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Table of Contents · Table des matières

J.F. Bennett, *Events and Their Names* 215
M.J. Cresswell

Rüdiger Bubner, *Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory* 217
Jeff Mitscherling

Panayot Butchvarov, *Skepticism in Ethics* 220
James C. Morrison

Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* 224
Jenefer M. Robinson

George H. Hampsch, *Preventing Nuclear Genocide: Essays On Peace and War* 229
Corbin Fowler

Richard Harland, *Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism* 231
Peter Caws

Paisley Livingston, *Literary Knowledge: Humanistic Inquiry and the Philosophy of Science* 235
Stephen Bonnycastle

David J. Melling, *Understanding Plato* 238
Steven S. Tigner

Douglas Odegard, ed., *Ethics and Justification* 240
John Underwood Lewis

Graham Priest, *In Contradiction* 243
James Cargile

W.V. Quine, *Quiddities, An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary* 249
Alex Orenstein

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., *Essays on Moral Realism* 252
Richard Bett

Frederick L. Will, *Beyond Deduction: Ampliative Aspects of Philosophical Reflection* 255
Barry Allen

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J.F. Bennett
Events and Their Names.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company 1988. Pp. x+243.
US $28.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-046-9);
US $12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-045-0).

Why do we need events? Jonathan Bennett, influenced by J.L. Mackie, claims that we need statements of event causation because 'we often know so little of the causal story' (137). For Bennett, informative causal statements are statements of fact causation. An example (24) is:

> Because of his falling 20 feet he suffered a fracture.

This is not equivalent to

> Because of his coming down from the roof he suffered a fracture.

But the following two could be equivalent:

> Henry's fracture was caused by his descent from the roof.
> Henry's fracture was caused by his twenty-foot fall.

The fact that Henry descended from the roof is just that, and is different from the fact that he fell. But his descent might be a fall, and knowing merely that it was a descent does not tell us whether or not it was also a fall. Given that his descent *was* a fall, it is correct to say that the descent caused the fracture. But it is less informative than a fact causation statement because it does not tell you what it was about the descent that caused the fracture. One can think of Henry's descent as a family of facts, that Henry descended, that Henry fell, that Henry fell 20 feet onto hard ground, and so on. Some of these will have more detail than others, and to say that Henry's descent is the cause of his fracture, is to say that one of the facts in the family is a cause of the fracture.

I quite like the idea that an event is a family of properties, and event talk is undertaken when we don't know which of the properties is the crucial one. It does mean that events have less metaphysical importance than has been supposed, but this is congenial to Bennett, who writes (12), 'Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be involved in any fundamental ontology', and on

p. 18 that philosophers have put 'onto our event concept a load it cannot carry.'

This is why I find it a little odd that Bennett should feel obliged to give an ontological analysis of events as *tropes*. A trope is a property instance. If a stone is flat then the particular flatness of that particular stone is a trope. Now Bennett on p.95 rejects the demand for identity criteria for events, and if events are seen as somewhat indeterminate families of properties then *which* family is involved in any given event statement can be a matter for semantics rather than metaphysics. At one extreme is Quine's view, according to which an event would be determined just by a substance and a zone, and would be the class of all properties that the thing had at that zone. At the other extreme is Kim's view that an event is a triple consisting of a substance, a property and a zone. Bennett thinks the answer lies somewhere between, but he is sure that there is no definite answer (127). But if a trope is part of the furniture of the universe then presumably there would have to be a definite answer though we may not know it. There is a tension here between the desire to have events in one's ontology, and a conviction that event talk is indeterminate. The latter conviction seems the more interesting and is the central theme of Bennett's book.

Event causation depends on fact causation. Bennett's analysis of fact causation in Chapter III is, in the end, that, where L is the totality of causal laws, the fact that P causes the fact that Q iff (49):

> There is a true R such that (P & R & L) entails Q, and (R & L) does not entail Q.

Certain extra conditions relate to the time at which these various propositions are true, but even so it is clear that this will not do, since, given that Q is true, we can choose any completely unrelated P provided L does not entail (P v Q) and, by letting R be (P $\supset$ Q), conclude that the fact that P causes the fact that Q. Bennett claims that his analysis is in 'hard logic' without any appeal to anything like a 'nearness relation' such as David Lewis uses in his counterfactual analysis of causation. But what Lewis does by nearness Bennett must do by saying when a particular proposition R can count as an acceptable suppressed premiss in a causation statement.

The main theme of the book – that event talk is indeterminate because it is used when we are unable to be more informative – is an important one, and if true goes a long way to explaining the trouble-

someness of events for semantical theories. It is a pity that Bennett so often hides this in overlong discussions of alternative views. While sometimes, for example in his excellent treatment of Davidson's theory of adverbs, this enhances our understanding, too much of the book, one feels, is dictated by the requirement of a graduate text to give an overview of the whole subject. This can easily have the effect of blinding a reader to Bennett's own theory. It took me several goes at section 36 before I realized that Bennett's own account of what an event is slips in toward the bottom of p.88 in the middle of a discussion of the views of Kim and Aristotle. The 'graduate text' flavour of the book can lull you into thinking that Bennett has little of his own to offer except comments on the views of others. Important as such comments are there is a theme to this book, and it is one which is worthy of serious consideration.

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Rüdiger Bubner
Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory.
Trans. Eric Matthews. New York: Columbia University Press 1988. Pp. viii+262.
US $30.00. ISBN 0-231-05704-0.

While Rüdiger Bubner, previously holder of the Adorno Chair at the University of Frankfurt and currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, is best known among English speakers for his outstanding survey of *Modern German Philosophy* (Cambridge 1981), this collection of eight essays will ensure that he be recognized as a foremost original thinker in his own right. The essays provoked considerable discussion when they first appeared in German (from 1971 to 1984), and now they may well do the same once again. While the first five essays concentrate on methodological considerations that span the major works of the last 200 years of continental thought, in the last three essays Bubner focuses on practical philosophy, i.e., on 'the substantive problems of action in history, which both consti-

tutes our understanding of past history and concretizes the real validity of historical norms' (viii). For reasons of space, I shall restrict my comments to two of the 'methodological' and one of the 'practical' essays.

In 'What Is Critical Theory?' (1971), Bubner traces the origin and development of the central ideas of critical theory from Hegel, through the Young Hegelians, Marx, and Lukács, to Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas. Bubner's critical acumen shines as he turns the 'docrtine' of cognitive interest back on its Frankfurt School proponents and Habermas, demonstrating how contemporary critical theory suffers from a 'decisive weakness' it inherits from 'the Young Hegelian movement of "pure criticism"' (33). The problem has to do with the unity of theory and practice, which Bubner sums up as follows: 'The self-deception on the part of a theory which is merely *fascinated* by practice is no less ideological than the one-sidedness of pure thought which abstracts from practice. Consequently, there can be no guidance for action of the kind which may nevertheless be derived from the Marxist knowledge of history with its allocation of a progressive role to philosophy' (34). This superb essay belongs on the required reading list of anyone in need of an introduction to the subject.

Critical Theory and Hermeneutics have often been juxtaposed as two radically distinct avenues of contemporary continental philosophy. In 'Philosophy Is Its Time Comprehended in Thought' (1971), Bubner demonstrates how the two attitudes of criticism and hermeneutics are in fact two elements belonging to the act of reflection. Unpacking the meaning of the Hegelian dictum that supplies the title for this paper, Bubner clarifies the role played by the 'logic of reflection' in the Hegelian project, showing how the immediacy that is characteristic of reflection and which is expressed in its reference to content remains immediately accessible to reflection always 'under the historical form of its *time*' (59). Criticism and hermeneutics are but two forms of immediate reflection on the concrete historical situation that provide both content and form to that 'reflection of reflection' that makes possible the phenomenological movement from one moment of consciousness to another, the movement that underlies Hegel's entire system. While Bubner does a fine job of distinguishing the two forms of reflection, he also explains how it is not only possible but necessary that this distinction become at times somewhat blurred: 'The different attitudes of reflection, the critical as much as the hermeneutical, are therefore absolutely in the right when they at times lay claim on their own behalf to the factor emphasized by

the other: criticism is never entirely without the element of reconciliation, and hermeneutical understanding does not suppress all critical judgment' (45).

In 'Norm and History' (1980), Bubner accuses traditional philosophy of not having faced up to the task of clarifying the connection between the two: 'Rather, it does all it can to avoid it' (195). The spirit of the paper is captured in the closing two sentences of his introductory paragraph: 'In what follows, I shall attempt to take a few steps toward a definition of this precarious relationship, being well aware that what is problematic in the connection has to be worked out in opposition to the usual tendency to conceal it. I shall proceed in four stages: 1) I shall discuss the traditional answers; 2) I shall examine the essential historicity of norms; 3) I shall consider attempts to mediate norm and history; and 4) I shall inquire into the reason for their failure' (195). The 'traditional answers' fall under two species, natural law and utopianism, neither of which allows for taking account of historical circumstances. While natural law answers account for norms with reference to their derivation, utopian answers ground their norms in 'original creation' (197). Both sorts of answers ignore the fact that 'The place of norms ... is precisely in the context of historical societies, and they acquire a function only insofar as they in fact regulate action in such societies. They must therefore, for their own sake, be related to their historical basis' (197). As in the two essays discussed above, the importance of history is fundamental to Bubner's argument, which he persuasively develops throughout the remaining sections of this essay, and it is his implicit defence of his philosophy of history in these sections, in which he demonstrates the failure of attempts to mediate between norm and history 'in the name of rationality' (210), which many readers will doubtless find most worthy of response.

The remaining essays in this collection – 'Logic and Capital: On the Method of a "Critique of Political Economy"' (1973), 'On the Role of Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Science: A Contribution to a Discussion' (1973), 'Dialectical Elements of a Logic of Discovery' (1973), 'The Possibilities of Practical Reason' (1976), and 'Historical Action' (1984) – are as illuminating and provocative those discussed above, and the collection as a whole would serve as an excellent text for a graduate seminar in hermeneutics, critical theory, or continental philosophy in general. Two concluding words of praise and warning: (1) Bubner's writing not only reflects his immense erudition, it also demands considerable familiarity with the tradition on the part

of the reader. (2) While the translation is in most respects excellent, it sometimes suffers from the painfully convoluted style of all 'faithful' translations from the German. For those already familiar with the style, it will make for tolerable reading. For those who are not so familiar with it, their patience will be repaid many times over.

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Panayot Butchvarov
Skepticism in Ethics.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1989. Pp. viii+225.
US $37.50. ISBN 0-253-35321-1.

