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Aziz al-Azmeh.
Ibn Khaldūn.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp.xv+176.
US$14.95. ISBN 0-415-03598-8.

This book, which is a reprint with updated bibliography of al-Azmeh's 1982 study of Ibn Khaldūn, is one of the first volumes in the series 'Arabic Thought and Culture', whose purpose is to 'provide straightforward introductions for the western reader to some of the major figures and movements of Arabic thought.' Although much of al-Azmeh's argument is concerned to challenge the 'undue modernization' (viii) of Ibn Khaldūn's historical writings by modern scholars, the book generally succeeds as an introduction to the main themes and historical context of Ibn Khaldūn's writings, and it will be useful both for the specialist in medieval Islamic thought, and for the non-specialist as well.

Ibn Khaldūn was a philosopher, historian, and jurist who was born in Tunis in 1332 and died in Cairo in 1406. His most famous work, the *Muqaddimah* (Introduction), which contains the preface and first book of his universal history, *Kitāb al-'Ibar* (Book of Exemplaries), has long been regarded as a classic, one of the first efforts at offering a comprehensive, scientific philosophy of history. It is the *Muqaddimah* on which al-Azmeh's study focuses, although he questions whether Ibn Khaldūn's approach to history is as unique as has been claimed by previous scholars, and he attempts to show how much of Ibn Khaldūn's work fits the general pattern of medieval Muslim historical writing.

Al-Azmeh begins his study of Ibn Khaldūn with a brief biographical account of Ibn Khaldūn's life, writings, and political career. The remainder of the work consists of three chapters. Chapter one explores the basic concepts upon which the 'new science' of the *Muqaddimah* is based, and the criteria by which Ibn Khaldūn determines the historical relevance of social and political events. Chapter two, which makes up the bulk of the study, consists of a detailed analysis of the *Muqaddimah's* principal arguments. Chapter three concludes with a brief examination of Ibn Khaldūn's reception by his contemporaries, and an assessment of his importance as an historian. In place of a bibliography, the book includes a critical 'bibliographical orientation,' which discusses the principal editions, translations, and studies of Ibn Khaldūn. While useful, it suffers from the obvious drawback of such annotated bibliographies in that it is not alphabetically organized.

Despite the fact that Ibn Khaldūn is often numbered among the principal philosophical thinkers of medieval Islam, particularly by scholars of medieval political philosophy, al-Azmeh's study of Ibn Khaldūn is not a philosophical one, and does not appear to be aimed at students and scholars of philosophy. It's principal concern is historiography and anthropology not the philosophy of history, and the study does not consider thematically Ibn Khaldūn's relation to the principal figures or problems of medieval Islamic philosophy, nor does it give much attention to the Greek background of Ibn

Khaldūn's thought. This does not, of course, detract from the overall attempt to analyze Ibn Khaldūn in his own context, against the background of medieval historical writing, nor does it invalidate al-Azmeh's analysis of such key concepts in Ibn Khaldūn's work as *'umrān* (civilization; organized habitation), *dawlah* (dynasty; state), and *'asabīyah* (group feeling, esprit de corps). But it does limit the book's appeal to a philosophical readership, and make its assessment on philosophical grounds difficult.

There are, moreover, a handful of specific instances in which al-Azmeh's allusions to the philosophical background of Ibn Khaldūn's writing, and to philosophical studies of Ibn Khaldūn, betray an intellectual historian's insensitivity to philosophical distinctions and perspectives. For example, there are several places in which al-Azmeh arbitrarily refers to Avicenna's *Najāh* in order to fill in Ibn Khaldūn's philosophical background, but in most of these cases what is at issue is simply a standard point of medieval philosophical vocabulary which has no particular connection to Avicenna. At other times, the philosophical parallels which al-Azmeh suggests seems rather overstated, as, for example, in the analysis of the parallels between a syllogistic premise (*muqaddimah*) and the title of Ibn Khaldūn's work (49-51). Similarly, al-Azmeh at times claims to find very specific sources for Ibn Khaldūn's philosophical principles and vocabulary which are questionable (and criticizes other scholars with a more philosophical approach for overlooking these same sources). This occurs, for example,in the discussion of Ibn Khaldūn's use of the notion of nature (*tabī'ah*=Gr. *physis*), which al-Azmeh associates specifically with 'Avicennian medico-physical discourse as it had been utilized among the Stoics' (52), overlooking the more obvious and more basic Aristotelian background which the term evokes. What is more, in this context al-Azmeh criticizes F. Jadaane's *L'influence du stoicisme sur la pensée musulmane* for its 'too restrictive and classical view of philosophy generally and physics particularly' (136 n.13), and its neglect of medical and alchemical issues. For the student of medieval philosophy, however, these associations seem far-fetched and derivative, and detract from our appreciation of Ibn Khaldūn's dependence upon the mainstream of Islamic philosophical thought. While examples such as these are comparatively rare in the study as a whole, they are indicative of the marked contrast between al-Azmeh's approach, and that proper to a philosophical study of Ibn Khaldūn.

As regards al-Azmeh's analysis of the main outlines of the *Muqaddimah* in chapter two, the presentation is generally clear, easy to follow, and illuminating. The main drawback to the analysis is an organizational one: the chapter covers roughly one hundred pages of this book of just under two hundred pages, and is almost entirely without subdivisions throughout. Al-Azmeh simply follows the main outlines of Ibn Khaldūn's text, and signals only the chapter divisions in the original. This often makes it difficult for the reader to see the overall structure of Ibn Khaldūn's argument, as well as the principles of al-Azmeh's analysis. It also has the obvious disadvantage of making it difficult to break up one's reading of the text. The book would have

benefited enormously from the introduction of further analytical subdivisions of this section.

Al-Azmeh's study remains an interesting and important introduction to the thought of Ibn Kahldūn, despite these relatively minor shortcomings. While students of Islamic philosophy may feel more at home with the approach of Muhsin Mahdi's classic study, *Ibn Khaldûn's Philosophy of History*, those interested in Ibn Kahldūn from a philosophical perspective will still benefit from the historiographical and anthropological approach provided by al-Azmeh, and from his summaries and analyses of the text of the *Muqaddimah*.

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Christine Battersby
Gender and Genius: Towards a New Feminist Aesthetics.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990.
Pp. viii+192.
$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-31126-8);
$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20578-6).

Christine Battersby's work (originally published in 1989 by the Women's Press Limited, London) is an important contribution to the fields of philosophy, art history, literature, and women's studies. It is a multi-disciplinary approach to a topic that has been traditionally either neglected or assumed to be clear and unassailable. Testimony to this fact is evident in Battersby's extensive historical research of the term, 'genius', (which constitutes the major focus of the book) and the overwhelming lack of critical writings focusing on any gendered approach to the topic.

According to Battersby, 'the gendering of genius' consists in the common assumption that any genius — past, present, or future — is naturally believed to be male. The belief is 'natural' due to the ancient origins and continued use of the term to designate a god-like male who is highly imaginative, emotional and sensitive (sometimes bordering on madness), who is bestowed with exceptional energies and powers that are funneled into creative production, and who succeeds in influencing generations of creators and (art) consumers alike.

Detailed analysis reveals that although the concept of 'genius' underwent alterations in meaning, it never fully extracted itself from its original ties to

virility, patrilineal power, and deitific status. Prehistoric cults of genius worshipped household spirits connected to the ownership, protection and cultivation of property passed on from father to son. The Romans modified the notion of 'genius' from the spirit that dwells within the *pater familias* to the virile powers possessed by such a man, culminating in the personification of genius in the form of the emperor: worshipped extensively as *the* source of patriarchal power (the *pater familias* of the State). Stoicism, Augustine and medieval allegory added the essential (for the purposes of discussing art and aesthetics) dimension of procreativity to the concept. The Stoics advocated genius as the divine origin of all creation, e.g., Zeus as 'genius on a cosmic scale' (59); Augustine tempered the notion to a somewhat humbler, Christian scale by proposing 'genius' as divine-*like* origin of all human creation (i.e., of man-made artifacts).

According to Battersby, it is essential to note that the creation of works of art by a man of genius became the male surrogate for actual physiological procreation, the act of which only women are capable. Herein starts the more pernicious 'gendering' of 'genius' that worries Battersby the most. For whereas any act of genius instantiated male power and male privilege that (thanks to Aristotle and others) excluded females completely (due to their 'natural' inferiority to males, lack of right to ownership and inheritance, and debarment from creative production of artifacts), the change in the act of genius to representing surrogate procreativity unleashed a host of other female (and feminine) attributes that became attached to the term and that have proven to be a plague to creative women (exluded from the accolade of 'genius') ever since.

It is the romantic era that is the apex of this change in meaning. Battersby argues that by the end of the eighteenth century, 'genius' became associated with the labor, pain, and sweat of creation (female attributes) as well as with imagination, passion, intuition, emotion, sensibility, abnormality and madness (commonly held to be feminine attributes). Gone were the days of anonymous creating, laborious imitating and an objective striving for beauty and/or harmony. Romanticism glorified individuality, self-expression, originality, and subjectivity, resulting in a usurpation of feminine values which 'should have given female artistic creators equality with males' (50). What took place instead was an appropriation of feminine characteristics for the exclusively male domain of genius that shut out females forever. Romanticism's legacy, which extends well into the twentieth century, is the notion of genius as a combination of male sexual drive and feminine psyche: 'the third sex' (103). Females, though of course possessing feminine attributes (being their authentic source), are incapable of genius; their works of art thereby suffer by comparison, relegated to the status of mediocrity, craft, or leisurely pastime. The derivative artistic and aesthetic criteria that remain in place today still impede women who seek recognition; they also impede the formulation of 'a feminist aesthetics.' Battersby intends her book 'to help women advance by showing the enemies that still remain' (23).

Though confined only to the final chapters, Battersby looks optimistically toward the future for women's art and the possibility of some sort of feminist aesthetics (she is more interested in being suggestive here than proposing a full-fledged theory). She takes many authors to task for being 'fake friends of feminism' (18) — Jung, Derrida, Lacan, and Cixous — and for impeding progress toward a woman-centered, *female*-based set of criteria for assessing the value of a work of art. Since a feminine-based notion of value ('genius') has been usurped by males, an alternative female-based model must be developed by 'appropriating the vocabulary of genius for feminist ends' (156). Woman's work should be valued for being done *as* a woman (and not *like* a woman, as a man might do) within a social and historical context that includes *all* works of art. 'The [female] genius is the person whose work (a) marks the boundary between the old ways and the new within the tradition, and (b) has lasting value and significance' (157).

Philosophers may find this text chatty, autobiographical and disconnected in parts, due partially to the author's intent to make 'abstruse metaphysical and aesthetic theories accessible to a non-specialist audience' (vii). The brevity of the discussions of Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche are particularly unfortunate. In contrast, however, are insightful revelations taken from many obscure (though highly influential) texts on genius. One of the most rewarding aspects of the text is the intermingling of the historical data on the exclusionary concept of 'genius' with the thoughts of women, past and present, who create in full awareness of that exclusion: Christine de Pizan, George Sand, George Eliot, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Wollstonecraft, de Beauvoir, Mary Shelley, Mary Coleridge. Whether one agrees with Battersby's suggestions for improving women's marginalized position, her analysis of the history of that marginalization is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of aesthetic theorizing, whether feminist or not.

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Leon Baudry
The Quarrel over Future Contingents (Louvain 1465- 1475).
Unpublished Texts collected by Leon Baudry.
Trans. Rita Guerlac. Synthese Historical Library Volume 36.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp. 454. US$119.00. ISBN 0-7923-0454-3.

Jeroen van Rijen
Aspects of Aristotle's Logic of Modalities.
Synthese Historical Library Volume 35.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp 238.
US$79.00. ISBN 0-7923-0048-3.

Jeroen van Rijen's book is a sensitive reading of Aristotle's ways with modal expressions. He is patient with the texts considered and tries to bring out the best in them. Although he is alert to parallels in modern logic, our own ways of doing things are not imposed upon the text. Chapters one and two lay out the program of the book and interconnect modal notions, namely those of necessity, possibility and contingency. Chapter three studies the distinction between absolute and relative modalities (to which I shall return); chapters four, five and six reconsider the evidence for the principle of plenitude, and the chapters put the brakes on the applicability of the principle in particular to *On Interpretation 9*. Chapters seven and eight are an interesting discussion of modal matters relevant to an understanding of Aristotle's modal syllogistic the apodeictic part of which is the subject of chapter nine, the final chapter of the book.

Van Rijen centers his study by means of Aristotle's view that if one thing implies another, then if the first is possible, so is the second and if the first is necessary so is the second (20ff.). He also focuses on the distinction between absolute and relative modalities. Since the book is very good on the notion of relative necessity and makes good use of the notion in discussing the sea battle issue in *On Interpretation 9*, I would like to emphasize van Rijen's contribution to this difficult matter.

Van Rijen formulates the distinction in a general way. Let us begin with his account of relative or qualified necessity (31ff). In practice van Rijen does not use the word 'absolute' (nor does Aristotle use the word *haplos*) to contrast kinds of necessity but rather to distinguish how things which are said to be necessary are said to be necessary. In both kinds of cases something is necessary relative to something which is correlatively said to necessitate it. When B is necessary relative to A in an unrestricted way, certain restrictions fall away from a characterization of A, and of these restrictions there are two worth mentioning: the 'if' of 'If thus and so, then necessarily ... ' and the 'since' of 'Since (or when in fact) something is so now (but could be otherwise), then necessarily ...' In the first case van Rijen offers 'inevitable, if ... ' (36) and in

the second, 'inevitable, because of the previous states.' But we pass to unrestricted cases with 'inevitable, irrespective of the previous states.' I suspect this is not a helpful way of trying to clarify the necessary without qualification. What then does it mean to say that A necessitates B without restriction or qualification? According to medieval commentators it means: nothing can impede A from its causal or logical force in bringing B about. And with respect to science a base of axioms and principles is necessitating in an unrestricted way. Does this mean, for example, that the denial of the base is self-contradictory? When we hear the term 'absolute necessity', we are apt to think of Leibniz and to suppose that that is absolutely necessary the contradictory of which is self-contradictory. But such notions of absolute necessity and possibility seem to be medieval and are not exegetically useful in understanding Aristotle. And so it still seems plausible that the unrestrictedly necessitating is a base which cannot be impeded from bringing its consequences about.

With regard to the modal syllogistic the necessitation is from term to term: from minor to middle and from middle to major. Given that the major is necessary, is it necessary relative to a cumulative set of terms or relative only to the last intermediate term? If the last term is necessary, there must be a necessitating term somewhere down the line but must every supporting and mediating term be necessitating? This issue becomes acute with respect to the Barbara syllogisms of modally mixed premises. And at least in the *Prior Analytics* it was roughly Aristotle's intuition that if there is necessity in the major premise, then the major term applies of necessity to the minor relative not only to the minor but also to the middle. For what a demonstration shows is not merely that necessity arises from the minor but also that necessity arises by means of the middle. And van Rijen opts for a *de dicto* reading of the syllogisms in order to make sense of an optimal set of Aristotle's results. For example, all unmarried men are necessarily bachelors and some people are unmarried men. If it is supposed that the major term 'bachelor' applies to some people and is necessary relative only to some people as people, an objector will reply that any person *qua* person could fail to be a bachelor; but if it is rather supposed that the major term applies to some people to be sure and is necessary relative to being married, then the cumulative effect of the reasoning would have us understand that some people insofar as they are unmarried men are necessarily bachelors.

Van Rijen's way with the thorny issue of the syllogisms with modally mixed premises is to introduce a notion of homogenous terms in light of an interesting discussion (chapters seven and eight) of *Posterior Analytics* I4-6. But that introduction effectively turns an assertoric minor premise into an apodictic premise and would rule out an assertoric premise which happens to be contingent. I think this is a too restrictive way of reading the modal syllogisms of the *Prior Analytics*.

I turn finally to van Rijen's discussion of the sea battle with this question in mind: How does the distinction between qualified and unqualified necessity help us understand Aristotle's reply to determinism? Aristotle himself

thinks that every future event which in fact arises is necessary relative to some time when it is brought about. But it does not follow that it is necessary relative to any time. Van Rijen writes:

> ... if a situation at a certain moment is such that a certain state of affairs is part of the situation at that very moment, it is irrevocable and necessary relative to the situation at that moment. What Aristotle is now saying is the following. As soon as something is or happens, its existence or happening has become necessary relative to the situation at that moment. Yet this does not imply that nothing would happen as chance has it. This would indeed be the case if everything that is necessary relative to the situation at a certain moment would also be absolutely necessary. For, in that case, the coming about of something at a certain moment would also be necessary relative to every situation at every moment of time of the history of that moment at which it came to be or happened. (127)

There is a first time with respect to which an event, say a sea battle, is necessary; relative to an earlier time it is not necessary — at a time when an admiral deliberates as to whether to start the battle. At the earlier time it is not yet necessary for the event to obtain. Nor from the unrestricted use of bivalence does the restricted necessity of the battle follow. So far so good. But what is the relation between necessity and truth? Is there a time when it is not yet true that the event will arise? Suppose that Tiresias, who knows the admiral, predicts there will be a battle. It is tempting to think that if Tiresias is right and it is contingently true and that tomorrow the truth will become necessary. Van Rijen translates a crucial passage:

> It is necessary that of the said contradictory pair one member is true and the other false. Not yet this member this and that member that, but [still] as chance will have it, or more probably that one will be the true one, and the other the false one, but not yet such that one is already true or [already] false. Consequently, it is obvious that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation it is a particular member of the contradictory pair that is the true one and the other that is the false one. (128)

Van Rijen opts for a coming to be of truth; in interpreting the passage of the text just quoted van Rijen writes:

> Each one of [the sentences] is either true or false, but as long as they are about events the coming about of which is still undetermined, it is not yet the case that a determined one of them is the true one and the other the false one. Which will be what, is then still as chance has it, and will depend on the course that the future will take. (129)

When he writes, 'not yet the case that ... is the true one', he implies: not yet true. So when the sentence 'The battle has started' becomes necessary, it also becomes true. Is Tiresias's sentence today 'There will be a battle tomorrow' contingent but not yet either true or false? I think van Rijen is in

a muddle here — in a kind of Aristotelian quicksand which eventually brings us all down (van Rijen himself helped push Hintikka under).

There is difficulty in balancing two pieces of text. One stretch provides arguments for holding: once true, it is always true to say so. Aristotle does not repudiate these arguments by any adjustment in a theory of truth. When Tiresias says there will be a battle, it is not that he is neither right nor wrong. Aristotle evidently thinks that being true or false or right or wrong is in time. And he does not give any argument for saying that Tiresias's prediction will start being true first tomorrow. Having given no such argument how are we to suppose that he is now saying that there is a beginning of being true as there is of being necessary? It is more likely that we are still meant to be drawing the benefit between unrestricted and restricted necessity. And since restricted necessity is so with respect to time, it seems sensible to take him to mean that a true sentence, if it is true, is not yet necessarily true.

The second book under review is a collection of texts assembled and introduced by Leon Baudry. Rita Guerlac has translated Baudry's introduction from the French and the texts from the Latin; Guerlac has added an abstract and a short preface.

Students of the period will be happy to have this volume. There is in the texts something for everyone: information of interest to historians of ideas and arguments for philosophical logicians and historians of logic. We will all recognize the picture the texts paint of academic life. The reader should have a sample of the translation; I have chosen an interesting text which touches upon an issue raised in the review of van Rijen's book, namely the issue of time and necessity. Here is the Latin text:

> Ut autem cum hiis idem sentirem inductus sum rationibus precipue duabus. Prima est ostensiva: quia nichil quod est vel fuit est impedibile ne sit aut feurit. Sed veritas aut falsitas propositionis de futuro contingenti est impedibilis ne sit aut fuerit; ergo nec est nec fuit. Consequentia tenet in 3(0) 2(e); et major patet quia, si id quod est aut fuit est impedibile ne sit aut fuerit, ad presens et preteritum esset potentia, contra communem animi acceptionem tam a theologis quam a philosophis approbatam. Et minor patet, quia si, veritas propositionis de futuro contingenti esset inimpedibilis, significatum ejus ex necessitate et inimpedibiliter eveniret. Si enim posset non evenire veritas ejus esset impedibilis. Similiter, si falsitas propositionis de futuro contingenti sit inimpedibilis, significatum ejus ex necessitate non eveniret; si enim posset evenire falsitas ejus esset impedibilis. (79f)

Guerla translates:

> I have been led to feel the same as they do, especially by two lines of reasoning. The first is direct. Nothing that is or has been is impedible, so that it not be or have been; but the truth or falsity of a proposition regarding a future contingent is impedible that it not be or have been; therefore it neither is nor has been. The consequence holds in the third

mood of the second figure. And the major is evident; for if that which is or has been were impedible so that it not be or have been, there would be power over the present and the past, contrary to the ordinary view approved by both theologians and philosophers. The minor is evident also; for if the truth of a proposition about a future contingent were unimpedible its significate would come about of necessity and unimpedibly, because if it could fail to come about its truth would be impedible. Likewise, if the falsity of a proposition about a future contingent were unimpedible its significate would of necessity not come about, because if it could come about, its falsity would be unimpedible. (46)

The wonderful brevity of scholastic argumentation is perhaps too brief for English, and we may wish to have the premises of demonstrative arguments set out a little. Now I have no wish to cavil with Guerlac's translation; she's undertaken a daunting task and has admirably executed it. But I wonder with respect to the text at hand whether there is a way of helping students take hold of the argument at the cost, perhaps, of a more elaborate translation. If the middle term is to be clear, perhaps the major premise can be put in this way: nothing that is or has been can be prevented from being or from having been. And the minor: but the truth or the falsity concerning a future contingent can be prevented from being or from having been. Therefore, the truth or the falsity concerning a future contingent neither is nor has been. (The end of the translation has a misprint which makes nonsense of the argument: 'its falsity would be unimpedible' should be: its falsity would be impedible (ejus esset impedibilis).

