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As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

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Norman L. Cantor.
Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press 1987. Pp. xii+208.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-253-3329-7.

Sometimes withholding medical treatment – or, what amounts to the same thing, withdrawing it – leads to death. This book is about such withdrawing and withholding. In a nutshell, the author argues that every competent person has the fundamental right to refuse lifesaving and/or sustaining treatment; that patients do not lose this right because they have become incompetent; and that even if they have never been competent the right remains, to be exercised by an appropriate surrogate. In the course of his reasoning, Cantor touches on issues like: Who should be the surrogate decision maker? What criteria should he/she use? What is the role of the family here? Of the courts? Of the health care professionals? Sandwiched in are discussions of omission vs. commission, ordinary vs. extra-ordinary means, suicide vs. refusal of treatment, etc. The number of issues touched on is legion.

How does Cantor argue his position? From a legal perspective, as the title suggests, and with almost exclusive focus on U.S. cases. But abstracting from this, his reasoning starts out from the thesis that 'the important object of preserving human existence must be tempered by respect for human dignity' (x). That is to say, while 'sanctity of life is indeed the foundation of a free society' – (Why? One would have thought that respect for the autonomy of persons would be more fundamental.) – 'and the state has an indisputable interest in the preservation of life' (30), this 'state interest in the sanctity of life does not hinge on the prospective duration of quality of a patient's existence; the state's interest is simply overridden by countervailing individual interests' (4). (All of which, I suppose, is one way of saying that autonomy is fundamental and supreme after all.) Cantor then continues that 'patient autonomy includes the prerogative to resist life-preserving treatment where the existence to be preserved would represent a subjective hell for the patient' (22). He then traces the legal extension of this to the incompetent patient. Here he finds a distinction between previously competent and never-competent patients; and in the former case again between patients who, while competent, have given some indication of how they wished to be treated should they become incompetent, and patients who did not. For the former he finds that the law requires that their wishes be respected (14 ff.); for the latter – neonates excepted – he considers two approaches: a subjective substituted-judgment approach, which tries 'to effectuate, to the extent possible, the course of conduct the patient

would have desired' (63); and a best-interests approach (68ff.), which focuses on what objectively is considered best for the patient. Exploring the legal ramifications of these in *Conroy, Quinlan* and related cases, he suggests that the two can be reconciled if one accepts that 'the definition of patient well being can be shaped by personal values and standards of the patient' (70). Where no subjective indications exist – as in the case of the never-competent – an 'objective test' based on society's perception of what is appropriate applies. However, 'the basic objective remains to respect intrinsic human dignity' (93). This may occasion difficulties and may not satisfy all concerns – e.g.: How does one determine indignity for a comatose incompetent? Suffering? Etc. (71) – but it is the best that we can do. As to who should decide, clearly the competent patient him/herself; in all other cases, whoever is best placed to determine the best interests (defined as inclusive of values) of the patient. Primacy here belongs not to the physician – this is not a purely medical matter (108) – but to the next-of-kin (107ff.). He sees the emerging role of ethics committees as educational, suggestive of policy and analytical, but essentially as still in the 'developmental stage' (110). He rejects regular involvement of the judiciary: 'regularized judicial participation in terminal decisions is neither practical nor desirable' (114), and adopts an equally as negative stance towards administrative power in these matters (120ff.). He touches briefly on the device of a patient proxy appointed by the patient when competent (122-3) but does not develop this, perhaps because trends in this area have not as yet developed. The largest segment of the book is devoted (53 pages) to defective newborns. We are told that 'under the current legal framework, decision making responsibility lies in the hands of the infant's parents in consultation with the medical staff' (130) – which means that parents may decide to forego treatment: but only where this choice is based on considerations of best interest for the child. 'The right of parents to protect family emotional and economic interests does not ordinarily encompass termination of human life' (146). In practice however, as Cantor admits, the situation may sometimes be different (151 et pass.). Cantor also appends a brief discussion of the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' feeding as means of maintaining life, and suggests that although not logically different, intuitively they are. 'Logic is not the only factor in this setting' (176). He also addresses the question of what constitutes acceptable quality of life for a newborn and points to the inadequacy of current understanding. The best we can do is this: 'It can probably be said in good conscience that an infant who will spend its entire existence in total immobility, unable or barely able to relate to its environment, subject to repeated physical invasions (from surgery, shunts, tubes, etc.) and dependent on outside aid for every bodily function is suffering and is better off dead than alive' (179).

How to assess all this? Cantor's book is one of the most readable I have encountered on the subject, and his legal scholarship is good for an introductory work. It is well worth reading by Canadians even though the cases are almost exclusively U.S. Still, Cantor might have benefitted from looking at Canadian cases and Canadian writers like Dickens, Somerville, Keyserlingk, Rozovsky, Kluge, Walton and Schaeffer – to mention but a few. I say this not because of chauvinistic leanings but because many of the issues that he finds problematic and 'new' in the U.S. setting have been discussed – and sometimes already resolved – in the Canadian context (cf. *Attorney General of B.C. v Astoforoff* for force-feeding; refusals by mature minors in *Re L.D.K*; refusal by competent patients in lifethreatening but salvageable contexts in *Mulloy v HopSang*). Another shortcoming from the Canadian perspective is that U.S. and Canadian standards on informed consent differ. On a purely conceptual plane, Canor's discussion of active/passive euthanasia is not too good – or legally complete; and his characterization of the doctrine of double effect as 'sufficient to satisfy religious and moral philosophers' (35) is simply wrong. But then, this does not purport to be a philosophical work. However, it does claim to deal with the legal frontiers of death and dying, and here it does not live up to its claim. Mature minor refusal is ignored; so is keeping anencephalics alive for transplant purposes; the acceptability of neocortical death is skated over with barely a mention – to point out only a few examples. But perhaps this is unfair. The book was written in 1986 – and much has happened since then. One can only hope that a newer version will soon be written – from a Canadian perspective. As it stands, however, it is still useful as an introduction to the U.S. legal issues, even though it is dated. The expert, of course, will look elsewhere.

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David Carr.
Time, Narrative and History.
Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press 1986. Pp. ix+189.
US$22.50. ISBN 0-253-36024-2.

The principal thesis of *Time, Narrative and History* is that human his-
tory should be understood as an extension of *the historicity that is the
form of ordinary experience*, and not as Louis Mink, Hayden White
and Paul Ricoeur seem to propose, in Carr's own analysis, by a su-
perimposition of fictional narrative forms on a 'mere sequence' of form-
less experiential events. From this standpoint, Carr's new work
represents an effort to defend a *theory of truth*, equally applicable to
narrative and to history, that stands between the extremes of a cor-
respondence truth within a causal context (physical sciences, positiv-
ism) and the truth of coherent or conventional meaning without an
adequate motivating referent (narrative, linguistic/text theories). In
arguing for this theory by freely using fragments of doctrines from
Husserl, Heidegger and Alfred Schutz, in the Continental philosophi-
cal tradition, and contrasting them with concurrent work by Barbara
Hardy, Frederick Olafson, and Alasdair McIntyre, in the Anglo-
American tradition, Carr makes the most recent contribution to a body
of doctrine, roughly classifiable as 'philosophy of action,' that gathers
ideas and methods from sources as different yet as affinitive as the
later Wittgenstein and his followers, analytic theories of motivation
as applied to History and the Social Sciences (W. Dray, Arthur Danto,
G.H. von Wright, Charles Taylor), and the pragmatist adaptation of
Weber by Talcott Parsons. Carr might not want to have his work in-
cluded within the philosophy of action, but that is ultimately the na-
ture of his effort.

In a commentary to a 1984 APA paper of his on the same subject,
I stated that there were clear indications of 'foundationalism' in Carr's
critical attitudes toward Mink, White and Ricoeur. He responded then
that his aim was not ontological but epistemological: a clarification
of experience without any reductionist purpose. But in fact there can
be an 'epistemological foundationalism' and a concomitant 'epistemo-
logical reductionism.' In epistemology, foundationalism consists in
establishing the definition of complex *meanings* necessarily in terms
of certain elementary meanings and their combination in fixed, speci-
fied ways. Any alteration of the elements or the procedures of combi-
nation, the foundationalist would claim, will inevitably lead to
untruth in the characterization of the areas of experience in which
the elementary or the combined meanings belong. Truth in this view
is the consequence of method, even if the method in question is a *reflec-
tive* one based on the motivational awareness inherent in all human

actions. The presence of an 'epistemological foundationalism' is, if any-thing, even more pronounced in the book than it was in Carr's paper for, although his modesty would not allow him to make this claim, *Time, Narrative and History* represents a robust and sustained per-sonal effort to make comprehensive modifications in the top reflec-tive theories of human experience in our century, to establish a methodology for the Human Sciences that rises systematically from clear and distinct units to more complex units of interpretation, and to give a well rounded shape to a non-speculative, non-fictional, hence *morally* significant, philosophy of history.

In order to carry out his stated critical purposes and his unstated program of reform in the Human Sciences, Carr makes a detailed ex-position of Husserl's phenomenological explanation of the temporal dimensions of all our intentional syntheses. No object of conscious-ness can acquire a definite form unless its parts, its presentational aspects, blend with each other in the 'protentive' and 'retentive' ten-dencies of intentionality. Such tendencies constitute both objects of awareness and the awareness of objects *in time.* Heidegger and Schutz extended these Husserlian discoveries of the temporal consistency of our awareness by unveiling the conscious structure of our practical dealings, our actions, in our human environment, and the relation of those actions with each other as they form a coherent whole. Carr's exposition of these doctrines attempts to show how these two authors demonstrated the role of the anticipatory, future oriented character of action in helping us distinguish phenomenologically from each other the two directions of intentionality that separate the epochs of time, the past and the future, and provide its content to our consciousness of history.

The reflective study of the (present) temporal structure of basic, everyday, consciousness and action is so important to the argument of *Time, Narrative and History* that one regrets that its author has not deepened and developed, more than he does, the doctrines of Hus-serl, Schutz and Heidegger (with some side glances to Merleau-Ponty) that he uses as his primary sources. Carr does not seem fully to un-derstand all the theoretical consequences of the distinction between passive articulation of protentions and retentions, on the one hand, and 'meaningful action,' on the other. In passive articulation, one should only see a horizon of *chronogenesis* without any time-specific features or *chonotypes. Passive articulation merely directs the move-ments of and agent in space and configures his/her total milieu in ac-cordance with teleological priorities.* Only the existence of active syntheses of consciousness, actions experienced in the future perfect tense and in their relations with each other, rather than with the 'lived present,' makes possible our awareness of the future as a *time-specific* epoch and permits the free displacement of the 'living present' to any

'moment' or point along the line of priorities and posteriorities in which those actions are to be accomplished. Such active syntheses transcend mere teleological behavior; they become possible indeed when each act of a series ceases to be performed merely *in order to* perform another and becomes *biographical*, that is, performed *for the sake of* the entire series and of the agent, as realized in and through his/her acts.

The precedence of the whole of our existence over its parts was taught unequivocally by Heidegger who, in his explanation of the worldhood of the world, makes all the 'assignments' and 'references' of our actions to each other depend upon our 'preunderstanding' of their 'involvement' in a world plan that is also the total articulation of *Dasein's* possibilities. The relation of our 'understanding' to the preunderstanding of the world plan marks the future-orientation of one of the directions of lived time. The relation of our 'state of mind,' our feelings, to the preunderstanding of the world in which we are thrown marks the past-orientation of time in historical recollection (another typical direction of lived time). These time structures are co-original with, not foundational to, the freer temporality or our existence as a whole, i.e., *of language.*

Confusions about this co-originality of temporality, language and the total sense of our existence were created by Heidegger himself when he separated the sign-making aspect of action from language and placed it within understanding, thus giving the impression that language is the inner voice of our world understanding. These confusions became the source of misleading contentions, principally expounded by Derrida, in favor of writing, the use of signs, over speech. It is true indeed that if linguistic temporality is not, to begin with, the time-articulation of the whole of our existence, and if the epochs of time (future, past and present) do not originate reflectively from that articulation, then Derrida would be right in assuming that there is an unacceptable 'supplementarity' in Heidegger's structuring of *Dasein* and of time. Such structuring indeed could only be the result of a tendency in the nature of our consciousness to use, in the process of structuring/expressing itself, basic linguistic tropes to which no reflectiveness can be presupposed without assuming a supplementary use of the tropes themselves.

