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Jerome V. Brown

MAILED IN AUGUST 1990

Donald C. Abel
Freud On Instinct and Morality.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1989. Pp. xix+123.
US $34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0024-7);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0025-5).

Many commentators on Freud have remarked that, though claiming to be merely investigating facts, he had important moral ambitions that reveal themselves in his work. Abel joins the ranks of these commentators with the publication of this interesting, but flawed, study. His contention is that a 'relatively comprehensive' set of principles for the guidance of life can be found in Freud's accounts of our instincts. Those accounts, in all their variety, amount to, he claims, a doctrine of egoistic – or 'individualistic' – hedonism. According to Abel, Freud's moral message is that each of us should seek to be as happy as possible. Our only inescapable duties are to ourselves. Prudence and an appreciation of reality will sometimes dictate that we bond ourselves in loyalty to others and to the tasks of civilization, but those bonds will always be only of instrumental value. Whatever moral force they might have will vanish the moment they cease to serve our private, hedonistic interests. Abel acknowledges that this may not be a defensible moral stand, but it is, he insists, the stand that those who accept Freud's description of our instincts are, knowingly or not, committing themselves to.

The argument supporting this thesis has three primary premises: (1) that for Freud the 'essence of our nature' is instinctual; (2) that our instincts are egoistic and hedonistic; (3) that people should live in a way that fulfills their nature.

The core of Abel's study is devoted to establishing the truth of premise number (2), and here his work is both cautious and creditable. He acknowledges that Freud abandoned an early duality between sexual and ego instincts in favor of a late duality between life and death instincts, and that an erotic, communitarian as well as a thanatopic, masochistic strand of analysis, neither of which is fully compatible with a biological doctrine of egoistic hedonism, is present in Freud's writings. Those strands, however, yield no moral doctrines, according to Abel, and they do not, even in the latest works, replace a continuing commitment by Freud to the view that our basic urges are both selfish and hedonistic.

Abel posits without argument premises (1) and (3), and here he fails to deal with what most anyone, including Freud, would acknowledge:

that the aims of an instinct may not be the aims of an organism. The aim of a sexual instinct may be what Freud thought it was: reproduction. Yet that may not be the aim of copulating animals. No instinct would seem to aim at justice, yet Freud proclaims in *The Future of An Illusion* that a driving force of human history is the desire for justice. An instinct can readily strike us as something alien to our aspirations – something that we have to cope with, not obey. What Freud calls the 'primacy of the intellect over the life of the instincts' just might amount, indeed, to what 'moral maturity' means. Thus, though our nature might be aptly described as consisting of instincts, it does not follow that their ends either must or should be our own. An instinctually driven cancer cell might expend its energy on drilling a hole through a man's cornea, but why should he adjust his aims to its? With an answer to that question hard to come by, the import of premise number (1) is undermined.

So is the truth of premise number (3). It is certainly false if taken as a description of Freud's position. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud adopts a version of Kant's historiography, arguing that 'a great human community' – Kant's Kingdom of Ends – seems to be what our civilization is leading us to. That community would be most successful if no attention had to be paid to the happiness of individuals – if, that is, Kant were right that we might in the name of duty evolve someday to a point where we had no need of satisfaction or happiness. Freud, of course, expresses doubts that we or our progeny will ever evolve into Kantian Stoics, and he, like Kant's Romantic critics, often takes the side of the morally harried who are made miserable with their efforts to live up to ideals that are beyond them. It is this side of Freud's stance that Abel emphasizes, using it as evidence that Freud implicitly adopts premise number (3) as his ethic. That, however, is not so. Freud's pleas on behalf of relaxing the moral and social demands placed upon us are not moral ones. They are not demands in the name of duty. They resemble the pleas we make to the overly conscientious, reminding them that duty has a limit – that they need not sacrifice everything to the responsibilities of job and home. If a moral theory is present in such pleas, it does not amount to a claim that living in accord with our instincts is obligatory. Telling someone to remember himself is not the same as asking him to understand that duty requires self-indulgence.

Abel's premise number (3) is an inaccurate description of Freud's position for another reason. Freud is Augustinian in his pessimistic assessment of our instincts. They are so unrealistic and so poorly

designed that anyone who would try to live an untrammeled life would be doomed to failure. He would live as mad as he dreams. The Oedipal desires of the young, for example, are instinctual but pathological and impossible of fulfillment. Our most pressing problem is that our minds, where intelligence might come to rule, are themselves ridden with instinctual commitments to pleasure. We natively think, not for the sake of truth, but for the sake of pleasures that fantasy and illusion offer. It is therefore imperative that we inure our minds to pain, renounce pleasure and evolve – so far as our brains are concerned – a goodly way toward Kant's ideal of a Kingdom of Ends whose citizens are fully rational beings. Only then will we have the prospect of coping with an instinctual nature that makes us born psychopaths. Abel acknowledges Freud's point that an acceptance of truth requires renunciation, but that, he holds, is only a price Freud would have us pay for the eventual reward of instinctual gratification that would come with the rule of intelligence over the life of the instincts. Since, however, that rule would have for Freud social and moral, as well as epistemological, imperatives – 'Tell the truth' for example – Abel's position is subject to the complaint Bishop Butler made to ethical hedonism: to call the satisfactions that come with meeting one's commitments to profession, family and community egoistic is to misuse the English language.

With the failure of premise number (3) Abel's concluding thesis is also in ruin. The moral vision that can be seen in Freud's work is Kantian, not Epicurean. Those who accept Freud's views are not committed to an ethic of egoistic hedonism.

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D.M. Armstrong
Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.
Boulder, Co: Westview Press 1989.
Pp. xii+148.
US $38.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0763-5);
US $11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0772-4).

This book is part of a series, the Focus Series, intended primarily for undergraduates; the series editors hope to provide, not general 'overviews', but rather 'examples of short, accessible studies of central,

more specific, topics' (blurb). *Universals* certainly fulfills this rubric admirably. It is written in a straightforward, readable style, and should give a student new to the topic a fair idea of the main outlines of some questions – and/or pseudo-questions – concerning universals.

That some of the questions he asks might be pseudo-questions is clearly not a possibility that Armstrong takes very seriously: in his Preface (xii) he says that he will 'not consider, except incidentally, the view of the later Wittgenstein that the whole Nominalist/Realist controversy is ... a mistake due to our misunderstandings of our own language.' I think it is not only Wittgenstein that would regard (what Armstrong presents as) 'the Nominalist/Realist debate' as a de*bate, or debates, arising largely from a misconstrual, by at least one* party, of linguistic forms. And it is a pity that there is scarcely a hint in this book that some philosophers might approach these questions with the tools of logical and linguistic analysis. The reader will find no discussion of 'subject', 'predicate' or 'quantification'; and he will look in vain for any references to Frege, Carnap, Strawson, Dummett, Geach ... . This lack is not, I think, due to the relative difficulty of such matters or of such writers, but rather to Armstrong's staunch adherence to a more traditionally 'metaphysical' method.

The book consists of seven chapters: an initial setting out of 'the problem' is followed by five chapters, each devoted to a particular approach to that problem, and the whole is capped by a final 'Summing Up'. The five inner chapters are headed: 'Primitive Natural classes', 'Resemblance Nominalism', 'Particulars as Bundles of Universals', 'Universals as Attributes', and 'Tropes'. For each chapter there is some suggested reading: papers or chapters by Quinton, H.H. Price, Russell, Armstrong, and (for 'Tropes') D.C. Williams, K.K. Campbell and C.B. Martin.

The book's subtitle is not inaccurate: Armstrong makes it quite clear where his sympathies lie. These sympathies are expressed in the chapter 'Universals as Attributes', which sets forth his own views, but also in 'Tropes'. Armstrong regards a theory of tropes, a theory of 'properties and relations conceived of as particulars' (16), as the next best thing to his own kind of realism.

In chapters 2-4 Armstrong expounds and criticizes three theories of universals, and it is in this more negative section of the book that I think his philosophical skills are shown to best advantage. He exhibits the problems facing what he calls 'Class Nominalism' and 'Resemblance Nominalism' in a manner both clear and, on the whole,

convincing. His objections to theories of particulars as 'bundles of universals' rely rather more on intuitions that are part and parcel of his own 'attribute' theory – these intuitions only get spelt out fully in the next chapter, where Armstrong argues against uninstantiated, disjunctive and negative universals.

It might be appropriate at this point to give the reader a taste of Armstrong's philosophical method. On p. 76 he writes: 'Once you have uninstantiated universals you need somewhere special to put them, a "Platonic heaven", as philosophers often say. They are not to be found in the ordinary world of space and time.' Now why would a philosopher positing the existence of uninstantiated universals feel the need to have 'somewhere special to put them'? The answer, I can only surmise, is because he is operating with a *picture*: a picture in which universals figure as 'super-things' – posh relations of things in 'the ordinary world of space and time'. Just as those spatiotemporal things 'need' their world of space and time, so (our philosopher reasons) uninstantiated universals must 'need' a realm to be 'in' – only, because they are uninstantiated, that realm cannot be the same as the realm of particulars (none of which instantiate them).

There are many other 'intuitions' appealed to in this book at whose heart one is liable to find little more than a picture. The picture of universals as 'super-things' is particularly prevalent; and it explains some of Armstrong's more sweeping assertions, such as the assertion (54) that '*all* solutions to the Problem of Universals ... require a fundamental relation', i.e., some relation connecting universal (class, resemblance structure...) to particular. It seems that Armstrong is just not aware of those nominalist solutions which deny that a predicative expression stands to something in anything like the name/bearer relation.

