Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
c 1990 Academic Printing & Publishing

Volume X, No 4
April · avril 1990

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Anthony de Jasay
Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1989. Pp. vi+256.
Cdn $79.95: US $49.95. ISBN 0-19-824474-6.

The prevailing arguments in the literature on 'public goods', *i.e.*, those goods which have the two characteristics of indivisibility and publicness, conclude that, owing to both 'free-rider' and 'externality' problems, either the public good will not be produced or the coercive powers of the state will be needed to ensure production of the public good in question. A standard version of this argument is that rational agents, motivated by their own self-interest, will accept a social contract, hypothetical though it may be, to ensure that everyone pays for the public good rather than suffer the adverse consequences of being in a 'prisoner's dilemma,' where, allegedly, the unconstrained pursuit of self-interest leads to less than optimal outcomes. In *Social Contract, Free Ride* de Jasay challenges the received view by arguing, amongst other things, that rational agents in a state of nature would transform the state of nature into a sovereign state by small incremental moves and that their motivation for doing so would not be the desire for public goods but rather the demand for a greater fairness in the manner of getting them.

De Jasay begins by arguing that there could be alternative motivating forces operating in rational individuals such that if the benefits of a particular public good are sufficient to outweigh either the privation suffered from the public good not being produced or the cost of privately producing the good, then it is possible that rational agents would be motivated to accept the role of being a 'sucker' to ensure that the public good is produced. In other words, de Jasay argues, under some conditions the risks one takes, in terms of failing to have the public good produced, might outweigh the risk one faces with respect to others free-riding on the successful producton of the public good. Therefore, he concludes, it may indeed be rational to voluntarily choose the 'sucker' role, even if others free-ride (205).

However, de Jasay continues, while it might be rational to voluntarily choose the sucker role in a 'perfect state of nature' – that is the state of affairs that can be deduced from the assumption of force being equally distributed amongst all agents (42) – in order to ensure production of the public good, thus tolerating the potential existence of free-riders, it is 'unfair' to allow the free-rider to free-ride if it is possible to prevent him. The argument being made here on behalf of the sucker is not an argument from justice – that is that it is unjust for the sucker to pay and the free-rider to free-ride – for, as the free-rider would quite rightly argue, each voluntarily chose their respective roles and he, the free-rider, did not encourage the belief or expectation that he would, in any way, contribute to the production of the good in question (213). Rather, it is an argument from fairness; that is to say, the sucker is arguing that, while he may have voluntarily assumed the sucker role in order to ensure production of the public good, it is not the case that he must endorse conspicuous over-consumption on the part of uninhibited free-riders. On the contrary, de Jasay argues, the sucker, if he should be able to identify free-riders, has two alternatives open to him to mitigate the incidents of free-riding: exclusion and enforced contribution. Of these two alternatives de Jasay first favors exclusion, if it is cost-effective, and, if it is not, he then favors forced contribution. In order to appreciate the force of his argument for forced contribution one must first consider de Jasay's earlier argument for why those who voluntarily chose the sucker role would also voluntarily choose an enforcement mechanism.

De Jasay argued earlier, with respect to the rational agents who voluntarily chose the sucker role, that, in order for the public good in question to be produced, it was not enough that a sufficient number of people would subscribe to the choice of producing the public good, for it may be the case that all would not comply with their initial choice of subscribing, once the public good was produced, and thus pay the requisite subscription fee. In order to ensure that each who voluntarily chose to subscribe actually paid the subscription fee ex post de Jasay argues that it would be rational for them to unanimously choose a 'group executive' to enforce their ex ante intent (212). It would be rational, de Jasay argues, on the grounds that they voluntarily chose the sucker role in order to ensure production of the public good and if some sort of enforcement mechanism was necessary to ensure ex post contributions they would also voluntarily choose the enforcement mechanism.

The decision to choose such an enforcement mechanism must, of course, be unanimous, for, if it were not, some would be forced to contribute even if they would have preferred the chance at free-riding. The argument for unanimous consent is a version of the Hobbesian argument that 'the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting;

but in the known disposition thereto.' Hence, what rational agents in a perfect state of nature require in order to make the first move towards civil society – and, in this case, the production of public goods – is not the absence of free-riders but rather the certainty of forced contributions on the part of those who voluntarily choose to subscribe (206).

By first voluntarily choosing the sucker role and then voluntarily choosing an enforcement mechanism, i.e., contracting with others to ensure compliance, and thus meeting the Hobbesian certainty requirement, rational agents can make their way out of the perfect state of nature. It is the taking of these first few steps to move out of the perfect state of nature, de Jasay argues (212), that shifts the argument from an argument of justice to an argument from fairness and thus provides the moral sanction for enforcing free-riders to pay for that which they consume. An argument from justice would not demand of free-riders that they cease free-riding but, de Jasay argues, an argument from fairness would, for 'once some must be forced to contribute, equality of treatment demands that all should be' (213). It is true, de Jasay concedes, that there is no criterion for choosing between rival principles of equal treatment but nonetheless one can argue that 'treatment according to *some* fair principle would usually prevail over treatment lacking *any* such principle' (214). This argument is supported by an argument to the effect that both suckers and free-riders 'will at worse not lose, and at best gain, when one more free-rider is forced to contribute' (214). Hence, by taking incremental steps such as these rational agents can move out of a state of nature into civil society without the need of a hypothetical contract.

De Jasay's argument may point the way out of the state of nature but it does so at the cost of an important assumption. The argument to move out of the state of nature ultimately rests on two crucial points: voluntarily choosing to be a sucker so that public goods can be produced, and a unanimous decision on an enforcement mechanism so that Hobbes' certainty requirement is satisfied. The problem is, however, that we require some explanation or argument for the move from unanimously choosing an enforcement mechanism to the belief that the enforcement mechanism will operate according to its mandate. After all, an enforcement mechanism is itself a public good and therefore the argument to show that the enforcement mechanism will satisfy the Hobbesian certainty requirement does not, and nor can it, be used to demonstrate that the Hobbesian certainty requirement will be satisfied with respect to the initial public good of enforcement. Furthermore, any particular enforcement mechanism will require another enforcement mechanism to ensure that it complies with its ex ante intent. Therefore de Jasay's argument entails either an infinite regress or it rests on an unwarranted assumption about the ability of the enforcement mechanism to bootstrap itself into complying with its ex ante intent.

Despite this problem de Jasay's *Social Contract, Free Ride* is a valuable contribution to the literature on public goods and social contract theory. It merits the attention of philosophers, economists, political scientists, and policy makers. Not only does he challenge the received view concerning the relationship between public goods and hypothetical social contracts; his argument, in so far as it goes through, also has important public policy implications.

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Marshall Edelson
Psychoanalysis: A Theory in Crisis
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
Pp. 392. US $39.95. ISBN 0-226-18437-4.

Edelson is well positioned to illuminate the issues discussed in this book. He is a professor of psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine and a practicing psychoanalyst; he is also very well read in the philosophy of science. In his last book, *Hypothesis and Evidence in Psychoanalysis* (1984), he defended the use of rigorous empirical requirements in the psychoanalytic field, but argued that such standards can be met in a clinical setting through the use of single subject and quasi-experimental designs. He develops this same view in his new book, but also moves in some new directions.

In Part 1, Edelson articulates what he takes to be the core theory of psychoanalysis; in Part 2, he defends the case study method for exploring and testing psychoanalytic hypotheses. When Edelson speaks of 'psychoanalytic' theory he does not mean one of the newer versions; he is talking about Freudian theory. He includes in the core of that theory those theoretical concepts that are used to formulate distinctive answers to question about entities in the intended domain of psychoanalysis (xx). That domain, on Edelson's view, does not include all psychological phenomena. He rejects as infertile and grandiose the idea that psychoanalysis is a general psychology (xxiii). Psychoanalysis, on his view, is most generally a psychology of mind, and, more specifically, is an intentional psychology. That is, it is concerned with the nature and causal interrelations of such entities as wishes and beliefs. He describes the psychology as 'intentional' because, he reasons, wishing and believing, etc. are *directed* toward mental representations (xxiii).

Besides being a theory about the mental, core Freudian theory also covers some behavioral responses in so far as it purports to explain neurotic symptoms and 'inexplicable' paraphrases. In referring to the latter and to certain dreams as 'inexplicable' (xxvi), Edelson presumably means that their occurrence cannot be explained without the help of Freudian theory.

In spelling out the details of the core theory, Edelson makes the following points (among others). In chapter 1, he argues that psychoanalysis is a science of the symbolizing activity of the mind. Along the way he draws an analogy between Freudian theory and Chomsky's views about transformational grammar. To illustrate the comparison, he contends (15) that Freud formulates certain mechanisms of symptom formation in terms of transformational rules for operating on verbal representations. For example, in the development of paranoia, according to Freud, 'I (a man) love him' is transformed into 'I do not love him – I hate him', which in term becomes 'He hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in hating him'.

In chapter 2, Edelson exploits this analogy between Freudian and Chomskian theory in explaining the psychoanalytic theory of dreams. In doing so, he is not merely adopting what he takes to be a useful heuristic strategy; he is also contending (22) that Freud implicitly used a transformational-generative model in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, even though he agrees that there are important differences between Freud's model and the one used by Chomsky.

In chapter 3, Edelson gives advice to his fellow analysts about dealing with the findings of other disciplines, makes a few brief comments about the status of psychoanalysis as a science and about the relation of psychoanalytic theory to other theories. Chapter 4 contains an account of the competence the psychoanalyst uses in 'inventing' (80) a psychoanalytic interpretation. In chapter 5, Edelson isolates the distinctive sense in which the term 'anxiety' is used in Freudian theory and lays out some empirical hypotheses about anxiety disorders. He also notes some limitations on animal models of human anxiety, lists some questions about anxiety to be answered by psychoanalysis and other disciplines, and closes with some proposals for overcoming impediments to sound psychoanalytic research.

Chapter 6 is entitled 'Psychoanalytic Theory', which is a bit odd given that the entire first half of the book is about the core theory of psychoanalysis. In this chapter Edelson discusses the domain of psychoanalysis, mental contents and causal gaps, and the kinds of interpretations that analysts make in their attempts to make comprehensible to the patient mental states that the latter finds incomprehensible. He concludes with an examination of the views of Heinz Hartman and the attempt to make psychoanalysis a general science.

In Chapter 7, Edelson argues that a complete theoretical reduction of psychoanalysis to neuroscience may be practically if not logically impossible. He opts for the view that the science of psychoanalysis is an autonomous discipline, a view, he adds (128), that is consistent with a thorough going materialism. Chapters 8 and 9 contain, respectively, discussions of applied psychoanalysis and what Edelson calls 'a cinematic model' (180) of wish fulfillments, fantasy and defense. Chapter 10 discusses psychoanalytic theory and sexuality.

