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Table of Contents . Table des matières

Tom Beauchamp and N. Bowie, eds., <i>Ethical Theory and Business</i>	1
Kenneth Hanly	
Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., <i>Feminism as a Critique</i>	3
Deborah M. Rosen	
John Cottingham, <i>The Rationalists</i>	6
Robert Imlay	
Jonathan Dancy, J.M.E. Moravcsik, and C.C.W. Taylor, eds., <i>Human Agency—Language, Duty, and Value:</i> <i>Philosophical Essays in Honor of J.O. Urmson</i>	9
David Novitz	
Paul Eidelberg, <i>Beyond the Secular Mind:</i> <i>A Judaic Response to the Problems of Modernity</i>	11
Martin D. Yaffe	
Michael Fischer, <i>Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism</i>	13
Timothy Gould	
James W. Forrester, <i>Why You Should:</i> <i>The Pragmatics of Deontic Speech</i>	16
John Morreall	
Clark Glymour, Richard Scheines, Peter Spirtes and Kevin Kelly, <i>Discovering Causal Structure: Artificial Intelligence,</i> <i>Philosophy of Science and Statistical Modelling</i>	19
Mike Oaksford	
Charles K. Griswold, Jr., ed., <i>Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings</i>	22
Jeff Mitscherling	
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, <i>The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library</i>	24
Joseph A. Novak	
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, trans., <i>Porphyry's Launching Points to the Realm of Mind</i>	24
Joseph A. Novak	
Thomas M. Johnson, trans., <i>Iamblichus: The Exhortation to Philosophy</i>	24
Joseph A. Novak	
Peter Kivy, <i>Osmin's Rage: Philosophical Reflections</i> <i>on Opera, Drama, and Text</i>	31
Lydia Goehr	

Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, trans., <i>Plato's Symposium</i>	34
Jane S. Zembaty	
Ben-Ami Scharfstein, <i>Of Birds, Beasts and Other Artists;</i> <i>An essay on the universality of art.</i>	37
Arnold Berleant	
Stephen Schiffer and Susan Steele, eds., <i>Cognition and Representation</i>	39
Radu J. Bogdan	
Robin Waterfield, trans., <i>The Theology of Arithmetic</i>	24
Joseph A. Novak	
Elie Zahar, <i>Einstein's Revolution</i>	42
Niall Shanks	
Alice Zimmern, trans., <i>Porphry's Letter to his Wife Marcella</i>	24
Joseph A. Novak	

Tom Beauchamp and N. Bowie, eds.

Ethical Theory and Business.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1988.

Pp. xi+596. Cdn. \$51.95: US \$39.95.

ISBN 0-13-290503-5 01.

As more and more business programmes have made courses in ethics and business mandatory an increased demand for texts has been created. Basically there are two types: i) texts which are original material by an author or authors; ii) texts which are collections of papers, often with some commentary and notes by the editors. The present volume is of the latter type except that there is a fine survey of fundamental ethical concepts and normative theory which occupies fifty pages at the beginning of the text. In this edition there is a further section dealing with analysis of cases. Each of the remaining eight chapters contain introductory summaries and discussion of the issues and papers included in each chapter. I find that most of the material written by the editors is exceedingly helpful to students. In particular if the course is taught to students who have had no previous work in ethics the first section is invaluable. For the most part each successive edition of this work has resulted in an improvement overall in the quality of the papers included and in the accompanying material written by the authors. There are however a few weaknesses which I would like to point out briefly.

Since this is a text produced in the United States and basically for the United States market it is not too surprising that there should be legal perspectives from U.S. courts. However, all but a very few of the cases presented for study are also based in the United States. There seems to be no reason why American legal perspectives could not be supplemented by decisions from other countries, and it seems even more evident that case studies could similarly involve material from other countries. It is true that in many instances the origin of cases is not particularly relevant, but in other instances there may be differences. For example, in the case which treats of covering health costs the authors use the United States Medicare system, which to anyone from Canada looks like a band-aid system rather than a medicare system!

This brings us to another general weakness. This text, in common with every other text I have examined, ignores the differences that might arise with respect to questions of business ethics because of the particular type of business involved. It seems obvious that corpora-

tions which are meant to give a good return on investment may have somewhat different ethical problems than those which are non-profit and meant only to provide a service – often at a loss. It would be interesting to examine the similarities and differences with respect to ethical issues in business in a country such as the U.S.S.R. with highly collectivised business operations and countries such as the United States which is predominantly private. Although it would seem Soviet corporations would not be tempted to pollute for reasons of private profit, pollution obviously was and is a problem. Why? Isn't it worth while enlarging the business students' horizons? In the vast majority of articles, though not all, business is understood as private profit-oriented business. Another area largely ignored concerns the role of unions, of the ethics of 'right to work' laws, etc. Hopefully future editions will try to address at least some of these 'lacks'. Dare one even suggest that the question of co-operatives and worker's control might enter the picture? Or perhaps this is too Utopian for business ethics! (The stakeholder theory of responsibility might be pointed in this direction.)

All in all, however, this is one of the superior texts in business ethics. It has developed a core of good articles in each area and shows improvements over the successive editions. One major advantage of this text over many of its competitors is the fact that it deals with broad issues and in particular with the justice of economic systems. Many texts seem to shy away from treating students to any basic critique of capitalism—or even any basic defense of it! The last two editions have had a quite intelligible presentation of the Marxist view by Milton Fisk as contrasted with a completely incomprehensible selection from Marx in the original edition. However, it seems to me that in terms of organisation the chapter on theories of economic justice should come at the first rather than the last. Ordering things this way one starts out from the most general to the less general—the social responsibility of business and then into sections which are even more specific. In conclusion this is a text I would recommend for courses in business ethics.

Kenneth Hanly

Brandon University

Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell,
eds.

Feminism as a Critique.

Markham, ON: Fitzhenry and Whiteside;

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

1989. Pp. 193. Cdn. \$56.50; US \$39.50

(cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1636-1); Cdn. \$21.50;

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1636-1).

In this consistently well-written volume liberal presuppositions about moral agency and Marxist theoretical postulates are examined in a lively effort to promote feminism as the vanguard of philosophical research. No longer satisfactory is the ideal that fabricates autonomous bearers of rights who seek to acquire status and property in the fashion formulated by Hobbes and Locke and reformulated by contemporary liberal theorists. Ideological commitments to either the welfare state or libertarianism do not obscure the basic flaw in theory construction that fails to account for gender relations in the private sphere of the family. Similarly unsatisfactory is the Marxist category of production which both obstructs from view the activities performed by women in the private economy of the domestic realm and has allowed gender to become irrelevant as an indicator of class status (5).

Maria Markus' essay, 'Women, Success and Civil Society', investigates success avoidance or 'fear of success', terms that are used to describe those who do not seek public acclaim. Disparaging these traits in women follows from adherence to norms that treat fame and fortune as values inherently attractive to humans. She argues for and demonstrates alternative conceptions of satisfaction by using biographical studies of Hungarian women who discredited public recognition as a factor in achievement. A shop-keeper took pride in being everybody's 'Auntie', not in profits; 'a post-office clerk dwelled on the assistance she provided to few Gypsies, rather than her promotion; a director of a girls' choir focused on the educational and artistic experience she offered, instead of her international reputation' (101). This essay provides evidence that the desires presented as universal by 17th-century liberal theorists, i.e., the quest for power, are gender-specific.

Empirical research that canvasses people on their perceptions and values has been convincingly incorporated into the exercise of theory formation by Markus. It is a welcomed innovation in philosophi-

cal research and an inevitable requirement of feminist scholarship, given the importance of individual and cultural difference that delineates feminists and post-modernists from the rest of the philosophical pack. Markus concludes that emancipation and economic equality with men are not identically valuable. Internalizing the achievement principle thereby relinquishing fear of success is not the solution, contrary to what is suggested by some liberal feminists, because it reinforces existing hierarchical and exclusive (to class membership) economic structures.

A well-reasoned history and critique of normative ethical theory is the part of Seyla Benhabib's, 'The Generalized and the Concrete Other' that is most amenable to general studies in ethics. In it she demonstrates the legacy of unreflective gender bias leading to the development of universalizability, reflective equilibrium, reversibility and Kohlberg's stages of moral development. 'The sphere of justice from Hobbes through Locke and Kant is regarded as the domain where independent, male heads of household transact with one another, while the domestic-intimate sphere is put beyond the pale of justice and restricted to the reproductive and affective needs of the bourgeois pater-familias ... An entire domain of human activity, namely, nurture, reproduction, love and care ... is excluded from moral and political considerations and regulated to the realm of "nature"' (83). The heritage of excising nurturance from the moral realm, as a result of de facto division of emotional labour on the basis of gender, results in the false perception of uniformity of desire and commonalities of agents. These flaws impair moral discourse by relegating women's experience to the private and thus amoral realm, and by placing unwarranted confidence in formalism.

Iris Marion Young works the same theme in 'Impartiality and the Civic Public'. Her complaint against philosophical ethics is housed on the context of political and moral theory. She uncovers some disabling oversights in Habermas' communicative ethics, specifically that it accepts the opposition between reason and desire. With the aid of Julia Kristeva's conception of speech which treats communication as motivated by a basic desire to love and be loved (12), ethics is offered as an interactive practice between language-users that cannot rest on the tenets of principled theories alone. The obvious objection that normative principles cannot be displaced without alternative methods to replace them can be held in abeyance: using Habermas' definition of reason – giving reasons, taking the practical stance of being reasonable, willingness to talk and listen (68) – an alternative is sug-

gested. Combined with Kristeva's theory of language cogency is given to the innovations of communicative ethics. Young capitalized on the breadth of communicative ethics by reviewing public responses to gay liberation and the women's movement, and the struggle to politically enfranchise minority groups in the U.S. Her vision of emancipatory politics is that it should 'foster a conception of public which in principle excludes no persons, aspects of persons' lives, or topic of discussion' (76). A substantive component to communicative ethics is thus suggested as well as a procedural one, i.e., 'let's talk'. These two essays offer a model of ethics that would treat persons rather than theories as authoritative. A debate between formalistic ethics and communicative ethics is now possible.

Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser attack the Marxist flank of political theory in 'Feminism and Marx' and 'What's Critical about Critical Theory' respectively. In the first two parts of her essay, Fraser demonstrates androcentricity in Habermas' terms: 'worker', 'consumer' and 'wage'. They are not, she argues, uniquely economic concepts; rather, they have an implicit gender subtext and therefore are gender-economic concepts. 'Citizenship' is likewise gender-political (46). Under welfare capitalism the role that the social-welfare client plays replaces the role of the consumer, and that role is paradigmatically a feminine one (49). Nicholson's detailed analysis of Marx's failure to adequately account for reproductive labour may be treated as the root cause of subsequent theorists' blindness to women as economic agents.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 raise challenges to traditional and modern continental ontologies of sex. As a result these entries can serve as case studies in applied metaphysics, permitting feminism to critique topics in personal identity. The whole text is suitable for advanced levels in feminist studies. Chapters 1-6 also have the advantage of introducing philosophical feminism to academic ethics and political theory, areas most likely to benefit from fresh perspectives.