There is less evidence in *Universals* than in previous books of Armstrong's familiar view that it is the physicist who is (or will be) best able to tell us what universals 'there really are'. But Armstrong is still concerned to sort the ontological sheep from the ontological goats. In fact, he seems on occasion to conflate two distinct questions under the heading of 'the Problem of Universals': namely, (a) What are universals and what is their relation to particulars?, and (b) Which universals are 'genuine', 'real', etc.?

To sum up. This book provides a simple account of Armstrong's latest views on a topic dear to his heart; the earlier parts are, I think, worth recommending to any student; the more 'opinionated'

parts seem to me grist to the mill of all who would claim that 'metaphysics' too often signifies an attempt to do philosophical logic without its tools.

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Anthony J. Cascardi, ed.
Literature and the Question of Philosophy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1988. Pp. xvii+333.
US $29.50. ISBN 0-8018-3418-X.

This volume divides roughly into three sections. In the first the issue is the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. The second concerns the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and the third is devoted to interpretation.

The volume opens with Arthur Danto's 'Philosophy as/and/of Literature'. Danto explores the question of whether the 'the concept of philosophical truth and the form of philosophical expression are internally enough related that we may want to recognize that when we turn to other forms we may also be turning to other conceptions of philosophical truth' (6). Danto argues that the form of philosophical texts 'might require a form of reading ... and this because something is intended to happen to the reader other than or in addition to being informed' (7). Danto explores this complex and uneven terrain with his usual intensity, imagination, good spirits and grand intelligence.

Peter McCormick also tackles head-on, i.e., ahistorically, the relationship between philosophy and fiction. McCormick provides a detailed exposition and critique of some standard views about the nature of fictional texts in terms of speech-act theory, and he then tests these views against passages from classic philosophical works. McCormick concludes that we need to recognize a broader form of truth than analytic philosophy commonly allows if we are to take these texts as having something serious to say about the world, which, presumably, they do.

The two other essays in this division approach the problem historically. Dalia Judovitz argues that philosophy was constituted by 'the effort to distinguish philosophical knowledge from all other ways of knowing' (27), especially from poetry. She then pursues with vigor and clarity the deconstructionist commonplace that 'the hierarchical exclusion, difference, and domination of poetry by philosophy in the Platonic text represses the very rhetorical and discursive structures that define it' (27). In the second part of the essay she makes the same argument about Descartes, 'for Plato's exclusion of poetry in the *Republic* is echoed by Descartes's exclusion of all philosophy that does not obey his epistemic criteria' (44).

In 'Levels of Discourse' Harry Berger reads the Platonic dialogues neither as slightly disguised argument (the 'mouthpiece theory' [78]) nor as dramas in the Straussian mode. Instead, he distinguishes between 'the field of *dramatic* play ... and the field of textual play' (83), and this leads to a three-level dialogue between the literary, the dramatic and the thematic (or textual). 'If Plato's myth of Socrates delivers Socrates from Ion, it also delivers us from Socrates' charismatic presence through the mediation of the text that ironically preserves it' (83). Occam's razor be damned, full hermeneutics ahead.

In the next section there are three essays which are concerned with the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. Anthony Cascardi's 'From the Sublime to the Natural: Romantic Responses to Kant' is complex and dense. Cascardi wants to re-describe the romantic project as the effort to 'recover the world-in-itself, which ... is the recovery of the natural from the sublime' (116). The aim is to heal the various splits – morals and aesthetics, world and self – generated by enlightenment, here Kantian, ideas. But Cascardi wants to avoid the nihilism Heidegger claimed is implicit in romantic thought, and he uses *The Winter's Tale* to illustrate a way to 'the discovery of the natural' which avoids the nihilism that follows upon the failure of sublimity. The compound of intellectual history, literary interpretation and conceptual analysis in this essay epitomizes the entire collection.

In 'From Expressivist Aesthetics to Expressivist Ethics' Charles Altieri proposes to 'demonstrate the possibility that the fullest social uses of art have less to do with exposing the historical conditions of their genesis than with clarifying the ways that in which they help us understand ourselves as value-creating agents and make possible communities who can assess those creations without relying on the categorical terms traditional to moral philosophy' (135). What Altieri

wants us to do is think about assessing all action and not just art-making in an appreciatory rather than rule-governed manner.

Martha Nussbaum in her essay on 'literature and the moral imagination' shows that Henry James and James's characters treat action just as Altieri would wish. She, in turn, provides a moving and subtle account of their appreciations of the complexities of action and response. This is a brilliant and eloquent essay, and Nussbaum is alert to many nuances, including, at the very end, our relationship to such exemplary imaginations. Aren't they too far from the heat and dust to make a difference? Nussbaum is content to quote James himself: 'What better example than this of the high and helpful public and, as it were, civic use of the imagination?' (190). That is not a rhetorical question in today's climate of moralistic urgency in literary studies.

The rest of the volume is devoted to interpretation. Dennis Dutton gives intentionalism another go. His main point is that 'it is only by virtue of having established so much familiarity with intentions that we can afford to disregard them and talk only of conventions' (200), and what knowledge of intentions yields is the category or genre of the work. After establishing the type there is considerable latitude, and author's intentions are not authoritative. What we must avoid is 'a false hypothesis about the nature of the whole' (201).

We are, according to Stanley Rosen, in a period of intellectual decadence and the ascendancy of interpretation is one symptom of this. 'The natural basis of theory, whether understood as the domain of *phronēsis* or as the pretheoretical domain of common sense, has been replaced by theoretical construction' (221) or, more precisely, interpretation. Rosen traces the 'gradual disappearance of the distinction between theory and interpretation' (216) whereby 'ontology is transformed into hermeneutics' (226). I suspect that there is – or must be – more *phronēsis* about than Rosen allows, although interpretation now has the floor.

Alexander Nehamas's essay 'Writer, Text, Work, Author' is the most recent of a series in which he argues that the basic, and mistaken, metaphor which has grounded interpretation is surface and depth (276). This should be replaced with the notion that 'interpretation ... must be pictured not as an effort to place a text within a continually deepening context but as an attempt to place it within a perpetually broadening one' (278). The idea of the author, which is developed here in contrast to the idea of the writer, who is an historical rather than a textual creature, is, Nehamas argues, an inescape

able part of the widening arc of interpretation. The only weakness in Nehamas's case is that there are some great oeuvres which don't yield much 'author'; Shakespeare is the most obvious example. It is an interpretive issue as to how much 'author' a writer's texts yield.

Mary Wiseman's essay, 'Rewriting the Self: Barthes and the Utopias of Language', is at once an explication of some of Barthes' later writings and the exhortation by a pupil that we follow the master's advice as regards 'the human subject'. Language is a force that constrains, rather an instrument that helps us to get what we want or express our being. 'Although the power of language cannot be destroyed, it can, Barthes holds, be masked or supplemented or evaded' (299). They way out is, to make a very complex tale short, to take ourselves as something other than persons: 'one may construe the identity over time of a human subject to be the whole of the genealogical network, one temporal segment of which is the subject's legal identity, a fiction bounded by certificates of birth and death' (307). What Wiseman calls 'the reidentification of the individual with his [sic] genealogical tree' has rather unhappy associations, and the whole project strikes me as crisis-bound.

In the final essay Berel Lang asks, 'where do we go from here?', i.e., from the suspicions and scepticism of post-modernism. Lang's pragmatist answer is that there has been no radical break, and philosophical business continues as usual: 'one thread of discourse has in the history of philosophy been continually, repeatedly, post-modernist' (318-19). Post-modernism is not a grand strategy to end all stategies but another tactic in a long line of tactics. Despite big claims about large things, metaphysics was really engaged in skirmishes. 'its [metaphysics'] intention reflected a design that was contextual and not transcendent, historical and not atemporal, practical and not theoretical' (323). Lang thinks that things go wrong when symbols, signs, constructs, representations 'are taken to be things-in-themselves, when their history is repressed' (325). He concludes – both essay and volume – by recommending that philosophy once again begin in wonder rather than suspicion, for wonder is local while suspicion stops nowhere.

The only essay in this volume which talks really different is David Halliburton's 'Endowment, Enablement, Entitlement: toward a Theory of Constitution', a Heidiggerian meditation that claims to adapt Husserl's discovery of 'a type of [logical] relation that does not correspond with familiar conceptual models. It is not causal ... It is not serial ... It is not spatial ... Nor is it organic' (244). Husserl called this

'founding'. Halliburton says that it occurs outside logic, and he calls it 'endowment'. This leads to sentences like the following: 'Cosmos endows earth as earth endows world' (255). This is an instance of 'poetic thinking', the title of Halliburton's book on Heidegger. The essay is a fragment or offshoot of that popular modern genre, the one-person mythology. Myth is where philosophy and poetry began and they may yet return.

The guiding spirits of this volume are Aristotle and Heidegger, the villains Plato and Descartes. *Phronēsis* beats metaphysics, the particular is preferred to the general. It is a very good collection and would have been even better if it included Francis Sparshott's 'Text and Process in Poetry and Philosophy', *Philosophy and Literature* 9 (1985) 1-20.

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Trudy Govier
God, The Devil and the Perfect Pizza: Ten Philosophical Questions.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1989.
Pp. 198. Cdn $12.95. ISBN 0-921149-50-6.

