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We’re Going On-Line

This is the last print issue of Philosophy in Review (PIR). PIR will continue as a publication devoted to reviews of recent philosophy books, but starting with its first issue in 2010 (Volume XXX, no. 1) it will appear in an exclusively on-line, open-access format. PIR will be hosted by the University of Victoria, in British Columbia, Canada, and access to the journal will be free, not subscription-based. The first issue of 2010 will be published on February 28, and it will be accessible on-line at the following website, currently under construction:

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2010 will be the thirtieth year that PIR has been publishing reviews of philosophy books. The publisher and the editorial staff of PIR would like to thank readers, reviewers, authors, and of course the publisher for their support over these years. We are fully confident that PIR’s new, on-line format will exceed the high standards that have come to be expected from this journal. In its new format there will be easy and ready access both to current and recent issues (within the current calendar year), as well as to archived past issues. In addition to this, our website will feature a reviewer stylesheet; an expanded “Call for Reviewers” page listing current titles available for review; information on reviewer eligibility; instructions on how to sign up for a review; a schedule of publication dates; and a list of books currently undergoing review. We look forward to seeing you again in February.
Tribute to Roger Shiner

This last printed edition of Philosophy in Review brings it to the verge of two remarkable transitions: the change to electronic publication and its separation from its founding father, Roger Shiner. In 1975 Professor Shiner, who was then at the University of Alberta (UA) and Managing Editor of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy (CJP), teamed up with Herb Ratsch, a fellow soccer player and owner of Art Design Printing Inc. (an Edmonton based print shop, specializing in Books and Journals), to create Academic Printing and Publishing (APP). APP printed or published CJP and other journals based at UA. In 1981 Roger and Herb, seeing the need for a review journal for books in philosophy, started Canadian Philosophical Reviews. In order to make CPR distinctively Canadian, hence bilingual, Roger partnered with the late Nicolas Kaufmann of the Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, as English and French Co-Editors, respectively. As Québec-based journals gradually assumed responsibility for Francophone publication in philosophy, CPR became predominantly Anglophone, more international, and eventually donned its current name, Philosophy in Review, in 1997. In 2006 Roger passed on the editorship of the journal to us at the University of Victoria, while he continued as its publisher and business manager in his capacity as head of APP. When Philosophy in Review moves to a completely electronic format in its next issue, it will for the first time stand on its own without Roger’s direct support and guidance.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank Roger Shiner for his part in bringing this journal into existence, for keeping it in existence through a quarter century of tireless dedication as its editor and publisher, and finally for entrusting it into our hands. We also take this opportunity to pay tribute to Roger for everything he has done for philosophy in Canada, and thereby for the profession of philosophy and philosophy itself. Roger’s multifaceted contribution to philosophy, as student, teacher, scholar, writer, editor, publisher, friend and fellow pursuer of wisdom cannot be measured, but it is recognized. Without you, Roger, many of us would not, like Philosophy in Review itself, not be in philosophy today. For all you have done, and continue to do, thank you.

Jeffrey Foss, Associate Editor
Robert Piercy, Associate Editor
David Scott, Editor
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Kant’s account of Hume’s role in awakening him from his dogmatic slumber expresses a momentous turning-point in the history of philosophy. However, the precise nature of Kant’s relation to Hume, both historical and philosophical, has not been uncontroversial, and has indeed been the subject of increasing interest in the literature, especially with the development of new approaches to the interpretation of both Hume and Kant. The year 2008 marked a unique event in this discussion: the publication of two studies of the Hume-Kant relation by Guyer and Allison. Since Guyer and Allison have developed their interpretations of Kant partly in response to each other, as seen especially in their diverging views concerning the coherence and cogency of Kant’s transcendental idealism, this coincidence is a welcome opportunity to consider their views of Hume and Kant, the transition from one to the other, and the ways in which one might approach the study of such a transition in the history of philosophy. (References to Hume in this review are to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000].)

Guyer and Allison are primarily concerned with the philosophical relation between Hume and Kant. Both acknowledge the ongoing debate concerning the textual sources of Hume’s influence on Kant; and both refer to several aspects of this debate in the literature, although neither seeks to present an original contribution on this historical question (Guyer 5-7, Allison 338 n.12). Both agree, however, with the general view that while Kant, who could not read English, was able to read translations of Hume’s *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and other works, he was not able to read the *Treatise of Human Nature*, though he may have known of various passages in the *Treatise* from translated excerpts or conversations with friends. Apart from this historical question, Guyer and Allison both contend that Kant considers a number of topics that are addressed by Hume in the *Treatise*, including such topics as space, time, external existence and personal identity, even if he was not aware of Hume’s treatment of these topics. Both then interpret Kant’s critical philosophy as a response to Hume, by examining some of their
common presuppositions, the limitations of Hume’s system, and Kant’s success in addressing the problems raised by Hume.

Of the two, Guyer’s book is the more broadly conceived, since it considers topics in moral theory and aesthetics, as well as in the theoretical philosophy of Hume and Kant. This is a collection of five essays written for various occasions. The first three concern Hume’s theoretical philosophy, focusing on Hume’s skepticism as it emerges in his theories of causation, external objects and the self. The fourth, ‘Reason, Desire, and Action’, is on Hume’s theory of motivation in relation to the development of Kant’s moral psychology and philosophy; and the fifth, ‘Systematicity, Taste, and Purpose’, examines the treatment of the laws of nature, aesthetics, and teleology in the third Critique, in response to questions left open by Hume.

In his first three essays, Guyer suggests that Kant distinguishes between (a) Pyrrhonian skepticism, or skepticism about reason arising from various dialectical arguments, (b) Cartesian skepticism, which holds that it is impossible to prove the existence of external objects, and (c) Humean skepticism, which is the view that it is impossible to justify the first principles of either theory or practice on the basis of reason or experience (Guyer 27-8). Instead, Hume claims to show that these principles can only rest on custom, or a habit of the imagination. While Kant claimed that Hume failed to recognize the problem of synthetic a priori judgments because he did not generalize from his analysis of causation, Guyer argues that in the Treatise Hume did in effect generalize this problem, and that Kant’s Analytic as a whole represents, perhaps unwittingly, a response to Hume’s systematization of this problem. More specifically, Kant shows that Hume must actually presuppose a set of a priori representations (such as space, time, substance, causation, and the transcendental unity of apperception) in order to account for the mental phenomena that he takes for granted, such as a succession of perceptions, or even the consideration of a single perception as an event (Guyer 111-13). However, Guyer denies that the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism is required for this response to Hume, and instead holds that the latter theory is directed against Pyrrhonian skepticism (Guyer 39-40, 51-2).

In his fourth essay Guyer proposes a particular interpretation of Hume’s theory of motivation: that the best goal of human life is tranquility, which we may pursue, at least to some extent, by cultivating our calm passions (Guyer 174). He then argues that between the 1760s and the 1780s, Kant moved from a similar view that practical reason is directed by a natural desire for freedom, or for consistent principles of action — in which reason seeks tranquility for the individual — to the view that pure practical reason requires us to limit the exercise of our freedom for the sake of the freedom of others. Guyer then argues that Kant’s account of the feeling of respect for the moral law, and its possible influence on our natural feelings, is continuous with his earlier account of the relation between reason and emotion in producing a good life, although by the time of his critical moral philosophy his view of the relative primacy of happiness and morality have been reversed (Guyer 179-80).
In his fifth essay, Guyer argues that in the third Critique Kant attempts to provide a priori foundations for three types of judgment that Hume regarded as products of custom and habit. First, Kant argues that our belief in the necessity of particular causal laws is supported by the a priori principle that we must regard the laws of nature as constituting a system. Second, while Hume considers judgments of taste to be subjective for the individual but rendered objective by the judgments of critics, Kant argues that judgments of taste are objective for the individual due to the pleasure produced universally and necessarily by the free play of the cognitive faculties, in response to specific objects: an argument which Guyer himself believes is unconvincing, though it offers an interesting alternative to Hume’s view. Finally, Kant argues that the idea of an intelligent creator is theoretically required as a heuristic principle for directing our inquiries into the system of nature, and that the practical belief in such a being is justified by the a priori principles of morality.

Guyer aligns his account with the traditional view that Kant intended to ‘refute’ Hume’s skepticism, in contrast to recent studies by Gary Hatfield and Eric Watkins. On Hatfield’s view, Kant’s system is a ‘refinement’ of Hume’s skepticism, since it is intended to promote a similar critique of metaphysical dogmatism while supporting the method of the sciences (Guyer 9-11). On the other hand, according to Watkins, Kant’s justification of the causal principle is not intended as a refutation but as a ‘replacement’ of Hume’s analysis, since in Watkins’ view the two are incommensurable (Guyer 18-20). However, it seems to me that Guyer might actually be depicting Kant’s system as a ‘correction’ of Hume, since, in his view, Kant concedes certain aspects of Hume’s analysis, but argues from these to a constructive rather than a skeptical outcome.

Allison’s book is concerned more specifically with Hume’s theoretical philosophy as developed especially in Book I of the Treatise. He thus examines in more detail the topics covered in the first three chapters of Guyer’s book, along with other topics such as Hume’s theories of extension, demonstration, and skepticism concerning reason. Through the course of his text, Allison argues that Hume is committed to a perceptual model of cognition, in which ideas (and more specifically images) are the main units of cognition, in contrast to Kant’s discursive theory of cognition, in which judgments are the main unit of cognition (Allison 5-9, 330-6). According to Allison, Hume then argues that our fundamental beliefs must be based upon custom, or the influence of ideas on our imagination. Hume concludes that the ‘true skeptic’ accepts these beliefs as the foundation for ordinary belief and action, even while recognizing that they cannot be justified through reason: a view which Allison calls ‘metaskepticism’ or ‘a suspension of doubt’, and also ‘philosophical insouciance’ (Allison 322-3).

In contrast to the perceptual model, as developed in different versions by Hume and his predecessors, Kant’s innovation is the discursive model of cognition, which holds that cognition consists in the application of concepts, via judgments, to the contents of sensible intuition. In light of this interpretation, Allison holds that Kant’s criticism of Hume for failing to generalize the
problem of synthetic *a priori* judgments is misdirected, since Hume’s perceptual model of cognition is unable to account for the application of concepts in judgments, and thus even for the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments (Allison 5-9, 76-7). Allison also indicates that Kant’s theory of discursivity entails both his theory of synthetic *a priori* judgments and his transcendental idealism, though his arguments for these claims are less clear (Allison 58, 336).

While Allison’s interpretation of Hume is notable for its clarity and systematics, it also raises questions, perhaps partly because of these very qualities. Allison himself suggests that Hume’s account of the ideas of space and time, as arising from the ‘manner’ in which our perceptions appear, seems to anticipate Kant’s theory of the forms of intuition (Allison 38, 52-61). He also notes that Hume offers some elements of a theory of judgments that might be compared to Kant’s theory (Allison 157, 173-6, 333-4). On the other hand, he seems to overlook other anticipations of Kant, such as Hume’s consideration of whether a statement about a straight line is, in effect, explicative or ampliative (Hume 37); and Hume’s reference to the idea of the ‘self or person’ as ‘that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference’ (Hume 164). Even Hume’s account of abstract ideas could be seen as approaching a Kantian theory of concepts, if the main feature of a concept is taken to be neither a specific image, nor the custom of associating images, nor the term associated with the images, but the natural capacity to recognize resemblances and the philosophical capacity to seek them by comparing objects, which Hume considers in his theory of relations (Hume 12-16; cf. Allison 29-37, 76-83.)

Allison seems to accommodate these anomalies by describing Hume’s view as a ‘commitment’ to a perceptual model of cognition, which implies that it might not be consistent in its details (Allison, 174, 331-3). However, given the number of these anomalies, one might ask whether Hume’s view should be described as a ‘commitment’ to this theory. Instead, one might regard Hume’s system as a perhaps not entirely consistent combination of theories, some derived from the perceptual model of ideas, and some anticipating a discursive model of concepts and judgments. In this regard, Hume’s system might intriguingly be interpreted, not simply as a foil to Kant’s system, but as a dynamic (or perhaps unstable) anticipation of it.

Guyer and Allison largely converge in their interpretations of Kant’s Second Analogy as a response to Hume’s analysis of causation. They agree that Kant and Hume both hold that we cannot directly perceive causation, or determine *a priori* the specific cause of any specific event. However, both argue that Kant responds to Hume by showing that Hume’s construal of a perception as an event presupposes that this perception is subsumed under the causal maxim, as necessarily succeeding some other event (Guyer 107-14; Allison 93-111). Both also note that in the Second Analogy Kant addresses only the causal maxim, or the principle of the necessity of a cause in general, and not the uniformity or the similarity-of-causes principle, although Hume addresses the causal maxim mainly in the *Treatise*, which Kant could not
read (Guyer 75-93; Allison 94-7). In keeping with the philosophical rather
than historical focus of their studies, they therefore leave open the interest­
ing questions of whether and how Kant might have been acquainted with
Hume’s formulation of this problem in the Treatise. On the other hand, Kant
would have encountered the similarity-of-causes problem in the first En­
quiry, and both Guyer and Allison suggest that Kant finally addresses this
problem and defends the uniformity principle in his account of the reflective
principle of purposiveness and its postulation of the systematicity of the laws
of nature in the third Critique (Guyer 114-23, 209-22; Allison 143-60).

There are some typographical errors in both volumes. The ones that are
most evident in Allison’s book are relatively simple errors of spelling, gram­
mar or editing (Allison 26, line 3; 28, line 29; 105, line 38). In Guyer’s book I
noticed two misquotations of the phrase ‘ought only to be’ in the famous pas­sage from Hume (Guyer 161, 168), an error in phrasing that apparently re­
verses the intended meaning of a statement about Descartes (Guyer 29-30),
and some missing words and other editing errors (Guyer 133, lines 4-5; 155,
line 14; 202, line 5; 204, line 36). Also, while neither author claims to presen­t
a thorough discussion of the literature on Hume and Kant, both should per­
haps have noted Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (New
York: Oxford University Press 1990), in which she discusses Kant’s possible
knowledge of Hume’s argument concerning personal identity, and offers an
interpretation of Kant’s response to Hume that anticipates their own recon­
structions (Kitcher 97-116).

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Ernst Bertram
Nietzsche, Attempt at a Mythology.
Pp. 382.
US$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-252-03295-0);

For those with a taste for Nietzsche, translator Norton has provided a par­
ticularly refreshing and satisfying dish. Spicy, smart, textured, layered, gen­
erous and fully engaging, it is the kind of reading that makes a singular,
unmistakable and long remembered impression on the palate. There is no
other work on Nietzsche like it. Bertram, a musician, poet and professor of
literature, displays a surprising level of psycho-moral sympathy with his subject. His work, which appeared in 1918, was beloved and deeply influential between the wars especially in Germany, where it won praise from Jaspers and Heidegger, among others. Translated into French in 1932, it has never appeared in English until now.

However, it was famously criticized in English by Walter Kaufmann, in his ground-breaking work of 1950, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Kaufmann aimed to clear the postwar air of Nazi and other myths about Nietzsche, and Bertram's eventual affiliation with the Nazi party, which led to his being banned from teaching after the war, was one part of his animus against the work. Another was its title. Another was the fact that Bertram cited Nietzsche and other authors extensively but for the most part without providing references to the original sources. Norton has thoroughly rehabilitated Bertram's reputation on this last point, providing correct references to letters, notebooks and published works wherever he could. Only a handful of sources were not found, and Bertram's extensive use of the text turns out to be both effective and accurate.

Kaufmann was reproached, by no less than Thomas Mann, for his dismissive treatment of Bertram. Meanwhile, the book has frequently been criticized as a product of the Stefan George Circle, largely due to Bertram's close friendship with George. Norton, author of *Secret Germany: Stefan George and his Circle* (Cornell University Press 2002), assures us that while a few ideas echo George, most do not, and many were unwelcome in his circle, especially Bertram's many discussions of Nietzsche's relations with music, the art that George despised most. Another curious charge against Bertram's work questions its degree of *Germanomania*. But even if the degree was very high, and it was not, it could hardly diminish the value of this new translation. There are few works in English that read Nietzsche within his German literary context like this one does. Indeed Bertram's knowledge of Nietzsche's literary influences, from Novalis to Angelus Silesius, is unparalleled, and that alone easily justifies this translation. However, there is far more to admire here than these sorts of very worthy contributions from the literature professor.

For most scholars who read English, this book's twenty chapters will surely represent a substantial gain. There is precious little in the English literature on Nietzsche's conception of justice, but Bertram has a provocative, textually based chapter on it. The same can be said with regard to several themes, including Portofino, Venice, Judas, Napoleon, Claude Lorraine, prophecy, ancestry and Adalbert Stifter's *Indian Summer*. The case is similar for several themes that do not have chapters of their own, including atavism, courage, the extreme, the weak, dreams, education, and the problem of the actor; Nietzsche's descriptions of his task and of himself as *one who* has a task; his descriptions of his childhood and personal development; his discussions of the battle between melody and harmony; and his love-hate relationships with Germany, Luther and the historical sense. Bertram's treatments of Socrates, Wagner and Goethe are a good deal more stirring than one likely expects. Perhaps his most surprising chapter, however, is titled
‘Knight, Death and Devil’. Its central theme is a sixteenth-century engraving by Albrecht Dürer, prints of which Nietzsche gave as gifts on a few occasions. This is another theme missing from the English literature, and one on which Bertram is highly effective.

It is easy to criticize Bertram for small things, such as referencing The Will to Power as the ‘last work’ from Nietzsche’s hand (279). A mistake like that barely diminishes the value of the work, however, for Bertram’s aim goes beyond such details. As an intellectual biographer, his goal is to present a unified picture drawn as much from the private letters as from the published work, and it is this vision of a man and his work that is of paramount importance. His vision is clear, unique and, we now know, solidly based in the texts; and thus it is likely to outlast many generations of scholarly scratching and clawing.

