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Editor's Note

The anglophone editors of **Canadian Philosophical Reviews / Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie** are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for electronic mail on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer. Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submission of reviews and any other messages. The E-mail address of **C.P.R/R.C.C.P.** is

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R.B. / R.A.S.

O.K. BOUWSMA. *Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949-1951*. J.L. Craft and R.E. Hustwit, eds. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1986. Pp. xxiv + 78. US$15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-009-4); US$4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-008-6).

You can tell a philosopher by the friends he keeps. That Bouwsma was one of the few philosophers with whom Wittgenstein was intimate tells us a lot about Bouwsma. In fact this book tells us as much about Bouwsma as it does about Wittgenstein and this is one of the reasons I enjoyed reading it so much. Bouwsma was an insightful philosopher for whom I had always had great respect. However, I doubt if Bouwsma himself would ever have printed these conversations with Wittgenstein. Many of them are just barely sketches of topics discussed and Bouwsma's well-known ability for trenchant comment is notably lacking. Nevertheless there are plenty of remarks that are interesting and suggestive. Space here barely leaves room for two that I found the most striking for different reasons.

1. Pp. 23-25. How does language represent? It is not like a mirror — something you gaze at and in so doing, see something else reflected in it, i.e., propositions that correspond to it. What then? Consider a map. Everything on the map represents something: squares represent houses, lines streets, etc. However, what tells us that this is a map? Representing itself is not represented on the map. You can point to what this square on the map represents, i.e., this house, but you can't point to what makes this a map — what makes it a map is the use you make of it. Similarly you can indicate the meanings of some words by pointing but you can't show the meaning of a sentence by pointing to anything. The meaning of a sentence is shown by its use. One knows or sees that this is a map because it can be used in certain ways, i.e., to tell you how far you are from a certain spot, etc. Its use is what makes it a map — and so with sentences. What transforms marks into a sentence is not something reflected in the sentence which the sentence points to or 'means' but the use that sentence has in a language.

Bouwsma tells us 'Wittgenstein really struggled to make this point. He considered it extremely important.' Considering that this was written in 1949, four years before the *Philosophical Investigations* was published, we can sym-

pathize with Bouwsma who must have found this a radical view. That Bouwsma in these few lines seems to have captured the essence of what Wittgenstein was saying then, shows how attuned Bouwsma was to Wittgenstein from the very beginning. A great many very good philosophers simply missed the importance of what Wittgenstein was saying and either dismissed it or made jokes about it (Russell). That Bouwsma seems to have so completely understood the thrust of this idea of meaning as use so early is just another indication of how insightful a philosopher Bouwsma really was.

2. The scattered remarks on Ethics I found seminal. The first, on pp. 40-2, shows how useless it is to try to define 'good.' There is absoultely nothing you can do with such a definition. Two months later at Smith College, it dawns on Bouwsma (50) why Wittgenstein thought that all attempts to define 'good' miss the crucial point about ethics. All definitions are useless to one in the throes of a genuine ethical dilemma. They can be of no help in guiding one out of a predicament. Imagine a utilitarian, a Kantian, or a psychological hedonist trying to resolve a problem like 'Sophie's Choice' by appeal to a definition. It would be ludicrous.

A clue to how Wittgenstein thinks about ethics comes in what for me was one of the most interesting remarks in the book. Bouwsma mentions to Wittgenstein the hedonistic principle 'Men desire nothing but pleasure.' Wittgenstein replies that this is obviously not an empirical proposition (58). You wouldn't confirm this by a poll. It is simply a generalization or theory that is taken as a regulative principle. There is no way you could disconfirm it. What about martyrdom? Martyrs are simply peculiar people who derive pleasure from martyring themselves, etc. This is how you see things. Thus ethics is not any kind of 'empirical science' and increased 'knowledge' in any area will not help one in making ethical decisions.

These are the conclusions I would draw from these remarks and this certainly has implications for the futility of something like bio-medical ethics. Increased knowledge in the field of medicine cannot help resolve any ethical dilemmas that doctors may face in treating their patients, and the assumption that philosophers can help by calling on their expertise in defining 'good' is also misguided for reasons mentioned above. Of course, if one blithely assumes that psychological hedonism or some form of utilitarianism is the correct ethical viewpoint then one can get on with the business of organizing seminars to settle questions of 'who shall live and who shall die.' However, life is not that simple. One of the reasons is that not everyone shares this viewpoint. Wittgenstein for one does not. As John King is reported to have heard Wittgenstein once say in commenting on the purpose of life, 'But of one thing I am certain — we are not here in order to have a good time' (Rush Rhees, ed., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections* [Oxford: Blackwell 1981], 90). That there is no argument or piece of philosophy that can show who is right and who is wrong on this issue is perhaps one of the reasons why Wittgenstein rarely wrote on ethical questions.

It is expected of a reviewer to come up with critical comments, typos and 'suggestions for improvement.' This book does not lend itself to the first of

these and since I couldn't find any typos, I will end this review by asking a couple of questions that occurred to me while I was reading this book.

On pp. 32-3 Bouwsma is describing how Wittgenstein treats problems in perception. 'Is this a pack of cigarettes on the floor? A shadow? A play of light?' We can imagine how Wittgenstein deals with this question by calling attention to the context of the situation, etc. However, on the fifth line of p. 33 an entirely different question is taken up. Suddenly we are confronted with a question of the different attitudes towards the world that characterize a theist and an atheist. There is no warning or sign of any change in the discussion. Is something missing here from the text, or is this a printer's error, or is there a connection here that I am unable to fathom?

A second question I had was on the entry for October 2, 1950 in Oxford, where Bouwsma records what he describes as a '... few sentences from Wittgenstein' (68). These sentences describe the sense or meaning of the world as lying outside the world. In the world there is no value. Ethics and aesthetics are one. The world of the happy is quite different from the unhappy. The solution of the riddle of the world lies outside the world. Where did Bouwsma get these sentences? He could have gotten them right out of the *Tractatus* for they are all there. But why should they be part of this period of Wittgenstein's life? Was Wittgenstein saying things like this then? It seems to me unlikely. Why then should they appear here? This is one riddle for which I think the answer must lie in the world.

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BARRY F. BROWN. *Accidental Being: A Study in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1985. Pp. xii + 427. US$32.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-4886-5); US$19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4887-3).

This book is definitely a valuable contribution to Thomistic scholarship. There is no other treatment like it for fullness of textual presentation — with an appendix of all the texts in Latin at the back — and painstaking care of interpretation of this secondary but not insignificant theme in St. Thomas' metaphysics. The importance of the book for Thomistic scholarship is that a notable split has developed among Thomistic commentators, both old and new, with respect to the being (*esse*) of accidents.