The error on the part of Derrida and his American followers at Yale and elsewhere lies in their inability to live up to the most important insight implicit in the claim (a claim that I accept) that *all* levels of distinctively human experience are mediated or, what is the same, reflective. If this is so, then the tropes of language can only be (together with 'protentions,' 'retentions,' 'the lived present,' or 'events' and 'mere action sequences') formalizations of *reflective turns from the whole of existence to its parts.* In fact, Carr coincides with post-

structuralism in the analytic approach he uses, an approach that is today almost universal in professional academic practice and that has become a total obstacle to our *grasping of experience itself* beyond the formalization of its parts and even of the whole. It is that formalization, and the focusing on the structuring features that constitute experience as a text, that is described by Derrida as writing and by Ricoeur and White as 'fictional' narrative.

The preceding clarifications of current epistemology and ontology of narrative make plainly visible that the polemical side of Carr's work rests on misunderstandings and is not relevant to the thought of the authors he opposes. He is simply not thinking about the same things as they are. Two important lessons can be learned from the contrasting of his position with theirs in Carr's book. The first is that the notion of world *as sense* that we have inherited from Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics is profoundly confusing because it involves a strange identification of forms of life as a whole with Being in language (Wittgenstein's merit lies in having avoided that identification). The second lesson is that the notion of *reference*, in itself and in its opposition to *sense*, belongs truly with epistemological conceptions of language that modern semiotic theories have rendered obsolete. Indeed, in all of modern epistemology (to the extent that it ignores semiotics) the 'world' retains a profound residue of naivete. Once it is understood that existence as a whole is the primary object *and* context of our understanding, that it is its own sign, and that it extends its own significance to all other signs, the idea of reference should be replaced, as it was by Heidegger in *Being and Time* (though he forgot it frequently later), by that of the reflective relativity of all signs to each other within totalities of experience. We do not *have* a 'world,' nor *are-in* a world; we simply live and communicate within the same reality and nature when, and if, we share in the same forms of life.

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Edward Craig.
The Mind of God and the Works of Man.
Don Mills, ON and New York:
Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. x+353.
Cdn$68.75; US$49.00. ISBN 0-19-824933-0.

Edward Craig's study combines an historical survey of the develop-
ment of philosophy from Descartes to the present day, an interpreta-
tion of two philosophers, Hume and Hegel, a general theory of phil-
osophy, and a critique of the present state of the discipline. Though
the seams are not invisible, this is an enormously worthwhile book.

Craig identifies as the problem which motivates his study the dis-
tinction between philosophies and philosophy. The former purport to
give a general picture of human nature and its place, or lack of it,
in the cosmos; they meet us not only in the form of great philosophi-
cal systems, but in poems, novels, and perhaps even in other works
of art. Philosophies are fixed to a given historical moment, express-
ing the particular (or peculiar) anxieties and the equally particular
or peculiar certainties of an age: its *Weltbild*. Philosophy, on the other
hand, is a timeless activity which involves identifiable forms of ar-
gument, criticism, 'refutation,' 'proof' and 'demonstration.' How are
philosophy and philosophies related? Many philosophers nowadays
conceive of themselves as 'doing philosophy' but react with embarass-
ment to the layman's well-meaning question about what philosophy
they subscribe to. Craig argues that the story here is not one of a
passage from benighted system-building to an enlighted project of
pure inquiry. Philosophy-the-activity always presupposes some sub-
stantive philosophy, whether or not its practitioners are aware of it.
Moreover, this substantive philosophy, which is inevitably shared by
a number of the philosopher's readers, helps to plug up holes in the
argument, suppress the perception of inconsistencies, smooth over
rough spots, and render certain criticisms beside the point. In short,
it protects and insulates the philosopher and maintains him and his
followers in the illusion that his inquiry is a presuppositionless search
after truth. But substantive philosophies need philosophy-the-activity
as well; the use of critical analysis, argument, scientific-looking clas-
sification, as well as 'proofs' and 'demonstrations,' establishes a given
philosophy's claim to universality and objectivity, a claim it could
not pretend to if expressed in purely literary form. Craig now illus-
trates this thesis in the only way possible: by attention to particular
historical cases. This method allows him to develop his second sub-
plot: the gradual ascendancy of the 'Practice Ideal' and its associated
philosophies, and the waning of the 'Insight Ideal' of the 17th century.

The Insight Ideal can be found in one form or another in the work
of Descartes, Galileo, Malebranche and especially Leibniz. The

philosopher-scientist – it was no accident that each of these figures contributed to mathematics or the physical sciences as well as epistemology – regarded himself as seeking to describe the world as it appeared to and was understood by God himself. Insofar as human beings could carry out this ontological task they realized what was godlike in their own natures and emulated in a sense God's creative power. Nevertheless, there was both a steadiness and a humility in this undertaking, which was based on the belief that the world was an orderly, harmonious, and, above all, intelligible totality. Craig now presents a version of the secularization thesis: this ideal collapsed during the 18th century under the pressure of sceptical writers like Hume, who argued that the reproduction of divine vision through the employment of 'Reason' was unattainable; one must begin with human powers and human experiences to explain, not the meaning of certain concepts from God's point of view, but the origin of our distinctively human concepts. Hume's aim is thus to replace questions about ontology (e.g., Are there material objects outside of us? Is there a causal nexus in nature?) with questions about human psychology (e.g., How do we construct the notion of material object or cause?). Hume thus does not confuse logic with psychology as his critics sometimes complain; on the other hand, he often appears to contradict himself – about whether, for example, we do and or do not have an idea of a causal power. Such textual trouble-spots reveal themselves as a defense of the book's thesis that philosophies smooth over the technical defects of philosophy and indicate a proper method for historians of philosophy. For, Craig argues, it is only by stepping back and taking into account Hume's explicit concern with the Insight Ideal, and indeed his own philosophical *Weltbild*, not simply by poring over the text, that such inconsistencies are resolved.

So far, Craig has been anxious to meet the analytical historian of philosophy on his own ground. The next chapter is, by contrast, concerned with a philosophy – the Romanticism of early 19th century German thought – which was initially expressed in poetic and novelistic form and only later philosophized. Noting that analytical philosophers are increasingly tempted to take on the case of Hegel, Craig maintains that they are not likely to bring much illumination to the subject without an understanding of Goethe, Schiller and especially Hoelderlin and their theories of nature and the self. Whoever has not read Hoelderlin's novel *Hyperion*, he states, is probably in no position to try to say what Hegel is talking about. For it is in this literature that we find the preoccupations with pantheism, with the idea of self-development, with the conflict of opposites and its resolution, with loneliness, self-awareness, and life in the community, and with the progress and meaning of history, which are the subject matter of Hegel's system. Despite the fact that Hegel's arguments

are notoriously murky, absurd or non-existent — a fact leading some to dismiss him from the point of view of philosophy-the-activity, as a 'charlatan windbag' — Hegel undoubtedly produced one of the great philosophies, for he succeeded in giving philosophical form and philosophical 'solutions' to these issues and problems.

Now the plot thickens. In Hegel's own doctrine of Mind's discovery of itself or God's realization of himself in history there is both an active and a passive component. The passive side, Craig suggests, was a remnant of the Insight Ideal; the world is an image of God, and he who grasps the course of history, grasps God's intentions. But this interpretation was not taken up by Hegel's successors; the Insight Ideal was slated for extinction. By contrast, the active side of the doctrine was taken over by Engels and Marx, who argued for the inevitable coming of a better culture based on the increasing awareness of human beings of their own power to bring about historical change. Men are now regarded as making their own culture, their own history, through their technological prowess ... and, by extension, their own morals and their own God. This 'man makes' theme had already been aired by Kant, who, however, did not draw its radical conclusions for ethics and theology, or buried them under the highly ambiguous methodological theory of the last sections of the *Critique.*

The Practice Ideal, which came to dominate the work of influential writers like Peirce, James, Sartre, and, in some of his moods, Wittgenstein, treats both values and beliefs as arising in the course of practical commerce with the world and as needing to be evaluated according to their functional utility, their role in adjusting the economy of the individual, or their place within a system of integrated 'practices,' not according to any transcendental standard. As a result, there are no unbreakable rules, no unrevisable beliefs; everything is provisional, depending on the present needs and interests of the individual or his group. From fallibilism in the philosophy of science, to current movements in theology, the message is: if it gets to be a drag, chuck it. Such apparently independent trends in modern philosophy as anti-foundationalism in epistemology, constructivism in philosophy of mathematics, causal theories of reference, and performative theories of language are all in one way or another reflections of the Practice Ideal; the common theme is that we need not understand what we are doing as long as we can operate effectively. Craig finds this 'opacity,' as he terms it, particularly disastrous in ethics and theology. The bold vision of the existential value-maker, bravely facing the abyss, the open sea, the world without fixed meanings, has been corrupted and degraded into an indecisive shoulder-shrugger, or an enlightened and tolerant moralist mouthing inanities about the importance of a mutually respectful exchange of opin-

ions. The Insight Ideal, as Craig shows, is still a ghostly presence responsible for the weird double-talk of some representatives of modern theology who have absorbed the dynamic features of the new *Weltbild*; In the words of one such Churchman quoted by Craig 'to have faith is to be under a divine compulsion to explore,' and another complains of the ordinary citizen's 'limited and static view' of God. As Craig points out, anyone's view of God may be limited – but should a clergyman be concerned about someone's having a static view of what is, after all, supposed to be an eternal unchanging object?

This is, in short, an unusual and significant book which places hard demands on its readers on account of the range of historical material covered, the closeness of the analysis in the Hume and Hegel chapters, and the uncomplacent nature of its general message. While the readers's sympathies are certainly drawn towards the party that history left behind – towards those philosophers who believed they were and strove to become better 'living mirrors of the divine,' it is difficult not to be critical of Craig's somewhat tentative leanings towards neo-transcendentalism in moral theory. To be sure, the doctrine that morality is to be conceived in terms of human interests and their effective furtherance is repugnant to those who conceive morality above all as placing limits on what can be done to achieve success in worldly terms. Moral realism is tempting because one wishes to insist that those limits are as objective as the desires they regulate. But could a God who set himself up as opposed to all human interests, desires and welfare really be called moral? An anti-natural moral realism, taken seriously, seems to imply that the truths of morality could be discovered to be so opposed, and this is what makes its claims highly problematic in turn.

Finally, although Craig's thesis – that the Practice Ideal furnishes the hidden dogmatic substructure of contemporary philosophy – is made very convincing indeed, it is unclear how far a retreat from it in philosophy of science, philosophy of language and epistemology is possible. Craig shows that a world without opacity is desirable; whether it is possible is another question. Meanwhile, it is worth pointing out that the works of man seem to be inducing a good deal of pessimism these days, and that much of Craig's argument gains credibility for this reason. The Practice Ideal itself appears to be undergoing its legitimate dialectical correction; it is no longer one of the favored and needed *Weltbilder* which philosophy supports. A good proof (or 'proof') of Craig's main thesis will be the emergence of a good deal of philosophy-the-activity, dedicated to showing, not its disfavored status, but its 'incoherence.'

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Marcelo Dascal.
Leibniz: Language, Signs and Thought.
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company 1987. Pp. xi+203.
US$36.00. ISBN 90-272-3280-6.

It is a commonplace of the history of ideas that even radical innovations rarely represent a complete break with the past. The new and forward-looking is apt to emerge gradually, perhaps in several authors and fields at once, often still clothed in a language, and set before a backcloth of assumptions, characteristic of the very traditions whose overthrow is afoot. It requires great sensitivity on the part of the historian to do full justice to both continuity and change in the tradition. In this regard Dascal's efforts to situate Leibniz' views on 'the precise role of signs in knowledge' (72) deserve high praise. Circumspect interpretations of a broad range of well chosen texts fix Leibniz' position vis-à-vis Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes and Locke in the great seventeenth-century debate on signs, language and knowledge. They highlight, too, Leibniz' pioneering role within the larger context provided by key developments in logic and semiotic theory in our own century.

