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MAILED IN JULY 1989
C. Fred Alford’s project is an interesting one of synthesis between contemporary psychoanalytic theory concerning narcissism, classical Socratic teaching concerning eros, and the critical social philosophy associated with the Frankfurt School figures of Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas. Were this synthesis in itself not enough, Alford also seeks to establish connections between his project and Alasdair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue*, as well as the cultural writings of Christopher Lasch, major influence on the content and themes of *Narcissism*.

Alford counsels the reader interested in philosophical analysis that the chapter on the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism can be skipped, but the discussion on this aspect of contemporary psychoanalytic theory is the most interesting aspect of the book, in my estimation. The topic of narcissism has stimulated a great deal of discussion and debate among contemporary psychoanalytic writers and also prompted reassessments of the classical Freudian treatment of the subject. Alford presents the views of Freud concerning the libidinal stage of narcissism and compares them with a host of more recent authors concerned with issues of separation, self-individuation and the search for satisfaction: Melanie Klein, W. R. D. Fairbairn and Harry Guntrip, Heinz Kohut, Otto Kernberg, Arnold Rothstein, Béla Grunberger, and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel. Alford’s purpose is not to adjudicate between the classical, drive-based account of narcissism and recent, object-relations explanations, but rather to develop themes compatible with both approaches and relevant to philosophy and social criticism. These themes are: (1) ‘that narcissism persists throughout life and is not superseded by object love, but follows its own developmental line’ (68); (2) that there is a duality about the phenomenon of narcissism such that it can be either progressive or regressive, mature or immature; (3) that the infant’s recognition of helplessness and lost omnipotence produces a narcissistic wound or injury which can only be healed through an attainment of a sense of mastery over self and world; and, finally, (4) ‘that narcissism seeks fusion and wholeness by merging with something complete and perfect—namely the ego ideal’ (69).
Socrates’ speeches on eros in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* are analyzed by Alford in order to develop a Platonic conception of ‘sublimation’ to be compared with the well-known Freudian counterpart. The Platonic conception is judged to be a superior expression of the progressive aspect of narcissism understood as a quest for perfection, wholeness and control over self and world. As a doctrine of erotic satisfaction, this combination of contemporary psychoanalytic theory and classical philosophy is defended against Adorno’s retreat from the very notion of eros in his negative dialectics. As an articulation of a progressive form of sublimation, it is advocated against both Marcuse’s reformulation of the Freudian process of sublimation and the regressive aspects of his erotic utopia in *Eros and Civilization*. Finally, insofar as ‘Habermas ignores the narcissistic quest for wholeness and perfection almost entirely’ (165), he is judged the most harshly as advocating a ‘pale, insubstantial view of the individual’ (167).

Alford’s positive accomplishments in *Narcissism* include the presentation of a truly interesting body of psychoanalytic literature that is philosophically relevant, as well as its integration with the thinking of an important school of contemporary philosophy and social criticism. From its inception, the Frankfurt School has taken Freud and psychoanalytic theory very seriously and its philosophical concerns are in no way irrelevant to the most central themes of Platonic philosophy. Alford is quite knowledgeable in both psychoanalytic theory and in the major Frankfurt School figures, and his attempts at integrating more recent developments of psychoanalysis with the projects of Adorno and, above all, Marcuse are both significant and enlightening. Less successful, in my estimation, are, however, his efforts toward criticism of Habermas. While it may be at least somewhat true that ‘the most striking aspect of Habermas’s treatment of psychoanalysis is his utter neglect of the earliest stages of life’ (173), Alford’s own treatment of psychoanalysis might appear to stand under an inverse suspicion of disregarding the most adult stages of development. In several places of *Narcissism*, it is asserted that the narcissistic conflict in the early relationship of child to mother is the ‘font’ or ‘foundation’ of ‘autonomous selfhood’ and ‘self-respect,’ but it is not clear how the preverbal basis of this relationship could be an adequate basis for the formation of adult freedom and self-esteem. In this regard, contemporary writings on narcissism do not provide the only psychoanalytic resource; there are also, for example, Erik Erikson and Jane Loevinger’s descriptions of the acquisi-
tion of ego identity in adolescence and adulthood that can be seen to pertain to later stages of autonomy and self-esteem. Habermas’s own theoretical contributions to personal development can be seen to correlate quite directly with these psychoanalytic contributions, a fact which is overlooked in Alford’s critique of his advocacy of hermeneutical psychoanalysis. Thus Alford succeeds in showing the value of a very interesting body of psychoanalytic literature, but it may be argued—hopefully without incurring any narcissistic wound—that this corpus on narcissism is not the only important recent psychoanalytic resource for contemporary social theory.

Jerry Wallulis
University of South Carolina

Richard J. Connell
The Empirical Intelligence—The Human Empirical Mode: Philosophy as Originating in Experience.

In this book Richard Connell does not so much argue for as present contemporary Aristotelian responses to the following: 1. How we know unobservables through observables; 2. Whether observation is theory-independent; 3. How philosophy is related to other sciences; 4. Why there are no a priori conceptions or innate ideas; 5. What notion of mind can be inferred from the empirical character of knowledge. Another book by the same author on a closely related subject was published almost simultaneously: Substance and Modern Science (Center for Thomistic Studies 1988). The latter was, however, more self-consciously a textbook and, probably for that reason, exhibits a more skillful pedagogical presentation.

Other scientific realists such as William Wallace, Rom Harré and myself would agree with Connell on a number of basic issues: 1. The function of the unobservable entities and activities theorized in philosophy and in science is to serve as explanations for the observable, as explanations for the regularities, changes, and surprises that are
immediately perceived. 2. Such unobservable theoretical entities, properties, and activities have a causal relationship with the observable world; and the concepts, frameworks, and models used to describe this unobservable domain are constructed by analogy and metaphor grounded upon and developed from the observable. 3. Philosophy is like the other sciences in that it seeks knowledge of the unobservable causes of that which can be observed.

Connell seems to get himself quickly into trouble, however, with his definition of ‘the observable’. An observable is ‘that which determines the character (the quality, the nature) of a sensation’ (21). Connell goes on to say ‘the observable is defined by its agency, by its character, as a principle’ (ibid.). How can such a definition do the job? It would appear to imply that many things, for example, light waves, are observable, simply because they determine the character of a sensation. But surely Connell would agree that light waves are among the unobservable causal explanations of visual perception.

Perhaps it is this curious definition of the observable that leads Connell to say that spatial relations are not observable. ‘Thus, however observable the shapes and dimensions upon which spatial relations are founded, we have to say that the relations themselves are not’ (30). Why is not this statement of the matter a faux pas? Surely the observation of shapes and dimensions presupposes the observation of spatial relations. How can there be shapes and dimensions which are not spatially distributed? It seems rather that the relationship between the observation of shapes and dimensions and the observation of spatial relations is biconditional rather than conditional.

Connell goes on to say that substances are unobservable, that substance ‘functions as a substratum for properties’ (31), and only the properties can be observed. Is a substance so distinct from its characteristic properties that one does not observe the substance when one observes those properties? Has not Connell confused the Aristotelian notion of substance as a substrate for change with a later view pilloried by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, which construes substance as a substrate for observable qualities? May we not, with complete philosophical as well as common sense accuracy, say that this tree is visible and not only that the properties of this tree are visible?

Later in the book Connell distinguishes between the naming and the describing function of words. He then draws a line between words that have only a naming function and those that have, in addition, a describing function (193-4). This all sounds familiar and straightforward. But then Connell goes on to say, ‘words such as “water”,

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“man”, “pulsar”, “circle”, “viscosity”, to mention only a few examples, are words that ordinarily have a naming but not a describing function. But “wet” in “wet dog” has a describing function (194). No doubt most of us had thought that proper names such as ‘Fido’ and ‘Harry’ were to be the examples of words with merely naming functions. Frankly, I am surprised that anyone should think that words like ‘man’, ‘water’, and ‘circle’ merely name and do not describe. Calling these words non-descriptive would appear to be just a strange consequence of Connell’s earlier, too complete distinction between a substance and its characteristic observable properties.

Most people would think of experimental methodology as one of the features that distinguish ‘science’ from ‘philosophy’, as we define these terms today. It, therefore, seems strange to find Connell defining ‘experiment’ as ‘deliberately acquired experience’ (158-9). Is going to the movies ‘experimenting’? But movie watching would appear to be, in most cases, a ‘deliberately acquired experience’. Granted that the word ‘experiment’ is now used in many extended and analogical ways, it would seem that the core meaning for scientific purposes has to do with controlled acting upon nature so as to force it to react and thus reveal some of its more recondite properties. Aristotle, no doubt, set out to deliberately acquire many experiences; but while we have ample record of his efforts at accurate observation, we have no record of his performing any activity that today would be called ‘experiment’.

This book has many more examples of virtues and flaws of the kind I have been describing. The general line seems plausible enough, but the details lack the precision and cogency that might have resulted from a stronger exhibition of dialectic and argument.

