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Editor · Directeur

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

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Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1988. Volume I: Pp. 452.
US $49.50. ISBN 0-691-05517-3.
Volume II: Pp. 296.
US $35.00. ISBN 0-691-05518-3.

Noël Carroll
Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory.
New York: Columbia University Press 1988. Pp. 262. US $34.50. ISBN 0-231-05964-X.

Noël Carroll
Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1988. Pp. 268.
US $29.50. ISBN 0-691-07321-X.

Robert Lapsley and **Michael Westlake**
Film Theory: An Introduction.
New York: St. Martin's Press (for Manchester University Press) 1988. Pp. 248.
US $39.95. ISBN 0-7190-1889-7.

Constance Penley, ed.
Feminism and Film Theory.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall (for the British Film Institute) 1988. Pp. 271.
US $40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-85170-228-8);
US $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-85170-223-6).

Kristin Thompson
Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1988. Pp. 361.
US $65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07321-X);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-00000-0).

Graeme Turner
Film as Social Practice.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. 187.
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US $11.50 (paper: ISBN 0-415-00735-6).

Woody Allen thinks it criminal. Nancy Reagan said 'We are impressed.' Ronald's acting? The red menace? Or perhaps some darker consideration involving both? Well, in a way, yes: it's the fact that you can now see an increasing number of black-and-white movies in colour. Pallid cheeks are everywhere becoming flushed, as purple plains are become emerald forests and the blues are played again in *Casablanca*. 'Colorization' makes us think about movies. It prompts a host of questions, and above all, gives new urgency and practical significance to the question whether film is art. How is it related to photography, drama and literature? What evaluative criteria are appropriate to it? Are there uniquely cinematic modes of representation and expression? Can a movie be faked or forged? and what about the moral effect of cinema, if any?

Questions of this sort were once, and indeed are still, to the fore in film theory, but they are no longer raised in a spirit very likely to help us with colorization, or for that matter with any identifiably aesthetic concerns at all. In the hands of contemporary film theorists, these questions are subordinated to something very different. Influenced by the Marxist theory associated with Louis Althusser and by the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, the contemporary film theorist has typically taken his task to be the identification and analysis of the ways in which cinema functions to 'position' and 'construct' 'subjects' compliant with the aims of the dominant order; the task, that is, of exposing the ideological operation of film, and so perhaps of paving the way for a genuinely emancipatory cinema.

The dauntingly complex theoretical background to this project is mapped by Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake in their *Film Theory: An Introduction* with a precision that quite belies the intractable nature of much of the literature that they deal with, and a clarity which survives the weight of inherited jargon under which so much of it is sunk. At their very best, in the chapters on politics and semiotics, they produce meanings from tangled nests of prose like rabbits from a series of unusually derelict-looking hats; and if they seem rather less resourceful in their teatment of psychoanalysis, then they are

nonetheless more lucid here than some of their subject-matter would have given one reason to expect. Among their central themes are authorship and critiques of *auteurism*; narrative, and the various attempts to show that cinema 'produces' meaning only via narrative structures which are historically determined and ideologically complicit; and realism, with the claim that mainstream realist cinema, in its alleged transparency to the world, in fact functions conventionally and thus (a characteristic inference) ideologically. Here, as throughout, Lapsley and Westlake combine concise exposition with stimulating and informative critical assessment. It is hard to imagine a more successful introduction to contemporary film theory than theirs.

Of course, you may not want an introduction at all. Perhaps bourgeois complicity would be a small price to pay for continuing to regard films as 'merely' more or less absorbing instances of dramatic representation. As his title suggests, in *Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory*, Noël Carroll takes a dim view of the whole business, doubtless feeling that the uninitiated should be encouraged to stay that way. He thinks that the combination of Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis which contemporary theory takes as foundational is unstable, and that its application to the study of cinema is almost criminally unilluminating. Analogies constructed by Baudry and Metz between film experience and dream/daydream experience infuriate Carroll; he argues that such attempts to explain our experience of film psychoanalytically are fundamentally misconceived, since the features exploited for analogy – such as 'inhibited motoricity', being in darkened rooms and a state of 'lowered wakefulness' – in fact amount to very little.

While Carroll's detailed criticisms of these arguments are wholly convincing, some of his more general methodological points concerning the advisability of invoking psychoanalysis in this context are less so. For example, he correctly argues that an informative analogy is one which likens something we know less about to something we know more about, but he seems wide of the mark when, on these grounds, he takes our relative ignorance of dreams to count against the kind of analogy which Baudry and Metz propose, for even on Carroll's own account their claim is not that films are like dreams, but rather that the *experience* of watching films is in some ways like the *experience* of dreaming; and it is certainly not clear that our dream experience is any more mysterious than our experience of film. Carroll makes better use of a simpler objection; as he says, it is only when

explanation at the conscious level proves unavailable that there is any *reason* for appealing to the unconscious. After all: 'Nor was the move from the early arcade movieolas to screened film prompted by an irrational longing for the mother's breast; it is explained by the degree to which it promised greater profitability.'

Carroll's doubts about using psychoanalysis to explain our experience of cinema form the background to a larger theme: that there is nothing inherently ideological about the structures of cinema. If a film does operate ideologically, he argues, it does so through its content, rather than through mere use of cinematography, narration, editing, and so on. He demonstrates in relentless detail that much of what film theorists have offered to the contrary resembles equivocation more closely than it does argument, and that much of the literature suffers from a simple want of logic.

Examples in support of this thesis can sometimes be quite arresting. For instance, when discussing 'the cinematic apparatus' in her essay '*India Song/Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta désert*: The Compulsion to Repeat', in Constance Penley's anthology *Feminism and Film Theory*, Joan Copjec attepts to exploit an analogy between the shift in theoretical focus from film as reproduction of reality to film as event, and the move in recent philosophy of language from a concern with the linguistic object to speech-act theory. In itself, the analogy looks promising. But conviction fades rapidly when we find that pivotal to her argument is the claim that: 'A performative utterance ... can only be said to have taken place, its saying is only said to be (or to make it) so, when it has appropriately, correctly, completely, intentionally, and consistently repeated, reproduced a conventional procedure. A performative, then, can not be either true *or* false because it can *only* be true, that is, according to the laws of logic, identical with itself.' If there is anything to be made of this (and given that it is quoted admiringly in her introduction, presumably Penley thinks that there is) then it is hard to see what it might be. Are we being told that performative utterances are analytic truths? If so, is the idea that, according to the laws of logic, anything which is analytically true is identical with itself? The former is obviously false. The latter looks a safe enough bet, but, unless Copjec has in mind some hitherto unnoticed class of entities which are not identical with themseves, is hardly very illuminating.

Carroll himself views contemporary treatments of perspective as symptomatic of the theoretical malaise. Perspective is conceived as a conventional, and thus arbitrary, construct (it would be nice one

day to see an argument showing that all conventions *are* arbitrary) which, in combination with other cinematic mechanisms, functions to position subjects in the Althusserian-Lucanian sense. It leads us to identify with the location of the camera lens, and thus gives us a false sense of psychological unity: 'the illusion of the "self" as a single, unitary, placed, centrally positioned center of experience.' But *how* does a spectator's identification with the camera lead him to generate false beliefs about the unity and centrality of himself as a subject? The short answer, says Carroll, is that it doesn't. The claim that it does is based on nothing more than punning and word-play, made possible only by the systematic ambiguity of the concepts of unity, centredness and position with which the contemporary film theorist makes so free.

The obscuring metaphor, coupled with what any but the most beguiled might identify as unmeaning free-association, does seem to be a favourite element in the film theorists' repertoire. Both have starring roles, for instance, in Copjec's richly awful article (the low-point, it should be said, of Penley's collection; the high point is Laura Mulvey's tightly written 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema') where she tells us that repetition has the effect of 'heterotautology' – that is: 'Of interiorizing difference, contradiction, distance, making them self-same. Of converting contradictions into 'metaphysical pitch and toss', that is, into an idealization of movement itself whereby pitch is absorbed by toss, hurly by burly, fort by da, death by life, body by soul and so on and so forth. That is to say, into no movement at all, into similarity, the 'at home' status of homeostasis.' Which is to say, pure showmanship, pure self-regard, pure narcissism, and so on and so forth.

Carroll quite properly describes theorizing of this kind as 'nothing short of an intellectual disaster'. The root of the problem is that contemporary film theory is 'totalizing' and 'top down', it 'contrives to explicate in one unified theoretical vocabulary queries into issues as diverse as the mechanism of point-of-view editing, the nature of the avant-garde, the mechanisms of movie advertising, the nature of the soundtrack, the nature of the camera lens, the operation of ideology, etc.', with the result that every question one might want to raise about cinema gets answered in terms of ideological subject positioning. (The Lacanian 'mirror stage' is often made central here: the infant sees its reflection and, with a surge of jubilation, for the first time misconceives itself as a unified subject. The analogy with contemporary film theory itself is irresistible.) This view is echoed in

Breaking the Glass Armor, in which Kristin Thompson complains that the challenge has been taken out of film analysis; what should be an intriguing, exploratory activity, responding to the mystifying characteristics of its subject, has instead become a dull procession of endlessly self-confirming applications of theory, whose only effect is to render indistinguishable the films it addresses. In her 'neoformalist' attempt to recapture the richness of analysis, Thompson offers individual studies of eleven films, ranging from Roy William Neill's *Terror by Night* to Robert Bresson's *Lancelot du Lac*; studies that make successful use of methods whose assumptions are subject to continual alteration, so that her analysis involves a steady exchange between theory and the requirements of practical criticism. Carroll, too, favours the small-scale approach. Film theory, he says, should become 'piecemeal' and 'bottom up', and his thoughts on the cinematic image and movie narration, for example, suggest – much as Thompson's detailed analyses of specific films suggest – that he is right.

Contemporary film theorists will find much in Carroll's book to depress them, not least his fondness for argument. Lapsley and Westlake say that bewildered abuse has been about the best that critics of recent theory have managed to muster, but that judgment can now no longer stand. Carroll has acquainted himself closely with film theory of the last two decades, and his objections to it, both empirical and logical, will be difficult to dismiss. He has written a book which deserves a response; and it would be nice to see one couched in language as amiable and as accessible as Graeme Turner's is in *Film as Social Practice*. But while Turner is clearly in sympathy with the contemporary theoretical project, the relaxed primer he has produced here draws far too superficially on the literature covered by Carroll and by Lapsley and Westlake to be able to do anything very much with it; and he is prone to be inadequately precise when he deals with specific films: to identify the helicopter music in *Apocalypse Now* as 'The March of the Valkyries', for instance, is to unhorse oneself completely. But in his favour – and in context, this is no small thing – he does keep film squarely at the focus of his attention. Much recent theory gives the impression that it would be just the way that it is even if no movies had ever been made.