The first half of Edelson's book contains a good deal of interesting material, but it is presented in a rather hodgepodge fashion, probably because much of it is culled from his earlier writings. As to Edelson's interpretation of the core of Freudian theory, parts of it are standard and parts are not. Concerning the more controversial elements, Edelson defends his inclusion of them on pragmatic grounds (xix); he allows that others might formulate the core theory somewhat differently and yet not be mistaken.

In the second half of his book, Edelson discusses methodological and epistemological issues. Chapter 11, in my view, is one of the best chapters of the book. Edelson begins by questioning what he terms 'pernicious' epistemological justifications of using case studies in psychoanalytic research (223). Some of these appeal to the subjectivity of the phenomena studied by analysts; others to a hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalytic theory; and others to the complexity and uniqueness of psychoanalytic phenomena. Most of these bad arguments for case studies, in Edelson's view, depend on a rejection of one or more canons of sound scientific reasoning. Edelson lays out (234-7) some of these canons and then relies on them in his criticism of the spurious justifications of case study research. He closes with a partial defense of employing case studies in testing psychoanalytic hypotheses, one based on (what he believes to be) a firm epistemological foundation.

In chapter 12, Edelson questions some of Adolf Grünbaum's interpretations of Freud. As to Grünbaum's critique of the clinical foundations of Freudian theory, Edelson (276) is inclined, some details aside, to agree with Grünbaum about the weaknesses of the existing evidence, but to argue that in the future, empirical support may come from *both* clinical case studies and (extra-clinical) experimental studies. In Chapter 13, Edelson rejects the covering law model of explanation and favors what he terms a 'causal model.' He then sets out requirements for arguing successfully for the validity of a case study. The requirements are different, he argues, depending on whether the analyst is trying to establish an empirical generalization or a causal explanation.

Edelson's final chapter contains the heart of his case for believing that psychoanalytic case studies are likely, if done properly, to have evidential value. The case he makes is complicated and difficult to summarize, partly because he draws on the diverse views of so many philosophers and scientists. Many of his arguments are interesting, but some rely on unargued premises that critics are likely to challenge, such as the following: That if a person is unaware of what caused one of his or her slips, dreams or neurotic symptoms, then there must be some other causal process (such as repression) that prevents the person from becoming aware of the cause (336); that the *thematic* affinity between two events is evidence of a causal connection (331-2); and that adopting (what Edelson calls) a 'generative' rather than a 'successionist' conception of causality is likely to make an epistemological difference, i.e. it will enhance the evidential value of at least some case studies (345-8).

In brief, Edelson's book contains many challenging interpretations and arguments; it is likely to be of interest both to psychoanalysts and philosophers interested in the fate of Freudian theory.

Edward Erwin
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Frederick Ferré and Carl Mitcham, eds.
Research in Philosophy and Technology 9: Ethics and Technology.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 1989.
Pp. xvii+306. US $63.50 (institutions):
US $38.10 (individuals). ISBN 0-89232-793-6.

With this the first of a new series of RPT volumes, Frederick Ferré replaces Paul Durbin, who served as General Editor of volumes 1-8. The Guest Editor for this issue is Carl Mitcham, the Bibliography Editor for the previous eight volumes. The new series also has a reconstituted editorial board. In his statement of editorial policy, Ferré indicates that future volumes of this annual will focus on themes such as Technology and Religion, Technology and Politics, Technology and Aesthetics, and Technology and History, and that the series will be respectful of a healthy pluralism in philosophical approaches' (x).

This volume furnishes ample evidence that Ferré is serious about his stated policy. The first 200 pages comprise 15 essays, arranged alphabetically by author, on the general topic indicated in the title. Beyond this similarity, however, they differ markedly in terms of interest, approach, and style.

Taft H. Broome, Jr. argues against the conventional characterization of technology as applied science on the grounds that scientists and engineers define 'consistency' in radically different ways. Whereas the former are satisfied with controllable predication, the latter require assurance of acceptable levels of risk. Edmund R. Byrne finds current film portrayals of nuclear war overly sanitized and calls for a more realistic depiction. Jacques Ellul continues his attack on contemporary technology, a viewpoint that is by now well known to those who have followed his work over the last three decades. Utilizing Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People* as an extended example, Rachelle D. Hollander calls for more dialogue between professionals and nonprofessionals in order to promote collective moral responsibility. In an essay that is heavily influenced by the work of Ellul, Gilbert Hottois outlines a complex program for preserving ethics and 'the human' from the technical regime.

Hwa Yol Jung, in an ambitious essay, examines the Cartesian *Cogito* as the 'genesis of technological rationality' and in the light of the work of McLuhan, Merleau-Ponty, Ortega, B.F. Skinner, Herbert A. Simon, and E.O. Wilson, among others. Utilizing Hayden White's neologism 'diatactics,' i.e. that which is neither over – or underdetermined in a conceptual or a social sense, Jung attacks what he perceives to be the very basis of artificial intelligence and 'artificialism.' Steven Lee considers arguments that the 'just war tradition' (JWT) has lost its relevance in the nuclear age. He concludes that an 'unrevised' JWT in fact requires the abandonment of nuclear deterrence, and so it may turn out to be highly relevant. Paul Levinson examines and rejects various technical objections to the exploration of space and then issues a passionate call for such a program. 'Cosmos,' he tells us in his title, 'helps those who help themselves.' Valerie Miké offers extensive support for her contention that '[b]etter scientific evidence is needed as the basis for meaningful, ethical defensible action in the health care field, whether in treatment or public policy' (108). She locates her proposals in terms of the major principles of Western thought, e.g. respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Hans-Martin Sass argues that reasonable risk management must come to terms with the disparity between technological risk perception and actual technological risk. He argues that despite the fact that life and health expectancies have dramatically increased during the last century, even the most informed members of society – top corporate executives, investors, members of congress, and federal regulators – tend to perceive technology as creating a net gain of risk.

Venturing beyond even the pessimism of Heidegger's later work, Wolfgang Schirmacher equates contemporary technology with self-deception and death. In a somewhat anarchistic vein, he tells us that 'As long as there are states, there will be no true knowledge about the human individual, because we keep ourselves in fear of what our rules might do' (133). His proposal is that we become Nietzschean *Übermenschen*, that is, that we leave 'no stone standing, and so ... finally begin to live as human beings' (133). In contrast to the gloom of Schirmacher's essay, José Felix Tobar-Arbulu offers the cheerful and prudent suggestion that the best way to make the future a desirable one is by means of careful planning and design. His essay is a complex proposal for a novel type of technical design, or what he calls 'technopraxiology and development.' Leonard Waks offers a carefully considered and well written criticism of what he takes to be the excesses of Ellul's treatment of technology. The 'oil' in the technological machine, he argues, is a humanism that is impervious, despite Ellul's claims to the contrary, to technicization. Anthony Weston examines the proposals advanced by Ivan Illich's *Tools for Conviviality*, and then suggests that they are limited in at least two ways. They fail to capture our 'relevant practical concerns for the social evaluation of tools, and [they do] not move at the level of generality that a fully philosophical comprehension of technology ... demands' (181). Finally, Walther Ch. Zimmerli examines some of the philosophical problems associated with robotics. He concludes that the technician of the future will have to have a broader educational background in the social sciences and the humanities.

The remainder of the volume, some 100 pages, consists of reviews and bibliographies. There are reviews by Albert Borgmann of Langdon Winner's *The Whale and the Reactor*; by Wolhee Choe of *Arts and Technology*, ed. René Berger and Lloyd Eby; and by César Cuello of *Philosophy and Technology II, Information Technology and Computers in Theory and Practice*, ed. Carl Mitcham and Alois Huning, and of *Philosophy and Technology 3: Technology and Responsibility*, ed. Paul T. Durbin. In addition, Paul T. Durbin reviews *Interdisciplinary Analysis and Research: Theory and Practice of Problem-Focused Research and Development*, ed. Daryl E. Chubin, *et alia*, and Jim Grote examines George Parkin Grant's *English Speaking Justice*.

Finally, there are three helpful 'status' reports. Clifford Christians assesses the current literature of communications technology, Eric Katz brings us up to date on publications in environmental ethics between 1983 and 1987, and Stephen H. Cutcliffe provides an informative essay on the emergence of Science, Technology, and Society studies as an academic field.

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Martin Heidegger
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1988. Pp. xvii+156.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-253-32766-0.

Heidegger's 1930-31 lectures on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* were published as part of the *Gesamtausgabe* in 1980, too recently for them to have had a deep, direct impact on Anglo-American Hegel studies.

Their appearance in the present English translation therefore prompts, in addition to the usual philological questions, the query: why should we grapple with the thoughts expressed here, by the least transparent philosopher of this century, about one of the most elusive philosophical texts of the last?

Heidegger's lectures on the *Phenomenology* are important documents of his own intellectual development. Much of the material covered in the 1930-31 lecture series was re-worked by him in 1942-43, in a series of lectures long available in English under the title *Hegel's Concept of Experience*. The second, shorter series is of interest chiefly as a commentary on views expressed in the first. The serious student of Heidegger who does not read German will therefore welcome the opportunity which the present translation supplies to contrast Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel in the early lectures with its later elaboration. The translators must be commended for choosing equivalents of technical terms and sticking with them, as well as for taking care to explain (xiv-xvi, 154-56) some of the ambiguities at play in the original which are inevitably lost in translation.

The 1930-31 lectures fulfil a promise which Heidegger made near the end of *Being and Time*. The penultimate section of that book (§82) briefly compares Heidegger's own account of temporality with Hegel's as it figures in the conclusion of the *Phenomenology* and elsewhere. What did Heidegger suppose the importance of this comparison to be? His work on *Being and Time* came to a halt before he could explain: 'We cannot as yet discuss whether Hegel's Interpretation of time and spirit and the connection between them,' he concludes, 'is correct and rests on foundations which are ontologically primordial.' The 1930-31 lecture series was thought by Heidegger to provide the background necessary for a justification of his earlier excursus, and that is what he ends the series with.

His conclusion, that 'For *Hegel*, being ... is ... the essence of time' whereas 'For *us*, time is the ...essence of being' (146), however, seems, like much else in these lectures, inconsequential. The two claims, whatever they might mean, cannot be 'played against each other antithetically', he insists, since 'the term *essence [Wesen]* says something fundamentally different each time, precisely because being is understood differently' in the two accounts (146). No sooner does Heidegger appear to reach a final conclusion about Hegel than he retracts it.

