleased to have a more complete version of Descartes' work.

**Frederick P. Van De Pitte**
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**Michael Detlefsen, ed.**
*Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics.*
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1992. Pp. x + 256.
Cdn $65.50: US $52.50. ISBN 0-415-06805-3.

This is a heterogeneous collection of eight articles all of which touch in some way on the topics of the title. Only one of the articles, that written by the editor, has been previously published. The editor provides a short preface (largely a summary of the articles), in which he argues unconvincingly that

the collection has some higher unity than appears to the casual reader. Nevertheless, some themes common to most of the authors do emerge; in particular most of them are anti-foundationalist.

Michael Resnik defends his structuralist view of mathematics against objections derived from the causal theory of knowledge, by providing a little fable about primitive people arranging pebbles in rows. According to Resnik, mathematical objects are positions in patterns (17); the causal problem is evaded by making mathematical learning dependent on 'templates' which are instances of patterns. William Tait argues in an interesting and provocative paper for a structural conception of *a priori* truth which he attributes to Plato and Leibniz, and against what he takes to be Kant's corruption of this idea. Tait's vigorous attack (61) on Kant's argument for the *a priori* nature of applied geometry is a salutary antidote to the current revival of Kant worship. Steven Wagner gives a defence of his own version of logicism, and provides a sketchy account of a sort of transcendental deduction intended to show that any rational beings would have to develop versions of arithmetic and set theory. His argument that arithmetic and set theory are rationally necessary (101-3) is very vague. Shelley Stillwell examines Wittgenstein's distinction between proofs and experiments; she defends Shanker's suggestion that the distinction rests on logical features of proofs. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer argues against Kant and Lorenzen that any justification of Euclidean geometry must rest on experience; our knowledge of space comes from our empirical knowledge of moving bodies from one place to another. Mark Steiner examines the scandalously unrigorous 'mathematics' employed by modern physicists. Stewart Shapiro tells us we can live well without foundationalism in logic and mathematics, and argues that we can live without completeness in logic, too. Detlefsen attempts to find in Brouwer ideas which validate Poincaré's claim that mathematical inference is not just logical inference; he stresses the autonomy of mathematical reasoning rather than the solipsism often attributed to Brouwer.

It is disappointing how few of the authors in the collection make use of the immense quantity of data for a theory of proofs which is provided by mathematical practice. Instead, we are treated to hackneyed examples familiar from other philosophical writers, science fiction stories about 'Galaxian' mathematicians (88), and sentences like: 'Imagine two cognitive agents M and L' (210). An exception is provided by the excellent and witty essay of Steiner, which points out to philosophers the genuine problem of how physicists can obtain such wonderful results by totally unjustified formal manipulations. This essay is a little gem, which illuminates an area which should be the object of more foundational studies.

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**Wendy Donner**
*The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy.*
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991.
Pp. x + 229.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2629-4);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9987-9).

For Donner, 'Mill's most fundamental commitment ... is the promotion of human self-development and the happiness involved in the development and exercise of our higher human faculties' (3). Thus she argues that the good is logically prior to the right for Mill, and she emphasizes both the centrality of self-development in Mill's thought and the importance of the social conditions under which it may proceed.

Much of the book's first half is devoted to discussion of Mill's qualitative hedonism. Mill rejects intuitionism because its principles, supposedly self-evident, are grounded on no rational foundation, whereas the principle of utility is based on the empirical existence of pleasures and pains. Moreover, intuitionist theories tend to defy the status quo, whereas utilitarianism emphasizes development through its use of the preferences of competent agents in making judgments. Both quantity and quality are good-making characteristics of pleasurable experiences. But for Mill, the latter are complex mental states when we associate present experiences with past ideas and feelings, and these relational properties create part of the value of current pleasurable experiences. Donner concludes that Mill's complex qualitative hedonism stands up well to either mental-state accounts or desire-satisfaction accounts of the nature of utility.

As a transition to Mill's theory of self-development, Donner analogizes between his views on the good-making characteristics of pleasurable experiences and the sensory evaluation of wines. In the latter, there are both phenomenal, good-making characteristics, and also a set of interpersonal standards applied by judges trained to pick out these characteristics. For Mill, although standards teach discrimination among pleasurable experiences, these 'standards are not "out there" in the universe but rather depend ultimately on the potential of human nature' (91), which includes the ability to be critical and thus to change and improve current standards. This ability in turn requires education or cultivation, grounded in affective development which is conducive to appreciation and pleasure, intellectual development which promotes independent judgment, and moral development whose goal is 'to train individuals to take enjoyment in the good of others' (115). Happiness requires the use and fulfillment of the generic human faculties or capacities in human nature, based both on individuality, or 'the process by which each person discovers his or her own unique mix of generic capacities, talents, and abilities,' and on autonomy, which 'is concerned with the critical reflection, choice, and endorsement of character, projects and pursuits in harmony with one's nature' (120). Since people do tend to choose to develop

and exercise their capacities, Mill 'is not a neutralist' but holds that 'the proper role of the state in this regard is to see that all citizens have an opportunity to develop their generic human capacities' (126). Neither is Mill an elitist who holds that the more developed may impose their choices on others. Mill's utilitarianism, rather, is rights-based, including the basic right to liberty of self-development (129). His 'qualitative hedonism is a developmental theory of the good ... rooted in his substantive conception of the nature of humans as beings with higher faculties who seek to grow and expand these faculties' (139).

The remainder of the book is devoted to linkages Donner perceives between Mill's commitment to liberty and development, on the one hand, and his conception of utility and principles of the good, on the other. First, although for Mill 'more valuable experiences are those that are preferred by agents competent to adjudicate' (142), he believes almost everyone may attain developed status. Since 'a necessary component of the most valuable satisfactions, or a factor that raises the value of a satisfaction, is its character of being freely chosen by a person of developed abilities' (158), utility is maximized when the largest possible number of people attain developed status, and thus his utilitarianism is egalitarian. Second, even undeveloped individuals have prior moral status as rights-holders and thus a right to liberty of self-development. Since Millian rights are socially embedded or effective only in a social context, 'their social setting dictates that their protection involve institutional arrangements, so that even those rights traditionally conceived of as negative ... necessitate positive actions to set up the machinery of protection' (175). Finally, Mill's harm principle is too simplistically interpreted when utilized to restrict liberty only when conduct *causes* harm; rather, under its rubric liberty may be restricted to *prevent* harm to others, as is the case when institutional arrangements are necessary for adequate rights protection. In her last chapter, Donner concludes that given his egalitarian principles, Mill was unduly pessimistic about the tendency of universal suffrage to promote majority tyranny, but 'unduly optimistic about the prospects for success of full economic democracy' (214). In the end, 'his basic theory is sound, and the flaw is located in the unsound application of his principles' (207).

Donner's book represents a fine integration of Mill's moral and political philosophy, although not all will agree with her conclusions. She is particularly strong in showing that Mill's Aristotelian tendencies do not conflict with his empiricism, and in making the case that people may have both positive and negative rights to negative liberty, particularly when the effective exercise of rights requires what Will Kymlicka calls the structural context or context of choice. Several topics which she addresses in more than one chapter would be clearer without the hiatuses involved. Also, she mentions on p. 185 that although the ends of Mill's theory are egalitarian, some of the means he uses are partly elitist, when she has been arguing throughout for his egalitarianism. Perhaps she is looking ahead to her final point about his unsound applications of some of his principles, but her reference is confusing

as she is still discussing his theory. Finally, given her attention to Mill's emphasis on the development of critical and competent judges of quality, Donner might ask the question, recently at issue between William Galston and Amy Gutmann, of whether *everyone* needs to develop critical faculties for judging among different ways of life. If not, Donner may overemphasize Mill's valuation of competent judges. If so, then Mill's theory may still hide an elitism by which those who value this activity may impose this requirement on others.

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**Lynd Forguson**
*Common Sense.*
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. vi + 193.
Cdn $42.00: US $35.00. ISBN 0-415-02302-5.

The subject of this book is the 'common-sense view of the world' (CSVW). Forguson defines CSVW as that 'shared network of beliefs about the world and our relation to it, which is expressed in virtually all our thought and behaviour' (157). This network, he argues, represents a kind of explanatory theory (or 'theorette' [19-25]) employed by all 'adult, psychologically normal members of our species' (18). The theory has two fundamental components. The first is 'common-sense realism': there is a single physical world external to and independent of our minds, about which different individuals have contrasting degrees of knowledge (15). The second is 'rational psychology': we explain actions by appeal to *reasons*, which are combinations of epistemic and desiderative states. By means of this common sense theory we find our way in the world.

The most distinctive feature of Forguson's position is his claim that CSVW incorporates a representational theory of mind. For common sense, the mind is a 'control centre' that receives information from the world, forms and manipulates representations, sets and executes plans, and so on (4). Drawing on recent developmental psychology (chs. 3-4), Forguson argues that children do not see the mind as a 'representational organ' (71) until about age 4. Hence before that age they cannot fully possess the cognitive abilities required by CSVW, such as the ability to form 'meta-representations', to distinguish

between appearance and reality, and to recognize representational diversity and change. Infants and toddlers, then, literally lack common sense.

Forguson's project is not only to describe the common sense view but to defend it. He offers an argument from best explanation: the best account of why adults are so much more successful at negotiating reality than very young children is because adults possess CSVW and CSVW is true (ch. 8).

The book has many virtues. The argument is consistently interesting and engages fruitfully with many significant issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is clear, well organized and pleasing to read. Moreover, Forguson's use of psychological material is refreshing (though difficult to assess without more details of the methodologies of the psychologists he discusses, the exact nature of their experiments, and so on). A possible weakness in Forguson's case, however, is that CSVW must be characterised very thinly if we are to accept that it is shared universally. The most Forguson can hope for is that we grant that everyone is *in some sense* tacitly committed to the basic tenets of CSVW as he describes it. But the thinner CSVW, the less philosophical interest in proving its truth. Thus it's no surprise that as the book proceeds CSVW seems to become thicker and thicker. And with this, the claim that every sane adult holds the theory becomes more problematic. For instance, we might agree that common sense sees the mind in representational terms if that just means we operate with a distinction between appearance and reality, recognize that different individuals have contrasting perspectives on situations, and so on. But Forguson needs more than this, because he wants to invoke our tacit representationalism to *explain* such cognitive abilities. And in so doing, he characterises the representational model by means of various culturally specific metaphors ('control centre', 'representational organ', 'internal' states/'external' world) and technical terms (anyone who has tried to translate Anglo-American philosophy into another language will know that even the philosopher's notion of 'belief' is a technical term). Is it really plausible that *everyone* is committed, even tacitly, to this model of the mind? To show this would require detailed — and cross-cultural — analysis of 'everyday' ways of thinking and speaking about mental life. In addition, one would have to consider the kind of critique of the idiom of 'representation' that has come from neo-pragmatists (most obviously Rorty) and others. Yet Forguson has little to offer in this regard.

The book's most interesting section is where Forguson considers the sceptical view that his favoured representationalism denies us access to an external world beyond our representations. Drawing on Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, Forguson argues that scepticism follows only if we reify representations as the primary *objects* of perception. If, in contrast, we think of mental representations as the *manner* in which the world is presented to us, then we can combine representationalism with a species of direct realism. Forguson's arguments here are careful and compelling, and his summary of Descartes and the British empiricists (ch. 5) is outstanding (ideal for teaching purposes). The only flaw is that he does not paint his direct realism in much detail. We understand what the position is not, but the crucial idea of

'immediate cognitive contact' with the world remains underdeveloped. It is to be hoped that Forguson develops this promising position in future writings.

Finally, Forguson should perhaps have taken certain significant challenges to common sense more seriously. Critiques of 'folk psychology' are treated briefly, but eliminitivism is simply dismissed on the grounds that the truth of common sense is the best explanation of our success in dealing with the world. This is unsatisfactory since it ignores the crucial question of *whose* standards of explanation are to be the measure of success. But in any case, the cogency of eliminitivism is just one aspect of the question of how far science can undermine common sense, and this general issue gets scant treatment.

Forguson also gives short shrift to scepticism that does not derive from Cartesian misconstruals of mental representation. Other varieties of scepticism are fun as an 'intellectual enterprise or parlour game' (175), but not worth philosophical effort. This attitude, though fashionable, is disappointing. It is hard, for example, to see Hume's legacy in this light (and not just because Hume favoured the parlour as a refuge from sceptical anxieties). Much philosophical enlightenment has come from taking the sceptical dimensions of Hume's work seriously. Though Forguson has only contempt for the 'died-in-the-wool philosophical sceptic' (*sic*), radical scepticism is surely a more lively antidote to the pretentions of common sense than Forguson admits.

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**Marvin Fox**
*Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy.*
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1990. 356 pp.
US $27.00. ISBN 0-226-25941-2.

Both medieval and modern commentators have differed sharply in their reading of Maimonides. Opposing interpretations have been held concerning his philosophical commitment, his Jewish orthodoxy, the extent of esotericism in his teachings, as well as on specific views dealing with various philosophical and religious issues. His major work *The Guide of the Perplexed*

poses the problem of how to handle outright inconsistencies, which Maimonides admits to have included for pedagogical reasons, and obvious tensions, which in part result from the confluence of religious and philosophic elements in it.

Indeed whether the *Guide* itself is a philosophic work has been an issue of contention. That it is not, is for instance the pivotal point of those who follow a Straussian interpretation; that it is, is the working hypothesis of those, by contrast, who offer a straightforward philosophical analysis. While the former tends to exaggerate the supposed esoteric character of the *Guide*, the latter tends to minimize it. Related to these concerns is the further question whether the *Guide* can be appropriated by the modern philosopher or whether it is inevitably misread and misunderstood.

In *Interpreting Maimonides*, Marvin Fox implicitly argues that the *Guide* is accessible to modern readers, provided they recognize its complexity in style and diversity in scope. According to Fox, the work is both philosophic and Jewish — to be studied in light of not only its philosophical argumentation — at times labyrinthine, at times cursory — but also its direct and indirect allusions to Jewish tradition and rabbinic teachings.

Fox is as much concerned with methodological as substantive issues. Thus, in the first section (ch. 1-4), he lays down considerations for an adequate study of the *Guide* that neither obscures nor trivializes its content. In the second section (ch. 5-8), he applies these to selected issues in ethical theory and in the third section (ch. 9-12) to selected questions on metaphysical issues.

Rather than juxtapose opposing viewpoints into an either/or proposition, Maimonides, on Fox's interpretation, more often than not, adopts a both/and position. Fox presents Maimonides 'as a thinker who seeks to exploit every possibility of true knowledge but is at the same time thoroughly cognizant of the limits of our knowledge' (22). As a result, Maimonides deliberately maintains 'a dialectical tension between diverse positions, each of which has its own merit' within a limited context (258).

He does so on such issues as reason and revelation as a criteria of truth (ch. 2), on the standard for virtue (ch. 5), on the cognitive and non-cognitive in ethics (ch. 6), on intellectual and moral perfection (ch. 7), on moral judgment in relation to the law (ch. 8), on a physical and metaphysical account of causality (ch. 9), on religious piety in relation to philosophic truth concerning God (ch. 11), on the new in relation to the old (ch. 12).

Maimonides' handling of the creation-eternity controversy (ch. 10) is an apt illustration. The kalam insistence on creation implies a dependency on, and a governance by, God but its voluntarism fails to account for the natural order in the physical world. The Aristotelian argument for eternity, on the contrary, implies a necessary interconnection of events and order but fails to account for freewill in the human sphere. Since neither view is supported by a demonstration, Maimonides in effect brings out the plausible aspects of both while highlighting their limits. Rather than opt for one worldview at the expense of the other and without conclusive grounds for either, Mai-

monides adopts 'the far more difficult way of living with the tension between the philosophic/scientific view of the world, on the one hand, and the Torah/religious view, on the other' (249).

Throughout, on Fox's interpretation, it is the philosophic and the religious that Maimonides keeps in a balanced dialectical tension (23, 46, 79, 249, 297). The philosophic, on the one hand, deals with true beliefs based on demonstration. It is ultimately directed towards an ideal of intellectual apprehension of God, which is expressive of the metaphysical view that God is a totally unique and transcendent reality. The religious, on the other hand, is linked to necessary beliefs and tradition. It is directed towards the duty to imitate God with implications for social order and moral behaviour. In so far as human knowledge and language have legitimate limitations, the religious, for Maimonides, supplants the theoretical and cognitive focus of the philosophic with a practical and non-cognitive one. By way of example, the foundation of ethics, for Maimonides, is inherently non-cognitive, a divine command theory that receives acceptance and specification within the Jewish, rabbinic tradition, rather than justification from philosophic understanding.

Maimonides is able to keep the philosophic and religious in tension because of his analysis of opposing claims. If two claims are contradictory, then one or the other must be true. But Maimonides, Fox shows, also admits other kinds of oppositions, 'divergences' (ch. 4), to which the law of non-contradiction does not apply. Thus, what is held as necessary beliefs based on tradition and as true beliefs based on demonstration are themselves 'divergent', for the former implies an 'imperative of action' and the latter a 'philosophical conclusion' (81). Since they are epistemically different without being, strictly speaking, contradictory, there is no need to choose either one or the other; both can be held simultaneously.

The distinction between true beliefs and necessary beliefs calls to mind Aristotle's between theoretical and practical knowledge. But for Aristotle, practical knowledge seems to be cognitive, involving a knowledge of ends and a less than certain knowledge of means; moreover, theoretical knowledge is clearly superior to practical knowledge (*Nichomachean Ethics* VI, 1139a-41b). Fox, however, takes necessary beliefs, characteristic of religion, to be neither cognitive nor subservient to true beliefs, characteristic of philosophy. The underlying epistemic distinction, however, can use further clarification.

