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Leah Bradshaw

Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989.

Pp. 162. Cdn \$35.00. ISBN 0-8020-2625-7.

This is in general a useful book, and in some respects a good one. Useful because it provides a dispassionate and well-focused picture of Arendt's intellectual development. Good in that Bradshaw, a political scientist, keeps to the 'red thread' of Arendt's lifelong concerns without allowing herself to get distracted by ephemeral issues such as the furor over alleged anti-Semitism in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (64-6). There is some astute refereeing of the debate between Arendt and Voegelin over the nature of totalitarianism (50); a non-nonsense appreciation of Arendt's persistent pessimism regarding our era's prospects for political renewal (60f.); an incisive presentation of the difference between Habermas's 'cognitive rationalism' and Arendt's commitment to an epistemologically non-transcendent form of 'good judgment' (104-6); and (with some help from Hans Jonas) a perceptive treatment of the concept of natality as central to Arendt's theory of political and moral freedom and responsibility (111-13).

On the negative side, Bradshaw's philosophical acumen—an indispensable asset when dealing with Arendt's work—is periodically wanting. There is a tendency to oversimplify the argument of *The Human Condition*, and consequently to overdramatize and overstate the alleged alteration of philosophical outlook in Arendt's later writings—the main thesis of Bradshaw's book. Bradshaw does not do justice to the central conceptual triad of *The Human Condition*: labor, work, and action. She underappreciates the rootedness of labor in natural processes, causing her to identify the traditional *animal laborans* too closely with modernity's massified, technified and 'societized' individual. Her account of work is self-contradictory: she alternately confuses work with action for its own sake (14, 48) and recognizes that the ends of the work process lie outside of itself (18, 52, 101). She conflates *homo faber* with artists and intellectuals (something which Arendt carefully avoided doing, in spite of obvious overlaps). And she fails to evoke a sufficient 'feel' for the distinctive nature of action (admittedly the most elusive of the three core concepts definitive of the human situation) and for its almost 'internal' connectedness with speech (73-6 in particular). Indeed Arendt's account of speech in *The Human Condition* is not as far removed from her rather

Kantian theory of judgment in *The Life of the Mind* as Bradshaw thinks. The upshot is that Bradshaw misses the bitter irony of Arendt's depiction of the modern age as an increasingly bizarre fusion of labor, work and action in abstract, deracinated and caricatured forms. Above all, Bradshaw underestimates the telltale manifestations of the life of the mind and of human 'interiority' in general in the various modalities of the human condition. It is not so much that Arendt had been oblivious to or had neglected the claims of thought in *The Human Condition*, but rather that her contempt for irresponsible intellectualism and her enthusiasm for abstraction-bashing had led her to come dangerously close to reducing the tradition of Western thought to the airy ideological counters one finds in the hands of both uncritical apologists for and cynical dismissers of our tradition's major thinkers.

Bradshaw's first approach to Arendt's invocation of the Socratic conception of conscience as inner dialogue in *The Life of the Mind* is something of a howler: 'The two-in-one thinking is an intriguing way of describing the thinking process, but it is difficult to see how Arendt's formulation of it has anything to do with "moral considerations"' (75). But Bradshaw recovers nicely from this one: 'The moral content of thinking ... is the moderation of one who is able to contain within his mind all the given boundaries of existence. He is not overcome with excessive apprehension or greed for the future; and he is not grieved with melancholy for the determinations of the past over which he has no control. In other words, he does not resent being a creature of time. The inner dialogue of thinking, then, is an ability to summon the given conditions of one's existence into consciousness. This is why, for Arendt, "Willing"—the faculty oriented towards the future—and "Judging"—the faculty for evaluating the past—were instrumental in the constitution of the life of the mind' (84-5). Countering an earlier tendency to bifurcate mental capacities, Bradshaw in her chapter on *The Life of the Mind* succinctly relates thinking and judging: 'Thinking prepares the mind for making good judgments and judging, in turn, gives worldly content to the "nowhere" of thought' (91). Belatedly, in her concluding chapter, she presents us with a distinction that would have avoided considerable confusion previously: 'Here of course we mean thinking as the encouragement of the soundless dialogue with oneself, not thinking as instrumental or scientific reasoning' (116).

Fortunately, self-correction is a recurrent phenomenon in this book. Chapter five begins with a restatement of the complex value-

hierarchy Arendt had expounded in *The Human Condition*—a recapitulation far superior to the shaky and inconsistent analysis offered in chapter one. At this point Bradshaw still maintains that Arendt ‘subordinates the contemplative life to the active life’ in *The Human Condition*; I’d argue that she ‘brackets’ the former, and would not claim that the much-discussed concluding sentence of that work—‘Never is he more active than when he does nothing; never is he less alone than when he is by himself’—is an ‘enigmatic *non sequitur*’ which ‘makes sense only from the perspective of Arendt’s later writings’ (103). Perhaps Bradshaw’s most judicious assessment of the place of Arendt’s posthumously published *opus* in the overall picture is this: ‘The analysis in *The Life of the Mind* is more complex and more subtle than anything else Arendt wrote for the very reason that she refused to order priorities between action and thought, or between different kinds of thinking’ (109).

Although Hannah Arendt preferred to dissociate herself from ‘the tribe of philosophers,’ her passion for making distinctions without losing sight of ‘internal’ connections won her a membership in that tribe notwithstanding. It is the rather more flickering presence of that passion in Bradshaw’s book that somewhat detracts from an otherwise solid appreciation of the life of Arendt’s mind.

Peter Fuss

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Frank Forman

The Metaphysics of Liberty.

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1988. Pp. xi+202.

US \$67.00. ISBN 0-7923-0080-7.

Forman’s book is a doomed attempt to marry such diverse thinkers as novelist/philosopher Ayn Rand, the social psychologist Raymond B. Cattell, the liberal philosopher and economist Friedrich Hayek, economist James Buchanan, and others, with the ‘scientific metaphysics’ of physicist Mario Bunge. He calls the offspring of this unlikely miscegenation ‘evolutionary federalism,’ that is, a world government

composed of 'many different people having different social contracts' (126), whose central aim is to 'foster *cooperative competition* among countries and the production of variation and natural selection' (121).

It is not the case that such a marriage would necessarily be doomed from the start: but in Forman's case, it is, and, for at least three reasons. First, he offers no sustained philosophical argument for his conclusion but rather simply pieces together contributions by these various authors. Second, he accepts, *sans* criticism, those ideas which he thinks will sustain his position. For example, he accepts virtually everything of Bunge's metaphysics without criticism. He says, 'I made no real criticisms of Bunge' (140). He admits that he does have 'several' criticisms of Bunge but he says 'they are not germane to the discussion here.' Again, he accepts, not without criticism though, Cattell's 'empirical approach to human nature' but the criticisms he did make were not 'germane to his overall conception of federalism and evolutionary ethics' (140). Finally, Forman fails to consider any of the serious possible objections which could be raised against his argument for 'evolutionary federalism.' For these reasons, then, the position is of little interest to philosophers.

It should be noted that Forman includes four appendices, two of which are book reviews, one of which is an article, while the other is an address he read at the Southern Economic association in 1986. It is unclear to me why they are included for they do not add anything of substantial worth to Forman's project.

