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Editor · Directeur

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

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Robert L. Arrington

Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism.
Pp. ix+321.
US $36.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2302-3);

Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism is a study devoted to a number of developments in metaethics, specifically concerning the problem of moral knowledge, occurring in the 1970s and 1980s. Arrington writes that he has three goals: (1) To provide a guide to some of the recent literature in the area; (2) to criticize the theories he surveys; and (3) to present a theory of his own, which he calls conceptual relativism (2).

According to Arrington the period he covers has witnessed a shift in metaethical views on moral knowledge from non-cognitivist to cognitivist theories. After a brief introduction he devotes Chapters 1 and 2 to a presentation and analysis of the main arguments that have led, during this period, to the demise of non-cognitivism. The case is well presented and the arguments against non-cognitivism seem conclusive. Arrington fails to note, however, that non-cognitivism had already been decisively refuted, considerably before the writers to whom he refers began their critiques of it.

Chapters 3-5 cover three recent, somewhat different cognitivist metaethical theories. In each instance Arrington presents versions of the theory in question by two main writers, explains the theory, points out its strengths, and subjects it to criticism. Chapter 3 is devoted to moral rationalism, Chapter 4 to moral realism, and Chapter 5 to relativism. The rationalists primarily reviewed are Gert and Gewirth, the realists McDowell and Platts, and the relativists Harman and Wong.

Ethical rationalism is the attempt to establish that some moral propositions are logically necessary or, at least, that to deny them is irrational. Arrington concludes that the defenders of this view fail to establish their case, although he shows some hesitation about his critique of Gewirth (107). Moral realism is the view that moral concepts refer to real entities in the world which we can directly perceive. Although its defenders are loath to use the term, Arrington is quite correct in labelling it a form of ‘intuitionism’. His critique of its consists in part of questioning our ability to intuit these concepts but mainly in challenging the meaningfulness of the notion of
‘moral facts’, conceived as ontological entities. Relativism is somewhat less easy to characterize, because the term covers a considerable range of theories, but the version that is most pertinent to the literature Arrington surveys is a form of cognitivism that is both nonobjectivist and nonsubjectivist. Arrington argues that this sophisticated form of relativism can satisfactorily answer the standard objections that have been raised against traditional relativism but that it is vulnerable to the criticisms he levels against it.

The discussion in the three chapters devoted to recent forms of cognitivism is, on the whole, of high quality. The theories themselves are clearly presented and the arguments their authors offer in their defense are given due weight. Although there is some unevenness in the criticisms of these theories, these are usually presented carefully, documented in detail, and argued for perspicuously. However, Arrington frequently adopts a dubious methodological procedure, basing his arguments on an appeal to our ordinary use of language, a methodology that often ‘solves’ problems by failing to come to grips with them.

In the final chapter Arrington presents and defends his own cognitivist metaethical theory – conceptual relativism. He believes that this theory combines the strengths of the three forms of cognitivism he has surveyed and also avoids their flaws. As its name indicates, however, it is closer in its theoretical allegiance to relativism than to either rationalism or realism. The theory is too complex either to describe or to evaluate in detail here. I shall, therefore, limit myself to a critical comment concerning a central aspect of it.

Early in Chapter 6 Arrington writes: ‘Here we have what may be called a form of conceptual relativism. Different people, cultures, or societies mean ... different things by ‘morality.’ ... None of these concepts can be justified or rationally criticized ... Likewise, no concept of morality can be demonstrated to be superior or inferior to another’ (256). He adds: ‘[My theory] is conceptual relativism in that our moral claims are made relative to our concept of morality ... and this concept has no ground in truth or reason’ (257). In a further passage he writes: ‘in stating that [a] moral principle is true, we are simply articulating that principle and expressing our commitment to it’ (261). These statements will alert critics of Arrington, undoubtedly leading some to conclude that there is something radically wrong with his theory. I shall not pursue that point because I have a somewhat different concern.

Why does Arrington make such statements? His response is that moral judgments cannot (and need not) be rationally justified because
they contain basic moral concepts, like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, which themselves are incapable of such justification (250). But why are such concepts incapable of rational justification? Is it because they are moral concepts or because they are basic concepts? Arrington’s reply is: The latter. Writing of science and common-sense he says that, because their basic concepts cannot be rationally justified, ‘empirical judgments in common sense and science are as nonobjective as moral judgments’ (262). Generalizing, he implies that ‘basic concepts per se cannot be true or false/rational or irrational’ (262). I think it must be granted that there is a considerable variety of basic concepts, including, in epistemology, the concept ‘true’. If this concept, being basic, cannot be rationally justified no proposition that employs it can be so justified either. Consider the proposition ‘Conceptual relativism is a true theory in metaethics’. I assume that Arrington would say this and by doing so would ‘express his commitment to it’. But if, according to his own theory, such a statement is incapable of being rationally justified, why should I or anyone else accept it?

Oliver A. Johnson
University of California, Riverside

Lynne Rudder Baker
Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.

Eliminative materialists, such as Stich and Dennett, hold that mental states, the states to which scientific psychologists may legitimately refer in describing or explaining human behavior, are not about anything. Mental states, so conceived, have no content. Beliefs, etc., that is, mental states with content, do not exist. According to the eliminative materialist, statements that refer to or presuppose the existence of such contentful mental states are not literally true. Baker attempts to save belief by arguing that eliminative materialism is self-refuting (134-48). For one thing, the concept of truth is called into question. If our mental states lack content, it is not at all clear whether
attributing truth or falsity to them makes any sense. Consider as an example the mental state to which we, who accept common sense or 'folk' psychology, would refer by saying, 'She believes that eliminative materialism is true'. How could this mental state have a truth value if it is not about some state of affairs (or something else)? The eliminative materialist, to avoid defeating himself, must explain how his thesis can have a truth value. Baker considers some sketchy possibilities but finds them unpromising. She maintains that eliminative materialism is self-defeating not only because that thesis if true would undermine the concept of truth. Eliminative materialism also undermines the concepts of 'rational acceptability' and of 'assertibility'.

Dennett has tried to save eliminative materialism by maintaining that while there are no beliefs or other contentful mental states, we are warranted in speaking as if there were such states because it is useful to do so for both moral and scientific reasons. For example, on Dennett's view it is useful to hold people morally responsible for their behavior but, to do so we must attribute reasons for action of which they are aware, to them. Dennett's view is a kind of instrumentalism with respect to contentful states. Baker suggests that this view does not make sense. Attributing beliefs to person, according to Dennett, is (part of) making a prediction about the person's behavior. Baker says, 'It is difficult to see how one could understand not only one's desires but also one's awareness of one's desires as a matter of predictive attribution' (156). She suggests that Dennett here, and in other ways, makes use of contentful concepts to which he is not entitled. Indeed she questions the consistency of his version of instrumentalism (159).

Of course one might try to save belief by showing that beliefs, desires, etc. are reducible to mental states physicalistically conceived. Reduction here is taken to mean that all talk about mental states is nothing more than talk about physical states such as brain states or machine states. This is the view taken by Fodor and others. However, Baker argues that these reductionist efforts to save contentful states must fail. Indeed the major part of this book, chapters two through five, is devoted to showing this (23-110). Reductionists and eliminativists agree in accepting physicalism. Given that denying the existence of contentful states is self-refuting, and that reductionism fails, physicalism must be abandoned. However, Baker argues that physicalism is not necessary for a scientific psychology (169-74). Scientific psychology is committed to systematic empirical research pro-
grams but not to any particular ontology. She maintains that scientific psychology as currently practiced is ontologically pluralist (172). So scientific psychology might be saved even if physicalism is unacceptable.

Baker states that any theory which is committed to physicalism accepts principle (C) which implies that for beings S' and S, 'For some level of description...If S is in a state of that description and if S' is a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of S, then S' is in a state of that description' (86). Commitment to (C) entails that if S believes p (for some proposition p) and if S' is a molecular duplicate of S then S' believes p. For mental states to be reducible to physicalistic psychology, beliefs and other contentful states would have to satisfy condition (C). Baker reviews several notions of content, and argues, in each case, that contentful states fail to satisfy (C). In each case, she argues by presenting counterfactual hypotheses to show that it is possible for distinct beings to be molecule for molecule duplicates but fail to share at least one belief, that is, that molecule for molecule identity is not a sufficient condition for sameness of beliefs.

Critics of Baker’s arguments might challenge some of these counterexamples. Consider one such example. Here she describes two languages which allegedly differ in only one respect. One language is ordinary English. But in the other, a mythical language, the term ‘Vodka’ designates gin. ‘In all other respects, translation between the mythical language and English is homophonic (88-9).’ I take it that this means that a mythical sentence is always translated by the English sentence that sounds the same with the exception that, for translations from the mythical language to English, sentences which contain the foreign term ‘vodka’ are translated to English sentences in which the term ‘gin’ is substituted for ‘vodka’. Indeed, the societies are so similar in other respects that their people are molecular duplicates. The example is supposed to show that it is possible that people who are molecular duplicates may still differ in belief. However, is such a language possible? What is the word in the mythical language for (the drink we call) vodka? Regardless of whether it is the same or different from ours, the translation of some foreign sentences would not be homophonic. Again, consider sentences containing the names of the word for ‘vodka’. Consider also other sentences about the words themselves, for example the sentences expressing the history of the foreign term ‘vodka’. How would translations of such sentences work? It appears that they would not be homophonic. However, there is a more serious question. If the
societies are so similar that the people are molecular duplicates, their histories must be virtually identical, but then how could the members of the mythical society have come to use ‘vodka’ to refer to gin?