More than any other author, Bertram is aware of and regularly drives home the point that ‘Nietzsche speaks most clearly, most openly about himself precisely at those points where he seems to be speaking least about himself’ (146). On this basis, he is able to discuss, for example, ‘Nietzsche’s identification of himself with music’ (105), and to formulate the charge that Nietzsche ‘does to music what he does all too violently to himself: he tears it apart by denying, mocking, damning, demonizing one half of it — and stylizing and deifying the other all the more passionately as the opposite ideal he so painfully desires. Nietzsche does to music what he does to himself, and if he “suffers from the fate of music as from an open wound,” then he is suffering from himself’ (101). Thus Bertram’s Nietzsche ‘burdens the Germans with representing the anti-melodic, anti-Hellenistic musical ideal,’ and seeks his ideal music in the European South, in ancient Greece, in the mystical moments of improvisation, or wherever the oppressive gray gravity of harmony is lightest (100).

At the same time, Bertram has a keen eye for the ways in which Nietzsche divided and scourged his nature, even as he identified it with external things, as he did in his discussions of music. Thus, Nietzsche’s ‘hatred of Germans belongs psychologically on the same plane as his hatred of Christianity, of Wagner’s music, Socrates and Platonism: it is a form of his asceticism,’ which is to say, of his self-denial (64). With regard to the famous essay on asceticism in the Genealogy, Bertram holds that ‘truly everything’ that it ‘contains in the form of pitiless conclusions and the most vicious disdain is really Nietzsche attacking himself’ (113). Meanwhile, Zarathustra ‘is simultaneously his most ambitious and most self-hating work’ (199). In Nietzsche’s relationship with Socrates ‘there was always a combination of deadly hatred and a plea for his blessing,’ but his ‘love hate relationship with Socrates combines self-hatred and self-transfiguration in a peculiar unity’ (263). It is these two themes, Nietzsche as internally divided and Nietzsche as identified with the objects he discusses, including landscapes, cities, historical figures and forces of the modern world, which form the unifying themes of Bertram’s work. It has been criticized as a disorderly heap of chapters. However, each topic represents a unique opportunity to elaborate these central ideas under new
and different circumstances, and that is probably unity enough for a non-chronological intellectual biography.

Bertram’s German prose is so good that Norton provides a partial list of his coinages. In addition, Bertram’s thinking, alongside Nietzsche’s, brims with memorable quips and aphorisms of its own, such as, ‘singing is sorrow, but as happiness; music is weeping, but as high ecstasy’ (104). Herman Hesse described this book as ‘beautiful’, and Mann, in his reproach of Kaufmann, called the chapters on Judas and Venice ‘beautiful’. From Judas, ‘Thus, Nietzsche’s exitus shimmers in a strange double light: half Judas-like self-execution, half Promethean self-sacrifice; both connected by the consciousness of an immense necessity that unites both with a decisive turn in human destiny, with the coming of some new covenant and new fire; and in such a way that he himself is not the bringer of the new salvation, but so that without his sacrilege, without his murder of God, the iron gates to the New World would remain forever barred’ (132). Given his title, I had expected Bertram to build Nietzsche up into a hero of some kind. Though his Nietzsche is something of an artist-martyr, he is anything but heroically drawn. Plain, very human delusions, weaknesses and recurrent failings are essential to the picture. ‘Nietzsche’s tragedy’, we learn, was ‘the deadly equilibrium of the two dominant opposing tendencies of his nature: the Socratically analytic, individualistic hunger for knowledge and the prophetically constructive, community-building will to mystery. The entire wretchedness of his century . . . is contained in this conflict.’ If Bertram has created a mythology, it is about Nietzsche’s attempt to satisfy that ‘burning cry for mystery . . . without which humanity withers’, while at the same time exercising ‘the jeering laughter of intellectualism’ and taking ‘delight in playing with the sacrilegious word, which if spoken ushers in chaos’ (294). Readers will reach their own conclusions about the value of that mythology, if it is one. What they should not do is avoid this work due to Kaufmann’s famous but now baseless complaints about it.

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What does it mean to be human? What constitutes a self? Such questions relating to the authenticity of subjective identity are explored in detail by Braman, who begins his study with a survey of the historical philosophical discourse. The first chapter is structured to show how Heidegger’s exposition on world, self, and Dasein are intimately intertwined. The quest for a foundational ontology leads Heidegger to explain that authenticity exists in harmony with the question of Dasein — being-a-whole-self in a lived context — a context which is at once both already determined and yet to be determined by interaction within the historicity and finitude of the lived world of which a self is but one part. This argument provides the groundwork for Braman’s analysis of theories of the narrative self proposed by both Taylor and Lonergan. Braman attempts to answer a basic question relating to the meaning of authentic personhood (73). He concludes that for both Taylor and Lonergan ‘authentic human existence is . . . psychological, sociological, historical, philosophic, theological, religious, ascetic, perhaps for some even mystical’ (7, 49).

Braman suggests in the second chapter that Taylor takes Heidegger’s argument a step further in proposing that being in a lived context entails ‘more than appropriating the finitude of one’s own being’ (27). Taylor questions how it is that identity is shaped in a particular way which enables the development of an ethical and moral self amongst other selves seeking authenticity. ‘Authenticity’, asserts Braman, ‘is a moral ideal that ultimately answers the question of what constitutes the good life’, going on to argue that for both Heidegger and Taylor the truth of human existence is embedded in ‘acquiring a proper understanding of authenticity’ (29). This understanding, for Taylor, emanates within a cultural framework or horizon and involves discovering the historical influences, or heritage (Heidegger), on the perception of identity and selfhood. ‘Human existence is a quest for meaning and significance’ (75). As Taylor posits in Sources of the Self, ‘[t]o know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand’ (27) within a particular communal horizon albeit construed from variable human interpretation (33). In other words, human beings are both belonging and becoming — ideas explicated at length by Braman as he discusses Taylor’s ideas on orientation to the good and the distinction between constitutive and life goods (38). Braman stresses the importance of clarifying and articulating this distinction in the quest for authenticity. He asks ‘how we determine or discover what is most important in shaping our identity’ (43), and offers Taylor’s comments on epiphanic ex-
pericence as a tool to reveal an overarching meaning of life: ‘An epiphanic event then fosters or constitutes something that is not only spiritually significant but also fulfils the desire for wholeness’ (45). The notion of epiphanic creativity is also shared by Lonergan, and Braman concludes that both Lonergan and Taylor ‘understand the power of art to set the conditions for the experience of self-transcendence both morally and spiritually’ (78).

The third chapter ‘On Being Oneself’ is dedicated to the thought of Bernard Lonergan who posits that ‘authentic existence is self-transcendence. This journey towards self-transcendence involves three dimensions: intellectual, moral, and religious conversion’. For him, ‘authenticity is a lifelong commitment’ (48), personhood a continuing development (55). He likens being-in-the-world to a drama (49), a human being fully embodied and engaged in the dynamics of life. Braman clearly identifies similarities and differences between Taylor’s hypotheses and those of Lonergan, revealing nuances which stem from Heidegger’s perceptions. Concepts such as engagement, being and becoming, feelings and value, responsibility/concern, thrownness, horizon, situation, existential gap/transfiguration, knowing, and meaning are related to the quest for the authentic self and a full understanding of one’s being-in-the-world. For Lonergan, this full understanding emanates from the process of threefold conversion (54), defined by Braman as ‘a movement into a new horizon; . . . a radical change in our orientation to the world’ (53). On this Lonergan and Taylor agree, ‘One becomes oneself’ (55). As Braman explains, Lonergan is concerned to show what it means to be an authentic self within the dynamic complexity of world-being. The ensuing discussion of revelation and immediacy highlights the distinction between experience and hypothesis. Is experiencing understanding? Is understanding knowledge? Braman navigates Lonergan’s critical exposition challenging his readers to allow him to lay out the arguments of Bernard Lonergan alongside those of Charles Taylor for review.

The review is the task of the fourth chapter, ‘Dialogue and Dialectic’. Braman identifies three areas — art, cognitional theory and the human good — which he thinks show most clearly the similarities and distinctions between the hypotheses of Taylor and Lonergan. For both, transfiguration through a process of conversion is central; the quest for authenticity rests on self-transcendence. This conclusion is articulated systematically as Braman weaves the discourse together allowing each author’s arguments to stand alone, complementing or contrasting with each other’s insights in their common search for the meaning of human authenticity. The reader is nudged to absorb Taylor’s ideas and to engage in further reflection on his conclusions by challenging them with the deep enquiry proposed by Lonergan. In fact, Braman suggests that it is Lonergan who more sharply defines authenticity in relation to the converted subject (75).

Is this book applicable to other areas of research? Is Braman’s work of value beyond philosophy? Could it be applied to, for example, neuroethics, law, social studies? What does it mean to be authentic? In Braman’s own words, ‘authenticity for Taylor and Lonergan is the experience of a profound trans-
configuration in one's being and doing' (98). For Lonergan, this conversion is 'explicitly intellectual, moral and religious' (89). For Taylor, conversion 'is implicitly moral and religious' (89). Most definitely, Braman's research will be of benefit to other areas of research which seek to understand further the nature of human existence. Braman's critical review offers ample opportunity for further enquiry and clarification.

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John Carriero
Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’s Meditations.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-691-13560-1);

Carriero's book is a meticulously detailed examination of the six meditations that comprise Descartes' Meditations Concerning First Philosophy. As Carriero states at the outset (ix), his 'goal is to work through the text as it appears and to confront it in an unfiltered way,' and, indeed, his focus throughout is intent on the Meditations: references to Descartes' other writings are rare, and discussion of secondary literature is generally reserved for the endnotes. That said, scholastic theory and sources do have a significant and explicit role in the comparative project that defines Carriero's reading. The book's thesis at large is that Descartes develops a new account of the human mind when compared to his scholastic predecessors and, in particular, to Aquinas' theory of cognition (3). Specific to the Meditations, the book highlights the 'cognitive being's' abilities and the corresponding theory of mind that Descartes develops as he works through the topics of the mind, God, and body — the three fundamental topics of that work. The use of scholastic theory sharpens that picture and makes Descartes' philosophical moves more precise. For that, Carriero succeeds in making the valuable point that the Meditations is a work that stands on its own philosophical merits, albeit not in isolation from its philosophical context.

An introduction sets up the book's comparative approach, and the ensuing chapters of the book are organized by meditation. On Carriero's reading of Descartes' well-known doubt in Meditation One, the doubt is not an isolated epistemological project but rather sets the stage for the two directions in which Descartes works in the Meditations: one destructive and one construc-
tive. The important lesson here is that understanding this meditation — and, indeed, the entire Meditations — requires knowing what Descartes is working against and where he is going.

Where Descartes goes is built upon his famous proclamation in Meditation Two that he, a thinking thing, exists. Taking what follows the 'cogito' in turn and keeping Aquinas's theory of human cognition close at hand, Carriero assesses where Descartes' developments depart from scholastic theory and where they align. The significant points of departure concern human cognition. Descartes' theory of understanding is particularly at issue in Carriero's reading of Meditation Two in Chapter 2, and his fundamental point is that for Descartes understanding does not involving abstracting from sensible phantasms; it does not depend on the body as it does for Aquinas. Contrasts concerning cognition carry on into the reading of the Third Meditation, which Carriero divides into two chapters (Chapters 3[I] and 3[II]). The division cuts between two major moves Descartes makes against scholasticism. In Chapter 3 (I), Descartes' target is the thesis that sensory ideas and the qualities of bodies are formally identical (i.e. the resemblance thesis). In Chapter 3 (II), Descartes' theory of human cognition of God — which is strikingly different from Aquinas' — allows Descartes to argue for God's existence in ways that Aquinas cannot. Two of those arguments occur in the Third Meditation and the third (the ontological argument) is in the Fifth Meditation. In Chapters 3 (II) and 5 where Carriero addresses these arguments, he does so from the position of explaining how all three require an idea of God in human cognition that Aquinas' theory of cognition denies.

In addition to evaluating Descartes' departures from scholasticism, Carriero also explores and argues for certain similarities. These demonstrations are sometimes useful for shedding light on what exactly Descartes is up to at various points in the Meditations. This is the case in Chapter 4 where consideration of the Thomistic tradition illuminates Descartes' position on free 'decision/judgment'. Carriero argues that, similar to Aquinas on the 'liberum arbitrium of the blessed', Descartes maintains a 'form of necessitation' that 'does not interfere with freedom' (254-5). As well, in Chapter 6 the role of the body in Descartes' account of imagining 'is helpfully understood' by analogy to the use of the body in Aquinas's theory of understanding (373).

The comparative angle of Carriero's reading is central to his book, but it does not consume his attention; he still has much to say about the Meditations on its own. This includes his argument that the theodical worry Descartes uses to structure the Fourth Meditation is just 'a convenient way' for him (Descartes) to discuss in detail the theory he develops in the Fourth Meditation — theory that he needs for the sake of the entire Meditations (225). In Chapter 5, Carriero offers an intriguing resolution to the Cartesian Circle (i.e., the infamous problem with Descartes' reasoning in his arguments for God) by parsing apart two different modes of cognition that he finds in Descartes' philosophy: clear perception and scientia. In the final chapter of the book, Carriero handles Descartes' account of the human being as a union of mind and body with an emphasis on the spirit of the text in the Sixth
Meditation rather than on the problems concerning causation and unity often associated with Descartes' dualism. That means accepting that 'the fact of sensation makes it clear that God has made a human composite' and, from there, taking on the task of understanding human nature as it is already composed and explaining how internal disorders of that nature are compatible with God's authorship (363).

The detail and depth of the book justifies its length, and still there is much in it to inspire further examination and discussion. It is a valuable read for those who want to enhance, deepen, or challenge their understanding of the Meditations, but it is not for first-time readers of the Meditations who want a companion guidebook. It assumes a familiarity with the entire work right from the start, and the subtle complexity of Carriero's commentary surpasses an introductory level. This is, however, an excellent introduction to reading Descartes with an eye to Aristotelian scholasticism. The explanations of Aquinas' theory of cognition are accessible but nonetheless substantive, and the book is a welcome addition to literature that attends to the scholastic background to Descartes' philosophy. Carriero does not address in detail the relationship Descartes' Meditations has to the other of the 'two worlds' between which it stands, but given his accomplishment with this book, it would be interesting to know how he would.

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Michael J. Dodds
The Unchanging God of Love:
Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology
on Divine Immutability.
Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
Pp. 286.

Aside from its specific focus on the notion of divine immutability in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, this book more generally explores the function of philosophy in theology. Dodds explains that Aquinas held divine immutability not only as a tenet of Christian faith, but as a notion entirely coherent with the metaphysics of subsistent being (ipse esse subsistens). Contrarily, many contemporary theologians hold that divine immutability implies an
uncaring, indifferent God. Hence the motivation for this revised edition of Dodd's book, which was originally published in 1986.

Dodds begins by examining immutability as perceived in finite creatures before proceeding to show how immutability is predicated analogously of God. Utilizing over thirty synonyms for immutability, Aquinas sometimes applies these synonyms to perfections in creatures and other times to imperfections. Mobility, for example, is a perfection within the hierarchy of animate beings, but a defect in love which calls for the steadfastness and fidelity of an intelligent being. Similarly, human knowledge requires the cooperation of both passive and active intellects, and therefore it involves a mixture of mutability and immutability. In the case of finite beings, whether or not mobility is preferable depends on the kind of motion and the being of which it is affirmed or denied. Since mobility is required by the very nature of living things, their motion allows them to imitate divine perfection and mirror the infinite goodness of the immobile God.

Particularly noteworthy is Dodds' discussion of Aquinas's cosmology, which, though primitive and incorrect in light of modern science, provides deep insight into the basic notions of immobility, actuality, and perfection. Also relevant is Aquinas's teaching on angels, who, precisely because they are capable of knowledge and love, are subject to movement even though they exist apart from matter. This raises the broader question of the distinction between transient and imminent motion. The former involves the perfection of some external object and the latter of the agent itself. Transient motion suggests incompleteness, whereas immanent motion is the 'act of a being in act'. Transient motion, unlike immanent motion, includes imperfection in its very definition. For this reason, immanent motion more closely conforms to the motion of the immoveable God. Yet both types of motion entail incompleteness and allude to a perfection yet to be attained. Paradoxically, though motion itself implies imperfection, it is precisely through motion that a creature attains perfection. Change is not only good but necessary for creatures, insofar as it allows them to acquire new forms which they would otherwise lack. To the extent that a finite being has reached some particular perfection, immovability is desirable, for any further change in the same respect necessarily results in a loss of that perfection. The perfectible creature thus attains perfection through motion and preserves it through immovability. At the same time, the superior perfection of motion in creatures is evident in that they best imitate the creator not by resting but by exercising their proper motions.

Despite the fact that motion always involves imperfection in creatures, it is nonetheless predicable analogously of God in two ways. The divine substance can be said to move itself insofar as it knows and loves itself, but also insofar as it has communicated its likeness to creatures and hence is said to be moved by them. This is why in the Commentary on the Divine Names Aquinas agrees with Dionysius that we can praise 'the motion of the immovable God' (243). At the same time, God's 'being moved' in no way implies change, for being 'ungenerated' does not mean that God is 'something yet
to be generated’ but rather is ‘always existing’. Dodds remarks that the attempt to reconcile the concurrence of motion and immutability in God — two seemingly incompatible notions — quickly runs up against the limitations of human thought and language. To overcome these, Aquinas borrows images from rectilinear and circular motion. The motion of the divine substance is circular in that it involves both motion (processus) and rest (statio): motion with respect to the production of things and rest with respect to the invariability of divine operation. This gives rise to two pregnant through seemingly oxymoronic terms in Aquinas: processus stabilis and status generativus.

In addressing modern theologians, Dodds draws attention to the importance of causality, negation, and eminence as the three classic Thomistic ways of predicing attributes to God originally known through creatures. The ways of eminence and negation remind us that God must contain all perfections in a superabundant way that excludes any hint of imperfection. The way of negation demands that, strictly speaking, we must deny God both motion and immutability. This means, however, that the statements ‘God is not movable’ and ‘God is not immovable’ imply that the motion and immutability characteristic of creatures are not attributable to God. Dodds explains that when Aquinas asserts that God is ‘immovable’, he wishes simply to make a negative statement. To apply it positively would suggest that God, like creatures, is ‘immovable’ in a way not unlike ice or concrete. Hence if we attribute immutability to God in a positive way, we must do so according to the way of eminence which focuses on immutability as a perfection in creatures, and then attribute it to God in a higher, maximally perfect way. Moreover, the way of causality allows us to say not only that God is wholly immovable as first cause, but that his causality is itself a kind of motion. Dodds concludes that ‘far from implying, therefore, that God is somehow static or inert, immutability directly signifies that God, as subsistent esse, is pure dynamic actuality’ (159).