According to Butchvarov, although ethics may be 'the most important branch of philosophy,' 'certainly it is not the most fundamental' (1). Hence, he states that 'the general purpose' of his book is to provide 'the general phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological foundations of an ethical theory that can withstand the challenge of skepticism' (2). The ethical theory itself centers on 'a conceptual scheme for ethics' (Chapter 2). Although Butchvarov claims that his theory belongs to the 'mainstream' of Greek and medieval ethics (2), Moore's ethical thought is clearly his main inspiration. Butchvarov states that his aim is both to provide the required phenomenogical, metaphysical, and epistemological foundations of 'a Moorean view' (35) and to modify, where necessary, Moore's ethical theory itself (64, 66). Butchvarov emphasizes that he takes 'a highly conservative approach,' presenting a 'standard, traditional' ethical theory which shows that 'ethical realities' are known in a 'standard, traditional way.' Such an approach is necessary, he claims, because ethics, more than any other branch of philosophy, is 'firmly rooted in everyday thought' (5). Hence his own conceptual scheme is 'guided' by ordinary use and involves the subjection of our ordinary conceptual scheme to 'mild criticism' and 'mild regimentation' (11). Butchvarov treats the history of philosophical ethics in a similar way, borrowing from others in his own distinctive way and for his own purposes. The

result, though rooted in tradition, is also highly original. The phenomenology founding his ethical theory is broadly Sartrean, the metaphysics Platonic, and the epistemology Cartesian. In ethical theory he draws from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Mill. He steers deftly between the shoals of deontological and consequentialist theories, preserving what is worthwhile in utilitarianism and intuitionism and avoiding what is most dubious. The reader feels in the presence of a rigorous, clear, penetrating, and original philosophical mind. Butchvarov challenges reigning fashion and eschews special pleading. Issues are squarely faced, and positions, both for and against, are precisely stated and convincingly argued. One of the special strengths of the book is the treatment of the phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological foundations of ethics (in Chapters 3, 4-6, and 7-8 respectively) which, as the author himself emphasizes, is more extensive than in most books on ethics (2). For these reasons the present work lays claim to being a major contribution to ethics.

Butchvarov divides ethics into three parts: 'the theory of good and evil,' which deals with the nature of goodness, the classification of goods into kinds ('abstract goods'), and the degrees of abstract goods; 'the theory of right and wrong,' which deals with conduct and (particular) actions; and 'the theory of virtue and vice,' which deals with the conditions of praise and blame, motives, and character ('the theory of morality') (29). Butchvarov emphasizes that he is 'concerned almost exclusively with the first two parts of ethics' and considers the first part the fundamental one (30). The three parts of ethics are derived from the 'three senses' of 'good' (29). The first sense is that 'in which it is attributed to abstract entities,' which include the kinds of actions which are duties; the second that of 'the unqualified goodness of concrete entities,' e.g., the rightness of particular actions; and the third that of 'virtue,' which applies to concrete entities such as actions, dispositions, and persons (29, 24). The first sense is 'primitive,' and the other senses are derivative from it (29). In its primitive sense 'good' designates a genus and is attributed univocally to all subgenera. It is basically 'a monadic property,' 'a property of properties,' and only derivatively a property of individuals (16, 20).

As the title indicates, ethical skepticism is Butchvarov's central theme. He states that by 'skepticism in ethics' he means the denial of knowledge of 'ethical facts,' of goodness, rightness, virtue, and duty. There are two major 'versions' of skepticism: irrealism and noncognitivism. Irrealism claims that we have no knowledge of ethical facts because there are no ethical facts; hence ethical judgments have

no cognitive content and are not true or false. Non-cognitivism claims that although there are ethical facts and true or false ethical judgments, 'we do not, perhaps cannot, have knowledge of these facts, of the truth-value of these judgments and statements' (2). Chapters 1-6 are devoted to a defense of ethical realism and Chapters 7-8 to a defense of ethical cognitivism. Butchvarov also distinguishes between seven more specific types of ethical skepticism. 'The most fundamental variety,' he claims, holds that basic ethical terms 'are not used to describe ethical facts' (42). The second, 'traced directly to Hume,' holds that ethical statements cannot be derived by induction or deduction from non-ethical ones (47). The third is characteristic of 'existentialist philosophers,' who ask, 'Even if I know what I ought to do, why should I do it?' (48). The fourth is 'phenomenological skepticism,' which denies that there is a real property goodness, and that we are aware of such a property (52). The fifth holds that there is no ethical knowledge because such knowledge 'can be obtained neither by science nor by logic' (139). The sixth holds that 'ethical matters' are either not 'subject to general cognitive appraisal' at all or that 'we lack the means for such appraisal.' The seventh variety denies 'we can know the *unqualified* goodnes of any concrete entities, and in particular the rightness of any [particular] actions' (160).

Butchvarov seems to regard the first, fourth, and seventh types of skepticism as the most important, and accordingly devotes more attention to them. Although his general aim is to criticize all forms of ethical skepticism, he states that he 'will concede that there is a respect in which each is justified' (10). As for irrealism, Butchvarov admits that his defense of realism rests on the acceptance of a 'kernel of irrealism,' for realism implies generic identity, and identity is a 'transcendental' concept, there being 'no relation in the world that is called identity' (77). As for non-cognitivism, Butchvarov concedes that knowledge of the rightness and wrongness of particular actions (as opposed to the intrinsic goodness of some kinds of actions) is, strictly speaking, impossible. His major concession, however, seems to be to the seventh variety of skepticism. He emphasizes that the concept of a right action is essentially that of an action which is 'optimizing,' i.e., 'contributes at least as much goodness (or as little badness) as any of its alternatives open to the agent would contribute' (17; see 20-2, 181). This means that knowledge of what action is right requires knowledge of the actual and possible, probable and improbable, consequences of the action, as well as of alternative actions. Butchvarov (in Chapter 8) presents two kinds of arguments against such know-

ledge, that of 'the philosophical skeptic' and that of 'the empirical skeptic.' The philosophical skeptic claims that we have no 'clear, genuine concept of non-demonstrative evidence,' which is the only kind of evidence available to us for judging the consequences of our actions (172). Empirical skepticism appeals to experience, which shows that in fact we can know little or nothing about the consequences of our actions (162). Although Butchvarov concludes that 'it seems that the empirical skeptic has won,' he argues that the victory is limited primarily to knowledge of how to act in order to produce the goods of pleasure and desire-satisfaction. There are other intrinsic goods which our actions can little affect (e.g., love, friendship, fortitude, and understanding) (193). These are objects of 'hope,' and make mainfest 'human impotence' rather than ignorance (194). Also, empirical skepticism does not affect our knowledge of good from evil and duty from offense (195), which survive the arguments of the philosophical skeptic as well (187).

Butchvarov makes it clear that his ethical theory is 'not purely consequentialist' because he allows for the 'intrinsic value of certain actions' (177). But he also makes it clear that he rejects the view of 'the traditional deontologist' that 'certain kinds of actions are absolutely obligatory, as actions that ought to be done regardless of their consequences' (192; see 161). He regards 'theological ethics' as profoundly confused morally, or even conceptually because it dispenses with the essential element of our concept of a right action, namely, that it be optimizing (181). Moreover, it is probably motivated by 'metaphysical or religious considerations' (192). To be philosophically adequate, a theological ethics must be based *wholly* on reason, and the difficulties facing a rational theology are notorious. But Butchvarov also emphasizes that 'an open-minded philosopher' must allow for the possibility that these difficulties might be overcome (174-5). His final conclusion is that a *complete* victory over ethical skepticism requires an adequate epistemological elucidation of the concept of non-demonstrative evidence and an adequate rational theology (195). But at the present stage of our knowledge we are very far from achieving either.

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Ronald de Sousa
The Rationality of Emotion.
Cambridge, MA: MIT. Press 1987. Pp. 448.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-04092-1.

This book is a discussion of the emotions and their place in the rational life by an intelligent, highly informed and elegant writer. Many different themes are broached and interesting connections among them suggested; many philosophical problems are given critical treatments and, in some cases, novel solutions; many writers are cited and discussed. In short, this is a learned and ambitious book, touching on (among other things) philosophical biology, evolutionary theory, neurophysiology, Freudian psychology, functionalism and computational models of the mind, epistemology and ethics. At the same time it is a frustrating book to traverse. The main track is obscure and ill-marked; we are constantly following side trails that after much circling double back unexpectedly to the main path; we spend much time in clearings on the way; and all the time we are pushing resolutely through underbrush in order to make progress. At the end of it all we have certainly learned a lot about the territory. We are left exhilarated and irritated in about equal parts.

De Sousa argues that emotions are mental phenomena which are in many ways like perceptions: both can give us genuine information about the world although both can also have 'illusory focus or hallucinatory targets' (151) and both are 'essentially perspectival' (156). He is especially concerned to argue that emotions are distinct from beliefs and desires or some combination of the two. Emotions, however, cannot just be identified with perceptions: rather they are 'second-order phenomena' which 'modify and condition perception, providing framework, not detail' (68). In particular, emotions are 'species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies' (196). Although de Sousa gives us a mentalistic theory of emotion, he also strives to maintain a biological perspective on the subject. Thus if emotions are indeed 'patterns of salience' this would explain how they can play an adaptive evolutionary role, yet still be maladaptive on particular occasions.

De Sousa defends two theses with respect to rationality and the emotions. (1) He argues that emotions are preconditions of the exercise of conventional rationality, i.e., *cognitive* and *strategic* rationality or rationality of belief and desire. As an example of how emotions are necessary to cognitive rationality, he cites the philosophers' frame

problem: by making salient only part of the vast amount of information potentially available to us, the emotions function as 'one of Nature's ways' (185) of dealing with the problem. Sometimes the intervention of the emotions is perhaps less helpful. An example would be the the role they play in *akratic actions*, i.e., actions done intentionally that one has overriding reasons not to do. De Sousa suggests that the emotions tip the balance by making the 'less strong' reasons more salient to the agent. In general, he says, 'the function of emotions is to fill gaps left by (mere wanting plus) "pure reason" in the determination of action and belief' (195).