Hugh Lehman
University of Guelph

Franz Brentano

Mach’s book was enormously popular and influential; it went through many editions (though the first English one did not come out until 1976). Vladimir Ilyich Lenin thought it important enough for a book-length attack. Brentano’s interest in Mach was fuelled not merely by intellectual, but also by personal concerns: identity conditions for academic chairs are vague, but we may take it that Mach was appointed to ‘Brentano’s Chair’ in 1895. In an appendix, the editors reprint the extant correspondence between the two philosophers (203-27), where B alludes to ‘clerical velleities’ and intrigues through which he had earlier been maneuvered out of his position. It is clear that he felt no animus against his successor as a person; his disapproval, which was profound, was reserved for Mach’s philosophy.

Mach’s book contains in its 25 chapters more fascinating information than Isaac Asimov’s Book of Facts: one learns from it about the calculating prodigies Diamandi and Anandi, about worms that devour themselves starting at the tail, about magician Robert-Houdin smashing an expensive watch before Pope Pius VII. The Index of Names has over 450 entries, the bibliography is enormous.

Brentano shows almost no interest in this mass of often marginal detail; his commentary — he has interesting and incisive things to say about each chapter — only concerns Mach’s argument. There is detailed discussion of the topics of philosophical and scientific thought,
memory, instinct, will, ego, knowledge, error, deduction, concept, sensation, thought experiments (Mach coined this term), analogy, hypothesis, space, time, geometry, natural law, and several others.

Mach stood in the positivist, or, if you will, sensationalist, tradition. The editors' account of this in the Introduction contains this quote from Mach: ‘Bodies do not generate sensations, but complexes of sensations (complexes of elements) form bodies’ (5). Sensations are the stuff of everything, both mental and physical.

Brentano, by contrast, held that we can distinguish agent, object, and act whenever we perceive, judge or will. The self is for him not a construction from neutral elements, but primitively present and ostensible in all mental acts. He criticizes M’s assumption that the laws of association alone can account for the generation of all concepts, judgments, theories, no matter how remote from the sensational basis. M’s confounding of association and reasoning leads him to overlook the ‘contribution of apodictic insights, of whose nature and existence he seems to have no inkling’ (34). Further, ‘the difficulty and arbitrariness in the efforts to delineate the self, which he bemoans, derive solely from the chaotic state of his basic psychological doctrine’ (40). Among other failures, M does not allow for a distinction of apperception and perception (49). B shrewdly points out that when Mach speaks of one who ‘assumes that there are identities without having ascertained them,’ he has no way of explaining in terms of sensations what ‘assuming’ and ‘ascertaining’ is (55). For B, these acts are, of course, psychological phenomena, which must be distinguished, and cannot be constructed, from their intentional objects. The same criticism recurs several times, e.g., in the discussion of interest (65) and expectation (68). Mach, B thinks, cannot distinguish between the expectation and that which is expected as, in general, he does not allow for a distinction between the representation and what it aims at (das worauf sie geht).

There are two aspects to B’s criticism: he claims, rightly I think, that on the basis of sensations and association, Mach cannot account for acts of the mind. He seems to hold, second, that sensationalist epistemologies cannot distinguish mental tokens from what they betoken - if the only ultimately real elements are sensations, then all becomes a runny pie - the distinctions between token and object, self and other, sensation and concept disappear. But this second criticism is less than persuasive: these distinctions, profound as they may be, need not occur at the basis of the system. Construction minded philosophers have occasionally complained about being misunderstood
on this point, so Berkeley in his Commentaries: ‘The using the Term, Idea of, is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters so also in this’ (No. 660). Though it makes sense to speak of having an idea of something, ideas, in this view, are not by their very nature ‘of’.

Mach was committed to a version of evolutionary epistemology. He held that the function of hypothesis and theory is to simplify, and thus to lighten the laborious tasks of memory and calculation; theorizing is a natural impulse of the mind motivated by convenience. M stresses the economical aspects of theory-choice, now often called simplicity and cost. B has no patience with this. He is repelled by the very thought that theories — which are judgments — should be instruments rather than factual claims, or that ‘the least degree of probability is neglected for love of convenience’ (85).

In addition to B’s commentary (17-166) and the correspondence, there is an appendix with further notes on Mach (169-99), pictures of the philosophers, of mss, and indexes. The edition is very thorough, the editor’s introduction precise and to the point. One small matter might be misleading: Mach’s later letters are described as typed, with stamped signature. This does not mean that Mach dictated them and did not have the courtesy to sign them. He had suffered a stroke in 1902, which immobilized his right side. All of his subsequent writing was typed with the left hand, and his signature stamped.

Aside from the great medieval commentaries on Aristotle, major philosophers have not often commented in detail on the work of contemporaries or predecessors. Spinoza on Descartes, Leibniz on Locke, Schopenhauer on Kant, Mill on Hamilton are exceptions that come to mind. Here is an important extension of this list, noteworthy not only because Brentano is always worth reading, but also because it is a confrontation of two profoundly different styles of philosophy of mind and epistemology. I note, in conclusion, that some, but not all, of B’s concerns were addressed by the next generation of Viennese philosophers when they added logic to Mach’s positivism.

Rolf George
University of Waterloo
Bohdan Dziemidok and Peter McCormick, eds.  
*On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments.*  

This volume contains eleven essays on Ingarden. The English translations of his works are insufficient for a critical appreciation. Readers of his works published in German are in a better position to understand his contribution to philosophy. Unfortunately, the selected bibliography of his philosophical works contained in this volume does not list a number of major works available in German. (E.g., *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst* (1962), *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Vol. I (1964), Vol. II/1 (1965), Vol. II/2 (1965), *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerkes* (1968); all in Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.) Readers of Polish are in the best position to understand his writings. Judging from the endnotes attached to these essays, none of the eleven contributors to this volume read Ingarden’s works in Polish. However, the contributors who read Polish do not speak the Anglo-American philosophical idiom, and those who speak this idiom do not read Polish. Peter McCormick’s ‘Literary Truths and Metaphysical Qualities’ and Richard Schusterman’s ‘Ingarden, Inscription, and Literary Ontology’ will repay close study, but only the first essay touches on a central issue in Ingarden’s work. This essay can be recommended as a good introduction to Ingarden for monolingual readers of English. A third essay by John Fizer presents a comparison between the ontologies of Ingarden and Mukarovsky.

Danuta Gierulanka provides an outline of Ingarden’s philosophical work. Concerning his work in aesthetics, Anita Szczepańska writes on the structure of artworks; Janusz Misiewicz on aesthetic categories; Bohdan Dziemidok on axiology and the evaluation of artworks; Henryk Markiewicz on the development of literary studies; Andrzej Pytlak on musical compositions; G. David Polick on sculptural artworks; finally, Danuta Kuznicka on the theatre.

Only the first of these eight essays is marked as a translation from Polish. The other seven are not so marked, but all are equally difficult to understand. An example will be helpful here. According to her translator, Danuta Gierulanka writes as follows (7): ‘The original concept of the formal structure of ideas developed in ‘Essentiale
Fragen’ enables him to escape objections raised for centuries against universals. Only Ingarden’s conception makes two allegedly contradictory sets of properties clearly distinguishable for the first time, viz. (1) the universal “man in general”, for example, would have to be, as it were, something real and changing in time, just like any man in general. On the other hand, man in general, i.e., the general object, would have to be something ideal and unchangeable; (2) a “triangle in general” would have to be both right angled and non-right-angled simultaneously.’ A translation that tries to make sense of this passage must indicate where the author refers to objects and where she refers to concepts.

Studies by and about Ingarden present translators with a fundamental philosophical problem. Ingarden insists on speaking about what he calls ‘intentional objects.’ At the same time, his very careful ontological studies provide evidence that he agreed with the content of the slogan ‘no entity without identity’ long before it was formulated by Quine. But in that case, why did he insist on speaking about objects rather than concepts? The philosophically sophisticated won’t find this harmful; but the unsophisticated are prompted to assume the existence of objects that lack criteria of identity. Danuta Gierulanka’s claim (13) about Ingarden is correct: ‘1. A literary work of art is a purely intentional object (all that it is is ascribed to it by the author’s consciousness); it is a product of the author’s conscious acts. 2. To prevent his work from perishing together with the conscious acts of its creation, the author makes it permanent, e.g., by setting it down in writing. Thus he shapes a certain physical object called the ontic foundation of the work, which cannot, however, be considered a part of the work of art; it is completely outside the work.” Janusz Misiewicz — or his translator — may have wanted, but failed to express the same point (56): ‘A literary work is a thing, an intentional object, that has its ontic foundation in another object (language); this results in a multiplicity of the physical forms in which it can be recorded (book, gramophone record, tape).’ We now have a proliferation of things, intentional objects and objects tout court. For some of these we do and for others we do not have identity criteria.

Even if we are aware of the different senses of the word ‘object’ when used in intentional and non-intentional contexts, we invite unnecessary confusions. The question arises: what prompts Ingarden’s readers to understand intentional objects as objects of a special kind? This question suggests a slight detour. First, let us remember what we are talking about when we talk about so-called ‘objects’ of the imagination.
It will be agreed that thinking does not involve the existence of what is thought. We may have wishes, desires and hopes, but the Universe in which we live does not always cooperate with us and these desires remain unfulfilled. If the Universe does cooperate and our desires have at least a chance of being fulfilled — because what we desire exists — then there is a relation between us and the physical object of our desire. Now, if we insist on calling this object of desire an intentional object, then in this case what we call an intentional object will be the same as what we call a physical object. For, if in this case the physical object of our desire were different from the intentional object, we could not account for the fact that our desire has been fulfilled.

