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Canada T6G 2E5

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Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6G 2E5

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Université du Québec  
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500  
Trois-Rivières, Québec  
Canada G9A 5H7

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**Ronald Aronson**

*Sartre's Second Critique: An Explanation and Commentary.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. xvii+253.

US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-02804-6);

US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-02805-4).

This is the first detailed exposition and interpretation of the unfinished second volume of Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and it provides an important link in our understanding of Sartre's attempt to reveal the conditions for the possibility of our history. Aronson had access to the manuscript eight years prior to its publication in French in 1985, and he was thus in an excellent position to prepare for this work.

Aronson reads Sartre's *Critique* as a reply to Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic*. For Merleau-Ponty, Aronson states, the materialistic dialectic is itself at fault, because it operates 'through, but independently of, human beings' (15). Sartre's project, however, 'is not to reject the dialectic, but to perform the intellectual labor necessary to free it from rigidification' (29). Aronson also insists that the *Critique* must be read in the context of Sartre's political concerns of the time, 'the Algerian struggle for independence, on the one hand, and his attempts to create sympathy for revolutionary Cuba menaced by the United States, on the other' (29).

After summarizing some of the central themes of the first volume of Sartre's *Critique*, Aronson moves to the specific goal of volume two, the search to discover whether there is a grand totalization of history without a totalizer; that is, whether history exhibits a single totalization, and whether this totalization can be explained ultimately by praxis.

Aronson takes us through Sartre's analysis of boxing and incarnation. 'Incarnation' is Sartre's term for the way a particular meaning and truth emerge from the interaction of common praxis and the practico-inert. This is a lived experience rather than a conceptual one, and from it a concrete universal emerges. 'This fight is three things, at one and the same time: "the specific fight of a young boxer from Martinique and a Parisian boxer, boxing itself, produced in common by all the participants, and human violence exploding publicly" (II, 44)' (63).

In volume one, Sartre had already shown how group praxis can become institutionalized, thereby making the practico-inert into an inertial system that gives the condition for the possibility of anti-praxis. In volume two, this notion becomes anti-labor. Aronson shows how interactions between subgroups can lead one group to produce a deviation from the original project of the group that then effectively becomes the group's project. Sartre's specific goal is to explain how Stalinism was possible, and how this deviation effectively became the revolution. Aronson stresses the practical necessity of someone like Stalin being chosen, but these conditions were themselves created by praxis.

Aronson acknowledges that Sartre's project remains incomplete; Sartre has examined only Soviet totalization and not a single totalization for all of history. Nevertheless, Aronson believes that Sartre's study goes a long way in validating the materialistic dialectic in history.

In presenting the first book-length study of the unfinished second volume of Sartre's *Critique*, Aronson has contributed a genuine service to the scholarly community as well as to everyone concerned with understanding our place in history and our ability to control our history. I believe, however, that Aronson has overemphasized the importance of this second volume, which Sartre refused to have published during his life. The complete validity of the first volume does not depend upon the second volume. Sartre himself, while acknowledging that he did not complete his project, always referred to the published version of the *Critique* as one of his most significant works. The text justifies this judgment; the first volume exhibits how totalizations without a totalizer are possible; it gives the basic outline of the argument for the Stalinistic totalization. Further, the basic aspects of incarnation are not difficult to work out on the basis of the first volume.

Also, I do not think that Aronson has demonstrated an intrinsic dependency of the *Critique* on Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures*. For example, the notion of deviation is a common notion, and even Aronson would admit that Sartre's actual use of this notion is concretely different from Merleau-Ponty's use. Other commentators would point to other sources for Sartre's thought: Joseph Fell reads Sartre in relation to Heidegger; Klaus Hartmann reads Sartre in relation to Hegel. But Sartre is the key to Sartre. Aronson would not disagree with this observation; it is a question of emphasis.

I have always had a problem with Aronson's interpretation of Sartre's earlier philosophy. I do not think that he has shown us why the 'us-relation' is not sufficient to account for cooperative actions among persons. The issue arises again in his exposition of the second critique, where Aronson thinks that Sartre retains some of the individualism of *Being and Nothingness*. Aronson also thinks that Sartre is inconsistent in his discussion of universals; but Aronson does not examine Sartre's dialectical nominalism, nor the reality of common praxis and the mediation of the third person.

I may be misreading Aronson's brief observations about his own thought in relation to Sartre. He seems to be working with two conflicting philosophies, one of freedom, the other affirming a necessary historical destiny. Talking of Soviet society, Aronson writes: 'A revival of opposition, fed by a revolutionary past and slumbering revolutionary ideology, based on real social contradictions, perhaps even instigated by the leadership, is only a

matter of time' (243). For Sartre, however, if history is to be truly a human adventure rather than an adventure of the dialectic, then we must be prepared for real defeats as well as real victories.

Aside from these reservations, Aronson's study introduces the reader into some of the most important aspects of the *Critique*, including the crucial and central problem of whether there can be a single totalization of history without a totalizer. He has indeed given us an insight into the way Sartre planned to finish his *Critique*.

**Joseph S. Catalano**

Kean College of New Jersey

**Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy**

*The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity.*

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 1987.

Pp. xii+185. Cdn\$36.96: US\$19.95.

ISBN 0-19-505072-X.

This delightful book is a self-contained account of the Liar paradox, complete with a formal syntax and proof theory, semantics and proofs of the theorems. It should be of interest to more than just Liar specialists, however, because of the new semantic techniques it introduces and the novel 'hyperset' theory which provides models for that semantics. With this book Barwise has started to fulfil the promise of his earlier book with John Perry, *Situations and Attitudes*. Barwise and Etchemendy (B & E) use just a few of the notions of Situation Semantics, but to such good effect that they may convince sceptics about the ultimate possibility of an account of propositional attitudes along these lines, and so eventually of much more of the semantics of natural language.

B & E see themselves as conclusively placing the Liar paradox in the class of diagonal arguments usually said to come 'close' to paradox. Their semantics provides propositions as the semantic values of the *liar*: 'This is false,' the *contingent liars*, like 'If Max has the three of clubs, then this is false' (which is only paradoxical if a contingent fact about Max and his cards is true), and *liar cycles* such as '(1): "(2) is false." (2): "(1) is true",' and more. In addition they give a decidable system for establishing that distinct sentences represent the same propositions, e.g., 'This is true' and 'It is true that this is true.' Presenting the reasoning as diagonal purportedly avoids unsatisfactory aspects of the Tarski solution, in particular that one cannot talk about the truth of sentences of a language in that language, that something about truth is inexpressible, or ineffable. In this regard they follow in the new approach of Kripke in seeing approximations to semantic closure as desirable. Unlike Kripke they see nothing in their solution of truth-value

gaps or approximations to something incompletable, rather simply diagonal arguments showing that certain totalities are illegitimate.

Situation Semantics revives from Logical Atomism the notion that there are *facts* which make propositions true. Propositions about the truth of other propositions are made true by *semantic facts*. B & E consider a limited language expressing propositions about a card game, which are about people, cards and the relation of 'having,' as well as a relation between people and those propositions of 'believing' and a property of propositions of 'truth.' The language allows self reference with expressions like 'this' and 'that.'

The paradoxes are in fact solved twice. The two solutions are called 'Russellian' and 'Austinian' with the latter preferred by the authors. The central point of the Russellian solution is that one must distinguish the truth which is backed up by a semantic fact, truth *in* a model  $M$  'True<sub>M</sub> $p$ ,' from the truth which is defined by more standard truth conditions ' $M \models p$ .' The difference between the two is clearest with falsehoods. ' $p$ ' may be made false *by* a model ( $M \not\models p$ ) because ' $p$ ' is not made true, but to be false *in* the model 'False<sub>M</sub> $p$ ' there must be some negative semantic fact in the model making it so. The liar proposition, asserting its own falsity, is then simply made false by any model, but does not thereby become false in it (and hence true ...). There can be a fact making the proposition false, but that fact is not in the model, hence the diagnosis of the liar as a diagonal argument. The failure of semantic closure is not a mysterious result of the ineffability of seemingly ordinary notions of truth. There is, rather, simply no totality of facts which would make the falsity of the liar proposition about that totality be made true by a fact in that totality. Proposition 1 of the *Tractatus* is provably false!

Reference to an 'Austinian' solution of the Liar may horrify disciples of J.L. Austin when they see what West Coast Formal Semantics has done to his ordinary language. In his famous paper 'Truth' (*Arist. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 29*, 1950), Austin says: 'A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs ... (the one to which it "refers") is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions [of the language].' In B & E's technical vocabulary this becomes the assertion that the *proposition expressed* by a sentence is *about* a certain *situation* (which is made up of *states of affairs*) and says that it is *of* a certain *type* and is true when the situation is of that type. Each Liar proposition must be about a situation  $s$  and say that that very proposition about  $s$  is not true. Liar propositions will be simply false. They are not about the facts which make them false and cannot be. The diagonal element appears here in the proof that while there may be a totality of facts, no proposition can be *about* it; whatever situation a proposition can be about cannot include the fact making the particular liar proposition about that situation false.

In both solutions there is no defect in the liar and other self-referential propositions; the problems emerge in the totalities of facts which make them true or false. B & E hold that propositions can be about themselves in the full sense of having themselves among their own constituents. The most stunning innovation of the book comes with the set theoretic models for such propositions. The set modelling a proposition has members which represent its constituents. A self-referential proposition is modeled by a set having itself as a member! The theory of these 'hypersets' which allows this is set forth

in a chapter which is not dependent on the rest of the book. Unlike the appearance of Kripke-Platek set theory with ur-elements (KPU) in *Situations and Attitudes*, this deviant set theory is really used. Peter Azcel's 'anti-foundational' set theory (AFA) drops the axiom of foundation which is what rules out self-membership in ZF and replaces it with an existence axiom asserting, roughly, the existence of any set which can be described by a graph. Among these will be sets containing themselves, easily pictured by graphs with edges returning to the node from which they arise. The appeal of this set theory is much like that of possible world semantics where even without a firm grasp of the technicalities one can draw pictures of the models. There is also a 'solution lemma' which allows postulation of any proposition that can be described with an 'equation,' such as ' $f = \text{False } f$ ,' which has a unique solution for ' $f$ ,' the proposition that asserts its own falsehood, the liar. This lemma thus guarantees the existence of propositions as described by the contingent liar, liar cycles and seemingly whatever puzzles one can dream up. One certainly hopes that paradox-mongers may be able to get somewhere now just by writing down the right equations and drawing the right graphs without first mastering some very sophisticated set theory, much as metaphysicians now draw pictures of possible worlds without mastering the completeness proofs of quantified modal logics.

I conclude with a few qualms about this program. Logical Atomism had problems with negative and general facts, as did *Situations and Attitudes*. B & E seem to have mastered negative facts and with them denials and the assertion of negations. But what about quantifiers? Despite the use of singular terms and predicates and arbitrary conjunctions of sentences, their formal language still does not contain quantifiers. One might also worry about the authors' claim to have avoided semantic gaps which only lead to the *strengthened liar*; 'This sentence is false or semantically defective.' B & E give us propositions for *almost every* sentence and argue that the surprises come in the facts they can be about and which make them true. Yet, we are still left with sets that solve equations like ' $p = p \ \& \ p$ ' which fail to represent propositions for what seems to be a matter of semantic deficiency. As well, propositions are always true only *in* a legitimate collection of facts or *about* a legitimate collection. We are to believe that what seems like a restriction against saying what one wants to is really just a metaphysical fact. Still one has the feeling that one's ability to speak is being restricted. Finally, the authors conclude their account with the claim that '... the liar sentence gives rise to no genuine paradox ... What once appeared as a paradox now looks like pervasive ambiguity. There is one unfortunate feature of this otherwise elegant solution to the Liar. Logicians abhor ambiguity and love paradox.' World-weary philosophers, however, may share with those conventional logicians a feeling that every confident 'solution' pays a hidden price, that's the way with paradoxes, and that claims about what *we* really mean are only a challenge to the ingenuity of language builders.

**Bernard Linsky**  
University of Alberta

**Pierre Bourdieu**

*Choses dites.*

Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1987.

Pp. 231. ISBN 2-7073-1122-7.