The issue is whether the accidents belonging to an existing substance have their own really distinct act of existence (*esse*) — albeit incomplete, inhering in the substance, and ordered entirely toward the substance — or whether there is, without qualification, only one act of existence in a real being, its substantial *esse*, which so totally absorbs the being of its accidents into itself that its accidents have no act of existence of their own at all, even incomplete, but are merely modifications of the one substantial *esse*, which 'extends itself,' so to speak, in new accidental ways of being. It is not a question whether an accident is really distinct, as a principle of being, from its substance — which it clearly is for both Aristotle and St. Thomas, from the analysis of change. For other principles of being are really distinct from each other too, such as matter and form, essence and existence, but this does not mean that each has its own distinct act of existence. The one substantial *esse* of the whole being holds them together as an existing unity of co-principles, making them one substantial being and not many. The question is whether the accident has its own *act of existence*, incomplete and non-substantial, of course, but really distinct from the act of existence of the substance. The question may seem a highly technical one, but it does have significant repercussions in various domains and has its own intrinsic importance for understanding the nature of finite being.

St. Thomas himself has two apparently contradictory sets of texts. In the first he seems to say that accidents have no *esse* of their own but are only that by which the substance is in a certain way, e.g.: 'Now that is properly said to be which itself has being (*esse*), as subsisting in its own being. Therefore only substances are properly and truly called beings. An accident, on the other hand, does not have being, but by it something is' (*Sum Theol*, I-II, 110, 2, ad 3). In the second set he speaks of accidents as having a 'second *esse*' added on to the first *esse* of the substance itself, and as being caused by the being of the substance, e.g., *De Ente*, ch. 6.

Brown lays out clearly the history of the problem in the Thomistic school. The five great early commentators, Capreolous, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, Banez, and John of St. Thomas all held that accidents had their own act of *esse* distinct from that of the substance, though Banez first held the opposite opinion, following his teacher, Soto, and then changed his mind. This view remained the predominant one till the middle of this century. With the revival of existential Thomism, however, following Gilson and others from 1939 on, the denial of a distinct *esse* of accidents began to spread more and more widely, with such distinguished defenders as Gilson himself, Fabro, Geiger, De Raeymaeker, Kossel, Albertson, etc. Some, like De Finance and Marc, espoused a compromise position: the proper, necessary accidents, such as the faculties of the soul, are so closely linked with the substance that they have no distint *esse*, but the extrinsic accidents added on from the outside, such as heat, color, etc., do. The Gilson position seems to have become the majority view at present among American Thomists. The concern of all these interpreters of St. Thomas has been to safeguard the existential unity of every real being, which, they think, excludes any plurality of acts of existence in one being.

Brown next proceeds carefully and systematically through all the main texts, studying them in their contexts and in relation to each other. Although his conclusion is a reversal of the position he held at the start of his research, he comes down clearly and unqualifiedly on the side of the predominant older tradition, namely, that according to St. Thomas all accidents, including the proper ones, have their own act of existence, supported indeed by that of the substance, but really distinct from it.

His argument seems to me decisive. The preponderance of texts in favor of two acts of *esse* in a real being, the substantial and the accidental, is so strong that it must overrule any ambiguous texts. Some of the strongest in their implications are those in which St. Thomas speaks of the substance as actively causing the being of its accidents, which can only mean in context some kind of efficient causality. Now an efficient cause, for St. Thomas, is one that communicates *esse* to an effect really distinct from it; this necessarily implies two acts of existence, one in the cause and the other in the effect. To speak of the substance as communicating *esse*, especially new *esse*, to its accidents does not make sense if there remains only the one substantial *esse* after the communication. And to say that the latter expands or 'extends itself' out into new accidental modes of being while remaining always the same seems only verbally different from saying that the substance acquires new metaphysically distinct modes of existence which now inhere in the substance and are supported by it. One of the hidden motivations behind the denial of *esse* to accidents seems to be, as the author points out, the dubious claim on the part of some contemporary Thomists that the essence of an existing finite being includes its accidents.

With respect to the small number of texts which assert that accidents do not have their own being but are that by which a substance is in some particular way, Brown shows convincingly enough that all that St. Thomas is trying to do in this context is to insist that accidents are not beings on their own, that their only being is their being in the subject (their inherence or *inesse*). But they are still a new mode of being in the subject, so that it is not accurate to stress the *in* to the exclusion of their *being* in. Though the distinct *esse* of accidents is more obvious in the case of new accidents added from the outside, Brown shows convincingly enough that at least for St. Thomas the same law of distinct being applies also to the proper and inseparable accidents.

Seeing all the texts brought together here with their careful contextual and comparative interpretation leads me at least to the conviction that Brown has made his case successfully and that the issue should be closed.

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FRED D'AGOSTINO. *Chomsky's System of Ideas*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Clarendon Press 1986. Pp. xii + 226. Cdn$53.75; US$34.00. ISBN 0-19-824765-6.

D'Agostino explains Chomsky's theory of language as resting on six philosophical doctrines. Subjectivism asserts that language's properties are those 'given to it by the innate mental processes of the organism that has invented it,' individualism that linguistics is 'a subfield of psychology,' mentalism that speakers 'know' their grammar, rationalism that learning is mediated by innate schematic representations, intellectualism that linguistic behaviour involves following rules, and limitationism that there are biological restrictions on the systems of beliefs people can acquire. For good measure, D'Agostino shows at the end how Chomsky's philosophy of language ties in with political libertarianism.

Productivity — the ability to process an indefinite number of acceptable new sentences — is the 'central fact' a grammar must explain. Chomsky's position is that it is explained by having a recursive definition of one's language's wffs. A grammar should describe the rules actually employed in speech production and interpretation. Identifying these rules is where *subjectivism* comes in, and it's where Chomsky's methodology differs most from Quine's. For Quine there are bound to be competing theories equally well-tailored to available evidence. Not so, Chomsky holds, for we can introspect the rules we employ in practice, and thus know our language's grammar.

Why assume that our intuitions about our grammar are true? Because language isn't an independent abstract object or public institution. Chomsky's *individualism* asserts that grammar is about, and so defined by, the rules individuals follow in speech. Suppose some smart Martians landed next door, and they could speak English even though their brains were so different that their realizations of English grammar couldn't be the same as ours. Does our ability to follow such stories refute individualism? No. It shows at most that Chomsky's theory is at best a contingent truth, which is all it pretends to be. It's an open, relevant, empirical question whether there are in Zorra Township different realizations of English grammar. But it's an utterly irrelevant question whether Martians could realize English in a different way — just as an imaginary Martian's ability to see through the back of his head would leave our theories of perception untouched.