(2) De Sousa also claims that emotions themselves are subject to assessments of rationality although it is a distinct kind of rationality from cognitive and strategic rationality. One consequence of this view is that emotions can be more or less rational or 'objective' and that there are intrinsic constraints on their objects. De Sousa illustrates this possibility with respect to 'time-indexed' and 'immediate' (emotional) desires. Intentional objects of (emotional) desires can be viewed *aspectually*, as continuous, punctual, perfect or frequentative. At the same time the actual objects of desire in the world are of different types, namely states, activities, and achievements, to which different aspects are variously appropriate. When the aspect of a desire does not match the type of its object, a 'false' desire results. For example, if sex is essentially an *activity* rather than an *achievement*, then to 'immediately' desire sex in an aspectually perfect rather than continuous way, (to want to *have had* sex) will inevitably be disappointing, since 'there will be an inevitable discrepancy' (219) between sex and the desire for sex.

Emotions can be self-deceptive in ways distinct from the self-deception of belief or desire. For example, even as I insist that I no longer love Fred, my attention may be fixed even more firmly upon his lovable qualities. Since emotions are 'patterns of salience', they are subject to the same (limited) control that our attention is normally subject to. (That is why it is possible but difficult to stop loving Fred.) It is not surprising, if emotions can be rational and to some degree controlled, that they can also be assessed on moral grounds. Some emotions are morally wrong (e.g., amusement at rape jokes). At the same time, many of our emotions–not just 'altruistic' ones as traditionally conceived–have a role to play in the ethical life. In particular, 'human thriving' requires the development of both 'objective' and 'self-related' emotions, i.e., emotions which are not necessarily virtues but which help to establish our own self-concept.

The main reason why 'emotional rationality' is distinct from cognitive and strategic rationality is that the formal objects of emotions are distinct from those of beliefs and desires. On de Sousa's view, emotion words are learned by association with 'paradigm scenarios', i.e., situation-types providing characteristic objects of emotion and a set of characteristic ('normal') responses to that situation. The 'formal object' of an emotion is an 'axiological' quality, such as 'enraging' or 'lovable', which is defined by a paradigm scenario. Each emotion has a different formal object fixed by a different paradigm scenario. An emotion is rational (or 'objective') if its formal object is fixed by a paradigm scenario that defines an axiological property which is actually present in the real world. For example, my current fear is rational if the current situation relevantly resembles the paradigm scenario in which I learned fear, and it is irrational if it doesn't. As de Sousa puts it: '... an emotion is appropriate (or minimally so) in a given situation if and only if that situation is relevantly similar to (can accurately be "gestalted" as) a suitable paradigm scenario' (188).

However, there is always more than one scenario which is appropriate to a given situation. The paradigm scenario in terms of which I experience a particular situation controls what is salient for me in that situation. When you and I see a situation differently (I as enraging, say, and you as frightening), we are experiencing it in terms of different paradigm scenarios. It does not follow, however, that only one of us is experiencing the situation appropriately. The standards of normality for paradigm scenarios are not just biological or even social but *individual*. My capacity and propensity for love or fear or anger are greater than yours because of the kind of person I am. Hence while emotion is necessarily 'subjective' in the sense of 'perspectival'–since things look different from different angles and distances, and by association with different paradigm scenarios–at the same time the existence of different perspectives is not incompatible with objectivity or the way things are. It may be reasonable for me with my perspective to pay attention to a situation in one way and for you to see it in another (like the seeing of Wittgensteinian aspects). If so, then in the 'same situation' it might be rational for me to be afraid but not rational for you to be afraid. It is only when our emotions entirely determine what and how we see that they are viciously subjective, 'hallucinatory' and hence irrational. 'True irrationality of emotion involves the perception of a situation in terms of a scenario that it does not objectively resemble' (188).

My emotion is appropriate if the current situation relevantly resembles the paradigm scenario in which I learned the emotion. But suppose my paradigm scenarios are themselves wildly idiosyncratic? For example, imagine that I have learned the meaning of 'love' solely in the context of the relation between my (self-deceived) parents who insist over long years that they love one another while in fact intentionally doing physical and emotional damage to each other. (Suppose for the sake of simplicity that my relationship with them is not thought of in terms of 'love' at all.) Now, as de Sousa insists, I can, as I get older, 're-gestalt' my view of love and adjust my paradigm scenario accordingly, but suppose I have not yet done this. In the situation I have described there is reason to suppose that I have not properly learned what 'love' is at all (in any of its many senses). If I now, while engaged in a mutually damaging relationship like my parents', claim to love my partner, then on de Sousa's criterion my love is reasonable or objective because the current situation sufficiently resembles my paradigm scenario for love. No matter that my 'individual norm' for love is quite different from everybody else's. However, it seems to me that in such a case I cannot be said to *love* at all, whether rationally or irrationally. I just don't have the concept of love. This problem arises from the fact that in de Sousa's theory the paradigm scenario functions both as the way in which an emotion is defined and as the criterion for its appropriate application. Hence if an emotion is badly defined, it will turn out to be appropriate in what are inherently inappropriate circumstances.

Cognitive rationality aims at truth. Strategic rationality aims at goodness. Axiological rationality has no single criterion of appropriateness: each emotion has its own formal object, defined in terms of a different paradigm scenario. De Sousa claims that although axiological rationality is similar in some ways to both cognitive and strategic rationality, the difference in formal objects suggests that we are dealing here with three distinct kinds of rationality. Now, it is not clear to me that differences in formal objects are sufficient to ensure differences in *kinds* of rationality. After all there are those who believe that cognitive and strategic rationality can be reduced to one another, even though they clearly have different formal objects. At times de Sousa seems to hint that there might be a framework in which these different kinds of rationality can be seen as different species of the same genus. For example, we assess the rationality of belief in terms of truth, i.e., in terms of the match between the content of the belief and what is actually the case (the truth). Similarly, we

assess the rationality of desire in terms of the match between the content of the desire and what is actually the best outcome (the good). By the same token, on de Sousa's view we assess the rationality of emotion in terms of the match between the 'content' of the emotion, i.e., the axiological quality as currently experienced, and the paradigm scenario in which the emotion was learned (e.g., between the current 'fearsome' situation and the paradigm scenario in which the emotion of fear was learned.)

This framework would permit a unified account of rationality on the model of cognitive rationality (since 'matching' or 'correspondence' is a concept from truth theory) but no doubt a similar unifying framework could be devised taking strategic rationality as the paradigm of rationality rather than cognitive rationality. Of course such frameworks still leave most of the hard work to be done, in particular what counts as a 'match' and whether it means the same thing in all three cases of rationality. There is a further difficulty in clarifying the nature of a 'relevant resemblance' or match between a current emotional situation and a paradigm scenario, since each new situation may effect a change in the paradigm scenario on which the current emotion is based.

De Sousa's central idea about the nature of the emotions is an appealing one. Emotions clearly have much in common with beliefs and desires, yet it is implausible to identify them with either, if only because for many emotions there just are no good candidates for the relevant beliefs or wants. What do I have to believe in order to love you? What do I have to desire in order to be depressed? De Sousa's view that emotions are patterns of salience affecting and affected by desires and beliefs gives a plausible account of at least one of the functions of emotion. *The Rationality of Emotion* is full of intriguing suggestions and insightful hints on all kinds of topics. Perhaps, given the current state of research on the emotions this is all we are entitled to expect. [I am grateful to Robert Kraut for discussion of these issues.]

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George H. Hampsch
Preventing Nuclear Genocide: Essays On Peace and War.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing Co 1988.
Pp. 149. US $28.40. ISBN 0-8204-0616-3.

This book is a collection of four essays based largely on Hampsch's earlier papers and articles. He writes very clearly, the material is provocative, and it should be of interest to a broad audience–including public policy scholars, Kant scholars, peace activists and the public concerned about the threat of nuclear war. Written from a cosmopolitan (and cautiously optimistic) perspective, these essays should be of special interest to all who see no hope of halting/reversing the nuclear arms race unless we can agree upon alternative methods for resolving international conflicts.

His essay 'On Preventing Nuclear Genocide' addresses the question of whether we can avoid another *total* war. Hampsch argues we can *providing* humans have the potential for increasing our concern for the *morality* of international relations. This, in turn, will be possible only if human nature is sufficiently flexible to allow us to alter some of our basic attitudes, including our sense of priorities. Distinguishing between three models of human nature, Hampsch points out that only one of the three, i.e., humans are essentially selfish, precludes reasonable hope that we can attain the needed flexibility. Furthermore, he argues that empirical evidence does not *especially* support this model, hence that we have reason to be hopeful that global holocaust can be avoided.

Hampsch uses Kant's *Perpetual Peace* proposals (for establishing a genuine sense of *community* among nations) to sketch what we need to do in order to alter our Hobbesian view of the international 'jungle'. To some day begin to realize Kant's progressive proposals, we must first overcome the nuclear-deterrent mind-set of the superpowers. For this to occur, our leaders will need to show great courage and foresight. Furthermore, Hampsch argues they will need to accept the following three principles. One, for the foreseeable future, there will exist between East and West profound and *unresolvable* differences of ideology. Two, there is nevertheless significant common ground between them–e.g. both claim it is to their own advantage to (1) prevent World War III and (2) secure world peace. Three, each side's desire for (1) and (2) is sincere, and there are concrete steps

(detailed by Hampsch) that can be taken to decrease the lkelihood of local/global wars of genocide.

His essay 'The Challenge of Peace: U.S. Catholic Bishops on Nuclear War' is noteworthy in two respects. First, Hampsch criticizes the bishops (as have others) for their seemingly paradoxical position which affirms that it is moral to intentionally threaten mass indiscriminate slaughter, yet denies that it is moral to intentionally use nuclear weapons for this purpose. Practically speaking, this seems to be a distinction without a difference. If both sides accepted the view that it was categorically wrong to purposefully use their nuclear weapons in war, how could either side view the other's 'deterrent' threat as anything but a hollow gesture? Second, Hampsch argues that a similar paradox confronts a Marxist-Leninist rationalization for the morality of nuclear deterrence.

In his essay 'Premises and Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', Hampsch addresses the issue of whether the Western concept of detente is essentially equivalent to the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence. If the answer is they are *not*, then one is reasonable in concluding that there is insufficient *mutual perception* of a common ground for negotiating (rather than coercing) more peaceful relations with the other side. An attitude of radical mistrust is reinforced between parties who view each other as having alien conceptual schemes. After examining various arguments about this issue (including views from the West and from the U.S.S.R., as well as from liberal and conservative critics of detente and peaceful coexistence) Hampsch argues that 'detente' and 'peaceful coexistence' express essentially the same concept. Some argue they do not, he argues, because they accept an implausible interpretation of East-West convergence theory.