Although we are in Guerlac's debt for having brought a large collection of texts into English, it is tempting to think that a somewhat different use of her time would have been even more useful to students of philosophy: namely a judicious selection from among Baudry's collection and a commentary on those texts which help bring the topics to life which occupied thinkers at Louvain between 1465 and 1475.

Richard Bosley
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Ermanno Bencivenga
The Discipline of Subjectivity. An Essay on Montaigne.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Pp. xi+132. US $19.95. ISBN 0-691-07364-3.

Bencivenga gives us an eight-part essay, or meditation on the problem of subjectivity. In a way it is an essay, inspired by Montaigne, especially his treatment of the discipline of giving to our selves the second nature of practice and habit through defect of any other nature; without the discipline of self, we only vary and drift. But in another way it is like a meditation à la Descartes, searching for the irrefragable ground of self in the act of self-consciousness, even confined to that self-consciousness which is philosophical questioning.

'Those who talk of the death of the subject are the last Cartesians. They look for something, they don't find it, and they conclude that there is nothing there .... My answer to them — as I found it in Montaigne's book, ...' (127) has two parts. Part of what you seek as a self is not 'there'; you must make it, bring it into being, over and over until it 'becomes natural' (128). As it comes to be, in society, custom and practice, it is then like all other 'things': they come to be and hold their place among other beings, 'socially'. The other part of what you seek is in language, but is not a thing and 'has no name' — alternatives, negations, the free play of the mind, whose fruits, once named, tend to *become* things in the world, losing their free and separate sport as pure playful activity.

Bencivenga's earlier works on Descartes, Kant and 'a new paradigm of meaning' are cited in order to show what he brought about the problem of subjectivity to the reading of Montaigne, and so that we might follow how and why Montaigne seems to have helped to crack the nut of transcendental unity of apperception or a non-solipsistic Cartesianism. Issues of deconstructionist thought are raised occasionally, and at one point the author sees himself as deconstructing Montaigne's 'deconstruction' of 'aping' (121ff.). Already in the *Essays* we see the beginnings of 'method', the discipline of undoing what discipline has wrought (47). But rather than Descartes' ontological dualism as foundation for the questioning self's separation from custom and fixity, Bencivenga seems to reject dualism: 'There are no two worlds: there is only one, in which some things are done according to custom and some are done in new, unsettling ways ... most of the latter things happen by words alone, and only rarely do such words spread into 'real' actions ...' (101).

From this Bencivenga infers that, since Montaigne had noted that real actions are performed 'with the arm' and merely verbal ones only 'with the tongue', that therefore it is Montaigne's view that discussion is 'the most fruitful and natural exercise of the mind' [*Essays* III/8, p. 704 of Frame trans.]. The irony may not be intentional, though Bencivenga had contrasted what is real, under the conditions for 'things', from what is the mind's play

by way of questioning, coining new terms or uses, doubting, or freely associating — all acts typical of the 'inside' of the philosopher. He seems to have taken 'most fruitful and natural' to be inherently ironic — that if its fruits get 'outside', to the world, then they have left the free realm where philosophical language breaks the bonds of custom; they are no longer the mind's free creations. And if the free mind stays in play, with no fruit in the realm of practice, it has not been co-opted, so to speak. (My own hunch is that this is asking too Stoic a guarantee of freedom).

A philosopher's book is 'a small asylum where language *can* be used as a means of liberation and grammer can be violated.' If the revolutionary fruits of philosophical play get out and are put into the play [?work] of custom and practice, then 'another book will have to follow this one, another small group of revolutionaries will have to be slowly and patiently trained to undo all training, to practice taking practices apart ...' (113)

It seems that Descartes' mind/body problem haunts Bencivenga in a way which, as I have argued elsewhere, not only did not haunt Montaigne, but was psychoanalyzed, healed and overcome by Montaigne with a healthier, philosophical wholeness. (See my 'Montaigne on the Art of Judgment. Part I: The Trial of Montaigne', in R.A. Watson and J.E. Force, eds., *The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Richard H. Popkin*, [Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988].) In passing, he describes Montaigne as having a 'somewhat schizophrenic personality' (97, n.30); but the passing is along the way to closing the circle on his own reflections about the discipline of subjectivity which, in a way like Montaigne, might be best expressed off in a corner, in another footnote: 'Ultimately, it is this separateness, this revolutionary positing of an inside, that is responsible for the "distinction between mind and body" and for all the attending "problems". This means that such a distinction is to be conceived as an act — an act of negation and challenge, a political act — and as one that cannot be performed once and for all but must be repeated over and over again, every time "the public" appropriates the counterfactual absurdities dreamt 'inside" (127, n.22).

Montaigne scholars will find much to borrow, quote, dispute and discuss here; I have voiced one or two doubts already. Other philosophers, if they had been tricked by Montaigne's indirection and his sportive, self-mocking lack of philosophical decorum, will find here both discipline and fruitful doubts, playful twists and a steady questing toward the heart of the philosopher's life. A wholesome fear of reification continually counterpoints our need for discipline and practice. Philosophers will welcome this book.

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Susan Buck-Morss
The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989. Pp. xii+493.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-262-02268-0.

Susan Buck-Morss, whose earlier study, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York: Macmillan Free Press 1977), has become a standard text in the interpretation of 'Critical theory', has now produced what is undoubtedly the best book on Walter Benjamin available in English. However, that singular accomplishment does not seem to have been her intention, which is both more and less than that.

The material substratum of Buck-Morss' work is provided by the massive compilation of historical and literary fragments relating to nineteenth-century Paris that Benjamin collected and produced between 1927 and his death in 1940. Although Benjamin succeeded in incorporating some of these fragments into essays on Baudelaire and on the commercial arcades of Paris, the great project for which they were intended, the so-called *Passagen-Werk*, was never completed; nor was its intended structure ever definitively laid out. In its published form, as volume five of Benjamin's collected works, this material comprises over a thousand pages, heroically arranged by its editor, Rolf Tiedemann, in accordance with Benjamin's home-spun filing system and Tiedemann's own exemplary detective work. Faced with this evidence that must speak for itself in some unknown language, Buck-Morss is emphatic that she has not attempted to recreate the Arcades Project as Benjamin would have completed it — an impossible and hubristic task. Nor has she provided a summary. Instead, what is presented here 'is a different text, a story (of nineteenth-century Paris) told within a story (of Benjamin's own historical experience) with the goal of bringing to life the cognitive and political power of the *Passagen-Werk* that lies dormant within the layers of historical data of which it is composed' (ix). Not Benjamin's Arcades Project, then, but Buck-Morss' particular interpretive construction built from its material according to a plan drawn from her knowledge of the *Passagen-Werk*'s collector/author.

Following the generally accepted notion that the *Passagen-Werk* in its finished form would have been Benjamin's masterpiece, Buck-Morss brings the whole of Benjamin's corpus to bear on her interpretation. Furthermore, she rejects all claims that his work can be divided into theological, Marxist, or dialectical phases (associated with Benjamin's connections to Gershom Sholem, Brecht, and Adorno, respectively). In her reading, it is the generation and persistence of the *Passagen-Werk* that provides the thread tying together Benjamin's study of Baroque allegory (*The Origins of German Tragic Drama*), his book of aphorisms (*One-Way Street*), and his essays, letters, diaries, and other autobiographical writings. So the mas-

siveness of the Arcades material is complemented by the massiveness of the material necessary to make sense out of it and out of which it makes sense in turn.

The 'dialectics of seeing' of the title is Buck-Morss' interpretation of the method deployed in the *Passagen-Werk*, a method that derives from Benjamin's theory of allegory. Buck-Morss stresses Benjamin's view that allegory is an aesthetic technique employed to deal with a world of debased nature in which the meanings of things have become arbitrary and is therefore a technique that is appropriate to particular historical epochs. The Baroque was one such epoch and modernity (that is, the world of European capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) is another. But while the debasement of nature effected in the Baroque era was bound up with Christianity's confrontation with antiquity, in the modern period it is the result of the capitalist production process. In place of the Baroque allegorical emblem, there is the commodity. Buck-Morss points out that the 'abstract and arbitrary meaning [of commodities] is their price ... But if the social value (hence the meaning) of commodities is their price, this does not prevent them from being appropriated by consumers as wish images within the emblem books of their private dreamworld' (181). Commodities are objects adrift in a dreamworld that is modernity, and Benjamin's *Passagen-Werk* can thus be seen to be a work of allegorical decipherment aimed at a collective awakening from this dream.

Unlike his scholarly approach to Baroque allegory, the method of decipherment Benjamin strove for in the Arcades Project was an aesthetic one in which the object world would speak for itself through the artful juxtaposition of fragmentary material. In this manner, Benjamin hoped to bring the reader to consciousness of the fetishistic character of daily life, particularly with regard to the tyranny of the ever-new, exemplified in fashion. Buck-Morss insists that this awakening must be seen in terms of the liberation of the utopian moment present in things as dream objects, and that this liberation is to be understood in Marxist categories, entailing a proletarian revolution. It is this political project, she claims, that gives structure to the *Passagen-Werk*'s apparent randomness. She thus reconciles Benjamin's Kabbalistic messianism with his Marxism while fighting a subtextual war against deconstructionist appropriations of Benjamin that revel in the random.

The great merit of *Dialectics of Seeing* is that it presents an enlightening, wholistic interpretation of Benjamin's work through the fragments of the Arcades Project. Contrary to Buck-Morss' claim that this is just one possible interpretation of that material, she has produced what will be *the* interpretation against which future work will be judged. But in her very persuasiveness that Benjamin's project has to be understood against his own experience, Buck-Morss undermines her larger intention to reactivate his political project. The claim that 'the present as the moment of revolutionary possibility acts as a lodestar for the assembly of historical fragments' (338) helps us to

understand the *Passagen-Werk* but also measures the distance that separates us from its great collector/author.

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J. Baird Callicott and **Roger T. Ames, eds.**
Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1989. Pp. xxi+335.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-950-9);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-951-7).

The editors of this anthology start from the premise that the world-wide environmental crisis has been precipitated, at least in part, by destructive attitudes towards nature which can be found in the Western philosophic tradition. The aim of the anthology is to bring Eastern traditions of thought to bear on the problems of environmental philosophy. The editors hope that a familiarity with these alternative traditions, with their different views of nature and of our relation to nature, will help us to recognize the assumptions embedded in our own tradition and will provide us with useful tools for developing new ways of thinking about the environment. A further, more radical, goal of some of the essays is to show that the methodology and aims of Western philosophy are inherently antithetical to a sound understanding of the environment, and that a more satisfactory understanding requires a complete revision of the way in which we approach philosophy.

The volume begins with a foreward by Eugene Hargrove which examines some of the reasons why Eastern thought has largely been ignored by environmental ethics — the fear that Eastern thought can be dangerous to Western civilization, the assumption that it cannot be adequately understood by those raised in the Western tradition, and the recognition that Eastern traditions of thought have not prevented the abuse of the environment in the East. He argues that none of these concerns justifies the neglect of the conceptual resources that Eastern thought might provide. This essay is followed by the introduction by Ames and Callicott which, first of all, makes the point that environmental ethics is not applied ethics. It is not simply concerned with applying ethical theory to particular controversies, rather, the controversies it addresses challenge some of the fundamental assumptions of traditional ethical theory — its anthropocentrism and its belief in

the merely instrumental value of nature — assumptions which are both Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman in origin. They then give an historical overview of the use of comparative philosophy in environmental ethics, which proves helpful in providing a context for the papers that follow.

The anthology is divided into five sections. The first contains papers which address the need for a shift in the Western world view and the remaining four sections deal with Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist, and Indian conceptions of nature. The anthology ends with an epilogue which looks at the history of environmental degradation in both the East and West in order to argue for a connection between the way in which we think about the environment and the way in which we act towards it.

The papers vary considerably in aim and character. Some, like David L. Hall's 'On Seeking a Change of Environment', employ a discussion of Eastern philosophy to provide a vantage point from which to question fundamental assumptions of Western thought, while others, like Tu Wei-Ming's 'The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature', explicate or trace the development of particular concepts in the East. The papers also range considerably in quality — from the provocative but glib polemics of William Irwin Thompson's informal essay, 'Pacific Shift', to the careful scholarship of William LaFleur's historical study of the idea of the Buddhahood of plants and trees in 'Saigyo and the Buddhist Value of Nature'.

Several of the papers, such as the Hall paper mentioned above, Ames' 'Putting the Te back in Taoism', and Gerald James Larson's "Conceptual Resources" in South Asia for "Environmental Ethics"', call for a fundamental redefinition of philosophy, a complete revision of our notion of what philosophy should do. For Ames, one problem with Western Philosophy is that it is primarily concerned with logical order and therefore primarily concerned with the abstract rather than with concrete particulars, whereas for Larson, the major problem is the compartmentalization of Western thought into distinct disciplines and the isolation of cognitive pursuits from other aspects of human life. But though these and other features of Western thought may be shown to be incompatible with Eastern thought, and even though they may be shown to have facilitated, in some cases, the development of pernicious attitudes towards the environment, it is never satisfactorily shown that these features are actually incompatible with the development of more enlightened attitudes. Though it is convincingly demonstrated throughout the anthology that various assumptions of Western Philosophy have contributed to our reckless exploitation of the environment and that these assumptions need to be revised, it is not clear that any of the essays succeeds in showing the more far reaching claim that, as Larson puts it, philosophy '... as conventionally construed in the modern world since Descartes cannot adequately deal with the environmental crisis. Rather it is a part of the crisis and cannot itself be used as a way of dealing with the crisis' (p.271).

One weakness of the anthology is that the papers vary widely with respect to how much knowledge of Eastern thought they assume of their readers. Some of them give very little background; and there are no introductory

essays, or even bibliographic references, to redress this problem. As a result, uninitiated readers may feel that the anthology serves to detach the issues and concepts discussed from a more general understanding of Buddhism and Taoism, and it is exactly this isolation of concepts that is so roundly criticized by several of the papers in the anthology. Nevertheless, a number of the papers do succeed in providing a suggestive glimpse at alternative traditions.

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Avner Cohen and **Marcelo Dascal, eds.**
The Institution of Philosophy, A Discipline in Crisis?
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1989. Pp. xv+334.
US $35.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9093-1);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9094-X).

This book's 13 essays cluster around two questions: How are we to understand the schism between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophers? And how should philosophy respond to the announcements of its death by an assortment of 'post modernists'? The editors work in Tel Aviv, but explore American philosophy. They have recruited celebrated campaigners including Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Joseph Margolis, and Hector-Neri Castañeda.

Most essayists seem somewhat puzzled and most are worried, though Castañeda says he is pleased with current philosophy. Rorty, despite his drastic conclusion that we should leave the solution of serious problems to the 'poets and the engineers', offers an exploratory essay.

There is a measure of agreement that one cannot tell whether an assertion is philosophical or not without philosophising about it, and that philosophy has no necessary presuppositions. The consequence is a paradox to which theses like Rorty's provide a partial solution. Since philosophy has no boundaried subject matters, one cannot quite escape it. But one *can* philosophise about what it is not. This need not imply a muddled negative subject matter. Indeed, Rorty thinks one can talk philosophically in a way which does not create a distinct subject matter. Some participants take him to be urging that they give up traditional philosophy and substitute a not very well defined but 'edifying' discourse. Yet he suggests a positive task, for he defends the notion that philosophy ought to be political in a Deweyite 'pragmatic' way rather than simply poetic or 'scientistic'. He *does* then say that if we knew what we were doing we would leave the *solutions* of serious political problems

to the engineers and the poets. But he associates himself with Dewey and also says that 'although Heidegger was only accidentally a Nazi, Dewey was essentially a social democrat' (23). Thus Dewey's position has political consequences. The editors speak of 'the tension between Rorty's theoretical anarchism ... and his conservative liberal-democratic view of political action' (5). The distinction between Rorty's philosophy and Dewey's may not be clear enough to enable us to sort out these tangles. Still, though Rorty's critique of the Cartesian view of mind and knowledge is denounced here by David M. Rosenthal and it may be weak, his philosophy gains utility from his ability to provide a notion of what it is to argue philosophically against philosophy.

Failing a *theoretical* account, one can point to a body of historical work normally denoted by the word philosophy. No one denies that Descartes was a philosopher. One might argue about Pascal's status, but not about Plato's. Thus Joseph Margolis says that philosophy consists of perennial themes which take different forms in different historical periods, and that this unity-in-diversity gives it a defensible sense which eludes the criticisms of people like Rorty who see it as posing problems without hope of solutions. David Rosenthal argues that we see the real philosophical problems by escaping some of the narrowness of our immediate focus and examining our own solutions in the light of the formulations of past philosophers.

Mark Okrent reminds us of Rorty's view that the 'archetypical' philosophical fantasy is that of a state of consciousness which 'combines the best features of inarticulate confrontation with the best features of linguistic formulation' (177). Rorty's case against modern philosophy is built on the claim that this is impossible. The seventeenth-century theory of ideas was meant to achieve what Rorty says is impossible, and it can be argued that nearly all current disputes amongst western philosophers stem from reactions to the theory of ideas, yet no one examines this theory here.

These essays reveal (sometimes indirectly) other causes of the philosophical wars. The 'analytic' philosophers tend to be defenders of the culture in which they find themselves. 'Hard analysis' is often (though not always) associated with the defence of the hard sciences and 'soft analysis' (which emphasises the difficulties of dissociating oneself from the commitments of one's language) tends to defend the overall world view of the culture which the language animates, even if it provides the means for criticising specific aberrations. By contrast, 'post-modernism' attacks the notion that there can be a single firm foundation for knowledge and value and is anti-establishmentarian, even if it undermines rational criticism. In the phenomenological tradition, Husserl promoted what Rorty calls a 'scientism' which would rival the official one, but he did act as a critic of the establishments of his time. A.J. Mandt reveals much of this and says the dispute in the American Philosophical Association over 'pluralism' has been essentially political inasmuch as it centres on a quarrel between an apparent establishment (which thinks itself a meritocracy) and its opponents. Such quarrels can be resolved if and only if political quarrels in general can be resolved. Carlin Romano suggests that the disputes between philosophers are more

nearly like legal disputes than like scientific ones, and could be resolved, if at all, only in the same way. Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson see the possibility of a fruitful if difficult alliance between the feminists and the post-Modernists, but seem to see little hope for feminism in the techniques of the analytic philosophers. Despite all this, Castañeda argues that philosophers should not give up. They have achieved much in detail and the problems are too important and too exciting to be abandoned to the poets and the engineers even if life is too short for any of us to find the ultimate solutions.

Maybe, though, the most sensible and exciting paragraph in the book is one in which Hilary Putnam describes one of *his* 'fantasies'. 'If I dared to be a metaphysician,' he says, 'I think I would create a system in which there were nothing but obligations. What would be ... ultimate ... would be what we ought to do (ought to say, ought to think). In my fantasy ... all "facts" would dissolve into "values". That there is a chair in this room would be analyzed (metaphysically, not conceptually ...) into ... the obligation to think that there is a chair in this room if epistemic conditions are (were) "good" enough ...' (70) Philosophy *is* largely about the justification of beliefs, actions, and claims to knowledge. Yet, as Carlin Romano says, there is not much literature about justification as such. If philosophy could be a wholly objective undertaking it would be because there could be shown to be *real* obligations. Investigating Putnam's fantasy may be a necessary and even urgent task.

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J.A. Cover and **Mark Kulstad, eds.**
Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays presented to Jonathan Bennett.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1990. Pp xiii+336.
US$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-110-4):
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-109-0).

In its preface the editors state that this volume has 'breadth' and 'unity.' The promise of breadth it certainly fulfils but that of unity is more problematic and — as it covers a 'diverse range of themes' 'from doctrines of substance, to essence, to knowledge of necessary truths, to epistemic responsibility' — is hardly to 'be gotten from a quick perusal of the table of contents.' Neither does a careful reading of the essays themselves redeem this promise. 'All the articles are new, written expressly for this volume' (ix) and 'collectively, the

essays ... offer a new discussion of central themes in early modern metaphysics and epistemology' (vii). If (except for the fact that they all deal with some problem in early modern philosophy) their unity is hardly apparent, it becomes difficult to see how collectively they offer a new discussion. And although the individual articles are new, most of them do not begin a new discussion but explicitly extend one with a long history which continues to flourish in recent books and journals. The editors have promised too much, which is a pity, for in raising the wrong expectations they make this collection vulnerable to criticism which may detract from the excellence of the various individual contributions, some of which are gems — outstanding tributes to Jonathan Bennett, the philosopher whom this collection honours on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday.

Margaret D. Wilson's essay is one of these gems. In her *Descartes* (1978) she presented what was then the most thoroughgoing account of the difficult passages in the *Meditations* and elsewhere on formal and material falsity of ideas. This account, since that time augmented by herself and others (e.g., Chappell, Normore) is here placed in a wider context, that of 'the status of [any and all] sensations ... as "representative" (or misrepresentative) "of things"' (1). She concludes that 'it is possible to defend attributing to Descartes a thoroughgoing conception of "thought" as representational, even down to the hardest case, the objectless passions,' (17) a conclusion she reaches by means of a helpful distinction between 'referential representation' and 'presentation' (8). True, 'the case gets more and more tenuous' (17) and no doubt the last word has not been written on it. But as far as it goes, this incisive essay is a model of clarity, even when it indicates an area for further work: that in which, so far, 'the "referential" component of Cartesian presentation is hard to explain clearly' (7).