The issue between empiricism and *rationalism* is a difference about the kinds of devices mediating language acquisition. Empiricists allow that we have innate faculties for perceiving similarities, but hold that associations of ideas are otherwise unbiased. Rationalists claim that they are biologically biased, that we have inherited tendencies to make certain associations. And so to champion rationalism is to argue for 'biased rather than unbiased innate associative faculties' (108). In rejecting *mentalism*, D'Agostino argues that it's not needed for a rationalist explanation of language acquisition. Mastery of language is explained, not by our 'knowing' our grammar, but by our having innate

neural mechanisms whose operations are causally responsible for our intuitions and outputs.

Chomsky's *intellectualism* is antireductionist: intelligent behaviour is sui generic, and explained 'in terms of the rational relations between actions guided by rules or maxims and the goals for the sake of which those actions were undertaken' (118). In terms of Quine's distinction between 'rule-fitting' and 'rule-guiding' behaviour — where fit is a matter of true description, guidance a matter of cause and effect — intellectualism claims that a language's grammar guides. A grammar is 'the underlying system of rules that has been mastered and internalized by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance' (123).

To explain the possibility of creativity with Chomsky's *limitationism* assumed, D'Agostino adopts the idea that an intellectual product is creatively valuable insofar as it constitutes a solution to a significant problem. Problems, for their part, are formulated with rational constraints on their solution, constraints that define the problem by defining a range of acceptable solutions and heuristics for their discovery. Thus to say that there are limits on human creativity is to say that there are limits on the kinds of problems human beings can formulate and solve. Chomsky claims that without restrictions on human problem solving, 'we have arbitrary and random behavior, not creative acts,' and that scientists can 'converge in their judgments on particular explanatory theories' only because of 'special and restrictive' restrictions on scientific inquiry (200, 202). Though most problems are set in biologically 'artificial' situations, D'Agostino suggests that we have a capacity for problem solving in these environments as a byproduct of abilities that were once needed for survival.

He concludes by showing how Chomsky's theory of intelligent behaviour can be used to buttress his *libertarian* idea that the ideal social order is one that promotes 'spontaneous initiative, creative work, solidarity, [and the] pursuit of justice' (209). The big problem for libertarianism is explaining how there can be agreement enough in practice and belief to constitute a political community in the absence of legitimate authority. Well, how do individuals manage to get together to make up a language community? It's 'because each individual has an innately-based "interest" in communication and an innately-based capacity to develop a system of linguistic dispositions which will enable this system to be satisfied' (213). Likewise for political organization: individuals can form a community because they have an innately-based 'interest' in having their thoughts and feelings jibe with those with whom they have to cope, 'and an innately-based capacity to achieve this co-ordination' (213).

Which brings me to the conclusion, and my only complaint about the book. Cognitive science is a lot easier if one is given free rein in the use of evolutionary and innateness hypotheses. Perhaps too easy. I would have liked more critical discussion of Chomsky's reliance on them, and a less heavy use of them by D'Agostino himself. But what D'Agostino mainly does he does

well. He gives us a good short introduction to the philosophical issues in Chomsky's work.

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A.B. DOWNING and BARBARA SMOKER, eds. *Voluntary Euthanasia: Experts Debate the Right to Die*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International 1986. Pp. 303 US$25.95. ISBN 0-391-03365-4.

JOHN KLEINIG. *Ethical Issues in Psychosurgery*. Winchester, MA: George Allen & Unwin 1985. Pp. xviii + 152. US$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-04-170032-5); US$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-04-170033-3).

MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, ed. *Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1985. Pp. viii + 259. Cdn$42.95; US$24.95. ISBN 0-19-217743.

Library shelves are beginning to sag under the weight of recent books in bioethics. As this bioethics literature has begun to mature it has moved away from anthologies suitable only for classroom use. These three volumes are fairly representative of that development.

Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine is a collection of papers which were originally delivered as lectures at Oxford University. With few exceptions, they seek to break no new ground; instead they concentrate on explaining the standard concepts and theories, describing particular moral dilemmas and offering tentative solutions. Enough of the common issues are treated competently in this book to make it a good introduction to bioethics for the layperson.

Raanan Gillon very capably explains the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy, and sketches their philosophical roots in Mill and Kant. Then he uses this as a background against which he lays out the rationale for the requirement of informed consent. Muir Gray describes the different elements which trouble the medical practitioner who must decide whether to force elderly individuals out of their homes and into institutions. A section of Great Britain's 'National Assistance Act' allows a Medical Officer of Health to remove an elderly or ill person from his or her home if that person is unable to care for himself or herself and is not receiving care from anyone else. Muir Gray describes the different elements which trouble the medical

practitioner who must decide whether to use this legal power. The standard arguments for withholding unpleasant information from patients are detailed by Roger Higgs, who then goes on to offer the standard counterarguments.

A few of the papers move away from the dilemmas which arise in everyday practice and onto the more esoteric. Mary Warnock considers the different concerns surrounding different forms of 'The Artificial Family.' Unfortunately, her paper does little more than outline the issues with which her government commission had to deal. (Her address was delivered several months before the *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology*, and she understandably may have wished to avoid giving a preview of its contents.)

Two papers stand out from the rest. R.M. Hare's 'Little Human Guinea-Pigs' is a disappointing consideration of experimentation using children as subjects. He starts well enough, clearly delineating the difference between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation and explaining why some nontherapeutic experiments must be performed on children if they are to be performed at all. But his argument in favor of such experimentation falls short of the standards set in the well-known exchange between Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey on the subject (P. Ramsey, 'The Enforcement of Morals: Nontherapeutic Research on Children,' *Hastings Center Report* **6**.4 [August 1976] 21-30: R.A. McCormick, 'Sharing in Sociality: Children in Experimentation,' *Hastings Center Report* **6**.6 [December 1976] 41-6). Hare notes that his utilitarianism leads to the conclusions that adults have a right to refuse to participate in nontherapeutic experimentation, and that it would be wrong for an adult to refuse if the risks to him or her were low and the benefits to others high. Then he claims that 'in the case of a child who cannot give or withhold consent, the same considerations apply at one remove' (88). This leads to the conclusions that children have 'a right not to be interfered with without the consent of their parents' and that if the risks are low and benefits high enough, it would be wrong for parents to refuse consent. The Ramsey-McCormick debate brought out an important objection to arguments of this sort, an objection which Hare ignores. The judgment that an adult should participate in research carries no weight in practice. If the individual adult does not wish to participate he will not be forced to. But on Hare's suggestion, a child who does not wish to participate may be forced to. A father may decide to do what he should do, and force his daughter into the experiment. Unless there is some reason for treating adults and children differently, then this discrepancy in actual treatment is unjust. But if there *is* some reason for thinking that moral theory should deal with children and adults differently, then it is not clear that the argument which is persuasive in the case of the adult will be persuasive in the case of the child.