Bourdieu's first published work, in the early '60s, was based on ethnographic research amongst the Kabylia in North Africa, though from the start he did not accept the anthropological practice of studying the exotic other without studying oneself and the social location from which one studied 'them.' He has subsequently worked in sociology, writing about French students and universities, language as a social phenomenon (specifically, an invidiousness-generator), photography, and taste. This last has resulted in *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (trans. Richard Nice [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1984] – now in paperback), which can be expected to enlarge his reputation *chez les anglophones*. There are three overlapping reasons why *Choses dites*, and the rest of his work, should be of interest to philosophers. First, his intellectual formation was philosophical; for example, he mentions in *Choses dites* preparing 'une traduction commentée' of Leibniz's *Animadversiones* with Henri Gouhier (13) – not the sort of thing an American social scientist would be likely to have done. Second, he is persistently reflective about concepts, conceptual distinctions, conceptual adequacy. Third, he has elaborated a general theory of action which intersects with many philosophy-of-the-social-sciences *topoi*. The general theory is available in *Le sens pratique* (Paris: Minuit 1980) and in a short, extremely useful, translation/compendium for which Richard Nice should be given more than ordinary translator credit: *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977). Bourdieu's theory is interesting – certainly worth thinking about – because it tries to find room for real-life, *lebensförmig* agents between the rule-following automata of structuralism, who live out the pure geometry of kinship and indeed everything else (exactly as mapped by the savants in Paris), and the fairly contextless, decision-theoretical calculators, the acultural yuppies and rugged individualists, of rational action theory. The central concept in this project is *habitus*: 'vieux concept aristotélien-thomiste que j'ai complètement repensé, comme une manière d'échapper à cette alternative du structuralisme sans sujet et de la philosophie du sujet' (20). In this re-thinking, *habitus* becomes 'principe d'une connaissance sans conscience, d'une intentionnalité sans intention et d'une maîtrise pratique des régularités du monde qui permet d'en devancer l'avenir sans avoir seulement besoin de le poser comme tel' (22) and 'système de schèmes acquis fonctionnant à l'état pratique comme catégories de perception et d'appréciation ou comme principes de classement en même temps que comme principes organisateurs de l'action, c'était constituer l'agent social dans sa vérité d'opérateur pratique de construction d'objets' (24). *Habitus* is not (as Raymond Boudon has suggested) an empty tautology. Nor is it irremediably vague or soft-edged. It is rather, to use Bourdieu's own term, a *signpost* or 'sous une forme condensée, un programme de recherches et un principe d'évitement de tout un ensemble d'erreurs' (54).

A good idea of the nature and range of the research program signposted by *habitus* can be gathered from the fifteen pieces collected in *Choses dites*.

Of these, four are interviews which together provide a sense of Bourdieu's cognitive and discursive style, some clarifications and amplifications for those who know his work, and – I should guess – glimpses, premonitions, and provocative samples for those who do not. Two of the interviews, 'Fieldwork in Philosophy' and 'Repères,' are fairly general and wide-ranging: they include intellectual autobiography, reasons for rejecting structuralism and Marxism, views about the 'crisis' in sociology, and an underlining of the need for '*Selbstreflexion* sociologiquement armée' (36). Although the necessity of 'objectifying' the observer is one of Bourdieu's familiar themes, it is here given a novel half-twist so that sociology itself becomes an *askesis* of self-knowledge or 'une arme contre soi, un instrument de vigilance' (38). We can see this reflective, and indeed agonic, employment of a discipline many think of as no more than an academic, or learned, speciality reflected in passages like the following: 'Si je puis dire ce que je dis aujourd'hui, c'est sans doute parce que je n'ai cessé d'utiliser la sociologie contre mes déterminations et mes limites sociales; et notamment pour transformer les humeurs, les sympathies et les antipathies intellectuelles qui sont, je crois, si importantes dans les choix intellectuels, en propositions conscientes et explicites' (37). This oughtn't to be dismissed as either self-important (it is after all permissible without vanity or arrogance to think you have arrived someplace by your own efforts that you wouldn't otherwise be) or irrelevant. Those people who think they have no humors, sympathies, or antipathies to render explicit are surely enormously self-deceived: it takes time and work (and maybe luck) to merit the compliment Collingwood paid Whitehead: the great thing about Whitehead is that he doesn't care what he says so long as it's true.

The next interview in the collection, 'de la règle aux stratégies,' makes the point – against structuralism – that people use rules (e.g., of marriage) strategically: they do what is in their, or their family's, interest, playing with rules, bending more often than breaking them, sometimes breaking them, though often being very careful to show they are 'en règle.' Strategy is neither the product of an unconscious program nor a matter of explicit rational calculation; it is rather 'le produit du sens pratique comme sens du jeu, d'un jeu social particulier, historiquement défini, qui s'acquiert dès l'enfance en participant aux activités sociales ...' (79).

The last interview, 'le champ intellectuel: un monde à part,' is a compressed sample of Bourdieu's ongoing effort to provide a *nonreductive desacralization* of cultural producers and products. There is literary politics and competition for recognition, but this is largely done through, and cannot quite be done without, writing or other work-production; and this gives rise to something sui generis: 'Les producteurs culturels détiennent un pouvoir spécifique, le pouvoir proprement symbolique de faire voir et de faire croire, de porter au jour, à l'état explicite, objectivé, des expériences plus ou moins confuses, floues, informulées, voire informulables, du monde naturel et du monde social, et, par là, de les faire exister' (174).

There is not space to mention even the titles of the eleven conference papers: they deal, always interestingly, with such things as codification, symbolic power, delegation, 'les usages du "peuple",' sociology of sport, and public opinion surveys ('une "science" sans savant').

**William James Earle**

Baruch College, CUNY

**David Braybrooke**

*Meeting Needs.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1987.

Pp. xi+344.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07727-4);

US\$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02259-3).

Though relief agencies etc. often draw up lists of human needs, psychologists speculate about hierarchies of needs, and welfare economists build their theories upon the concept, philosophers have tended to ignore the issue: a computer search of *The Philosopher's Index* on the subject serves up only about two dozen pieces from the '40s to 1986, three of them, in addition to the book here under review, by Braybrooke himself. It was not a popular subject, at least among non-Marxist philosophers.

Two reasons for this neglect seem to have been these: At least some rights, it has been argued, are based on the satisfaction of needs, and at least some human needs can be objectively determined. Here then is a prospect for a scientific or naturalistic ethics. But, of course, this is the NATURALISTIC FALLACY, which was considered very bad form some twenty years ago.

The other difficulty with the subject is that microeconomic theory, and the philosophers who take their inspiration from there, resolutely deny, or at least ignore, the distinction between needs and mere preferences. The reason for this is not just that the notion of (revealed) preference is tidier, more clinical. It is, alas, also true that people are often unaware of their needs, or unwilling to tend to them, so that satisfying them may require persuasion and even coercion: paternalism, in a word (cf. Wojciech Sadurski's passionate statement of that point: 'To Each According to His (Genuine?) Needs,' *Political Theory* 11 [1983] 419-31).

*Meeting Needs* is the first book-length philosophical study of the subject. It is the fruit of many years' work and shows just how difficult and complex this matter is. Braybrooke begins by elaborating the issues just mentioned, i.e., the ostensible reasons why the subject should be left alone, or why needs should not be a policy determinant. He points out that the positions from which these criticisms are advanced are often in a pretty bad theoretical fix themselves. After these introductory matters, a technical problem is addressed: The 'relational formula' often adopted for the analysis of the term (e.g., by Harry Frankfurt, 'Necessity and Desire,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45 [1984] 1-13, one of the best, and certainly clearest, earlier analyses), viz. 'N needs  $x$  in order to  $y$ ' tends to concentrate attention on the end  $y$ . And since even apparently frivolous ends may sometimes turn out to be matters of life and death, one must investigate the need for  $y$ , and so forth. But the point of talk about needs is to make a broad distinction between mere preferences and more urgent requirements; making that same distinction again, this time within the domain of needs itself, is a conceptual diseconomy. Braybrooke avoids it by defining needs relative to social roles: needs are whatever is 'indispensable to mind or body in performing the tasks assigned a given person under a combination of basic social roles, namely, the roles of parent, householder, worker, and citizen' (48). The criterion is cautiously extended to those too old, too young, or otherwise incompetent

to act in these roles. This criterion allows us to distinguish adventitious from life-time needs, and justifies, or at least makes plausible, lists of needs (of which B gives four [34]) drawn up by various agencies.

A Principle of Precedence then gives bite to the criterion: matters of need (in a given reference population) 'take priority over their preferences or anybody else's' (60). But here a problem arises: when agencies' lists of human needs command universal assent, it is usually because of their vagueness: who would quibble with such items as 'food,' 'shelter,' etc. Many complications arise, not only concerning quantities and levels, but also manners of need satisfaction: Is an obligation to meet a need discharged if a devout muslim is offered pork to eat, or beer to slack his thirst? How then, operationally, are lists of needs and standards of satisfaction to be derived from the criterion? Braybrooke presents this as a matter of formulating a 'linguistic hypothesis' and resolves the issue (in a manner that will seem statesman-like to some, and arbitrary to others) by stipulating that the decision be made by a certain member of the 'Selfgovliset.' This term ('ugly and obtrusive enough, though usefully transparent, to designate a newly organized agency of the Soviet Union' [62]) stands for 'self-governing linguistic subset,' a political unit that decides to what extent the needs of a target population ought to be met. This is here represented as a linguistic decision on the use of 'need.'

The person to make the decision is the least generous of the most generous 90% of the Selfgovliset. She identifies the target population (for which she feels some responsibility), and the list of needs and standards of satisfaction. Braybrooke's point is not that this is the best or only way of identifying needs, but to demonstrate that it is 'conceptually confusing to allow anxiety about resolving conflicts hurry us past seeing how much can be accomplished with the concept of needs when the conflicts are avoided' (74).

And so most of the book, without relying too much on this rough characterization of needs, is given over to a host of truly useful analyses that explore the context of the concept: how should we treat needs that stem from avoidable, but now inexorable, social arrangements, or from conventions that might be changed. Answer: 'neither being derived nor being conventional ... takes away the normative force of needs or their factuality' (104). What is the connection between serving justice and meeting needs? Answer: 'precautions extending to meeting people's needs equally have to be taken, if equality, taken to be the pattern of justice, is to be assured of persisting' (156). Braybrooke then develops a 'utilitarianism without utility,' which 'incorporates a Census Notion rather than Bentham's felicific calculus as the basic device for bringing evidence about consequences to bear upon the choice of policies' (162). This version of utilitarianism is thought more compatible with liberalism, which is traditionally, if not often consistently, associated with the former.

It often seems right to trade away the satisfaction of a need to have a perhaps even frivolous preference honoured: 'A man might let the rain wet him in order to keep his stamp collection dry' (207), says Braybrooke in Confucian terseness. To save stamp collections from a paternalistic insistence on meeting needs first, and, generally, to reconcile the demands of needs with the demands of preference and liberty, the Principle of Precedence is relaxed

to give needs a merely 'precautionary priority.' Attention is then paid to the expansion of needs with advances in science, technology and prosperity, and finally such subjects as 'embarrassing needs,' problems of a world-wide reference population, and medical needs are taken up.

This is a complex book. Its unusual and ground-breaking emphasis warrants every attention. Still, there remain some troublesome and nagging problems. Even granted that one wants to get on with the discussion of needs, and not get stuck with endless bickering about a definition that takes care of every far-out case, appointing a certain member of a Selfgovliset seems a bit nonchalant. It is not clear, for one thing, how we would identify her, since the problems of amalgamation and ranking are as formidable for needs as they are for utilities. And why is this a (linguistic) *hypothesis*? As the criterion is set up, it simply *has* to be the case that the people clustered around the tenth percentile (if we can manage a scaling) would agree, and the rest of the Selfgovliset would not. What's to confirm? Perhaps a standard so low was picked just to silence the champions of preference for the few hours it takes to get to the end of the argument.

I also see problems with the 'Census Notion' and 'Utilitarianism without Utility.' While it is true that 'no one has drawn up anything like a full schedule of even a single person's utilities' (172), there are problems of a related kind concerning the ranking and amalgamation of social indicators. These matters are, however, more completely dealt with in Braybrooke's earlier *Three Tests for Democracy* (New York: Random House 1968) and *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press 1963).

The chapters of *Meeting Needs* are followed by useful summarizing dialogues between author and reader; very informative notes, which are sequestered at the end of the book, provide the scholarly context of the discussion and are highly recommended reading.

I had wanted to say, in conclusion, that *Meeting Needs* is a much needed book. But, having been made conscious by the book itself of the slings of need-talk, I was pulled up short, and had to conclude that by its own lights *Meeting Needs* is not needed, nor is the rest of the literature on needs, including this review. This is because such analyses are *societal needs* (certainly not luxuries), rather than personal needs. Certainly, no Selfgovliset's tenth generosity percentile would regard them as prerequisites for discharging one's duties as householder, etc. Societal, or what may be called *de dicto* needs (as in 'We need scholarships in applied mathematics,' taken, not in the sense that there are [already] students of the subject who need such scholarships, but that we need scholarship-supported students), might, we can only hope, become the subject of a sequel. Since political decisions often address perceived societal needs, this is an issue that deserves some attention.

This is an eloquent and engaged book. The message I get from it is that the concept of need, and the interplay with its chief rival, preference, is an immensely more complex matter than I had thought, and than anyone who is oriented toward preference theories is likely to notice. As an antidote it is a must for the champions of preference, and highly recommended for the rest, though, as we all know, in this business conversions are difficult to achieve.

**Rolf George**  
University of Waterloo

**Steven M. Cahn**

*Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia.*

Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1986.

Pp. 125. US\$15.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7517-3);

US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7518-1).