Wilson's essay is followed by four in which Spinoza is central: Woolhouse's 'Spinoza and Descartes and the Existence of Extended Substance', Parkinson's 'Definition, Essence, and Understanding in Spinoza', Garrett's 'ETHICS IP5: Shared Attributes and the Basis of Spinoza's Monism', and Curley's 'Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): The THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE as a Prolegomenon to the ETHICS'. Of all the essays in this collection, Woolhouse's best justifies the editors' promise of beginning a new discussion. Its thesis is startling: it denies the correctness of the centuries old tradition which identifies 'Spinoza's extended substance and Descartes's extended substance' and which 'take[s] Spinoza's view to be that the corporeal world is the one extended substance and is God' (25). His thesis, repeated at several points in the essay, is that 'for Spinoza extended substance is the substrate and foundation not of instantiations of geometrical essences' — as it is for Descartes — 'but of those essences themselves', (39); it is *this* 'extended substance (though not the extended material world)' which is Spinoza's 'God' (45). Woolhouse is able to muster impressive support for this novel and fascinating thesis; the fact that he indicates passages which are 'awkward' for his interpretation (see ft. 37, p.39 and 48) hardly detracts from this imaginative analysis.

I shall pass over the solid contributions to our understanding of Spinoza by Parkinson, Garrett and Curley, and turn to the last five essays: Sleigh's 'Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality', Brandt Bolton's 'Leibniz and Locke on the Knowledge of Necessary Truths', Jolley's 'Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition', Annette Baier on 'Real Humean Causes', and Patricia Kitcher on 'Apperception and Epistemic Responsibility'. Each of these is a worthy member of this collection; Brandt Bolton's and Kitcher's are perhaps the most interesting of this group.

Brandt Bolton demonstrates how, in the *Nouveaux Essays*, Leibniz attempts 'to supplant Locke's restrictive [because anti-innatist] account of knowledge with a more satisfactory and inclusive one' and that, in this process, 'Leibniz gives a probing critique of Locke's definition of knowledge and ... offers a coherent alternative' (220). There is one point at which I wondered whether she grants Leibniz too much and Locke too little, namely, when she concedes that Locke 'does not assign any epistemic value to sound inferences we make when we do not (and at the time cannot) attend to everything needed to show that the inferences are sound' (216). This conclusion she reaches via the example of a child recognizing the impossibility of each of the three children at her birthday party getting half of the cake. According to Locke (says Brandt Bolton) the child could not have this knowledge because 'she has neither present perception nor the ability to remember the connections among ideas that show the inference to be valid' (215). This would make the child's knowledge (if it possessed such knowledge) an item of 'general' or 'demonstrative' knowledge. In that case, for reasons stated by Brandt Bolton as well as for an important additional one (that 'general' knowledge requires universals obtained through abstraction, and young children are incapable of abstracting and hence of obtaining universals) it would be correct to draw Leibniz's and Brandt Bolton's conclusion. But why should not this example be one of 'sensitive' knowledge? Cannot the child *see* that if the cake is cut in half only two of the three children will have some? (It takes no abstraction to grasp that 'these halves' and 'those two' go together.) Here, it seems to me, Brandt Bolton allows Leibniz too easy a victory over Locke. (Alternatively, Leibniz's victory might here perhaps have been shown to be more extensive than it now appears: is there implicit in this argument the conclusion that 'sensitive' knowledge presupposes innatist principles?)

More should be said about this collection. Each of the essays in it warrants as much — especially Kitcher's, in which she admirably succeeds in her task of 'deepen[ing] our understanding of the ownership thesis' (279) of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. The whole collection, and each of its individual essays, constitutes the kind of tribute any philosopher would be happy to receive on a sixtieth birthday. Jonathan Bennet has been well — and deservedly — honoured.

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John W. Danford
David Hume and the Problem of Reason.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.
Pp. xii+228.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-300-04667-7.

John Danford claims that Hume's philosophy must be understood within the framework of the 'problem of reason'. The 'problem of reason', according to this account, concerns the general relationship between philosophy and reason, on the one hand, and experience and 'common life' on the other. Danford maintains that the nature and development of Hume's thought, considered as a response to this problem, falls, essentially, into two parts. First, we must consider Hume's *Treatise* and his first *Enquiry* (i.e., his 'epistemological works' [61-cp.9]). The heart of Hume's *Treatise*, Danford suggests, lies with the epistemology of Book I and, in particular, with the discussions of causation and the external world. Hume's primary concern in these passages, it is argued, was to refute and discredit the rationalistic, 'scientific' philosophies of Descartes and, especially, Hobbes (24-5, 40-5, 59, 74-5, 84-5, 190). These thinkers, Danford maintains, had driven a 'wedge' between philosophy and experience or 'common life' (24-5). By emphasizing the limits and weakness of human understanding Hume exposes the vulnerability of Hobbes's and Descartes's scientific ambitions and, in this way, he seeks to return philosophy to the secure and appropriate foundations of 'common life' and everyday experience.

Shortly after Hume published the *Treatise* there was, Danford claims, a 'shift ' in his thinking on these matters (28). This shift is represented most clearly in his later works: the *Essays*, the *History*, and the *Dialogues* (10, 33, 77, 88, 108). Danford firmly rejects the suggestion that these works represent a turning away from philosophy. On the contrary, it is these later works, taken together, which constitute Hume's most mature *philosophy*. Indeed, they are, Danford says, the 'flower of Hume's philosophic career' (10). The mature philosophy of Hume, it is argued, must be interpreted as '*political* philosophy'. It is political philosophy in the sense that it attempts to investigate human life in its full diversity and complexity and, on this basis, it seeks to provide us with some general guide as to how we should live (10, 77, 88-9, 183-6). From the 'teachings' of the *History* and the *Essays* Danford draws some lessons that are 'valid for all times' (112 and 114). The inspirational message concerns, roughly, the merits of capitalism (see, e.g., p.131: 'The increase in personal liberty, then, was and is directly connected to the growth of commerce ...,' and p.137: '... the central lesson of British history [is] the superiority of liberal commercial society ...'). Given this account of things it is, perhaps, not particularly surprising to read that Danford interprets Hume's moral philosophy in the same (commercial) spirit: 'We are now in a position to appreciate the genuine originality of Hume's moral philosophy. Its great complexity results from Hume's efforts not to distort the perspective of common life ... It avoids the dangerous distortions of philosophic moral

systems which teach that virtue is rigorous and austere ... It might be described as a *Nicomachean Ethics* for liberal commercial society ...'(158-61).

Danford keeps descending, lower and lower, until he hits rock bottom with his interpretation of the significance of Hume's *Dialogues* (Ch.9). The *Dialogues*, it is said, should be read as a work that is concerned with a '*political* problem' (169-70). More specifically, the *Dialogues* should be read 'as a forewarning of the dangers of scientific reason' (170). That is to say, political life needs to be defended against the 'dangerous' influence of a conception of science and philosophy which is removed from 'common life' and, thereby, indirectly, brings about or produces 'abject superstition' (183). The upshot of all this is that the *Dialogues* is to be viewed as an effort to *discredit* the sort of philosophical scepticism which teaches us that we cannot know anything about the nature of the divine being (180). Hume hopes to replace such scepticism with a 'politically responsible theology' of the sort that Cleanthes argues for (183). Philo, according to Danford, represents not so much 'too much reason' as 'unpolitical or irresponsible reason' (184). The basic mistake of the radical sceptic (Philo) on these matters is that he supposes that it is possible for men to cease believing 'in some principles of religion' (182).

To consider or comment on the central theses of this book in any detail would be to flatter it well beyond its merits. I will, therefore, make only two brief criticisms of a specific nature, and then close with some remarks of a more general character.

(1) in *A Letter from a Gentleman* (1745) Hume makes it very plain that one of the principal targets of his (series of) sceptical arguments in the *Treatise* was Samuel Clarke. Clarke's highly influential philosophy was a demonstration of 'truth and certainty of the Christian Religion'. It was, first and foremost, put forward as an 'answer' to the 'atheistic' philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. It is impossible to form even the most remote and general understanding of Hume's philosophical intentions and development without a least *taking note* of the *Letter* and the light that it sheds on Hume's concern with Clarke's philosophy. Danford entirely ignores both Hume's *Letter* and — partly in consequence of this — Clarke's philosophy. These facts go *some* way to explaining Danford's bizarre distortion of Hume's intentions in the *Treatise* and the *Dialogues*. Quite simply, Danford has stood Hume on his head and turned him inside-out — all that is left is shredded stuffing.

(2) Danford shows little or no sign of regarding his grouping of Hume's 'mature' philosophy (i.e., the *Essays*, the *History*, and the *Dialogues*) as prima facie awkward. The varied and diverse character of these works and, indeed, of the essays themselves, gives Danford no pause for second thoughts. Nor, apparently, is he disconncerted by the fact that at least one member of this set, the *Dialogues*, substantially overlaps in *content* with both the *Treatise* and the first *Enquiry*, and this bears much closer resemblance to these works than it does to its 'mature' partners. Suffice it to say that the arbitrary and misleading nature of this grouping provides, in itself, clear evidence against Danford's strange theses about the nature and development of Hume's thought.

The (distorted) picture of Hume's philosophy which emerges from Danford's study requires some explanation, and Danford provides us with it. In his Introduction he forewarns us of his cavalier attitude to the historical aspect of his interpretation. He tells us there that 'the historical and biographical circumstances of Hume's career are largely passed over in this study' (12). He points out, furthermore, that the existence of the 'philosophical tradition' in which he proposes to place [sink] Hume's philosophy is one which he 'largely takes for granted'. Given this, it is hardly any wonder that his interpretation is so out of touch with historical *fact*. The philosophical shortcomings of Danford's study can also be easily accounted for. A large section of Danford's Introduction is devoted to a diatribe against 'rigorous philosophy' (6-7). Certainly Danford practices what he preaches — there is no 'rigour' to be found in this work. The analysis is vague and imprecise throughout. When Danford does make any effort to substantiate his claims — and he often does not — he relies almost exclusively on the 'impressionistic' use of quotations rather than on careful and precise attention to textual detail.

When a study is unguided by fact (i.e., historically reckless) and it is uncontrolled by reason (i.e., lacks basic analytic precision and detail) then it is very likely that it will give rise to an interpretation that is more original than convincing. Danford's study constitutes, in my opinion, nothing more than intellectual assault and battery against one of 'the great dead philosophers'.

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Stephen T. Davis, ed.
Death and After-Life.
London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1989.
Pp. v+211. ISBN 0-33348044-9.

Davis' book consists of a collection of papers and critical comments which were presented at a conference on death and after-life at the Claremont Graduate School in 1987. Among the essays is a defense of reincarnation by Joseph Prabhu, a Whiteheadean approach to personal survival of death by David Ray Griffin and a Zen Buddhist defense of the thesis that the illusion of self is destroyed by death by Francis H. Cook. The volume also contains a defense of the traditional Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection by Stephen T. Davis (the editor), a defense of a dualist conception of life after death by Paul Badham and arguments by John Hick that a) his soul-making

theodicy is a viable explanation of the world's suffering and b) that it entails that human beings continue to undergo the process of soul-making after earthly death. Hick advances the thesis that a reincarnationist version of the process of soul-making is not implausible. Finally, Kai Nielsen brings skeptical comments to bear on a number of these papers.

Rather than trying to discuss each of the papers within the brief scope of this review, I shall simply comment critically on some of Hick's and Nielsen's contributions. I shall begin with Hick's theory of soul-making and immortality.

Hick holds that thinking of suffering as being an essential component of an evolution of human persons toward fitness to be in close communion with God is as sound an interpretation of our earthly predicament as the prevailing, naturalistic interpretation of the world and its woes. But I think that, barring a cogent argument for God's existence, Hick is wrong here. For it looks very much as though, whatever may be true of human suffering, the soulmaking theodicy breaks down vis-à-vis the suffering of *wild animals*, much of which is simply *not* an occasion for human soul-making. It follows that Hick needs to supplement his theodicy with the thesis that animal suffering has to do with non-human soul-making or, perhaps, to depart altogether from the soul-making theodicy and to posit an indiscernible end, which is served by the suffering of wild animals and which is valuable enough to outweigh the negative value of that suffering. But, whichever alternative Hick might come to accept, he would be positing unobserved, and, barring evidence for God's existence, unevidenced entities. And it is far from clear that that would be an epistemically legitimate move.

Another problem for Hick's claim that a long history of coping with the suffering of one's self and others is necessary for final blessedness is that, since God is omnipotent, Hick needs to maintain that the envisaged evolution of the human soul is *logically* necessary for becoming a fit spiritual companion of God. And I, for one, find this doubtful. Why couldn't an omnipotent being have created persons who were fit to be in close communion with him right from the start?

A version of the soul-making theodicy which avoids this criticism is as follows: The negative value of suffering is compensated for by virtuous (i.e., charitable) responses to suffering, which are, of course, such that suffering *is* logically necessary for *them*. But this version of the soul-making theodicy does not entail that human beings survive earthly death, only that there are enough virtuous responses to suffering in *this* world to outweigh the negative value of the suffering (a claim which is wrecked once again on the rocks of the suffering of wild animals).

As against Badham and Davis, both of whom defend (and need) the claim that there is such a thing as human disembodied existence, however incomplete a human being may be without a body, Kai Nielsen argues in effect as follows: Mere seeming recollections of some past experiences of a given human person, Hans, do not guarantee that the seeming recollector is indeed, Hans; for to claim that his seeming recollections are veridical is already to be

committed to the thesis that the seeming recollector is Hans. If he is not, then his seeming recollections, though they may strongly resemble Hans's recollections, are non-veridical. Moreover saying that what guarantees that the seeming recollector is Hans is a disembodied soul, which is uniquely Hans's, is in effect making an unverifiable utterance (presumably because we cannot observe souls as we can observe bodies), which is therefore unacceptable.

I have two reservations about this criticism. First, if someone communicates through a medium extensive seeming recollections of many of the details of Hans's past life, and if I know the relevant facts about his biography and also know that the medium was hitherto unacquainted with it, then it is surely not the case that, if I conclude that it is really Hans with whom the medium is in contact, I will be subject to being charged with circularity, on the ground that I cannot know that the seeming recollections are veridical unless I already know that it is Hans who has them.

Secondly, it is simply false that I cannot verify that the envisaged individual is Hans, if that is supposed to mean that I cannot even conceive of what it would be like to get evidence for the claim that he is really Hans. For I can easily conceive of the following state of affairs: a) I meet an individual, B, who appears to be of impeccable moral character, and who provides me with a way of checking on whether he is telling the truth when he answers questions. b) I follow B around for aeons and discover that, on each of very many occasions on which B is asked a question, he tells the truth. (B tells, say, a billion truths in my presence.) c) I finally ask B whether in fact it was Hans himself who communicated with the contemplated medium, and B says 'yes'. Under these circumstances I would have a huge amount of ennumerative inductive evidence that the medium has indeed been in contact with Hans. (It should be noted that the conceivability of the envisaged truth-teller renders the principle of verifiability impotent vis-à-vis *any* allegedly unverifiable, but philosophically interesting, thesis.)

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Richard De George
Business Ethics: Third edition.
New York: MacMillan 1990
Pp. x+486. Cdn. $36.50; ISBN 0-02-328011-5

This is the third edition of a text originally published in 1982. As De George mentions in his preface (v), courses in business ethics and literature in the field have greatly increased since the text was originally introduced. Indeed, business ethics is a growth industry! Since De George's book has survived

the competition, this must provide prima facie evidence of it's value according to conventional business wisdom. In my opinion this text *deserves* to survive. De George not only provides students with a background in ethics that gives them indispensable tools for analysing the issues but his treatment of issues themselves is intelligent and reasonably thorough. De George makes no attempt to gloss over difficulties or to provide the student with simplistic solutions to complex questions. The range of issues covered, as well as the depth of coverage, is impressive. There is mostly meat and little fat (pace vegetarians) in this text. However, since the text is now over four hundred pages in length, perhaps in future editions consideration should be given to eliminating some topics.

Altogether, De George's text contains twenty one separate chapters covering an extremely wide area, ranging from the justice of economic systems (Chapter 6) to computer ethics (Chapter 14). The first chapter, Ethics and Business, tackles head on what De George calls the Myth of Amoral Business. De George argues that ethics are an essential aspect of business decision-making and that the public is demanding that businesses consider the moral dimensions of their activities. This theme runs throughout the text and is again emphasized in the concluding chapter, The New Moral Imperative for Business. In that chapter, De George argues that business can no longer consider itself amoral nor responsible only to shareholders but 'must now consider the worker, consumer, and the general public as well as the shareholder..in making decisions' (455-6). Both the good and the rights of all must be considered. De George maintains consistently a relatively liberal view of the obligations of business, and is quite critical not only of the position that business is amoral but also of the limited view of business's responsibility found in authors such as Milton Friedman.

After making preliminary distinctions between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and meta-ethics, De George outlines what he takes to be the main tasks of business ethics. The following chapters provide an extensive overview of traditional ethics including separate chapters on Utilitarianism (Chapter 3) and deontological approaches to ethics (most of Chapter 4). De George devotes close to one hundred pages of the text to a discussion of those parts of ethics he feels most important for his purposes. For the most part this is well done and there are short but pithy treatments of such important issues as moral responsibility and ethical relativism. At the end of each chapter De George provides helpful discussion and review questions; as well, there is a list of references for further reading in a bibliography at the end of the text. I find several minor difficulties in De George's treatment of ethics and I deal with those now.

De George has too restrictive a definition of 'deontology'. De George writes: 'Deontologists maintain that actions are morally right or wrong independent of their consequences' (63). This description leaves theorists such as W.D. Ross and W.K. Frankena somewhat in limbo since they hold principles which are *both* consequentialist and non-consequentalist. De George's subsequent discussion of Ross' prima facie duties (73) fails to note that Ross is not a

deontologist in the sense that De George has defined that term. It would help if De George were to distinguish between 'pure' deontologists, who hold consequences are not relevant *at all* to moral rightness or wrongness of acts, and 'mixed' theorists, who hold both consequentialist and non-consequentialist principles.

De George also seems to ignore the distinction between rule theorists and act theorists as applied to deontologists; indeed De George suggests that the deontological tradition holds that an action is right if it conforms to the moral law which he interprets as having a certain *form* (66). While this may be true of some deontologists it does not seem to be true of all; in particular, it does not seem true of Ross, who is a mixed deontologist. Ross' appeal to intuition in deciding between the relative strength of prima facie obligations seems to have nothing to do with form or applying a rule as compared to apprehending sensitively all the relevant features of the alternative acts. Aside from a few lapses of this kind, De George does provide the student with a quite intelligible and reasonably thorough background of ethical concepts of use to the student in analysing issues in business ethics.

Having completed his survey of ethics, De George devotes the next fifteen chapters to moral issues in business. As well as covering the relatively standard areas discussed in most texts such as environmental protection, consumer safety, ethical issues in advertising, etc., De George devotes considerable space to the general question of the justice of economic systems. One of the potential disadvantages of a text written by one author as compared to a collection of papers on the relevant issues is that the author must present all sides of an issue, including views with which the author may not have much sympathy. For the most part, De George is able to carry out this task with considerable skill and empathy. De George is obviously not a Marxist; nevertheless he manages to provide a basic and quite intelligible summary of some of the key aspects of a Marxist critique of capitalism. Although I found his response to the critique rather summary, De George deserves credit for providing students with at least some basic background for making intelligent judgments on this most general and basic issue of the morality of economic systems. Many texts shy away from the issue altogether. In his defense of American capitalism from a moral point of view, De George compares it with the former communist regimes for the most part, rather than with countries such as Sweden or Germany (West) where capitalism has been modified considerably by social democratic movements. Given the kind of principles De George adopts concerning worker's rights, a right to a minimal standard of living and so forth, it would seem that at least among forms of capitalism those countries such as Sweden and Germany with extensive systems of worker's rights and welfare entitlements are more in line with De George's ideals than the U.S. capitalism which De George defends.

Another area De George stresses is that of worker's rights. In contrast to some U.S. texts, he also deals at some length with ethical issues having to do with unions such as the right to strike, closed shops and 'right to work'

laws. It is refreshing to find a text that seriously considers labor issues in some considerable depth. This broadness of vision extends throughout the text and perhaps on occasion leads De George to deal with issues that in the opinion of some might be regarded as peripheral to business and ethics. For example, the penultimate chapter deals with ethical issues concerning American consumption of scarce resources such as oil, and the obligation of business to those who are starving in the third world.

There are a few minor faults I would point out before closing. De George tends to use 'he' in the vast majority of cases to include both genders. To be fair he does in an example make a vice-president 'she' and a secretary 'he'! In at least one instance I noted the term 'thusly' (351), a usage I thought confined to first-year students inhabiting the outer limits of civilisation such as Manitoba. There are a number of places where the wrong words are used. On p. 227 it is said that the terms 'true' and 'false' are *predicted* of sentences or propositions rather than 'predicated'. This may be a typesetting error but another case on p. 213 is probably due to De George. Speaking of conditions required for an obligation to blow the whistle, De George writes: 'The conditions are too permissive for those who wish everyone to be ready and willing to blow the whistle whenever there is a chance that the public will be harmed' (213). Presumably De George means too 'restrictive'.

If one is searching for an original text rather than a selection of articles, I highly commend this book for courses in business ethics. The range of issues covered provide the instructor with a wide choice and all are dealt with in some depth. De George's book is filled with many clear well articulated *arguments* that provide students with exemplars of the kind of writing and argumentative skills one hopes students will develop. One might perhaps prefer a bit more in the way of wit and sparkle in the style; however, the merits of the substance atone for any cavils about the style. A combination of this text with selected articles would provide an excellent base of text material for any introductory business and ethics course.

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Clement Dore
God, Suffering and Solipsism.
New York: St. Martin's Press 1989.
Pp. x+120. US $35.00. ISBN 0-312-02368-5.