The bulk of this lecture series is ostensibly a commentary not on Heidegger's own writings, but on parts A ('Consciousness') and B ('Self-Consciousness') of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. If it is disappointing, that is because Heidegger offers slender support for his interpretation of the texts. His guiding principle is that 'every real philosopher is *contemporaneous* with every other philosopher' and must be treated as such (32). We might suppose this to mean that one is entitled to expect an exposition of Hegel's ideas to meet the same standards of clarity and logical rigour by which one would judge the thought of a contemporary philosopher. And Heidegger does make concessions to this view of his task, a view which many Anglo-American historians of philosophy find congenial. Thus, he sets out to explain the *Phenomenology*'s two subtitles, viz. *Science of the Experience of Consciousness* and *Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, by carefully distinguishing what he takes to be the relevant senses of the words out of which they are composed (9-26). He points out clearly that Hegel regards the *Phenomenology* as 'scientific' not in any familiar sense but in a special one: what is scientific, in Hegel's jargon, is that which explains the emergence of something which he calls 'absolute knowledge' (11, 27). Heidegger's elucidation of this point is, however, more obscure than Hegel's own: 'At the beginning of its history,' he writes,

> absolute knowledge must be different from what it is at the end ... But this otherness does not mean that knowledge is at the beginning *not yet and in no way* absolute knowledge ... The not-absolute *is* not yet absolute. But this "not-yet" is the not-yet *of the absolute.* In other words, the not-absolute is absolute, not in spite of, but precisely because of its being *not*-absolute. (33)

Heidegger struggles in this passage to express two rather simple ideas. The first is that according to Hegel, certain of our false beliefs about things evolve into what he describes as absolute knowledge. The second idea is that this evolution is natural or necessary: false beliefs of the kind discussed in the *Phenomenology* are implicit or potential knowledge, Hegel maintains, because absolute knowledge is what they tend to develop into; and this knowledge itself, he tells us, cannot be reached by any other movement of thought than the one traced in the *Phenomenology.*

If Heidegger eschews ordinary language in his exposition of Hegel's ideas here and elsewhere, it is not because he places a premium on logical or scholarly rigour. Hegel is widely known to have claimed that only those who have followed the *Phenomenology*'s dialectical argument out to its conclusion are able to apprehend the necessity of each step within it. To the oft-repeated charge that this procedure is circular, or presupposes what it is alleged to demonstrate, Heidegger disarmingly replies that

> we ought not to bring this up as an objection to the work. It should not be brought up as an objection, not because it does not touch Hegel, but because it completely misses the point of philosophy ... [F]or philosophy is not concerned with proving anything in the usual sense of following a formal principle of proof in a logic which is not that of philosophy itself. (30)

Heidegger rules out not only logical analysis, but also intellectual history, biography, secondary literature, and Hegel's later writings as aids to understanding and evaluating the *Phenomenology* (40-1). All that is required in order to understand Hegel's ideas, he asserts, is that we be 'kindred' with him (31); and to be kindred with Hegel, he explains, 'is not here a question of belonging to a school, much less of agreement on propositions and concepts,' but is simply 'to be *committed* to the first and last necessities of philosophical inquiry arising from the matter' at hand (31).

Commitment to solving the problems which Hegel addressed is surely a necessary but insufficient condition for understanding Hegel's ideas. If there is no more to one's approach than this, one is bound not only to be vague about Hegel's answers, but also to mistake his problems. Heidegger in fact identifies the *Phenomenology*'s theme with the question which dominates his own work, viz. 'What is being?' (12, 41), when the question which Hegel actually addresses is either 'What is truth?' or 'What is *the* truth?' Although Hegel's answer to this question involves him in answering Heidegger's as well, the questions themselves are not the same. There is an unintended irony in Heidegger's contention here that 'to enter into philosophy ... means that we ... gain clarity *about ourselves*' (31).

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John Hick
An interpretation of religion.
New Haven: Yale University Press 1989.
Pp. xv+142. US $35.00. ISBN 0-300-04248-5.

This book is an expanded version of the 1986-87 Gifford Lectures. Hick's project is that of producing a religious interpretation of religion. His interpretation is religious, rather than naturalistic, in that he believes that religion is a response to a non-natural Transcendant. It is religious, rather than (say) Christian, because it does not accept any one religion's reading of the entire religious field.

Several themes here will be familiar from Hick's earlier work. One is that of the evidential ambiguity of the world. There are stock critiques of theistic and atheistic arguments, and Hick judges that none of them are conclusive. Probabilisitic arguments also turn out to be unsatisfactory. There just is no evidential way of choosing here.

The epistemic neatness of that state of affairs may strike some of us as suspicious. It would not be surprising if someone were to make these observations the basis of a new version of the teleological argument, claiming that the world could not be so finely balanced evidentially unless someone had designed it in that way.

However that may be, some people appear to experience the world and their lives in a religious way, and others do not. Hick maintains that the irreligious suffer no lack of rationality, but neither do the religious. They are fully within their rights in accepting, and acting upon, their experience as it presents itself to them.

Such people will be religious. But which religion? Here Hick plumps for pluralism. All the great world faiths are valid modes of experience of the genuinely transcendant, of what Hick calls 'the Real.' And a substantial part of the book consists of sensitive accounts of the phenomenology of these faiths.

Hick's epistemological justification of his pluralism relies heavily on two themes. One is the claim that all experience is 'experience as', an already interpreted experience which is shaped by the categories which we bring to it. The other is an extension of Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena to the field of religious experience. Hick accepts the basic elements of Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, but he does not restrict them to the field of sense experience. And (also apparently unlike Kant) he does not hold that the interpretive categories need be common to all human beings. There can be categories which are idiosyncratic to various cultures.

The one transcendant noumenon is experienced variously in the religious traditions.

So, according to Hick, the gods of the theistic religions – Jahveh, Shiva, Allah, etc. – along with the *impersonae* of the non-theistic religions are phenomenal realities. He finds, in fact, adumbrations of this quasi-Kantian view in many religions themselves, and is fond of such quotations as 'The lamps are different, but the Light is the same' (233), 'Thou art formless: thy only form is our knowledge of thee' (278), 'the God above the God of theism' (237), etc. Thus a profound relativism about the actual living religions of the world is combined with a realism – one might say a 'monorealism' – about their significance.

No doubt such a view has many problems. I mention one here (one, endemic, I think, to radical relativisms), that of finding a way of speaking consistently from within such a perspective. Hick writes of the *personae* and the *impersonae* of the Real, and he quotes from the Rig-Veda, 'The Real is one – sages name it differently (252). But, from within a basically Kantian metaphysics, if the Real is noumenal then it is not one. Of course, it is not many either. For number, quantity, etc., are categories which are constituent of the phenomenal world. They do not apply to the noumenal world.

In fact, the term 'the Real' is itself suspect. For reality is a category whose application is within the world as experienced – e.g., real as opposed to illusory, real as opposed to artificial, real as opposed to mere appearance, real as opposed to non-existent, etc. Reality is not constitutive of the noumenal, for the noumenal is that which is not constituted by human categories at all. Furthermore, the use of this name, and the associated discussions, suggest that the entities of the phenomenal world can be mapped onto elements of the noumenal world which are, somehow, their sources. So one gets the picture of a many - one mapping which links all of the theistic gods to some one noumenal element called 'the Real'. But within a basically Kantian perspective, so far as I can see, this makes no sense. The concepts without which our percepts would be blind enable us to 'see' those things of which they are constitutive – i.e., phenomenal things. They do not give us a vision of noumenal things, and of their links with the phenomenal world.

In a similar way, I think, we should resist the natural inclination to suppose that Hick's Real exists, or that there is such a thing as the Real. (This point, I think, was somewhere recognized by Tillich.) The Real, if it is noumenal, could not be the cause of religious experience, nor could it serve to explain or account for the occurrence of such experience. Such concepts as existing, causing, accounting for, etc., belong to the phenomenal order of things.

But then, what could someone like Hick consistently say about what he most wants to discuss? That is a difficult question. I suspect that the real answer to it is that there is nothing which can be consistently said about the noumenal world within this perspective. If there is, in anything like a Kantian sense, a God beyond God, a Tao which cannot be named, etc., then they have no place in human thought and no bearing on human deliberative action. And then, perhaps, one thinks of applying Wittgenstein's provocative advice.

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Jaakko Hintikka and **Merrill Hintikka**
The Logic of Epistemology and The Epistemology of Logic.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp. xx+245.
US $59.00. ISBN 0-7923-0040-8.

This book contains fourteen essays, each of which has already appeared, or is scheduled to appear, elsewhere. Two of them are co-authored by both Hintikkas; the other twelve are written by Jaakko Hintikka. (But I will simply talk of 'the Hintikkas'.) More a congerie of provocative, thematically linked, ideas than a sustained argument for one specific thesis, the book is both (A) philosophically invigorating and (B) non-philosophically frustrating.

(A) The philosophical vigour of the book springs from the determination with which it adduces examples of how philosophical insight can depend on semantical insight, and of how semantical insight can in turn call for the informed use of *possible worlds* semantics. The Hintikkas argue, for example, that such semantics can model propositional knowledge without assuming that persons are logically omniscient, since possible worlds can be 'impossible' (65). And they also stress the existence of different ways of semantically identifying an individual across possible worlds. This is probably the most fundamental move in the book. (The Hintikkas suggest, on p. 114, that 'This distinction is one of the most fruitful ideas in the philosophical analysis of the last few decades. It is also one of the most neglected ones.') And it allows the Hintikkas to demonstrate, first and foremost, that recognising these different modes of individuation is essential to developing a philosophically adequate epistemic logic. They demonstrate this by repeatedly linking this insight with topics such as these metaphysically and epistemologically pivotal ones: knowledge acquisition and questioning, nonexistent objects, Frege and the objects of knowledge, Russell and denoting, Descartes and cognitive science, Quine and quantifying in, and sexist language. The discussion is often quite technical (in more of a logical and semantical, than an epistemological, way), but rarely is it forbiddingly so. (For example, in Essay 10, the Hintikkas suggest that at least some ways of comparing individuals across worlds could be gender-linked, and hence that some important base clauses in a possible worlds semantics for propositional attitudes could be correlatively gender-linked.) In inviting readers to appreciate the importance of modes of individuation, the Hintikkas do, I think, take an important step towards avoiding their own worthy admonition (196): 'Speaking of possible worlds is empty talk as long as it does not have some consequences in possible experience ... The rest is metaphysics in the pejorative sense.' For they do a fine job of at least beginning to chart some connections between metaphysics and epistemology – more specifically, between semantical theory and the sort of claims upon which epistemologists purport to shed light. An important moral which emerges from this book is that, at least sometimes, epistemologists *should* be semantically-minded – and, for any epistemologist who *is* thus minded, the book will undoubtedly be engaging and stimulating.

(B) But unfortunately a reader's enjoyment of the book might be marred by some of its *non*-philosophical features. In short, the book's editing leaves a lot to be desired. (1) Most importantly, there are an astonishing number of typographical mistakes, many of them *very* careless ones. (There is even one on the all-too-brief *errata* page!) (2) Not all of the page references (e.g., 72n6), and not all of the bibliographical references (e.g., many – though, even more oddly, not all! – of the end-notes in Essay 14), in some papers' original versions have been modified as is necessary for their reprinting in this new volume. (3) There is a lot of overlap, in two senses, between many of the papers: (i) I would have preferred to see one exhaustive bibliography at the book's end. As it is, many of the bibliographical references are repeated in full in essay after essay. This wastes space and diminishes the book's elegance. (ii) The key way in which the Hintikkas illustrate their important modes-of-individuation difference involves an argument, a version of which appears in *many* of the essays (nine of them). It is a subtle argument, and meeting it in these different contexts can render that aspect of it more evident. Still, someone who is reading the book in its entirety (as against reading only a few of the essays) needs to be aware *of* the philosophical importance of seeing an argument work in so many contexts. Otherwise, he or she could tire of re-encountering the same argument so often.