Are professors professionals? 'Self-policing' is one of the key elements of 'professional.' Thus doctors, lawyers, and social workers have Codes of Ethics with stated regulations, sanctions, methods of censure, and expulsion. John Dewey thought professors should have something similar; he insisted on having, and chaired, an early AAUP committee to draw up a statement of professors' responsibilities, which he said must accompany any plausible claim to academic freedom. He was proven wrong: academic freedom seems well established in North America, but the list of responsibilities has been a long time coming. Not until 1966 did the AAUP get around to giving any statement on professional ethics, and it was a statement, no code. The July-August, 1987, issue of *Academe*, AAUP Bulletin, gives a newly revised version of this statement on p. 49.

Worth describing, this one-page statement acknowledges special responsibilities for professors, but disavows responsibility for the enforcement of ethical standards, distinguishing academics from law and medicine, 'whose associations act to insure the integrity of members engaged in private practice.' (Note: on this view, codes are not for doctors in hospitals; and engineers, nurses, and social workers are off-base when they draft codes to apply primarily to professional employees.) AAUP holds that sanctions are left to individual institutions which employ professors, with the result that one can be dismissed from a job, in accord with due process, but one cannot be expelled from the profession.

So, no matter how viciously I plagiarize colleagues, exploit or neglect students, and harass the department secretary, I can only lose my current job, not my profession, so long as anyone else, anywhere, will hire me. For teaching false and pernicious doctrines, I am not likely to lose even my job. Someone will defend my right to do so – it's called academic freedom. (Nicholas Rescher has commented on the idea that there is no such thing as 'Philosophical Malpractice,' Editor's Page, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24:3, July 87 – suggesting it is our shame, not credit, that this is so.)

The AAUP Statement goes on to offer useful, succinct homilies on professorial duties as scholars, teachers, colleagues, employees, and citizens. These are memorable and will surely have some influence with the intended audience, the faculties and administrators of employing institutions, though they will be free to accept what they like, interpret it as they will, and ignore the rest.

Cahn's book contributes to this effort to specify the duties of the professoriate, arguing for his views along the way, and sketching examples of the saints and scamps our profession produces. Cahn also argues his views on tangential issues: why students need required courses; why all students should study the liberal arts; why examinations should supplement papers in our courses; why junior professors should not vote on promotion of peers or seniors, why students should not evaluate professors, etc. He is Provost

at the Graduate School of City University of New York, and has administrative experience at the National Endowment for the Humanities, and elsewhere. He currently chairs the APA Committee on Teaching, is author/editor of several popular texts, and of *Scholars Who Teach* (1979) and *Eclipse of Excellence* (1973).

After a brief account of 'The Professorial Life,' stressing its autonomy, the justification for such autonomy, and the abuse it sometimes leads to, Cahn asks for our attention to the duties of the professoriate – that exist whether recognized or not. There follows a chapter on Teaching, with discussion of what's expected of a good teacher, with talk on syllabuses, testing, assignments, texts, rejection of 'neutrality,' grading, etc. This ranges from the banal ('begin all classes on time') to the unobvious but important (whether teachers should befriend their students), to the dubious ('read all student answers to one question at a time' when grading exams), and to the simply false (grade inflation can be exposed by requiring on transcripts the grade average for all students in a course).

In 'Scholarship and Service' we have a discussion of responsibility to publish and to maintain up-to-date knowledge and methods, a quick account of the ethics of scholarship (including book-reviewing), and of letters of recommendation. Department duties are everyone's; though the Head's are more.

Under 'Personnel Decisions,' Cahn discusses appointments (and interviews), tenure decisions, voting procedures, and dismissals. He argues against hiring those with poor personality traits and those insensitive to academic ethics. We shouldn't tenure any we have doubts about, and voting should not be confidential. Occasional review of tenured faculty can keep live sprouts from becoming deadwood, and can be done with no threat to academic freedom.

A last chapter on 'Graduate Education' argues for comprehensive exams, grievance procedures against too-demanding advisors, and courses in teaching for future professors. Such courses would cover all facets of teaching: motivating students, choosing materials, lectures, discussions, exams, grading, and above all ethical obligations.

I strongly recommend this book for our libraries. It is better than most anything you will find there on academic ethics. Universities, like many other of our institutions, are catching the ethics bug, and this will be as useful as any you can refer others to when they seek scholarly discussion of these topics. And it will be provocative: Cahn says you are irresponsible for allowing any professor/student dating. He does a good job of trying to advance professorial ethics without codes.

But this praise must be tempered with a sense of disappointment. What is needed as a foundation for professorial ethics is to establish that the professoriate is a profession and then to show how, and what, duties flow from that. I see the first part of this as fairly easy in that education is as much a social good as health and justice. Cahn does not attempt this, though at places he seems to assume this is obvious. Thus, he frequently argues by analogy from our expectations of lawyers and physicians to what we can expect of professors. The absence of this foundation to work from is particularly felt where Cahn starts to spell out duties of teaching. 'Teaching ... has an ethical dimension, for the teacher has the capacity to help or harm others' (10). By this

test, carpentry, shoe repair, and bagging groceries are all jobs with ethical dimensions.

Another disappointment is in his sometimes willingness to abandon his own injunction that we adequately present our opponent's views. This occurs in his opposition to student evaluation of teaching. We are given the downside (Dr. Fox stories), nothing on the plus side, and his solution, classroom visits by senior professors known to be good teachers, is question-begging and the essence of the 'oldboy network' that always tolerated the scamps.

### **Arnold Wilson**

University of Cincinnati

### **C.J. de Vogel**

*Rethinking Plato and Platonism.*

Leiden: E.J. Brill 1986.

Pp. x+253. US\$38.75. ISBN 90-04-07691-3.

This book contains recent work – some revised and reprinted and some appearing for the first time – of an author who labored in Platonic studies for over fifty years. It aims to shed light on Plato's actual views and what can be considered genuine Platonism (vii-viii). The underlying theme is that Platonism was and remains a most respectable philosophical position. On de Vogel's interpretation, Plato's metaphysics and anthropology are quite compatible with and convenient for expression of Christian doctrine, and, what is more, Platonism cannot easily be dismissed by contemporary philosophers. Plato, she argues, has fully transcendent principles, yet without resigning this world to contempt. Hence, many of the Church Fathers used Platonism in elaborating their theologies and our modern 'love for this world' is not so extreme a break with Plato as often supposed.

The book divides into two sections. The longer first part provides a selective review of sixty years of scholarship on Plato and Platonism, and the second outlines the author's views serving as source of her criticisms. The writers on Plato of most concern in the first part are J.N. Findlay, W.K.C. Guthrie, and J.H. Krämer; interpreters of Plotinus discussed are E. Berti, A.H. Armstrong, and P. Henry. De Vogel offers comments on many more authors, however, and numerous insights into the long tradition of Platonism, including Neoplatonists, Church Fathers, and Cambridge Platonists.

De Vogel focuses on the erroneous view of Plato or Platonism (mainly Plotinus) as dualistic since, when Platonism is so construed, it seems opposed to Christianity and contemporary thought. She denies dualism as Plato puts Being (the forms) and Becoming (this perceptible world) on different levels. This world surely exists, but with a dependent and subordinate existence (162, 165). Striving to imitate true being, this world shares in the beauty and order of that other one (169), though not as itself worthy of religious de-

votion (143-55). Plato's conception of man is parallel. He neither considers soul and body as equal nor conceives the body as inessential to man or valueless. De Vogel suggests either position would lead to some kind of dualism (190). Rather she finds in Plato's texts, especially the *Timaeus* and *Laws*, the view that the body is something of value requiring much care, if less than the soul (173, 230). She contends that Plato was actually more insistent than Aristotle (170) or Plotinus (218) that man is essentially a natural unity of soul and body.

To answer those, such as Gomperz and Krämer, who see Aristotle depicting a dualism in Plato of the principle of limit (the One) and unlimitedness (the Great-and-Small or Indefinite Dyad), de Vogel presents her interpretation of the so-called 'unwritten doctrines' (190-203). She thinks these doctrines, which were central to traditional Platonism but have been often ridiculed for the past two centuries, peek out of passages in the later dialogues. Plato saw that the forms must derive from principles of limit and unlimitedness as is the case for perceptible beings. The principle of unlimitedness may be linked to the other (the *heteron*) in the *Sophist* (200); the One identified with the Good in *Republic* VI and VII (196). The forms are not each isolated but participate in each other or communicate so as to constitute an organic whole (54, 69, 105). Since there is thus an articulated whole, life and thought must be in the intelligible realm. The forms taken all together are *nous* or the demiurge. The human soul has the power to cognize both sensible and supersensible reality because it too has in its composition Sameness and Difference (*Tim* 35a-b), which connect with the One and the Indefinite Dyad (202). Whereas the Pythagoreans were dualistic because they conceived limit and unlimited as equiprimordial principles, it was the Platonic tendency to develop a monistic position by subordinating the unlimited to the One (201).

Clearly de Vogel rejects the prevalent dismissal of Aristotle's testimony about Plato (11, 15, 202-3). She thinks it too hard to believe Aristotle merely invented these doctrines, for they accord with what is in the later dialogues and in fact help clarify them. She would not go along with the Tübingen school, however, and suppose these 'unwritten doctrines' were the very heart of Plato's thought and from the very beginning of his authorship. Instead, she restricts them to his later years.

De Vogel upholds a moderate view of chronological development of Plato's thought. For her, the early dialogues contain no complete doctrine of forms because this was only worked out when Plato composed the middle dialogues. The *Parmenides* marks a shift in Plato's interests toward the 'unwritten doctrines.' This is, however, not so much a change in doctrine as a change in Plato's interests. There is a parallel reassessment by the later Plato of views in epistemology and anthropology. Plato became increasingly appreciative of the senses and enhanced his conception of the unity of human soul and body. De Vogel attributes the more positive attitudes about the senses and the body, in the *Timaeus* as compared to the *Phaedo*, to Plato's increasing attention to the regular course of the heavens (174-5), a turn to concern for how all men and not just philosophers should live, and a relaxing in Plato himself of the conflict of soul and body (177).

The most important general criticism I might offer is of de Vogel's approach to interpreting Plato. She did not sufficiently allow for the impact of the con-

text of a dialogue on its content. For example, since the context of the *Phaedo* is a discussion of immortality just prior to Socrates' death, it is perhaps unsurprising that Socrates will seem to diminish the value of the body and stress the desirability of the soul's getting away from it in death as it strove so hard to do in life. Rather than appealing too readily, then, to shifts in Plato's own interests or existential concerns, it is as promising to allow that Plato's dialogue form, as opposed to a treatise form, should complicate our interpretations. Particular points for criticism are her too simple view that the 'Divided Line' in *Republic* VI has mathematical entities intermediate between perceptibles and intelligible forms (62, 168) and her conception of form-numbers (65) which is quite obscure compared to her excellent grasp of how life and motion enter Plato's intelligible realm (54, 69, 105).

This is a lively book by an author who was enthusiastic about Platonism. It invests the study of its subject with dignity. Even where its views do not win assent, they are worthy of consideration.

**Ronald M. Polansky**  
Duquesne University

**Allan Gotthelf, ed.**

*Aristotle on Nature and Living Things:*  
*Philosophical and Historical Studies.*

Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications 1985.

Pp. xxix+410.

US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-935225-00-5);

US\$15.50 (paper: ISBN 0-935225-01-3).

David Balme, whose seventieth birthday this *Festschrift* celebrated, is a scholar whose influence is out of proportion to his output; his published writings amount to fewer than twenty papers and one book, his Clarendon Aristotle version of *De Partibus Animalium 1* and *De Generatione Animalium 1*. Yet his work has been of incalculable importance: it is almost solely due to his pioneering studies that Aristotle's biological treatises have once more begun to receive the attention they deserve from philosophers. After Balme few people would dream of writing on Aristotle's ethics, politics or metaphysics without referring to the biology; before Balme, such neglect was commonplace.

No quarrel, then, with the choice of subject, and the editor, Allan Gotthelf, has spared no effort to bring the project to fruition. So far, so commendable. But *Festschriften* are Protean beasts, liable to lose their proper focus under the conflicting stresses of divergent interests – principally, the desire to discuss aspects central to the dedicatee's work, and the wish to involve as many of his colleagues and former pupils as possible. This volume is no exception to that unhappy rule. It contains twenty-four contributions of widely varying lengths, concerns, and importance. To cope with this

*embarras de richesses*, the volume is divided into four sub-sections: Biology and Natural Philosophy (which contains only two brief pieces of limited technical interest); 'Substance, Form and "Species"' (six more substantial contributions); 'Teleology, Necessity, Motion and Value' (nine articles); and, increasingly desperately, 'Before and After Aristotle' (a *pot-pourri* of seven). The central two sections contain most of the meat of the collection: I shall concentrate on those.