Deborah M. Rosen

(Part-time and Continuing Education)

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John Cottingham

The Rationalists.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1988. Pp. 234.

Cdn \$44.95; US \$29.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-219209-4);

Cdn \$15.95; US \$9.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-289190-1).

This book constitutes a serious attempt to provide an intelligent but in all likelihood non-professional reader with a maximum amount of information on the great rationalist trinity of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz – if history were just, it would be a quartet which included Malebranche – in the minimum amount of space. Virtually all the major themes common to all three of them such as substance, the relation of mind to body, God and freedom are treated, and the variations of one philosopher on a given theme are always compared with those of the other two. At the same time Cottingham within the inevitable limits of space tries to situate these philosophers and their concerns within the broader historical context. Thus he shows the relevance of the Aristotelian conception of substance for the later debate on the subject. All in all then, given its limited aims the book is a real tour de force, and I myself should be tempted to use it as a base on which to structure an undergraduate course on the rationalists.

That is not to say, of course, that I am in agreement with everything that Cottingham has to say. It is especially in the area of the philosophical evaluation of the rationalists' performance – and Cottingham is constantly at pains to engage them philosophically so that the book is anything but a tedious and extended *explication de texte* – that I disagree most with Cottingham. It seems to me, for example, that he is all too ready to put himself on the side of those albeit illustrious critics of Descartes' argument for the real distinction between mind and body, like Leibniz and Arnauld, who summarily dismiss the argument on the grounds that it is no more than an argument from ignorance. Indeed, Cottingham goes so far as to say the conceivability of my existence without body is not proved but boldly asserted by Descartes, and he informs us without further ado that Arnauld's version of the counter-argument seems to be unanswerable (121). But surely it is wildly unfair to say that we are dealing here with a bold assertion on Descartes' part. On the contrary he is

at great pains to show us in the first Meditation by standard pyrrhonian moves, reinforced, if need be, by the hypothesis of the evil genius, that we are epistemologically obligated to admit that body may be conceived not to exist whereas my existence as mind confirmed by the 'Cogito' may not be so conceived in such circumstances. He then goes on to argue in the effect that, if we are epistemically justified in conceiving body not to exist and if my existence as mind is identical with body, then I should be epistemically justified in doubting such an existence. And that, of course, goes against the indubitable truth, if it is indubitable, of the 'Cogito'. Thus far from presenting us with an argument from ignorance Descartes presents us with an argument from epistemic justification that is much stronger than the absurd argument that with little or no evidence has been ascribed to him and one which must be judged on its own merits.

As for Cottingham's contention on p.117 that Descartes seems to have acknowledged the justice of Arnauld's counter-argument, nothing, with all due respect, would be further from the truth. When Descartes allows that his argument does not suffice to prove the real distinction between mind and body he makes it perfectly clear in his reply to Arnauld that it is essentially the evil genius hypothesis that stands in the way. But that is one obstacle he fully intends to remove in due course. Thus it cannot be and is not taken as a reason for withdrawing the proof.

Reference to the evil genius hypothesis and our earlier reference to standard pyrrhonian moves brings up one problem that faces anyone intent, as Cottingham rightly is, on emphasizing the thematic resemblances among the rationalists. For while such resemblances abound, there is Descartes' readiness to take scepticism seriously, if only to beat the sceptic at his own game, which at the same time sets him apart from Spinoza and Leibniz, neither of whom were much taken with pyrrhonian dialectic, but, if I may venture to say, makes him so much more alive and actual to the contemporary reader. As a result, any examination of these philosophers that stresses thematic resemblances will play down this side of Descartes' philosophy – it can hardly be ignored all together – and the French philosopher will suffer in the process.

How is such a difficulty to be overcome? It might have been a good idea to devote a chapter to this one major thematic dissimilarity. At the same time it would have helped us to appreciate how ironically enough Descartes in the final analysis turns out to be more dogmatic – despite his initial sympathy with scepticism – than either Spinoza

or Leibniz. For on the great sceptical issue, namely, how to be certain that the material world exists, neither of the latter, for diverse reasons, thought like Descartes that a causally-based demonstration proceeding from mental contents was possible.

Greater attention to Descartes' concern with scepticism would, moreover, have paid handsome dividends in clarifying the cartesian distinction between analysis and synthesis when it comes to method. Cottingham quite appropriately observes that whether we start with axioms, the method of synthesis so characteristic of Spinoza's was of proceeding, or whether we work back to the axioms, the method of analysis preferred by Descartes, they do not, as Descartes suggests, involve two logically distinct types of argument, one demonstrative and the other not (45). But I don't think that that is what Descartes is really trying to get at. In a dialectical struggle with the pyrrhonian sceptic, for example, whose good faith, given the initial and ultimate implausibility of his position, cannot be taken for granted, the best if not the only way of proving to him and others that he does in fact espouse the principles that he pretends to doubt is to consult his actual inferential practices which belie what he preaches. This procedure constitutes a kind pragmatic refutation of scepticism, and, more importantly, it brings to an end the sceptic's alienation from his own reason. 'He will make the thing his own' as Cottingham notes on p. 45 quoting from Descartes, where the thing in question is the truth. The ownership of the reasoning is exported to that of its product and both are the result of a kind of epistemological consciousness-raising. Spinoza, on the other hand, like Leibniz, is relatively uninterested in scepticism and so is not interested in this particular form of epistemological consciousness-raising.

Robert Imlay

University of Toronto

Jonathan Dancy, J.M.E. Moravcsik, and C.C.W. Taylor, eds.

Human Agency – Language, Duty, and Value: Philosophical Essays in Honor of J.O. Urmson.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
1988. Pp.xi+308.

US \$35.00. ISBN 0-8047-1474-6.

J.O. Urmson has had an illustrious career. As a philosopher, his work is accessible, unpretentious, and insightful; as a teacher, he has influenced for the better generation after generation of Anglo-American philosophers. This volume is a timely and worthwhile tribute to the man: one which honors him with a fine collection of interesting articles that give the reader insight into the work currently being done in the areas to which Urmson has addressed himself. It also includes, at the end, a useful bibliography of Urmson's philosophical writings.

The volume begins with a comprehensive overview by Julius Moravcsik of the various contributions to the collection. Urmson's article 'Prichard and Knowledge' takes pride of place in the volume. It is the only essay that deals directly with epistemological issues, and is an afterword to his well known 'Parenthetical Verbs'. Knowledge, if Urmson is right, must not be understood as a mental state. Rather claims to knowledge are to be understood as a kind of warrant or status that is ascribed either to the knower or that which is known. On Urmson's view, philosophers 'have been led to treat knowledge as a case of belief as a result of concentrating of the relatively unimportant locution "I know that", which has, no doubt, superficially similar uses to "I believe that"' (24). Urmson encourages a wider view. We should not only look at knowing that and knowing how, but also knowing when, who, why, where, which, and what.

Part One of the volume contains three articles which deal with contemporary issues the philosophy of language. Jennifer Hornsby contends that theories of language and action are necessarily related to each other: a fact, she reckons, which is seen in the case of performatives since in such cases one does not describe reality but partakes in a social activity. In developing this, Hornsby tries to show how a theory of language can generate not just explanations, but predictions. Patrick Suppes and Colleen Crangle in their 'Context-fixing Semantics for the Language of Action' argue that meaning in the analysis of the language of action is best represented as a set of procedures. The assignment of such procedures can be carried out only

in specific contexts, and they show that different contexts require different procedures – so that one cannot assign a fixed meaning to action verbs since this is bound to vary with context. The third article in this section is by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber who are concerned, in an accessible article, to explain mood and the analysis of non-declarative sentences.

True to Urmson's interests, the second part of the volume is concerned with the moral life and duty. Anthony Kenny deals incisively with the fashionable topic of moral luck, and argues that, provided we ascribe responsibility in terms of an Aristotelian framework, moral luck need not be thought of as unfair. C.C.W. Taylor explores Urmson's views of Aristotle on pleasure, and takes issue both with the way in which Urmson uses Aristotle to explain enjoyment, and with his criticisms of Aristotle. Moravcsik writes interestingly and engagingly on the topic of friendship and the self, arguing for conceptions of loyalty and the self, as well as for a particular attitude towards the loss of friendship, that will help resolve the tension in any friendship between safety and peril. David Heyd comments on Urmson's 'Saints and Heroes' in a discussion of supererogatory action. On his view, 'sensitivity to the central role of idiosyncrasy in moral reasoning and to the concept of radical freedom involved in choice and operation of moral reasons may throw light on the special value usually ascribed to supererogation' (166). While Jonathan Dancy also deals with supererogation, he deals with it in the context of the problems that attend moral realism. But Dancy's article is disappointingly written and it is difficult to untangle some of his metaphors as well as some of his arguments. Bernard Williams offers an absorbing response to McDowell's views of moral intuitionism. He rightly distinguishes moral intuitionism as an epistemological doctrine, from moral intuitionism as the view that moral agents operate with a plurality of deeply-embedded first principles. He rejects the former position, and offers an interesting and new defence of the latter thesis.

In the final part of the book, problems of aesthetics are paraded with a number of excellent articles. Bruce Vermazen leads with a somewhat austere commentary on Urmson's well-known 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic'. This is followed by a much more engaging article by Peter Kivy who tries to explain why we feel obliged to realize the composer's intentions in our performance of a musical work. Kendall Walton's excellent article, 'The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns' (which is the only article to have appeared elsewhere) is deservedly reprinted in an expanded form in this volume.

He addresses the question: 'Which is of primary musical importance, musical works ... or performances of musical works?' He offers a very detailed and plausible explanation of those who support the latter view, only to argue later in the article that they are wrong and that musical works are of primary musical importance. The volume is brought to an end by Ted Cohen's stimulating and insightful comments on sport and art. Our appreciation of the athletic elements in sport, Cohen argues, is similar to our appreciation of art and the artist. Both are required to attend to similar difficulties, and are properly admired only if we have some knowledge of the difficulty that attaches to their respective feats. The genuine sports fan is one who remains loyal to a chosen team even in times of adversity. 'This', Cohen writes, 'seems to me to be a wonderful thing. And it is wonderful yet again because this capacity, which makes it possible to be a fan, surely has its source in the capacity that makes morality possible. What this is, is the capacity for altruism' (273). This, Cohen hopes, will provide something for moral sceptics to chew on, for on his view it provides a model in terms of which to construe the possibility of altruistic action.