Dodds’ study covers a large range of the Thomistic corpus and synthesizes well the main philosophic and patristic sources feeding into it. He recognizes the intricate interplay of theology and philosophy in Aquinas’s reasoning, but does not hesitate to assert the forensic force of the latter; so much so that the reader may easily come away convinced that the problem with theologians who undermine the importance of divine immutability is far less theological than philosophical.

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Alfred Tarski considered himself to be ‘the greatest living sane logician’, expressing simultaneously ‘supreme confidence in his talent’ (1) as well as a criticism of life-long rival Gödel (who developed strange habits like wearing a mask). Tarski is mostly known by philosophers for his work in semantics (justifying the study of truth in a formal fashion) and Tarski’s Theorem (that languages with basic means of self-reference cannot contain their own truth predicate). His work, besides these classics, comprehended wide areas of logic. With others he invented meta-mathematics as the study of properties of formal systems themselves (e.g. decidability, soundness, independence of axioms). He invented decision procedures, number theories, types of algebras — and a lot more. After the Second World War he made the University of California into the world’s centre for logic. Famous logicians (like Dana Scott or Richard Montague) studied logic with Tarski.

Tarski’s biography by Anita and Solomon Feferman is now available in a paperback edition. They write from the perspective of former Tarski students. Students knew Tarski from late night sessions carefully re-working single phrases of publications, with Tarski himself staying awake on coffee and amphetamines, urging them on. The Fefermans euphemistically describe a person others may consider an egocentric megalomaniac. Some of the behaviors they describe as ‘a life-long need for women’ (158, 178, 196, 200) nowadays would be filed under ‘sexual harassment’ (of students). What is more interesting about this book is less the admiration for the person of the great logician one may share or not, but the insightful view into the early days of analytic semantic theory (before the Second World War) and Tarski’s empire building in logic (after the Second World War). Even the story of a logic genius shows itself to depend on many chance events. Most dramatically, Tarski left only on the eve of the Second World War to tour the USA. Had he stayed and converted to Catholicism, being of Jewish descent (originally named ‘Teitelbaum’) he most certainly would have been killed like many other Polish logicians famous nowadays for single theorems (like Lindenbaum or Presburger), as they were murdered by the German occupants. For
the whole war he had to fear for his family, his wife and children, other family members and colleagues.

The Fefermans not only picture the biography of Tarski, but also set out, in six ‘Interludes’ beside the biographic narration, some of Tarski’s major achievements and areas of work. Thus, students and readers interested in the history of analytic philosophy and logic, even if they are only vaguely familiar with the areas with which Tarski’s name is associated, will certainly benefit from this book.

Tarski’s treatment of the notion of truth and its paradoxes superseded the syntax centrum and hostility to semantic concepts that prevailed in the Vienna Circle up to Tarski’s ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ in 1935, including Carnap’s just published Logical Syntax of Language (1933). Carnap devoted himself to semantics, and Tarski’s work became classical. Tarski aimed at formalized languages only, as he took natural languages to be universal (i.e., including their own semantics) and thus inconsistent. His approach works by distinguishing the definition of truth in a meta-language $L^+$ from the object-language $L$ for which ‘true in $L$’ is defined. A stratification of truth predicates enforces. Although Tarski himself did not extend this idea to natural languages, one may hope to treat (simple/natural) truth this way, but treatments of this type have been heavily criticized for several reasons (like the strict separation of levels of truth apparently absent in natural discourse, inexpressibility of the method itself if true, etc.), so that new paths to deal with the paradoxes have been explored.

Questions of truth bring us to the second book covered in this review. Hartry Field has devoted much of his work in the last years to the study of the antinomies of truth and property theory. His book provides both an overview of ways of dealing with the paradoxes of truth, as well as an introduction to Field’s own approach to save truth from paradox.

Field’s approach is a version of a gap-approach, i.e., he denies tertium non datur (TND) for the problematic sentences like the Liar. Field uses several building blocks from other theories. Therefore the first part of the book introduces inter alia Kripke’s fixed point construction for a theory of truth and Łukasiewicz’s continuum valued logic. Field shares some of the criticism of Tarski-style stratified truth theories. He works, like Kripke’s construction, with iteration instead of stratification: Starting with a ground-level of sentences not involving ‘true’, more and more sentences (i.e., now sentences involving ‘true’, speaking of other sentences involving ‘true’ ... ) are assigned to the positive extension of ‘true sentence’. As there are not more sentences than ordinals (i.e. only countable many), somewhere in the non-finite or­dinals the construction has to settle onto a fixed point, delivering the ultimate extension of ‘true sentence’. Kripke’s own three-valued construction contains no conditional and ultimately has to fall back to stratification. Field therefore uses a three-valued or a continuum-valued logic in the fashion of Łukasiewicz.

To avoid some pitfalls of Łukasiewicz’s construction Field introduces a special conditional beside material implication. The conditional is true at
a stage if there is an ordinal (in the preceding iteration process) starting from which the antecedent always has a lower semantic value than the consequent; it is false if, starting from some ordinal, it always has a higher semantic value; otherwise it is neither true nor false. This conditional has to be used where TND fails (i.e., in the critical semantic sentences); where TND holds it is identical to material implication. The logic of this conditional is, of course, weaker than standard propositional reasoning. Field’s overall theory makes heavy use of limit ordinal constructions. Field is finally able to derive his central result: his construction can conservatively extend a model of the semantics-free ground language by evaluating all the truths evaluations, and do this by having both the Truth Scheme (True(A)\(A\)) and intersubstitutivity of ‘True(A)’ and ‘A’. ‘It is only insofar as the unscripted predicate “True” transcends the Tarskian hierarchy that it is nonclassical’ (275).

The justification of Field’s approach depends crucially on a comparison to other approaches to the paradoxes. In one part of this work Field thus compares his approach to ‘classical solutions’, and to paraconsistent solutions in the final part of the book.

Classical solutions retain classical logic, and so have to give up at least one direction of the Truth Scheme. Either way they have to endorse bizarre claims. For instance, giving up the left-to-right direction means having theorems saying that some sentence is true without having that sentence itself or even having its negation! Giving up the right-to-left direction means having some sentence as a theorem without being able to say that the sentence is true or even being able to say that it is not true! Field’s book works meticulously through many filiations of such theories and provides a veritable field guide in that area. Such theories seem worse than giving up TND for some sentences.

Paraconsistent solutions keep the Truth Scheme, but change the underlying logic, just like Field’s solution. In contrast with Field’s ‘paracomplete solution’, which has some sentences being neither true nor false, a paraconsistent solution, at least dialetheism, may involve some sentences being both true and false. Field tries to argue that paraconsistent solutions face worries worse than paracomplete solutions (inter alia problems of expressing determinate truth or falsity, extending the ubiquity of true contradictions to simple arithmetic). It is not at all clear that these criticisms apply to paraconsistent solutions in general, as Field focuses more on Graham Priest’s dialetheism and on Priest’s criticism of Field. There are several paradigms of paraconsistent logics (e.g. adaptive logics, which have interesting conditionals), which may be better positioned to answer Field’s challenges, and which have a better net balance of virtues and vices than Field’s solution. Whereas the part dealing with the classical solutions in itself recommends Field’s work, the comparison with paraconsistent solutions is far from settled. Sometimes intuitions clash: dialetheism denies intersubstitutivity of ‘True(A)’ and ‘A’ in the scope of negation, which Field challenges as counterintuitive; whereas Field subscribes to verum ex quodlibet sequitur [e.g., A(BB)], which is counterintuitive to Relevant Logics (one of the areas of paraconsistent logic).
Field himself considers some of the typical challenges to gap-theories. Beside his theory of truth, he considers determinacy operators at length, constructing an additional theory of being determinately true (once again involving fixed points somewhere beyond some limit ordinal, where on pain of reintroducing the paradoxes the determinacy iteration must not collapse). Field believes this theory to be immune from revenge and almost free of counterintuitive drawbacks.

Notwithstanding the technical sophistication of his overall treatment of matters, this positive self-assessment needs further elaboration. For instance, Field makes short work of the problem that one might introduce exclusion negation again by a postulate ‘A is true iff A is not true’. If that worked one would have a negation with TND and thus reintroduce paradox. Many gap-approaches have the problem that their meta-theory allows — on pain of losing the power to express some semantic fact — the re-introduction of exclusion negation, and thus of Strengthened Liars. Field rejects such a postulate, as it works ‘only if we assume Boolean laws for the “not” used in making the stipulation’ (310). Nicely put, but unconvincing. Compare: ‘You have three collections of items and the operation of moving one item from one to the other. Now the three collections are placed/distributed over a border. There are three ways to do this, in all cases one collection is opposite to the others (thus now making the across-the-border region). There is an operation of moving an item from one of the opposing two collections to this collection.’ This is perfectly structurally isomorphic to having three collections of sentences, divided into true sentences, false sentences and gappy sentences. As one can introduce a border with collections of marbles (the green vs. the non-green), it is possible to have a border between the only true sentences and the other two collections. The operation across the border is exclusive negation. Thus either a Strengthened Liar is re-introduced (bad for Field) or, although the semantics is isomorphic to the marble model, the semantic fact of a (possible) border cannot be expressed, i.e. we have expressive limitations (also bad for Field). Except, the structural analogy between marbles and sentences is false — but this needs some heavy duty metaphysical work, not yet delivered by Field.

Further on, Field proves a lot of theorems about fixed points and limit ordinals, i.e. levels of iteration that we finite beings certainly do not ‘reason up to in stepwise fashion’. We can, of course, prove theorems about these infinite ordinals. What about the reasoning about these limit stages and fixed points — where does it take place? Field often distinguishes truth and validity tout court from truth and validity for some semantics in some model. Proving soundness for validity tout court then seems bared by Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem (45-9). If such reasoning concerning the soundness of genuine validity is not feasible, according to Field’s theory, we express something inexpressible, and thus we have mystery. If, in answering these concerns, one proposes to talk from the ultimate fixed point stage, it doesn’t sound that way: what about the usage of ‘true’ at this stage? It seems we are at a level very like the first semantic level above the ground language, but
there is nowhere to which to iterate anymore in order to avoid paradox (as we have, by assumption, exhausted all countable ordinals)! If this is a classical meta-language, we are back to Tarskian stratification and nothing is gained! Field's answer to that challenge, which could be put as a request for the truth theory for the set theory ZF used in the model theory, is that 'we have an adequate truth theory for $\text{ZF}_{\text{true}}$ within $\text{ZF}_{\text{true}}$' (356). He explicitly promises in the introduction 'that there are languages that are sufficiently powerful to serve as their own meta-languages' (18). But his construction contains its theory only in that sense of 'theory' that the set of theorems containing 'true' is included within it. The meta-theorems he proves are of another kind. They speak about the whole hierarchy. Field has to be more explicit about the status of his meta-theory and its resources. This is especially pressing in his treatment of determinate truth. He sees the problem that with the determinacy operators (i.e. the operators 'it is determinately true that . . .') for any amount of iteration) we do not have the same construction as with 'true', where we have only iteration. We have the idea of a 'super-determinacy' operator claiming something to be true tout court. Finally Field seems to yield to expressive limitations: 'the claim that I dispute is that the model theory ought to allow for super-determinateness operator meeting intuitive preconceptions' (357). The meta-theorems he puts forward, I gather, are meant to be super-determinately true, but he denies that they can be so.

Field's is a challenging book. The reader has to have advanced background knowledge and understanding in meta-logic and semantics. The treatment, at times Byzantine, is for the most part exciting.

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Samuel Freeman
Justice and the Social Contract:
Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy.
Pp. 351.

This fine book brings together seven previously published articles along with two new essays on various facets of John Rawls' path breaking work in political philosophy. (Some of the previously published pieces have been lightly edited and include some new material.) It is useful to have Freeman's care-
ful and illuminating discussions of themes in Rawlsian philosophy brought together in a single volume. The collection is supplemented by two brief appendices that provide a compelling biographical sketch of the man friends called 'Jack'. As editor of Rawls' collected papers, Freeman knows the Rawlsian corpus better than any other scholar. The elegant manner in which he presents and defends Rawls' views is very impressive. To be sure, the emphasis is on clarifying and defending Rawls' arguments rather than criticizing them. There is no major substantive issue on which Freeman is prepared to concede that Rawls' critics have the better of the argument or that Rawls' view stands in need of revision. In the wrong hands, this kind of unrelenting enthusiasm for Rawlsian contractarianism could be tedious. But Freeman is a skillful and fair-minded interpreter of both Rawls and Rawls' critics, so the essays lack the kind of shallow hagiography that bedevils the work of some diehard Rawlsians.

Five essays focus on themes in *A Theory of Justice* and two each on material from *Political Liberalism* and *The Law of Peoples*. Each essay explains a dimension of Rawls' thought that Freeman believes has been misinterpreted or incorrectly criticized. Freeman begins by situating Rawls' work in the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant. He shows how liberal contractarianism can be animated by a distinctive conception of practical reason that contrasts with a narrower Hobbesian conception. Critics of Rawls often contend that his contractarianism is predicated on an unrealistic and unpalatable conception of persons of rational maximizers. Freeman shows that this construal is inaccurate and that Rawls' theory views persons as fundamentally motivated by mutual respect and a concern for fair reciprocity. Freeman also disposes of the popular misconception that Rawls sought to defend the capitalist welfare state. In fact, Rawls favored a property owning democracy, and Freeman's discussion illuminates respects in which Rawls should be understood as a deep critic of the neo-liberal state rather than an apologist for it. Yet Freeman distances Rawls' basic stance from 'luck egalitarian' interpretations of the animating ideals of *A Theory of Justice*. Although just social institutions should mitigate the ill effects of some morally arbitrary factors, Rawls does not hold that all forms of misfortune should be compensated. Opinion will be divided on whether this interpretative claim adds to or diminishes the credibility of Rawls' theory. Despite a general tendency to regard Rawls' views as entirely consistent rather than as displaying inconsistencies or unresolved tensions, Freeman's analysis is subtle and instructive. The interpretation of Rawls on difficult matters such as the distinction between teleology and deontology or on the role that considerations of stability play in the argument for justice as fairness is also very interesting. But Freeman sometimes underplays the degree to which Rawls' writings invite quite different interpretations than the ones favored by Freeman.

The two essays devoted to themes in *Political Liberalism* provide a helpful overview of changes in Rawls' outlook. Freeman credibly argues that developments in *Political Liberalism* are not to be understood as reactions to communitarian criticisms but rather reflect Rawls' increased sensitivity to the
difficulties of relying on express ly Kantian premises for the justification of principles of justice. In a democratic poli ty in which citizens have diverse but reasonable moral, philosophical and religious commitments, political justification must be more ecumenical. Rawls came to think that political justification must be predicated on a conception of democratic citizenship that can resonate with a wide plurality of citizens. The resulting doctrine of public reason is not, as some contend, constituted by a coincidental overlap of the private reasons of citizens. Rather it embodies and expresses a distinct ideal of democratic citizenship that all persons can accept qua free and equal citizens who are jointly committed to justifying the terms of fair political association to one another. Freeman helpfully tries to show how the considerations of public reason can resolve real divisive political issues such as abortion. In a brief but revealing discussion, he argues that considerations of public reason clearly favor a pro-choice stance on the legal status of abortion because public reason must assign greater importance to protection of women's interests in privacy, civic equality and freedom than to protection of the interests of the fetus. Providing a legitimate resolution to such controversies is the work that public reason is supposed to do. Yet it is doubtful that citizens who insist upon the basic sacredness of fetal life will view Freeman's argument as one they must, qua citizens, accept as reasonable. How can they accept that the possible truth of their view is politically irrelevant? The attempt to insulate political discourse from truth oriented philosophical discourse is attractive, but Freeman's treatment of public reason does not fully quell doubts about its feasibility.

Freeman's attempt to explain and justify the anti-cosmopolitan conception of global justice in Law of Peoples meets with mixed success. The exposition of Rawls' doubts about the scope of norms of distributive justice and his endorsement of a very limited conception of human rights is careful, accurate and illuminating. But unlike some other dimensions of Rawls' work, the criticisms taken up by Freeman do not reflect misunderstanding of the Rawls' view or its rationale. Indeed, the clarity with which Freeman explains Rawls' views on global justice only highlights the force of the objections Freeman wishes to rebut.

Even where Freeman's vigorous efforts to refute criticisms fail, we gain an appreciation of the subtle complexities of Rawls' views and the considerations that motivated their development. The range, depth and clarity of Freeman's analysis make this collection an invaluable resource not just for scholars of Rawls but for all contemporary political philosophers.

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In this book Gill presents David Hume's moral philosophy as the conclusion of a debate over the question of whether human beings are naturally inclined towards good or evil. This debate, which he refers to as 'the human nature question', serves to frame his discussion. The book is divided into four parts in which Gill traces the Cambridge Platonists' rejection of Calvinist theology and Hobbesian egoism (Part 1: Whichcote and Cudworth), through the moral sense theorists (Part 2: Shaftesbury, and Part 3: Hutcheson), and finally to Hume. Gill maintains that Hume's moral philosophy represents a 'Copernican Revolution'. Prior to Hume, moral standards were understood to be something prior to and independent of human nature. We could, therefore, meaningfully ask whether human nature itself was good or evil. According to Hume however, human nature is prior to any moral standard and therefore we cannot sensibly ask whether human nature itself is good or evil. The human nature question itself must be abandoned. Gill skillfully weaves biographical fact and philosophical interpretation, resulting in a highly readable, engaging, and informative discussion of one of the richest periods of moral philosophy.