Michael Frede's 'Substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*' is a fine example of the brilliance of Frede's work. He attacks an issue of central Aristotelian importance: what is the relation of forms to particulars? Crucially, what is it that individuates individuals? Frede's analysis takes seriously a passage of *Metaph* H 1, 1042a28f., in which Aristotle argues that substantial forms are in some sense the ultimate subjects for predication, and Frede's argument excitingly involves a discussion of issues central to contemporary debates on individuation. Frede effectively claims that the identity of an object is given by its retaining through material exchange (Theseus' ship is invoked here) the same functional disposition in an uninterrupted spatio-temporal continuity. Thus it is the form (considered as a 'this') which is the ultimate subject of predication; thus the substantial form cannot be universal (or else it would itself, contra Aristotle's settled doctrine, be predicable); hence forms are particular, although qua form they do not differ from one another (matter turns out, as it should, to be the *principle* of individuation, although it is not the *substance* of it). Frede's case is elegant, economic, and to my mind entirely convincing. It whets the appetite for the forthcoming Frede-Patzig edition of *Metaph* Z.

Gotthelf's own contribution ('Notes towards a Study of Substance and Essence in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals* ii-iv') is avowedly a piece of work in progress. Gotthelf assembles ten texts that bear on the relation of definition to substance, and asks what work each does, and what assumptions about the relationships involved between the concepts it employs. The results are summarised and 'interim conclusions' drawn (most importantly perhaps that 'dimensional features' can enter into the *ousia* of animals). This is solid stuff, but it does not stir the blood.

The remaining papers in the section concentrate on similar themes, making it the most cohesive section of the book; D.W. Hamlyn discusses Aristotle's conception of form, without offering any strikingly original insights into it. Bob Sharples traces Aristotle's views on the form-matter relation through his Peripatetic successors, and relates it to the controversy as to just what is transmitted by which parent in generation. He considers two possibilities: either it is not just the form that is transmitted in generation, or the form includes more than just the specific characteristics. Sharples' discussion is learned and interesting; and it answers directly to one of the main preoccupations of David Balme's work; it is not the best piece in the volume, but it is one of the most suitable. Jim Lennox poses the interesting question 'Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?' The answer, he claims, is that it depends on what you mean by 'species': if you mean 'properly constituted natural kind' the answer is yes; if you mean anything else, the answer is probably no. Finally in this section Pierre Pellegrin argues interestingly that the words *genos* and *eidos* in Aristotle's biology are primarily logical in function, and do not

(at least directly) prefigure our notions of genus and species. Properly understood Aristotle's biology is a moriology, and his *ousiai* are the essences of the parts. That interpretation accords with Paul Moraux' claim in the final section that Galen was the most intelligent and acute interpreter of Aristotle's philosophical biology; for Galen takes over and rigorously applies Aristotle's methodological dictum that it is the function, not the structure, of the parts which should concern the theoretical biologist and which provides the criterion for homology. This article is a contribution to the revival of interest in Galen, and a valuable corrective to the prevalent impression that he was in some relatively uncontroversial sense a Platonist.

The third section collects papers broadly concerned with the issues of teleology and necessity in Aristotle. John Cooper contributes a penetrating analysis of the concept of hypothetical necessity, linking it with the notions of Democritean or material necessity in an intriguingly original manner: hypothetical necessities are necessity of matter (that the matter is the way it is is an irreducible necessity all right); but they are hypothetical just in that for a particular material to need to be employed in a particular way it must be teleologically necessitated. Wolfgang Kullmann distinguishes three types of final causality, depending on whether the tendency of an object towards an end is essentially located in the object, the end, or in both. Charles Kahn argues for a coherent sense in which the Prime Mover is, after all, the ultimate end of all activity; David Furley attempts to bring the apparently recalcitrant rainfall example of *Phys* ii 8 within the net of a general teleology; Dorothea Frede argues that the 'indeterminism' in *Metaph* E 3 consists not in a failure of mechanical causation, but in a lack of teleological explanation (contra Sorabji's recent influential claims); John Ferguson emphasises the teleological preoccupations of the *Politics*: these papers are the most unified in theme and general direction in the volume; but they have little (at least directly) to do with the work of David Balme.

I have omitted one paper from the third section, Gwil Owen's 'Aristotelian Mechanics'; one of the last things Owen wrote, it is still one of the best things in the volume, and an exemplar of his vigorous dialectical style. Owen was a scholar in the same mould as David Balme, and of roughly the same generation; enormously influential, on the basis of (at least by today's inflated standards) a minuscule output; concerned, like Balme, to publish only when he was convinced he had something important to say. Although his piece touches none of Balme's principal concerns, it is in many ways the most fitting of all the tributes in this volume to the style and peculiar importance of the man.

**R.J. Hankinson**  
McGill University

**George Grant**

*Technology and Justice.*

Toronto: Anansi Press 1986.

Pp. 133. Cdn\$8.95. ISBN 0-88784-152-X.

Has technology foreclosed the possibility of maintaining our traditional discourse of justice? Do we find ourselves increasingly in an age where what is due to the 'human' has lost its self-evidence? Are philosophy and science so complicitously co-penetrated that our old 'compass points,' which permitted us to say how our science might be used, can no longer serve as bearings? Are we then like Nietzsche's madman, cast away from the sun, falling backward, sideward, forward, in all directions, groping as through an infinite nothing? To all of these Grant offers a sober 'yes.'

Continuing his lifetime vocation of recalling us to experiences which sanction and vouchsafe our moral principles and now increasingly eclipsed by our technological consciousness, Grant offers in this recent work six studies on the complexity of our destiny. What he means by our 'destiny' is in opposition to the view that autonomous, willful subjects legislate their own being. The horizon we inhabit is a system of limits on and possibilities for what we are in the world, an 'unsaid' which precedes and enables our being. Grant's task repeatedly has been to 'enucleate' that horizon.

Beginning with an explanation of how the dominant paradigm of knowledge manifests itself in a technological ensemble of interlocking and self-justifying means for mastering life, Grant continues by reflecting on the fate of the university, the significance of Nietzsche for understanding our destiny, the meaning of 'research' in the humanities, and the awesome powers that we can mobilize in our technologies of birth and death. In brief, putting the world to test as 'object,' securing and disposing of it as 'data,' has meant finally the extinction of mystery and the death of the gods who defined human limit and possibility.

Our age is given over to a relentless will-to-knowledge. As opposed to the ancient trust in the revelation of the reality of meaning through the appearances of the world, our efforts at 'knowledge' are agitated by suspicion and doubt. Ours is an account of knowledge marked by the co-penetration of knowing and making, which renders our productive capacities cognitively significant. It also introduces a self-justifying element to technological conquest. This unlimited making has permitted spectacular practical results. But that co-penetration has meant that we are hampered by a loss of independent measures by which such making is to be gauged. This is especially when the same form of knowledge is permitted to legislate to every mode of human experience and exclude other forms of knowledge.

The ascendancy of the technological will-to-know has come with another cost. For all the pleasurable things it equips us with, the self-augmenting nature of technology has meant finally that the diversity and depth of experience, possibility, and meaning has been relentlessly absorbed within 'technological monism' or 'total functionality,' contributing to a situation where, oblivious to eternity, we have replaced reception to the transcendent with infinite and indefinite tasks of mastery – a nihilistic purposiveness without

purpose, negating the ambiguities and mysteries of human existence in an 'immanent sempiternity of the same.'

The loss of trust in the reality of meaning and intelligibility beyond what we wilfully summon to presence, and the resultant desire to reconstruct the appearances of the world, has meant finally the eclipse of those experiences of receptivity and participation which remind us of our place. 'Faith,' Grant writes, 'is the experience that intelligence is enlightened by love.' But now we are not open to otherness or receptive to difference, for we will what is 'other' and 'different' to be the 'same.'

This forgetting of the context and contents of our existence is furthered by the 'research' done in the 'multiversities': a collecting and sorting of data which enhances wilful subjectivity as much as it hides over what has meaning and intelligibility apart from self-assertion. What we celebrate instead of moderation and prudence – those virtues by which we adapt ourselves to the contingent and probable – are the cunningness and audacity with which we face an infinite and indefinite future.

The consequence of this has had its fullest impact on the moral sphere. Whereas, the tradition of Western thought had been sustained by a 'justice in human relationships ... [that] was the essential way in which human beings are opened to eternity,' Grant reminds us, the most extensive moral projects of the contemporary period are those which must ultimately subordinate justice to 'human conveniences which fit the convenience of technology.' We can pay lip-service to 'rights' and 'justice' but these are understood as arbitrary and artificial constructs for the function they perform. They can then also be sacrificed for convenience or substituted with functional equivalents, and there is little reason left to refuse such capitulation.

Our current efforts at moral speech, Grant challenges, inevitably reproduce the logic of technology and cannot hold back the destructive implications of its nihilistic will-to-will. This is especially true of the 'alternative' projects to conceive a basis for our moral existence, projects whose language is that of 'self,' 'creativity,' 'values,' and 'persons.' This is a language celebrating man's free will-acts and his capacity to transform the very nature of valuation itself. 'Morality,' Grant reminds us, is 'above all concerned with the frontiers and limitations of making,' but when those limits are defined by our will, nothing can withstand being rendered conditional and disposable. We cannot expect of 'willing' an equivalence in moral guidance, since the unconditional end towards which the will is willing is excluded by the act of will. Will defines purpose or condition, rather than receiving them. The 'great delayers,' as Nietzsche called the Kantians, cannot put off the destiny of their unstable language, for 'such destinies have a way of working themselves out – that is of bringing forth from their principle everything which is implied in that principle.'

The perplexity concerning moral limits manifests itself in the most difficult sphere of our technological interventions: abortion and euthanasia. Focusing primarily on the euphemistic language by which the nature of these acts is obscured – 'quality of life,' 'right to reproductive freedom,' 'mercy killing,' 'benign neglect' – Grant reminds us that the integrity of what we recognize as 'justice' is measured by how we treat our weakest social members. In the interests of convenience and by virtue of the will-to-will which now mobi-

lizes us, the self-evidence of the rights of the unborn and the unable, he argues, is nearly entirely extinguished. What we have instead are endless contrivances of control which pass for the satisfaction of our moral obligations. When 'quality of life' and 'personhood' become definitionally administered, matters of means-tests and methodic procedures, the question is whether we are still dealing with human beings in their particular, concrete existence. While these methodic procedures of contemporary justice-administration are efficient and while they achieve the long-term goals of prosperity and population health, what Grant asks is whether there are features of being human which are foreclosed, experiences which sanction our confidence in saying what the human is 'due' or what is 'proper' to human life.

The urgency of Grant's questions cannot be denied. Neither resolute will-ing nor wishful nostalgia can take us from under Nietzsche's shadow. Grant, against conservatives and romantics seeking for a re-activation of what is past or a re-enchantment of our posture to the environment, has always reminded us that we cannot undo time's 'it was.' Our destiny is to think through how we have come to be and to think the difference between the dissatisfaction grasped upon by the technological ensemble and our 'intimations of deprivation.' This may lead us to remember the difference between charity and the welfare-administration technologies, between souls and selves, between eros and sexual frivolity. Only that moderation and the prudence it sanctions will take us through our current dark times.

**Peter C. Emberley**

*(Department of Political Science)*

Carleton University

**Ruth Grant**

*John Locke's Liberalism.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. ix+220. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-226-30607-0.

This is a book based on a University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, one which in fact received the Leo Strauss Award of the American Political Science Association. Contrary to possible expectation, there is nothing notably Straussian about it: however, its origins as a dissertation are very evident. Although it contains interesting material, this is a definite handicap: its style could not, for example, be called readable, it tends to prolixity and repetitiveness, too often it re-treads already well-trodden ground without saying anything new. The author seems to have felt – mistakenly – that she must say something about everything in Locke's political theory.

Nevertheless, Grant does have an interesting reading of Locke to propose (whether it is fully sustainable is another matter). The political theory of the *Treatises*, she suggests, is a coherent application of Locke's epistemolo-

gy as stated in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (she admits that to claim Locke as coherent at all will raise eyebrows). In the *Essay*, Locke distinguishes two kinds of general knowledge, certain and probable. General knowledge of 'substances' depends on experience and is probable only: whereas 'mixed modes' and 'relations' (complex ideas defined by combining or relating simple ideas) are creations of the human mind, about which certain knowledge is available by demonstrative (deductive) reasoning. According to Locke, the propositions of both mathematics and morality are thus demonstrable. However, the application of these propositions is problematic, because they may refer to substances: even if it is certain that 'Man is subject to Law,' there are borderline cases which might or might not be counted as 'men' (e.g., children). In other words, application of such principles requires *judgment*, and is disputable. And this, precisely, is the political problem. Its solution is the establishment of an *accepted, common judge* to interpret, apply (and enforce) the demonstrable principles of the law of nature. Legitimate political power is the performance of this necessary function.

