As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

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We might think of incompatibilism as a syllogism in Celarent: No action having property X is one for which the agent is morally responsible. Every determined action has property X. Therefore, ... If we do, then we may see Berofsky's central argument as a defence of compatibilism through a diligent but unsuccessful search for a suitable middle term X.

What sort of an X would it take to remove moral responsibility? Unavoidability will not do the job since you remain responsible for your action even in the presence of Frankfurt's 'counterfactual intervener' who guarantees the occurrence of the action by being prepared to step in and force it should you not do it willingly yourself. A better candidate is provided by Berofsky's 'Effort Thesis': You escape responsibility if you tried your best to prevent yourself from doing the action, or would have done so had you been able to make that effort and thought it had a chance of success. This gives us a sufficient condition for non-responsibility, but, alas, it does not seem to link up with determination.

Another attempt leads through concepts of compulsion and addiction to the notion of power; you are not responsible if you lack the power, in a some sense, to do the alternative action. But what removes that power? Impossibility, for one thing; you are not able to do the impossible. The impossibility of the alternative amounts to the necessity of your action, and this, which fits very well with incompatibilist patterns of argument, becomes our best candidate for the middle term.

So we are plunged into considerations of modal logic, and the various conceptions of necessity. There is logical necessity, of course, and also factual necessity, but neither of these, it turns out, meets the needs of the incompatibilist. What is required is something Berofsky calls contingent necessity. This is the necessity a proposition may acquire as the result of the coming true of some other, factually and logically contingent, proposition. Berofsky develops a modal system for this kind of necessity and its relation to other kinds of necessity, and to time. This in itself is a good hack, to use the jargon of the computer hobbyist.

And here at last we do seem to make contact with determination. A determined action is one subsumed under laws of nature, given antecedent facts, and thus, says the incompatibilist, rendered contingently necessary; alternatives to it are therefore impossible, and so beyond the range of power, and so outside the scope of responsibility.

But not really, for here, says Berofsky, lies the fundamental error of incompatibilism. There is a gap between subsumption under law and necessity. Berofsky defends a regularity theory of laws of nature, which are to be understood as simply generalizations which meet certain conditions, and which, most importantly, do not require modal concepts for their explication. Natural laws are not themselves necessary in any way, and so do not confer necessity on other propositions. There simply is no metaphysical necessity to worry about, and, freed from that threat, which is the point of the book's title, we may view even total determination with complete equanimity; moral responsibility is untouched, since the minor premise of the syllogism fails.

But this book is not limited to the development of its central argument. It is a wide-ranging update of the author's 1971 *Determinism*, and along the way it reaches accommodation with much of the intervening literature. It also explores a number of more or less independent themes. One of these is the very reasonable point, often overlooked, that the free will issue is about moral responsibility for a particular determined action, not about universal determination. Another theme links moral responsibility and the estimation of a person's worth; the actions for which we are responsible just are the ones relevant to such an estimation. That is why you escape responsibility for an act by best efforts to prevent yourself from doing it. Making such efforts to steer your conduct into proper channels is what moral worth is all about. This is related to another Berofsky theme that links intentional action with the guidance of behavior, and so stresses the importance of will as against desire. These ideas are developed, in ways largely independent of the central argument, and with interesting results, in connection with the notion of autonomy and with the question of the survival of moral responsibility in a world in which folk psychology has been replaced by some scientific theory. (The scientific theory, concludes Berofsky, will need to make only minimal concessions for responsibility to be preserved.)

This book covers a lot of ground, and this summary does scant justice to it. It has something to say on just about all the issues that

have arisen in recent years concerning its topic, and just about all the philosophers who have discussed it.

It is also a difficult book. The issues discussed are themselves complex, and substantial familiarity with recent literature and controversy is presupposed. But beyond that, the book is written in way that makes comprehension more difficult than it need be. The argument does not unfold in a straightforward way, but rather by twists, turns and backtracks. And there are too many simple errors in expression of the kind which better editing might have removed, and which irritate, like a scratchy surface on a record, and impede appreciation. We have 'compatibilist' for incompatibilist' (4), for example, 'C1' rather than, what I assume was intended, 'CI' for the counterfactual intervener (26), 'number' for 'member' (138), 'replace' for 'place' (189), and so on.

It is nevertheless a good book and an important one, densely argued and packed with close analysis. Philosophers working in this area will find it unavoidable, but it is probably not well suited to even advanced students, and should be no one's first book on the subject.

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Brian P. Bloomfield, ed.
The Question of Artificial Intelligence:
Philosophical and Sociological Perspectives.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
(for Coroom Helm) 1988. Pp. xvi+286.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-7099-3957-4.

Finally a wonderfully thought-provoking collection of solid scholarly essays on artificial intelligence (AI). Bloomfield has assembled six pieces, each of substantive length and quality, which offer new insights into AI's philosophical issues and its socio-historical development. Thankfully this collection is not another superficial treatment of crucial epistemological and conceptual concerns like those infuriating glosses found in the early chapters of so many AI texts. Thankfully it is not a rehash of reactionary, philosophical claptrap about

the real meaning of 'intelligence', or the conceptual impossibility of 'mechanized intentionality' which demonstrates little except that philosophy is so threatened it plans to contribute nothing helpful to cognitive science or AI research. And, thankfully it is not another mindless witnessing to the amazing god, Technology, whose goals are to confound humanists with the unfathomable intricacies of robotics and to capture the genius of our species in expert systems shells thus inexorably replacing humans with infallible machines and relieving us of all the interesting, challenging, and meaningful things we formerly did to earn our living.

Rather, Bloomfield's collection aims to describe the culture of AI scientists and the styles of thought and discourse which shape the intellectual terrain of their enterprise. In the premier essay, Stuart Shanker exposes AI's implicit scientism, a misguided attempt to pursue empirical solutions to philosophical problems. Shanker does so by first tracing the intellectual history and sociological forces which lead philosophy into a defensiveness that has all but rendered it impotent against the mechanistic assumptions of AI. By examining the logical grammar of AI discourse Shanker reveals how AI tends to collapse qualitative questions about the content of the information in a message into quantitative questions about how much information a message carries. While his implicit but accurate criticisms of philosophy's response to AI are difficult to accept, his analyses of the circularities at the root of the Mechanist Thesis are most insightful.

Bloomfield's own contribution invites sociologists to consider the scientific culture of AI, which is itself a social construction—a kind of shared world-view. Bloomfield argues that crucial AI beliefs are context-dependent and subject to the reinforcements of the AI thought-community. This community, composed of its elite and its popular followers, has presented and defended AI as any other product of science. For example, the discourse among members of this community labels opponents of AI as 'paradigm reactionaries', necessarily doomed to be bypassed by what this community describes as its revolutionary perspective.

The next two essays examine how accurate the AI community's self-analysis is in sociological terms. As one might expect, the verdict is that the descriptions of AI as a genuine scientific revolution in the Kuhnian sense are exaggerated if not inaccurate. James Fleck's socio-historical study traces the development of AI as a scientific discipline, including the ways in which funding and human resources of key governmental and academic institutions became oriented as

they are now. The official history of AI as 'the cognitive revolution' is the subject of Joop Schopman's essay. The view that the computer hardware itself was the model of human intelligent behavior was abandoned in favor of looking to the software as the guiding metaphor. But, Schopman argues, this change was part of a continuing process of technological development, a choice along the path. Selecting the software metaphor does mark AI as a genuine Kuhnian scientific revolution. Nor is AI's rejection of the behavioristic analysis of human intelligence sufficient to separate AI from its inherently positivistic tendencies.

The final two essays discuss applications of AI. Philip Leith describes logic programming and how it applies to the field of law. Leith's essay is a technical but highly accessible treatment of the conceptual architecture of a central AI program, PROLOG. I have found an understanding of the ways AI uses list processing and recursion crucial for demythologizing AI and for appreciating what 'thinking' means in AI. The second example of applied AI, expert systems, is the focus of Harry Collins' essay on knowledge engineering and some of the fundamental problems it encounters, such as that human expertise is a social, not simply an individual, reality.

Bloomfield might have selected additional examples of AI applications. Reasoning by analogy, for example, has emerged as a crucial concern in psychology, cognitive science and AI, as AI researchers explore how machines might be made to achieve reliable analogical inferences. Abductive inference as used in diagnostics, or natural language processing might also have been excellent choices for inclusion. The conceptual and logical problems in any of these broad areas are in serious need of attention by philosophers willing to apply their talents to improve AI rather than to a futile protest of its very existence.

I find surprising and disconcerting Bloomfield's oversight in not including an essay on machine learning. More central to AI's hopes and boasts than the many useful applications of expert systems or logic programming, machine learning focuses more directly on issues of 'intelligent' computing through autonomous progressions in machine knowledge and decision-making. Machine learning researchers are asking how computers can be made (built and/or programmed) to learn from their own mistakes. Is it possible for an AI device *cum* program to examine the patterns of its own errors and to rectify them, either by adding new production rules or by augmenting its knowledge base? Might a machine *cum* program be able to identify prob-

lems, try to solve them, correct flaws in its attempts and learn from that 'experience' to do a better job next time?

That many of Bloomfield's authors place such ready reliance on sociological and historical explanations makes their essays at once captivating and yet frustrating to those who will look therein for philosophically more forceful and persuasive arguments. But this aside, for thinkers who want a penetrating, open-minded second look at AI, Bloomfield's collection provides material for thought which is scholarly, balanced and fresh.

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Hans Blumenberg
The Genesis of the Copernican World.
Translated and with an introduction by
Robert M. Wallace.
Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press 1987.
Pp. xlviii+772.
US $40.00. ISBN0-262-02267-2.

Until recently few of Blumenberg's voluminous writings had been translated into English, a deficiency now remedied in part by MIT Press, which has so far published three large books of his. Yet it looks as though Blumenberg will remain unread. In part this neglect is due to the mixed genre he works in, neither straight history of ideas nor speculative metaphysics, but both together. In part it comes from his heavy style, with its lugubrious irony and a tone at once erudite and essayistic. In part it is simply the heaviness of the books themselves; the present volume, for instance, is another monster of well over 800 pages. For all that, the rewards of reading Blumenberg far outweigh the sheer weight of his books.