Hampsch's essay 'Varieties on the Nature of Democracy and Human Rights' explores the different understandings whch East and West seem to have of 'human rights' and 'democracy'. He argues (I think quite plausibly) that there is more common ground here than our ideologies would lead us to believe. He claims that the problem is not that we mean entirely different things by these crucial expressions, but rather that we each place *different emphasis* on different and legitimate senses of 'democracy' and 'human rights'. For example, the West emphasizes political human rights while the East emphasizes economic human rights. Hampsch argues that these opposing emphases can be reconciled on the bases of common ground. Both agree that the ultimate purpose of the political order is to create a

just community in which the full development of individuals is nurtured. Both agree we should seek world peace, and the phenomenal growth in global awareness of the perils facing humanity also serves as a motivation for conciliatory attitudes.

Hampsch's 'Afterword' is noteworthy for his critique of U.S. N.U.T.S. nuclear policy. He offers strong historical evidence about warfare to show how implausible is is to feel confident that nuclear war, once initiated, can be kept from escalating out of control.

Overall, this book is a critique of the Realpolitik assumptions which have brought us the threat of nuclear omnicide. I recommend it in general, and it should prove a suitable complementary text for undergraduate courses in war and peace issues.

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Richard Harland
Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1987. Pp. +213.
US $37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-416-03232-X);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-416-13242-7).

This terse and compact book is a useful, if sometimes perfunctory, excursion through what has become a well-trodden (though still confusingly signposted) domain of recent thought. The most immediately interesting thing about it is its title.

In coining the term 'superstructuralism' Harland wishes to claim, all at once, the connotations of its various possible deconstructions—'super,' 'structuralism,' and 'superstructure.' The claim to 'structuralism' is certainly justified, since the first section of the book, while it is entitled 'The Superstructuralist way of thinking,' is in fact an exposition of the ideas of the canonical structuralists (Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser, and Barthes) with the obligatory reference back to Saussure, though the treatment of Saussure is uncomfortably thin and at times confusing (to take a single example, Saussure argued,

according to Harland, 'that the system of language in general should take precedence over the sum total of ... actual utterances' [11], but it is not made clear what 'take precedence' is supposed to mean).

This first part is enriched by an optional reference back to Durkheim, which is on the whole lucid and helpful; Harland attributes to Durkheim 'co-paternity' of the superstructuralist movement, and it is certainly refreshing to see his contribution put in perspective. Harland however seems to me too quick to accept Durkheim's argument for collective representations, and it is on this point, generalized to include Saussure's theory of the ontology of 'langue,' Lévi-Strauss's of the ontology of myth, Foucault's of the ontology of power, and so on, that I would be inclined to engage him in debate – though for reasons I'll come to later (and not only because this is a short review) I'm not sure whether that would be fruitful.

'Super' is claimed not in the sense of proposing an especially splendid version of structuralism but in the sense that his scheme is intended to rise above the doctrinal differences that separate structuralism, semiotics, post-structuralism, deconstruction and the rest. Harland casts the net widely, it is true – but that in itself doesn't necessarily represent a rising above, and his sequential style of exposition, which continues in the second section ('Superstructuralism becomes philosophical,' with Jakobson, more Althusser, and the early Foucault) and in the third ('Post-Structuralist philosophy,' with Derrida, the later Foucault, and a final mixed bag including among others Deleuze and Guattari and Baudrillard) stays admirably close to the textual terrain – admirably, that is, as long as one *isn't* looking for an *Aufhebung*. The virtues of inclusiveness that follow from such a generous construction of the period and the domain under study tend, in fact, to work against the third claim, that the book is about 'superstructures.'

Harland's summary of 'superstructuralism' as a position goes like this: 'To put it roughly, the Superstructuralists [both noun and adjective are always capitalized, which is distracting] invert our ordinary base-and-superstructure models until what we used to think of as superstructural actually takes precedence over what we used to think of as basic' (1-2). But who are we? and what used we to think? and was this model ever 'ordinary' except among Marxists? and does superstructuralism manage to invert the specifically Marxist base-superstructure relation? The most plausible answers to these questions would suggest, among other things, that most of us outside the Marxist tradition haven't been in the habit of thinking in base-and-

superstructure terms because there's something unsatisfactory about identifying domains as derivative from one another in that way, whether the base be economic or linguistic–from which it follows that inverting the categories wouldn't be very satisfactory either.

Harland wants superstructuralism to qualify as an *epistēmē* in Foucault's sense, but its distinguishing characteristics turn out in the end to be pretty disappointing: 'the unity of Superstructuralism is the unity of a developing story ... The story of Superstructuralism is not the kind of story which lends itself to a happy-ever-after kind of ending. It is the kind of story which peters out ... In the last analysis, it is not the goal of the voyage that counts, but the discoveries along the way' (184-6). He has, it seems to me, concocted Superstructuralism (which I here concede its capital, as a proper name invented and conferred by him rather than a descriptive title) as not much more than a tempting title under which to tell the story of the 'discoveries along the way.' Not that the story doesn't in fact include plenty of inversions of old priorities–of nature over culture, of the individual over society–but these are less base-superstructure shifts than moments in a much longer history in which these correlative pairs are by turns as it were dominant and recessive.

In the present epoch nature turns out to be an invention of culture, the individual a social construction (though the latter of course is just what the old Marxist base-and-superstructure view would have said). Harland finds similar inversions in various specific cases–Althusser's shift of priorities as between class and ideology, Derrida's as between signifier and signified–but all this doesn't, again, add up to a position its practitioners share, still less one they would be willing to acknowledge as shared.

It is in the exposition of specific cases that Harland's talent for summarizing and encapsulating shows to best advantage. So I will stop belaboring the point about superstructuralism and turn to the positive content of the book. Obscuring generalities once out of the way, Harland proves an acute reader and a sometimes inspired teacher. His two short chapters on Derrida, for example, make the best sense, for the novice, of any expository writing on the subject I have yet seen. He does a comparably clarifying service for Lacan and Althusser. Also there is a brief (but again helpful) retrospective look at what he calls 'metaphysical philosophy' that sets all these figures in a historical context stretching from Plato through Spinoza to Hegel and beyond. The style is direct and definite, if sometimes arch–Harland is fond of informalities like 'sign-ish,' 'language-y' and the like–and the

vocabulary commendably down-to-earth, no small virtue considering the arcana it has to translate. All in all the book is a friendly and quick read, but with an exceptionally high ratio of intelligence to bulk, more like a serious briefing than like a primer.

What is disappointing in the end—and here I return to an earlier remark, about the possible arguments one might get into with Harland over the material he covers (not about the plausibility of 'Superstructuralism' as a designation but about the positions it is taken to designate)—is the absence, as I read this book, of an independent critical stance. It is of course the business of the expositor, in the first place, to expound, and from a work that claimed to be nothing more than exposition no more could be demanded. But as we have seen Harland's very title promises something more, at least a newly synoptic way of seeing the material, and one would expect his own views to emerge and take some definite shape over the course of the exposition, more particularly because the acuteness of that exposition occasionally throws into such sharp relief the extravagance of the positions expounded.

Would Harland be inclined to defend the strong collectivist position, from Durkheim to Baudrillard? or Derrida's furthest-out claims about dissemination and the trace? The more clearly stated these views are, it seems to me, the more indefensible they become, and perhaps indeed Harland's stating them as clearly as he does is enough. And yet a kind of deference permeates the book, so that it's hard to tell whether he'd agree that some of these characters get away with an awful lot when it comes to conceptual rigor, or whether he'd want to insist on our deference as well. It would be interesting to know; there are hints that make me suspect the former but that may be to give credit where it isn't due. At the same time that I wouldn't want to withhold it where it is, and therefore repeat, in summary, that this is a book that has solid merits and can be recommended as a refreshingly straightfoward entry in an often dauntingly baroque field.

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Paisley Livingston
Literary Knowledge: Humanistic Inquiry and the Philosophy of Science.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988.
Pp. xii+276.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2110-1);
US $9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9422-2).

This book begins with the premise that literary criticism today is in a state of confusion. Livingston presents this widely-accepted view in a lively way. He shows that many critics work with confused or unexamined assumptions, that assumptions often overwhelm the evidence which they are used to interpret, and that problems are often badly defined. The central issue in literary criticism – how to find the right interpretation of a literary text – is fraught with logical problems, and so leads inevitably to disagreement and frustration. Livingston is searching for a more solid, dependable, and unified activity which would produce 'literary knowledge.' The direction in which he wishes to move is clearly indicated when he says, 'I lend my voice to the call for a sociological and historical framework for the study ofliterary phenomena' (197).

Livingston does not simply want to return to the practices of Sainte-Beuve. His book has grown from his opposition to a number of positions adopted by contemporary critics, such as skepticism, aesthetic idealism, and (most important of all) framework relativism. He notes that criticism has been greatly influenced by Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, in which Kuhn suggests that scientific knowledge is not objectively true because it is dependent on particular paradigms. Because Kuhn shows that even the hard sciences are 'soft', literary critics can draw on his book to defend the 'softness' of their own discipline. In a Kuhnian world where framework relativism reigns supreme, critics do not have to worry about achieving objectivity.

But, Livingston maintains, we do not have convincing reasons to accept Kuhn's view of science. The fundamental aims of *Literary Knowledge* are (i) to defend a view of science whch would allow it to achieve a mind-independent picture of reality, and then (ii) to suggest that literary scholars should try to achieve a similarly objective kind of knowledge (with the help of the social sciences). 'Much of critical theory is oriented by images of science that should not be taken for granted,' Livingston says; one of his goals is 'to re-open literary

criticism's dialogue' with scientific disciplines, seen in an anti-Kuhnian way (18, 4).

A wide range of knowledge is necessary to situate problems in literary criticism in this broad context, and Livingston's work is impressive in this respect. Most of the first three-quarters of the book is not about literature at all; instead it explores questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science. One main purpose is to combat radical skepticism, which the author rightly associates with deconstruction; another is to oppose 'methodological dualism,' which maintains that the sciences and the humanities ought to operate with different methods. Livingston wants to defend the existence of objective scientific knowledge, and to propose it as a model for literary knowledge.

Livingston's actual proposals are that critics should search not for the 'meaning' of a text, but for its 'consequences within different, specifically identified interactional systems' (252). He is interested in questions such as 'What systems of interaction are the proximate conditions of the emergence of the utterance?' (255). Answering these questions would require the best available knowledge of the history and sociology of the period, and knowledge of 'the particular circumstances, institutions, norms, and agents in question' (255). Livingston warns us that such enquiries would be 'forbiddingly difficult' (256).