Most philosophy instructors are on the lookout for meaningful new materials by means of which to introduce students to philosophical problems. Many of the standard textbook descriptions of problems are quite abstract and the examples are often too far-fetched. So much has been removed from the contexts in which the problems arise, that students often think that they are just empty verbal games. I have thought about writing short stories and dialogues to suit the purposes mentioned above, but so far have not carried out such a project. I am happy to report that Govier's new book does an admirable job of presenting several central philosophical questions and problems through the imaginative use of dialogues and short stories.

There is always a risk, as professionals, of losing touch with the full context of a philosophical problem. One can become fascinated with the abstract nuances of formal statements of a question, and

then ignore its richer, deeper details. Part of the refreshing nature of the later Wittgenstein's work was that he tried to lead readers back to the larger linguistic context of problems in language and meaning. It can be refreshing to reread Plato, since his writings invite one to enter a dialogue which is usually connected with a concrete problem. Socrates confronts problems which arise out of conflict and doubt. He does not usually start with abstractions which have become part of specialized debate.

Likewise, Govier manages to catch authentically the way in which philosophical problems can arise for us in the normal course of life. This gives them a depth and meaning which abstract puzzles usually do not have. Her book has the virtue of helping us to recover part of this larger, richer context, and for that reason alone it serves a valuable end. It could make a positive contribution to teaching philosophy to undergraduates, since students could be excited by its approach to philosophical questions.

Govier presents a series of dialogues and short stories which immediately involve the reader in a discussion of several central philosophical questions. Not all of these questions are directly asked, but from the discussions and stories we can frame them as follows: Can we attribute consciousness to computers? Are they capable of thought and such intentional actions as cheating? What is the basis for claiming that people are free and morally responsible? Is there a purely logical proof for the existence of God? What is the nature of the objects of mathematics? Is mathematics discovered or created? What is the basis for judgments about personal identity? What is the nature of the human self? What is the relationship between the theories of physics (science) and the world of everyday life? What is the basis of moral life? Are moral judgments completely relative? Is so-called rational self-interest truly rational and genuinely in our interest? Is it possible to end the environmental crisis within our current structures, when they seem to encourage pursuit of self interest, while resolving the crisis requires self-sacrifice and cooperation? Or, can it be logically shown that rational self-interest is incompatible with the requirements for survival in the late 20th century? These questions should keep any undergraduate course in introductory philosophy busy for a year. This is not to suggest that they are presented in a manner not of interest to more advanced students. In a note near the end of the book Govier mentions that she has a comprehensive pamphlet of academic notes and comments available for instructors of philosophy courses. The book does have 6 pages of explanatory notes and comments.

In connection with teaching philosophy, one use to which this book might be put is the following: Suppose it is used in a problem-oriented introductory philosophy course. Students could read a particular dialogue or story and then be assigned to write their own story, dialogue, or play, which presents the same sorts of issues in their own words (or other problems not discussed in the book but described in class). One could have them work in groups to produce dialogues or plays to be presented to the class. However, if story, dialogue and play seem too literary, since contemporary students have been raised on TV, one could alternatively suggest that they produce something appropriate to that medium, e.g., an interview, a parody of a news program, a soap opera, etc. Any of these exercises would foster active participation and lively discussions.

I have found in my courses, at both the introductory and more advanced levels, that students become very personally engaged by philosophical problems and questions, when these arise in short stories or novels. In my advanced classes, especially those which have an applied dimension, I now give students a choice from three or four novels, one of which they must use as the basis for an essay. From their comments and essays, it is clear that this assignment personalizes and intensifies their interest in the major problems and topics under discussion.

I have chosen in this review to emphasize the instructional use to which Govier's book might be put, since it does not offer us a new thesis. Instead, it provides a way to engage philosophical questions and problems so as to give them a more meaningful context and plausible statement than they have when presented in abstract form. Since the dialogues and stories come with a lot of tacit stage setting, they connect with more of our lives than formal statements of problems do. In this respect, then, the book is original and insightful. I found it a pleasure to read and am impressed by Govier's ability to weave the major issues surrounding these philosophical questions into coherent dialogues and stories. Other philosophers will also find the book worthwhile.

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Gary M. Gurtler, S.J.
Plotinus: The Experience of Unity.
New York: Peter Lang 1989. Pp. x+320.
US $43.40. ISBN 0-8204-0670-8.

This work addresses the question of the harmony between the metaphysics and the psychology of Plotinus through an exhaustive study of one of the central themes of his work, that of the unity underlying diversity in the world. Gurtler proceeds in what seems to me the most fruitful way for extracting accurate insights from Plotinus, the close consideration of a series of key terms in the contexts in which they are used, and produces much that is useful, especially in the earlier chapters.

The book is divided into an introduction, six chapters, each devoted to the study of a key word or concept, and a brief afterword. There is a bibliography, an index of passages quoted and a general index.

The first chapter considers a favorite analogy which Plotinus uses both to illustrate the relation of individual souls to the hypostasis of Soul (e.g., in *Enn* IV 3, 1-8), and that of individual intellects to Intellect (e.g., in V 9, 8), that of the theorems of a science to the science as a whole. He particularly likes this because it is a relation between *immaterial* entities, and indeed it serves his purposes very well. Gurtler also provides enlightening exegeses of other important passages concerned with the problem of the one and the many, such as VI 4, 9 and VI 2, 20. He is very sound, I think, on Plotinus' attitude to the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (22 and n.8). It cannot be taken by itself as a delineation of Intellect; Intellect also requires unity. So the hypothesis itself invites a critique, such as Plotinus gives it.

Gurtler next turns to consider the important term *synaisthēsis*, a word which derives much of its technical meaning from the Stoics, but which Plotinus uses for un-Stoic purposes, first in an ontological context, to describe the self-awareness or self-apprehension of an entity at the moment of its emanative production (in which context it is even, once, in a notable passage, applied to the One, V 4, 2); and secondly, and more commonly, in a psychological context, to mean, broadly, consciousness, in so far as it imposes unity on perceptions. In this connexion Gurtler gives particular attention to selected passages of IV 3-4, VI 7, and the 'Grossschrift' (III 8-V 5-11 9). I am not sure, however, that Gurtler can make the distinction between these two meanings as sharp as he would like to. Plotinus always uses a

hoion ('as it were') with *synaisthēsis* when referring to the One (as in V 4, 2) or Nature (as in III 8, 4), which indicates to me his uncomfortableness about using the word in contexts where no real consciousness is in prospect. But his discussion remains most useful.

Subsequent chapters deal with *sumpatheia* (ch. 3), *antilēpsis* and *parakolouthēsis*, as terms for perception and consciousness (ch. 4), *dianoia* and *logismos*, as terms for reason (ch. 5), and *noēsis*, as a term for intellection (ch. 6). In connexion with *sumpatheia* and Plotinus' remarkable theory of sense-perception Gurtler's remarks are most apt, though it is a pity he did not have a chance to take account of Eyjólfur Emilsson's *Plotinus on Sense-Perception* (Cambridge 1988), which goes over the same ground, and comes to the same conclusions, though from a slightly different perspective.

Chapters 5 and 6, it must be said, are rather less satisfactory than the preceding ones, mainly, I think, because *dianoia* and *logismos* (and their cognates) – the subjects of ch. 5 – and *nous/noēsis* – subject of ch. 6 (which is largely an exegesis of *Enn* VI 7, 35-40 and V 3) – are so common in Plotinus that his study becomes little more than a catalogue of instances, often with their contexts left in obscurity, while the conclusions he draws are, it seems to me, familiar enough.

While Gurtler's interpretations of doctrine are sound enough, the same cannot be said, I fear, for his philological prowess. When he decides to essay a translation himself, rather than relying on Armstrong, as he generally does, things can go badly wrong. Armstrong failed him, it would seem, on the sixth *Ennead* (his book must have been completed before the last two Loeb volumes appeared), and he decides to go it alone. This has almost uniformly unfortunate results. His renderings of passages of VI 2, VI 4-5, VI 7 and VI 9 have to be approached with caution. Consider, for instance, VI 9, 4, 30-35, on p. 192, first in Armstrong's translation, which is accurate, and then Gurtler's:

> '... if then someone is not yet there but is outside because of these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to guide him and give him assurance about the One, let him blame himself (*en aitiāi tithesthō*) for those hindrances and try to depart from all things and be alone, but as for what he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reasonings, let him consider the following.'

Of this Gurtler makes something of a dog's breakfast, as follows (it will be seen from Armstrong's version that the context is in any case incomplete):

'If then the soul is not yet there, but because of these external things or the lack of a guiding word to provide confidence about it, because of such things as these let it take itself as cause, and let it try, renouncing all things, on the other hand, which, failing in reasons, it disbelieves, from here let it reason.'

There are unfortunately many other passages of this sort. Could Gurtler not have made use of Bréhier, or Harder, or even, if these foreign languages are not open to him, Stephen MacKenna? One does not wish to be excessively pedantic, but Plotinus is troublesome enough without being subjected to this sort of treatment.

Another rather misleading habit of Gurtler's is to divide the tractates into 'early', 'middle' and 'late' (following in this, it would seem, the Spanish scholar, Fr. Jesús Igal, who is his favourite authority in other respects also). This is occasionally a meaningful distinction (as, for instance, in the matter of Plotinus' views on the relation of the individual souls to the All-Soul, or the self-apprehension of the One), but it is generally not very useful in the case of a man who only began to write at the age of 49, and died at 65. There are really no 'early' works of Plotinus, though there is justification for following Porphyry's chronological list.