In his discussion of the Cambridge Platonists Gill explains their Calvinist upbringing and ultimate rejection of a basic tenet of Calvinism, the claim that human beings possess a deeply depraved nature. In providing these autobiographical details and situating these philosophers in social and historical context, Gill helps the reader appreciate how and why these philosophers arrived at the positions they held. He notes, for example, that Cudworth's position appears to shift from an emphasis on moral sentiments to a more rationalist approach, and that this shift seems to reflect a desire to endorse a rational means to resolve disputes generated by the social conflicts of his lifetime. The result is that the Cambridge Platonists on the whole can be seen as something more than a philosophical curiosity. The main point of the discussion, however, is this: in moving away from the Calvinist conception of human nature and adopting a more Platonic conception of human beings and moral knowledge, the Cambridge Platonists begin the movement towards a secular ethic. For if human beings are basically rational and good, and if understanding moral duty is a matter of reasoning well, then it seems that we humans can live morally without any knowledge at all of Jesus as our savior. While duties to God are still believed to be an essential part of morality, Christianity is not.

In the second and third parts of his book, Gill discusses how this shift away from Christianity progresses in the moral philosophies of Shaftesbury.
and Hutcheson. Here Gill refuses to oversimplify, and his Shaftesbury is a transitional, Janus faced figure standing between the Cambridge Platonists with their moral rationalism and the more empirically inclined Hutcheson and Hume. More importantly for Gill's purposes, there is also a further movement away from any religious component to ethics: 'Shaftesbury and Hutcheson constructed a kind of halfway house between theological and secular ethics' (205). That is, both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson believed we can lead a virtuous life without a belief in God, because they believed that human beings are by nature good. Belief in God, while valuable in pursuit of a moral life, is not absolutely necessary.

These philosophers believed that we humans have within ourselves all that is necessary for living morally. This belief, however, prepares the way for abandoning the human nature question altogether. Hume accepts that morality is based on our human nature. He goes farther though, concluding that there is no independent moral standard available to judge that nature. In this way, Hume can be understood as the culmination of this debate regarding the intrinsic good or evil of human nature. Rather than assert that human beings are naturally either good or evil, Hume embraces a morally neutral view of human nature. He is then able to show how our moral evaluations of good and evil are based in this neutral human nature.

This book is clearly written and easily read: I have used it with success in an upper division undergraduate course. One of its greatest strengths is that Gill relies on primary texts and presents these thinkers sympathetically, refusing to oversimplify their positions or motives. As I have mentioned above, his discussion of Whichcote and Cudworth benefits greatly from the inclusion of biographical information. Similarly, his discussion of Shaftesbury benefits from an unwillingness to fully endorse the distinction between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism. The result is a book that is sensitive to the philosophers and their concerns, and which refuses to pigeon-hole these thinkers. There are some minor flaws and blemishes. There are a few odd typographical errors, and Gill's quick dismissal of Shaftesbury's understanding of Locke stands out in comparison to his other, more careful discussions. Despite offering a substantial section on Hume, the discussion seems incomplete. To a large extent this is a result of the great care Gill takes to situate Hume with respect to his predecessors, and the fact is that a more complete discussion of Hume is a task worthy of another book. Finally, there are questions (of which he is aware) raised by his choice of philosophers and points of emphasis. Hobbes and Clarke, for example, seem to be obvious candidates for inclusion. These are minor points, though. This is an excellent book.

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‘Philosophical anthropology’, writes Hacker (4), ‘is the investigation of the concepts and forms of explanation characteristic of the study’ of human beings. After explaining his conception of the aims and methods of philosophical anthropology, Hacker addresses: substance; causation; powers; agency; teleology and teleological explanation; reasons and the explanation of human action; the mind; the self and the body; the person. He identifies with Aristotelian, rather than Platonic, traditions in philosophical anthropology (21-8).

Many chapters contain material on the history of philosophy. Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright, Alan R. White and A. J. P. Kenny are among the twentieth-century philosophers whose work strongly influences the book.

The concepts we employ to talk about ourselves, and to describe and explain human behaviour, do not constitute ‘the concepts and conceptual network of a theory of some kind (sometimes referred to contemptuously as “folk psychology”) that might be abandoned if the theory were found defective’ (5). Rather, ‘our use of many of these concepts . . . itself moulds our nature as human beings . . . their use is partly constitutive of what they can also be invoked to describe.’ Philosophical anthropology, as Hacker (5-11) conceives it, is a descriptive metaphysics of the human: it is ‘an investigation into the conceptual scheme in terms of which we describe ourselves and our complex moral and social relationships, give expression to our inner life, explain, justify or excuse the thoughts, feelings and actions of human beings’ (10-11).

While ‘human being is a biological category, person is a moral, legal and social one’ (4). Nevertheless, ‘a human being is . . . a creature whose nature it is to acquire’ the capacities which ‘give to human beings the status of persons . . . in the course of normal maturation in a community of like-minded beings.’ Human beings are ‘animate substances’ (29). By ‘substance’, we sometimes mean, on the one hand, ‘a concrete individual thing of a given kind’ (30) and, on the other, ‘one kind or another of material stuff’ (34). The common nouns that apply to individual substances are count nouns, while those that apply to stuffs are non-count nouns (32). Not all of the common nouns that apply to individual substances are ‘substance names’ (32). When a substance name applies to a thing, $x$, it applies to $x$ as long as $x$ exists. For example, ‘human’ is a substance name but ‘tailor’ is not. If, as I presume, a human being can gain or lose the capacities upon which being a person rests, then person is a phased sortal rather than a substance sortal (cf. 295, 312, 316). Concerning the second sense of ‘substance’, not all common non-count nouns are stuff names (34-5). The non-count nouns divide into concrete non-count nouns (e.g., ‘steel’, ‘light’, ‘furniture’) and abstract non-count nouns (e.g., ‘music’, ‘homework’, ‘honesty’). The concrete non-count nouns, in turn, divide into mass nouns (e.g., ‘steel’, ‘light’) and ‘pseudo-mass nouns’ (e.g., ‘furniture’).
Finally, the mass non-count nouns divide into stuff nouns (e.g., ‘steel’, ‘water’) and non-stuff nouns (e.g., ‘light’, ‘fire’). Moreover, ‘“mind”, though a count noun, does not signify a kind of thing, let alone a substance, in any sense’ (41).

Concrete individuals have ‘active and passive powers’ (57). In this sense, they are agents. The Humean and post-Humean emphasis upon event causation tends to mislead us. ‘Substantial agent causation’ is ‘the prototype of causation . . . around which we can order the variety of concepts of causal connection’ (79). Rather than causation being unobservable, ‘we observe and participate in causal transactions constantly . . . we observe agents acting on patients and bringing about change’ (69). Causes need not proceed, but can be contemporaneous with, their effects, as when a splash is caused by a stone’s dropping into the water (69).

In the case of inanimate individuals, V-ing implies being able to V, whereas this is not the case for animate, and specifically for human, agents (93). Powers are potentialities, and so they (as opposed to their vehicles and their exercises) are unobservable (99, 10). Powers are reducible neither to their vehicles nor to their exercises (98-105). Among human powers, there are ‘one-way powers . . . such as our powers to digest food, to salivate . . . in short, all those things that we can do, but which we cannot do at will and cannot refrain from doing’ (107). The powers of inanimate objects are all one-way. ‘Two way powers . . . are powers of voluntary action’; they are ‘powers to do things that we can do or refrain from doing at will.’ Two-way powers are related to, but are not themselves, dispositions, since to be able to V does not entail having a disposition to V (108). ‘Knowledge that something is so . . . is an ability’ (109), but ability and know-how are logically distinct (111). The vehicle of thought and understanding is the whole human organism, not any proper part of the organism (117).

Only animate agents ‘take action’. Inanimate things ‘may act on other things (and) have an activity (as enzymes do), but they do not engage in an activity’ (127). Agents, whether animate or inanimate, ‘can often be said to need things’ (128). In the case of inanimate agents, however, their needs are relative to the ends of animate agents (129). Against volitionalism, some objections to which he summarizes (148-51), Hacker regards human action ‘as agential causation of movement’ (153).

Teleological explanation is properly applicable to ‘the domains of biology and of human action and artifact’ (182). The notion of the good of an organism or organ is teleologically rooted (175-81). Moreover, ‘human action for reasons is of a form of teleological behavior’ (226) and, argues Hacker (226-32), ‘it is clear that reasons are not causes’ (227). ‘Explanation of action in terms of agential reasons . . . enables us to understand our fellow human beings as persons’ (232).

There is no such entity as the mind (41, 233-56, 281). Rather, ‘the domain of the idiom of mind coincides roughly . . . with that of the Aristotelian rational psuchē’ (254). That is to say, talk of the mind correlates roughly with talk of the intellectual and volitional powers of human beings (254-6, 303). It
is human beings that are subjects of experience, rather than (real or alleged) proper parts of human beings, such as brains (306-7) or selves (259). The concept person 'belongs... to the study of man as a moral, social and cultural being' (311) and is the subject of the book's final chapter. Hacker's position is that the persons we know are human animals (313).

In my opinion, this book's main overall shortcomings are that it is dogmatic in approach and parochial in its consideration of relevant recent literature. Pronouncement is frequently favored over argumentation. Hacker's views on most of the major issues discussed in the book often seem to me to be sensible. However, given the relative sparseness of argument, and that most of the recent work discussed is by authors with whom Hacker is broadly in agreement, those who are partisans of, or who incline towards, views other than Hacker's and who read this book are unlikely, as a result, to be won round or even to think they have anything novel or formidable to confront. Nevertheless, the book is rich in relevance to various areas of philosophy and it deftly relates the issues addressed to the history of the discipline. Some topics infrequently addressed in analytic philosophy, such as needs and the human body, are usefully and insightfully discussed. The book is well-organized and Hacker writes in an impeccably clear style.

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Jens Harbecke
Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World.
Pp. 434.

Mental causation is Harbecke's Ph.D. dissertation. As a dissertation this is excellent work, careful, detailed and technical. It is well researched and thorough, with a few exceptions I'll mention below.

Like most philosophers in the metaphysics of mind, Harbecke sets up the puzzles of mental causation as a problem between reductionism and causal efficacy. Either we embrace reductionism or we eschew the causal efficacy or causal relevance of the irreducible. And, like the majority of current philosophers, Harbecke finds reductionism implausible, due to multiple realizability. So, if mental events are not physical then either the mental event is epiphenomenal or it overdetermines the physical effect, assuming that every
physical event has a physical cause. Harbecke spends the most interesting part of his book discussing whether overdetermination is a plausible position. He dubs his own view ‘overdetermination lite’. Harbecke has three concerns: to define an acceptable concept of causation and causal relevance; to evaluate whether a nonreductive model is plausible; to show whether the adequate nonreductive model can provide a good account of mental causation.

The book is divided into four sections. The first, ‘Central Principles’, spells out the main metaphysical concepts to be utilized, such as supervenience, multiple realization and Kim’s exclusion arguments. Section 2 is entitled ‘Canonical Solutions’. Here Nagelian reduction and Davidson’s anomalous monism are both rejected, along with functionalism and substance dualism. In Section 3 Harbecke takes on what he calls the new compatibilism, focusing rightly on the works of Stephen Yablo and of Kornblith and Pereboom. These philosophers reject token-identity, without committing themselves to substance dualism. Harbecke spends much time on the details of causal proportionality and in defining causal influence. In Section 3, entitled somewhat indecisively, it seems) ‘Open Solutions’, Kim’s supervenience argument is revisited and rejected.

Harbecke’s ‘overdetermination lite’ is, as far as I can make out, the claim that when a mental event is a cause of a macrophysical event, the coincident microphysical event will be causally relevant to the same effect. So, on the assumption that two events can be spatiotemporally coincident yet nonidentical — this is the constitution theory of objects applied to events — we can have either the constituted or the constituting event as cause and the other as causally relevant. This is overdetermination lite because when one is a cause, the other is merely causally relevant, not itself a full cause in the very same sense. Thus, full causal overdetermination is avoided, as there are not, literally, two causes. Epiphenomenalism is avoided, since each event is either a cause of the effect or is causally relevant to the effect.

But this solution looks problematic: physical events are always causes of some further physical events, so regarding those effects as the mental event is always to regard them as merely causally relevant, not as a cause. That just doesn’t sound right. For instance, I may decide to push the button, starting the particle accelerator. We would rightly say that my mental event led to the microphysical event involving the collision of two particles. However, Harbecke could not say that, but only that my decision was relevant to the causing of this microphysical event, not that it was a cause of it. But then shouldn’t we say, loudly and clearly, mental events are not causes, but merely causally relevant? Isn’t that causal ‘downgrading’ a problem, and one that Davidson avoids? Harbecke thinks it is an open question whether the microphysical event or the macrophysical event is the cause of a particular effect, depending on which is proportional to that effect. But we may wonder whether we can downgrade the physical in cases where we are committed to the mental (or macrophysical) being a cause. A statue that is nonidentical with the lump of bronze it is constituted by falls and kills a mouse. If the statue caused the demise of the mouse, then the lump of bronze was merely
causally relevant to the mouse's death, according to overdetermination lite. But in this case, do we not have equal reason to assert that the mouse was killed by a lump of bronze and by the statue. Both the lump and the statue look like a cause for the death.

The motivating claim of Harbecke’s book is irreducibility. Without such an assumption, there simply is no problem, given that physical events and properties are assumed to be efficacious or causally relevant. Harbecke rejects Nagel’s reductionism as a solution, not because Nagel’s model of reductionism is wrong, but because multiple realizability shows that according to Nagel’s model, no reduction is successful (118). If Nagel’s model of reduction is accepted then multiple realizability will be a problem for reduction, allowing us to conclude that mental events and properties are irreducible. Then we face the dilemma: are these events epiphenomena or are they overdetermined?

This is a tired line of argument. Nagel’s model of reduction has been roundly contested. Unfortunately, Harbecke doesn’t discuss this worry. Indeed, philosophers such as John Bickle have argued against the traditional Nagelian model of reduction assumed in the philosophy of mind. Therefore, the claim that we have reason to believe in irreducible properties because multiple realizability is incompatible with Nagel-reduction, is undercut. As Bickle and Kim have argued, the model of reduction is incorrect, so arguments utilizing the model to prove irreducibility will fail. Thus Harbecke doesn’t really cut off the reductionist response. Rather, he ignores the literature that offers non-Nagelian models of reduction as solutions to the puzzle. He thinks that multiple realizability will still be a problem for such views, but he doesn’t explain why. Indeed, Bickle and Churchland have explicitly argued that multiple realizability is consistent with reduction. Unless the correct account of reduction is utilized we have reason to doubt the premise of irreducibility that is essential to the puzzle and to Harbecke’s discussion. Harbecke dismisses Bickle’s ontology as eliminativist, which seems to me a misreading of Bickle’s view. As I understand the dialectic, Bickle offers us a theory of reduction that is intended to be adequate to the practice of science but which does yield a reduction for the mental, despite multiple realizability. Given the attention that multiple realizability has received recently and the crucial work it does for Harbecke, it is unfortunate that he doesn’t address this more completely.

Another weakness in the book was the short shrift that Davidson’s positive solution receives. Harbecke agrees with the standard criticism of Davidson’s work that mental properties are not obviously causally relevant to their events, since mental properties do not enter into the strict laws necessary for an event to be a cause. But Davidson’s reply to this charge is not discussed. Briefly, in his paper ‘Thinking Causes’ Davidson holds that supervenient properties of an event make a difference to the subvenient properties of the event and hence make a difference to the event’s causal relations. Harbecke doesn’t address this notion of ‘causal relevance’ as far as I could tell, and he relies, again, on rather old criticisms. Whether supervenience alone could
save the causal relevance of mental properties is another matter, but Davidson’s account ought to have been addressed. If ‘making a difference’ because of supervenience is not an adequate account of causal relevance, then we might wonder why events spatio-temporally coincident with a cause are causally relevant.

Overall Harbecke’s discussion is technical and detailed, and as such somewhat hard to follow. At times, I could not see the forest for the trees. Sometimes I felt I was reading a series of commentaries on academic papers, and the coherence and direction of the overall argument was lost to me. Indeed, I was never really sure what the positive thesis of this book was, since at every turn numerous possible objections and replies were discussed, which taken alone were often quite interesting. Yet the conclusions are not always made clear or perhaps simply not advertised loudly enough. Indeed, the section headings betray this indecisiveness, ‘the right view’ is never trumpeted, but is buried in the muddy rhythms of detail. An author should ask, ‘Who is my audience?’ The audience for a dissertation is a committee, intent on evaluating the author’s expertise. But the audience for a book takes one’s expertise for granted, and will not require or tolerate excessive ‘asides’. Rather, the author can assume familiarity on the reader’s part with much of the literature, and will quickly leap to the ‘correct’ model, spending less time on all but the most pressing alternatives. This book, while an excellent dissertation, is not a great read as a book. Those who would gain most from this book are other Ph.D. candidates in the field. I look forward to reading Harbecke’s crystallized paper-length contributions where I won’t trip over the roots of other debates.

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Nancy J. Hirschmann and
Kirstie M. McClure, eds.
Feminist Interpretations of John Locke.
Pp. 347.
US$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-271-02952-8);

This is a new addition to the Pennsylvania State University Press series ‘Re-Reading the Canon’. It contains original as well as previously published essays on Locke’s puzzling and apparently ambiguous views about the status
of women. In addition to seven essays written especially for this volume, it brings together in one place three classic papers on Locke's views regarding sexual equality: a 1979 paper by Mary Lyndon Shanley, another paper from 1979 by Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, and Melissa Butler's 1978 'Early Liberal Roots of Feminism'. For this volume, the authors of these ground-breaking essays have each written Afterwords in which they revisit the themes and issues of their earlier works. These authors are, as editors Hirschmann and McClure point out in their introduction, literally re-reading Locke, as well as offering 'a broad and robust perspective on the trajectory of feminist political thought over the past quarter century' (7).