Thus in the *Treatises*, Grant argues, Locke sets out a quasi-mathematical argument intended to demonstrate the principles of political morality, and at the same time to demonstrate the need for an impartial judge to enforce them. What are the premises of this demonstration? Grant argues that they are two-fold: first, the life of all men is, as far as possible, to be preserved; second, all men are by nature free. From the latter premise comes Locke's familiar argument that political power must rest on consent, and preserve individual freedom insofar as its exercise does not jeopardise the preservation or freedom of self or others; from the former, that it must protect the lives and properties of all (*both* conditions are necessary to legitimacy). The antithesis of freedom is slavery, hence despotism, which is akin to slavery, cannot be a legitimate form of government. A despot is above the law, whereas political authority must be an articulation of the law of nature equally applicable to all – it must be the 'rule of law.' And this in turn requires (if not always, at least 'at a later stage in the historical development of societies' [87]), a separation of executive and legislature, and that 'laws be made by collective bodies of men who periodically return to their status as subjects' (75). These are necessary, not sufficient conditions of impartial judgment: ultimately, the people, and indeed the individual, retain their right to judge, and hence to resist their rulers. As Grant sums up: 'Politics is possible, necessary and imperfect' (180).

The above summary puts Locke into a very small nutshell, but suffices to indicate some of the difficulties of Grant's thesis. For example, recognition of the need, in later stages of political history, for separation of powers and collective legislatures, must surely be based on experience, and hence not (for Locke) a matter of demonstrative reasoning. Is not the same true, more fundamentally, of the need for political power? In Locke's argument, this depends crucially on human *moral* shortcomings – the necessarily uncertain application of moral principles could not alone be sufficient. Most fundamentally, even these together cannot demonstrate the need for political power without the fundamental moral premise that calls for preservation of human life. What, then, is the basis of this crucial premise, and of the equally crucial one that asserts the natural freedom of all men?

Locke's answers to these questions are notoriously unsatisfactory. Ultimately, they rest on his theism. In the *Essay*, Locke claimed to give demonstrative proof of the existence of 'an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether anyone will please to call God, it matters not,' for this Being evidently has the attributes of God, and is the creator of all that is, including men. We might (or might not) swallow this. If we do, what follows? Two things, apparently: first, that God intends all men to be preserved (and therefore has given them a desire for self-preservation); second, God has given all men reason by which to govern themselves, hence 'by nature' they are free. These are scarcely tight deductive inferences. Discussing the proposition 'murder deserves death,' Grant suggests that, for Locke, both the definition of 'murder' ('killing of an innocent man,' but not 'killing of a sheep') and the proposition itself are validated by the fundamental premise of human preservation: both the killing of sheep, and capital punishment of killers of innocent men, promote this. But surely *this* knowledge must depend on experience, and hence be only probable, and so must therefore be the proposition 'murder deserves death (while the killing of a sheep is lawful).' More fundamentally, perhaps, sheep too are presumably God's creatures, and give every sign of wishing not to be killed. Why shouldn't this be respected just as much as the desires of human beings? How can we know (revelation apart) what God's will is? In brief, neither the definitions of moral concepts, nor the existence of God, can possibly generate the demonstrative morality which, according to Grant, Locke aimed to apply to politics in the *Treatises*.

It might be said that this is Locke's fault, not Grant's. However, she is too ready to give Locke the benefit of almost every doubt, and does not discuss the serious problems mentioned above. Grant has performed a useful service in pointing to some parallels in Locke's view of men's epistemological and political predicaments: but her interpretation needs a thinker much more penetrating and rigorous than the real Locke.

**Michael Lessnoff**  
(*Department of Politics*)  
University of Glasgow

**Harold J. Johnson, ed.**

*The Medieval Tradition of Natural Law.*

Kalamazoo, MI:

Medieval Institute Publications 1987.

Pp. 211. US\$22.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-918720-81-8);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-918720-82-6).

*The Medieval Tradition of Natural Law* is a collection of sixteen essays gathered from sessions of the International Congress on Medieval Studies held in Kalamazoo, Michigan from 1979 to 1981. The majority of these es-

says consist of critical examinations of key concepts in the natural law tradition. The remaining essays explore the influence of the tradition on other theorists or the broader influence on politics, economics, art and literature.

Most of the philosophical issues raised by these essays will already be familiar to students of the natural law tradition. However, the aim of this anthology was not simply to contribute to scholarship in the field, but to challenge other philosophers to reassess their own understanding and evaluation of the tradition. Despite the prevailing modern attitude that the natural law tradition has all but run its course, one of the presuppositions of this anthology is that the medieval tradition of natural law continues to have relevance for contemporary theories of law and morality.

In an exceptionally well-argued essay, Barry C. Hoffmaster explores the alleged superiority of natural law theory over legal positivism in providing an account of legal obligation. Hoffmaster first disposes of the standard positivist objection to the Thomistic claim that any positive civil law which conflicts with natural law fails to be a law. He suggests that Aquinas' intention was only to indicate that such a law failed to generate an obligation of obedience, not that it failed to be legally valid. Utilizing the distinction between legal validity and legal obligation, Hoffmaster argues that with respect to the latter, Aquinas is closer to his positivist critics than is typically supposed. The relationship between natural law and civil law is also the subject of an essay by Edgar Scully. In contrast with Hoffmaster, Scully argues that despite the clear distinction between the two kinds of law, all just civil laws are both civilly and morally binding, provided they are imposed by a just authority and do not violate natural law principles.

Recent debates among natural law theorists have centered on the epistemological status of natural law principles. Grisez and Finnis, for instance, maintain that these principles are 'self-evident,' while most theorists continue to insist that they must be derived by reason from an examination of human nature. John U. Lewis adds an historical dimension to this controversy by tracing it back to the sixteenth-century commentaries of Dominic de Soto (1494-1560) and Bartholomew Medina (1528-1580). In an analogous manner, De Soto restricted natural law to those principles 'naturally apprehended' by reason, whereas Medina insisted that derivative principles be included within the general class of natural law principles.

The scholastic doctrine of just price is the subject of an essay by Harold J. Johnson. After surveying the standard interpretations which range from medieval price-fixing to identification of just price with market price, Johnson argues that, for Aquinas, the crucial determination of just price was found in the costs of production. Despite other differences, Johnson concludes that at this crucial point Aquinas, much like Marx later, treated labor value as the ultimate determination of just price.

John B. Killoran revives an often forgotten chapter in the natural law tradition by re-examining Vitoria's repudiation of the Thomistic defense of natural slavery. This essay will be especially useful to anyone interested in the early development of natural rights theories within the natural law tradition. Vitoria's defense of each person's natural dominion over himself, his actions, and his possessions provides a fine introduction to that history. Similarly, Edward F. Walter, in association with Bruce Babacz, argues that

Aquinas avoided the medieval temptation to define the common good as something apart from the good of the individual. By viewing the good of the state as the best means for promoting the individual's good, Aquinas, in effect, anticipates the development of modern revolutionary rights doctrines.

In a more historical vein, John H. Geerken explores the elements of natural law theory in a rather unlikely place – the political thought of Machiavelli; Harold Owen Brian defends the not too surprising thesis that Martin Luther was not a natural law theorist; and Geoffrey Koziol attributes the absence of natural law doctrines in the early middle ages to the political circumstances of a time when all law was based on a lord's personal authority.

Although these essays vary in depth and quality of analysis, the essays by Hoffmaster, Lewis, Johnson, and Killoran are especially insightful and well worth the price of the volume. Since many of the essays do not presuppose an extensive knowledge of the tradition, this anthology should be of benefit to anyone wishing to acquire some acquaintance with the character and historical significance of the natural law tradition. The essays are most successful when they call into question the modern, often stereotypical, accounts of the tradition. To the extent this volume serves that purpose, I welcome its publication.

**Peter P. Cvek**  
Benedictine College

**Benson Mates**

*The Philosophy of Leibniz:*

*Metaphysical Underpinnings.*

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 1986.

Pp. ix+271. Cdn\$44.95:

US\$29.95. ISBN 0-19-503696-4.

Mates presents what seems to him to be the metaphysical foundations of Leibniz's philosophy, namely his nominalism. After examining several of his statements, Mates concludes, 'it is clear enough that Leibniz would agree wholeheartedly with that notorious pronouncement of present-day nominalism: "We do not believe in abstract entities."' He does not believe in numbers, geometric figures, or other mathematical entities, nor does he accept abstractions like heat, light, justice, goodness, beauty, space or time, nor again does he allow any reality to metaphysical paraphernalia, such as concepts, propositions, properties, possible objects, and so on. The only entities in his ontology are individuals-cum-accidents.' All these rejects belong to the realm of ideas. All are special cases of concepts, and although Leibniz refers to ideas as being in the mind of God it is not to be supposed that they are there as kinds of entities. Ideas are dispositions to think in a certain way and this

is no less the case with the ideas in God; they are God's dispositions to think in a certain way as occasion requires. This means that when we seem to be talking about entities called 'ideas' our statements can be restated to show that they are really only about the states of an individual substance. If statements that appear to be about certain abstract entities are really only *compendia loquendi*, abbreviated ways of talking about individual substances and their accidents, it becomes important for Leibniz's nominalism to show how this reduction is to be performed. Mates finds that Leibniz unfortunately provides no general instructions for doing it though he does deal with a few particular cases and has suggestions as to how other types might be dealt with. Mates then formulates some conjectures as to how in general Leibniz might have gone about it.

Relations, as already noted, belong in the realm of ideas, 'something merely ideal,' and as in the real world there are only individual substances with their accidents, it becomes incumbent upon Mates to show how relational propositions can be reduced to non-relational propositions, particularly because some commentators maintain that Leibniz is unable to dispense with relational properties. Behind this view is the assumption that the results of the reductions would be logically equivalent to the propositions which are reduced. But Mates rejects this assumption. All that is required is that the resulting reduction imply the original proposition. Thus the relational proposition, (1), Theaetetus is taller than Socrates, can be supported, let us suppose, by the two propositions (2), Theaetetus is six feet tall, and (3), Socrates is five feet tall. Leibniz would, says Mates, maintain that (1) is reducible to (2) and (3). The latter are not equivalent to (1) but they do imply it. (2) and (3) cannot be true and (1) false. When Leibniz says there are no purely extrinsic denominations Mates takes him to be saying that there are no relational properties of an individual which cannot be reduced to non-relational properties of that individual and others, and thus be grounded in the accidents of those individuals.

Prominent among Leibniz' statements on the unreality of relations are those on space and time, and these receive a chapter to themselves. Mates finds, however, no indications of how propositions about space and time are to be reduced to propositions attributing qualities to bodies. It would appear then that Mates' reducibility thesis applies not only to the grounding of relational properties in the accidents of individual *substances*, but in this case in the qualities of individual *bodies*. Bodies, of course, are only phenomena and, according to Mates, 'phenomena do not really exist.' One would think that nominalism is hardly served by reductions to non-entities. However, Mates believes that all statements about phenomena should be analysable into statements about monads' perceptions. The equating of bodies with phenomena and in turn of phenomena with perceptions – they are the more or less confused perceptions of aggregates of monads (198) – has some queer results. Perceptions *have* objects, but phenomena and bodies *are* objects; they are individual objects with individual qualities. Inconsistent with the statement that bodies, as phenomena, are perceptions of an aggregate of monads is either of Leibniz' two separate accounts of what a body is: (1) that it is an aggregate of monads, (2) that it is not composed of monads, but 'results' from them. According to (1) the body is phenomenal because the unity of the

aggregate is bestowed on it by the mind. It is semi-mental, but it is nevertheless an entity – ‘an entity through aggregation.’ *One and entity* are interchangeable.’ According to (2) bodies as ‘results’ belong neither to the realm of individual substances, nor to the realm of ideas. But as ‘results’ they are not nothing. And as in (1) they are individuals with qualities. Leibniz’ nominalistic ontology is perfectly adaptable to two levels of being, and he shows himself to be very sympathetic to such an ontology in Plato in so far as he distinguished between the intelligible and the sensible with the proviso however that the intelligible not be identified with Platonic universals but with monads or individual substances. Berkeley, a rigorous nominalist and enemy to abstractions, had a two-level ontology – simple indivisible substances and ‘sensible things’ or ‘bodies.’ But Leibniz’ bodies are left in limbo. It is a considerable merit of Mates’ account of Leibniz’ metaphysics as a nominalistic ontology that he brings his philosophy into very clear focus and from a refreshingly novel point of view. But by virtue of its clarity it points, at least to this reader, to the fundamental incoherence of Leibniz’ account of phenomena or bodies.

*In the chapter on space and time Mates looks at Leibniz’ argument for the relational theory of space, that if God preserved bodies in the same relations to one another, but changed east into west, there would be no observable difference. Mates states the argument in this way, ‘if Newton’s view is correct, at least two distinct states of affairs were possible: one, that the physical universe be situated in space in its present orientation; the other, that it should instead be in the situation that would result from rotating it 180 degrees around a north-south axis while keeping all internal relations the same. But the consequent is false, for the supposedly distinct states of affairs would be indiscernible and hence identical.’ I do not think that this will satisfy the requirements of Leibniz’s thought experiment, for if the east contains what is to your right when facing north it will continue to be on your right whether the universe is rotated 180 degrees or not. What is required to change east into west while all internal relations remain the same is that everything in the world be transposed into its mirror-image, with the hypothetical mirror facing east. To someone finding himself suddenly in the mirror-world the difference would be palpable as, for example, when he tried to turn taps on or off.*

**Robert McRae**

University of Toronto

Michael H. Mitias, ed.