On the other hand, it must be said that the conclusions which Gurtler draws from the passages he translates are generally sound, and he avoids making too much of his chronological distinctions, so that his conclusions remain valid, if not often very original.

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Gary B. Herbert
Thomas Hobbes: the Unity of Scientific and Moral Wisdom.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 1989. Pp. xiv+201.
Cdn $30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7748-0315-0);
Cdn $15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7748-0316-9).

Considering the spate of books on Hobbes in the last generation, Herbert judges they have been 'enormously valuable in disclosing different aspects of Hobbes's thought, but they have improperly abstracted from his own intention,' that of producing a unified system. 'The objective of the present study will be to undertake just this reintegration of his thought' (9).

Herbert finds an evolution in Hobbes's thought that can bridge many of the gaps that the commentators have found awkward. The key is the concept of *conatus* ('endeavour' in English translation), incipient motion or action before it is quantifiable, but accounting nevertheless for the dynamic interactions of bodies and the voluntary responsiveness of persons. Since Hobbes puts this concept to both physical and psychological uses, it is capable of supplying the often neglected 'integrated system', 'the dynamical character of Hobbesian physics,' and human 'dialectic at the level of psychology and politics' (20; ch.1). In the physics, first motion, then, body itself is seen to derive from *conatus*, its counter-currents supplying mutual definition to consequent entities (20, 85; ch.2). The liberation of human volition from natural necessity by mediation of language and understanding is an instance of such self-definition (ch.3). From an evolving treatment of the passions emerges the concept of man as 'master and possessor of nature' (159, 23), which culminates in the 'magnanimous and generous' few who are capable of the discipline such mastery requires (ch.4). The strategic equality of the Law of Nature is not to be taken as literally descriptive (ch.5), and the apex of Hobbes's philosophy is found, not in the authoritarian state, but in the man who finds in scientific understanding and mastery also a moral fulfillment of his transpolitical and indeed infinite aspirations. When this unifying thread in his thought is uncovered, Hobbes is seen to anticipate such other champions of the unity of scientific and moral wisdom as Leibniz and Hegel (ch.6).

Leibniz and Hegel – idealists, rationalists, logical realists, holists – may seem odd company for Hobbes, who has more characteristically

been interpreted as materialist, empiricist, nominalist, and, if not atomist, at least insistent on the independent entity of particular bodies. But the reader of this study must increasingly recognize that the Hobbes who has come to interest Herbert is not the one who can be identified with Hobbes's most frequent, forthright, and regularly cited claims. It is a nearly secret agenda, the exploring thinker often almost concealed from the published writer, revealed by particular phrases and metaphors, that more often negotiates the steps in the interpretation.

Herbert finds 'one of the principal sources of obscurity in Hobbes' that he treats 'objects as simultaneously phenomenal and non-phenomenal' (70). He thinks it 'terribly unlikely' that 'Hobbes naively believed that bodies exist outside the mind' (70,50). 'The generation of bodies is, in effect, the construction of images' (51). Surely this would be a curious doctrine in a philosopher who entitled his major work in First and Natural Philosophy *De corpore, (Concerning body)*; who lists 'body' first in his repeated four-fold classification of nameable things (*Leviathan* i 4; *Body* ii 8); and who defines body as 'having no dependence upon our thought' (*Body* ii 8).

The three other categories of nameable things are (2) 'accident' (e.g., 'motion', 'extension', 'hardness') 'that faculty of any body by which it works in us a conception of itself' (3) 'phantasm' of sense, memory or imagination, and (4) 'name,' a written or oral mark or sign (*Body* ii 8). Bodies are characterized by accidents, know and are known by phantasms, signify and are signified by names. This being the situation, Hobbes will often in his definitions and distinctions have to make reference to more than one of these categories. Failure to observe these crucial distinctions of kind (accident is *conceived* by *phantasms* and *names*, but it is a *faculty* of *body*) leads to such conclusions on Herbert's part as that 'body is entirely phenomenal' (45).

In the treatment of civil philosophy as well I find many claims that call for clarification and (unfortunately lengthy) refutation. It would be difficult to think of anything more misleading on the social contract than the claim that the subject 'is not bound by the sovereign's natural right, having never contracted with the sovereign. Subject and sovereign stand in a "natural" relation to each other when questions of personal safety or well-being arise' (177). The final phrases being broad enough to cover all political relations, one would have to conclude that the social contract has accomplished substantially nothing. Is not the reason that the sovereign remains in the state of nature and not a party to the contract precisely so that his (or its)

power will not be limited by bargaining conditions? Exactly the non-natural contractual relation to the sovereign, negotiated by the subject with his fellows, is the surrender of his rights of resistance. Thus it is certainly not the case that 'the price of sovereignty' is 'that he alone cannot enjoy civil guarantees of safety' (170). It is the surrender of the right to resist which creates the obligation to obey, and it is only derivatively and conditionally that subjects enjoy the civil safety accorded to the soverign in the first instance.

Herbert's project of discovering the unity of science and moral wisdom in Hobbes is appealing and, I think, justified: Hobbes did assert that 'doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature' (*Lev* ii 18). Also I should not wish to deny Herbert's wide familiarity with the Hobbesian corpus and the secondary literature and some genuine – even delightful – insights into them. But it is significant that in both scientific and moral wisdom Herbert presses for ideal outcomes: something like the ultimate metaphysical secret in *conatus*, and no less than the achieved good life for the few capable of scientific-philosophical inquiry. Hobbes's solutions seem consistently more modest: there is no *summum bonum* 'in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia' (*Tripos, E W* IV 33); and 'the infallible sign of teaching exactly and without error' is only negative and deflationary, 'that no man ever taught the contrary' (*Tripos, E W* IV 71).

One could be more sympathetic with the execution of this project if in the course of it Hobbes were not charged with having fallen into philosophical lapses that presumably would have distressed him fully as much as the failure to achieve system: his 'philosophical terminology' was not 'sufficient to express ... [his] account with any clarity' (59); he seems not 'to have concerned himself much with ... a problem' [nominalism!] that nonetheless would render him unable to 'make sense' (73); he is 'conspicuously inconsistent', and his demonstrations 'incredibly, even conspicuously, unsound', and this 'even to the less careful reader' (132; cf. also 64, 122). One aspiring to disciplined hermeneutic might wonder what system it is worth seeking in texts so unsystematically flawed.

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Howard Jones
The Epicurean Tradition.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. vii+276.
US $39.95; Cdn $47.50: ISBN 0-415-02069-7.

Despite two major shortcomings, this is a fine book and a valuable addition to the growing body of recent Epicurean scholarship. Jones has written an intelligent and informed history of Epicureanism, presented with clarity and insight, and supported by meticulous scholarship.

The story of the reception of Epicurean philosophy and its influence on the development of ideas begins with an attempt to understand the degree to which Epicurus, for all his originality, was a product of his historical situation, then continues with an account of the spread of Epicurean schools into Italy and Asia minor, its eclipse by Christianity and a long dormant period during the Middle Ages until its rediscovery by Renaissance Italians early in the fifteenth century and its subsequent revival in France and incursion into England.

In all of this the book succeeds very well. It is the story of a philosophy which retained its original vision more or less intact for over five hundred years and which remained an influential participant in the philosophical debate of the ancient world until that world itself came to an end in the all-obliterating snowfall of Christianity. There are already important distortions of Epicureanism in the ancient world by people like Cicero and Plutarch, but during the patristic and medieval period the Epicurean caricature of a godless life of the gratification of sensual desires becomes more or less fixed. Renewed interest in Epicurean philosophy in the fifteenth century is originally no more than an interest in the beauty of Lucretius' poem, which can be enjoyed despite its offensive philosophical content. Epicurus, the philosopher, remains for the most part a stock character having very little in common with the real Epicurus. Lorenzo Valla's *De voluptate* is an example of a literary stage on which the stock character struts his stuff, though there are also signs that some people, such as Cosma Raimondi in Italy and Michel de Montaigne in France, are taking him more seriously. Epicurus even enters the theological debate of the Reformation where he gets batted back and forth between Luther and Erasmus, but still there is no serious scholarly interest in Epicurus.

Such serious scholarly interst is first evident at the beginning of the seventeenth century in France, above all in the person of Pierre Gassendi, and by the time we reach the halfway mark of that century the Epicurean tradition seems all set to wake after a long dormancy and to shed the caricature of its long snooze. What a disappointment, therefore, (and this is the first of the two shortcomings I mentioned at the beginning) that the book ends at this point almost in mid-sentence. To be sure, we are taken to England where there is a lot of new interest in Epicurus, but always, as it were, apparently at arms length only. A book, however, which purports to give an account of the 'impact of the Epicurean philosophy upon the development of intellectual and scientific ideas' (vii) should not stop at this point. One thinks of the atomic mechanical interpretation of the natural world, of social contract theory and individualism in politics, of utilitarianism and hedonistic theory in ethics, and much more which was to develop and where the touch of Epicurus cannot be missed, right up to the present revival of interest in Hellenistic philosophy. Jones has written only the first volume of *The Epicurean Tradition*; the project is unfinished.