My reaction to this book is a mixed one. Dore deals with important topics in a provocative and original way. Many parts of the book make contributions which deserve careful consideration. Moreover, this is a sophisticated, engaging, and philosophically interesting piece of work. The book is crisp and energetic in style, and generally a pleasure to read. Nevertheless the main line of argument is unconvincing, and one is left with the impression that it is a book whose parts are greater than their sum.

The parts are as follows. There are chapters on a modal argument for God's existence, on the logical possibility of God, on an argument for God's existence which resembles Descartes' argument in *Meditations* V, and on Gaunilo-type parodies of that argument. Then there are two chapters on the freewill defence, one on Plantinga's version and one on Hick's 'soul-making' proposal, a chapter on the idea that suffering might serve indiscernible ends, and two chapters on solipsism. There is interesting and important work in each of these chapters. Much of Dore's project is Cartesian in its conception and in its procedure. The central argument is this. Solipsism is a serious problem. Seeming perceptions are phenomenologically indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. We are non-inferentially aware only of seeming perceptions, not of veridical perceptions qua verdical. And seeming perceptions do not entitle us to infer either that any particular seeming perceptions are veridical or that we are having any veridical perceptions.

The first step in saving ourselves from solipsism is to prove that God exists. Each of us also knows that he suffers. On the surface my suffering seems inconsistent with God's existence. The best way to show that there is no inconsistency here requires the assumption that there is an external world. The reason for this is as follows. Neither Plantinga's freewill defence nor Hick's theodicy provides the best way for theists to deal with suffering. Instead what you need to assume is that there is some enormously valuable but indiscernible end E which is served by suffering. There must be some such E because there has to be an explanation of how it is that suffering is consistent with God's existence, and even the best of the available theodicies will not do the trick. We should also assume that it is logically necessary for E that there are scientific laws which generally operate unimpeded on the matter which the universe contains. Much suffering is the inevitable result of the operation of such laws. So we regain the external world after all.

Why does God not step in and prevent our suffering? Answer: because God is essentially disembodied. And if a disembodied being interferes in the world, this will be done by telekinesis, and will involve the violation of one or more scientific laws. If this were done on a large scale, scientific laws would not generally operate unimpeded and consequently E would not be served.

This central argument is very peculiar. It is peculiar that the reasonableness of my belief in the existence of the entire external universe should go piggyback on facts about my own suffering! It is hard to take the alleged threat of solipsism seriously, and hard therefore to be impressed with the attempt to rescue us from it. Moreover the attempt to rescue us is not convincing. The problems which this argument faces include the following.

1. Dore's scepticism extends only as far as the veridicality of our perceptions. Why no further? If our perceiving processes can be relied upon only when an elaborate defence of them is given, why does the same not hold for at least some of our reasoning processes? In particular, why does it not hold for our ability to engage in complicated pieces of reasoning such as is involved in his case against solipsism? That case requires mastery of either of his two arguments for the existence of God, of the role of E, of the claim that generally unimpeded scientific laws are logically necessary for E, etc.

2. Even if Dore's central argument were to work, all that I would be justified in believing to exist is God and whatever external entities and events are causally necessary for *my* suffering, such as the sword with which I now seem to be being stabbed, the person who now seems to be stabbing me, and so forth. What about the rest of the external world? What Dore says about this is that 'since I am now justified in taking many of my seeming perceptions to be veridical, it is open to me to claim as much empirically based knowledge of the external world as common sense tells me that I have, i.e., I can establish a system of interrelated explanations which covers much more than instances of my suffering and, indeed, which is broader in scope and has more predictive power than any other such system.' (106). But why? Why does a case for the existence of whatever is causing me to suffer open a door through which the entire external world can march?

3. According to Dore, it seems, it is reasonable for me to escape from solipsism only if *my* suffering is such that it is inconsistent with God's existence. It is reasonable for me to believe that, e.g., an external world, including other people, exists only when I have sought a solution to the problem presented by the incompatibility of my suffering and the existence of God. And that of course requires that there by such an incompatibility. If, like me, you see no inconsistency between your suffering and the existence of God, a solipsist you should remain, it seems.

4. If the external world needs to be posited in order to give a satisfactory account of how it is that my suffering is consistent with God's existence, surely a strong case for positing it is also provided by the fact that it is the best way to account for my seeming perceptions? The existence of an external world is an ideal candidate to explain *both* the fact that I have seeming perceptions and the fact that I sometimes suffer, whether or not God exists. Moreover, when I posit an indiscernible end E which will remove the apparent inconsistency between my suffering and the existence of God, why should I assume that E requires an external world? The only plausible answer is that that is necessary for a satisfactory explanation of my suffering. But if that is so, why do we need to take such a circuitous route to avoiding

solipsism? And could it not be that E is compatible with, say, our being in Berkeley's universe, a universe which contains no matter?

I have discussed neither Dore's arguments for God's existence nor his treatment of the theistic responses to suffering which he rejects. As I have indicated, there is much in his discussion of those topics that is interesting and important, although if space were to permit it I would also raise questions about those parts of the book

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John Earman,
World Enough and Space-time: Absolute vs. relational theories of space and time.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-05040-4.

John Earman's 1989 *World Enough and Space-time* is a very welcome addition to the current literature on the philosophy of space and time. Earman has been a leading writer on the philosophy of space and time for over 20 years; he has been particularly a leader in bringing the mathematical physics of General Relativity to bear on philosophical problems. *World Enough* continues this trend, and provides philosophers with a synthesis and extension of Earman's thought on many important topics.

The book is divided into 9 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the absolutist and relationist conceptions of space and time, setting the stage for many of the arguments of later chapters. Chapter 2 does more stage-setting: Earman reviews a fairly complete collection of 'classical space-times', i.e., space-times with intrinsic structure that is more or less strong, with the strength of structure being revealed by the class of associated symmetries. While this chapter is informative and helpful, the classifications developed turn out not to play a very crucial role in the arguments of later chapters — largely because many of those arguments are set in the context of General Relativity theory, which uses no classical space-time structure. Chapter 3, 'Choosing a Classical Space-time', begins the treatment of arguments about the nature of motion, and the arguments are continued in Chapters 4 and 5, on rotation and relational theories of motion respectively.

World Enough can be viewed as largely tackling two distinct but intimately related debates in the philosophy of space and time: the relationist/absolutist debate, and the relationist/substantivalist debate. The former debate concerns primarily the problem of a physical theory of motion: does an

adequate theory of motion need to postulate absolute quantities of motion (and hence absolute structure to space-time), or can a theory be found that uses only relative motions? This debate is the subject of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (and perhaps Chapter 7, on incongruent counterparts). The remaining Chapters 6, 8 and 9 are concerned with the ontological question of whether space-time can or must be thought of as a substantial, existing entity. Chapter 6 covers the traditional arguments of Newton and Leibniz on the issue, as well as some recent twists; Chapter 8 discusses more recent arguments about substantivalism and relationism, addressing the work of authors such as Hartry Field, Michael Friedman and Brent Mundy. Chapter 9 is devoted to a recent argument against substantivalism by Earman and John Norton called the 'hole argument' (see their 1987 BJPS paper 'What Price Spacetime Substantivalism: The Hole Story').

While much of the ground covered in *World Enough and Space-time* has been covered by Earman in previously published papers, this book is by no means a compilation of past works. Earman gives a systematic and fresh treatment of the two major debates mentioned above, and in fact his conclusions on some points differ from those reached in earlier papers. One major theme has remained constant: on the absolutist/relationist debate, Earman quite clearly claims victory for the absolutists. In classical physics, Earman thinks that relationist accounts of motion almost certainly fail; in modern relativistic physics, he claims, the failure is unequivocal. Relativistic theories allow clear-cut definitions of absolute acceleration and rotation, and the only possible relationist grounding of these quantities, namely the Machian program in General Relativity, is in Earman's view a complete failure (for a strongly contrasting view, see Christopher Ray's book *The Evolution of Relativity*).

While Earman thinks that the failure of relationism on the problem of motion would seem to support not just an absolutist, but more strongly a substantivalist view of space-time, he treats the question of space-time substantivalism primarily on other grounds than those of arguments about motion. On the question of the correct ontology of space-time, Chapters 6 and 8 make it clear that Earman's sympathies are all with the substantivalists; this makes his about-face in Chapter 9 all the more dramatic. Earman concludes in the end that neither relationism nor substantivalism, as currently conceived, are viable views of the correct ontology of space-time; instead, he says in several places, *a tertium quid* is needed. Frustratingly, Earman gives only vague and even conflicting signals about what form the more plausible third option might take. At first it seems that Earman views a variant of relationism due to Sklar as the beginning of a more viable view (see p. 155). But in Chapter 9 Earman seems to hint that a very abstract program of eliminating space-time points in favor of 'Leibniz algebras' is the current best bet. After such a clear discussion and criticism of traditional views, it is disappointing that Earman is so cryptic when it comes to explaining what views may be viable.

With its essentially completely new treatment of the 'hole argument' and responses to critics, Chapter 9 contains the most new and controversial material of the book. The hole argument is directed against a version of substantivalism called 'manifold substantivalism'. This version holds that the topological point-manifold M of space-time theories represents a substantial space-time whose points and regions exist as physical entities; according to Earman, it is '... the only form of substantivalism presently in the offing' (180). The hole argument shows that if this form of substantivalism is maintained, and our space-time theory is generally covariant, then the theory must be radically indeterministic. Earman argues that the unavoidable, almost a priori failure of determinism shown by the hole argument cannot be accepted (though determinism may fail for other reasons), and so we should abandon manifold substantivalism.

Tim Maudlin and Jeremy Butterfield have offered responses to the hole argument that try to rescue substantivalism; Earman presents very detailed and interesting criticisms of their positions. Space does not permit a discussion of all these arguments, but one tension in Earman's latest position can be mentioned that may be notable to those who have followed the debates since 1987. In their initial exposition of the problem, Earman and Norton claim that the argument applies to all local space-time theories that are given a generally covariant formulation. This would include (modern versions of) Newtonian mechanics and special relativistc electrodynamics, as well as General Relativity. In *World Enough* however, Earman wants to save the more classical space-time theories from the hole argument. He proposes a way of saving these theories that amounts to redefining substantivalism for these theories: it is the space-time manifold M *plus* some further absolute structures (such as spatial and temporal metrics) that represent substantival space-time. This re-definition of substantivalism blocks the application of the hole argument to these theories.

Earman's move of incorporating more structure into substantival space-time is quite plausible; in Newtonian mechanics, for example, the modern mathematical correlate of Newton's absolute space and time is not the manifold alone, but the manifold together with its spatial metric, absolute time and absolute position structures. But there is a tension between Earman's acceptance of additional structure into substantivalism here, and his rejection of it in the case of General Relativity. Part of Tim Maudlin's proposal for saving substantivalism involves his claim that the manifold *plus* the space-time metric are the proper representatives of substantival space-time in General Relativity. In his response to Maudlin, Earman seems committed to maintaining that the metric must be viewed as a physical field existing in space-time, rather than as a part of the structure of substantival space-time itself. The main reason Earman can give for this position is that, unlike the metric structures in classical theories, in General Relativity the metric is 'dynamic' or mutable. But as Maudlin has pointed out, literally speaking the metric is not mutable *within* a world (or space-time model), but is rather mutable only in the sense that different models may have different metrical

structures. Since this sense of mutability does not compel us to view the metric field of General Relativity as being contained in space-time rather than as being *part* of space-time, Earman may have trouble maintaining his view that only in the case of General Relativity should we fail to include metrical structure as part of the definition of substantival space-time.

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The Authority of Language: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Threat of Philosophical Nihilism.
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Pp. xi+249. US $28.95. ISBN 0-8130-0942-1.

Edwards' book is a very important work, one which continues and expands upon Richard Rorty's critique of representational knowledge. Edwards' writing is clear, elegant, and often inspiring. His philosophical analysis is also first-rate. He cuts through the obscurity of the later Heidegger's prose and draws out important insights about nihilism and language. Although I will quibble with his Wittgenstein scholarship, Edwards' exposition of what it is to follow a rule is nothing short of masterful.

Edwards begins by explaining, with help from Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams, how modern philosophy has sown the seeds of its own destruction — the 'irony of the self-consuming intellect.' He demonstrates how this philosophy — with its dual vision of 'rational transparency and moral autonomy' — assumes that the self can represent itself fully to itself. Such a 'transcendental standpoint,' as Edwards calls it, allows us to fulfill the Socratic ideal of the 'examined life.' There are, according to Edwards, three possible results of such a project: (1) we could discover, happily, that our own 'form of life' was unobjectionable from a rational point of view; (2) we could realize that our social practices generated many objections, but there were alternatives that did not; or (3) we could find, to our utter dismay, that no form of life whatever had any rational foundations.

The third possibility not only makes all alternatives unworthy, it also calls into question the assumptions of transcendental philosophy as a whole. As Edwards concludes: 'Thus we can no longer trust our own capacities for self-criticism and self-correction; the dream that nourished Socratic philosophy has become a nightmare. In action and in reflection we have been brought to a standstill. Because of the peculiar generality of both the objects and the

nature of our reflection in this case, philosophy has (*ex hypothesi*) produced a genuine *nihilism*, not just a personal crisis' (9).

Edwards argues that in their later works Heidegger and Wittgenstein call into question the *vorstellendes Denken* that makes the critical thinking behind these scenarios possible. In a lengthy analysis of the now famous *die Sprache spricht*, Edwards shows that Heidegger believes that it is impossible for the self to represent itself through language, the 'avatar of the self.' Instead, it is primordial speech itself that speaks through us, and we are destined to always speak and live within its confines. Because of this hermeneutical circle, we are unable to step outside our own world to perform any of the self-critical operations described above. But, as Edwards rightly concludes, 'the threat of philosophical nihilism has been replaced by the threat of a kind of linguistic fascism, which elevates the Logos to the status of a God' (3). By substituting God for the authority of reason, Heidegger's widely vaunted postmodernism has become a very antiquated premodernism.

While Heidegger is exhorting us to center our lives in the Logos, the later Wittgenstein, according to Edwards, is saying that no center holds. For him language and rationality are polymorpohous and polyvalent, such that human life is a 'happy concurrence of an indefinite number of little facts, facts of physiology, psychology, social organization, and so on' (232). Because of these utterly contingent grounds, language cannot represent the self to itself; but, just as important, it cannot serve, as it does for Heidegger, as the 'last stand of the Spirit' (4). In Wittgenstein there is a 'grammatical *dispersal* of authority, not its centralization' (227); and instead of Heidegger's implicit patriarchal monotheism, Wittgenstein is 'a thoroughly polytheistic thinker.' There may be a religion of wonder in Wittgenstein, but not one of obedience and worship.

One might argue that Edwards has ignored countervailing tendencies in both thinkers. In *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) Heidegger says that 'it is the authentic function of philosophy to challenge historical *Dasein* ...' (9), and not to just passively accept one's fate. Connected to this is Heidegger's doctrine of *Dichtung*: *Dasein*'s capacity to create new forms of expression that allow people to break out of inauthentic modes of existence. With regard to Wittgenstein, many commentators have spoken of the reactionary implications of the idea of language-games. The Afrikaner can simply brush off criticism of apartheid by saying: 'This is the way we do things down here.' Edwards seems to agree: 'At the bottom of our rule-governed behavior is *obedience*, not choice; *blindness*, not whole sight' (180).

Wittgenstein's famous phrase 'forms of life' appears on nearly every page of the book, but Edwards nowhere attempts to clarify its meaning. As a result, Edwards gives it a weltering array of referents: forms of life include ethics, European and American culture, bourgeois liberalism, one's own world-view, technology, intellectual endeavor, modern philosophy, its postmodern alternatives, and many more. Except for possibly the first two, Wittgenstein gives us no reason to identify the others as forms of life. Close scrutiny of the texts

reveal at least a two-tiered interpretation in which various cultural life styles are grafted onto specific forms of life such as language, hope, pretending, being certain — all elements of the 'common behaviour of mankind' (*PI*, §94). Is this perhaps the 'single organizing principle' which Edwards says is absent in Wittgenstein? If Edwards had paid closer attention to Wittgenstein's actual use of 'forms of life', he might have discovered a more centered and grounded philosophy than he proposes. Indeed, I believe that commentators are probably wrong in claiming that Wittgenstein is involved in antifoundationalism or deconstruction.

The rewards of this book are many, but it will disappoint readers who think that Edwards will show them important links between Wittgenstein and Heidegger. For example, more careful work with *Lebensformen* might have led Edwards to see instructive parallels in Heidegger's *Existenzialen*, his forms of being-in-the-world. The 'existentials' play a transcendental function in *Being and Time*, and I believe Stanley Cavell is correct in suggesting that forms of life play a similar role in the later Wittgenstein. Edwards is right in saying that neither offer transcendental arguments, but both of them follow a linguistic neo-Kantianism in which grammar shows 'the conditions necessary for the understanding of the sense [of propositions]' (*PG* p.88).

Edwards does of course demonstrate that Heidegger and Wittgenstein team up to reject the linguistic 'humanism' contained in the theory of language-as-representation. In my own work with Wittgenstein I have traced another link with Heidegger in their common roots in the 'life-philosophy' of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Dilthey. One could easily conclude that our principals are proponents of the language-as-expression theory contained in that tradition. But Edwards rescues us from this mistake. In any case, Wittgenstein's roots in life-philosophy help us to see that it is not thinking, or even speaking, that is the foundational activity, but *doing* — living life itself. In the 'Big Typescript' of 1933, Wittgenstein says: 'If we surrender the reins to language, and not to *life*, then the problems of philosophy arise' (521).

In his Acknowledgments, Edwards defers, with unnecessary humility, to Rorty's superior accomplishments. But I believe that, in many respects, Edwards is Rorty's equal, and easily surpasses him in understanding Heidegger and Wittgenstein. With regard to the latter, I have quibbled with Edwards on textual details and have suggested some interpretative alternatives, but I believe that Edwards has succeeded in getting many more things right than wrong.

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Luc Ferry and **Alain Renaut**
Heidegger and Modernity.
Trans. Franklin Philip.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1990.
Pp. 131. US$16.95. ISBN 0-226-24462-8.

This book was originally published under the title *Heidegger et les Modernes* in 1988, during the peak of the latest resurgence of interest in Heidegger's Nazism. The present translation, which appeared two years later, may well serve to keep the issue alive for some time to come in the English-speaking world, but the appeal of this topic is curiously unpredictable, as Ferry and Renaut's account of the critical/historical context of the issue makes clear. This is the third time Heidegger's Nazism has inspired controversy. 'The first debate, from 1945 to 1948, took place in the pages of the journal *Temps modernes*' (7), and the second began in 1961, when 'Jean Pierre Faye published a partial translation of the speeches and proclamations from the period of the rectorate.' The first debate dealt only abstractly with 'the problem of how Heidegger's ideas were related to the advent of Nazism,' and the second 'did not go beyond the rather narrow circle of specialists' (8) and compelled no one to take sides on the issue. This third debate, however — provoked by Victor Farias's *Heidegger et le nazisme* in 1987 — is different, and the present book tries to account for this difference (8): 'What we need to understand is why such a large number of French intellectuals ... felt themselves touched by the scandal and were unwilling to admit that Heidegger's compromise by Nazism was as extensive as Farias revealed or had the meaning that Farias gave it by forging indissoluble links between the thought of Being and the Nazi involvement ... In this book our intention is to clarify this agitation among French intellectuals and to reveal its logic and significance.' The English-speaking reader will do well to bear in mind that Ferry and Renaut are concerned primarily with the interpretation of Heidegger, and the reception of Farias's book, *in France*; they are concerned, in other words, with 'the French intellectual universe' (9). Whatever force or logic may impel this debate beyond the borders of France is of little concern to the authors, and this fact bears on the assessment of their discussion of the 'logic and significance' of the debate. That having been said, however, much of the logic of the debate in France would seem to hold good elsewhere as well, and that is what makes the book of value in translation.

This 'logic' revolves around the relation between modernity and humanism (3-4): 'The purpose of this book is not to rehash the trial of Heidegger but to set forth the philosophical meaning of what today is understood as humanism, so that this reductive view of our relation to modernity will clearly appear for what it is.' According to Ferry and Renaut 'humanism' maintains (i) 'that the distinguishing feature of man is his nothingness' and (ii) 'that man aims at the universal,' never confusing himself 'with any *particular* identity or *being*' (5), and French intellectuals have been wrong in laying the blame for Heidegger's Nazism on his humanism, for his thinking is properly to be understood as a *deconstruction* of humanism. What is truly

at issue is *democratic* humanism, underlying which as a condition of its possibility is that subjectivity, characterized by human will, which Heidegger has rendered suspect (17): 'In short, how can we think of democracy without imputing to man the minimal will and mastery that Heidegger denies him because will and mastery in some sense already contain the seeds of the world of technology conceived of as the "will to will"?' Having noted that 'it is philosophically impossible to return to the idea that man is the owner and controller of the whole of his actions and ideas,' Ferry and Renaut remark that 'This observation should not ... lead us to adopt a philosophical position that ... cooly deconstructs subjectivity when the real task today, *after this criticism and not merely opposing it*, is to rethink the question of the subject.' (17) After their Introduction — from which the above quotations are taken — and their opening chapter — 'The Heidegger Case', in which they present the historical and textual parameters of the debate — Ferry and Renaut pursue this task throughout the three remaining chapters of the book.