The book is a collection of essays, all published or forthcoming elsewhere, in languages and publications as accessible as French and *Studia Leibnitiana* or as remote as Spanish and *Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia*. Yet the 'common thread running through all the essays' (ix) would justify their re-issue in book form even if all were more readily accessible, for the argument of each is reinforced by collateral evidence in the others of what Dascal (infelicitously) terms the 'general pattern of creative oscillatory thought' in Leibniz' views on 'semiotico-epistemological matters' (75). The basic 'oscillation' (20) documented in Leibniz' writings on signs, definitions, and truth is a peculiar tendency to vacillate between the older, Cartesian-intuitionist or 'inspectionist' (35, 36, 50) assumptions and the 'pure "formalism" ' (21) of a self-contained calculus like modern logic. Towards the latter Leibniz tends without ever quite breaking through – neither to a Saussurean-Wittgensteinian conception of language or signs generally as autonomous systems of representation, without the idea that there is something outside the system (namely, concepts or things) that they are representations of (essays 1-3); nor to a purely syntactic rather than semantic conception of definition and proof (essay 4); nor, finally, to a full acceptance of the 'constitutive' rather than merely 'instrumental' function of language or signs for all higher forms of thought and cognition (*passim*). In this last regard, what is urged to be most characteristic of Leibniz is the uneasy juxtaposition of elements of two different though not incompatible

views. The one is typified by Hobbes, for whom there is a distinction between reasoning by words and a 'purely "mental discourse" ' (35) which operates with a train of ideas or concepts directly 'inspected' though not necessarily 'translated' into a train of words or other signs. The other is the view that 'although there may be some "pure" character-less thought ... thought which involves reasoning, the only kind which interests philosophy, science – in short, every systematic and developped [*sic*] form of thought – cannot exist without characters' (56). This represents an exciting challenging to received interpretations. The view that thought consists solely in the manipulation of signs has been attributed to Hobbes by the Kneales (*The Development of Logic*, 312); and the claim that language or signs of some sort are, for Leibniz, *not* constitutive of the higher forms of thought has recently been advanced by R.F. McRae (*Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought*, 130). Least convincing is perhaps Dascal's attempt to employ the inchoate formalism in Leibniz' semiotic theory to narrow the wide gulf believed by Bunge and others (following Kant) to separate truths of reason from truths of fact (essay 5). Among 'the first modern philosophers to perceive the power and nature of formalism' (84), Leibniz advocated the use of sensible signs to replace Cartesian acts of purely intellectual intuition in checking complex abstract reasonings. From this Dascal infers that he regarded the used of the senses, namely the 'empirical' manipulation of symbols, as *constitutive* even in the domain of truths of reason. Though in accord with much recent criticism of the time-honoured rationalist/empiricist stereotypes and with McRae's and Parkinson's criticisms of Kant's Leibniz interpretation, it is not clear that Dascal's argument is free of equivocation in its use of the expression 'sensible knowledge.'

Essay 6 breaks the established mould, contributing little to the picture of Leibniz as a transitional figure between the 'épistemé' (21) of his century and that of our own (Foucault) – an opposition characterized by Belaval as 'Cartesian intuitionism' versus 'Leibnizian formalism' (41). Instead, it adds fresh detail to a long-familiar canvas, exploring the semantico-epistemological issues raised by Leibniz' lifelong preoccupation with the mysteries of faith. Against a background provided by contemporary emotivist theories, which consign the mysteries to the realm of the sheerly unintelligible, and by traditional attempts to combat scepticism by applying to revealed dogmas like transubstantiation, the virgin birth etc. the same criteria of intelligibility and proof demanded in natural theology, Dascal traces Leibniz' persistent efforts to carve out an interpretation which satisfies the requirements of intelligibility and unintelligibility, of reason and faith alike. The essay makes stimulating reading not just for the admirable generalship displayed in the marshalling of the arguments,

but for the subtlety and appeal of the position at which Leibniz is shown to arrive in the end.

If essay 6 adds fresh touches to the familiar historical portrait of Leibniz grappling as a philosopher with peculiarly seventeenth-century problems of faith and reason, the final and by far most technical paper of the volume places his thought squarely in the alien context of twentieth-century linguistics. In a *Studia Leibnitiana* article of 1971, H.E. Brekle claimed to uncover clear anticipations of contemporary generativism and transformationalism in Leibniz. In an essay in the same volume of *SL* (reprinted as essay 7), Dascal produces a much more subtle and convincing picture of Leibniz standing (as one might expect, given that the distinction and controversy were unknown to him) comfortably *astride* generativist and structuralist linguistic theories. The volume concludes with an appendix containing translations of six texts of Leibniz on the issues discussed in the preceding essays. In sum, the work is one from which philosophers, semioticians and linguists – in that order – will derive valuable insights into the seventeenth-century history of problems central to their disciplines.

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James M. Edie.
William James and Phenomenology.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press
1987. Pp. xiii+111.
US$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-31854-8);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20419-4).

I should like to have been able to lavish praise on a work accusing me of 'traditional provincialism' (20) about James, thereby displaying an admirable magnanimity, but in the case of Edie's animadversions this is not altogether possible. Remember the table in your high school cafeteria where a bunch of kids who had nothing in common save their outsider or marginal status (obese, gay, speech impediment, computer nerd) banded together against a hostile world and so constituted a self-dramatizing *salon des refusés*. This is a good model for the recent 'pluralist' movement which has made bedfellows of 'Golden-Age-of-American Philosophy' buffs and North American phenomenologists – people, in other words, mainly united in feeling that the APA movers and shakers are looking down on them.

Edie is, in this history, an interesting case: a distinguished – and erudite – interpreter of European phenomenology, particularly Husserl, who is *also* interested in James. Edie makes much of the fact (first publicized by Linschoten) that Husserl read James; there is an annotated *Principles of Psychology* amongst Husserl's books preserved at Louvain (23). Interesting as this is, it is more interesting for understanding Husserl than James, and, in itself, says nothing about whether James was a proto-phenomenologist or, as Edie describes him, 'a *genuine* precursor' (18). But Edie does not rest his case on historical connection and he is indeed fairminded enough to mention facts that might be thought to cut the other way: for example, that James advised an American publisher against bringing out a translation of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (23). 'It is only because of the intrinsic and logically necessary convergences within James' philosophical discoveries and those of the phenomenologists [Edie writes] that we can show that they make contributions to what is, in essential respects, the same program; that they hold fundamental doctrines in common; and that these doctrines are thus intrinsically and necessarily fated to the same philosophical triumph or failure' (22). Leave aside the question, though not inconsiderable, whether James himself believed in, or would – or could – comfortably speak in terms of, 'intrinsic and logically necessary convergences,' 'philosophical discoveries,' or 'fundamental doctrines' (terms that belong to a highly specific rhetoric assuming, rehearsing, reinforcing the autonomy of philosophy); we can still consider whether James' work has anything to do with phenomenology.

There is a strong initial presumption to the contrary though this, admittedly, depends on how one understands 'in essential respects, the same program.' James was not interested in isolating philosophy from the empirical, the not necessarily true, the noneidetic, the nonessential; he aimed from beginning to end at the most comprehensive empirical adequacy which he believed could not even be approximated within an exclusionary system. He was willing to learn from all the sciences and from all the derelict scraps of human experience that didn't happen to fit into the sciences then flourishing. This explains the extraordinary, and thoroughly principled, unsystematic compendiousness of *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Jamesian openness, it should be remarked, is a genuine philosophical accomplishment necessarily conditional upon the critical destruction of all the ordinary, and ordinarily unconsidered, exclusivities of our first-order socialization, our casual enculturation, our pretheoretic 'values.' There is a strong initial presumption against this Jamesian openness squaring with any conception of philosophy as purified of 'merely' empirical elements, as autonomous and modally distinctive, the conception [as Husserl put it] of *'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft.'* We must

consider whether Edie is able to defeat this presumption in the four
– originally independent – essays collected in *William James and
Phenomenology*.

The first of these essays, 'Necessary Truth and Perception: William James and the Structure of Experience,' suggests a number of places where James overlaps with something phenomenological. James is presented as someone who has thoughts about, though – like everybody else – no answers to, 'the question of the origin of categorial truth in experience' (1). Actually the idea of 'categorial truth,' as opposed to 'truth,' and worries about origins and foundations are both foreign to James who was never, not even in *Principles of Psychology*, that unpragmatic. But let us, for the sake of discussion, pretend that Edie and James are not talking at cross purposes. What is it James says that Edie likes? James speaks of the 'paramount reality' of sensation, of sensible experience, and this is associated, by way of praise, with Merleau-Ponty's 'primacy of perception' (3). James and Merleau-Ponty can be classed together, here, as in common revolt against rationalist dismissals – from Plato to Descartes – of sense experience. In Edie's presentation this seems to metamorphoze into the claim that 'acts of consciousness' and 'orders of reality' are 'strictly correlative' with the suggestion that James thinks this too (4). It is hard to be sure. For one thing, we are dealing with almost incommensurable discursive styles. An idea of this can be gotten (one sample from many possible) by comparing, or meta-comparing, the following quotations, the first Edie, the second James quoted by Edie in presumptive support:

> Thus whether we begin primarily with an intentional analysis of acts of consciousness (such as perceiving or imagining or thinking) or whether we turn our attention to the noematic correlates of such acts (the orders of reality as existence experienced as such), the one approach necessarily and correlatively implicates the other. (4)
>
> *Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.* (4)

James is a master of the open style, designed to be appreciated, and criticized, by anyone who can read and think. Edie is a master of a kind of mandarin code, or philosophical pidgin, designed to trigger flashes of recognition in the learned, and open to criticism by anybody who already knows – there are no adjacent definitions – what exactly is meant by 'intentional analysis,' 'acts of consciousness,' 'noematic correlates,' and other such terms of art. But let me return from style to substance. (This is not the place to argue that style is sometimes as substantial as it gets.)

Two other themes in Edie's first essay should at least be mentioned. First, James is presented as someone who, like Husserl, has refuted psychologism (10-13). If 'psychologism' means the atomism and associationalism of Locke and Hume, James is indeed against it. Whether James was against, and indeed whether anyone has ever subscribed to, 'psychologism' as Edie defines it — 'the belief that the structures of reasoning are to be identified with psychological processes (whether of the individual or of the historical community as a whole)' (10) — is another, and much easier, question. Second, James is presented as someone who 'vindicates the distinction between categorial thought and perceptual consciousness' (13), which seems to mean that James has a place for the ideal, the eidetic, for necessary structures and truths. The evidence Edie himself presents supports something quite a bit less highfalutin, that James, like anyone worth a penny of research support, has a place for a distinction between matters of fact and matters of definition, between what is and isn't being tested in a given experimental sequence.

The second essay, 'William James and Phenomenology,' is inspired, Edie tells us, by three books on James — Hans Linschoten's *On The Way Toward A Phenomenological Psychology: The Psychology of William James* (1968), Bruce Wilshire's *William James and Phenomenology: A Study of the 'Principles of Psychology'* (1968), and John Wild's *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (1969) — which together make James qua phenomenologist at least an objective illusion, in any case something more than an eccentricity of Edie's. This is a very rich chapter and a reader might use it, economically, to decide whether any of the books mentioned above is worth reading. Here again, despite everybody's best efforts, it is hard to feel that James translates fluently into phenomenologese. For one thing, James is interested in the physiological basis of experience and even in a chapter like 'The Stream of Thought' which describes experience from the inside, the descriptions are supposed to square with what we know of how the brain works. James' ideas may have matured during the composition of the *Principles*, but it is wrong to suggest, as do Edie and Wilshire, that James finally got clear about the limits of natural science and invented a pure, transcendental, or a priori, philosophical project to which physiology is irrelevant. Remarks like 'physiology and science themselves are possible only within the life-world as special and restricted systems of explanation of what is primordially given' (32), close to vacuous theroetically, can be understood only in terms of [in Pierre Bourdieu's words] 'la relation que la philosophie entretient avec les autres disciplines: menacé dans ses prétentions à la domination intellectuelle, depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, par le développement d'une science de la nature portant en elle sa propre réflexion et par l'émergence de sciences sociales visant à s'appropri-

er les objets traditionnels de la réflexion philosophique, le corps des professionnels de la réflexion est en état de mobilisation permanente contre le psychologisme et surtout le positivisme ...' (54) [*L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger* [Paris: Minuit 1988]).