Kenneth F.T. Cust

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Trudy Govier

Selected Issues in Logic and Communication.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company 1988. US \$16.95. ISBN 0-534-08694-2

In her introduction to *Selected Issues in Logic and Communication* Trudy Govier states that the sixteen collected essays all contribute to the general theme of 'how mass media in contemporary times affect understanding and critical thought, and how and whether the

free marketplace of ideas is still a viable concept today' (1). All of the essays do provide analysis or distinctions useful for thinking critically about communication in general. But only about a third of the essays relate explicitly to the narrower theme of mass media communication. However, Govier relates the more general articles to mass media communication in the ten-page introduction.

The book of collected essays, about half of which have been previously published, opens with a brief preface containing short biographies of the contributors, and closes with a bibliography of sources cited in the essays. There is no index. Each chapter begins with an abstract and ends with several study questions.

Govier does not list the collected essays under topics. However, they can be organized as responses to the first essay 'Critical Thinking in the Electronic Era'. In this article Neil Postman argues that we need to teach critical thinking differently in the age of television. He believes we cannot apply the usual tools of argument analysis, for typically there are no arguments in the sense of an extended series of statements intended to support a conclusion. Postman maintains that television provides 'fragmented and discontinuous language' and 'holistic, concrete, and simplistic' images (17-18). Though Postman's article is clever and lively, I disagree with his claim that we can't apply the usual tools of argument analysis to television. Though there may not be many well developed arguments on television, there *are* a host of fallacious arguments in television commercials alone. And television news provides abundant examples of slanted information and misleading language, two other common topics in a critical thinking course.

In 'Are Fallacies Common?' Gary Jason applies one typical critical thinking skill—fallacy identification—to televised presidential debates. Though his examples provide a nice response to Postman, I would have preferred that he show the frequency of fallacious reasoning in contexts where persons are trying to avoid error rather than actually trying to mislead. Carl Cohen's 'Heavy Question Arguments' and Stephen Jay Gould's 'Of Crime, Cause, and Correlation' also provide examples of argument analysis that are useful for critiquing mass media as well as general communication.

In 'Distinguishing Fact from Opinion', Perry Weddle argues that we should focus, not on distinguishing fact from opinion (for it cannot be done, in any case), but on providing evidence for our beliefs. John Hardwig's more theoretical essay 'Relying on Experts' and Jerry Cederblom and David Paulsen's textbook chapter 'Making Reasonable

Decisions as an Amateur in a World of Experts' point out that all too often our best evidence for belief is an appeal to authority.

The volume contains a number of articles on the topics of slanted information and misleading language. In 'Mass Media and International Conflict', William A. Dorman provides numerous examples of propaganda presented as news and argues that we should not rely on the press as our 'primary textbook on foreign affairs' (65). Dennis Rohatyn continues the discussion of propaganda in 'Propaganda Talk', a playful, informative, and provocative fictional interview with Dr. Uve Binad, Director of the Ministry of Truth and the world's foremost authority on propaganda. In 'Nuclear War and Other Euphemisms', J. J. MacIntosh argues that phrases such as 'nuclear war' and 'nuclear winter' are misleading and their use immoral, for they imply falsely that nuclear war is winnable and that spring will follow nuclear winter. In 'The Political Language of the Helping Professions', Murray Edelman shows how labels, such as 'delinquency prone' and 'overachiever' reinforce imbalances of power. Maryann Ayim applies her critique of language to its use by academics in 'Violence and Domination as Metaphors in Academic Discourse'. Ralph Johnson in 'Pollution: Coping with Surveys and Polls' teaches how to recognize slanted coverage of surveys and polls.

As an antidote to the idea that everything is propaganda and intentionally slanted, J. Anthony Blair distinguishes harmful and avoidable bias from unharmed and inevitable selection of information from a particular point of view. Alexander Cockburn's 'The Tedium Twins', a satire of the 'MacNeil/Lehrer Report', and Trudy Govier's thorough essay, 'Are There Two Sides to Every Question?', point out that we cannot avoid the effects of slanting and fallacious arguments merely by presenting two sides of a question. Cockburn presents a mock MacNeil/Lehrer report on questions such as whether one person should eat another. And Govier provides a list of nine factors, other than two-sidedness, that make an account fair and balanced.

This collection's strength lies in the high quality and diversity of the essays. They offer a host of ways to critique mass media and other communication and provide good reading for an upper division critical thinking or communications studies course. However, though Govier's introduction attempted to provide thematic organization to the collection, a number of the essays, including Ayim's, which was written specifically for this volume, don't fit tidily into Govier's theme. Also, I'm not satisfied that the collection fully addresses Postman's

concern that television images require different tools of analysis from written arguments. The book contains no pictures other than the one on the cover, and not one article in the entire collection provides detailed analyses of visual images.

Dianne Romain

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John Gray

Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall

1989. Pp. ix+273. \$32.50 ISBN 0-415-00744-5.

In *Liberalisms* Gray looks at liberalism and finds it wanting 'all the major justificatory strategies in the project of constructing a liberal ideology' (240). The book consists of a collection of thirteen essays, all of which, except one, the Postscript, have been published before. Each essay, save the last, is a critical examination of the arguments of a particular liberal thinker or a critical examination of a particular problem which liberal thinkers must resolve. The overall theme of the book is the demise of liberalism. Gray's approach is to first identify and distinguish the particular versions of liberalism which have been offered over the past century by such thinkers as J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls and Robert Nozick and, second, to subject not only the particular arguments of that thinker to careful philosophical scrutiny but also the general argumentative strategy. Such a methodological approach not only gives the reader a taxonomy of the many versions of liberalism which have been offered but it also provides a taxonomy of their philosophical shortcomings.

Though Gray finds liberalism wanting he nonetheless thinks that there is much that contemporary liberals can learn from early liberal thinkers, especially J.S. Mill. It is not the case, Gray argues in the first chapter, that Mill's contribution to the liberal tradition is of little or no relevance to the pressing problems confronting modern society. On the contrary, he argues, Mill addressed himself not simply to problems which were endemic to his own historical epoch but

rather he argued for a view of an open society that would be trans-generational as well as cross-cultural. Mill's liberalism was a radical liberalism, Gray argues, and that in three ways: first, Mill's is a 'decentralist, anti-statist radicalism,' second, it is a radicalism which 'offers an alternative conception of social justice to that of a levelling-down egalitarianism,' and finally, 'it is a radicalism which is well prepared to meet the challenges posed by an end to economic growth in the world's developed (or overdeveloped) societies' (8).

In chapters 3 and 10 Gray tackles the 'contractarian' position of Rawls and Nozick, though most of his criticisms are directed against Rawls. Gray takes his most devastating criticism (though he does offer other criticisms) of the Rawlsian project to be that it 'endorses a misconceived presumptivism in respect of liberty and equality and that its contractarian argument is superogatory in so far as it is not ultimately incoherent' (33-4). Gray also argues that neither the Rawlsian project nor Nozick's attempted derivation of the 'immaculate conception of the state' are contractarian projects, for, in Rawls' case, it is 'logically impossible' that there be a 'diversity of selves' in the original position. With respect to the Nozickian project being a contractarian approach Gray offers three arguments: first, no invisible-hand process could allow for a contractual agreement authorising a transfer of rights; second, that if rights are inalienable then they cannot be transferred by any contractual agreement, and third, the now well-worn argument that Nozick doesn't offer any defense of the rights which he says people have.