The second major shortcoming is Chapter 2, the summary presentation of Epicurean philosophy whose history is subsequently to be traced. In his account of Epicurean epistemology Jones discusses sensation, preconceptions and feelings. He calls them the criteria of truth, which is all right for the first two, but misleading if claimed without qualification of the third, for feelings (of pleasure and pain) function importantly as criteria of value. Also he claims that the three are 'reducible to one' (24) which is unfortunate, for the difference is important. It is also claimed that the 'senses provide our only contact' (25) with the world and are therefore 'our only source of information' (27) about it, but that is too strong a claim for it ignores the so-called image making contact of the mind which by-passes the senses and by which we are said to perceive the gods. Also the preconceptions are called 'almost variants of *aisthēseis*' (26) and are claimed to 'carry with them their own guarantee' because they 'are characterized by the clarity which amounts to self-evidence' (27). But to speak of a concept as a variation of a sensation is either false or too confused to be either true or false, and the same can be said of the claim that the criterial role of preconceptions is a matter of their clarity, when we are speaking of a philosopher who makes no Stoic-Cartesian assumptions about providence. In discussing the Epicurean procedure of testing observations, Jones discusses the puzzle of the square tower

which looks round when seen at a distance. He explains that a 'false opinion had been added to sensation to produce an erroneous frst judgement' (28). What false opinion? And how would Epicurus establish its falsehood? The Epicurean claim that all sensations are true is more problematical than is allowed here and cannot be rescued by appeal to false opinion even if we could say just what opinion is meant.

The discussion of Epicurus' theory of pleasure is confused by, among other things, linking pleasure too closely with desire, to the point of discussing Epicurus' classification of desire as though it were a classification of pleasure. And even though Jones thinks, incredibly, that Usener (409), 'The pleasure of the stomach is the beginning and root of all good ...', justifies the claim that 'being the most immediate, sensual pleasures are the most intense, and among these the pleasures of the stomach are the greatest' (49), he rejects 'a narrowly sensual view of pleasure' in Epicureanism (49-50). Why? Because Epicurus had a hedonistic calculus. How does that help? Aristippus also had such a calculus. Clearly Jones feels uncomfortable with the culinary caricature of Epicurus, but appeal to a hedonistic calculus won't get rid of it.

The treatment of the important distinctions between kinetic and katastematic pleasure is also most unsatisfactory. Katastematic pleasure is described as 'the enjoyment of complete absence of mental and bodily discomfort' (50) which is conventional and fairly innocent, though I wonder what Jones would do with Epicurus' claim that the sage can sustain such pleasure even under torture. But kinetic pleasure is described as 'those particular pleasures which presuppose the simultaneous experience of pain' (50). This view of kinetic pleasure as being experienced only in the removal of pain, and thus presupposing pain, simply cannot be substantiated in the Epicurean texts, nor in our own experience, which we may assume to be much like Epicurus'. These descriptions are probably meant to be orthodox and unoriginal, but Jones is definitely original, alarmingly so, when he describes the relation between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. Diano and Rist had a theory of kinetic pleasure as supervening of katastematic pleasure. Jones, however, inverts the relation and has katastematic pleasure supervening on kinetic pleasure (51). I don't know what to think here. The easy way in whch this startling view is presented leads me to think that Jones believes that what he is saying is uncontroversial, even orthodox. Inadvertence may be the explanation, an unfortunate mistake which escaped notice.

There is more that could be said about this by far the weakest chapter. Fortunately it does not function importantly in the general plan of this book, whose great merit is the historical account, engagingly told and meticulously researched, even if it is unfinished.

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Ethel M. Kersey
Women Philosophers: A Bio-critical Source Book.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1989.
Pp. xi+230.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-313-25720-5.

Ethel Kersey has produced a valuable resource that helps reclaim women's place in the history of Western philosophy. Reaching back to the pre-Socratics, the work extends into the twentieth century, including women born up until the early 1920s. Kersey has identified one hundred and seventy women who have been actively involved in the traditionally defined subject matter of philosophy, characterized as including metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and logic.

Kersey is self-conscious about the value judgments implicit in her definition of philosophy, and I sympathize with her need to limit the scope of her survey. Nonetheless, there is something troubling about her decision to rely on the dominant male values of what constitutes philosophy proper. This vision of philosophy requires her to exclude some of the very questions that attracted the interest of many women theorists. The accepted definition of philosophy leaves out, for instance, women who have been engaged in theology, devotional, or visionary literature and also those involved in the study of human nature and social relationships. Moreover, she has chosen to omit reference to Mary Wollstonecraft and others who wrote on issues of gender and on women's rights on the assumption that most of these 'polemicists' are already dealt with elsewhere. The question of what is to count as philosophy is an important and on-going one, though. Contemporary feminist philosophers, like their historical counter-

parts, are all too often dismissed by their colleagues with the accusation that what they do is 'not really philosophy'. Ironically, Kersey's uncritical acceptance of the gender bias that restricts philosophical attention to the topics and methods that interest men serves to reinforce (and legitimize) the exercise of power by which so many of the *women remembered here have been effectively silenced. This book* is meant to be a beginning, however, and not an exhaustive list of historical women figures in philosophy; we can hope that a more broadly defined companion volume will someday follow.

Many of the women Kersey includes are well known to most philosophers (and several are still active: e.g., Warnock, Grene, Anscombe, Foot, and Marcus). A great many more are not familiar and have been omitted from standard histories of philosophy; many are remembered merely by their names and associations, e.g., Abrotelia is described simply as a Pythagorean philosopher who was the daughter of Abroteles, and Beronice is identified as a Roman philosopher from whom Stobaeus was set to have taken his apothegms. Most entries merit two or three paragraphs, but some, like those for Beauvoir, Arendt, Fuller, Rand, Weil, and most of the contemporary women listed, receive several pages. The space each woman receives seems to rely on some complex formula of the amount of material available about each (especially with the women from antiquity) and Kersey's personal evaluation of the significance of her work; in some cases, a summary is offered of the author's work, and in others, there is also a brief critical evaluation. I expect that most readers would choose different emphases in many cases. Although many of the entries are frustratingly short, Kersey acknowledges that this work 'only skims the surface;' her hope is that it will inspire some deeper analysis of women's role. She helps make such follow-up work possible by including extensive bibliographies of each author's own work and of secondary writings about their work.

Though Kersey is not to be blamed for this, the historical map she appeals to is defined by male markers; this means that in the biographical dimension of the entries, women are most readily situated by locating the influential men that surround them – each is identified as being the daughter, wife, lover, handmaid, mother, or student of some man. Their philosophy, too, is usually characterized as comments on the work of men. In addition, the critical dimensions of each entry rely on the authority of male philosophers' reports or critiques of these women's work. Thus, the overwhelming impression in reading this book is to view these occasional women philosophers

as anomalous interlopers in the masculine world of philosophy. Where I had anticipated a book that would acknowledge and celebrate women's importance in philosophy, I was discouraged to find myself struck with wonder at the ability of these remarkable women to have been heard at all within a discipline so defined by male privilege and power. I was particularly disappointed that the actual summaries and evaluations of some women's work often repeats common 'malestream' philosophic assumptions without mentioning any of the more sympathetic feminist alternatives; e.g., Kersey accepts without comment the widespread view that Simone de Beauvoir merely echoes Sartre, even though many feminist scholars have challenged this analysis.

The book includes a useful introduction that reviews the main roles of women in philosophy by time period (antiquity, early Christian and Middle Ages, the Renaissance, early modern philosopy, the Enlightenment and nineteenth century, and the twentieth century). Only among the Pythagoreans do we find women genuinely treated as equals in philosophy and offered the same educational opportunities as men. Despite the obvious restrictions women have faced in the subsequent centuries, many did somehow manage to receive an education and make important contributions to the intellectual thought of their times. Kersey has performed an important service by rescuing so many women philosophers from oblivion and establishing the significance of several. She has provided a useful guidebook for those who wish to learn more about the histories and ideas of the women who are remembered in Western philosophy and has also helped reveal why many more women did not make their mark in the history of philosophy.

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Alphonso Lingis
Deathbound Subjectivity.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1989. Pp. 211.
US $32.50. ISBN 0-253-31660-X.

In an age of analytical thought where subjectivity is deconstructed and replaced by cybernetic circuitry or some other mathematical model, Lingis offers the assurance that subjectivity is alive and well as the locus of order in the world. He lays bare the core of subjectivity as being the place where the universal and necessary propositions of willed legislation are formulated into the drama of human historical truths. It is in this praxis that the idea of humanity destined for truth, is constituted. However, his incursion into the folds of subjectivity is a considerably complex enterprise in which the style often obfuscates the substance.