On the other hand, if our Universe does not cooperate and what we desire does not exist, it won’t be helpful to stipulate that we desire an intentional object. There cannot be a relation between us and what does not exist, even if we disguise this by talking about intentional ‘objects’. Accordingly, whether our Universe does or does not cooperate with us, the assumption that there are intentional 'objects' is not useful in our inquiry.

However, if we abandon the claim that there are intentional ‘objects’, we must still answer the objection that in desiring and in speaking about our desires the cooperation or lack of cooperation of the Universe cannot make a difference. If there were a difference between these two cases as far as our desires are concerned, we would never desire what does not exist. What remains invariant whether our Universe does or does not cooperate with a person’s desires is not an object, but a concept. This concept is given by a description of what he desires. Once this description is at our disposal, we may be able to decide whether he desires that a certain object in our Universe satisfy a given description or whether he desires that there be an object satisfying a given description. In the first case, a person is related to an object and he desires that it satisfy a certain description; in the second case, he is related to a concept given by a description and he desires that there be an object satisfying that description. In either case, the cooperation or lack of cooperation of the Universe does not make a difference to this account. Once we accept the view that in desiring we are either related to an object or to a concept, the question concerning the ontological status of so-called ‘objects’ of desire cannot arise. It is a category mistake to assign the same ontological status to what is in some cases an object and in other cases a concept.
Writers on Ingarden and translators of essays on his works must
be aware of the possibility of committing category mistakes when
speaking about intentional objects. Ingarden did not commit such mis-
takes. But many of his readers, commentators and translators were
both less sophisticated and less self-conscious philosophers: they did
not avoid category mistakes. Not only Gierulanka's essay, but all
other essays translated from Polish would have gained by the trans-
lators' efforts to distinguish between objects and concepts, while talk-
ing about Ingarden's intentional objects.

The essays in this volume were carelessly translated and they were
not even subjected to minimal proofreading. E.g. (234), 'All works of
art are purely intentional objects. Their vehicle is some real object
and they have their abuse [sic!] in conscious experiences of the au-
thor (creator).' The proliferation of nonsense in this volume could have
been avoided. Also, some formulae are garbled. E.g., the following
is said to be in the language of modal logic: 'p - 8(q.r.s.t.)'(180). Given
its prohibitive price, only libraries can afford the purchase of this care-
lessly produced book. Libraries who have a standing order for all
books by a given publisher may wish to reconsider their policies.

Laurent Stern
Rutgers University

Jürgen Habermas
The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere: an inquiry into a category of
bourgeois society. Trans. Thomas Burger.
Pp. xix+301.

What is the value of public opinion, a public mandate, or what pass-
es for public participation in public government? What good is this?
Not to be hasty with so curious a question, consider first what makes
the public problematic. I think Habermas would agree that it is be-
cause the public sphere has become a marketplace and publicity a
commodity. Anckorpersons, spokspersons, spin doctors, pollsters and
media consultants do not facilitate a critical discussion of our government. Instead they for the most part all produce signs which are designed either merely to entertain or discreetly to manipulate their consumers. Habermas goes so far as to suggest that what public media publicly circulate as signs of publicness in government, education, justice or opinion now actually ‘prevents the formulation of a public opinion in the strict sense.’ For instance, when ‘important political decisions ... are introduced ... as publicity vehicles into a public sphere manufactured for show.’ Crafted as a media event or as a tactical disclosure, these ‘remain removed qua political decisions from both a public process of rational argumentation and the possibility of a plebiscitary vote of no confidence in the awareness of precisely defined alternatives.’ What passes for a public mandate therefore ‘operates less as a ... rational foundation [for] the exercise of political and social authority the more it is generated for the purpose of an abstract vote that amounts to no more than an act of acclamation within a public sphere temporarily manufactured for show or manipulation’ (220-2).

It was not always like this. Habermas does not allow that there is public opinion unless two conditions are met: First, this opinion is formed rationally, ‘that is, in conscious grappling with cognitively accessible states of affairs’; second, the opinion is formed ‘in the pro and con of a public discussion.’ This was possible some time ago but no longer: ‘one can properly speak of public opinion only with regard to the late-seventeenth-century Great Britain and eighteenth-century France’ (xvii). What passes for a public now is a mutation or structural transformation of a public sphere that came into existence with the ascendancy of private capital in the European 18th century. What Habermas calls bourgeois publicity (bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit) evolved from a pre-modern use of publicity and representation as instruments by which feudal and later courtly power displayed itself, to become an urban and ideally democratic space in which private persons engage in a critical discussion of politics and culture. This shift (in late-17th-century England and the 18th century) ‘produced not merely a change in the composition of the public but amounted to the very generation of the public as such’ (39).

Habermas’s account of this is especially interesting for the way in which he shows how a change from the public as a place of sovereign display to one in which private persons discuss their government was prepared for by the new power of commodified, urban forms of cultural production and exchange: ‘public’ theatres, galleries and
concerts; subscription libraries and reading rooms; weekly critical-moral journals (like the *Tatler* from 1709), and the coffeehouses whose clientele read and discussed their contents. Despite differences among these of size, composition and climate of debate, three common features contributed to the nascent bourgeois public sphere: (1) the possibility of a kind of social intercourse that disregarded distinctions of rank, establishing instead a 'parity on whose basis alone the authority of the better argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy'; (2) the discursive problematization of political economics, relations previously unconsidered by critical discourse; and (3) however exclusive it might have been in fact, this public was inclusive in principle. Here one glimpses the politics of 'disinterestedness' in the Enlightenment aesthetic. Theorists of a bourgeois public (Kant is singled out for an extended consideration) worked on the idea of the public as 'an order in which domination itself was dissolved ... Public debate was supposed to transform *voluntas* into a *ratio* that ... came into being as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the interests of all' (82-3). It was intrinsic to the idea of a public opinion born of the power of the better argument' to 'claim to ... discover what was at once just and right' (54). Habermas does not minimize the real exclusiveness of 18th-century power. His analysis takes poverty and patriarchy soberly into account. Yet he also takes the opportunity to observe that 'ideologies are not only manifestations of the socially necessary consciousness in its essential falsity,' and even says 'there is an aspect to them that can lay a claim to truth in as much as it transcends the status quo in utopian fashion' (88).

There is a significant difference between the bourgeois public sphere and ancient or medieval models of publicity. Where the public sphere of the *polis* was a field in which to display virtue and feudal publicity an instrument of tutelage, the bourgeois public sphere would be critical (*räsonierend*). What is new, in philosophy as much as politics, is the identification of reason in social relations with an exchange among private and equal persons in a critical discussion of their government. Yet there is also a significant difference between this and our present experience. Nowadays the public sphere is for the most part a place where a social-psychologically modulated publicity is strategically deployed with a view to the formation of opinions by anything but critical, rational discussion. What passes for a public opinion is the summation of reactions which, while 'in many ways mediated by group opinions,' remain private 'in the sense that they were not exposed to correction within the framework of a critically
debating public' (221). As a result, 'the critical discussion of a reading public tends to give way to exchanges about tastes and preferences between consumers — even the talk about what is consumed ... becomes a part of consumption itself' (171). If, as Habermas says of the 18th century, 'the census which regulated admission to the public sphere in the political realm ... [was] identical with the tax list' (85), today it is identical with the reach of advertising technology and the market for what calls itself the media. Those who tune in are looking for a satisfying use of their leisure time. The last thing anybody wants to do, or is seriously encouraged to do, is to engage with others in a critical examination of the options concretely available for their government. This is precisely the condition Kant defined as tutelage, now ironically sustained by new instruments of the public communications from which Kant and the 18th century anticipated enlightenment.

There you see the structural diremption, the *Structurwandlung* of Habermas's title: The sounding board of an educated stratum tutored in the public use of reason has been shattered; the public split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical (175). While publicity has 'penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its political function, namely that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to the control of a critical public' (140). 'To be sure,' he adds, 'within an immensely expanded sphere of publicity the mediatized public is called upon more frequently and in incomparably more diverse ways for the purposes of public acclamation; at the same time it is so remote from the processes and equilibration of power that their rational justification can scarcely be demanded, let alone be accomplished any longer, by the principle of publicity' (180). Televisions tell us individually that we are each of us of 'the public', yet participation is for most an electoral decision that is basically irrational because unconditioned by reliable information about concrete alternatives. This 'public mandate' manages nonetheless to legitimize deals worked out through essentially non-public exchanges — among labor, capital, administration and political parties — in a re-feudalized society.

Assuming that it once existed, one might conclude that the body politic is dead. Habermas concludes that 'the task of providing a rational justification for political domination can no longer be expected from the principle of publicity' (180). At the same time, and against all odds, he insists that the 'conditions for a public sphere
to be effective in the political realm ... can today no longer be dis-
qualified as simply utopian' (235). What gives him hope, I think, is
a perception of two antagonistic tendencies in the industrial democ-
racies, and his conviction that it has not yet been decided which will
triumph. On one side, it has to be allowed that what passes for pub-
lic opinion nowadays is mostly 'a staged and manipulative publicity
displayed by organizations over the head of a mediatized public;' as
such it 'represents the collapse of the public sphere of civil society.'
Yet Habermas thinks 'the ascendency of publicity regarding the ex-
ercise and balance of political power ... over publicity merely staged
for the purpose of acclamation is by no means certain.' For on the
other side, 'to the degree to which it preserves the continuity with
the liberal constitutional state, the social-welfare state clings to the
mandate of a political public sphere according to which the public
is to set in motion a critical process of public communication through
the very organization that mediatize it' (232). For this reason he ends
on a note of guarded optimism: 'the outcome of the struggle between
a critical publicity and one that is merely staged for manipulative
purposes remains open' (235).