An equally troublesome issue concerns an account of the relationship between humans and God. The relationship is an intellectual one, as Maimonides insists and Fox notes repeatedly. But can an account be given that is consistent with the metaphysical view that there can be no relation between God and anything other than God? Fox suggests that apparently opposing claims about God — in this case that there *is* a relation, and that there is *no* relation, between God and humans — are themselves instances of divergent claims. Because Maimonides takes statements about God to be singular propositions that, following his predecessors, are considered to be neither universal nor particular, there are 'no rules for dealing with them' (81). But if

so, then negative language of God remains unintelligible. Yet Maimonides at least proposes such language to offer some intelligibility of God.

Fox draws interesting links between the discussions of Maimonides and contemporary concerns. Thus, the role of reason in Maimonides offers an occasion to refer to the epistemological debate between rationalism and empiricism (ch. 2); elements of his ethics relate to differences between positivist and natural law theories (ch. 8); the medieval controversy between creation and eternity matches a current interest among scientists in the origin of the world (ch. 10); and in the final chapter (ch. 12) on the contemporary relevance of Maimonides, Fox draws a parallel between Maimonides' attitude towards religious tradition and philosophic innovation, on the one hand, and the stance of religion towards modernity in the twentieth century, on the other.

Fox touches on a wide range of controversial issues in Maimonides. To each, he contributes an overview of the contemporary debate and fresh insights towards its resolution. His methodological approach, explained and exemplified in *Interpreting Maimonides*, sets a current and high standard for students of Maimonides.

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**R.G. Frey** and **Christopher W. Morris, eds.**
*Liability and Responsibility.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
US $54.50. ISBN 0-521-39216-0.

This volume of essays is based on a 1988 conference on liability and responsibility held at Bowling Green, to which invited essays have been added. The result is a strong collection containing a number of fine papers by well-respected authors, about half of which have been previously published. The papers fall into four groups, those exploring selected conceptual difficulties for criteria of responsibility in law and morals, and those examining more closely some aspect of responsibility or liability-determination in each of the areas of contracts, torts and criminal punishment.

In 'Can responsibility be diminished?', Anthony Kenny criticizes legal measures designed to secure verdicts of diminished responsibility and defends the more traditional insanity defence against recent attacks, provided that it is construed not as a status of a person but rather as a factor that can be relevant to a determination of responsibility for an action. John Finnis'

paper 'Intention and side-effects' gives a plausible account of intended action in terms of a plan or program that is chosen for certain reasons in preference to others, and uses this to explain when foreseen and other indirect effects are side-effects and when they are not. Some effects are not side-effects because they are included in the proposed plan either as a means or as an end, therefore are intended, and some effects while desired and foreseen are still side-effects because the plan and the practical reasoning supporting it are in no way modified to ensure the occurrence of those effects. Alan White, in 'Attempting the impossible', offers an astute analysis of what is, and what is not, entailed by attempting to do something. It distinguishes carefully what is done in an attempt from what is attempted in doing that, and highlights the importance of the intended result in understanding an act of attempt, using it to explain how one can adopt means or steps which may make for the impossibility of success in one's attempt and how it is a mistake to attribute to someone an attempt to Z just because he thinks or knows that the V he attempts is Z.

The section on contract contains papers by Richard Epstein, Randy Barnett, and a monograph-length paper by Jules Coleman, Douglas Heckathorn and Steven Maser, with each of these authors elaborating some aspect of their preferred contract theory and its implications for contractual obligations and remedies. Epstein, in 'Beyond foreseeability: consequential damages in the law of contract', argues that damages in contract should be conceived not as governed by independent principles of fairness or natural justice, but as the outcome of the contractual agreement between the parties, thus as default provisions in lieu of express provisions. Like Epstein, Barnett explains remedies from the perspective of the contractual agreement, but understood as an expression of consent. His paper, 'Rights and remedies in a consent theory of contract', provides an elegantly clear exposition of how contracts can be viewed as valid consensual transfers of entitlements between persons, making them part of a larger system of entitlements whose acquisition, use and transfer demarcates the boundaries of individual freedom. Barnett defends an interpretation of consent which admits of public objective criteria for when it is 'objectively manifested', arguing that such an interpretation is practically necessary and will minimize conflicting claims amongst right-holders. Coleman *et al* develop a detailed account of rational bargaining and of contract as a rational *ex ante* bargain; within that framework, they compare the different rationales for such a bargain that would arise from consent theory and rational choice theory.

The third part of this collection is devoted to issues of responsibility attaching to risk and compensation in tort law. This contains two excellent papers, 'Theories of Compensation' by Robert Goodin (reprinted from the *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*) and 'Risk, Causation and Harm' by Glen O. Robinson. Goodin begins by noting that compensation corrects for wrongful injuries within the category of activities that are 'permissible with compensation', as distinct from those that are 'simply permissible' and those that are 'impermissible, even with compensation'. Compensation involves offsetting

or counterbalancing some loss in a way that brings something up to some *status quo ante*. Goodin then distinguishes two kinds of compensation, called means-replacing and ends-displacing respectively, and argues that, contrary to welfare economists who make no distinction between these, the former type of compensation is morally preferable to the latter. Means-replacing compensation serves to improve people's lives in the very respects in which their lives have been worsened by the harm, while leaving intact personal schemes of value and preferences. Ends-displacing compensation attempts to bring global satisfaction up to some previous level, but compensates for loss in one area by giving benefits in a completely different area. While some losses, such as those of 'irreplaceable assets', can be compensated only in this last way, Goodin persuades us that efforts at compensation here, while sometimes necessary, remain unsatisfactory because they are insensitive to the importance of coherence and unity in persons' lives and fail to respect the actual choices people have made.

An enshrined tenet of tort liability is that it depends on some causally determinate sequence of action causing harm to another. In fact, however, many cases where liability accrues are probabilistic in character and exemplify some unreasonable risk of harm created by an action. Robinson builds on this observation by exploring the idea of extending the present liability system to include tort liability for tortious creation of probabilistic injury (risk). He first shows that the idea already underlies interpretations of the standard of care in product liability cases, and then argues that a carefully circumscribed liability for risk can be defended on utilitarian grounds and on grounds of corrective justice. Ernest Weinrib (who also has a paper on corrective justice in this section) has objected that liability for risk is not compatible with one of the central premises of corrective justice, namely, the juridical relationship between injurer and victim. In response, Robinson convincingly shows that neither Aristotelian theory about corrective justice nor Kantian views of duty preclude liability for wrongful risk creation; as well, such liability preserves the juridical relation between plaintiff and defendant. This is an innovative and well argued paper investigating an important potential extension of tort liability; it exhibits depth and thoroughness in scholarship, drawing on a wide-ranging knowledge of theorizing about tort law and the history of tort liability.

The final section, devoted to criminal liability and punishment, contains three previously published pieces, George Fletcher's essay 'Punishment and self-defence' from *Law and Philosophy*, and papers by Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton substantially reiterating parts of their recent exchange on retribution and punishment in their book, *Forgiveness and Mercy*. Despite the absence of new material in this part, the book as a whole is a worthy collection deserving the attention of legal and moral philosophers interested in questions of liability.

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**Sandra Harding**
*Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking From Women's Lives.*
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991.
Pp. xii + 319.
US $34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2513-1);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9746-9).

This book is an important sequel to *The Science Question in Feminism*, written by the same author and published by Cornell University Press in 1986. Part of its considerable interest lies in the fact that it represents a move by Harding away from the position she seemed to be embracing in 1986 and a return to something more akin to the stance and strategies of her earlier work. *The Science Question in Feminism* quickly established itself as one of the major works in the burgeoning literature known as feminist critiques of science. In it and in the newer book, Harding organizes much of her discussion around a tripartite taxonomy of these critiques, the taxonomic categories being feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint epistemology, and feminist postmodernism.

Very roughly speaking, feminist empiricists believe that gender bias in the sciences reflects a failure of science to live up to its own epistemological ideals and that a more rigorous and thoroughgoing application of scientific methodology would eliminate this bias, thus producing better science. The epistemic commitments and methodologies of science are not called into question by feminist empiricists, and the underlying assumption is that the sex of the knower would be irrelevant if science were done properly. It is this assumption that is repudiated by feminist standpoint theorists. They argue that the standpoint of the knower is epistemically relevant and that a kind of epistemic privilege is available to women (or to feminists, depending on the account). Just as Hegel's slave could know things that the master did not, so women (or feminists) are in a position not only to effectively criticize masculinist science but also to produce a feminist successor science that is epistemically superior to what went before. It is important to note that although feminist empiricist and feminist standpoint theorists disagree about the adequacy of current conceptions of scientific method and the relevance of the standpoint of the knower, they both espouse 'successor science projects' in the sense that both strive for epistemic progress, for *better* science. This goal is not shared by feminist postmodernism, which eschews the very idea of a successor science and aims instead for 'a permanent multiplicity of partial narratives.'

An interesting (and I think important) characteristic of this taxonomy of feminist critiques is that the three categories are presented in a way that sometimes suggests that they represent successive *stages* in feminist inquiry, each stage being developed in response to tensions and inadequacies in the preceding stage. So Harding herself, a leading developer and proponent of feminist standpoint epistemology, appeared in 1986 to be moving toward a

postmodern position in response to criticisms of standpoint theory. Although these criticisms have been numerous and diverse, the one that most affected Harding (and many other feminist theorists) was the insistence that there is no single feminist standpoint. Just as the standpoint of women differs from that of men, so also the standpoint of women of color will differ from that of white women, the standpoint of poor women from that of rich women, the standpoint of lesbians from that of heterosexual women, and so on. Fractured identities lead to fractured standpoints, and so it might seem to the permanent multiplicity of partial narratives espoused by postmodernists. Feminist standpoint epistemology appeared to presuppose a kind of gender essentialism that was no longer supportable. Although Harding insisted that all three types of feminist critique serve useful purposes, she seemed to suggest in 1986 that feminist postmodernism was the most sophisticated and theoretically adequate of the three.

This is the position she partially disavows in *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* Postmodern approaches have been unwelcome in some feminist circles for a variety of reasons. Perhaps chief among these is the belief that both feminist theory and feminist action require a fairly robust notion of objectivity. One wants to be able to say, for example, that masculinist accounts of female roles are *false* and ought to be replaced by accounts that are *objectively better*, not simply that there are many narratives available for a variety of purposes. Similarly, Harding argues in this most recent book, we must recognize that although science is politics by other means, it also generates reliable information about the empirical world. It has both progressive and regressive tendencies. An adequate feminist epistemology will have to take into account not just the political dimensions of science but also its empirical successes; it will have to develop strategies for promoting the progressive tendencies of science while blocking its regressive tendencies. At the same time, it must never lose sight of the crucial point that the observer and the observed are in the same causal plane. The challenge for feminist epistemology is to articulate how it is that scientific knowledge is, in every respect, socially situated without denying its considerable empirical success. As we shall see, one of the chief strategies employed by Harding to achieve this end is the reconceptualization of the relationship between the natural and the social sciences. Instead of seeing the social sciences as derivative upon and potentially reducible to physics, she urges us to treat physics as a social science.

Instead of repudiating the notion of objectivity altogether, Harding criticizes the traditional conception for being too weak and calls for its replacement with the notion of *strong objectivity*. Although she recognizes and accepts descriptive relativism (it is true that different peoples have different belief systems), she rejects judgmental relativism as being simply the flip side of weak objectivity. The strong objectivity that Harding embraces extends the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination of cultural agendas and other powerful background beliefs that inform the scientific enterprise itself. It 'requires a commitment to acknowledge the

historical character of every belief or set of beliefs — a commitment to cultural, sociological, historical relativism. But it also requires that judgmental or epistemological relativism be rejected' (156). It is in this context that the social sciences become paradigmatic; physics is just one human social activity among many others and is amenable to investigation in the same way as other social activities. (It is interesting that Harding could be said to have joined the 'unity of science' crowd — but in a shockingly nonstandard way.)

Strong objectivity requires that we not only take into account the standpoint of the knower but that we constantly question and analyze the assumptions that inform that standpoint. Furthermore, we must recognize that there is no single standpoint that confers epistemic privilege. Harding's brush with postmodern feminism has left its mark. In fact, she describes her current position as a 'postmodernist standpoint approach', where 'postmodernist' (with a lower-case 'p') describes any approach that fundamentally challenges the assumptions of Enlightenment epistemology, rather than a specific set of views about epistemology. She acknowledges that feminist standpoint theories tend to stress gender differences at the expense of ignoring other important differences, and she acknowledges that such theories contain an essentializing tendency. But, Harding argues, the logic of the standpoint approaches also contains the resources to combat these very same tendencies. To ground claims in women's lives is to ground them in differences 'within women' as well as between women and men. And the same kinds of considerations that compelled us to theorize from the perspective of women's lives will also compel us to see the importance of theories created from the perspective of poor people, people of color, and others not represented in the current knowledge establishment. When we center the lives of lesbians, for example, we learn things we would not have learned otherwise.

The difficulty is, of course, to come up at the end with an integrated theory; for this is clearly what Harding wants, particularly an account that successfully integrates gender, class, and race. And it is at this point that one begins to wonder in just what sense Harding's new position is correctly characterized as a standpoint theory after all. For we have now a multiplicity of standpoints from which we must fashion an integrated theoretical account, one that strives toward strong objectivity. The standpoints are now just starting points; and no one of them possesses any ultimate epistemological privilege. So the sorting out, the adjudicating, the integrating of theories arising from radically different standpoints will have to proceed along lines not dictated by any one of those standpoints. And here a sort of instability or insufficiency in the postmodernist standpoint approach begins to emerge. The standpoints will provide rich resources for mutual criticism and a source of rival background assumptions against which to test theories of all sorts. Presumably the theories will be tested against one another from a rich variety of perspectives, but no one of those perspectives can provide privileged criteria for theory choice.

This begins to sound something like the marketplace of ideas, but one in which all vendors are equally represented. And indeed Harding appears to endorse the notion of 'an intellectual participatory democracy' (151). This cannot collapse into a postmodern relativism given Harding's commitment to strong objectivity. One wonders, though, whether we don't find ourselves now in 'the radical future of feminist empiricism.' This was always the territory on Harding's original taxonomy that seemed to me the most appealing. Although feminist empiricism would appear to be the most conservative of feminist epistemologies, it always struck me (and many others) as *potentially* the most powerful and radical of the approaches discussed by Harding. This is because the attempt to apply it shows so effectively that true fidelity to the notion of objectivity forces one to undermine and ultimately reject many of the epistemological assumptions that were supposed to guarantee that objectivity in the first place. Harding, of course, coined her phrase as a direct paraphrase of Zillah Eisenstein's claim about 'the radical future of liberal feminism', which undermines key assumptions of the parental discourse; and she noted that the epistemology that is coherent with liberal feminism is feminist empiricism (1986, 162). The talk of 'intellectual participatory democracy', so far removed from the Marxist discourse that used to inform standpoint epistemologies, called these points to mind. Harding would probably be displeased to think that her analysis tended this way, but others would not be dismayed at all. In any event, one thing is clear: The vigor with which feminist epistemological projects are currently being pursued has caused the boundaries of the old taxonomy (however useful it was) to give way. We have not only a postmodernist standpoint epistemology but perhaps also a useful hybrid of feminist empiricism and standpoint approaches.

Sandra Harding remains one of the leading figures in feminist epistemology. Her work not only reflects but also precipitates much of the fast-moving debate in this arena. The speed and vigor of the debate sometimes creates unresolved tensions in the analyses, and this book is full of those. But even if one is less sanguine than Harding about the usefulness of unresolved tensions and 'principled ambivalence', this is a book worth reading — not just for feminist theorists but for philosophers of science and epistemologists of all stripes.

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**Eugene C. Hargrove, ed.**
*The Animal Rights / Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. xxviii + 273.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0933-3);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0934-1).

While historically there has been an uneasy alliance between animal rights advocates and environmental conservationists, it has often seemed a strained relationship from both the practical and theoretical points of view. Exploring the moral dynamic between animal rights and more broadly based environmental concerns is the purpose of this anthology. Specifically, the central concern is 'whether an animal welfare ethic can be an adequate foundation for an environmental ethic' (ix-x). The book includes a preface and eleven previously published papers: five published in *Environmental Ethics*, two taken from Mary Midgley's *Animals and Why They Matter* (chapters 9 and 10), and four drawn from other sources. One unfortunate feature of the book is that it does not contain a bibliography, a weakness in an anthology intended to serve as a textbook.

The essays provide a thematic account of the evolution of the environmental perspective with respect to animal rights. One common theme among the first papers is that most nonhuman animals and the environment itself cannot have moral rights within the accepted paradigms of moral rights because they lack the requisite characteristics. In addition, the emphasis of the animal welfare ethic on the individual, whether grounded in utilitarian or deontological considerations, cannot adequately incorporate the holism required by an environmental ethic. Assuming the legitimacy of environmental ethics, it is unclear whether the resolution of this apparent conflict will involve 'a single position that covers both environmental ethics and animal welfare ethics (moral monism) or several positions (moral pluralism) that are complementary' (xxiii). While one paper defending moral pluralism is included, the emphasis is on the development of the former alternative. This position, which stands as an alternative to utilitarianism and deontology, finds its origin in a Humean sympathy view.

Watson's 'Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature' is 'an attempt to develop and apply a historically accurate account of rights to the debate over animal rights and rights for nature' (xv). According to Watson, a '*reciprocity framework* provides a justification for intrinsic possession of moral rights. If an agent does or intends to do, his duty, then he is a moral agent acting in a moral milieu and is worthy of moral rights' (3). Essentially, Watson restricts the realm of direct moral concern to moral agents and excludes what are often called moral patients. Norton's 'Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights' develops a similar theme, as well as emphasizing the conflict between environmental ethics and individual animal rights. 'An environmental ethic must support the holistic func-

tioning of an ongoing system. One cannot generate a holistic ethic from an individual basis, regardless of how widely that basis is expanded' (90).