As an historian Blumenberg is notable on several grounds. First of all, he practises a kind of formalist historiography, according to which not everything is possible at all times; he looks at the conditions of possibility – and impossibility – for particular modes or systems of discourse. Nevertheless this does not amount to a Kuhnian

analysis or archaeology of a supposed Copernican 'paradigm'. For (in the second place) Blumenberg focusses not just on the breaks in discursive formations but equally on the continuity underlying them, a continuity of rational expectation and felt 'lacks' (*Lücke*) fulfilled in different ways by successive modes of thinking. Ultimately (and, for orthodox history of science, controversially) he is concerned with the place of scientific and philosophical ideas in the lifeworld, with the relation of human existence to the cosmic *Umwelt*; it remains an investigation of meaning rather than of social or other causality. Third, he differs from formalism in emphasizing the history of *reception* of ideas, the diverse ways in which an event can look quite different in retrospect from how it appeared at the time: the Copernican Revolution is to some extent a posterior construction. Last, Blumenberg is alive to the ways in which reception depends upon the metaphors that shape our worlds (indeed he has an important essay entitled 'Paradigms for a Metaphorology' which deserves translation). Like Foucault (but without his teasing manner) Blumenberg traces the effects of metaphor across disparate fields of experience.

The issue addressed by *The Genesis of the Copernican World* amounts to this: How is it that Copernicus could become so epoch-making a figure? How could he be seen as the one who ushered in the modern age, who 'deprived mankind of his heaven' (Feuerbach), his achievement 'the greatest, noblest, most momentous discovery that man has ever made, more important in my eyes than the entire Bible' (Goethe)? In answer Blumenberg looks at the Copernican 'event' from two angles: as the result of a long pre-history of its coming to be conceivable, and from the opposite direction, as a revolution mainly in retrospect (to cite Borges, we generate our own progenitors). Around this central event he circles in a rather eccentric orbit, giddily passing back and forth between ancient sources and twentieth century themes and concerns. Part II contains the main examination of what he calls (in paradoxical phrase) 'the opening up of the possibility of a Copernicus,' or more precisely, the conditions of Copernicus' having 'any expectation at all that his readers would consent to the work's full claim to truth' (128). Here Blumenberg argues that the astronomical model of a heliocentric system should be understood against the background of an anthropocentric Humanism which broke with an essentially theocentric medieval tradition, and that one of the main catalysts in the loosening up of medieval Aristotelian cosmology was Nominalist theology. Implicitly this pre-history fits into a larger story Blumenberg tells elsewhere of the emergence of modernity under the

aegis of a principle of 'self-reliance' (*Selbsterhalten*)–a principle Blumenberg legitimates on almost Darwinian grounds of cultural survival (one of the more controversial aspects of his thinking).

The other side of the genesis of the Copernican world is retrospective. Thus Part III sketches out the ways Copernicus' claim was interpreted. The claim was controversial because it could be seen as displacing man and earth from their rightful places. Human reason is able to theorize how our own world gives only a partial view on the solar system (and later on the universe at large); we can conceptualize our own limitations. Copernicus' colleague Osiander tried to defuse potential controversy by substituting his own preface to *De revolutionibus*, in which he argued that Copernicus was advancing a mere hypothesis rather than claiming a truth–truth is determined by God, whereas hypotheses are human and so of little account. But Copernicus was epoch- (and world-) making precisely because he was taken as advancing something more than a thought-experiment: he was laying claim to the truth.

Blumenberg throws his net wider still, and in Parts I, IV and V considers the speculative context of this shift, in both pre- and post-Copernican lifeworlds. The Copernican drama is played out against a backdrop of the ancient Greeks' wonder at the starry heavens above. Humans were thought of as by nature theorists and observers of the cosmic order. While observational reason could unify the cosmos, its infinite spaces seemed indifferent to the human spectator. How then are human and cosmic orders related? Between Stoic indifference or guarded optimism, on the one hand, and Gnostic fear of imprisonment in a closed and glittering perfection, on the other, Christian cosmology charted a peculiar course, telling a dual story at once of creation and redemption. Elsewhere Blumenberg has gone into the disappointment such expectations met, and the inability of such a cosmology to justify the fact of a created world. Here he is more concerned about the Copernican break with the medieval picture which put man in his sublunary place. Human knowledge is now seen as perspectival, at once a partial view on the universe and yet able to project itself beyond this partiality.

In retrospect this claim seemed ambiguous. It served to boost the power of human reason (hence Feuerbach's notion of the depopulation of heaven). Yet it could also put human self-awareness in its place; man is a small fish in a very large pond (a humiliation made even more striking by the discovery of the speed of light and a consequent limiting of what can be observed). In a section called 'the Coper-

nican comparative' Blumenberg describes how subsequent thinkers extended Copernicus' perspectival view beyond the solar system to the stars themselves, a step that only exacerbated the Pascalian fear of infinite space. He has original things to say on the Kantian topos of awe at the starry heavens above and the moral law within as an attempt to link cosmic and human orders. Kant (like his friend Lambert) postulated laws of cosmogonic evolution, but was unable to guarantee a god's-eye-view from which to grasp them. (Blumenberg incidentally explodes the myth of Kant's supposed 'Copernican Revolution', a phrase or thought Kant himself never used.) Blumenberg gives interesting interpretations of German Idealism as the abasement of nature and the boosting of humanity to transcendental significance, and of Nietzsche as seeking a cosmic assurance for man's self-reliance in some mythic eternal return.

In the last section of his study, Blumenberg turns to the results of the Copernican break. He argues that Copernicus in effect divided theory from observability, thus undermining the congruence between reality and visibility which the ancients had supposed. 'This final stage in the reversal of the postulate of visibility means that the invisible has occupied the position for which, in the metaphysical tradition, the visible seemed to possess the sanction of being the access to reality' (643) (a quotation which gives some idea of the rather lumbering quality of the translation). But not only is our observation limited, so is our potential for travel. In a final geotropic shift, Blumenberg argues, the earth turns out to be a cosmic exception. Despite Carl Sagan's firm-jawed assurances, we remain in an oddly pre-Copernican manner sublunary beings. Conversely, we become more aware of the power of simulation, the impossibility of knowing which perspective on the universe is the correct one, as if hypothesis wins out over theory.

Cosmic disillusionment is however only the final episode in this long and complex book, which offers a defamiliarizing perspective on Copernicus' perspectivizing of knowledge. Blumenberg deserves a wider reception than he has so far received; perhaps with this work he will begin to get it.

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Alexander Broadie
Introduction to Medieval Logic.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1987. Pp. vi+150.
Cdn $55.00: US $42.00. ISBN 0-19-824941-1

After centuries of neglect, medieval logic has recently been widely and deeply studied. Alexander Broadie's book does not aim at the exposition of discoveries in the work of the medieval logicians so much as it attempts a general survey of medieval logic, particularly in the fourteenth-century, which stresses common themes and common discoveries at the expense of disagreements and controversies that were characteristic of the logicians of the time. It concentrates its main attention on the theory of inference and validity conditions, generally what the medievals would have called *consequentiae*. Broadie gives relatively less space to the theory of supposition and debates in the philosophy of language and logic. For the most part he avoids the temptation to make constant comparisons to modern logical systems and lets his logicians speak in an English that closely reflects their own Latin formulations of logical problems and logical rules. To say that Broadie allows his logicians to speak in the vernacular is not to say that he eschews symbolization. He makes good use of symbols in a way that does not beg questions about the relationship of medieval logic to modern logic. This is not to say that there is not much here to interest the modern logician. Particularly the chapter entitled 'Syllogistic Tense Logic' is a rich mine of information about logical insights and discoveries in an area of logic that is relatively unknown to modern logicians.

My main reservations about this book have to do with his discussion of supposition. Here he presents as the accepted fourteenth-century view what is in fact Ockham's view of supposition. So, for example, he says that in simple supposition the term does not stand for what it signifies. He ought to have known that this position was a matter of controversy among the fourteenth-century logicians. Burley, for example, denied it and maintained that in 'Man is a species', 'man' stands for what it primarily signifies. What is involved in this has obvious consequences for the ontological commitments of medieval logics. And Burley was not alone in his opposition to the Ockhamistic definition of simple supposition. On this point hangs the difference between 'realist' and 'nominalist' theories of the ontological commitments of medieval logic. Likewise one has qualms about

accepting the nominalist view, given by Broadie as the fourteenth-century view, that predicates have supposition and that there is such a thing as merely confused supposition. Again both of these positions were denied by Vincent Ferrer (whose work is available in a modern edition). Ferrer wrote as a convinced Thomist, and whether his views can be entirely traced back to Aquinas, he defends doctrines that have recently been attributed to Aquinas, by P.T. Geach in particular. So, for example, Ferrer, contrary to Broadie, argues that predicates do not have supposition. In this he is really denying the two-name doctrine of predication of Ockham, which is taken for granted by Broadie. He is maintaining a theory of predication which he would say is Thomist, but which looks very much like that of Frege. Therefore, Broadie's discussion of the theory of supposition and of predication is very one-sided and does not take into consideration the very lively controversies that characterize medieval logic in the fourteenth century.

In conclusion, I would say that Broadie's book is a very good introduction to the theories of inference in medieval logic but that it is less successful as a guide to the theory of supposition and to all the ontological and semantic problems that that theory involves.

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Pierre Clastres
Society Against the State:
Essays in Political Anthropology.
Trans. Robert Hurley in collaboration with Abe Stein.
New York: Zone Books 1988. Pp. 218.
US $18.95. ISBN 0-942299-00-0.

From 1971 until his death in 1979 Pierre Clastres was Director of Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, where he held the chair of Religion and Societies of the South American Indians. Throughout the 1960s he lived with Indian groups in Paraguay

and Venezuela. The book under review, only recently translated, draws on these experiences with telling effect.

Clastres opens with Nietzsche. 'In all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have also been human herds (clans, peoples, states, churches), and always a great number who obey in comparison with the small number who command' (7). Wrong, says Clastres. In most Amerindian societies, indeed in most 'primitive' societies everywhere, a political command/obey structure does not exist. He quotes Alaykin, war chief of a tribe inhabiting the Argentine Chaco. 'The Abipones, by a custom handed down by their ancestors, follow their own bidding and not that of their cacique ... If I were to use orders or force my comrades, they would turn their backs on me at once.' Clastres adds, 'Let there be no doubt, most Indian chiefs would have spoken similar words' (208).