That things were not always like this in film theory is shown by Richard Abel's two-volume anthology *French Film Theory and Criticism 1907-1939*, which collects writings by Gance, Renoir, Epstein, Cocteau, Colette and others, with fine expository and historical essays by the editor interpolated. These volumes give a rich picture of

the background to classical film theory, and demonstrate just how serious early intellectual engagement with the medium was. But as Carroll shows in his *Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory*, there was even at this stage a tendency towards abstraction and unhelpful essentialism in the attempts by many of the most important classical theorists to find medium-specific features of film. And as film studies have become institutionalized, the abstraction (and indeed, according to Carroll, the tendency towards essentialism) have run riot, so that contemporary film theory has come to resemble less a set of carefully selected analytical tools than a blunt instrument, altogether better at flattening things, at rendering them indistinguishable, than at looking into them. The problem, of course, is that if one becomes more interested in theory than in the objects that theory was allegedly intended to explain, one cannot expect to illuminate anything very much apart from the disembodied workings of theory – which, to be sure, can be rather pleasing; but then so can a mace be pleasing, as long as you don't imagine it being used on anybody. Only by matching manner to matter, by tailoring method to medium, can this kind of violence be avoided; and only then do many of the most delicate and difficult questions about film – those surrounding colorization, for instance – stand a chance of getting recognized, let alone answered.

Alex Neill
Trinity University, San Antonio

Aaron Ridley
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

James Bernauer and **David Rasmussen, eds.**
The Final Foucault.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989.
Pp. ix+168.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-52132-6.

Michel Foucault
Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984.
Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed.
New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1988. Pp. xxv+330.
Cdn $35.00: US $25.00.
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90082-4).
Cdn $17.95: US $13.95.
(paper: ISBN 0-415-90149-9).

Nowhere does Michel Foucault present his ideas more clearly and concisely than in the many interviews he gave over the course of his working life. There is no better commentary on his work of the 1960s than *Language, Counter-memory, Practice* (Cornell 1977), no better commentary on the work of the early and mid 1970s than *Power/Knowledge* (Pantheon 1980), and now there is no better commentary on the work of the late 1970s and 1980s than Lawrence Kritzman's collection of interviews, discussions, and lectures entitled *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*. The book is divided into six topical sections comprising twenty pieces of work, a number of which were not easily available to many American readers prior to this publication.

Kritzman's introduction to the volume places Foucault's thinking within the recent history of French politics and political critique. Kritzmann cites the events of May, 1968, as a decisive turning point not so much for Foucault himself as for French intellectualism in general. With the rejection of Marxism as the primary frame of reference for interpreting movements of thought and action, Foucault's understanding of 'the intellectual' as 'specific' to his or her situation and unable to make revolutionary universalistic theoretical pronouncements could begin to exercise some influence.

Foucault never claimed to be a revolutionary; quite the contrary, in fact. In a 1977 interview he suggested that 'the very desirability of the revolution is the problem today' (122). Rather than some total,

comprehensive revolutionary movement undertaken by the oppressed under the direction of theoreticians, Foucault envisioned, and practiced, localized struggle against very specific forms of domination by one relatively limited and definable group over another – prison officials over prisoners, psychiatrists over patients, heterosexuals over homosexuals, etc. And in these struggles Foucault always cast himself as a participant observer; his articulations of shifting power relations were always produced in dialogic interaction with the forces shaping them. Foucault's voice – in this collection as in the others mentioned – always comes to us from within matrices of power and speaks to us not only of those matrices but also of itself as situated in them, specific to them, and structured by them as it attempts to restructure them. As a result, the voice that speaks in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* is not the hollow voice of prescient theoretical abstraction but rather the passionate voice of full commitment to the project of living in *this* time, of responding to the contingencies that shape *this* moment. It is a voice compelling precisely because of its passion. Kritzman has done a marvelous job of arranging and editing so as to allow this voice to speak clearly and powerfully through his text.

Bernauer and Rasmussen's *The Final Foucault* is a short collection of essays concerned mainly with *The Use of Pleasure, The Care of Self* (both of which appeared in 1984 just prior to Foucault's death), and the last of Foucault's lectures and interviews. It was originally published as volume 12, nos. 2 and 3 of *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. The book opens with a 1984 interview with Foucault entitled 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom'. As that title indicates, much of this volume is devoted to discussion of morality, ethics, and *ethos* in the articulation of specific historical selfhoods. Questions of power and politics are seen to function in Foucault's late work as tools for understanding the creation and cultivation of selves.

The essayists of *The Final Foucault* – Karlis Racevskis, Garth Gillan, James Bernauer, Diane Rubenstein, and Thomas Flynn – each provide interesting perspectives on Foucault's work on self. Flynn's account of Foucault's last course at the Collège de France (spring, 1984) is especially thought-provoking. The course was on the practice of truth-telling, particularly on *parrhēsia* in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. Flynn's essay casts Foucault himself as a contemporary version of the fourth century Greek parrhesiast, one who not only says what in fact happens to be true but, more importantly, believes that truth and manifests it. Thus Flynn's essay echoes

Foucault's own voice in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, the voice of passionate commitment and response to the particular contingencies of an historical situation. The parrhesiast, according to Flynn, is one committed to his or her truth, not one committed to the dispassionate, disinterested conveying of objective information or brute facts. Objectivity and universality have no privileged place in this notion of true speaking, and speaking owns its truth as act within a context of practices and events.

James Bernauer's essay, 'Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking', is also of special interest. Bernauer terms Foucault's last works 'ecstatic' because it is in the writings of the 1980s that Foucault most overtly rejects the notion of a 'core' or 'constant' self in favor of unstable dynamics of self-unfoldings through ascetic practices. This theme of (perpetual) self-constitution – which of course de-centers the self as identity within which we are enclosed – was already present, as Foucault himself repeatedly pointed out, in the works of the 1960s and 1970s. But Bernauer sees it as the dominant theme in Foucault's turn to 'ethical subjectivity and individual conduct' (47) in works like *The Care of Self.*

Bernauer suggests that Foucault's 'renunciation' of self in favor of analyses of the 'processes from which the experience of self derives' offends many critics because of our culture's 'sacrilization of the modern experience of the self' (48). Bernauer speaks disparagingly of this 'sacrilization,' calling it 'a self-love which survives in a culture which has lost its way intellectually, politically and morally' (48). He seems to respect Foucault's moves to undermine this cultural narcissism; yet, he also sees Foucault's project as caught, to some extent at least, in paradox.

Bernauer offers an astute and concise account of the emergence of paradox within Christian practices of self-renunciation (52-3). Within Christianity one articulates and objectifies the self precisely in order to forego it; careful study of one's selfhood is the prerequisite for the death of self that permits the soul's salvation. This, clearly, is a paradox. Bernauer suggests Foucault's study of the self, which is undoubtedly designed to decenter our notion of self, represents a 'desire to be free of the self,' a desire that 'presents a similar type of paradox' (69).

Bernauer's essay is rich and thoughtful; his characterization of Foucault's work as ecstatic seems beautifully consonant with the voice emerging in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, where it is clear, especially in discussions of the 'specific intellectual,' that Foucault is thinking

self (including his self) outside traditional notions of self as static entity. Rather, Foucault is thinking ecstatically, thinking self as occurring with and within the plurality of selves and world, thinking self as historical dynamic intermeshed with arrays of historical dynamics. Similarly in the interview in *The Final Foucault* Foucault insists that the self 'is not a substance; it is form and this form is not above all or always identical to itself' (10). Self can be thought as the form effected by and maintained as a tension of force relations and subject to change as those relations change. But, if this is how one thinks oneself most honestly – or better, if this is the understanding within whose movements thinking is now most powerfully taken up – then one's apparent renunciation of self is only the refusal to espouse and perpetuate what one knows to be an illusion and one's passionate living out of one's own historical contingency – or, to use a Nietzschean phrase, one's joyful release of one's self to itself as a process of self-overcoming – is how one is most true to 'what' one 'is.' Except when viewed from a Christian perspective in which self is taken to be, really, some kind of substantial identity, Foucault's de-centering of the substantial self does not appear to be paradoxical in the way that Christian asceticism is. One might question, then, Bernauer's assertion that Foucault is caught in paradox.

Foucault spoke frequently of living as creating, as a form of artistic endeavor. Perhaps we tend to think too often of art as visual art, as painting or sculpture immobilized and complete. But the word *art* also includes performing arts – song, drama, and dance. As Bernauer so astutely points out (45), Foucault's work is structured around the image of confinement. It is against confinement, stasis, that his thinking always moves. In *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* Foucault says (14), '[M]y problem is my own transformation ... [D]o you think I have worked like that all those years to say the same thing and not to be changed? This transformation of one's self by one's own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience.'

Trans-formation – traversing the gap between forms, movement that entails that gap's affirmation – is, for Foucault, speaking's song and thinking's dance. The self, thought as ever-shifting, non-self-identical form, is most truly its own perpetual transforming. Foucault is, surely, an ecstatic thinker; he speaks (or sings) throughout his work of the ecstasy of self-transforming, self-overcoming.

Both these books make valuable contributions to the literature on Foucault's work. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* presents a sample of Foucault's thinking on subjects ranging from music to rape and child

molestation, from homosexuality to the possibility, or impossibility, of his works' being read. *The Final Foucault* includes an apparently comprehensive bibliography of Foucault's writings and interviews followed by a brief chronology of his life. Foucault himself has ceased to write, but it is clear from these two books that the thinking that he engaged in and that his writing leads us to engage in has not reached its end. He leaves us with new paths opened. As *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* and *The Final Foucault* show us, there is nothing final about Foucault.

Ladelle McWhorter
Northeast Missouri State University

Judith Butler
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.
New York: Routledge Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. xiv+172.
Cdn $39.00: US $32.50
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90042-5);
Cdn $15.95: US $12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-90043-3).