Ian Kennedy's paper also deals with issues concerning children and medicine. His focus is on the thorny issue of providing contraceptive advice and care to adolescents without their parents' knowledge or consent. Kennedy first provides a brief account of the ethical arguments leading to the conclusion that doctors should be allowed to treat at least some minors as compe-

tent individuals able to give consent for their own medical care. Then he deals with the legal issues which such a policy must confront. In this section Kennedy presents the arguments which he used successfully before the House of Lords in *Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority* ([1985] 3 WLR 830), the case which clearly establishes the minor's right to consent.

Voluntary Euthanasia is, according to its copyright page, a 'revised, enlarged and updated edition of *Euthanasia and the Right to Death: The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia,*' originally published in 1969. Revised and enlarged it may be, but improved it certainly is not.

During the past decade a number of commendable clear and insightful papers on euthanasia have appeared, many precipitated by James Rachels's 'Active and Passive Euthanasia.' One might reasonably expect at least some of these papers to appear in an updated and improved collection. Such expectations are unrewarded by this volume. The new material here, with but a few exceptions, is rich in emotions but poor in argument. Indeed, one gets only the slightest suggestion that the argument may have advanced since 1969.

It is not entirely fair to criticize an editor for what she failed to include. (I assume that Barbara Smoker bears primary responsibility for the revisions since A. B. Downing died in 1980.) There is much to criticize in what has been included. The original edition was an untidy collection of papers by philosophers, theologians, lawyers and physicians, most of whom advocated changes in the law to permit euthanasia. The main element of debate was provided by the oft-reprinted exchange between Yale Kamisar and Glanville Williams on 'non-religious objections' to legalizing euthanasia. All of these papers are retained in the current edition. The additions consist of non-argumentative material (a history of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, a review of current law in England and Wales, etc.) and some argumentative pieces which seem to have been chosen because of the fame of their authors (e.g., Christiaan Barnard) rather than their clarity of thought. There are some exceptions.

Many professionals in the hospice and palliative care movements are opposed to active euthanasia. Their opposition is often based on the observation that few of their patients ever request it. This, they say, shows that there is no need to consider killing the patient if pain is properly controlled. Colin Brewer suggests a different interpretation for the lack of requests. He suggests that these terminal patients do not make the request because they know of their care-givers' opposition and recognize that a request would be futile.

The other important addition is an exchange between Luke Gormally and Smoker. The stated target of Gormally's 'Non-Utilitarian Case against Voluntary Euthanasia' is the commonly-held belief that voluntary euthanasia is similar to suicide. This belief plays a important role in the debate over the legalization of euthanasia in countries, such as Canada, which have decriminalized attempted suicide. The difference between euthanasia and suicide, of course, is that the former requires the participation of a second party. This difference is, according to Gormally, morally crucial. His main concern seems to be that the second party's character will be harmed because he or she will be drawn

to participate in an act which he or she judges to be wrong. Evidence that this is his principal concern is provided by his central use of the example, drawn from the *Apology*, of Socrates' refusal to take part in the killing of Leon of Salamis. Socrates refused to take part even though his refusal could have cost him his life; and he refused because he judged that killing to be wrong. Had he decided to participate despite his own assessment of the act he would have harmed his character.

To concerns of this sort the proponent of euthanasia has several responses. First, proper drafting of laws permitting euthanasia can protect those who hold conscientious objections to euthanasia in general or to a specific request. More importantly, proponents can question the relevance of the Socrates example. The salient feature of that example is that the killing is wrong, and recognized by Socrates to be wrong. But voluntary euthanasia involves killing which is not judged to be wrong. The second party is not being pressured to take part in an act he believes is wrong; rather he is asking for legal permission to perform an act he believes is right. How can this do harm to his character? Gormally's answer appears to be that the agent's belief is evidence that harm *has already been done* to his character. The act of euthanasia is wrong (it is an unjust killing), and any method of moral reasoning — such as utilitarianism — which leads one to a different conclusion thereby shows itself to be seriously flawed. Anyone who uses such a method is liable to damage his capacity for moral discernment. Gormally is more specific in his diagnosis of what is wrong with utilitarianism in the euthanasia case. 'What is false is the belief that the value of a human life can be adequately expressed as the outcome of a calculation' (76). Where such calculations go astray is in failing to take account of 'spirit.' Gormally's use of this notion of 'spirit' simply begs the important issues. As he develops the idea, spirit is little more than mysterious stuff which causes human beings to realize when it is right and wrong to kill.

Gormally's article is complex and interesting: Smoker's 'Rejoinder' is neither. She regularly misunderstands his argument and wastes time on irrelevant points. The only use for her contribution is as source material for a course in informal logic, since a good selection of everyone's favorite fallacies are to be found in it.

There is one point which Gormally raises without pursuing, but which is at the core of the euthanasia issue. As noted earlier, advocates of legalization usually hold that the request for death should not function as a sufficient condition. A crucial question is whether it must function as a *necessary* one. The official position of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society is that the request is necessary. This position is well presented in Anthony Flew's contribution to this volume. 'The first point is that the argument is about *voluntary* euthanasia. Neither I nor any other contributor to the present volume advocates the euthanasia of either the incurably sick or the miserably senile except in so far as this is the strong, constant, and unequivocally expressed wish of the candidates themselves' (40). Critics, however, discount such pronouncements, claiming that if voluntary euthanasia is legalized there will soon be calls to legalize non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. And the debate on euthanasia often

ends at just this point with the critics claiming that euthanasia's supporters have a hidden agenda and the supporters laying the counter-charge that their critics have committed the fallacy of the slippery slope.

A useful antidote to this situation is a paper in the Lockwood collection: Bernard Williams' 'Which Slopes Are Slippery?' Williams describes the general form of the slippery slope argument and carefully dissects the different varieties to be found before going on to discuss the evaluation of them. The form can be exemplified in the euthanasia argument: if voluntary euthanasia is allowed, then there will be a natural progression to other forms of euthanasia. Williams points out a number of assumptions contained in such arguments. First is the assumption that the practice toward which one slides down the slope is agreed to be objectionable. Second is 'the idea that there is no point at which one 'can non-arbitrarily get off the slope once one has got on to it' (126). The latter assumption is particularly important in the context of the euthanasia debate. The assertion that there is no non-arbitrary point at which one can get off the slope is usually supported by the further claim that it is impossible to distinguish appropriately between two cases located close to one another on the slope. Williams points out that this further claim is ambiguous. It may mean 'that a distinction between them cannot *reasonably* be defended' (127), or that 'they cannot *effectively* be distinguished' (128). He goes on to make the important point that 'a reasonable distinction need not be an effective one' (128).