The inquiry revolves around a number of central themes, namely, time, space, nature, and the death of the other to reveal that what unites and characterizes the human species is the relational attitude we express towards one another and bequeath to the other in death. We are beings in the making that share with others the responsibility of civilization through the pursuit of common historical truths about what is to be thought and what is to be done. Lingis pursues the inquiry in two stages; the first part of the book (1-106) probes the valuing of subjectivity through the eyes of Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. The time design of subjectivity, the origin of infinity, arises as either an internal reflection of external time (Husserl), or as an intuition of the power of the now (Nietzsche). Part Two (107-211) details the descriptive analyses of otherness and difference in the work of Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan and Blanchot, for whom otherness disarticulates the sovereign subject. The central message is that the attitude in which the self is perceived to be self-sufficient is destined to fail since it ignores the primacy of responsibility to the other. The ego becomes itself after the encounter with the other, only. For Levinas, ethics is prior to ontology. The primacy of ethics is grounded in the primacy of the other. For Heidegger, (109-34) death is a possibility in which the being of Dasein attains its high noon truths in the space of relational activity. Although death puts an end to Dasein as possibility, the operations, the tropisms my life consisted in will be taken up by others. Chapter Six (135-55) adds to this an interesting description of the phenomenology of the face and an original

interpretation of the aging process. The style is grave and lucid and continues well into the concluding chapters of the book. The Sign of The Subject, (156-75) is, in my opinion, the least interesting aspect of the work since it is a rehash of a tired (Freudian) libidinal odyssey into the reductivist-sexual origin of personality. For instance, the description of the mother-child relationship is complete with a few pages on the child's discovery of the castration of the mother, penis envy, and the excrement (feces) of the infant. Although signs of the subject one wonders why they are celebrated on this altar? Fortunately, the concluding chapter (176-211) recasts the discourse in fresher light as the role of the other is seen to make authentic existence possible. The death of the other is an awakening to responsibility as it leaves the life itineraries that make authentic existence possible.

Deathbound Subjectivity is an important book, perhaps for what it fails to say as much as for what it says. The fundamental structure of responsibility to others that emerges from it provides much needed insight into what it means to be human. We live in a world of rapid developments in science and technology and the traditional grounds of ethics are crumbling. For instance, we wonder if there is anything unique about humanness? Recent work in gene transfer from one species to another show that genes are interchangeable. However, the conception of otherness and responsibility that appears in the book dis-articulates the subject as we are presented with an image of the person without ground for reverence. Lingis' calculations on nature, for instance, do not provide a metaphysical foundation within subjectivity for technology (following Heidegger's use) as a letting be of nature. Perhaps one has to move beyond Freud and phenomenology in order to re-articulate the role of the subject in the love affair with nature. If subjectivity is the locus of order, then, something within it should appear to contain the solution to the second order ethical consequences of technology. Perhaps the solution to the problem lies within the realm of the spiritual unconscious (C.G. Jung), or in the province of mystical insight and non linear, non analytical, right hemispheric thought (Matthew Fox)? But if this or any such necessary and eternal model of humanness provides the ground of values, Lingis does not say.

There is ample evidence to suggest that going back to the roots of subjectivity involves a process of allowing those things that feed us to emerge. Thus, my concerns with death are not met by the Heideggerian refusal to move beyond the conception of death as possibility since nothing about it emerges as the root of that possibility.

Perhaps the solution to the problem is contained within the study of death as such? The work of G. Marcel, Ferrater-Mora, P. Tillich and Macquarrie contains the study of death as such (death as it is to the dead). Thus, the interest in the question is manifestly present as a legitimate human concern and one would expect a thoroughgoing phenomenological study of deathbound subjectivity to address that interest. However, Lingis does not do so.

Still, *Deathbound Subjectivity* is a major work and like all other serious works the task of ongoing development is taken up by others. In the section on Notes (193) the author offers the book as a contribution to four newly published books. They are *History as Apocalypse* by T.J.J. Altizer, *Spirit in Ashes; Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death* by Edith Wyschogrod, *Erring* by M.C. Taylor, and *Black Rain* by Masuji Ibuse. One can note that the case for humanness is ongoing.

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Paul Thagard
Computational Philosophy of Science.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989.
Pp. xiv+240.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-20068-6.

As the idea that the mind is a computational system ceases to be a metaphor for many philosophers, we should naturally expect this to have important effects on areas outside of the philosophy of mind. The influence of computationalism is already being felt in the philosophy of science. If science is a product of minds and minds are computational systems, then philosophers' explications and reconstructions of science had better describe a product that can be generated by computation. This may not look like much of a constraint if by 'computation' we have in mind only very abstract mathematical ideas like that of a Turing Machine. If, however, we restrict our attention to processes that can be computed by finite, plausibly 'mind-sized' devices in real time (see Cherniak, *Minimal Rationality*, [MIT Press 1986]), then we *may* obtain some powerful constraints that have

not governed traditional philosophy of science. Given the near anarchy of post-logical empiricist philosophy of science, new constraints should be received with enthusiasm.

This is the basic premise behind Thagard's book, which parades as a sort of manifesto and preliminary manual for a 'new' philosophy of science that would view computational constraints as among the first tribunals of adequacy to be faced by any specific account. The constraints emphasized by Thagard sort naturally into two families, which we might distinguish as 'realizability constraints' and 'explicitness constraints'. Realizability constraints are those which prohibit us from going too far in sacrificing computational efficiency for logical power. Such constraints have always been at least dimly present in philosophy of science, though the computational perspective undoubtedly helps us to articulate them more precisely. Explicitness constraints are more novel. If we demand that accounts of scientific reasoning be tested by being actually *implemented* in software, then we avail ourselves of a taskmaster that will ruthlessly expose all vagueness and conceptual ambiguity.

These are sound, perhaps exciting, ideas. Thagard is well qualified to defend them, as he is among a small group of pioneers who have actually begun to implement the research program. He and three psychologist collaborators presented their attempts to simulate scientific induction in Holland *et al, Induction* (MIT Press 1986). Their research using their learning program, PI, represents the most detailed and revealing investigation of inductive reasoning since Hume.

The present volume opens with a recapitulation of this research. I do not think that the reader unfamiliar with the earlier book will be much impressed by this. In the interest of brevity, Thagard omits the detailed examples of PI's inductive successes and failures, but it is precisely these which make the 1986 work a gold-mine of data for philosophers. What is more distressing here is that the rigorous application of PI as a research tool more or less disappears after the first few chapters, that is, after the basis of its design has been explained. A reader unfamiliar with the 1986 book may thus be forgiven if she comes to suspect that the 'computational' rhetoric is mostly just that, for little of what Thagard has to say about science in the bulk of the volume seems to in any way depend on it. A careful, imaginative student of Peirce's pragmatism might well have arrived at Thagard's general philosophy of science without benefit of the slightest acquaintance with computers or computationalism.

Thagard thus claims to be about to demonstrate a new, technologically up-to-the-minute way of doing philosophy of science, and then manifestly doesn't. That this will alienate many readers is a pity, for Thagard's version of pragmatism is worth attending to in its own right. His book is best read as a clear and lively argument for the thesis that the basic, indeed, defining, aspect of scientific reasoning is inference to the best explanation. This is a worthwhile hypothesis that might shed considerable light on how sciences such as economics, biology and psychology can have a deep methodological unity with physics even though the relationship between theory and evidence which they presume seems very different. It might also explain why logicist approaches to science, whether syntactic or model-theoretic, are difficult to maintain as descriptions of actual scientific practice: scientists' accounts, if literally and accurately represented as logical arguments, would usually turn out to be instances of affirming the consequent.

As my last sentence suggests, Thagard's thesis could be used to serve an anti-scientific or relativist perspective. Thagard is concerned to block these implications. His resulting discussion of the justification of inference to the best explanation is, to my mind, the high point of the volume, though I will not be surprised if Peirce scholars claim to find nothing new in it. As to normative relativism, Thagard is aware that pseudosciences such as creationism use inference to the best explanation as their basic persuasive instrument, and so devotes a chapter to distinguishing proper from improper applications of the reasoning. Roughly, his suggestion is that good inferences to the best explanation carefully and explicitly balance the competing goals of consilience (scope) and simplicity (minimization of auxiliary hypotheses), while pseudoscientific reasoning characteristically sacrifices one desideratum wholescale for the other.

In summary, there is much of value in this book, but its subject matter and significance are not as advertised. There *are* some tough philosophical questions to be asked of the inventors of PI, which Thagard might usefully have taken up. Is it, for example, a problem for genuine computational philosophy of science that computational models are of individual minds, while full-blown scientific theories are generally *not* the products of individual minds? Thagard waves his hands at this issue, suggesting that teams of scientists may be modelled as distributed neural nets. Until more detail is supplied, this seems to rest on a faulty analogy, since individual scientists are rational deliberators and nodes in neural nets are not.

By all means, one can profit from Thagard's book. But if computational philosophy of science, rather than pragmatism, is your primary interest, then I suggest you turn to his earlier co-authored work instead.

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Laurence Thomas
Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1989. Pp. xii+260.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-87722-602-4.

Recent moral philosophy exhibits a move away from normative theories which propose universal principles to an Aristotelean focus upon moral character and practice. Laurence Thomas's *Living Morally* is a solid contribution to this latter approach. It has two primary virtues. The writing is so clear, accessible and interesting that one could happily recommend it to friends. Nevertheless, it presents a distinctive position by giving a naturalist theory of moral character.

Thomas's approach is 'naturalist' in two senses. First, it takes the position that there is such a thing as human nature which can be given a substantive characterisation. Second, it provides descriptions of human life and morality which are not governed by any sort of fact/value dichotomy. Though his book is appropriately subtitled, *A Psychology of Moral Character*, he makes significant use of sociobiology as well.

Thomas assumes that morality is altruistic, requires altruistic acts and motivation. His aim 'is to offer an account of how individuals come to have and to maintain a good moral character' (3). He accomplishes this by describing the biological and social bases of morality in the first five chapters and addressing important implications of this account of moral character in the remaining three.

