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*The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia.*
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Analogical terms pose a number of philosophical challenges. On the one hand, such terms are supposed to be semantically distinct from one another, which means that they are not synonymous. Such terms are not, in other words, univocal terms, and this fact about them is supposed to be analytically true. Yet on the other hand these terms also ground warranted inferences and lead to genuine understanding via analogical arguments. These two characteristics of analogical terms create a dilemma, which is captured by the following question: How do analogical inferences avoid the fallacy of equivocation? On the one hand it seems as if they must commit the fallacy because the two middle terms in an analogical argument are, by definition, not univocal terms. But on the other these arguments are considered to lead to genuine understanding, if not to *scientia* or scientific knowledge. Thus the challenge for the defender of analogical terms and reasoning is two-fold. First she must find some ground between univocality and equivocation for the analogical terms to inhabit. Second she must explain how this middle ground can support analogical reasoning and ground genuine understanding despite the lack of univocality.

In *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia* Joshua Hochschild has convincingly argued that responding to this challenge, which was first formulated by John Duns Scotus, was the primary purpose of Thomas Cajetan’s *De nominum analogia*. But what is most valuable—and most astounding—in Hochschild’s book is his philosophical analysis and defense of Cajetan’s answer to Scotus’ challenge. Hochschild aims, and largely succeeds, in making Cajetan’s doctrine less alien to those of us approaching it from outside the Aristotelian-Thomistic logical and psychological framework, or indeed for those of us approaching it from within that framework. It is an important read for Thomists and non-Thomists alike.

Hochschild’s work belongs to a recent, welcome shift away from the tendency of much of the scholarly literature on Cajetan’s *De nomanum*, as Hochschild acknowledges. Hochschild is following in the footsteps of E. J. Ashworth, Franco Riva, and Michael Tavuzzi in approaching Cajetan’s project in its own terms. Much of the scholarship has been focused on the question of ‘how Thomistic is Cajetan’s account really?’ because of a presumption that Cajetan’s purpose was to systematize Aquinas’ account of analogy. Hochschild’s work, however, rests on no such presupposition, and is historically richer and sounder as a result. His treatment of Cajetan is more comparable to Riva’s *Analogy e univocità in Tommaso de Vio ‘Gaetano’* and Ashworth’s *Les théories de l’analogie du XIIe au XVIIe siècle* than to Ralph McInerny’s *Aquinas and Analogy.*
The principal difference between Riva’s and Ashworth’s work and Hochschild’s is that Hochschild’s is much less ‘historical’. This is not to say that he is insensitive to the historical context surrounding Cajetan’s text or that he is offering merely a ‘rational reconstruction’ of it. Hochschild’s analysis is certainly historically informed and contextually sensitive. But Hochschild is happier to presume the historical and contextual work established by Riva and Ashworth than to add to it. He is not making, nor I think intending to make any contribution to our historical understanding of Cajetan or his context. Instead Hochschild is more interested in philosophically analyzing and defending Cajetan’s semantics for analogy.

The book consists of nine chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion. The chapters are grouped into two parts, ‘Cajetan’s Question’ (Chapters 1-4) and ‘Cajetan’s Answer’ (Chapters 5-9). Part 1, ‘Cajetan’s Question,’ is where Hochschild argues against the Thomistic paradigm of interpreting Cajetan and in favor of the anti-Scotistic one sketched above.

After an introduction that quickly sketches the philosophical problem of analogy and the history of reflection on it from Aristotle to Aquinas, Hochschild argues against the Thomistic paradigm in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 through 4 constitute his argument for his version of the anti-Scotistic paradigm. Chapter 2 convincingly locates Cajetan’s project within the domain of logic rather than metaphysics and sets it up as a response to Scotus’ semantic challenge. Chapter 3 supports this by arguing that Cajetan’s project was a philosophically appropriate response to Scotus’ challenge.