Gender Trouble is demanding, especially for those unused to the idioms of modern French philosophy. Its three essays, framed by a preface and conclusion, are difficult, packed with ideas, ambitious, important. They take up Beauvoir, Kristeva, Irigaray, Wittig (as well as Lacan, Freud, Riviere, Foucault). Abstracting from Judith Butler's critiques of them to highlight basic issues, I do not do the book justice here – for which I apologize – for it attempts a genealogy, which requires examining individual ancestors.

The first essay defines the problem of the 'subject' of feminist politics, i.e., whose interests feminist politics represents. The second is on psychoanalysis and heterosexuality. The third, twice as long as either, provocatively entitled 'Subversive Bodily Acts', is the most interesting. Here Judith Butler says most often, most directly, what she thinks. She finds feminist identity politics in trouble because (a)

there is no pre-existing 'woman' for it to represent and (b) invariably it excludes 'women' it doesn't mean to exclude. Working with the Foucauldian idea that politics creates as well as regulates its subjects, she argues that for sexual politics, this means sex as well as gender. She claims we need a '*feminist genealogy* of the category of women' (5) – fascinating idea! She attempts more: 'a critical genealogy of the naturalization of sex and of bodies in general' (147).

Against feminists who assume a category of subjects, *women*, for whom they seek representation and visibility, Judith Butler argues that feminist identity politics actually 'constructs' women. Working through invisible 'exclusionary practices,' the construction seems to elude feminist critique, at least once it is established. The problem arises how to avoid constructing new dominations as bad as the old. The solution is, apparently, politics that does not assume a pre-existent subject.

What does this mean? What does it imply for political issues currently of interest to feminists, lesbians, gays? Here (I know) I get lost. An agenda of the book is to defend butch-femme relationships and drag against feminist criticism by arguing that these practices are subversive of femininity and masculinity. But do they subvert oppression? Or only certain forms of it?

The picture Judith Butler wants to *replace* looks something like this: Sex oppression is a social straitjacketing of biologically given sexes, female and male, by normative gender constructs, femininity and masculinity. Heterosexual orientation, embedded in both genders, penalizes as deviant lesbians, gays, bisexuals. Feminist (and gay) liberation are about removing the straitjackets.

There are things I dislike about this picture. It conveys the impression that we are all in the same political predicament. This is not, apparently, what troubles Judith Butler. Unfortunately, I canot draw her replacement picture, except negatively. There is no 'natural' woman under a cultural overlay of gender. What, then, *is* there? Many 'women' constructed as 'natural'? (Why call them all 'women'? Do we?) Is it construction 'all the way down'? (From what materials?) Is there a Wittgensteinian 'family resemblance' among 'women'? What does it mean that *agents* are constructed by their acts? How do act repetitions yield agents? *What happens to responsibility*?

A central question for me, on the new picture, is how to identify *oppressive* 'constructions' as such. Or, is there no longer oppression but only struggle and conflict? 'Oppression,' an infrequent term in this book, isn't even in the Index. 'Domination,' less tendentious,

seems preferred. Both raise the questions who does it to whom. But 'oppression' suggests that *something* has been *reduced, molded, immobilized* – as Marilyn Frye put it in her essay on oppression in *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Trumansburg, NY: Crossing 1983) – and would otherwise have a different shape, although we may not know what shape it would have. Does denying a 'pre-existent' subject deny such hypothetical conditionals? If so, how does being 'oppressed' differ from simply being formed?

This is crucial to feminist criticism of drag and butch-femme, which Judith Butler argues do not reproduce but parody femininity, masculinity, women, men. For the question remains whether drag and butch-femme 'deconstruct' the *oppressiveness* of what they undermine. Or do they, as others have argued, reinforce erotic attraction to, and undermine ability to resist, what kills us, maims us, exploits us, drains us and throws us away. Humor, fiction, drama can be oppressive.

A related issue is the 'exclusionary' character of the 'woman' of feminist identity politics: how should we assess whether what is excluded shouldn't have been? Disappointment in those excluded – transsexuals, perhaps – is insufficient to show exclusion wrong. The derogatory sense of 'exclusionary' seems here to beg instead of addressing ethical questions, such as how to distribute responsibility. Consider the following: 'By refusing the category of women, Wittig's lesbian-feminism appears to cut off any kind of solidarity with heterosexual women' (127). Who is excluding whom? Why say Wittig excludes heterosexual women, rather than that the latter, by their choices, exclude themselves from the category of lesbians? Describing *such* lack of solidarity as excluding *people* obliterates the distinction between chosen identities and inherited identities which individuals cannot freely discard. I have the uncomfortable sense that understanding 'women' so as not to exclude those who *inherit* racial or ethnic identities, which they not only ordinarily have no wish to discard but could not, as individuals, if they wanted to, is being used to slip in, as though comparable, the idea that feminist (postfeminist?) liberation should not exclude real identity *choices*, either, which women can make as individuals – becoming butch or femme, affirming primary heterosexual relationships, doing drag.

Any concept, 'construction,' will exclude some things. Oppressive about gender is neither its 'social constructedness' nor the fact that it excludes, but its contents, how it distributes power, defines relationships. Perhaps we can undermine gender by re-arranging parts

of the constructions, as Judith Butler suggests. But how are we to critique the new arrangements? Knowing their origins seems insufficient.

These questions, pointing toward limits of genealogical critique, lead me to ask, finally: how should critical understanding of 'ancestors' help us choose which possible 'descendants' to foster?

Claudia Card
University of Wisconsin, Madison

William H. Dray
On History and Philosophers of History.
New York: E.J. Brill 1989. Pp. ii+237.
US $67.50. ISBN 90-04-09000-2.

Analytic philosophers have not been attracted to philosophy of history. Only once, from the mid-1950s to the mid-70s, did they pay much attention to it. And then their interest was derivative – motivated primarily by the question of whether positivist models devised to explicate explanation in the natural sciences could be extended to cover explanation in historical studies.

Why analytic philosophers have not been more interested is a mystery: perhaps because they tend to be suspicious of any putative form of knowing that is not scientific (witness, for instance, their relative lack of interest, compared to other philosophical traditions, in Marxism and psychoanalytic theory); perhaps because – as an unspoken legacy of positivism – they tend to assume that historical studies, in so far as they make genuine contributions to knowledge and understanding, cannot be relevantly different from the sciences.

Whatever the explanation, now that the furor over positivist theories of explanation is over (since now their applicability even to science is widely questioned), analytic philosophers have again turned away from philosophy of history – and again, it would seem, without justification. After all, aren't historical interpretations, in so far as they embody genuine modes of understanding, different enough from scientific theories that these differences are worth investigating? And, at least prima facie, aren't there intractable, distinctive,

and philosophically interesting barriers to objectivity in historical studies?

Any philosopher curious about such questions can do no better than to read these essays by William Dray, who for over thirty years has been the most visible and influential advocate within the analytic tradition of the methodological autonomy of historical studies. Best known, perhaps, as an uncompromising critic of positivist theories of historical explanation, Dray has also quietly, but methodically, authored a rich and powerful alternative vision of the study of history as a humanistically-oriented, value-laden inquiry.

There are ten essays in this volume. The first eight – five published originally from 1967 to 1981, one in 1988, and two for the first time in the present volume – are an excellent introduction to the mature Dray's most constructive thoughts about historical studies. But they are more than that. Since Dray begins most of these essays by explaining and then revising or developing claims made by other important contributors, such as W.H. Walsh, Alan Donagan, Morton White, A.C. Danto, Louis Mink, and Hayden White, these eight essays collectively provide an overview of many of the central concerns of philosophers of history over the last forty years. Except, gratefully, for *the* central concern. Criticisms of postivist accounts of historical explanation are all but absent. There is no Hempel-bashing. Although a few of the essays deal centrally with non-positivist accounts of causal explanation – such as the first essay, in which a theory proposed by Alan Donagan is considered – the rest focus on other issues: colligation and intelligibility, point of view, historical importance, value judgments, narrative, and presentism – all issues which are alive, worthy of serious concern, and potential evidence that historical studies as distinctive modes of knowing deserve more attention. The ninth and tenth essays evaluate the contributions of Collingwood and Oakeshott, respectively.

This is a terrific book: interesting, insightful, and well written. Dray's presentations of the views of others are patient and careful. His reactions to them are invariably judicious and, in my opinion, almost always right. Throughout, Dray exhibits a sure feel for historical practice, frequently illustrating his own claims with interesting surveys of historiography. Anyone who does not appreciate most of the essays in this book does not appreciate analytic philosophy of history, for this is about as good as it gets.

And, yet, Dray is so judicious, so balanced, so fair-minded, and so cautious that the reader is denied the excitement and rewards of grappling with a bold, synthetic hypothesis. Instead, Dray gives qualified

support to many ideas – each so cautiously stated that it is hard to argue with it. If, collectively, these ideas add up to a bold hypothesis, Dray does not tell us what it is.

For instance, a central strand in Dray's earlier work was the idea that historical studies – he used to say, 'the very idea of history' – are necessarily evaluative in ways the natural sciences are not. Dray argued for this view, among other ways, by arguing that common sense causal language is essential to historical studies and also necessarily evaluative. And he argued for this latter view primarily by showing that historians often use causal language in moral or quasi-moral ways. (A problem with this argumentative strategy is that one cannot prove the *conceptual* necessity of history's being evaluative by a historiographical survey.)

In 'Generalization, Value-Judgment and Historical Causes', published in 1988 and included here, Dray modestly concludes his interesting and clear-headed analysis of historian Norman A. Graebner's interpretation of the Mexican war with the remark: 'Unlike Graebner, therefore, I should not expect controversy over the causes of the Mexican war easily to disappear. Not, at any rate, unless historians stop using the traditional concept of causation which his own analysis for the most part employs.' Given this study and Dray's earlier analyses of causal disputes in historical studies (*Daedalus*, 1962; *History and Theory*, 1978), it is hard to argue with Dray's claim that historians often use causal language evaluatively. What is missing, however, in the present essay, is either an argument that they must – that there is no viable alternative – or an explanation of how historians could avoid this obstacle to resolving explanatory disagreement. The old, bad argument – a historiographical defense of the conceptual necessity of historians using an evaluative notion of cause – is missing. But the modest conclusion that is put in its place is not pursued to what would seem to be the central question: do historians have a viable alternative to using causal language evaluatively?

In spite of such minor reservations, one cannot but be impressed with the fertility and importance of Dray's contribution in these essays. And because Dray writes so clearly and interestingly and his review of the ideas of other philosophers and of historiography is so patient and helpful, this volume would make a superb text for an undergrduate or graduate course in philosophy of history.