That coercive political leadership has been absent in most human societies throughout most of human history is a fact perhaps surprising to political philosophers, but certainly not to anthropologists. Nevertheless, anthropology, no less than political philosophy, remains deeply ethnocentric. Such is Clastres' charge. Tribal societies are defined negatively. They are 'primitive,' 'archaic.' They lack political authority, an economic surplus, writing, history. It is this conception that Clastres vigorously disputes. He calls for a 'Copernican revolution.' We should not view primitive societies (Clastres continues to use the term, despite calling it into question) as embryonic forms of our own, societies that lack features that 'normal' societies have. Rather, we should look at primitive societies as the 'norm,' and at 'civilized' societies as deviations. History should not be viewed as a natural progression from societies without states to societies with states. The emergence of the state was a rupture.

Society Against The State is a discursive work, a collection of essays, unified by a double question: How do stateless societies maintain their egalitarianism? Why do ruptures sometimes occur? Clastres offers a number of provocative answers to the first question, two of which, concerning chieftainship and torture respectively, may be sketched as follows.

The chief relates to the group through the exchange of goods, words and women. This exchange, however, is not reciprocal, and it is preceisely the rejection of reciprocity that reduces the chief's power too impotence. The chief has immense prestige within the group, but his function is essentially that of peacemaker. He is expected to speak with wisdom and to be generous with his goods, so generous in fact

that accumulation is impossible. In return, he, unlike most other males, is permitted multiple wives. The exchange—words and goods for women—is unequal, says Clastres. Women are highly valued in primitive societies, so the gift of the group to the chief far exceeds, in the eyes of the group, his gift to them. Thus he lacks any basis for *demanding* obedience.

In his essay on torture Clastres advances an even more startling analysis. The torture about which he speaks is the initiation rite, which is designed, Clastres argues, to inflict *maximum* pain. (His descriptions leave little room for doubt.) But what is the point? To test the personal courage of the initiate, to be sure, but beyond that something more. According to Clastres, torture inscribes on the body of the initiate the fundamental dictum of the group: you are worth no more than anyone else; you are worth no less than anyone else (186). The body is marked; one can *never* forget. How can one summon the hubris to demand the group's submission, when one carries on one's body the scars of that group's power?

If primitive societies are structured so as to block the emergence of coercive power, how is it that such power did in fact emerge? Clastres' first point, powerfully argued, is negative. The state did not emerge because technological advance (the Neolithic Revolution) allowed for an economic surplus that could be expropriated by a ruling class. The basic problem with this classical (Marxian) argument is that most primitive peoples were capable of producing a surplus long before the agricultural revolution. Moreover, many societies persisted in their egalitarian ways even after becoming sedentary. Primitive economies, Clastres argues, are subsistence economies because they choose to be so. Primitive people do not work very hard. (A study of the Yanomami Indians established that 'the average length of time spend working each day by adults including all activities, barely exceeds three hours' [194].) Unless compelled to do otherwise, they choose leisure over accumulation. But compulsion is exactly what is absent from primitive societies.

Clastres denies that we yet understand how states come into being. However, he gestures toward two factors. One is demographic pressure, though that pressure itself needs to be explained (he notes) since primitive people know well how to limit their population, and generally do so. The other is more elusive, to be found in a kind of speech different from that of the chief—the speech that breaks forth from time to time from the mouths of the 'prophets,' a fiery religious discourse that 'is uttered like a commandment' (218).

There is much more in this brilliant volume: analyses of Indian humor, metaphysics, demography. (Think of the Black Death, which may have killed a third of Europe's population, then think of this. The Mexican region of Anahuac: 25 million inhabitants in 1500; a century later, one million. Similar devastation throughout the 'New World'. Over the course of a century perhaps a quarter *of mankind* was annihilated by the European microbic invasion [99].)

There is also a very large hole in this work. The book was written in 1974, in France, so one is not surprised. Still it must be said: Clastres' anthropology is andrology. Women are not wholly absent, but the 'Indian' subjectivity Clastres so skillfully renders is always male. Two important consequences follow. First of all, primitive societies look less egalitarian when male/female is thematized (cf. Jane Fishburne Collier, *Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies* [Standord, CA: Stanford University Press 1988]). Secondly, in his search for an answer to what Clastres rightly sees as far more than just an 'interesting question' – the emergence of the state – important hypotheses are ignored.

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Lorraine Code, Sheila Mullett and Christine Overall, eds.
Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Pp 205.
Cdn $41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2627-3);
Cdn $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6668-2).

The ten essays in this book were originally presented at meetings of the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy (C-SWIP). That this feminist society exists is testament to the tensions between philosophy and feminism. Discussions at C-SWIP conferences and by the women who author these essays address the reasons for the tension, challenge philosophy, and enhance feminist discourse.

The challenge to traditional philosophy appears throughout the ten essays, but is most obvious in the first half of the book on method. In the lead article, Susan Sherwin examines the differences between philosophic and feminist methodology and teaching, and concludes that the differences are many and fundamental (for instance philosophy usually denies personal experience while feminism emphasizes it). However, both philosophers and feminists are skeptical of truth claims, and neither group has achieved consensus about the best single method. Therefore, according to Sherwin, the methods of each might well be explored and utilized by the other.

Marsha Hanen employs the methods of legal theory in her essay on 'Feminism, objectivity, and legal truth'. Using recent work as a model, she challenges the standard notion of objectivity, wherein objective interpretations must 'wring assent from a stone' (41), and posits a less narrow understanding that also fits a feminist conception of knowledge and observation. While Hanen leans heavily on nonfeminist philosophy authored by men in supporting her case, Petra Von Morstein recovers the words of a woman, Cassandra, in making her point that story telling is a necessary component of philosophic inquiry into the nature of knowledge. The Cassandra story represents the *self-determined* articulation of experience that makes philosophic method viable. Von Morstein, with Cassandra, challenges Kant's notion that intuition is passive and does not lead to experience.

Lorraine Code addresses experience from another direction, by comparing the 'experience' of female nurses to the 'knowledge' of male doctors. Code points out that the assumed break between knowledge and experience is based on the assumption that knowledge leaves experience behind. The knowledge-experience dichotomy, together with other dichotomies, supports stereotypes which devalue women as merely private, emotional, closely associated with body and nature, and creditable only because of practical experience, not knowledge. Code's feminist philosophic challenge is not to specific male philosophers, but to present day western scientific epistemology more generally.

Christine Overall, in the final essay on Method, challenges not epistemology but malestream ontology, by outlining the questionable features of the problem of other minds. She argues that notions of 'belief', 'other' and 'minds' are all problematic in this context and that therefore the problem of whether or not to believe in other minds is a pseudo-problem. Overall supports her case for a feminist revision of the problem by demonstrating that certain sorts of experience

such as mothering are incompatible with the cognitive stance inherent in the problem of other minds. She reiterates Code in her admonition that philosophical problems have a history and 'they need not be permanent features of our intellectual landscape' (103).

Overall's focus on mothering as special care and regard for others, prefigures the next five essays on morals. Sheila Mullett introduces this section by outlining the three dimensions of feminist consciousness: moral sensitivity to pain; ontological shock which puts everything into question and blends thought and feeling; and praxis which requires an understanding of the transformative possibilities in a given social context. Jacqueline Davies demonstrates moral sensitivity to pain in her essay on pornography. However, she goes beyond a liberal position by recognizing that feminist praxis necessitates a community of consensus which includes women as well as men. Pornography, on the post-liberal feminist analysis, destroys the opportunity for the inclusion of women in collective consensus. Davies therefore illustrates a specific example of the more general exclusion of women from the public domain, a theme which Kathryn Morgan discusses. Morgan shows that women are denied moral agency because of their exclusion from the public sphere, and proposes that feminist moral philosophers identify and blur the corrupt distinction between public and private. This identification will demand the exposure of hidden moral domains in women's lives.

Barbara Houston discusses Carol Gilligan's conception of 'women's moral domain'. Her essay focusses on the politics of Gilligan's conception of morality, and the politics of Gilligan's critics. Houston wonders if Gilligan has correctly characterized women's moral voice, suggesting that this moral voice is not yet asking questions about whether women's morality serves women. In the final essay of the book, Bonnelle Strickling furthers the discussion of self-abnegation that is implicit in Gilligan's articulation of women's morality. Strickling asserts that it is only after a person has achieved a certain level of self-development that they can virtuously engage in self-sacrifice.

Many of the philosophers represented in *Feminist Perspectives* use personal anecdote to illustrate their points, and to demonstrate the focus on personal experience that is one foundation of feminism. They also frequently comment on the collective, noncompetitive nature of the feminist philosophic endeavour. Morgan writes: '(the) community of feminist theoreticians is calling into question the very model of the individualized autonomous self presupposed by a star-centred, male-dominated tradition' (161). This valuation of personal experience

in a noncompetitive environment was evident to me when I attended the C-SWIP meetings in Edmonton in 1988. The openness of the participants encouraged those, such as myself, who were not trained in traditional philosophy to join in a community of feminist thinkers, based on our experiences as women and feminists, and on our ability to think and voice our concerns.

As the feminist (philosophic) community matures and increases in number, more voices will be heard. Presumably, because of the emphasis on voicing personal experience, a greater diversity among women will emerge. For instance, as Code indicates, most feminist philosophers have learned from and engaged with the western tradition. There is also a silence, in this text, about questions of race and social class, though allusions are made, in Davies' discussion of pornography for instance, to the effects of the capitalist economy. Also, an emergent stream in feminist philosophy attends to institutionalized heterosexuality and lesbian existence. In future this stream will inform discussions of heterosexual stories like Cassandra's or the sometimes too easy extrapolation from mothering to womanhood. These new voices of lesbians, women of colour, working-class women, and women from around the globe will enrich feminism and continue to challenge philosophy.

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Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (G2) is often thought to imply three philosophically significant corollaries: (i) that any consistency proof for a theory T of which G2 holds will have to rely upon methods logically more powerful than those of T itself; (ii) that (in all the significant cases) consistency proofs for T can yield no epistemological

gain and so do not provide a satisfactory answer to the sceptic regarding T's consistency; and (iii) that G2, if not strictly implying the outright failure of Hilbert's programme, at the very least indicates that significant modifications to it are needed. As a result, the conventional view regarding Hilbert's programme is that, despite its technical merits, it lacks philosophical (and, in particular, epistemological) significance.