Taylor, in 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature', also concludes that there is a conflict between the individualistic and the holistic perspectives, and he proposes a view grounded in the latter. 'From the perspective of a life-centered theory, we have prima facie moral obligations that are owed to wild plants and animals in themselves as members of the Earth's biotic community. We are morally bound (other things being equal) to protect or promote their good for *their* sake' (96). 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', by Callicott, develops a similar theme, suggesting that the 'theoretical foundations of the animal liberation movement and those of the ... land ethic may even turn out not to be companionable, complementary, or mutually consistent' (40).

This apparent antagonism is one of the issues that Warren addresses in 'The Rights of the Nonhuman World'. She argues that 'a harmonious marriage between these two approaches is possible' (186), and that only 'by *combining* the environmentalist and animal rights perspectives can we take account of the full range of moral considerations which ought to guide our interactions with the nonhuman world' (206). Callicott responds to Warren's position in 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again'. 'Not long after the schism emerged, ... Warren took a positive step towards reconciliation. ... Warren's approach is thoroughly pluralistic' (249). Callicott rejects such a moral pluralism because 'when competing moral claims cannot be articulated in the same terms, they cannot be decisively compared and resolved. [Moral pluralism] leads, it would seem inevitably, to moral incommensurability in hard cases' (251).

Building on the two previous papers (Midgley's 'The Mixed Community', and Fisher's 'Taking Sympathy Seriously: A Defense of Our Moral Psychology Toward Animals'), Callicott sketches a moral framework and theory motivated by a Humean sympathy account. 'Animal liberation and environmental ethics may thus be united under a common theoretical umbrella — even though, as with all the laminated layers of our social-ethical accretions, they may occasionally come into conflict. But since they may be embraced by a common theoretical structure, we are provided a means, in principle, to assign priorities and relative weights and thus to resolve such conflicts in a systematic way' (259).

The book includes three other papers. Midgley's 'The Significance of Species' is a discussion of the idea of 'speciesism', and is the ninth chapter from her book. Callicott's 'Moral Considerability and Extraterrestrial Life' is, as the title suggests, an exploration of the moral status of life beyond Earth. Hargrove's 'Foundations of Wildlife Protection Attitudes' is 'intended primarily as an examination of the history of ideas behind the environmental ethics/animal liberation debate' (xix).

This is an excellent collection of papers, and the 'Preface' provides a clear account of the moral issues in the debate. It also provides clear summaries of the papers, and the reason why they have been included in the order that

they have been. Hargrove notes that 'this book does not include any author specifically advocating the animal liberation or animal rights perspective' (ix). For this reason, while these perspectives are discussed in the 'Preface', instructors considering this anthology as a textbook might want to combine it with another book. Still, within its stated purpose, the anthology is very good, and is sure to generate a great deal of discussion in the classroom.

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**Marcus Hester, ed.**
*Faith, Reason and Skepticism.*
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.
Pp. 180.
US $39.95. ISBN 0-87722-853-1.

This attractively published book is divided as follows. The editor and organizer of a conference held in April, 1989 at Wake Forest University, NC, introduces the contents clearly (1-5). William Alston's opening paper is 'Knowledge of God' (5-49); Robert Audi's 'Rationality and Religious Commitment' follows (50-97); then come Terence Penelhum's 'Parity is Not Enough' (98-120) and Richard Popkin's 'Fideism, Quietism, and Unbelief: Skepticism for and against Religion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' (121-54). Penultimately the four speakers give their 'Concluding Reactions' to one another (155-74). A useful account of the contributors' lives and a handy Index close the work.

In his final statement Popkin says: 'I feel that I am the odd man out, since I am not an analytic philosopher, I am not a Christian [but a Jew], and I am a skeptic and a mystic' (169). Attacks on atheism and agnosticism, he adds, 'can be of importance if this discussion of where this leaves us is rooted in living religious experience' (173). He advocates a philosophical position of religious pluralism: 'if one starts with living religious experience, then each believer will find what is a live option for herself or himself. And each live option can then be carefully explored and explicated. The results will be meaningful for each believer though probably quite individualistic' (173). Popkin comments on the others that, without rootedness in religious experience, their analyses of basically reasonable beliefs and the hopes they place in a new natural theology will lead to an unwarranted leap into Christian

faith. He ends with a rebuke to the main institutions of orthodox Judaism for ignoring advocates of pluralism.

Popkin refers several times to the William James of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and 'The Will to Believe'. Like James, he lays stress on human individuals and their choice of options affected by their experience. Since people are fallible, (but need not be culpably fallible), it seems to him that he can fairly be a Jew in religion, yet a religious pluralist in philosophy. He rejects the suggestion that experience and live options favour Christianity. But he fails to spell out the nature of rational belief in terms of individualism's relation to maximizing expected utility in religion. That is, reflective, reversible, tolerant choices of options, utilities and odds.

Penelhum cites Nicholas Wolterstorff at length in partially protesting against what Popkin rejects — against the so-called *Basic Belief Apologetic* of Alvin Plantinges and his followers. According to this, one's basic religious beliefs and experiences are no more open to radical questioning than are innumerable beliefs of common sense about the world based on sense-experience, etc. Penelhum writes: 'The theistic beliefs ... now included among the commitments exempted from the demand for independent justification have competitors in a way that commonsense beliefs appear not to have' (103). Thus parity between sense experience and religious experience is not enough. Taking serious account of the very varied religious and secular ideologies of the world, as opposed to following the parochial dichotomy of believing in a Biblical God or not, shows that there is a serious asymmetry between the data of commonsense beliefs and those of a worshipping theist. Here Penelhum concedes too much to commonsense beliefs, for the brain structure and languages behind commonsense 'Basic Beliefs' incline humans to take, for example, a pluralist ontology of many individuals as a given in experience. But a monist ontology's 'Basic Sentences' mainly receive the same backing from the senses, as do many varieties of pluralism. The same seems to be true of a harsh Platonism. (See Hector Castañeda's 'Plato's "*Phædo*" Theory of Relations' and my *Self-Knowledge and Social Relations*). Monist translation can serve branches of Hinduism and of Platonism turned into a source of neo-Orphism. And compare philosophy's history of many rival ontologies.

Penelhum, however, stumbles then makes a very wise suggestion. Biblical faith will be split and 'Balkanized' if it is confined to grounding in 'Basic Beliefs': that kind of faith stands in need of a renewed and vigorous Natural Theology, if one can be constructed which is cogent. *That* could minister to the unity of Christendom or another religion — *and* serve the eventual unification of mankind. He might have added that *naturalist* ideologies cannot hopefully rest on sense experience, but require a well-argued Natural Ontology rather like a Natural Theology (The 'threat of ambiguity' hangs over religious and secular philosophy alike.) Turning to Natural Theology more specifically, he adds some more valuable advice: practitioners need not appeal to what is universally known, or to the premises of a metaphysical nature or 'of a very general observational character' (116). 'It is called *natural theology* not because its premises are known to everyone, but because they

can be known to be true without already knowing or believing that God exists and without any grounding in experience of God' (118). Popkin (171, 173) mocks at the hopes of Penelhum and the other contributors for a new Natural Theology. But other believers, who suspect there is something to Aristotle's and Kant's talk of Pure *and* Practical reason, may prefer that philosophers work *both* in the tradition of St. Thomas and also more in the ways of Pascal, James and maximizers of expected utility.

While Penelhum and Popkin illuminate their papers with expert comments on Hume, Reid, Pascal, James and other historical figures, William Alston and Robert Audi point their Christian pens more towards the perils and promise of modern analytical epistemology. What they have to say is very much worth reading: Alston tends more to complement the Plantingan approaches and Audi more to correct them.

This is a truly rewarding volume.

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**Brad Inwood**
*The Poem of Empedocles.* A Text and Translation with an Introduction.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1992.
Pp. x + 320.
Cdn $45.00. ISBN 0-8020-5971-6.

This book's contents are: Introduction, Fragments in Context, Testimonia, Fragments, Concordances, Sources and Authorities, Indexes. The book succeeds admirably in its primary goal: 'to make available for students with a philosophical interest in Empedocles (whether they read ancient Greek or not) the texts necessary for an exploration of his thought' (3). The fragments are printed continuously in Inwood's original order, with Greek text and English translation on facing pages, and the translations are very literal and consistent (e.g., 'thought organs' for *phrena* and 'thinking organs' for *prapides*). Textual notes follow, although there is no detailed commentary as in M.R. Wright's *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1981). Inwood's book is unique in providing the contexts in which the fragments occur as well as the testimonia about Empedocles. Some of this information appears here for the first time in English translation. Unfortunately missing is an Index Verborum: the serious reader will have to consult Wright.

Inwood's interpretation of Empedocles' philosophy is given in his Introduction, and it is clear, often persuasive, and sometimes original. This Introduction is accessible even to the Greekless reader, unlike Wright's, in which she frequently lapses into untranslated Greek. Inwood proceeds on the unorthodox thesis that the extant fragments come from *one* poem (hence his title), which was known primarily as the 'purifications' but also referred to as the 'physics' (14-15). The traditional view has been that the fragments come from two distinct and very different poems, 'The Purifications' expressing Empedocles' religious beliefs and 'The Physics' expounding his scientific doctrines. Catharine Osborne first proposed the one-poem thesis in 'Empedocles Recycled' (*Classical Quarterly* 37 [1987] 24-50), but Inwood was already working from that hypothesis independently (6 and 15, n. 33). The primary evidence for there being only one poem is the *lack* of evidence for there really having been two. Inwood's argument for this thesis is strong enough to justify accepting it as a working hypothesis, and here he discusses some of its consequences. Instead of dividing the fragments in two by subject matter, Inwood reorders them into a coherent whole in which 'religious' and 'scientific' doctrines are consistent and complementary. (His degree of success must be evaluated in future scholarship.) Consequently his numbering is unique: fragments are numbered *n/m*, where *n* represents the number in Inwood's ordering and *m* represents the number of the corresponding B fragment in Diels-Kranz.

Inwood defends the traditional interpretation of the cosmic cycle (41-6). The cycle is defined by two termini: at one point Strife is dominant and the roots earth, air, fire, and water are utterly separated, and at the opposite point the dominance of Love results in a perfect blending of the roots. Our world began from the latter point and now exists in the half of the cycle in which Strife is becoming more powerful; all compounds will eventually perish, their component roots separating to form four concentric spheres (49). The opposite half of the cycle contains a world similar to ours, but tending from separation to mixture.

Here arises the most fundamental conflict in Empedocles' philosophy: how can whatever constitutes the reincarnated and *immortal* Empedocles survive the mixture and separation of these termini? Inwood's solution to this problem is original and is discussed at length (52-65). Noting that Empedocles' cosmic cycle does not conflict with the doctrine of reincarnation per se, but only with the claim of personal immortality, he argues that Empedocles is not committed to the latter claim. Inwood takes Empedocles' 'daimon' to be 'the bearer of the moral and intellectual continuity for each person' (53), and he thinks that *all* humans have such a daimon, not just the enlightened few (ibid., n. 123). He then argues that Empedocles usually refers to gods and daimons as 'long-lived' rather than 'immortal,' and the two fragments which seem to refer to personal immortality (137/147 and 1/112.4) need not be taken literally (54-5). Thus Inwood thinks that our daimons are created at the beginning of one half of the cycle, when the conflict of Love and Strife causes compounds to form; are reincarnated innumerable times in the guise of

plants, animals, humans, and sometimes gods; and are destroyed at the end of that half of the cycle because their elements are dissolved in total mixture or separation. This theory anticipates Cebes' view in Plato's *Phaedo* (86e6-88b8) that the soul is like a weaver who makes and wears out numerous cloaks in his lifetime but eventually dies in one of them (52-3).

It is true that 1/112.4 and 137/147 *may* be explained away as metaphor, although the former, 'I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,' certainly sounds serious. And Inwood's interpretation is the most successful to date in extricating Empedocles from this putative inconsistency. The weakness in his interpretation is that inherent in any interpretation of Empedoclean reincarnation: lack of positive evidence in the fragments. It is essential to Inwood's reading that "'we" are what Empedocles calls long-lived "daimons"' (53), yet he admits that this is an *assumption*. In fact the term 'daimon' occurs only twice in the fragments: in 11/115.5 daimons are described as long-lived, but it is not certain that this refers to reincarnated people; and in 65/59.1 'daimon mixed with daimon' refers to Love and Strife according to Inwood (51), and to the four roots according to Wright (212). Thus there is little direct evidence to support Inwood's assumption. There is some indirect evidence via Plutarch (CTXT-10c and 97a) and Porphyry (CTXT-93b), but the value of these secondary sources is debatable. Nevertheless, if one's goal is to save Empedocles from inconsistency Inwood's interpretation is quite appealing and preferable to alternative explanations of Empedoclean immortality (e.g., Wright's proposal (69-76 and 273-4), while similar to Inwood's, does not sustain the continuity of the *individual* within the cycle.

Inwood also discusses what Empedocles accepts and rejects from Parmenides (22-31); the relation between the roots, Love, and Strife and compounds formed from them (31-9); the roles of Love and Strife (46-52); and Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles (65-72). This book is ideal for use in a graduate seminar and is sure to provoke further scholarship on Empedocles.

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**A.D. Irvine, ed.**
*Physicalism in Mathematics.*
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990.
Pp. xxvi + 365.
US $82.00. ISBN 0-7923-0513-2.

This exciting volume in philosophy of mathematics grew out of a conference at the University of Toronto. It contains fourteen recent articles by some of the leading authors in the field, many of whom use the occasion to expand upon their own philosophies of mathematics. The shared theme is given by the title, but an appropriate subtitle would refer to Hartry Field — that high-profile advocate of physicalism ('all facts are physical') with respect to mathematics ('no mathematical statements are true'). Field is criticized here by more than half the authors, including John Burgess, Crispin Wright, Bob Hale, Alasdair Urquhart, David Papineau, Michael Hallett, Penelope Maddy and John Bigelow. The epistemological concerns that motivated Field in the first place are addressed by nearly all the authors. The platonists Michael Resnik and James Robert Brown both reject the causal theory of reference/knowledge; Peter Simons, Penelope Maddy, and John Bigelow are sympathetic to physicalism but reject nominalism; Geoffrey Hellman accepts nominalism, but his own brand; and Yvon Gauthier, a constructivist, seems to think that Field did not go far enough. (Only Chandler Davis seems to be on a quite different wavelength, seeking criteria by which to evaluate mathematical theories.) For snapshots of each article, read on.

Field thinks the main argument in favor of the truth of math — and hence for platonism — is its usefulness to science, but that one need not suppose that mathematics is *true* to explain its usefulness; it's enough if mathematics is *conservative*, i.e., when appended to a nominalistic theory, no new nominalistic consequences result. The obvious question is: what sense of 'consequence' is involved here? The usual proof-and model-theoretic senses involve quantifying over such abstract objects as formal derivations and structures (respectively). Field's answer is that a conclusion is a *consequence* of certain premises if it is not possible — in some primitive modal sense — for all the premises to be true but the conclusion false. Similarly, a body of statements is *consistent* if it is possible for them all to be true together. Field must claim that some mathematical theories are consistent, and hence that in his sense of 'possible', it is possible for each of their axioms to be true. Since, in addition, he claims that the axioms are in fact false, it seems this is only contingently so. Field seems to be left with the embarrassment of explaining what it is about the world that makes mathematics *just happen* to be false. This is Bob Hale's point of departure. He argues that Field cannot explain how the world would be different if there *were* mathematical objects, because according to Field such objects are 'constitutionally acausal'. In a wide-ranging and illuminating discussion, Hale explores the other options available to a nominalist — e.g., saying that numbers are 'conceptually impossible', or that they

'necessarily don't exist' — and concludes that nominalism's best chance of survival consists in a sort of formalism.

Not only is an adequate account of *consequence* required, if Field's account is to succeed, but also an account of *conservativeness* and of how standard mathematics is both useful and conservative. To this end, Field makes various 'conservation extension claims', for example, Principle C:

> Let A be any nominalistically statable assertion, and N any body of such assertions; and let S be any mathematical theory. [If A* is the result of restricting the quantifiers in A to non-mathematical entities] then A* isn't a consequence of N* + S + '$\exists$x-M(x)' unless A is a consequence of N. (*Science Without Numbers* [Princeton UP 1980], 12).

The nature of these claims is unclear, says Alasdair Urquhart, for 'there seem to be at least four ways in which these claims can be made precise, depending on the strength of the underlying logic, and the mathematical theories involved' (148). Urquhart argues that none are satisfactory. For example, Principle C, although true if we assume that the logic involved is pure first-order logic with identity, is *useless* for applications, because N* + S affords no functions from concrete entities to mathematical entities. Reliance on full second-order logic would preserve conservative extension claims, Urquhart argues, but full second-order logic does not qualify as an 'attractive nominalistic theory'. Finally, recursively presentable subsystems of second-order logic will leave Field exposed to Gödel's incompleteness results. Urquhart's parting suggestion: 'abandon any hope of a general conservative extension result' and 'develop such results for the mathematics actually needed in physical theory,' like the weak subsystems of second-order arithmetic needed for classical analysis (153).

David Papineau bypasses the question of whether Field's fictionalism about mathematics is technically feasible, and asks whether we *ought* to be fictionalists. His answer is 'yes', but not for the following 'reasons' which he thinks are bad ones: that mathematical beliefs are 'non-essential to our having beliefs about scientific observables' (156); that beliefs have to be *caused* by the facts they are about; or that mathematical objects are not spatio-temporal. Then why endorse fictionalism? Because, says Papineau, 'mathematical content does not match mathematical practice' in the sense that 'mathematical statements claim more than our practice for accepting such statements entitles us to' (160). (He thinks mathematicians are only entitled to make 'if-then' claims.) Can't a similar complaint be lodged against physics, viz., that theories that postulate unobservable particles go beyond the evidence? Ought we then to endorse only Craigian transcriptions of physical theories? No, says Papineau; the difference is that physical theories are more attractive than their Craigian counterparts in displaying the world as having a more simple physical structure ('a small number of basic components [composed] in a small number of basic ways' [163]), but platonistic mathematical theories do not lead to greater physical simplicity (in the above sense) than their nominalistic counterparts.