Thomas A. Russman
(Center for Thomistic Studies)
University of St. Thomas
Jacques Derrida
*The Post Card.*
US $46.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-14320-1);

This text is divided into four separable sections with ostensibly separable themes, issues and problematics. The translator has added a commendable glossary of terms and usages peculiar to Derrida and the strategies of deconstruction, as well as a short preface serving to acknowledge debt, at the same time as thematizing indebtedness.

The first section (we shall call them 'sections' rather than essays, since not all take the essay form, and rather than chapters, since these writings do not cohere or take the 'form' of a book or a whole) is entitled 'Envois' in French, 'sendings' in the English version. It is a series, with gaps, of letters of apparent post-card length (though some require several pages) to an ostensible lover. Each entry is dated and the dates form a chronology—with gaps—from June 3, 1977 until August 30, 1979. They are cryptic, allegorical, theoretical, seemingly autobiographical, if not confessional in style. In addition, Derrida seemingly uses this plurality as a symphonic orchestration of issues he both addresses and performs.

No key or explanation of these 'sendings' [envois] is given and the reader is left with the hermeneutical problematics of interpretation and judgment as an issue to be solved, not determined in advance. Hence, the careful interplay of multiple genres helps to produce the effect of this hermeneutical defiance—at once a series of open letters, and multiply concealed and concealing. One can read them at an emotional, erotic level; a psychoanalytic level; a philosophico-metaphysical level; a sexual-political level; and/or a theatrical-fictive-playful-aesthetic level. Undoubtedly more examples of possible readings could be produced here, but our point is that Derrida's text takes on this plurality as its own—if it has a 'proper' nature to it—and produces by performance the message he simultaneously theoretically addresses. If there is a theme to this text, as a whole, this might be it.

The second section, a treatment of Freud's text, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, again returns to this issue of thematics and performance as they overlap, interpenetrate and doubly manifest themselves in this particular work. In addition, Derrida responds to a number of readings of Freud's text which he shows have made unfounded as-
sumptions in their respective interpretations. Derrida’s essay, on the contrary follows the letter, the signifier of Freud’s work so as to reveal—perhaps more than Freud desired, if not also his desire—the autobiographical, semi-hidden elements therein. In turn, Derrida raises the issues of the thematic/performative coherence manifest in this text. Why this ‘takes place’ is not so much his issue as how it does, and how and why this phenomenon has been overlooked hitherto.

The third section involves an in-depth analysis of Lacan and a response to his reading of Poe’s story entitled, ‘The Purloined Letter’. Again the translator wisely leaves Derrida’s title in its original French (adding a translator’s note at the bottom of the page) in order to sustain the play in the French language operating between postman [facteur] (now known as a letter carrier) and factor [facteur]. The ‘one’ who delivers the truth on the one hand is at stake here, and the issue of the factor of truth, or truth itself as only a factor; hence, only one factor among others. This play in the title sets the thematic stage for Derrida’s analysis as he shows how the analyst—Lacan—the letter carrier of truth—in fact reduces the Poe story to its truth factor alone. In this reduction, Derrida opens up what else takes place, what else was involved, and hence how the analyst—factor of truth—is himself delivered over and in a sense staged by that truth that he/she finds. Hence, the literary that can stage psychoanalysis is reinscribed in Derrida’s account such that the analyst-as-letter-carrier becomes analyst-as-factor. A typical deconstruction, yet also, as always, a unique strategem as well is at work here.

The last all-too-brief section of the text is an interview (done by mail, writing) with Derrida by René Major on the subject-format-style-content of Glas, Derrida’s most cryptic and perhaps ambitious text to date. The issues are barely broached by this interview and Derrida’s responses circle round the production of double-binds—presumably there and then, as well as theoretically performed in Glas. Again, faux-bond is in French both double bind as well as false bind—hence, forming simultaneously a trap and the means of escape. The issues of partiality, destiny, death, sending, concealment, and revelation are only the most evident in this discussion as Derrida tries, perhaps in vain, to connect the project and projections of Glas with the sections preceding this interview here. The issue, he says, is indeed, the facteur and his/her/its relation to truth. But this leaves us again thrown back on ourselves, as readers, to wonder about the allegorical echoings this engenders through the history of philosophy,
the works of psychoanalysis, literature and many more supposedly distinct fields of inquiry. A most provocative, invocative, and delirious text.

Irene E. Harvey
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Judith Genova, ed.
Power, Gender, Values.
Cdn $37.95; US $37.95
(cloth: isbn 0-920980-24-4);
Cdn $17.95; US $17.95
(paper: isbn 0-920980-25-2).

This is a collection of seven papers, together with commentaries, originally presented at the 1986 meeting of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature. The project seems to be that of extracting philosophical points in the area of feminism from literary works. A reader unfamiliar with the literary works under discussion may find this rough going, especially since some of the essays cover a great deal of ground. I found the commentaries extremely helpful in trying to pick my way through the main papers.

The editor tries to tie together some of the multitude of ideas appearing in the book. 'In its own way, each essay attacks the myth of "raw power". Power is sexed and ... has been harnessed male' (1). My thought, however, is that a reader looking for a unifying theme, including this one, will only become frustrated. Better to take the ideas as they come, in all their complexity and variety. I have attempted to briefly summarize each essay below. Its number is its place in order of appearance in the collection.

1) Winnie Woodhull, commenting on Monique Wittig's Les Guérillères, shares Wittig's basic viewpoint that language, legend and history have been shaped to better serve their function as instruments of patriarchal power. Guerilla action is called for to free ourselves.
So let’s break the rules of English (or French), burn words, create new myths and ward off closure by devices like leaving blank spaces.

2) Anca Vlasopolos claims that English Romantic poetry represents women as ‘either on the margins of the social order or entirely outside patriarchy’ (32). Such a figure is Keats’ ‘La Belle Dame Sans Merci’. Her commentator, Ruth Barton, disputes this as a generalization, however, and develops Wordsworth as an exception.

3) Suzette H. Henke argues that women have allowed male ideas to ‘colonize’ their writing about women’s own erotic and reproductive experiences. Except for lesbians, women authors remain dutifully ‘phallocentric’ in their writing. Birth control, seen until quite recently as an exclusively feminine need in sex, is never portrayed in a sexual encounter in fiction. Patricia S. Yaeger, in commenting, adds that we need to hear more about women’s reproductive vulnerability, the dangers pregnancy brings, including that of death.

4) Frances Bartkowski picks up some of the ideas of Foucault and the French feminists. This is probably the most difficult essay to follow because of the scope and complexity of its subject matter. However, one interesting idea that emerges is the patriarchal identification of the female body with fluid. Bartowski argues that anorexia is a reassertion of solid over fluid. Her commentator, Martha Satz retorts that this suggestion gives too much honour to self-destruction.

5) Linda Singer discusses Gilligan, French, Janeway and Hartsock. Her warning is that feminine ‘caring’ may be just one more form of window dressing for feminine acquiescence in patriarchy. Her commentator, Roger Shiner, notes that the alternative approach (he labels this ‘Attila the Hen’) puts feminists in a dilemma that is certainly not peculiar to their struggle: if an oppressed class does not adapt some of the methods of their oppressors, what hope have they of making any progress? But then, if they do, is this not a betrayal of their cause?

6) In a way, the most controversial paper in the lot is that of Naomi Scheman. She likens Othello’s inability to dispel his Iago-induced doubts about Desdemona to Cartesian skepticism. The feminist aspect of the comparison lies in her claim that Othello had to be male; a female in the throes of love would not get herself into such a state of irrational jealousy. This seems not plausible given that contemporary accounts of jealous lovers seem to feature women and men with about equal frequency. Moreover, as her commentator Roger Shiner points out, Othello is not in the best possible circumstances for gain-
ing knowledge, as Descartes was with respect to the fire in his room. Othello is overwhelmed by his feelings for Desdemona, and, from the outset, the audience knows more about what is going on than he does.

7) The final essay, by Lorraine Code, discusses a case of abuse of power where both abusers and victim are women. Mary Sarton’s ‘As We Are Now’ is a story about a former teacher’s brutal treatment by her ‘caretakers’ in a nursing home. Code claims their behaviour stems from moral blindness, specifically, inability to apply their accepted morality to an unfamiliar type of person. Code’s commentator, Dianne Romain, suggests that the caretakers are just plain insensitive to the plight of a dependent person.

Anne Minas
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Paul Guyer
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-33192-7);

This is an extremely important work on certain essential issues in Kant’s epistemology. Guyer’s central concern is to demonstrate that the traditional interpretation of Kant as a transcendental idealist, in the sense that it would preclude realism, is not uniformly supported by a close analysis of his work. There are, of course, explicit statements—e.g., in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason—which clearly support a strong reading of the transcendental idealist position. But there are also clear statements, both before and after 1781, which would force us to re-evaluate Kant’s position: notably in the Refutation of Idealism of 1787.

Guyer therefore goes back to the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, and carefully traces the development of Kant’s thought through the years leading up to the First Critique. He demonstrates that, at the time Kant first conceived of the status of space and time as subjec-
tive forms of intuition, he explicitly denied that this implied idealism with respect to the objects of experience (21).