Raymond Martin
University of Maryland

Steve Fuller
Social Epistemology.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press
1988. Pp. xv+316.
US $27.50. ISBN 0-253-35227-4.

Imre Lakatos, who appears in Fuller's *Social Epistemology* as the last vestige of an obsolete approach to science, feared that without an effort to 'demarcate scientific progress and intellectual degeneration' there would cease to be any 'objective standard of honesty.' The recent revival of historicism, sociology of knowledge, and relativism in philosophy of science would appear to confirm Lakatos's worst fears. Yet the demise of objective standards of honesty, along with such concepts as truth, reality, and progress in the natural sciences, are worlds well lost according to this new injection of social theory into philosophy of science.

Fuller has written a collection of what he calls 'a parcel of provocations, a sourcebook of ideas, and directions for further research' (xiv). The work is divided into four parts. In part one Fuller discusses what he calls 'social epistemology' as a normative and naturalistic study of knowledge production and distribution. Fuller stresses that it constitutes a radical break with past epistemology and that he is not interested in traditional questions raised by a theory of knowledge. Part one mostly argues with various brands of what Fuller calls analytic, formalistic, or ahistorical philosophy of science. Part two concerns the two classic problems of realism and incommensurability in contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of language. Fuller analyzes these issues as grist for the mill of social epistemology and a demonstration of the bankruptcy of traditional analytic epistemology. Part three concerns the more sociologically oriented issues of demarcating science and pseudo-science and how consensus brings about the formation of disciplines. Finally, in part four, Fuller turns to the policy implications of social epistemology and even a curriculum for graduate studies in knowledge policies.

Fuller defines the naturalistic approach to knowledge as holding to a causal interaction between the representation and that which it represents or that 'the order of words is part of the order of things' (38). At first this position sounds very traditional. Naturalism has been the solid core of epistemology from Hume to Quine and today rests on appeals to evolutionary biology. How then can Fuller claim to be a naturalist about theory of knowledge and yet a sociologist of science?

As best as I can reconstruct it, Fuller's position is that a naturalistic account of what causes knowledge is based on social theory of human behavior rather than a biological or psychological account. However, what is represented within the scientific disciplines is not a real object but a constructed objectivity due to whatever discourse dominates, through sociological mechanism, in some scientific discipline. Thus whereas the sociological theory concerns real mechanisms in its representations, no natural science does.

The normative side of social epistemology is also different from its traditional version in Popper, for example. Popper considers epistemology normative because it tells scientists what they ought to do, no matter what they in fact do. For Fuller social epistemology is normative because it provides a set of policies for designing those institutional structures which are meant 'to define, extend ... humanly possible epistemic practices' (xii). Some of these policy recommendations are outlined in part four of this book and seem to involve Fuller's attempt to categorize different disciplinary boundaries, types of consensus, and argumentative strategies. Thus by normative Fuller seems to mean 'applied' and practical rather than Popper's emphasis on the demands of rationality. For example, Fuller calls the method of idealization 'an elliptical form of social engineering' (24).

On the issue of incommensurability Fuller argues for failure of translation between conceptual schemes, but he considers this failure a methodological heuristic for the study of science rather than an ontological claim; 'incommensurability is not so much an empirical hypothesis about the history of science as a methodological directive for the historiography of science' (138). Fuller's antirealism means that the referent of a scientific theory is the result of negotiations by groups of scientists. It is the linguistic and sensory 'cues' that set the boundaries of such scientific debates and then constitute their objects that social epistemology will study. Oddly enough, Fuller remains, as shown above, a realist when it comes to social science. It is never clear in the book what leads him to conclude that social theories represent real causal processes 'out there' and thus do not fall under the same criticism he makes of the natural sciences, namely that their object is wholly discursive.

Fuller contrasts a classical epistemologist with a 'panglossian epistemologist.' Instead of assuming that the aim of knowledge is truth and the attempt to outline an ideal method for realizing that

purpose, the panglossian epistemologist takes the purpose of knowledge to be itself a problem of investigation. 'It follows that the knowledge production process works optimally toward some end, but it is a matter of *empirical* determination what that end is: What sorts of goals can be realized given the actual structural constraints on knowledge production?' (27). According to Fuller, the panglossian is a skeptic who questions the image of knowledge as accumulative and deductive. What Fuller hopes to offer is an 'alternative image that is true to the knowledge product in its natural state' (29).

Fuller's ambitious efforts are open to at least two types of criticism. On the purely theoretical side, it is never clear how Fuller's criticisms of analytic efforts at solving philosophical problems require his sociological solution. Fuller rejects efforts to proclaim the death of philosophy or treat philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. Yet what he continually offers as a solution to traditional philosophical problems is his as yet promisory sociological study of the production and distribution of knowledge. In other words, he offers an apparently empirical study as a replacement for philosophical questions. That is either inconsistent with his effort to retain the field of philosophy or inconsistent with his claim to provide solutions for traditional epistemological questions. The detailed arguments by analytic philosophers to which Fuller wants to contribute rest on a conception of knowledge that Fuller entirely rejects. Thus Fuller's attempt to enter into these debates and clarify them often appears confused or uninformative.

But more importantly, there appears to be something countersensical about the whole effort. What is the status of social epistemology? Is it a discipline formed by the negotiation of researchers? If so do they form it on the basis of the best argument and best evidence or due to some non-cognitive sociological forces? Fuller has written a long argumentative book which appeals to reasons for such a discipline. But in that case the traditional account of knowledge would reemerge. But without the need for the best reasons, the best explanation, or the best account, Fuller's book appears irrelevant to the discipline he proclaims to found.

If, on the other hand, social epistemology is not a discipline, yet represents what is really going on outside us in the world of cognitive subjects (as follows from Fuller's social scientific realism), then we need some arguments in defense of such a claim. But such

arguments would be the same as traditional ones about the best explanation, or best evidence, or reference for theoretical terms. On either reading Fuller's radicalism evaporates.

Robert D'Amico
University of Florida

Alan H. Goldman
Moral Knowledge.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1989. Pp. ix+224.
Cdn $38.50: US $35.00. ISBN 0-415-01310-0.

In this meta-ethical study, Goldman is intent to tell us whether there is moral knowledge and, if there is, what it is like. His story goes something like this. Knowledge is belief best explained by reference to a belief's truth. But a belief can be true not just in the way found in science. Science, for Goldman, follows a realist mold which means, roughly, that scientific beliefs are true when they are in part caused by the facts they speak about. Goldman is serious about applying this same mold to ethics. Indeed, he seems sorely tempted by the realist theory as is evident from his efforts to show that it is the second best one around. However, the best theory is coherentism. This theory says that as rational creatures we spin webs of ethical beliefs, the strands of which have truth value not because they realistically are in touch with the facts but because they hang together. This coherence in ethics, he tells us, is not unlike that found in the legal world.

How does Goldman make out this story? As the dust jacket states he does so both from an historical and a contemporary perspective. After setting a contemporary stage in the Introduction in which we are told about knowledge (and Edmund Gettier among others), realism, objectivism, relativism, and emotivism, the story takes us to the past. We are told about Hobbes and how his theory fails to show that the egoistic reasons we have for contracting for peace are enough to override some of our other egoistic desires for breaking the contract. The story moves next to Hume, whose theory is read not as proto-emotivist but as realist with a utilitarian twist. In that form, Goldman

says that Hume's theory fails because it cannot deal properly with moral disagreement. Kant and his rationalistic theory is next. There is failure here too since the theory cannot generate the duties it claims it can.

At this point, one wonders whether this book is the place to tell stories about our ancestor theorists in ethics. Not that the stories told about Hobbes, Hume and Kant are not well told. But once Goldman resumes the contemporary discussion the reader gets the impression that now we are getting down to business. It is with contemporary analytic tools, not with history, that Goldman does his heavy work showing to his satisfaction that we have moral knowledge of a coherentist sort.

But how does he show that we have moral knowledge and of the kind he says we have? He does it against a background of the phenomena, structure and, to a lesser extent, the language of ethics. Ethics as we experience it is concerned with actions, practices, and policies. Also, it is different from science, it imposes obligations originating outside of the individual, has a normative force, contains conflicts and disagreements, suggests we are fallible, and exhibits many other features. For Goldman one meta-ethical account is better than another if it gives us a better descriptive 'fit' with respect to these features. Thus, for him, it is a point in favour of coherentism over even a sophisticated form of realism (one not postulating some special moral faculty) that the latter theory has more problems accounting for radical disagreement in ethics. Also, realism has problems accounting for supervenience. Just what kind of close relationship exists between certain natural properties and the moral ones that ride piggy-backed on them? After carefully comparing both theories with respect to these and other features, Goldman finds so many flaws (some of them fatal) in the realist position that he feels justified in declaring coherentism a winner by knock-out.

Fair enough. But coherentism must also deal with non-cognitive theories before it can be declared champion. And here we run into a problem. The only non-cognitive representative pitted against coherentism is emotivism. Another knock-out. Emotivism has fatal flaws too. The main problem with this theory is that it cannot properly account for moral reasoning. Instead of talking about reasons, it lapses into causal talk; and that kind of talk for Goldman does not properly describe moral phenomena as he thinks we experience them.

However, the problem here is that it is not clear where prescriptivism belongs. Such a theory can, and probably should be, interpreted

as a form of non-cognitivism. In that case, Goldman simply fails to pit his 'champion' against a worthy challenger. Another possibility is that Goldman has assimilated the prescriptivist position into his own. To some extent it makes sense to do this. Both prescriptivism and coherentism appeal to reason giving (rather than causes) in accord with the universalizability principle. Further, both can and do emphasize the prescriptive aspect of our moral experiences (or discourse). But certainly prescriptivists would not grant that just because a kind of consistency (or coherence) can be found in our moral thinking, there must be such things as moral truths and moral knowledge. It is not as if 'truth' and 'knowledge' are the only commendatory words available in our language. It is true that we sometimes hear talk about moral truths, although it is also true that we hear much less talk (except perhaps when we overhear a discussion in some philosophy department) about people having moral knowledge. More often, we hear talk not about moral rules and other moral claims being true, but being correct, right, or the like. And instead of moral knowledge, we hear talk about a person's sensitivity, awareness, or good judgment. Clearly these issues are complicated. Clearly, as well, these issues concerning truth and knowledge have not been fully addressed in *Moral Knowledge*. As a result, we really are not given a satisfactory answer to the question 'Is there moral knowledge?' What we are given is a book in which the case for a coherentist form of moral knowledge is well presented. We are also given a book containing a variety of important distinctions, clear arguments, and information about many meta-ethical issues found in the history of and in contemporary ethics. All that is enough to make *Moral Knowledge* well worth reading.