First published in 1962, *The Structural Transformation of the Pub-
lic Sphere* was Habermas's Habilitationsschrift for the Philosophical
Faculty of Marburg University. If it comes to us in English 28 years
later, it is all the more needed. For nothing has happened in the mean-
time to make the value of publicness less fundamentally problemat-
ic. Our English-speaking philosophy could use a work on this problem
— on publicity, public opinion, the good of it. Also we could use the
example of a philosopher for whom there is no approaching these mat-
ters from a 'purely conceptual' point of view, nothing datum-like about
intuitions, and no references that transcend the altogether contingent
history of the language game. For it is there that the signs of
publicity acquire their discursive and commercial value, and enter
into the government of conduct.

Barry Allen
McMaster University
Both books argue for the position that nothing is coloured, although they arrive at somewhat different views about the precise ontological status of colours.

Hardin’s book received the 1986 Johnsonian prize, and there can be no question I think about its enormous value. I would however locate this value not so much in any constructive philosophical achievement as in Hardin’s clear and comprehensive survey of contemporary colour science and in the forcefulness and timeliness of his warnings concerning the dangers of philosophizing about colour in ignorance of the relevant scientific work.

Hardin is perhaps prematurely persuaded that one particular theory of colour vision, the opponent-process theory, will in the end resolve all philosophical puzzles. (The main contender, Land’s retinex theory, is relegated to an appendix.) To be sure, the opponent-process theory has achieved notable successes in explaining or seeming to explain a considerable variety of visual phenomena. According to the theory ‘there are four fundamental chromatic processes ... arranged in opponent pairs, like muscles or a multitude of other physiological elements... The “red process” (i.e., the process giving rise to the sensation of red) is opposed to the green, so an increase in the one must be gained at the expense of the other, and the yellow process is, in a similar fashion, opposed to the blue. In addition, there is an achromatic pair, in which the black is opposed to, and produced solely by the inhibition of, the white process’ (29). The theory is particularly serviceable in accounting for the phenomenon of metamerism where quite different combinations of lights give rise to identical colour sensations.
The following may serve as an example of the sort of warning delivered by Hardin. He notes that numerous philosophers, beginning with Wittgenstein, have pronounced that it's a matter of logical necessity that there is no such colour as reddish-green. However: 1. opponent-process theory makes it plausible that difficulties in the way of reddish-green are of a contingent nature. It so happens that the red and green processes are opposed, so that a red sensation must be gained at the expense of inhibiting a green one. But it might not have been that way. Red might instead, for instance, have been opposed to blue. 2. Experimentation by Crane and Piantanida (1983), based upon the hypothesis that opponency can under special circumstances be superseded, has produced the remarkable result that some experimental subjects have claimed actually to experience reddish green.

Hardin arrives, more or less by process of elimination, at the position that colour experiences — experiences 'as if' of colours (109) — are identical with neurological processes. (He also thinks evidence of such identity can be provided.) Colour cannot be an occurrent property of physical objects because any such property is either on the physicist's preferred list or it is not. In the former case colour will no longer be the familiar red, green, yellow, etc. of common sense we had sought to capture. In the latter case 'our knowledge of object colour becomes totally mysterious' (80). But neither can colour be a dispositional property of physical objects. Such a view would have to base upon the notion of a 'normal observer', but 'an appeal to the color experiences of normal observers under standard conditions will assign colors to objects only approximately and relatively to particular interest [sic] and purposes' (81). Nor are there such things as sense data for colours to be attributable to. The notion of a sense datum depends upon an untenable dichotomy between what is given in experience and its intellectual interpretation.

I offer the following criticisms of Hardin's overall philosophical position for what they are worth: 1. Hardin holds, wrongly I think, that there can be empirical evidence for a philosophically significant identity (such as between colour experiences and certain neural processes). This is admittedly a popular position. I think it is nonetheless unintelligible. Granted, there can be evidence that two attributes F and G occur generally in close association. And given two such attributes, one can then single out an arbitrary thing x defined as having both F and G in their usual close association. It is then of course trivially true, since x is identical with itself, that x which has F is
identical with x which has G. But unless F and G are mutually logically entailing there will be distinct F and G aspects to the thing and there will no compelling reason for not recognizing these aspects as distinct things in their own right, but then there remains the significant fact that the F part of x is not identical with the G part of x. 2. According to Hardin, 'The characteristics and relationships of colors depend upon their biological substrate, and we delude ourselves if we suppose it possible systematically to understand the relations colors bear to each other in isolation from that substrate' (127). I think this is obviously false for some relationships which colours bear to each other. We understand quite clearly – and independently of any reference to the substrate – that orange has both a yellowish and a reddish component. Hardin himself seems to concede as much (126), yet he returns ever again to burden the substrate with more than it can bear. 3. It is not in the end possible, I think, to dispense with something like sense data as bearers of colour. From the fact that it is not always possible to explicitly notice where the experiential given ends and interpretation begins, it does not follow that there is no given.

Landesman’s approach is the more usual one of criticizing various historical and contemporary philosophical positions before setting forth his own view. Throughout his interesting book he stresses the presentational nature of colour. And it is this which leads him to reject both Locke’s power theory according to which colour is a dispositional property of physical objects as well as Reid’s microstate theory according to which colours are features of physical bodies too small to be seen. Both theories fail, thinks Landesman, for similar reasons:

For Locke we must make use of those inductive procedures that are capable of corroborating the existence of a natural law. On Reid’s view, we must invoke theoretical inferences from our sensations to their unknown cause. But, in fact, our knowledge of color is largely non-inferential. We see the colors of bodies and make judgments about them accordingly. A book’s being red, for example, is a state of affairs that can be presented in visual experience. We learn that it is red in virtue of being acquainted with this directly given fact. Thus, our conception of perception fails to square with the account of the nature of color provided by either theory. (40)

Landesman also examines an interesting variant of the microstate theory, the viewpoint of theoretical identification, according to which
colours can perfectly well be seen notwithstanding that they are the same thing as certain microstates. The point is that colour is double-aspected: it is at once both a visible quality and an invisible microstate. Landesman rejects this theory, rightly I think, for the following reason: if V (the visible aspect) and M (the microstate) are distinct then ‘it is reasonable to doubt that color is to be identified with M or with M plus V rather than with V alone’ (52).

Landesman devotes a long chapter to examination of the — to my mind implausible — view that colour experiences are a species of belief. His insistence throughout on the presentational character of colour leads him to reject this.

The weakest part of Landesman’s book is the chapter which deals with sense data (and with Ducasse’s adverbial theory of perception). He dismisses sense data in very summary and, I would say, superficial fashion (96-100). His ‘argument’ amounts to little more than the bare assertion that there is ‘no place’ for them. Thus, in discussing a holographic image of a tomato, he says: ‘One reason against supposing that there really is a holograph tomato image that one is seeing is that there is no place for images in nature or mind. Images just don’t fit in’ (99). I think, however, that there must be a place for sense data (not necessarily conceived precisely as images) else there would be no experiential given for the interpretive activity of mind to get a grip on. Landesman’s use of the expression ‘one reason’ in the above context leads one to assume he will supply further reasons against sense data; but he does not do so.

Landesman’s colour skepticism takes a form different from Hardin’s and one less easy to grasp. According to Landesman colours exist and are presented in experience yet they are not exemplified by anything. Colours exist because they are Platonic or abstract entities. When we think we are perceiving a colour we are in fact making an error, indeed hallucinating, because a necessary condition for perceiving a colour is that a colour should be exemplified. It is possible for a Platonic entity to be given in experience independently of any embodiment, and this is precisely the source of the error: we mistake presentation for embodiment (106). I have to confess I can make little sense of this. If an abstract entity can be said to be presented without being exemplified, its presentation must, I think, be in a purely intellectual mode. We can talk of presentation if we like (though I should not advise it) as when I am ‘presented’
with the concept of a cube — i.e., I conceive cubicity. And, of course, I can conceive redness too. But is it at all plausible to suppose that when I think I am seeing a red object I am mistaking a presentation in this sense for a real instance of redness?

Roger Smook
University of Guelph

Robert Kane and Stephen H. Phillips, eds.
Hartshorne, Process Philosophy, and Theology.

This volume is a collection of papers and comments first presented at the international conference held in honor of Charles Hartshorne’s ninetieth birthday at the University of Texas at Austin during February 1988. It contains papers by Griffin, Van der Veken, Whitney, Viney, Dombrowski, Phillips, Ketner, and Ford, and comments on Ford’s paper by Kane and Nobo. The volume opens with a Preface by the editors which provides an overview of its contents, and, except for its final two pages identifying the contributors, it closes with Hartshorne’s general remarks, consisting in specific responses to each of the other contributors’ papers or comments. The premises upon which the conference and the volume are constructed are that process philosophy/theology is a major constructive philosophical movement transcending the deconstruction of modern philosophy and that, along with Whitehead, Hartshorne is a towering creator and exponent of this philosophy. Granting the premises, the reader is led into a series of scholarly forays into the details of Hartshorne’s views by exceptionally learned and meticulous specialist scholars. Few contemporary American philosophers have been as fortunate as Hartshorne in winning so devoted an audience of superior philosophical talents. To the uninitiated, however, the volume poses formidable difficulties in communication.
Fortunately, the opening article by Griffin, entitled ‘Charles Hartshorne’s Postmodern Philosophy’, offers a well-organized, comprehensive account of the honoree’s theologico-philosophical thought, its avoidance of the downfall of modern philosophy, and its advantages as a new philosophy embracing both religion and science. Griffin’s recommendation is that ‘panexperientialism’ is to be preferred to Hartshorne’s terms ‘panpsychism’ and ‘psychicalism’ to designate his type of process philosophy/theology; it is a recommendation which Hartshorne accepts. Whereas Griffin explores Hartshorne’s philosophy as a whole, underscoring the originality of his neo-classical theism and his deep empiricism, the other papers focus on more specialized topics.