The importance of Williams' analysis for the euthanasia debate is that it points out the places where the two sides must engage one another; and by doing this it incidentally points out the structural flaws of the Downing and Smoker book on euthanasia. The proponents of euthanasia represented here assume that it is obvious that there is a reasonable and effective distinction between voluntary euthanasia and other forms of euthanasia. That is, they assume that their reasons for considering the request of the patient to be a necessary condition are so obvious that they do not need to be defended at length. And some of the contributors, such as Smoker and Mary Barrington, give the reader cause to wonder whether they really do consider the request to be necessary when they drift off and ponder whether active euthanasia of handicapped neonates is morally acceptable (Smoker) or whether the elderly have a *duty* to avail themselves of their supposed right to die. Furthermore, many proponents follow Flew in dismissing the question of whether a reasonable distinction they propose will be effective. They fail to consider whether a law permitting voluntary euthanasia would lead in practice to other forms of euthanasia. Opponents of euthanasia for their part do not take seriously enough the contention that there is a reasonably defensible distinction to be made between voluntary euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia. Moreover, they assume, rather than demonstrate, that even a reasonable distinction could not be effective.

Ethical Issues in Psychosurgery is an admirable monograph and a valuable addition to the literature in bioethics. Kleinig takes his readers through the many issues and arguments surrounding this controversial set of medical proce-

dures, carefully analyzing the arguments of both its detractors and supporters. He does a fine job of making clear why psychosurgery has attracted so much attention from those outside the medical community. But his book does much more than this. It also serves as an introduction to many of the key themes in bioethics, a model of how arguments should be constructed in the field, and as a warning to those who still believe that the ethical issues in medicine can be resolved by any philosopher with a bit of common sense and a few minutes to spare. Kleinig divides the ethical issues surrounding psychosurgery into three broad groups: those which arise because of the patients for whom the procedure is often recommended; questions concerning the procedure itself; and questions about how far society should go in regulating a medical procedure.

The reigning orthodoxy in medical ethics is that a patient should not be treated unless he or she has given a valid informed consent for the treatment. Kleinig clearly presents the rationale for this view and explains what is required for a consent to be informed and valid. Securing valid consent for psychosurgery poses serious difficulties because the patients to whom it is recommended may be deemed incapable of giving such consent. Two different factors raise suspicions. Often psychosurgery is recommended for patients who are institutionalized, and this raises the worry that their consent is invalid because it is not freely given. Also, the procedure is 'designed to alter disordered mental states and/or behaviour' (1), thus giving birth to the concern that the consenting patient is not competent to consent.

Kleinig's handling of these twin worries reflects his approach to most of the issues in this book. He resists the lure of the broad generalization and redirects attention to the details of specific situations. Broad generalizations are prone to mislead because the term 'psychosurgery' does not refer to a single procedure, but to a group of different procedures intended to alleviate a number of different conditions. In this respect 'psychosurgery' is like 'transplant surgery.' No one would think to ask 'Are potential recipients of organs competent to consent to surgery?' or 'Are potential donors genuinely free to consent?' Such questions, when asked about donors and recepients in general, may heighten awareness about factors in the transplant situation which might invalidate a consent; but they do not determine whether the consent given by this patient in this instance is valid. The only defensible answer to the broadly-posed question is that some donors do consent freely and others are coerced. The general question may rouse awareness of this and lead to an understanding of those features of a situation which are coercive.

Kleinig argues that institutionalization, even involuntary institutionalization, does not automatically deprive one of the ability to consent to treatment. What it does is give the doctor more means to coerce a consent. Where institutionalized patients (or prisoners) are giving consent one must be more careful than usual to insure that the choice they are offered is not coercive. And this requires a close scrutiny of the alternatives presented to the patients. Are these manipulated to insure that the patient arrives at a particular decision?

Competence to consent to treatment is a difficult and controversial subject, particularly in psychiatry. Kleinig does not add much to this debate. For his purposes it is enough to consider and reject an inference which is regularly made. Since the candidates for psychosurgery are suffering from a psychiatric disorder, it is often inferred that they must be incompetent. The very condition which the operation is intended to cure robs the patient of competence. This inference relies on far too crude a picture of psychiatric disorders; in particular, it ignores the fact that some disorders do not affect the decision-making capacities which constitute competence. If this inference is unacceptable, then the competence of patients 'to consent to psychosurgery would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis' (46). Some candidates for psychosurgery undeniably are incompetent. The reigning orthodoxy does not deprive these patients of medical treatment, of course. Proxy consent may take the place of the patient's own consent. Proxy consent, however, requires a more searching evaluation of the proposed procedure. This is because the proxy is more constrained in what he or she may allow to be done to their charge than in what they may allow to be done to themselves. The proxy must be particularly careful about proxy consent for experimental procedures. These considerations lead Kleinig to investigate a number of questions concerning the procedure in psychosurgery.

The second, fourth and fifth chapters all consider issues important in evaluating psychosurgery. In the fourth Kleinig considers a number of reasons for supposing that psychosurgery. In the fourth Kleinig considers a number of reasons for supposing that psychosurgery is different from other forms of medical treatment and therefore should be evaluated in some special way. All of the suggested reasons he finds wanting. The second chapter takes up the question of psychiatric diagnosis. How reliable are such diagnoses, and do they pick out genuine diseases? As Kleinig notes in chapter five, any evaluation of psychosurgery's effectiveness depends upon the existence of reliable diagnostic criteria. Unless these are available any experiment purporting to evaluate a surgical procedure's effectiveness will be open to criticism on two counts. Reliable diagnostic criteria are needed first as selection criteria, to insure that the correct group of experimental subjects is chosen. And such criteria are needed to buttress any claim that a subject's condition has improved following the surgery. Many past attempts to evaluate particular procedures have foundered due to the lack of the control these criteria give.

Kleinig does not attempt to judge whether psychosurgery should be considered to be standard therapy, therapy of last resort, or experimentation. Part of the reason for this is, once again, that the question is too general, like asking 'Is transplant surgery standard therapy?' The proper questions to ask will be much more specific: 'Where there is independent evidence of temporal-lobe epilepsy is the treatment of uncontrollable rage by amygdalectomy effective?' Another part of the reason is that such judgments even in the specific cases must be based on a great deal of scientific expertise.

Confounding variables, placebo effects and ethical limitations on experimentation will probably make the answers to even the narrow questions more equivocal than one might like.

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MICHAEL ALLEN FOX. *The Case For Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1986. Pp. vii + 262. US$18.95. ISBN 0-520-05501-2.

In spite of the fact that Fox has recently published several retractions of this book (see, for example, *The Scientist*, Dec. 15, 1986, and *Between the Species*, vol. 3, Spring 1987), it will be of interest to those concerned with the ethics of animal experimentation, for it articulates many of the defenses offered by scientists for the use of animals in research, and it is useful to have these arguments gathered in one volume.