On the basis of this essential insight, Guyer proceeds to examine (in the five following Parts) Kant's focus on objective validity, and how this focus prompted a fluctuation between realism and idealism as the years passed. He first provides a careful analysis of how the transcendental theory of experience arose, ending with a discussion of Kant's understanding of the Analogies of Experience in the years preceding the First Critique. The central problem here rests with the question as to whether the mind has the power to actively impose these essential conditions on the raw data of sensibility that come to it (70).

In Part II, Guyer shows the different strategies employed by Kant in his attempts to formulate the transcendental deduction between 1781 and 1787 (four are outlined, 85-6). Those which focused on the a priori knowledge of objects, or on the a priori conditions for empirical knowledge generally, were clearly unsuccessful. But the attempts which focused on apperception were more promising. The first dealt with a priori knowledge of the unity of the self; the second dealt with the a priori conditions of empirical self-knowledge. This latter, employing the theory of time-determination which Kant works out in the Analogies of Experience and in the Refutation of Idealism, is what Guyer takes to be the only sound basis for a genuine transcendental deduction.

Part III is dedicated to a careful analysis, first of the Axioms and Anticipations, and then of the three Analogies of Experience in order to show precisely how the theory of time-determination must be understood within the framework of the deduction. In Part IV, this is complemented by an analysis of the Refutation of Idealism in which the theory of time-determination was completed by Kant. The outcome of this presentation is to demonstrate that Kant's transcendental idealism can—and must—be reconciled with the realistic implications of the refutation of idealism. Part V works out the details of that reconciliation.

In this last part, Guyer examines both the foundations of transcendental idealism as they are presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and then the possibility that Kant might be able to support his position simply on the basis of his theory of subjective and objective time-determination. In both cases, however, Kant's arguments are found wanting. Finally, therefore, Guyer considers the indirect proof for transcendental idealism which is offered in the Antinomy of Pure
Reason. But this attempt also must fail, since the resolution of the antinomies which would support transcendental idealism requires Kant to argue for the positive assertion that things in themselves are specifically not spatial and temporal—a position which his own restrictions forbid.

In an ‘Afterword’, Guyer discusses briefly the various contemporary versions of Kant’s arguments. His conclusions focus on two points. First of all, he sees ‘Kant’s arguments from empirical time-determination to a priori constraints on the knowledge of external objects’ as ‘the only ones among his arguments which can sustain our contemporary interest in his theoretical philosophy’ (427). Second, he asserts: ‘The idea that a faculty of representation may have internal regularities in its changes adequate to ground judgments of subjective time-order and yet even potentially afford knowledge of an external reality seems incoherent: A faculty of representation must be sensitive primarily to what lies beyond it or give up its claim to representation’ (428).

Many competent scholars will find it difficult to agree with Guyer’s conclusions. But these issues are certainly among the most central for any interpretation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy—and the arguments advanced in this volume are impossible to ignore. It is therefore not difficult to predict that Guyer’s work will remain at the centre of controversy among commentators for some time to come.

Frederick P. Van De Pitte
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Konstantin Kolenda, ed.

Organizations and Ethical Individualism.
Pp. xxi+173.

Organizations and Ethical Individualism is a collection of six essays written by philosophers, social scientists, and management theorists, each of which deals approvingly with some aspect of ethical individualism. ‘Ethical individualism’, a theory proposed by David Norton,
focuses on a eudaimonistic concept of the individual whose goals are self-direction, personal responsibility, and well-being. The aim of the collection is ‘an attempt to explore various avenues toward a restoration of ethical health in organizations by revitalizing the moral resources of individuals’ (xii). Implicit in each of the essays is a critique of psychological egoism or the Theory Y thesis, that human beings are motivated primarily by their own self-interests.

In the first essay John Kekes identifies ethical individualism with self-direction, the proper balance of which takes into account one’s subjective values and objective moral tradition. Kekes implies that this balance of self-direction should be the aim of any organization in the development of its managers, but Kekes does not spell out how this might be achieved. This latter task is left to Alan Waterman. Waterman expands ethical individualism to include psychological individualism, and argues that for a number of very good reasons an organization will simply function well and best achieve its goals if it develops self-direction, personal responsibility, and a commitment to universalizable moral principles of individuals in organizations.

Two essays attack directly the Theory Y view of economic man. William Scott and Terence Mitchell take issue with mechanistic or instrumentalist management theories and focus on the possibility of evaluating intrinsic evil and virtue within organizations. David Hart attacks the basic presupposition of Theory Y, that our economic motivations are primarily egoistic. Appealing to eighteenth-century moral theory, Hart argues that human beings are motivated equally by self-love and benevolence. The neglect of the dual aspect of human motivation skews our perception of human action and this truncates management theory. Hart defends a theory of ‘sympathetic society’ which he traces to Adam Smith, although in the passages he cites from Smith, Hart neglects Smith’s edict that ‘beneficence ... is less essential to the existence of society than justice.’

David Norton continues the critique of egoism, and using Plato’s Republic Norton makes an interesting analysis of organizations which is neither collectivist nor authoritarian. In the final essay Peter Breggin, a psychiatrist, gives a thought-provoking speculative analysis of human spiritual progress from oppression, through freedom, to beingness as the ideal.

Each essay presents a thoughtful treatment of ethical individualism from different but complementary perspectives, and the collection as a whole provides an antidote to a prevailing theory of economic egoism without reverting to collectivism. Nowhere, however, is col-
lectivism defined or brought into question. Nor is egoism considered an ethical theory, an assumption that needs to be defended if one is to respond to the claims of ethical egoists. Each essay, too, seems implicitly to assume that all organizations are instrumentally goal-directed to the neglect of individuals. This over-simplification of modern management practice will distract management theorists from taking the important positive aspects of ethical individualism seriously. Finally, the collection does not deliver on its promise 'to explore avenues toward a restoration of ethical health in organizations.' There is little in the way of practical guidelines to help management theorists actually put into practice the valuable theory of ethical individualism presented in these essays.

Particia H. Werhane
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Robert Mugerauer
Heidegger’s Language and Thinking.

Heidegger was once asked what the most crucial word was in the title of his book, Sein und Zeit. Quite seriously, he said that it was ‘und.’ The ‘and’ is a relation, although a questionable one. In Mugerauer’s work, Heidegger’s Language and Thinking, the ‘and’ could be taken as a mild relation, a conjunctive one, or perhaps even in a disjunctive sense. M suggests, however, that ‘and’ means sameness, although not identity; language is thinking.

Mugerauer’s intent appears modest: 1. To show that H’s language and thinking are the same; in language one thinks; in thinking, one articulates; the focus is on the how. 2. To show that H shows that thinking and language are the same; M does this by staying with only three of H’s works, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, What is Called Thinking? and Discourse on Thinking; the focus is on what H says. 3. To show how H’s approach in 1 and 2 can help us to speak and think.
M brings to his patient and empathetic analysis a background in philosophy but also one in architecture. Thus he is sensitive to the architectonic of H’s works, that is, to the form that is a prerequisite to, and both becomes the home of and fashions the content of what is said. M considers the whole structure of saying and thinking, while appreciating both its well-placed but sometimes crude footings in addition to its precisely crafted finishing boards.

How does one learn to read and think? The ‘how’ is represented most of the time as a ‘how to,’ as a technique of highlighting the salient points, of getting the gist, of summarizing and retaining what was said. Reading and thinking can, however, become a craft, an art whereby one gives oneself over to what is there, whereby one patiently waits and hears what is there. The response to the given and to its disclosure is that of thanking. What is given also hides itself, and so the letting and waiting should continue.

In ‘A Dialogue on Language’, where Heidegger engages in a reflective process with an unnamed Japanese thinker, M blazes a path through the underbrush of H’s thought, suggesting three sub-dialogues going on at the same time. What emerges in the dialogue is H’s fear that the Japanese will appropriate the so-called success and facility of western scientific and conceptual patterns and lose the subtle and unarticulated presence of thoughts. Ironically, H feels that the way that thinking can proceed in the West non-representationally is close to the original intuitions and non-conceptual expressions that the Japanese traditionally held. Thus while H is delighted with a convergence with Japanese thinking, the latter is in danger of forgetting and diverging from its needful past.

How is one to think non-conceptually, beyond and before the subjective and subject-object framework? Thought itself gathers what is thought and is a promise of giving. Thought interprets itself and then delivers in festive luminosity. Thought first enfolds, and then unfolds. The gesture of language is the gracious gathering within, the devoted abiding and safeguarding (memory), and the event of what it says.

In chapter three which focuses on What is Called Thinking? M delves into H’s theological past and suggests that the early medieval fourfold approaches to hermeneutics implicitly at least nourish H’s fourfold questioning. That which calls for thinking has four secular analogies corresponding to earlier methods of scriptural exegesis. This is an insightful and helpful comparison based on clues H gives both about the debt that his thinking owes to biblical studies and on the
fact that while his thinking is not identical to faith it belongs to it like a secular scripture.