In the several other chapters of this book Gray considers not only the positions of other liberal thinkers – Popper, Berlin, Hayek and Spencer – but also specific problems that liberalism, as a political doctrine, faces. In chapter 5 Gray confronts the problem of whether or not a contended slave can be shown to be free. Of course, any attempted answer to this question is going to turn on what it means to be free, and Gray is fully prepared in this regard. Drawing on arguments of the previous chapter, where he distinguishes four conceptions of freedom, Gray argues that 'a man who acts successfully upon such a preference [slavery] at once ceases to be a free man and forecloses some of his chances of happiness' (86). In chapter 8 Gray considers whether there can be a utilitarian justification of rights. He argues that one can interpret Mill's arguments to be arguments for an 'indirect utilitarianism' and that this version of utilitarianism is not subject to the standard criticisms, although it is subject to other, perhaps more intractable, problems.

In the last essay Gray sums up the main difficulties he has identified which the doctrine of liberalism faces: no Principle of Liberty or an account of rights has ever been successfully defended by any liberal theorist; there is not, anywhere in liberal theory, 'a compelling demonstration of the priority of liberty over other political values' (261); and, contrary to what many liberals think, current liberal ideology does not have centuries of intellectual tradition supporting it. (In this regard he takes the recent work of Pocock to be definitive.) Gray also offers general criticisms against the three dominant strategies used by liberals to defend the liberal doctrine: the argument from ignorance, the argument from agreement and the argument from flourishing. Finally, also in this last chapter, Gray offers a post-liberal view of society and its institutions. He suggests that in these post-liberal times we adopt a 'post-Pyrrhonian method of philosophical inquiry,' that is, 'a mode of theorizing in which to the sceptical Pyrrhonism of Hume is added the insight that our forms of self-understanding are narrative historical creations' (263). The positive role of this post-Pyrrhonian method of philosophizing is that it will allow us to take advantage of what we can learn from history so that we can 'seek to uncover the genealogy or archaeology of our present forms of life and to understand them as historical creations' (263).

Is liberalism dead? Gray thinks, for the most part, that it is, for, it has failed to give a satisfactory answer to '*the liberal problem*—the problem of finding fair terms of peaceful coexistence among persons with different conceptions of the good' (166). Liberalism does indeed have its problems and Gray has gone to great lengths to identify them for us but one can always ask if Gray has not written liberalism's obituary too soon. *Liberalisms* is a deep and penetrating look into the philosophical shortcomings of liberalism, backed by intricate and rigorous argumentation. It is a challenging work and deserves careful consideration by all those interested in political philosophy.

Kenneth F.T. Cust

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Philip T. Grier, ed.

Dialectic and Contemporary Science: essays in honor of Errol E. Harris.

Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1989. Pp. xxvi+235.

US \$29.50. ISBN 0-8191-7422-X.

Errol E. Harris has published much on the philosophy of nature and on logic. His approach to these disciplines, however, is quite different from that of the prevailing orthodoxy. Developing his philosophy from the writings of Spinoza and Hegel, Harris argues that a mechanical or atomistic world view is essentially flawed and incoherent. For a satisfactory rational method and explanatory procedure articulates how parts are discriminated within, and contribute to, wholes. Discrimination is a function of dialectic; integration is achieved through sublation or (in the form Harris prefers) *Aufhebung*.

This volume contains ten articles, all of which discuss, or are related to, Harris's contributions to philosophy. For each of them Harris provides a response. Five of the ten are devoted to his reading of Hegel, in particular to his *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*; but a few look at his systematic writings. Philip Grier provides a useful introduction, relating Harris's various publications to the topics of the papers contributed.

As in any *Festschrift* the articles are quite diverse, ranging from Giacomo Rinaldi's reworking of Harris's own reading of the identity of thought and being in Hegel's *Logic* to W.N.A. Klever's commentary on Spinoza's *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, Paragraph 108, which barely mentions Harris at all. A number take issue with some of Harris's positions: Brand Blanshard has some misgivings about his theory of internal relations; George R. Lucas opposes a pluralistic account of teleological explanation to Harris's monistic claim 'that the universe is one single and indivisible whole' (53); Ronald Hepburn challenges Harris's attempt at a theodicy, arguing that animal suffering can never be justified by any appeal to an all-encompassing good; W.H. Walsh argues that an Hegelian ethic cannot warrant Harris's principled stand against apartheid in his native South Africa; while William Earle protests against using coherence and rationality as ultimate philosophical criteria. In others the relation to Harris's thought is more ambiguous: Philippe Muller suggests that Harris's refutation of a representational epistemology enables him to improve on Hegel (an honor Harris himself declines

by stating that he simply integrates Hegelian thought with recent science); Tom Rockmore's point is that history is as important to Hegel as system, although it is unclear whether Rockmore sees this claim as disagreeing with, or complementing, Harris's analysis; for John E. Smith, finally, because Harris is too concerned to affirm the whole, he underemphasises the negativity in the dialectic.

If the content of the papers is diverse, no less so is their quality. Earle's contribution simply emotes expressively; at the other extreme, Walsh's exploration of Hegelian morality develops a detailed argument, and Smith's review of Harris's commentary identifies some important themes. Frequently disagreements serve to trigger simply a restatement of Harris's own position. His response to Hepburn shows how closely he verges on pantheism, while his reply to Lucas reaffirms his monism. Repeatedly the importance of sublation and dialectic to the process of constituting wholes out of parts is stressed. As a result, the volume presents the core of his philosophical position.

Harris's gracious gentility pervades the text, expressed both in the respect the contributors have for him, and in the considerate nature of his own replies. So it offers to any who are interested in Harris as a philosopher an opportunity to discover in brief compass who he is, what he is about, and how he intends to achieve it.

John Burbidge
Trent University

Michael P. Levine
*Hume and the Problem of Miracles:
A Solution.*
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1988. Pp. viii+212.
US \$64.00. ISBN 0-7923-0043-2.

The most important part of this book is a criticism of the argument Hume presents in the first half of the Miracles Section in the first *Enquiry*, against the possibility of miracles being proved by testimony. Levine holds that Hume's view depends in an unacceptable way upon his analysis of causation, and is not inconsistent with that anal-

ysis, as C.D. Broad suggested. He supports his position by investigating the question, 'Why did Hume think that one could, under certain circumstances, justifiably believe an extraordinary event had occurred, but never a miracle?' (25), and he has interesting comments on the key examples of the Indian and the ice, the eight-day darkness in 1600, and the alleged resurrection of Elizabeth I. His answer to the question is that experience teaches us that testimony to the extraordinary may show that there are relevant observations (like that of the climate in Moscovy) that we have so far missed, and these observations may show the extraordinary phenomenon to be an instance of a natural regularity. This is impossible for testimony to the miraculous, however, for two reasons: (i) a miracle, as a violation of a law of nature, cannot have past phenomena to which it is relevantly analogous; (ii) a miracle, as an event caused by a supernatural agent, is an event with a cause of which we could never have an impression. The force of these considerations depends on the special features of Hume's empiricist regularity view of causation. The point is not that Hume so defines 'miracle' that the very concept of one is self-contradictory (although he comes close to doing this), but that he so defines it that there can be no evidence for one, either from the senses or from testimony, since neither could support the occurrence of a unique and supernaturally-occasioned event.