One of the most interesting discussions in Part 1 occurs in this (third) chapter. Hochschild argues against Ashworth and Gilson that Cajetan’s commitments to compositionality and a conceptualist rather than usage-based analysis of signification did not confuse Cajetan’s attempt to semantically analyze analogy. Hochschild elaborates on Cajetan’s understanding of ‘concept,’ explaining the connections between a semantic analysis of analogical terms and the importance of interpretation, context, and judgment, and highlighting Cajetan’s sensitivity to context and judgment in his treatment of analogical signification (47-56). His point in considering this is to show that ‘the criticisms considered here all assume that semantic principles that are conceptualist and compositionalist are also necessarily reductivist.’ But Cajetan, he argues, ‘worked with a semantic framework that was conceptualist and compositionalist but also organistic. That is (to draw an analogy), for Cajetan a proposition is related to its component terms much as an organism is related to its organs. The function of the whole depends on the function of the parts, but the functions of the parts are also determined by, and in some sense depend on, the function of the whole’ (63).

The final chapter of Part 1 contributes to Hochschild’s defense of the anti-Scotist paradigm by highlighting the urgency of responding to Scotus’ challenge during Cajetan’s
era. He identifies seven semantic principles in Thomas and the subsequent Dominican tradition and compellingly argues that, whether taken individually or collectively, they are inadequate to resolve Scotus’ challenge. Thus, Hochschild argues, by Cajetan’s time the need for some semantic solution was urgent.

What I found most interesting was Hochschild’s analysis and defense of Cajetan’s answer to Scotus’ challenge, which is the topic of Part 2 of the book (Chapters 6-9). According to Hochschild Cajetan’s answer to Scotus is relatively straightforward: ‘Cajetan’s response is that analogical signification is semantically possible, because analogical relationships are metaphysically real’ (138). But, as Hochschild is well aware, explaining and defending this answer is anything but straightforward.

Cajetan is famous for identifying three modes of analogy—Inequality, Attribution, and Proportionality—and then privileging Proportionality over the other two. Hochschild analyzes Cajetan’s dismissal of Analogies of Inequality and Analogies of Attribution in Chapter 6. Hochschild explains that they violate the secundum quid eadem, secundum quid diversa principle. Since univocals are subsumed under concepts that are absolutely equal, and equivocals under concepts that are absolutely diverse, analogicals must be subsumed under concepts that are simultaneously in some way equal and in some way diverse. Analogies of Inequality fail this because semantically they are really univocal terms. And Analogies of Attribution fail this because semantically they are really equivocal terms, as their failure to support valid inferences shows. (One of the highlights of Hochschild’s work is its clearing up of the much vexed issue of the role extrinsic denominations play in Analogies of Attribution: ‘Saying that this kind of analogy involves the extrinsic denomination of the secondary analogates is here a properly semantic, as opposed to metaphysical claim, as it follows from a strictly semantic specification of analogy of attribution’ [111].) It is the Analogies of Proportionality, according to Hochschild’s Cajetan, that are truly analogical terms, because it is only they that semantically function as analogical terms. It is only they, in other words, that are subsumed under concepts secundum quid eadem and secundum quid diversa and yet support valid inferences.