(C) Nevertheless – and partly by the same token – this book could well grow on a reader. First, it has more moments of *depth* than most recent epistemological books, for example – and depth should grow on one. But second (and most prominently), it is a noteworthily *imaginative* book too. Jaakko Hintikka, in the book's Introduction (xiii), sees the collection as a sequence of somewhat programmatic ideas. He is right. It *is* programmatic, and at times I wished that some of the arguments would get pushed further. (Some of them *have* been, though – elsewhere in Jaakko Hintikka's work. That lessens this book's ability to stand on its own. But – to put that point more favourably – one of the book's obvious features is the way it should stimulate readers *to* explore that other work.) Epistemologists and philosophical logicians alike should consult this book: its philosophical imaginativeness is refreshing.

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John Kekes
Moral Tradition and Individuality.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1989. Pp. xii+245.
US $27.50. ISBN 0-691-07813-0.

Kekes sees morality as a balance between personal satisfaction and a moral tradition which establishes a social or public good, and he sees the proper object of moral judgement as a whole life rather than acts or events. Only a whole life provides the context for intelligible moral judgement. The individual has a legitimate claim to satisfaction, but the community has a fundamental claim, too, because 'impersonal conventions are necessary for sustaining the framework in which individuals can make good lives for themselves' (8).

Furthermore, Kekes thinks *our own* communities have a serious claim on us: 'Among the many reasons guiding us,' he says, 'the conventions of the moral tradition of our society have primary importance' (5), though he sees this claim as defensible chiefly in the context of a 'moral tradition' going back to the Greeks which he calls 'Eudaimonism'. 'Eudaimonia denotes the state of human flourishing ... This state is close enough to what I mean by *good life*' (5).

Within this tradition, reason plays a central part, and he argues that a life which cannot be defended with good reasons cannot count as a good life. Good reasons include appeals to 'internal goods' – 'satisfactions involved in being and acting according to our conceptions of good lives' (185). But good reasons also include appeals to the basis of moral theory. Kekes believes we ought to oppose perfectionism and keep our moral theories open-ended. 'If there were a *summum bonum*, human life would be instrumental to a predetermined end ... But 2,5000 years of search has not revealed a generally, or even widely, accepted *summum bonum*' (115). He says 'self-direction is open-ended; the pursuit of perfection is not' (114).

Kekes' work needs to be seen in the context (which the reader must mostly supply) of the current debate over traditions and entrenched practices: Alasdair MacIntyre has agued that one must choose a philosophical tradition and that what one takes as good reasons depends on such a choice. Wittgensteinian moral 'realists' see established *linguistic* practices as traditions which provide some of the necessary conditions for posing moral questions. Bernard Williams suggested that traditional moral conventions provide the possibility for certain important moral judgements which actually mesh with concrete situations. David L. Norton has revived discussion of some of the elements of the British idealist notion that we get our identities only within a continuing community[1]. And rumour from France has it that the populist tradition of Félicité de Lamennais (according to which religious and moral truth arise out of common experience) is again attracting attention. Kekes uses both the notion of a community tradition and the notion of an unfolding philosophical tradition whose weight is associated with its persistence and its rationality.

All of the views of tradition and entrenched practice can be seen as ways of conceptualizing an element of the human predicament: Each of us seems to be at the centre of experience, and everyone struggles to make this experience both acceptable and intelligible. But 'making sense' of the situation requires that we draw on some element whose roots are social. Language is an obvious candidate. Others are reason and the idea of a human nature. The need to admit – if we are to make sense of our situation – that other agents do play a role in our experience reinforces these elements.

Kekes develops the notion of a Eudaimonist tradition which, in exploring the open possibilities in human nature (admitting them to include evil as well as good) and giving weight to what we want to do, enlightens our moral practices. Thus we do not simply confront our moral language but reflect on it from some knowledge of what we are and what we want. If Kekes is left with an element of relativism, he evades the lazy forms of it which arouse the ire of philosophers like Panayot Butchvarov. He may also be able to respond to MacIntyre's difficult questions about the possibility of a sense of 'good reasons' which is general enough to accommodate a wide array of philosophical traditions.

But Kekes uses tradition to explicate his notion of the intelligibility of 'a life', and so welds his defence of tradition to his thesis that a whole life (and not individual acts) is to be judged. He thus lands in the quandary exposed by the Greek tragedians.

One who judges a *life* as a whole must somehow lump together the elements for which the agent is wholly responsible and those for which praise and blame are absurd. Oedipus convicts himself of patricide and incest, and Kekes says 'I think he was right' (23). He adds 'the central moral notion is character, not choice or action' (132). This seems to conflict with his insistence on the role of good reasons in determining what constitutes a good life, and with his insistence on the importance of 'successful self-direction'.

Admittedly, *all* the notions of moral tradition create conceptual difficulties about moral agency. The Wittgensteinians seem to permit the excuse that the agent's language limits questions which can be posed. Must an agent, then, accept responsibility for a disastrous communal language game? MacIntyre, by contrast, permits the agent to choose the tradition which *maximizes* the available excuses. Williams seems to argue that escapes from a limiting tradition lead to a kind of skepticism.

Kekes' trade-off between individual and tradition does not allow Oedipus the defence which nearly everyone suspects he ought to have. To permit a serious defence, we would have to judge individual acts by specific principles which give a priority to ideas of moral responsibility.

Kekes should be taken seriously. He opens new vistas and his book is a delight to read. His theses make one itch to rethink the problems, but this is the mark of philosophical success.

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1 Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice, Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth 1988); R.L. Arrington describes the Wittgensteinian moral realists amongst whom he finds different British and American sub-species in *Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1989); Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1985); David L. Norton, *Personal Destinies*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976). Panayot Butchvarov, *Skepticism in Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1989), criticises several of these theses.

Mary Midgley
Wisdom, Information and Wonder.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1989. Pp. x+275.
US $27.50. ISBN 0-415-02829-9.

Mary Midgley's book is mainly concerned with finding the answers to two questions: why have scientists ignored moral and social problems and why have analytical philosophers also ignored moral and social problems – especially when those philosophers consider themselves to be moral philosophers. One might excuse a chemist for ignoring social problems but one can hardly excuse a moral philosopher.

To find the answer to the first of these questions, Midgley takes us through some of the history of scientific thought from Galileo until the present. Along the way she points out how the drive to achieve a scientific understanding of the universe can lead to the ignoring of social problems. The scientist wants to be objective in his work so he considers himself to be just a scientist and not a husband, a parent or a member of the community. He also wants to achieve results, but his field has become so large that he can only do so if he focuses on just a few topics. As a result, science becomes more and more compartmentalized. He also notices that those scientists who have strayed into the social aspects of their work have often ended like Spencer and Lysenko – not only doing poor science but also making poor social recommendations.

Midgley accepts that scientists now show more concern than they used to. That the enormous social consequences of recent findings in science have forced many scientists to realize that they can no longer be socially irresponsible. But the situation in philosophy is however rather different. Here one would expect people to know better. But one finds that philosophers – especially those of the analytical tradition have been as aloof as their scientific counterparts. Part 3, the major part of Midgley's book, is devoted to explaining how this came about and why it was a mistake. As Midgley puts it 'The ideas that caused philosophy to shut itself away from its publicly useful functions have now been shown to be mistakes ... To say this however involves us in looking at those ideas themselves, and tracing briefly the history of their rise and fall' (88).

The first source of this reluctance to deal with moral problems is one shared with the scientists. The philosopher, especially in the early part of this century, modelled himself on the scientist and like him wanted to be analytic, objective, and to concentrate on a limited number of topics. As a result moral problems were bypassed. To study them was to be unprofessional.

But not all the sources of this reluctance were shared with the scientist. For example until the time of the later Wittgenstein, most philosophers of the analytic tradition accepted that any knowledge claim must be based on statements that were incorrigible, such as statements about sense data. But statements of morality do not enjoy this certainty and so they were placed to one side.

A second source of this reluctance, also not shared with the scientist, is G. E. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. According to Moore, most attempts to set up a system, such as Utilitarianism, that could be used to decide what to do in various situations, founder on the Naturalistic Fallacy. They came, ultimately, to grief because they tried to give the non natural simple property word 'good' a naturalistic definition. But, according to Moore, because the word 'good' refers to a simple non natural property all these attempts fail. In her account of the Naturalistic Fallacy Midgley takes note of the fact that many of the philosophers who came after Moore had difficulty in making clear just where the alleged fallacy lay, and as a result they talked instead about the gap between fact and value. Here it was maintained that one could never know what one ought to do because such claims would have to be ultimately based on facts about the world. But one cannot deduce statements about what one ought to do from statements about the world. In other words, they cannot be based on factual statements.

Third, there was a fear on the part of some philosophers such as C.L. Stevenson and R.M. Hare that if it were possible to reach moral conclusions on the basis of facts this would limit one's freedom and sense of commitment. One would find oneself being pushed around by the facts rather than freely making one's own decisions.

Finally there was a reluctance on the part of philosophers to 'moralize' and also to blame. But since to make moral judgments is in some contexts to blame, philosophers withdrew from making moral judgments and restricted themselves to discussing the logic of moral discourse.

How then are we to get philosophy back on track? How in other words are we to get philosophers concerned with moral problems? Surprisingly it was G. E. Moore, who did so much damage with the Naturalistic Fallacy, who showed the way. Moore was disturbed and puzzled by philosophers like McTaggart who was reported to have said at the end of a lecture that having just proven that space is unreal he would go on next week at the same place and the same time to prove that time was also unreal! Moore pointed out that we could be more certain that lunch came after breakfast and before tea than we could be certain of the arguments, like those presented by McTaggart, for the unreality of time. Although Moore led the way it was really the later Wittgenstein who showed us how paying attention to particular cases can rid us of the temptation to accept those theories that lead us astray.

Although Wittgenstein did not concern himself with moral philosophy the message of his teachings is clear. Instead of asking such questions as can moral statements be deduced from factual ones, one should look at particular cases, for example the dilemma pesented in *Sophie's Choice*, and see if one can decide on the basis of the facts surrounding the case what ought to be done. Fortunately we now find that a number of philosophers are engaged in just this sort of work. No doubt the influence of Wittgenstein is partly responsible for this change.

Midgely has written an interesting though somewhat rambling book but it must be asked for whom it is written? It does not seem to be written for the educated layman because there is not enough depth in her presentation of such topics as the alleged gap between fact and value to let the layman appreciate how perfectly sensible people (who happen also to be philosophers) could be held spellbound by such theories. On the other hand it does not seem to be written for those philosophers who remain to be converted. Midgely would have had to do a lot more spade work if she really wanted to convince those who for example still believe in the Naturalistic Fallacy, that no such critter exists.