While Hirschmann and McClure maintain that their volume is 'strongly interdisciplinary', all the essays are by political scientists and political theorists. Five of the ten essays devote considerable space to exploring the tensions in Two Treatises of Government, where, in some passages, Locke seems to endorse an egalitarian, contractual account of marriage, while nonetheless asserting that men are 'abler and stronger' than women and that women are naturally subject to men. Is there any way to render Locke's views consistent? Shanley looks at this question in the context of a discussion of Locke's place in the changing landscape of seventeenth-century views on the marriage contract and the social contract. Brennan and Pateman address the same passages while exploring the complicated relationship between seventeenth-century social contract theory and patriarchalism, as does Butler in her lucid explanation of the context of the seventeenth-century debate about patriarchy to which Locke was, in part, responding. The tensions in Two Treatises are also addressed in the essay by Gordon Schochet, which, like Butler's, offers an overview of seventeenth-century patriarchalism, and in Jeremy Waldron's essay on Locke's interpretation of Adam and Eve. Not surprisingly, none of the five essays agree about how best to reconcile the ambiguities in Locke's claims. The interpretations range from Butler's claim that Locke had 'feminist sympathies' (119) to the view that Locke is a 'chauvinist in egalitarian clothing' (257; this is actually Waldron's description of Brennan and Pateman's interpretation), to Waldron's conclusion that Locke's texts are quite simply inconsistent (262).

Like the five essays just mentioned, Terrell Carver's essay also examines Two Treatises on Government. Claiming that most feminist readings have pointed out ways in which Locke's texts are 'covertly gendered', Carver examines ways in which they are 'overtly gendered' (188-9); that is, he analyzes Locke's comments on such issues as parental authority, marriage, childbirth, and female rulership. However, Carver takes a novel approach, arguing that Locke's texts not only 'exclude and devalue women', but are 'also hierarchically validating with respect to some kinds of men, in terms of some kinds of masculinities' (188).

In what I found to be the most interesting essay in the collection, Hirschmann points out that by focusing on Locke's comments in Two Treatises, feminist analyses have ignored what Locke says about poor and working class women, for Locke's remarks in Two Treatises are about bourgeois
women. Through a close reading of Locke’s ‘Essay on the Poor Law’, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, Hirschmann argues that Locke’s views about the rational capacities of the poor can illuminate the way that ‘Locke’s notion of reason is decidedly a function of gender, as well as class’ (181).

One particular virtue of this collection is the way many of the essays mine Lockean texts that have otherwise been neglected in the scholarly literature. In her study of Locke’s midwifery notes, Joanne H. Wright considers Locke’s notion of the family, particularly how his views should be located in relation to later sentimental positions such as Rousseau’s. Drawing both on what Locke does say about infant feeding and what, in contrast to some other seventeenth century writers, he does not say, Wright argues persuasively that the midwifery notes provide another lens for viewing Locke’s political thought. Waldron’s essay draws on Locke’s analyses of the story of Adam and Eve in The Reasonableness of Christianity and the Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul, two other relatively neglected Lockean texts.

Carol Pech turns to Locke’s monetary writings and examines the associations between money and gender in these texts. Unfortunately, Pech’s strained analysis depends on an uncritical acceptance of Luce Irigaray’s claims that the trope of metonymy is linked with femininity, as well as that masculinity is associated with solid mechanics, femininity with fluidity. Pairing this with the claim that Locke describes money using metonymy and the figurative language of fluidity, Pech labors (unsuccessfully, in my view) to establish that Locke’s monetary writings contain a ‘feminine semiotics’ (281).

The final essay in this collection, a paper by Linda M. G. Zerilli, also addresses the role of rhetoric in Locke’s writings, but here Zerilli’s focus is Locke’s political theory, in particular, his account of the social contract. Zerilli focuses on what she calls ‘Locke’s political semiotics’ (309). Touching on Locke’s epistemology and philosophy of language, she argues that Locke’s admission of the existence of idiosyncratic, unpredictable associations of ideas in our minds introduces an element of irrationality into Locke’s account of language use and thought. In an interesting move, Zerilli then invokes Lockean associationism to explain Locke’s account of how free subjects would consent to being constrained by a social contract.

Hirschmann and McClure make clear in their introduction that the book’s focus on Locke’s political concerns is intentional. As they point out, ‘Locke’s political writings are what make Locke stand out in the canon, and it is that literature to which feminists have most often attended’ (5). Nonetheless, I was disappointed that none of the essays address the intersections between Locke’s writings and the work of women writers from his own time. For example, Locke famously spent the last years of his life living at the home of Damaris Masham, whose anonymously published works were generally attributed to Locke; her 1705 Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Virtuous or Christian Life covers some of the same ground that Locke had addressed in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and it would be interesting to see
some scholarly discussion of the relationships between these texts. In 1702, Catherine Trotter Cockburn anonymously published a defense of Locke’s Essay against criticisms leveled by Thomas Burnet. Locke was so grateful that he reportedly went to great pains to find out who had authored the work, and sent Cockburn a letter of thanks and a gift of money and books. On the other hand, Locke is a target in Mary Astell’s 1705 work, *The Christian Religion, As Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England*. The works of Cockburn and Trotter may in fact be merely female interpretations of John Locke, rather than feminist interpretations; but some discussion of that very question would seem appropriate in a volume devoted to feminist interpretations of Locke. It might also have been worth pursuing the implications of Locke’s views for other issues of interest to feminists today; for example, in a 2002 article, Kathryn Ready suggested that Locke’s theory of personal identity might have interesting ramifications for feminist theories of identity. It seems a lost opportunity that the essays in this collection do not, except for Zerilli’s attention to Lockean associationism, consider Locke’s metaphysics or epistemology from a feminist perspective.

One additional, relatively minor criticism of this book concerns its organization. Butler’s essay is placed third in the volume, after the two 1979 papers, despite its having been published first, and, perhaps more importantly, despite the fact that it contains background information that is likely to be helpful to readers who are not already familiar with seventeenth century patriarchalism and the puzzles of the Lockean texts. The paper already alluded to by Jeremy Waldron (which argues that Locke’s contradictory claims about sexual equality cannot be reconciled) is located towards the end of the volume, between the essays by Wright and Pech; presumably this is because, like those essays, Waldron’s paper considers some of Locke’s non-political writings. Still, Waldron is addressing the same ambiguities and puzzles as the earlier papers (by Shanley, Brennan and Pateman, and Butler), even responding in some detail to these earlier authors’ interpretations; it might have made more sense to group Waldron’s paper with those.

But these are only slight imperfections in a volume that contains a wealth of valuable insights and new perspectives. Locke scholars, contemporary social contract theorists, and anyone with an interest in the history of feminism and protofeminism will benefit from adding this volume to their library.

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Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, eds.  
*Degrees of Belief.*  
Dordrecht: Springer 2009.  
Pp. 354.  
US$249.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-9197-1);  

The concept of strength of belief, or degree of confidence, is central to a considerable amount of contemporary work in epistemology, decision theory, statistics, economics and artificial intelligence. This timely and impressive collection of essays brings together a number of important contributions to its philosophical study, authored by some of the most influential figures in the field.

Co-editor Huber’s introduction situates the various subsequent contributions within a useful, concise overview of some of the main issues at stake, an overview that covers similar ground to his excellent recent ‘Formal Representations of Belief’ (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2008). Like the remainder of the book, the scope of this chapter extends beyond coverage of the probabilist paradigm that is so ubiquitous in the mainstream philosophical literature. We find here a clear summary of various alternative models, such as Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) belief functions, possibility/necessity measures and ranking functions. Huber’s enthusiasm for the latter is fairly clear, although the claims made regarding its theoretical advantages will no doubt prove to be contentious.

The remainder of the book is divided into three parts — ‘Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief’, ‘What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey?’ and ‘Logical Approaches’ — with Part 2 collecting the bulk of the contributions (seven of twelve articles).

Although the issue is also touched upon later in the volume, Part 1 is devoted to the relation between reports of degrees of confidence (e.g. ‘I am pretty certain that I locked the car’) and reports of plain belief or disbelief (e.g. ‘I believe I locked the car’). All three papers in this section seem to share a (possibly somewhat uncritical) commitment to the view that, to the extent that one’s degrees of confidence ought to determine the beliefs that one holds, the only plausible mapping is given by the so-called ‘Lockean Thesis’ (LT). LT states that it is rational to believe that $P$ iff one’s rational degree of confidence in $P$ exceeds some appropriate threshold $t$, which may fall short of absolute certainty. This view, of course, is subject to notorious difficulties. The Lottery Paradox, for instance, brings home the fact that the right-to-left direction of LT is incompatible with either (i) the closure of rational belief under conjunction or (ii) the irrationality of belief in a logical contradiction, which both appear to be intuitive constraints. The Preface Paradox, in turn, highlights the incompatibility of (i) and the left-to-right direction of the principle.

Richard Foley attempts to salvage LT by casting doubt on various possible motivations for endorsing (i). He aims to provide a story as to why, contrary
to what one might think, failure of closure of rational belief under conjunction does not undermine the force of traditional inference rules such as conjunction-introduction and *reductio ad absurdum*. James Hawthorne offers us a further development and refinement of the work that he initiated in his co-authored (with Luc Bovens) 'The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief' (*Mind* 108 [1999]: 241-64). He shows us how a pair $<Pr, t>$, consisting of a probabilistically coherent credence function $Pr$ and a Lockean threshold $t$, can be represented in purely qualitative terms, by a pair $<\geq, B>$, consisting of a binary relation $\geq$ of comparative confidence and a set $B$ of fully believed formulae. In particular, Hawthorne establishes a correspondence between the value of $t$ and the kinds of Lottery- / Preface- paradoxical belief states that can figure in $B$. Finally, philosopher of mind Keith Frankish usefully reviews various possibilities regarding the plain belief / degree of belief connection and their associated difficulties. The view that rational belief supervenes on rational degrees of confidence, in particular, is quickly rejected on the basis of LT's difficulties with the Lottery and the Preface. Frankish then moves on to offer his own (admittedly rather opaque) positive account.

The second part of the book is devoted to the specification and justification of the constraints, both synchronic and diachronic, to which rational degrees of belief are subject. Four of the essays focus on probabilism; three others expound various alternatives.

The opening article sees Colin Howson offer us a clear and elegant exposition of his views on such vexed issues as the requirement of countable additivity of degrees of belief, which he ultimately rejects, and the relation between probabilistic coherence and deductive consistency, both of which he takes to be special cases of solvability of a system of equations under a set of constraints.

The following three chapters provide extremely useful points of entry to various frameworks that have yet to gain common currency in the philosophical world. The bulk of Rolf Haenni's contribution (sections 1 and 2) is a self-contained introduction to Dempster-Shafer theory, that could constitute a valuable teaching resource. The exposition is clear, amply illustrated by very helpful diagrams and examples and dotted with references to the literature. The final section briefly outlines Haenni's 'probabilistic argumentation' framework, which purports to provide a unified model of both logical and probabilistic reasoning. Next up are computer scientists Didier Dubois and Henri Prade, with a comprehensive, if at times somewhat terse, tour of their 'possibilistic' framework. Topics covered notably include possibility and necessity measures, relative confidence and full belief, and non-monotonic reasoning. It is then Wolfgang Spohn's turn to introduce the reader to a close cousin of possibility and necessity measures: negative/positive ranking functions. Spohn's paper is extremely clear and rich, spanning a wide range of applications of ranking theory and discussing points of contact with both the philosophical and the computer science literatures. Of particular interest were the discussion of the intended interpretation of numerical ranks (Section 2.3), drawing on a recent paper co-authored with Matthias Hild, as
well as Spohn’s musings on the connection between ranking and probability theory (Section 3).

We then return to probabilism with a characteristically neat article from Alan Hajek. This reprint from a recent issue of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science critically reviews the standard battery of arguments in favor of the view. The unifying theme of many of the criticisms is that proponents of these arguments do not convincingly establish that parallel arguments cannot be given for alternatives to probabilism. Next up is an interesting piece by Brian Skyrms, again a reprint of a recent article (‘Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism’, Philosophy of Science 73 [2006]: 959-68), in which he attempts to derive the synchronic constraint of probabilistic coherence from diachronic considerations. Finally, James Joyce offers us a sequel to his widely discussed ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’ (Philosophy of Science 65 [1998]: 575-603), in which he attempted to ground probabilism in the view that degrees of belief are to be evaluated in terms of their accuracy as estimates of truth values. We find here a more cautious treatment of the topic, with an admission that several crucial premises in the original argument are in need of further support. Joyce reviews various inaccuracy measures and potential general constraints thereon, before outlining two further accuracy-based arguments for probabilism, judged to be less controversial than the one offered in his 1998 paper (although see section 5 of Hajek’s chapter for dissent).

The final part of the book gathers the contributions of two distinguished authors, best known for their contributions to the literatures on belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning: In his elegant ‘Degrees all the Way Down’, Hans Rott sets out to enrich the possibilistic/ranking theoretic frameworks by equipping them with a means of distinguishing between levels of confidence in different propositions with respect to which an agent suspends judgment. These distinctions were not catered for in the original models: a Spohnian two-sided ranking function, for instance, would have mapped all such propositions onto 0 (although see p. 192 of Spohn’s paper in this volume). Finally, David Makinson offers a highly accessible and informal introduction to the connection between degree of belief and non-monotonic consequence. This student-friendly piece would constitute a great addition to the reading list of any course dealing with either of these topics.

Setting aside the rather surreal price tag for the cloth edition (though a reasonably-priced paperback appeared in October 2009), it is hard to find much to grumble about here. This is an incredibly rich collection that strikes a good balance between cutting-edge research articles and introductory overviews. From AI researcher to philosopher, from newbie to seasoned vet, this book will prove to be a rewarding read to all of those interested in the topic.

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In this book Hughes takes a distinctive approach to the relations of Deleuze and phenomenology and to the way we understand Deleuze’s philosophy. He seeks to present a unified reading of three of Deleuze’s books — The Logic of Sense, Difference and Repetition, and Anti-Oedipus, his first collaboration with Félix Guattari — using a structure taken from phenomenology. This structure comprises the phenomenological reduction and the account of the genesis or constitution of objects which Hughes locates in Edmund Husserl’s later writings. This provides a formula for understanding three of Deleuze’s works as unified and as united by a common system. These three books are analyzed in turn and compared in depth, leading to wide-ranging conclusions: ‘Each book describes the way in which this structure produces itself out of a field of materiality’ (156). In this way Hughes avoids presenting Deleuze’s relation to phenomenology as selective. Rather than being a ‘toolkit’ for Deleuze’s thought, phenomenology has an integrity that allows it to unify Deleuze’s work. It lends a common form of unity to each of the three books in order to better understand Deleuze’s thought as a whole and defend it against its critics. The methodological imperative is clear: ‘Taking Deleuze one concept at a time will never work. He is a systematic and totalizing thinker’ (157). According to this method for reading Deleuze’s work, ‘it is the position of a concept in relation to the structure of the genesis that gives the concept its sense and gives us our bearings’ (156).

The fruits of this strategy for reading Deleuze include the claim that Anti-Oedipus is not a decisive break with Deleuze’s earlier work. In the second part of Hughes’ book, Anti-Oedipus is presented as a ‘direct continuation’ of the themes and structures already located in phenomenology and in The Logic of Sense (51). The argument is made for downplaying Guattari’s role in the writing of Anti-Oedipus, citing his own claim that he was unable to recognize himself in this text (52). This needs to be further tested against the evidence of Guattari’s influence. For example, the role of his solo writings and his work on institutional analysis in the formulation of the notion of a subject group in Anti-Oedipus appears to be crucial. However, it is how Deleuze unifies or ‘orchestrates’ concepts — whether these come from his own thought, that of Guattari, or from elsewhere — that leads Hughes to argue that Guattari’s role is to be downplayed. The reading of Anti-Oedipus developed here is persuasive and refreshing in its attempt to free this book from the weight of the various influences upon it. We find that ‘Anti-Oedipus isn’t so much a critique of psychoanalysis as it is an enormous affirmation of the lived experience of ordinary life’ (55). We also find a defense of the role of the actual and actualization in Deleuze’s philosophy. Against those who see the actual as being subsumed by the virtual, Hughes locates an account of
the integrity and importance of the actual and actualization. He also finds an account of the production of the virtual 'in the interaction of temporal syntheses' (106). Rather than dominating and subsuming the actual, the virtual is situated in a process where each of these terms plays a systematic role. Such defenses of Deleuze’s thought are the result of a method for reading his books that looks for an enduring system or framework despite the changes in terminology that are so frequent. This system can then secure things that are found to be lacking or neglected by Deleuze’s critics. A defense is also mounted against Frederic Jameson’s claim that Deleuze and Guattari abandon any concern with meaning in Anti-Oedipus. They are said to propose that we read books in terms of the meaningless function of machines. Meaning is a feature of the actual that is apparently neglected because we are so distracted by the superior reality of desiring-production. Hughes argues that, while desiring-production works with partial objects that have no meaning, the reading of books takes place at a different level (90). In this way Deleuze and Guattari seek to fully account for actual meanings but aim to do so without presupposing them. They consistently follow the critical standards that Hughes finds embodied in the phenomenological reduction.

While this reading strategy for Deleuze’s books provides an effective defense of key aspects of his thought, it also leaves us wondering what might be left out. Kant’s contributions are regularly mentioned but his role is limited mainly on the grounds of his alleged neglect of the problem of genesis (56). The claim that Kant does not account for concrete experience relies heavily on citations from Jean Hyppolite and Jean-François Lyotard (17). This risks neglecting the methods common to Kant and Deleuze. While it is clear, as is shown in the book, that Deleuze rejected Kant’s notion of possible experience in favor of a conception of real experience, the methods provided by Kant’s thought need to be considered. As we have noted, the critical injunction to present the transcendental without confusing it with the empirical is attributed to the influence of the phenomenological reduction (6). This has the effect of crowding out the notion of immanent critique that Deleuze finds in Kant and develops using Nietzsche’s thought in his Nietzsche and Philosophy. This is mentioned (8, n.18), but not developed. Is the notion of critique at work in Deleuze’s thought to be attributed solely to the influence of phenomenology? However, this emphasis on phenomenology and its unifying role follows from a method that has clear advantages when it comes to reading Deleuze. It is a method which affirms the structural and unifying influence of phenomenology and in this way shores up Deleuze’s account rather than moving between different influences and failing to attend to the unity and integrity of his thought. Accordingly, this book provides a clear presentation of Deleuze’s philosophy and contributes greatly to efforts to show that his account does not neglect aspects of reality that really do matter.