Language is not merely a a straightforward and unambiguous human tool which humans have created. We are already within language; we already belong to language. Language as well as thoughts come to us in their own time and place.

One of H’s crucial tasks is to transcend the present preformed metaphysical and historical embodiments of language. The initial movement in that direction involves going beyond using language as a technical tool of power; it also means letting the essential nature of ‘that which is’ come before us, which engenders attitudes of reverence and care, setting aside self-importance so that we can be called into our essential nature.

H’s style of thinking and saying exhibits the path to originary thinking, calling for a vocabulary different from representational thinking. His style helps us to learn to think and say. In What is Called Thinking? he rouses us from representational slumber through Nietzsche’s thinking, and then when we are awake he leads us to Aristotle, and then to the quiet unspoken. In the manner of the Indian vision-quest, he leads us through the multiple meanings of thinkers and poets, helping us to hear beyond our historical language spoken in its 2000 year-old metaphysical voice.

In the works considered, we agree with M that H cannot completely pass beyond our historically conditioned selves; H finds that words fail him as he struggles to articulate a way beyond reification. H does, however, give hints on how to move beyond the representational: one can think and articulate by using verbal formulations such as ‘the world worlds’ instead of assertive subject-verb-object ones; the use of impersonal forms, such as ‘It gives’, achieves the same effect; in general, using non-voluntaristic thinking and speaking demonstrates this somewhat awkward comportment.

H suggests that we do not follow him slavishly, but once we have found him, we should lose him, that is, think on our own. Then H’s main suggestion, that of letting be, will be complete.

M brings a leisurely meditative approach to this work. We are curious as to how he translates this contemplative stance into built and natural environments which are often seen as guided mostly by technological demands.

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This is an anthology of new essays in the philosophy of mind. The editors’ goal is to bring together philosophers from both the continental and analytic traditions, thus affording a variety of perspectives on intentionality, consciousness, the nature of mental representation, and related topics. The selections have been carefully chosen, and a great deal of effort is taken by the editors to coordinate the essays in the volume and to tie them together with short introductory and concluding essays throughout the collection.

_Perspectives on Mind_ contains four chapters. The first three chapters each have three sections. Each section consists of two or three papers. Throughout the book, sections follow the same format. Sections begin with a lead-off essay. The remaining essays in the section are responses to it. Almost all the lead-off essays were written for this volume. Exceptions are Yuval Lurie’s paper, Michael Arbib’s ‘Schemas, Cognition and Language: Toward a Naturalist Account of Mind’, adapted from his _In Search of the Person: Philosophical Explorations in Cognitive Science_ (1985), and Ronald McIntyre’s contribution.

Otto and Tuedio seek to establish an ‘open-ended dialogue between the two schools of thought,’ identified broadly as analytic philosophy, which they see having a ‘focus on the objective functionality of mental processing,’ and continental philosophy, addressing ‘the subjective structures of conscious experience’ (2). Each section of _Perspectives on Mind_ attempts to carry this dialogue forward. If the initial paper of the section is written by an ‘analytic’ philosopher, at least one commentary is by a ‘continental’ philosopher. For example, section 1.2, entitled ‘Correspondence’, contains a paper by Yuval Lurie, who the editors explicitly describe as an analytic philosopher. The paper, ‘Brain States and Psychological Phenomena’, deals with the mind-brain identity thesis, and is reviewed by continental philosopher Forrest Williams, in his ‘Psychophysical Correspondence: Sense and Nonsense’. Chapter 2 opens with three papers on qualia. The first, by James Moor, ‘Testing Robots for Qualia’, is followed by Robert Van Gulick’s ‘Qualia Functional Equivalence, and Computation’, and
Henry Johnstone, Jr.'s 'Animals, Qualia, and Robots'. Moor's contribution is a stab at the absent qualia issue, familiar in Anglo-American philosophy of psychology. Moor argues that a variety of tests would fail to establish that a robot who exhibits a range of behavior similar to that of humans does not have qualitative states, such as pain states. Unlike Van Gulick, who criticizes Moor but accepts the ground rules of the controversy, Henry Johnstone Jr. doesn't buy into the qualia issue directly. Instead, Johnstone questions whether qualitative states can be distinguished from intentional states, and he argues that qualia are caught up in what he calls an 'interpretative process' which make them something other than the 'pure stimuli' to which Moor, on his view, is committed.

A subject which dominates much of the volume is the evaluation of functionalism, particularly versions of functionalism allied to work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology. Several essays and commentaries side with or against the 'computational model' of mind, and there is some discussion of the philosophical fallout of research in cognitive science generally. For example, Michael Arbib argues that in spite of the massive size of a workable database of information which a machine requires to carry out common sense reasoning, it is not unworkably large. Harrison Hall, citing Heidegger and Dreyfus, emphasizes expertise and argues that know-how cannot be represented in schemas, scripts, or any other sententially based system of knowledge representation.

The essays which address research in AI and cognitive psychology tend to review well-travelled ground. Raymond Nelson, in 'Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot', briefly mentions problems in pattern recognition. Christopher Fields, defending the computational model, discusses expert systems and the work of Abelson and Shank. The contributions to Perspectives on Mind do not evaluate recent work in connectionism and computational neuroscience. Still, many of the papers discuss related philosophical issues, such as the relationship of functionalism to materialism, and at least two essays, Georges Rey's 'A Question About Consciousness' and Christopher Hill's 'Intentionality, Psychology, and Reduction' concern the status of folk psychology. The perspectives on mind are those provided primarily by philosophical reflection rather than an evaluation of research in cognitive science.

In light of the emphasis on AI and functionalism, it comes as no surprise that the dominant historical figure on the continental side is Husserl. Husserl's work gets particular attention in section 1.3,
on representation. The main article, by Ronald McIntyre, ‘Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind’, is followed by the commentaries of Kathleen Emmett and Hubert Dreyfus. The section pursues a debate on Husserl’s role as a founder of cognitive science. Both McIntyre and Dreyfus refer to Dreyfus and Hall’s anthology, Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1982) which centers on Husserl’s place in cognitive science. Perspectives on Mind and the Dreyfus and Hall anthology share the goal of bringing together continental and analytic thought, and Husserl provides a natural meeting place.

The first three chapters cover a range of topics in the philosophy of mind. The final chapter, ‘Prospects for Dialogue and Synthesis’ has just two sections and it is the shortest chapter. The main paper here is Joseph Margolis’s ‘Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and the Psychological Sciences’, which explicitly discusses the metaphilosophical issues concerning different traditions of philosophizing about the mind. Margolis chastises analytic philosophers for not taking their own holist conclusions to heart.

A concern which emerges as central to the dialogue between analytic and continental philosophers is a version of the holism/atomism debate. Several sections deal with the question of whether cognitive phenomena are discrete, as the computationalists maintain, or whether any attempt to isolate mental contents gets one entangled in a web of interconnected cognitive stuff which cannot be represented in a digital machine. The issue appears in almost every section of the book, but particularly in sections entitled ‘Transaction’, ‘Background’, and ‘Translation’. In ‘Transaction’, papers by Tuedio, Steve Fuller and William McKenna discuss the question of the separability of the perceived environment from the content of perception and thought. ‘Background’ concerns methodological solipsism and the debate over individuating mental contents without reference to social and environmental features. No reference is made to Tyler Burge’s influential work on individualism, though there is some discussion of Putnam’s related twin earth arguments. Still, the papers by Fields, Norton Nelkin, and Robert Richardson deal with the same issues currently being addressed by Burge and others, in spite of the fact that the individualism literature is not acknowledged in the anthology.

Unlike most collections, in which the editors provide continuity only in the form of an introductory essay, Otto and Tuedio have gone to considerable lengths to weave the papers which comprise Perspectives on Mind into a coherent whole. Every essay in the book is fol-
lowed by a summary discussion by the editors. Usually this includes a brief account of the main argument, and a preview of the perspective of the next essay. Frequently, the editorial interludes discuss several essays, not just neighboring ones. The service provided by such editorial comments adds significantly to the usefulness of this anthology, a volume which will be of interest to those working in contemporary philosophy of mind.

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Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed.
Constitutionalism:
The Philosophical Dimension.
Pp. xii+263.
US $45.00 (Cloth: ISBN 0-313-25671-3);

Intended to commemorate the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, this volume of original essays explores a number of ideas and issues that bear upon the concept of constitutionalism, defined as 'the legal limitations placed upon the rightful power of government in its relationship to citizens' (4). This concept includes a framework of fundamental law, the doctrine of official accountability, and the axiom that the people are the best judges of their own interest. The book includes six essays devoted to constitutionalism's classical foundations, followed by seven more essays written from a variety of contemporary philosophical perspectives.

Leslie Armour begins by rejecting both leftist and libertarian interpretations of Locke which would view him as imposing no limits on what human beings may do in governing the universe. Armour surveys the roots of Locke's constitutionalism, emphasizing that basic natural rights extend to community claims to the natural environment as well as to those of the individual, and that the moral acceptability of a political system is as important to Locke as is its political acceptability. Wade Robison traces the conceptual shift in the basis of political obligation from Locke to Hume, suggesting that Hume's
empiricism led him to jettison the social contract, while his practicality caused him to focus upon the creation of government to the mutual advantage and security of all, a central concern of constitutionalism.