The third essay, 'William James' Phenomenology of Religious Experience,' is a discussion of *Varieties of Religious Experience* which is meant to support the claim that James was employing the phenomenological method. What James did was to try to *describe* experience as it struck those whose experience it was and say, extensively quoting first-person reports, what various experiences meant to those who had them. This is, I think, a terrific thing, but it hardly amounts to a method. Edie speaks of James's 'systematic collection and analysis of a great mass of materials' (52); it would be interesting to know what the actual research was like and what criteria of inclusion/exclusion actually operated. This question presses the more sharply given that 'we will not get a clear and distinct concept [of religious experience] defined through genus and specific difference but a polymorphous [James says "collective"] concept, "no one essence, but many characters" '(58). This is, or is like, Wittgensteinian ethnography of the family-resemblant, but, again, it would be nice to know more than Edie tells us about the choice of familial paradigms from which resemblant series depend.

The fourth, and final, essay, 'Notes on the Philosophical Anthropology of William James,' Edie describes as 'limited strictly to the thought of James himself with a view toward presenting a broadly schematic and highly synthetic view of his *philosophy of man...*' (68), but here again Edie is really concerned to see, and make us see, James in the context of phenomenology and existentialism; the reader will not be surprised to discover the essay was first published in a volume entitled *An Invitation to Phenomenology* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1965). Much could be said about Edie's construction of a 'philosophical anthropology' from Jamesian materials, but there is space for two brief comments. First, the very term 'philosophical anthropology' is unfortunate. Despite its honorable history (for example, as the title of a work of Kant's), it comes to mean, certainly by 1965, anthropology-philosophers-are-in-charge-of, as opposed to the empirical science. Edie is, as always, worried about the autonomy of philosophy, whereas having none of this worry, in both senses of 'having none of,' helps explain the achievement of James. Second, according to Edie, 'there is a myth of William James. It can be called the "myth of pragmatism," and James must be credited (or blamed) in large part for its creation and subsequent growth' (65). Poor James! He didn't even know what was important in his own work. It turns out, by a kind of 'postestablished harmony,' that what's important is what Edie thinks worthwhile. Edie's own view of pragmatism oper-

ates in the following – probably inadvertent – shift: 'It is rather the *meaning* of pragmatism which must be rescued from the oversimplified version of it uncritically accepted by historians of philosophy. By reducing James to his pragmatism we risk losing the authentic genius and originality of his thought' (67).

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Paul Gochet.
Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy.
Hamden, CT: Philosophia Press 1986.
Pp. 202.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 3-88405-050-8);
US$29.00 (paper: ISBN 0-318-20507-6).

This is a study by a Francophone Belgian philosopher of the central themes in Quine's philosophical work. There are a number of reasons to welcome its appearance and to commend the book to an appropriate audience. There also are difficulties that the book is saddled with.

Gochet produced an earlier book on Quine, in French, in 1978. The present study was evidently translated into English in manuscript. Gochet demonstrates a very good command of Quine's work, and a wide, if selective and incomplete, knowledge of the huge secondary literature partly or wholly generated by that work. He also brings into his account a number of writers, chiefly in French, who he sees as anticipating ideas of or objections to Quine. There is as well an effective deployment of papers of a number of years ago that had not perhaps received the degree of notice they deserved. The overall result is synoptic, democratic, minimally polemical or reflective merely of current philosophical fashions.

This book is intended to be introductory, a survey of major ideas and arguments, and a critical assessment. Under all three headings it is I think successful, with some reservations. The ideal audience for the book is someone with some prior sympathetic acquaintance with 20th century empiricist philosophy (which could hardly avoid including some knowledge of at least some of Quine's work), and a footing in an older philosophical tradition (Gochet makes a number

of uses of mediaeval logical terminology, for example). The truly continentally immersed reader (perforce also Anglophone, of course) would get little out of it, and some of the ideas and arguments that appear are given so compact an explanation – and sometimes none at all – that Gochet must at times be taken to be engaging, not the external philosopher seeking access to Quine, but the active participant in Quinean controversy. More or less all the central philosophical topics Quine has initiated or importantly contributed to are here: logical empiricism as such; the analytic-synthetic distinction; epistemological holism; language and theory; the radical indeterminacy of translation; behavioural semantics; extensionality and intensionality; anti-foundationalism; the boundaries of logic; quantified modal logic; and essentialism. Most – but not all – are clearly presented, as are arguments for and against the position Quine takes, the arguments coming generally from the secondary literature, sometimes from Gochet himself. Gochet finds grounds to agree with Quine about quite a lot, and to disagree on a good deal as well.

I proceed to some very selective comment, chiefly of matters that seemed to me problematic. Gochet thinks the argument of G. Priest's 'Two Dogmas of Quineanism' (1979) refutes Quine on analyticity, defining an analytic sentence as 'any sentence which can be validly inferred from conditionals corresponding to valid rules of inference.' But the so-called L-truths – which Priest's proposal is designed to capture – are unproblematic (and if one likes, unproblematically analytic) for Quine anyway; and if *valid inference* is *entailment*, and necessary truths (e.g., *All bachelors are unmarried*) are entailed by every statement (including therefore conditionals corresponding to valid rules of inference) – and none of Priest, Quine, or Gochet argues that these are not the case – then it will be open to intensionalists to argue that Priest's definition captures semantic analyticity as well as L-truth, which would leave matters much as they stood before Priest wrote.

Gochet attributes (133) confusion, wrongly, I think, to Katz, Moore, and unnamed others, over a failure to distinguish formal or logical entailment from semantical entailment. The position he refers to is intensionalist: it holds that all valid implication is a matter of meaning. There are held to be two subspecies of valid implications, namely, the ones that hold 'in virtue of' the meanings of logical terms alone, in the argument, and the ones that hold because of the meanings of non-logical terms in the argument. (Gochet himself just previously writes clearly and persuasively about logical terms, and the project – essential for Quine – of seeking to characterize them otherwise than enumeratively or intensionally.) This position isn't confused (except insofar as all intensionalism is), and does permit – indeed, usually goes on to draw – the distinction Gochet has in mind.

Gochet fails to distinguish the two Leibnizian principles, of the indiscernibility of identicals $((\forall x) (\forall y) (x = y \rightarrow (F) (Fx \equiv Fy))$ – 'F' being construed as a *property* variable), and the intersubstitutivity of co-designating expressions for individuals, in all contexts, *salva veritate*. (For a particularly valuable discussion of this distinction, and its import, see Richard Cartwright's 'Identity and Substitutivity' [1971]). The former is what is now usually called Leibniz' Law (or half of that law); and the latter is a falsehood, the falsifying cases for which determine, by definition, what Quine means by referentially opaque contexts.

Gochet's entire discussion of referential opacity, quantified modal logic, and essentialism is – if I may put it this way – slightly out of focus. As elsewhere, the discussion is proffered very much from Quine's point of view, and these themes have flowered into a wide and diverse literature within which that point of view is an increasingly small note. Inaccuracies are present. So-called weak essentialism is said to be the view that a 'property necessarily belongs to an object if the object has it regardless of how the object is referred to.' But if an object *is* in fact, say, red, or happy, or terrestrial, then it will be so regardless of how the object is referred to – even though none of these properties will be regarded, by Quine or anyone, as candidates for necessary or essential properties. (Gochet's 'has it' needs to be replaced by 'has to have it.') Strong essentialism is defined in an unclear way as well. Gochet seems unaware that large numbers of philosophers do not view essentialism (including versions styled 'Aristotelian') as obviously untrue or incoherent, indeed, are active practicing essentialists. He also thinks what Kaplan dubbed *Haecceitism* – the view that individual *thisness* is a metaphysical constant, that can secure the identity of the individual through dramatic change and prevent the identity of individuals however qualitatively similar – is 'an innocuous semantic theory.' A purer case of a metaphysical theory, of classical rationalist type, would in fact be difficult to find than haecceitism. It is anything but innocuous or (merely) semantic. (It is also probably *true*.) Subsequently (166) Gochet introduces the notion of 'vivid designation,' without explaining it.

Other remarks on Gochet's book: the bibliography fails to itemize a considerable number of references that occur in the body of the text, some of them not well-known articles, that it would be helpful to have citations for. Parts of the exposition of some technical notions (Quine's or those of others) seemed to me unclear or incomplete, among them the concept of a proxy function (93), and the distinction between ontological commitment and the choice of an ontology. Ian Hacking's definition of logic – which Gochet sees as of great importance for Quine's views on the boundaries of logic – is left unexplained as well.

Gochet's claim that Quinean ontological relativity will provide a novel refutation of radical or transcendental skepticism, is unconvincing.

More globally, while Gochet is often careful to point to anticipators of Quine's ideas – even mediaeval forerunners are cited – there is an almost complete absence of attention to the role of the single greatest influence and forerunner for Quine's philosophy, viz., Russell. Ontological commitment, referential transparency and opacity, programmatic commitments to Occam's razor and ontological reduction, the background framework of scientific realism, metaphysics undertaken within 'the linguistic turn' – these are just some of the key ideas in Quine's philosophy that appear earlier, only some of them in very developed form, it is true, in Russell's work. Quine has acknowledged the extent of his indebtedness to Russell; indeed to a very considerable extent Quine is the direct philosophical heir, and continuer of Russell's work. (Even Quine's behaviourism is anticipated in Russell's behaviourist period, and writings, in the 1920s.)

To sum up: this is a good serious general introduction to Quine's philosophy – with some flaws – which should be useful both for the student and for someone wanting in a single brief volume a kind of digest of Quine's views and central objections to them.

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Bruce Haddock.
Vico's Political Thought.
Swansea, UK: Mortlake Press 1986.
Pp. vii+238.
£25.00. ISBN 1-869825-00-4.

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Haddock begins by emphasizing that he is not going to view Vico primarily as 'a precursor of ideas of others' but in terms of the ideas and issues which engaged Vico himself (1,4). Such an approach, it may be noted, follows Vico's own procedure of interpreting ideas from within their own historical context. Haddock also follows Vico's procedure of viewing political ideas within the larger context of their 'historical and cultural development' (4). Thus, three-quarters of the book deals with these broader issues, and it is not until the final chapter that Vico's political thought becomes the central theme. The argument of the book is structured chronologically, the *Autobiography* being used as a guiding thread through the extensive and often

sprawling material which comprises the corpus of Vico's writings. (For the latter, Haddock uses the recent editions of Paolo Cristofolini, of the *Opere filosofiche* and *Opere giuridiche* [Florence 1971, 1974].)

After a brief Introduction (Chapter I), in Chapter II, 'Rhetoric,' Haddock presents a clear and useful summary of salient points from the six Inaugural Orations (1699-1707) and *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (1708). In Chapter 3, 'The Earthly City,' he discusses the well-known *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* (1710) and the little-known historical biography of Carafa (1716). Chapter 4, 'Law,' presents an extensive and lucid account of the four treatises comprising the *Diritto naturale* (1720-2). In Chapter 5, 'Society,' Haddock shows how the *Scienza nouva prima* (1725) mediates between the early works on law and the final version of the science of man in the *Scienza nuova seconda* (1730, 1744). Chapter 6, 'Politics,' deals with the *Scienza nuova seconda* and focuses on the political philosophy, yet the seminal and central theme of the union of philosophy (the true) and philology (the certain) is rightly kept in the foreground. In the *Scienza nuova seconda* Vico shows how 'the practical consequences of men's choices' 'manifested a common and predictable pattern.' It is this, he claims, which constitutes its 'originality and importance' (171-2). Chapter 6 contains a detailed account of Vico's description of the state of nature and an insightful reconstruction of Vico's argument against the 'hypothetical models' of traditional social contract and natural law theories (175 *passim*).

There are two critical points I should like to make about Haddock's interpretation of Vico. The first has to do with Vico's 'piety,' that is, the extent to which the doctrines of the *Scienza nuova* are compatible with Christian belief. Although Haddock notes that Vico's conception of divine providence is 'among the most vexed questions of Vichian scholarship' (194; cf. 228, note 174) he fails, I think, to come to grips with the issue. Indeed, given his own accounts of how Vico's providence works, the 'first men' and the state of nature, primitive language and society, etc., it seems superficial and inconsistent to say that 'Vico thus presupposes a traditional Christian conception of a transcendent God' (194). One cannot, I think, simply take Vico's professions of orthodoxy at their face-value. (Since I have argued this point in detail elsewhere ('How to Interpret the Idea of Divine Providence in Vico's *New Science*,' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 12 [1974] 256-61, and 'Vico and Spinoza,' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 41 [1980] 61-80, I shall say nothing more about it here.)