The biological basis he argues for is surprisingly more specific than providing humans with a general nature in which altruism can develop. Thomas does argue clearly and effectively that sociobiology

does not imply the non-existence of motive altruism but connects unwitting altruism with unwitting selfishness. This would leave us with a general nature which does not rule out altruistic motives. However, less plausibly, Thomas argues one step further that, 'sociobiology underwrites motive alturism' (42). The structure of the argument for this is briefly as follows. Parental love is an instance of transparent love which is a motive to do good for another where the motive does not depend upon characteristics of the recipient. Such love engenders psychological security in offspring which is necessary for human flourishing and survival. Thus, we have reason to believe that the specific capacity for transparent love has been selected for (62). This is an unconvincing argument for a particular biological capacity since the fact that transparent love is beneficial does not show that it was not developed through social conditioning of some more general capacity. Having shown that sociobiology does not rule out altruistic love and what its significance is, one wonders why Thomas feels he has to ground this specific motive in biology. Even if it turns out to be true, what exactly are the gains for moral philosophy?

Given the capacity for motive altruism, Thomas proceeds to explain how social interaction brings it into play. For this purpose, he gives an insightful account of both parental love and friendship and their role in engendering altruism. Parental love engenders in the child the ability to forgo a benefit for others, largely through the principle of reciprocity. We tend to favour those, such as parents, who favour us. It is also aided by the tendency of one to admire and wish to be like those one loves. Thus, children come to want to exhibit the altruistic love their parents show them.

However, the altruism of parental love is only gratitudinous in that the child loves the parent as benefactor. In order to generate autonomous altruism, where one would benefit a stranger with no thought of return, Thomas appeals to friendship. Friendship and its functions are sensitively described, but the argument is thin at the crucial point of engendering fully autonomous altruism to strangers and moral agents in general. Thomas defends the thesis that, 'friendship is the vehicle of social interaction through which we come to have the degree of autonomous altruism that morality requires' (132). He gives an enlightening account of how friendship enhances the sort of sensibilities we need to be moral. What remains unclear is the role of friendship in actually getting us to generalize our altruism to all moral agents. Thomas's one comment on this is not very helpful. He writes: 'But companion friends do not constitute one species of human

beings and everyone else, another. Accordingly, the sensitivities that companion friendship gives rise to put one in good stead for social interaction generally' (156). However, being in 'good stead' for such interaction does not seem sufficient for 'the degree of altruism morality requires'.

In the last few chapters, Thomas develops the implications of his psychologically realistic account of moral character for certain issues about the moral life. The first issue is the degree of dependence moral character has upon society. Thomas denies what he calls 'the Platonic thesis' that a morally virtuous person would continue to behave morally regardless of how immorally treated. However, he agrees that moral character should not depend directly upon how one is treated. He offers a plausible way of holding these two beliefs together by giving an account of how character is dependent upon society. Moral character requires beliefs about how one would be treated by others under certain counterfactual conditions and it requires a society which will be conducive to holding such beliefs. Thus, an ordinary moral person can withstand considerable, though not complete, immoral treatment in the right sort of society.

The second issue is the relation between moral character and living well. Here again Thomas finds some truth in a Platonic thesis; namely, that the moral person is, thereby, happier than the immoral. The truth is that the moral person is simply favoured to be happier than the immoral. By giving a detailed account of the emotional structure of moral character, he is able to make a plausible case for its contribution to living well. However, his argument for the comparative judgment that the moral is favoured to be happier than the immoral is unconvincing. It depends upon the claim that immoral people are more uncertain about their motives in intimate relations because their lives require dissimulation of caring behaviour. Being uncertain that their caring behaviour for their loved ones is genuine makes them unhappy.

The last issue to which Thomas turns his attention is the nature of the bad moral character. His description here is quite compelling. He claims that moral character is determined neither by reason nor will, but 'by having the proper values instilled in us from the start' (242). One of these values is self-respect, the desire that others treat us as moral agents. When this value is not instilled by parents or society, the search for self-esteem, which is a sense of worth deriving from the belief that our endeavours are worthwhile, may not include being moral and may turn to bad values for which we can gain recognition.

Briefly, the value of this book goes beyond its arguments for particular issues which are sometimes unconvincing by presenting an insightful and humane description of moral character and its significance.

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James Tully, ed.
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1989. Pp. xii+353.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07796-7);
US $19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02301-8).

James Tully has performed a useful service by putting together this collection of Quentin Skinner's best essays on method, a representative set of papers by his critics, and a new response to them from Skinner. Working scholars in the history of ideas will appreciate having these essays conveniently gathered together, and graduate students and outsiders with more than a passing interest in historical interpretation will find Tully's lucid introductory essay a good aperitif and the rest of the volume a tasty appetizer. That there is no entrée here is no criticism of the volume; anyone who expects full sustenance from methodological debates in the history of ideas should alter their expectations.

The papers chronicle a twenty-year debate which began with Skinner's rejection of the two modes of interpretation dominant among historians of political theory in the 1960s: *textualism*, the view made popular on the west side of the Atlantic by Leo Strauss and advocated on its east side by John Plamenatz with the slogan that the way to understand a text is to read it 'over and over again', and *contextualism* which reduced texts to epiphenomenal status by assuming that their meaning could be 'read off' from the relevant historical context. The much argued-over classic of this genre was C.B. Macpherson's *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, a rendition of the political thought of Hobbes, the Levellers, Harrington, and Locke as all

being decisively shaped by the emergence of modern capitalism which Macpherson supposed then to have been underway. In opposition to both these orthodoxies Skinner argued that writing a text is performing a linguistic action, and by borrowing from insights of Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin concerning the performative character of language he came up with an exegetical method geared to 'decoding' the meaning of a text from the prevailing linguistic context. The idea was to get at what an author had been trying to do by discovering what his contemporaries had understood him to be doing. This method yielded some important early results especially for the study of Hobbes; Skinner discovered that the dominant view of him as 'the monster of Malmsbury' was wide of the mark and that Hobbes's ideas about obligation in particular were more influential in seventeenth-century England than had previously been realized.

How useful the method has been beyond this, particularly in informing Skinner's two volumes on *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, is more difficult to assess. His readings of Machiavelli and Bodin have drawn heavy critical fire, but Skinner's brilliant portrayals of Lutheranism and Calvinism have stood up well and are likely his most enduring contribution to historical scholarship to date (besides the Hobbes essays). There is much disagreement in the volume under review and elsewhere over the extent to which Skinner's interpretations in the *Foundations* actually utilize the method. The answer in my view is affirmative; Skinner does mainly explore how arguments were interpreted by contemporaries and he does try to analyze the roles that texts played in the politics of the day as this was conceived of by participants. In this connection it should be said that the disagreements between Skinner and other competing schools are less extensive in two respects than the quantity of ink and noise generated by the debates might lead one to suppose. First, as Skinner now concedes (233-4), his methodological innovations were less revolutionary than the early essays advertised them as being; perhaps this is always so with historiographical innovation. What he really offered was a new contextualism in which 'prevailing linguistic practice' displaced other allegedly basic explanatory realms, and it is not surprising that just as he charged his predecessors with economic reductionism some of his critics would later charge him with linguistic reductionism (see below). Second, almost all parties to the Skinner debate accept that at least a large part of the aim of the enterprise is to recover authorial intention; what is at issue here is how best set about achieving this. For this reason it is a fairly tame debate;

the more outlandish claims of *avant garde* Derridadaism that have generated so much controversy in literary circles in the past decade enter only at the margins, usually as no more than foils for pejorative sideswipes.

The most contentious of Skinner's methodological assertions is his much-trumpeted claim that studying the history of ideas in the way he advocates will generate something that can illuminatingly be thought of as the history of *ideologies*. It is here that he and I have had occasion to disagree, and since his reply in the present volume misrepresents what I have said it is appropriate briefly to set the record straight (leaving it to others to respond to Skinner's accounts of their views). The core issue dividing us concerns whether or not the beliefs and actions of an agent can be explained purely by an internal analysis of the kind proposed by Austin in his analysis of speech acts. I argued that one cannot credibly claim to be studying the history of ideas as the history of ideologies and still proceed in these terms, eschewing causal analysis that moves beyond the subjective perceptions of the relevant historical agents. Among other things I pointed out that we have to pay attention to the opaque relations between language and social reality, and the fact that people often perform actions other than, or in addition to, the ones they think that they do.

Skinner is less than accurate when he says that no examples other than redoubling in bridge were given by me to show that his equation of the description of an agent's action with his intention is problematical (265). Apart from the fact that that was not my example, I supplied a number of more consequential ones. I discussed unconscious, mistaken and distorted intentions, all of which are ruled out of court by a linguistic reductionism which limits explanatory reference to the speaker's avowal or his overt linguistic behavior. I gave the examples of inadvertent reproduction of the nuclear family and of wage-labor relationships. I noted that acts of overlooking and neglecting are often pregnant with ideological significance, giving the example of what the Pareto system neglects in its definition of voluntary exchanges, and referring Skinner to the political science literature on power since Bachrach and Baratz, which revolves centrally around the study of how what is not said and not perceived by agents can often be integral to the exercise of power. In case it might be supposed that these points are irrelevant to the historical study of ideologies I also noted that Skinner's preoccupation, in his *Foundations*, with internal analysis enabled him to offer an account

of the genesis of modern conceptions of rights in which 'he never mentions the structural transformations then occurring in European society, or that the development of a generalized right to resist contributed importantly to the growth of an ideology that could justify the transition to a market-based society,' giving illustrations from his discussion of the Huguenot revolution. My point in all this was to show that although as a theory of communication Austin's schema may work tolerably well (although it confronts difficulties that are serious and well-known), to try to extend it into a theory of ideology commits one to a linguistic reductionism that plainly is not credible. That someone of Skinner's evident sophistication appears unable to see this is surprising.