Chapters 7 through 9 are dedicated to explaining and defending this claim. Chapter 7 addresses the sort of unity that analogical terms possess—Proportional Unity. Proportional Unity is rooted in intrinsic features of two things, but does not involve any kind of identity between those features. Proportional Unity between two things \( x \) and \( y \) requires that \( x \) and \( y \) contain properties \( p \) and \( q \) that are similar in some way, but that are not specifically or generically identical to one another. What grounds the Proportional Unity, in other words, is the similarity obtaining between properties \( p \) and \( q \), with the qualification that this similarity is not based upon \( p \) and \( q \) being related to one another via some shared genus or species. In Hochschild’s way of putting it, Proportional Unity is what allows analogical terms to be on the one hand non-reductive, thereby avoiding univocality, and on the other explanatory, thereby avoiding equivocality (124-39).
Chapter 8, ‘The Semantics of Proportionality: Concept Formation and Judgment’, focuses on how Analogies of Proportionality satisfy the *secundum quid diversa* condition. According to Hochschild Analogies of Proportionality involve diversity among the things denominated and equality in the way those things are conceived (as well as in their names, of course). Cajetan’s central move in explicating this was to draw a distinction between perfect and imperfect concepts (146). The forms or natures denominated by the analogical terms are perfectly conceived as distinct from one another. Yet each perfect conception gives rise to an imperfect conception that represents the proportionality obtaining between the distinct forms or natures. ‘Proportional similarity allows us to speak of another “imperfect” concept, a concept that imperfectly represents *both*’ (146) properties in *x* and *y*—the properties of *p* and *q*—as the same, even though they are truly different. As Hochschild points out, this raises difficult ontological questions regarding these concepts, but from a semantic perspective Cajetan’s point is relatively clear—how we represent both *p* and *q* is muddled in a way that they become effectively united in our minds. Thus Hochschild does not think that the ontological questions are worrisome or that they would threaten Cajetan’s doctrine in any way.

One might reasonably complain that these ontological questions concerning the relationship between the perfect and imperfect concepts, the number of concepts involved, and their individuation and identity condition are not so easily swept aside. But the criticism should be laid more against Cajetan rather than Hochschild, for Cajetan does not addresses these ontological questions and seems even inconsistent, claiming sometimes that there is only one imperfect concept suggested by the two perfect concepts, and at other times that there is more than one imperfect concept. For Hochschild, however, the main thing is that these ‘imperfect’ concepts are not abstractions, strictly speaking, from either (or both) perfect concepts of *p* and *q*. If that were the case, we would have reduced the similarity of *p* and *q* to some overarching genus, and found the terms to be univocal rather than analogical. According to Hochschild that is the key move in making Cajetan’s analysis work. Insofar as these imperfect concepts could be said to be ‘abstracted’ from the perfect concepts of *p* and *q*, it is really a mental process of con-fusing the two perfect concepts such that the ‘diverse proper analogues are considered as similar, and their diversity ignored’ (149), rather than isolating or separating some content contained within either (or both) perfect concept(s).

Hochschild’s final chapter considers how analogical terms can support valid syllogistic inferences. Cajetan’s answer is that the unity in the imperfect concepts suffices to ground these inferences. If the objects are conceived via their perfect concepts, which represent their absolute diversity, the syllogism will collapse into equivocation. But if the imperfect concepts representing their proportional unity are used, equivocation is avoided. As Hochschild puts it, ‘in analogy of proportionality, the different *rationes* of the term do not cause the fallacy of equivocation because the proportional similarity of those different *rationes* as predicated of their different subjects allows for a superior,
imperfect concept that can be predicated of both subjects’ (163).

Hochschild’s book provides a clear exposition of Cajetan’s doctrine and a philosophically intriguing analysis of it. Contemporary Thomists will certainly want to read Hochschild’s book carefully. It should also be required reading for any early modern scholar interested in how analogy and analogical predication was understood by both proponents and opponents of it during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Experts on late scholastic logic and the philosophy of language might be disappointed by Hochschild’s lack of historical contextualization or by how closely Hochschild hews to Cajetan’s text. One would have liked to have seen Hochschild draw connections between Cajetan’s doctrine and contemporary conceptions of analogy, as both a means for illuminating the benefits and limitations of Cajetan’s doctrine and the benefits and limitations of contemporary analyses. There is also a missed opportunity here to make the history of the philosophy of language relevant for contemporary practitioners of the philosophy of language. But for historians of philosophy generally, and historians of early modern philosophy of language in particular, Hochschild’s book provides a fabulous introduction to Cajetan’s historically and philosophically important doctrine and is an ideal companion for reading it.

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