Nick Fotion
Emory University

Peter Kivy
Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990.
US $27.50. Pp. xii+226. ISBN 0-8014-2331-7.

In this, the fifth of his books on the philosophy of music, Peter Kivy discussed the experience of 'pure' music; that is, instrumental music without text, title or programme. (Kivy decides that the nature of 'pure' music can be defined with respect neither to composers' intentions nor to the character of the music itself. He settles for ostension, listing typical works of the type, such as Brahms's *Fourth Symphony*. His concern lies with the experience of such music, an experience which might be afforded by other kinds of music but which is characteristic of an appreciation of the paradigm works at the core of the instrumental repertoire.)

Kivy rejects the view that music is merely a physical stimulus, like a narcotic drug, which reacts with our sense organs to produce pleasure. Whereas one need not appreciate or understand the nature of a drug before one can experience its effects, the enjoyment of music is essentially cognitive. The enjoyment of music involves perceiving that certain things, such as counterpoint, are going on in the music, and the enjoyment of the music is the enjoyment of perceiving just those things under relevant descriptions. Kivy also rejects the view that the pleasure provided by 'pure' music is the pleasure of appreciating music as representational (at a 'deep' level, if not on the surface). As well as pointing out that the experience of 'pure' music need not take the music to be representational, he suggests that such music should not be approached in this manner since any non-musical content must be supplied by the listener because it is not present in the work, in which case the object of appreciation is not the purely musical work as such.

In arguing that the music is an object of cognition, Kivy must argue that the experience of the non-expert, musically untrained listener is no less cognitive than is that of the musicologist or composer. This he does. The description under which the music is experienced need not be a music-theoretical one. A *stretto* might be enjoyed as a musical moment in which 'things get sort of crowded', for example. The simplest melody, or even a single note, has a structure which must be perceived as a condition for enjoying its beauty. But that musical enjoyment is cognitive is not to say that one must be *aware* of what

one is thinking as one listens; the thought is revealed in the character of the descriptions which one gives (or might give) of the musical object.

To understand music is to be able to describe it. The more detailed and complex is the object as perceived, the more detailed is the description available, and, hence, the greater the level of musical understanding. The more understanding, the more appreciation. Sometimes a deeper appreciation will lead to a loss of pleasure (since the work is revealed as banal, for example), but, in general, increased appreciation of music yields increased pleasure in the experience of music. The musically untrained listener may have difficulty in verbalizing his or her 'internal' description, but this need not reveal a lack of knowledge. The performer might also find that 'words fail', but a performance may be thought of as a description (as well as an instance) of the work in that it is motivated by, and encapsulates, a particular understanding of the work which can be 'read' from it. For that matter, the ability to compose is no guarantee that the composer will understand the work as, or more, fully than the perceptive listener.

Kivy challenges the view that musical understanding involves abilities other than that involved in describing that which can be heard in the musical work. He considers the view that music possesses an inaudible micro-structure in terms of which its surface, macro-structure might be explained. He examines Rudolph Reti's analysis of the unity of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* and concludes that the analysis is unconvincing. The analyst unjustifiably attributes unifying significance to features within the work which occur as no more than the inevitable consequence of Beethoven's working within a tonal tradition. The point is not that such analyses *must* be irrelevant to musical appreciation, but that their relevance relies on their success or otherwise in making features of the music audible and thereby integrating them into the listening experience. Kivy acknowledges that composers (for example, in the Middle Ages) have used devices in their music without expecting or intending that they be heard. If such features cannot be heard in the experience of the music, they are not available (and hence not required) for musical understanding, appreciation or enjoyment. They are irrelevant to the listening experience and to the musical understanding which the description of that experience reveals.

Kivy turns to a consideration of the relation between music's expressiveness and musical appreciation. He argues that, while music is expressive of some emotions, such as sadness and happiness, it does

not move us to feel the emotions which it expresses. Music moves us by, say, the beauty and perfection of the part-writing, or the way in which the work's expressive properties are integrated into the musical fabric. The expressiveness of the music is an objective property of it; a given theme always possesses the same expressive character (unless the theme is varied in pitch, rhythm etc.). In some cases the expressiveness is like 'the fuzz on a peach' – that is, it is a concomitant of the musically significant features. In those cases the expressiveness has no musical role as such and need not be mentioned in a description of the work revealing of musical understanding. In other cases, those in which the expressiveness is dominant in that the exploitation of expressive possibilities is a musically significant feature, the work's expressiveness could not be ignored in a description revealing of musical understanding.

The final chapter attempts to explain why some works of the instrumental repertoire are considered to be profound. Although he believes that musical works may be profound, Kivy admits that his arguments fail to establish the claim. He declines the possibility of arguing that music might be profound by virtue of its expressing 'serious' emotions because he denies that music is 'about' the emotions which it expresses and he regards 'aboutness' as a necessary condition for profundity. If 'pure' music is 'about' anything, it is about the possibilities of musical sounds, about music itself. Although 'pure' music is of abiding interest and importance to many people, it is not obvious that music is worthy of great concern, that it goes to the moral heart of human life – and worthiness of that sort is identified as another necessary condition for profundity. Moreover, if musical sound is not a profound subject matter except insofar as there are profound musical works, it is not clear that the analysis of musical profundity can avoid a vicious circularity.

I find myself in sympathy with Kivy's general line, and I admire the detail and clarity of his arguments. I confine my critical remarks to just four issues.

(1) I find the discussion of 'deep' musical analysis unsatisfactory. Reti's analyses often are faulted, and with reason, but many convincing examples of this analytical approach can be found – for example, in Hans Keller's 'functional analyses'. It is clear that Keller takes himself to be exposing relationships which could be heard to perform their unifying function; it was in order to facilitate their audition that he arranged for 'performances' of his analyses. Of course, Kivy allows for the possibility that such analyses might succeed (which

makes one wonder why he devotes so much space to demonstrating the unconvincingness of Reti's analysis of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*), but note that this concession is weaker than one might at first suppose, since what is allowed is that one might come to hear hidden relationships, and not that one need accept the theory of the nature of musical unity which motivates the approach. I doubt that Kivy can so comfortably divorce music theory from the appreciative experience of the listener, given his emphasis on the way in which what one perceives is informed by one's beliefs about the nature of the object of appreciation. I suspect that he is correct in setting the pragmatic test of audiblity as establishing the credentials of some theories of musical deep structure, but I fear that the connection between such theorising and that which is audible is more subtle and complex than he acknowledges. His observation that some compositional practices are inaudible (the use of *color* and *talea* in isorhythmic motets, for instance) is correct, but this confuses the issue rather than helping his argument if it also is true that such practices are not claimed to provide the musical substrate for expressive or structural properties which might be audible and significant.

(2) While Kivy allows that the listener who lacks a technical vocabulary can understand music in his or her own fashion, he comes close to implying that technical knowledge is required for the fullest appreciation of 'pure' music (99). I don't believe that this is so. But something which may be required is not directly mentioned by Kivy at all – namely, an appreciation of the *history* of compositional and performance practice. How could one understand the 'problem' to which the last movement of Mozart's *Jupiter Symphony* is a famous solution without an awareness of the difficulties of reconciling the demands of sonata form with fugal writing? How could one understand why Mozart's concerti contain so much more thematic material than his symphonies without recognising the tension between, on the one hand, the need in a concerto to distinguish and characterise the solo instrument and, on the other, the thematic and tonal stringencies governing classical forms? How could one understand the differences between classical and baroque concerti without a knowledge of the implications of their differing formal structures, and of the contrasting stylistic principles to which those structures were adapted? Without an understanding of such issues – an understanding, be it noted, which need not be assisted by the mastery of a technical vocabulary – how could one be said to appreciate the music as such?

(3) Like Kivy, I believe that the evidence of one's musical understanding is provided by the detail and character of the descriptions that one might offer of the work. However, the suggestion that musical performance is a form of description strikes me as false. A performance (or nods, winks, pokes in the eye with a stick, or whatever) may convey information which otherwise might be conveyed by a description, but that the one might stand proxy for the other does not indicate that, in doing the same job, they do that job in the same way (that is, by describing). We do accept that a performance might reveal the performer's understanding of the work, but only because we take it that, if asked and helped, the performer could supply an appropriate description. The performer or composer who could not describe the music in a way which gave point to the choices made would strike us, I believe, as impenetrably mysterious. Of course, one might get no more than 'of these alternatives, this one sounded more right than any other, given what had been done so far and was to come. I mean, this way of phrasing the theme would make no sense given the treatment of the theme which follows'. If phenomenal descriptions may reveal the untutored listener's understanding, similar descriptions could do the same for the performer and composer.

(4) Kivy adamantly denies that music is 'about' anything, except, perhaps, its own materials. Where the materials are inherently expressive of emotion, the expressiveness is not 'about' the world of human emotion; the exhibition of expressiveness need not involve representation or reference, he says. But when the composer intentionally appropriates and exploits the expressive character inherent in musical materials, is it not possible sometimes to consider the likelihood of reference? Even if musical materials are 'naturally expressive', the intentional use of this natural property might make reference possible. (I might use a spotty-faced student as an example of the acned condition. The student's pimples do not refer to acne, but my unkind use of them may do so.) For this reason I think that Kivy too quickly dismisses the possibility of musical reference and, in doing so, the chance of explaining the profundity of music as residing, at least in part, in its expressive power.

Stephen Davies
University of Auckland

Patrick T. Mackenzie
The Problems of Philosophers.
Buffalo: Prometheus Books 1989. Pp. 314.
US $15.95. ISBN 0-87975-486-9.

This book is an introductory text for beginning philosophy students. It is not the usual collage of selections from the writings of famous philosophers interspersed by succinct editorial summaries and comments. The entire volume was written by Mackenzie. He characterizes his aim in the Preface: 'I wanted to deal with the main problems of philosophy but approach them through the writings of a number of influential thinkers. In this way, the reader could be taken to the heart of philosophy via a gentler, less austere route.' (The other route, presumably, would be to take students to philosophy via the reading of original sources.) To this end Mackenzie provides exposition and critical discussion of assorted philosophical topics and thinkers.