Guy Lafrance addresses constitutionalism in the thought of Montesquieu and Rousseau. For the former, although law is relative to a particular society, law also implies ‘an antecedent order, that is, anterior relations to properly human institutions’ (57). For the latter, the notions of both general will and Legislator are rooted in a desire to protect the sovereignty of the people—or constitution—against violation by the government. Mary Gregor examines Kant’s theory of property, suggesting that as rights against everyone else, individual property requires contract as the basis of civil society. Peter Stillman stresses both the interdependence of governmental branches in Hegel’s constitutional thought, and also the interdependence of juridical and social institutions in his notion of a broad constitution. In spite of Marx’s criticisms of Hegel, Stillman concludes that Hegel reminds us of the importance of the political education of citizens and of the expression of the spirit of the people in a constitution. Finally, Andrew Reck summarizes the debate over the various plans considered in framing the U.S. Constitution.

Leading off the essays on contemporary perspectives, Jeffrey Reiman argues that we perhaps need not choose, as some would suggest, between protecting individual rights and keeping government legitimate by holding to the intentions of the Constitution’s framers. If, as he believes, a legitimate state requires an institutional mechanism for correcting the conditions of legitimacy (145), ‘then the Supreme Court’s “discovery” of new rights in the Constitution may be a condition of the continuing legitimacy of our government rather than a violation of it’ (131). Mark Tushnet, an exponent of the critical legal studies perspective, retorts that neither faithfulness to original intent, to the purported expression of a democratic will, nor to principles of moral philosophy render constitutionalism possible. The rule of law promotes stability and constrains government only when it is implemented by a group that shares given values, which makes it by definition the ‘rule of men’ (164). Milton Fisk holds that property rights under constitutionalism emerge from a blending of the economist justification, which emphasizes property’s contribution to the underlying economy, and the statist modification, which looks to the state’s need for legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.
In the first of three essays on specific aspects of constitutionalism, Peter French suggests that although the military legal system must in some respects necessarily differ from the civilian constitutional system, a compromise is desirable which would confine the jurisdiction of military courts solely to the military crimes of armed services personnel, thus better protecting the constitutional rights of the latter. Richard Falk argues that the prevailing presidential hegemony over foreign policy, which has grown in a nuclear age where the statuses of war and peace are often blurred, must be challenged both on domestic constitutional grounds in the courts and also through the priority of international legal claims. 'There seems little doubt that the most important contribution to the evolution of constitutional democracy at this stage would be to endow citizens with an effective right to a lawful foreign policy by way of judicial protection' (220). Rosemarie Tong examines the impact of electronic communications, genetic experimentation, and reproductive technologies on constitutional protections, holding that technological literacy can promote sensitive interpretations of the U.S. Constitution which will allow it to respond to these imperatives. Finally, in an Afterword, Jeffrie Murphy soberly concludes that the Kantian enterprise, based upon the uniqueness and dignity of persons, must fail, because 'the dignity of persons cannot in fact be utterly detached from the theological context in which it arose and of which it for so long formed an essential part' (245). Without theological underpinnings, the alternative is a weaker theory or perhaps no theory of human moral rights, a proposal that 'is not one to be welcomed with joy ... But it still might be true for all of that' (248).

Since it is a collection of separate essays, this book requires no overall critique. Unlike the case with some collections, however, all of the contributions address the book's topic, whether they are devoted to the classical foundations or to more contemporary topics relevant to constitutionalism. Nearly all of the essays emphasize to some degree the antecedent limitations that constitutionalism places upon both government and citizens in pursuing their political wills, a major theme of Armour's essay on Locke. The essays by Lafrance, Reiman, Tushnet, and Falk also seem to address this theme with particular clarity. But any reader interested either in past influences upon the development of constitutionalism or in current challenges to constitutionalism will gain by reading this book.

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This fairly clear text is significant in covering all the major themes discussed in this complex field. In it diverse philosophies attempt to understand the equally dynamic complexity of the social sciences. One virtue of Rosenberg’s book is that it conveys both levels of complexity. Each chapter in addition ends with a helpful ‘introduction to the literature’.

R accepts the pseudo-scientific practice of putting questions into logical form: viz., ‘for any agent x, if x wants d, x believes...’ (26). I find this unilluminating and distracting. Given the failure of this style of philosophy to develop valid theories of any significance I think we should drop the trappings thereof.

R begins with the natural question, ‘why a philosophy of the social sciences?’ He goes on to show that the social sciences cannot answer all the questions about human conduct and values they raise. Chapter 2 moves onto the main question of explaining human action, e.g., of distinguishing future purposes and prior causes, reasons, and intentions. Its concern with the individualistic mind/body problem makes me wonder in what sense, if any, psychology is a social science. R then discusses the logic of generalization in science; but the human issues are to the fore. Chapter 3 discusses behaviorism, interpreting it broadly in terms of the theory of rational choice and instrumentalist economics. A tacit commitment to American market theory pervades the chapter. It is not excusable as it stands, given the many attacks on the latter. R’s discussion of economics is nevertheless a change from the usual approach.

R then takes up the hermeneutical model of ‘intelligibility’ in explaining human action (ch. 4). But he gives it short shrift, moving almost immediately into questions of ‘rules’, language, and cultural relativism. This won’t do; especially given the work of people like Gadamer (not mentioned in the book). R does not remark on the many variants of interpretative explanation. Rather he rapidly moves on to critical theory, basing his comments exclusively on Habermas. R notes the importance of ‘reflexiveness’ in social science, i.e., how the interpretatability of scientific knowledge by its subjects affects its
validity, especially in predictions. He distinguishes this from the moral dimension of reflection in critical theory. Then he offers a short discussion of Freud on symbolic meaning and a bit more on Marx's 'Ideologiekritik'. These potted summaries of complex, sophisticated theories contrast with the greater space given behaviorism and market economics. Too much important material is squeezed too tightly into Chapter 4. Hermeneutics alone demands a separate chapter, as does critical theory as well. It could in addition be combined with other ideologically oriented models of social science, viz, liberal, conservative and nationalist.

Allow me to remark that social critique is not critical theory. Marx's practice, especially in the early critical writings and the journalism was 'reflexive' (in both senses), but it was also realistic, practical and—in his mind—scientific. Marx confused these dimensions, as many have remarked. But his Hegelian training would have led him to reject the Kantian dualism in Habermas' transcendentalist view of communication and phenomenological reflection.

Unlike Kant's, Marxian critique leads to perceiving reality, explaining it, and acting on such knowledge. It is concerned with social power and human powers (as C.B. Macpherson would say). It seeks to unite perception, theory and practice, not to deduce them transcendentally, as Kant. Critique is not primarily a matter of reflection or communication, as Habermas implies. Of course the relations of understanding and critique are complex and unclear; but R does not bring this out, unfortunately. He ends the chapter with a comment on the 'epistemological impasse' between empiricism and rationalism, intelligibility and predictibility.

I dispute R's statement that Charles Taylor and Stuart Hampshire—especially—give priority to an 'introspective' model of scientific explanation (112). Such an assertion shows up R's positivist limitations. R deals with the powerful forces of hermeneutics and critical theory all too superficially. He shows little grasp of the dialectical complexity of the themes he broaches. He would have been better to gloss over the superficial behaviorist and the logical models of science. Perhaps that would have given the book less appeal to an Anglo-American market; but it might have been more interesting to me and to a social science community increasingly sophisticated in hermeneutics, Hegel, Marx and critical theory.

In Chapter 5, on 'Macrosocial Science' R takes up functionalism, holism, and individualism, in clear and fair fashion. I have little patience however for any attempts to portray individualism as scien-
tific; for it is an overwhelmingly evident truth that humans live in groups—except possibly in some quarters of U.S. ‘social science’. The implied separate self model is simply a residual 17th-century European myth. It has more to do with the state and private property than with nature or science. R gives too much credence to the individualist association of holistic social thought with undemocratic ideologies (133f). Just as Macpherson and Marx showed the unprogressive side of individualism, others, like Frank Cunningham, have shown the ease with which democracy and ‘social-ism’ can be integrated.

R’s treatment may neglect democratic theory but he does criticize individualism in terms of the evolutionary implications of functionalist theory. Then Chapter 6 moves into a discussion of social facts, with a side commentary on the ‘Invisible Hand’s’ reduction of systemic dynamics to individual actions, especially in economics. Appropriately R criticises such views by using functionalist models of kinship systems from anthropology. This leads to a fascinating discussion of rational choices, public goods and sociobiology. Here R subverts individualism and reductionism by showing how ‘fitness or utility maximizers’ undergird ‘social institutions based on cooperation’ which in turn ‘emerge through the invisible hand of nature.’ The result is a bravura performance, and an interesting solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (163).

Chapter 7, ‘Shall we Commit a Social Science?’, deals with the ethics of research into humans. R’s final chapter then brings us full circle with a discussion of classic epistemological, metaphysical and ethical questions implicit in the social sciences.