John Burgess criticizes all nominalists who, like Field, take for granted the thesis that 'belief in an assertion or theory implying or presupposing that there are objects of some particular sort cannot be knowledge unless some objects of that sort act directly or indirectly on us' (3). Burgess argues that, far from supporting this thesis, naturalized epistemology undermines it. His argument, in outline, is that the scientific community accepts as true e.g. that Avogadro's number is greater that $6 \times 10^{23}$; that attempts to reconstruct such statements involve 'extravagance and prodigality in logic' (10) — their only virtue is economy of mathematical ontology; but that such economy, as a scientific standard, is in no obvious way supported by the history of science. His conclusion is that the burden of proof falls upon the nominalist to show that 'ontological economy of mathematical apparatus is a weighty scientific standard' (12).

Michael Hallett raises questions about Field's *physicalism*, and, since Field's program is in some ways reminiscent of Hilbert's, proposes to answer them by comparing the two. He argues that there are 'crucial differences' between Field and Hilbert, 'differences which show why Field's project is misguided in principle' (193). For example, Field's project supposes there are sharp differences between 'the claims that real numbers exist as *abstract* objects, and that space-time positions or regions exist as *physical* objects' (194), and Hilbert's work shows that this is not the case, according to Hallett. Hallett's article is a heavily historical tour of Hilbert on meaning and axioms, on geometry, and on ideal elements and consistency proofs. At seventy-four pages, it is by far the longest article in the book — too long for even a cursory summary — but well worth the read.

Penelope Maddy argues that if 'physicalism is the inspiration for nominalism, then there is a naturalized form of platonism that should be just as acceptable as [Field's] form of nominalism' (259); she calls it 'physicalistic platonism'. It's platonistic, because it posits mathematical objects; it's physicalistic, because these objects are located in space and time. The set of a dozen eggs is in the refrigerator, and we perceive it just as we perceive the eggs. Such considerations provide the epistemological basis for her 'radically impure' set-theoretical hierarchy. Maddy argues that Field is no better off epistemologically or ontologically than she is — nay, he is worse off, since she can claim without equivocation that $2 + 2 = 4$ but he cannot.

John Bigelow says he is 'transmitting on the same wavelength' as Maddy: he endorses physicalism but rejects nominalism, claiming that sets are physical. The difference between them is that he is a thoroughgoing realist about universals, whereas Maddy is not. As a physicalist he maintains that 'the only objects that exist are physical objects, and the only properties and relations there are, are physical properties and relations' (292); but as a realist, he maintains that 'mathematics deals with properties and relationships, patterns and structures: things which can be instantiated by many, very diverse things, and so, things which qualify as *universals*' (291). So how are *sets* universals? That is, which physical properties or relations are they, and what instantiates them? Bigelow says the following sorts of things by

way of answer: sets are plural versions, aggregates, of individual essences; they are higher-order universals, instantiated by their members. He claims that mathematics discovers higher-order universals, like what two patterns have in common, and sets emerge when we consider what two coextensive properties have in common: a certain second-*degree* property (perhaps *having the same instances*), which confers on their instances a certain second-*order* property (like *being members of a set which constitutes the extension of those universals*).

Peter Simons, motivated by what he calls 'Platonism's epistemological implausibility,' sympathetically explores the epistemological underpinnings for a view like Bigelow's. That is, he discusses the feasibility of explaining mathematical knowledge via abstraction. After considering various accounts of abstraction he settles on 'equivalence abstraction' wherein 'an abstractum is an object "arising" from objects on which an equivalence relation is given' (27) (as for example, in Hume's principle: 'the number of Fs = the number of Gs iff there are just as many Fs as Gs'). Numbers are Aristotelian universals, for Simons, 'obtained' by abstraction from 'ontologically dependent particulars or moments as well as individual substances' (32). He points to problems with this account, but, unfortunately does not defend it.

James Brown disparages Maddy's physicalistic platonism as 'faint-hearted.' He defends what he calls full-fledged '$\pi$ in the Sky' platonism: mathematicians observe and report on abstract mathematical structures, just as astronomers do galaxies. He approvingly quotes from Gödel and Hardy, both of whom compared mathematical intuition to sensory perception. This leaves him open to the following charges, which he addresses with gusto: that platonism's ontology is redundant, that its explanation is 'flabby' (Chihara), and 'that our knowledge is at best highly mysterious, and perhaps even impossible' (100). He readily concedes that mathematical intuition is currently not understood, but argues that neither is the physical process that culminates in a *sensory* belief (say, that the teacup is full). His argument that the causal theory is false is straightforward: given a particle that decays into a pair of photons moving in opposite directions, if we measure the spin of one, we can know without measuring what a measure of the spin of the other is, *even though there is 'no causal connection* (either direct or linked through hidden variables) *between these events'* — unless special relativity is false (111f, my italics).

Michael Resnik takes the epistemological challenge to platonism more seriously. Since he holds that mathematical objects are positions in patterns, one might expect him to say that we see the patterns; but instead he claims 'our epistemic contact with mathematical entities themselves is indirect at its best and mediated through isomorphisms' that are 'posited' (43). Since Resnik maintains that mathematical objects play no causal role in generating our mathematical beliefs, he correctly feels it is incumbent upon him to explain how beliefs about such objects could be acquired in the first place. Beliefs are 'about' mathematical objects, he says, either in the sense that (i) a sentence expressing the belief contains terms referring to mathematical

objects; or (ii) in some stronger *de re* sense. Resnik tries at length to explicate the *de dicto / de re* distinction with an eye towards applying it to beliefs about mathematical objects, but fails. He therefore feels that he need only account for the acquisition of beliefs about mathematical objects in the sense of (i), and he does so utilizing the following strategy:

> To explain how someone came to refer to [numbers, say], I first explain how they came to use one of our terms *F* for [numbers] as a grammatically referential term. Then I point out that there are [numbers] and that *F* refers to something if and only if it is a [number]. (52)

Obviously this approach will sound very question-begging to a nominalist or a causal theorist; it underscores the fact that Resnik's starting point is a strong form of platonism coupled with a rejection of the causal theory of reference.

Like Resnik, Crispin Wright is a Platonist who takes the Benacerraf challenge to Platonism very seriously, but one who takes an entirely different route towards justifying our arithmetical beliefs, viz., logic. Here, Wright advances the argument for Fregean Platonism set forth in his book *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects* (Aberdeen UP 1983) by responding to objections raised by Field in the latter's critical notice of that book (*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 14 [1984] 637-62). Wright denies Field's contention that he is committed to the view that 'what is true according to ordinary criteria really is true, and any doubts that this is so are vacuous,' and handily destroys the comparison offered by Field between the ontological argument and the manner in which numbers are thought by Wright to be obtainable from the equivalence: 'the number of Fs = the number of Gs iff there is a 1-1 correspondence between the Fs and the Gs'. Wright raises, and answers, an interesting objection to his own view. He holds that since the ontological commitments of the left side of the above equivalence include numbers, so do those of the right side. Therefore, if a community never arrived at the concept of number, sticking instead with second order statements like the one on the right hand side, then it would seem that the whole community would be referring to numbers quite unwittingly, and without possessing the concept of number.

Like Field, Geoffrey Hellman attempts to do without abstract objects and possibilia, but unlike Field, he thinks mathematical statements are true or false. Here he gives an overview of his 'modal-structural' approach, according to which theorems of, for example, number theory 'state what *would* hold in any structure of the appropriate type that there *might be*' (314). To make this explicit, he provides patterns for translating them into a 'modal-structural' theory: where A is a sentence of second-order Peano arithmetic, for example, its translation into his axiomatic second-order S5 modal theory would say, in effect, that A holds in any possible ω–sequence (he assumes ω–sequences are possible).

Yvon Gauthier thinks that Field's program may be feasible, but that Field does not go far enough, because Field uses first-order logic, which is 'perme-

ated with set-theoretic notions,' notions that have yet to be nominalized (340). So Gauthier favors instead a constructivist approach to mathematics that he calls 'Arithmetical Logic'. Instead of representing arithmetic in logic, à la Frege, he represents logic in arithmetic, that is, in what he calls *Fermat Arithmetic*, where induction is replaced by *the principle of infinite descent*:

> if the existence of a property for a given n implies the existence of the same property for an arbitrary smaller number, then this property is possessed by still smaller numbers *ad infinitum*. Of course this is impossible since any descending sequence of natural numbers must eventually terminate. (332)

Gauthier claims this is not equivalent to the least number principle, but since he also suggests a 'slightly different formulation' that obviously *is* equivalent to the least number principle, it is hard to evaluate his claim. Much of this article was hard to evaluate, as it is too short on explanations.

Chandler Davis, who terms himself a 'working mathematician', rejects the view that mathematical statements are about an ideal world and not the physical world. If that were so, he claims, there would be 'no external check upon us' — except avoiding inconsistency (344). He asks:

> Are we really free to study *anything* and, if so, does this not dissipate our energies and thereby slow us down? The conventional view is that ... it does not slow us down because there is nowhere we are going — because (unlike the physicists) we are not seeking understanding *of* anything. If there is no subject matter of our study, how can we measure progress? (344)

And yet there does seem to be progress. Thus there must be criteria for evaluating mathematical progress other than mere consistency. Using nice examples along the way to illustrate, Davis proposes seven criteria, related to different mathematical ends. They range from 'describing real phenomena exactly' (as do 'Arithmetic, Euclidean geometry, Newtonian mechanics and quantum electrodynamics'), or less exactly but insightfully (as do '$n$-person game theory and much of "applied" catastrophe theory'), to 'clarifying the deductive structure of a theory' by changing the rules (as does non-Euclidean geometry) (352f). One of Davis' theses is that the diversity of ends justifies 'different notions of rigour and even different ideas of *what constitutes a result*' (353).

I heartily endorse this book for anyone interested in recent developments in philosophy of mathematics.

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**Will Kymlicka**
*Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1990. Pp. 321.
Cdn $55.95: US $42.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-827724-5);
Cdn $19.95: US $13.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-827723-7).

In this excellent book, Kymlicka offers a well-written overview of the major approaches to contemporary political philosophy. This book would be an extremely useful main text or secondary resource for a course on contemporary political philosophy, and also reads very well for anyone simply interested in an up-to-date overview of the subject.

The introductory chapter discusses in general terms the subject matter of political philosophy, and sets out the method to be followed in the book. This chapter contains some discussion of the role of our 'considered convictions' in political philosophy, and the nature of argument which is appropriate to the subject matter. More importantly, however, it sets out Kymlicka's general view of what distinguishes various political philosophies. Kymlicka argues that the traditional scale of theories ranging from left to right (depending upon how they emphasize equality or liberty) does not adequately capture the range of contenders in the political philosophy arena (2-3). He also argues that political philosophy is not likely to get anywhere if theories are seen to differ in terms of which principle they take to be 'foundational', and that it would be useful to search for some deeper value according to which competing principles can be judged (3-4). Kymlicka's suggestion, following Ronald Dworkin, is that equality may be this deeper common value (4-5). The structuring principle of the book seems to be an examination and evaluation of each of the leading approaches to political philosophy according to its conception of equal concern for persons.

Kymlicka provides chapters on: Utilitarianism; Liberal Equality; Libertarianism; Marxism; Communitarianism; and Feminism. The current state of the debate is presented clearly, and frequent references provide interested readers with considerable guidance for examining the arguments offered in greater detail. Kymlicka is not particularly concerned with presenting new and original arguments here. He does, however, draw on some of the original contributions he has previously put forward, and he often manages to throw the debates into a new and refreshing light.

This book is, as the cover remarks note, a *critical* introduction. Although all the positions are presented sympathetically and with a deep understanding, Kymlicka's own views come through clearly. Much of the book can be understood as a defense of a certain interpretation of liberal equality. Again and again, Kymlicka argues that the most appealing aspects of each of the theories are those which accord with this liberal conception.

Utilitarianism is presented before liberalism, apparently because it is taken to be the dominant background theory against which contemporary liberals have developed their theories (9). Kymlicka argues that the most plausible reading of utilitarianism is as an interpretation of equal consideration (31-5), but claims it does not offer the *best* such interpretation. It falls short, he argues, because it tries to count *all* preferences equally, whereas in fact some preferences (such as selfish or prejudiced ones) should be excluded, and some biases (such as those favouring loved ones over strangers) should be allowed (35-42). He claims that political theory needs some account of people's legitimate claims, rights, and shares which is prior to utilitarian calculation. Then we could expect people to try to shape their preferences in accordance with what they were legitimately entitled to.

The pivotal third chapter then begins the account of the liberal conception of 'legitimate shares'. This conception is introduced through a very clear discussion of Rawls' hypothetical social contract and resulting difference principle, and Ronald Dworkin's hypothetical insurance scheme (50-85). Kymlicka claims that each of these authors is striving to produce a distribution of resources and liberties which will minimize any advantage people might get from fortunate natural endowments (talents, etc.), but allow some inequalities to appear as the result of choices individuals make — as Kymlicka puts it, advantages should be 'ambition-sensitive' but 'endowment-insensitive' (76).

The contours of the liberal conception then continue to emerge throughout the book, and in particular in the discussions of libertarianism and communitarianism. It seems that what is central to this conception is the idea that we should promote people's interests by providing them with what is necessary for self-determination. For example, Kymlicka states that, in order to fulfill 'our essential interest in leading a life that is good', we must 'lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life', which in turn requires that people 'have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value' (204).

Kymlicka maintains that practically all liberals have failed to see the radical implications the conception of equality at the core of their theory has for redistribution of resources and liberties (85-90). Much of the survey of other schools of political thought involves noting those elements they emphasize which liberalism has traditionally ignored, but of which Kymlicka claims liberalism must take note if it is to be true to its own principles.

For example, Kymlicka considers the communitarian claim that liberalism ignores the importance of membership in social groups. He claims that liberals should indeed recognize the importance of community, since 'individual autonomy cannot exist outside a social environment that provides meaningful choices and that supports the development of the capacity to choose amongst them' (216). He insists that the real difference between communitarians and liberals here concerns not the importance of society, but the role the coercive power of the state should play in protecting the necessary society, with liberals tending to be more confident that 'society' need not

depend on the state (216-30). (NB: Kymlicka also discusses other communitarian criticisms, such as those of the 'unencumbered self'. He argues that the contrast communitarians try to draw here between their theory and liberalism turns out to be merely semantic [207-15]).

To take another example, Kymlicka considers some feminist criticisms of liberalism, and often claims that the changes the critics would require should be called for by liberal principles, and that their motivating vision is often a conception of equality which is very much in keeping with how liberalism should be interpreted, though not with how it commonly has been put into practice. For example, Kymlicka follows MacKinnon in saying that it is not enough for women to be provided with equal access to certain social positions if the positions themselves have been defined in a way which women have had no power to control (239-47). For example, suppose the design of income-generating positions is such that they require so much time, that a person who is the primary care-giver of children cannot satisfy the requirements of the position. If women are generally considered to be (and/or want to be) the primary care-givers, then such a design will tend to discriminate against women, even though the bare fact that one is a woman is not taken into account in deciding whom to hire. Kymlicka argues that liberals should be sensitive to such systematic inequalities in society, because the result of them is that some people are denied the access to resources and power which the liberal conception of equal consideration requires. 'Equality requires not only equal opportunity to pursue male-defined roles, but also equal power to create female-defined roles, or to create androgynous roles that men and women have an equal interest in filling' (245). Similarly, he argues that the boundaries between public and domestic may have to be reconsidered, since the effect of the existing boundaries is often to deny some people (i.e., women and children) that which is required for their equal consideration (247-62). (NB: Kymlicka distinguishes this public/domestic distinction from the much-criticized public/private distinction. He states that 'Once it is detached from patriarchal ideas of family autonomy, I believe that most feminists share the basic liberal motivations for respecting privacy' [261], but this idea must be understood to include privacy *from* one's family).

The arguments in this book are consistently clear and convincing. Each of the competing schools of contemporary political philosophy is presented sympathetically, with a genuine effort at interpreting the key claims and disagreements. Although the framework of searching for interpretations of equal concern may be a bit controversial, it results in some illuminating insights into the differences between the various theories. In summary, this book offers a very neatly organized overview of contemporary political philosophy, which leaves those who would defend an alternative view, or who would redefine liberalism, with some important issues to consider in formulating their views.

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**Thomas M. Lennon** and
**Patricia Ann Easton**
*The Cartesian Empiricism of François Bayle.*
New York: Garland Publishing Inc. 1992.
Pp. viii + 127.
US $43.00. ISBN 0-8153-0624-5.

**Patricia Easton, Thomas M. Lennon** and **Gregor Sebba**
*Bibliographia Malebranchiana: A Critical Guide to the Malebranche Literature into 1989.*
Carbondale and Edwardsville: South Illinois University Press 1992. Pp. xxiv + 189.
US $24.95. ISBN 0-8093-1603-X.

The French Cartesians have traditionally attracted little attention from English-speaking historians of philosophy. It has often been assumed that they were mere epigones who were either unable or unwilling to advance significantly beyond the thought of the master. The present two books bear witness to a change of attitude towards Descartes' disciples on the part of Anglo-American scholars. Malebranche's claims on our attention are now recognized by a growing number of philosophers; in no small measure this re-assessment has been the result of Lennon's own scholarly contributions. Other Cartesian figures, such as Cordemoy, La Forge, and Regis, are no longer condemned to the total obscurity in which they once languished. Lennon and Easton seek to persuade us that even such an unknown as François Bayle (not to be confused with the more famous Pierre) deserves to be rescued from oblivion.