*The Possibility of the Aesthetic Experience.*

Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1986.

Pp. ix+171. US\$47.50. ISBN 90-247-3287-6.

*The Possibility of the Aesthetic Experience* edited by Michael Mitias is a collection of eleven essays (two by the editor himself) exploring the existence and nature of aesthetic experience. The essays exhibit quite diverse points of view. Some are historical, others confessional, some are in the analytic tradition, others the phenomenological. Yet each author defends the existence of some sort of distinctive aesthetic experience.

I don't have space to discuss all the contributions, but I shall comment briefly on some of them, organizing my remarks around two areas of disagreement: our attitude towards natural beauty, and the cognitive content of aesthetic experience. The volume's lead essay by T.J. Diffey offers a preliminary warning. Diffey cautions that we close the question prematurely, when we investigate the nature of aesthetic experience, if we assume that aesthetic experience and the experience of works of art are one and the same. Assuming these to be identical, or making the identity true by definition, rules out a wider locus for aesthetic experience.

This negative point conceded, the much harder task remains of stating just what aesthetic experience *is*. Diffey is not so helpful in this regard. His solution is 'that we should regard the term "aesthetic" as a term that extends thought, stretches the mind, and leads us into new and uncharted territory ... The idea here is that language is leading us ... to new possibilities of experience ... language tells us more than we know ...' (11-12).

I find Diffey's personification of language as the possessor of some sort of inchoate (and ineffable?) knowledge puzzling. However, some contributors to Mitias' volume don't even abide by the unexceptionable part of Diffey's view. Warren Steinkraus, for example, pursues a comparison between sports and art. Just as sport experience requires some sporting event as its object, so, claims Steinkraus, aesthetic experience requires an artistic object, one with 'evidence of genuine artistic intention' (110). But this stipulation rules out by fiat any genuine aesthetic appreciation of nature, contrary to Diffey's point.

Robert Ginsberg does not dismiss the appreciation of nature quite so summarily, but he reserves different labels for different cases, effectively compartmentalizing natural beauty and segregating our experience of it. Harold Osborne, by contrast, assimilates the cases of natural and artistic beauty. Noting the way our attention can be caught by various sights and sounds in the world, Osborne claims that these moments rank as aesthetic and that 'there is always the intimation of a feeling that they have the nature of interludes or interruptions ... and this feeling is assuredly a reflection of the attitude of detachment from practical concerns ...' (119).

Detachment is one of the traits commonly attributed to aesthetic experience. Yet not all philosophers believe that there *is* such experience. George Dickie, for example, has argued that purported cases of the aesthetic attitude are simply cases of closely focused attention. The burden of proof rests with the advocates of aesthetic experience, who must show their assumption

to be both plausible and useful. Let me close by sampling four accounts of aesthetic experience and seeing whether they pass this test.

Jerome Stolnitz elaborates the view he has defended elsewhere that aesthetic disinterestedness is the core of aesthetic experience. He proceeds by considering examples which fail of disinterestedness. One such failure is seeing a work of art as fulfilling a category (37). Someone who listens to the music of Bach and hears instantiated in it the universal 'Bach's Protestant piety' has a non-aesthetic experience, according to Stolnitz, because 'to discern the universal, contingent properties must be ignored' (31). In a Bach cantata everything is essential. Thus the universal-particular relation can be apprehended only at the cost of ignoring the work's individuality.

Stolnitz's strict interpretation of what it is to apprehend a work disinterestedly – contemplating it for its own sake alone (35) – rules out understanding. If subsuming a work under a universal necessarily neglects and falsifies that work's individuality, then we must savor works of art without universals, without concepts at all. But what can come of such an encounter? Stolnitz in effect demands that artworks be treated like raw givens. Aesthetic interaction, so conceived, leaves us mute and the work of art a surd.

Harold Osborne avoids this error in his account of aesthetic experience. He notes that 'the demand for detachment does not involve jettisoning understanding or restricting awareness to superficial sensory qualities ... apprehension is not possible without understanding' (121). Aesthetic perception, then, is cognitive for Osborne. What distinguishes it from our ordinary attitude is that in everyday life we are concerned mainly with 'the reality revealed by appearances [while] in aesthetic perception our interest rests in the appearance itself' (122). Osborne believes that aesthetic perception is a special skill. It requires cultivation and practice because the requirements of daily life reinforce very different habits of attention and analysis.

Contrast Osborne's account of aesthetic experience with two others. Michael Mitias characterizes the aesthetic object in terms of purposive form. The aesthetic qualities which constitute this form are not given ready made (164). Rather, they exist as a potentiality awaiting realization, 'pregnant in the physical aspects of the work of art' (164). Mitias thus emphasizes that aesthetic perception is creative and constructive. The problem here is that this does not distinguish aesthetic perception in any way. Since our quotidian perceptual interactions with the world are themselves active and constructive, Mitias has not proven that there is a *distinctive* variety of aesthetic experience.

Similar remarks apply to Arnold Berleant's phenomenological account of aesthetic experience. Berleant stresses the unity of aesthetic experience and our active engagement with works of art. Such engagement, it seems to me, differs not in kind but only in degree from our ordinary interactions with the world. Berleant's further claim that aesthetic experience is *recreative* (that it 'regenerates the sequence of experience originally shaped by the creative artist' [104]) *would* distinguish the aesthetic situation, but the claim seems quite questionable. It is certainly not clear how we are to interpret it across the various arts.

Overall, the defenders of aesthetic experience are caught in a crunch. If the experience is described in too rarified a way, it does not seem credible,

while if it is characterized in more familiar ways, it does not seem different from our ordinary perception of the everyday world. Despite these caveats, Mitias' volume is valuable, especially for the breadth of its contributions. The collection would have benefitted from further editorial attention for the very same reason. The great variety of philosophical approaches and styles made me long for an 'About the Authors' page and a more detailed introduction giving the editor's sense of the inter-relation of the various papers.

**Stephanie A. Ross**

University of Missouri – St. Louis

**Maurice Natanson**

*Anonymity:*

*A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz.*

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986.

Pp. xiv+172. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-253-30746-5.

'The time of pure exposition of Schutz' thought is largely over,' and that of 'serious criticism ... is upon us' (6-7), but Natanson provides neither. He is rather concerned to probe Schutz' writing for what is most elusive: his 'philosophy,' those 'gorgeous intimations of what a phenomenological metaphysics might be' (123). Following 'my own topath' (xiv), his interpretation carries 'forward what [Schutz] began' and assesses 'his accomplishment in immanent but not subservient terms' (7).

The 'transcendental clue' for this is 'anonymity.' This, however, requires a critical appreciation of Kierkegaard – whose place must itself be interpreted 'indirectly.' It is richly rewarding: incisive, lively rigorous, and witty, a meditation of remarkable depth and subtlety.

The two basic sides of Schutz' work are familiar: a methodology of the social sciences, and a phenomenology of the life-world. The methodology must demonstrate how social life can be theoretically understood, and what its methods must be. Its fruits are well known: first- and second-order constructs, 'explanation' versus 'understanding,' the 'disinterested' scientist who constructs 'models' or 'ideal types.' Schutz gives this a Kierkegaardian twist. Natanson emphasizes that Schutz' view was that, 'Theory cannot capture life directly,' as the theorist must 'build up an artificial device, comparable to... "indirect communication," in order to bring the intersubjective life-world into view ...' (134).

The methodology presupposes a 'phenomenology of the natural attitude.' Here, too, the themes are familiar: taken-for-grantedness, typification, relevance, biographical situation, stock of knowledge, etc. This also receives a Kierkegaardian turn: the 'life-plan' underlying daily life is framed within and deeply informed by 'the fundamental anxiety': 'I know that I will die

and I fear to die' – which is not a theme from Heidegger (82-3), but is the hearthfire of Kierkegaard.

Natanson's study is at its best in grappling with this 'existential' thematic. It is not foisted onto Schutz. One must never overlook, we are reminded, it was Schutz who 'forebodingly wrote "... that we inescapably grow older together, that within the essentially undetermined fact of our future one simple certainty stands out, namely that we have to die, uncertain when and how ..."' (129), and that we are born into a world not of our own making, into the transcendence of nature and culture. There is no need to 'existentialize' Schutz; he is quite 'existential' enough on his own (*ibid.*).

Natanson weaves subtly through all the familiar Schutzian themes, patiently ('indirectly') teasing out their elusive existential threads. At its center is a stunning insight: the taken-for-grantedness and typification of life-worldly existence reveal that 'existential' thrust. At the root is anonymity (Chapter II); operative within that is the core form of abstraction (Chapter III) whose basic sense is the suppression (via the fundamental 'idealizations' that are the organon of common sense) of difference for the sake of typified similarity (governed by the 'pragmatic motive'). A relatively open complex of multiple finite provinces of meaning (Chapter IV), the paramount reality is the 'world of working.' These provinces partially overlap in a variety of ways, forming 'enclaves' of meaning (Chapter V), especially within that of 'working.' The enclaves are 'phenomena of intersubjectivity' (96), and signify, at bottom, the appearance of elemental 'negativities' or 'othernesses.'

With this, Natanson reaches a core phenomenon: the concrete experience of 'otherness' *within* social life signifies that common sense is itself a hidden issue for and within common sense. It is implicitly apprehended, via enclaves, as a 'could be otherwise.' Schutz's writings thus intimate a 'philosophy' whose source is common sense life: in Natanson's words, it is 'the gist of practice' (35). Acknowledging the many silly senses of 'philosophy' in daily life, he insists that there is a 'tougher meaning' integral to it: 'That meaning is philosophy as the hardness, the adversity of existence, the creaking of the life-world, its hernias and hemorrhages' (36).

The life-world's taken-for-grantedness and anonymizing typifications are fundamental. Yet, it is riddled with 'enclaves' and 'otherness,' marked by transcendence (Chapter VI) and the 'fundamental anxiety.' The individual – typified and self-typifying, anonymized and anonymizing – yet seeks to understand and reckon with the world and himself. How is this possible? Or, for Schutz, 'is the individual *possible* in the life of typification' (129)?

The 'indirection,' which is the clue to Schutz' philosophy, recognizes the power of typification and anonymity and precisely therein seeks to arouse 'in the Other what direct discourse can never touch,' to bring 'the Other by his own insight – the clamor of his being – to recognize what he always "knew" but succeeded in avoiding' – namely, 'that one is not born but must become an Individual. The self that has never "known" the meaning of subjectivity cannot be told or informed or lectured into knowledge' (134). This can occur, if or when it ever does occur, only from within the clutch of anonymizing/anonymized life itself, as that 'creaking of the life-world,' *through* its 'hernias and hemorrhages.'

While most of his writing was in the realm of 'direct discourse,' Schutz himself suggests the necessity of 'indirect' interpretation, and this highlights what he took to be the issue central to human life: that every individual faces the necessity of "coming to terms" with ... the fragmented and fragmenting power of transcendence,' including the prospects of self-transcendence or bad faith (128). Schutz therefore followed a different path from that of Husserl: the constitution of the social world must be viewed 'in terms of anonymity rather than "a solipsism of the present moment".' Here, 'we are no longer in the vicinity of *das Man*, no longer lost in the "They," but in the midst of a "We" whose meaning each of us is called upon to decipher' (142). It is in the midst of life's routines, the drudgery of the 'anyone,' that the 'me' or "I" sings out, says "Here I am in-the-world".' We are in the world as 'beings whose possibility it is to trace back their history, their "becoming," and that possibility, I suggest, is the tension, the fist of phenomenology' (143).

This powerful study succeeds brilliantly in penetrating to the heart of Schutz' life and writing. It is a vibrant instance of what Husserl often lamented had become so rare in philosophical circles: thinking *along with* another thinker in responsive and responsible dialogue.

**Richard M. Zaner**

(Department of Medicine)

Vanderbilt University

### **Otto Pöggeler**

*Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking.*

Trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ:

Humanities Press International 1987.

Pp. xix+293. US\$39.95. ISBN 0-391-03367-0.

In the 24 years since its original publication Pöggeler's *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* has secured a position of great respect. William Richardson calls it 'the best book-length study of Heidegger in any language' (*Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 686). Now, with this careful and engaging translation, English readers can judge for themselves.

The American Edition comprises three parts: the body of Pöggeler's original text with an author's appendix and endnotes, the Afterword to the second edition and a new Preface. The central thesis is accorded its most direct and rigorous treatment in the book's opening pages. Pöggeler summarizes: 'The task of an introduction to the thought of Martin Heidegger can only be to stake out guideposts which permit some of the stretches and turns of the way which Heidegger travels to become visible. The introduction must grasp Heidegger's attempts at thinking as steps upon a way and thus in a preliminary and provisional manner familiarize the reader with the field

paths, timber tracks, and all the different ways which Heidegger travels' (3).