Against this position, which I agree is almost certainly Hume's view, Levine maintains that the concept of a miracle is that of an event whose origin is outside the scope of natural law, even though it is an event having natural consequences. Its occurrence, therefore, does not undermine *natural* laws, miracles do not have to be unique (so there could be more than one resurrection or faith-healing), and we do not have to question the validity of a natural law by accepting testimony to an event that the law cannot explain.

I incline to agree with this too; and Levine has a good deal of ingenious argument in support of it. The case he makes would have been more effective, however, if he had said at least a little about the comments Hume makes in the second part of the Miracles Section about the defects he claims to find in the testimony to the miraculous that we actually have, and about Hume's point (in paragraph 95 in the Selby-Bigge edition) that miracle-stories in different traditions cancel one another out. Indeed, the book as a whole suffers from strange decisions about inclusions and exclusions. Although there have been a great many discussions of Hume's argument in books and essays about miracles, I think this is the first whole book nominally

devoted to Hume's argument alone (unless one counts the separate issue of Taylor's long essay in 1927). In this circumstance, one might expect an attempt at comprehensiveness. But one would not expect all the things that *are* here. For example, I fail to see the relevance of Chapter Five, which argues that a logical entailment analysis of causation (which is manifestly not Humean) would rule out miracles. Nor can I really see that the long final chapter on 'Miracles and Contemporary Epistemology' should be here, even though it contains some acute comment on Plantinga, BonJour and others. Since Levine argues convincingly at the outset that belief in a miracle's occurrence cannot be a basic belief, it is hard to see why a book about miracles needs discussion about what beliefs are properly basic; nor is there much surprise in the view that a coherentist analysis of justification is consistent with both the assertion and the denial that acceptance of miracle testimony can be justified.

I am more ambivalent about the two chapters devoted to Hume and Tillotson. They succeed in showing that Hume probably misunderstood, and certainly misused, Tillotson's argument against transubstantiation, and that Tillotson's argument has independent merit. But, like Hume's first paragraph where Tillotson is invoked, they are peripheral. The whole book suffers from the fact that a succession of related but distinct essays is presented as though it comprises one continuous argument.

This difficulty is compounded by a style that is sometimes unnecessarily complicated. Levine is a little inclined, in particular, to disorient the reader by multiple negations. For example, on page 58 we get 'It seems unlikely that one would want to deny that this kind of event was of a type that could not be accounted for in terms of causal conditions—that it was not part of a causal nexus.'

These defects of presentation disfigure a book that really does contain novel arguments as its author claims, and which definitely must be read by anyone who seriously wants to understand the failings of Hume's position. Taking it as a whole, I can only describe this work as a curate's egg. But parts of it *are* excellent.

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John W. Murphy

Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism.

Westpoint, CT: Greenwood Press 1989. Contributions in Sociology, Number 79.

Pp. viii+218.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-313-26683-2.

In this clearly-organized and clearly-written book Murphy provides a brief outline of the development of post-modernism and the opportunities he feels it offers critical social analysis. His aim is 'not only to introduce the main tenets of postmodernism, but to answer the criticisms of this philosophy' (15).

Chap. One describes the dualism of the whole Western tradition and modernism in particular. Chap. Two 'illustrates how the traditional dualistic worldview has begun to collapse in various fields of study' (31)—philosophy, science, the arts, cultural science—and identifies postmodernism with this rupture with dualism. Chap. Three describes postmodern social science largely in contrast to positivism. Chap. Four shows that 'postmodernists want to avoid 'totalizing society' (64) and to 'decenter social existence' (60).

Chap. Five presents a postmodernist critique of bureaucracy and discovers examples of postmodernist challenges in community based mental health, work place democratization, community justice/critical legal theory, and liberation theology; though not, surprisingly, in feminism which one would have thought was an obvious candidate. Chap. Six argues that 'according to postmodernists, the culture of dominance that has been accepted throughout Western philosophy is no longer justified ... postmodern society spawns a "culture of immanence"—a style of culture that embodies human inspiration' (107).

Chap. Seven, 'The Politics of Postmodernism', claims that 'postmodernists are subtly but powerfully political, in that they offer criticism, but no formulae for liberation' (128). 'Postmodernism is consistent with what might be called radical democracy' (147). 'Postmodernists are advocates for human freedom; pluralism is basic to their project' (132). They seek 'the establishment of a just society' (140), 'order without control' (145). Postmodernism 'encourages socially responsible government (147); 'self-management is the only acceptable form of government' (146). 'The protection of differences is the key-stone of a postmodern polity. Postmodern society is based on the toleration of difference. ... Recognizing and integrating otherness is the hallmark of the community in the postmodern world' (140).

Chap. Eight reiterates earlier refutations of charges that postmodernism is solipsistic, anti-political, nihilistic, lacks ethics, denies the self, truth, reason, knowledge, and historical meaning to present the position indicated in the following quotation selected from the last few pages of the text:

[W]hen dualism is overcome, every aspect of society must be conceptualized anew. The absence of an ultimate reality does not precipitate the demise of truth, and, likewise, individual spontaneity does not necessarily conflict with the commonweal ... [I]nstead of destroying culture, postmodernists radically democratize society. ... Truth is decentered, or disassociated from any specific social constellation. ... [T]he interpersonal character of knowledge is revealed. Solipsism, accordingly, is dismissed by postmodernists. ... Social existence is rehabilitated. ... Postmodernists provide an educational program that allows persons to return to themselves. Society is restored to its original state, before the crisis that ensued following the acceptance of dualism. Persons can live their own lives without accepting or rejecting reality. (159-62)

I have largely used Murphy's own words in describing the contents of the book so they can stand as illustrations of a number of concerns I have with his reasoning. Some of the problems stem from the level of generalization that Murphy is working at in this short book. He speaks, throughout, as if postmodernism were a unitary phenomenon. He is attempting a task of enormous scope so some simplification is to be expected. However, it would have strengthened the case he is concerned to make if he had even briefly identified *which* strand of postmodernism he feels he is speaking for and mentioned some of the postmodern work that does not fit (or least fits) the claims he is making for it. It would also have helped readers new to this area if he had explained explicitly that although his focus is on the relevance of postmodernism to social analysis the phenomenon is by no means bounded by this terrain and is probably more identified with and more influential in cultural studies.

In this very general argument a sanitized and tamed postmodernism is appropriated unproblematically by social science to become something that its proponents and opponents may both fail to recognize. Murphy claims, and goes some way to convince us, that the de-centering enabled and required by postmodernism opens up new possibilities for social analysis and can strengthen critical anti-dualistic, anti-positivist social science. Paradoxically, however, his

acceptance of other aspects of postmodernism seems to me to undermine the critical tradition of social analysis. The presentation of postmodernism as a political project in a simple and direct sense (as illustrated in the quotations above) has the effect of eliding the distinction between epistemological understandings and society itself, between analyzing the world and changing it. These are related activities of course, but they are not identical. When they are treated as such, power disappears from the picture and we are told, for instance, that 'as a consequence of postmodernism, discourse among all parties is rendered symmetrical' (144).

Yet power has been an organizing concern of critical social analysis and this is one of the main ways it is distinguished from the postivist and functionalist social science Murphy is so critical of. Interestingly enough the criticism that postmodern analysis ignores or cannot deal with questions of power is one criticism that Murphy does not directly defend it against in the book. Perhaps he feels it is enough to deny the charge that it is apolitical. But, in the end, the politics he saves postmodern social science for is a pluralism more in keeping with non-critical traditions of social science than the radical tradition for which he says he is attempting claim it.