In all, this is a successful volume. There are of course arguments and articles that any reader will want to challenge, and one is bound, as ever, to detect a certain unevenness in the collection. This notwithstanding, the editors have done a good job in bringing these articles together in order to honor an outstanding philosopher.

David Novitz

University of Canterbury

Paul Eidelberg

*Beyond the Secular Mind: A Judaic
Response to the Problems of Modernity.*
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1989.

Pp. xvii+177.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-313-26663-8.

This book semi-popularizes Eidelberg's earlier *Jerusalem vs. Athens: In Quest of a General Theory of Existence* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1983). There he defends the intellectual (*sic*) supremacy of Jewish Orthodoxy over its two most serious rivals, (a)

the tradition of political philosophy as originated by Socrates and recently revived by Leo Strauss, Eidelberg's ex-teacher, and (b) twentieth-century physics as developed above all by Bohr and Einstein. Socratic political philosophy is said to lack Orthodoxy's profound appreciation for the guiding role of such virtues as *anava* or proper humility in human life. Contemporary physics, on the other hand, ignores Orthodoxy's evident anticipation of the principles of both quantum mechanics and general relativity, found in the Torah esoterically understood. Nevertheless physics is shown to warrant Orthodoxy's full articulation of the principle of consciousness to which the statistical laws of quanta and of relativity point, and which Eidelberg's argument would accordingly spell out.

Beyond the Secular Mind now diagnoses the 'stultifying influence' of moral relativism. Its origins Eidelberg traces through Machiavelli and beyond. His analysis resembles or presupposes fellow political scientist Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1987), whose call for a return to Platonic-Aristotelian natural right Eidelberg considers instructive but inadequate. Bloom, arguing anecdotally rather than systematically, overlooks the 'secularism' embedded in the Socratic tradition itself – which Machiavelli's two-pronged attack on Christianity and Socratic philosophy subsequently exposes and vulgarizes. Even so, the Machiavelli-inspired emancipation of modern political theory and practice from moral restraints has left the twentieth century not only history's bloodiest but also its most shameless. Nor may modern men look simply to modern physics for moral guidance or consolation, especially since its ripened fruit, modern technology, remains available alike to tyrannical and non-tyrannical regimes. Finally, modern democracy by itself supplies no moral touchstone either; for as Plato knew and Tocqueville warned, the absence of complementary moral standards collapses the necessary balance between liberty and equality in democratic regimes, into a harshly tyrannical egalitarianism.

Eidelberg therefore grounds democracy in the Torah's own putative 'aristocracy of learning', open in theory as well as in practice to all human beings. His premise is that the Torah, though hardly cosmopolitan, is by no means chauvinistic. In this connection, he emphasizes that Orthodoxy does not conceive itself to be a 'religion', or set of man-made beliefs about a deity and a man's relationship to it. Given rather that the Torah is 'the blueprint for the totality of existence,' it follows that its laws are 'on principle ... wholly accessible to the human intellect and fully applicable to human concerns.' Hence

what physics calls laws of nature are simply God's announced promises not to change certain stable or predictable regularities in existence. Similarly, the laws of morality which political science would seek in support of a viable social order under limited government may be found in the Torah's seven Noahide laws (prohibiting murder, stealing, unchastity, cruelty, idolatry and blasphemy, and establishing courts of justice; cf. *Gen* 9:4-6). In addition, the Torah provides numerous human models for understanding and guiding political conduct in its patriarchs, prophets, kings, et al. Eidelberg contrasts at length such figures as Abraham or Moses, who combine intellectual excellence and graciousness (*hesed*) or humility (*anava*) respectively, with Esau, the Torah's counterpart for the various egoistic human types set in motion by Machiavelli and his successors.

Eidelberg's argument is learned and eloquent, albeit polemical throughout. Yet would a vulgar reader be altogether wrong to wonder, despite Eidelberg's assurances, whether a nation governed wholly by the authority of the Torah would, practically speaking, permit the open exchange of issues freely debated in his book? Does not Eidelberg's 'systematic' defense of the Torah dampen the delicate tension between revelation and philosophy, or between loyalty to the tradition authorized by the Torah and the unfettered examination of that tradition, which makes the present discussion both possible and instructive?

Martin D. Yaffe

University of North Texas

Michael Fischer

Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.

Pp. xiii+165.

US \$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-25100-0);

US \$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-25141-1).

Apart from two collections of critical essays, this is the first book devoted entirely to the work of Stanley Cavell: it is capable of placing the discussion of Cavell's work on a new footing. The book is not aimed primarily at elucidating Cavell's projects in their own terms but rather at using his work to elucidate what Fischer calls 'literary

skepticism'. By this term, Fischer means to single out a strand of post-structuralist thought that either amounts to a version of epistemological skepticism or bears at least a significant analogy to skepticism. One part of the primary task of this book is to demonstrate the existence of this strand of thought. The second and interlocking part of the task is to use Cavell's various diagnoses of skepticism about objects and about other minds as the groundwork for a response to these theoretical perplexities about interpretation. Ultimately, Fischer's guiding hope or assumption is that such applications of Cavell's work will open up a 'fresh approach to deconstruction and other tendencies in contemporary literary theory' (1).

Fischer's concern is with a relatively narrow but still extremely influential segment of poststructuralist views. These views belong to larger critical projects and they are difficult to summarize. But the English-speaking philosopher is likely to need some background, in order to gauge Fischer's accomplishment: (1) There is Fish's view that even the grossest and most commonplace of interpretive claims (e.g. 'Jane Austen pokes fun at Mr. Collins in *Pride and Prejudice*') does not refer to a text existing independently of our schemata of assessment and ontological commitment. Hence, there is nothing against which such claims could be checked, apart from our employment of such schemata (Fischer, 16-17; 28-30). (2) There is the line of thought developed by de Man, which suggests that criticism is bound to strive for some degree of completeness in its possession of a work and doomed to incompleteness and blindness by the temporal structure of this very striving (de Man, *Blindness and Insight*, 31-2; cf. Fischer, 18-19, 49-53).

And, finally, (3) there is the complex of views announced in Derrida's critiques of structuralism and climaxing in the assertion that we are – at best – caught up in 'two interpretations of interpretation'. In one mode, we long for the origin of the work and thus for a center around which our trains of thought can organize themselves – or at least seem to. We long for a 'Rousseau' who will guarantee the integrity and coherence of what we are seeking in the texts of Rousseau. In the other mode, we give up the reassurance of our nostalgia for origins and the relative safety of our exile from the structures we are studying. In their place, we accept the 'play of signs' and the endless provisionality (or 'non-centeredness') of our interpretations (Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 291-2; cf. Fischer, 17-20; 53-60).

Fischer instructively demonstrates that each of these very different projects shares a skeptical thread or edge. Fischer then goes on

to follow Cavell in insisting that skepticism represents something in us that cannot be defeated head-on or refuted by any straightforward philosophical argument. Indeed, to think that it can be thus refuted constitutes a victory for the condition that skepticism represents in us. Such an effort to refute the skeptic accepts knowledge as the measure of our distance from objects and others – and also, e.g., from battles, letters, taxes, wills, novels and poems. It thus accepts the very distance from the world that skepticism – not without reason – claims to discover as a fixed and unchanging problem for human knowledge. Then everything in Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein comes to depend on how we treat the evidence of our own opposition to the skeptical voices within us. And it is in the analogous effort to criticize the critics of literary skepticism that Fischer's accomplishment shows up as most effective and most original. Fischer brilliantly characterizes the efforts of critics like Abrams and Altieri as parallel to Austin's efforts to dismantle the skeptical enterprise before it gets off the ground. These pages are worth the price of admission.

Despite its judicious sense of its own scope and limits, this book leaves a number of unresolved issues. The very success of Fischer's mapping of deconstruction onto skepticism deprives deconstruction of a good deal of its distinctive power. For by the same arguments that he uses in making this analogy, he also tends to reduce the writings of de Man and Derrida to what they have in common with the neo-pragmatists of Fish and Rorty. Fischer therefore tends to slight those features of deconstruction that are not primarily skeptical and which appeal to those who are not just looking for fancier ways of evoking the alledged groundlessness of interpretation. For instance, Fischer has little to say about Freud and even less about Heidegger. And given that he seems genuinely to seek in Cavell's work a 'fresh approach' to deconstruction, such omissions cannot quite be justified merely on grounds of space or rhetorical strategy.

Moreover, Cavell's own treatments of Heidegger and Freud form a significant segment of his later understanding of skepticism. In particular, Cavell comes to treat certain kinds of reading (and presumably 'interpretation') as themselves constituting a response to skepticism. Reading is here construed as a kind of continual responsiveness to the implications of our words' being said (or placed) where and when we say them. Most especially, this is a responsiveness to the skeptic's will to freeze the meaning of our speech, independently of the occasions within which we are ordinarily able to mean our words. We have here a complex series of issues, and what Cavell

means by 'reading' is no easier to say than what Derrida means by 'writing' (though perhaps it is somewhat easier to point to). But if reading is conceived of as a response to the skeptic within us, then reading occupies a philosophical position analogous to the Wittgensteinian appeals to the ordinary. On Cavell's account, reading is not securely located within the realm of the ordinary, in the same way that Wittgenstein's recollecting of what we ordinarily say cannot be safely or entirely characterized as itself an ordinary activity. The more important reading becomes in Cavell's later work the less obvious it is how we are to apply his thoughts about reading to the disputes about the objectivity of interpretation.

But if this book does not resolve all the issues that it raises – indeed, if it carries with it the shadow of some of the doubts that Fischer has worked to clarify – nevertheless, the book goes a long way towards rendering these issues in a form that can no longer be ignored or postponed. And Fischer does this with a style, a lucidity and a thoroughness that places any reader who wishes to ask these questions permanently in his debt.

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James W. Forrester

*Why You Should: The Pragmatics of
Deontic Speech.*

Hanover, NH: University Press of New
England 1989. Pp. x+239.

US \$28.00 ISBN 0-87451-453-3.

Pragmatics, as understood in this book, is the study of how the conditions under which language is used contribute to its success or failure. Forrester is the first to treat at length the pragmatics of deontic language, not just in ethics but also in etiquette and law. Deontic pragmatics is not a mere linguistic exercise, he says; it holds important philosophical lessons, among them refutations of ethical nihilism, skepticism, and relativism. To show the importance of his enterprise, Forrester in Chapter 2 argues that the principle that 'ought implies can' is not a semantic or logical principle, as is often thought, but

a pragmatic rule. To use Grice's term 'ought' does not *imply* 'can', it *implicates* 'can'.