The title, *The Cartesian Empiricism of François Bayle*, is a little misleading, for it encourages us to expect a work of secondary literature. In fact, Lennon's and Easton's book is a careful, scholarly edition of two short texts by this medically trained thinker who lived and worked in the Toulouse region, far removed from the intellectual excitement of the capital. One of these two works, 'The General Systeme (*sic*) of the Cartesian Philosophy', is a straightforward textbook summary of Descartes' main tenets; it is so obscure that it apparently survives only in the form of the seventeenth-century English translation which the editors reproduce here. The other, more interesting text, 'Discourse on Experience and Reason', appears in Lennon's and Easton's own translation; it is a treatise dealing largely with medical methodology which may well have influenced another philosopher with a medical background: John Locke. The translations of the texts are prefaced by a lengthy introduction which sets out the facts of Bayle's life and places him in the context of the development of Cartesianism; Desgabets and Regis are indicated as leading influences on Bayle's thought. Like some other editors, Lennon and Easton do not perhaps do enough to introduce the works

themselves; the reader has to hunt for the basic facts about the texts and their transmission.

It is natural to ask whether the title of Lennon's and Easton's book is misleading in another way as well: is 'Cartesian Empiricism' really an apt description of the thought of the figure revealed to us in these two short works? To many readers of course the phrase will sound like an oxymoron; no thinker, it will be objected, can be both a Cartesian and an empiricist. Yet, as Lennon and Easton observe, there is a side of Descartes which is quite unlike the dogmatic rationalist of the textbooks who is supposed to believe that all scientific knowledge about the world is deducible from first principles. In the *Discourse on Method*, for example, Descartes stresses the importance of physical experiments and calls on his readers for assistance in carrying them out. But if 'Cartesian empiricism' indicates a possible position, we may still wonder whether it is the right label for Bayle's views. It might be said that in the 'General Systeme' there is Cartesianism but no empiricism, while in the 'Discourse on Experience and Reason' there is empiricism but no Cartesianism (apart from a few courteous nods in Descartes' direction). However, the position is a little more complicated than this characterization suggests, for in the 'Discourse' Bayle writes somewhat equivocally about the role of experience in the advancement of medical knowledge. At one point he claims that 'reason alone does not instruct us in [medical matters]; experience has the best part' (100). A little later, in a section significantly entitled 'Experience is blind and deceitful', he writes that the most that experience can claim is to be the 'servant of reason' (103). In truth it seems doubtful whether Bayle's essay yields any very clear picture of the respective roles of reason and experience in his philosophy of science.

The case for Bayle's claim on our attention is not really proven; with Malebranche the situation is very different. There can be little doubt now that Malebranche made major contributions to the development of thought about such topics as causation, intentionality, and self-knowledge. Interest in his philosophy has reached the point where there is a real need for a comprehensive bibliography of the primary and secondary literature, and Easton, Lennon, and Sebba have met this need admirably. Their *Bibliographia Malebranchiana*, which is based on a preliminary study by the late Gregor Sebba, is a splendid research tool which will be of great value to Malebranche scholars. The book is organized in a sensible and straightforward way, although a separate subject index might have been desirable. Despite a few minor lapses — for example, the French word '*inédit*' means 'unpublished', not 'unedited' (56) — the general standard of scholarship seems to be high.

Not the least of the attractions of *Bibliographia Malebranchiana* is its critical character. In the case of the section on the secondary literature, many — though not all — of the entries are followed by crisp summaries of the argument and trenchant value judgments. The editors can be generous in their praise: Gouhier's *La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse* is hailed as 'magnificent' (98). On the other hand, they do not pull

their punches: Beatrice Rome's two-volume study of Malebranche 'fails badly to give Malebranche any contemporary relevance or even intelligibility' (158). Obviously readers will want to quibble with some of their judgments; not all Malebranche scholars will agree, for example, that Desmond Connell 'argues compellingly' for his thesis that Malebranche relied on Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez for his doctrine of vision in God (74). But these firm, decided judgments are preferable to the bland characterizations that we might have had. Malebranche scholars in the English-speaking world need some kind of guide through the large continental literature; few Anglo-American philosophers will know in advance which of the many French writers on Malebranche are likely to prove rewarding. In general, the editors inspire the reader with confidence that they know how to separate the wheat from the chaff.

It is a striking sign of the current vitality of Anglo-American Malebranche studies that the book is already a little out of date. The guide to the literature goes up as far as 1989, yet even so there are a number of additions to be made. An anthology of essays on Malebranche, edited by Stuart Brown, came out in 1991; Steven Nadler's important study of Malebranche's theory of ideas will be published by Oxford University Press in the autumn of 1992. Meanwhile, leading philosophical journals in the analytical tradition have begun to devote space to Malebranche exegesis and criticism. How different the situation would have been, say, twenty years ago! In those bad old days a three-year interval would have yielded only the most meagre harvest of English-language contributions. Remarkably, when Lennon and Olscamp published their ground-breaking translation of *La Recherche de la Vérité*, only one English edition of a work by Malebranche had appeared since 1700. We can hope that in a few years' time the editors will publish an updated version of their bibliography. With any luck it will need to be a considerably fatter volume.

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**Bernard Lonergan**
*Pour une méthodologie philosophique.* Trans. Pierre Lambert et al.
Montréal: Bellarmin 1991. 246p.
Cdn $19.95. ISBN 2-890-07718-7.

Les ouvrages consacrés aux questions méthodologiques préoccupent de plus en plus les chercheurs, les enseignants, et les candidats au doctorat. La rigueur d'une thèse ou d'un rapport de recherche se mesure souvent à sa qualité méthodologique. Plusieurs ouvrages sur le sujet ont paru récemment. (Citons par exemple les guides méthodologiques suivants: Laramée, Alain et Bernard Vallée, *La Recherche en communication. Eléments de méthodologie* [Sillery: P.U.Q. 1991]. Signalons également la récente réédition d'un manuel fondamental en méthodologie de la recherche: Gauthier, Benoît, *Recherche sociale. De la problématique à la collecte des données* (Sillery: P.U.Q. 1992), 2e édition.)

Ce livre, ayant pour sous-titre 'Essais philosophiques choisis', regroupe une dizaine d'articles et de conférences de Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). On y retrouve une première traduction française de plusieurs écrits, dont certains inédits, datant de 1955 à 1974. En fait, plusieurs personnes se sont réparties les textes en vue du travail de traduction. Comme Bernard Lonergan est né au Québec, l'ouvrage a pu bénificier de deux subventions du Gouvernement fédéral.

On peut considérer l'auteur comme un théologien préoccupé par des questions philosophiques. Son principal livre, intitulé *Insight*, et publié en 1957 (New York: Longmans, Green), demeure intraduit dans notre langue. Toutefois, le présent ouvrage risque de dérouter le lecteur non-initié ou le chercheur désireux de trouver une méthode de recherche spécifique à la philosophie, car il y est beaucoup plus question de *la* méthode que *de* méthodologie.

Ce recueil de textes résulte d'un choix d'extraits des trois livres regroupant les oeuvres complètes de Bernard Lonergan, publiées originellement à New York et à Londres. La sélection ne dépend pas seulement de l'auteur, mais appartient aussi à l'éditeur et aux traducteurs. Une courte introduction nous présente chacun des articles au début du livre.

Malgré les qualités de la pensée de Bernard Lonergan, il importe de signaler un certain nombre de lacunes dans ce recueil intitulé *Pour une méthodologie philosophique*.

1) Le titre même du recueil ne correspond pas à son contenu et surestime la place de la méthodologie, au sens où nous l'utilisons ordinairement, englobant à la fois ' ... la structure de l'esprit et de la forme de la recherche et les techniques utilisées pour mettre en pratique cet esprit et cette forme (méthode et méthodes)' (Cette définition se retrouve dans l'introduction de Benoît Gauthier, *Recherche sociale*, 8). En fait, sans contredire cette définition au sens large, on trouvera

ici des essais sur l'épistémologie, selon une perspective religieuse et philosophique.

2) Les premiers articles du livre font souvent référence à la notion d''insight', élément central de l'oeuvre de l'auteur, sans jamais en proposer une définition opératoire dans le cadre de ces essais. Les traducteurs auraient dû, dans leur entreprise d'édition, reprendre une définition du concept, soit par l'auteur lui-même (tirée par exemple de son ouvrage sur le sujet) ou selon d'autres sources, afin de préciser d'entrée de jeu les termes fondamentaux qui seront utilisés.

Ce n'est qu'au quatrième article (78) qu'on découvre une définition de l''insight', qui selon Bernard Lonergan vise ' ... une conception plus claire ou plus complète ou plus méthodique des raisons cognitives et des causes ontologiques' (78).

Les traducteurs ne proposent aucun équivalent français pour le terme anglais 'insight', qu'ils reprennent pourtant à maintes reprises tout au long du recueil. Des ouvrages élémentaires, comme le *Dictionnaire de la psychologie* de Norbert Sillamy ([Paris: Ed. Larousse 1967], 152) utilisent judicieusement le terme français d' 'intuition', tel que repris entre autres par Henri Bergson, dont les travaux ne sont curieusement pas cités ici.

3) Le premier article, intitulé 'Retour sur *Insight*', propose un essai autobiographique qui se comprend comme une présentation minutieuse d'un autre livre de l'auteur, connu sous le titre *Insight*. Idéalement, ce texte introductif devrait plutôt se retrouver au début d'une éventuelle traduction de l'ouvrage qu'il présente; ici, on a l'impression de s'être trompé de livre lorsqu'on constate que les textes qui suivent ne reprennent évidemment pas le contenu et le plan de cette présentation.

Le livre se subdivise en quatre parties: analyse de l'intentionnalité et philosophie de la connaissance; l'horizon humain: notion dynamique d'objet et niveaux de conscience; théorie de la connaissance différenciée: formes et domaines de la signification; vers une méthodologie philosophique. L'auteur base son argumentation sur des écrits d'Aristote et de Saint-Thomas d'Aquin. Un index des noms propres et un index général complètent le recueil.

La pensée thomiste de Bernard Lonergan demeure aujourd'hui encore reconnue et respectée, comme le prouve d'ailleurs cette publication posthume. Cette seconde traduction française de ses textes accuse cependant quelques faiblesses au niveau de l'édition, mais ne trahissent nullement le contenu et la portée de la pensée de son auteur. (On remarque dans le présent ouvrage que le haut des pages de gauche porte comme titre 'Pour une méthologie scientifique' entre les pages 8 et 12, puis on rectifie pour 'Pour une méthologie philosophique' entre les pages 16 et 32, pour finalement y inscrire le titre définitif *Pour une méthodologie philosophique* jusqu'à la fin de ce livre. La confusion apparente entre 'méthologie' et 'méthodologie' ne pourrait-elle pas annoncer une distinction nécessaire entre une discipline fondamentale et une autre plus pratique destinée à la recherche?) En fait,

ces quelques remarques ne visent que la présentation en soi et non le contenu même du livre. Les préoccupations de Bernard Lonergan montrent à quel point la méthodologie demeure au-delà de son usage pratique et courant, une science fondamentale et complexe.

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**Karl Löwith**
*From Hegel to Nietzsche.*
New York: Columbia University Press 1991.
Pp. xvii + 464.
US $60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-07498-0);
US $16.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-07499-9).

**John Sallis**
*Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy.*
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1991. Pp. x + 158.
US $24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-73436-6);
US $11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-73437-4).

Löwith's book is a reissue of a study which first appeared (in German) in 1936. Its concern is with what the author holds to have been a revolution in 19th-century thought. As such, its attention is focused on just those figures, texts and concerns which made up that revolution. The major figures here are Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. A good many other figures receive attention, however, including Goethe, Stirner, Bauer, Schelling, de Tocqueville and Burckhardt. Conspicuously absent is Schopenhauer, whose philosophy falls outside of the revolutionary movement Löwith is concerned with.

Hegel stands at the head of this movement, not quite in the sense that he is one of the revolutionary figures within it, but in the sense that it was his 'philosophy of mediation' that those who do make up the movement proper were reacting against, rejecting his sustained attempts at overcoming such traditional oppositions as those between reality and reason, the historical and the eternal, God and man, philosophy and religion, morality and the state, the public and the individual. Each of these mediations occurs, of course, within Hegel's grand 'system of thought', in which he attempted to

show how speculative reason could on the one hand grasp reality, and on the other hand show that reality to be ultimately at one with itself, rather than irreconcilably at odds with itself. Each of the figures within L's revolution rejects these speculative attempts at reconciliation, each in his own way repudiating Hegel's famous 'Whatever is rational is real, whatever is real is rational'. In presenting their various critiques, together with their attempts to develop alternative philosophies of history, human nature, the state and the individual, L argues persuasively for the extent to which such figures as Feuerbach, Marx, Stirner and Kierkegaard (the so-called 'young Hegelians') were still indebted to the master, referring to them as 'the true heirs of Hegelian philosophy' (50).

L's book is made up of two main parts. In Part I, L first outlines Hegel's speculative philosophy of mediation, and then shows how each of Hegel's critics rejects these mediations, with this group as a whole thereby defining a new turn in philosophy. In Part II, L considers one by one the various critiques that thinkers from Rousseau to Nietzsche were making of the contemporary 'bourgeois-Christian world.' Here he focuses his discussion on various 'problems' addressed by these writers; viz., the problems of bourgeois society, of work, of education, of man, and of Christianity. Running throughout these critiques is a common conviction that life in the post-French Revolution bourgeois-Christian world is divided against itself, so that a truly human life is all but impossible. Thus, L writes, for Marx, the proletariat lives a life which is obviously 'dehumanized' and 'alienated'. But bourgeois life is equally dehumanized in that it takes place within 'the universal division of bourgeois society into two complementary and contrasting modes of human existence: the private individual, with his private morality, on the one hand; and the citizen of the state, with his public morality, on the other. All these forms of human existence are partial; man as such, as a totality, is lacking in them' (313). For Kierkegaard, true Christianity, essential to the life of a 'true individual,' is 'the very opposite of what it has become in the course of time: humanitarianism and education' (318). De Tocqueville finds that bourgeois democracy increases the isolation of individuals; they 'restrict themselves to a dull egoism in which every public virtue suffocates' (255).

Other than that by Hegel and Goethe, who both died in the 1830s, the bulk of the writing attended to in both parts of L's book was done in the 1840s. After the failed revolutionary movements of 1848 a period of reaction set in, and it was not until later in the century that radical critique was once again taken up, by Nietzsche.

One of the many considerable merits of L's book is that it is written from a standpoint that is non-partisan. L is not writing as an advocate of any one of these critiques; there is nothing dogmatic or ideological about his approach. Nevertheless, he often makes it clear enough where he himself stands. Thus, for example, he concludes his presentation of Hegel's philosophy of history with the well-taken observation that 'Whoever has really experienced a slice of world history ... will have to come to the conclusion that Hegel's philosophy of history is a pseudotheological schematization of history

arranged according to the idea of progress toward an eschatological fulfillment at the end of time; it does not correspond at all to visible reality' (219).

Interestingly enough, the figures whom L evidently feels most in overall sympathy with are not the four or five major philosophers of his study, but such more temperate interpreters of their own times as Goethe, de Tocqueville and the German historian Burckhardt. Thus, he clearly identifies with Goethe against Hegel when Goethe protests that Hegel mistakenly 'drags the Christian religion into philosophy, although it has no business there' (16). Whereas Hegel denigrates the 'merely particular' in favor of the universality of the 'notion', Goethe has the utmost respect for the detail of everyday life, and is 'forever a pure spring of truth in the relationship of man to himself and to the world' (200). And when de Tocqueville and Burckhardt are deeply troubled by the age's leveling everything to an average, by the new education's producing only 'force-fed mediocrities' (301), 'a general semiliteracy', and then conclude that 'the mediocre condition of bourgeois democracy makes truly historic greatness impossible' (257), they clearly are reading the modern world the way L himself does.

Two concluding remarks: First, I find it refreshingly instructive to see how L, in his presentation of Kierkegaard, puts him in context with Marx, rather than following the by then common practice of comparing and contrasting him with Nietzsche. Second, it is equally instructive to see how L shows us how to reflect on this period of modern thought without making more than incidental use of such rather vague and not very helpful terms as 'idealism' (Hegel), 'materialism' (Marx), 'irrationalism' (Kierkegaard) and 'voluntarism' (Nietzsche).

This new reprint of L's original work contains a foreword by Hans-Georg Gadamer, a fellow student and colleague of Löwith's, in which Gadamer speaks of L's 'sober scepticism', 'virtually Egyptian fatalism' and 'Stoicism'.

Sallis' concern with Nietzsche is very different from Löwith's; viz., not with Nietzsche on Hegel, or as critic of the 19th century, but with N on tragedy. His book has four chapters: one each on Apollo, Dionysus, Tragedy and Socrates. Its principal focus, of course, is on N's early work, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872); considerable attention is paid, however, to all other writings by N on this topic, including preliminary drafts of *The Birth of Tragedy*, notebook entries from the late 1860s and the early 1870s, as well as such later reflections on *The Birth of Tragedy* as the 'Attempt at a Self-Critique' of 1886.

The book opens with an 8-page preface entitled 'Das Masslose', a term which S translates as 'the exorbitant, the immeasurable, the boundless' (2); in short, the Dionysian. It is here that S explains his title. Both the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the two defining elements of tragedy as N understands it, are 'crossings'. They each move beyond the everyday world of appearances; the Apollonian crossing over to the world of beautiful images, the Dionysian to the self-oblivion of the ecstatic state. Tragedy itself results from the crossing of these two elements, which each exist both as an artistic energy inherent in nature and as an artistic creation. This crossing defines what S

calls 'the space of tragedy.' Socrates presents a further instance of crossing. 'He crosses tragedy ... by thwarting it, contravening it, opposing it to the very point of death' (5).