The other way in which literature could be used in the pursuit of knowledge is that it could contribute to the development of other disciplines: the aim of this kind of work would be to 'refine and complexify the models underwriting research programs within the human sciences; in such a context, the literary text can contribute to the crucial process of hypothesis formation' (198). An example would be the use of novels to make economists aware of the complexity of human behaviour. Livingston points out that 'contemporary economics is based upon a psychology of individual behaviour that a cheap novelist of 1850 would have rejected as overly simplistic' (198).

The main purpose of this book is to promote these two projects among literary scholars. It is a weakness of the book that it provides very few examples of what the author would like to see undertaken, and even these examples are presented in an extremely abstract way. It seems that Livingston feels that nothing like this has ever been done before. He is, as it were, trying to establish two new traditions, and a new knowledge community to support them. I think he is unlikely to succeed in this aim.

The second kind of project, refining the conceptions in other disciplines by looking at the complexity of human experience as shown

in literature, is certainly desirable, but it will mainly benefit those other disciplines, and will have to be done by people who are well versed in them. It is hard to imagine that many young literary scholars will be attracted to this kind of project.

The first project is more directly related to literature itself, and so is more significant for literary scholars. This project is to set up a new, densely historical, body of knowledge about how specific works of literature have affected 'the history of social relations and interactions, of conflicts and domination, of institutional stability and changes' (255).

A principal disadvantage of this kind of enterprise is that it would demand huge resources of intellect and effort. It is unlikely to obtain them, because it aims to produce a kind of knowledge which people rarely go to literature to find. The kind of person who wants the solid, detailed, specialized knowledge which this project aims to produce is much more likely to be attracted to the sciences than literature, and for good reasons. Literature typically provides us with myth, substitutes for religion, reflection on values, avenues to self-knowledge, and amusement, but it does not in general provide the type of knowledge we find in science and history.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions may be wrong about science, and scientific knowledge may not be based on paradigms which relativize it. But literary criticism *is* based on a number of different paradigms. Feminist, marxist, and deconstructive readings of *Wuthering Heights* differ radically because the three different types of criticism use different paradigms to identify what is to count as significant knowledge. It is impossible to inhabit the world of literary criticism in the 1980s without being aware of this problem. Kuhn is popular with literary critics not because of what he says about science, but because he provides a marvellously stimulating and clear analogy for what happens in criticism. This does not mean that Livingston cannot try to develop a new kind of 'literary knowledge' untouched by Kuhn and framework relativism, but in this book he has made the difficulties of the enterprise much clearer than the rewards which would follow from it.

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David J. Melling
Understanding Plato.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1988. Pp. viii+178.
Cdn $45.00:
US $32.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-219129-2);
Cdn $14.95:
US $9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-289116-2).

This is a very good 'introduction to Plato and his writings,' admirably fulfilling its aim to provide 'a route-guide' to 'the most significant and important features of his thoughtscape.' While the reader is pointedly alerted to the fact that this is but 'one man's view of Plato and his work,' it is not a highly eccentric one. Indeed, it stands above the crowd in the sweep of its synthesis and in the easy grace of its compactly crafted prose. A 'Preface' and 'Notes on sources' are followed by fifteen short chapters of about 11 pages each–the longest, 'The theory of Forms or Ideas,' runs to 18–a modest list of about 35 books for 'Further reading' and a single index of about 240 main entries (including names, notions, and works).

Melling is a rare master of the one-sentence paragraph, normally to be eschewed, but here elevated to a kind of laconic art. Consider: '(¶) Socrates was never a professional teacher, but he was ready to make use of the techniques of verbal combat the Sophists had developed and to apply them to a serious philosophical purpose, turning the question-and-answer game the Sophists used as an exhibition piece to demonstrate their skills into a strategy for the conversational destruction-testing of definitions' (8).

The opening chapters on 'Plato's life and background' and 'Plato's writings' are very well done, and could be recommended as ancillary reading for undergraduates no matter what their further encounter with Plato was to be. The long-sweep chapter 10 on 'The theory of forms or Ideas,' perhaps supplemented with the following chapter 11 on 'Problems with Ideas: the *Parmenides*,' might similarly be assigned to stand as compact accounts of the Forms, no matter what actual Platonic texts students were to read. But the remaining chapters are tied so closely to explicating specific dialogues that it is hard to imagine the novice getting much profit from them–the final chapter 15 possibly excepted–without concomitantly reading the dialogues themselves.

Chapter 3, 'Early dialogues: the *Laches*,' is the second longest in the book (16 pages), and the most complete in covering its subject dialogue. Why the *Laches*? 'The *Laches* is one of the most accessible of the early dialogues,' and is chosen simply as an illustration of 'the form, content, and philosophical concerns of Plato's early dialogues' (19). Melling's engaging treatment makes a very good case for this selection. What is lost by this approach, as opposed to what (in North American, at least) is a more common entry to the Platonic corpus by way of the 'trial and death of Socrates' sequence – *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo* – is a sense of the historical Socrates as a person. The ironic, humorous Socrates is virtually absent from Melling's account. How serious an omission that is the reader is left to judge.

Chapter 4, 'Can virtue be taught: the *Protagoras*,' partially rectifies this, but not with respect to the historical Socrates. 'In order to appreciate what Plato is doing in this dialogue,' Melling wisely writes, 'it is important to avoid the trap of seeing Socrates as simply Plato's mouthpiece: the Socrates of the *Protagoras* is a subtle literary creation, ironic, witty, and devious in argument ... Neither Socrates nor Protagoras should too easily be assumed to be the mouthpiece of Plato: it is the dialogue itself which represents Plato's thought, not merely one of the protagonists' (36). And what does it come to in the end? Socrates' summary at 361a 'represents no victory as such on the part of either disputant. It represents rather the conclusions which can be drawn from the whole debate: if virtue is not knowledge, then it cannot be taught. If virtue is knowledge, it should be teachable' (42).

Chapter 5, 'Philosopher and anti-philosopher: the *rhētōr*,' deals not only with the *Gorgias*, but also illuminatingly brings in relevant developments in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, along with significant references to the *Crito* and *Phaedo*.

Melling's orthodox conclusion to Chapter 6, 'Learning and recollection: the *Meno*,' is that the dialogue 'marks a transition from one major stage in his philosophical investigations to another' (63). The chapter includes a number of characteristically concise expressions of pedagogically important points. For example, 'It is frequently objected that the experiment [with the slave boy] is devoid of value since Socrates has carried the boy with him by means of leading questions. The objection is beside the point: leading questions are still questions. It is still the boy who makes the crucial series of judgements on which the mathematical argument depends' (59).

Melling's treatment of the *Phaedo* is less systematic and more highly selective than that of earlier dialogues. The next three chapters,

which together constitute about a fifth of the book, are devoted largely to the *Republic*, which Melling characterizes as 'a sustained and developed discussion of the nature of the ideal form of social organization in the context of a debate on the nature of justice' (75). That context is all but ignored, unfortunately. Chapter 8, 'The ideal *polis*,' argues strongly that 'It is the Basic *Polis*, the Frugal Community, which can most fully embody Plato's moral ideal' (79), a point to which Melling returns again in Chapter 15. Chapters 9 and 10, 'Educating the ruling class,' and 'The theory of Forms or Ideas' are well titled and well done, as is the follow-up Chapter 11 on the *Parmenides*.' 'Parmenides' criticisms are cogent, but they do not demolish the whole of the Theory of Forms, rather they help clarify it' (115f).

Chapters 12 and 13 on the *Theaetetus, Sophist* and *Statesman* provide serviceable summary assessments of those dialogues. Chapter 14, on the *Timaeus* is the shortest in the book, and perhaps also the least satisfactory. The book ends strongly with a cogent plea for taking 'Plato's last words: the *Laws*' with greater philosophical seriousness than is customary.

If you are looking for a good, short book on Plato to recommend to undergraduates in conjunction with an assigned selection of dialogues, this would be a fine choice.

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Douglas Odegard, ed.
Ethics and Justification.
Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing and Publishing 1988. Pp. xiv+276.
$38.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-28-7);
$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-29-5).

This book's 15 papers came from the 1987 Conference on Ethics and Justification at the University of Guelph. Most such clusters of published conference papers are a waste of time. These are not. The conference's goal was 'to determine whether a cross-section of moral philosophers in Canada could reach enough agreement on the condi-

tions of justification in ethics to provide useful guidelines for theoriests working in applied areas' (Preface). The essays are so philosophically varied and sophisticated that it is a matter of opinion whether the goal was met, but everyone interested in theoretical or applied ethics will want a chance to form one.

These essays reflect the best of Canadian – and, one might add, of any – philosophical reflections in moral philosophy. Harold Johnson's 'A Natural Law Basis for Ethics' shows why his writings have over the years set the Canadian standard for explaining why natural law thinking is jurisprudentially indispensible to relating law to justice and why in moral philosophy it is a mistake to think anything enlightening can be said when one assumes that human behaviour is divisible into self-regarding ('prudential') and other-regarding actions. Johnson's essay, along with Leslie Armour's 'The Origin of Values' and Kenneth Rankin's 'Responsibility as an Ontological Basis for Ethics,' show this volume's readers where the cutting edge of Canadian moral philosophy lies. It lies where ethical theory turns into an ontological investigation of values (Armour, 78) or, that is, where questions of ethical responsibility are analyzed in terms of human personality – described in this volume (somewhat unfortunately) as 'intrinsic nonarbitrary thinghood' (Rankin, 218). Kai Nielsen, in 'In Defense of Wide Reflective Equilibrium,' continues the philosophical quest for formal unity in ethics, although E.J. Bond in his admittedly tentative foray into the varieties of ethical judgments in 'The Justification of Moral Judgments' concludes, rightly I think, that such formal unity will come, if at all, at the high price of too-rarefied abstractions.

These topics are indicative of the volume's contents and the reader can judge for herself or himself their success in attaining the goal set by Odegard for the conference participants. Just know this: Odegard's volume has done several things very well, Astonishingly, given that it is as it were a book of readings, it provides excellent teaching materials. Secondly, it is intellectually fun to read. One example, beyond those mentioned, is Joseph Novak's 'Ancient Greek Ethical Theories and the New Testament.' This will prove to be a lastingly important essay not only because it introduces philosophers to a set of mainline religious ethical writings – although it does do that, but because it convincingly suggests that philosophical ethics since the 16th century has been distortedly abstract in a way not until recently realized: abstracted not simply from substantive ethical concerns but from the ontologically transcendent realities of human history.