The second (more philosophical) issue which Haddock fails to confront is Vico's 'historicism.' He alludes to this issue several times; indeed, his own interpretation of Vico, which rightly emphasizes the central place of historical origins and development, makes it unavoidable. Haddock says, for example, that 'the *Scienza nuova*, with its

emphasis on explanation rather than justification, could make only a limited contribution to the debate about the "ends" of political life' (160; cf. 162). The *Scienza nouva* 'leaves prescriptive talk precariously exposed,' for none of the 'political languages' of the ideal eternal history 'can claim any validity beyond its particular context' (199). The implications for traditional political philosophy are, of course, obvious and devastating. But what does it imply for Vico's *own* thought? Are the meaning and truth of Vico's own statements also relative to a particular stage in the ideal eternal history? Haddock seems to think that his distinction between the first-order statements of political theories and the second-order statements of the *Scienza nuova* saves the latter from self-refutation and allows for the possibility of stating the universal and lasting truth about man and history (cf. 199-200). But unfortunately he does not develop a detailed argument in defence of this possibility. Instead, at the end of his book he leaves hanging the issue of Vico's ' "historicist" tendency' and the 'reduction of political ideas to historical categories' (203).

Throughout the book Haddock shows an extensive knowledge and clear understanding of Vico's writings. His discussions of neglected works like the history of Carafa, the *Diritto naturale*, and the *Scienza nuova prima* are among the most interesting and useful parts. As well, there are fine expositions of particular themes like the Law of the Twelve Tables and the theory of Homer. The author gives extensive endnotes referring to Vico's writings and secondary sources, 'Suggestions for Further Reading' (instead of a bibliography), and an index of names and subjects. Other works on Vico, including the books of Croce, Pompa, Berlin, and Verene, are mentioned but not discussed at length. (However, no reference is made to Frederick Vaughan, *The Political Philosophy of Giambattista Vico* [The Hague 1972].)

In general, the book is well-organized, the argument moves along, central themes are kept in focus without undue repetition, and the general interpretation sympathetic and (with the two major reservations mentioned above) balanced. For all these reasons it can be confidently recommended to both beginning and advanced students of Vico's writings. Since the author's style is clear and straightforward, the book is enjoyable to read. Indeed, while reading it I relived some of the excitement I experienced when first encountering this truly remarkable and fascinating thinker.

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Stephen Halliwell.
*The Poetics of Aristotle: translation
and commentary.*
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press 1987. Pp. ix+197.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8078-1763-5);
US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8078-4203-6).

Aside from the translation and commentary of the title, this compact
book includes a preface which makes clear the intentions of the au-
thor, an introduction with much useful background information, a
few (extremely brief) textual notes, a list of further readings, and a
glossary in which one finds Ares as well as Ariphrades listed.

Those familiar with Halliwell's *Aristotle's Poetics* (London: Duck-
worth 1986), which the author, in the preface to that work, describes
as 'a patient, critical reassessment of the major doctrines of the *Poet-
ics*' (vii), will not be surprised at the interpretation Halliwell offers
here of the *Poetics*. But this is quite a different sort of book, conceived
essentially as a running commentary which will provide 'a continu-
ous exposition which follows with critical attention the structure and
implications of Aristotle's argument' (vii), intended for the Greekless
reader interested in literature rather than the scholar in ancient liter-
ature or philosophy. This is not to say that the work is unphilosophi-
cal (on the contrary), but that it presupposes no acquaintance with
Greek or Greek literature, and that it guides the reader by reference
to the history of literary criticism before and after Aristotle.

Halliwell's modest claim for the translation is that by providing
his own he has 'been able to achieve consistency between the trans-
lated text and the commentary' (vii). This is true. Moreover, the trans-
lation reads well, although it does not read easily, and the reader
unused to Aristotle's prose or Halliwell's diction may find it slow
going.

The Introduction to the book presents a history of the text of the
Poetics, a discussion of Greek tragedy and Greek writing on tragedy,
a history of the interpretation of the *Poetics*, and three reasons for
reading the *Poetics*: 1) the unique status it has vis-à-vis Attic culture,
2) its historical influence and 3) the intellectual benefits of confront-
ing the premises and standards on which Aristotle's ideas on poetry
rest (2-3). Halliwell's commentary addresses itself particularly to the
latter two of these reasons.

On my reading, three themes emerge most prominently from the
commentary. The first is the place of the literary theory of the *Poet-
ics* in the history of literary criticism from Plato to Structuralism.
It is not unusual for commentators to read the *Poetics* in part as a
response to Plato's views on poetry; Halliwell does, however, an un-

usually good job of showing how Aristotle, in altering the epistemological claims for poetic discourse, was able to make a case for the ethical value of poetic *mimesis* (171-2). Aside from Plato, Halliwell contrasts Aristotle's views most often with Romantic criticism, and stresses the difference between the Romantic view of the poet's activity as a matter of deeply subjective expression and Aristotle's theory of a rational poetic art. While one could wish that Halliwell's only mention of post-Romantic criticism – a remark to the effect that the poetic 'impersonality' which Aristotle advocates is closer to the literary theory of T.S. Eliot than to Structuralism (173) – were more developed, the compactness of this book requires that it remain an interesting allusion.

The second theme of this commentary, as with *Aristotle's Poetics*, is the importance of tracing connections, both within the *Poetics* as a matter of following the argument, and between the *Poetics* and Aristotle's other works, particularly the *Rhetoric* (where the discussion of linguistic theory is much more detailed) and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (where Aristotle's conception of ethical character is useful for understanding his conception of literary character).

The third theme is the centrality of plot-structure to Aristotle's literary theory. Halliwell contends that on Aristotle's account plot-structure is not a question of form divorced from content; rather, it is the logical, the causal, connections in a literary piece that constitute the structure of its plot and lend intelligibility to the whole (137, 150, 166). This is hardly a remarkable view, but Halliwell is able to show how this understanding of plot-structure influences even those parts of the *Poetics* not directly concerned with plot, and how this emphasis on the intelligibility of the sequence of events makes it difficult for Aristotle to grant a place in his theory to the religious or the mythical, despite the tradition of the literary genres with which he is concerned. Halliwell is critical of this insistence on unity in plot-structure for another reason: it excludes from consideration many forms of literary art which one might well want to include in a theory of poetics.

In general, Halliwell's commentary is admirable not simply because it offers a knowledgeable and coherent interpretation of the *Poetics* as a whole, but also because it acknowledges when Aristotle's claims or arguments in one place lead him into inconsistencies, problems, or tensions, in another (167, 176, 183). For those unacquainted with Aristotle, in particular, this recognition of real problems will be helpful in developing a deeper understanding of the *Poetics*.

There are a few devices which would make this book more useful. First of all, an index. Second, Bekker numbers accompanying the

translation (even the Greekless reader may have recourse to anoth-
er translation). And finally, the philosophical reader (again, particu-
larly one unacquainted with Aristotle) would benefit from more
extensive notes on the philosophical literature, and a more complete
list of Further Readings.

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M.E. Moss.
Benedetto Croce Reconsidered:
Truth and Error in Theories of Art,
Literature, and History.
Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England 1987. Pp. xii+150.
US$20.00. ISBN 0-87451-399-5.

In this book Myra Moss seeks to distinguish what is living and what
is dead in the thought of Croce. She attempts to discredit Croce's ideal-
ism and his coherence theory of truth. At the same time she affirms
what she calls Croce's 'categorial conception of error' as 'a genuine
contribution to contemporary philosophical thought' (ix). In connec-
tion with the second goal she goes so far as to claim that Croce's
categorial theory provides 'solutions to important philosophic prob-
lems in aesthetics, as well as in theory of history' (112). These solu-
tions turn out to be quite dramatic and would indeed be major
contributions to these fields if they were adequately supported. For
instance Moss claims that 'to interpret history of art in terms of eco-
nomic and political concepts would be unsuitable' (119). Therewith,
Moss condemns vast tracts of contemporary history of art. In fact,
she fails to distinguish the living from the dead in Croce, for reasons
which I shall give below. However she does succeed in introducing
English-speaking readers of Croce, many of whom tend to focus on
one or two of his aesthetic works, to the full scope of his enterprise
(including, especially, his *Logic*), providing an overall structure for
further research.

Moss divides her book into five chapters. The first surveys Croce's
life, noting his reactions to Hegelianism, Marxism, Positivism and
Fascism. The second chapter summarizes his overall philosophy. The
last three chapters form the core of the book. In 'The Sphere of the
Aesthetic' Moss convincingly argues that problems with distinguish-

ing artistic from non-art intuition led Croce first to introduce the idea of art as 'lyricality' and later that art must express 'cosmic totality.' She shows how these changes represented elaborations rather than reversals of position. The fourth chapter deals with 'The Sphere of Logic.' Moss claims here that, although Croce began with a Platonistic view of concepts, his mature position was always Kantian in some respects and Hegelian in other respects.

Before moving on to the essential last chapter I shall give a short summary of Croce's thought as seen by Moss. Croce followed Kant in rejecting transcendent metaphysics and yet believing that there were transcendental synthetic a priori categories. However he understood these categories as Hegelian concrete-universals. The role of philosophy is to discover and delineate these categories through introspection (21). As these are the categories of historical narration, philosophy is seen as the methodology of history (22). There are four categories: the beautiful, the true, the useful, and the good. The first two of these are theoretical, the second two are volitional and practical. As expressions of consciousness they are: intuition, conception, economic, and ethical. As institutions they are: art, philosophy, economics and ethics. The categories are ordinally related – the category of philosophy presupposes that of art, the category of economics presupposes that of philosophy, and the category of ethics presupposes that of economics (67). Philosophy, for instance, presupposes art because it must use metaphors and images in the process of transforming feelings into pure concepts. However, this ordering does not imply valuational superiority. Unlike Hegel, Croce does not, for instance, accept a philosophical subsumption of art.

Categories, or pure concepts, are distinguished from pseudoconcepts, which include both empirical class names and mathematical terms. These terms do not refer to reality and cannot be presented in judgments which are true or false (29). Instead, they are found in judgments which are evaluated according to their usefulness (30). Empirical science consists mainly of such judgments. By contrast, philosophical judgments which combine categories to form definitions can be true or false.

The four categories are autonomous: for example moral questions cannot be solved by conceptual or intuitional means. However they are also interrelated: a man would not be moral if he could not intuit and conceptualize. The ethical aim of liberty unifies and vitalizes the other categories. Thus, for Croce the whole human is someone who actualizes each of these aspects of life (32).

In the last chapter Moss defends her two theses. The first is that Croce's coherence theory of truth is no longer viable. Moss raises an interesting objection, which, if I understand it correctly, is that the historicist aspect of Croce's philosophy implies the possibility of reso-

lution of contradictory truths in a 'wider truth' whereas the transcendental theory of categories disallows this (84-6). I would have liked to have seen this elaborated more thoroughly. She also criticizes Croce for his idealism and his conviction that history must be autobiography. Contrary to Croce, Moss advocates empiricism and scientific realism. I found her arguments here, based mainly on appeals to 'the usual opinion' (94), to be unconvincing.

Her second thesis is that Croce's categorial theory is still viable if, in accord with her empiricism, the categories are expanded to include such scientific disciplines as sociology and psychology. For Croce, a categorial mistake involves either improperly substituting a pseudoconcept or intuition for a category in judgment, or simply affirming a pseudojudgment (98, 104). However when we look at Croce's actual examples of categorial mistakes we find that they consist mainly in assertions contrary to his philosophical system. For instance, attributing moral value to art is said to be a categorial error. Similarly, the philosophical position of 'aestheticism' commits the categorial error of assuming that all knowledge is intuitional (100). So the categorial theory is not, contrary to Moss, a special method for finding philosophical errors. It is merely Croce's theory saying that other theories are wrong.

Moss believes that a strong support for the categorial theory is Croce's conviction that art genres such as tragedy are pseudoconcepts and that judgments using such concepts are thus pseudojudgments. Contrary to those followers of Aristotle who questioned whether, e.g., Shakespeare's works were tragedies, Croce insisted that the real question is whether they are works of art (105-6). Thus Croce saw himself as liberating art from the dogmatic constraint of genres. This is not a bad thing, but it hardly suffices to make Croce's philosophy 'living.' Few writers in this postmodern era accept genre purity. More important, although postmodernists share with Croce a rejection of genre essentialism they also, contrary to Croce, reject all forms of essentialism. And this means that they reject such claims as that art is autonomous or that art and morality should not be mixed. Moss hasn't provided any new or compelling reasons for accepting Croce's autonomy claims.