In Chapter 2, 'From Humanism to Nazism: Heideggerian Interpretations of Heidegger's Nazism', they contrast 'the orthodox interpretation' to 'the Derridean interpretation' by placing both in the context of Heidegger's analysis of (spiritual) fallenness and authenticity (49): '... unlike the orthodox interpretation, Derrida's does not bluntly maintain ... that Heidegger was a Nazi because he was still clinging to the metaphysics of the subject and its concomitant humanism: the interpretation is that Heidegger attempted to evade a certain Nazism by appealing to an idea of subjectness as spirituality, forcing him into a steady complicity with "the spirit of the times."' The third chapter, 'Heidegger, Nazism, and Modernity', argues that Heidegger's view of the relation between modernity and technology provides the ground both for his notorious assertion regarding 'the inner truth and greatness' of National Socialism (*Introduction to Metaphysics* [1935]) and for his announced distrust of democracy ('Only a God Can Save Us', *Der Spiegel* interview [1966]). Ferry and Renaut offer a persuasive explanation of how his refections on technology 'permit Heidegger to see in National Socialism ... the political system that best corresponds to the technological completion of modernity: when we add that Heidegger in no way considered the reign of technology a contingent aspect of history but regarded Being itself as being the "essence of technology," in other words, that he inscribed the advent of technology in the destiny of Being, it is thus a "political system" based on the *Führerprinzip* that is fitted into the destiny where it achieves better than democracy what is required by "complete metaphysics." ' (65) The final chapter, 'Moderns and Antimoderns: Humanism in Question', employs Heidegger's deconstruction of the metaphysics of subjectivity as the focal point for understanding his criticism of liberalism, communism, democracy and humanism; the chapter concludes with a concise account of the incompatibility of philosophical critique and Heideggerian phenomenology, an incompatibility that explains how Heidegger's thought fails to comprehend the nature of National Socialism (107-8): 'For Heidegger, the distinguishing property of man is always transcendence ... it is very much in the name of

humanism thus understood, in the name of that strictly human capacity to wrench oneself free of natural determinations, that a criticism of the racist imagination ... is possible. When, however, Heidegger makes the destiny of Being the destiny of man, when he thus returns to the antihumanist idea of a traditional code (if only that of the history of Being), he founders in inauthenticity, and his fall makes possible the return of the nationalistic myth and the fanatical hatred of modernity.'

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Albert Flores, ed.
Ethics and Risk Management in Engineering.
Lanham MD: University Press of America
1989. Pp. viii+260.
US$36.75 (cloth:ISBN 0-8191-7564-1);
US$18.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-7565-X).

The relationship between science (or knowledge more generally speaking) and human values is by no means a new subject. That said, in recent years, there is a new, and quite different preoccupation in the literature. Of interest recently are the legal and institutional implications of using science for the purpose of public policy or regulations. Even here, the basic problem is not a new one. Scientists and engineers have been engaged in courts, and by government departments and regularity tribunals, for as long as such bodies have been required to deal with technical and scientific information. what is new is the recognition that the relationship between science and policy making is beset with problems. The new literature deals with the institutional and procedural problems raised by combining science, ethics and policy making.

It has been observed, for example, that many scientist regard the procedures associated with regulation and policy making with considerable trepidation, and that many university-based scientists refuse to become involved. Specialists now exist whose expertise is as much in how to handle cross-examination as it is in their original discipline. It has been argued that the science used for making policy is unoriginal, limited and often misunderstood, while policy makers, in turn, demand of scientists a level of certainty that even the most experienced and well respected scientists are incapable of producing.

In making these observations, commentators have focussed their attention on the design of both procedures and institutions. They see several tasks

to be done. First, both scientists and policy makers must become more sensitive to each others' questions and difficulties. Second, both must become aware of the pitfalls int he process, not the least of which are its public visibility and presence of participants (public advocate groups, industry interest groups, media etc.) who are neither policy makers not scientists. Finally, all must become aware of the difficulty of distinguishing between questions of fact and those of public policy and/or ethics, even in the most carefully crafted procedure and institutions.

It is in this last context that risk management has come under scrutiny. The use of the concept 'risk' to deal with potentially dangerous products or situations is also relatively recent. In itself, it reflects three underlying assumptions. First, given the difficulty and complexity of the decisions to be made on the basis of scientific information, and the range of interests and viewpoints involved, some manner of balancing advantages and disadvantages must be found. The critical term here is 'balance'; the assumption is that any choice will involve 'trade-offs' and compromises not only among various groups but also in terms of the implications for individuals and communities of any decision. Second, given the difficulties inherent in the scientific work that underlies regulatory decision making and the likelihood that the scientific evidence will not be conclusive, those relying upon scientific information will be dealing primarily with statistical and other means of estimating probability. Finally, the third assumption is that in the balancing of probabilities, the standard to be used is 'acceptability', itself a concept shot through with value assumptions and political considerations.

Risk management, then, refers to the procedures used to balance probabilities in the estimation of potential danger or harm and its implications, and to judge these estimates against a standard of acceptability. There are many ways of doing this; some are enshrined in environmental and occupational health and safety legislation and others operating more informally. The new literature on science and public policy is focussed on the evaluation of legislation and regulation, and of the less formal institutional practices and procedures that usually accompany them. At best, it contributes to the sensitivity of scientists and policy makers to each other's concerns; it can identify the pitfalls of any risk assessment process and it can draw attention to the inevitable mix of fact and values in all aspects of risk assessment.

Ethics and Risk Management in Engineering is typical of many essay collections in the new literature on science and public policy. It focuses on the institutional and legal issues raise by risk management for a particular scientific specialization —) engineering — because '(e)ngineers play a crucial role ... because they are in a unique position to identify and assess the potential hazards of consumer and industrial technology.' It is designed to educated the engineering community because '(i)n the real world, engineers are ill-equipped and generally unable to assume such an awesome responsibility' because they are usually salaried professionals 'lacking the autonomous power to assure the integrity of their work.' But the book is also a commentary on more general issues raise by risk management.

The first section covers territory dealt with in many other collections, the constrains inherent in the use of a 'risk' approach. It is a good overview for those unfamiliar with the literature, but it adds little new. The second section does cover new ground, and very well indeed. In it, discussion is focussed on how different types of legal processes — e.g., tort law versus public regulation — structure the relationship between science responsibility and public policy differently from each other. Worth seeking out are the articles by Jasanoff and Cranor. The last section seals with engineering as a profession, and it is disappointing. For the most part, the complex issues arising from the practice of engineering are treated with much less acumen than is now customary in similar discussions of other scientific disciplines in this new literature. In general, the book's strengths are also its weaknesses. Originally the proceedings of a conference, the book introduces new readers to debates in the literature, but with several notable exceptions, it does not deal coherently or thoroughly enough with any one of them.

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Michael N. Forster
Hegel and Skepticism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1989. Pp. 256. US $29.50. ISBN 0-674-38707-4.

This is among the most stimulating books about Hegel to have been published recently. Forster sets out to dispel the misconception that Hegel was 'an epistemological delinquent building metaphysical castles on sands which the first flood of skepticism would be bound to wash away' (3). The charge of delinquency is perhaps a red herring: during the past decade, Hegel's epistemology has received as much respectful attention as other aspects of his philosophy. What is interesting about *Hegel and Skepticism* is therefore not its target but its argument, that 'Hegel's interpretation of the skeptical tradition in philosophy and his reaction to this tradition are absolutely fundamental to his philosophical outlook' (1).

Hegel often contrasts the procedure of ancient skeptics with the procedure of modern skeptics. He disparages the latter, but likens his own dialectic to the former. The explanations which Hegel gives of this leitmotif (e.g., in his 1802 essay entitled 'The Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy', and in paragraphs scattered throughout his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*) are, however, inconsistent and obscure. The useful task of clarifying Hegel's

contrast between ancient and modern skepticism is the one which Forster sets himself in the first half of *Hegel and Skepticism*, and he performs it admirably. Forster commands a broad knowledge of his subject-matter: he is able to delve as far into the tropes of Agrippa or Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines*, as is necessary to render Hegel's remarks about them perspicuous. He also displays a most refreshing willingness to modify Hegel's interpretations of other philosophers when they are indefensible.

In this part of his book, then, Forster extracts an account of the relation between ancient and modern skepticism which consists of three theses. (1) Modern skepticism differs from ancient skepticism in being 'dogmatic', as Hegel puts it, or in assuming the truth of one set of propositions (e.g., sense-datum statements) in order to establish the doubtfulness of others. According to Hegel, the ancient skeptics did not grant such programmatic exemptions from doubt (13-32). (2) The ancient skeptics rather followed a procedure of 'equipollence', or a method of advancing equally strong reasons for each member of a pair of contrary propositions, in order to produce a suspension of belief in both of them (11-12). (3) In their different ways, though, ancient and modern skeptics both raise doubts about concept-instantiation, or about the existence of entire categories of item: common to ancient and modern forms of skepticism is a doubt whether there exist the individual things which our general thoughts purport to be about (26-7).

In the second half of *Hegel and Skepticism*, Forster argues that Hegel presented his own dialectic as a development of the ancient skeptical method of equipollence. This part of Forster's argument goes some way toward explaining Hegel's disparagement of modern skepticism: it is clear that Hegel rejected its foundationalism. In the second half of *Hegel and Skepticism*, Forster also argues that Hegel deployed his dialectical method for the purpose of guaranteeing the epistemological security of his system. This part of Forster's argument is the least successful. It is of interest, because it is a sustained attempt to demonstrate that among Hegel's ambitions was the venerable one of refuting skepticism by skeptical means. It is unsuccessful, however, because this goal was not really 'fundamental to his [Hegel's] philosophical outlook' at all.

If Hegel had intended to defend his system against skeptical equipollence objections, as Forster maintains, he would not have made the second of two assertions which Forster actually adduces in support of this interpretation. The first assertion is that Hegel's dialectic is a method of *immanent critique*: it is a procedure for establishing not a mere suspension of belief in either member of a pair of contrary positions, but the self-contradictoriness, and hence falsity, of any philosophical claim to which another can be opposed. The second assertion is that a *true* philosophical theory, for example Hegel's own, is one which encompasses all opposites and excludes none; hence, the method of immanent critique is inapplicable to it. Forster cites this pair of assertions as evidence for his interpretation of Hegel's dialectic as a method of equipollence, employed for the purpose of rendering his own philosophical theory uncontestable by eliminating the alternatives (105-7, 113-16). Forster

cites the second assertion as evidence that Hegel's ambition was to render his system immune to equipollence objections: in order for an equipollence objection to one position, P, to be possible there must at least be a contrary position, Q; but Hegel has asserted that any philosophical position to which there is another opposed cannot be identified with his own; therefore, Hegel must have intended his own system to be immune to equipollence objections (107-11). Now, the assertion surely does not imply what Forster thinks it does, for the assertion that P contains all oppositions invites the reply that it cannot do so, since any theory which contains a contradiction is necessarily false.

If Forster has failed to account for Hegel's contention that his system encompasses all opposites, we may begin to understand it by reminding ourselves that Hegel states not just that all opposites are contained in his system, but also that in it they are *aufgehoben*. Hegel explains that by this he means that in his system, contraries are both *negated* or *eliminated*, and *preserved*: either member of any pair of opposites, he tells us, is in his ontology conceived of as being not ultimately distinguishable from the other, but instead as tending to merge into a kind of identity with it — an identity in which, paradoxically, each member retains its opposition to the other (*Science of Logic* Bk. I, Sect. I, Ch. I, C, 3).

Hegel's contention that in his system opposites are *aufgehoben*, far from depriving equipollence objections of a foothold, is easily seen to generate equipollence objections of a second order. Consider what is entailed by the assertion made in his *Logics* that every pair of contrary categories (e.g., the categories of general concept and spatio-temporal individual) is subject to *Aufhebung*. If two categories, X and Y, are contrary then they are not identical: for if X and Y are contrary then they are mutually exclusive; and if X and Y are mutually exclusive then they have different extensions; but categories which have different extensions are different categories. If, on the other hand, X and Y are one and the same category then they are not contraries: for if X and Y are the same category then they are mutually inclusive; but categories which are mutually inclusive are not contraries! Thus, any of Hegel's assertions to the effect that in his system a pair of categories is *aufgehoben* strictly entails two contradictions: first, that those categories both are and are not opposites; and second, that they both are and are not identical. It is hardly surprising to find Hegel insisting, as a consequence, that the law of non-contradiction is false (*Science of Logic* Bk. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, C, Remark 3).

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Fire on the Earth: Anselm Kiefer and the Postmodern World.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1990.
Pp. xvi+214. US $44.95. ISBN 0-87722-690-3.

Oddly, that same postmodernism in the visual arts which announced the end of the reign of modernism was born in a blizzard of 'neos': Neo-Expressionism, Neo-Geo, New Image, as well, of course, as the self-effacing neonatality of appropriationism. This unifying feature of otherwise radically diverse movements suggests a commonality of reference backwards to something now, finally, reappearing regicidally; it suggests, specifically, a difficult relation to an unresolved past. Indeed, for some theorists (e.g., Lyotard) the presentation within art of its relation to the past, the self-conscious appearance of a work's historicity, is a defining mark of the postmodern. For some postmodern German painters, the relation to an unresolved past has a double edge. On the one hand, they are tied into various international anxieties about the return of representation to post-minimalist painting; on the other, more particularly German, hand, they are concerned with their specific relation to the complex German past of Kant and Goebbels, of Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment. This doubled return of an unresolved past characterizes the art of A.R. Penck, Georg Baselitz, and Anselm Kiefer. The particular postmodernism of Kiefer is the subject of John Gilmour's interesting study.

Gilmour analyzes Kiefer's paintings in three broad thematic sweeps. First, he analyzes Kiefer's return back through abstractionism to representational practices. Kiefer's representationalism is not, however, an illusionistic recidivism in the face of the pure painterly spaces of Pollock and Still; instead, Kiefer makes representation and its effacements the very subject matter of his painting and so demonstrates various ways in which representation both reveals and conceals. Gilmour interprets Kiefer's project here in terms of the Nietzschean interplay of the Apollonian and Dionysian, arguing that Kiefer's concerns with representing as an essentially unstable practice allow him to revive the issue of representation in a way which absorbs, rather than rejects, the lessons of abstractionism.

Because this discussion is firmly anchored in Kiefer's relation to art history, it is, I think, quite successful. Through a judicious set of contrasts to both pre-modern and modern paintings, Gilmour establishes convincingly that Kiefer's use of paint and perspectival construction in paintings like *Varus* is neither abstractionist nor illusionist. It functions instead as an immanent critique of two expressive modalities detached from their bases in the lived world. Kiefer rejects the reifying ideals of optical transparency and painterly opacity in favor of an active use of representation as a mode of engagement with what resists it. This is a theme at the heart of postmodernism, and so Gilmour's treatment of Kiefer in this light is illuminating.

In his second sweep, Gilmour expands his analysis to argue that in paintings such as *Wayland's Song* Kiefer engages the repressions of Enlightenment thought in general. Drawing again on Nietzsche, and also on Lyotard,

Gilmour presents Kiefer's work as a systematic challenge to models of progressive history and to the privileged subjects generated by such models. On Gilmour's reading, Enlightenment thought has bequeathed us a kind of rage at the limited and the fragmentary and, on that basis, a destructive striving for what Thomas Nagel has called 'the view from nowhere'. Such a perspectiveless perspective requires a renunciation of those mythopoetical modes of thought which express the scandal of human partiality. Kiefer's response to the enlightenment worldview is to recover its own mythic dimensions, to treat myth not as renounced but as disavowed. In *Wayland's Song*, Kiefer forges a metaphorical identification between the postmodern painter and the artisanal smith. The smith's activity starts from the implicit recognition of his immersion as an agent in a world already there, an agent who can do no more, and of course no less, than fulfill, and thereby redeem and renew, the promises kept in the secret heart of the world. The postmodern painter recognizes 'that the renewal of our world may require that we return to ancient and archaic ideas' (126), but he does so only with the insight that this renewal must be accomplished with the tools handed down by his world. The postmodern painter works through modernity by working with it.

The necessity to recover what Enlightenment represses is surely also a theme at the heart of some postmodern projects. But in seeing a call for renewal in Kiefer, a plea for us to learn, again, to live in the world, Gilmour argues in a Heideggerian fashion, giving his analysis a romantic tilt which emerges most clearly in his third sweep over the postmodern terrain. Many of Kiefer's paintings depict a scorched earth, an earth used and used up by a technology not represented in the scene of its devastation. In a painting like *Nürnberg*, the earth has withstood its depletion, standing ready as the scene of a possible renewal. Gilmour sees this possibility taken up in Kiefer's use of the earth as ground of both renewal and painting. When winged figures take flight, they do so by renewing a relation to the scorched earth as the horizon of their flights. Gilmour interprets Kiefer as instantiating Heidegger's critique of the inauthenticity of the technological relationship, an inauthenticity revealed in the earth's refusal to be mere reserve for future harvest. Even in its scorched form, Kiefer's earth stands as a ground exceeding technology and thus, for Gilmour, exemplifies the possibility of a postmodern habitat. 'A postmodern artist like Kiefer wants to revive a close relationship to the natural habitat and thereby challenge the historical project of modernity' (162).

The tilt toward Heidegger in *Fire on the Earth* emerges as Gilmour expands his analysis from Kiefer's relation to art history to his relation to the earth as such. Perhaps this is inevitable since, given Gilmour's progressively broader thematic engagement with what exceeds the projects of modernity, he ultimately finds himself face to face with the excessive as such. Starting with what is repressed in modern painting (what is, after all, *our* excess), Gilmour moves toward what is repressed as such (what is, thus, excess as such). This is Heideggerian terrain, and for that reason Gilmour's final chapters depict what might be called a pre-postmodern painter con-

cerned with 'elemental forces' and 'the Dionysian background [which] remains, whatever systems of control we may design' (168). These are not the concerns, I think, of postmodern theorists of excess like Foucault and Bataille but are, instead, the stuff of romantic myth. With the invocation of Heidegger, Gilmour increases his risk of treating Kiefer not as a postmodern prophet of the return of the repressed myth but rather, too simply, as a new mythmaker. To my taste, Kiefer is a bit of both, and so, in the end, *Fire on the Earth* does a fine and fair job of representing him.

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Ian Ground
Art or Bunk?
1989. Pp 146.ISBN 1-85399-014-0;
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85399-015-9).

As the title suggests, a major theme in Ian Ground's book is the difference between art and bunk. Ground uses Carl Andre's *Equivalent VIII* as one vehicle for exploring this theme. *Equivalent VIII* is a 'work of art' consisting of 'a set of 120 completely unworked fire-bricks arranged in a rectangle' (1). According to Ground, what *Equivalent VIII* did was to awaken people to questions about the nature of art, what sorts of things can be works of art, and what sorts of things are 'bunk'. The book, which has five chapters, attempts to answer these questions.

The first chapter (art or bunk?) provides the framework and structure governing the book's overall discussion. Ground suggests three points of departure. These are: 1) art and the artist; 2) art and the audience; and 3) art and tradition. Each of the next three chapters is devoted to discussing one of these points. Ground concludes the first chapter with the contention that works of art cannot be understood purely in terms of their physical qualities. To illustrate this contention, Henry Moore's *Recumbent Figure* is compared to a meteorite, which happens to be physically identical to the Moore sculpture. The chapter ends with the claim that the work of art is properly identified with the 'intended appearance' of the object.

Chapter two (art and the artist) is an exploration of the notion of artistic intention. Continuing with the 'bunk' theme, the concern is how bunk relates to the artist's intentions. The question is whether the difference between art and bunk 'lies behind the object: ... is it what the artist intended to do which makes the real difference?' (31). Ground examines both responses to this

question. This examination is then used as a springboard back to the idea of 'intended appearance'.

The third chapter (art and the audience) begins with the question: 'when it comes to art, isn't bunk in the eye of the beholder?' (61). This leads to a general discussion of the nature of skepticism and the possibility of knowledge. Out of this emerges the first discussion of one of the central themes of the book. Ground proposes an analogy between knowing a person and knowing a work of art. Reflecting on how we come to have knowledge of other people provides insight into how we come to have knowledge of works of art. There is also a rich discussion involving the levels of competence and knowledge that the audience brings to bear on works of art.

In chapter four (art and tradition), questions about knowledge and competence are tied to artistic traditions. The opening question of the chapter is the following: 'Is the sort of difference there is between art and bunk determined by an object's relations to the traditions of art?' (100). Ground contrasts an analytic/nonhistorical construal of art with a Marxist portrayal of art in regard to this question. The discussion then proceeds to an excellent analysis of the difference between medium and material.

The last chapter (understanding art and understanding people) provides a summary that pulls all the threads and themes of the book together. In particular, there is more discussion of the 'knowing people/knowing art' analogy. More generally, there are several particular features of the book which are very good. Each chapter is divided into sections, and this makes the line of argument easier to follow. Ground makes use of cartoons and diagrams to illustrate his major points of contention. The links between the chapters are good. Ground's book is a 'good read', and it presents and develops its themes in a clear way.

There is one other general comment that needs to be made. Ground claims that we need 'to stop thinking of the notion of a work of art that we use as one which is solely descriptive' (17). 'The notion of a work of art is not a tag we place on the object after the main event. It is the programme for the main event. It is not merely a label. It is much more like a rule. The concept of a work of art does not describe: it regulates'(27). Whatever one thinks about the philosophical method and assumptions that stand behind such an account, the question remains as to whether or not it is an appropriate approach in a book that is supposed to be an introduction to aesthetics. For example, there is something troubling about an 'introductory' book that does not discuss, except in passing, formalism and expressionism.

However, it should be noted that this is not intended to be a standard introductory text. *Art or Bunk?* is one book in the Mind Matters series, and its purpose is not, as the series editor Judith Hughes notes in the preface, 'to produce a potted history of philosophical ideas' (x). Or, as Mary Midgley says in the foreward, the 'series contains excellent guide-books ... which are clear, but which are not superficial surveys' (viii). Unless one is aware that *Art or*

Bunk? is not a survey but a piece of original philosophy that is interesting and valuable in its own right, Hughes' claim that Ground's book provides a much-needed, lively and readable introduction to aesthetics' (x) is misleading. Otherwise, Hughes' claim is most certainly true.