Several papers are devoted to connections between Hartshorne’s process theology and the analytic theists. I use the word ‘connections’ advisedly. In ‘From Modal Language to Model Language: Charles Hartshorne and Linguistic Analysis’, Van der Veken suggests that there is a superior philosophy to be found if Hartshorne’s thought is synthesized with the analyses of religious language performed by Ramsey, Wisdom, and Wittgenstein. On the other hand, in ‘Must a Perfect Being Be Immutable?’ Dombrowski demonstrates how analytic philosophers, such as Stump, Kretzmann, Mann, and Plantinga, fall into errors which they would have avoided if they had studied Hartshorne’s dipolar theism. Hartshorne’s theism is further probed in Whitney’s ‘Hartshorne and Theodicy’, which relates the honoree’s views to those of like-minded scholars, and Viney’s ‘God Only Knows? Hartshorne and the Mechanics of Omniscience’, which furnishes an interpretation of the historical background for understanding these views. Unless the reader already knows the fine points of Hartshorne’s theism and is also cognizant of the works of both the analytic and the process theists, he will find these papers difficult to read. It is encouraging to observe that a bridge of scholarship is being constructed over one of the gulfs in contemporary thought between the systematic and the analytic philosophers. It is to be hoped that others will work on this bridge, so that eventually many may cross.

The two papers with the most specialist interests are by Phillips and Ketner. In “Mutable God”: Hartshorne and Indian Theism’, Phillips declares as his aim to ‘reveal conceptions that unite, as well as issues that divide, Western process theism and Indian theism’ (113). In consideration of Hartshorne’s own explicit affiliation of process philosophy with Buddhism, Phillips’ aim is inviting, although
it is Hinduism that wins his attention, and in particular the mys-
tical variety elaborated by Aurobindo in *The Life Divine*. Thus most
of Phillips’ paper compares and contrasts the doctrines of Hartshorne
and Aurobindo. Here Hartshorne’s remarks are pertinent: ‘I have
long been aware of Aurobindo and have regarded his views as
somewhat congenial. *The Life Divine* somewhat bored me by taking
so many words and pages to achieve a somewhat unclear result’
(188). As for Ktner’s paper, ‘Hartshorne and the Basis of Peirce’s
Categories’, it spells out in somewhat laborious detail, with use of
graphs, Peirce’s hypothesis concerning the basis of the categories
in mathematics and the logic of relatives, and further shows how
Hartshorne’s interpretation of Peirce misconstrues this basis. Amidst
much praise for Ktner, Hartshorne simply reiterates his own
mistaken interpretation of Peirce. I think Ktner wins the argument,
but Hartshorne remains the charmer who wins the audience.

The most original paper in the volume is Ford’s ‘Temporality and
Transcendence’. Ford argues ‘that God should be conceived as whol-
ly temporal, and that we need to express divine transcendence strictly
in temporal terms’ (152). Ford advances his theses by quoting chap-
ter and verse from Whitehead and Hartshorne, and by reconstruc-
ing Whitehead’s meanings to overwhelm Hartshorne’s alleged
differences. If Ford could win his case, of course, the foundation of
process theology as neo-classical, as resting on the conception of god
as dipolar, with an abstract eternal aspect and a concrete temporal
aspect, would collapse. I wonder whether Ford realizes that, like Sam-
son, he would perish in the rubble of the temple. In any case I be-
lieve that the responses by Kane and Nobo sufficiently undo Ford’s
theses, at least so far as he wishes to ground them in Whitehead’s
philosophy. Interestingly one of the major differences of interpreta-
tion concerning the nature of God between Whitehead and Hart-
shorne – namely, that whereas Whitehead conceives God to be an
actual entity, Hartshorne conceives God to be a society of occasions
or of actual entities – is dealt with in a footnote by Nobo. Hart-
shorne often claims that his interpretation is endorsed by White-
head’s remarks made in conversation with A. H. Johnson. By
examining the record of this conversation Nobo definitively shows
that ‘Hartshorne ... is in error’ (180). In his responses Hartshorne
charmingly reiterates his own views.

In conclusion, this volume is highly recommended reading for
process philosophers/theologians and for those who already have
studied the process thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne. For those who are new to the field a better place to start is Hartshorne’s *The Divine Relativity* (1948).

Andrew J. Reck
Tulane University

Ruth Link-Salinger, ed.

Some collections are of interest because of their unified theme; others are of interest because of their variety. *Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts* falls into the latter category. In recognition of Arthur Hyman’s ‘thirty years of active service to the Columbia University Philosophy Department’, the volume appropriately reflects the renaissance interests of a noteworthy and wide-ranging scholar.

Not restricted to philosophy, the volume touches as well on themes in the history of religious and Jewish thought. Among these are essays by J. M. Dillon (*The Theory of Three Classes of Men in Plotinus and in Philo*), Louis Finkelstein (*Simeon the Righteous*), Lawrence E. Frizzell (*Education by Example: A Motif in Joseph and Literature of the Second Temple Period of Maccabee*), Robert A. Herrera (*Augustine’s Manichaean Turn: The Physical World in the New Creation*), Ephraim Kanarfogel (*Compensation for the Study of Torah in Medieval Rabbinic Thought*), Jacob Jay Lindenthal (*Perspectives on Health in the Judaic and Islamic Tradition*), and Sol Roth (*The Halakhah as a Theoretical Construction*). More than one of these essays illustrate – as Dillon contends in his – ‘cultural crossfertilization’ among the Greek philosophical tradition, Jewish law, and Christian doctrine.

The articles that do deal with philosophy range from ancient philosophy to some contemporary issues. Jaakko Hintikka (*On the role
of Modality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics) brings out the dual notion of potentiality, as *dynamis* and *energeia*, in connection with Aristotle’s attempt to explain the unity of substances in Metaphysics Θ. David Winston (Theodicy in Ben Sira and Stoic Philosophy) deals with Ben Sira’s account of evil which adapts the Stoic view ‘that nature is to be seen as a harmony of opposites.’ Tracing the development of the intradeical interpretation that Forms are in the mind of God, Bernard McGinn (Platonic and Christian: The Case of the Divine Ideas) shows that the historical interaction of Platonism and Christianity involved a ‘process of mutual adaptation and correlation.’ Of contemporary issues, Bernard Berofsky (The role of Power in a Theory of Freedom) critically assesses the so-called hierarchical theory of freedom. Jude P. Dougherty (Maritain on Creative Intuition) gives an exposition of Maritain’s philosophy of art, which shows Maritain to be staunchly influenced by the classical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, in contrast with a more recent view of art as socially useful.

Most of the contributions, however, fall within the area of medieval philosophy. On the basis of several texts, Bernardo Carlos Bazan (On ‘First Averroism’ and its Doctrinal Background) undertakes to explain why the Masters of Art prior to 1250 did not grasp the thesis of monopsychism in their reading of Averroes, a thesis denounced a few decades later as a ‘serious and dangerous doctrinal error.’ Ivan Boh (Franchantian’s Debt to Heytesbury) shows that the dispute among Italian logicians of the 15th and 16th century over the KK-thesis — ‘if A knows p, then A knows that he knows p’ — came to them from William of Heytesbury by way of the relatively unknown Franchantianus Vicentinus. Larry B. Miller (A Brief History of the Liar Paradox) finds the liar’s paradox discussed among Islamic scholars, whose solutions as well as criticisms anticipated the modern debate. Olaf Pluta (The Question of Immortality in Lawrence of Lindores’s *Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros De Anima*) brings out ‘the attitude of compromise ... common in the fifteenth century’ towards the contentious issue of demonstrating the immortality of the soul. Menahem Schmelzer (Two Philosophical Passages in the Liturgical Poetry of Rabbi Isaac Ibn Giat) deals with Ibn Daud’s reliance on Ibn Giat whose religious poetry was used as ‘a source of philosophical and scientific knowledge’. Fadlou Shehadi (Art and Imitation: Plato and Ibn Sina) contrasts Plato’s more metaphysical and moralistic approach to music with Ibn Sina’s more aesthetic approach. Edward Synan (Peter
Bradley: 'No' to Scotist Univocity?) seeks to correct the impression that John Scotus was the only logician of note at Oxford in the 15th century; indeed, Peter Bradley with the use of formal logic refutes several arguments in favour of univocity that can be traced to Scotus.