More troubling yet, the categorial conception of error accepted by Croce and Moss involves not only denying art the capacity to make moral claims but also denying the capacity for ethics to make judgments about the economic realm (11). Politically, Croce tended to support the propertied classes and the monarchy, while downplaying cries for economic justice (19). Moss has chosen to 'reconsider' Croce without looking closely at his ethics, even though she herself has stressed that ethics marks the culmination of his system. Recently, serious questions have been raised about Heidegger's support of the Nazis.

Croce never went as far as Heidegger: he supported Fascism in the beginning (1920-24) but soon moved against it to represent the liberal resistence in Italy (15). Yet the fact that he did not immediately repudiate Fascism may be relevant to evaluation of his overall theory. Was his commitment to the independence of art, philosophy, and economics from ethics itself ethically neutral?

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Paul Nelson.
Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1987. Pp. x+180.
US$21.50. ISBN 0-271-00485-1.

For some modern philosophers the various attempts since the Enlightenment to base morality on reason alone have failed, and it has become obvious that moralities depend on communal narratives. Indeed each morality *is* a collection of stories about human possibilities and paradigms for action, stories which shape our understanding of self and situation. Various moral concepts and moral rules are included within each traditional set of stories, but they depend on the stories for their intelligibility and justification. It is folly to try to abstract the concepts or rules from the tradition within which they have their meaning and validity.

Paul Nelson's book is an excellent analytical exploration of this current trend in secular moral philosophy (led by Alasdair MacIntyre) and its counterpart in Christian ethics (led by Stanley Hauerwas). Nelson writes with exemplary clarity, rigour, discernment and fairness in his presentation. Even philosophical readers who have little concern with Christian controversies may be interested not only in Nelson's philosophical section but also in its theological sequel, which illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of morality-as-narrative as applied to a particular tradition. In this brief review, however, I will not consider Nelson on Christian ethics.

He first outlines the 1950s debate in Oxford between descriptivists such as Foot, for whom certain facts of human nature entail particular moral judgments, and prescriptivists such as Hare, who severed all connection between fact and value. Two analogous 'solutions' to

this impasse were proposed. Wittgensteinians such as D.Z. Phillips insisted that any moral judgment is made within the moral 'practices' of a particular community. These practices or forms of life include *rules of language* such as 'Lying is wrong.' For anyone within the moral-linguistic community no further justification for such a rule is possible or is needed. Thus Foot's entailments may hold, but only within the practices of this or that community, not universally. Another 'solution,' suggested by Iris Murdoch, focused on imaginative stories which shape an individual's understanding of self and situation, merging fact and value as a person simultaneously sees both what is and what is to be done. Alasdair MacIntyre can be seen as drawing on both approaches, linking together practices and stories. He also connects both with virtues.

Concerning virtues Nelson considers MacIntyre's appropriation of Aristotle. 'Practices do for MacIntyre what the notion of a human *telos* did for Aristotle and his successors. They provide a context in which the content of the virtues may be specified. Although for the Greeks and for Aquinas both the *telos* and the virtues were underwritten by the cosmic order, for MacIntyre the guarantee must be internal to human activity' (51). But if human activities are defined by the practices of human communities, the virtues are enclosed within a circle created by the community. One either lives totally within that circle or totally outside it. Yet MacIntyre himself is quite selective concerning what he accepts and what he rejects within the Aristotelian tradition. On what basis? And although in his narrative account of Western philosophy he sees other moral traditions as merely historical products, he does not do this to the Aristotelian tradition. On what basis? Nelson rightly asks how MacIntyre can escape the relativistic implications of his account of morality as narrative. On what basis can he or anyone else choose between, or select from within, rival moral perspectives, each of which has its own independent set of stories concerning human nature? MacIntyre's account seems to require that he and anyone else append to every moral judgment the words, 'That's true *for us*, according to *our* traditional story.' Can an account of morality as narrative be revised in such a way as to retain its insights concerning the communal perspectives which we bring to moral situations while restraining its proneness to total relativism?

Nelson does not try to answer this question at length, but he does indicate two main paths. I will present these, exploring them somewhat further than he does. First there is the claim that 'human sociability entails certain patterns of behaviour that cannot be violated without risking the destruction of cooperative human life' (126). This minimal, core moral code sets forth 'what is demanded of men as such' (50, quoting Strawson). On top of it, as a second tier, there can be a great variety of moralities as each community expresses a differ-

ent social ideal in a different narrative. Then one can appeal to some extent to a universal moral code in disputes between rival narrative-traditions and in rejecting elements within a narrative-tradition.

On what basis can one establish such a code? It can not be pure reason, for MacIntyre has rightly rejected the claim that pure reason can provide a transcendent viewpoint which is totally uninfluenced by the perspective of any historical community. Instead, the basis can arise, surprisingly, from within perspectivalism itself. For in the very realization that I and all human beings see moral issues *through* perspectives I to some extent transcend my perspective, in two ways. First, I no longer absolutize it, but implicitly concede that it could need correction or expansion. Second, I also take up a meta-perspective in which (a) I can discern similarities among most moral perspectives and (b) I can reflect concerning why this common core is necessary for society as such — while also realizing that my meta-perspective is likely to be influenced by my perspective and thus needs correction and expansion through dialogue with other perspectives.

Indeed, the second path which Nelson suggests is a kind of dialogue, in which 'neither party transcends the particularities of her tradition and narrative to attain some tradition-neutral vantage point' (59), yet previously-unnoticed weaknesses or gaps in one's tradition may be exposed, making revision necessary. Nelson rightly suspects that such dialogue does not remove relativism, but does not explain why. What is lacking is an explicit assumption that as I revise my own tradition and you revise yours we are moving together towards a *universal* truth which can gradually emerge, a truth-for-humankind. This enlarged human consensus, while going beyond a minimal code, does not preclude a toleration and even a celebration of varied moralities which are true-for-this-community.

Such a vision of a human consensus is complicated by two further considerations. First, what if human nature is still changing? What if the very process of dialogue which uncovers human nature also creates it? Second, humankind could universally hold to be true what is actually false. Relativism is ultimately only rejected if such a possibility is intelligible.

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Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel, eds.
Maimonides and Philosophy.
Norwall, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1986.
Pp. x+286.
US$55.00. ISBN 90-247-3439-8.

Maimonides, the medieval Rabbi and philosopher (1135-1204), received worldwide attention in 1985-86, the 850th anniversary of his birth. The papers published in this volume were first presented at an international symposium devoted to 'Maimonides as *philosopher*' (vii), leaving aside other aspects of his thought.

The volume contains nineteen articles overall. Two articles are in French; the rest in English. They are all relatively short – only two articles are over 18 pages. Some contributions are quite new in their analyses and insights; others are more of an expansion or summary of views developed by the same author elsewhere. The topics range from interpretative issues to historical influences; from epistemological and metaphysical questions to legal and ethical ones. While *The Guide of the Perplexed* is still the main focus of study, other texts by Maimonides, as well as by his predecessors, are contributing to a renewed understanding of his philosophical views.

Some common strands, however, link the philosophical issues in these Maimonidean studies. Whatever else the *Guide* may be, two points are central to it: its underlying Aristotelianism and its explicit esotericism. Maimonides espouses much of Aristotle's thinking as a precondition to his own. But he adopts a style of development that is intentionally deceptive to some yet indicative of truth to others, capable of understanding.

A number of articles touch on Maimonides' Aristotelianism. Thus Kluxen ('Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism') sketches the image that the scholastics formed of Maimonides, namely, 'as a Jewish representative of Aristotelianism, who shares basically the world view of the *Physics*, but limits its import by his criticism so that revelation becomes possible' (230). Puig ('Maimonides and Averroes on the First Mover') draws a close parallel between Maimonides and Averroes, which he attributes 'to the common philosophical tradition to which they both belong' (223). Pines ('The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides' Halachic Works and the Purport of *The Guide of the Perplexed*'), however, notes a significant deviation because of a problem with knowledge of immaterial substances. Under the influences of al-Farabi and ibn Bajja, Pines concludes that Maimonides, much like Kant later, advances a critical philosophy, in which 'metaphysics, conceived as the knowledge of God and other immaterial entities, transcend the human understanding' (12). The question of eternity versus creation poses another deviation from Aristotle. Maimonides ostensibly claimed that Aristotle did not demonstrate the eternity of the

world. Showing that Maimonides' counter argument is inconclusive, Malino ('Aristotle on Eternity: Does Maimonides Have a Reply?') suggests that Maimonides does agree with Aristotle. Yet contrary to an esotericist interpretation that would have Maimonides implicitly agree with Aristotle and to a traditionalist interpretation that would have him espouse creation, Klein-Braslavy ('The Creation of the World and Maimonides' Interpretation of Gen. i-v') argues that Maimonides suspends judgment; his scepticism, she contends, is logically consistent with a philosophical anthropology that emerges from his exegesis of Genesis.

Maimonides' esotericism is discussed by Idel ('*Sitre 'Arayot* in Maimonides' Thought') in connection with certain teachings that formed part of a traditional Jewish esotericism, which, Idel contends, Maimonides sought to restrict so as to replace it with 'an alternative theology which was presented as the "authentic Jewish esotericism" ' (86).

In Ivry ('Islamic and Greek Influences on Maimonides' Philosophy') both focal points come together. Noting the *Guide*'s contradictory style and its inner tensions, Ivry suggests how deviousness had become a virtue for Maimonides and goes on to propose the intriguing thesis that the *Guide* was written 'not only *for* the perplexed but *by* the perplexed' (151) – a perplexity arising from the competing philosophical systems of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism that Maimonides – perhaps never adequately – sought to resolve.

Another strand of interest, as already reflected in Pines, concerns Maimonides' epistemology. Thus Nuriel ('Remarks on Maimonides' Epistemology') offers a helpful analysis of the different concepts of belief, opinion, mind, and intellect in Maimonides. Blaustein ('Aspects of Ibn Bajja's Theory of Apprehension'), on the other hand, raises a critical question about the usual doctrine of the unity of the intellect in both ibn Bajja and Maimonides. But two derivative issues are of particular interest: prophetic knowledge and human knowledge of God. The first is explicitly dealt with by Goldman ('Rationality and Revelation in Maimonides' Thought'), Jevollela ('Songe et prophétie chez Maïmonide et dans la tradition philosophique qui l'inspira'), and Macy ('Prophecy in al-Farabi and Maimonides'). Thus Goldman explains how, for Maimonides, revelation and prophecy are rational in both its content and overall explanation. Jevollela and Macy question the role of the imagination in prophecy, which, according to Maimonides, purportedly explains why prophetic knowledge ranks above philosophic knowledge. Jevollela draws a cognitive function of the imagination from earlier neoplatonic sources, while Macy accords it a political and educative role taken from al-Farabi. Maimonides' approach to knowledge of God emerges indirectly in the discussion of Reines ('Maimonides' True Belief Concerning God'), Hyman ('Maimonides on Causality'), and Yovel ('God's Transcendence and its Schematization: Maimonides in Light of the Spinoza-Hegel Dispute').

On Reines' interpretation, Maimonides esoterically advances an absolutely transcendent concept of God, which leads him to replace traditional Rabbinic Judaism with an intellectualized, natural religion in which providence, prophecy, and meaning obtain 'not by virtue of a relationship with deity, but through a relationship with the Active Intellect' (35). Hyman's analysis of causality shows that, according to Maimonides, God's agency, explained in terms of both divine will and wisdom 'must be interpreted as referring to certain features of the world' (170), in line with Maimonides' theory of divine attributes and knowledge of God. Yovel explores the relation between religious law (*halakha*) and philosophy in comparison with a later Spinoza-Hegel controversy. But his answer also relies on Maimonides' shift from negative knowledge of God's essence to a positive knowledge of His effects in the world. Thus the way of life enjoined by the Jewish commandments becomes an indication of the transcendent through the imagination; it 'sanctifies the banalities of daily life and endows them with a touch of the otherworldly, without abolishing their thisworldly character' (279).