Chapter 3 spells out Forrester's views on the nature of deontic language. Its central use, he argues, is *directive*: to cause people to act or refrain from acting in certain ways. Other uses can be explained on the basis of the directive use.

In Chapters 4-10, Forrester lays out what he believes are the eighteen maxims of deontic pragmatics. They all function as rules for maximizing our chances of success in directing people's actions with deontic language. They spell out, he says, 'the meaning of deontic rationality' (190), and indeed, can all be viewed as submaxims under the Supermaxim of Deontic Rationality: 'Impose, accept, and impute obligations only in accordance with a rationally defensible structure' (56).

There are three principal submaxims (51). The first is Straightforwardness: Have as the goal of deontic speech that people behave in accordance with what your utterances say they ought, ought not, may or may not do. The second is Consequences: In determining whether to make a deontic utterance, take into account the consequences of making that or any other deontic utterance. And the third is Minimalism: reserve deontic utterances for occasions when the goal is pressing, the likelihood of achievement high, and the availability of suitable alternatives for reaching the goal limited.

Forrester distinguishes between the legislative mode and the judicial mode of using deontic language (51). He further distinguishes, following Grice and Kant, the matter and manner of laws. These two distinctions yield four categories into which his remaining maxims fit. First are legislative rules of manner: Regularity, Publicity, and Openness. Second are legislative rules of matter: Theoretical Virtue (Make your rules consistent, clear, applicable, simple, and modest), Universalizability, Factuality, Proportionality, Economy, and Distribution. Third are two judicial rules of manner: Use of General Rules (Decide the case under consideration, if possible, by subsuming it under properly determined general rules), and Equity (Provide a method for solving conflicts, in case general rules appear to give conflicting advice or prove insufficient in particular situations). And fourth are judicial rules of matter: Judicial Factuality, Judicial Economy, Judicial Publicity, and Judicial Review of General Rules (Impute or accept particular obligations only when those obligations are imposed in accordance with general rules that are consistent, clear, applicable, modest, universalizable, and proportional).

Forrester claims completeness for his list: there are no other maxims of deontic pragmatics which are not subsumable under these. But how about Memorability: Make rules that are easy to remember? Or Non-condescension?

In Chapter 11 Forrester applies his maxims to the *Bakke* decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. He argues that various members of the court appealed, at least implicitly, to various of his maxims. And surely they did, though not as maxims of pragmatics. But his chapter also shows how loose his appeal to pragmatic maxims is. These rules apply only sometimes: under some circumstances, he says, any pragmatic rule can and should be set aside. In specific cases, for example, the rules often conflict with each other, and there is no fixed hierarchy to tell us when one rule should make way for another. Pragmatic maxims advise us how to achieve individual goals, moreover, but where different people have different goals, as in the *Bakke* case, the maxims won't decide between them. As Forrester admits, where there is more than one goal under consideration, or where the eighteen maxims conflict with other pragmatic maxims or with non-goal directed rules, the eighteen maxims are probably useless (192).

Even when the maxims can be applied, moreover, they come down to 'ordinary common sense' (194). 'When the choice of either goals or means is not obvious,' Forrester says, 'the maxims of deontic pragmatics provide little help in making or justifying a particular choice' (190). But isn't that to admit that we can't use these maxims to make a decision, for we only have to make a decision where the choice is not obvious. And if the point of a maxim is to advise someone in making a decision, and Forrester's eighteen principles don't do this, then what's their point? If, as he says, 'the study of deontic pragmatics teaches us little more than what we already know about solving genuine conflicts' (196), then what's the study for?

In his last chapter, Forrester claims one value for his study: it refutes ethical nihilism, skepticism, and relativism. His basic argument is that systems of moral rules are intended in part to serve certain purposes, such as keeping society together. So anyone who shares those purposes automatically has some reason to follow those rules. 'There are therefore good reasons to engage in morality; and this answers the nihilist and the skeptic' (211). But what real nihilist or skeptic ever denied that sometimes some of their purposes might be served by doing what a moral rule commands? Real nihilists and skeptics (and relativists) question not the occasional usefulness of moral rules, but their objectivity and universality. Forrester, with his completely

pragmatic approach, has no answer for them. Whatever his study of the pragmatics of 'should' language accomplishes, it does not explain why you should.

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**Clark Glymour, Richard Scheines,
Peter Spirtes and Kevin Kelly**

*Discovering Causal Structure: Artificial
Intelligence, Philosophy of Science and
Statistical Modelling.*

San Diego: Academic Press 1987.

Pp. xvii+394. US \$39.50.

ISBN 0-12-286961-3.

Glymour et al's book is an interdisciplinary account of the application of the methods of Artificial Intelligence to the problem of extracting causal models from statistical data. This is an enterprise which most undergraduate students in the social sciences (including psychology) are advised against *in principle: correlation is not causation*. However, mainly from the example of their peers, it is a peice of advice they subsequently learn to ignore *in practice*. Glymour et al's book provides (i) a sustained philosophical justification for this practice, and (ii) practical tools for its principled application (the TETRAD program, on a 5.25 inch floppy disc for the IBM-PC and compatibles, comes with the book at no extra cost).

The book is in three parts. The Foreword by Herb Simon locates the work directly in the tradition of employing heuristic techniques in Artificial Intelligence to the problem of scientific discovery. In part I, the basic rationale of the book is outlined and defended. Chapter 1 outlines the general problem of searching for causal models in the social sciences. There are two problems with inferring causal structure from non-experimental data. First, introducing explicit causal models provides for no better predictive success than simple statistical algorithms. Second, the possible causal models of a non-experimental data set grows explosively with the number of variables considered. Glymour et al's Artificial Intelligence solution to these problems introduces the two main themes of the book:

(i) *Explanation*, via the invocation of latent (non-measured) variables (e.g., gravitational forces, electromagnetic fields, etc.), is the primary goal of causal modelling. Therefore, models should be preferred which offer the best explanation of the data. Formal properties of explanation can be represented as mathematical relations between data and model. These relations provide evaluation functions for deriving estimates indicating whether one model provides a better explanation of the data than another.

(ii) The estimates can be used to implement a *heuristic search* of the space of possible elaborations of an initial model. The estimates indicate the best elaborations to explore rather than attempting an impossible exhaustive search of all possible elaborations.

Chapter 2 is a sustained philosophical defence of causal modelling of non-experimental data. The arguments turn on the similarities between the discovery procedures used in the natural sciences and those criticised in the social sciences. Glymour et al argue that the main objections hinge on particular bad practices rather than on any in-principle objection to inferring causes from statistical data. The application of contemporary history and philosophy of science in resolving spurious methodological disagreements in the social sciences is to be applauded. Chapter 3 offers a similar bravura defence of computer-aided discovery.

In part II, the TETRAD program is introduced, primarily in chapters 4 and 5. Causal models are represented as *directed graphs* and a procedure is described for extracting linear statistical models directly from a causal model. The relations between causal model and statistical data which are central to TETRAD's operation involve two sources of constraints, implied by a particular causal model, on the correlation matrix. A model may imply that certain partial correlations in the matrix should be zero, or that certain *tetrad* equations should apply. In both cases measures of whether the data conform to these constraints can be derived.

Three principles of scientific explanation are identified: *Spearman's principle*: the model should imply constraints that hold in the data; *Thurstone's principle*: the model should not imply constraints which do not hold in the data; *The simplicity principle*: as few causal connections as possible should be invoked. Whether and to what extent the current model satisfies these principles in the data can be assessed from the above measures. The program is interactive and allows users to weight the principles as they see fit.

Starting with an initial or *skeletal* model, elaborations can be effected by adding edges or vertices to the graph representing the model.

Each addition can be assessed to see whether and how far the model is an improvement on the previous model and whether any further additions may effect further improvements, thus effecting a heuristic search through the space of possible causal models. The simplest skeletal model embodies the simplest explanatory hypothesis that all the measured variables are direct causal consequences of one latent variable. However, depending on the prior knowledge of the researcher, more complex initial skeletal models can be employed which include more latent variables.

Chapter 6 provides an impressive account of TETRAD's ability to locate causal models. Chapter 7 follows up with some simulation studies, and Chapter 8 with some particular case studies drawn from the social sciences. Chapter 9 is a brief historical account of heuristic search in Applied Statistics, where Glymour et al trace the antecedents of the TETRAD philosophy in the work of Spearman. Chapter 10 provides the relevant proofs of the various mathematical results on which TETRAD relies.

Part III is the TETRAD manual, which provides a lucid and thorough account of the program. Chapter 12 discusses how to employ TETRAD with other programs such as EQS and LISREL. That TETRAD can not be used independently may be seen as a disadvantage; however, those researchers for whom TETRAD will be of most practical value will already be familiar with these programs.

TETRAD is an important and valuable addition to the store of exploratory statistical techniques available to social scientists. Moreover, the book provides the TETRAD user with a sustained philosophical justification for its employment. In this sense *Discovering Causal Structure* is a unique book. It is exemplary to historians and philosophers of science who may wonder whether their discipline has an applied dimension. It is of direct interest to workers in Artificial Intelligence as an example of a practical application of the methods of heuristic search. Moreover, it may prove of immense practical value to researchers in the social sciences concerned to derive better explanations of their data. Thus, *Discovering Causal Structure* is not only a necessary addition to the library, it should also adorn the bookcases of disparate researchers whose collections had previously been mutually exclusive.

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Charles K. Griswold, Jr., ed.

Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall

1988. Pp. xi+321. Cdn \$61.95: US \$47.50

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-00186-2); Cdn \$18.50:

US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-00187-0).

At one time or another every reader of Plato has asked him- or herself the question, Why did Plato write dialogues? That question is often followed by another (generally uttered in despair): Why couldn't he just write what he meant like other philosophers do? While some deconstructionists have lately offered a radical response to the latter question – namely, that no author ever really knows what he or she means to begin with – other commentators have tended to align themselves with more traditional approaches to these two questions. Reference has often been made, for example, to such passages in the *Seventh Letter* as the following (341b-c; tr. L.A. Post): 'One statement at any rate I can make in regard to all who have written or who may write with a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which I devote myself – no matter how they pretend to have acquired it, whether from my instruction or from others or by their own discovery. Such writers can in my opinion have no real acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies.' Accepting this as an honest autobiographical account, we have an easy answer to both of our questions – Plato's meaning was ineffable, so he never even tried to write it down, and the Dialogues were never intended to present Platonic doctrine.