In this book Detlefsen argues that all three of these 'corollaries' are at least misleading, if not literally false. Detlefsen also examines a number of related philosophical objections to Hilbert's programme and finds them wanting. Thus, it is the main contention of the book that Hilbert's mathematical instrumentalism is still viable despite the common objections, both philosophical and technical, which have been raised against it over the past half-century.

Chapters 1 and 2 outline the goals of Hilbert's programme and the most prominent philosophical objections raised against it. Detlefsen holds that, like other foundational programmes from early in the century, Hilbert's programme was primarily epistemological in purpose. To this end, Hilbert set himself two goals, the first descriptive, the second justificatory. The descriptive goal was to be achieved by the complete formalizaton of mathematics. The justificatory goal was to be achieved via a finitary (and hence epistemologically acceptable) proof of the reliability of those essential but non-finitary (and hence epistemologically more suspect) parts of mathematics. These chapters then go on to examine two specific philosophical objections to the programme. After all, there is the problem (which Detlefsen attributes to Frege) of just how instrumental means can ever produce an adequate warrant for knowledge. There is also the possibility (raised originally by Poincaré) that Hilbert's instrumentalism may be circular. Both of these chapters serve as a justification of Hilbert's finitism and, hence, as a vindication of instrumentalist reasoning in mathematics.

Chapter 3 goes on to state the most common of the technical arguments raised against Hilbert's program, namely that based upon G2 (78f). In short, if T is a (consistent) theory of which G2 holds and $\mathrm{Con}_{\mathrm{G}}(T)$ is a sentence which expresses the consistency of T but which (by G2) is not provable in T, then (since every finitary truth can be expressed as a theorem of T) it appears to follow immediately that the consistency of T will have to be proved, if at all, by non-finitary means. If this is so, the justificatory portion of Hilbert's program appears to have been doomed from the start. After all, proof of consisten-

cy is assumed to be an essential part of any proof of soundness and hence reliability; without a finitary proof of consistency, no epistemologically acceptable account of reliability would be forthcoming. (For a carefully argued example of this kind of argument see Michael Resnik's 'On the Philosophical Significance of Consistency Proofs', reprinted in Stuart Shanker's fine collection *Gödel's Theorem in Focus* [1988].) Chapters 4 and 5 go on to argue Detlefsen's case against such objections. The book closes with an Appendix which offers a similarly-spirited defence of Hilbert in the face of similar objections based upon Gödel's first incompleteness theorem (G1).

Detlefsen's main argument against the G2 argument is in outline a simple one. Detlefsen holds that the inference from the assumption that every finitary truth can be expressed as a theorem of T and that $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$ expresses the consistency of T to the conclusion that if $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$ is not provable in T then $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$ 'does not express a theorem of the finitary metamathematics of T' is invalid (80). As Detlefsen points out, 'this is so because [these assumptions do] not guarantee that *every* formula of T that expresses a theorem of the finitary metamathematics of T will be provable in T, but only that *some* such formula will be' (80f.).

The upshot is that even if $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$ expresses the consistency of T and yet is not provable in T, 'there might still be some formula other than $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$, expressing the same proposition that $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$ expresses, that *is* provable in T' (81).

Thus, much of the remaining book is devoted to what Detlefsen calls the *Stability Problem*, i.e., the problem of showing 'that every set of properties sufficient to make a formula of T a fit expression of T's consistency is also sufficient to make that formula unprovable in T (if T is consistent)' (81). Detlefsen concludes that, not only does there not appear to be any good reason for a positive solution to the Stability Problem, there also appear to be good reasons for believing that no such defence will ever be successful (83ff. and Ch.4).

In defending this claim, Detlefsen gives a much needed discussion of the adequacy and extent of the representation through arithmetization of such metamathematical statements as consistency. He also gives a very helpful discussion of the various attempts (e.g., by Bernays, Löb, and Feferman) of obtaining a generalized version of G2; i.e., a version which solves the Stability Problem by extending G2 not simply to the unprovability of $\mathrm{Con}_G(T)$, but to all finitarily acceptable statements of T's consistency.

Like much of the recent work in the philosophy of mathematics, the book deals with those issues which are central to philosophy. However, unlike the material arising from the most well known of recent defences of instrumentalism in mathematics, viz., that of Hartry Field, this book takes very seriously the more sophisticated Hilbertian point of view. This fact alone serves to distinguish it from other recent work and makes the book well worth reading. The book is clearly written and cogently argued and deserves a wide audience.

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Jacques D'Hondt
Hegel in His Time: Berlin 1818-1831.
Trans. John Burbidge with Nelson Roland and Judith Levasseur.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1988.
Pp. xiv+224. Cdn $19.95. ISBN 0-921149-16-6

Hegel's political philosophy has commonly been denounced as fundamentally antidemocratic, authoritarian and as laying the groundwork for brutal modern dictatorship. Jacques D'Hondt attempts to change the common picture of Hegel the man as the official philosopher of the Prussian state and the ideological leader of the forces of reaction in nineteenth-century Prussia. He does this not by uncovering any new evidence about Hegel's role in Prussia but by asking us to reconsider the evidence that we have. What emerges is not the traditional picture of Hegel the conformist reactionary obsequiously in league with the established powers. Instead, we have Hegel the embattled liberal, distrusted by the powers that be, using what little influence he has to protect other less important liberals and dissidents from the wrath of the Prussian state and continually putting himself into danger by championing the cases of progressive individuals.

D'Hondt argues that the common belief that Hegel was beloved by the authorities simply does not stand up on the basis of the evidence that we have. His appointment came at the hands of various

liberal elements in the government, and he was always suspected because of that. Many of his ideas were ignored, and there is ample evidence of the authorities becoming very upset with what they understood to be his teachings. D'Hondt argues that the historical record shows us that not only were Hegel's patrons were in the liberal wing of Prussian politics, his enemies were among the worst reactionaries.

D'Hondt also argues that there is good circumstantial evidence to show that Hegel really was the 'advocate of the oppressed' in Prussia (this is the title of a chapter). He marshals a good bit of circumstantial and direct evidence to show that in case after case, Hegel came to the aid of people either arrested or under suspicion from the police for political activity. D'Hondt goes into great detail in particular about the affair concerning Victor Cousin, a French philosopher who was arrested in Prussia on political grounds. This was a celebrated case at the time, and D'Hondt argues that there is good evidence to demonstrate a collaboration between the French police and the Prussian police to have Cousin arrested and imprisoned while visiting Prussia. It was only Hegel's courageous intervention into the affair that threw these well laid plans into disarray. Hegel's intervention gave the case the publicity it needed and made it enough of an embarrassment to the authorities so that Cousin had to be set free. D'Hondt also turns up other amusing anecdotes, such as when Hegel and some students set out in a rowboat late at night to visit a prisoner whose jail window fronted on to the river. In order that the guards might not understand what was going on if they happened to overhear, Hegel conducted the conversation in Latin. In all these cases, D'Hondt points out, there is a pattern. A person is arrested for liberal political activity, there is some protest, and each time the person behind it all is Hegel, who often put up the money for the defense.

In sketching out this portrait, D'Hondt goes to great pains to throw cold water on the image of Hegel as the official philosopher of the Prussian state. Even at the height of his so-called fame, Hegel was not being paid as much as other academics, he was not part of the inner circle of Prussian nobility as some others were, and he was always regarded as something of an outsider. D'Hondt is a bit inconsistent here, since on the one hand, he wants us to believe that Hegel was really an outsider to the inner circles of Prussian politics, yet on the other hand, he was important and influential enough to intervene successfully in the cases of various political prisoners. If he was

really so lacking in influence, why then would his interventions have mattered?

Of course, in a way this demolition of the Hegel myth is not new to those in the English speaking world. D'Hondt does not cite the well-known essay by T.M. Knox on Hegel and Prussia, nor does he cite Walter Kaufmann's 'The Hegel Myth and Its Method', both of which make similar points. In fact, in some cases, D'Hondt does not go far enough in trying to exonerate Hegel. In the preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel has a particularly vicious attack on the philosopher Fries; he also sided with the authorities in their rather brutal crackdown on the various student groups known as the *Burschenschaften*. More than anything else, this has fueled the myth of Hegel the conformist reactionary. D'Hondt argues that Fries was in fact a bit of a progressive allied with the student groups, which themselves had mixed elements of liberal progressivism and dangerous nativism to them. Nonetheless, Hegel was only attacking the dangerous nativism in them, and in the political context of the times, his attack on Fries is understandable. Shlomo Avineri has shown in his *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* that in fact Fries and the student groups were permeated with dangerous antisemitism. Fries himself published a virulent pamphlet against the Jews that would have made many an ideologue of the Third Reich jealous.

D'Hondt's handling of Fries is illustrative of D'Hondt's Marxist scheme of interpretation. For him there are 'progressive' movements for their times, and 'reactionary' movements for their times. Given this scheme, he is bound to associate some of the calls for a German constitution by the student groups as 'progressive' for their time. This apparently blinds him to the historical ambiguities of such movements as those of the *Burschenschaften*. In many ways, they were not 'progressive' at all, although they were certainly 'modern' in their espousal of ideas that were later to find their fruition among the Natonal Socialists. Likewise, Hegel comes off well, since his liberalism was for its time 'progressive'.

The translation is excellent and lucid. The only noticeable mistake is indeed minor. D'Hondt translates 'Aachen', the name of the German city, into its French name, Aix-la-Chappelle, but the English translators leave it in French. Would that all translations only had such minor glitches.

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J.N. Hattiangadi
How is Language Possible?
Philosophical Reflections on the Evolution of
Language and Knowledge.
LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1987. Pp. 185.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9044-3);
US $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9045-1).