The book consists of seven chapters plus a one-page Introduction – in which Mackenzie declines to say what philosophy is – and a two-page Appendix, in which he opines that philosophy is the endeavor to remove 'linguistic aberrations' which lead to problems and confusions (313). Philosophy is always difficult because 'we cannot step outside of our language' (314).

Chapter 1 covers Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, and Lucretius in about thirty pages. The main focus is the atomism of Lucretius, with its picture of the world as consisting of nothing but atoms and empty space. Mackenzie traces some implications of atomism regarding life after death, the nature of perception, acts of will, and the existence of gods.

Chapter 2 discusses Plato and Socrates with reference to *The Republic*. Mackenzie traces the challenge to justice and morality as presented by Thrasymachus and recast by Glaucon and Adeimantus. He then relates Socrates' attempt to demonstrate the true nature of justice and its necessary connection with happiness. Mackenzie provides several pages of sensible general criticism.

Chapter 3 changes the pace with a short critical thinking text. It covers many of the familiar dogmas of logic, such as analytic and synthetic statements, inductive and deductive arguments, validity and soundness, contradiction, inconsistency, truth tables, entailment, and so forth. The latter part of the chapter discusses informal fallacies. The examples provided to illustrate each fallacy are interesting and often amusing.

Chapter 4 presents René Descartes in a 40-page exposition of the *Meditations*. Each of the six meditations is given close and sympathetic attention. Chapter 5 is about the existence of God. Mackenzie discusses Aquinas, Anselm, Kierkegaard, and William James. His conclusion is that 'no argument can be found to give us any reason to believe that there is or is not a god' (221). In closing he briefly considers the suggestion, which he credits to Wittgenstein, that 'religious claims are not to be taken in a literal way, that what they do is express one's attitude toward life' (222).

Chapter 6, entitled 'Problems of Philosophy', contains Mackenzie's own argument to the effect that we have no reason to doubt that there is an external world, even though we cannot prove the existence of God as Descartes thought we had to do. The argument is admittedly roundabout (225) and it leads the reader across a dark continent: the Cartesian mind/body problem and its relation to human freedom. Mackenzie outlines the contributions of epiphenomenalism, identity theory, and compatibilism. His own solution, supported by several pages of difficult argument, lies in the discovery that the problems about our knowledge of the external world and about human freedom rest on mistaken assumptions. In particular 'the belief that there is a mind, and that what goes on in the mind goes on largely as a result of what goes on in the body, is mistaken. We come to think that there is a mind because we are misled by the fact that we can think about human beings in two radically different ways' (249). Thus skepticism regarding perception dissolves. So does the problem about human freedom. If we speak of a human being as a *person*, we rightly assume that he is free; if we speak of the same human as an organism or mechanism, it makes no sense to say that he is free (250).

Chapter 7 deals with what Mackenzie takes to be the central problem of moral philosophy: the linkage, if any, between fact and value. The chapter touches on the relation of religion and morality, discusses varieties of egoism, and distinguishes moral relativism from cultural relativism. Utilitarianism is presented with brief references to Bentham, Mill, G.E. Moore, Sir David Ross, and unnamed Rule utilitarians. Kant is treated more fully, with about 10 pages devoted to his discovery of 'the shape of morality' (292).

Would *The Problems of Philosophers* be a good choice for the classroom? It certainly has some virtues. Mackenzie's writing style is clear, fresh, and entertaining. The pace is brisk and the book probably would be an *engaging* one for many students. However, the instructor may find, as I do, that Mackenzie's book has some annoying features and

one serious defect. At times his writing, while never austere, becomes too causal or conversational for my taste. Also, I wish Mackenzie wouldn't say such things as 'Perhaps the Greeks and Romans were more emotional than we are' (34). A text cannot prevent silly speculations, but it shouldn't encourage them. A more serious annoyance is Mackenzie's tendency to indulge in expository digressions. For instance, in the middle of the discussion of Lucretius and his atomism, Mackenzie pauses to report on the main varieties of metaphysics available, Materialism, Idealism, and Dualism. In two pages he tells the reader about Thomas Hobbes, twentieth-century behaviorists, George Berkeley, and Descartes (32-3). Beginning students will surely find such digressions confusing and distracting.

My main objection to using Mackenzie's book in the classroom, however, is that it does not encourage the reading of original philosophical texts. In the Preface, Mackenzie says, 'In order to get the most out of this journey, the reader would do well to have some important classics on hand.' But why would a student read Lucretius or Descartes in the raw when he has a predigested version on hand?

William Davie
University of Oregon

G.B. Madison
The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press
1989. Pp. xvi+206.
US $35.00. ISBN 0-253-32190-5.

The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity is a collection of essays on figures in Continental philosophy such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricœur and on metaphysics and certain of its themes – analogy, the mind-body problem, and the imagination – in relation to phenomenological hermeneutics. Although the first of the essays is written at a considerably earlier time than the others, Madison succeeds in articulating an integrated postmodern philosophy and in applying this philosophy to the dissolution or reformulation of

traditional metaphysical problems and indeed the entire metaphysical enterprise.

However it is also very important to state what Madison understands by postmodern philosophy in comparison to many other understandings of this popular term. As is usually the case, postmodern obtains its meaning in comparison to and reaction against modern philosophy. By 'modern philosophy' Madison has in mind a philosophical tradition beginning with Descartes and emphasizing epistemological foundationalism and the dichotomies between mind and matter and subject and object. Madison's postmodern philosophy reacts against and seeks to overcome these themes but does not oppose Enlightenment goals for politics and morality. Indeed what he claims of Merleau-Ponty and his support for the liberal tradition is also clearly true of him: Merleau-Ponty is called postmodern, but not a 'postmodernistic thinker' (72). Therefore by Madison's meaning of the term if not his own, Habermas is in many respects a postmodern thinker and almost all of contemporary Continental philosophy and indeed much of current Anglo-American philosophy is similarly post-Cartesian.

If so much of current philosophy is postmodern under Madison's understanding of the term, then what is the specific contribution of his form of postmodern philosophy? That contribution comes in the demonstration that phenomenology, a usual target of postmodernistic if not postmodern attack, can be viewed as an important and thoroughgoingly postmodern source of thought. This viewpoint to the entire phenomenological tradition can be put forward, if Husserl's advocacy of *strenge Wissenschaft* (strict science) is tempered by the recognition of the great importance of the later introduction of the concept of the *Lebenswelt* (life world) into his project, which leads to its failure in terms of earlier ideals but its actual success in its contribution to the overcoming of Cartesianism (Chapter Three). The importance of the life world and lived experience is capitalized on by Merleau-Ponty who overcomes subject-object duality in his later work *The Visible and the Invisible* with his concept of the 'flesh' (Chapter Four). Finally the philosohical hermeneutics of Gadamer – as opposed to the objective hermeneutics of Hirsch (Chapter One) – provides the full historical dimension to Madison's postmodernity, and the integration of hermeneutics and phenomenology by Ricoeur allows for a 'hermeneutics of the subject' that can withstand postmodernistic critiques (Chapters Two, Five, Six, and Seven).

Madison's comprehensive viewpoint to the entire tradition of phenomenological thinkers is a very useful and indeed defensible

reading of phenomenology into the most contemporary problematics. Therefore his conception of postmodern philosophy has a great attractiveness to it. However, his attacks on postmodern*istic* thinking and his attempt to dissolve the mind-body problem are not likely to make converts among, for example, Derrideans or Dennettites. Deconstruction is too quickly associated with the charge of nihilism and the 'nonquantum-mechanical computational model' of the mind is too quickly posed with what are not obviously 'insurmountable problems.' Nevertheless Madison makes a valuable contribution within the context of phenomenological hermeneutics and of postmodern thought in the interesting way that he conceives it.

Jerry Wallulis
University of South Carolina

Nathan Salmon and **Scott Soames, eds.**
Propositions and Attitudes.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1988. Pp. vi+282.
Cdn $55.00: US $39.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-875092-7);
Cdn $17.95: US $11.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-875091-9).

This volume is part of the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series. It is a valuable and useful book. Salmon and Soames have collected together eleven papers (plus selections from the Frege-Russell correspondence), on propositions and the analysis of states of propositional attitude. Two are their own contributions. Seven of the twelve pieces in the volume date from 1979 or since. The other five are earlier statements of 'classic' positions or arguments in the literature of propositional attitude by Frege, Russell, Church, and Putnam.

The dialectic guiding selection and arrangement is clearly one of convergence on the positions defended by the editors, a pure 'Russellian' or referential conception of propositions as information contents containing the entities denoted by the 'directly referential' singular terms in the sentence complement expressing the proposition. The

Salmon-Soames view (there are minor divergences between the two, but it is essentially a shared conception) – its immediate antecedent lies in Kaplan's work – is a highly specific, in part technically dense, and in part not-obvious (less sympathetically: counter-intuitive) position. The result is a collection that in some of its constituents is fairly demanding on the reader, and in most focuses attention on the subtleties of just one conception of the logic of propositional attitude. However, that conception is a currently popular one, so one has in the Salmon-Soames anthology an up-to-date centre focus compilation of leading voices and views in a large ongoing literature. The book would find particular use as a text at the graduate level. It would be too technically daunting even for senior undergraduate classes, but should be a very appropriate choice for a graduate class on propositions, propositional attitude, or referential semantics.

One shining virtue of the volume is its inclusion of the 'classic' background material Salmon and Soames have assembled. Russell's 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' is a very fine piece, clear and sharply focused in ways that much later Russell work is not. Frege's 'Thoughts' is also splendid. (It is doubtless too late to do much about it, but the essay really should be called 'Propositions': Fregean *Gedanke* are patently technical items, and systematic replacement of the word with 'propositions' in the essay makes for a vastly more illuminating English read.) And the two Church pieces reconfirm their author's stature as one of the finest philosophical minds of the century. Indeed, if one has not been persuaded by the central position advocated in the volume, one may find, as this reader did, the classic material – together with John Perry's delightful and important paper 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical' – the best part of the collection.

The Soames-Salmon positions on propositional attitude, shared also (with divergences) with David Kaplan and Mark Richard mean to alter what may be thought of as a prior, and for some still prevailing orthodoxy. That orthodoxy is the theory of referential transparency and opacity, partly introduced by Russell, and more fully associated, in different ways, with Church and Quine. The classic position – in its Frege-Church form – putatively replaced by referential semantics identifies abstract propositions as truth-value-bearers and objects of belief-states, individuated (in some theories identical to) meanings of declarative sentences without indexicals. In Quinean form this classic position nominalistically discountenances propositions, but regards certain classes of sentences or sentential 'contexts' as referentially

opaque – not guaranteeing substitutivity of co-referential expressions salve veritate – among them the central core of the sentences expressing 'propositional attitudes'. S might believe that *a* is F, but not believe that *b* is F, even though $a = b$.