Several of the essays focus on the medieval Rabbi and philosopher Moses Maimonides. Alexander Broadie (Maimonides and Divine Knowledge) raises a contradiction in The Guide without attempting to resolve it. While Maimonides' theory of divine attributes in Part I hinges on a denial of any similarity between God and creatures, his treatment of divine providence and knowledge in Part III says some 'helpful things' that clearly imply a similarity. Thus his theory of attributes implies we cannot know anything about God; his theory of divine providence implies that we do. On Walter S. Wurzburg's analysis (The Centrality of Virtue-Ethics in Maimonides), ethics for Maimonides is rooted in imitatio Dei but fueled by epistemology rather than social or political theory. The development of virtue, on this view, has as its goal, not the attainment of social order or personal happiness but the refinement of human character. The virtuous imitation of God, nevertheless, is graded according to individual capacity; the higher levels of moral perfection require 'intellectual apprehension' of God. But this raises the same question behind Broadie's discussion: what can we know about God? Neither, however, seem to give sufficient attention to Maimonides' attributes of action, by which, according to Maimonides, we can know God and thus imitate him without implying a similarity. Finally, Hubert Dethier (Maimonides and German Idealism) sees in Maimonides' methodology a parallel with Hegel's dialectic and German idealism. 'This method centers around the detour,' according to Dethier, which may involve wandering around wrong tracks but nevertheless in the direction of truth.

There is a preface by the editor and a list of Professor Hyman's publications to date. Given the diversity in content, it is unfortunate that there is neither a subject nor author index.

Arranged in alphabetical order according to author, the twenty-two essays are all quite brief — no doubt the result of an editorial directive, so as to include more contributions in a single volume. The brevity and variety of the contributions, however, make the volume much like a gourmet smorgasbord. In it, scholars can sample the issues, concerns, and research of specialists they might not otherwise
encounter. While there are more developed discussions available to the specialist on specific issues and authors than are here presented, the volume allows the opportunity to broaden interests beyond the narrow confines of a specialization.

Joseph A. Buijs
St. Joseph's College
University of Alberta

Michael R. Matthews, ed.  
*The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy.*  
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company  
US $17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-075-2);  

This volume is addressed to the need for an anthology in the history and philosophy of science for the use of undergraduate students. The book begins with selections from Aristotle's *Physics* and the *Posterior Analytics* on nature, motion, knowledge, and the role of mathematics in science. It proceeds to Copernicus's summary of the main elements of his heliocentric system from the *Commentariolus*, and the dedication of Andreas Osiander to Copernicus's *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, which presents heliocentrism as a system for saving appearances rather than a description of the world. This is followed by a selection of aphorisms from Bacon's *New Organon* and by a section from Galileo's *Assayer*, dealing with the nature of sensory qualities, and parts of his *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* and his *Discourse Concerning the Two New Sciences*. The second half of the book reprints portions of Descartes's *Discourse on Method* and *Principles*, and Boyle's defense of the corpuscularian (not corpuscularian) philosophy in *The Excellency and Grounds of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy*. A short excerpt from Huygens on method in science and the wave theory of light is followed by extracts of the philosophical sections of Newton's
Principia, and the book ends with the text of the famous Query 31 of the Optics on God, the ether, sensation, vibration and atoms.

The editor has prefaced each section with a few pages of biographical information and commentary meant to serve as a general introduction. The overall impression is tasteful and modest; he has been careful to avoid expressing his own opinions about the development of the history of science, though one gathers that his general view is that mathematicization and abstraction are progressive while too fond an immersion in the sensory world generally holds up development. If this is his general view, it accounts for the neglect of the empirical sciences: chemistry, medicine and natural history. The effect is that the introduction, which recommends a study of science in its social, intellectual and historical context, is somewhat belied by the text, which not only avoids these significant areas but does not give much indication of what the contribution of science to modern philosophy really was or might be thought to be.

It is tempting to suppose that the instructions of the publisher were 'keep it short'; the entire text is only 158 pages, so that an adequate discussion of the problems raised by the primary material does not even come into question. The burden, in this case, will fall almost entirely on the instructor, who will doubtless want to supplement the anthology with a good secondary source such as Westfall's The Construction of Modern Science or Butterfield's The Origins of Modern Science. The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy is not as versatile and comprehensive a book as M.B. Hall's anthology, Nature and Nature's Laws: Documents of the Scientific Revolution (Harper and Row 1970), now regrettably out of print, and one wishes the publishers had been brave enough to test an unknown market by allowing an editor more scope. But the appearance of any new offerings in the field is welcome, and the editor is to be commended for his unerring eye in selecting the most important sections of the works reprinted. Students will find it approachable and accessible, and they will have at their fingertips a good deal of material for discussion of theories of matter and method in 17th-century science.

Catherine Wilson
University of Oregon
John McCumber
US $60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-55703-0);

M follows the currently popular fashion in speaking of the 'occlusion' of metaphysics in the Western philosophical tradition, but he at the same time finds in this tradition the thread of an ongoing 'poetic interaction' that is not only 'intrinsically emancipatory' but also suggestive of the manner in which we might discover norms which, while not the traditionally desired 'absolutes', may nevertheless enable us to engage in legitimate social and political critique. M opens his 'General Introduction' with a statement of what he calls his 'simple thesis': 'that language is oriented to freedom as inherently as it is to truth' (1). Language, in other words, whether it be ordinary language or the language of philosophers, serves both a truth-telling and an emancipatory function. That language serves the goal of freedom is, according to M, already suggested by the nature of freedom itself: it is achievable only in interaction with others. M's central task in this book is to demonstrate that such interaction is to be found extending throughout the western philosophical tradition, and that this tradition is thereby properly to be regarded as itself serving an emancipatory function. Identifying Plato's Phaedrus as 'Western philosophy's original presentation of intrinsically emancipatory interaction,' M attempts 'to narrate what amounts to an entire philosophical tradition – one that has persistently been occluded and marginalized' (167) by the assumption that the language of philosophy has been regarded throughout its history as directed exclusively toward the telling of truth.

M's book is constructed in a manner redolent not so much of the Kantian desire for a coherent architectonic than of the Hegelian obsession with the syllogism. It is divided into three Parts, called, respectively, 'Analysis', 'Narrative', and 'Demarcation'. The first Part consists of seven chapters of exposition, four devoted to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Aesthetics and three devoted to Heidegger's Being and time, The Origin of the Work of Art, and 'From a Dialogue on Language'. The second Part consists of eleven chapters, with each of the central eight chapters – devoted to Plato, Aristotle,
and Kant – divided into a section called ‘analysis’ and a section called ‘narrative’. The third Part of the book consists of five chapters, concentrating on Jürgen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer, each of which is divided into three sections: ‘analysis’, ‘narrative’, and ‘demarcation’.

M’s task in ‘Part One: Analysis’ is to demonstrate that the chosen texts of Hegel and Heidegger contain ‘not merely isolated insights into emancipatory interaction, but sustained investigations of it’ (8). He attempts to show that both thinkers were concerned with the analysis of intrinsically emancipatory interaction. M argues that Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is structured around three basic concepts – ‘recognition’, ‘externalization’, and ‘reconciliation’ – and he interprets each of these concepts as referring to a particular type of interaction. He further argues that it is necessary to interpret these concepts in this way if we are properly to appreciate the role played by ‘reconciliation’ in Hegel’s conception of freedom. Turning to Heidegger, M claims that we cannot appreciate the importance of Heidegger’s critique, in his later works, of the central place given to the conception of human discourse in *Being and Time* unless we understand this conception in terms of interaction. Once we do so, we can understand Heidegger’s later critique of this conception as ‘a form of interaction which is intrinsically emancipatory’ (106).

In ‘Part Two: Narrative’, M outlines the history of philosophy’s ‘narrative’ of intrinsically emancipatory interaction, arguing that Plato’s presentation (in *Phaedrus*) of this interaction was ‘theoretically occluded’ by Aristotle’s metaphysics: ‘For Aristotle conceives of human interaction as dominated by the polis, which has some of the characteristics of a substance and which therefore ... cannot tolerate intrinsically emancipatory interaction’ (168). According to M, this interaction ‘begins to be recovered theoretically in Kant’s critique of metaphysics, which in his Third Antinomy ... directly hits both Plato and Aristotle. This recuperation is carried out, though obscurely, in his *Critique of Judgment*, and has two sides: that of the beautiful and that of the sublime. Hegel’s philosophy, M maintains, ‘develops the former side; Heidegger’s, the latter’ (168).

‘Part Three: Demarcation’ centres on the claim that while intrinsically emancipatory interaction is theoretically retrieved by Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, the problem posed by its practical proscription by the modern state is not solved until the second volume of Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action*, with the reformulation of the Husserlian notion of the ‘life-world’, in the context of which alone such interaction can serve to provide norms for social and
political critique. According to M, the occlusion of such interaction first by metaphysics, then by transcendental critique, and finally by ‘the modern way of distinguishing aesthetics and politics’ can be ‘brought to an end’ (380) by way of a critical appropriation of the work of Habermas and Wellmer. In his concluding two chapters – ‘Structures of Poetic Interaction’ and ‘Freedom, Politics, and Poetic Interaction’ – M attempts to do so by broadening the Habermasian conception of the life-world and arguing that ‘intrinsically emancipatory interaction has roots in ordinary language’ (404). This view of such interaction frees language itself from the imposition of ‘a single set of norms and parameters,’ thereby enabling us ‘to articulate radically heterogeneous uses of language – uses which aim, for example, not at truth but at freedom, or presumably at other values than those two, such as justice or equality’ (425).