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Hugh J. Silverman
I nscriptions: Between phenomenology and structuralism.

The major theme of this book, the relationship between Phenomenology and Structuralism, can also be understood, as Silverman makes clear, as the problematic of the relationship between the subject and language, between speaking and being spoken.

The first section of the book proceeds from a critical exposition of the Husserlian conception of the ego or self, by way of a discussion of Heidegger's conception of Dasein, which, we are informed, is ambiguous in that it can be viewed both as a subject and an object, to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body, which is similarly ambiguous.

Silverman next moves to include a discussion of language by extending the concept of ambiguity to embrace the Hermeneutic ambiguity of interpretation, meaning or signification, which, he suggests, can result from similarities or isomorphisms within the structures or formal relations (systems of differences), from which, according to Saussure and the structuralists, all signification and meaning arises. In light of this claim that meaning can be rooted in systems of relations, or 'differences', Silverman argues that we can account for Dasein's ability to understand and bring meaning to presence in terms of the 'Ontological Difference' of Being from beings, and perhaps also in terms of what Merleau-Ponty has characterized as the Chiasm between the visible and invisible.

Expanding upon this Structuralist reading of Phenomenology, Silverman suggests that it implies that, like linguistic meaning, philosophy also, and even the subject itself, may be so inscribed within, or dispersed throughout, the structural relations, systemic distinctions or 'differences', which constitute the world, as to be no longer visible to reifying reflection. Consequently, language (understood as a conceptual system), and speech (understood as an expression of thought within that system), may no longer be locatable as the reified products of a reified subject, but as distributed throughout the network of communicative relations (or community), through or by which the subject both speaks or constitutes itself, and is spoken or conceived. 'Language,' Heidegger tells us, 'is the house of Being,' while Sartre too, we are reminded, was interested in role of language in establishing identity,—as when Genet's experience of himself is medi-
ated by the label 'Thief'—and in the role of speech as the locus of self-expression. Moreover, insofar as we can also express ourselves in acts, language can interpret these acts, and thereby give meaning to the 'self' as their locus. All such determinations of the subject are, however, ultimately reificatory, and therefore it is as the very process of interpretation and signification, the project of making sense or giving meaning, that, on this structuralist reading of Sartre, we might expect finally to encounter the subject.

Thus taking Sartre's as a paradigm of the (Existential) Phenomenological position, we can see that while, like the Structuralist subject of Lacan for instance, the Sartrean subject may also be de-centered or distributed throughout the process of signification, nevertheless, as Silverman reminds us, the Sartrean subject is, in addition, an active surpassing towards the realization of its projects. Similarly, while for Lévi-Strauss, for example, the diachronic historical project of the subject is constituted in or by ahistorical, synchronic structures, Sartre regards synchronic structures as arising and being transformed within diachronic historical processes.

Such differences are further reflected in the contrast between Sartre's concern for the dynamic activity of writing (écrire), (understood as engaged communication) by an author, and structuralists', such as Barthes', concern for writing (écriture), (understood as a work), which, being subject to the play of contextual interpretations, constitutes its 'author(s)'. Thus Sartre's not yet quite decentered subject can clearly initiate individual praxis which, when socio-politically totalized, can constitute a unified, continuous, diachronic history, while for Foucault, by way of contrast, there is no universal history but only a series of discontinuous transformations between discreet and fragmented Épistèmes or discourses, (on grammar, wealth, etc.), which, so far from chronicling the behavior of independently existing individuals and institutions etc., constitute different, fragmentary, aspects of such individuals and institutions in the discontinuity of their, (the Épistèmes'), interplay or discourse.

Building upon Saussure's recognition, already noted, that a word or signifier derives its significance diacritically from its relation to, and distinctions or différences from, the totality or system of other signifiers, to which, in turn, the same applies, Derrida recognized that this implied that such significance can not be fully and finally determined until the extension and structure of the entire system was fully and finally determined, and vice versa. Consequently, final meanings are constantly deferred or delayed. Derrida therefore coined the term
Différance, (with a silent ‘a’) to mean both difference or distinction, and deference or delay, and in both cases suggesting a certain non-coincidence, a certain negation of immediacy, comparable in some respects with Heidegger’s Ontological Difference, within which Dasein is located, and through which it speaks or articulates itself, and Sartre’s for-itself or No-Thingness, understood as the process of negation. This seems to imply that not only language (Langue), but human subjectivity also, can be understood in terms of différance.

Now having shown that for (Existential) Phenomenology/Hermeneutics, the subject speaks and/or conceptualizes the world through language, and that for Structuralism/Semiotics the subject is spoken and/or conceptualized through language, Silverman finally suggests we synthesize Phenomenology and Structuralism into a Hermeneutic Semiology by which the subject semiotically speaks or constitutes itself through the language by which it hermeneutically speaks of or conceptualizes the world.

In view of its ambition and scope, Silverman’s book is clearly aimed at a readership already to some extent familiar with Continental thought. Nevertheless, in view of the complexity of some of the material I felt that it would have benefited from more frequent synoptic overviews or ‘signposts’ along the way. Nor do I share the taste for cryptic presentation which is now quite the fashion in certain structuralist circles, and which in my view detracts from the clarity of some of the, particularly earlier, chapters. This is a shame, particularly as what Silverman has to say is sufficiently important and well thought out to be able to dispense with the enigmatic mask behind which many authors of more trivial works seek to hide their insufficiencies.

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Hugh J. Silverman, 
Algis Mickunas, Theodore Kiel, 
and Alphonso Lingis, eds. 
The Horizons of Continental Philosophy: 
Essays on Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
Pp. xvii+304. 
US $78.00. ISBN 9-0247-3651-X.

The twelve essays in this volume are presented as representative of the best work being done in America today to extend the insights of the foundational figures of recent continental philosophy. (The editors take the relevant 'foundations' or 'inner horizon' of continental philosophy to be phenomenology rather than hermeneutics, which explains the trinity chosen.) The volume is divided into a triple of four essays, with each set in the triple selected from among the papers given in the societies devoted to the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.

As might be expected (and hoped for!) in such a selection procedure, the essays are uniformly competent in their mastery of the canonical texts, but the horizons of the field are not extended as much as one might like. Most of each essay is spent on exegesis of one of the trinity, and even then the level of commentary often does not rise above providing transitions between quotes. This does lend a certain lucidity to the volume, perhaps making it useful as a teaching text. Some of the essays attempt to compare two philosophers, sometimes an analytic and a continental one, but generally more with an eye to vindicating the continental philosopher than with posing a true dialectic which, in the end, would issue in something more interesting than what either philosopher had to offer on the subject. As I will suggest, some of these essays are worse offenders than others.

It may be that the authors of these essays have internalized the personae of the philosophers they study. At least, this would explain the uniformly scholastic character of the Husserl essays. J. Huertas-Jourda argues that Husserl's project of philosophy as a 'presuppositionless science' should be understood as a critical, not a dogmatic, enterprise that enables us to see how the special sciences add superstructure to the phenomenological foundations of objective thought. K. Haney poses a paradox for Husserl's project: either the objects of his inquiry are mind-independent but ungrounded or they are ground-
ed but mind-dependent. Haney dissolves the paradox by invoking Husserl’s doctrine of intersubjectivity, whereby a thinker constructs objects so that they could be objects for another thinker. This sort of imaginary communication accounts for the phenomenalological ‘there-ness’ of thought. J. Mensch observes that Husserl agreed with Aquinas that essence could be known independently of existence, but then criticized Aquinas for not grounding his insight in the phenomenalological method. Husserl argued that the priority of essence is tied to the thinker’s ability to bracket the existential character of objects (i.e., their existence at a given point in spacetime) in the course of constituting their essences. Finally, L. Langsdorf and H. Reeder try to show that Husserl has the upper hand over Popper in accounting for the non-material, non-mental realm of essences that underwrites all mind-matter interactions. Langsdorf and Reeder then make unusually heavy going of Popper’s World Three, failing to see that Popper and Husserl hold compatible views on the relation between logic and psychology: whereas Popper stresses that all psychologically realized objects must be logically possible, Husserl emphasizes that not all logically possible objects are psychologically realized. To their credit, Langsdorf and Reeder nicely trace Popper’s increasingly liberal attitudes toward ‘essentialism’ in the course of his career, though I wonder whether it is a bit self-serving to thematize Popper’s changes as getting ever closer to Husserl’s original views!