The ten chapters that follow unfold with this in view. For the most part, texts are taken up in the order of their appearance. Nevertheless, what Pöggeler calls 'historical presentation' (5) is never essential. Instead, it is a matter of developing an ear for 'the one question which Heidegger thinks through' (7), which is to say, the question of Being. Beginning then with the *Habilitationschrift, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, and some early work in the area of logic, Pöggeler traces this question through the course of its many transformations: fundamental ontology, the recovery of metaphysics, the overcoming of metaphysics, the search for another beginning in poetry and language, and so on. All of this is excellent commentary: pointed and concise. But two sections perhaps merit a special note. The first is Chapter 2, 'Metaphysics and History.' It addresses the question of Heidegger's relation to Dilthey and describes in some detail the role of Heidegger's religious education in his early experiments with phenomenology. The decade prior to *Sein und Zeit* is still for the most part neglected. Pöggeler makes a strong case here both for its relevance to Heidegger's later works and for its own philosophical significance. The second is Chapter 7, 'The Overcoming of Metaphysics.' It constitutes, in my view, the genuine climax of the book. Pöggeler is drawn into the manifold complexities and reversals of Heidegger's struggle with the tradition. This active stance reveals the truth of Heidegger's thinking on a different and more fundamental level and attests the words of the Introduction: 'For those to whom Heidegger's thought becomes visible as the possibility of a way, this thinking can become the impetus for travelling the way themselves' (4).

The Afterword to the Second Edition, written some twenty years after the body of the text, constitutes a kind of critical backward glance. It comprises certain bits of biographical detail, a rather lengthy and compelling discussion of Heidegger's political 'entanglement,' and additional reflection on what Pöggeler calls the 'specific perspective' of his own work (261).

The new Preface to the American Edition provides a defense of Heidegger's place in the proliferation of schools and movements at work in present European philosophy. Moreover, it explores tentatively and in broad strokes the new frontier of American thinking; a thinking which is no longer tied exclusively to 'the analytic and linguistic-analytic traditions' (xix).

*Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* is, above all, an argument for unity and consistency ('One would have to understand Heidegger's thinking as a way, but not as a way of many thoughts. It is rather a way which restricts itself to a single, solitary thought' [2]). The enduring strength of Pöggeler's book is its compelling vision of this unity. The course of transformations (from fundamental ontology to the recovery of metaphysics, from recovery to overcoming, and so on) appears there as a series of concentric circles: orbits of 'a single star,' which is to say, a single question. The question itself is brought into bold relief time and again as the steadfast ground of Heidegger's multiple excursions. The consequences of such a vision are significant. Among other things, the work constitutes an important challenge of the now customary distinction between 'early' and 'later' Heidegger.

Obviously, no work of this type and scope is entirely free of difficulties. In closing, I mention two. The first is the neglect of Heidegger's 'political

entanglement' in the original text (1963). More often than not, the so-called reversal of Heidegger's thought and the turbulent years of his association with National Socialism are intimately connected. Pöggeler's general argument is weakened by the exclusion of this matter. (Remarks in the Afterword – the question is described there as 'indispensible' [272] – do not constitute the redress of that weakness: nor does the bare suggestion that 'Heidegger's way of thinking certainly presents itself otherwise if one notes how themes from the religious and political dimension penetrate' [280]). The second is the central position of the unpublished *Beiträge zur Philosophie* ('The *Beiträge* were for me Heidegger's major work' [286-7]). For Pöggeler this work clearly represents a gathering of themes – the point at which the apparently disparate ways of Heidegger's thought converge. Eventually, this work will appear as part of the *Gesamtausgabe*. In the meantime, however, its inaccessibility makes his claim difficult to evaluate. That is no marginal concern. On many occasions the *Beiträge* are used to illuminate the crucial junctures of Heidegger's way.

**James Crooks**

University of Toronto

**Zenon Pylyshyn, ed.**

*The Robot's Dilemma:*

*The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence.*

Norwood, NJ:

Ablex Publishing Corporation 1987.

Pp. 168. US\$29.50. ISBN 0-89391-371-5.

Philosophers with a passing acquaintance of AI (and Cognition generally), who wish to know more of such matters, should find *The Robot's Dilemma* of considerable value. Even researchers deeply immersed in AI or Cognitive Science will find this anthology rich in insights into the central problem it addresses, the Frame problem (FP). In this collection, Zenon Pylyshyn brings together eight papers, three by AI researchers, and five by philosophers. The collection is valuable not only because of the direct light it sheds upon a fundamental problem in cognition, but because of the myriad of related questions it illuminates. Moreover, the papers are far from the dry technical papers one often finds in AI anthologies. This is due not only to the choice of authors, but to Pylyshyn's having made drafts of papers available to several of the authors during the writing phase. As a result, a lively debate emerges among many of the authors, most notably between Jerry Fodor and Drew McDermott, and Fodor and Pat Hayes.

The central issues addressed are: what precisely is the FP; has it been solved; if not, where should we seek its solution. An excellent discussion of the problem itself, and a survey of proposed solutions, is provided by Lars-

Erik Janlert in the introductory chapter. For our purposes we require at least a rough characterization of the problem, despite the fact that its scope is disputed. Both McDermott and Hayes argue for a narrow, technical definition, whereas the philosophers, with some justification, take the FP to *include* any problem whose solution is *presupposed* by a solution to the narrow problem. The narrow problem is roughly this: suppose a robot's database includes a description of a given physical situation, how the objects are spatially arranged, and what their tangible properties are. And suppose the robot contemplates taking a particular action in this situation. How may the robot predict what new situation would result from this action? In particular, how is the robot to know which aspects of the situation would change, and which would remain the same?

On the face of it, the solution is obvious. Give the robot some 'knowledge' of physics (or chemistry) appropriate to its domain of action, and let the robot formally derive a complete description of the resultant situation from its knowledge of the initial situation and the laws of change. A serious problem arises for this solution, however. In order for the robot to derive formally what aspects of a situation do *not* change as the result of an action, it must either be supplied with a rich knowledge of the relevant physical laws (including details such as inertia, friction, etc.), or it will require a *very* large number of so-called 'frame axioms' – special purpose axioms which describe those intrinsic and relational properties of an object which do *not* change as a result of a given kind of act. In either case, given the number of axioms and initial state assumptions required, the robot will be unable to perform the required derivation within *feasible* time constraints, except in unrealistically simple situations. This is due to the complexity of the theorem proving algorithms, which consume time as an exponential function of the number of axioms involved (in the best case). Clark Glymour provides an excellent introduction to the issue of computational complexity and formal intractability.

Once the utter impracticality of the above 'solutions' was realized, AI researchers hit upon an alternative strategy, which McDermott holds to be the only viable solution to the FP. He claims that ever since this new strategy was adopted in 1971, 'no working AI program has ever been bothered at all by the frame problem.' The strategy, which Haugeland aptly dubs the 'sleeping dog strategy,' is simple: to predict the situation an act will produce, simply calculate the immediate effects and side-effects of the act, and assume that all aspects of the situation not thereby proven to have changed remain unchanged. The strategy seems reasonable, at least as a heuristic method, since we usually have no reason to think that a situational aspect not affected by the act would change. Consequently, we 'let sleeping dogs lie.' The sleeping dog strategy may be viewed as an application of the (controversial) *non-monotonic* or *default* logics which have emerged in AI in recent years.

Most authors in *The Robot's Dilemma* address the sleeping dog strategy in some fashion. The major exceptions are Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, who adopt a unique approach, grounded upon the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Janlert does not explicitly address the sleeping dog strategy, but he expresses reservations about any solution grounded upon non-monotonic (or default) logic (primarily because of difficulties with the

foundations of such logics). Dennett concedes that default logic *may* constitute a solution to the FP in the case of robots, but he cautions us against assuming, in the absence of concrete evidence, that cognitive mechanisms which would work for robots are to be found in human cognition. This caution is somewhat puzzling in this context, since it is not difficult to imagine that the *kind* of default reasoning found in the sleeping dog strategy would be employed by humans. Glymour finds Dennett's warning somewhat beside the point, since as Glymour points out, if we have found *some* way in which the FP can be solved, why should we worry whether humans solve it in that particular way (unless we are especially concerned with human psychology)? Both McDermott and Hayes (in the AI camp) also insist that the FP not be construed as a problem about human cognition. This is one respect in which the *scope* of the problem is contentious.

Returning now to the sleeping dog strategy, we find several authors who express serious doubts about its feasibility, including Haugeland, Hayes and Fodor. Indeed, McDermott is the only one who wholeheartedly endorses the strategy. Recall that the strategy requires us to compute both the direct effects and the relevant side-effects of an act – all else is assumed not to change. Haugeland points out that, except in unusually simple situations, the problem of computing the *relevant* side-effects of an act is *itself* intractable, when addressed within the axiomatic, theorem-proving mode. Consider an example: suppose a teacup is resting on a saucer, and one picks up the saucer and carries it across the room. A human has no difficulty seeing that the cup will come along for the ride, under normal circumstances. And, given the simple situation as described, a robot *might* formally derive the same conclusion within acceptable time bounds. But suppose the robot has a rich knowledge of the world. This requires that its database contains many, many axioms. Further suppose that our teacup not only rests upon the saucer but is tied to a doorknob in the direction opposite from that in which the saucer will be carried. Under these circumstances the robot would very likely be overwhelmed by the complexity of its theorem-proving task, though a human immediately foresees the outcome.

To overcome this difficulty, it has been suggested that something like Schank's 'scripts' be employed. Within AI, scripts are identified with descriptions of stereotyped sequences of events (e.g., Schank's notorious restaurant scripts). If a given act in a given situation can be shown to match the initial circumstances in some script, then the outcome can be anticipated by simply consulting the script; no deduction is required. That, at least, is the solution being contemplated. The 'scripts' solution is explicitly rejected by both Haugeland and Dennett, and for essentially the reasons. It is simply not plausible that an agent could possess a repertoire of scripts for all the novel situations which arise in a lifetime. All of us sometimes are confronted with a situation in which the particular combination of *salient* features is quite novel. Yet, we often manage to cope well in such situations, and this fact cannot be explained by appeal to scripts we have previously learned.

There is a general consensus, among the authors mentioned here, that truly novel situations of any real complexity pose a very serious problem for any robot. However, McDermott argues that the same holds for humans. Now, several other authors remind us that humans often make serious blunders

in such circumstances, but McDermott contends that humans are every bit as prone to mistakes in this regard as robots. At the same time, he charges the philosophers with 'an unwarranted raising of the stakes' when they insist that robots should exhibit all the flexibility and speed that humans exhibit in complex situations. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by McDermott's view that AI researchers have not had sufficient time to solve the many technical difficulties in knowledge representation which nature has already solved in the human case. McDermott's contention is that situations of the *teacup tied by a string* ilk may be handled by special algorithms, and that humans already possess many thousands of such algorithms. To strengthen his case, McDermott produces an algorithm which would certainly deal with an infinity of situations of the *move an object which physically touches other objects* variety. However, he does not attempt to explain how humans manage to acquire thousands of such special purpose algorithms. Nevertheless, if the existence of such algorithms is granted, the sleeping dog strategy looks considerably more promising, for such algorithms enable us to predict in reasonable time the direct and indirect effects of an act.

Or so it would seem. Jerry Fodor manages to cast considerable doubt on the very foundations of the sleeping dog strategy. He makes the critical point that the changes wrought by an event or act are very much a function of our conceptual scheme. So, for example, if we allow certain 'kooky' concepts into our scheme, then the simple act of turning on one's refrigerator may cause an infinity of changes. For, suppose our conceptual scheme contains concepts like 'fridgeon,' defined thus: *x is a fridgeon at time t iff x is a particle at t and Fodor's fridge is on at t*. Then, turning on Fodor's fridge causes countless particles to become fridgeons. Fodor concludes that the FP cannot truly be said to be solved until we have a principled (indeed a syntactic) mechanism for ruling out kooky concepts such as fridgeon.

Not surprisingly, the champions of AI object strenuously to Fodor's conclusion. Their reaction is somewhat analogous to what a scientist's would be, if Goodman were to claim that science cannot proceed until the grue-bleen problem is solved. Hayes, in particular, argues that Fodor is confusing the FP with a much broader problem about human cognition, and that as long as humans are *building and interpreting* the databases of robots, robots will not be using kooky concepts, and Fodor's problem will not arise. Fodor replies that there seems to be nothing to prevent a robot from inventing kooky concepts. However, Hayes does not see this as a problem, perhaps because he does not expect AI programs to exhibit all the sophistication of a human agent. Fodor, of course (as well as Dennett and Haugeland), seeks a solution to the FP which explains *both* human and robot performance. Contrary to Hayes, this does not mean that the philosophers have identified the FP with all the problems of human cognition. Rather, the philosophers are assuming that an adequate solution to the FP will not presuppose that cognitive agents depend upon an external *deus ex machina* to solve important *subproblems* which arise in planning.