Edward Willatt
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When this book appeared in French in 2006, it quickly developed a following among those arguing for a turn to realism in continental philosophy. To write a review of this work is not just to engage critically the book in question, but also to remark upon the *ennui* felt by many using Meillassoux’s ideas to move beyond what they take to be the dead end of recent continental philosophy. This dead end is summed up in the book’s first two chapters by what Meillassoux terms ‘correlationism’, and the irony of Meillassoux’s reception is that this book’s weakest chapters are its most influential. Nevertheless, this is one of the most stirring books to come out in recent years.

Correlation is the view, prevalent since Kant, that reality *as such* cannot be thought except as mediated through the schematism of the understanding in neo-Kantianism, phenomenology’s noetic-noematic relation, Quinean conceptual schemes, Wittgensteinian language games, or post-structuralist entanglements of power/knowledge. These philosophies, Meillassoux argues, think that the ‘world is meaningful’ only insomuch as it is ‘given-to-a-living (or thinking)-being’ (15). ‘Correlationism’, as such, ‘consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realm of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another’ (5).

Meillassoux argues that philosophical correlationism cannot, without contradiction, attest to what he calls the ‘ancestral event’. That is, while empirical science can tell us, say, the date of the origin of the universe (13.5 billion years ago) or the date that *homo habilis* took its first steps (2 million years ago), correlationists always undercut scientific claims with caveats that speak in a tone of modesty but seek to ‘correct’ science in its endeavors. The scientist is said to be dogmatically realist, but the philosopher knows that the archi-fossil — the evidence for any ancestral event — is something given, either to a particular human subject or to a community of scientists, depending on the specific form of correlationism. The ancestral event would stand, then, for a ‘retrojection of the past on the basis of the present’ (17). The correlationist, for Meillassoux, cannot take the ancestral statement — the accretion of the Earth occurred 4.56 billion years ago — in its literal sense. The event is not in the past, for the correlationist, but in the event of the ‘givenness’ or manifestation *for us*; here the correlationist’s denial of reality ‘is exposed’ (18). The archi-fossil, then, stands as a continual frustration of the correlationist worldview: ‘there is no possible compromise between the correlation and the arche-fossil; once one has acknowledged one, one has disqualified the other’ (17).
But Meillassoux’s depiction of correlationism is but a philosophy built of straw, a scarecrow without the brains to figure out the basic distinction between ontological and epistemological claims. To make his claims, Meillassoux needs to depict the correlationist as conflating epistemological givenness and the ontological dependence of real entities on thought. For example, I recognize that my radio ‘constitutes’ the sound waves it brings in through a century’s old mechanism, but this doesn’t mean that I think that the sound waves weren’t in the air before the radio was turned on, or that the actual people whose voices are transmitted are relying on my radio’s battery power for continued existence. Nor, as such, need the correlationist argue that ‘to be’ is to exist as a ‘correlate of thought’. The correlationist argues, without contradiction, that when you produce a ‘discourse about a past when both humanity and life are absent’ (26), you admit that you are producing a discourse. This is to say that Kantians who take themselves to be ‘realists’ are not just arguing in bad faith. Meillassoux’s problem is not to think his way out of the correlationist circle, but rather to think a way out of the tautological circle by which what is thought of some event prior to the beginnings of human thinking is still a matter of thought.

No matter, since the point of Meillassoux’s work is to take seriously the very existence of the correlationist view in order to provide his realist proof. This marks the enlightening part of this work, which is lit by setting fire to the straw man of the first two chapters. Meillassoux’s approach, then, is to find a pivot point from the correlationist presupposed relation between subjects and objects to the real as it is. It is here that Meillassoux’s ‘speculative’ endeavor gets underway.

This speculation begins by absolutizing the correlationist relation (not undoing it) in order to follow the ‘narrow passage’ (63) from within the correlationist circle in order to find ‘a non-metaphysical absolute’ (52). I cannot cover all of Meillassoux’s logical moves here, but suffice it to say that for Meillassoux, one must admit the ‘absolute contingency of the given in general’ in order to postulate any correlationism, since it would otherwise fall into idealism’s positing of a necessary relation between thinking and being (54). Hence, correlationism must assert positively one absolute fact: the facticity of the contingent relation it postulates. The difference between Meillassoux and the correlationist regarding the in-itself may appear minor, but it is crucial. The correlationist argues that the in-itself exists but that one can only know that we have no knowledge of it. For his part, Meillassoux ‘maintain(s) that the in-itself could actually be anything whatsoever and that we (now) know this’ (65). Speculative realism is thus founded on the principle that the in-itself has an independent existence and our knowledge of it extends to knowing it ‘could actually be anything whatsoever’. This fact of contingency is at once minimal and breathtaking; we know that everything can be otherwise, and this known fact of contingency he dubs with the French neologism factialité, the non-facticity of facticity. Here we have Meillassoux’s absolute, which is not a thing, which would be a necessary substance (e.g., God) from which all else derives its being. Rather, the only ‘eternal principle’ is the fac-
ticity of contingency (65). Three consequences: 1) there is no necessary being (here, we have, in sum, a proof for the inexistence of any God); 2) the in-itself is freed, because of its eternal contingency, from the principle of sufficient reason, since no cause can be said to have a particular effect; 3) the in-itself, as Kant argued, is non-contradictory, since any entity that is already otherwise would always be what it is, and thus non-contingent (67-8).

What we have, then, is an an sich that is 'hyper-chaos', since, as Meillassoux argues, without the principle of sufficient reason, not just every thing is contingent, but so is every physical law. Here, Meillassoux's rationalist compatriots might step away, for Meillassoux's principle of factualité stipulates that every intra-worldly law is itself contingent and thus capable of being otherwise. For those looking to Meillassoux's return to rationalism as a means for eternally grounding the laws obtained in scientific analysis, Meillassoux's rational principle of 'unreason' will surely disappoint. Radicalizing Hume, Meillassoux argues that given this speculative absolute, it is not just that chance is involved in each roll of the die. The die itself, given the 'eternal and lawless possible becoming of every law' (64), is open to mutability between each toss. Taking this example, Meillassoux argues that we rightly suspect that it would be infinitely improbable that a pair of dice would continuously come up with a pair of deuces, just as we continually deduce that it would be infinitely improbable that the laws of our universe come out the way they do without some prior cause (97). But this model is all wrong, since it would leave us to assume that the universe is a 'whole' composed of possible laws that would be constantly changing, and thus it would be nearly impossible and thus unthinkable that our laws keep turning out the way they do each time they are measured. Hence, we assume that the stable laws we experience provide ample evidence for necessary laws governing the universe. 'This probabilistic reasoning,' Meillassoux points out, 'is only valid on condition that what is a priori possible be thinkable in terms of numerical totality' (101). It is here that we move from the logical absolute of the principle of un-reason to a mathematically inflected absolute, for which Meillassoux takes up the Zermelo-Cantorian axiomatic of set theory.

In the end, Meillassoux contends that 'what the set-theoretical axiomatic demonstrates is at the very least a fundamental uncertainty regarding the totalizability of the possible,' and thus 'we should restrict the claims of aleatory reasoning solely to objects of experience' (105). Thus, Einstein was right that God does not play dice with the universe, but for the wrong reasons: there is no God (that is, necessary being) and the universe is not on the model of a pair of dice with a finite set of outcomes.

I have my doubts about a number of Meillassoux's moves, not least his continuing dualism between the realm of experience (totalizable) and the noumenal (non-totalizable and chaotic), which seems not to have returned to the an sich but to have given up on things altogether in name of a chaotic in-itself. But as a first move in his speculative materialist thought, Meillassoux offers an economical work brightened by a 'luminous clarity of intellection' (91) that flashes none too often. Meillassoux's critique of probabilistic rea-
soning aside, I am not one to bet against him and the speculative materialist project now under way.

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Kurt Mosser

Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
Pp. 250.

Mosser’s book is a highly readable and neatly argued attempt to show that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a treatise on logic. Rich in historical detail, clearly written and refreshingly non-pretentious, this book will appeal to Kant scholars tired of reading impossibly convoluted reconstructions of Kant’s mystifying proofs. It could also be read profitably by those who have a particular interest in understanding the bearing of Kant’s thought on contemporary philosophy. General readers should stay away.

Mosser’s main interpretative thesis is that transcendental logic is simply logic relative to a particular domain. His main philosophical thesis is that this interpretation makes Kant much more relevant to current concerns in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind than is generally supposed, and much more plausible. The relevance and plausibility of Kant’s position depend upon the aptness of the analogy he sees between general and transcendental logic. Mosser’s goal is to explain that analogy.

Logic is concerned with rules, for Kant, and the rules that range over all thought whatsoever are appropriately described as conditions of the possibility of making judgments and thus conditions of rationality itself. By reflecting on the conditions of the possibility of making judgments, general logic makes explicit these most fundamental rules of thinking. For instance, reflection reveals that the principle of non-contradiction is necessary for the possibility of thought and ‘thought itself reveals the necessity that makes thought itself possible’ (55). General logic thus yields a set of minimal necessary constraints on rationality as such. Transcendental logic, by contrast, specifies a particular domain for judgment, namely, possible experience. Reflection on the conditions of the possibility of making judgments about objects thus uncovers a set of minimal constraints on experience as such.
Kant’s strategy in the first *Critique* assumes this analogy between general and transcendental logic.

Mosser attempts to clarify the analogy between general and transcendental logic by considering a corresponding analogy between logic and grammar. Grammar is concerned with syntax — the set of formal conditions that any proposition must meet in order to be well-formed — as well as with semantics, which considers the relation between a proposition and the thing the proposition is about. Since Kant sees a significant affinity between grammar and logic, we should expect to find in logic a parallel to the grammatical distinction between syntax and semantics. Mosser claims that the distinction between general and transcendental logic is analogous to the grammatical distinction between syntax and semantics. Just as the grammarian specifies the formal syntactical rules for the proper formulation of linguistic expressions, the general logician specifies the minimal set of rules governing thought in general. And just as a proposition may be syntactically well-formed but fail to be meaningful, a judgment may be free of contradiction — it may meet the minimal requirements of general logic — but still fail to make reference to an object. Transcendental logic brings in a ‘semantic’ component by considering the possible application of judgments to objects of experience. One could say that general logic articulates the grammar of thought, while transcendental logic articulates the grammar of experience. Mosser’s perceptive discussion of grammar and logic and the historical relationship between them is one of the most interesting sections of the book.

The analogy that holds between specifying a set of universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of thought (general logic) and specifying the universal and necessary conditions of experience (transcendental logic) is reflected in Kant’s move from the table of judgments to the table of categories in the metaphysical deduction. Mosser believes that Kant’s strongest argument for regarding the categories as necessary conditions for the possibility of experience is his attempt to show that they coincide with the functions of thought. Establishing a clear connection between the two tables is to some extent tantamount to establishing the assumed connection between general and transcendental logic. Against the dominant reading of the metaphysical deduction, Mosser argues — convincingly — that Kant’s aim is not to derive the pure concepts of the understanding from the logical forms of judgment, but — exploiting the analogy between general and transcendental logic — to take the forms of judgment as providing merely a clue for discovering the set of rules governing the experience of an object. Kant’s strategy in the *Critique* is therefore explicitly logical in that it seeks to lay out the minimal constraints on judgments relative to sensibility by considering the minimal constraints on judgments in general.

This interpretation is meant to demonstrate the relevance of Kant to contemporary philosophy. Mosser argues that (1) Laurence Bonjour’s defense of the a priori badly misconstrues Kant’s position and as a result fails to recognize a strategic option that could remedy certain weaknesses in his own argument; (2) Donald Davidson’s view that cognitive claims must be adjudicated
by ‘triangulating’ amongst two subjects and a shared world relies on the very Kantian notion of necessity that Davidson rejects; and (3) the postmodern critique of Kant presupposes just those universal and necessary constraints on rationality that postmodernists blame Kant for maintaining. The success of Mosser’s reasoning here depends in each case on the accuracy of his interpretation of Kant as well as of the allegedly cognate position. He thus invites criticism from a number of different angles.

One shortcoming of the book is that Mosser never really explains what ‘necessity’ means for Kant, or how transcendental necessity differs—if at all—from either logical or psychological necessity. Given the title, such an explanation might reasonably be expected. But perhaps this objection commits the common error of criticizing an author for not writing a different book. There is much here that is worth reading and nothing obviously superfluous. The transparency and smoothness of Mosser’s analysis, by comparison with the crushing weight and murkiness of other works on the same topic, make this an easy—almost enjoyable—read.

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John Mouracade, ed.
Aristotle on Life.
Pp. 207.
CDN$/US$74.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-920980-96-5);

This slim collection of essays emerged from a conference held at the University of Alaska Anchorage in 2007. Some of the essays are broad while others focus on quite specific areas of research. The level of detail also varies but most can be understood by an informed general reader. Many run over some quite basic principles (i.e., what Aristotle means by substance and soul) and lines of interpretation (e.g., various interpretations of Aristotelian teleology) while also providing distinctive and original interpretations of key ideas, concepts or passages in texts. The volume as a whole provides the reader with a sense of the philosophical interest and relevance of Aristotle on living nature.
Paul Studtmann’s ‘On the Several Senses of “Form” in Aristotle’ begins with the idea that Aristotle’s various accounts of form are problematically confused. Studtmann attempts to establish that there are two key senses of form, form of matter and form of a composite, and that most of the descriptions and definitions of form can be found to fall neatly under these two. Studtmann admits that such neatness is artificial but claims it is necessary to make Aristotle’s philosophy plausible. Studtmann adds that form often represents soul or living essence, but his appeal to and explanation of passages from Aristotle’s biology is not extensive.

In ‘The Role of Material and Efficient Causes in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology’ Margaret Scharle tackles an issue at the heart of Aristotle on the life sciences, namely the nature of his teleology. Scharle argues against the view that Aristotle was sometimes willing to accept the physical science of his predecessors. On Scharle’s view, material and efficient causes (that is, physics and chemistry) are, for Aristotle, always inadequate on their own, without a view to an end (telos). Scharle believes that her interpretation has the advantage of making Aristotle’s teleology more relevant today. Unlike the alternate view, her interpretation avoids natural teleology becoming redundant through advances in physical science. This is a bold and interesting thesis and the evidence, which comes mainly from Aristotle’s Physics, is compelling. However, it would have been helpful to include some discussion of Aristotle’s biological texts, in order to set out the implications of this position for Aristotle’s explanations of living beings.

One of the most interesting papers in the volume is Devin Henry’s ‘Organismal Natures’. This essay offers astute insights about the possibly broad-reaching implications of various discussions within Aristotle’s Generation of Animals. The piece reads more like a detailed commentary than a single argument. However, one of its main aims appears to be to support A. Gotthelf’s contention (‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality’, in A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox, eds. Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge University Press 1987, 204-42) that Aristotle’s teleology is grounded in the powers (dunameis) at work in the natural world. These powers can be quite specific and reach below the level of teleology, as in the unusual case of the powers at work in hereditary resemblance (GA IV 3; 767b24-68a3). Henry speculates that inherited features of animals are neither caused by chance (i.e. they are not random), but nor do they count as part of the essence of an animal. Another speculation comes from Aristotle’s discussion of hair color in GA Book V, where it seems that Aristotle considers a group of animals as having a nature. This appears anomalous since something with a nature is normally an individual animal, but it may be helpful in order to explain goals undertaken by several animals together (e.g. reproduction).

Julie Ward’s ‘Is Human a Homonym for Aristotle?’ is a carefully argued piece taking its lead from Aristotle’s logic. Ward attempts to untangle various uses of the term ‘human’, coming mostly from Aristotle’s ethical and political writings, in order to set out whether it would be best characterized as a homonym. She concludes that it would not and that we need to accept
the implications of the term’s being synonymous. Ward cleverly explains how women and slaves can be human, according to Aristotle, without possessing the essential feature of deliberative rationality. This is an interesting attempt to link Aristotle’s biology (specifically his discussion of the soul) to his ethics and politics.

Errol Katayama’s ‘Substantial Unity and Living Things in Aristotle’ argues that not all living things are substances, defined as unified entities. Katayama links the ability to remain unified (nutritive) with the ability to produce another like oneself (reproductive), and focusing specifically on hybrids and spontaneously generated animals, he argues that animals that do not have this combined ability cannot count as substances. It is somewhat surprising that Katayama did not include a common reproductive strategy, mentioned often by Aristotle, in which an animal is incapable of producing another like itself: larvae production.

Christopher Sheild’s ‘Substance and Life in Aristotle’ defends Aristotle’s claim that only living things are properly termed substances. Sheild does this by first forcefully setting out the opposing stance which argues that he is not justified in excluding structured artifacts from the category — after all, no table is a quality or quantity. The argument is that it is the ability to feed itself that best distinguishes the substance from the non-substance and effectively excludes artifacts.

In the final essay editor Mouracade argues that non-reductive materialism, the most viable theory in contemporary philosophy of mind, is missing an account of mind as an ‘internally caused and maintained structure’. Mouracade attempts to argue that Aristotle’s hylomorphism can fill this gap, in the process assuming that Aristotelian form can be unproblematically equated with DNA. The attempt to integrate Aristotle’s psychology with modern ideas in the philosophy of mind is admirable. However, more care needs to be taken in particular to justify associating Aristotelian biology with modern genetics. Two articles cited in footnotes of this essay do not appear in the bibliography (Hasker 2001, Ariew 2007). Another editorial peculiarity is that the first essay has a completely different referencing style from the rest.

Important new interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy emerge from several of these articles, based on careful readings of Aristotle’s biological works. This volume is therefore a valuable contribution to our understanding of Aristotle, and it ought to be of interest to any historically minded philosopher.

Sophia Connell
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This volume — a better title might be ‘Wittgenstein’s Very Early Philosophy’ — covers ‘the whole of Wittgenstein’s period working with Russell’ (3). The first fifth of the book (WNL) focuses on philosophy within Wittgenstein’s reach during his pre-Cambridge years and first year in Cambridge, when he was learning the trade. Next, in the central chapters, themes from Russell and Frege that Wittgenstein broaches in Notes on Logic (NL) are critically examined. Finally, some four-fifths of the way in, ideas in the Tractatus not in NL, ideas about elementary propositions, picturing and the like, are isolated and explained.