S does a very fine job of bringing into sharp focus N's many remarks on each of the four main topics of S's book. But S means to do more than present a straightforward exposition of N's thought. A major concern of his is the question as to the extent to which N's interpretation of Greek tragedy proceeds within a 'metaphysical' framework; in particular within the framework of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. As S uses the term, metaphysics has its origin in Plato's distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, reappearing in new guise in Kant's distinction between phenomena and the in-itself, and again in Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will (60). It is undeniable, as S readily concedes, that in much of his discussion of the Dionysian, N writes as though he were subscribing to the Schopenhauerian metaphysics. Thus, he repeatedly writes as though he were taking Dionysian experience to be a direct encounter with the in-itself, understood as Schopenhauerian will. Furthermore, S adds, 'Is it not indicative that even Heidegger ... tends to regard *The Birth of Tragedy* as having been largely determined by Schopenhauer's theory of the will?' (60). Heidegger's own position was that in the writings of the young N we find only a preview of N's later 'overturning' of metaphysics in general and of Schopenhauer's metaphysics in particular. S disagrees, and marshalls a great deal of evidence for his view that 'Nietzsche had already decisively distanced himself from Schopenhauer's metaphysics within a couple of years of discovering it and some five years before the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*' (63).

S argues further, however, that not only had N distanced himself from Schopenhauer, but that he already had an alternative to Schopenhauer's metaphysics, and to metaphysics in general, at this early date. I find his attempt to defend this position (in terms of undeveloped remarks about N's 'thinking the abyss,' 'thinking the Masslose') quite unconvincing. N's alternative to Schopenhauer and to metaphysics in general is his 'philosophy of perspectivity,' developed in his later writings. But this alternative is not there in the early N. Surprisingly, there is no explicit reference to it in S's book.

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**Jean-François Lyotard**
*The Inhuman: Reflections on Time.*
Trans Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991.
Pp. viii + 216.
US $37.50. ISBN 0-8047-2006-1.

**Jean-François Lyotard**
*Phenomenology.* Trans Brian Beakley.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1991. Pp. vi + 147.
US $34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0805-1);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0806-X).

It seems so odd that these two works, one of Lyotard's earliest works (*Phenomenology* 1954) and one of his latest, have the same publication date, as if they have something in common (in addition to their author). And of course they do. Though his study of phenomenology precedes his collection of essays on time by 37 years, there is a striking continuity between these works. Even though stylistically the earlier work is more concerned with deciphering texts and the latter is more open to reflections and meditations, they are both attempts to respond to one footnote that appears in a different work altogether: they are both attempts to explain what postmodernism is or does.

In *Just Gaming* (1979/1985), and by way of a response to the confusions that have emanated from his celebrated *The Postmodern Condition* (1979/1984) (probably Lyotard's best-seller and perhaps even one of the best-selling philosophy texts of the 1980s), there is a short sentence at the end of a footnote that says: 'Postmodern is not to be taken in a periodizing sense' (16). As he claims time and again, 'Modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with its postmodernity' (IN 25). Now of course it is undeniable that when a prefix 'post-' is used, it is for the purpose of drawing a distinction, delineating between two terms or between two meanings of the same term, but also connecting them, showing their genealogical intimacy. As Lyotard insists, 'Postmodernity is not a new age, but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by modernity, and first of all modernity's claim to ground its legitimacy on the project of liberating humanity as a whole through science and technology. But as I have said, that rewriting has been at work, for a long time now, in modernity itself.' (IN 34)

For Lyotard, then, both modernity and postmodernity are processes of rewriting so that the 'project of liberating humanity' becomes possible. Though modernity is not 'a historical period, but a way of shaping a sequence of moments in such a way that it accepts a high rate of contingency' (IN 68), it is nonetheless a temporally defined process of rewriting, of experiencing and inscribing. This process is phenomenological in nature and made comprehensible (to humanity) only phenomenologically. Phenomenology, Lyo-

tard reminds us, is 'a meditation on knowledge, a knowledge of knowledge' (P 31), and therefore requires not only the techniques of the phenomenologists he cites, but also their framework. As he says: 'Truth is always and exclusively tested in present experience, and the flux of experience cannot be relived; we can say only that if such experience is presently given to me as past and erroneous evidence, this actuality itself constitutes a new "experience" expressing, in the living present, the past error and the present truth as the correction of that error. There is no absolute truth, as postulated by dogmatism and scepticism alike; rather, truth defines itself in process, as revision, correction, and self-surpassing — this dialectical operation always taking place at the heart of the living present (*lebendige Gegenwart*)' (P 62-3).

This phenomenological setting or backdrop sets the stage for whatever concerns about 'knowledge' Lyotard develops over the course of his intellectual trails and discourses. The most pronounced theme of both books, but evident in many other works as well (especially since IN is a collection of essays written over a decade 1980-90) is the question of time, the categories of past, present, and future and their relation to space in a Kantian sense (IN 158-9). Though, as he admits, '"Postmodern" culture is in fact on the way to spreading to all humanity. But to this same extent it is tending to abolish local and singular experience, it hammers the mind with gross stereotypes, apparently leaving no place for reflection and education' (IN 64), there is a sense in which it offers some salvation (for whom?) — in the sense of a 'break' or 'splitting' between the project of 'human emancipation' and that of 'programm[ing] the future as such' (IN 68). With this in mind, we are back with the personal experiences of the phenomenological sort, timing one's experiences, and figuring out what knowledge claims to appreciate as truths.

Just as Lyotard thinks in the *Phenomenology* that science might be an important, but overly determinant factor (and therefore insufficient) in the acquisition of knowledge (P 32, 38, 95-100), in his later work he speaks of 'the penetration of techno-scientific apparatus into the cultural field,' claiming that this process 'in no way signifies an increase of knowledge, sensibility, tolerance and liberty.' Instead, what one sees is 'a new barbarism' (IN 63). Perhaps it is this disillusionment with techno-science, with the processes by which 'history' has been rewritten in modernity and postmodernity, with education and politics (IN 1-7), that leads Lyotard to speak, once again in terms of time and space, about the 'sublime'. At first glance the essays collected in IN seem remotely, if at all, related to each other because they shift from aesthetic deliberations to those of the body, color, sound, literature, and philosophy. But, when one threads Lyotard's themes along one quilt called time, then it makes sense to reconsider the possibility of diminishing the inevitable progression toward 'the inhuman' by means of suspending 'time' or at the very least breaking down the analysis of time as it has been traditionally carried out with classical and modernist categories.

If we are to believe Lyotard that 'my intention is only that of trying to bring out some of the ways in which modernity deals with the temporal condition' (IN 59), and if we are convinced that the various attempts to deal

with temporality have failed miserably because of their overly techno-scientific and capitalist limitations (IN 67-8), then it would make sense to focus on the presence of the present. That is, highlight the sublime as the manifestation and expression of the suspension of all the categories of time, a perfect constellation — like music (IN 173-4), painting (IN 151), and love (IN 201) — of time and space or time in space or space in time, what the Jewish tradition calls '*Makom*' or '*Hamakom*': 'the *there*, the site, the place, which is one of the names given by the Torah to the Lord, the Unnameable' (IN 89-90).

Perhaps the only 'site' for Lyotard's 'resistance' (IN 56) is the Jewish ghetto, where one witnesses the 'secret timbre,' but where one also 'exterminates' (IN 203-4). Perhaps even the sublime, as a suspended and reified focus, involves a contradiction and as such an impossibility; perhaps there is no exit, as Sartre has said, no way to be phenomenologically alive and write about it as if one were inscribing history; perhaps 'the witness is a traitor' (IN 204), as Lyotard says, even though witnessing is all humanity can do to escape its own inhumanity (IN 7).

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**Robert M. Martin**
*The Philosopher's Dictionary.*
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1991.
Pp. xii + 255.
Cdn $12.95. ISBN 0-921149-75-1.

One of the great assets of this book is that it is remarkably user-friendly. Entries are easy to find and are copiously cross-referenced. The prose style is clear and informal. There is even the occasional touch of humour. The entry for 'Superman', for example, begins 'Not Lois Lane's boyfriend, ...' (224). Martin (according to his introduction) does not intend this dictionary to be used for historical purposes. This is just as well, as some of the historical entries are so terse as to be barely informative. Kant, for example, is dismissed in a mere twenty lines; Heidegger only gets four. Instead, Martin's intention is to provide explanations and definitions of contemporary analytic philosophical terminology.

To a limited extent, this dictionary successfully achieves this goal. A number of the more technical entries are succinct and illuminating. For example, in the entry for 'Intentional', Martin is careful to point out the ease with which this term can be confused with 'Intensional'. He then goes on to

describe the differences between normal objects in intentional states, as contrasted with the role of purely intentional objects in mental states. Martin also gives the definitions of contrasting and related terms together. Hence, 'Type' and 'Token' are both discussed in a single entry, as are 'Analytic' and 'Synthetic', 'Demonstrative' and 'Indexical', and 'Denotation' and 'Connotation'. This helps to keep the nuances of these technical distinctions clear.

Martin's use of examples is also admirable. On the whole, they are both intuitive and helpful. For example, he illustrates the type/token distinction by explaining that, ' ... in the sentence "The cat is on the mat" there are six word tokens, but only five word types' (240). This kind of clear example ensures that many of Martin's technical definitions are useful and easily comprehensible, despite their being very brief.

Not all Martin's entries however, are of the same high standard. For example, the entry for 'Ethics' refers the reader to 'Morality'. When the latter term is looked up, the entry simply tells the reader that 'One's morality is one's tendency to do right or wrong, or one's beliefs about what's right and wrong, good and bad' (149). The rest of the entry is taken up with a discussion of the synonymity of the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' and the various uses of the terms. There is no mention made of deontological or teleological approaches to ethical theory, despite the fact that elsewhere Martin gives quite reasonable entries for both.

Another problematic example is provided by the entry for H.P. Grice. Martin describes Grice as an 'English philosopher with influential work on metaphysics and epistemology' (99). No mention is made of Grice's important work in the philosophy of language at all. There is also no entry for 'Conversational implicature', and the entry for 'Implicature' simply refers the reader to 'Inference'. For a work which purports to deal with modern philosophical terminology, such omissions are surprising. Oversights such as these may well compromise the usefulness of this dictionary to students at the introductory level.

The dictionary is also weak in the area of the philosophy of science, to the extent that there is not even a separate entry for the topic. Under the heading of 'Science', there is a brief (and amusing) discussion of some of the more bizarre views held by philosophers throughout history. However, the only philosophical movements referred to under this entry are empiricists, positivists and logical positivists. There is no mention at all of key figures such as Kuhn, Lakatos or Feyerabend, although Popper is given a brief section. Instead, Martin chooses to include under the heading 'Scientists' a long (but somewhat arbitrary) list of scientists who have ' ... written importantly about the philosophical presuppositions or consequences of science ... ' (209).

Martin provides an admirably extensive number of entries under the general rubric of 'Logic', given the small size of the book. Many-valued logic, modal logic, quantifier and sentential logics are all given separate treatments, as is the distinction between formal and informal logic. However, some of the entries are too short to be useful, other than in a purely introductory way. It is also unclear what criteria were employed to determine

which terms were worthy of a separate entry (or at least a cross-reference) and which were not. Given that 'Many-valued logic' was deemed to be of sufficient importance to warrant separate inclusion, it is unclear why 'fuzzy logics' were not worth mentioning at all.

The problem of the criteria used to decide whether a term warranted inclusion or not, is not just restricted to the entries on logic. Perhaps, given Martin's stated intentions, it is reasonable that he does not make mention of Rorty. However, to omit any reference to 'Postmodernism' seems to make considerably less sense. Other examples abound in this work. Consider Martin's inclusion of an entry for 'Feel' (which is accompanied by the advice that this is a locution to be avoided in philosophy), whilst making no reference at all to 'Propositional attitudes'.

In conclusion, although this dictionary is clear and informative with respect to some aspects of contemporary philosophical terminology, it is far from complete. Furthermore, the selection of the terms that are treated seems to have been done in a somewhat arbitrary manner. As such, this work is probably best for recommendation to the curious layman, rather than an academic audience.

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**Diana T. Meyers**
*Self, Society, and Personal Choice.*
New York: Columbia University Press 1991.
Pp. xiii + 287.
US $19.50. ISBN 0-231-06419-5.

In *Self, Society, and Personal Choice*, Diana Meyers explores the concept of personal autonomy, defined as identifying and doing what one genuinely wants to do. She carefully distinguishes this notion from the related concepts of moral, legal, economic, and political autonomy, and she also separates it from the metaphysical debates surrounding questions of free will. Her principal concern is to explain how it is possible for an individual to determine what she genuinely wants to do in the face of four distinct sorts of threats: 'social pressure, externally applied coercion, internalized cultural imperatives, and individual pathology' (19).

Unlike many theorists, Meyers does not see socialization as being at odds with autonomy; she recognizes that socialization is an inevitable part of an individual's history, so the problem in autonomy discussions is how best to

account for its influence. She argues that personal autonomy is a matter of living in harmony with one's authentic self and she accepts that the authentic self is shaped by its socially constructed history and desires. Because the authentic self is separate from the socializing forces which shape it, it is possible for such a self to reject particular aspects of its socialization. The difficulty is that she defines an authentic self as 'a self that has autonomy competency and that emerges through the exercise of this competency' (53), which makes the whole structure appear circular.

Her solution lies in pursuing a procedural rather than a substantive definition of autonomy: the measure of an individual's degree of autonomy is determined by that person's possession and use of a repertoire of autonomy skills. Meyers believes that individuals all have dynamic, revisable life plans in which they specify (however vaguely) what they want to do in life by identifying certain basic values, interests, or relationships. An autonomously chosen and pursued life plan constitutes programmatic autonomy and provides the basis for specific, episodic autonomous decisions.

Meyers proposes that the skills necessary to recognize, modify, and act on one's life plan constitute each individual's autonomy competency. Autonomy competency is represented as falling along a continuum that ranges from minimal skill through medial ability to the ideal of full competency. Like other important life skills, those associated with autonomy competency are a product of both natural endowment and social conditioning, for they can be either enhanced or discouraged by the individual's upbringing; in fact, differential socialization plays a significant role in people's development of autonomy skills. Meyers cites several psychological and sociological studies which show how women tend to be socialized in ways that develop only *minimally* competent autonomy skills while most men are raised to develop at least *medially* competent autonomy skills; also, men are more likely than women to be fully autonomous.

Meyers then argues that autonomy is both a personal and a moral good, so greater autonomy is clearly preferable to less. She shows that at least medial autonomy competency is really the minimal level required for an individual to claim any effective degree of personal autonomy. Further, equal opportunity provisions are largely inaccessible to those with less than medial autonomy competency. Because contemporary society systematically stunts the development of autonomy skills in many women, it can be criticized on both utilitarian and justice grounds.

The analysis Meyers offers is important and well argued. She provides a plausible and useful definition of personal autonomy and responds persuasively to many competing autonomy theories. Moreover, she draws important links between autonomy discussions found in diverse areas of philosophy, including ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of psychology, and feminist philosophy. Richness is added by use of illuminating examples from life and literature.

Not all readers will be pleased with this book, however. The book is placed squarely within the humanist tradition of modernism and seems oblivious to

postmodern criticisms. For instance, in Meyers' view, selves and identities are essentially not fractured but whole — though they may be muddled and difficult to decipher. Further, although Meyers acknowledges and values wide diversity among selves, she does not really leave much space for the different approaches to autonomy that widely different needs, values, skills, or cultures might be expected to entail.

The women and men Meyers compares seem to be unmistakably white, middle class, and heterosexual. She does not account for the wide differences in socialization that exist among women (or men) depending on their race or disability status, nor for the corresponding effects this has on their autonomy competency. The gaps in personal autonomy that afflict First Nations women and men, for example, seem quite different from those affecting middle or working class white women programmed for housewife roles. Meyers would probably respond that her account offers a framework for defining and valuing personal autonomy that permits explorations of different sorts of failures of personal autonomy, but it is by no means clear that this analysis stretches so far.

The book is faithful to the liberal feminist roots from which it emerges. It provides depth and explanation of the important puzzle confronting liberal feminists of how to characterize autonomy in the face of pervasive oppression, but it is not clear how this analysis helps resolve any of the pressing autonomy debates that divide feminists (e.g., the 'sex war debates' or the questions of access to new reproductive technologies). Further, Meyers does not even attempt to respond to the multitude of challenges that other feminists have brought to bear against the assumptions and values of liberal feminism. Many of those challenges can be readily extended to this analysis: it can, for example, be faulted for its failure to address the diversity of women's experience and oppression, its commitment to masculinist ideals and values, its appeal to individual solutions to the political problem of oppression, and its trust in the very institutions that created women's oppression to remedy it. Feminists from non-liberal traditions generally insist on much tighter links between personal autonomy and political, legal, and economic autonomy (as well as different conceptions of political autonomy) than what is proposed here.

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**Hugo Meynell ed.**
*Grace, Politics and Desire; Essays on Augustine.*
Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press 1990.
Pp. x + 193.
Cdn $19.95. ISBN 0-919813-55-0.

This book makes an easy read. The eleven essays treat their topics straightforwardly, without complex analysis or tortured dialectic, despite considerable factual detail. Each essay identifies a problem in the literature, and then sets out references to prove a correct solution. University students can be informed by these studies, without fear of drowning. The attractive slim volume escapes with only about one typesetting error per article.

The authors preserve this easy tone from their 1986 conference in Calgary at the sixteenth centenary of Augustine's conversion. Most of them teach nearby. None are philosophers by trade, but profess disciplines cognate to the Augustinian topic at hand. 'Grace' is focused upon in three essays about Augustine's conversion. Three more on 'Politics' discuss justice, church and state. 'Desire' is studied in three articles upon Augustine's literary theory and practice, another on music, and an essay on the body and human values. Essays are not grouped this way by the editor; integration between the themes is taken for granted, but the editor and authors leave this for the readers to do. While essays upon grace and politics cite the *Confessions* and the *City of God* most heavily, it is *Christian Doctrine* which assumes the higher profile for several of the writers upon desire.