While the book is in some respects original and instructive – the treatment of Habermas and Wellmer in Part Three is especially valuable – it suffers from two serious problems. First, M’s selection of texts appears to have been dictated by the thesis he has attempted to establish with regard to the Western philosophical tradition; that is, he appears to have chosen precisely those texts that allow themselves (and sometimes only reluctantly) to be interpreted in such a way as to support his thesis. Second, it is simply not enough to conclude that the creative power of language will provide us with the means to discover norms for social and political critique as the need arises. While these norms perhaps need not be absolute or universal, and while they perhaps need not enjoy any transcendent foundation, surely they must lend themselves to a more precise characterization than that they are in principle discoverable.

Jeff Mitscherling
University of Guelph
Phillip Mitsis

Epicurus' Ethical Theory. The Pleasures of Invulnerability.


Epicurus identifies pleasure with the ultimate goal, happiness (11). Mitsis’ excellent book is essentially a search for the nature of this pleasure. He accepts Cicero’s statement that Epicurus denied that pleasure was increased by duration (26) and holds that Epicurus may have denied that pleasures had increasing and decreasing levels of intensity (27). These remarks are based on Kuriae Doxai 19, which Mitsis translates as: ‘Infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning’ (24).

Epicurus did not accept anything intermediate between pleasure and pain, and regarded a complete lack of pain as the highest pleasure (35). Mitsis points out that, if pleasure is satisfaction of natural needs, it is plausible for him to claim that there is no neutral state between pleasure or pain, for these needs are either satisfied or not (36). The satisfaction of our necessary and natural desires leads to a state of ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) and aponia (freedom from pain). Mitsis concludes that ‘we will have attained a condition that satisfies the eudaimonistic requirements of completeness, invulnerability and self-sufficiency’ (35).

Epicurus distinguished between kinetic pleasures, such as eating or drinking, and katastematic pleasures which result when our hunger or thirst is satisfied (45). He recognized no grounds for preference among kinetic pleasures. It made no difference whether the Epicurean ate with pleasure or with positive dislike. In either case, the katastematic state of satisfaction was realized (48). As Mitsis says, if a person can achieve the same katastematic pleasure from a wide range of kinetic pleasures, he can increase his ability to avoid frustration (49). To free the individual from dependence upon chance or luck Epicurus held that richer kinetic pleasures do not add to our happiness (50), and that our pleasures must be in our control (49, cf. 50). I personally do not see how our pleasures can be in our control, if we assume that ‘freedom from pain’ is a necessary condition for happiness. Unless Epicurus is willing to concede that I can be happy even when I am in extreme pain, or emaciated by hunger, my pleasure and happiness must surely be contingent. Epicurus, however, may have done precisely this, for he wrote that the wise man was happy even on the rack (121).
If we are to be happy, we must be temperate, courageous, wise and just (53). Epicurus, Mitsis writes, ‘attempts to redescribe the virtues so that they will be compatible with the virtuous agent’s invulnerability’ (57). How Epicurus does this is described in the second chapter, ‘Justice and the Virtues.’ Pleasure and the virtues entail each other (61). Mitsis states that the virtues are states that are dependent on our beliefs (72). These beliefs, however, are the tenets of Epicurean physics and theology. Our knowledge of these tenets are necessarily contingent upon our accessibility to them. This means that all statements about the autonomy and self-sufficiency (50) or invulnerability of the wise man are applicable only to the wise man who is well versed in Epicurean teachings. Epicurus argued, however, that each virtue had a corresponding prolepsis (anticipation, 76). Is it not possible that he could have used this to prove that Socrates was a wise man?

Justice not only benefits the person to whom it is directed, but it benefits the man who acts justly as well, for it provides psychic tranquillity (77). Epicurus, however, also asserted that injustice was in itself not an evil, and that it was an evil only because we cannot be confident that we can escape detection (77). It is true, as Mitsis points out, that, in making these statements, Epicurus did not deny that justice and injustice were psychic states that affected one’s ‘freedom from disturbance’ (78). Presumably, however, if we had absolute confidence that we could escape detection, the psychic state, injustice, would not affect our tranquillity.

Why then, if the virtues are psychic states, did Epicurus adopt a contractualist theory of justice? Epicurus states that a law is just only so long as it reflects the agents’ mutual advantage (80). Mitsis argues that, in making ‘advantage’ a standard, he must have appealed to his telos, happiness (81). Mitsis says that ‘contracts save the Epicurean from any possible inconveniences’ (89). I believe that they do much more than that. In Lucretius de Rerum Natura V, we find that primitive men formed pacts of friendship, desiring neither to hurt nor be harmed, because of their pity for women and children (5.1020-1). Mitsis concludes by arguing that a contractual theory ‘is meant to explain how benefiting others can for the most part be in one’s own interests’ (94), but that Epicurus ‘has not shown why we should value the interests of others’ (96).

In the second chapter, Mitsis pointed out the difficulty of reconciling a doctrine which regards the virtues as dispositional states with a contract theory of justice. In the third chapter, Friendship and
Altruism’, he points out the inconsistencies between Epicurus’ emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the wise man, and his recognition of the wise man’s need for friendship. Why, for instance, would the wise man sometimes die for a friend, or endure the greatest pains for his friends (99)? Mitsis concludes correctly that: ‘If friendship is necessary for happiness, happiness can no longer be entirely par’ hemas (in our control), nor can we always avoid the frustration of our desires’ (125).

Mitsis is to be commended for his willingness to acknowledge the inconsistencies and contradictions in Epicurus’ theory of ethics, and his reluctance to impose a system on the evidence. This is an excellent book, which may be recommended to the specialist and non-specialist alike.

Margaret E. Reesor
(Department of Classics)
Queen’s University

Jan Patočka

Philosophy and Selected Writings, trans. Erazim Kohák.


Pp. xiv + 386.

US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-45003-4);


In this work Professor Kohák has provided us with a ‘Philosophical Biography’ (3-135), translations of eleven texts of Jan Patočka (137-347), and a brief bibliography (349-77).

The philosophico-biographical essay traces Patočka’s philosophical output and development from 1929 to his death in 1977. Comprising outlines of virtually all of Patočka’s books, articles and lectures, it is a superb introduction and analysis of a body of work still largely unavailable in English. Kohák’s essay will surely prove to be a valuable contribution to the ‘virtually nonexistent’ secondary literature on Patočka’s life and thought. Kohák’s intent is to present the spirit and letter of Patočka’s thought tracing its development,
context, fundamental themes and its obstacles. The essay is massively informed, philosophically and politically astute and written in a lucid and thoughtful manner. Kohák is convinced that Patočka was an original philosopher who 'brought out, often with dazzling lucidity, the deepest philosophical questions of our time (132).’ His essay goes a long way, I think, in justifying this conviction.

Whether he was commenting on his two greatest mentors – Husserl and Heidegger – or developing a critical understanding of ancient Greek philosophy, or working in the history of science – chiefly on his monumental study of comenius – it is increasingly clear that Patočka brought a subtle and profoundly empathic intelligence to bear. In addition to this critical intelligence we find a philosopher possessed with a vision of the natural world: a vision which animates an original and creative philosophical project. Kohák’s outline of Patočka’s project seems altogether exemplary.

The texts selected for translation and inclusion in this volume are quite diverse. The essay ‘negative Platonism’ dating from 1953 is a fascinating reflection on the project of ‘metaphysical philosophy’ and its development into a doctrine of ‘true being’. This essay culminates in a profound reflection (191-205) on historical being as the experience of freedom and the related inability of metaphysics to constitute itself as a science. The 1971 essay referred to as the ‘Warsaw Lecture’ is an exceptionally lucid introduction to Husserl’s *Krisis*: a powerful overview, commentary and critique of Husserl’s analyses of the ‘natural world’. Stressing the ingenuity and Husserl’s diagnoses of the crisis of Western rationality/spirituality Patočka finds in Husserl a ‘too-complete inversion of physicalism’ which is disappointing in key respects. The essay ‘The Natural World and Phenomenology’ (1967) provides an analysis and description of the phenomenological tasks in grasping the ‘natural’ world. Its treatment of our way of being as primordially open to a totality, as orientated perpectively and situationally, as practico-willing corporeity (250-72) is subtle and profound. The essay ‘Cartesianism and Phenomenology’ (1976) is a careful analysis of Husserl’s transcendental motivation and a thoughtful and measured response to the scholarship of I. Kern and L. Landgrebe. The reflections here on act-intentionality and on ‘primordial belief’ as belief are indicative of Patočka’s engagement with and indebtedness to Husserl and Heidegger. The brief selection (274-84) from *Body, Community, Language, World* a series of university lectures dating from 1968-69 is a tantalizing introduction to Patočka’s philosophy of basic ‘movements’
or 'life-lines'. These pages represent only a small portion of what promises to be a very rich text.

The second portion of Kohák's book ends with the presentation of two brief Charta 77 texts dealing with the obligation to resist injustice (340-4) and what the outcome of such resistance might be (343-7). The outcome in the short run for Jan Patočka was his death from a massive brain hemorrhage suffered under police interrogation. The outcome in the longer run is that we continue to struggle with Charta 77's hopes - 'that our citizens may learn to act as free persons ... while those in authority may realize that the sole respect worth winning comes from a people confident of its worth.'

Dennis T. O'Connor
Concordia University

William S. Robinson

There are fashions in philosophy as in everything else and, like hats for men, dualism may be coming back into fashion. Dualists differ in their respect for the scientific world view; Robinson is quite respectful of it and so denies that any behaviour could actually have a non-physical cause. His brand of dualism is thus epiphenomenalism and, in particular, an epiphenomenalism of sensations. For him, sensations are non-physical individuals brought into being by physical occurrences in the brain but which themselves play no causal role in behaviour or, paradoxically, thinking itself. The term 'sensation' is taken to encompass anything of which we are immediately conscious. Thus our inner dialogues count as a kind of sensation, akin to the auditory sensations arising from the brain's response to speech.