A second example is H.A. Nielsen's 'Is There a "Language of Morals"?' This essay is delightfully typical of how Nielsen's mind works. Just as Leslie Armour has contributed to Canadian ethical thinking by grounding moral theory systematically in its metaphysical conditions, so in his 'marvelously perceptive' writings as Johnson calls them (86) has Harry Nielsen patiently been explaining, usually to slow learners, that chasing the dreams of complete formal unity in attempts to understand human moral experience has been leading philosophers into a mental twilight zone. Nielsen's essay is deliberately non-abstractive and for that very reason more intellectually complex and certainly more illuminating than the sterile second-cousin English approaches to moral philosophy that have characterized so much Canadian writing since at least the 1960s. So read Nielsen's essay. See for yourself what he is up to with his talk about 'the fixed stars of personal ethics' (115). Because he leaves you with a serious, but unstated, question rather than any concluding answers, chances are that like Nielsen you too will begin focusing on those stars instead of (if you have been) myoptically setting your sights on the formal relations between abstract ethical concepts.

Odegard has done a first class job of summarizing his book's contents. He has done an even better job of pointing up the philosophical significances of the essays he has edited. Most books of readings, especially conference contributions, are bound together only by their covers. Odegard's readings have an intrinsic unity. He asked his contributors to revise and cross-reference their articles with an eye on each other's work. The results show.

When you see *Ethics and Justification* advertised, don't think 'conference proceedings.' Think good philosophy. Also think great teaching material. And hope Odegard hosts more conferences.

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Graham Priest
In Contradiction.
Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1987.
Pp. xv+279. US $79.00. ISBN 90-247-3630-7.

Graham Priest accepts Hegel's idea that 'perfectly correct reasoning ... leads to a contradiction ... and since a sound argument must have a true conclusion, there must be contradictions which are true' (4). He calls these 'dialethia': 'a dialethia is any true statement of the form α and it is not the case that α.' He defends the contention that there are dialethia and works out what he takes to be the consequences of this for logic and various other disciplines.

It would seem that Priest is committed to rejecting the law of non-contradiction. However, while he stresses that there are sentences which are both true and not true, he also stresses that it is not the case that there are any such sentences (91). This is flatly inconsistent of him, but what should you expect? Priest says that 'this is quite self-consistent, though this is hardly a happy way of expressing the matter!'.. (91) I take him to mean by this that his openly accepting and rejecting the same principle is in some sense true to his position. (Here a 'position' must be something other than a set of principles.)

Ordinarily, someone worried lest there might be some sentence which was both true and not true would get reassurance from a logician of Priest's stature assuring him that there are none. (A giant token of 'it is raining' might be seen from afar by persons in the midst of rain, for whom it was true, and from another angle by persons in a rainless area, to whom it was false. This would be occasion to speak of the one sentence expressing two propositions. I assume Priest is making his claims about cases I would describe as involving a sentence expressing just one proposition, though he might not care to put it in those terms.) But of course the function of Priest's 'affirming' is not to give such assurance. When he 'affirms' that there is a sentence which is both true and not true he is making a perfectly understandable claim, characteristic of his position. But the claim that there are no such sentences conflicts with the claim that there are in another way than the obvious logical conflict. It conflicts with the integrity of the persona giving the assurance.

In a chapter on legal dialethia (13) Priest considers such examples as a parliament that rules both '(1) no person of the female sex shall have the right to vote' and '(2) all property holders shall have the right to vote.' This was done when no woman owned property. But it comes

to pass that a women, Jan, comes to own property. Priest says 'Jan, it would seem, both does and does not have the right to vote' (230). Here again is a conflict in the attempt to assert both that Jan has a right (in this system) to vote and that Jan does not have a right (in the system) to vote. That the system rules that she has a right and also rules that she does not have a right (which I will concede for purpose of argument) shows a trouble in the system, but the trouble can be reported straightforwardly. For Priest to say that Jan has a right in the system to vote and also that she does not have such a right does not convey any assurance that she has a right to vote. The assurance that she has a right cannot function without cancelling out the assurance that she does not have such a right, and conversely. The system can be correctly described as both according her the right to vote and denying her the right. But its denying her the right does not make it the case that she is not accorded the right. It just conflicts with the according, so that the two performances cannot both be completely successful. For Priest to describe the system as according her the right and also not according her the right (as opposed to its denying her the right) is for him to give similarly conflicting performances.

Priest might reply that he chooses to give such performances, not being a dodger of conflict. Here 'performance' is ambiguous, with just one reading implying success. When he says 'I am attacking the law of noncontradiction (though I am of course prepared to assert it too)...' (258), he is misusing 'assert'. (His claim should be not merely that he is prepared to assert it, but that he does assert it, as on page 91). He has perhaps tried to assert that no sentence is both true and not true, but his persona will not cover both this and the attack on that same proposition. He cannot be credited with succeeding in both these performances in this one setting.

This is not to say that it is impossible to both assert and deny the law of noncontradiction. That this is possible is one of many sharp points Priest makes against naive defenses of the law. But he has not succeeded in asserting the law in this book. He has succeeded in arguing quite forcefully for his view that there are counterexamples to the law. But he shows a misunderstanding of 'affirm' in claiming also to affirm that there are no such counterexamples.

There is a deep ambiguity between 'assertion' (or 'affirm') as used by logicians and as used by ordinary speakers. On the logician's use Priest can be credited with asserting that there is a sentence that is both true and not true, and also with denying this, that is, with

asserting that there is no such sentence. For purposes of logical assessment, for assigning truth values, I would myself speak in this way. But if someone genuinely wanted to know whether the Liar sentence is true, he would get no assurance from Priest 'asserting' that it is not, if he understood what Priest is doing. He would not credit Priest with assuring him that the Liar is not true, and thus, in the sense of 'assert' relevant to general human communication, Priest has not asserted that the Liar is not true.

If I am right in this, it does not refute Priest's logic. But it does bring out a gap in his understanding of the 'disfunctionality' of dialethias. The question of the consequences of inconsistency, in a broader than mere logical sense of 'consequence' is interesting and complex. In logic, we are interested in formulating and studying general rules for assigning 'truth values'. One system is 'classical logic', which equates nontruth with falsity, never assigns more than one value, etc. Assigning 'true' is one version of 'asserting'. Another might be making something an axiom or theorem of a system. These logical performances are a valuable study, but there is a more fundamental activity, performed, for example, by authors of books that are taken seriously, put forward as to be so taken, in which a person assures his fellows of some proposition. The logical game of assigning truth values can be played apart from this more fundamental connection. But an incorrigible divergence from the connection counts against the general value of the logic. Such an activity as betting your money both on *p* and on *not-p* can be done successfully and even with practical value (hedging a bet). But putting your authority both on *p* and on *not-p* is another matter. It can be done, but only under certain conditions, conditions which are notably absent from the context of Priest's sincere presentation of dialetheism. It is one thing for him to assure us, on the basis of his expert analysis, that the Liar comes out both true and not true in a system of truth assigning rules in which he can find no flaw. It would be quite another for him to succeed in assuring us that the Liar is, after all, not true.

Priest's main argument for his position is that the Liar sentence is both true and not true. A crucial case is his

(4) (4) is not true.

He argues as follows:

A. '(4) is not true' is true if and only if (4) is not true. (by Tarski's criterion T)

B. (4) = '(4) is not true' (by ocular inspection)

C. (4) is true if and only if (4) is not true (from A and B by the law of identity)

This is my own simplified version of Priest's argument. He has to contend with many would-be paradox solvers, and in my opinion, he does a superb job of answering lots of them. But he overlooks my answer (advocated in my book *Paradoxes* [Cambridge 1979] and elsewhere), which rejects criterion T as conclusively refuted by the argument from A and B to C. Here Priest might say, 'Yes, it is refuted-but it's still correct!' But then he would be characterizing his principal basis for urging us to accept his position as one which has been refuted.

At any rate, he does defend criterion T, in my opinion unsuccessfully. He says 'The inference from α to Tα is at least truth preserving, and not just materially, but necessarily so'. In a footnote to this crucial (and false) claim, he cites John Wallace ('On the Frame of Reference' in Davidson and Harman, eds., *Semantics of Natural Language* [Reidel 1972]) as replying that this inference is not valid 'on the grounds that the words in a sentence may have different meanings in different "possible worlds"'. He says 'this argument is well answered in Gupta (1978) [Anil Gupta, 'Modal Logic and Truth,' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (1978) 441-72] and Peacocke (1978) [Christopher Peacocke, 'Necessity and Truth Theories,' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (1978) 473-500] who point out, in effect, that all is well provided we suppose the language to be specified rigidly.'

The issue here is one which it is difficult to state in general because of familiar difficulties about generalizing about contents of quotation marks. For Priest's argument, we are concerned with whether the following argument is valid:

D. (4) is not true,

therefore

E. '(4) is not true' is true.

The answer is that it is not valid. The idea that one can define a 'formalized language' (a phrase logically similar to 'decoy duck') so that in it the inference from the proposition which as a matter of contingent fact is expressed in English by D, to the proposition similarly expressed by E, is valid, is a mistake or an equivocation on 'infer-

ence'. One can define a formal language L such that it is 'correct-L-inferring' to infer that 2+2=5 from the premise that 2+2=4. We just need to remember that in such a case, L has an incorrect account of what follows from what.

One can also define a language as one in which such-and-such sentence expresses such-and-proposition. It no more follows that there is such a language than the existence of a rational root of two follows from the definition of such a root. This is easy to overlook because for most propositions we can think of, arranging for them to be expressed by some sentence is indeed possible. However, it is impossible for there to be a language in which a sentence expresses just the proposition that that sentence is not true. The assumption to the contrary leads to a contradiction. Of course, this will not impress Priest, who would probably say that it begs the question against him. So we need to contest the matter in terms of intuitive plausibility – a dangerous procedure. Priest could say that if deeply plausible assumptions lead to a contradiction, we might as well stay true to our intuitions and accept the contradiction. Then he can try announcing that the contradiction is both true and not true, and see if he can accomplish the task of conveying assurance of his audience that the contradiction is not true (not, after all, true).

But let us try the issue on merely intuitive grounds, at least for the case of (4) – a general discussion is not possible here. It might seem to the fan of language as abstract object that one thing that can be said truly about (4) is that it is not true. So why can't we just assign this proposition to (4) as one it expresses?