Obviously, this alternative has never been overly popular with those who have wished to find in the Dialogues some record of Plato's thoughts and/or philosophical 'development' – indeed, the desire to do so has doubtless provided much of the motivation for rejecting the *Seventh Letter* as spurious, either in whole or in part. And there *does seem little reason for maintaining that we find absolutely nothing of Plato's own ideas in his dialogues. The notion of participation, for example, must certainly have played a central role in Plato's 'unwritten doctrine'. Recognizing this, however, we are led to the problem of figuring out just what is and is not 'Platonic' in the Dialogues, a problem that belongs to the larger task of establishing the appropriate manner in which to read and interpret the Dialogues. Are they properly to be read as philosophical treatises embodying Platonic*

doctrine in dramatic form? Or are they not intended to be read as treatises at all, but as a series of exercises (the Academic equivalent of a student workbook) in which Plato sets out for his students a lively picture of the proper dialogical procedure of philosophical inquiry? Or are they perhaps intended as a historical record of the doctrines propounded by various contemporaries of Socrates and Plato, a record occasionally accompanied by critical commentary on these same doctrines? Is Socrates sometimes to be regarded as the mouthpiece for Plato – as, for example, in the *Republic*? In order to answer questions such as these, we have in some way or another to take a stand with regard to our initial question, Why did Plato write dialogues? As Griswold observes (15): 'The presupposition of this book is that serious consideration of the twin problems of interpretation and of Plato's reasons for writing dialogues is essential to a successful understanding of his work.'

G's collection includes 21 papers explicitly directed to one or both of the questions, How ought we to interpret Plato? and Why did Plato write dialogues? Both Part I of the book, 'Essays', and Part II, 'Dialogues', are divided into two sections: 'Readings', comprising papers concentrating on the first question, and 'Writings', comprising papers concentrating on the second question. The list of contributors reads like a Who's Who in contemporary Plato studies. Part I includes: ('Readings':) Diskin Clay, 'Reading the *Republic*'; Richard McKim, 'Shame and Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*'; Alan C. Bowen, 'On Interpreting Plato'; Jean-Francois Mattéi, 'The Theater of Myth in Plato'; Robert S. Brumbaugh, 'Digression and Dialogue; The *Seventh Letter* and Plato's Literary Form'; ('Writings':) Kenneth M. Sayre, 'Plato's Dialogues in Light of the *Seventh Letter*'; Rosemary Desjardins, 'Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play'; Jürgen Mittelstrass, 'On Socratic Dialogue'; Charles L. Griswold, Jr., 'Plato's Metaphilosophy: Why Plato Wrote Dialogues'. Part II includes: ('Readings':) Clifford Orwin, 'Liberalizing the *Crito*: Richard Kraut on Socrates and the State', and Kraut's 'Reply'; David L. Roochnik, 'Terence Irwin's Reading of Plato', and Irwin's 'Reply'; Ronald Polansky, 'Reading Plato: Paul Woodruff and the *Hippias Major*', and Woodruff's 'Reply'; Joachim Dalfen, 'Kenneth Dorter's Interpretation of the *Phaedo*', and Dorter's 'Reply'; ('Writings':) Jon Moline, 'Recollection, Dialectic, and Ontology: Kenneth M. Sayre on the Solution to a Platonic Riddle', and Sayre's 'Reply'; Nicholas P. White, 'Observations and Questions about Hans-Georg Gadamer's Interpretation of Plato', and Gadamer's 'Reply'.

Each of the papers in Part I makes for enjoyable and instructive reading – Bowen's 'On Interpreting Plato', for example, which takes as its starting point Eugène Tigerstedt's *Interpreting Plato* (1976), is especially helpful in its historical overview of 'the taxonomy of Platonic interpretation' (51). Nonetheless, it's not until Part II that G's book begins to fulfil its promise of stimulating 'the dialogical thinking Socrates and Plato made fundamental to philosophy' (15). As Plato observed in *Phaedrus* (275e; tr. Hackforth), when a written work 'is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself.' In the exchanges between author and critic in this part of G's book, we find the parents marching back with a vengeance that would put the Furies to shame. Sometimes the author's reply is directed at his critic's misunderstanding of some portion(s) of his book – as is the case with Dorter's reply to Dalfen – while at other times the author attacks the assumptions underlying his critic's entire position – as is the case with Gadamer's reply to White. In each case, however, the reader comes away having profited immensely from the exchange. If their goal is not only to promote scholarship but also to stimulate ongoing discussion, prospective editors might well consider adopting G's book as their model.

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Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie

The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1987.

Pp. 361.

US \$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933999-50-X);

US \$17.00 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-51-8).

Thomas M. Johnson, trans.

Iamblichus: The Exhortation to Philosophy.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1988.

Pp. 128.

US \$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933999-62-3);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-63-1).

Robin Waterfield, trans.

The Theology of Arithmetic.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1988.

Pp. 130.

US \$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933999-71-2);

US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-72-0).

Alice Zimmern, trans.

Porphyry's Letter to his Wife Marcella.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1986.

Pp. 59.

US \$6.00 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-27-5).

Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, trans.

Porphyry's Launching Points to the Realm of Mind.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1988.

Pp. 95.

US \$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933999-58-5);

US \$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-59-3).

The last thirty-plus years in Anglo-American philosophy have witnessed considerable activity in the area of ancient Greek philosophy. At first the interest centered on Plato and Aristotle, with lesser attention being given to the Presocratics. The logical and linguistic aspects of the ancient philosophers was the focus of the majority of the works published on these thinkers, as shown by the classic articles of Vlastos on Plato's Third Man and on Zeno, of Mourelatos and others on Parmenides, and of Lukasiewicz and Patzig on Aristotle. This wave of interest spread not only into other areas of investigation by these ancient thinkers but also into other schools of philosophy, those of Stoic and Hellenistic thinkers. The works of Long and Sedley, Inwood and Gerson, have made accessible to a large audience the otherwise fragmentary thought of this period. Even Plotinus has come in for an overdue revival, as can be seen not only from the recently completed publication of the *Enneads* in the Loeb series but also by the foundation of a Neoplatonist society. Similarly, examination of philosophical issues in other areas of interest to ancient thinkers, e.g., medicine (Galen and Celsus), is seen in many a publication. The books at the centre of this present review cover, in addition to Neo-Platonism, yet another area which has heretofore largely gone ignored, Pythagoreanism and Neo-Pythagoreanism.

The books, although published by the same press, are of various quality and original vintage; some are reissues of earlier translations. *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library* as well as *Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind* by Porphyry are reprinted here with the translations of Kenneth S. Guthrie who died in 1940. Porphyry's *Letter to his Wife Marcella* contains, without any substantial modifications, the translation done by Zimmern in 1896. Iamblichus' *The Exhortation to Philosophy* is presented in the version of T. Johnson who died in 1919. *The Theology of Arithmetic* stands out as the only completely new and updated translation, done by R. Waterfield. The publication of the older translations is, in a way, disappointing. Although the notes, introductions, and appendices that are found in the above works are instructive, they rely on earlier editions of the Greek texts which have been superseded. Although the Teubner series has issued no new critical text for the *Exhortation* (1888), its new edition of *Launching Points* (1975) was not employed in the present English translation. Similarly, the new critical text of *To Marcella* edited by Poetscher along with notes and published by Brill at Leiden in 1969 was not used. The Waterfield work is, however, based on the new Teubner edition of the *Theology* (1975) and displays a great sensitivity to the more scholarly aspects of translating. Despite this almost universal use of older originals, there is some acknowledgement of the more recent improvements – *Launching Points* includes a table which compares the numbering of the fragments to the most recent Lamberz edition.

The *Sourcebook* stands out not only as the largest of the volumes but also as one that contains texts foundational for the Pythagorean movement. The Forward by Godwin is followed by an introduction by the current editor D. Fiedeler. The introduction contains a clear presentation of the basic ideas of Pythagoreanism, useful diagrams, a list of some of the figures in the movement up through Boethius (525 AD), as well as notes which include references to some of the more current secondary literature. The first part of the book contains translations of four different lives of Pythagoras – those by Iamblichus, Porphyry, one preserved by Photius, and that of Diogenes Laertius. The last has been readily available in English in other editions, but Guthrie was the first to have translated those of Porphyry and Photius into English. Brief introductions by the current editor are added before each life. Part Two contains texts of Pythagorean doctrines. First included are the maxims – these are familiar to most anyone who has taught even introductory Greek

philosophy. However, added to each saying by Guthrie (in parentheses) is its purported explanation, e.g., 'Sit not down on the bushel' (Do not loaf on the job); 'Sleep not on a grave' (Live not in idleness on the parents' inherited estates). The *Exhortation* edition includes more expanded remarks about each of these. Next in the volume are the so-called 'Golden Verses' which are followed by fragments from Philolaus and Archytas. Although Guthrie presumably relied on Diels-Kranz for the fragments he translates, he does include some that are judged by those co-editors to be *unecht*, i.e., not genuine. Moreover, he includes some other fragments without making clear to the reader their origin. The fragments of these two key Pythagorean authors are followed by Ocellus Lucanus' *On the Nature of the Universe* which contains a number of arguments for the eternity of the world. Many of the selections which follow this are very brief and come from minor authors. However, Guthrie does include some fragments of Hierocles which are followed by excerpts from Plato which deal with Pythagoreanism; among them are some passages from the *Timaeus*. Aristotle's treatment of the Pythagoreans is not neglected; fragments gleaned from his writings are also presented. Also included are some reports from Aetius (not translated by Guthrie). The book closes with a number of interesting appendices, glossary, bibliography, and indices.

The Exhortation to Philosophy by Iamblichus (better known as the *Protrepticus*) is one work whose format is well-known in Antiquity. Works of this genre were written in praise of philosophy to encourage its cultivation among people. Aristotle is said to have written such a work – indeed, it has been reconstructed largely from this work. Cicero is also said to have written such a work which profoundly affected Augustine. Many of the arguments employed by Iamblichus are drawn, in a syncretistic way, from earlier philosophers. Man's felicity is said to consist in achieving a state where reason can dominate or befriend the appetitive and spirited elements within him (platonic). A proper understanding of self reveals the true essence of man to be within himself, something free from the fortuitous events of external reality (stoic). It is the contemplation of the divine, an activity loved for its own sake, which is afforded by philosophy and can be given by no other discipline (aristotelian), that allows man to be in harmony with himself and truly free. Numerous other arguments are brought forward to bolster the importance of philosophy, including many arguments from Plato's *Phaedo*, e.g., philosophy as the preparation for death, man's destiny among the invisible

world of the Forms, and the reward of the philosopher after death. The image of the cave (practically plagiarized by modern standards) is also used to extol the role of philosophy. Iamblichus does not want to leave the impression that philosophy is purely theoretical in its effects. All political problems, he argues, have their root in anarchy; to avoid anarchy one must follow the law as a guide of one's whole life. But such a guide is none other than right reason and the knowledge of it can be had only by philosophy. The last protreptic tool which Iamblichus uses is his commentary on the 'symbols' or cryptic sayings of the Pythagoreans; these are all interpreted to show the primacy of the philosophical life. The present edition also includes a few pages of excerpts from Iamblichus and Proclus at the end.