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Jeffrey Olen
Moral Freedom.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1988. Pp. xi+140.
US $19.95. ISBN 0-87722-578-8.

The program for this rather delightful book is set by three apparently conflicting 'truisms', first stated as follows: (1) 'Moral rules are society's rules'; (2) 'Morality is a matter of individual choice'; (3) 'Some things, deliberate cruelty for kicks, for example – are wrong regardless of what any society or individual has to say about them' (3). Olen quickly presents alternative, as we may say minimal, versions: (1) becomes 'moral rules arise as social conventions and are maintained as social conventions, and ... are, to varying degrees, morally binding on the members of that society.' (2) becomes the claim that the rules 'leave the members of that society a generous degree of moral freedom.' And (3) becomes 'society's rules and individual decisions may be seriously defective.' These weaker versions are vague: 'Depending on how someone chooses to interpret them, they can be ... utterly trivial, as strong as the original truisms, or anyplace in between. The purpose of this book is to find the correct interpretations' (4). The book then becomes a sort of Odyssey in search of the best understanding of the three, exploring Moral Points of View, Reasons, Absolute Wrongs, Good Lives, and better Moralities along the way. On each

Olen has much of interest to say. But his underlying concern throughout is really with moral freedom: 'Does anybody or anything have any moral authority over how I lead my life?' (19)

In Olen's view, there is (1) Social morality and (2) Personal morality(ies), which can be and often are in conflict. Olen explains the first in broadly contractarian terms: 'Moral rules ... are mutually agreed upon rules among the members of a given society (4).' They are, as Baier says, 'intended to provide reasons for acting that override reasons of self-interest when the interests of individuals conflict' (5). Society requires cooperation, which requires trust; its morality provides the basis of that trust. How are we to reconcile this with the second 'truism', then? After all, if moral rules override individual judgement, then isn't the individual ipso facto in the wrong if his judgments conflict with them?

Nevertheless, Olen holds, the social contract has no authority over any individual. 'Individuals are morally free to refuse to sign on, to leave, and to reject or accept any part of the social contract' (6). Yet 'This is not to say that these choices can be made capriciously.' Well, why not?

Olen never supposes that moral freedom is the freedom to follow just *any* old directives, but only 'moral' ones. So what does 'moral' mean here? Note that it *could* still mean the same as in 'moral rules': one's moral decisions and directives would be those that are determined on the basis of one's sense of what the moral rules are or, more importantly, should be. Which brings up another point: Is the social contract to be understood in a purely descriptive way? Or do we speak of an 'ideal' contract, the contract that *should* be made? If it is the former, then there is ample room for divergence between what actual rules require and what the individual thinks they ought to require. But not if it is the latter. If by 'morality' one means the set of rules for one's society that (one thinks) ideally should obtain whether or not they actually do, then divergence of Social from Personal morality again makes little sense.

Is the 'strong' version of (2), that moral rules never override the individual's contrary moral beliefs, a *possible* view? In the real world, we must expect considerable divergence between individual interests and moral requirements. If individuals' 'moral sense' is to be explicated in terms of their own judgments of what moral rules should be, then if we accept the general Baierian characterization of what moral rules are, only the confused or insane could fail to see that morality cannot allow 'moral freedom'.

Olen regards the Baierian thesis as 'externalist' – as holding that 'individuals can have reasons to act even if those reasons are incapable of motivating them. These reasons are impersonal reasons, the kinds of reasons that apply to everyone, regardless of their desires, commitments, and projects' (27). This, I suggest, has to be wrong. For the point of the contractarian view is to marshal motivations that the individual already has behind certain universal rules. The reason why everyone should do x and not y is that if all do x, all will be better off in terms of their own values. However, contractarian theory is normative. It doesn't just tell us to accept the prevailing rules. To suppose it does is to lose the primary force of contractarianism, for there may be no good reason of a contractual type for following the prevailing rules in certain cases. Indeed, there can be principled reasons for not doing so.

Thus a conflict between an individual's 'personal morality' and the output of a contractarian morality cannot be a conflict between 'external' and 'internal' reasons, but rather, between two different sets of internal reasons, one having to do with one's relations to miscellaneous others, including those with whom one has no personal relations, and the other having to do with assorted projects having no particular connection with impartial moral rules. Olen argues that the claim that moral reasons of the contractarian type are the best reasons in the 'internal sense' of 'reason' is 'extraordinary.' 'When people break a promise or tell a lie merely for their own convenience – and does anybody know anybody who hasn't? – even those who freely admit that they did wrong will maintain that they did so for good reason' (4). On their view, people who are immoral are not necessarily unreasonable.

It is an important question, I take it, whether they are right. But I don't accept that the issue is as Olen puts it. To talk unguardedly of an 'impersonal point of view', standing flatly against one's own point of view, is, I think, a mistake.

Meanwhile, there are lovely discussions of ordinary people's relations to what they consider 'moral rules', which leave Olen concluding with a proposal that 'moral philosophy shift its emphasis from the right to decency' (121-2). Question: would this be a shift out of the contractarian idea into something else? Perhaps not, in my view. But if so, then Olen must be conceded to make a serious point, with imponderable implications. You'll profit from reading this eminently readable short book and tussling with this issue.

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Henry M. Rosenthal
The Consolations of Philosophy: Hobbes's Secret; Spinoza's Way. Edited with an introduction by Abigail L. Rosenthal.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1989. Pp. x+211
US $29.95. ISBN 0-87722-610-5.

As might be expected, Rosenthal's book is divided into two parts, the first on Hobbes, the second on Spinoza. The editor supplies an introduction including a memoir of Professor Rosenthal. The link that unites the two parts is the concept of the social contract, the possibility of which concerns Hobbes and which grounds the possibility of the life recommended by Spinoza.

This is an obscure book, difficult to read because the author has adopted a meditative, aphoristic, and oracular style. Such a style can be useful. It may force a reader to think through an issue seriously by forcing him inside the argument if he wants to understand it at all. The danger is that the style will multiply difficulties to no purpose and discourage readers. In the present case, readers who do not have a very strong interest in Hobbes or Spinoza will give up.

'Hobbes's secret' – which Rosenthal lets us in on immediately – is that he does not fall into the classifications that modern commentators have proposed for him. He is not characteristically a political philosopher, a mechanistic materialist, a philosopher of law, etc. (31). He is a sociological ontologist (44). The phrase is not very informative. Rosenthal means that Hobbes's project in *Leviathan* is to say how social relations and their relata come to be. In this project Rosenthal seems to think that Hobbes was largely successful.

The project that Rosenthal attributes to Hobbes is essentially to explain the origin of co-operative behavior and the human institutions that depend on it. If the interpretation is right, Hobbes' undertaking is a strange one by Rosenthal's own lights. The problem is to say how co-operation comes to be from a state where there is none. But a state in which there is none is so different from the world we know that it is hard to say anything about it. This does not keep Rosenthal from having quite a lot to say. Not surprisingly, his sayings are often dark and portentous. He says he does not wish to be more sibylline than the case warrants (45), but his choice of style warrants quite a bit.

Aside from questions of philosophical style, there is the question of the soundness of Hobbes's alleged project and Rosenthal's interpretation of it. Hobbes gives the appearance of attempting a naturalistic explanation of co-operation. The trouble with it is that he assumes that the initial conditions are conditions of radical non-co-operation, the 'war of each against all' and that these conditions include elements that could only be present through co-operation, e.g. language. Hence the appearance of an inability to conceive of a human world without co-operaton. This isn't a mark of something deep going on, as Rosenthal thinks. It's a mark of someone who appreciates neither the existence of co-operative behavior among animals nor the fact that humans are not sundered in their nature and genesis from other animals.

Sometimes, however, Rosenthal writes as if Hobbes's problem is to explain the origin of co-operation in more limited cases, not globally. 'The state-of-nature is an afterthought, and a rabid one. Man entertains it all the time. But this does not in the least mean that it is a founding thought, in the being of man, or even a primordial one, in any significant sense of the word "primordial"' (64). In view of such evidence it isn't clear why the state of nature should be represented frequently as if it were an initial condition for an explanation.

Either way we are left with the question of just what Rosenthal thinks is going on if not a naturalistic explanation gone awry. The explanation that Rosenthal seems to prefer is given in an appendix (96-8) included by the editor. The transition from a state of nature happens out of mutual fear without anybody exactly intending it or thinking about it, a kind of unreflective mutual intimidation. There is supposed to be something a priori about this (36, 54), but why? The story Rosenthal tells to illustrate the transition implies a testable empirical hypothesis that is false in the global case and at least sometimes false in more restricted cases.

The material on Spinoza relates to Hobbes through the idea of the social contract. Rosenthal is interested in Spinoza's ethical ideas concerning the life of a free man. A free man can only live in a community of some sort and this implies a social contract.

Rosenthal rejects two interpretations of Spinoza, one that makes Spinoza's third kind of knowledge a sort of mysticism and one that makes it a sort of perfected scientific knowledge (113-14). His alternative is to take the third kind of knowledge as what he calls 'performative knowledge' (120). This is knowledge intimately related to practice and the practice it is related to is the conduct of life generally. The third type of knowledge feeds back into our experience involving the first two types (122). The way of life of the free man, involving the third kind of knowledge, is 'Spinoza's way.'

The discussion of knowledge leads to commentaries on various aspects of the *Ethics* and finally to Spinoza's ethical propositions and a discussion of blessedness. The social contract reappears (146ff) to make a connection between Hobbes and Spinoza: the life of the free man needs to be a life in a community (157).

I do not mean, by my skepticism concerning the success of Rosenthal's project, to imply that there is no interest in it or value in the details. Even the part on Hobbes, which simply won't work, will probably yield useful insights into how a misunderstood empirical problem turns into metaphysics in the pejorative sense. And the expert on Spinoza will no doubt find many of his comments on the *Ethics* original, valuable, and suggestive.

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Mark Sacks
The World We Found: The Limits of Ontological Talk.
LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1989. Pp. x+198.
US $36.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9099-0);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9100-8).

In this book, Sacks engages in a serious encounter with that brand of idealism of which F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* is representative. He does so without abandoning the tradition begun by Moore and Russell but by developing it and examining several of its leading representatives. The outcome of this encounter will be easier to indicate after we have seen some key steps of the argument.

Sacks begins by announcing that his topic will be 'ontological talk' (1), that is, talk in which things are said to be real or not real. The sense of 'real' required here is this: 'x is real iff x is ontologically independent of the form of all experience' (13). That is, x is real iff it could exist even if the form of all experience did not. (I shall return to this phrase 'the form of all experience'.) The focal question is whether such ontological talk makes sense. Its making sense is required, obviously, for realists who assert that some things (e.g., material objects) are real and for idealists who assert that they are not real. The coherence of ontological talk is, however, also a presupposition of the sceptic who doubts that we can know whether there is anything real, or if so, what it might be. If we are to get off the wheel of realism, idealism *and* scepticism, we must show that the question whether anything is *real* is incoherent. The climax of Sacks' book is his attempt, in Chapter 7, to argue for the incoherence of ontological talk.