The first three chapters discuss general questions regarding the use of animals for human ends, including the question of the value of animals and nature, and the place of humans in nature. Fox argues for the uniqueness of humans in spite of the evolutionary similarities between us and other species, chiefly on the grounds that humans are autonomous. This characteristic of autonomy is then used in Chapter 3 to argue that only such automous beings can be members of the moral community, and thus be rights-holders. Fox concludes that animals have a lesser, 'ambiguous,' moral status which allows us to use them for our ends, but also merits them protection from cruelty and inhumane treatment.

In the second part of the book, Fox turns specifically to scientific uses of animals. He discusses some notorious research, attempting to show that an examination of the larger context of the research and more information about details will vindicate even the paradigms of cruel and unnecessary research cited by the proponents of animal rights. He then turns to some observations concerning the nature of scientific inquiry itself, including our inability to foresee the applications which research will have, the need to manipulate variables under controlled conditions and to replicate results. These features of science are used to argue that the demands of animal welfarists misunderstand the nature of science. Fox then discusses the difficulties in determining the extent of animal suffering, and thus of knowing how to limit research. He dis-

cusses the possibilities for alternatives to the use of animals, and concludes that there are no viable alternatives to many of the current uses of animals. He concludes the book with some suggestions for humane reforms, emphasizing the use of animal care committees, education in humane treatment of animals for all those involved in experimentation, and 'universal but nonrestrictive' legislative standards of care and housing of laboratory animals.

Ch. 1, aptly entitled 'Fallacies in Our Thinking About Animals,' contains some very weak reasoning, including ad hominem and straw man attacks on those who defend an animal rights view. Fox claims that proponents of animal rights are inconsistent, sentimental, and irrational. Since it is possible to find irrational and inconsistent proponents of almost any view, Fox should have examined closely the carefully worked out arguments of those serious philosophers, such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer, who have argued for the rights of animals. Instead, Fox attacks the political movement, including the Animal Liberation Front and 'antivivisectionism' generally. He labels the antivivisection movement in Victorian England, for example, as involving a mental set which was 'mostly reactionary,' xenophobic, and antiscientific (11). Even if this were a fair description of the members of this movement, it would be an irrelevant attempt to discredit current proponents of animal rights through guilt by association. In the scant passages where he takes on the serious arguments of philosophers, Fox fails to characterize their views accurately. For example, his attack on Singer characterizes him as a hedonistic utilitarian, even though Singer's view has developed over the years since *Animal Liberation* toward preference utilitarianism. Fox fails to take into consideration the complexity of Singer's more developed view. He then proceeds to attack Singer for never explaining why the life of a self-aware being is more valuable than that of a more simple being (67). Since Singer has given an account of this in print in several places, Fox is simply unfair and misleading here. Fox only mentions Tom Regan's conclusions in order to label them as arbitrary and uncompromising (29). Given the stature of *The Case for Animal Rights*, and given the serious treatment of the very issues Fox is discussing (inherent value, the importance of various mental faculties, etc.) in that book, Fox's omission is simply irresponsible.

As Fox himself has subsequently admitted, his arguments for admitting only humans and other autonomous beings (if any) into the moral community are essentially arbitrary. In arguing that humans are uniquely autonomous, and that this autonomy constitutes a difference in kind, rather than in degree, Fox belies his claim to espouse an 'evolutionary perspective.' There is simply no place for such essentialism in Evolutionary Theory. Thus, the first part of the book, while informative for those interested in learning the justifications offered by the scientific community for animal research, breaks no new or interesting philosophical ground.

The second half of the book is somewhat more original. Fox makes a valiant attempt to defend some examples of research which animal rights advocates have pinpointed as most torturous and least valuable. But the defense of disputed research such as Harlow's infant monkey isolation experiments

and learned helplessness experiments is ultimately unconvincing. The animals in Harlow's experiments, for example, suffered extensively, and Fox does not convincingly show that the results could not have been obtained in other ways. In fact, extensive clinical data on humans was available all along which obviated the necessity of Harlow's research. His discussion of the nature of scientific research is essentially correct, however, in pointing out the serendipitous nature of many important and life-saving scientific discoveries. This points up the problem in demanding that all research with animals be justified as immediately applicable to major human health problems. It is simply impossible in many cases to know in advance that an experiment will be of major benefit. Fox fails to note that this conclusion gives as much comfort to abolitionists as to supporters of the status quo.

In discussing drug and product testing on animals, Fox draws the appalling conclusion that the widespread and unnecessary replication of pharmaceutical research is virtually inevitable within our current capitalist system (188). We have placed limits before on the ways in which capitalistic greed can express itself, by protecting humans from being used unwittingly as experimental subjects, for example. There is no reason to think we cannot do so here too. The recommendations for reform he offers in the final chapter are moderate; so much so that many of them are already part of current law.

Overall, the arguments in this book are indefensible, and Fox did well to retract them. Still, there is much to be learned from these mistakes, as well as from the subsequent arguments Fox has made in retracting his former views.

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EDUARD HANSLICK. *On the Musically Beautiful*. Translated by Geoffrey Payzant. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1986. Pp. xxiii + 127. US$19.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-015-9); US$4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-014-0).

Von Musikalisch-Schönen, written by the Viennese music critic Eduard Hanslick in 1854, is undoubtedly the best known tract of the nineteenth century on the subject of the aesthetics of music. Bobbs-Merrill's English edition (Library of Liberal Arts #45), in print since 1957, had regrettably lapsed as of a couple of years ago. Fortunately, Hackett has seen fit to rescue Hanslick's important work from the abyss so far as English speakers are concerned. It has been

clothed in new garb by Geoffrey Payzant, something of a Hanslick specialist, who has essayed his own translation. It is clearly none too soon for a second attempt, the first having been made, by Gustav Cohen, in 1891.

The present edition more than fills the gap left by its predecessor, being an improvement on it in most respects. Payzant has worked very conscientiously from the eighth edition of 1891. His edition includes the complete text of Hanslick's essay, rendered with accuracy and consistency; Hanslick's Foreword to the Eighth edition; and several supplements provided by Payzant himself. Hanslick's Foreword is especially useful, summarizing with clarity the two principal theses he wished to advance — the negative, that music does not have as its main purpose or power the representation of feelings, and the positive, that the beauty of a piece of music is specifically musical, *sui generis*.