Two essays touch on ethical issues, in addition to Yovel's. Harvey ('Ethics and Meta-Ethics, Aesthetics and Meta-Aesthetics in Maimonides') sketches Maimonides' definition of 'good' in both a moral and aesthetic sense. Stern ('The Idea of a *Hog* in Maimonides' Explanation of the Law') examines the question of traditional Jewish practices, by analyzing the distinction between statutes (*huggim*), and ordinances (*mishpatim*). He shows on what grounds Maimonides defends the continued obligation to carry out religious practices, unchanged, by both the ordinary believer and the philosopher.

Two other essays deal with unrelated issues. Niewöhner ('Are the Founders of Religions Impostors?') touches on the nature of Judaism and its attitude to other religions by contrasting the answer of Maimonides in his *Epistle to Yemen*, with two similar treatises: one predating and the other following his letter. And Brague ('Leo Strauss et Maïmonide') surveys the work of Leo Strauss and critical responses to it. He suggests on the one hand that Strauss himself adopted an esoteric style from his study of Maimonides and on the other that he was influenced by Nietzsche in his critique of modernism.

There is of course much more of philosophical interest than is outlined here. But in all, this volume contains a good sample of current philosophical developments among Maimonidean scholars in North America and Europe. (A caution to the buyer: the copy I received had five blank pages [23, 35, 51, 223, 245] with missing text and footnotes. Two library copies that I checked were in order.)

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Hilary Putnam.
The Many Faces of Realism.
LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1987. Pp. 128.
US$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9042-7);
US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9043-5).

The Many Faces of Realism (MFR) is a series of four 'Lectures,' three of which were given as the Carus Lectures at an American Philosophical Association Conference in 1985. *MFR*'s purpose is to explain Putnam's 'internal realism' (Lectures I and II) and develop an application of it in moral philosophy (Lectures III and IV). In *MFR* internal realism (IR) contrasts particularly with metaphysical realism (MR) and a non-discriminatory cultural relativism. The principal attack is on scientific realism (SR), a version – or cluster of versions – of MR, which Putnam locates as arising in the 17th Century. SR claims that only scientific objects really exist (4); it presents us with 'the idea of the "external world" as something whose true description, whose description "in itself," consists of mathematical formulas' (5). The 'real' objects in such a world are those with intrinsic properties which they have 'apart from any contribution made by language or the mind' (8). Putnam's principal charge against SR is that it deprives us of the world of commonsense realism (CR) in a way similar to the way idealism does, while at the same time failing utterly to provide us with any understanding of an essential ingredient for such a view: intentionality. Tables and chairs and – perhaps most importantly – causation, according to SR as Putnam interprets it, are really subjective phenomena, projections by the mind onto the real objects. At the same time, SR is irremediably unsatisfactory on the nature of subjectivity and, since intentionality becomes itself a kind of projection, paradoxical. IR, in contrast, rejects the idea, fundamental to SR, that terms such as 'subjective vs. objective' or 'projection vs. property of the thing in itself' mark genuine dichotomies. Nonetheless, IR recognizes that these terms can describe legitimate distinctions among positions on a continuum. Hence, IR does not lapse into an overly permissive, anything-goes relativism.

Lectures I and II occupy less than 40 pages. What we are given is a valuable overview of an important set of theses. But, as the length makes inevitable, not all the details are carefully delineated. For example, if we press the question of why SR is committed to a severe censuring of CR, a central argument in the text is less than complete. Putnam takes SR to insist that every real property can be correctly represented in a mathematical formula as a function of dynamic variables. But, Putnam argues, our representations of the properties and dispositions favored by ordinary commonsense employ words such as 'normal' in 'something is water soluble just in case it will dissolve

in water in normal conditions.' And there is no reason to think that the contribution of such a term, given its task of excluding all physically possible abnormal conditions, 'could be summed up in a closed formula in the language of physics' (11). The difficulty with *MFR*'s argument here is that it looks as though SR's trouble with CR may be due just to a rash use of the term 'real.' An equally interesting SR might extend the use of 'real' or 'objective' to cover properties which supervene on the favored properties. If supervenience does not enable SR to respond adequately to the argument about 'normal,' we need to be told why.

Somewhat similarly, another central case Putnam discusses seems underdescribed. A major claim of Putnam's is that 'What we *cannot* say – because it makes no sense – is what the facts are *independent of all conceptual choices*' (33). A cental illustration of this is his discussion of the question 'How many objects are there?' For Putnam this question has no answer independently of our choice of concepts. Given a universe containing only three atoms, the answer may be 3 or, if we choose to count with (a particular version of) mereology, 7. Putnam concludes that there can be *competing* but equally allowable answers to the 'How many?' question. Hence, what is the true answer is *relative* to a chosen scheme and not a matter of correspondence to reality. At least one problem the argument so far has is that the 'How many?' question may be considered incomplete, receiving one answer when completed one way and another answer given another way. According to this second approach, what look like rival answers to the same question are really answers to different questions. There are three atoms, but seven mereological objects; somewhat similarly, a label on a box may read 'One place setting (five pieces)' or 'One 18" by 20" puzzle (500 pieces).' Of course, agreeing that the 'How many?' question needs completion may be seen as conceding Putnam's claim that 'how many objects there are in the world ... is relative to the choice of a conceptual scheme' (32). But at the same time, we should question whether this claim is entirely inaccessible to SR, despite the ominous word 'choice.' At the very least, it is not obvious that such a claim puts into question the idea that some conceptual categories conform to pre-existing cuts in reality. Without the presence of equally right, conflicting answers to one question, we lose the idea that truth is *relative* to a choice of concepts and thus we lose a major conclusion the example is to support.

There remains much of interest in Lectures I and II which has not been mentioned or fully described. For example, in saying that SR's failure to explain intentionality argues that the approach as a whole may be misconceived, Putnam is issuing an important challenge. And it seems right to worry about the position of causation in SR, or at least in those SRs in which causation is both extensively appealed

to (for example, in causal theories of reference and causal theories of the mental) but at the same time is treated as merely supervenient on items of a more favored class or, given Putnam's characterization of SR, as fully subjective.

The scope of Lectures III and IV, the application of IR to moral philosophy, is hardly narrower. Here Putnam is again concerned to present us with a tolerance for a pluralism without leaving us in the grip of an overly permissive relativism. A rich discussion of Equality, Aristotelian ethics (as interpreted by medieval philosophers), Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, the Frankfurt School and *Brave New World* provides us with the thesis that moral philosophy must be able to give us a plurality of moral images while at the same time equipping us with the means to reject certain candidates for morally relevant goods. According to Putnam, a vision of an ethics based an Aristotelian conception of *eudaemonia* is justly criticized by Kant; we 'cannot build an ethic upon the notion of happiness, because too many different things can be made out to be the content of that notion' (49). At the same time, it is only a 'thick,' discriminating concept of human nature that will allow us to ground adequately our rejection of the infantile pleasures presented in *Brave New World* as of a kind to provide the basis for a reasonable conception of the good life.

Lecture IV addresses directly the issues of justification and objectivity in moral theories. IV starts with arguments against the idea that moral judgments are shown to lack cognitive content (factual content) because, as it is said, disagreement among rational persons regarding moral judgments cannot always be rationally resolved. Consideration of, inter alia, theories of scientific method is used to argue that statements in other areas of inquiry which intuitively seem to be cognitively meaningful are such that we cannot always settle all disputes regarding their truth. Hence, moral judgments are not peculiar in this respect. Another defense of the objectivity of ethical judgments is the use of internal realism to provide an account of ethical discourse as capable of principled distinctions among moral theories even if there can be no one true foundation or one right moral theory. IV closes with a very interesting discussion of Peirce's Puzzle. Here again, Putnam argues, 'if we are in a position that seems troubling in "ethics," we are in exactly the same position in "engineering" ' (80).

With Lectures III and IV, as with I and II, what is particularly rewarding about reading *MFR* is that we are given a perspective from which very general patterns are discernible. Complaints that not all the details are examined may seem in this context to miss the point. Still, there are areas where one might like, on another occasion, to see more discussion. Here are two: Aristotelians will judge problem-

atic Putnam's relatively undefended view that he can have the criti-
cal capacities to reject the moral picture given in *Brave New World*
without at the same time acquiring enough restrictive content to give
us the unifying moral image of an Aristotelian ethics. (And here his
identification of Aristotelian ethics with a happiness-based ethics
[48-9] does not sit well with his comment on 'the insensitivity of
happiness-based ethics to issues about *means*' [60].) Second, one would
have liked Putnam's remarks about the cognitivism/non-cognitivism
issues in ethics to have addressed directly what is a major concern
of many non-cognitivists, the relation between moral judgments and
action. There is much in the text – for example, his comments about
the making of values and moral images (78-80) – to suggest that there
are interesting arguments to be given here.

The recent discussions about metaphysical realism and internal
or anti- or quasi-realism are concerned with philosophically impor-
tant issues and in other works Putnam has done much to shape this
debate. *MFR* will not end the controversy, but it does give us a valu-
able articulation of a set of theses absolutely central to the debate.

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Robert Richards.
*Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary
Theories of Mind and Behavior.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.
Pp. xvii+699.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-226-7199-4.

Robert Richards is out to overturn the received view of Darwinism
(RV). According to RV, Darwinism is philosophically materialistic,
mechanistic and amoral. It excludes God and reduces mind to brain.
It recognizes only physical laws. And it eliminates moral meaning
from human life. In this rich, complex, well written and beautifully
produced volume, Richards, a historian and philosopher of science
at the University of Chicago, argues for an alternative view of Dar-
winism (AV), one which is compatible with religious perspectives, non-
reductionistic about the nature of mind and the laws governing na-
ture and which provides an evolutionary basis for ethics. He contends
that an examination of nineteenth century evolutionary theories of
mind and behavior (ETMB), those of Darwin, Spenser, Wallace, T.H.

Huxley and their successors, Romanes, Morgan, James and Baldwin, will display the superiority of AV as an historical interpretation of Darwinism.

Richards begins by showing that the roots of ETMB, as reflected in the works of Cabinis, Lamarck, Frederic Cuvier and Erasmus Darwin, can be found in the sensationalist philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment. Their attempts to account for the instinctual bases of behaviors in a way compatible with that tradition led to the proposal that the inheritance of the effects of habitual practice, the use mechanism, explains the evolution of both anatomical and behavioral structures.

In the next four chapters Richards traces the development of Darwin's conceptions of the mechanisms of evolutionary change and their applicability to humans. According to Richards, answering the question of how to give an evolutionary account of the moral sense was central to Darwin's construction of the concept of natural selection. The philosopher James Macintosh had contended that humans were motivated by a God-given moral sense to act in ways that coincided with moral criteria discoverable by reason. Darwin argued that the moral sense was a development of evolutionarily based social instincts. At first, Darwin relied on the use mechanism to show how dispositions to act for others that may have originated for selfish reasons could over generations produce spontaneously altruistic actions purged of selfish motives. But as Darwin came to rely more on natural selection for explanations, he was faced with the problem of how to explain behaviors that provided no direct advantage to the agent. Richards contends that the works of naturalist natural theologians, especially that of Kirby and Spencer, not only influenced and confirmed Darwin's convictions about natural selection but also challenged him to show how natural selection could explain the phenomena of the altruistic behaviors of neuter insects. And he concludes that the long delay between Darwin's initial insights about natural selection and the publication of the *Origin* was due in significant part to Darwin's efforts in meeting this challenge. Darwin's solution was group selectionist. Applying that solution to human social instincts, Darwin argued that altruistic dispositions were selected for because of the community good.

Two informative and insightful chapters on Spenser follow. One of Richards' goals is to restore the historical importance of Spenser's contributions to Darwinism. To this end he emphasizes the merits of Spenser's views for developing both an evolutionary epistemology and an evolutionary ethics. In Richards' view, the development and defense of an evolutionary ethics by both Darwin and Spenser refutes the RV characterization of Darwinism as amoral.