On the way to this climax, there is a discussion of many related views, most notably those of Kant, Quine, Putnam, Goodman, Strawson and Carnap. There are many interesting points of detail in these discussions. Their general aim, however, is to show that there is a sceptical question that remains after these philosophers have had their say. Arguing, as Quine does, that raw experience 'is a consequence of something beyond' our conceptual schemes strongly suggests that he 'presupposes some kind of noumenal reality' (35). Showing that a question about reality is not answerable by us should daunt the realist and the idealist, but it only reinforces the sceptic – 'a philosophical question surely does not have to be *answerable* to be legitimate' (147). Showing that Goodmanian radical relativism – radically different versions – were possible 'would still leave room for the introduction of a neutral world beyond all those versions ...' (101). There is a particularly detailed consideration of Putnam's argument that a brain in a vat could not coherently formulate the question whether it was a brain in a vat. Sacks' argument here is, I think, weakened by his acceptance of the idea of referring to notional brains (e.g., 70-1); it would have been better to work out a theory of exactly how and to what a brain in a vat can refer. Still, however difficult it may be to say exactly *what* mistake a brain in a vat might be making, Sacks is convincing that it can be correctly represented as making some kind of mistake and, more importantly, that it could itself formulate a *coherent* question about what things in its notional world are real.

Believing that none of his predecessors has shown scepticism about the reality of things to be incoherent, Sacks takes the job upon himself. To appreciate the outline of his argument, we must explain the phrase 'the form of all experience'. One key question that critical discussion will have to investigate is whether this phrase is sufficiently clear to bear the weight placed upon it. ('Perspectival individuation' (see below) is another such phrase.) Certainly, the explanation it receives could have been moved forward; readers may wish to follow chapter 1 immediately with pp. 108-10 (which threaten to make act-object structure *definitionally* constitutive of experience – but perhaps this is alright) and p. 133, with its claim (to my mind, problematic) that 'To account for our common-sense beliefs [e.g., that mountains existed before any of us] we must, so to speak, be able to remove the actors and all of their acts, but the stage can still remain set with the form thereof.' In brief, the form of all experience is its act-object structure. The question whose sense is to be investigated is, therefore, whether anything could exist even if there were not and never had been any such thing as an object of experience (or, the experience of an object, where 'object' is taken in the widest sense).

As indicated, Sacks holds (somewhat hesitantly – see p. 184) that this question is not coherent. The strategy of the argument is this. First, if a claim that *X* and *Y* are independent is to be coherent, the terms '*X*' and '*Y*' must meet the condition, that necessary co-dependence of their referents is not derivable from their senses. But this condition is not met when we apply it to the terms (a) 'the form of all experience' and (b) any term – even 'something' – that we may advance for consideration. 'Individuation is essentially perspectival. Perspectival individuation does ... require the form of object-directedness. Object directedness is the central feature of the form of all experience. From this it follows that ... the very conception of an object-world is bound up with the form of all experience' (159). Therefore, we cannot get a coherent question going about whether anything is independent of the form of all experience; nor (see above) whether anything is real (180).

Sacks regards the result of this argument – which will surely be the focus of critical discussion – as also reducing realism, idealism and scepticism to incoherence. I hope it will be clear, however, why I regard this argument as reminiscent of Bradley and as arriving at the incoherence of ontological talk and dependent views only by conceding to idealists their central claim. (Sacks is aware of this point and regards it as an objection to be overcome [164] but I do not believe that he succeeds.)

The style of the book is generally clear, although not easy. Sacks might, however, have put more trust in his readers' ability to keep track of the progress of the argument and not repeated so often his intentions, strategies and steps already taken.

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Barry Taylor, ed.
Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy.
Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1987. Pp. xii+339.
US $58.00 ISBN 90-247-3463-0

Included here are eight essays together with extensive replies by Dummett. Five of the eight address central issues raised by Dummett's well-known but not so well-understood verificationist approach to the theory of meaning and to the realism/anti-realism dispute. Although all five are difficult, some more than others, together they make clear much of what is at stake and provide Dummett with ample opportunity to clarify his views. Dag Prawitz's paper is the least critical and most expository, and anyone not well versed in Dummett's views might begin with it. Neil Tennant makes a rather technical attempt to explain how Dummett's molecularity (compositionality) thesis can be reconciled with those holist tendencies of his that survive his criticisms of holism. This requires distinguishing different kinds of holism. Crispin Wright's, Brian Loar's, and John McDowell's papers (to be discussed briefly below) each raise fundamental objections to Dummett's approach. The only other philosophical paper, by D. H. Mellor, does not address Dummett's views, but, claiming inspiration from Dummett, aims to explain how, within Mellor's framework of a tenseless view of time, alternative futures are really possible in a way that alternative pasts are not.

The two remaining essays, and Dummett's replies to them, shed light on his two well-known nonphilosophical interests, playing cards and racism. They make a seemingly incongruous pair, but like his hostility to racism, Dummett's fascination with the cultural history of cards and of card games reflects a profound respect for human diversity. Sylvia Mann, an authority on playing cards, writes affectionately of Dummett's contribution to 'the enchanted world of cardboard history' (187), notably in his book on the game of tarot. What may strike one as a mere hobby offers many surprises about artistic, cultural, and sociopolitical history. Mann explains how Dummett's energetic quests have revealed a wealth of information about the development of all sorts of playing card designs and of card games. Mann's essay and Dummett's defense of this arcane field as a legitimate topic for academic study are each a delight, hers as a tribute to him and his as a tribute to the fascinations of this 'hobby'.

Finally, there is an highly informative essay by John Rex, a specialist in ethnic relations, on racism in England from the sixties to the present, specifically as it grounds government policy and practices on immigration, ethnic commuities, employment, and education. Dummett's reply is an eloquent and passionate account of the self-deception that enables those officials for whom 'racism is such a horrible thing that no-one here could possibly be a racist' (315) to justify numerous pernicious policies. To illustrate, he explains the blame-the-victim mentality that underlies the use of the word 'disadvantage' and finds 'the location of the defect in the victim of prejudice and discrimination, instead of lodging it where it belongs' (326).

Wright's complex paper seeks to ascertain how closely connected are Dummett's various doctrines regarding the realism/anti-realism issue. For example, does anti-realism require abandoning those very principles of logic given up by the intuitionists in mathematics? For that matter, does realism inherently involve one of the most basic of those principles, the Principle of Bivalence? Dummett's rejection of the truth-conditional conception of (indicative) sentence meaning in favor of a verificationist one may suggest as much, but Wright points out that, at the very least, realism can accommodate vagueness and is therefore not committed to bivalence. Dummett replies that vagueness is a red herring, 'a very special case' (228) – it strikes me as a pervasive linguistic phenomenon – and insists that the relevant question is whether bivalence implies verification-transcendent truth. Together, Wright's paper and the reply clarify the relationships between anti-realism and non-classical logic. Dummett's reply also presents a fine account of the fundamental differences between local and global anti-realisms.

Loar's 'Truth beyond all verificaton' is an extremely subtle and meticulously argued realist response to Dummett's challenge. It is based on a holistic, conceptual-role approach to meaning, and though programmatic its careful distinctions between semantic realism and realism proper, between different forms of holism, and between different ways bivalence can fail all serve to distinguish the real from the spurious issues about realism. But Dummett, though disavowing any 'assurance that [anti-realism] is true gospel,' thinks Loar has 'misrepresented the opposition between a verificationist and a holistic theory of meaning' (269) by mistakenly separating the holistic theory of understanding from the holistic theory of justification. As a result, unfortunately, he does not treat Loar's view in the detail that it deserves.

McDowell challenges Dummett's demand for a 'full-blooded' theory of meaning, one that gives an account even of the primitive terms of the language. He maintains that this requires an account 'as from outside' the language. A homophonic theory cannot do that, and a theory given in a second language merely postpones matters, at least if the theory is supposed to represent the facts learned by the person who understands the language. And if the theory is not supposed to represent what the language user implicitly knows, it can only be perniciously psychologistic (presupposing that thought is prior to language and unproblematically endowed with content) or, even worse, behavioristic. McDowell presents an eloquent, if at times mystifying, defense of a modest theory, according to which, as Dummett puts it, 'there is nothing in virtue of which the words of a language have the meanings that they do; it is simply a brute fact' (258).

It is an interesting question to what extent contemporary work in syntactic theory and in the theory of content and mental representation threatens to undermine the theory of meaning as Dummett conceives of it. For example, Dummett's view that expressions 'mean what they do in virtue of an enormously complex social practice in which the employment of the language consists' (259) clashes with the individualism that underlies Noam Chomsky's Government Binding Theory. And Stephen Schiffer has argued forcefully against the very possibility of compositional theories of meaning, Dummett's included. Further, it is an open empirical question whether Dummett is right to deny 'thought is prior to language in the order of explanation' (256). Whether or not the theory of linguistic meaning should be replaced by the theory of mental content, Dummett himself admits that 'No-one is actually going to construct a theory of meaning for a natural language; the questions we must ask ... concern how such a theory is to be constructed. The point of asking these questions is to provide a sophisticated answer to the query, "What is meaning?"' (254-5). Considering recent developments on the subject of mental representation, I suspect that the truly sophisticated answer may be to a different query, 'What is content?', but considering both the diversity and the primitiveness of such developments, I don't expect such an answer soon.

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Paul Thompson
The Structure of Biological Theories.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1989. Pp. x+148.
US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-933-9);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-934-7).

The central thesis of this book is that the 'Received View' of theories as interpreted sets of axioms and derived theorems (the statement or syntactic view) is inferior to a newer model-theoretic approach (the semantic view) for the philosophical study of theoretical biology. The book describes the syntactic view, discusses its application to evolutionary theory, and then gives the same treatment to the semantic approach. It ends with chapters on sociobiology, and on evolutionary epistemology and ethics, that are supposed to demonstrate the advantages of the semantic approach, but also discuss the substantive issues in these controversial areas.

The syntactic view is presented in a rather poor light, piling criticism on criticism with little discussion of its merits. There is an ambiguity running throughout the book about whether the syntactic view is strictly wrong, or just practically unworkable. Most of the arguments that point to fundamental flaws also apply in some way to the semantic approach. Since anything that can be represented can be represented as a first order theory, this conclusion seems inescapable. Thompson does point to some real problems in applying the syntactic view, however, and these problems are demonstrated in his critique of attempts to axiomatize evolution. Although there are, in principle, ways to meet his objections to particular axiomatizations, that these ways are needed justifies his claim that the syntactic approach is difficult to apply.