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Aleksandar Pavković, ed.

Contemporary Yugoslav Philosophy:

The Analytic Approach.

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1988. Pp. vi+319.

US \$82.00. ISBN 90-247-3776-1.

This collection consists of sixteen papers in the analytic tradition, an introduction sketching some of the main points of its development within Yugoslavia, and a select bibliography. The papers vary widely both in subject and quality. Demographically, however, the volume is almost entirely Serbian, there being only two non-Serbians

(one Montenegrin cum Croatian, and one Slovenian) among the contributors. Given the activity and vitality of analytic philosophers in such places as Ljubljana, Zadar and Zagreb, this is both a little surprising and a little disappointing. The editor, however, states that invitations were extended to all whom he knew to be working in the analytic tradition and that he included all responses.

In his introduction, Pavković outlines the history of relations between the Yugoslavian communist party and analytic philosophy—a history that is both more eventful and more acrimonious than one might have antecedently supposed. The first signs of opposition appeared in the 1930s, before Yugoslavia yet had a communist government. However, after the Partisan victory, which brought the communist party to power in 1945, the opposition intensified as official reformers sought to purge philosophy of all non-communist influences. For the most part, this reform movement had died out by the end of the 60s, though as recently as 1985 there were still rumblings within the Serbian communist party.

The first essay in the volume (by Miloš Arsenijević) is concerned with a 'staccato' version of the Achilles Paradox. Arsenijević surveys the major attempts to solve it and finds that they are all failures. He then proposes his own solution, which is based on the idea that a legato model for time in a world of staccato events is inappropriate. Thus, a staccato sequence of events that is temporally finite when measured in legato-time may nonetheless be infinite when measured in staccato-time.

Next follows a paper by Jovan Babić on pacifism, the principal claim of which is that, though finding a moral basis for pacifism may be problematic, it is nonetheless not necessary in order to justify the pacifist's political ends and activities. These ends and activities, Babić claims, can be justified by showing that they serve more important goals than pacifism—goals that are imperiled, without promise of sufficient compensation, by a state of war. It is therefore unnecessary to be a pacifist in order to be a peace-activist.

The reference of demonstrative terms is the topic of a paper by Vojislav Božicković. The question he addresses is whether all general terms occurring within a demonstrative sentence (e.g. 'This horse is a steed') play an equal role in determining the reference of the demonstrative expression. He opts for an affirmative answer, though for a limited range of cases, by arguing that (within the range of cases in question) the general terms can be permuted (e.g. 'This horse is

a steed' to going to 'This steed is a horse') without changing the Fregean thought of the sentence thus altered.

'Philosophy and Pain Research', by Nikola Grahek, argues that recent scientific research on pain runs contrary to the ideas of those physicalistic philosophers who want to replace ordinary talk about pain with talk of pain receptors, pain fibers, pain pathways, and pain centers in the brain, and whose accounts of pain may depend upon a link between the intensity of pain and the extent of tissue damage, and who tend to represent pain as a primary simple sensation rather than a type of perceptual experience.

The next essay, by Mane Hajdin, argues for the now out-of-fashion view that duty-ascriptions imply (and hence are equivalent to) right-ascriptions. The difficulty posed for such a view by the case of charity is handled in this way: the beggar has a right not to the donor's alms, but rather to an equal chance at them. Charity-rights are thus likened to the rights of lottery players.

The focal concern of the paper by Aleksandar Jokić is whether scientific discovery is a philosophically interesting topic. He argues for a positive response, urging a distinction between this question and the question of whether there is a logic of discovery.

In the paper 'Hegel and Logic', Svetlana Knjazez-Adamović examines Hegel's arguments against logic, some of which she finds to be ineffective, others of which she regards as applying to traditional but not to modern logic, and still others of which she finds to be suggestive of such later developments as the theory of types.

In 'Temporal Modalities and Modal Tense Operators', Aleksandar Kron provides semantical schemes for these types of expressions, together with (provably sound and complete) axiomatizations of the valid formulae thereby induced. The question he wants to answer is whether a sentence of the form $\mathbf{MT}\phi$ (where \mathbf{M} is one of the modal operators 'necessarily' or 'possibly', \mathbf{T} one of the tense operators 'always' or 'sometimes', and ϕ a sentence) is equivalent to a sentence of the form $\mathbf{TM}\phi$. On one of the semantical schemes constructed they are, while on another they are not. The axiom of choice shows up in a proof of a weak version of equivalence for the semantics in which the two are not equivalent, causing the author to make the extraordinary claim that 'answering a rather naive question about natural language [i.e., whether sentences of the form $\mathbf{MT}\phi$ are equivalent to the permuted sentence $\mathbf{TM}\phi$ —M.D.] may be involved in the consideration of a rather sophisticated question in the philosophy of mathematics [viz., the question of the validity of the axiom of choice—M.D.].'

Živan Lazović writes on causal propositions and essential properties. He argues that a modal view of Aristotelian essentialism together with an acceptance of causal propositions as necessary does not commit one to the view that kind-essential properties are instantiated.

'Internalism and Intentionality', by Nenad Mišćević, seeks to make clear what is at stake in the debate between internalism and externalism. He argues that belief in representational states is only plausible on the internalist alternative. He then considers the difficult question of how one committed to internalism could ever hope to give a fully reductive analysis of mentalistic predicates, given the apparent need, within an internalist analysis, of a clause which grants the agent 'access' to or 'awareness' of the representational character of his cognitive states. No solution is offered, though Mišćević thinks that one might emerge if it could be shown that mental predicates can be arranged in a hierarchy according to their elementariness, and that the predicates of the 'access' clauses are always more elementary than the predicates being analyzed.

'Scientific Persuasion' is the subject of Staniša Novaković's paper. The question he considers is the role that logical argumentation plays in the acceptance/rejection of scientific theories. He argues that it plays an important role (more important than the Kuhnian believes), and offers an account of the different ways in which it has influenced belief historically.

The editor, Pavković, offers an essay on the subject of evil demon hypotheses as sceptical devices; specifically, their validity as means for establishing a traditional sceptical thesis. 'Traditional' sceptical arguments (e.g., the argument from illusion and the argument from perceptual relativity), he says, start with mistaken beliefs that have occurred in the past and move to doubt concerning present beliefs. Demon arguments, on the other hand, have a different logic. They do not describe a past mistake, but rather a possible state of affairs which, if true, would explain our having our present beliefs and also make them false. These features of demon stories, however, are taken to be less potent as sources of rational doubt concerning our present beliefs than are the actual documentable past mistakes of the so-called traditional sceptical arguments.

'Why Won't Syntactic Naturalization of Belief Do?', by Matjaž Potrč, takes up the question of how intentional mental states can be brought into conformity with a scientific (i.e., naturalistic) approach to their study. He argues that a naturalization of belief cannot proceed primarily by syntactical means because such an approach leaves

out that of which it otherwise purports to be the science; to wit, intentionality or the 'contentfulness' of mental states.

In 'An Argument against Theism', Aleksandar Pražić argues that there cannot be a being which is both omnipotent and omniscient, since an omnipotent being would be able to 'test' someone (as in God's testing of Abraham), but an omniscient being would not (since one can truly test only if one does not know the future). Missing, however, is any discussion of those varieties of omnipotence worth having.