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P.M.S. Hacker
Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press;
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1990.
Pp xxi+575. US $110.00 ISBN: 0-631-16784-6.

Meaning and Mind is a wonderful book. Like all great works of its kind, it succeeds in communicating on several different levels. First and foremost, it provides a lasting contribution to Wittgenstein studies. Scholars and students alike will find this an enormous asset. It is the product of two decades spent in intensive study of Wittgenstein's writings. The result is that Hacker is able to situate the highly condensed arguments which appear in §§243-427 of the *Investigations* in their original contexts, thereby revealing Wittgenstein's intentions and the great subtlety which he was able to bring to the final rendering of his thoughts. But *Meaning and Mind* is much more than this; for Hacker constantly challenges us to assess the relevance, both past and present, of Wittgenstein's remarks on empirical and a priori efforts to understand 'How the mind works'. *Meaning and Mind* is thus a work for the future: one that will prove essential reading for cognitive and social psychologists, and for anyone who is interested in clarifying and thus contributing to their results.

Hacker sticks to the highly successful format which he and Gordon Baker adopted in volumes I and II of their massive 'Analytical Commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*'. An overview of a thematically contained body of remarks is presented, followed by an essay detailing and developing their philosophical significance, and then concluding with a careful exegesis of the actual text explaining the crux of the passage in question and relating it to previous versions in manuscript and published materials. Hacker divides the work into five 'chapters', dealing respectively with 'The Private Language Arguments' (the pluralized form here is quite deliberate), 'Thought', 'Imagination', 'The Self and Self-reference', and 'Consciousness'. The first is really a collection of seven, closely interrelated chapters on the 'inner/outer picture

of the relation between the mental and behaviour' which set the tone for the rest of the book.

Hacker begins by establishing how the first of the private language arguments introduced at §243 ties in with Wittgenstein's preceding concerns with the nature of rule-following. Hacker is intent on establishing the continuity, both methodological and substantive, between Wittgenstein's earlier remarks on the nature of language and philosophy and his shift to the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's primary concern is to show how the private language arguments relate to the classical Cartesian picture of the 'two realms of experience': the mental and the physical. According to this august tradition, we are acquainted with events in the mental world; hence, first-person psychological reports are descriptions based on introspection (where introspection is an 'inner sense': a mental analogue of perception) and third-person psychological judgments are inferences (I know that I am in pain, but I infer that he is in pain). What we are presented with is a doctrine of *epistemological asymmetry*: our knowledge of our mental contents, states, and processes is experientially different from and superior to our knowledge of events in the external world (including, of course, our knowledge of other minds).

Hacker takes us through Wittgenstein's dense and often bewildering remarks that are designed to bring us to see how first-person psychological utterances are not a paradigm of incorrigible (a priori) knowledge, that introspection is a metaphor and 'privileged access' a confusion, and that 'self-knowledge' is categorially different from knowledge about the external world. Wittgenstein clarifies that in order to say of someone, 'A knows that P', it must also be possible to say A does not know that P'. This is the criterion of its being a genuine empirical proposition. If a proposition like 'I am in pain but do not know it' is nonsense, then so too is the opposite 'I know that I am in pain' (i.e., the latter is not making any genuine epistemic claim). The same arguments apply to the Cartesian doctrine of the transparency of mind. In order to say 'I can see clearly and distinctly that I have a pain' it would also have to be possible to say 'I can only barely or indistinctly see that I have a pain'. Our job here, as conceived by Wittgenstein, is to clarify the nature of the certainty which characterizes first-person psychological utterances: to see how and why the possibility of doubt is excluded by grammar, and thus, that the Cartesian thesis of the incorrigibility of first-person knowledge results from confusing the *grammatical exclusion of doubt* with epistemological certainty.

Hacker then provides a close reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on the distinction between avowals and descriptions. The thrust of this discussion is to show that what the wide diversity of linguistic expressions grouped together as 'avowals' all have in common is that they exclude the paradigm of description (in the physical sense): they are not grounded in perception (I have pains; I do not see or infer them); they are not based on observation (therefore there are no conditions of observation — e.g., visibility); we do not identify or recognize our sensations (although we can identify or recognize

the significance of certain sensations); we cannot scrutinize or examine sensations, emotions etc; and avowals are not based on evidence (hence the exclusion of justification).

The upshot of these investigations is to bring us to appreciate the shift which Wittgenstein intends from epistemological to grammatical asymmetry. Epistemological asymmetry is an asymmetry about justification: viz, in third-person cases I am justified in my assertion 'He is in pain' by what I see, and in first-person cases by what I am acquainted with. What is different in the two cases is the 'type of fact' which justifies my assertions. Hence we get a private/public epistemological asymmetry of justification. The point of replacing epistemological with grammatical asymmetry is to see that whereas we say of another person that, e.g., he has a pain in his leg on the basis of his behaviour, in first-person cases there are not grounds for our statements: *not* because our utterances are ultimately unjustifiable but rather, because the possibility of doubt (justification) is grammatically excluded in first-person statements.

The converse significance of this argument is crystallized in the distinction between *behavioural criteria* and *bodily symptoms*. We do indeed speak of 'bodily movements' or refer to various bodily changes as symptoms in specific situations (e.g., a flushed face may be a symptom of fever, shaking hands a symptom of Parkinson's disease). But this is categorially different from speaking of behavioural criteria of 'inner processes'. For the latter are: things that *human beings* do; things that human beings *do* (contrast St. Vitus' dance with doing the hurky-jerky); context-and agent-relative; and include subsequent behaviour (what agents later say or do). Behavioural expressions of the 'inner' are not symptoms — inductive evidence — of an agent's mental processes or states but *criteria*. If someone screams when a doctor touches his lower abdomen the doctor does not say to himself 'That is only behaviour, the pain itself cannot be seen': i.e., he does not infer that this behaviour is a symptom of pain but rather, that this pain is a symptom of appendicitis. On the basis of this opening salvo against the Cartesian picture of epistemological privacy Hacker then goes on to elucidate Wittgenstein's attack on the 'dual-process' picture of thinking and the problems that result from viewing psychological acts or abilities as mental equivalents of physical processes, states, activities, or experiences.

This is but a thumb-nail sketch of this rich and stimulating book. Nothing has been said here of Wittgenstein's sustained attack on the notion of a 'private ostensive definition', the chapters detailing the differences between Wittgenstein's approach and behaviourism, and its relevance to AI and computational psychology; the dangers of construing mental images as copies, pictures, or mental representations of perceptual impressions stored in the mind and the conceptual constraints on what is imaginable; and the reasons why a new 'form of representation' cannot give us an insight into the 'real nature' of the Self. The most that one can hope to convey in so short a compass is that the Wittgenstein who emerges from this book is not a reactionary, intent on salvaging ordinary linguistic conventions from the

encroachments of psychology. This is a Wittgenstein who had read closely and carefully in experimental psychology and whose criticisms are unlike anything that had ever been seen before. This is a Wittgensein who was intent on removing the conceptual confusions that plague psychology in order to further, not to thwart its development as a science. And above all, this is a Wittgenstein whose contribution to the philosophy of psychology we can now, because of *Meaning and Mind*, begin to understand and advance.

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Mark S. Halfon
Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1989.
Pp. xv+190. US $27.95 ISBN 0-87722-605-9.

In his 1971 lecture, 'Moral Integrity', Peter Winch declined to give an analysis of the concept; instead he argued against treating morality as a guide to action, that is, as disrupting a person's integrity by coming between her and her actions, by insisting on external considerations for doing one action rather than another. Mark Halfon has some sympathy with Winch's opposition to the contractarian and utilitarian traditions which appeal in this way to fundamental moral principles, but he does set out to provide an analysis of integrity and it is one which immediately puts aside the Winchean criterion of wholeness. Instead, Halfon notes that even arguments and the game of baseball can have integrity, while people can have intellectual, or professional, or other kinds of integrity. For this reason, he doubts that there is a common thread among the term's various moral uses: as equivalent to wholeness, or authenticity, or autonomy, or sincerity, or soundness of principle. The claim he defends is that 'persons of integrity characteristically maintain a consistent commitment to do what is best — especially under conditions of adversity' (8). This account has four main elements, which are set out in Part I of the book.

Starting with some people widely thought to be paradigms of integrity (Socrates, Ghandi, Martin Luther King), Halfon first claims that they exemplify lives of serious and consistent commitment, whether explicit or implicit, to some objective. Second, he argues that there are constraints on what the objective can be. It does not have to be what is actually good, for that would deny the diversity of goals which can legitimately be pursued with integrity. But it cannot be just any capricious or morally intolerable objective; rather, it should be something which the agent at least *believes* is morally right.

Third, this belief is itself subject to constraints which include a commitment to conceptual clarity and logical consistency. 'Persons of integrity should consider all relevant and available empirical evidence that apparently conflicts with the truth of their beliefs. They should also acknowledge and confront all relevant moral considerations' (36). Fourth, the commitment must survive the test of adversity. Otherwise, integrity would be indistinguishable from virtues such as sincerity. There is an element of courage to integrity, which must be capable of facing up to the challenge of serious temptations to abandon the commitment.

The second part of Halfon's book discusses the sort of revising to which commitments constrained in such ways must be open, and he carefully contrasts that sort of reassessment with the kind of moral compromising that results in loss of integrity.

The third part of the book is devoted to discussion of the *value* of moral integrity. First it cannot be of intrinsic value, for, unlike the Kantian good will, integrity is compatible with having evil principles or causing evil consequences (in rare cases the sincere and consistent Nazi can have integrity). Halfon concludes that it is false 'that the possession of integrity is intrinsically good in the sense that it has value irrespective of its consequences' (136). It would appear to follow that in such a case it is worse to have integrity than not; otherwise we ought to conclude the opposite, that the *goodness* of integrity is independent of its consequences. Here Halfon fails to make sufficiently clear the connection between compatibility with evil consequences and having value regardless of consequences. He says, for instance, that people choosing a lesser evil may lose integrity, but only on condition that they 'believe they are enbarking [*sic*] upon a path that is morally best' (134). [That, incidentally, is the only typographical error I have found in what is a very well produced book.]

Next, Halfon considers whether integrity has instrumental value. Winnie Mandela exemplified (until recent surprises) a person who was steadfast in the service of a goal which appeared unachievable in her lifetime. Halfon argues that the value of that sort of integrity hinges not entirely on results but also on one's 'being a certain kind of person' (147). This leads to a key chapter on the Aristotelian conception of what it is to be a person of virtue. Just as virtue is a constitutive part of the eudaimonic life, so is integrity, as analysed above, a part of the process of being or becoming a noble or praiseworthy kind of person.

Finally, Halfon claims that while a person of integrity can be tortured and hurt and can have her dignity stripped away, she 'cannot be harmed.' If she is a victim of abuse, for instance, she should not feel guilt or remorse (unless she herself is responsible for choosing evil over good). He concludes that 'if honesty, fidelity, trustworthiness, sensitivity, courage, and temperance are some of the virtues that characterize noble persons, then the presence of integrity will serve to strengthen those virtues, and the absence of integrity will weaken them .... [M]oral integrity is a special virtue uniquely related to almost all other moral values. For this reason alone, the possession of

integrity is a characteristic that ought to be cultivated by any noble human being' (162). Thus a life which strives for clarity, consistency, care with evidence, commitment in adversity, and which seeks to do good, even if it is a life which in error pursues ignoble ends or principles, is nevertheless preferable to a similarly ignoble life which lacks such integrity.

Clearly Halfon is right that persons of integrity must be true to their commitments, but commitment may not be the essence of the matter. A person of great simplicity may have the required purity of heart without being one of those whom we call committed. And a person with integrity should laugh at what she thinks is funny, not at what she thinks other people think she should think funny. Halfon's sophisticated epistemological demands are not consistent with our attribution of integrity to children, or to those whose simple spontaneity evinces such perspicuous wholeness that we consider them paradims of integrity. The book, however, is a careful and workmanlike job, which displays many of the virtues it discusses.

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David Ingram
Critical Theory and Philosophy.
New York: Paragon House 1990. Pp. xxx+240.
US$12.95. ISBN 1-55778-201-6.

When someone asks me to recommend a good book on 'Critical Theory' or 'The Frankfurt School', I am going to recommend this one. From its roots in Marx and the German Enlightenment to the appropriation of Weber and Freud, from the founding of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s to Horkheimer and Adorno's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment,' from Marcuse and the New Left to the 'discourse ethics' of Habermas, this book covers all the essential points with authority, clarity and concision.

While there is a comprehensive look at Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, Habermas receives the fullest consideration, which is no doubt as it should be. Ingram shows how Habermas moves from a position close to the Critical Theory of the pre-war 30s to his unique discourse ethics and, most recently, a new opening to the Arts.

A closing chapter introduces two significant lines of criticism: French Post-structuralism (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard); and the work of feminists like Gilligan (who raises important doubts about Kohlberg's developmental psychology, on which Habermas relies), as well as the more philosophical criticism of Benhabib and Fraser.

If the book has a weakness, it is that Ingram is too willing to let Marcuse tell him what Freud thinks, and to let Habermas tell him what Foucault thinks. Recounting Freud, he says, 'the child internalizes the punitive aggression inflicted by his or her parents. That is, he or she learns to punish himself/herself mentally so as to avoid physical punishment by them' (40). Freud's view is the contrary: 'the original severity of the super-ego ... represents rather one's own aggression toward it [object/parent] ... the severity of the super-ego which a child develops in no way corresponds to the severity of treatment which he has himself met with' (*Civilization and Its Discontents*, vii). Ingram says, 'Freud believed that this aggression would eventually lead to the triumph of the death instinct' (100). But unlike some of the gloomier Critical Theorists of 'Grand Hotel Abyss,' Freud refrains from prophesy. 'The fateful question for the human species' — which he defines as 'whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction' — is wide-open: 'I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow men as a prophet' (ibid, viii).

Ingram passes on Habermas's absurd claim that for Foucault, the '"validity" — and therewith the truth and meaningfulness of permissable statements — is ultimately a function of arbitrary violence' (201). Foucault contradicts this any number of times. It is a laughable misreading of his work on power relations, and oblivious to the analytic power of his concept of '*government*'. The entire point of the study of 'panopticism' was to show how a far-reaching government of conduct can be effected without any threat of violence: Under panoptic conditions there is 'no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost' (*Power/Knowledge*, 155).

But these are details. The book is generally very solid; clearly and intelligently written and organized. I read it with interest, and learned from it at several points. As I said, I will be recommending it to anybody who asks about a good introduction to Critical Theory.

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Keekok Lee
Social Philosophy and Ecological Scarcity.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. xiv+425.
Cdn $66.00: US $55.00. ISBN 0-415-03220-2.

Lee argues that ecological scarcity has dramatic implications for social philosophy, turning topsy turvy both of the contemporary and competing social philosophies, capitalism and state socialism. Both expect growth without limit and are thus erected on what she calls 'fantastic' assumptions that are 'crucially flawed' (x, 2, 9). Growth without limit violates the principles of ecology but violates even more the laws of thermodynamics. Lee deplores the ecologically insensitive values of the industrial world (which she denotes ESVs) and advocates a radical social philosophy based on ecologically sensitive values (ESVs).

Lee's use of ecology is precedented by others, who argue that development ought to be sustainable and that a culture that degrades the natural world on which it depends is irrational. But Lee's use of thermodynamics is unprecedented in social philosophy (70-108). The Second Law of Thermodynamics (that entropy increases overall) is regularly thought to be relevant in bigscale cosmology (the universe is running down), evolutionary history may be described as a countercurrent to entropy, but the laws of thermodynamics are seldom considered relevant more locally in social policy, since the sun will shine for several more billion years. Lee, however, is not just concerned with a thermodynamics of energy but with a thermodynamics of matter.

Enormous amounts of work have been performed during Earth's past history to concentrate resources (iron ores, fossil fuels, photosynthate in ecosystems); humans occupy the top levels of an energetic synthesis of materials in ecological pyramids; and when we use resources we inevitably degrade this collection of useful matter. Low entropic matter is in short supply; civilization requires increasing the entropic state of matter, running down our resource base. There is no escaping this degradation of resources; in this sense there is no sustainable development; our only course is to meter scarce resources as frugally as possible. Recycling helps, but with every cycle some resource is irretrievably scattered, which could be recovered only with ever escalating energy expenditure. Humans face an 'absolute finitude' (101).

Others will argue that there can be indefinitely a sustainable use of renewable resources (solar energy, water power, wood, food) and that, although some resources are nonrenewable (fossil fuels, iron ores), substitutes can indefinitely be found for them. Materials are indeed limited, energy is in principle at least in generous supply, and information technology making possible novel uses of materials is quite open ended, so that thermodynamic scarcity is not quite the absolutely constraining first principle that Lee supposes. But even those who demur on the thermodynamics are likely to agree that there is something essentially wrong-headed about the expectation of limitless growth that drives both capitalism and socialism. It is neither

possible nor rational nor moral to escalate consumption forever. 'Economics [is] at odds with ecological scarcity' (161). At this point, Lee's analysis can profitably be coupled with a profound study by Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., *For the Common Good*.

Lee's positive social philosophy again mixes the expected with the unexpected. Capitalism and socialism anticipate that wealth (which they measure with money) can grow forever, a fantastic assumption oblivious to the realities of ecology and thermodynamics. Lee wishes the sense of community among people to become forever richer. She develops a sense of agency and self-realization (Chapter 4) that rejects what she calls 'external relations' (increasing power over nature, increasing consumption, increasing money) in favor of what she calls 'internal relations' involving 'a collective theory of responsibility' (139). Persons, selves, are not characterized by the possession of material things but by the possession of experiences and memories (200). Cultivating human relationships, both with each other and with the natural world, is what life is really all about, and such experiences (though too little provided for in materialistic capitalism and socialism) are not in short supply at all; they are in principle limitless.

Lee hopes 'to direct human agents to seek satisfaction not from the ever increasing possession and consumption of material goods which are scarce, but to direct us to seek satisfaction in activities which are not dependent necessarily on ever increasing possession and consumption *per se*' (208, cf.352). In more typical vocabulary, she emphasizes nonconsumptive over consumptive goods. Life that seeks external goods is a competitive zero-sum game; if some win, others must lose. Life that seeks internal goods is a win-win game; cooperatively we can share. Lee terms this an 'artistic morality' as opposed to a 'morality of consumption' (224-25). 'The burden of this book is to establish the central good to be the acquisition of internal goods, that is, of self-development under the artistic mode of production' (292, cf. 310).

Lee's social philosophy is an 'ascetic version of socialism,' rejecting the 'cornucopic version' of Marx (228). For inspiration she turns, somewhat surprisingly, to a rather obscure figure, Charles Fourier (1772-1837), who lived in eastern France, essentially a pre-industrial figure with some rather eccentric sexual and other views. But Fourier did have a vision of participatory community that Lee thinks is worth recovering. He advocated a society he called 'Harmony' (237-9), which dislikes emphasis on manufactured goods in favor of agriculture and horticulture, with even these having an 'artistic' emphasis. In particular Lee finds in Fourier a useful contrast to the Protestant work ethic, an ethic she laments as a principal trouble in the West. Lee seems not to know the Protestant sense of vocation in work, which at times bears much similarity to Fourier's artistic workers who rejoice in their craft as a meaningful contribution to human relations. Further, Lee provides a useful analysis of the redistribution of resources that could make possible her participatory society.

Lee's reconstruction of Fourier's social philosophy provides an interesting foil to contemporary capitalism and socialism and often her criticisms are well taken. Nevertheless it is unlikely that many will find much inspiration in Fourier as an answer to the ecological crisis. He is too idiosyncratic for that. In fact Lee's book as a whole is, like Fourier, mixedly idiosyncratic and seminal.

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John Leslie
Universes.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. vii+228.
Cdn $30.00; US $25.00. ISBN 0-415-04144-9.

The relationships between science and religion are once again in transition for at least two reasons. New understandings of the nature of science have forced a change from positivistic rejections of the cognitive potential of religious claims and substantive advances in the sciences seem to leave more room for religious positions. Within this more open atmosphere questions and speculations characteristic of classical natural theology are becoming more commonplace among both scientists and philosophers. John Leslie's *Universes* is a good example of this resurgence of natural theological investigations, one that is informed both by a wide-ranging knowledge of current investigations in cosmology concerning the origin of the universe, and by an incisively honed philosophical perspective. To construct his work, Leslie draws upon a series of papers he has written over the last decade on cosmological topics as well as on both his book *Value and Existence* (Oxford: Blackwell 1979) and related papers, where he develops some Neo-Platonic ideas about the existence of God.

Leslie ranges through the most recent theories of the origin of the Universe, including its constituents and forces, to establish in impressive detail the substantial amount and variety of evidence for the fact that our physical universe is fine-tuned (ft) for the existence of intelligent life, that is, that small changes in this universe's basic features would have made life's evolution impossible.

In Leslie's view this evidence leads to only two approximately equally probable hypotheses. One hypothesis is that of multiple worlds or a world ensemble (WE). The second is the Fine Tuner (FT) hypothesis. WE is the view that our physical universe is only one of many universes, ours being one of

the rare type in which life exists. The laws of probability make the chances reasonable enough that out of a large number of universes a few, at least one, will exist that allow for the existence of intelligent life. FT, on the other hand, explains the existence of intelligent life, either through the design of an intelligent God or, as Leslie prefers, on the basis of a creative abstract principle of ethical requiredness (ERE). Such a principle is the source of the existence of this universe because the existence of this universe, with the values it exhibits, especially that of intelligent life, is required by that principle. Leslie also allows that the ERE may have created a personal God who then on the basis of that principle must create the Universe. Although Leslie believes that FT and WE are not mutually exclusive hypotheses since the FT may have chosen to create a large number of universes, of which only a few were suitable for intelligent life, he treats the two hypotheses as competitors. Leslie gives us an even-handed exploration of both WE and FT, attempting to show that neither are implausible and that both can account for ft.