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Douglas N. Walton
Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1989. Pp. xii+292.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-37032-9);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-37925-3).

This is a timely book. At a time when informal logic has become an area of intense scholarly (as well as pedagogical) research, Douglas Walton has provided an overview of one increasingly popular approach to the study of argumentation in natural language. The question whether this approach will stand the test of time is open to debate, but this is to be expected in a newly emerging field and Walton's book provides a useful overview for anyone interested in recent discussion and research.

The basis of Walton's approach is a view of argument that construes it as reasoned dialogue. Understanding arguments in this way, logic still encompasses the study of soundness, validity, and inductive strength, though they play a less central role. The emphasis they lose shifts to logical 'pragmatics,' which studies 'the use of ... propositions

by an arguer to carry out a goal of dialogue in reasoning with a second participant in the dialogue' (1). Chapter 1 of Walton's book therefore distinguishes between different kinds of dialogue, the different stages of dialogue and the different kinds of rules that should govern discussion in a dialogue.

The basic categories of dialogue discussed are: quarrel, debate, persuasion (critical discussion), inquiry, negotiation, information seeking, action-seeking and educational. The various rules introduced in chapter 1 govern the opening, confrontation, argumentation and closing stages of a dialogue, and a variety of other topics pertinent to the assessment of a dialogue are also outlined. Major fallacies are also introduced, and deductively valid, inductively strong and plausible arguments are defined as possible standards of proof within a dialogue. Later chapters of the book elaborate the account of good and fallacious reasoning found in chapter 1, discussing complex questions, arguments from ignorance and begging the question (chapter 2), irrelevance (chapter 3), appeals to emotion (chapter 4), deductive validity and composition and division (chapter 5), *ad hominem* (chapter 6), appeals to authority (chapter 7), inductive arguments (chapter 8) and ambiguity, vagueness and equivocation (chapter 9).

The strength of the book is its sensitivity to the open ended nature of ordinary argument and the context and nuances of ordinary language reasoning. This is sometimes reflected in Walton's discussion of particular examples, where he is careful to discuss possible responses to particular criticisms, and in his account of fallacies more generally, which is sensitive to exceptions to the standard accounts of fallacies. As he points out in discussing appeals to emotion, for example, 'logic texts ... [have treated] appeals to emotion ... as inherently illogical and subject to strong censure' though such appeals may be appropriate in personal decisions and especially in moral and political discussion (see p.83 and cf. his criticism of the heavy handed use of fallacy labels on p.16). Convincing cases where arguments that fit the form of traditional fallacies are not fallacious are provided in his discussion of arguments from ignorance, *ad populum, ad baculum, ad misericordiam* and *ad hominem.*

Walton's account of the dialogue approach to argument is less convincing. Putting aside worrisome questions that might be asked about the different kinds of dialogue (whether it really is possible to make a clear distinction between natural language quarrels, debates, inquiries, etc., for example), the book does not convincingly show that the account of dialogue it begins with is essential or important in

the analysis of good argument. It is true that sensitivity to context, audience and the open-ended nature of ordinary arguments is a necessary prerequisite for a satisfactory natural language logic, but they can be accomplished without a detailed (and cumbersome) analysis of the different aspects of natural language dialogue. It is in keeping with this that Walton's account of dialogue does not play a central role in chapters 2-9 of his book (in cases where it is appealed to – on pp. 150-1, e.g. – the same points could be made in other ways). Even chapter 1 lacks convincing ordinary language examples that show why the distinctions this implies are essential to the analysis of argument. Without such examples, one must wonder whether Walton's important points could not be said in more traditional ways, with little or no talk of dialogue.

Whatever one thinks of the dialogue approach to argument, there can be no doubt that Walton provides an insightful overview of the most central aspects of argument analysis. There are some minor problems that should be corrected (an overabundance of italicized technical terms and a confusing definition of 'plausible' arguments), but the bulk of the book is interesting and informative. From a stylistic point of view, the book also has a great deal to offer, as it is clearly written and accessible. Given that it does not contain exercises, the book will not work well as a textbook, though it will be a useful supplement for anyone who teaches informal logic and its discussion of many specific issues (e.g., the use of expert testimony in legal reasoning) can certainly add some worthwhile spice to the ordinary informal logic course.

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William of Auvergne
The Trinity, or the First Principle.
Trans. Francis C. Wade, S.J. and
Roland J. Teske, S.J.
Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press
1989. Pp. viii+286.
US $19.95. ISBN 0-87462-231-X.

William of Auvergne's (b. 1180-1189-d. 1249) *De Trinitate* (about 1223) is more monumental than brief, whether one is looking at the critical edition in Latin of Bruno Switalski or the translation of Wade and Teske done from it. It is clearly a work of the first half of the 13th century and not of the second half; a work of the bishop-as-theologian rather than of a university master. The work reveals one who would like to be considered part of the Augustinian/Anselmian tradition, both in thought and style, but one who nevertheless is too caught up in Aristotle and Avicenna to go back to the philosophical and theological exercises of the monastic and cathedral schools. William's style is more akin to that of Scotus than it is to that of Aquinas. The translators have done well in the rendition into English, but it is still difficult to see how it can be of any help to someone who does not have the Latin in front of him. (Who *is* the audience anyway?) Throughout, *esse, essendi*, and *ens* are translated as 'being' and, each and every time, the appropriate word in Latin is placed – italicized and in parentheses – after the English word. Likewise for *non esse, non ens*, and *non essendi*: 'non being' is used for all three. Chapters 1 through 7 and the last chapter, the important 44, are the worst. As said, it is difficult to imagine what sense this can make to one ignorant of the subtleties of medieval philosophical Latin and it makes reading the translation fatiguing in the extreme. Apropos these parenthetical designations, we are advised by the translators in 'Some Conventions Used in the Translation' (59) to, 'follow the advice Bradley offered his readers regarding the Index to *Appearance and Reality* and regard them as non-existent.' I cannot say how helpful the advice was in the case of Bradley, but the present translation is certainly an instance of 'easier said than done'. It is a wonder (and a testimony to the care with which the work was proofread) that 'being (*being*)' instead of 'being (*esse*)' occurs only once (72), and that a solitary typo sticks out: 'cruscade' when 'crusade' is meant (56, n. 106). Indeed, the whole paragraph on p. 72 – the one within which 'being (*being*)' occurs – should be read as a model of faithful rendition of

William's Latin and at the same time a prime instance of a translation that proves valuable to a Latinist and to practically no one else.

The reader's needs are well cared for however in the extended Introduction (1-60). *On the Trinity* is but one part of a larger work of William, *The Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom*. It is a work on metaphysics every bit as much as it is a discourse on the Trinity and in it William, his Avicennized Augustinianism perhaps more evident here than elsewhere, introduces us to the distinction between essence and existence (including, at one point, '*esse essentiale*' [186] and, at another, the '*actum existendi*' [188]) that was to figure so prominently in the philosophy of Aquinas. But it is only for the purpose of 'right living' and the glorification of God – nothing else. William approaches Aristotle and Avicenna as though they are the tree of the forbidden fruit before which he cannot control himself. He battles 'Aristotelianism and Arabian philosophy; the pantheism of Amaury of Bène, the Albigensians, and the moral laxity of the era' (8, n. 28: Josef Kramp – not the translators), but shows considerably greater deference to the proclamations of the fourth Latran council (1215) than he does to the prohibitions on Aristotle: at Paris, dating back to 1210 at least.

It is a probing, tentative work, difficult to render consistent in all respects. William is against necessity in God. But he hesitates before divine voluntarism à la Ockham as well. He seems to opt for some kind of secondary causality in creatures, but he is unsure of its nature and extent. At times he leans toward a participation metaphysics. Yet God cannot be 'in' creatures in any essential sense. Repeatedly, his Augustinian desires are confronted with well-wrought Avicennian arguments that point in a different direction entirely. In the matter of the 'explanation' of the Trinity itself, William is intensely loyal to the Fourth Lateran Council and it can with some justice be said that his account of the 'three persons in one God' does not go much beyond the speculations of Boethius. He knows full well what the problem is: how to 'say many things about God' without introducing plurality and at the same time to 'say something real'. By the 13th century, that problem had become one of the 'real distinction' and William does at least try to deal with it in these terms. The complexity of the metaphysics is nowhere more evident than in the final chapter of the work, chapter 44, where he addresses the issue of the propriety of the language we use about God.

We are told by Teske in the Preface that Fr. Wade died in 1987, his labours uncompleted. He has been well-served in his pupil. The

translation is faithful to both the Latin and to the thought of William of Auvergne, even in passages where the temptation to 'go Thomist' must have been overwhelming. There are always items with which the reviewer can quarrel. For example, there does not seem to be anything wrong with the Latin text of Switalski at the beginning of chapter 31 and consequently, there appears to be no justification for preferring the text of Le Feron. 'Quantity and quality' (195) fit the subsequent discussion and indeed, they seem to be exactly what William has in mind when he opens chapter 32 (198) with 'Let us go back' and then proceeds to discuss quantity and quality in this very paragraph.

The points are minor; the translation is excellent. We are given a more than adequate bibliography and not just one, but three fine indices to help us find our way around in a complex and often abstruse work.

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Analyzing Marxism

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

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