In 'A Relativistic Criticism of Realism', Svetozar Sindjelić disagrees with the argument given by so-called convergent realists that their position offers the only possible explanation of the observational success of science. He agrees that there is a connection between scientific theories and a mind-independent reality, provided by the devices of human cognition, but disagrees that the former describe the latter. What theories describe is reality-as-mediated-by-human-cognitive-apparatus.

In the final essay of the volume Heda Šegvić challenges the current interpretation of the role of deliberation in Aristotle's view of moral conduct which sees it as a device for justifying or explaining actions after the fact rather than a means by which moral conduct is guided.

The editor, contributors and publisher are all to be congratulated on their efforts to increase the exchange between Yugoslavian and non-Yugoslavian philosophers.

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Samuel Scolnikov

Plato's Metaphysics of Education.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. x+157.

Cdn \$36.00: US \$27.50. ISBN 0-415-01864-1.

This book has an unfortunately misleading title—we would be likely to assume that Scolnikov has taken the Sun-Line-Cave passage as a guiding principle for interpreting whatever Plato has to say about

education, and has perhaps forced everything into that Procrustean Bed. But although Scolnikov eventually shows tendencies of wanting to adopt that hermeneutic stance, in fact he does not do so for the first half of the book at least. Instead, he begins by comparing sophistic and Socratic ideas about education, largely on the basis of the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, and *Meno*, goes on to look at Plato's reconsideration of Socratic goals and methods in the *Theaetetus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus*, and only then turns to the *Republic*. Apart from a brief notice of the *Statesman*, there are only scattered references to Plato's more 'metaphysical' dialogues, the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, and there is no discussion of the educational theories embodied in the *Laws*. A more descriptive title might have been *A Brief Introduction to Plato's Philosophy of Education*.

The dust jacket claims that the book is addressed to 'educators, philosophers, philosophers of education, historians of philosophy, and Plato scholars.' Probably the best audiences for the book are educators and philosophers of education; certainly Plato scholars will be gratified to learn, from that point of view, that there is nothing shockingly original here. Scolnikov knows the literature on the dialogues he discusses quite well, understands the issues as they are normally understood in Anglo-American scholarship, and briefly reports his own judicious selection of the findings of that scholarly tradition.

Still, the book does not hold together very well; Scolnikov has not resolved for himself a hermeneutic dilemma which faces teachers who read the dialogues. On the one hand, Scolnikov tells us that 'at least as Plato saw it, Socrates' purpose seems to have been for the most part therapeutic' (19). He also suggests on p. 20 that Socrates is aiming at the development of 'a unified and harmonic personality.' On the other hand, Scolnikov also says that in some of the Socratic dialogues (*Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*) 'Education ... emerges gradually ... as the development of human reason,' and that is not at all the same thing as 'a unified and harmonic personality.' Worse, much later in the book (103), Scolnikov tells us that 'There is no denying that most of the so-called "Socratic" dialogues of Plato come to nothing.' Of course we do not get a final definition of courage in the *Laches*, or of *sōphrosynē* in the *Charmides*, but how can he judge whether or not Laches or Nicias or Charmides has come away from the discussion with a more 'unified and harmonic personality'? If you expect dogma, the Socratic dialogues are 'failures'; if you expect therapy, you might want to find out how Charmides turned out later in life (rather nasty), or for that matter how Theaetetus turned out (admirably).

We get philosophy of education from Plato's Socrates in at least two ways: by example, and by precept. It's not clear that the precepts are entirely consistent (Scolnikov notes some of the difficulties in fact), and the precepts do not, on the whole, match the practice. Judged by the precepts of Plato's Socrates, the practice as described in the early dialogues fails; yet we find the practice perhaps more attractive than the precepts, especially the precepts of the *Republic*. Are we as educators supposed to do what Socrates does, or what he says? Scolnikov ultimately does opt for the 'metaphysics'; thus the title of his book. But he does not follow out the implications as developed in the mature dialogues. Many of us will, as teachers, prefer the 'therapy', hoping that we may have a student who turns out as well as Plato, Xenophon, Theaetetus, or even Aristippus, and not too many that turn out like Charmides, Meno, or Alcibiades.

Perhaps the root cause of Scolnikov's hermeneutic problem is that he never becomes existentially involved with Socratic education; he does not ever show signs of thinking that this might be a message for him as a teacher. His disinvolvement provides a reasonable standpoint for interpreting individual analytical puzzles as they arise in the dialogues, but it prevents him from conveying the sense that he has taken the dialogues to heart. Still, it's not a bad introduction for educators to the early and middle dialogues, provided that it does not replace reading the dialogues themselves.

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Dennis L. Sepper

Goethe contra Newton: Polemics and the Project for a New Science of Color.

New York: Cambridge University Press
1988. Pp. 222.

US \$39.50. ISBN 0-521-34254-6.

Goethe's scientific work 'has been subject to a more persistent neglect and misapprehension than Newton's' (xii), and Sepper makes every attempt to be fair to the underdog. His book contains much valuable

research. It seems to me, nonetheless, that he doesn't quite succeed in capturing the spirit of Goethe's endeavors.

In a famous experiment Newton admitted sunlight into a dark room through a small aperture and passed it through a prism and onto a screen thereby obtaining the familiar continuous spectrum. From this experiment (and others) he concluded that white light consists of different colours of light having various degrees of refractibility. On the contrary, according to Goethe, 'Refracted light shows no colour unless it has been bounded; light shows a colour upon refraction not as light but insofar as it appears as an image' (143, quote from Goethe): the colours are the result of the mutual interaction (called forth by the prism) of the brightness and darkness at the boundaries of the image. Suppose the refracting edge of the prism is pointed downward; then the cold colours appear at the upper boundary, the warm colours at the lower, and the green is the result of the blue and yellow blending together in the middle.

Goethe's theory (amongst other advantages) provides a natural explanation of why, when one looks through a prism at a line separating areas of different degrees of brightness, one sees (depending upon the orientation of the prism) either warm or cold colours but never green. Goethe complained that Newton started out with a *complex* phenomenon, the full spectrum. But the green of the full spectrum is a *derivative* phenomenon; it does not show in the case of the simple line.

According to Sepper Goethe went through two phases with respect to the question of the significance of hypotheses (88-99). In the earlier stage, represented by the *Beiträge zur Optik* 1791, he held a naive view about what could be achieved by induction alone. The phenomena would disclose their true nature if examined in the right way. Hypotheses had at best suggestive value and could be superseded by a grasp of the *Urphänomene*—i.e., the basic phenomena out of which more complex phenomena are in some sense constructible. At the later stage, represented by the *Zur Farbenlehre* 1810, Goethe attached more significance to hypotheses, regarding them as an ineluctable feature of the scientific enterprise. In fact he became, in Sepper's words (96) 'a thoroughgoing pluralist.' (Sepper thinks the shift was due to some daunting difficulties encountered in trying to explain physiological colours.)

According to Sepper Goethe made a serious mistake in taking a polemical stance against Newton's theory. Admittedly Newton too had made a mistake. He had given out as pure fact what was merely

an hypothesis (see the two quotations from Newton on p. 166). But Goethe in the light of his new found pluralism should have realized that Newton's theory of colour, considered merely as hypothesis, had the same right to existence as his own theory (especially 19,94).