If the Husserl essays mimicked Husserlian scholasticism, it should come as no surprise that most of the essays on Heidegger emulate Heideggerian obscurantism. E. Gendlin begins this set with the most opaque essay in the volume, a meditation on ‘dwelling,’ the writing in which exemplifies dwelling’s fugitive nature, a ‘here’ ever in search of a ‘there.’ In short, dwelling offers a more existentially grounded sense of the intentional. H. Silverman follows with an instructive exposition of how the aesthetic attitude provides the key to understanding Heidegger’s conception of ontology: for Heidegger, art is the site where truth reveals itself, a site bounded by the ‘frame’ which focuses the observer’s attention on an object that is regarded for its own sake. W. Wurzer then compares the means by which Heidegger and Lacan deconstruct subjectivity. Both stress the persistent independence of the imagination from the subject’s conscious control, but Heidegger differs from Lacan in refusing to identify the imagination with the unconscious. He turns instead to the poetic, which is at once grounded in the materiality of language (i.e. the sound and feel of poems define their nature) as well as liberated from the historical encum-
berment of determinate meaning (i.e. unlike prose). Finally, J. Caputo shines forth from the dark sayings of the previous pieces to argue for the interdependence of hermeneutics and deconstruction. Caputo’s pretext for making this argument is the now classic deconstruction of hermeneutics, Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. Caputo notes that hermeneutics is implicitly deconstructive in that the search for original meaning presupposes that the text must be rewritten before it can speak in its own voice; likewise, deconstruction is hermeneutical in that its sense of critique is not born of global skepticism, but rather of a need to recover the indeterminacy of the human condition that is sublimated through metaphysics.

Whereas Husserl and Heidegger, in their rather opposite ways, cultivated a consistently non—or meta-disciplinary voice, Merleau-Ponty spoke simultaneously in many disciplinary tongues, which has made his philosophical voice the most tantalizing and open of the phenomenologists, a point reflected in the last and best set of essays. R. Langan first cautions against David Levin’s attempt to develop an existential therapy that valorizes insanity, for that would be to reinstate the sort of Cartesian non-communicative phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty was trying to deconstruct. G. Mazis then offers the most successful exegetical exercise in the volume, chronicling Merleau-Ponty’s gradual externalization of the concept of memory to encompass the way in which one’s own body enables oneself to be situated as part of the world. A. Weiss draws the link between freedom and art by developing Merleau-Ponty’s idea that meaning is potentially infinite, as it relates any number of perceptual levels in which an artwork may appear as object with an equally large variety of libidinal releases. In a final moment of darkness, V. Foti explores the difficulties that arise from philosophy’s interest in conforming to reality, and hence in articulating what is in reality left both said and unsaid.

Steve Fuller
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Sparshott's new book on dance is accurately subtitled. First, it is about what it claims to be about. It aims to situate a theory of artistic dance—the dance—within a general consideration of the practice of dance (or more properly, as Sparshott tries to demonstrate, within a conglery of practices with various overlappings and dissimilarities). In the course of his examination of the practice of dance, Sparshott surveys the ways in which dance and dancing can be meaningful and what factors contribute to such meaning; examines putative necessary conditions for something's being dance or dancing; and considers the other practices and arts which are nearly, maybe, possibly not, and clearly not dance of some sort or other. Very generally, Sparshott's conclusion is that dance has an essential relationship to modes of human presencing, an immediate existential import and importance. The key to understanding this relationship is the perception that dancing as an activity is an elective self-transformation, a displaying, laying bare, celebration, discovery, or what-have-you, of ways of human being in the world. Artistic dance is that portion of dance as a whole which 'has or aspires to, or submits to be judged in the light of, or can be related to a significance of one of the many conceptions of art (296-7). Thus artistic dance is 'the art of human presence or a set of arts and practices in which the modes of human presence are at issue as they are nowhere else' (397).

Sparshott proposes his general conclusion as an answer to the puzzle with which he begins his inquiry: Why has the dance received so little attention from aesthetics? The answer is that the ways in which dancing characteristically has or realizes meaning and the more characteristic meanings of dances have not fit well into the schemata of the arts which have been traditional in aesthetics, a misfit which has inevitably triggered deprecatory judgments about the value of the dance.

Second, Sparshott's undertaking is philosophical throughout. It reflects abundant consciousness, as a first inquiry should, of the large extant literature on dance. The arguments and dicta of this material are carefully differentiated and illuminated, then weighed and test-
ed against critical reflections and well chosen counterexamples. Moreover, Sparshott is scrupulous and reflective about his own undertaking. He examines carefully the philosophical issues surrounding the enterprise of definition and theory building. He has a clear conception of what he is doing in giving necessary conditions and proposing paradigm cases. Sparshott's own general philosophical position is clear and consistent. Despite the relative absence of 'buzzwords' like 'open texture' and 'form of life', Off the Ground has obvious resonances with the thought and style of Wittgenstein.

The resonances are profound. Off the Ground is definitely what it claims to be, a philosophical book on dance; but it is also considerably more than that. It is also a validation by example of the approach of Sparshott's The Theory of the Arts (Princeton 1982 [cf. C.P.R./R.C.C.P. 4 (1984) 000-000 (Eds.)]). Central to this approach is a rejection of the claims of monolithic theories of art to the effect that art is some unified activity which is changelessly single in essential purpose and which can therefore be given an essential definition on the basis of which it can be decided which activities and objects qualify as art and which do not. Such theories are not, however, useless, as Sparshott sees it. Though their claims to an absolute insight into essentials are incorrect, they illuminate aspects of the complex network of practices which we treat as art, illuminations which need not be mutually consistent to have importance and validity. Ultimately, in fact, Off the Ground is more than a book about art. It is a validation in execution of an entire philosophical approach, an approach whose general outlines are by now fairly familiar. (Readers who are interested very specifically in dance aesthetics might wish to skip directly to p. 341, where the author begins to collect his results, and then refer back to earlier sections selectively.)

Off the Ground is by and large successful with its broader agenda in aesthetics and philosophy generally. In part this is because one thing Sparshott does very well is to explain clearly and sympathetically what other people, from Hegel to Balanchine, mean by what they say. If, so sympathetic and illuminating a presentation notwithstanding, claims to total vision and total validity fail, well, that is certainly significant. In part, too, the book owes its success to the fact that the account it presents is not so elastic as to have to accept the self-understanding of Guerilla Street Theater, trance dancing, and happenings. Sparshott repeatedly makes the point that we may agree to let such things call themselves and be called dance because we have
got nothing better to call them, though we are pretty well aware that they are not dance.

*Off the Ground* has some theoretical lacunae. For example, suppose that *dancing* is, as Sparshott says, a sort of transformation, the sheer presencing of a way of being. Nothing yet follows clearly about this or that *dance*, particularly in the case of artistic dance. (One way of clearing the ground for such inferences, and one which might be congenial to Sparshott, would be to undermine the distinction between action and product, at least in this case.) Nor is it quite clear why there should be any connection between the tendency of dance to force aestheticians to reveal their own existential leanings and a disinclination on their part to deal with dance. (One is inclined to suspect that Sparshott’s earlier suggestion is more to the point: The meanings and modes of meaning characteristic of dance have been ones which aestheticians disliked, given their existential commitments.)

Sparshott’s method of presentation is also not without its problems. The constant flow of proposing, elucidating, and undermining positions and arguments is apt to create in the reader a feeling of being inside a kaleidoscope. The decimal ordering of sections and subsections is helpful in dealing with this problem, but it has its limitations. To take an example, the motivation for making the discussion of not being a dancer a subsection of the section on specialness is not illuminated much by labelling the former ‘4.531’ and the latter ‘4.53’. And such illumination would be welcome, since subsections often appear not to be on a logical par with one another.

But after all, Sparshott claims only to have taken the ‘first steps’. Further steps will surely have to close lacunae, increase specificity, and, perhaps most importantly, deal more extensively with the testimonials of dancers and choreographers of the 20th century. *Off the Ground* is nonetheless as it stands an exceptionally intelligent and far-ranging book. It is also a great pleasure to read.

Mary Sirridge
Louisiana State University
Per Sundström

*Icons of disease.*

Linköping, Sweden: Linköping University, Department of Health and Society 1987.


This book argues for an interesting account of what diseases are. It departs from the standard view which tends to restrict the concept of disease to processes and events somehow in the patient, with more or less exclusive stress on disease in a pathophysiological or pathoanatomical sense' (31). Sundström admits that these restricted concepts serve well enough in contexts such as physiology, anatomy, pathology, histology and clinical research (not to mention the dictionary). His interest, however, is in the concept of disease that functions in the clinical encounter between physician and patient. Such a concept is determined by the physician's point of view; it is to be found in the 'clinical life-world' in the first place, and in textbooks of medicine in the second place. One of the valuable features of Sundström's account is that it is based upon a careful summary and interpretation of ten different diseases as described in a standard medical text. Sundström, himself a physician, gives a philosophically sophisticated account of how physicians think about disease when they practice medicine.

In his view the central question of the clinical encounter is "What can I do to help my patient?" (149). He argues convincingly that it is a consequence of this perspective that the clinical conception of disease is (1) action-oriented, (2) pluridimensional and (3) open-textured. I will illustrate each characteristic in turn.

(1) The physician is not a neutral scientist who simply applies reductionist hypotheses and precise definitions of diseases (provided by anatomy, physiology, etc.) to patients (38, 62-3, 143). Rather she is trying to help the patient. Consequently concepts of disease developed in the clinic tend to be 'coherent guides to action' (76); they typically contain information about 'diagnosis, prognosis and therapy' (35), not diagnosis alone.