One assumption shared by many analytic philosophers is that phi-
losophy of language occupies a central place among philosophical dis-
ciplines. The point of view could be attributed with some qualifications
to Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Davidson and Dum-
mett, to name only a few. Furthermore, it is an a priori discipline
and, sometimes, is even understood by some as 'first philosophy' and
playing the role once held by formal ontology. But the prospects of
ever coming to grip with the notion of meaning are very bleak and,
perhaps, now more than ever. This is partly due to the influence of
the late Wittgenstein, of Quine, and of different strands of scepticism
that have flourished everywhere in the recent literature. I am think-
ing especially about the works of Kripke and Schiffer. All these
authors tend to show the impossibility of providing an external foun-
dation for meaning and, therefore, of producing adequate theories for
that notion in the strict sense of the word. It should then not come
as a surprise to learn that some are prompted to start from scratch
and try to eradicate once and for all philosophy of language from its
central position on the philosophical scene. Among those who favour
such a radically new departure, there are some who want to reduce
it to a sub-discipline in the philosophy of science. Hattiangadi's book
illustrates this new tendancy in a striking way.

The central thesis of the book is that the meaning of a word is a
'set of theories' (10). Far from understanding theories as linguistic
in nature, in the way they are commonly conceived, Hattiangadi
reverses the cart and the horse and sees scientific theories (under-
stood as sets of beliefs) as what determines the meanings of individual
words. Theories are ultimately pre-linguistic in nature (12-13). He
also claims in a somewhat allusive way that grammar itself is deter-
mined by the 'revolutions of thought' (7-9, 37). Here, Hattiangadi
limits himself to a few suggestions and just gives an example to il-
lustrate his point. By establishing an equivalence between mass and
energy, Einstein imposes a world view in which things are seen as
repetitious events (or waves) and this, in turn, forces us to abandon

the distinction between nouns and verbs (9). But I wonder if such a close connection between syntax and ontology is possible outside the scope of 'picture' or 'referential' theories of meaning where an isomorphism between language and reality is indeed stipulated. Confining ourselves to analytic philosophers, it could be replied that the works of Russell and others have tended to separate the study of syntax from any kind of connection with ontology, using instead the linguistic resources of logic alone. Unless Hattiangadi wants to take the influence of the development of logic on the theory of syntax as a confirmation for his thesis, he would have to tell us how grammar, now understood as the study of logical syntax, is itself determined by scientific world views. It is not at all clear that the task of attributing a logical form to natural language sentences always goes hand in hand with the choice of a particular ontology.

In Chapter II, Hattiangadi claims that his central thesis enables him to explain such phenomena as linguistic change and sees this as an empirical confirmation for his theory. For philosophers of language, empirical confirmation is just one among many other desiderata that a theory must satisfy. An adequate theory should also permit the formulation of a criterion of meaningfulness, eliminate paradoxes, solve philosophical puzzles, be ontologically parcimonious, provide a definition of logical validity, maintain the autonomy of semantics, etc. Most of these desiderata are a priori and, for this reason, philosophy of language becomes itself an a priori discipline. In any case, mere empirical confirmation is something that can be shared by many incompatible theories, as revealed by the indeterminacy of radical translation. But even if Hattiangadi's theory were to account for linguistic change, the price to pay would still be enormous. A consequence of the account is that no one shares the same language really since each of us associate different theories to each expression. Even worse, speakers may associate different theories to each expression at different times and, therefore, do not speak the same language on these different occasions (33). One can even wonder how it is possible to account for the perpetuation of any language. For sure, speakers do have expressive capabilities and limits (20) and languages also (22). But from those facts, it hardly follows that each speaker has its own language and that the limits of the language are the ones imposed by an individual speaker. One can even wonder if the account leaves any room for the notion of a 'linguistic error'. Also, in criticizing others for their own criterion of meaningfulness, Hattiangadi mistakenly associates Russell with the

logical positivists (28) and the late Wittgenstein with the philosophers of ordinary language (30).

In Chapter III, Hattiangadi develops his central thesis. He argues for a particular version of the cluster theory of proper names in which the descriptions serve to fix the reference and not the sense. Its originality lies in the fact that the theories that spell out the meanings of individual expressions must satisfy certain specific constraints. These theories should be expressed by sets of universal subjunctive sentences, where the defined expression occurs in the antecedent and the definiens occurs in the consequent, and such that they are believed by someone (43). The idea is that these theories will determine the reference of terms just as Frege's senses determine the reference of terms. (Frege's principle is amended by a 'Counter-Fregean Rule' [51-2].) Hattiangadi adopts here an interpretation of Frege's Sinn, similar to the one expounded by philosophers like Dummett and Burge, and identifies it with the 'cognitive value' associated to any given term.

The theory that speakers associate to a word gives its 'total' meaning and limits its expressive capabilities. These can grow as long as the new subjunctive conditional sentences (called 'expansion sentences') obey the laws of logic (49). The problem is that if a language must surely satisfy the principle of non-contradiction, it is usually assumed that speakers do contradict themselves. But since, according to Hattiangadi, the language is nothing more than the language of the speakers, and since he conflates the expressive capabilities and limits of the former with those of the latter, he cannot account for the possibility of entertaining contradictory beliefs (50). Hattiangadi also has an account of subjunctive conditionals that, from the point of view of logical semantics, looks a bit gratuitous, to put it mildly (57).

In Chapter IV, Hattiangadi introduces the notion of restricted meaning for a term. It is defined as a subset of the set of all its expansion sentences (61). It is argued that the meanings associated by speakers to individual expressions are restricted in this sense. Even if they vary at different times and from speaker to speaker, they nevertheless contribute to the word's total meaning. The account is not without difficulties. Once false beliefs enter the picture and are allowed to contribute to a word's restricted meaning, the total meaning that results will not look as appealing as Hattiangadi suggests. There do not seem to be enough 'restrictions' placed on total meanings for the account to gain any plausibility as a theory of meaning.

There is also another problematic aspect to the account. Hattianga-di characterizes restricted meanings by exploiting the semantic resources of English but this distorts the picture in at least two respects. Recall first that the 'theories' must be accounted for ulti-mately in a pre-linguistic fashion if the account is not going to be circular. Second, each speaker associates different theories to the words he is using and this must be true also of the words used in the expansion sentences. It is then very hard to see how one could es-cape semantic solipsism. It is not clear also how Hattiangadi could claim not to fall prey to Wittgenstein's private language argument. If one wishes to identify the semantic rules of an expression with the beliefs entertained by a particular speaker, it will be difficult to dis-tinguish rule-following from the mere belief that one is following the rule. This consequence indeed follows from any account which is un-able to allow for any kind of linguistic mistake. In the end, there does not seem to be any way to preserve the autonomy of semantics.

The rest of the book deals mostly with epistemological issues. As a whole, it is perhaps too ambitious and leaves the reader with the unpleasant impression that he was led in all sorts of directions and left each time at a superficial level. Hattiangadi's book surely is a good example of some of the philosophical orientations now being taken in contemporary philosophy of language. But I would like to suggest that they are the wrong ones and that a positive lesson can be learned from the sceptical arguments that tend to undermine all foundational approaches to meaning. It is perhaps that meaning is indeed a primitive notion and that no theorizing need to be done about it. The task of the philosopher of language would then be not to an-swer the question that gave this book its title, but rather to show why it did not need to be asked in the first place.

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William G. Lycan
Consciousness.
Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press 1987.
Pp. xii+165.
US $23.50. ISBN 0-262-12124-7.

This book is a lively, engaging defense of physicalism and functionalism against various forms of qualitative consciousness-objection, together with concluding discussions of freedom of the will and the possibility of machine consciousness. It is an attempt to discharge the qualitative incubus—the Daemon Qualia—from the functionalist interior.

The physicalist approach to consciousness that Lycan favors is a descendent of the functionalist model proposed by Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, and others, and consists in characterizing mental and conscious states in terms of their input and output conditions and functional/causal relations to each other. Lycan's variation on functionalism he calls 'Homuncular Functionalism' or 'Humuncularism,' due to an idea of Dennett. On Lycan's view, the person is pictured as a large organization or institution, with a great many distinct functionaries or departments, and levels of such, each of which performs one or more chores in the service of the person. Lycan argues that mental states, including both propositional attitudes and qualitative states of consciousness, such as bodily sensations (e.g., pain) and perceptual experiences (e.g., perceiving a green ball), can and should be type-identified with sub-organizational or sub-personal states of the organization or institution, and ultimately with states which exhibit minimal intelligence and rationality. Although he does not press the point, Lycan suggests that attitudes and qualitative states may belong at different functional levels, with qualitative states more closely and species restrictedly tied to biological structure than attitudes. Thus, while tinfoil machines may believe that snow is white, perhaps only human persons can see or recognize the whiteness of the snow.

Homuncularism is intended as a way in which to include the non-relational aspect of qualitative consciousness—its monadic 'phenomenal content'—in a physicalist framework. Qualitative states can be understood at different levels of function and biological or structural detail. By shifting levels, and other tactics, the functionalist can deflect, argues Lycan, several standard anti-physicalist/qualia-centered arguments, due to Ned Block, Saul Kripke, Thomas Nagel and others,

including 'absent-qualia', 'inverted spectra' and 'perspectival facts' arguments. An illustrative example is the China Population thought experiment of Ned Block (which I shall vary for purposes of review). Suppose the population of China cooperates to instantiate a machine program for perceptual experience. Yet surely, charges Block, we should not believe that the population perceives. Aggregates of persons don't perceive. Lycan rebuts that Block is not entitled to the 'surely'. If we examine the human brain at a level analogous to individual Chinamen, say, at millions of neurons firing off impulses at one another, we are unlikely to believe that the brain subserves perception, though, in fact, it does. The moral is that perception must be characterized at its proper functional level, which likely is higher than the neuronal. This raises the epistemic possibility that the population of China perceives if individual Chinamen (neurons) instantiate the proper program. *Pace* Block one million Chinese – the program instantiating aggregation – might perceive.

Lycan's homuncularist has a thick store of counter-arguments with which to rebuke critics: charges of question-begging, function/structure level shifts, adverbialization techniques, accounts of essential properties. Nearly always his arguments are plausible and sensible. Sometimes they are absolutely persuasive (as in his anti-Block level shift argument). However, I don't believe he should or needs to deploy every counter in the store. For example, Lycan claims that being in pain is an event and that events lack essential properties (individual essences), hence, contrary to Kripke, a person can be in 'painless' (nonhurting) pain. I am not sure why Lycan claims that events lack essential properties. For, for example, it seems that the constituent individuals of events are essential to them: if I am in pain then *that* event would not have taken place had *I* not been the person in pain.