Robinson defends epiphenomenalism with one positive argument for the non-physical nature of sensations but also through the traditional negative method of rebutting arguments against it. The
positive argument is, I fear, weak. It is that since there is no explanation in physical terms of sensations they must be non-physical items. But there are any number of phenomena that we count as physical but for which we have no explanation. The weather is, we now know, far too complex for us to actually explain in physical terms but it is surely a physical phenomenon. There is no explanation of why the sun emits far fewer neutrinos than it 'ought to' but again this is obviously a physical phenomena. Our inclination in such cases to say that there is *in principle* a physical explanation which we could successfully provide, if only we knew enough or had enough time and memory resources, really shows, I think, that Robinson's driving principle has things backwards. This principle is that without explanation, identification of something as physical is pointless. I would say to the contrary that it is the belief that something is physical that provides us with the faith that a physical explanation is, *in principle*, possible. It is odd that an epistemic principle like Robinson's should figure as a constitutive principle of ontology. Human abilities to figure out and to grasp explanations might well be limited in all sorts of fundamental ways. It surely does not follow that the ontology of the universe should mirror these human limitations. It is possible that the mental could be physical and that we should be unable to understand how this could be. One philosopher who comes close to espousing such a view is Thomas Nagel, and it is odd that Robinson does not even mention him. Another is Donald Davidson, whose anomalous monism posits both the inexplicability of mental phenomena and its physicality (Davidson's views are not about sensations but the position is nonetheless clearly relevant to Robinson's inexplicability argument). Davidson is mentioned only once, in a footnote, where he is listed with David Armstrong as a proponent of the identity theory (strange bedfellows).

Robinson's negative argumentation against traditional and recent attacks on epiphenomenalism is great fun. Robinson writes very clearly and puts his position down plainly; even those who are sure that he is wrong will benefit from sharpening their wit against him. Unfortunately, there is no time here to consider any of these attacks. In the end, I think Robinson does show something which even the staunchest physicalist ought to admit but which should be of little comfort to the dualist: an epiphenomenalism of sensations is coherent and ultimately irrefutable. This is because epiphenomenalism is 'empirically equivalent' to physicalism. Nothing in our experience could tell decisively against epiphenomenalism since even if epiphenomenalism is
menalism were true, everything would 'look' just as if it weren't and vice versa. Robinson mentions one phenomenon that favours epiphenomenalism. One jerks one's hand from a hot element before it hurts. But since we understand reflex arcs this is far from compelling. We should ask for evidence that the pain did not cause one to say that the element was on.

Robinson's epiphenomenalism extends only to sensations. This does not mean that the intentional psychological states such as beliefs, desires, wishes, etc. are to be thought of as causes of behaviour, as the contrast with epiphenomenalism would suggest. Robinson is a behaviorist about these states. Crudely put, 'believing p' is analyzed as 'acting like one who says p'. The traditional objection to such an approach is the charge that one cannot specify this way of acting without mentioning other mental states. Robinson devotes much effort to refuting this circularity objection. His solution is to replace the simple formulation just given with an inductive hierarchy which begins with simple situations where behaviour is closely tied to belief and which then takes the beliefs generated at this first level for granted when it constructs the next level. Thus by laddering up this hierarchy the behaviorist can harmlessly appeal to other mental states in the task of attributing psychological states. This approach is certainly ingenious, but Robinson doesn't give us sufficient reason to think that the bottom layer exists. The suspicion remains that there is a confusion between evidence for and an analysis of mental states. While it is necessarily true that language could not exist if there were no regular patterns of behaviour which linked words to action, this 'social' fact does not mean that every believer must participate in these patterns. Abnormal cases bedevil Robinson's account. Severe aphasics, especially those suffering from Broca's aphasia, will not act like one who says p even if they do believe p. The case will be worse still for paralytics. It is not clear that Robinson's solution can subsume the behaviour, or non-behaviour, of such abnormal cases under the general schema of acting like one who says x. It seems simpler to believe, contra Robinson, that it is the internal states of such people that underwrite the continued ascription of beliefs to them after their affliction (and by implication therefore before their affliction and in normal cases as well).

The doctrines of sensation epiphenomenalism and neo-behaviorism are the central topics of Robinson's book but other themes are struck. There are discussions of incorrigibility (can the reader guess already that Robinson defends a form of incorrigibility?) and self-consciousness,
as well as a rather cursory but intriguing concluding chapter on morality. It follows from epiphenomenalism and behaviorism that there could be non-sentient rational beings. Such beings would have to espouse a morality that made no appeal to such usual ethical foundations as promoting pleasure and avoiding pain or suffering. The question of whether such a morality is possible and the general question of the relation between one's mind-body theory and ethics are interesting, and Robinson has interesting things to say about them.

William Seager
Scarborough College, University of Toronto

Alan Soble, ed.
Eros, Agape and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love.

This is the second anthology on the philosophy of love and friendship to be published in the United States. The first one appeared in 1971 (David L. Norton and Mary F. Kille, eds., Philosophies of Love). Because there was scarcely any philosophical material on love published in the 1950s and 1960s, the first anthology could not contain much then-current material. Since 1971, however, an increasing number of articles and books on the subject have appeared, and three-fourths of Soble's anthology consists of readings originally published in the 1970s and 1980s.

Eros, Agape and Philia is divided into four sections. The first, entitled 'Where We Are', consists of three selections on romantic love, one written by an anthropologist, one by a psychotherapist, and one by an editor of a feminist journal. The anthropologist challenges the high value placed on romantic love in Western societies on the grounds that, up until about two centuries ago, most societies did not value it in the aberrant way we currently do. The psychotherapist discusses the differences she believes exist between women and men in their capacity to be intimate with each other. The editor argues that real love between women and men is generally impossible at present because women belong to a 'lower caste' than men.
The second section, ‘Classical Sources’, contains Diotima’s speech in Plato’s *Symposium*, portions of Books VIII and IX in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, and I Corinthians 7 and 13. The third section, ‘Exploring the Classics’, begins with material from Anders Nygren’s *Agape and Eros*. The remaining four entries in the third section consist of discussions of Plato, Aristotle and Nygren. Gregory Vlastos’ ‘The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato’ is especially good, both for the clarity of its exposition of Plato’s views in the *Lysis, Republic* and *Symposium*, and for the depth of its argumentation. Vlastos rejects Plato’s theory of love because it ‘does not provide for love of whole persons, but only for love of that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities’ (110).

L. A. Kosman, in ‘Platonic Love,’ discusses this criticism of Plato, plus the criticism that characterizes love in Plato’s theory as ‘egoistical and selfish’ because love for Plato is fulfillment of desire. In response to the first criticism, Kosman maintains that what Plato means to convey by his claim in the *Symposium* that love begins with individuals and ascends to the Forms is that through the Forms we can see the individual aright, and thus as beautiful. In response to the second criticism, Kosman says that the fact that love is fulfillment of desire does not mean it is selfish, since love for others can also fulfill a desire, namely, the desire to love others.

Section Three also contains a nicely written article by Neera Kapur Badhwar, ‘Friends as Ends in Themselves’, in which she distinguishes loving friends as ends in themselves not only from loving friends as means to ends, but also from Nygren’s unconditional and unmotivated agape. Friendship love involves loving people as ends in themselves, she argues, but not the unconditional love of agape.

Four of the five selections in the third section were written by philosophers, and five of the six selections in the fourth section, ‘Contemporary Analysis’, were written by philosophers. Although the material in these sections is sophisticated, most of it is suitable for use in the classroom; with the exception of D. W. Hamlyn’s ‘The Phenomena of Love and Hate’, which will be inaccessible to most students, the selections are clear and readable.

In ‘A Conceptual Investigation of Love’, W. Newton-Smith engages in a philosophical analysis of the concept of love of the sort common in the analytic tradition. His conclusion is somewhat sceptical: ‘we have no criterial test for “love” simply because there are not public, objective standards as to the degree of concern, respect, etc., that is required to constitute love’ (211). Susan Mendus, in ‘Marital
Faithfulness’, defends, mainly on conceptual grounds, the marriage vow against two objections. In ‘The Commandability of Pathological Love’, Robert W. Burch argues that Kant is correct in claiming that love as an emotion cannot be commanded, because love must be motiveless, whereas acting for the sake of a command is to act for a motive. His argument for the claim that we are ‘logically debarred’ from obeying a command to love is likely to seem to be a conceptual trick to most students, though it will force them to clarify the concepts of love and commandability.

At the end of the book there is a short appendix containing poems and essay excerpts, including two of Shakespeare’s sonnets and an excerpt from Montaigne’s essay on friendship. In addition, each of the four sections contains introductions by the editor, which, unfortunately, are too difficult for most students.

The anthology is successful in demonstrating the philosophical respectability of the philosophy of love and friendship, something that has needed demonstrating for several decades. Like clothes, philosophical topics have their day, and this is one that has not had its day for some time. Philosophy teachers who propose that a new course on the philosophy of love and friendship be put into the curriculum need no longer be defensive or timid. They can point to this anthology as an instance of good philosophical work that has been done on the subject.

Although some of the material in the anthology does not seem suitable for the typical undergraduate course, a very high percentage is, and that is enough to give the book a high recommendation for classroom use.

Clifford Williams
Trinity College (Illinois)
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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for electronic mail on the University of Alberta’s mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution’s computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R.A. Shiner