(2) The central question of the clinical encounter arises only because patients feel that their wholeness or integrity as organisms is being threatened and because they believe (as does the physician) that medicine may be able to help. Clinical conceptions of disease reflect this by integrating 'objective' information from anatomy, physiology, laboratory procedures, medical technology, etc. with 'subjective'
information from patients about how the disease typically affects their life (their feelings, thoughts, drives, sense of individuality, etc. (200). All these dimensions are given a place in clinical conceptions of disease.

(3) Perhaps the most provocative claim is that clinical conceptions of disease are ‘open in the sense that no definite set of descriptions and criteria specify their meaning’ (161). He suggests that they are like Thomas Kuhn’s exemplars—time-tested and established ways of seeing things. The consequence of this is that the physician must decide whether or not she will see things in one way or another and act accordingly. In other words, it is only the physician’s clinical judgment of the particular case which can bring about closure.

There is a kind of tension here. On the one hand we tend to think that a person has asthma, or cancer, or arthritis, etc., whether or not their physician ‘sees it that way’. On the other hand it is common knowledge that physicians can differ dramatically about the diagnosis and treatment of many illnesses and, I think, all would agree that the final decision to treat a patient in some particular way must be the result of a particular judgment of a particular physician of a particular case. Sundström puts it this way: ‘The point here is that no matter how established and routinized a certain action-orientation may be in current praxis, the ethical question of truth (“What am I supposed to do?”) may always be opened anew in the concrete clinical encounter between physician and patient’ (204). The fact is that we are pulled in different directions here. We want resolution of our health problems—we want to know what’s wrong and we want something done about it—but we also want freedom of choice in how we shall do so—both for the physician and the patient. (More on this momentarily.) It is to Sundström’s credit that his account of disease embodies this tension rather than artificially dispelling it.

I think Sundström has given us a valuable description of clinical conceptions of disease. I am persuaded that they are more complex and less well-defined that those found in such related disciplines as anatomy, physiology, histology, etc. I am also persuaded that the clinical conception of disease constitutes a crucial part of the rich matrix in which medical ethical questions arise. I must confess, however, that much of the value of the philosophical apparatus he employs (the categories of hermeneutics, phenomenology, semantics, ontology) is lost on me. They seem more designed to show that one knows such literature than to advance an appreciation of the topic at hand. But this may be my eccentricity.
Finally, I am not persuaded by his numerous arguments to the contrary that clinical conceptions of disease require some form of moderate realism. I am happy to concede ‘the sui generis character of the clinical encounter and the ... conceptions of disease wedded to it’ (197). I also concede that patients and physicians alike would find it difficult if not impossible to believe that real suffering from real disease is not taking place in cases like asthma, cancer, and arthritis, etc. I also concede that clinical conceptions of disease are not ‘mere gratuitous contrivances of the human mind ... that the “things” of clinical reality—the physician himself included—prompt these conceptions’ (119). But surely it is obvious that the physician’s clinical reality is but one among several ‘healing realities’ available in our culture today. Consider nutritional therapy, homeopathy, and Chinese medicine. All the above concessions must initially be made for each of these ‘realities’ as well, unless the matter is to be decided by sheer prejudice. It may well be that physicians cannot help but function from a moderate realist perspective. If, however, we adopt the point of view of a potential patient it is immediately evident that he is free to choose which ‘healing reality’ to participate in. Patients also must decide which way they will see things for there is more than one time-tested and established way of doing so. My reservation is this: if too much weight is given to the moderate realism inherent in clinical medicine (assuming that Sundström is correct in this) the patient’s freedom of choice will be eclipsed. Clearly this is not something which Sundström would be happy with. Future discussions of how to balance the epistemic freedom of patients and physicians will greatly benefit from accounts like Sundström’s of how physicians think about disease.

Bob Litke
Wilfrid Laurier University
This is a book that is both timely and of enduring value. Timely, because the very idea of spiritedness as the politically most important component of the human soul threatens to disappear from our psychology. Enduring, in that the ten essays comprised therein constitute a permanently useful introduction to the phenomenon as it has manifested itself throughout our tradition of political philosophy. These essays are not only unified by their theme, however; the collection takes its inspiration from the teaching and scholarship of Joseph Cropsey, the distinguished professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago. The American regime receives some special attention, but no more than is justified by Cropsey’s quite plausible judgment that it is the quintessential modern regime: ‘The United States is an arena in which modernity is working itself out.’ In this connection, one must acknowledge both strands of the modern teaching vis-à-vis the spirit: the tough strand, encouraging an austere assertiveness (most evident in Machiavelli); and a softer one, predisposing the regime to a primary concern with the private pursuit of happiness (as per Hobbes and Locke).

But the first problem confronting the modern reader is the near disappearance from modern political discourse of any reference to the spirit as such—whereas it was fundamental to the ancient understanding of politics. In Plato’s tripartite analysis of the soul, the spirit—as distinguished from both the calculating and desiring parts—is the seat both of our strongest passions (epitomized by anger) and of our love of honor and victory (thus our pridefulness and concern for status, respect, success, etc.). As such, it is ‘the psychic origin of distinctly political action.’ If this view is correct, to fail to recognize the spirited dimension of human nature is necessarily to misunderstand both our individual selves and the political world in which we find ourselves. To some extent the problem may be semantic if we in effect speak of the spirit under a different name (e.g., will or conscience). But are these actually equivalent conceptions? It is the purpose of this collection to stimulate a serious reconsideration of the nature
and political implications of what the ancients called spiritedness. What is at stake is nothing less than the adequacy of our philosophical psychology.

The introductory essay by the volume’s editor (“On the Role of Spiritedness in Politics”), as well as previewing the more detailed studies which follow, offers an especially lucid and penetrating synopsis of our entire tradition’s treatment of the problem of the spirit. She reminds us of what the Platonic Socrates seems to teach in the early books of the Republic, and sketches Aristotle’s criticisms of the surface of that account. But both ancient philosophers agree that spiritedness is the basis of a truly political community, and that its appropriate expression presupposes small polities—such as were overwhelmed by the Macedonian and Roman imperial-scale regimes. Thus the moderns’ dissatisfaction with the ancient teaching.

Machiavelli agrees that the political problem is primarily a matter of properly educating natural rulers, but the teaching he offers (concisely in The Prince, more fully in The Discourses) is very different from that of Plato and Aristotle. Machiavelli, as in their somewhat different ways are Hobbes and Locke, is not so much concerned with controlling the spiritedness of the high-spirited few as he is with arousing it in the less-spirited many, that being the prerequisite of gaining and maintaining the independence of a democratic regime. But is there not a natural tendency for such a regime to decay, precisely as a consequence of success in its attaining what it aims at: internal and external peace? Does not the citizenry become increasingly preoccupied with comfortable self-preservation, with an ever narrower and self-centered pursuit of happiness (which for the vast majority means a life of sensual gratification), and accordingly less willing and able to defend their liberty? Thus, the modern concern with the ‘bourgeoisification’ of political life, so unforgettable analyzed by Rousseau (the absence of an essay devoted to this major thinker’s thoughts on spiritedness is the most regrettable weakness of the collection).

Hegel attempts to address the ‘bourgeois problem,’ as in his radically different way so does Nietzsche. By contrast, contemporary political thought (represented, e.g., by Rawls, Nozick, inter al.) generally sees life in spiritless terms. Being preoccupied with maximizing the satisfaction of desires, it has an essentially economic character. Not surprisingly, then, it throws little light on the persistent dissatisfaction with the contemporary liberal regime and the way of life lived
therein, and so provides little guidance for transcending the current malaise.

Restraints of space preclude much in the way of comments about the individual essays. Three deal with ancient views: Arlene Saxonhouse analyzes Homer’s treatment of the relationship between spiritedness and justice as represented in the character of Achilles; Ann P. Charney contributes ‘Spiritedness and Piety in Aristotle’; Mary P. Nichols’ ‘Spiritedness and Philosophy in Plato’s Republic’ is perhaps the least satisfactory of the studies (which is doubly unfortunate, since it is from Plato’s teaching about the spirit—more profoundly understood—that subsequent philosophers take their bearings). Despite its brevity, David Lowenthal’s ‘Locke on Conquest’ (which also summarizes Hobbes’ view) is simply excellent. But Harvey Mansfield’s ‘Machiavelli and the Modern Executive’ is, for me at least, the highlight of the collection; in it he specifies and elaborates upon seven elements of the modern view of the executive (whether of business or politics) which originate with that cunning Florentine, and contrasts them with Aristotle’s teaching on such matters. Werner Dannhauser’s essay on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is also to be especially recommended, for not only does it offer considerable insight into that masterwork, but it can serve as a corrective to the deficiencies of Nichols’ piece in that Nietzsche’s view of the relationship between courage and philosophy is very close to, if not essentially identical with, Plato’s. Timothy Fuller’s essay on Hobbes, Michael Gillespie’s on Hegel, and Nathan Tarcov’s ‘The Spirit of Liberty and Early American Foreign Policy’ round out this admirable, and altogether useful collection.

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