If it's worth being an homuncularist it might be worth thinking of events as possessed of essential properties. In so doing, the homuncularist retains the right to argue that having the right essential properties is definitive of functional/structual levels and conscious states. If Tin Foil Machine 'sees' white snow, then *that* event might not be perception of whiteness of snow if biological structure is an essential albeit sub-personal property of qualitative consciousness.

At any rate, for purposes of attacking Kripke, Lycan needs only to deny that events have essential properties of a certain sort, viz., essential phenomenal properties or constituent phenomenal individuals or sense-data. Thus, e.g., painfulness cannot be essential to pain.

Indeed, Lycan would deny that events have constituent phenomenal individuals, for he denies the existence of phenomenal individuals (sense-data). The denial consists of a complex blend of two theories: adverbial theory and intentional object theory. Crudely paraphrased, the painfulness of pain is a pseudo-individual, a non-existent object of sensation or sensory perception, which inhabits neither physical nor phenomenal space. So, if there are no phenomenal individuals, then regardless of whether properties are essential for events, phenomenal individuals are not essential to conscious events or states. Kripke's argument is rebuffed.

Just such a denial of phenomenal individuals is, I think, all that is needed to get Lycan over Kripke's criticism. But just how powerful is his case against them? As Lycan worries, sense-data/phenomenal individuals haunt the adverbial theory, and their shadow disturbs his blend of adverbal theory and intentional object theory. This is not the place to launch into a detailed discussion of Lycan's case against sense-data. Instead, I merely note the following.

Lycan endorses D. M. Armstrong's view that introspective consciousness is a kind of meta-level scanning of mental states. This sits nicely with the idea of functional levels. There need be no self or Cartesian ego which does the scanning: one level surveys another. It also sits nicely with the approach to freedom of the will he favors, viz., soft determinism. There is no contra-causal self or Cartesian ego which does the free willing: one level directs the other and the body. However it stands in some tension with a picture of introspection as inspecting certain events or properties rather than others: e.g., the color quality in a visual after-image rather than the curve on the retina. For one thing, explaining why certain properties are introspected rather than others might commit one to sense-data. The explanation goes as follows. Colors are, but retinal curves are not, introspected because introspection surveys sense-data and colors are but retinal curves are not sense-data. Of course that means that the denial of sense-data works only if sense-data are not essential to introspection and introspective scanning.

It's worth noting that Lycan appreciates that sense-datum theory is the central challenger to physicalism. This is wise appreciation, and it serves to make his mixture of the adverbial and intentional object theories and sympathy for the scanning model important commitments in the book and definitive of Lycan's brand of functionalism.

Lycan's book is easily the best sustained defense of functionalism in print. It brings into sharp and systematic focus the sum of func-

tionalism's parts and raises the level of debate over functionalist consciousness to its most sophisticated level. It can be heartily recommended to philosophers and students of the mind.

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George E. McCarthy
Marx's Critique of Science and Positivism: The Methodological Foundations of Political Economy.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988. Pp. xi+225.
US $74.00. ISBN 90-277-2702-3.

The principal aim of this book is to establish a continuity between the work of Marx and the 'critical perspective' which informed the epistemological and methodological presuppositions of the German intellectual tradition. It then seeks to apply this perspective to the arguments in *Capital* in order to demonstrate Marx's rejection of the methodology of positivism and his adoption of an emancipatory epistemology that was centered on the role of human praxis.

The first feature of this perspective, the notion of 'critique', seeks to clarify the structures or boundaries of human reason in a way that will permit the creation of foundations for knowledge claims. McCarthy establishes the evolution of this concept from Kant's critical idealist response to Hume's 'dilemma of objective validity' to Hegel's response in the form of a synthesis of pure and practical reason in the context of the historical development of Spirit. He then shows how Marx rejected Hegel's metaphysical identification of Concept and reality as well as his notion of an abstract consciousness and developed instead (in his mature works) a theory of the logic of commodity production and a theory of class consciousness.

It is fundamental to McCarthy's argument that Marx's approach should not be viewed as a change from an idealist (Hegelian) to a materialist (positivist) perspective. This is illustrated, he believes, through an examination of the 'temporal' dimension of the concept

of critique, that is, the methodological framework through which reality is appropriated and knowledge claims structured. For its part, the positivist tradition views time as quantitatively composed of a series of discrete 'moments' and is concerned to establish the 'coming-to-be' of events. The critical method, on the other hand, focuses on the logical connectedness and dialectical unfolding of a methodological totality and emphasizes the 'having beenness' of the past.

On the basis of this latter view, Marx's scientific project in *Capital* is revealed to be predicated on a systematic organization of a methodological totality that takes place through a 'reconstructive recollection' (*Er-innerung*) of the concepts and theories of classical political economy. Put another way, *Capital* is not to be conceived as a work that traces the historical development of, for example, bourgeois relations of production. Rather, it is concerned with reconstructing the dynamic potentialities that are involved in the concept of the commodity form as these logically unravel in a series of contradictions (between, for example, use-value and exchange-value). McCarthy writes that; 'History is simply the manner in which the antecedent and embryonic elements of reality are manifested by the teleological principle, but history itself is a product of this prior ontological category of temporality' (50).

Before exploring the implications of this view in more detail, McCarthy discusses a final feature of Marx's critical method, that is, its relation to the spheres of materialism and idealism. The key here, he suggests, lies in grasping the influence on Marx of the work of Schelling. The latter had argued that knowledge claims were founded in both the individual's subjective experience of the world of nature and from certain objective derivations that emerged from the necessary unfolding of the Concept independent of experience. In denying Hegel's identity thesis, Schelling had postulated two realms (history and logic) which, although dialectically interrelated, were irreducible to one another.

According to McCarthy, it was this insight which permitted Marx to philosophically justify a methododological distinction between the historical development of capitalism (that is, an examination of the phenomenological world of experience) and the logic of capital and the commodity form (the inner logic of history). Marx's enquiries thus came to operate on two ontologically distinct levels that each functioned according to its own logic and method. The 'Concept of capital reflects the moral and structural essence (contradictions) of the capi-

talist system, but at an extremely high level of abstraction and distance from immediate realty' (88-9).

Because the categories of political economy do not simply reflect material reality, the course of history itself is liberated from the iron laws which govern the logic of capital development. In this way, according to McCarthy, Marx's historical investigations come to emphasize not the 'actuality' of history but, rather, the 'openness' of the historical potentialities that are inherent in the development of a critical self-consciousness. The ultimate creation of such a consciousness, he suggests, involves a return to an Aristotelian conception which emphasizes the central place of practical action and knowledge (praxis) in the constitutive process of an enlightened search for the creation of a rational society.

The principal defect with McCarthy's neo-Althusserian approach lies in its failure to adequately detail or specify the nature of the relationship between the two ontologically distinct levels of analysis that he claims to have identified. To claim as he does that they are 'dialectically interrelated' tells us very little, particularly in the light of his suggestion that the logic of capital 'cannot give the reasons and underlying causes of particular events' (118).

Put another way, in order to justify his assertion regarding the historical potentialities that inhere in the emergence of a critical self-consciousness, McCarthy is forced to argue that, despite the man's own oft-repeated comments to the contrary, Marx was not a productive force and economic determinist. Such an argument, however, simply misconstrues the whole nature and purpose of Marx's arguments in *Capital* which were directed precisely at demonstrating how the development of the productive forces of capital would bring about changes in the corresponding economic base of that formation and how, in turn, this would give rise to the emergence on the level of the superstructure of society of a revolutionary class-consciousness. For Marx, the logic of the mode of functioning of the capitalist system and the creation of a working class consciousness constituted integral aspects of the *same* process of development. Indeed in Marx's view the project of scientific enquiry consisted in attempting to investigate and explain the manner in which these superstructural events were connected to productive force and economic developments.

Ultimately, McCarthy's error rests on his attempt to foist on Marx the view that the latter adopted at some time Schelling's critique of Hegel. To say the least this is a questionable suggestion. It is known that Marx held a very low opinion of Schelling's abilities as a philos-

opher. In a letter written to Feuerbach in October 1843 (a text conspicuously omitted from McCarthy's discussion) Marx refers to Schelling, amongst other things, as a 'windbag' and urges Feuerbach to write an article refuting his views. It is of course always possible that Marx unconsciously adopted some of Schelling's arguments and integrated them into his own work. At this stage, however, we are required to abandon the realm of serious philosophical inquiry and enter into the more rarified sphere of psychoanalytic speculation.

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In this volume the editors present a collection of original essays by professors of philosophy, law, and political science. The essays deal primarily with one of four areas of philosophical inquiry concerning the Constitution, each corresponding to the book's four main divisions: 'The Ideals of the Framers' (Part I); 'Democracy and the Constitution' (Part II); 'Interpreting the Constitution' (Part III): and 'Current Issues in Constitutional Law' (Part IV). In general, the essays are interesting and well-written, but most of the themes have been discussed at length in other recent volumes and articles.

Although the editors preface each of the four parts of the volume with their own brief remarks about the content of the essays to follow, they leave to another writer the task of authoring an Introduction.

In a discussion of the 'philosophical basis of the U.S. Constitution,' the book's Introduction consists mainly of an elaboration and defense of Richard De George, its author's, own interesting thesis, viz., that the Constitution's current philosophical foundations differ from those of its framers (5), rather than a descriptive analysis of the contents

of the volume's essays. De George believes that the framers' ideals have neither endured nor are they relevant to those of the modern period. Indeed, he argues that the Constitution is not a philosophical document, despite its philosophical basis. Accordingly, the genius of the Founding Fathers consists in their incorporation of procedures, 'structures and practices within which the nation could develop' (3, 13), and not in their integration of 'specific philosophical views or particular moral principles into the Constitution.' He regards this belief as crucial if, as he asserts, those 'who live under and interpret the Constitution today' in terms of *current* beliefs are to escape being wedded to the putative outmoded values and beliefs of the framers, and so find contemporary relevance and significance in the document. It is De George's main claim that it is plausible 'to ground the Constitution in many ways and from many philosophical points of view' (4). This apparent anarchy of perspectives is mitigated to some extent by the acknowledgment of certain constraints, for instance, that some philosophical viewpoints are incompatible with the document. On the other hand, although some consensus may exist on the primacy of such values as freedom, equality, respect for rights, and social welfare, no consensus is necessary nor inevitable in how best to interpret and further fulfill these values. Thus, he observes that 'a variety of different philosophical approaches' (13) respects and promotes a pluralism of positions in society. Of course, there is a large body of ('originalist' or 'strict constructionist') literature which challenges this implied concept of the constitution as a 'dynamic, changing, evolving thing.'