Payzant's supplements include a preface of a biographical nature, a short bibliography of critical work on Hanslick, a concluding essay touching on some points of interpretation, and an extensive set of notes which further elucidate or document numerous matters in the text. The preface, in drawing upon some passages from Hanslick's autobiography and the first Foreword to *Von Musikalisch-Schönen*, aptly alerts the reader that Hanslick never intended his essay as a complete aesthetics of music, but only as a groundwork or prolegomenon to such — which, indeed, can make one more forgiving of its thinness at many points and its polemically unconciliatory tone throughout. The interpretive essay primarily defends the translator's rendition of the title and of an important phrase figuring in the expression of Hanslick's positive thesis. (I shall return to this momentarily.) Finally, one other feature of the present edition deserves special comment: Payzant has helpfully taken some passages in Hanslick's original text consisting in nothing but quotations from other writers, with minimal commentary, and placed them at the end of the essay, as separate appendices. This, as claimed, does improve the continuity of Hanslick's argument; I leave its cogency aside.

Now to matters of translation. Payzant renders 'Von Musikalisch-Schönen' as 'on the musically beautiful,' and 'tonend bewegte Formen' as 'tonally moving forms,' the latter being what Hanslick ringingly asserts to be the content (Inhalt) of music. This is as compared, respectively, with Cohen's 'the beautiful in music,' and 'sound and motion.' It is clear, as Payzant argues in his concluding essay, that the former are superior renditions. 'The musically beautiful' conveys better the idea, implicit in the hyphenated German, of a way of being beautiful (or aesthetically good) that is unique to music and indissolubly bound up with its special medium. Cohen's phrase, on the other hand, suggests that what will be explored is just beauty — that familiar aesthetic virtue — as it *happens* to appear in music. Similarly, 'tonally moving forms' suggests the unity and integrality of the tonal and dynamic (pitch and rhythmic) factors in music, whereas Cohen's phrase leaves them uncomfortably asunder. In general, Payzant's decision to translate 'Ton' by 'tone,' where Cohen has usually given 'sound,' is a good one. Through numerous phrases such as 'tonal system,' 'tone-forms,' 'tone-structure,' 'tonal connections,' Payzant succeeds in underlining the intended sense of Hanslick's positive thesis about mu-

sical beauty — that it is inseparable from the skein of autonomous, self-contained relationships that a tonal system (a framework of *related* sounds) represents. The consistency of rendition of 'Ton,' extending even to all its compounds, helps keep the importance of this Hanslickian idea — the internal relatedness of tones as essential to musical beauty — constantly before the reader.

In making some further observations on the translation as a whole, I will have to sound a few negative notes — but not so many, I trust, as to mar the overall major consonance of this review. I will be primarily concerned to contrast the present and the earlier version as tracts in English.

Despite its greater accuracy — or perhaps in some cases because of it — the new version is prevented from being a total success because the results are rather often less flowing and elegant when compared to their predecessors. Worse, but luckily infrequently, not only flow but also intelligibility has sometimes been diminished. For example, in the important discussion at the beginning of Chapter Two, on the logical analysis of emotion in general, Payzant gives the following: 'The feelings are not so isolated in the mind that they have made themselves the salient feature of an art to which the representation of the other mental activities is closed' (11). Several readings of this did not serve to discover to me what it meant, and it was only by repairing to Cohen, whose rendition is not among his best, that I received some illumination: 'Our emotions have no isolated existence in the mind and cannot, therefore, be evoked by an art which is incapable of representing the remaining series of mental states' (21). Later in the chapter, on the main theme of whether it is the necessary province of music to represent feelings, the supposedly feelingless preludes and fugues of Bach's *Well-Tempered Clavier* are thrown out as examples with which the enemy feeling theory will have to reckon. Payzant gives this: 'However, if important historically and aesthetically well-founded art genera have to be ignored in order sneakily to preserve a theory, then that theory is false' (14). Cohen's rendition is surely less awkward: 'But if large departments of art, which can be defended both on historical and aesthetic grounds, have to be passed over for the sake of a theory, it may be concluded that such a theory is false' (29).

A few pages later, Payzant has replaced Cohen's 'quarreling Jewish peddlers' (to which the fugato from the *Magic Flute* overture is being compared), with 'quarrelsome Jewish shopkeepers' (18). Why? It seems more likely the event in question would transpire in a market place, among vendors, than between *petits patrons* ensconsed in their separate establishments: furthermore, the progressive form of adjective, unlike the dispositional, conveys the appropriate sense of occurrent action. (The original, 'zankender handelsjuden,' would permit either rendering.) Turning to Chapter Three for one more example, we have a famous passage concerning the proximate causes of expressiveness in music. Here is Payzant: 'the powerful effect of a theme comes not from the supposed augmentation of anguish in the composer but from this or that augmented interval, not from the trembling of his soul but from the drumstrokes, not from his yearning but from the chromaticism' (33). And now

Cohen: 'the thrilling effect of a theme is owing, not to the supposed extreme grief of the composer, but to the extreme intervals; not to the beating of his heart, but to the beating of the drums; not to the craving of his soul, but to the chromatic progression of the music' (54). It seems plain the idea has been rendered with more symmetry and flair in the older version. As far as accuracy is concerned, it is more or less a toss-up; consider, for example, the middle phrase 'nicht in dem Zittern Seiner Seele, sondern im Tremolo der Pauken,' which neither renders in every particular.

It is time to right the balance by stressing some further significant successes of the new translation. On the matter of music and its evocative power, Payzant's rendition captures Hanslick's claim with exactitude, 'the connection between a piece of music and our changes of feeling is not at all one of strict causation; the piece changes our mood according to our changing musical experiences and impressions' (6). Whereas with Cohen, one is faced, implausibly, with what seems to be almost an outright denial of music's causal efficacy vis-à-vis a listener's emotional state: 'there is no causal nexus between a musical composition and the feelings it may excite, as the latter vary with our experience and impressibility' (14). In the course of his rendition of the crucial analysis of emotion at the beginning of Chapter Two, Payzant stresses in two places the important idea that part of the conceptual content of a specific emotion, without which it would not be identifiable as that specific emotion, consists in an 'actual historical content' (9), i.e. a set of real circumstances which occasion it. This idea, which is clearly present in Hanslick's original, is not to be found in Cohen's otherwise acceptable account. Lastly, I mention for special praise Payzant's treatment of a rather difficult paragraph near the beginning of Chapter Three, concerned with the way in which the notions of form, logic, language, thought, and truth — which have natural homes in other domains — should be understood in relation to music ['In no way...not at all the same thing.' (30)]. In passages such as that — and they are not at all uncommon — Payzant does indeed bring off the dual result of bettering Cohen in exactness and pithiness, while not entirely trading away style and elan.

My conclusion is implicit in what I have already had to say. In the best of all possible worlds we would have a version of this philosophico-musical classic which reflected all of Payzant's accuracy, attention to theoretic detail, and conciseness, while boasting at the same time a good portion of Cohen's elegance and ease. But in real world terms, what Payzant has given us has ample virtues, especially on the philosophical score, and we are thus very much in his debt. Even were Cohen's version to have remained in print, Payzant's would have largely superseded it.