This 'assigning', as in 'setting up a one-to-one correspondence' does not bring about expressing. I grant that (4) is not true, and regard this as a true proposition about (4). But it is the proposition that what (4) says, if anything, is not true. And (4) does not say just this. For if it does say this, it also says that this is not true, which is to say that, that (4) is not true, is not true. And this is to say that (4) is true. Since what (4) says is self-referential, any attempt to say in full what it says, that is, to fill in an account of its content, leads to an infinite regress. This does not prove that it says nothing. The law of noncontradiction is also self-referential and there is an infinite regress in trying to spell out its content, but we nonetheless understand it well enough (some of us, anyway) by grasping the general ideas of proposition and truth. We can understand (4) well enough (though history shows this is difficult) to see that it makes the contradictory claim that it is true and that it is not true. We can see this contradiction

and say, in view of it, just that (4) is not true. But (4) cannot say *just* this. Its saying that it is not true, is by virtue of being its own saying, also a saying that it is true. This is a logical limit on the possible relation between a sentence and a proposition.

Whether this sketch of part of my answer to semantic paradoxes is enough to produce conviction, it should at least show that Priest's assumption that Tarski's criterion is so plausible that it is preferable to accept contradiction rather than give it up is open to serious questions. (Of course my argument did assume that to say it is not true that it is not true that P amounts to saying that it is true that P, but Priest accepts this too.)

In my opinion, Priest has done a great service to the cause of truth by showing how hard it is to honestly resist contradiction once one has accepted Tarski's criterion for truth. Tarski made a similar point himself when he held (at first) that natural languages are inconsistent. This was later qualified, and today, there would be some disagreement as to exactly what 'Tarski's Criterion' is. It is connected with some very safe mathematical logic, where a general procedure for defining a predicate of sentences in a given formal language, which predicate will not itself belong to that language, is described and proven safe under certain conditions. Mathematical work continues on the question as to how far these conditions can be modified without inconsistency. It may be valuable mathematics. But Priest contributes to showing that the predicate studied by this mathematics is not unproblematically describable as a 'truth predicate'.

I think that Priest has the philosophical spirit of Tarski's criterion exactly right. It is that truth is a predicate of sentences, and the content of the sentence can be captured, at least in non-indexical or otherwise simple cases, simply by writing out the sentence again. The difference between a sentence and a proposition, on this approach, is really just a difference in styles of quotation, direct or indirect. This is implicit in Priest's contention that the claim that the sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white is itself a necessary truth. This profound mistake persists because its consequences have not been well appreciated. Priest is a major contributor to the appreciation of them.

Priest might even concede that he did not adequately defend Tarski's criterion, assuming rightly that it is generally accepted. At any rate, he usually argues very well, and shows brilliantly how a formalist, conventionalist attitude towards logic makes the requirement of consistency difficult to justify. As a theory about formalized lan-

guages as 'abstract objects', 'Classical Logic' is just one approach to assigning 'truth values'. Its associated proof procedures have the feature that from a contradiction as premise, any arbitrary conclusion follows, which means that for a contradictory set of axioms in a 'classical' formal system, being a theorem becomes trivial. But Priest knows a lot about alternative proof procedures that avoid trivialization, and discusses them at length.

Here the disagreement with 'classical logic' needs to have clearer what is meant by 'classical logic' ('"classical logic"'?). That a 'nonclassical' formal system plus formal semantics might have formal contradictions as theorems and still be useful and even have some intuitive rationale is perfectly compatible with classical logic. (The relation between modern 'classical' formal systems and the traditional classical logic is discussed at length in my paper 'Classical Logic: Traditional and Modern,' in James H. Fetzer, ed. *Principles of Philosophical Reasoning*, APQ Library of Philosophy, 1984.) That a genuine contradiction should be genuinely true is another matter.

I have not tried to describe the many insightful ideas in Priest's book. It ranges widely over contemporary logic, including an interesting discussion of the question of consistency in set theory and category theory, showing high skill and knowledge. It is lucid, unpretentious, masterful, stimulating and educational.

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W.V. Quine
Quiddities, An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary.
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1988.
Pp. xx+249. US $20.00. ISBN 0-674-74351-2.

As the title indicates this work is a dictionary of selected words; topics of general interest as well as of special importance for Quinians. While there is not much that it adds to Quine's positions on major issues, it does provide an excellent survey of themes he has touched on over

the years, and there is that special eloquence of Quine's in recapitulating and summarizing his views. What is new, is Quine extrapolating from his well thought out positions on theoretical and somewhat technical topics, to offer insightful tidbits on such seemingly un-Quinean subjects as abortion, Altruism–why should one be moral, Beauty, the big bang theory–creation e nihilo, artistic creativity, Freedom, Free will, Tolerance, etc.

Both the Quine scholar and the philosophical novice will find first rate surveys of some of Quine's views by tracing through several of the entries which contain convenient cross-references. These clusters of entries appear on topics in logic (formal as well as philosophical), the philosophies of language, of mathematics and of science, ontology, etc. One example of a family of topics concerns the philosophy of language. There are related entries on Meaning, Senses of Words, Communication, Belief, Idea, Information, Universals, Singular terms, Artificial Languages, etc. The family of entries on the philosophies of logic and of mathematics consists of excellent surveys via such entries as Truth, Excluded Middle, Identity, Gödel's Theorem, Natural Numbers, Zero, Infinite Numbers, Real Numbers, Complex Numbers, Constructivism, Formalism, Impredicativity, Paradoxes, Types Versus Tokens, Variables, etc. All of this is served up in delightfully witty prose. On Altruism and the question of why be moral, speaking of the ever wider extension of our concern for other beings, beyond ourselves to our families, communities, nation, all races, other species, Quine says 'that the human heart is distended till it is as big as all outdoors' (5). Commenting on the use-mention distinction, we are treated to the following remark: 'Boston is not disyllabic, but "Boston" is; the quotation serves as the name of the name. A quotation names its insides. It is a name of its own guts' (23). In the section on Belief, before citing an additional difficulty for that notion, Quine jokingly quips: 'Loath though one is to kick a concept when it is down'. The entry on definition opens with 'Definition define thyself'. The useful alliterative expression 'Preprincipian' is introduced to refer to older views in logic.

The selection on the future extrapolates from Quine's four dimensional view of space-time and the tenselessness of attributions of truth to sentences, to the topic of abortion and the status of the unborn. For Quine sentences about the future are tenselessly true or false. Bivalence is preserved and we needn't speak of a sentence becoming true in the light of contingent future events.

> We may end, ... by noting how the full acceptance of futures, through spatialization of time can be welcome on moral grounds too. Thus consider consider the following dilemma. Conservation of the environment is called for by the interests of people as yet unborn, and birth control by the menace of overpopulation. On the one hand, thus, we are respecting the interests of people as yet unborn, and on the other hand we are denying them the very right to be born. Observe, then how the four-dimensional view resolves the dilemma. On that view, people and other things of the past and future are as real as those of today, where "are" is taken tenselessly as in "Two and two are four." People who will be born *are* real people, tenselessly speaking, and their interests are to be respected now and always. People who, thanks to birth control, will not be born, are a figment; there are no such people, not even tenselessly, and so nobody's right to life has been infringed. The four-dimensional view affords a place in the sun to all future actualities, but offers no aid nor comfort to mere possibilities that are never due to be actualized. To put it less perspicuously, the rights of an unactualized possible are contingent upon his actualization. (74-5)

There are also a number of entries on a well-known interest of Quine in various not strictly philosophical aspects of language, such as etymologies. Entries appear for Alphabet, Etymology, Euphemism, Inflection, Gender, Kinship of Words, Language Drift, Language Reform, Latin Pronunciation, and Usage and Abusage.

I hope that the sampling of quoted material used above elicits the impression that *Quiddities* is a pleasure to read, defining key concepts in contemporary philosophy with Quine's special wit and eloquence. Moreover, since it is available in a paper edition as well as hardcover, it would be suitable for use as a supplementary text for various courses touching on current issues.

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Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed.
Essays on Moral Realism.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988.
Pp. xiii+317.
US $42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2240-X);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9541-5).

This volume contains some of the best current work on moral realism, together with a few more established pieces. All the papers but one have been previously published–including Sayre-McCord's introductory essay; and the sole exception, Richard Boyd's paper, has received frequent exposure at university colloquia. Several pieces have been revised for this collection, but the alterations are in no case more than slight. The contents are as follows.

Sayre-McCord's introduction, 'The Many Moral Realisms,' discusses what it is to be a moral realist, and lays out a structure within which the various types of realism and anti-realism about morality, and the relations between them, may be exhibited. The remainder of the volume is divided into an anti-realist half and a realist half. The anti-realist group begins with the chapter on ethics from A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover 1952). This is followed by 'Ethical Consistency,' a relatively early paper by Bernard Williams, which explores analoges and disanalogies among conflicts of belief, conflicts of desire, and moral conflicts. A tough, technical paper by Simon Blackburn, 'Supervenience Revisited,' analyzes supervenience claims of various strengths, both about morality and about other areas; included is the suggestion that a plausible understanding of supervenience in the moral area, combined with one other plausible thesis about morality, lends support to moral anti-realism. Jonathan Lear's 'Ethics, Mathematics, and Relativism' argues against recent attempts to develop a form of moral realism analogous to Wittgenstein's conception of mathematics, but also expresses some worries about moral relativism. Chapter 1 from J.L. Mackie's *Ethics* (New York: Penguin 1977) sets out his now famous 'error' theory of moral judgements; and chapter 1 from Gilbert Harman's *The Nature of Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press 1977) expounds another celebrated position–namely, that moral facts play no role in the best explanation of our having the moral beliefs that we do, and so may be dispensed with.

The realist section begins with David Wiggins' 'Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life,' which deploys the mathematical analogy

referred to above, while also conceding to the anti-realist camp what Wiggins calls the thesis of 'cognitive underdetermination.' John McDowell's 'Values and Secondary Qualities' is a critique of the conception of reality on which Mackie's error theory depends, and a consequent reaffirmation of moral reality. Richard Boyd's 'How to Be a Moral Realist' expounds his own prominent brand of scientific realism, and argues for a closely analogous brand of moral realism. Nicholas Sturgeon, in 'Moral Explanations,' argues, contra Harman, that moral facts may be just as explanatory of our beliefs and observations as any other types of facts. Sayre-McCord himself then takes this debate further, in 'Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence,' undermining Sturgeon's criticisms of Harman, but arriving at a tentative realist argument of his own. The final piece is Mark Platts' 'Moral Reality,' the last chapter of his *Ways of Meaning* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1979), which defends a version of moral realism named 'ethical intuitionism' against various standard objections. Appended is a wide-ranging, though admittedly far from exhaustive, bibliography of works on moral realism.