The *Theology* edition easily emerges as the most scholarly of this bundle. In addition to the employment of an improved Greek text, Waterfield has included page references to the original, explanatory footnotes, a glossary of terms, a current bibliography, and short biographical list for the ancient authors cited. Such scholarly apparatus almost seems necessary to offset the initial reaction many might have to the contents of a work on arithmology. The work draws on the speculation surrounding the monad, the dyad, the triad, etc., up to the decad. In other words, the first ten numbers and their various mathematical relationships are discussed in light of metaphysical and physical truths or supposed truths. No doubt the best way to sift through the enormous amount of information and pseudo-information in numerological thought of this sort is to consider first the basic mathematical relations that are beyond question and then consider their putative applications. With regard to the former, the work is very useful in filling out the ordinarily sketchy accounts of Pythagorean number philosophy found in so many textbooks regarding the monad, dyad, and decad. The questionable applications of mathematical relations which this Pythagorizing approach finds in astronomical, medical, physiological, and a host of other areas, at least begin to assume some intelligibility against the backdrop of the purely mathematical relationships for which the explanatory notes of the translator are extremely useful.

Porphyry's *Letter to His Wife Marcella* is more than a justification of his marriage to a woman who already had borne a number of children and more than just a personal communication between a man and his spouse who are geographically separated. Porphyry explores several themes that are related to the ethical and intellectual life of the wise man. Indeed, since the goal of human striving and moral

excellence is the attainment of wisdom itself, one might say that the ultimate concern is the development of the intellect. It is this that constitutes the 'colorless and formless essence' of man. Porphyry develops around the theme of man's cultivation of his mind several ideas that give his work a theological twist. This turn results in part from the anthropological dualism which is a Platonic inheritance. In a Platonic vein, Porphyry writes of the body's pleasures as keeping the soul shackled in chains from ascending into itself and thus arriving at its true home in the heavens. If the true man is thus the disembodied self or the mind, he who is wise has his mind moulded in the image of God (taken no doubt from Plato's *homoiōsis tōi theōi*). The wise man needs God alone (the Aristotelian theme of *autarkeia*) and his mind becomes a temple of God. This association with, and resemblance to, the Divinity allows the wise man to have the authority of a god. Virtue becomes the means of the soul's being drawn to God and it seems that the four particular virtues that enable this to take place are faith, truth, love, and hope. Presumably because it is in the observance of laws that the virtues get exercised, Porphyry proceeds to talk of the three types of law, divine, human, and civic. One must know the human law which governs our physical selves and then come to the knowledge of the divine law which is within the mind; the impressions of this law are written within the mind from all eternity and presumably are reached by a kind of recollection. The civic law or the laws of nations are rather conventional by contrast. One can see in Porphyry's discussion here a link to the natural law and eternal law tradition to be found earlier in the Stoics and later in Augustine. The letter ends abruptly at this point.

Launching Points is Porphyry's introduction to the philosophy of Plotinus by commenting on selected passages from the *Enneads*. As an immediate student of Plotinus, Porphyry had the mathematical interest neither of his own student Iamblichus nor of Proclus who gave us the great commentary on Euclid's *First Book of the Elements*. His own concerns are the metaphysical ones of Plotinus, and since 'metaphysical' in the Plotinian tradition is scarcely a dry investigation of purely technical ontological questions, the work discusses the so-called 'cardinal' virtues, the relation of the soul to the body (or types of bodies) and matter, and the disposition of the soul toward contemplative activities. The second half of the work deals with the nature of intellection, the incorporeal, the procession of beings from, and their return to, the One. His treatment of these themes is typically Platonic or Plotinian. The cardinal virtues function, in his

account, on four levels: the higher the level, the higher the type of soul development. At times the distinctions he makes seem artificial; his insistence on this aretaic quartet on each level appears to be architectonic gone mad. The dualism of body and soul, the impassibility of the soul not only as a quality given by its very nature but also as something achievable by ascetic practice (fasting, abstinence from sex, etc.), and the dominant role of theoretical activity, all point back to Plato of the *Phaedo*. However, his talk of the soul as possessing the 'reasons of all things' is distinctive and no doubt prepares the way for Augustine's doctrine of *seminal reasons* and indirectly for the *petites perceptions* of Leibniz. The translation does at times surprise: the Greek for 'processions' is sometimes translated in the singular, sometimes in the plural; *theos* is once rendered as 'Divinity' once as 'the First', and the Greek for 'non-sensible' is rendered as 'incorporeal' which otherwise is the rendering of *asōmata*. Included as a brief appendix is a work attributed to Porphyry entitled *On the Faculties of the Soul*.

From what I have said the reader is no doubt inclined to think of these volumes as a valuable contribution to the study of ancient philosophy. That estimation surely has some foundation; many texts here have been either not at all or not easily accessible in English. However, in addition to some of the reservations I expressed above, there is an additional note of caution that must be sounded. Phanes Press seems to have concentrated its publishing efforts on books that are related to theosophical subjects and it seems that the Pythagorean and Neo-Platonist works here reviewed are part of this effort. One might even see this as part of the so-called 'New Age' movement that has already affected the current culture. Evidence for this connection can be seen in the remarks made by Godwin in the forward to the *Sourcebook*. Of Pythagoras she writes, 'If he failed as the avatar of the passing age, perhaps he is coming into his own as the new age dawns' (14). Even more striking is her remark about the traditional worship of a personal God, 'Far better to worship the One within but to recognize and cooperate with *those beings* who have to maintain the world against mankind's best efforts to spoil it' (11 – italics mine). Channeling has become a popular activity, but one hopes that philosophers will not sanction it! The new translation by Waterfield was sponsored, as the back of that book notes, 'by Kairos, which is a registered British charity established to promote ... the study of the perennial wisdom of humanity, whose goal is to recognize the inherent unity of the spiritual and natural worlds.' Editorial remarks in the

other volumes also, at times, hint at this same 'religious' or ideological bent. In other words, the reader should not expect to find here the scholarship of a Burkert or an O'Meara. Nonetheless, the books should provoke further interest in this field of ancient philosophy which seems to be acquiring an increasing number of scholarly and religious devotees.

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Peter Kivy

Osmin's Rage: Philosophical Reflections on Opera, Drama, and Text.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1988. Pp. xiii+303.

US \$29.50. ISBN 0-691-07324-4.

When Emperor Napoleon inquired of Grétry as to the difference between Mozart's and Cimarosa's operas, Grétry replied that Mozart put 'the statue in the orchestra and the pedestal on the stage,' Cimarosa, the opposite. The relation between the musical and dramatic/textual components of opera has long been debated: Is opera a dramatic art in which music is supporter and accompaniment to the dramatic text or is it a musical art in which music expresses, on its own terms, the meaning of an operatic work as a whole? Out of this debate arises Kivy's [K] problem of opera. Intent on arguing that opera is a musical genre, he asks how operatic music can remain both faithful to the dramatic situation it represents and independently meaningful on its own terms.

K titles his book after a character from *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* who experiences such a rage, that, in Mozart's own words, he 'oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation and propriety.' For K, as for Mozart, the issue is how Osmin's rage can be expressed within the medium of music given what music can do *as music*. Posing the problem in this way, K and Mozart have some idea of what it means to express emotion musically; for both, 'musically' has classificatory and evaluative connotation. Mozart provides the clue: 'passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed ... [so] as to excite

disgust, and ... music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must please the hearer, or in other words must never cease to be *music*.' The problem is reminiscent of Herder's one: how could the statue *Laocoon* express intensity of suffering without transcending the aesthetic boundaries of a beautiful sculpture? It stems further back to Aristotle's theories of mimesis and tragedy.

Following his books, *The Corded Shell* and *Sound and Semblance*, K poses the 'problem of opera' within a marvellously broad and interdisciplinary context. (He also uses arguments developed in earlier writings.) His book is witty and readable, musically and philosophically acute. He succeeds in providing subtle comprehension of an aesthetics of opera that does a new sort of justice to operas written between 1600 and 1800. Whether his conclusions extend past these dates is not made fully explicit, although he provides remarks suggesting they would – in some cases. In others, say, Wagnerian operas, the suggestion is that they often transgress aesthetic criteria articulated in the late 17th. and 18th. centuries.

This book almost reads as if it were written in 1800, as if it were presenting the problem of opera without knowledge granted us by what many consider the great century of opera, namely the 19th. Maybe K has a reason for this. Did 19th.-century opera resolve K's 'problem of opera'? Did it change the problem? Had it already been solved? K opts for the last suggestion. Enlightenment aesthetic theory coincided with the rise of purely instrumental music. Out of the coincidence emerged two rival conceptions of music: pure music and text-based music. Pure music provided a model for opera so that it could, for the first time, be treated less as a drama-with-music than as, what K calls, a *drama-made-music*. Enlightenment thinkers also produced philosophical/psychological theories that provided a foundation for the creation of operatic *musical* masterpieces.

K argues for the intimate relation between philosophical theory and the creation of musical masterpieces, an intimacy present in the Florentine Camerata as well as in Mozart's operas. The relation runs in a single direction: opera, K suggests, involved 'the self-conscious application of theory to practice.' Plagued by ancient theories of naturalism, rationalism, and mimesis, music was, for most of its history, demanded to conform to the conditions of human speech, moral and rational action – in general to extramusical conditions. K uses a motto relevant to opera: 'Sing the way normal people speak'. Contrary to demand, musicians increasingly struggled to compose operas as examples of an unconstrained musical genre.

An early (16th-century) form of the struggle is shown in K's beautifully-described distinction between principles of 'textual realism' and 'opulent adornment' (crudely, between a word-for-note correspondence and musical portrayal of a word's meaning). In the latter, music exhibits structural independence from the text. Even so, the music is still bound by extra-musical 'meanings', so the problem of opera remains. In K's words, the 'inevitable conflict between the purely musical and music in the service of textual "representation" shapes, for all time, the aesthetics of opera.' K recalls the basic tension in mimesis arising when any medium approaches an object of representation: it must simultaneously be itself and another thing. Music can never succeed in becoming speech. If it could, it would no longer be music.