Editor Hugo Meynell's leading article affirms that conversion can indeed be authentic. Conversion is not simply assuming one culture after another; instead, stable norms for conversion are available in the agent's cognitive and volitive structures. A Maréchalean Thomism akin to Lonergan's is discernible. These norms are defended against contemporary relativism, as classically, by looking to the relativist's own need to defend her claims by using these same norms. A similarly psychological study of Augustine's conversion by Harold Coward shows how Augustine's memory of scriptural texts recedes before his study of philosophy, but then returns to reinforce the more metaphysical anamnesis of God within. Richard Chadbourne devotes more attention to Pascal's conversion than to Augustine's, contrasting it especially to Augustine's philosophical bent, his clericalism, and his angelism of doctrine but sensuality of style. Citing more the secondary literature, Chadbourne recognizes that these characterizations of Augustine are only partly sound.

What Meynell had called this 'dark side' of Augustine is what Margaret Miles faces directly as his 'dark undertow'. Resonance of spirit to the sensual and sexual order fares well in Augustine. But sexuality does not, for its concupiscence or compulsive grasping results from our disorder. Nor does social order, for as order it is reactivated out of chaos only by means of domination and inequality. Miles nicely states what she considers to be

Augustine's overgeneralization of his life into this historical strand: 'Augustine spoke of sexuality from the perspective of his own experience, and his experience was unfortunate, not only for himself, but also for those who have inherited the effective history of his ideas of sex', using Gadamer's terminology. But Miles sets limits she does not recognize upon this etiology, since she chides Augustine also for not sharing the 'satisfying and productive synthesis' in his own life that rose from his way of sin. Nor does she recall her own ripostes to her two problems: that sympathy is the proper attitude toward concupiscence; and that trust is the way toward interdependence which heals domination. Politics and desire are remedied.

Anthony Parel continues Miles' query about the deficiency of even the 'highest justice' involving domination. He poses the Thomistic critical question of why this is not enough to make up the 'true justice' of right ordering, even without a special illumination, since the natural causality of human nature still continues. Here as elsewhere in the book, the problematic regards more the Augustinian literature than any contemporary problematics at large.

'Politics' are not only the content of Augustine's thought, but also its setting, in two reference essays crammed with historical detail, more about the late fourth-century empire's paganism than about Augustine at all. Timothy Barnes argues that Augustine and the emperors inhabited a West which was still constructively pagan, and not a folkloric civic corpse, although Christians now could assume public office without the sin of embracing paganism. This is how John Vanderspoel explains Augustine's retractation of his youthful approval for there being more than one road to God: the pagans' self-defence was still being put forward; but it had shifted its ground to pluralism as its argumentative technique, while Augustine had shifted his away from Porphry.

'Desire' has a consistent structure through the four essays on aesthetics: scripture, poetry, literature and music are good, for Augustine; but as means and not ends, to use and not to love, for truth and not pleasure. Heijo Westra shows Augustine's ambiguity in this way toward even Christian poetry, as does Gordon Hamilton for even biblical literature and its interpretation. Christine Sutherland shows how love for the hearer unites the style to the content of literature, but with a new kind of unity, which would look like a split from the viewpoint of pagan aesthetics. At a similar level of depth, William Jordan develops Augustine's musical psychology, ethics and cosmology in such a way that, under additions to be made by Bonaventure, even pagan art can be appreciated. 'Desire' seems to have more resources even than 'Politics' for converting nature to 'Grace' without loss of the human.

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**Basil Mitchell**
*How to Play Theological Ping-Pong: And Other Essays on Faith and Reason.*
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co 1990. Pp. 218.
US $14.95. ISBN 0-8028-0544-2.

This is a collection of 13 essays written over two decades by one of England's most distinguished living philosophers of religion. They range in tone, as well as time, from Mitchell's inaugural lecture as Nolloth Professor of the Christian Religion in 1968, through papers published or delivered to societies and conferences between 1970 and 1987, to the informal piece which gives its name to the collection, first read to 'Theological Wine' in 1970.

There is a span, too, of topics, all touching in one way or another on religion. Several papers (e.g., 'Reason and Commitment in the Academic Vocation', 'Neutrality and Commitment', and 'Faith and Reason: A False Antithesis?') deal with the question of how the believer is to deal with challenges, from other believers as well as from sceptics, concerning the compatibility of that commitment which faith is said to entail with that neutrality which rationality in belief is assumed to involve. Others are directed toward the social outcroppings of Christianity: education, morality, law and politics (e.g., 'Indoctrination', 'Is There a Distinctive Christian Ethic?', 'Should the Law be Christian?', and 'Thoughts on the Church and Politics'). Still others probe apparent dilemmas faced by the believer in dealing with the advice of theological experts ('The Layman's Predicament'), or current attacks on apologetic ('Contemporary Challenges to Christian Apologetics'), or in dealing with the role of symbols in expressing the inexpressible ('The Place of Symbols in Christianity'). The title piece stands alone in standing back from the actual discussion of such issues and offering wry comment on the way in which such discussions are often — too often, in Mitchell's view — conducted in theological circles.

Most of the papers are, in one way or another, about dilemmas. In each case the problem is set up by citing a pair of positions that compete for supremacy in dealing with some question. Each of the outlooks has much to be said for it, and is advanced with the rider that one cannot have it both ways. So it appears one can embrace the supposed insights of a particular approach only by foregoing those of its competitor. One such difficulty has to do with religious commitment itself. It seems that anyone considering the matter must choose between the requirements of a religiously adequate faith, which bids us adopt an unconditional commitment in the context of things not easily believed, and the requirements of reason, which demands that we begin with a completely open mind and rigorously tailor our beliefs to the pattern of available evidence.

Another difficulty concerns morality, law and politics: it is possible to be torn between the impression that a religious outlook entails distinctive views on these points, views which demand authority in human society; and the

'liberal' view that Christian pronouncements in these areas are simply to be counted in with the rest of the variety one finds in a pluralistic society. And on a topic such as education, thoughtful people may still find themselves attracted both to a 'liberal' outlook, according to which learners are treated as autonomous, and encouraged to adopt no beliefs which have not survived strenuous examination, and at the same time to an 'authoritarian' standpoint, according to which it is permissible, perhaps even necessary, that at least some of a person's beliefs be imparted by others in a way that leaves those beliefs stable and dependable.

Mitchell has a way with these dilemmas. He presents the pair of options, each attractive but apparently dichotomous in relation to its alternative. He then considers carefully the claim of mutual exclusiveness, and seeks a way of recognizing the insights offered by each claimant without having to dismiss those of its opposition. In most cases, the outcome is achieved by regarding the competitors as extremes on a continuum. Insights are reconciled, and liabilities avoided, by refusing to accept the 'either-or' presumption made at the outset. So Mitchell contends, for instance, that a standard assumption making faith and reason antithetical is true neither to the requirements of faith nor the demands of reason. On the one hand, he holds it consistent with religiously adequate faith that one both seeks to ground it in good reasons and acknowledges the possibility of turning out to be mistaken. On the other hand, he regards it a necessary, and not merely understandable feature of reasoned enquiries that they contain a certain tenacity of conviction, deference to tradition and authority, and other features reminiscent of religious faith. In both cases, good reasons are seldom of the kind that brook no reply. And in both areas, the best protection lies not in 'neutrality' — abjuring all commitment to presuppositions, but in 'impartiality' — holding whatever convictions one has open to critical scrutiny. Similarly, Mitchell steers between the claim that the law should reflect Christian values on the ground that there is an objectively correct morality and Christianity contains it, and the counter that the law should not be Christian on the ground that beyond a certain 'basic' morality, value prescriptions are matters for private choice. Mitchell argues for the view that the law should be Christian only to the extent that believers succeed in convincing others that its values do, in fact, offer insight into the common good.

This summary may suggest that what Mitchell has to say is predictable and pedestrian. In fact it is neither. He has a gift for outlining in a winning way even those positions with which he differs, and discerning in them elements which must be retained in any final solution. His techniques of argument includes a strong sense of how discussions of the issues in question are actually carried on. His own are conducted by appeal to discursive, reasoned judgement — to which his commitment is fundamental and explicit — rather than by deductive inferences featuring numbered premises and conclusions. The style is distinctly non-technical; Jane Austen is cited as well as J.L. Austin, and a rich variety of sources from outside philosophy and theology are called into apt service.

While some professional philosophers may find the informal tone not to their taste — the collection is, after all, meant for non-specialists — the pieces are full of contributions to the serious discussion of religion. Would that everyone teaching introductory philosophy of religion, for instance, took into account the argument of 'Faith and Reason: A False Antithesis?' Anyone considering the intersection of religion with philosophy, law, morality, politics, education and academic life, will find profit in these papers. For those with a taste for style and an air of sweet reason, there will also be considerable pleasure simply in the reading of this book.

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**Elizabeth Pybus**
*Human Goodness.*
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991.
Pp. x + 149.
Cdn $40.00. ISBN 0-8020-5939-2.

Elizabeth Pybus explores two sometimes rival conceptions of virtue, the 'Kantian' and 'Aristotelian', in order to reconcile them. Courage is the primary virtue for the Kantian and generosity for the Aristotelian. Her reflections on this dichotomy encompass as well the nature and roles of autonomy, conscientiousness, learning, judgment, knowledge, and self-knowledge in the good life. The upshot is an account of goodness that is decidedly more Aristotelian than Kantian. For example, although courage is identified as the Kantian pole of the dichotomy, her treatment of it generalizes from Aristotle's notion of conquering fears to do the right thing. Likewise, although her treatment of autonomy begins with an exposition of Kant's views on the freedom of practical reason, she rejects his transcendental account as irrelevant to decisions made in space and time. Instead she substitutes a more plausible account of autonomy akin to Aristotle's treatment of voluntary choice, which holds us responsible not only for our actions but also for our character formed through past choices and actions.

The Kantian model of virtue sees goodness primarily as conscientiousness, i.e., willed effort to act rightly in rationally prescribed ways in the face of potentially contrary inclinations and obstacles. Courage, then, freed from the paradigmatic military contexts of Aristotle's treatment, is the virtue we need for living well in order to overcome obstacles, fears and dangers in the

pursuit of worthwhile ends. Its value is primarily instrumental in the service of those ends, but it has an important place in a humanly good life because it enables purposive living. It need not, however, always be morally admirable because some forms of courage may be enlisted in the service of self-interested or even evil ends. Nevertheless, P stresses the importance of good judgment as a component of courage.

Morality needs a place for rational judgments of duty that transcend and sometimes oppose inclinations and for an autonomy that allows us to assume responsibility for our actions and our lives. But a conscientious Kantian ethics is not morally adequate for several reasons. In the first place, being good is not always an effort contrary to inclinations and may enlist our positive feelings in ways that Kant did not countenance as moral. Feelings are not just predetermined givens of nature, as Kant thought. We can exercise some control over them through acts of attention, imagination, and choice of context and stimuli in the short term and a history of commitments and actions in the long term. Likewise our learning to be good through interactions with others, modelling and advice do not compromise our autonomy and responsibility for our lives and actions.

Nor can we be fully good acting only from duty. We must be capable of sympathy, moral imagination, ungrudging giving, and generosity of spirit and understanding to treat others fully as ends in themselves and objects of care. Thus P finds a generosity that encompasses these qualities to be more the essence of goodness than a merely conscientious or even courageous adherence to duty. Such generosity, too, requires careful rational judgment, since we must accurately assess the needs of other individuals to whom we generously respond, and that judgment will require elements of sympathetic feeling too.

Generous goodness requires a general commitment to do the right thing (the Kantian side of morality), but the specific motives for generous acts arise in direct sympathetic response to the judged needs of individuals who are objects of one's personal concern (the Aristotelian side). Kant and others have made a variety of attempts to formulate the generic requirements of duty. P finds Aquinas' 'Do good and avoid evil' to be the most illuminating as to the nature of duty in relation to goodness. Such an injunction indicates the need for a complementary affective/cognitive/voluntary virtue like generosity to provide a concerned response to specific human needs and thereby fulfill our duty. A person generically committed to goodness (as is our most comprehensive duty) will try to cultivate and develop in himself and others such a generosity of spirit. The dutiful but cold-blooded product of a niggardly nature that Kant portrays can begin to exercise generosity by recognizing his moral limitations and generously allowing others to respond to human need in those cases where his own lack of sympathetic insight and warmth would create a bungled response. He can also recognize that others have needs and desires that may be very different from his own stoic character and by listening, observation, a study of literature, and the exercise of moral imagination may try to develop the empathic insights and feelings that were

initially so deficient. He can thereby grow in goodness, as can we all except psychopaths who entirely lack such human capacities.

Goodness may be further illuminated by contrast with its opposite (badness) and deficiencies. Cruelty is the direct opposite of generosity in wishing ill on another. Greed, sloth, and cowardice sap the will to do the good that people of conscience know they should do. Selfishness just is the absence of generosity, i.e., an unwillingness to engage in sympathetic understanding and responsiveness to the needs of others. It may arise from an excessive preoccupation with our own concerns or from becoming embittered with life. Whatever the flaw or deficiency, though, we are responsible for these moral failures unless we are psychopaths completely lacking in the abilities needed to pursue goodness. Thus generosity and concern are the essence of goodness, selfishness its antithesis, and cruelty its moral opposite.

This book does not deeply engage other moral theories except at a few points. Kant and Aristotle are used largely as foils to work through P's insights into human goodness, and scarcely any other philosophers are cited. The chief merit of the book lies in its worrying through some elements of moral psychology that it presents largely through an appeal to intuitions about examples. Although theses are not crisply presented, some sense emerges of the interconnections of aspects of the moral life with a focus on benevolence.

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**Nicholas Rescher**
*A System of Pragmatic Idealism Volume I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1992. Pp. xiv + 327.
US $37.50. ISBN 0-691-07391-0.

For most of the past thirty years, Nicholas Rescher has been writing on topics in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Two major themes have dominated the works he has produced in that time: pragmatism and idealism. However, one enduring question about this body of work has been the extent to which it can be taken to be animated by some single philosophical vision. Is Rescher a systematic philosopher whose various publications form part of some single overarching project, the articulation of a core set of basic principles, or is he rather an 'occasional' thinker writing on many topics

whose interrelationships are perhaps suggestive, but not fully clear? That American pragmatism's roots reach firmly into the soil of classical German idealism is well known. But whether these disparate pieces cohere in Rescher's work has remained unresolved.

Volume I of Rescher's *A System of Pragmatic Idealism* is the first in a projected three volume series which is designed to answer this question. Recollecting and assembling the principal themes from his many books and articles, Rescher here begins the attempt to weave them into a single tapestry. The book is divided into four parts.

The first, 'A Normative Theory of Rationality' develops a general account of rationality as the means for 'effecting the resolution of choices in the best possible way — in line with the strongest reasons' (4). Rescher takes rationality thus defined as a survival mechanism and as essential to humanity. This in turn provides him with an argument against skepticism. The skeptic avoids committing to false propositions (misfortunes of type 1) by refusing to take cognitive risks. But this refusal compels the skeptic to withhold belief in many true things (misfortunes of type 2). Survival requires that we know truths in order to function optimally. From this perspective, type two misfortunes are as unfortunate as type one misfortunes. Therefore, skepticism is a bad cognitive policy. According to Rescher, human intelligence is a product of prolonged biological evolution, and all its basic features can be explained in evolutionary terms.

The second part addresses 'The Status of Science.' Rescher takes science to be in principle imperfect and imperfectible. It works because '*a world in which intelligent creatures emerge through the operation of evolutionary processes must be an intelligible world*' (103). 'Perfected science' is an unreachable ideal which yet functions heuristically in actual scientific practice. While we must operate as if our science were the best available account of the structure of reality, it remains 'our science,' and as such it is conditioned by our specific circumstances and point of view.

In the third part, 'The Pursuit of Truth,' Rescher takes up induction and the coherence theory. He defends induction as a truth estimating device based on principles of cognitive systematization. We accept those answers to our information-transcending questions which fit standards such as completeness, cohesiveness, consonance, functional regularity, functional simplicity/economy, and functional efficacy (136-7). Treating induction not so much as a means for making justifiable inferences as a tool for 'jumping to conclusions safely,' Rescher views induction as an example of 'the Hegelian inversion' (141ff), converting systematicity from a *hallmark of science* into a *standard of truth*. This emphasis on system leads directly to cognitive coherentism. On Rescher's account, coherentism differs from foundationalism because it requires no basic facts as starters for the cognitive enterprise. It aims at 'truth without true foundations.' Coherentism can do without basic facts because it can rely on data. For Rescher, a *datum* is a 'truth candidate': a proposition which could well — and will, if all goes well — turn out to be true. The coherentist begins with a set of such data and systematizes them

so as to preserve the truth of as many of them as possible. Rescher sees science as the systematization scheme which has best survived the selective pressures of evolution and is therefore the fittest means of rational selection. Understanding that perfected science remains an unfulfillable idealization, we can define 'truth' as ideal coherence within a system of perfected science. Rescher thinks that in pursuing truth we work with epistemic criteria taken as given. These criteria commit us to the truth of various theses. The pragmatic effectiveness of these theses in turn provides retrojustification for the criteria with which we began. Thus, the validation of induction and coherence are circular, but not, Rescher thinks, viciously so.

In the final section, Rescher turns directly to the question of realism and idealism. He believes that knowers are committed to realism in a number of ways. If there is a distinction between true and false in factual matters, if our picture of reality is to be distinguished from reality itself, if intersubjective communication is to be possible, or if there is to be a shared project of communal inquiry, then we must assume that there is a mind-independent reality. Rescher's distinctive combination of pragmatism and idealism is perhaps clearest when he discusses the validity of idealization. For him, the cognitive enterprise (indeed all human action) *necessarily* involves idealization. 'Knowledge,' 'truth,' 'law,' and 'system' are unactualizable ideals. They represent 'not goals but *values*' (302). But such values are not autonomous or self-sustaining; their validation is pragmatic and utilitarian. Finally, because there are many competing versions of idealism and realism, there can be no simple victory for either side. What we must rather do is to combine plausible versions of each and find a fruitful collaboration between them.