The list of contributors is distinguished indeed; several of the papers have already become classics in the field. Of the newer pieces, I would single out for special comment Sayre-McCord's introductory paper, which seems to me an admirably lucid exposition of what is and is not at stake in the confrontation between realists and anti-realists. There are, as noted, numerous interconnections between different pieces; and the volume as a whole achieves with distinction one of its main goals – namely, to 'Illustrate the range, depth and importance of moral realism, the fundamental issues it raises, and the problems it faces' (xi).

I do, however, have some questions about the selection of the pieces. First, I am somewhat puzzled at the inclusion of Williams' paper. Sayer-McCord regards this as a specimen of anti-realism because it argues that moral conflicts are, in one respect, like conflicts of desire rather than conflicts of belief (x). But it also emphasizes another respect in which moral conflicts are different from either. Moreover, typically for the period in which it was written, the very issue of moral realism, or of moral truth or moral facts, is never explicitly raised. It is in his more recent work that Williams' credentials as an anti-realist become evident.

My second question is more general. For whom is this volume primarily intended? Sayre-McCord describes it as 'An introduction to moral realism,' and says that 'Care has been taken to make the

collection accessible' (xi). However, if 'accessible' here means—as it presumably does—'accessible to those without prior exposure to the subject,' this largely misrepresents the contents. A few items might reasonably be so described; in fact, the contributions of Mackie, Harman and Platts derive from works which were specifically designed as introductions. But most of the volume is forbidding by comparison. Anyone for whom *Language, Truth and Logic* is news will be utterly unable to cope with the prolixities of Wiggins' paper, the labyrinthine prose of McDowell's, or the logical and metaphysical intricacies of Blackburn's. If, on the other hand, the collection is really targeted towards seasoned philosophers, interested in work at the forefront of the field, then the genuinely 'accessible' pieces appear strangely redundant; such readers will surely have well-thumbed copies of all the latter on their shelves already: I certainly do. It seems as if the volume is aiming to be *both* ground-breaking *and* introductory; but these two aims are, almost by definition, incompatible.

To end, however, on a less churlish note, it is undeniable that all those with a serious interest in ethics, from students to accomplished scholars, will find much in this anthology to engage, stimulate and challenge them.

One final word of warning: The book contains a regrettable number of typographical errors, not all of them trivial. (The word 'not' is omitted on p.28, line 23; and the final occurrence of the word 'consistent' on p.159, n.52, should read 'inconsistent.')

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Frederick L. Will
Beyond Deduction: Ampliative Aspects of Philosophical Reflection.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1988. Pp. x+260.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-415-00177-3.

To see the scene beyond deduction one has to appreciate an unexpected use of that word. A textbook might explain deduction as argumentation in which it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Compared to this, Will substantially enlarges the scope of deductive reasoning. For one thing, he includes probabilistic reasoning. This is because what in his view marks reasoning as deductive is not the certainty of the conclusion (given the premises); it is rather two properties, one dialectical, the other rhetorical. Dialectically, the conclusion is reached by subsuming the case at hand under broad and well-understood rules, and rhetorically, the argument solicits free assent. Will classifies as deductive any reasoning that is *applicative*, subsuming given cases under norms or rules already well-established in practice, and also *probative*, aiming at conviction or assent (32-3). Deduction embraces any process 'soliciting assent through the application of well-defined accepted rules, norms, procedures.' Reasoning is 'deductive to the extent that [it is] directed to achieving results through the application of agreed upon norms, rather than through any substantial extension, revision, generation or reconstruction of norms themselves' (59). In its perlocutionary setting, this broad rhetorical mode (deduction) aims to convince an audience that in some given instance consistency to norms manifest elsewhere in practice demands one rather than another thought or action.

There is no denying the possibility or value of probative and subsumptive routines, but Will disagrees with the philosophy that would represent them as the very substance of reason or intelligence. This classical intellectualism, the philosophical interpretation of deductive procedures as the paradigmatically rational, he calls *deductivism*. This philosophy of reason is ally to foundational epistemology. Deductivism declares practice anywhere in culture but especially in science, ethics, politics and law to be rational just in so far as it demonstrably exemplifies 'the application of already installed, pre-existent established norms' (157). This allows epistemology to represent itself as 'transcendental' knowledge of these norms, as if it were the

lieutenant-governor Reason appointed to administer the difference between rational (founded) and non-rational practice.

To read this book is to become engaged with a determined and, I think, plausible attack on the utterly one-sided view of rationality according to which the absence of deductive procedures marks individual or social practice as irrational or arbitrary. It were as if the simple choice for the fixation of belief were between reason (that is, deduction) or something woolly, obscurantist, subjective or irrational. This false choice follows from the in itself groundless assumption that the limits of deduction are the limits of reasoned thought and action. A principal argument of the book is that one holds this assumption at the cost of denying, occluding or misunderstanding what, despite the inapplicability of the deductive paradigm, appears to be rational in a wide field of action and thought. Will believes this may be documented at several levels of practice. His discussion of concrete instances of reasoned change in law, politics and scientific practice would show the rigor of the strict deductivist to be 'a narrow, thoroughly scholastic and unrealistic conception of what reasoned processes are' (183). Will maintains that a broad range of action and thought can neither be regarded as deductively routine nor yet dismissed as irrational or arbitrary. This is practice transforming practice: thought and action modifying, reconstructing or revising practice in a reasoned reaction to experience that was not secretly anticipated by rules all along. Reasoning that does not simply replicate norms of practice, that does not aim merely to extend them to new cases but is on the contrary revising, generating or reconstructing norms, is *ampliative* reasoning. Where deduction is probative, ampliative reasoning is experimental or critical; where deduction is applicative or subsumptive, aimed at replicating already normal comportment, ampliative reasoning reacts upon what passes for normal, transforming the cultural context of everyday life.

To question the deductivist hegemony (as this book does) is itself to participate in an ampliative process underway in recent philosophy; and since 'the nub of the dispute about ampliative ... processes is not the prevalence of these processes but their legitimacy' (192), the determined deductivist will detect nothing but circular reasoning in Will's argument. But this means only that his argument is not deductive – which is true. Instead of a normal contribution to normal epistemology it is an intelligent, determined effort to question presently dominant assumptions concerning what a 'theory of knowledge' should look like, what questions it should pose, what lines it may

pursue. Will urges that philosophy break out of 'the traditional idiom of deduction'–the idiom of 'premises, and conclusions erected upon premises, deriving their stability from these premises, and therefore weakened by any tendency of the premises to move beneath them.' To take this step beyond deduction implies no hostility toward deductive reasoning per se. However it does imply that what epistemology calls rigor is really the groundless, historically contingent hegemony of deductivism. The view beyond deduction assimilates deductive reasoning 'to a wider view, the more basic units of which are not propositions, statements, sentences, not linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities of any sort, but ways of behaving, or proceeding in thought and action. Within this wider view ... in the very process of following these ways of proceeding, the ways undergo change, redefinition and reconstruction' (112). Seen from this perspective, the life of reason is diphasal. In its deductive phase reason serves to solidify and maintain a body of norms or the patterns of a practice, while in its ampliative phase reason positively modifies practice, changing it with a view to coping with experiences that were not secretly subsumed under rules all along. To institute an order of rank between these distinct and complementary phases would misunderstand the dialectic of practical life.

Besides being an intelligent contribution to pragmatic philosophy, *Beyond Deduction* aims radically to criticize the late-Analytic philosophy of the English-speaking university. This makes it an interesting book to read. A reader will find a discussion of Wittgenstein on rule following, Hegel on concrete universals, Hume on reason and custom, Kuhn on the history of scientific objects, Dewey on practice, Oakeshott on political change and Rorty on epistemological foundationalism and whatever lies beyond. One also finds the elements of a philosophy of rationality: a theory of normative behavior, of its difference from reaction or instinct; an account of conceptual change, not just in science but in culture or practice generally; an analysis of the sources and implications of the deductivist will to ground; and a humane, wide-ranging effort to articulate the larger unity of rational comportment.

Barry Allen
McMaster University

THAT I AM AN AGENT, but also a plant; that much that I did not make goes towards making me whatever I shall be praised or blamed for being; that I must constantly choose among competing and apparently incommensurable goods and that circumstances may force me to a position in which I cannot help being false to something or doing some wrong; that an event that simply happens to me may, without my consent, alter my life; that it is equally problematic to entrust one's good to friends, lovers, or country and to try to have a good life without them—all these I take to be not just the material of tragedy, but everyday facts of lived practical reason.

Martha C. Nussbaum
The Fragility of Goodness

I SUSPECT NUSSBAUM'S retrieval of Aristotle at least partly involves an attempt to sustain an ethos sufficient to underwrite the institution we associate with the "liberal project," i.e. an allegedly limited state in service to a social economic order based on exchange relations. To use the phrase "the liberal project," of course, is to put the question in MacIntyre's terms but that has the virtue of reminding us that the social-political question cannot be divorced from the epistemological—i.e. can liberalism survive the acknowledgment that it is a tradition when its epistemological commitments are based on the denial of tradition?

Stanley Hauerwas

IN NUSSBAUM'S READING of Plato I value her recognition of the importance of the dialogue form (but puzzling her insistence that Plato was the main creator of the austere, unambiguous style of philosophical discourse) and her awareness of how difficult it can be to ascertain what choice between the alternative responses articulated within a dialogue "Plato" wants us to make.

Christine Downing

AN ARISTOTELIAN SUBLIME is, of course, an anachronism, and the concept might therefore be assumed to be of little relevance to Nussbaum's patient reconstruction of Aristotle's poetic ethics. However, the pathos of tragedy, including Aristotle's description of that pathos, is more ethically ambiguous than Nussbaum's account implies, and theories of tragic sublimity like those of Burke, Kant, and Schiller address this ambiguity by supporting that the discovery and empowerment of an ethical identity is both threatened and facilitated by community.

Allen Dunn

NUSSBAUM ARGUES that Aristotle's remarks about the limitations of the ethical life at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* contradict both his earlier acceptance of the dependence of a good life on fortune and his commitment to an "anthropocentric perspective" on the human condition. On the contrary, the limited character of human goodness follows directly from the beliefs about its vulnerability that she derives from Aristotle and urges us to accept.

Bernard Yack

WINTER 1989
A SOUNDINGS SYMPOSIUM ON *THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS*

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89 / 108 B

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