A modification or elaboration upon the classic position, developed in the 1960s, distinguished de re from de dicto states of propositional attitude; so, even if S doesn't believe that *b* is F, in our sample frame, S believes – in this sense – *of b* that it is F. (De re propositional attitude states then receive appropriately modified Platonistic-propositional construal, or nominalist-sentential, according as the given theorist inclined.)

Modifying and extending Russellian semantics for proper names Salmon et al. take the meanings of ordinary proper names to be the objects they denote. The result is that for these Neo-Russellians believing (or asserting) that *a* is F *is* believing (or asserting) that *b* is F – where $a = b$. Kaplan's distinction between character and content – which for me is never genuinely adequately explained, or motivated, either by Kaplan or any of his followers – is utilized, or modified (as in Salmon's distinction between a proposition and a *way* in which the proposition is apprehended) to try to fit standard intuitions about belief and assertion.

A considerable degree of ingenuity, and much formal machinery, go into the effort to fully 'referentialize' indirect discourse, but it does not, it seems to me, succeed. Soames' (and Salmon's) attempted rejection of truth conditional semantics is – tolerably – easy to resist; and it has costs they acknowledge but attempt to smooth over. In fact there seems to be no barrier to continuing to hold the classic position, in either propositionalist or sententialist form, so long as one keeps also de re propositional attitudes, and so long as one advocates a partly holistic theory of states of propositional attitude – i.e., a theory that holds that the ascription of such a state cannot be guaranteed (though of course it will normally be inductively implied) by isolated episodes of sentential assent or dissent, but rather may require taking account of relevant behavioural and historical information. The latter is, it seems to me, the basis for solving Kripke's alleged 'puzzle' about belief: the case of Pierre, the once monoglot, later bilingual Frenchman who has formerly believed 'Londres est jolie', now believes 'London is not pretty', and – apparently – has not surrendered his earlier view (remaining ignorant that Londres = London). That is, we should affirm that it isn't true that Pierre still believes that London is pretty (or that 'Londres est jolie' expresses one of his

beliefs). He may think he believes this, but he doesn't; because his history, and his behaviour have changed. Similar remarks attach to a case discussed in Soames' paper, which depends on non-anaphoric pronominal reference.

Finally, the Salmon-Soames position has more or less nothing to say about propositional attitude when directed upon contents that include apparent referents of non-denoting singular referring expressions.

The whole complicated – extremely complicated (as it becomes in the semantics developed by Kaplan, Richard, and Soames) – story seems to this reviewer finally more trouble than it is worth. Why not return to the 'classical' view, with a *partly* referential semantics for singular terms? (So, '*b*''s meaning is referring to *b as b; 'a*''s to *b as a*. Then we could hold – as surely we should if we can – that *a* is F and *b* is F do say something different – as do $a = b$ and $a = a$ – and likewise the assertions in which they are complement-objects.)

The post-1979 philosophers represented here take it to be a virtue of their approach that it provides formal semantical treatment for pronominal expressions functioning non-anaphorically as singular terms. Certainly they studiously ignore Frege's conviction (53), implicit in the classical position, that sentences containing non-anaphoric pronouns, or indexical expressions, 'are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of' a proposition. Problems that develop in these papers, leading to the implausible complexities that their authors then seek to persuade themselves of, may be held to constitute an unintentional reductio of the denial of the Fregan view.

There are only a few misprints or similar slips, at least that I noted. One, curiously, is a mistaken death date for Russell, who is said on p. 276 to have died a year before the actual date.

There are many other important papers on propositions that could have been included in the anthology. Of course it is difficult to select among more papers than were possible to include. One paper that should at least have appeared in the bibliography at the end (it too is deliberately selective) is E.J. Lemmon's still relevant 'Sentences, Statements, and Propositions'.

Peter Loptson
University of Saskatchewan

Liora Salter; with the assistance of **Edwin Levy** and **William Leiss**
Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988. Pp. 221.
US $64.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-55608-057-3);
US $24.00 (paper: ISBN 1-55608-077-8).

What happens to science when it becomes a servant of public policy? Can science effectively determine when exposure to hazardous chemicals is unsafe? These questions form the foundation of this richly researched and thoughtfully written work, entitled *Mandated Science*, that examines the role scientists play in setting health and safety standards.

Based on research conducted over two years, involving more than two hundred interviews, with in-depth interviews of over eighty scientists directly involved in creating workplace and environmental health and safety standards, the authors examine how 'mandated science' – conducted for the purposes of making public policy – affects scientific interpretations of risk. Four case studies, the heart of the book, illustrate how social, legal and economic values influence the complex and ambiguous relationship between science and public policy in the creation and use of standards. The authors argue that science mandated to produce conclusions supporting policy decisions 'had a significant impact upon the conduct of scientific activity, and the interpretation of scientific information' (186).

The first two cases focus on the standards setting activities of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), which sets 'threshhold limit values' or 'TLVs' for workplace airborne contaminants, and the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) which sets international maximum residue limits or 'MRLs' for pesticides on food products. A number of significant dilemmas are revealed by the analysis. While both are considered public organizations neither used public hearings and maintained low profiles in arriving at their standards. While their standards were issued only as guidelines and were regarded as scientifically neutral, they nonetheless were imbued with regulatory judgements, with considerable influence on public policy. Ironically, participants considered themselves industry 'watchdogs' but relied extensively on industry connections and cooperation in their decision-making.

The remaining two cases focus on so-called 'political chemicals' that sparked intense public debate over pollution control, viz., the Toronto lead controversy and the debate over the use of the wood preservative pentachlorophenal, particularly as it erupted in British Columbia. The central issue in both these cases involved concerns about how best to revise existing standards given new but complicating evidence regarding hazards to health. An important part of the debate involved concerns about whether a dispassionate scientific assessment of this evidence was even possible. In both cases, scientists were attacked as biased and lacking credibility, turning science into an ideological instrument of power politics.

The analysis of these cases challenges the widely accepted rationalist view that the assessment of risk is distinguishable from questions about how to manage risk. Preferring to label this two-stage approach to risk assessment as involving 'truth-seeking and justice-seeking' activities, the authors assert that mandated science is more properly characterized by a mixture of both scientific and value disputes that canot be disentangled. 'Standard setting involves science, values, public policy, and legal, trade, and economic relationships (and)...cannot be understood without paying attention to each' (183). The authors conclude that while standards are primarily aimed at protecting public health and safety, ' ... decisions about accepting them are taken for many other reasons' (185).

These conclusions suggest several crucial questions about the role of science and values in the assessment of risk. What role does advocacy play in this process and can the lay public contribute to the truth-seeking activities of science? If the conduct of mandated science exists in an inherently adversarial context where participants must take a stand, how can scientists maintain their traditional commitment to dispassionate inquiry? Does an overly idealized image of science create unrealistic expectations that science is well-suited to resolve public controversies about the acceptablity of risk? How should we deal with the inevitable range of uncertainties that infect the determination of public policy in the management of risk? Finally, does the opaqueness and incommensurability of the languages of science and public policy undermine the communication of information so necessary to the establishment of acceptable public policies?

The authors' discussion of these questions reveals the richness of their analysis and suggest new avenues for future research. The case materials provide a level of detail and realism that gives their conclusions and inquiries the impact of seeing something new and

important. This is a conceptually endowed and empirically fruitful study of how science in the context of setting public policy is something different than we expect, and perhaps, than we desire. *Mandated Science* provides the grist for transforming windmills into challenges that test our judgement and convictions about what science can do for us.

Albert Flores
California State University Fullerton

Anthony Savile
Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1989.
Pp. ix+254.
Cdn $75.95; US $45.00. ISBN 0-631-15819-7.

In this book, Anthony Savile reconstructs and assesses the central arguments of three classic works in aesthetics, Lessing's *Laocoon*, Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, and Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Savile treats each of these works as a self-contained text, devoting three chapters each to Lessing and Kant and two chapters to Schiller. In what follows, I shall present some of the issues that Savile discusses and comment on the usefulness and appeal of his approach.

Lessing believes that artists are constrained by their media. His *Laocoon* is a sustained attack on the 'transparency thesis', the claim that any art is capable of representing any subject. Savile examines various arguments that Lessing offers in support of his view and maintains that none of them succeeds. The three chapters on Lessing are quite different in tone and texture. In Chapter One Savile analyzes an argument about beauty: Greek sculptors could not represent Laocoon writhing in agony. To do so would create a distorted, therefore not beautiful, therefore not successful work of art. Since the notion of distortion has no application to poetry, painting and sculpture are constrained in ways that art is not. Savile recasts Lessing's argument

in terms of *graphic* representation and a special canon of Hellenic artistic beauty (13ff). Much of the discussion is tediously rigorous. The section eventuates in a 22-line valid formalization of the argument, but this applies only to art which takes beauty as its goal.

Chapter Two focuses on two claims advanced by Lessing, the Beauty Thesis ('beauty has no place in poetry' [29]) and the Subject Matter Thesis ('the proper objects of painting and sculpture [are] bodies, and those of poetry [are] actions' [34-5]). Returning to Lessing's definition of beauty as harmonious effects which the eye can take in at a glance (6), Savile argues that this unity must be interpreted experientially, not temporally (32). Since any restriction to spatial juxtaposition would be wholly arbitrary (33), 'the actions and sequences of events that poetry depicts are just as good candidates for the qualification "beautiful" as are bodies' (34).

Savile's account of the Subject Matter Thesis is a bit more complicated. Noting Lessing's claim that in graphic representation 'there must be an easy accomodation between the signs and the represented object' (40), Savile examines cases where this easy accomodation seems to fail. Paintings cannot depict actions and events because the juxtaposition of their signs makes it impossible to see these things in them (45). Nor can paintings represent change unless the signs themselves register that change. Poetry exhibits a similar shortcoming. Borrowing a distinction from Richard Wollheim, Savile argues that the facts of our psychology make it practically impossible for poems to graphically represent bodies, that is, to make us vividly imagine them using the passive rather than the active imagination (57-9).