In subsequent chapters on the work of Romanes, Morgan, James and Baldwin, Richards shows that the RV portrayal of Darwinism as materialistic and mechanistic is inaccurate and that his AV of Darwinism as religiously open and non-reductionistic better fits the historical evidence. In a final chapter we see how in the early part of this century, as the new science of genetics emerged and before the Neo-Darwinian synthesis was achieved, ETMP lost favor due to increasing doubts about the adequacy of evolutionary theory, the development of social scientific approaches antithetical to evolutionary explanations, and the tarnished career of the social applications of genetics. According to Richards RV was a product of this period. But the coming of ethology and sociobiology reflect, according to Richards, the reemergence of ETMB and the opportunity to reestablish AV as the genuine representative of Darwinism.

In his conclusion Richards shows how Darwinian historical scholarship reflects both the differing emphases of historiographic method, from internalist to externalist, and the varying estimates of the scientific status of Darwinism. The book also contains two important appendices in which Richards spells out some of the philosophical lessons of his historical account. In the first Richards discusses historiographic methods in the history of science and argues for the superiority of a natural selection model (NSM) of both the discovery and justification of scientific ideas. In the second he outlines his defense of an evolutionary ethics based on Darwin and sociobiology.

Richards' case for the superior historical accuracy of AV is attractive; but, as he recognizes, Darwinians championed diverse philosophical positions. This diversity suggests that what holds Darwinians together is not a set of philosophical theses but a scientific research programme concerning the evolutionary bases of mind and behavior. Moreover, Richards himself supports only an emergentist view of mind and evolutionary ethics with any sort of detailed argument. Both the scientific uncertainties of ETMB and the diversity of philosophical implications of ETMB make any adherence to AV problematic. Finally, NSM gives a more comprehensive account of the multifaceted data of the origins of ETMB than do its competitors. But it does not give much enlightenment about their justification both because NSM requires, in Richards' view, that we know the end of the scientific story about ETMB (but we do not) and because his NSM of the justification of scientific claims and change is underdeveloped.

Despite these difficulties, I recommend this book very highly. Richards' version of Darwinian views of mind and behavior should be of great interest not only to historians and philosophers of biology and psychology but to philosophers generally.

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Frits Staal.
Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
Pp. x+267.
US$47.50. (cloth: ISBN 0-226-76999-2);
US$18.95. (ISBN 0-226-77000-1).

Staal has collected in one volume twelve articles and seven reviews published between 1960 and 1977. With the exception of 'Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini,' written in collaboration with Paul Kiparsky, Staal is the sole author. Seven of the articles and four of the reviews pertain to Indian logic; the remainder pertain to Indian linguistics. The articles on logic and linguistics comprise Part I and Part II respectively, and the reviews Part III.

This collection is introduced by an essay, especially written for it, in which Staal rehearses the content of the articles and reviews and states their unifying theme. What ties them together, according to Staal, is the search for universals, features peculiar to, but general among, human beings. The universals which interest Staal are familiar: one, usually associated with Aristotle, is man's capacity to use reason; another, commonly suggested today by linguists, is man's capacity to use language. In particular, Staal wants to know which logical and linguistic principles are manifest in the logical and linguistic tradition of India and to what extent linguistic structure impinges upon logical thought.

Contrary to widespread, but uninformed opinion, classical Indian thinkers, especially philosophers and linguists, relied, both explicitly and implicitly, upon such well-known logical principles as those of Non-Contradiction, Double Negation, and Excluded Middle – as Staal (Chapters 5, 6, and 16), and others, have shown. From a very early time, classical Indian philosophers were concerned to distinguish between good and bad arguments, identifying in the process a canonical type of inference, discussions of whose truth conditions make up the preponderance of the material of what is referred to as Indian logic. The type of inference studied by Indian logicians was never formalized by them; and though it bears some affinity to the inference in Barbara, this syllogistic inference form does not do justice to the scope of the Indian inference.

Staal is interested both in the form of the Indian inference (logical syntax) and in the conditions under which it is true (logical semantics). In four of his articles (Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7), Staal avails himself of modern logical theory to elucidate both of these dimensions of Indian logical thought; in four of his reviews (Chapters 13, 14, 19, and

20), he examines similar attempts by others. In the same spirit, Staal (Chapter 4) also looks at the classical Indian theory of definition.

If classical Indian thinkers were remarkable for their logical thought, then they were astonishing for their linguistic thought. It is not an exaggeration to say that their achievements in linguistics were unequaled anywhere in the world before the twentieth century and that modern linguistics owes a real debt to them. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, written or compiled by Pāṇini, is a grammar of the Sanskrit language as it was spoken by his near contemporaries, the descendants of the Indo-Aryan tribe living on the Gangetic plain around the sixth century B.C. The work is neither a list of observations about the language, nor a descriptive grammar of the kind compiled by modern field linguists. It is a set of rules by means of which, according to some at least (e.g., S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya, Kārakāhnika* [University of Poona 1980], i-vi), all Sanskrit sentences can be constructed. Yet the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is not a formal grammar, at least not in the precise mathematical sense of the term 'formal.' It is, rather, an informal grammar. To see what is meant by the term 'informal grammar,' consider, for a moment, Euclid's *Elements*. Mathematicians call it an 'informal theory.' It is called a 'theory' because the theorems which make up the *Elements* are all deduced from a basic set of ten axioms; it is called 'informal' because the logic used for the deductions is unstated. Now, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is a grammar in the precise mathematical sense of the term because it provides a set of rules whereby well-formed Sanskrit sentences are to be generated; but it is informal because the rules are not stated with the degree of mathematical precision necessary to provide an effective (in the sense of Turing), or purely mechanical, derivation. However, just as the formalization of the *Elements* has uncovered the implicit use of logical principles far more sophisticated than those identified by Aristotle (see Ian Mueller's 'Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic,' in J. Corooran, ed., *Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations*); so even the formalization of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has uncovered the use of mathematical principles far more sophisticated than any in use anywhere until the latter part of the twentieth century.

Four articles on Indian linguistics (Chapters 9, 10, 11, and 12) aim to explicate some of the linguistic principles of Pāṇini's grammar through their formalization; two of the reviews (Chapters 15 and 17) examine similar treatments by other authors. One remarkable fact, set out in detail in chapter 10, is the striking similarity between the informal rules of Pāṇini's grammar and formal context sensitive rules of modern mathematical linguistics, which were first treated by Chomsky in 1963. Another, treated in Chapter 12, is the fact that Pāṇini's grammar clearly sought to address in a systematic fashion the relation between syntax and semantics in Sanskrit. It should not

be surprising, then, that just as Euclid's *Elements* exercised an enormous intellectual influence over the thought of Europe, so Pāṇini's grammar of Sanskrit, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, exercised a similar influence over the thought of India; and Staal shows this quite well in Chapter 8.

The Introduction and Chapters 8, 18 and 19 are accessible to any reader. The other chapters, however, require somewhat specialized knowledge: a tolerance, but no knowledge, of the Sanskrit idiom and a rudimentary familiarity with linguistics are required for Chapters 9 through 12 as well as 15, 16 and 17; Chapters 4 through 7 require both a tolerance of the Sanskrit idiom and a basic knowledge of formal logic; Chapters 1, 2, 3, 13 and 14 require an understanding of restricted quantification and an acquaintance with Sanskrit.

There can be little doubt that Staal is a major figure among scholars interested in Indian logic and linguistics; and each of the previously published pieces is an important contribution to the study of either one or the other. His approach to problems in the field is fresh and innovative, often possessing implications beyond that of Indian linguistics and logic. Thus, for example, Staal's use of restricted quantification for the representation of quantified noun phrases in natural language anticipates by more than twenty years the introduction by Jon Barwise and Robin Cooper of the systematic use in linguistics of its more general form, so-called 'generalized quantification.' (See their 'Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language,' *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 4, n. 2.) There are, of course, points which one can take exception to, as some have done; but even if Staal's analysis of any given topic is ultimately to be rejected, it will have to have been reckoned with and that reckoning will leave its imprint on any successive, successful analysis.

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Jennifer Trusted.
Moral Principles and Social Values.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1987.

The main purpose of this book is to introduce the reader to moral philosophy. The author begins by distinguishing between different kinds of statements: mathematical statements, factual statements, metaphysical statements and value statements. Along the way she points out, and quite rightly, that there are many statements that lie half way between factual statements and value statements. Some examples are: 'Jones is timid,' 'Smith is courageous,' and 'James is prudent.'

Having trotted out some of the basic points in the logic of moral discourse Trusted proceeds to present some of the favourite philosophical positions in ethics – emotivism, prescriptivism, utilitarianism and intuitionism. All this is fairly well done though one gets the feeling that Trusted has tried just a bit too hard to expose the reader to what recent philosophers have had to say on these positions. The views of 22 thinkers such as Ayer, Hare, Austin and Rawls are presented in just three chapters! One wonders what the beginner will make of all this.

Fortunately, Trusted is not content just to survey the landscape of recent moral philosophy. She also presents her own theory. It runs something like this. There are two basic true moral principles, keeping the trust and benevolence. These principles have been accepted by all peoples at all times. They do not form a part of the moral code of any social group but lurk in the background. Even though moral codes vary from social group to social group they are all based on the principle of keeping the trust and the principle of benevolence. What makes it possible for moral codes to vary is that they are partly dependent upon the environmental conditions and the non-moral beliefs of the social group. And these, of course, vary from group to group. Thus 'surface morality' is partly relative and partly absolute. It is relative to the extent that it is dependent upon social conditions, and it is absolute to the extent that it is dependent upon the two underlying principles.

Trusted's presentation of this theory raises tremendous difficulties. First of all neither principle is given a linguistic expression and so it is difficult to verify the claim that they have been accepted by all peoples at all times. Just what is it that has been accepted by all peoples at all times? From the clues she offers it would seem that what she has in mind when she talks about the principle of keeping trust is a claim to the effect that one ought to do what society has come to expect (and so is relying on) one to do. Thus for example, in our society parents ought to look after their children because society expects parents to do so.

The principle of benevolence is perhaps more difficult to pin down. One might expect it to run something like 'One ought to do what one can to help others in need,' but this would be a mistake. Trusted expects it to cover moral acts that are beyond the call of duty so there cannot be anything obligatory about it. I suspect it would be something like – 'Helping others is an ultimate good.'

One obvious worry here is that even if the two basic principles could be clearly articulated and then shown that they have been accepted by all people at all times this would not show that they were valid or, in other words, true. It is perfectly possible for a principle like 'Women ought to be treated as inferiors' to have been accepted by all peoples at all times. But this would do nothing towards showing that it was valid.

Trusted seems to be dimly aware of this deficiency for she does at one point want to argue that we could no more make sense of a hypothetical society that did not accept the basic principles than we could of a society that did not accept the simple rules of arithmetic – rules like $7 + 5 = 12$. According to Trusted 'Both kinds of principles [the moral principles and the mathematical principles] are universal in that they mirror the world and human behaviour as we understand them' (124). However, if Trusted wants to argue that the validity of the two basic moral principles is a conceptual matter she says little to support this position.

The rest of the book is mainly an attempt to trace the relationship between the basic principles and secondary principles, secondary social values and legal systems. Along the way we find (at least in the context of her overall theory) an intellectually pleasing account of human rights. The basic principle that one ought to keep the trust gives rise to the basic obligation to treat others equally. And this in turn gives rise to the right to expect to be treated equally. Trusted considers this right to be a natural right but does not feel that, as the word 'natural' has been traditionally used, there are any other natural rights. There are however many social rights. The source of these is the following: the basic obligation to keep the trust gives rise to the obligation to do what is socially expected and this in turn generates the right to expect what is socially expected. For example it is socially expected that people will keep their promises. Therefore if you have promised me that you will do x then you have an obligation to do x and I have a right to expect you to do x.

Not all obligations give rise to rights, however. The basic obligation to keep the trust could give rise to the obligation not to cut all the forests down but forests do not have a right not to be chopped down. Do animals have rights? To the extent that they are rational and self conscious, Trusted is inclined to think that they could have rights but she also feels that a being cannot have rights without having obligations and whales and porpoises clearly do not have obligations.

To conclude – Trusted covers a lot of interesting ground in her introductory work and she also hints at what could be an exciting moral theory. However the theory is not developed and little is done to support it. Would I recommend her book to a beginner? I am inclined to think not. Partly because she tries to introduce the reader to too many philosophers and partly because even though she mentions that one should distinguish between questions of fact and questions of value, the distinction in the presentation of her theory is often blurred. It is my belief that one should always try to distinguish them to the extent that it is possible.

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
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are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R. Burch
R.A. Shiner