Leslie argues that FT can be strengthened if one considers the very plausible claim that FT is most likely to occur only within the context of certain basic laws, often called grand unified theories (GUTs) or theories of everything (TOEs). A supporter of FT can argue that the basic laws themselves must be carefully chosen by an FT if life-permitting ones are to be had. On the other hand, a supporter of WE can seek to eliminate the necessity for FT by postulating a multiplicity of universes. Given a very large number of universes, one could expect that one or a few of them would be life-permitting. Thus the laws of random variation and large numbers would suffice to explain not only the evidence for ft, but also the presence of the proper GUT or TOE.

Leslie devotes a chapter to arguing for the physical and logical possibility of WE and two chapters to issues concerning the plausibility of various FTs. He argues that FTs, if properly understood, can avoid the traditional problems associated with design arguments, for instance, that they are explanatorily superfluous or fall under the weight of the problem of evil. Surprisingly, Leslie does not draw any explicit connections between the Anthropic Principle (that the universe seems to be made for intelligent life) and ft; and he denies that it has any theistic implications.

Leslie presupposes extensive familiarity with the theories and evidence he discusses. Readers who are not familiar with these matters may find Leslie's casual presentation very tough sledding. A more systematic introduction to the scientific issues would, I think, have been helpful.

Leslie finds explanatory power in only two directions, ethical choice or statistical chance. A personal FT or an ERE satisfies the former and WE the latter. However, I believe that Leslie has unwarrantedly limited the possible explanations of FT. He dismisses, without argument appeals to basic laws as appeals to mysteries. In so doing he eliminates the hypothesis that it is of the nature of the constituents of this universe to be life-permitting. One can agree with Leslie that there are no current GUTs or TOEs which explain ft.

But I see no in-principle reasons for ruling out the discovery of such theories, nor do I find that Leslie gives any reasons for doing so. Moreover, Leslie's own standards for acceptable explanation, those of common sense and scientific reasoning, do not limit one to only these two types of hypotheses. Definitiveness of results within a narrow range of possibilities does not require only choice or statistical chance explanations. Nor are all choices of the ethical sort. One could hypothesize principles concerning the pragmatic, prudential, or aesthetic requiredness of existence. In addition, neither of the two explanatory types favored by Leslie are without severe problems. Leslie recognizes the obvious problems associated with ethical choice. Those are versions of the ever-pressing problem of evil. However, setting those aside, he does not seem to recognize sufficiently the inadequacy of explanations invoking probabilities and large numbers. Scientists seek causal explanations of both expected and unexpected distributions. In addition, Leslie seems to leave us in an endless explanatory oscillation between FT and WE hypotheses: Life permitting-universes are explained on the basis of ethical choices of an FT or the ethical requirements of an ERE. The existence of the latter is explained on the basis of statistical chance given a large enough number of different sorts of life creative sources including at least one FT or ERE.

Moreover, from a scientifically naturalistic perspective, one has reason to be sceptical both about whether ft calls for an FT hypothesis at all and whether any appeal to abstract entities and principles as in themselves creative is plausible. After all, actions deriving from choice based on ethical principles have emerged only very recently in this universe. Given the insufficiency of a mere appeal to large numbers as an adequate scientific explanation, a natural theological approach more closely based on the facts of cosmic and biological evolution, might find its models for speculation about the divine in the positions of Samuel Alexander and other emergentists. Cosmic and biological evolution may lead one to reject the general applicability of the Aristotelean view, entrenched in common sense explanations, that the cause must be adequate to its effect. In a more radically creative universe, in which quantum mechanical effects are, to use Abner Shimony's provocative description, part of 'objective chance', we might argue that there is evidence that the cause need not be adequate to the effect, that more complex levels of reality are brought forth from less complex. If that is so, then we might want to postulate the divine, in some appropriate sense of the term, as a possible goal of our cosmic journey rather than as its starting point. Provided both that we are lucky and choose well and that we have the kind of universe with the kind of constituents and basic laws that we seem to have, the divine or the transcendent may come to be. Thus both the phenomena of ft and of fundamental causal regularities to which Leslie appeals may be better accounted for not by FT or WE but by an emergentist hypothesis.

These observations do nothing more than point out that Leslie's speculations lead us back to fundamental ontological issues about the nature and existence of the transcendent and basic epistemological problems about the

nature of explanation and the criteria for adequate explanation. It is to Leslie's credit that he has raised these issues in such a provocative fashion within the context of recent scientific theories concerning the fundamental nature of physical reality and the origin of the universe. If we had any doubts about the matter, Leslie's *Universes* demonstrates that natural theology is alive and well!

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David Michael Levin
The Listening Self. Personal Growth, Social Change and the Closure of Metaphysics.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1989. Pp. xxvii+333. Cdn $56.50: US $47.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-02582-6); Cdn $20.50: US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-02583-4).

This is a very rich book and draws from many facets of contemporary thought. Levin participates, as a careful listener but with a critical ear, in a dialogue with thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Freud, Lacan, Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Derrida, and various contemporary practitioners of psychoanalysis and psychiatry.

The Listening Self is the third volume of a trilogy, the first two books being *The Body's Recollection of Being* and *The Opening of Vision*. In the present volume Levin continues the theme that the real crisis today is that we lack an awareness of our true human potential, a potential to be discovered primarily in our embodiment as spiritual beings with the capacity to listen. There are two basic elements to Levin's strategy. The first is to make the argument of the book an argument from potential. There is no attempt to ground a new ethics or political theory in a *necessity* arising from our nature as lived-body; rather, there is an attempt to ground an ethics in a *possibility* belonging to us by nature. The second element of the strategy is to focus on our potential as listeners rather than as seers. Levin hopes to steer us away from the kinds of totalization which 'the tradition' has favored — basing itself chiefly on the metaphor of 'seeing' — and toward a conception of a 'wholeness' which is not totalizable, but which involves the play of figure/ground and development central to the formation of gestalts.

According to Levin, if we are to develop our potential for the moral life, we must head the attacks made against the egological, logocentric position of the tradition. But we must not throw out the baby with the bath water,

discounting, deconstructing, and in general abolishing the self, leaving only a socio-cultural construct. One must ask, rather, if there is not a self which is neither only a form of self-absorption and self-indulgence nor simply a mechanical construction. In order to answer this question — and the answer is in the affirmative — we are urged to think about ' "practices of the self" that do *not* separate self and other, self and society' but that are, rather, 'aware of the subtle complexities in [their] intertwining' (117-18). We must understand that the self is not a given, but '*grows* by virtue of its participation in, and its assumption of responsibility for, the processes of power constitutive of democratic societies' (ibid.). Lastly, there are practices of the self which are '*not* mere "functions of bio-power," *not* mere "technologies" applied to the control of the self' (ibid.).

These practices of the self reveal an interplay or 'intertwining' between the 'historical' and the 'transhistorical'. By this Levin means that, although we 'owe' ourselves as selves to history and its social forces, there is something more to us than this; namely, a 'transhistorical' element involving 'contingent conditions of possibility and contingent limitations, relative to history, that history can neither create nor totally reorganize'. This brings 'into history a transhistorical otherness — history's unconquerable alterity, of which, in fact, the historical body-self itself always carries at least a trace' (96).

This intertwining of the historical and the transhistorical brings not a *necessity* to act in one or another way, but rather the *potential* to be responsible to ourselves and to others. In other words, the relation between human beings, and between human beings and their historical and natural reality, is not such that a 'space' is necessarily or even actually there for an interplay of responsibilities; rather, it is the responsibility of humans themselves to create such a space.

But one asks: if there is no moral necessity to do this, but only a potential, why should one act responsibly? The answer is twofold. First, Levin appeals simply to the contingent tendencies, hopes, aspirations, and needs of the other and of the social whole to which we are asked by others and ourselves to respond. Here Levin shows the degree to which he is proposing a 'character ethics': this listening is 'a question of character. Its development is a practice of the self ... in [which] one works on oneself. It is a moral struggle to *become* someone who can always listen and hear the truth' (137).

But, second, Levin also holds to an ontology involving '"evolutionary potentials," utopian-emancipatory potentials, which are already schematized, for our species, in the very nature and character of the medium Merleau-Ponty calls "the flesh"' (176). If we are to be authentic or 'genuine', then we should listen to our being and develop those potentials (180). Reminiscent of Sartre's and Heidegger's respective appeals to authenticity and genuineness, Levin achieves a 'grounding' of his position in an appeal that we be 'authentic' in the face of our given ontological condition by responding to the openness and contingency of it. And this is to be acheived, fundamentally, by listening.

Our responsible moral character and stance, therefore, do not follow necessarily or actually; they simply have the *potential* for actualization. What is needed in order to bring about *this* actualization rather than another (e.g., rather than the egological actualization belonging to 'bourgeois capitalism') is the *desire* to listen and the *desire* to act on what is heard in that listening. What is needed is an educational process that will liberate us to 'respond to the gift, the suppressed utopian dream, of the human flesh' (183).

This is *not* a book *about* ethics or *about* the foundations for morality. Rather it involves us in a *morally* motivated analysis intended to show us a *moral* potential we have for our being, a potential which will be realized only if we ourselves take a *moral* stance toward the questions and respond in a *morally* responsible way. The penultimate paragraph of the book sums this up beautifully. 'It is, I think, conceivable that, out of this listening, reversing the closure of metaphysics, we *could* make a new historical beginning, gathering into our recollection the concealment of, and at, the origin, that elusive, audibly inaudible, clearing silence by grace of which the history of moral hearing first became a possibility — our gift, our task' (275).

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Jane J. Mansbridge, ed.
Beyond Self-Interest.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1990. Pp. ix+402.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-50359-3);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-50360-7).

The eighteen essays in this anthology recognise and lament the shortcomings of the model of rational man that until recently has dominated the social sciences. In the face of examples of actions such as voting in large elections, donating blood, and contributing anonymously to charities, it is hard to defend models that identify self-interest as the sole or the primary motive. A closer look at many other types of behaviour (including classic prisoners' dilemma-type scenarios and cooperative and principled behaviour) forces one to acknowledge the inaccuracy and the poverty of this model. Simplicity in a model is a virtue, but simplemindedness is not. The challenge is to recognise the proper limits within which self-interest does and ought to operate and to concede that duty and love do and ought to motivate rational action. To this end, social scientists are well served: economists, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and evolutionary biologists all provide evidence of

rational actions arising from non-self-interested motives. And they show how such actions are necessary for the flourishing of any society. Indeed, perhaps the one group that will feel shortchanged by this anthology is philosophers. For it is an anthology thin on theory, and rich with empirical considerations, in particular, ones that are relevant to present day American constitutional democracy.

Clearly, the slogan, 'all political behaviour is motivated by self-interest' is either vacuous or false. First, we have to identify correctly the legitimate scope of self-interest. Then there remains the problem of giving a rational explanation of behaviours that are not obviously self-interested and of cooperation where it does not serve self-interest. There are the further practical challenges of identifying and knowing how to implement the kinds of institutions that foster a cooperative spirit and that encourage citizens to work for the common good. These problems set the agenda for the volume.

In the introduction, Mansbridge provides evidence of the historical popularity of the (bad) model of rational choice in which self-interest is taken to be the sole motivator of political action. She then cites several renegade social scientists whose empirical studies undermine this model. Unfortunately, as she notes, these findings have had little influence in rational choice theory or in empirical political science.

Sen's paper 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory' is reprinted in one of the more theoretical sections (Part II: Dimensions of the Problem). In it he argues that personal choice does not always aim to promote personal welfare. Rather, commitment to principle is often present in personal choices, and the welfare promoted is often that of the community. Choices can be understood, he claims, through a meta-ranking of preferences. Included in this section is a sociologist's perspective on the problems: Jencks (in 'Varieties of Altruism') traces the ways in which genetic and cultural selection work to favour different kinds of behaviours. Genetic selection favours partial empathy with offspring and kin and those with whom one stands in reciprocal relations. But genetic selection is notoriously selfish. Because cooperation on military and economic ventures is required for a society to thrive, cultural selection favours altruistic behaviours that contribute to the success of such ventures.

Following on this, in a section devoted to discussing the problem of how altruistic behaviour can survive to reproduce itself, the contributions include both practical solutions and practical suggestions. Boyd and Richerson (in 'Culture and Cooperation') account for the evolution of human cooperation by means of 'conformist transmission' whereby the frequency of the more common variant in a population increases. And Mansbridge ('On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest') suggests what kinds of empirical research are needed to determine when self-interest is likely to undermine unselfishness and when it is likely to enhance or complement it. Such research would also show what kinds of institutions and arrangements would permit non-self-interested reasons to survive the evolutionary competition.

The next six papers all provide empirical support to undermine the prominence ascribed to self-interest in political decision-making. Included here is Kelman's 'Congress and Public Spirit: A Commentary' which argues that the presence of self-interest is inversely proportional to the importance of Congressional policies. Quirk ('Deregulation and the Politics of Ideas in Congress') shows how patterns of deregulation in the last fifteen years in the United States reveal the inadequacies of self-interest theories of politics. And Sunstein (in 'Political Self-Interest in Constitutional Law') argues that constitutional doctrines, far from supporting interest-group pluralism, require the kind of deliberation that is immune from private pressures.

The last four papers are more theoretical: Margolis (in 'Dual Utilities and Rational Choice') summarises his dual-utilities model of rational choice (developed elsewhere) which is intended to capture the mixed motivations present in most choices. Instead of maximising a single utility, the agent has to recognise irreducibly distinct private and social motivations and find some way to balance them. And Mansbridge ('Expanding the Range of Formal Modeling') writes of the hazards and benefits implicit in models that seek to accommodate more than self-interest as a motive.

The final two articles are perhaps the most interesting for philosophers. In 'The Secret History of Self-Interest' Holmes cites Hume, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson as critics of the motivational reductionism that postulated self-interest as the source of all action, and then explains why the subtleties of eighteenth-century moral psychologies were forgotten in the face of political reasons for insisting on the importance of self-interest as a motivator. And Held (in 'Mothering versus Contract') argues that the model of a society of rational self-interested contractors fails us both descriptively and normatively. She urges that more can be learnt about the grounds for caring, cooperation, and trust by looking at the mothering (or, better, the 'parenting') relation and its involuntary nature, its asymmetric dependencies and all its vulnerabilities than by viewing agents as self-sufficient rational deliberators entering freely into apparently mutually advantageous contracts.

Faced with such an obviously implausible model as that of the rational contractor, it is illuminating to speculate why it had such a hold on social scientists. And one is grateful to have such a wide variety of empirical evidence falsifying the model. But one also has cause to regret the underrepresentation of philosophical contributions to these discussions, the more so if this reflects truly the current state of thinking on these matters.

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Arthur M. Melzer
The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1990. Pp. xix+308.
US $51.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-51978-3):
Cdn $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-51979-1).

Melzer's title reveals the nature and scope of his project: 'to reassemble the system of Rousseau's thought,' as grounded in the principle of natural human goodness (12). Though others have undertaken the quest for Rousseau's system, Melzer is rather more successful — because, he adopts 'the most obvious and potentially useful approach' (xiii), namely, to take Rousseau's remarkable experience of 1749 seriously. In recounting that experience, Rousseau claims 'that he had been illuminated by crowds of great truths which were then weakly distributed in his writings; that if he had ever been able to write a quarter of what he saw and felt, with what clarity he would have shown all the contradictions of the social system, with what force he would have exposed all the abuses of our institutions, with what simplicity he would have demonstrated that man is naturally good, and that it is solely by these institutions that men become wicked' (11). Melzer's project, then, is to overcome Rousseau's 'weak distribution' problem by revitalizing the principle of natural human goodness (in Part I), by supplying an accessible and plausible (if not altogether simple) demonstration of that principle (Part II), and by adducing its consequences for political theory (in Part III).

Revitalization: Melzer construes Rousseau's fundamental principle of natural human goodness as both self — and other — directed. That is, we are by nature good for ourselves insofar as we are well-ordered and self-sufficient, and we are by nature good for others insofar as we lack the desire to harm them and, indeed, empathize with them instead. In contrast to the Christian doctrine of original sin, to the Hobbesian doctrine of original animosity towards others, and to the Platonic doctine of original bifurcation of the self, Rousseau posits an original goodness, an original indifference to others, and an original unity of the individual self. But for Melzer, the most critical concern is the unified, autonomous self which is motivated by *amour-de-soi*, or self-love qua the desire to preserve oneself.

Demonstration: Melzer 'reassembles' from Rousseau's 'weak distribution' four arguments, supplemented by a new description of human evil, as the warrant for Rousseau's fundamental principle. Two of these arguments, which appeal to introspective evidence and to psychological theory, offer a positive proof — 'that the fundamental principle of human nature (viz., self-love qua self-preservation) is good;' and the other two arguments, which supply 'historical and anthropological evidence' and then an account of 'the nature and structure of society,' confirm (albeit obliquely) our natural goodness 'by showing the external, social origin of all our present vices' (29). But

it is the fourth, social argument which is especially important, for it constitutes 'the veritable centerpiece of Rousseau's thought': viz., 'the derivation of the disunity of the civilized person's soul from her/his personal dependence' (76). This derivation, indeed, clarifies 'the contradictions of the social system' to which Rousseau alludes: the contradiction, specifically, 'between our single natural end (self-preservation) and the means required to secure this end in society' (69,70). As Melzer indicates, the social means of self-preservation is the Hobbesian quest for 'power after power that ceaseth only in death;' and such a quest is self-contradictory, or at least self-defeating, since it entails the attempt to control and use others, who are — perforce — engaged in the same quest, and since everyone so engaged depends, ultimately, on the acquiescence of others (72-3). How, then, are we to reunify the self, or — that is — reconcile our means and end, within society?

Application: Melzer, quite reasonably, restricts his response to this question. That is, he offers an account of Rousseau's political theory, and — even more specifically — he attempts to explain how natural human goodness 'systematically produces the SOCIAL CONTRACT' (xiii). This explanation emphasizes Rousseau's substitution of a democratic social contract for the presumptive rule of 'the best and the brightest,' and of popular sovereignty (or the rule of law) for natural law, and then details Rousseau's theory of executive power, in order to show how consent and wisdom might be reconciled (252).

Unfortunately, Melzer's explication of the *Social Contract* does not really explain its systematic grounding in the principle of natural human goodness. Instead, he claims 'that, when one actually looks at this work, one will find no mention of the principle of natural human goodness, no reference to the corrupting effects of personal dependence, no allusion to the problem of disunity of soul' (114). Yet, when I read the *Social Contract*, I do find a straightforward allusion to the problem of the disunity of soul: 'that each contracting party (previously, a private person) is to be received, through the act of association, as an *indivisible* part of the whole' (cf. I.6). Subsequently (in III.13), Rousseau suggests that in a well-formed or legitimate polity, the words 'citizen' and 'subject' become extensionally equivalent designations, thereby ensuring harmony between freedom and obedience, between making and obeying the law. And, Rousseau claims, 'when the citizen-subject's constant will is the general will' (IV.2), and thus when the citizen-subject has achieved self-mastery through obedience to the self-prescribed rule of law (I.8), such a politically unified self will satisfy the very condition that, within society, 'guarantees her/him against all personal dependence' (I.7). And so, if Melzer were to look more closely at the *Social Contract*, I believe he would find what is needed 'to explain how the principle of natural human goodness systematically produces' that text.

In his conclusion, Melzer characterizes Rousseau's system as Janus-headed (284), by which he means that Rousseau embraces quite opposite tendencies: that Rousseau 'sublimates Hobbes into Plato,' that his thought is structured by a 'curious, complex idealistic realism' (26). But, as the Roman

god of doors, Janus also serves as an apt figure for Melzer's genuine achievement: to open the way to a better understanding of Rousseau's system, and to a clearer recognition of the fact that we are all unconscious Rousseauians, insofar as we seek to accommodate opposed tendencies and beliefs regarding the self and the political order.

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Istvan Meszaros
The Power of Ideology.
New York: New York University Press 1990.
Pp. ix+557.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8147-5450-3);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8147-5458-9).

In this substantial volume, Istvan Meszaros sets as his project nothing less than the wholesale critique of the prevailing intellectual and social order. The book might — in terms congenial to Meszaros himself, at any rate — be described as a critique of bourgeois ideology and its social roots. From 'modernity' and 'post-modernity' to the Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas, from Bernsteinian revisionism and Weberian disenchantment to 'the end of ideology' and modern 'Western' Social Democracy, little escapes the acidity of Meszaros' attack. For Meszaros, the very concept of modernity — from its roots in Hegel, through its trunk in Weber to its branches in Habermas and Critical Theory — is deeply suspect and in fact ideological. Weber is the principal ideological villain, but Habermas' theories of universal pragmatics and the ideal speech situation come in for severe criticism. All this is well and good, but for the serious intellectual work which it surely aspires to be, the book's tone strikes this reviewer as overly polemical. The work of Habermas, for example, is ridiculed as 'transcendental opportunism' (24).