In Part I, E. Gill's essay is worthy of study beyond her exposition of the Framers' concepts of civic virtue and the public good, especially for philosophers, because she explores the neglected influence of the writing of the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, upon the thinking of the framers. In brief, she considers whether the claims of Publius (in *The Federalist Papers*) about the role played by the natural sentiments in inspiring a genuinely important concern among citizens for the public good are traceable to or are a parallel development with Hume's philosophy (32-7). (Also see: Morton White [1987]; Alan S. Rosenbaum [1988]).

In Part II, neither writer seems to address directly the thesis that there are at least three different theories of democracy suggested by the Constitution, as some other scholars have suggested (e.g., Martin Edelman [1984]). In any case, Cornelius Murphy's essay examines the volatile issue about the possibility and value of convening a sec-

ond constitutional convention. He recognizes that the Americans ultimately retain their sovereignty and therefore their 'authority to revise their fundamental law' as a people vis-à-vis the Constitution (60). In my opinion, Murphy's analysis is a uniquely significant contributon to the literature because it explains the set of reasons one must factor into an account of the justification for constitutional revision. For instance, it assesses the dominant view that the Constitution is 'immune from revision except through the action of those qualified to interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the intentions of the Founding Fathers' (65), viz., through judicial review or the amendment process. In the end, Murphy argues for greater public (i.e., non-judicial) participation as self-expression in constitution-making and – revising, since the Constitution is not a 'higher law imposed upon the people' (66).

In Part III, H. Hill's discussion of his 'positivist noninterpretivist' thesis is noteworthy despite that the literature is replete with essays on the nature of judicial review. Its chief strength lies more in the clarity of statement of the relative merits of different conflicting positions regarding judicial review than in a construction of an adequate defense of his own claim. Hill seeks 'a theory of judicial review that remains faithful to the sources thesis and the principle of electorally responsible policymaking while sanctioning the judicial imposition of some extraconstitutional values' (104), a customary 'positivist' charge against noninterpretivist theories like M. Perry's. In Hill's view, he credits his 'positivist noninterpretivism' with just such an accomplishment. Hill's argument for a unified theory of sovereignty is vested in the presumption that the people are sovereign and so that it is the 'consensus of the governed' (109) or the peoples will that determines law. However, Hill's critics will likely question his claim that the 'will of the people' is able to satisfy the positivist criterion of law.

In the last part of the book, among the topics discussed are: a nonindividualist concept of religious freedom; circumstances which prompt due process of law; and a defense of the position that the constitutional right to privacy 'protects personal autonomy indirectly by securing areas of life in which the individual is free to act autonomously' (157, 202, 204-5). Since the current controversy regarding abortion involves the 'right of privacy,' Wellman's essay is of special interest.

In conclusion, the volume has a good index but lacks an Editors' selected bibliography. Also, the overall fine scholarly quality of most of the volume's essays is adumbrated to some degree because no men-

tion is made of the Critical Legal Studies Movement and its influence on constitutional scholarship today, despite that nonpositivist (and positivist) approaches to understanding the Constitution are represented.

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David Novitz
Knowledge, Ficton & Imagination.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1987. Pp. xiii+262.
US $34.95. ISBN 0-87722-480-03.

David Novitz' new book covers a great deal of ground and contains many interesting ideas and themes. He begins with an excursion into romantic theory and ends by offering an account of culture and cultural identity. Perhaps his main theses can be summarized as follows: (1) fanciful imagination plays a crucial role in the acquisition and growth of empirical knowledge; (2) fanciful imagination is essential in fiction; (3) ficton is an important and reliable source of knowledge about the world; (4) fiction can provide propositional knowledge in addition to other important varieties of knowledge; (5) the previous theses are compatible both with realism and with the determinacy of textual meaning, i.e., with the thesis that interpretations of literary works can have truth-value.

Clearly, seeing as, games of make-believe and fanciful imagination are important for artists as well as readers and beholders of art works. Novitz' point of departure, for which I have much sympathy, is that science is neither the only nor the primary source of empirical knowledge. We can and do learn a great deal from fictional literature. For one thing, fictional literature, as Novitz points out, 'enables us to see things differently, to think anew, to reconceptualize, and in so doing, it brings us to notice, and to be sensitive to, aspects of our environment to which we were previously blind' (11). This is in my view essentially correct, but it is not an original view; similar claims have been made by others. We also, Novitz argues convinc-

ingly, learn emphatic beliefs, skills of various sorts, and to explore values. However, his assumption that we 'can know that certain actions are right or wrong' (139) needs to be supported by arguments.

But does that mean that fiction can provide us with propositional knowledge? Does it follow that literature has a mimetic function? In the attempt to establish the five theses listed above, Novitz challenges some assumptions of traditional epistemology as well as contemporary literary theory. He develops a functional view of fictional literature, explores extensively the use of metaphor in imaginative literature, and comments on the Black-Davidson controversy on the meaning and function of metaphors, etc. Here he criticizes Davidson's view that there is no such thing as metaphorical meaning, sketches an interpretation program for metaphor, and concludes with an interesting discussion of metaphors of fiction.

I particularly enjoyed Novitz' critical discussion of Derrida's textualism as well as his attempts to single out what in his view is tenable in the Romantic tradition while avoiding the excesses of idealism and contemporary French textualism. Along with John Ellis' recent book it provides a useful antidote to what has long been the intellectual fashion among literary theorists on both sides of the Atlantic ocean. One can only wonder that it should have taken so long time to see through the sloppy arguments offered to support Derrida's attacks on logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence.

However, I must confess that I am somewhat puzzled by Novitz' discussion of induction on p. 36 and p. 131. His contention is that induction alone cannot furnish new knowledge or fresh beliefs. When, he says, I eat a piece of bread, I apply my past experiences of bread and infer that this piece too will nourish me. So far, so good. But then he goes on to say that it seems obvious that I 'know, and have known for a long time, that bread (*this piece included*) will nourish me' (my italics). But how can I know this before I have even tried? Of course, I have good reasons for this; but to say that you have good reasons for something, or that you think you know it, is not to say that you know it.

However, rather more important than this is Novitz' discussion of interpretation of fictonal works. He distinguishes between two allegedly quite distinct senses of 'interpretation': 'one in which interpretations involve fanciful conjectures intended to answer certain questions or solve certain puzzles, and another in which interpretations involve the fanciful, largely subjective, and entirely gratuitous elaboration of the work' (91). But since Novitz on the following page

grants that there are situations in which pianists may be puzzled about how best to play a piece, and that in such cases their performances involve 'problem-solving of one sort or another,' it seems difficult to sustain this distinction.

In the discussion of interpretation on pp. 98-9 one misses a more in-depth discussion of the relations between interpretation and what Gadamer calls 'application.' Novitz' assumption (105) that 'the primary goal of interpreting a literary work is just to recover those meanings which could reasonably have been imputed to it by its author and contemporary audience' needs to be supported by more independent arguments to avoid begging the question as to whether interpretations can have truth-value and hence be verified (thesis 5 above). If this assumption is granted, that thesis follows. But what are the reasons for accepting the assumption? Anyway, it seems somewhat at odds with Novitz', in my view essentially correct, answer to Leddy that he will use the dictionaries and other works 'that give the most coherent, and in this sense, the most successful, explanation of the age and its culture' (113).

The main theses listed above are all closely interrelated in the argument of the book, but that a good case has been made for some of them does, of course, not automatically prove all the others. Personally, I am inclined to accept the first three theses above, but I have not been convinced by Novitz' arguments for thesis (4) and only partly by his arguments for (5). In the latter case I think that one needs to distinguish between more types of literary interpretations that Novitz does, and that what he says holds only for some of them. At points, as I have indicated above, one wishes that he had pursued the issues raised in greater depth and detail. However, this is a highly readable and sophisticated book which nobody seriously interested in the philosophy of literature can afford to ignore.

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David Z. Rich
The Dynamics of Knowledge:
A Contemporary View.
New York: Greenwood Press 1988.
Pp. x+230.
US $39.95. ISBN 0-313-26102-4.

Rich holds that the industrial nations entered upon 'a new historical era, the era of knowledge' (15), following World War II. In the previous era, which began with the Industrial Revolution, capitalism flourished and then broke down in the market crash of 1929 and the Depression.

Rich believes that our era takes the 'anti-realist' view that truth is not objective but relative to historical occasions. Later on he defines 'truth' as being eternal; the operative term in science, technology and everyday life, is not 'truth' but 'fact'. He says, for example: 'It was a fact that the sun rose in the east and set in the west, until the knowledge system changed and placed the earth in orbit, revolving around the sun' (111). Truth and fact are not related; facts are valid or invalid, not true or false. Nevertheless he invites confusion by speaking of fact-statements as 'true' (see 111). 'Fact,' according to Rich, 'is system-based and theoretically derived; it is the result of the functioning relationships existing between area and operational statements' (112). He does not deny that there is enduring religious truth, but holds that it 'is outside the dynamics of contemporary society' which are 'historical, not religious' (17).

Rich's position is thus a thoroughgoing historical relativism. One wonders what he sees as the status of his own theory; but this question is never entertained.

He thinks that the uniqueness of our era derives in part from the freeing of reason from the grip of static influences—religion, ideology, and the confusion of knowledge with truth. Moreover, scientific and technological developments in the postwar period, especially in atomic science and computer technology, have had the result that: 'Our era is one of change, at a pace more rapid than at any other time in history. Knowledge systems are rendered obsolete, in part or total, at rates never before experienced' (46). A new system is developed or an old one modified for the sake of 'utility', and systems are modified or replaced when they come to suffer from 'entropy', that is, to suffer from anomalies or inadequacies.