**Robert F. Hadley**  
(School of Computing Science)  
Simon Fraser University

**Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff**

*Knowledge and Class:*

*A Marxian Critique of Political Economy.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. v+352. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-226-71021-1.

This book is about a theory the authors claim to find in Marx and therefore call Marxian theory, though they recognize other theories in the Marxian tradition. Marxian theory has an epistemological position based on a modified version of Althusser's concept of overdetermination. Overdetermination implies 'mutual constitutivity among entities' (4). The concept of overdetermination is antiessentialist and anti-reductionist. Accordingly, Marxian theory rejects empiricism and rationalism, which it sees as essentialisms in epistemology. In so doing, it rejects the notion of knowledge as 'accuracy of representation,' for the view that different theories produce different knowledges. Each theory has its own concept of reality and its own epistemological standards. Thus '[t]ruths are intra- rather than intertheoretic' (32).

Essentialisms are also found in social theory. A case in point is economic determinism, which Marxian theory therefore rejects. It also rejects all the alternatives to economic determinism in the Marxian tradition, for these too are essentialisms. In their place it offers a social theory that sees society as a totality of overdetermined processes.

The starting-point of the social theory is the concept of class, not because the class 'aspect' of society is more important than any other (that would be essentialism), but because the idea of class is useful for producing social changes that Marxian theory deems desirable. The authors have a novel idea of class. Classes are not groups of people. 'Class is an adjective, not a noun' (159). Thus there are class phenomena. (Why, then, did Marx depict classes as groups? This was a 'polemical shorthand,' a 'discursive device'; it is no longer appropriate.) One class phenomenon is the class process – the process of producing and appropriating surplus labour. This process exists in all societies. When it involves non-workers' appropriating the surplus labour of workers, it is exploitative. Another class phenomenon is class struggle. But since classes are not groups, it is not classes that struggle. 'Class struggle' refers to the object of struggling groups, not to the subjects doing the struggling. A struggle is a class struggle if (and only if) it is a struggle over the appropriation or distribution of surplus labour.

The authors propose a theory of the enterprise. They distinguish a capitalist industrial enterprise from a non-industrial capitalist enterprise and from a non-capitalist industrial enterprise. A capitalist industrial enterprise has a class character because it appropriates surplus value. It also accumulates productive capital. But this process (for which the authors develop an equation) is not its essential goal; it is merely one of the processes that provide 'conditions of existence of the appropriation of surplus value' (184). The first receivers of surplus value in a capitalist industrial enterprise are the individuals on its board of directors. These individuals are industrial capitalists: this is so even if they do not own means of production, for capitalists are not defined in terms of property ownership but as personifications of self-expanding value.

Another 'social site' with a class character is the state. Referring mainly to the current American federal government, the authors discuss the revenue and expenditure flows of a capitalist state, with a view to showing the interaction between the state's 'contradictions' and the class structure of American society. The state is not the agent of a class, of course. Nor is it an effect of the economy. Rather, it is overdetermined by natural, economic, political, and cultural processes. The authors argue that the state may own all the principal means of production, yet be a capitalist state. Underlying this claim is their belief that 'Marx's concept of capitalism refers centrally to a particular process of producing surplus labour and not to a particular process of allocating ownership of objects among individuals' (270).

There is much of interest and value in this book. But there are flaws, some of them serious. The writing is often turgid and repetitive. The concept of overdetermination – the book's central concept – is not well analyzed. Neither are the related concepts of 'constitutivity' and 'conditions of existence' (the authors are not philosophers). In their analysis of the class process, they accept the labour theory of value uncritically (this is surprising, for they are economists). The justification of Marxian theory, they claim, is that its formulations assist class struggles aimed at altering the class process from a capitalist to a communist form. However the Marxian tradition has not produced a developed account of what the communist class process involves. Neither do the authors. But then how can they (or we) make sense of their justification of Marxian theory?

The authors claim that essentialist readings of Marx have produced a 'distortion' of his theory. This is one of many indications that they are not simply offering a different, non-essentialist reading of Marx, but are trying to persuade us that their reading is correct. Yet by their own admission they cannot produce evidence for their reading that is neutral among rival interpretations. For there are no 'textual passages ... to whose intertheoretic truths all [reasonable observers] may appeal' (101). Then what means of persuasion are available to them? Again, Marxian theorists want to 'accomplish the predominance of Marxian over other theories' (36). But if each theory has its own epistemological standards, how is this to be done? By extra-rational means? These are not unknown in the Marxian tradition. But the authors have something else in mind. For they believe, in spite of themselves, that Marxian social theory is correct – in a non-relativistic sense. Thus they imagine an essentialist who 'might quite literally not see' the capitalist class process (329). This essentialist has a blind-spot; or so we may infer, for the authors later inveigh against the wearing of 'theoretical blinders' (245). They are not entitled to this phrase. For in Marxian theory, one theory is not blind to what another sees. Rather, different theories see different things. The authors face a dilemma: if they stick with their radical relativism, their position is self-defeating; but if they repudiate it, they give up the epistemology of Marxian theory.

**Derek Allen**  
University of Toronto

**Michael D. Resnik**

*Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.*

Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press 1987.

Pp. xiii+221.

US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1439-3);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1440-7).

*Choices* is designed to be used as a textbook for an introductory philosophy course in decision theory. As far as I know, it is the best available book for this purpose. *Choices* covers all the major topics one wants in an introductory text. Resnik writes in a clear and sometimes elegant style, and, since the book is written by a philosopher for philosophers, there is no longer the need to adapt an economist's or a statistician's or a game theorist's outlook for philosophic purposes.

The book consists of six chapters. The first chapter informally introduces a few central concepts and points out some reasons why decision theory is of *philosophic* interest. The second chapter covers the various rules for decisions under ignorance (maximin, minimax regret, etc.). The third and fourth chapters are devoted to decisions under risk. The third chapter covers probability theory, Bayes' theorem, and statistics, while the fourth deals with the Von Neumann-Morgenstern development of utility theory, various paradoxes – Allais', Ellsberg's, and Newcomb's Problem – and causal decision theory. Chapter five deals with game theory and includes excellent discussions of the Prisoners' Dilemma and Gauthier's work. The final chapter is devoted to social choice theory. Here Resnik proves Arrow's Theorem and discusses Harsanyi's utilitarianism.

Each chapter ends with references to works one might turn to for a more complete account of the topics discussed in the chapter. Every so often Resnik provides a 'problems' section consisting of questions which could readily serve as assignments. There is an index and a small but useful bibliography.

My few complaints about this book are all minor. The connection, or rather lack of connection, between Bayes' theorem and Bayesianism is not explained. Pascal's wager is not mentioned. Nor is Rappaport's work. The discussion of Arrow's theorem is so compressed that I suspect only those who have already read Arrow will be able to follow it. Occasionally Resnik introduces symbolism without explaining how it is to be read. I am sure many readers would appreciate it if Resnik followed the increasing common practice of providing a glossary of the symbolism inside the front and back covers. That way, when one forgets what a symbol means, one wouldn't have to hunt for where it was originally explained.

But these are minor problems with a much needed book. Besides being the best introductory decision theory text I know of, *Choices* will be useful to those philosophers who simply want to familiarize themselves with the fundamentals of decision theory.

**Sheldon Wein**

Westminster Institute

London, ON

Mark C. Taylor, ed.

*Deconstruction in Context:  
Literature and Philosophy.*

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1986.  
Pp. viii+446.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-79139-4);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-79140-8).

As an anthology of excerpts from major philosophical writings from Kant to the present, *Deconstruction in Context* is organized around an overt argument and philosophical agenda. Selections from Kant, Hegel, Kojève, and Husserl exemplify the '“onto-theological tradition”' (14), 'the repeated effort to overcome plurality and establish unity by reducing the many to the one' (4). Or, in more Kantian terminology, this tradition aims to provide a 'demonstration of the primal unity of nature and reason, as well as nature and freedom, [in order to establish] the possibility of overcoming fragmentation and alienation by recovering the unity of experience' (6). That is, the aim of this tradition is to understand human experience as the effect of some ultimate metaphysical subject (noumenal reality or God or *Geist* or transcendental subjectivity), the operations of which might be known, so that life is made intelligible.

Saussure then appears as a transitional figure, for whom 'identity is derived from difference' (14), while he nonetheless continues to elaborate a science of semiology that is 'bound to traditional philosophical assumptions' (14). Next Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein are introduced as figures who open up 'other fissures' (14) in the philosophical tradition in suggesting that tension, plays of forces, contextuality, and difference are omnipresent in human existence.

Heidegger then suggests that it is art – and neither philosophy nor any of its putative central subjects – that “holds open the Open” (20) that is 'the condition of the possibility of Being and beings' (18). Hence our lives are lived fundamentally against the background of the radical and illogical opening of experience through art, not within stable structures of being that might be grasped philosophically. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Bataille, Blanchot, and Derrida each further radicalize Heidegger's thought, as they see in Heidegger's talk of art and the Open the continuation of a metaphysical concern to recover and know the origin of experience. Rather than participate in this effort, each of these latter writers sees experience as engendered by differences and oppositions, in ways that cannot be understood. 'Each, in his own way, undertakes the impossible task of thinking the unthought by interrogating that which exceeds, escapes, and eludes philosophical reflection' (4). As a result, we are – insofar as we are seriously concerned with the real character of our experience, in all its self-differing unintelligibility – given over not to philosophy, but rather to literature, which 'writes the end of philosophy by writing without end' (34).

Taylor's introductory essay is both lucid and useful in elaborating the argument of the anthology. I can think of no other short essay that so neatly summarizes, with clearly developed references to the major philosophical

texts, the development of philosophy as it is now understood by those preeminently influenced by Heidegger and Derrida.

The selections of excerpts that support the development of the argument are nearly perfect, with one exception: it would have been better to have Derrida's essay 'Structure, Sign and Play' rather than 'Différance.' It is useful to have Kant on genius (*Geist*) next to Hegel on *Geist* from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*. Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche are nicely juxtaposed on 'the irreducible temporality of self-consciousness' (23). The difficult choices of material from Heidegger and Wittgenstein are sound.

The bibliography, however, is both seriously incomplete and highly eccentric. Over four pages are devoted to works by and about Derrida, while scarcely over a page is devoted to Kant. Standard works on Kant by Kemp Smith, Paton, Körner, Strawson, Melnick, Ameriks, and Nagel, among others are not listed. Works on Hegel by Charles Taylor, on Husserl by Maurice Natanson, on Wittgenstein by Baker and Hacker, and so on are likewise omitted. Neither the introductory essay nor the bibliography acknowledges the existence of ways of looking at philosophy since Kant that lie outside the generally Heideggerian tradition. One would have to correct this one-sidedness in using the anthology as a principal text for a course in philosophy, literature, and criticism. With this correction, however, the anthology is invaluable.

Both the organization of the selections and the introductory essay display an argument against the discipline of philosophy that has considerable currency at present. This argument, however, is not free from problems.

1) Taylor sometimes seems to argue: (i) there are numerical differences among various objects; therefore (ii) there are real or essential differences; therefore (iii) there is in reality only difference – reality itself has no underlying substance or structure. This argument is logically invalid; at best it turns on an uncritical equivocation on 'difference.' Indeed, it would seem that (ii) implies the *falsity* of (iii). Considerable more clarity and consistency in the use of terms such as 'difference,' 'substance,' and 'subject' are called for. (iii) is also urged largely through the criticism of Descartes and Hegel. Realist metaphysical schemes, such as that of Davidson, that require neither the independent characterization of a correspondence relation nor a God-like agency of history are not considered.

2) The comprehensive anti-realism that is urged is taken to imply a general rejection of normative discourse, insofar as such discourse could be useful or intelligible only if it were grounded in an understanding of the essences of things – and there are no essences. Here one might observe that both Plato and Kant emphasized the partial character, given our finite and embodied rationality, of such understandings of essences as we can manage. Yet they went on to offer us articulate partial understandings and plausible systems of normative discourse. Hence there may be a place for traditional philosophy against the claims of deconstructive criticism. And one might further wonder whether normative commitments and traditional philosophical presuppositions can ever be escaped through a move to the literary. (Taylor's argument itself seemingly urges that literary study and open-ended writing and criticism are uniquely true and valuable.)

3) It is dubitable whether literature 'writes ... without end' – dubitable, that is, whether literary writers and critics lack organizing, albeit implicit, assumptions about a *telos*, either of the work or of those who would receive it. (That in writing and reading we make such assumptions does not imply that it is knowable either a priori or with certainty which of them are sound.) These implicit assumptions may be open to philosophical criticism, as their implications are developed and tested for plausibility. Here, too, there may be a place for philosophy.

**Richard Eldridge**  
Swarthmore College

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**B. K. Matilal**, *All Souls College, Oxford, UK*

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
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**Rédacteur francophone:** François Duchesneau, Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succ. A, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7

**English-language editor:** Michael McDonald, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1

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