The main problem with the syntactic approach is how to give an adequate interpretation of a formal structure that is itself linguistic in nature. This is done through correspondence rules that assign empirical interpretations to the terms and statements of the theory. If the rules are too specific, the theory must change as new empirical methods are developed, but if the rules are not specific, the interpretation of the theory is too vague to allow the truth of its statements to be determined unequivocally. This problem is particularly acute when different theories must be correlated with each other to be brought to bear on complex phenomena. Some means of coordinating the respective correspondence rules is required, but the theories do not tell us how to do this, since coordination requires either that the theories be changed, or else that the equivocation be resolved. Either move requires information not available in the theories themselves. It isn't clear where the information required is supposed to come from, or what the criteria are for a satisfactory coordination.

On the semantic approach, the interpretation is a class of models. The meaning of the theory is given independently of its empirical application. A theory applies to phenomena if the phenomena are isomorphic to a model of the theory. Different theories can be correlated through models they have in common. The constraints the different theories place on each other specify their common interpretaton. Unfortunately, things are not quite this simple, since the coordination of different theories also usually involves further extra-theoretical contraints (that Thompson ignores) involved in identifying components of the models of different theories. Contrary to what might be inferred from Thompson's account, I am not convinced that the information required to specify these constraints is any less than is required to coordinate interpretations on the syntactic approach. This does not, though, detract from the methodological and heuristic advantages of the semantic approach.

Thompson maintains that the neo-Darwinian synthesis is not a single unified theory but a set of disparate interacting theories. These theories mutually constrain each other, so that in the Darwnian framework the permissable models are more restrictive than would be allowed by any theory alone. The interaction of the theories is more faithfully represented by the semantic view than the syntactic view. This advantage of the semantic view would be undermined if a unified theory of evolution, using a common language, could be developed. There are efforts under way to do just this (e.g. D.R. Brooks and E.O. Wiley, *Evolution as Entropy: Toward a Unified Theory of Biology*, 2nd Edition [University of Chicago Press: 1988]). On the other hand, the historical development of evolutionary theory involved the confluence of several independent theories, so the semantic approach would maintain its advantage for the description of the development of evolutionary theory even if a unified theory of evolution were to appear.

Thompson uses the contrast between the syntactic and semantic approaches to shed some light on the sociobiology debate. Sociobiology has been successful, as even its critics admit, in the explanation of behaviour of various lower animals, but has been less successful in the explanation of human behaviour. Thompson suggests that this is because there are available theories that can connect evolutionary and genetic theory to behaviour for simple behaviours, but that human behaviour involves intelligence and culture, for which there are no good connections to physiology and genetics (105-6). In order to make these connections, we need to apply theories outside of evolutionary theory itself.

Thompson points out that while opponents of sociobiology have argued that human behaviour cannot be deduced from evolutionary theory, supporters have introduced additional hypotheses that facilitate the deduction. These hypotheses are sometimes ad hoc (113). Thompson suggests that sociobiology should not be rejected, but it should be recognized that the explanation of human behaviour involves many disparate theories, not just evolutionary theory. The semantic approach is best adapted to bringing these theories together. We should not expect deduction of human behaviour from evolutionary theory, but evolutionary theory can play a central role, if it is supplemented with cognitive psychology, neurobiology, and theories of culture.

Thompson adopts a similar strategy to explain the problems with evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics. An adequate evolutionary epistemology needs to be supplemented with a good theory of non-genetic transmission of information, and with a theory of cognition that explains how cultural information 'programs the neurological system' (121). Likewise, evolutionary ethics needs supplementation with theories of geneculture evolution, which will require better theories of cultural evolution, and of how culture affects the brain (128).

Because it is fairly elementary, and because it deals with both the main issues in philosophy of biology and foundational issues in philosophy of science about the nature and interpretation of theories, this book would serve as a good text for a philosophy of science course. It is a good platform for discussion, and can serve the dual purpose of introducing students to the philosophy of biology while they learn about recent philosophy of science. The book is generally clear, but it does not oversimplify the current state of the art. It lays bare some arguments so that their flaws are glaringly evident. Thompson, however, does not take advantage of this to advance the debate. This feature adds to the book's value as a text, but makes it less valuable to researchers familiar with its topics. One unfortunate feature of the book is the large number of typographical errors. I did not notice any that changed the meaning, and they seem to have been introduced in the final stages of printing. They are nonetheless irritating.

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Hao Wang
Reflections on Kurt Gödel.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987. Pp. 319.
US $27.50. ISBN 0-262-23127-1.

Hao Wang tells us in the preface to *Reflections on Kurt Gödel* that this book is 'meant to be a first attempt to consider [Gödel's] life and work as a whole within an inclusive context that is accessible to most thoughtful people.' Not only does he achieve this goal in splendid fashion, but in the process, he presents us with a work of far greater philosophical significance than is suggested by the comparatively modest claims outlined in the preface.

Wang has adopted a biographical approach in which details of Gödel's life and insights into his character are intermixed with a chronological account of the evolution of Gödel's thought and the exposition of his major papers. The approach is particularly well-suited to Gödel, since so much of his work was developed in response to contemporary issues in the foundations of mathematics and the philosophy of science. Moreover, Wang's life-long involvement with these problems, together with his close acquaintance and obvious admiration for Gödel, renders him ideally situated to appreciate and convey the subtlety of Gödel's achievements.

Wang promises us an introductory text which should be comprehensible to anyone with a limited background in mathematical logic, and true to his word he succeeds in expounding Gödel's ideas in terms which will benefit all readers of Gödel's work, and not just those who are novices in logic and philosophy. Most important of all, however, are Wang's efforts to elucidate the philosophical implications of Gödel's work: both in terms of Gödel's own perceptions, and the measured judgments which a lifetime's reflection has brought to Wang.

This last point is crucial to assessing the import of Wang's book. Due to the revolutionary character of Gödel's thought, there is a seemingly unavoidable tendency today for attitudes to polarize around its ramifications. The very fact that it seems so straightforward to label Gödel as a robust platonist makes it especially tempting to exaggerate or discount the philosophical consequences of his work. Although he does little to advertise the fact, it is clear that the real purpose of Wang's book is to put these simplistic attitudes to rest in order to enable us to come to terms with the greater depth afforded by Gödel's writings. Thus the book reads as a study in counterpoint: Gödel's work is presented in the context of contemporary developments, only to illuminate how it leads us to a new and deeper understanding of the issues involved. For Wang's ultimate goal is synthesis, not exegesis.

This is perhaps most clearly seen in the chapters on Einstein and Wittgenstein. The former is a study in one of the more inspiring intellectual relationships of our century; the latter, a study in intellectual alienation. It is fascinating to discover here how little patience or interest Gödel had in Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas in general and his puzzling remarks on the incompleteness theorems in particular. It is not an attitude which Wang is about to replicate. Rather, he searches here for a common ground between these two giants: a formidable task, given the contrary positions which they take on such fundamental issues as the nature of mathematical propositions and proofs or the gravity of the dilemma which Gödel posed for Hilbert's Programme. But then, Wittgenstein shared with Gödel (and Hilbert) the belief that the mathematician cannot ask unanswerable questions; could not a similar common ground be found for their prima facie disparate attitudes towards philosophy?

Wang has chosen to test the merits of this approach in a stimulating essay on 'computers and mechanical procedures'. Gödel was among the first to challenge the thesis that 'mechanical procedures' (as conceived by Turing) are (or could ever be) co-extensive with 'mental processes'. For Gödel saw mechanical procedures not as an 'analysis of' but rather, an alternative to 'mental processes'. Thus Wang leads us through the various arguments canvassed by Gödel in order to establish that the power of mental processes (as manifested, e.g., in leaps of mathematical intuition) lies irrevocably beyond the compass of mechanical procedures.

As Wang quite rightly emphasizes, the issues which arise from the putative conflict between 'mechanically' and 'humanly effective procedures' poses a major problem for Wittgenstein studies: not just in regard to Wittgenstein's insistence that 'thinking is not a hidden process', but at a still more fundamental level, for his basic precept that philosophical problems cannot be solved empirically or mathematically. For the upshot of Gödel's reasoning is that, regardless of whether or not we are aware of the fact, mental and mechanical procedures may well be partially co-extensive, and further, that the question whether mind is inherently superior to machine is indeed one that can (at least in part) be settled mathematically. Perhaps, then, we owe to Wittgenstein a deeper understanding of the nature of these problems, and to Gödel, a radical new method for dealing with them?

This is a challenge which no Wittgensteinian – indeed, no contemporary philosopher – can afford to ignore. For that matter, it poses a challenge which Wang himself is clearly unwilling to ignore. Thus he promises to pursue these matters in a companion volume which will highlight his conversations with Gödel. We can all look forward to his future contributions to our understanding of the nature and significance of Gödel's thought, and be grateful that he has provided us with such a valuable starting-point in *Reflections on Kurt Gödel.*

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Ian Winchester and **Kenneth Blackwell**, eds.
Antinomies & Paradoxes: Studies in Russell's Early Philosophy.
Hamilton: McMaster University Library Press 1989. Pp. 248.
Cdn $24.00 (institutions):
Cdn $15.00 (individuals). ISBN 0-919592-06-6.

Jocelyne Couture's criticism of Russell's elimination of classes is one of the volume's more interesting and substantive papers. Yet, the problems Couture finds are due, I believe, to her construal of R. One problem concerns R's use of predicate quantifiers in contexts with '$\phi!x$' and '$\phi!\hat{x}$'. R was aware of this and noted: '... it would be strictly more correct to indicate the fact by placing '$(\phi!\hat{z})$' before what follows, as thus: '$(\phi!\hat{z}).\ f(\phi!\hat{z})$.' But for the sake of brevity we write simply '(ϕ)' ... (*Principia*, 165). The problem is notational and stems from R's use of the caps to form his early lambda abstracts, to mark the use of predicates in subject place and to signify the 'function itself'. Another problem is more serious, but, again, I believe it is C's, not R's. She thinks that R's pattern for eliminating class abstracts should follow that for definite descriptions and contain a uniqueness clause, since he speaks of 'the class'. This would force 'the' function generating a class to be unique and yield an extensionality axiom for functions. But, R's use of 'the class' and his construal of class abstracts are warranted by the proof of 20:13 (modified): $(x)(\phi x \equiv \Psi x) \supset \hat{z}(\phi z) = \hat{z}(\Psi z)$. His use of class abstracts only requires that there be *a* function equivalent to both $\phi\hat{z}$ and $\Psi\hat{z}$ here, which there trivially is.

In another interesting paper, Michel Seymour argues that the referential use of a definite description can be handled on R's analysis of definite descriptions by imposing a number of conditions on the context, the hearer, speaker, etc. The idea is to construe descriptions in a 'unitary' R-style theory so that they can be taken to be used 'referentially' if certain intentional, 'pragmatic' and existential conditions are fulfilled. Alasdair Urquhart's cutely titled 'Russell's zigzag path to the ramified theory of types' briefly surveys alternatives R considered. Oddly no mention is made of Cocchiarella's work, which has gone over the same ground in a far more comprehensive manner. Gregory Moore's short piece 'The roots of Russell's paradox' takes such *roots* to be found in R's early interest in paradoxes and to have *grown* 'in the Kantian and Hegelian soil in which Russell was educated in Cambridge' (46).