While these conclusions about the limitations of painting and poetry establish Lessing's negative case, Savile argues that Lessing fails to establish the positive case. He does not show that poetry is suited only to the representation of actions and painting only to that of bodies because he wrongly treats events as atomic (61). The restrictions posed by memory and synthetic imagination apply as much to poetry's representation of events as to painting's representation of bodies. Savile argues that Lessing must 'relax the notion of the graphic as it applies to poetry' (62) and grant that poetry involves the reader's active as well as passive imagination. As a result, 'the poet now is ultimately free to select his subject matter at will ... ' (63).

Savile's final chapter on Lessing concerns the imagination. Lessing believes that this faculty allows us to return time and time again to great works of art. He also believes that certain restrictions on subject matter are required for deep and extended viewing (66). Savile

distinguishes three varieties of imagination – exploratory, projective, and ampliative (71-88). He proposes that only the ampliative imagination answers to Lessing's remarks about the endlessness of art (87), but he insists that the functioning of this faculty establishes no substantive difference between painting and poetry (95).

The chapters on Kant offer an interpretation of the central argument of the Third Critique, Kant's transcendental deduction of the judgment of taste. Savile takes up Kant's difficult claims that 1) the beautiful pleases universally apart from any concepts, and 2) the beautiful is cognized as object of necessary delight (112). He proposes an account of necessary delight which both distinguishes the beautiful from the agreeable and allows claims that something is beautiful to be contingently true. This turns on taking 'necessary' to mean 'non-accidental' or 'non-fortuitous' (124). Thus something is beautiful if it is non-fortuitously the case that all those who disinterestedly contemplate it are pleased by it.

In the chapter 'Cognition and Taste' Savile explores the analogy between cognitive and aesthetic judgments and the role of pleasure in each. Pleasure and its projection to others is relevant to the cognitive case because in acquiring perceptual knowledge we form representations. This is an active matter (135). Continually faced with a choice of whether to rest with a given representation or elaborate it further, we 'stop at a point that we find matches sensibility to imagination and understanding in a way that we find pleasing or satisfying' (136). Moreover, we believe that this will satisfy others as well, that certain representations will be 'universally (and necessarily) pleasing' (137).

Savile does not believe that taste and cognition are entirely similar. He maintains that cognitive and aesthetic pleasures are different in kind (140). He also claims that the transcendental deduction of a common sense (142-3) is not mirrored in the aesthetic case. Accordingly, in Chapter Six Savile formulates an alternative aesthetic deduction. He construes taste as an artificial faculty which must be acquired. The universality of taste applies only to those who have acquired it. Savile explicates the 'aesthetic ought' – the claim that others ought to agree with our judgments of taste – in terms of the aesthetic ideas embodied in particular objects, both works of art and elements from nature (169ff). These ideas have an interest for us and we have good reason to engage with them (177). Moreover, the exploration and appreciation of these ideas is itself pleasurable (176). This secures the connection among interest, pleasure, and beauty needed for Kant's deduction. 'Hence the concept *beauty* is legitimate' (179).

Savile's closing chapters try to elucidate Schiller's conception of beauty as 'a necessary condition of man's existence' (195). Savile presents Schiller's basic metaphysical principles which oppose Person or Self to Condition or Determinations (199) and suggests that we are rationally required to seek perfection or the maximization of our essence (201). That is, we must maximize both self-consciousness (Person) and variety of experience (Condition) (207). Harmony and beauty enter in as we seek an optimal combination of the two (212). Thus '*beauty in man* is nothing other than the way in which the ideally harmonized balance of his metaphysical constituents ... is manifested in appearance' (214). Freedom is thereby achieved because 'when the forces of sense and reason are in balance, all tension between them is resolved and they cease to exercise any constraint on man' (214). This then connects beauty with the ideal state.

In his final chapter, Savile discusses the mechanism by which, according to Schiller, beauty forms moral character. Love is the connection between the aesthetic and the moral. The artist is empowered to form a deeply attaching vision of the ideal (232). Beauty begets love which in turn begets benevolence. Aided by the artist's imagination, we form loving attachments to beautiful things and also to others' values (249). 'The ability to feel one's own way into the situation of others, into perspectives that are not one's own, is both (practically) necessary for stable moral character and scarcely something to be achieved on a wide scale without something akin to imaginative engagement with the arts' (250).

Savile emphasizes that this, like his account of Kant, is a reconstruction, a line of argument that Schiller could have taken but did not (249-50). Thus overall, Savile deems Lessing's project a failed one, but finds arguments to complete the programs of Kant and Schiller.

Savile's own project is equally difficult to assess. He is dealing with exceedingly dense and difficult material. His book is at times equally off-putting. Here is one sample sentence that I reread several times before giving up in despair: 'If we rejected the thought that this sort of "benevolence" was morally required, then not to have it would not be to have a character of which it was false to say "duty flowed as if by instinct" ' (251).

The format Savile has chosen does not yield a traditional commentary on the works he discusses. The lack of a topical index further limits the book's usefulness. Overall, I think these authors might

have been better served if the arguments Savile unpacks, examines, and reconstructs with such thoroughness and rigor had been lightened instead – discussed so that their central issues become accessible and engaging.

Stephanie Ross
University of Missouri – St. Louis

Richard Sorabji, ed.
Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence.
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1990.
Pp. x+545.
US $65.00. ISBN 0-8014-2432-1.

'Since the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Berlin corpus of Greek commentators on Aristotle was published, historians of ancient philosophy have had at their disposal the materials for studying not only the commentators' exegetical merits, but also their own philosophical views. But the availability of the texts has not yet resulted in research to match their volume and historical importance.' So begins Koenraad Verrycken's paper, 'The Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology', chapter 11 of the twenty chapters that comprise this valuable survey of current scholarship on the 15,000 pages of Greek text in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG)*, 'the longest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not previously been translated into English or other modern European languages' (24), as the editor observes. (Volumes have begun to appear in the series of English translations that Sorabji himself is editing, which will cover a substantial portion of the corpus, and related projects are under way in France and Italy.) The commentaries we possess begin in the second century AD and continue for about a thousand years, centering about an important cluster of Neoplatonic writers working mainly in Athens and Alexandria between the fourth and sixth centuries, although these texts preserve evidence of still earlier phases of the tradition.

The essays collected in this volume are all either new (six) or recent (1958 and onward), except for a classic review (in German) of

the original Greek edition, including a brilliant description of questions for future research, by Karl Praechter (ch. 2), which appeared in 1909 and is translated here for the first time. They include, besides the introductory chapter, a magisterial study of the earliest Greek commentators (H.B. Gottschalk), whose works are known only through later references or citations, papers on individual figures such as Themistius ('The Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?', H.J. Blumenthal), Porphyry ('The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle', P. Hadot; logic, S. Ebbesen), Syrianus' view of Aristotle (H.D. Saffrey), Ammonius's metaphysics (Verrycken), Philoponus (cited at the beginning of this review), Simplicius' 'Life and Work' (I. Hadot), and Boethius (J. Shiel, Ebbesen), as well as studies devoted to groups of commentators ('The School of Alexander?', R.W. Sharples; the Alexandrians' practice in writing introductions, L.G. Westerink) or commentaries (on *de Anima*, H.J. Blumenthal; on *Ethics*, H.P.F. Mercken), or to special topics or problems ('infinite power', Sorabji; 'The Origins of Medieval Logic', Ebbesen'; 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Abstraction', I. Mueller; 'An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena' and its contribution to our knowledge of twelfth-century Byzantine Aristotelianism, R. Browning). A forty-page 'Select Bibliography of Secondary Literature' concludes the volume. In all, the essays and bibliography provide the most extensive and reliable introduction available in English to the tradition, and the book is invaluable to anyone interested in Aristotle, his commentators, the history of Byzantine philosophy and intellectual culture, and the transmission of classical learning to the modern world.

The approach adopted in most of the chapters is in the first instance historical and philological, rather than philosophical. Thus, Verrycken sets forth the evidence for a change in Philoponus' thought in or about 529, the year that Justinian forbade the teaching of philosophy by pagans in Athens. To be sure, this is an investigation of philosophical issues, and, as Verrycken says, 'the distinction between Philoponus 1 and Philoponus 2 at the level of doctrine is independent of my chronology' (273), but the concern is to establish the chronology, rather than with the intrinsic interest of the philosophical problems raised or solved by Philoponus at whatever stage of his intellectual career. Philoponus' influence on Boethius, Syrianus' respect for Plato, the absence of Neoplatonic thinking in Themistius' paraphrases of Aristotle and how such thinking affected Simplicius' reading of the *Categories* – these are the kinds of questions that are centrally addressed. Only a few essays, such as Sorabji's on infinite

power, Ebbesen's on Porphyrian logic, or Mueller's on abstraction, take a philosophical problem as their point of departure, and even in these the emphasis remains on the evolution of a notion through successive commentators, rather than on, say, a philosophical puzzle within Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism and the quality of the solutions propounded. There is little in this collection of the partisanship, the feeling of arguing with contemporaries over still living and urgent questions, that informs much of the scholarship on Plato and Aristotle, for example, and even, at least recently, on the Hellenistic schools. It is more a matter of getting the record straight than of opening up new areas of philosophical speculation. Thus, when Blumenthal insists on the necessity of attending to the Neoplatonism of the commentators, it is in order to enable 'a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship' (305).

This is understandable enough, for two reasons. First, the commentators are still pretty much virgin territory (cf. Verrycken, 199), and what is needed in the first instance is a set of topographical maps, assembled by those who have waded through all 15,000 pages of this wilderness. Second, the commentary form itself, and the way in which it evolves by incorporating (and often arguing with) materials from earlier stages in the tradition, encourages a historical approach. There is an almost insuperable sense that the commentary is a derivative genre, parasitical on authoritative philosophical texts rather than a source of immediate and original thought. At best, the creative work of the commentators tends to be seen in their capacity to achieve compromises between contending doctrines, as in Verrycken's conclusion that 'with Ammonius, something like a specifically Alexandrian Neoplatonism emerges, characterised by a tendency to simplify the complicated system of Proclus ... the "Neoplatonisation" of Aristotle was Ammonius' main achievement' (231). But the commentators contributed much to the analysis of particular issues (see, e.g., Gottschalk's incidental remarks on Boethus concerning time and substance, 75-7), and the present volume will surely inspire others in which the emphasis is more centrally on the Aristotelian commentators as philosophers.

David Konstan
(*Classics and Comparative Literature*)
Brown University

Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

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is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

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R.A. Shiner