I disagree with Sepper's interpretation. It is true that Goethe is to some extent a pluralist at the time of *Zur Farbenlehre*. But his pluralism is only a provisional one. When confronted by a phenomenal base which does not yet adequately disclose itself in terms of *Urphänomene* Goethe is as willing as anyone to hypothesize—indeed he is willing to look at a plurality of hypotheses. However the ultimate goal is always to penetrate to the *Urphänomene*. (It should be pointed out that the goal is to attain to *Urphänomene* within the realm of colours strictly as such. Goethe is strenuously opposed to any reductionist approach.) With regard to this point Goethe, as I read him, never changed his mind (see the important quotations from Goethe on 158 and 174 which Sepper does not seem to properly evaluate). But even with respect to a field where the *Urphänomene* have not been worked out Goethe could consistently reject some hypotheses on grounds that they are inadequate to the phenomena and hence do not point in the direction of any *Urphänomene*. It was in this sense that Goethe rejected and polemicized against Newton's theory.

Newton attached great significance to what he called the crucial experiment (10). In this experiment each of the various 'coloured lights' refracted out of the initial white light is in its turn passed through a prism. According to Newton a coloured light, say violet, when subjected to this procedure remains pure. But according to Goethe's view a violet image ought to give rise to colours at its borders in much the same way as the initial white image. As Sepper points out, historical attempts to replicate Newton's crucial experiment have not met with unequivocal success (e.g., 163-4). Strangely Sepper does not comment upon whether the experiment has been replicated in modern times. I have read conflicting reports about this. According to Christoph Goegelein (*Zu Goethes Begriff von Wissenschaft*, [Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag 1972], 51) so-called monochromatic light stays pure when passed through a prism. The Goethean colour scientist Heinrich Proskauer begs to differ (*Zum Streit der Newtonischen gegen die Goetheschen Denkweise in der Farbenlehre* [Dornach, Switzerland: Goethe-Farbenstudio am Goetheanum 1989], 30-1), citing an article

which I have as yet been unable to obtain: H.G. Hetzel, 'Goethe und der Laser', in *Optometrie, Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Augenoptik* Nr. 1, 1987.

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Cyril Welch

Linguistic Responsibility

Victoria, BC: Sono Nis Press 1988. Pp. 400.
Cdn \$19.95. ISBN 0-919203-85-X.

Language, asserts Cyril Welch in his literate book, is 'our distinctive medium of responsibility' (24). Who we are as human beings is not just served by language as instrument, but language is the very condition of our humanity. Welch patiently unfolds the layers of our becoming human in the linguistic condition of our existence. His best insight is that addressing and responding are both a standing forth of who we are. In other words, we take a stand. Such forthrightness is an existential surge and an act of understanding.

Welch makes his case with subtle analyses of everyday discourse and of theories of discourse from the heritage of Western culture. Whether he is making sense out of the utterance of a garage mechanic or of an Aristotle, Welch opens fresh understanding for the reader. He ranges from selfhood to thinghood and then dialogue. He is equally at home in the classical and German and French texts. The analysis of Aristotle's *Poetics* (116-20) is outstanding, though Welch's best textual explication is of a fictional passage by William Faulkner (163). The bibliography is happily presented as an annotated discussion, critical and descriptive, of the great books in the field. As a writer Welch shares his experience of being a good reader.

This book is reflexive: it self-consciously deals with itself. It opens and closes in dialogue with its reader. The reader, Welch correctly argues, has linguistic responsibility too. A book reaches out only half way; the reader must do that person's half of the work. Reading is our performance as human beings, just as writing is a human perfor-

mance. A book must transform the reader by a disclosure which brings forth community. At stake in this book is our shared humanity.

Writing in his 'Testimonial Introduction', Welch points to a much-needed change in the Western tradition of denying our intellectual predecessors: 'In recent times, however, something in or about our own historical condition has suggested that we might profitably deny the long tradition of denial, try re-attuning all works of our tradition (despite themselves, perhaps), and affirm them in due recognition that in receiving them we have already mixed our own voices with theirs (lent or given our voices to theirs): accept them all, providing that we can break through their apparent answers to procure our own questions (as Hans-Georg Gadamer has more or less put it, following cues from Heidegger), acknowledging our own need to mean prevailing meanings, to understand these meanings by meaning them (as Stanley Cavell has more or less put it, following some scattered cues from Wittgenstein)' (20). This sentence is succeeded on pp. 20-1 by the following one: 'One thing is sure (or is it?): the question of linguistic responsibility, and the basic paradox of the relation between *logos* and *pragma* (later: *lagos* and *ousia*)—the tension between speech (initiated or received) and that with which we (and our speech) deal—is at least as old as Myson (according to Diogenes Laertius' *Lives* I 108)'.

The reader reaching out to grasp the point of Welch's passages is often treated to points spun out and overlapping, parenthetically hedged, and tricked out with a series of emphatics. Thus, on pp. 46-8 we have: 'Most obviously and most pristinely, ... Most pristinely, ... most pristinely ... most obviously, ... most pristinely, ...' On pp. 206-7 the analysis runs: 'More fundamentally ... more obvious ... most constantly and most evidently ... most genuine ...'. And on pp. 214-19: 'One simply says ... simply follow up ... simply following ... words simply say ... look simply for answers? ... simply the familiar ones ... simply vanish ... simply three ... simply live in estrangement ...'. 'Of course' occurs eighty-nine times in this book. Punctuated by such mannerisms, Welch's Faulknerian style is a barrier to good relations with his reader.

A useful distinction between 'Mother Tongue' and 'Father Tongue' organizes two of the book's three chapters. A mother and son are used once as an example (345), and three times Welch shows sensitivity to the social implications of gendered pronouns by using 'his or her' and 'he or she' (161, 200, 266), but the rest of the book is committed to the old convention of having 'man' and 'he' serve as general terms for human beings.

Are these quibbles over styling that have nothing to do with the intellectual case made by Welch? Welch makes his intellectual case precisely on behalf of taking responsibility for the words one employs in calling forth the humanity of the reader. In our words is our world. Alas, this book does not find its reader. It does not sufficiently reach out to the reality of readership. It remains a writer's book. Erudite, expressive, and insightful, it talks primarily to itself and with the past. It belongs on the shelf of significant works of language theory. As an analysis of linguistic responsibility it is often quite sound; as a performance of its responsibilities it is too often just sound. Of course, I may simply be too demanding as a reader of intellectual discourse.

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Andre Wylleman, ed.

*Hegel on the the Ethical Life, Religion, and
Philosophy (1793-1807).*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1989. Pp. viii+283.

US \$39.00. ISBN 0-7923-0102-1.

This volume consists of seven long essays that take us in chronological procession from the early writings of Hegel to the chapter on Absolute Knowing in the *Phenomenology*. They methodically expound and criticize all that Hegel had to say in these years on the closely related subjects of ethical life, religion, and philosophy. Unlike many other cooperative efforts of the type, the present volume actually delivers what it promises. It presents a truly unified picture of a very important aspect of Hegel's thought. Moreover, each of the essays offers a thorough update on the scholarship of its particular subject. The essays themselves are examples of solid, though not necessarily innovative, scholarship. The volume will serve as an invaluable source book for every student of Hegel—whether beginner or advanced. I strongly recommend it for every library.