Is there a solution to the problem of opera? K thinks there is. His solution rests, first, upon elucidation of a purely musical syntax defined in terms of musical parameters: closure, finite duration, and form, which found the conception of music as a purely musical, yet meaningful, language of sound; second, upon reconciling this view with any 'other aesthetic purpose' music might have, say, the setting of a dramatic text. Next, K describes early operas, *Orpheo* and *Euridice*, Handel's *opera seria*, and Mozart's *opera buffa* to show that later operas embody reconciliation between musical ('grammatical') coherence and the representation of human expression in a way earlier operas do not. Later composers had the advantage of using a developed language of 'pure' music as well as sophisticated theories of human emotion. Where Handel's operas use a mechanistic and static Cartesian psychology, Mozart's express a Hartleyan 'associationist' psychological picture, a realistic and dynamic view of human emotion. Handel provided the first solution to opera, Mozart a perfect solution, especially in his *Così fan Tutte*. Both composers transformed opera into drama-made-music; they translated 'drama into pure self-sufficient musical form.'

The thesis is embodied in a motto: What music can't do, opera can't do. Without entirely discounting other ways to see opera, say, as a dramatic genre, K concludes that Mozart produced perfect opera qua drama-made-music. Careful analysis renders the conclusion stimulating and convincing. Still, a tension remains. For K, opera is a musical genre. Does that mean music has *equal* status with, or *primary* status over, the other components of opera? The second option places the statue in the orchestra pit and the pedestal on the stage and coincides with K's comments on the self-sufficiency of operatic music. But

now one wonders what role is left for opera's dramatic and literary components and to what extent opera-made-music has become identical (in its aesthetic) to 'purely instrumental music'. Instrumental music is also plagued by the question how something *purely* musical can also be expressive of something extra-musical like human emotion. The first option, in contrast, maintains the difference between opera and purely instrumental music. In opera, music can never achieve complete independence of the text, for then it would no longer be about the union of drama and music; it would now be about purely instrumental music. This reasoning duly prompts the thought that Wagner provided a good solution to the problem of opera when he urged the unity of various artistic media within the operatic genre, when he did not ally his *Gesamtkunstwerk* with one single art in preference to others. Whether one prefers separation of the arts over their unity is a genuine choice. Its outcome affects the nature of one's overall *reaction* to K's argument in favour of opera-made-music. It does not, however, constitute a philosophical *objection* to Kivy's argument.

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Alexander Nehamas and

Paul Woodruff, trans.

Plato's Symposium.

Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett

Publishing Company 1989. Pp. xxvii+80.

US \$17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-077-9);

US \$3.45 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-076-0).

This is a very useful, readable new translation of Plato's *Symposium*. It includes a number of aids for non-specialist readers – a short (16 pp.) informative Introduction, a Selected Bibliography and 116 notes, located at the bottom of the pages.

Nehamas and Woodruff point out in regard to their translation (xxvii) that they have opted for an idiomatic English version. Thus they have rejected the approach adopted in other recent translations of Plato's dialogues (e.g., in the translation of the *Charmides* that is also published by Hackett) which attempts, wherever possible, both

to translate word for word and to follow the sentence structure of the Greek. In keeping with their policy, Nehamas and Woodruff have also chosen not to translate certain Greek terms consistently (xxvii). For example, they translate *kalos* by 'fine', 'good', 'beautiful', or 'noble' and *sophia* by 'wisdom' or 'skill', depending on the context. Some of the footnotes explain the different renderings of the same Greek terms. Footnote 56, which refers to the passages in which Socrates questions Agathon, provides a good example of the approach. Nehamas and Woodruff note that *kalos*, which in other contexts means 'beautiful', is translated here by 'good' and that Socrates chooses *kalos* as a term of commendation in commenting on Agathon's replies because it suits Agathon's interest in the aesthetic qualities of love. Nehamas' and Woodruff's translation policy has resulted in a very smooth and readable version of the *Symposium* that will be especially welcome to teachers in introductory Greek Philosophy courses. Partly because of its readability, but also because of the philosophical astuteness of its translators, this translation renders the philosophical thinking in the dialogue more easily accessible to those approaching it without any knowledge of Greek than other available translations.

The Introduction, which is written by Nehamas, provides useful historical and cultural information as well as a brief explication of the speeches in the dialogue. Especially useful is the presentation of Greek attitudes toward homosexuality and an account of the nature of the relation between the lover (*erastēs*) and the beloved (*erōmenos*) – a relation whose asymmetry needs to be carefully explained to neophyte students of Greek thought. The notes, written by Woodruff, complement the material in the Introduction. In addition to biographical, historical, and cultural information and comments about the translation of Greek terms or expressions, the notes provide references both to other editions of the *Symposium* and to the work of commentators on various passages in the dialogue. The notes also occasionally refer back to earlier parts of the text where agreement had been reached on some statement currently under discussion.

Any criticisms that I have to offer of this edition of the *Symposium* are relatively minor since I believe it to be a welcome addition to the other excellent, inexpensive translations of Plato's dialogues offered by this publisher. One minor slip-up is the failure to include any page references in footnote 5. Another is the omission from the bibliography of David Halperin's excellent article on the *Symposium*, – "Platonic *Erōs* and What Men Call Love", *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985) 161-204. There are two, more serious, omissions in the notes

and introductory material, however. Although the decision about what to include in the notes is always a difficult one since the possibilities are so numerous, the lack of any discussion of the meaning of *agathon* and the relation between Greek uses of *agathon* and *kalon* is surprising given the centrality of these notions in Diotima's speech. More troubling, however, is Nehamas' and Woodruff's approach to the question of whether Diotima was a historical personage or a fictitious character created by Plato. The question itself may not be important to an understanding of the philosophy expressed in her speech, which is certainly Platonic. However, since the authors do raise the question in the introductory material and address it again in several notes, it seems one-sided to present only reasons against the view that she is a historical figure, and to give neither any reasons for the other view nor any references to articles where that view is discussed (see for instance, Kathleen Wider's 'Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle', *Hypatia* 1 [1986] 21-62). Furthermore, the reasons advanced by Nehamas and Woodruff for the view that Diotima is a fictitious character are not convincing. In notes 66 and 77, they point out, for example, that material in Diotima's speech refers back to earlier speeches. As they state in another note, however, Plato wrote all the speeches. Thus the fact that Diotima picks up on material in earlier speeches may support the view that her speech was written by Plato to express his philosophy, but it does not provide evidence to disprove her historical existence.

To sum up, despite the relatively minor reservations expressed above, this is a very useful volume which should work well in any course in which Plato's dialogues are studied through translations but which will be especially helpful to those who are non-specialists in Greek Philosophy.

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Ben-Ami Scharfstein

Of Birds, Beasts, and Other Artists; An essay on the universality of art.

New York: New York University Press

1989. Pp. xi+313.

US \$19.95. ISBN 0-8147-7881-X.

This is an idiosyncratic book, both as winsome and as literal as its title. Its length notwithstanding, the book is a true essay, setting forth in a personal manner the author's forays into the wide world of artistic activity and aesthetic response. The result is a statement filled with intriguing observations and a range of reference as inclusive as its scope. Yet at the same time it would be utterly mistaken to set this book aside as a self-indulgent rhapsody on the theme of artistic universality. There is a serious attempt here to embrace the breadth and variety of artistic creation and experience in an effort to establish a case for universality. This is an intimidating goal, to be sure, yet in the final analysis a necessary one. For Scharfstein recognizes in the aesthetic realm, as Kant did in the moral one, that this intellectual quest cannot be satisfied short of an all-embracing account. But whereas Kant's ploy was to free himself of the claims of the empirical order and develop a moral theory binding on all rational beings, human or not, Scharfstein undertakes the equally difficult task of attempting to reach the universal ground of art as it is manifested, not only throughout the striking variety of human cultures and their histories, but in the behaviour of other creatures, as well. And while Kant ends by diminishing the claims of the empirical, Scharfstein's wide-ranging details leave us with a yearning for a more solid theoretical structure.

Scharfstein begins with the condition of the modern arts, driven constantly by the compulsion to disclaim the old and follow the beacon of innovation, thus producing confusion for the artist and chaos for the public. Scharfstein's response to this is not to narrow the field but to widen it still more, leading him to inquire into the pre-human occurrence of art-like activities. He explores the ethological background of art in three domains, that of birds, of apes, and of young children. Out of their rich and fascinating details he discovers revealing analogies between these activities and those of mature humans in the impulse to self-expression and the constant desire for consummatory experiences (81). Following this exploration of origins come complementary treatments of the polar attractions of spontaneity and

tradition, succeeded by a discussion of the egocentrism of the artist as expressed in originality, inspiration, and the cult of genius. The rich details that embroider these discussions are drawn from many histories and cultures, equally Asian, African, and Western, and they provide a large part of the appeal of the book.

But it is in the final chapter that the central argument surfaces in the attempt to support a universal aesthetic. Given the anthropological cast of Scharfstein's approach, it is no surprise to find art characterized as a power and a need rooted in our biological nature and grasped as sociological, psychological, metaphysical, or aesthetic, depending on one's interests and preferences. Cross-cultural influences attest to the similarities of the artistic interest among diverse traditions, even though art is always embedded in a cultural context. Yet what is common among them? The need for fusion, the impulse in art to go beyond the limitations and boundaries that separate and divide self, life, and world, together with the related ideas of oscillation and equilibrium that join and balance various and different things (200 ff). In the language of Plato and Plotinus, this is the desire to participate and to be participated in (213). Fusion appears in the Indian concepts of *rasa* (literally, 'flavor' or 'essence') and *dhvani* ('suggestion' or 'overtone'), in the Chinese idea of *ch'i* ('breath' or 'life-spirit'), in the Japanese idea of *yugen* ('an overtone or feeling that is invisible and indescribable'), and in the Western aesthetic concept of *Einfühlung* or *empathy*. Fusion through art, then, joins human with human, people with culture, and humans with their world, a connectedness that is immediate and real and at the same time enigmatic: it is the taproot of artistic universality.

A word in defense of Scharfstein's approach, in as much as it is likely to strike some readers as perhaps soft and flimsy. Aesthetics is a particularly difficult philosophical discipline, for while bound by the logical demands of clarity and coherence, its subject matter is unyieldingly empirical. So to develop concepts and principles that do not derive from and reflect artistic practice and aesthetic experience is to play an intellectual game that has its own rules and winners but that is largely irrelevant to the phenomena or art. It is to Scharfstein's credit that he avoids such self-gratifying temptations and yet at the same time does not slip into the contrary one of free speculation. He is as alert to the dangers and limitations of empirical generalization as he is governed by the need to recognize similarities and achieve qualified generality. Within the dual constraints of subject matter and approach, he is remarkably successful.