Throughout, Rescher operates within the conceptual presuppositions of contemporary analytic philosophy. This limits him. He might have taken even more from his study of classical continental philosophy and considered other possibilities: for example that 'reason' (as in Schelling) is not merely calculative rationality or that 'world' (as in Heidegger) includes more than 'the realm of physical existence' (257). Further, Rescher does not attempt to demonstrate that the animating principles of his book form a 'system' of philosophy in any strong sense. But while there are points of detail which could be qualified or questioned and arguments which call for fuller statement and defence, Rescher decisively demonstrates that classical idealism has continuing relevance for contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. This book stands as a major statement by a major American philosopher.

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**Robert F. Schopp**
*Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 277.
US $39.50. ISBN 0-521-40150-X.

No professor trying to present a systematic approach to the theory of criminal liability will need to be coerced into reading Robert F. Schopp's *Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility*! Any such person knows that the beguiling simplicity of the actus reus/mens rea distinction misleads as it promises to reveal a straightforward but principled approach to ascriptions of criminal liability. How is voluntariness related to culpability? And each to agent status? Where do contextual considerations fit in? Are we providing defenses, or showing failures to establish offenses? Is free will relevant? These questions beg for a structured approach that will give coherence to our judgments about liability and provide a normative foundation for the moral intuitions that drive them. In this book, Schopp provides us with such an approach.

Schopp develops a general theory of liability as accountability to an agent as a practical reasoner. He focuses on insanity and automatism as test cases for his theory, reviewing the frustrated attempts in both British and American jurisdictions to formulate these defenses adequately. The insanity defense, touted variously as a failure-of-proof defense, a standard excuse, or a status defense, is nowhere satisfactorily defended. The insane may meet all the offense elements, yet intuitively not be liable. Their ignorance may not parallel mistake-of-fact; yet there is no excuse of 'nonculpable ignorance of immorality'. And if psychopathology alone should excuse, we want to know why.

An adequate *test* of insanity is as elusive as its correct categorisation. Most jurisdictions, (notwithstanding a period of flirtation with inclusive cognitive and volitional tests) have settled on M'Naghten-type tests. Yet M'Naghten is haunted by persistent problems — must the criminal be able to (just) know or (also) appreciate the wrongfulness of her action; is it legal or moral wrong that matters; shouldn't volitional disorders excuse?

Automatism is as perplexing as insanity for our approach to liability. American law has variously treated automatism as an insanity defense, as defeating intent, or defeating voluntariness. British law is more settled, having defenses of sane and insane automatism, the former challenging voluntariness, the latter the agent's capacity to know, under the terms of M'Naghten. But the British cannot support the sane/insane distinction, for the 'disease of the mind' distinguishing them is understood so broadly as to include both sane automatism and conditions like hypoglycemia! In the absence of a defensible distinction, court decisions appear (unacceptably) to turn only on policies of disposition, rather than principles of liability. Schopp

proposes that the exculpatory significance of automatism and insanity will be better captured within his theory of practical agency.

Schopp's positive theory is developed out of Goldman's causal theory of action and Dretske's associative theory of structuring causes. Human actions are understood as caused 'in a characteristic manner' by the beliefs and wants of the actor. An actor develops an 'action-plan' — a proposed basic act (accomplishable simply be deciding to perform it) and actions level-generated by it. The liability of the actor depends upon how her action-plan maps onto the act-tree, which traces the acts level-generated by the basic act under the circumstances in question. Acting purposely, knowingly, or recklessly 'translates' into what is sought or anticipated in the action-plan, and acting negligently into what ought to have been anticipated. Voluntariness is defeated unless the act constituting the offense is part of an act-tree whose basic act is caused by the wants and beliefs of the actor in the characteristic manner. Thus, liability is shown to be a matter of practical agency, and one underlying model of practical agency accommodates the customary conditions for liability-ascription.

But how are we to understand the 'characteristic manner' in which wants and beliefs cause actions, avoiding problematic deviant causal chains and also allowing for explanations of human action by reasons, as demanded by, e.g., Michael Moore? Enter Dretske! The characteristic manner in which human wants and beliefs cause actions is by structuring causes: *representations* of the actor, her environment, and a record of success or failure in similar conditions, which regulates action. These structuring causes are, thus, reasons for action, and can be distinguished from 'triggering' causes, (which explain why actions take place when they do, but do not provide reasons for them) and the problematic deviant causal chains which lack the representational content that both causes and rationalises the behaviour in question. (The causal story told here is developed and applied to the free will/determinism debate in Schopp's last chapter.)

Schopp now returns to automatism and insanity, both of which can be seen as failures of practical reasoning. Automatism undermines reasoning by substantially impairing access to the 'relatively comprehensive set of wants and beliefs' which typically informs practical agency, and (by selective retrieval of learned associations) stimulates appropriate inhibitions. Thus, automatic behaviour is involuntary, since the basic act on the act-tree of the actor in question (albeit purposive) is not caused in the requisite manner. The appropriate legal categorisation for this defense is a failure-of-proof defense regarding the voluntary act requirement.

With insanity, pathological cognitive disorder undermines the capacity to draw appropriate inferences, or to achieve consistency amongst the relevant beliefs. Schopp argues that the defect in question is one of processing, rather than the (say) delusive content of beliefs. Insane actors may have full information (unlike their 'automatic' counterparts), but their capacity to assign it appropriate weight, or relate it to their standing wants and beliefs in the formation of an action-plan, is seriously flawed. Thus, they cannot be

held liable as competent practical agents. The insanity defense, so understood, becomes a sui generis general defense, providing a specific excuse which exculpates. (Here Schopp includes his proposed formulation of the defense.)

Despite the promise of Schopp's approach to automatism and insanity, some familiar objections arise. Rash acts, or acts of passion, hardly reflect our 'relatively comprehensive set of relevant wants and beliefs'. Aren't we liable for them? Yes, replies Schopp, unless our reasoning processes are substantially impaired by them. But how much impairment is substantial? That which puts our ordinary wants and beliefs 'beyond the reach of' the associative retrieval system, replies Schopp. But don't rash impulses and passions effectively do this? Perhaps we must appeal to the etiology of the impairment, attribute it to a clinical condition? But doing so would compromise the independence of Schopp's account.

Schopp intends his insanity proposal to help us 'avoid moral mistakes', partly by limiting the exculpatory scope of volitional disorders. Volitional disorders, he says, must interfere substantially with the actor's capacity for practical reasoning in order to exculpate. In other words, they must amount to cognitive disorders! Irresistible impulses, or mood disorders, being insufficiently cognitively disruptive, merely create 'difficult decisions', candidates for mitigation only. But are the traditional 'volitional disorders' so easily dispelled? Surely there are motivational pathologies too, like clinical depression or kleptomania, that implicate practical agency, but not via cognitive disruption. Can we avoid 'making moral mistakes' without allowing such conditions to excuse?

Schopp's book is a collection of treasures, to be slowly and carefully unwrapped. It brings the reader to the heart of current debates in action theory, philosophy of mind, social psychology, and metaphysics. It offers a wealth of jurisprudential data and reflection to the legal philosopher, as well as calling to order the intransigent legal and philosophical categories of liability. But most significantly, it vindicates the philosophical enterprise in the legal context, offering up-to-date solutions to some traditional problems that have vexed and embarrassed both law and philosophy.

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**B.R. Tilghman**
*Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1991. Pp. xiv + 193.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0594-X);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0595-8).

Wittgenstein (W) said of himself: 'Only conceptual and aesthetic questions really grip me. Others I may find interesting, yet at bottom I am indifferent to their solutions.' This suggests a man with intense cultural interests. By contrast, the portrait implicit in British-American Wittgensteinia is largely that of a cultural illiterate.

Benjamin Tilghman (T) makes us realize that W was much more than the philosopher of language that analytical philosophy sought to tame. His dominant interests were ethical/aesthetic and T directs our attention to the abundant resources W's work offers for doing aesthetics. Another aim is to explore some connections between art and the rest of our lives.

The ethical/aesthetic commitments of the *Tractatus* are explicit, even if shrouded in silence. But how are we to see the *Investigations* as a work in ethics/aesthetics? Admittedly W is not doing ethics/aesthetics in the conventional way. To find the ethical dimensions of the *Investigations* T urges us to look at it as a continuous reminder of the language, along with the form of life, that constitutes human relationships which are perforce moral relationships. W is sketching the nature of human understanding and misunderstanding that lies behind and gives sense to all questions of how we should live our lives in general and how we should act on particular occasions.

What animates T's argument is fear of the eclipse of the human. He sees in recent, especially in abstract non-representational art, 'a questioning of the role and the importance of the human.' Formalist aesthetics aids this eclipse when it claims that 'to appreciate a work of art we need to bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas or affairs, no familiarity with its emotions.' Aestheticism drives a wedge between humanity and art. T wants to bring art back into our lives. To do this he grounds understanding art on understanding people: to understand a work of art we must bring with us the same store of concepts we use in understanding people. He also insists on putting a *demand* on the artist: to display to us humanity, and in that way 'show us the meaning of life, what it is to be a human being.'

So art has a human face. This theme is elaborated by exploring parallels between discerning the humanity in a person and discerning the art in a work of art. Such discernments do not consist of the perception of some common essence, but of our practical attitudes that form the basis of action towards them. The real problem in our relations with people is not that we deny them a mental life but that we deem such a life inadequate or unworthy. For example, one feature of racial, ethnic or sexual denigration of others is that their behaviour, thought or feelings are seen as a parody or travesty of our

own. As somehow ersatz or impoverished. We fail to notice features of their lives that resonate with human significance.

Now compare this with the reaction of the British public and critics to Post-Impressionist art. Cézanne was seen as an incompetent, failed draftsman; his works were seen as parodies or travesties of genuine painting. There was a callous failure to discern his intentions and the expressive character of his works.

T goes on to diagnose the causes of our philosophical discontent: Problems in aesthetics and philosophy of mind are rooted in the mind/body dualism of Cartesian metaphysics. Both persons and works of art have a physical dimension. But by definition physical objects cannot be the bearers of such properties as intention, meaning, expression. So the *real* person, the *real* work of art must reside in the soul or mind. T is anxious to exorcise this ghost in the machine myth from aesthetics. And he takes W's achievement to lie in his insistence that aesthetic materials themselves, like the human body, display character and meaning; and that art is a means of indirect communication.

When people understand a work of art, they tend to resonate in harmony with it, respond to it. Perhaps it is like that in philosophy too. There is much to resonate with in T's rich and suggestive book. I mention only a few moments of recalcitrance.

*Tolstoyan Anxieties* plague the book: 'the problem of art is how to make the ethical, the serious aspect of life, a proper object of contemplation.' — What about art that punctures the bubbles of 'seriousness'? 'A moral demand must be put on the artist.' — Isn't this usually an effort to impose a partisan conception of morality on the artist? 'Art shows us the meaning of life.' — This smacks of the didactic, even of the idolatrous. In any event, such phrases obscure rather than illuminate art's niche in our lives. In place of such generalizations, perhaps particular examples of art could be depicted, and through them, various conceptions of what it is to lead a human life could be articulated and discussed.

W says somewhere: 'You might say: the work of art does not aim to convey something else, just itself.' How does T square this remark with his account of the purpose of art?

*Concerning human and artistic understanding*: If discerning the humanity in a person is a matter of how we treat that person, can members of other species than *homo sapiens* qualify for such discernments? If so, T cannot be charged with speciesism. But then we need an imaginative forging of an account of what it is to live a human life; an account that enables us to see such a life in people who are very different from ourselves and which does not limit our moral and aesthetic concerns simply to members of a biological category. This kind of understanding is not, as T thinks 'the most ordinary thing in the world which should not astonish us.' Rather it is a fragile and remarkable achievement.

*The differences* between understanding persons and works of art could use more attention. Perhaps the way T formulates his question blocks such an

exploration: 'What is it to discern the art in a work of art?' To my mind, a more revealing question is: 'What is it to see an artifact as a work of art?' Here drawing out the connections between the particular artifact and the existing corpus of art, the conceptual tools provided by art theory acquire salience as we try to fit the artifact into the corpus. And then we may even see the corpus in a fresh way. But if this is so, then art history and aesthetic theories are important to us. And this history and these theories have their distinctive twists and turns which mark *a difference* between the languages of art and our everyday language. T's strong anti-theoretical bias, which regards philosophical and aesthetic theories as sources of blind spots, prevents him from admitting these things. The sentiment of anti-theory should be balanced by a rarely noticed remark of W's: 'We cannot treat philosophical problems and theories too carefully: they contain so much truth.'

*To conclude*: This is an important book; it opens a new chapter in practicing aesthetics in the spirit of W. Of course, it is not the view from eternity. And I might as well confess the obvious: my remarks are glimpses from Saskatchewan.

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**Peter Vallentyne, ed.**
*Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xvi + 339.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39134-2);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39815-0).

This is a collection of seventeen essays, most of which were a part of a conference held at the University of Western Ontario in 1987 on contemporary contractarian thought. Vallentyne made it into an anthology devoted to David Gauthier's *Morals By Agreement (MBA)*, adding a few essays that had been published elsewhere. Some of the essays were re-worked in light of the conference discussions and the other essays, making for a very coherent collection. Vallentyne divides the essays into three groups, centering on what he terms Gauthier's three projects in *MBA*: (1) to defend a contractarian theory of morality; (2) to show that the initial position of the Lockean Proviso (LP) together with the bargaining principle of minimax relative concession

(MRC) characterizes rational choice in the circumstance of justice; (3) to defend the rationality of complying with agreements.

Part one of the book on contractarianism begins with a nice article by Gauthier arguing that contractarianism is the solution to the foundational crisis that secular morality faces. He defends the way that *MBA* saves morality from skepticism against three alternatives. Gauthier raises the 'problem of alternative compliance' for his view, i.e., why comply with these moral rules rather than some others? He argues that a contractarian view can only respond to this in part: the bargaining situation requires the agreement to be stable, non-coercive, and impartial, but beyond that many sets of rules are possible. There follow three theoretical articles: one by Jean Hampton on Kantian vs. Hobbesian contractarian themes in *MBA*, one by Vallentyne rejecting Gauthier's assumption of mutual unconcern by the bargainers, and one by Christopher Morris that argues that non-rational objects can have moral standing on Gauthier's theory. There is also a very critical applied article by David Braybrooke, 'Gauthier's foundations for ethics under the test of application'. Braybrooke argues that civil rights will have no guarantee on Gauthier's theory since the parties to agreement might choose to have greater wealth under authoritarian rule to less wealth under democratic government. Since, unlike Rawls, Gauthier allows rights to be part of the agreement, this conclusion seems warranted. It may not be damaging to Gauthier's view, though, if rational agents will only agree to authoritarianism when the alternative is extreme poverty. As Braybrooke points out, however, this depends on their preferences, and he argues that Gauthier is not justified, because he desires to defeat the moral skeptic, in assuming particular preferences to make the bargain come out right.

Part two on MRC and the LP includes two pieces on the LP, two on MRC, and one on both. Peter Danielson, in his article on the LP, compares three initial positions: a Nozickean natural distribution position which respects property rights established prior to bargaining, a 'noncoercive' point at which only personal rights are respected, and Gauthier's LP which respects personal and property rights. He argues in favor of the noncoercive point against the LP. Jan Narveson's article addressing the LP and the MRC takes the libertarian natural distribution position over the LP. Hampton's article on the MRC, reprinted from the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, rejects that solution and replaces it by her proportional solution. More generally, she shows that several bargaining solutions have plausible claims to be called just or fair, and that choosing among these requires moral presuppositions. Finally, an article by Wulf Gaertner and Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert provides a useful axiomatization of MRC and compares it with other axiomatized bargaining solutions.

Part three on the rationality of compliance is the deepest and most interesting section of the book, reflecting the fact that this topic is the most valuable contribution of *MBA*. Three of these papers came from the conference and were reworked in light of each other, and merit special attention. David Copp's 'Contractarianism and moral skepticism' and Holly Smith's

'Deriving morality from rationality' are both deeply critical of the project of defeating skepticism through instrumental rationality alone, while Danielson's 'Closing the compliance dilemma: ... ' defends Gauthier against Smith's objections. Copp argues that Gauthier's is the best attempt possible, but that contractarianism can never defeat the moral skeptic. The problem for Gauthier arises in his attempt to derive a general justification to individuals from instrumental rationality, when the recommendations of instrumental rationality depend on each person's idiosyncratic preferences. (This generalizes Braybrooke's point in part one.) Copp formulates this objection to *MBA* as a dilemma: the assumption that persons' preferences are non-tuistic is necessary for the response to the skeptic, but persons who have tuistic preferences have no reason to comply with an agreement that is rational on non-tuistic preferences. The second half of this dilemma is a problem for Gauthier, since preferences for positional goods, for example, will destroy the agreement. The first half is even worse than Copp recognizes; it is not clear that the skeptic should be satisfied by the argument with the assumption of non-tuism. As Vallentyne notes (74-5), non-tuism is not the worst case for morality, worse is the case where people are *negatively* concerned with each other.

Smith's article argues first that even if it is rational to adopt the disposition to be a constrained maximizer, it is not rational to act on it unless one adopts what she calls the 'rationality of perseverance principle' (RPP), which says that if it is rational to adopt an intention then it is rational to act on it. Though this principle seems problematic, her argument against it crucially depends on the persons being transparent, not translucent as Gauthier assumes. The second part of her paper purports to show that even if CM is rational it is not moral. Danielson's article provides a nice response to her criticism, showing that there is a strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma that is both moral and rational, though it is not exactly CM.

This book provides an overview of the important aspects of *MBA*, and most of the main criticisms that have developed in the six years since its publication. The book could have been improved in this regard with criticisms of the rational choice framework itself, by including an article, for example, that criticizes 'considered preferences' or the stark Humean separation of belief and preference. However, the book is well conceived and most of the articles well written. It is technical and requires acquaintance with *MBA*, but will greatly reward the reader who has a serious interest in contractarianism.

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## Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

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Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

*R.A. Shiner*