What has been said will make it clear that Meszaros is interested, not so much in a critical examination and/or development of the concept of ideology itself, as in a systematic account of what the multifarious elements of the dominant ideology actually are (or are thought by Meszaros to be), and what is wrong with them. And as might be expected from the above-mentioned highly selective list of topics, Meszaros' book does contain much that is of interest on these matters. In the end, however, it must be said that the book is disappointing. It has a distinctively defensive tone, and what might be

described as the main sub-text of the book is not so much the 'Crisis in Bourgeois Society' as the 'Crisis in Marxism' itself — a crisis to which Meszaros occasionally and explicitly adverts. How does Meszaros respond to this crisis? His remarks concerning the strategies of the French and Spanish Communist Parties, among others, are I think illuminating: he claims that the way in which

> these parties disengaged themselves from their earlier strategies brought with it ... disastrous consequences for them ... with which the Marxian theory ... had absolutely nothing to do ... the problem in reality was not the inadequacy of the ... Marxian strategic framework ... but, on the contrary, the unprincipled departures of the parties in question from it. (52-3)

It is then the politics of Meszaros' book which must be a central focus of attention. But here, the message is less than transparent. On the one hand, Meszaros seems unequivocal in his rejection of Stalinism, characterising its aspirations to be 'more advanced socio-economic system' than capitalism as an out- and-out failure. On the other hand, socialism — which in some form Meszaros sees as morally and politically preferable to capitalism — 'can only prevail' if it somehow succeeds in establishing itself in such capitalist strongholds as the USA. And why is this? Because, Meszaros says, 'it is unthinkable to project the perpetuation of the present stalemate between the two rival systems far ahead into the future' (469), in view of the terrible dangers and obscene military waste associated with this stalemate. But quite apart from the fact that history, in the form of Gorbachev and internal Soviet crisis, appears to have short-circuited this argument, it *seems* to tie hopes for the future in some fashion to the preservation [and presumably the transformation] of actually existing socialist society.

At the heart of the book's 'strategic vision' is an insistence on the continued revolutionary potential of the working class — which may in the long run be forced, by its own vital interests, to overthrow the capitalist system and replace it with a classless society. But it is not very clear precisely what grounds Meszaros has for this qualified revolutionary optimism. In the middle of the book (sec. 6.9) he has some rather cryptic things to say about the views of his erstwhile teacher Lukacs, whose Hegelian views about the world-historical role of the proletariat are well known. Meszaros admits that there is something paradoxical about Lukas' claim that even if research 'disproved once and for all every one of Marx's individual theses', nevertheless orthodox Marxism, seen in its true light as pure methodology, could continue unscathed. Yet it is difficult to dispel the impression that in the last analysis, something like this is just what Meszaros himself believes.

Indeed, it is difficult to dispel the impression that Meszaros' response to various current forms of scepticism about [orthodox?] Marxism is ultimately not so much to openly engage them as to beg the question against them, and it is not clear that, even from its own perspective, his book substantially advances any basic issues. One has the uncomfortable feeling that at bottom,

Meszaros is engaged in teaching the converted. For socialists at large, I think, *The Power of Ideology* must be viewed more as a manifestation of the crisis of Marxism than as a part of of the solution.

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Jerome A. Miller
The Way of Suffering: A Geography of Crisis.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
1987. Pp xii+201.
US $22.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87840-465-1);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87840-466-X).

[A lire comme un projet de scénario pour un film d'animation (durée 5 minutes).] ... this essay focuses throughout on the experience of crisis as it is undergone by the individual person, and on the pilgrimmage which one inevitably undertakes if one allows crisis to uproot one's life [ix].)

Ce livre est en quelque sorte l'histoire de ce pèlerinage dans les profondeurs insondées de l'espace crânien d'un mâle moderne (*'If I refer over and over to the person undergoing crisis as a male, it is finally because it is the maleness in all of us that is devasted by it' [xii].*) en état de crise, 'with its experience of dissolution and chaos, its unleashing of horrific possibilities, the sense it creates in [him] of being sucked into a yawning emptiness, of being carried along by dark undercurrent [he] cannot slow or direct' (2). Il vivait comme s'il n'avait plus de point d'appui: tout s'écroulait autour de lui et en lui ... comme s'il était devenu un aphasique ... un philosophe aphasique ... ne sachant plus parler, ni lire, ni écrire. Il lui fallut faire un grand effort pour ne pas paniquer durant cette expérience de crise: en guise de distraction et de soulagement, il se rappela quelques-unes de ses expériences critiques d'antan ... comme la fois que son grand frère lui apprenait qu'il n'y avait point de Père Noël, ou encore que la terre n'était pas plate ... chaque expérience, une véritable crise épistémologique.

Mais ces moments de crise n'étaient que cela... des moments. Afin de retrouver son équilibre antérieur, il n'avait qu'à s'inventer un nouveau plan de vie, un autre scénario, et, avec cette 'réponse' en main, il pouvait se tisser de nouveaux liens avec son environnement. Ainsi, avec peu d'effort, il pouvait retrouver assez rapidement sa belle petite vie paisible. La perte de contrôle n'était que passagère car toujours, tant bien que mal, il réussissait à raccommoder sa vie, à recouvrir la fissure capotante qu'occasionnait chaque crise.

> At the basis of our ordinary world is an unwillingness to be disrupted that would not be necessary unless existence in its unmanageable otherness kept posing a threat to our ability to cope. The very fact that we cannot bear to think of losing control shows how determined we are to avert that possibility. But such aversion could not occur unless we knew all too well that what we are so intent on avoiding is capable of happening. But that possibility is always kept in the *back* of our minds (14).

En somme, il avait toujours bien su gérer la crise, i.e., la taire. Il était donc conscient qu'elle voulait lui dire quelque chose d'important à propos de lui-même et de sa vie, mais il lui avait toujours refusé la permission de lui parler. Que lui arriverait-il s'il acceptait le risque, le risque de ne pas se défendre contre elle, le risque de lui donner libre jeu, le risque de la suivre là où elle voudra bien le conduire? Que lui arriverait-il s'il acceptait de vivre la crise pleinement, sans désir de la contrôler?

Sa présente crise lui offre l'occasion parfaite de trouver réponses à ses questions. Alors, pour la première fois de sa vie, il abandonne toute tentative de contrôler quoi que ce soit dans sa vie. En retour, il accepte de se laisser guider par la Crise ... cet Étranger (*Chapter Two: The Open House: Gener*osity *as the Welcoming of Strangers*.). 'I allow the other to be itself and to establish its relation to me without my infringing upon it through my action' (31). Accepter le risque de souhaiter la bienvenue à l'Étranger, c'est de fait accepter la possibilité que ce dernier l'entraîne dans une expérience infernale et douloureuse. 'The only alternative to ordinary action is the act of suffering, where I open myself to utter defenselessness to an other over whose otherness I have no control' (32). Il consent ainsi à sa propre désintégration, à une destruction complète de sa vie, de son monde habituel. Pourra-t-il souffrir une telle existence?

> If we cannot bear to experience the other in its otherness, it is because we cannot bear to be ourselves in our frailty. We would rather there be no world at all than one we have to be in defenselessly. (...) Is it too farfetched to say that the dread we feel when risking such exposure is akin to the dread one feels in the face of death itself? (34-5).

Aura-t-il la générosité et le courage nécessaires pour suivre jusqu'au bout l'expérience de la Crise? Succombera-t-il à la tentation omniprésente de reprendre le contrôle et de retourner à sa vie superficielle? 'That impulse to recoil is never stronger than when reality to which generosity has exposed us has the capacity to shatter our world as a whole' (48). Il sent que sa présente Crise a non seulement la capacité de rupturer sa vie d'une façon irréparable mais qu'Elle est aussi une porte d'entrée qui lui permettra peut-être, s'il en a la générosité et le courage de découvrir cette autre Réalité que sa volonté de toujours tout contrôler avait jusqu'alors réussi à faire taire (54) en la refoulant dans la noirceur profonde de con âme. Sa porte d'entrée qui le conduira dans cet univers inconnu est nulle autre que la fissure qu'occasionne dans sa tête la présente Crise. C'est par elle qu'il devra

descendre dans les profondeurs de son moi. Un tel pèlerinage vers la vérité mérite d'être appelé héroïque (*Chapter four: Heroism and the Will to Greatness: Embracing Abysses.*).

> For it is not just that the hero is willing to encounter what the rest of us ordinarily avoid. What makes him heroic is that he does so without armor, without illusion, without madness, without violence. The hero moves without halt into the dark grip of realities over which he has no control and before which he is defenseless (82).

Métamorphosé en spéléologue, il se met à descendre dans le gouffre infernal, 'with its heights and abysses, its severe and pitiless peaks, its sudden cataracts of dread' (105). Ce type d'univers, de par son appartenance au monde souterrain, d'en bas, des entrailles de la terre, connote sinon une certaine répulsion, du moins une crainte, une appréhension généralisée chez Monsieur-Tout-le-monde (*voir J.-Y. Dugas, 'Quand les entrailles de la terre prennent la parole', Sous terre* 4. 1 [1987]). Ce n'est pas la descente elle-même qui lui fait peur, mais plutôt la tentation de vivre cette dernière crise selon les modes ordinaires d'être-en-crise, c'est-à-dire de vouloir la contrôler, s'en guérir. Il se rappelle ces divers modes de contrôler la Crise: un appel à Dieu, une visite chez son psychiatre, devenir dépressif ou fou, tomber dans un désespoir total. Tous ces modes ne sont que des tactiques plus ou moins raffinées pour ne pas faire face à la Crise ... à l'Étranger. Même son plus bel acte, son acte d'héroïsme peut le confronter à une épreuve insurmontable qui exigerait de lui justement qu'il abandonne son statut même de héros. 'Confronted by a situation which requires that he be ashamed of himself, the heroic individual must choose between recoiling from this ordeal or undergoing the one from of suffering which up to now he has avoided: the experience of humiliation' (97). Il se rappelle, par exemple, des visages qui lui sont chers... son épouse, ses enfants, ses parents, ses employé(e)s ... tous des gens que son envolée en *terra incognita* a sûrement fait souffrir. Il se sent soudainement mal à l'aise: il ne peut se sauver de leurs regards... leur message le suit partout. Il a honte. 'Shame is, put quite simply, the feeling of being a participant in something wrong' (99). Encore une fois, la tentation de vouloir être-en-charge-de-sa-vie fait son apparition: ou bien il se ferme les yeux au mal qu'il a créé, ou bien il poursuit sa descente à l'intérieur de cette expérience de la Honte. C'est un 'Catch-22': d'une façon ou d'une autre, il doit accepter l'éclaboussement de son image de béros. Toute sa vie fut une lutte contre le mal: le mal c'était l'Autre. Mais voilà qu'il réalise soudainement que le mal c'est lui! Il n'est plus la mesure du Bien et du Mal... il est le Mal. Ainsi, dans la noirceur du gouffre, sa honte lui donne un choc moral: il se voit comme Monsieur Hyde: l'Étranger c'est nul autre que lui-même. Il a honte d'être ce qu'il est et a toujours été. Il se déteste ... se suicider? Mais n'est-ce là qu'une autre tactique pour se sauver de la Crise?

> Beneath all its psychic contortions, all its involuted strategies, beneath its mystical contradictions and tortured ecstasies, self-hatred is as simple as all other faults: I hate myself in order to avoid having to be

> myself in my imperfection. (...) Self-hatred is the heroic struggle to avoid the crisis I would have to undergo if I were to accept fully the self I am ashamed of being (127).

Mais toutes les galeries ne semblent être que des détours, à savoir, des avenues pour les lâches. Doit-il enfin reconnaître qu'il ne peut rien faire face à l'Étranger, qu'il doit se livrer à la toute puissance de l'Autre, qu'il est perdu à jamais.

> It will not do to say of that person who has abandoned himself in this way that he has given a new direction to his life. *It would be more accurate to say that, from the ordinary point of view, he has permanently lost his way* ... There ought to be no structure to our lives except the structure of crisis itself. (172-3).

Mais justement, le point de vue ordinaire ne l'intéresse plus. Il a sur sa vie une perspective étrangement posthume dans laquelle son passé ne fut que gaspillage de temps et d'énergie. Il se sent comme un convalescent qui, venu à un cheveu près de la mort, s'éveille en disant 'Merci!' à chaque objet qui tombe sous son regard, car leur présence est vécue comme un cadeau non-mérité qu'il doit à la générosité de l'Étranger. Il sait trop bien aussi que cette générosité peut tout lui enlever d'un instant à l'autre, donc il ne garde rien en réserve. Il se donne complètement au moment présent:

> ... to such a person, nothing in the universe seems so deserving of single-hearted passion as the small details in the midst of which he lives. What used to be experienced as ordinary is embraced as sacred in its very ordinariness, irrespective of how banal one's experience of it might be (184).

Voilà dans quel esprit il retournera à la surface. On le traitera certes, de fou, d'aliéné ou même de héros ... un peu comme on traite présentement Mère Thérèsa ...

On survole un quartier de Calcutta ... *Zoom-in* sur Mère Thérèsa, à genoux et en train d'embrasser un vieillard gémissant sur le bord d'un trottoir.

[Fade Out]

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A.W. Moore
The Infinite.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. xii+268.
Cdn $49.95: US $42.00.
ISBN 0-415-03307-1.

This fine book is an installment of Routledge's 'The Problems of Philosophy, Their Past and Present' series. Accordingly, Moore divides his treatment into two parts, 'The History' and 'Infinity Assessed', presenting us with the theories of the infinite from Anaximander to Quine, and his own analysis of the infinite, respectively. According to the dust jacket, the aim of the book is to cover all aspects of the infinite, from the mathematical to the mystical, and is meant to be of use to teachers and students of philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and theology.

On the whole the book is successful. Moore begins by making a distinction between what he calls 'mathematical' approaches to the infinite and 'metaphysical' approaches to the infinite, a distinction which will ultimately give way in the course of his account to the more stable distinction between potentialist and actualist theories of the infinite. Moore then presents several paradoxes of the infinite in an admirably clear way.

The historical section gets off to a good start with a review of the thinking of Anaximander, Pythagoras' school, the eleatics, and Plato. Aristotle is given a chapter to himself, and the exposition is particularly lucid of Aristotle's views on the paradoxes of the infinitely small. It is this chapter which sets the stage for the main philosophical issues. Medieval and Renaissance thought on the infinite is adequately reviewed, giving appropriate attention to Peter of Spain's categorematic/syncategorematic version of the actualist/potentialist approaches to the infinite. There are important omissions, however, such as Hasdai Crescas' critique of the Aristotelian position, and the detailed Kalam arguments so ably reviewed by W.L. Craig in *The Kalam Cosmological Argument.*

Moore next reviews the development of the calculus, the theory of infinitesmals, and the solution of the problems raised through the theory of limits. His discussion of Kant's antinomies contains an intriguing gloss of the second antinomy. Moore says (93) that Kant's position 'was very much like denying that what was composite had an actual infinity of parts, but conceding that it had a potential infinity of parts.' The gloss is intriguing. But is it accurate?

Before addressing the main course, as it were, in his chapter on the impact of Cantor, Moore surveys Hegel, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Sartre, on the infinite. The treatments are brief, and suggestive merely, but references are provided for the reader who wishes to pursue the topic of existentialism, human finitude and the infinite.

The chapter on Cantor is well done for the intended audience, particularly Moore's exposition of ordinals and ordering arrangements. On the negative side of the ledger, Moore's treatment of axiomatized set theory unfortunately skips the controversy surrounding the axiom of choice. The Chapter on reactions to Cantor's theory presents intuitionism and the case against it (133) in lucid terms. And the discussion of Wittgenstein's contribution and the current issues is skillful.

Part Two, 'Infinity Assessed' begins with further exposition: the set of all sets paradox, ordinals as sets, cardinals, the continuum hypothesis. There is some assessment here, to be sure, but it is brief and in each case, amounts to noting that resolving matters by formal stipulation, as one does by stating that the collection of all sets is a class, not a set, or formally stipulating that the continuum is the second Aleph in power is not satisfactory for other than the most purely formal purposes. The treatment of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem involves more elaborate apparatus in the way of assessment. Moore defuses the apparent paradox, with one lingering angle of exception. Moore's presentation of Gödel's theorem and its implication for Hilbert's program is also welcome and more balanced than that of other popular treatments such as that of Hofstadter in *Gödel, Escher, Bach*. Moore's criticism of Lucas' rendering of the implications for mind and machine is clear if a touch understated, and also superior to other popular versions. The last thirty five pages of the book come closest to fulfilling expectations that Part II will present Moore's own views in reasonably systematic form. As it happens, Moore's framework is that of Wittgenstein, and further exposition of that framework occupies half the discussion. Moreover the conclusions Moore reaches require a more thoroughgoing assessment of the central issues in the philosophy of mathematics: Platonist versus non-Platonist attitudes towards mathematical objects must be more clearly and explicitly pitted against each other prior to what amounts to an underchallenged Wittgensteinianism.

In sum, the book will be useful as a text in an undergraduate course in philosophy which aims to introduce philosophy students to the topic of the infinite. It is subtler and more sensitive to the philosophical issues by far than the highly popular *Infinity And The Mind* of R. Rucker. For this reason one hopes that Moore's work will be released in paperback. A final comment, though: the Western world centrism of the book is much to be lamented. Moore opens by stating that his aim 'is to arrive at an understanding of the infinite — via an understanding of how it has been understood by other thinkers in the West over the past two and a half millenia' (1). But a mere three paragraphs later, the 'Western' history of the topic of the opening statement has become 'its history' simpliciter (2). The issue is not merely that *Chandogya Upanishad* (VII,23,24), for example, has as legitimate a claim to our attention as Anaximander or Parmenides, or that Jain mathematicians early on provided an inductive approach to generating members of an infinite set. It is rather that the content of the Eastern and non-mainstream Western approaches to the infinite — Yoga-Vedantic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Kabbalist

— is suffused with theory which has only weak counterparts in the mainstream West.

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Peter P. Nicholson
The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.
Pp. x+359. US $59.50. ISBN 0-521-37102-3.

A major reassessment of British Idealism, conducted at the highest level of analysis, is at last under way among philosophers. In moral philosophy, there are the significant recent works of Thomas on T.H. Green and MacNiven on F.H. Bradley; in political philosophy, that of Wempe on Green. What makes Nicholson's long-awaited book so important and exciting is that it presents a close and superbly argued historical and philosophical reconsideration of the political thinking of the three major figures of the Idealist movement — Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet — and does so in such a way that from now on it will be impossible for political philosophers either to ignore or dismiss them. No-one reading this book will look at Berlin, Rawls, Nozick, or Walzer in the same way again. Nicholson brilliantly succeeds in showing not only that the work of the Idealist triumvirate represents a closely interrelated set of considerations which have been seriously underestimated and misunderstood, but also that their political thinking represents a major challenge to the basic orientations of contemporary political philosophy. After a decade in which conservatism, liberalism, and marxism have all been thrown into serious confusion, there could be no more timely work of philosophical recovery than this.

The book comprises six separate but interlinked 'Studies'. Beginning with an analysis of Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Nicholson offers by far the best account ever written of the structure and movement of the complex argument of that work. Rightly taking the concept of self-realisation as the lodestone of Idealist ethical and political thinking, the discussions of Bradley's view of the relation of character, self, and will, of his conception of the state as the totality of social relations, and of his account of the nature and conditions of moral change, are particularly valuable. Nicholson completely discredits the wearisome shibboleth that Bradley's chapter on 'My Station and Its Duties' represents his final view of ethics, convincingly showing that this is in fact stated only in the chapter on 'Ideal Morality', and completely disentangling Bradley's overall theoretical position from his personal conservatism. To

some, the inclusion of a study of Bradley's ethics in a book on politics might seem odd, for Bradley has no political theory proper. But this would be to overlook not only Bradley's influence on the political thinking of the Idealist school as a whole — particularly Bosanquet — but also the fact that one of the greatest strengths of the Idealists is their subordination of politics to morality — a theme which Nicholson emphasises to great effect throughout.

Studies II-V, which comprise the main body of the book, deal respectively with Green's theories of the Common Good, of rights and property, of freedom, and of state action. There is an embarrassment of riches here. Green's connections with political liberalism, his views on education and liquor control, his relations to Spencer and Mill — in particular, the Millian inductivism of his practical politics — are all analysed in a masterly fashion. Throughout, Nicholson confronts Green's philosophical critics with clear and precise argument, showing at every turn that his is a position which has a hitherto unrecognised power and cogency. Of especial distinction in this respect is the treatment of Green's thinking on property and scarcity in the context of the views of Sidgwick and MacPherson, and the analysis of negative and positive concepts of liberty — which is likely to become a influential discussion of that issue. In these four studies, Green's political thought at last comes into its own and finds contemporary voice.

The sixth and final study concentrates on Bosanquet's theory of the General Will, laying out where he differs from Rousseau — his relation to Hegel is less clearly defined — and once again lucidly exposing the serious and regrettably influential misunderstandings of critics such as Hobhouse. In particular, Bosanquet's careful distinctions between state and government, and between government and democracy, are well presented, as also are his judicious and highly relevant analyses of international relations. Nevertheless, Nicholson seriously underestimates just how complacently stated and conservative in practical politics Bosanquet's position had come to seem by about 1906.

Viewed as a whole, Nicholson's book brings out two general features of the politics of British Idealism which securely establish the relevance of the movement to contemporary debate. First, he insists throughout on the acute but often overlooked historical consciousness which informs the Idealists' political thinking. Second, he demonstrates how their moral concept of politics as a matter of the 'common good' stands as a powerful critique of dominant current theories which treat the 'common good' as a matter of the contingencies of 'public interest', understood primarily in terms of the distribution and allocation of material goods. In stressing these important common features, Nicholson succeeds in keeping the more problematic metaphysical concerns of the Idealists in the background. Though legitimate in its own right, however, this strategy leads him to regard the political thinking of Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet as much more of a homogeneous unity than it actually is. For while they often *say* similar things, the underpinnings of their positions are very different: in its reliance on an analysis of 'feeling', for example, the movement of argument in Bradley's *Ethical Studies* differs

radically from Hegelian dialectic, Green's 'spiritual principle', and Bosanquet's 'rational' politics. Nevertheless, insofar as such differences have real significance, they do so only in virtue of the importance which Nicholson undeniably restores to Idealist political thinking. The superb and exhaustive bibliography which he provides is an invitation to further work on a group of thinkers whose achievements in political theory have only now, with this book, been given the recognition they deserve.

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

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are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R.A. Shiner