Not an abstractly reasoned argument, this book offers nevertheless a coherent case supported by an abundance of curious, yet pertinent information. It provides, in effect, an argument by example. While I find Scharfstein's exposition marred by constant personal reference, its content is not at all subjective, and the scope of its details provides powerful support for the universality of its claims. Actually, Scharfstein's brief for universality, more the universality of artistic creation than of art, becomes almost submerged by such information. One wishes for a better balance between evidence and theory, or at least for a theory of fusion, which seems to be his central claim, instead of yet more examples. Perhaps one of the best uses for the book is as a rich source of such evidence, for it offers precisely the kind of data that aesthetics must include if the theory of the arts is to go beyond the self-referentiality it has come to share with some recent art. If for this reason art has become philosophy, as Danto seems to think, need philosophy emulate such art? Works like this help provide the groundwork for a more substantive aesthetics.

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Stephen Schiffer and Susan Steele, eds.

Cognition and Representation.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988.

Pp. viii+257. US \$26.95 ISBN 0-8133-7656-4.

This volume contains invited papers read at several cognitive science colloquia held between 1984 and 1985 at the University of Arizona. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the enterprise and the colloquium format, the reader should not expect much unity. The volume is divided into four parts: the nature and content of psychological theories; mental representation; cognitive development; and semantics. Given the readership of this journal, the philosophical papers receive most of the attention.

Two of the philosophers contributing to this volume are metareflective. One (Gilbert Harman) discusses psychological explanation, the other (Henry Kyburg) the notion of causation. The title of Harman's paper, 'Wide Functionalism', says it all. Psychological explanation

is *functional* (in terms of functions, not hardware) and also *wide* in that it appeals essentially to the actual or possible environment of the organism whose cognition or behavior is being explained. *Narrow* psychological explanations, which appeal only to the internal states of an organism, are rarely if ever used by psychologists. Fodor, the high priest of narrow functionalism, therefore must be wrong. Harman gives a number of examples of mechanisms and processes (sensory-motor coordination, visual detectors, cars, thermostats, radio receivers) which can only be understood and explained in the wide sense. He is right. He further argues that, in its notorious methodologically solipsist version, narrow functionalism could not even isolate the relevant functional components of an organism. He is right again.

But, more generally, is Harman right about psychological explanation being wide, and Fodor wrong about it being narrow? It depends on what we are talking about. If we are talking about cognitive *mechanisms* and *processes*, as Harman does, then again he is right. Understanding what such mechanisms and processes are, and how they work requires a wide psychological explanation. After all, cognitive mechanisms and processes are answers to, and are selected by, the pressures of the environment. But Fodor, I guess, would not disagree. He seems to argue this very point in his *Psychosemantics* (The MIT Press 1987) with the help of the notion of methodological individualism (42-5). The latter is a principle of explanation which urges that psychological states be taxonomized with respect to their causal powers. Such a taxonomy is wide: one would not know what a cognitive mechanism or process is, and what it does, unless one figures how it handles and relates to the environment.

Methodological solipsism, which recommends narrow psychological explanation, is quite a different principle, with a different domain of application. It is not about mechanisms and processes but about cognitive *representations* qua explicit data structures generated and operated on by various mechanisms and processes. (Fodor himself is terminologically ambiguous, and often talks of 'psychological states' and 'processes' instead of data or, if necessary, datal states. The former notions do not help his important distinction.) The principle urges that representations be taxonomized narrowly and irrespective of their semantic evaluation. The two principles of explanation are compatible and can be used jointly. But even when so distinguished and refocused, is methodological solipsism shown to be wrong by Harman? Not really. As I said, his arguments and illustrations are for methodological individualism, not against methodological solipsism. His dis-

cussion of the Twin Earth example is too brief and rhetorical to change the thrust of his argument. To conclude, what Harman shows is that wide functionalism is right about how to explain cognitive *processing* and what it causes; he does not show that narrow functionalism is wrong about how to explain the *data* being processed and what the data cause.

Henry Kyburg's paper ('Cognition and Causality') is about the importance of causality in cognitive science. The suggestion is that the notion of causality has three major roles: metaphysical (as a general category of understanding), epistemological (as a principle of rational inference), and psychological (as a descriptive concept). The first is insignificant, the second nonexistent, the third quite marginal. I will briefly comment on the first and most serious point. Metaphysically, Kyburg notes, causality is not that important if the basic science of the universe, quantum mechanics, can do without it. I think that Kyburg's claim holds only if we *also* assume that causal relations obtain only in virtue of their ultimate components (which are quantum mechanical), and not in virtue of the structures these components inhabit. If, however, there were causation in virtue of structure, then what is causally true at the quantum level might fail to be true at other levels of organization. Structures often cause in ways in which their components don't and can't: a stone can break a window, a lonely neutrino can't. This, of course, does not mean that we know what causation is, at various levels of organization; but it could mean that the quantum mechanical truths about causation are not universal.

There are three papers on cognitive representation. The one by Edward Smith and Daniel Osherson ('Compositionality and Typicality') discusses the problem of typicality (how to compute the relation between a concept and its instances) by way of the subproblem of compositionality (typically for complex concepts). Their solution to the latter is to interpret prototypes as abstract summaries of attributes which are characteristic (rather than definitive) of the members of a class in varying, and hence probabilistic, degrees. The paper by Lynn Cooper is about what its title says it is ('The Role of Spatial Representations in Complex Problem Solving'). There is also a paper by Donald Hoffman and Bruce Bennett whose title ('Perceptual Representations: Meaning and Truth Conditions') may attract a philosopher's attention. The paper is not philosophical and its content is not easy to decipher. So I will not try. There follow two papers on cognitive development. One, by Susan Carey, compares child cognitive development with theoretical reorganizations in the history

of science; the other, by Thomas Roeper, is concerned with the child's acquisition of grammar.

The volume concludes with two papers on semantics. Richard Dehrle's paper deals with the semantic effects of stress or intonation in English. Scott Soames' interesting paper attacks the widespread view that theories of the semantics of a language can also function as theories of the semantic competence of a speaker by showing that knowledge of the propositions (à la Russell) expressed by sentences is neither necessary nor sufficient for semantic competence. As a result, it not only follows that understanding a sentence does not amount to knowing what proposition it expresses, but also that understanding sentences is prior to, and needed for, knowing the propositions they express.

The editors have provided a good summary of the papers, and collected the bibliographical references at the end of the volume. For a disjointed sample on the latest in cognitive science and its philosophical kibitzing, it is not a bad volume. It is also good to welcome Westview's interest in this nice field, and to salute its courage to publish conference proceedings.

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Elie Zahar

Einstein's Revolution.

La Salle, IL: Open Court 1989. Pp. v+373.

US \$48.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9066-4);

US \$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9067-2).

Zahar's book is an outstanding contribution to scholarship in philosophy, physics and the history of science. It is also a wolf in sheep's clothing. That is to say, it is not only different from what it appears to be, it is also more formidable.

Before turning to discuss the contents of the text I think it is important to say something about the somewhat peculiar format which Zahar has adopted. According to Zahar, his text has a dual aim: to serve as a textbook on relativity theory and to serve as a textbook on philosophy of science. Ideally, the book should be studied with both

aims in mind. But Zahar also thinks that his book may be read either just as a text on relativity theory or just as a text on philosophy of science. This claim is somewhat misleading, for, viewed this way, the book runs the danger of falling between two stools. To benefit from the historical presentation of the details of relativistic physics, it greatly helps if one has a prior acquaintance with relativistic physics. In this way the book will probably not be satisfactory as the core text in an introductory course on relativistic physics – though needless to say, anyone who really wants to understand the details of relativistic physics should read this book. (When Zahar says that an understanding of elementary algebra and calculus are prerequisites for an understanding of the technical sections, he isn't joking. He means a working knowledge and not just a passing acquaintance).

Could the book be read primarily for its philosophical benefits? The answer is not clear. The problem is generated by the format Zahar has adopted, given the lessons about the philosophy of science which he wishes to communicate. In accord with the dual aim of the text, most of the chapters are divided into three sections. The first section presents, with a minimum of technicality, the philosophical claims to be defended. The second section is devoted to the justification of these claims, primarily through a sort of detailed microscopic analysis of the historical details of the development of relativistic physics. This tends to be somewhat technical. The final section of the chapter is a non-technical summary of results achieved. As Zahar seems to be aware, this has the effect that the non-mathematical reader is cut off from the meat of the argument. This problem is quite serious, because one of Zahar's lessons is that good philosophy of science requires an awareness of the complex nature of actual science and the interesting twists and turns in the historical process by which scientific concepts are developed. Given the role played by actual science – as opposed to carefully-doctored philosophical models of what science *ought* to be – the reader loses much by glossing over the technical bits. If I am right in this, then a full appreciation of Zahar's philosophical theses will, for non-mathematical readers, be a rather more formidable undertaking than he suggests. I am forced to conclude that this text will probably not serve well as the core text for an undergraduate philosophy of science course. However, I would strongly recommend the book for graduate-level courses in the philosophy of science.

The introduction and first chapter can profitably be read by anyone interested in philosophy of science. The second chapter spells out

the details of Lorentz's aether programme. As the significance of the null result of the Michelson-Morely experiment is almost always presented wrongly in popularizations of relativity theory, as well as in some technical introductions to the theory, this chapter is important in setting the record straight.

Chapter three concerns the origins of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and contains an accessible account of Einstein's views on the failings of classical physics – and hence the factors which prompted the development of the special theory. Chapter four concerns the influence which Mach is alleged to have had on the development of Einstein's ideas. In popularizations of relativity theory and in many scholarly texts it is widely held that Machianism in particular, and the spirit of positivism in general, had a firm hold on Einstein's mind. Thus Arthur Fine has written in his book, *The Shaky Game*, 'it would be hard to deny the importance of this instrumentalist/positivist attitude in liberating Einstein from various realist commitments' (122-3). Zahar would disagree most strongly. First, he claims, 'positivism was largely irrelevant to the development of modern physics' (123). Secondly, he claims, 'scientists like Einstein remained old fashioned realists. Had Einstein really adhered to the tenets of Machianism, then special relativity would never have seen the light of day' (123). These are exciting and controversial claims. From my perspective, Zahar's reassessment of the relationship between Machianism and the development of Einstein's theories is one of the high points in this book.

Other chapters concern Poincaré's work on relativity theory, the significance of the Kaufmann experiment for the Lorentz-Einstein model of the electron, and the relationship between mass and energy in relativity theory. The final chapter concerns the general theory of relativity and the early unified field theories.

In sum, the importance of Zahar's book lies in the myths it shatters about the development of relativity theory. It is a book which may transform some commonly-held beliefs about the relationship between philosophy and physics by demonstrating the philosophical benefits which flow from a careful analysis of the development of actual science.

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Editor's Note

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is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

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