That knowledge systems change so rapidly means, for Rich, that there is an unprecendented level of creativity. The two chapters devoted to creativity are, perhaps, the best part of the book. First comes a distinction between two types of creativity. That of great thinkers such as Copernicus and Da Vinci is called 'innovation.' It has always been rare and is still so today. Most of the creatvity in our era is 'initiation,' 'the changing of elements within established systems' (50). Rich gives examples of computerization, for instance of air navigation, and of the watering, packaging, refrigerating and shipping of agricultural produce. He also remarks that: 'Shipping, market distribution, and selling have also become very technical, and all these processes rely on the uses of technology and the ability to adapt them to the specific products and markets. This is knowledge, and it is formulated into working systems' (49). Thus Rich's system-based view of knowledge is technological; his thesis that the present era is an era of knowledge is a technocratic one. Any faults in our present social and economic system are attributed to the present incompleteness of the development of the new era out of the previous one.

In discussing the dynamics of creativity, Rich distinguishes between 'convergent' and 'divergent' reasoning. The former is, roughly, a matter of solving a problem by assembling given elements into an appropriate structure, as when a detective reasons out the solution to a mystery. On the divergent pattern, a problem is solved by putting together materials from *prima facie* unrelated universes of discourse. Rich gives the example, taken from Koestler, of how Archimedes found a way of determining whether or not the king's new crown was pure gold. He combined knowledge of 'determining the purities of metals according to their specific densities' (69) with his bathtub insight that things of the same specific density and the same weight will 'give off the same water displacement' when submerged (70).

Recent theorists, according to Rich, treat creativity as based exclusively on either convergent or divergent reasoning. He argues persuasively that creativity, in most cases, involves reasoning of both types. In the case of Archimedes, convergent reasoning is used in integrating the material taken from the two sources, a necessary step in producing a solution to the problem.

In the final chapters of the book, Rich discusses the present world situation, distinguishing three types of society: future-oriented, present-oriented, and past-oriented. In the first category are the 'post-industrial' nations which are in the 'era of knowledge'. The present-

oriented societies are the new nations, formed since World war II. The nature of their needs and the difficulties in the way of satisfying them are thoroughly discussed. Rich stresses that means of satisfying these needs are at hand and that it is in everyone's interest that these nations attain self-sufficiency. This is probably true but scarcely new.

The past-oriented societies, the communist and Arab nations, operate on the basis of 'the teaching of the leaders who established these countries' (166), which Rich describes as 'irrelevant to our contemporary era of knowledge' (167). Since he presents religion, ideology, and fundamentalism, as being alike in rigidity and irrelevance, one wonders what motivation he thinks could exist for a nation to place the economic interest of a new nation ahead of its own short-term self-interest.

Rich urges that we 'let the dynamics of our era take hold and move us along the line of evolution, merging these three types of society into a future-oriented framework ...' (167). But he rejects historical determinism; he proclaims that it is up to us whether this era in human history will be marked by a real step towards universal peace and prosperity or by the destruction of civilization. The former outcome depends upon maintaining our era of knowledge and bringing other societies into it.

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Guy Sircello
Love and Beauty.
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
1988. Pp. viii+253.
US $30.00 ISBN 0-591-07335-X.

This is an unusually significant book, not just for what is done but for the way it is done. As to substance, Sircello develops a systematic, philosophical theory of the affective life. This anatomy of the human experience of qualities and how they are enjoyed yields a theory of great general importance. It is within this larger frame that

Sircello crafts his theory of love. But he does all this with very little help from the philosophical tradition. What help he does use, for instance from Plato, he realizes is precious; and Sircello's construal of such material indicates a deep understanding of those texts. Yet they give him little for building what he calls his New Theory of Love. As to method, he relies upon introspective evidence judiciously generalized. The way he does this is admirable. Instead of the impressionistic indulgence that we might expect from a less careful and brilliantly analytical philosopher, we find exceptional clarity in which plausible claims readily answer to the reader's intuitions. A label may be useful. This is a work in analytical phenomenology of the affective dimension of experience and, more specifically, of love.

The paucity of modern philosophical literature on the subject is ironic when we recognize the continuous concern that humans have had for love. But since the Middle Ages we find few major philosophical attempts at a comprehensive theory. So anyone like Sircello who takes up the task now faces a strange country with few roads. The best travelled is the one built by Plato.

In the present book, Sircello carries forward an endeavor he began in *Mind and Art* (Princeton 1972) and continued through his *A New Theory of Beauty* (Princeton 1975). The general topic of the three books is the conscious experience of qualities, but his work on beauty is most closely tied to this new book. Beauty is a function of qualities that objects have in more or less degree, e.g., the freshness, the cleanness of green foliage, the sweetness, the sauciness of a bird's song (32), and love is a matter of enjoying the experience of those qualities. To love walking in a forest is to enjoy the experience of seeing the freshness and cleanness of the foliage.

The first part of *Love and Beauty* is entitled 'Desire.' Sircello carefully marks the relationships between pleasure and enjoyment, enjoyment and desire, and then arrives at a major point for his later characterization of love, viz., all a person's enjoyment can be reduced to that subject's enjoyment of his or her experience (26). The crucial thing to note is that although we may say that we enjoy an object, an occurrence, a series of events, a person or whatever, any such enjoyment is ultimately a matter of our enjoying our experiences of those different things. This anchors love for Sircello quite ultimately within the loving subject. But how, we may ask, can he account for that other term of the relationship, the beloved that often becomes the focal point, the cynosure of the lover, be it a work of art, a person, or a

natural object like the sea stretching out before us? The intentional movement of love so often seems outward—*our* own experience as lover is no longer the focus.

Sircello accounts for this movement in the second part of the book where he develops a theory of what he calls 'expansion experiences.' This is, I believe, one of his most important contributions to our understanding of affective life. Someone may be aroused to anger by receiving an accusatory letter. The arousal of the feeling is somatic as well as psychic; it courses through one's body and augments into a burning rage (57). Like arousals, other parts of our conscious life which he calls 'preparations' and 'expressions' have four properties that make them expansion experiences—motion, increase, continuity, and self-generation. Such experiences often bleed over and penetrate the external world. The person in the rage rips the letter into fragments; the anger has penetrated into the external world. But the direction is not necessarily one way; rather the movement can be '(a) "through" ourselves, (b) "from" ourselves "to" elements in the external world, and (c) "from" elements in the external world "to" ourselves' (92-3). The quality which remains the same in expansion experience preserves the authenticity of love's movement, and every quality that appears in human experience can be part of an expansion experience (*ibid.*). Although Sircello is dealing here with a more general subject matter than love, his theory is, at times, dynamically similar to Plato's poetic description of love and counter-love in the *Phaedrus* (255c).

Sircello's major intent throughout this section is to argue for the identity of the felt quality as the experience moves through its expansion stages. But this in turn gives him a solid base of counter-argument against those who would characterize his theory as simply egoistic. The quality of the experience is preserved in this intercourse between the lover and beloved. The mutual penetrating and influence relaxes the boundaries of the ego. However, I will argue below that the boundaries have not been relaxed enough.

One more major idea remains to be developed before Sircello can give us what he calls the New Theory of Love. It is the reproduction of an experience of a quality. A theory of Love, he says, 'must be a theory of the Love of *the experience* of qualities.' (121; his italics.) The lover lives through an enjoyable experience and wants to continue on with it; thus the lover 'reproduces' the experience or a similar one in him or herself. This activity of reproduction gives the ongoing dynamic to the process of love. The experiences described by Sircello's theory are those in which one enjoys a quality, reproduces it in one's

ongoing total experience, and in reproducing it both satisfies and stimulates the lover's desire for such reproduction. For instance, if I love gardening, I will enjoy the feeling of the fresh, moist earth in my hands and consciously want to reproduce the feeling; and thus I go on with the activity both satisfying my desire for the felt qualities of the earth and generating the feeling by continuing on with the gardening. In loving we are mainly reproducing expansion experiences and enjoying not only the qualities therein but the experiencing of the qualities. Thus in loving a work of art I may enjoy its exquisite drawing, my feeling of this delicacy will course through me, I may feel it in my fingertips as if I were wielding a fine brush. I will reproduce this experience of delicacy so that it will continue, but I will also enjoy the experienc*ing*. The movement of the expansion experience is, in addition, enjoyed; going through the activity has its own desirable qualities.

Thus Love, according to the New Theory of Love, can be roughly defined in the following way. Someone, S, Loves an object if and only if S reproduces his or her experience of the object and, in reproducing, arouses and satisfies S's desire to reproduce such an experience (124).

Sircello gives us a complex and finely wrought theory of the *activity* of love. But, I think, we can make plausible argument that some forms of love are more than the affective activity that he describes. According to Sircello, all loving is an enjoying. Grant that he uses 'enjoy' in a broader, even stronger sense than what we find in much ordinary usage; for him we can enjoy, that is savor and live through, normally painful emotions such as grief. Nevertheless, even with this enlarged notion of enjoying, his theory does not adequately describe at least one and possibly other love relationships. The parental love for the child seems to involve more. Although he discusses this relationship, I believe that he leaves something out, what I can best characterize as a state of being or an attitude.

Imagine Smedley, an unfortunate child without any redeeming qualities. Even in the eyes of his parent he appears mediocre in every way, and no one seems to ever notice whether he's in the house or not. Then imagine that Smedley encounters trouble of some sort. It makes perfectly good sense to expect a flow of compassion from the parent. Why? Because the parent preserved an attitude of care and concern, neither of which need be construed as feelings or emotions. Rather, as an enduring stance taken by the parent toward the child, the care and concern become conditions under which certain feelings

or emotions occur. The parent may go through an activity of loving Smedley similar to that described by Sircello; but, we may argue, it is done in virtue of being in a state of being or having an attitude towards the boy. If this example makes sense, then love at least in one instance is more than the activity Sircello so well describes.

The addition of a component of this sort would put to rest an unease that I felt upon reading this excellent book. Even with Sircello's seeing love in terms of expansion experiences which often flow forth from the lover and may penetrate the lover from without, the lover is still enjoying his or her *own* experience. This enjoyment of one's own experience preserves a certain irreducible egoism; and, perhaps, Sircello is suggesting that when he speaks of 'the fundamental Hellenism' of his theory (241). If the activity of love were taken together with the attitude or state of being I have proposed, perhaps the envelope of egoism could be pierced.

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R. Burch
R.A. Shiner