Though not principally concerned with textual niceties, Potter has a fair amount to say on the origins of NL. In an appendix he conjectures that the text was put together over three days in October 1913, starting from notes extending back ‘perhaps as far as the previous February’ (270). He argues that the items published as ‘First MS’, ‘Third MS’ and ‘Fourth MS’ were translated by Russell from a text Wittgenstein dictated in Birmingham on October 7th, the item referred to as ‘Second MS’ is Russell’s ‘transcription’ of a document (266), now lost, that Wittgenstein wrote in Cambridge on the 8th, and the so-called ‘Summary’ is a dictation produced in Cambridge, again in Russell’s presence, on the 9th. (A version of NL reflecting these conclusions is included in a second appendix, along with textual notes and an analysis of the later, less authentic, ‘Costello version’.)

It is no easy task to track Wittgenstein’s thinking from mid-October 1911, when he turned up in Cambridge as ‘a self-taught philosophical novice’ (4), to late October 1913, when he left for Norway as an important independent philosopher, one responsible for ideas Russell considered ‘as good as anything that has ever been done in logic’ (262-3). Wittgenstein instructed Russell to destroy his early notebooks and there is not much else to go on, just a handful of letters from Wittgenstein to Russell, diaries of contemporaries, meager University records and letters of varying reliability from Russell to Ottoline Morell (and one or two other acquaintances). To compensate Potter scours the philosophical literature likely familiar to Wittgenstein for clues.

By scrutinizing this literature, Potter aims to put us in a position to work through NL on our own. He does not provide a line-by-line commentary but refers to Wittgenstein’s text as he proceeds (and appends a list of page references to the quoted passages). He observes that ‘[t]he bulk of the book itself is taken up with exegesis — not, certainly, of every sentence of the Notes, but at least of what I take to be their central claims’ and writes: ‘An important aspect of this book [is] to disentangle these texts in order to leave the way to philosophical understanding of Wittgenstein’s intentions much clearer’ (3).

NL is, to put it mildly, a hard read, and Potter does his level best to make it less forbidding. He expounds the ins-and-outs of the work in contempo-
rary philosophical language, paying special attention to conclusions and arguments of interest to philosophers today. Thus he describes Wittgenstein’s ‘symbolic turn’, his understanding of facts and complexes, his treatment of ‘the unity of the proposition’, his examination of judgment and his conception of meaning and sense, i.e. what makes propositions true or false and what they say about the world. In addition he reviews Wittgenstein’s remarks about truth functions, molecular propositions, generality, types, identity and other more specific topics.

It does not hurt that Potter indicates where he thinks his three principals — Wittgenstein, Russell and Frege — go astray. He may be overly bothered by Wittgenstein’s ‘insouciant attitude to the details of . . . implementing [his thoughts]’ (48, 140, 159, 243), unreasonably quick to chide Russell for advancing ‘hopeless’ theories (36) and unnecessarily harsh about ‘Frege’s bewildering error of treating sentences as names of truth-values’ (254). But his criticisms, however moot, serve to clarify what he takes to be Wittgenstein’s, Russell’s and Frege’s objectives and what he takes N.L. to be about.

Potter’s observations about Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach are no less helpful. It is good to be reminded that Wittgenstein reconfigures philosophical problems or seeks to show they are spurious (43, 61, 73), that ‘technicalities were never for Wittgenstein the real reasons for holding the views in question’ (176) and that ‘Wittgenstein’s logical insights were independent of formal considerations’ (194). Moreover, I appreciated Potter’s stressing that ‘Wittgenstein’s method of theory formation . . . put[s] a much greater premium on suggestive analogies than on reasons’ (217) and ‘[a]lmost all his ideas are, in a certain sense, simple’ (2) in fact have ‘a forcibly striking combination of depth and simplicity’ (250).

Central to Potter’s argument in WNL is his belief that Wittgenstein was influenced much more by Frege than by Russell. Potter acknowledges that debates about influence are ‘often sterile’ (258) and concedes that Wittgenstein’s friend, David Pinsent, wrote in August 1913: ‘[I]t is obvious that Wittgenstein is one of Russell’s disciples and owes enormously to him’ (258). But he insists that ‘Wittgenstein owed [the underlying principles which guided his handling of propositions and their relationship to the world] to Frege, not to Russell’ (262) and ‘the effect that Frege’s thinking had on [him] was . . . profound’ (58). Indeed he avers that ‘Frege’s influence on the Notes is so persuasive and so manifest that it is almost superfluous to supply an argument for it’ (258).

Lacking compelling proof for interpreting Wittgenstein as following in Frege’s footsteps, Potter has to speculate. In particular, he portrays Wittgenstein as ‘collapsing . . . distinctions Frege had drawn’ (70), hazards the opinion that ‘Frege’s influence can be detected in Wittgenstein’s move from copula to form’ (109) and deems Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between language and the world to be ‘a synthesis of two influences, Frege’s and Russell’s’ (69). At one point he even says: ‘Perhaps it is not too fanciful to wonder whether Frege wrote [a certain document in his Nachlass] in preparation for, or as a response to, one of his meetings with Wittgenstein’ (100).
Wittgenstein thought highly of Frege’s writings but was he as indebted to them as Potter contends? Not everyone agrees that Wittgenstein had a firm, never mind deep, understanding of Frege’s philosophy, and there can be no denying, as Potter himself allows, that ‘Russell’s work during [the] period ... constitutes the context in which Wittgenstein was working’ (4). Wittgenstein was a reactive thinker, and it is difficult to believe his three meetings with Frege in 1911-1913, meetings that Potter notes lasted ‘a few days at most’ (58), marked his philosophy more profoundly than his regular, sometimes daily, meetings with Russell. And how apparent is it that the parallels between Wittgenstein’s remarks in NL and Frege’s pre-1913 writings in his Posthumous Writings ‘hint at the enormous effect that [Wittgenstein’s] few visits to Frege must have had on [him]’ (258)?

Separating what Wittgenstein appropriated from what he arrived independently is especially tricky. It is, to mention one example, possible that his ‘conclusion that logic is contentless ... derives from ... tenets central to Frege’s thinking’ (60). But it is equally if not more probable that he came to it very early on. Chances are that Wittgenstein rejected the idea of logic as saying something before reading Frege — and not merely because Frege did not himself, as Potter notes, derive the conclusion. His training in applied physics would have inclined him to think of logic as a technique for making inferences rather than as a body of information, and he was always distrustful of the idea of logical knowledge (149, 205).

Surprisingly, there is little in WNL on Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz, the first two thinkers Wittgenstein mentions in the list of influences he drew up in 1931 (256). Wittgenstein’s mathematical knowledge and engineering talent may have been as unimpressive as Potter argues (7, 9-10), but he was not scientifically uninformed. He was 22 when he arrived in Cambridge and his background in science was by no means negligible. Nor was the role of the physicist’s notion of an abstract (coordinate) space of possibilities in his philosophy insignificant, to say nothing of the applied mathematician’s conception of physical systems as having so many ‘degrees of freedom’ (84, 199).

While mostly valuable for understanding Wittgenstein’s pre-Tractatus philosophy of logic, WNL also sheds light on the question of how the Tractatus itself should be read. Potter is surely right that however much Wittgenstein’s wartime experience affected him personally, he did not change his philosophical spots in 1916 (247). All indications are, as Potter says, that ‘the general principles that inform [the Tractatus] ... already guid[e] Wittgenstein’s work in the Notes’ (254). And since the remarks in NL recycled in the Tractatus are, as Potter notes too, ‘not there advanced ironically, “transitionally”, or for purely literary effect,’ we can be pretty confident that ‘Wittgenstein did not always believe that the claims made in the text of the Tractatus were nonsense’ (252).

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Fr. Schall is a Jesuit priest and professor of government at Georgetown University. He has written voluminously (more than 25 books and some 200 articles) on an enormous range of subjects — from piety in Plato to ‘noble lies’ in Machiavelli, from ‘madness’ in G. K. Chesterton to liberation theology. This volume is itself a collection of essays on diverse subjects. All of the twenty-two essays have been published previously; however, with few exceptions, all have appeared within the last fifteen years and many within the last five. As a result, there is a currency to them — in, e.g., their inclusion of statements by Pope Benedict XVI and Fr. Schall’s reflections on Christianity’s relation to Islam (a comprehensive index accurately leads a reader to both). The essays are grouped under seven headings: ‘On Catholic Thinking’, ‘Reckoning With Plato’, ‘The Abiding Implications Of Friendship’, ‘The Medieval Experience’, ‘Implications of Catholic Thought’, ‘Things Practical and Impractical’, and ‘Where Does It Lead?’ The conclusion, ‘On Being Allowed to Read Monte Christo’, which is new, is followed by an interview with Fr. Schall on both the importance and limits of political philosophy.

Before commenting on the content of some of the essays, a remark on the style in which they are written is in order. Fr. Schall tells readers (2) that while his essays are ‘academic’, they are academic ‘light’, in that they seldom cite many sources for the positions he defends. They are also light in that they are not only brief (average length: ten to twelve pages) but also rather informal and discursive (one will not find in them rigorously formulated arguments). This is intentional, since Fr. Schall admires Catholic writers like Josef Pieper for his brevity and Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc for their common-sense pithiness and playfulness. I find myself of two minds here. On the one hand, Fr. Schall’s essays are usually a delight to read — even if you don’t agree with him. For example, he asserts that winning, within the rules of the game, is the purpose of sport. The idea that ‘it matters not whether you win or lose . . . ’ is, he thinks, just nonsense (255). On the other hand, the loose structure can sometimes be annoying, since it is not always clear what position Fr. Schall holds (on, e.g., the Fall) or what he thinks follows from what (as in his discussion of the Trinity). Consult the index, and especially the tenth essay, ‘The Trinity: God is not Alone’, for passages that reveal my concerns.

What is there to like in this volume? A lot. Another reviewer could easily point to other essays, but I mention a couple of my favorites. The relation between faith and reason is a recurring theme, and I especially liked his moving tribute to Étienne Gilson (‘Possessed of Both a Reason and a Revelation’) and
an equally moving tribute to Jacques Maritain ('The Very Graciousness of Being'). I also liked the only essay explicitly devoted to Chesterton ('Chester­ton: the Real Heretic'), since he was a late nineteenth-century Kierkegaard who sought to wake (and shake) us up, and 'On Choosing Not to See', since that is normally how we try to avoid the wake-up call.

Does one have to be a Catholic to find something worth reading in Fr. Schall's book? Not at all. The entire part devoted to Plato, for instance, may be read with profit by anyone interested in ancient thought — especially political thought — and its relevance to contemporary thinking about politics and society. And the essays on friendship, another recurring theme in the book, are all insightful. The nine-page 'Aristotle on Friendship', in particular, is a gem. Moreover, the essays on 'Sports and Philosophy' and on 'The Real Alternatives to Just War' are both provocative and they should be of interest to any thoughtful person. I've already mentioned Fr. Schall's view that the point of sport is to win, while abiding by the rules, which may seem a strange position for a Catholic priest to take. What about building character? Read the essay to see what he has to say about that. Fr. Schall is no pacifist. He defends some wars as just. Indeed, he thinks that force is sometimes needed to preserve justice and that the idea of 'eternal peace' in this world is a utopian myth (263), which may also seem a strange position for a priest to defend. But Fr. Schall's reasons are relevant, to non-Catholics as well as Catholics, and opposition to utopian thinking is another recurring theme in the book. See, especially, 'The “Realism” of St. Augustine’s “Political Realism”: Augustine and Machiavelli'.

Still, as a Catholic myself, I was intrigued by the book's title and wondered whether I have a Catholic mind. The definite article in 'The Mind that is Catholic' might suggest that, for Fr. Schall, there is only one way to think like a Catholic, but he clearly acknowledges that this is not so: sincere, honest, reflective Catholics disagree on many things (3, 13). What he suggests, instead, is that they share a certain temperament, which includes the following components. First, Catholics are not opposed to reason or enemies of the mind, rightly used; they aren't fideists. 'Catholicism is not afraid of intelligence' (16), he writes. Second, Catholics don't think that reason and revelation are incompatible; each can (and should) inform the other. So they are neither Biblical literalists nor naturalists who think that reason alone is sufficient. Third, they are open, in consequence, to all of what is, Fr. Schall's way of characterizing the whole of reality. Fourth, the Catholic mind is ecumenical; it seeks to be inclusive (16-17) and non-judgmental. God is to be found everywhere — 'in all things', as my Jesuit colleagues would say. If all this is true (the last point is probably the most contentious), then I am pleased to say that not only am I a Catholic, but I have a 'mind that is Catholic' as well.

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At first glimpse, this book would appear to be superfluous. What can Skinner have left to say about this subject that he has not said in his previous work (particularly in *Visions of Politics III* and in *Liberty before Liberalism*)? In a sense, the question is justified — there is little radically new here, although Skinner makes a novel argument about the break between the old and the young Hobbes. The book’s importance lies in its expansion of Skinner’s primary philosophical concern to justify a variant of neo-Roman republican liberty in the face of a triumphant Hobbesian liberty. Thus, while Skinner claims to have written this book to contextualize Hobbes’ thought and to ‘bring Hobbes down from the philosophical heights’ (xvi), he is embarked on a project at odds with his pugnacious battle against anachronism. A philosopher *malgré lui*, Skinner is exploring an issue of importance to contemporary political philosophy: the combat between republican liberty and the more slavish kind he sees in Hobbes. In the Anglophone world, Skinner affirms, Hobbes ‘has won the battle’ against republican liberty, but we should not assume that he has ‘won the argument’ (216).

But if political philosophy is the reason for this book’s existence, the bulk of Skinner’s account is given over to the historical development of Hobbes’ doctrine. We follow the concept of liberty as it appears in the three versions of Hobbes’ political philosophy (*The Elements of Law*, *De cive*, and *Leviathan*). Skinner locates each of these visions of liberty in their respective political contexts, and he attempts to situate precisely the origins of Hobbes’ radical notion of freedom as the absence of external impediments to movement, a view that Skinner contrasts to the ‘republican’ notion of freedom which, in his presentation, entails a juridical condition in which an individual is free from dependence on the will of others. The bulk of Skinner’s argument here is dedicated to the proposition that this radical view of freedom was not present in *De cive* and *The Elements*; Skinner thereby swims against the current of much Hobbes scholarship that stresses continuity between the works. ‘Hobbes’s analysis of liberty in *Leviathan*,’ he argues, ‘represents not a revision but a repudiation of what he had earlier argued’ (xvi).

Given that the stated intention here is contextualization, it is surprising that such little use is made of the extant Hobbes scholarship or of the massive scholarship on the intellectual landscape in England before and during the civil war. Skinner makes comparisons to some major thinkers, but his analysis of everyone but Hobbes is relatively limited. His contextual point that Hobbes’ shift was based on an opposition to republicanism is clearly fair to some degree, but he devotes so little attention to the existing literature on the context that it is of negligible utility — experts on the period will learn
little new; neophytes will be given a somewhat distorted view of the civil war as a simple battle between monarchists and republicans (a term which, in Skinner’s usage, covers any number of positions opposing arbitrary government). The book would have benefited from a greater attention to the complexities of early seventeenth-century royalism — just as the ‘republican’ (or neo-Roman, Skinner’s preferred phrase) strand in English political thought requires much more careful treatment, both historically and analytically, than that given by Skinner here.

Rather than analyzing these sources, Skinner prefers to make numerous comparisons between Hobbes’ evocative frontispieces and renaissance emblematas. Attractive as the images are, the comparisons are often quite forced (esp. 99-103), relying both on speculative assertions of influence and even more on speculative readings of the images. Nor is it entirely clear what interpretative conclusion Skinner would have us draw from some of these comparisons, save perhaps the reinforcement of his earlier claim that Hobbes was an apostate humanist.

It is not historical scholarship that carries Skinner’s argument, but rather a close reading of Hobbesian freedom in the three major formulations of his political philosophy. Hobbes, we learn, has three different notions of liberty. The first, in The Elements, entails a view that liberty and subjection are mutually exclusive, although Hobbes never explicitly defines liberty in that text. In De cive, liberty emerges as the absence of impediments — but here, liberty appears to be undermined both by external impediments, and by Hobbes’ somewhat scholastic term, ‘arbitrary impediments’, of which fear is one. There is no physical barrier to, say, jumping off a ship into the sea, but we find ourselves unable to do so because of fear, an ‘arbitrary impediment’. This raises a problem, for it would appear to undermine the claim that liberty and necessity are reconcilable, or that contracts made out of fear are free (134-5). It is in Leviathan that Hobbes fully articulates the strictly materialist conception of liberty as simply the absence of external impediments, thus being able to argue that subjects of an absolute and arbitrary sovereign are free so long as they are not physically bound. This is Hobbes’ rhetorical tour de force, since it does away with the republican contention that living under an absolute sovereign is equivalent to slavery: for Hobbes you are free if you are physically unimpeded, so subjects are free — liberty and subjection can go together.

If Skinner is clearly correct to note a shift in emphasis between these texts, we might contest his claim that they are essentially in tension. And, indeed, while Skinner sometimes speaks of Leviathan as ‘contradicting’ the earlier works, he also speaks of it as ‘tying up loose ends’ (132). The difficulty is that Hobbes throughout speaks of liberty in different senses. There is a juridical condition of bearing rights (liberties), and there is the actual physical capacity to move. The connection between these two is one of the more difficult aspects of Hobbes’ thought. Unfortunately, Skinner increases rather than resolves our difficulties here, since he sometimes assimilates these two conditions rather than clarifies the relationship between them. If one were to take more care on this point (as Skinner did in his earlier work), one might
make a strong case for the 'tying up loose ends' thesis rather than for the stronger claim of outright theoretical contradiction.

The important philosophical questions raised by Skinner's book, however, are not about the unity of Hobbes' oeuvre or the various rhetorical strategies Hobbes employs, but about the nature of liberty itself and whether Hobbes' understanding is philosophically compelling. It would be a delightful coup for modern republicans if Skinner rose to Hobbes' philosophical heights in order to win the argument for republican liberty.