Two papers deal with R's early work on geometry. Joan Richards focuses on his concerns with Poincaré's conventionalism, projective and metrical geometry, and the connection of the latter with spatial concepts. Martha Harrell discusses the interpretation of Peano's primitive terms and postulates in *Principia* terms and the use of the arithmetic of the reals, construed R-wise, to interpret geometries via the bridge of analytic geometry. This approach is contrasted with R's also speaking of physically interpreted geometries as parts of physics. Hempel's well known paper is not mentioned. One crucial issue involved is pursued by I. Grattan-Guinness in the round table discussion that concludes the book. He questions how abstract algebras can be handled by a logicist. Quine's reply that they can be 'embedded' in the logic of relations is no answer (236). Though not developed, G-G's point is that one cannot viably talk of a logistic *construal* of an abstract system, only of an interpretation. This also holds for the Peano postulates taken as an abstract system. One must distinguish such a system, call it P1, *from* 'the' postulates taken as an axiomatization of ordinary arithmetic, with primitive terms having definite 'meanings', call this P2, *and from* an R-type interpretation of P1 designed to resolve philosophical questions about P2. A logicist can then respond to G-G's query, the queries about geometry, and the standard objections to the logicistic construal of arithmetic, *not mathematics*, first raised by formalists, later by Wittgenstein and, much later, by Benacerraf.

In a paper weighed down by quotations from R, Ian Winchester considers R's discussons of dynamics, matter, motion, and force in the Leibniz book and *The Principles.* Much is made of R's early use of the phrase 'mathematical fiction', in discussing vectors and the resultant 'real' force, and R's subsequent talk of 'logical fictions'. Nicholas Griffin's paper is a mass of citations and comments that illustrate R's concerns prior to 1900 – geometry, physics, classes, analysis, the continuum, metaphysics, relations, Hegel, Kant, Cantor, Leibniz, Bradley, Ward, etc. – and demonstrate that G has read early papers that are not generally read or have not been generally accessible. Problems are paraded, but not probed. For all the topics and figures mentioned, G overlooks two basic philosophical issues in R's works that are crucial to his own main theme – issues that occupied R from the end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century: the analysis of particulars and the viability of appealing to relational differences to individuate particulars.

G surveys R's early neo-Hegelianism which took the mind to supply relations which were 'in Leibniz's phrase "a mere ideal thing ..."' (21). Yet, *diversity* is not a relation as any relation requires *unity in diversity.* Unity and diversity themselves are not genuine relations, but 'proto-relations' (22). R has 'adjectives and proto-relations', not relations, and thus a 'relationless pluralism.' Much must be clarified here, but G hurries through a superficial, if standard, discussion of Bradley and his influence on R to get to his main theme: to explain numerous antinomies he chronicles as cases of R's '*contradiction of relativity*' (34). This R characterized as arising from 'difference between two terms, without a difference in the conceptions applicable to them' (34). Asserting that 'the contradiction' follows from R's taking intrinsic properties to ground apparent relational difference, G dismisses it as based on the false doctrine of internal relations: ' ... there would normally be taken to be no contradiction in saying of two things that had all their intrinsic properties in common, that they differed in their relations ...' (34).

But R's 'contradiction of relativity' is no mere offshoot of a doctrine of internal relations; it is concerned with the nature of particulars (individual 'substances') and the ontological ground of their diversity. G's overlooking this is not simply due to his preoccupation with citing numerous texts and with internal relations. He fails to distinguish two quite distinct questions. *One* is whether a *relation's holding between two things* is grounded in monadic properties intrinsic to the things. *The other* is whether *two things being diverse* is grounded in their intrinsic properties. If diversity is a relation the two are easily fused. But R holds, as Armstrong and Bergmann recently have, that diversity is not a relation. One should then see the deep metaphysical issues involved and that R's discussion warrants and awaits serious analysis.

John G. Slater's 'Russell's conception of philosophy' is an accurately titled straightforward survey that manages to convey an impressive amount of information in a compact piece. It is exceptionally well written and animated by the author's scholarship and devotion to his subject. Janet Farrell Smith's article surveys R's views on acquaintance in the 1913 manuscript *Theory of Knowledge*. The main points concern the various connections among *naming, intention*, and R's *acquaintance* relation and Brentano's influence on R's discussions of experience and self-consciousness. One problem arises from Smith's running together R's talk of *contents of experience* with Meinongian *contents of intentional acts*, via the obvious verbal bridge. Thus, she finds R's talk 'curious', since he 'supposedly decisively rejected Meinongian contents' (192). R's discussion of contents of experience then becomes the basis for concluding that 'at the heart of the acquaintance relation lies an analysis consistent with an intentional analysis of consciousness' (193). Space prevents going into why S's surmises on such matters are wrong; it must suffice to recall that R's multiple-relation analysis of intentional 'verbs' was devised to avoid Meinongian contents and Fregean thoughts. S does not delve into the complexities involved, but she correctly links R's views on the *meaning* of proper *names* with *intentional reference.*

Michael Bradie's attempt to deal with R's scientific realism suggestively finds diverse senses of 'real' involved, but also finds R's discussions of sense data, sensations, existence, etc. confusing. B is puzzled by R's taking 'sense-data as constituents of the actual world' while 'it makes no sense to say they either exist or don't exist' because 'only those things which can be described by propositional functons can be meaningfully said to exist or not', and yet 'they are supposed to have the same ontological status' as 'sensibilia' (unsensed, here) which 'can be said to be real' (205). B overlooks that R held that while you cannot say about an existent particular that it exists *using a name* of it, you can say that it exists *using a description* of it. To hold that one can describe what one is not acquainted with does not imply that one cannot describe what one is acquainted with. Also, saying, or being able to say, *in a schema*, that ß exists need not be a criterion for ontic commitment to ß. Irrelevant complications arise as R also took existence to be a function, $(\exists x)\hat{\phi}x$, taking functions as arguments, which led him to hold that existence was ascribable to functions, not particulars.

Robert Tully argues R did not abandon neutral monism when most think he did, but adhered to it from 1919 to 1959. T's claim rests on neutral monism being ' ... a synoptic metaphysics which seeks to reconcile the contrary tendencies of materialism and idealism ... through its intrinsic appeal as a comprehensive theory which vindicates itself by ... its wider perspective' (210). This allows R's structural realism and various other views to qualify.

Quine's brief reminiscence of his logical correspondence with R is a charming piece. It quotes a letter from R praising Q's work as having 'reformed many matters as to which I had always been comfortable'; my copy of R's autobiography has 'uncomfortable'. A. J. Ayer moderates and joins the other participants in a closing round table discussion.

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R.S. Woolhouse
The Empiricists.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1989. Pp. 183.
Cdn $37.50; US $29.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-219207-8);
Cdn $ 14.95; US $9.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-289188-x).

According to its general notice, the OPUS series aims to provide an introduction to a given subject both for the general reader and for students. *The Empiricists* is one of a projected eight works that will comprise a history of western philosophy in this series. It is to be hoped that the other seven are up to snuff, for this work succeeds admirably in its appointed task. Woolhouse has produced an accurate, clear and concise book that should supplant Copleston, for example, for most purposes. (I can report that I have already made use of it in an undergraduate honors course.)

As the title suggests, and as is anyhow typical of histories of philosophy, the subject is treated for the most part according to segregated authors, each with a separate chapter. The list includes the familiar names of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Supplementing it, however, are a chapter on Gassendi and a chapter on the Royal Society. In addition, there is an introduction that sets out what is meant by empiricism, and does so against the background that gave rise to the new philosophies of the seventeenth century. Particularly treated are skepticism and the rejection of latter-day Aristotelianism.

The seventeenth century was conscious of its advances in natural science and was convinced that it was systematically doing something new. As a result, the century was preoccupied, not to say obsessed, with questions of method. This preoccupation is reflected by W's book, which distinguishes empiricism as an epistemological theory, espoused by Locke for instance, from empiricism as a methodology. Bacon of course is treated from the latter perspective, which also serves the chapter on the early history of the Royal Society (alas, with no mention of the Académie royale des sciences, founded at the same time with the same order of importance for empiricist principles). Hobbes too is treated from this perspective, but the unwelcome upshot here is that his materialism gets introduced almost *en passant* and the systemic significance of his nominalism is ignored. (On the other hand, Hobbist nominalism does figure in a nice discussion of abstraction in the Berkeley chapter.)

The inclusion of a chapter on Gassendi is the most original change from the usual English-language accounts of empiricism. The reading of Gassendi as primarily concerned with the refutation of Aristotelianism is not implausible (*v.* B. Brundell's recent book) and is certainly supported by the texts that are cited. (Only previously translated texts are cited, presumably because only they would be of further use to the typical reader of this book.) But the historian perspective of L.S. Joy's recent book and the ontological perspective of O.R. Bloch's classic work in my view offer much more interesting interpretations of Gassendi. [See **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.** December 1989 for a review of these books. Ed.]

W is of course recognized as a Locke scholar of the highest calibre, and it is no surprise that his best and longest chapter is on Locke. The sprawling *Essay* is given a masterly rational reconstruction that is at once both thorough and economical. A nice account of Locke's views on identity is tacked on, as well as an account of his political philosophy, which may be found too brief by some, but which seems to me perfect for this text.

The account of Berkeley is not a sympathetic one. W appears to regard Berkeley's views as more interestingly connected with his religious beliefs than with his philosophical arguments. Indeed, the so-called Master Argument on which Berkeley was 'content to put the whole issue' of his immaterialism is not even mentioned. Even so, the account is thorough and accurate. An exception may be the claim (127) that 'given Berkeley's immaterialism, the idea that things have real essences (be they scholastic forms or corpuscular constitutions), which are the cause of their properties, simply has no place.' An important qualification of this claim may be made on the basis of D. Garber's paper in C.M. Turbayne's *Berkeley...Essays*.

The chapter on Hume is perhaps best described as premised on Kemp-Smith's view that 'Hume, under the influence of Hutcheson, entered into his philosophy through the gateway of morals.' In these terms, the chapter provides a clear, consistent and coherent account of all the themes we have come to associate with Hume. Worth noticing, however, is that W takes Hume at face value in regarding the difference between impressions and ideas as 'one of degree, not of kind,' according to the vividness of the impression (137). The unsurprising result is that Hume has a variety of systemic problems. Although distinguishing between differences in kind and differences in degree may be problematic in Hume, this difference seems to me to be of the latter sort. Their relative liveliness and vivacity is how we tell the difference between impressions and ideas; but what makes them different is that, absent worries about the missing shade of blue, impressions are always those perceptions that first appear in the soul, and ideas are those that subsequently copy them.

The book is generally, if not completely, free from proofreading errors. A humorous one – something of a malaprop – occurs when not only the text (34) but also the index refers to Jacopo Zabarella as 'Zarabella.' Nothing said here or above, however, should discourage anyone from making great use of this welcome book.

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R.A. Shiner