The first paper, for which the editor is responsible, takes us from the earliest writings of the young Hegel to 1800, the year when Hegel wrote to his friend Schelling at Jena acknowledging that philosophy constitutes the 'high' pathway of wisdom. It was high time for him too to enter into it. Hegel was in fact sounding Schelling on the possibility of a job at the new Jena University, and his motives were just as likely practical as theoretical. Yet, his profession of renewed interest in philosophy was genuine enough. Hegel, who had always thought of himself as an 'educator of man' rather than a philosopher – indeed, who had hitherto harboured more than a strong suspicion against the reflectivity of philosophy – was now being 'driven forth to science' (as the title of Wylleman's paper descriptively puts it) as a means of overcoming the very socio-cultural alienation that he accused reflective thought of having caused. And so Hegel moved to Jena as a professional philosopher. The rest of the papers in the volume document the growth during his stay there of his philosophical reflection on the very subjects that had been his main concern from the beginning.

Peter Jonkers's 'Hegel's Idea of Philosophy and His Critique of the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity' examines Hegel while still coming to terms with philosophy itself in *Faith and Knowledge*. In this essay Hegel defines his distance from Kant, Fichte and Jacobi. The next paper by Paul Cruysberghs, 'Hegel's Critique of Modern Natural Law', is particularly significant because it demonstrates quite convincingly that in his *Natural Law* essay of 1802-03, by no longer placing 'nature' and 'intelligence' on a parallel with each other, Hegel is actually breaking away from Spinoza and Schelling's Spinozizing idealism (91). Arie J. Leijen then explores the theme of 'concept' vs. 'intuition' within the context of ethical life ('The Intuition of the Absolute Concept in the Absolute Ethical Idea: Hegel's System of Ethical Life'). We then move on to the *Phenomenology*, with three papers that examine in turn chapters VI, VII, and VIII – to wit, Wilfried Goossens's 'Ethical Life and Family in the Phenomenology of Spirit', Rob Devos's 'The Significance of Manifest Religion in the Phenomenology', and Lu Devos's 'Absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology.' In this last paper the often made claim is repeated again that the *Phenomenology* fails in its project of causing 'speculative knowing to come into being from the knowing of a finite consciousness' (270). The book thus concludes with two critical questions, 'First, does Hegel's justification of speculation within speculative science itself [i.e. the *Logic* as contrasted with the *Phenomenology*] succeed? Second, after Kant's

Critique of Pure Reason, has the verdict of the impossibility of a *Phenomenology of Spirit* been rendered on every form of scientific speculation for us humans?' (270)

The seven papers were originally written in Dutch but competently translated into English. Although the language adheres closely to Hegelian usages, it is on the whole very lucid. There is a detailed Glossary of Technical Terms and a Selected Bibliography, both of which will make the volume all the more useful to the student of Hegel.

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An Essay on Moral Responsibility.

Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1988.

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This detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of the many facets of moral responsibility is firmly based on a dualistic metaphysics. Zimmerman argues that one can be strictly free and thus have direct moral responsibility only for one's volitions. One is not strictly free to *do* what one *wills*. One is thus indirectly morally responsible for one's actions, due to the presence of intervening factors between one's willing of an action and the resultant action itself. Moral responsibility is essentially predicated of the mental, and only secondarily or indirectly of the physical. One may, then, be culpable for one's volitions, but not for actual wrongdoing. We attribute moral responsibility for one's actions only because we judge that they probably ensued from morally appropriate volitions. Moral responsibility for wrongdoing is thus indirect, not direct.

Once Zimmerman has established the metaphysical core, the theory of moral responsibility unfolds consistently. Analyses of kinds of ignorance, negligence, attempts, omissions, shared responsibility, compulsion, mental disorders, character, virtues, vices and luck are well developed and worthy of careful study. The accounts provided are both consistent with many of one's intuitions and at times revealing.

Zimmerman shows, for example, how one can be both laudable and culpable for the same event: by meaning well but acting negligently. He argues that we should both praise and blame the agent, and not do one to the exclusion of the other. His approach is temperate in its position that an adequate analysis should not necessarily resolve all common quandaries related to the topic of moral responsibility.

The analysis stems from Zimmerman's theory of action, which was previously published, and is developed briefly here through discussion of action, volition, freedom, and control. This theory serves as the touchstone for his analysis of moral responsibility, and clarifies a number of central concepts and theses. However, Zimmerman argues that the analysis of moral responsibility is compatible with other theories of action. He points out that his analysis is based on four '... general assumptions: that moral responsibility requires freedom; that direct freedom is to be distinguished from indirect freedom; that culpability is to be distinguished from wrongdoing; and that appraisability is to be distinguished from liability' (14). The latter assumption means, roughly, that moral responsibility is to be distinguished from justified punishment, since the former (appraisability) does not justify the latter (liability).

Zimmerman's statement of these assumptions appears frank and helpful, but raises questions which are worthy of further examination. It is not obvious that the four must be stated in a way entailing a dualistic metaphysics. Nor is it established that these are the only assumptions his analysis requires. Moreover, he does not accept them uncritically, but argues for each of them at various points in the book. Just why he views them as assumptions which are alone sufficient to uphold his position, then, is far from clear.

Some of the most striking implications of the analysis emerge in the last chapter of the book, which addresses the subject of liability, or the deserving of praise, blame or stronger response. Zimmerman admits quite frankly that the foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that many who violate the law are morally inculpable, that many who are punished do not deserve punishment, or that they deserve more or less punishment than they received, and finally that many who are punished are punished unjustly.

By locating moral responsibility completely on the side of the mental, wholly dependent on certain mental properties, it is divorced from social morality and ethics. As a result, one person will almost never be justified in praising, blaming or punishing another. If punishment is justified only if deserved, and one deserves punishment only for

certain volitions, then because volitions are inaccessible to other people, one person will almost never have conclusive justification for punishing another.

Such a conclusion is not entirely unreasonable or entirely inconsistent with our moral intuitions. And it does not point to the falsehood of the philosophical analysis on which it is based. If accepted, it does make one face a decision. At the very least, one must decide whether to eschew social morality or seek an analysis which allows one to embrace it in addition to Zimmerman's concept of morality. Either way, one grants a sharp distinction between moral responsibility as Zimmerman analyzes it and the practices of social morality and ethics. Either way, Zimmerman's metaphysical dualism leads to a kind of ethical dualism.

Whether such a dualism is philosophically satisfactory needs further examination. One might, after all, take an approach which is quite different from Zimmerman's. Instead of beginning with the assumption that one is most clearly morally responsible only for that over which one has direct freedom and control, one might begin with the assumption that the best model of moral responsibility involves an action which stands in a certain relationship to a moral code. Whether or not one is morally responsible would then depend upon the obligations one had, whether one's actions implemented them, and whether there is some exculpatory excuse. The nature of one's personal freedom would then be of secondary importance, not primary, and the moral code would be of primary importance, not secondary in analyzing, understanding and applying the concept of moral responsibility. The point here is that Zimmerman bases his analysis of moral responsibility on a certain perspective on the freedom and determinism controversy, and certain value judgments about the best way to describe the model case of moral responsibility. While such an approach is plausible, Zimmerman's work needs to be assessed in full knowledge and consideration of the alternatives to it.

Finally, Zimmerman writes concise, unpretentious and at times candid prose. The book is, philosophically, very clear, but never the less slow and difficult reading. Written in the style of Roderick Chisholm, with major claims set aside and numbered, and then referred to by number in the text, it is tedious to read. Rather, one might say it was written to be studied, not read.

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