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Catherine Wilson
Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity.
Pp. 320.

Wilson presents a well-researched and readable plea for the importance of Epicurean thought in the origin and evolution of early modern philosophy. There is a wealth of scholarly detail and philosophical insight in this book, much more than can be justly covered here. But even so, the book promises more than it delivers, and Wilson's larger thesis remains unestablished.

In arguing for the importance of Epicureanism for early modern philosophy, Wilson intends something bold. She wants 'to establish that an intellectually compelling and robust tradition took materialism as the only valid frame of reference, not only for scientific inquiry but for the solution of the deepest problems of ethics and politics. . . . [So much so that] the identification of Epicurean topics and themes and the analysis of their reception offers a useful framework for understanding and interpreting the history of early modern thought' (v-vi). She even suggests, contra the 'received' Popkin thesis (that the development and tenor of early modern philosophy is explained by the rediscovery of Pyrrhonianism), that 'the philosophical skepticism that is sometimes said to have generated a crisis in the early modern period was not so much an expression of genuine bewilderment as a rhetorical tactic facilitating the reworking and assimilation of the Epicurean's remarkable philosophy of nature and society in the early modern context' (2). Wilson is right, certainly, to reject the denigration of Epicureanism's importance and the fixation on its role in scientific inquiry — one of the most welcome aspects of the book is the emphasis placed on ethical and political theory — but
a pervasive fuzziness about what constitutes Epicureanism limits its usefulness as an interpretative lens for early modern period.

Such a bold thesis requires, of course, more than mere responses to Epicurean suggestions, but given the impressionistic nature of Wilson's argument that is often all that is implied. Wilson analyzes wide swaths of primary literature, much of it obscure, on a number of Epicurean topics. She is, however, uninterested in trying to document or trace out actual influences, or in providing a chronological narrative of early modern Epicureanism. Instead she concentrates on textual and theoretical similarities or parallels sprinkled across the various texts. The introduction provides an overview of ancient Epicureanism and its fortunes, from its censure by Cicero and loss in the middle ages, through its rediscovery in the 15th century and relative neglect in the 16th, to its flourishing in the 17th. But the book's heart is its topical chapters, where Wilson highlights the acceptance and use of various Epicurean theses: 1. 'Atomism and Mechanism', 2. 'Corpuscular Effluvia: Between Imagination and Experiment', 3. 'Order and Disorder', 4. 'Mortality and Metaphysics', 5. 'Empiricism and Mortalism', 7. 'The Social Contract', 9. 'Robert Boyle and the Study of Nature', and 10. 'The Sweetness of Living'. Two other chapters, centered around Leibniz, are thrown in to provide illustrative contrasts and critiques: 6. 'Some Rival Systems' and 8. 'The Problem of Materialism in the New Essays'. As one would expect, each chapter displays considerable penetration and insight. The wealth of her scholarship is impressive indeed. But the overall coherence of the project is another matter.

Endemic to 'big picture' history of philosophy is circumscribing the project. One possibility is to follow the early moderns' use of the term 'Epicureanism'. The danger, of course, is that even if everything reported is absolutely correct, the project might still fail, perhaps because the early moderns were so confused or so unsystematic in their uses as to unhang it from historical Epicureanism, or perhaps because there is so little overlap among their uses as to degenerate into triviality if not outright inconsistency. Better, it seems, for the author to assert control and consider how what we now recognize as constituting Epicureanism was engaged. Of course that requires criteria for determining what constitutes Epicureanism. One criterion might involve focusing on definitive theses, e.g. mortalism, the thesis that humans are naturally mortal. The danger, however, is that one might accept that thesis without actually being an Epicurean, as shown in Pomponazzi's mortalism, which was anything but an 'Epicurean idea' (17). Pomponazzi's mortalism was Averroist. The Christianization of Epicureanism, furthermore, implies that mortalism should not be considered even a necessary condition for Epicureanism. A second criterion might focus on the deployment of distinctive arguments. But does Berkeley's deployment of perceptual relativity arguments make him a Pyrrhonian? Of course not, and why should Epicureanism be any different? A third criterion might concentrate on certain principles or premises, e.g., the atoms and the void. In such a case, the author owes us an account of why these principles, and not others, constitute the essence of Epicureanism. Moreover, she should worry that someone's denial that certain
conclusions follow from those principles — as the Christianization of Epicureanism requires — implies that those principles mean something different for that individual than what they meant for Epicurus and Lucretius.

Wilson is insensitive to these dangers, and appears variously guided by all of these criteria. Daniel Sennert and Francis Bacon, for example, appear as atomists, but clearly neither are Epicurean atomists. They held matter to be fundamentally infused with vital and occult powers, and their atomism owed much more to the decidedly non-Epicurean tradition of late scholastic and Renaissance doctrines of minima naturalia, where the particles were not properly atomic but simply the smallest particles capable of containing the substantial form in question and where the principles of interaction were not mechanical. Their atomisms were no more an ‘Epicurean idea’ than was Pomponazzi’s mortalism. Additionally, Wilson calls Hobbes ‘the most thoroughgoing Democritean philosopher of the seventeenth century, despite his denial of the void’ (52). Yet that kind of materialism seems Chrysippean or Stoic. Without the interstitial void, there are no atoms; and without atoms, it is hard to see that kind of materialism as properly considered Epicurean. And elsewhere Descartes is called, ‘the most fervent and explicit Epicurean — or perhaps theo-Epicurean’ (98) — because in Le monde he speculated on the evolution of a world, given God’s creation of matter and the laws of motion. Yet Descartes is quite careful not to assert the Epicurean idea of multiple worlds. Le monde was intended as an allegory, and the thought-experiment in the introduction to Chapter 6 was couched in terms distancing his meaning from any literal interpretation: ‘I shall create for you a new world in imaginary space [which] the philosophers say is infinite and as they should know since such space is invented by them’ (Descartes, Le monde, AT 11:31-2). Whatever the inspiration Lucretius provided, Descartes’ point hardly qualifies as Epicurean. He nowhere asserts a multiverse, nor gives any indication of a purely natural and non-providential evolution of material systems, nor holds a theory of eternal and atomic matter. These three examples indicate the wooliness with which ‘Epicurean’ is used throughout the book and which limits the explanatory value of her analyses of the arguments.

Indicative too is the discussion of Walter Charleton’s The Immortality of the Soul. Charleton’s spokesman, Athansius, does not completely shed the Cartesian strains that marked Charleton’s conception of soul in The Darkness of Atheism, and as Wilson recognizes the doctrines and arguments ‘officially’ asserted to be ‘victorious’ are Athanasius’ rather than Lucretius’. Thus it is hard to say that the work is Epicurean, at least on the surface. While conceding that ‘it is difficult to gauge the impact of Charleton’s dialogue’ (148), Wilson suggests that it ought to be seen as Vanini-esque — the intentionally elliptical presentation of dangerous and heretical ideas by conjoining weak and implausible refutations to vigorous and powerful descriptions of them. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that Charleton so intended the dialogue, or that his contemporaries took it in that way. Indeed, that seems unfair. After all, Charleton described the soul’s immortality as a ‘proleptical’ — i.e., axiomatic — and ‘super-excellent’ notion and equated it
with ‘the Being of the Deity’. More likely, Charleton was simply being honest — these are the best arguments to be marshaled in support of that ‘proleptical Notion’. Indeed Descartes, who drew on much richer conceptual and methodological resources, never claimed to demonstrate *more geometrico* the soul’s immortality. He claimed simply to lay the foundation for the construction of a proof of its possibility (*Meditationes de prima philosophia*, AT 7:12-14, 153-4). Thus without any indication that Charleton’s work is itself Epicurean, or that it influenced subsequent thinkers as an Epicurean work, it is difficult to fit it into a narrative taking ‘the identification of Epicurean topics and themes and the analysis of their reception [as] a useful framework for understanding and interpreting the history of early modern thought.’ The impressionistic flavor that such disconnections and doctrinal fuzziness generates pervades the entire work.

None of these criticisms, however, should be taken to lessen the significance of Wilson’s book, especially the wonderful chapters on ‘The Social Contract’ and ‘The Sweetness of Living’. The sheer volume of lesser-known works brought to light, and the rigor and depth of her analyses of many of those works, alone make it required reading for any early modern scholar. Her book is a treasure trove, which scholars will no doubt be mining for years to come.

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**Paul J. Zak, ed.**  
Pp. 386.  
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The point of this book is to replace the common view that free markets are a non-moral realm in which all participants pursue their self-interest without regard to their moral obligations to others or to the common good. The volume’s contributors argue that moral rules and an instinctive regard for the interests of other people are fundamental to free markets and that markets cannot function without morals.

The common view of the free market is that it is a self-regulating mechanism in which every individual pursues only her own self-interest, and from
which, as though by an invisible hand, emerge enhancements to the common good. The central assumption is that people act within markets like *homo economicus*, a being who rationally pursues the maximization of his own utility, has a well formed consistent utility curve not influenced by other people, and is never altruistic except when altruism pays dividends. Since free markets promote the common good, *homo economicus* need never sacrifice his interests from moral motives. Sometimes part of the common view is the idea that *homo economicus* is the natural result of evolution, since self-interestedness is the result of the evolutionary survival of the fittest.

The contributors to this book reject the common view from many perspectives, both theoretical and empirical. The attack comes from many disciplines, including economics, where institutional theory, behavioral economics, game theory, and macro-economics have shown that (a) people do not behave like *homo economicus*, (b) altruism and costly rule following is common, (c) the invisible hand does not work well in real markets, (d) free markets (even if self-regulating in some sense) are not self-generating or self-restraining, and (e) the best outcome is often the result of co-operation and co-ordination, not free market competition. Our economy is full of prisoners’ dilemmas. Psychologists have contributed empirical data that make nonsense of *homo economicus*’s obsession with self-interest; people, they have shown, are mostly trusting and trustworthy, honest, and deeply concerned about others, plus we have an instinctive sense of fairness. Biologists have pointed out that our closest evolutionary relatives (other primates) share some of our altruism and sense of fairness, and that such attributes are not only a possible outcome of evolution, but are a probable outcome in many social species. Anthropologists have tried to trace the cultural evolution of free markets, and have shown that trust and trustworthiness necessarily accompanies such evolution. Sociologists have collected further evidence on the role of trust in economic exchanges. Philosophers have pitched in with theoretical constructions and arguments, and they have claimed that philosophy has known all this for centuries.

This book is a snapshot of current developments in all these fields, and most of the contributors are leading scholars well able to give an overview of what their discipline has to say relevant to markets. The result of bringing these views into one book is a new paradigm of morals and free markets. Key elements of this new view are that markets require morality to function; that most human beings are naturally moral even at the expense of their self-interest; that moral instincts are buried deep in human emotions and that morality derives from ‘sensations’ not ‘reason’; that this natural morality of fairness and co-operation is the result of evolutionary forces; that there are many common moral instincts that exist across most human cultures; and that free markets have culturally evolved in ways consistent with natural human morality. None of these views are original to this book, but it is nice to have such excellent accounts of them brought together: the result is like a picture emerging as a jigsaw puzzle is completed.

For philosophers, the picture painted in this book is of great interest, but the book raises several more specific issues of philosophical purport. First,
bringing these contributors together made them realize that key words had radically different meanings in different disciplines. De Waal comments on this directly with respect to 'altruism' and 'selfishness'. For a primatologist, 'altruism' refers to any behavior with results that benefit others, and 'selfishness' refers to behavior with results that benefit the actor; intentions, motives, reasons, and feelings are not considered. But, of course, most of the other disciplines deal with what the primatologist exquisitely ignores. This is not just scientists leaving love to the poets. At stake is the nature and structure of acceptable explanations. An evolutionary explanation of altruism has to explain altruism in terms of survival benefits, which by definition makes altruism selfish. The sensations and feelings that Solomon claims underlie morality do not enter the biologist’s picture — or rather, the philosopher is left wondering how they enter it. The methodological questions of explaining and doing ethics are intriguing.

If levels of explanation are to be kept clear, it is helpful to be clear on whether the morality being studied concerns altruism, co-operation, rule following, or mechanism design. Oliver Goodenough has contributed an excellent article specifically on this issue. I wish the other contributors had positioned their ideas more clearly with respect to his conceptual structure. I recommend that Goodenough’s contribution be read first; and I recommend his discussion be required reading for anyone who thinks game theory has implications for ethics.

The main contribution of a philosopher to the volume comes from Robert Solomon, who examines how the Scottish moral sense school anticipated much of what is now being said by other disciplines. The key point is that most of the contributors believe that morality is the result of feelings or sensations, not rational principle. They seem to think that this view is entailed by their claim that morality is the result of human evolution; rational principles are the result of cultural evolution. The empirical evidence is thus deciding the eighteenth century debate between moral reason and moral sense in favor of the latter. I am not convinced. Unfortunately, this issue runs as a theme through many contributions; no single author tackles it directly.

Reading this book is like looking at a still from a film; all the contributors’ disciplines are expanding explosively and several of these disciplines are very young. This book should be read by everyone interested in current views on morality and its role in how free markets function. This includes anyone interested in moral failure within our economy, a most important topic at the moment. However, I am afraid that this book will date very quickly. A revised edition in 10 years, even in 5 years, will show a vastly different picture.

**John Douglas Bishop**

Trent University
Tzachi Zamir

*Ethics and the Beast: A Speciesist Argument for Animal Liberation.*
Pp. 158.

According to its acknowledgements, this book is the result of a number of arguments that Zamir had with Justice Richard Posner in which he ‘did not fare well’ in defending his moral vegetarianism against Posner’s elenchi. As a result, Zamir has staked out new territory in the animal ethics debate in which expediency with regard to animal liberation trumps the need to undermine speciesism.

Since the 1975 publication of Peter Singer’s *Animal Liberation*, all but a few philosophers writing in support of animal liberation have argued that the controverting of *speciesism* is a necessary conceptual first-step in achieving true animal liberation. By contrast, Zamir argues for what he calls ‘speciesist liberationism’, claiming that a rejection of speciesism is *not* necessary for the reform of our current attitudes and practices toward nonhuman animals, and that, contrary to conventional Singerian wisdom, speciesism and animal liberation are in fact quite compatible. Not only are they compatible, but, according to Zamir, there are a number of good arguments for why one should be both a speciesist and an animal liberationist, the central one being based on the ‘[w]eighty practical ramifications’ that follow from the ‘deradicalization’ of the animal liberation movement and the embracing by animal liberationists of ‘conservative, widely shared, moral beliefs’ (xi).

At the heart of the book is Zamir’s claim that solely from the fact that X has greater value than Y, it does not follow that X’s interests always trump Y’s interests. As Zamir points out, there is ‘no simple semantic equivalence between greater value and trumping interests’ (5). To illustrate, given a situation in which it is possible to rescue only one, I could admit that the life of an important scientist is *more valuable* than that of my aging father while simultaneously be justified in allowing the interests of my father to take priority over those of the scientist in choosing whom to rescue. According to Zamir, once animal liberationists see that *value* and *interests* can be conceptually de-coupled in this way (thus abandoning any sort of ‘trumping thesis’), they can then *concede* that humans are more valuable than animals, *reject* the implication that human interests must always trump animal interests, and forge ahead with arguments for liberation.

Once this ‘trumping thesis’ is dismantled, we follow Zamir in search of a version of speciesism that actually *is* in opposition to liberationism. Of the six formulations he attempts, only one he thinks liberationists should reject, namely, that any and all human interests trump any and all animal interests solely on the basis that those human interests belong to humans. Of course, this type of extreme speciesism is *held* by relatively few (thoughtful) individuals. And that is precisely Zamir’s point. For if that is the case, then
there is no need for liberationists to waste time undermining this type of speciesism. Since five of the six versions of speciesism that Zamir formulates are consistent with liberationism, it behooves liberationists to abandon their theoretical moral highground and — for the sake of expediency — advocate a ‘speciesist liberationism’.

Next Zamir moves to one of the most refreshing aspects of the book, highlighting how the debate over moral standing is, at best, merely a distraction from the real issue at the heart of animal liberation, namely, whether animals possess morally relevant properties that imply restrictions on what may be done to them (which, of course, they do). After disintegrating neo-Kantian arguments against the moral status of animals, Zamir then salvages the morally-relevant-properties approach essential to utilitarianism (and the Rollin-modified version of utilitarianism), advocating what he calls a ‘single-stage’ approach to liberation which assumes rather than argues for the premise that animals possess morally relevant properties.

The first two chapters comprise the main argument of the book. The remaining six chapters (save one) include previously published (and persuasive) essays on a range of topics from vivisection and moral vegetarianism, to arguments for pet ownership and against zoos, to veganism (against) and animal-assisted therapies (for).

Overall, Zamir’s arguments are original, clever, and, for the most part, persuasive. Yet, there may seem, for most animal liberationists, something odd and unsettling about advocating a ‘speciesist’ liberation, odd in the same sense that an argument for racist black liberation or a sexist women’s liberation movement might seem unsettling. To see what I’m getting at, first consider the type of speciesism that Zamir finds compatible with liberationism, and then consider an analogy. Speciesism: Human interests are more important than animal interests, in the sense that promoting even trivial human interests ought to take precedence over advancing animal interests (15). Now imagine a (very Singerian) analogy in which an abolitionist movement accepts the following version of racism. Racism: The interests of white persons are more important than the interests of black persons, in the sense that promoting even trivial white interests ought to take precedence over advancing black interests.

The analogy calls to mind the Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate of 1858 in which Abraham Lincoln declared, ‘I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races . . . . And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior; and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race’ (‘The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858’).

Putting aside the complicated and imperspicuous legacy of Abraham Lincoln, advocates of black liberation might find a strategy like this disturbing, one that advocates liberation while sanctioning the sentiments of such a declaration. Likewise with some animal liberationists with regard to Zamir’s central thesis. Nevertheless, Zamir is an exceptionally clear writer whose
book constitutes an important contribution to the literature on animal liberation. His book would surely fare well against any of Richard Posner's arguments.

**Robert C. Jones**
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