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ANN HARTLE. *Death and the Disinterested Spectator: An Inquiry into the Nature of Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. 263. US$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-285-7); US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-284-9).

This book is an inquiry into the nature of the philosophical activity rather than a study of death as such. The author singles out the phenomenon of human mortality, and the question of the immortality of the soul, as the gateway to the nature of philosophy. Philosophy is presented as being an endless activity in which the philosopher, like Penelope, weaves and unweaves the thread of powerlessness into the quest for immortality; the philosopher expresses the desire to be like God, or pretends to be inhuman and unaffected by trivial matters such as death. The disinterest of the philosopher, however, belies a fundamental anxiety towards death (and insight into the nature of philosophy).

The argument is developed in four chapters. The first chapter contains a re-interpretation of *Phaedo*. The definition that dominates the discussion in the *Phaedo* is of philosophy as the art of separating the soul from the body (or ruling the body). The philosopher appears disinterested towards his very own death as a result of this detachment. Socrates is able to joke about his own death: this makes him appear to possess divine-like qualities unlike other (ordinary) humans. Socrates' attitude depends on the success of his argument for the immortality of the soul. Hartle says that Socrates' argument is troublesome: his argument assumes, not proves, the existence of the dead soul; the term dead, as an opposite of life, can only mean being separated from the body. 'And this is one of the first assumptions of the dialogue' (50). There is reason to think that Socrates' sureness of action is a deception and a self deception. The *Phaedo* is a myth (75).

There is a mood shift in the second chapter from the presumptuousness of Socrates to Augustine and the look of pity. The story of Augustine's contrition is told as a story of tears that beg for mercy. The absence of tears from the books of the Platonists is due to pride — they think themselves to be somehow divine — while, for Augustine, trembling and wonder are inseparable. Augustine assumes this posture only after having abandoned the attempt to be a disinterested spectator. His trembling is directed towards his personal fear of death, the fear that death is evil. The solution to this problem (112) is found in the discovery of a beauty that is embraced for its own sake. The love of God takes place as the disinterested union of two souls. The source of truth is in having been created by (unchangeable) God and acknowledging dependence on him.

The third chapter of the book takes a quantum leap from Augustine's dependence on God to Descartes' self-sufficiency. Hartle thinks, however, that Descartes' pretentiousness belies a deep rooted fear of death. This is a study of the *Discourse* in order to identify the hidden or shaded aspects of the *Discourse* that would confirm this interpretation: for example, the total absence of passion, of body, and of other men in what is being presented as the story

of a human life. Hartle finds that the fear of death is suggested in Descartes' references to the brevity of life, and the expression of urgency about his work. Descartes' intention is to rule no one but himself. He resolves to conquer himself rather than fortune and to change his desires rather than the order of the world. Descartes' resolve to obey the laws of his country and to keep faithfully the religion in which he was instructed from his childhood, his decision not to publish the treatise containing the principles of his physics, his deference to the authority of religion and the state are 'attempts to conserve health, to escape disease and perhaps even the enfeeblement of old age.' The mastery of nature, that is, over bodies by knowing them, is ultimately the attempt to conquer death by purely human means (188).

The fourth chapter of Hartle's book reinforces what has been said above. The very activity of (ancient) philosophy makes the philosopher appear to be more divine than human. The question of the immortality of the soul is the perfect issue (since the gods are immortal), to engage in this deception (myth). The disinterest of the philosopher is in fact not successful as philosophy is always forced to begin anew. This seems to be precisely what Descartes' *Discourse* (fable) is attempting to overcome as he sets out to replace wonder with certitude (201). Hartle says (207) that this is very much an attempt to eliminate fear, and in particular the ultimate fear, of death. This struggle is foreshadowed in Augustine, but whereas he resolves it on the level of trust in God (hope), Descartes' solution to the problem is found in the self-sufficiency of the *je pense, donc je suis*. Have we in our day moved away from the spirit of self-sufficiency? It seems not. The author says 'philosophy now, at least as it appears in the self-understanding of the analytic tradition (which has its origin in Descartes), is at best a rather pathetic, anemic handmaiden of science. It is embarrassed at its own powerlessness' (211).

This book is a re-interpretation of Plato's *Phaedo*, Augustine's *Confessions*, and Descartes' *Discourse on Method* in the light of philosophy as preparation for death. It is well written, although the title of the book is misleading since this is a book about the nature of philosophy not death. It states in fresh light the interpretation of philosophy as endless activity (wonder, laughter, tears, powerlessness, despair, hope, trembling, pride, weaving and unweaving ...). I have reservations, however, with the interpretation that is given to the *Discourse* as containing shaded or hidden meaning. I think that Descartes is one of those rare thinkers that lets the reader know exactly where things are. Descartes would not have been so silent on the issue of his very own powerlessness before death had it been a serious concern. The conclusion I draw from the book is that the preoccupation of *some* philosophers is preparation for death.

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WILLIAM LYONS. *The Disappearance of Introspection*. Cambridge, MA: Bradford 1986. Pp. xiii + 193. US$22.50. ISBN 0-262-12115-8.

The central thesis of this interesting book is that introspection as conceived in post-Cartesian philosophy of mind does not exist. Lyons (surely correctly) attributes to this tradition a belief in two levels of consciousness, with the stream of ordinary experience of external stimuli being itself monitored by a second level of experience. What is more, in Lyons' view, philosophers have characteristically theorized too far in advance of the facts, seeking to reconcile the alleged datum of introspection with favored overall theories of the mind without first investigating the datum in its own right. Thus, behaviorists construe the second level as proprioception of inhibited behavior, phenomenalists construe it as observation of sense-data, materialists construe it as the brain's self-scansion, and functionalists construe it as throughput to a physically unspecified speech center. In opposition to all this, Lyons argues that what the philosopher-in-the-street calls 'introspection' is simply the recall and imaginative reconstruction of first-order world-inspection, done for the purpose of self-understanding.

Lyons prefaces his positive view with extensive criticisms of the theories previously mentioned, interspersed with informative tidbits about who first said what where. He rejects behaviorism because there are no correlations between episodes of introspection and the right sorts of truncated behavior. (Throughout the book, Lyons freely mixes empirical psychology and anthropology with philosophical analysis.) He rejects brain scanning because, first, so mechanical and automatic a process would be as unreliable as ordinary 'introspection' manifestly is, and, second, the predicates used in 'introspective' reports correspond in no natural way to physiological similarity-classes of brain events. This first criticism deftly inverts familiar criticisms of introspection based upon its supposed *in*fallibility, and the second owes much to Davidson's 'anomalism of the mental.' Finally, Lyons rejects functionalism because functionalist flow-charts must either be cashed in for neural mechanisms — in which case functionalism inherits the difficulties of 'orthodox physicalism' — or risk being 'pure invention.'

Ironically, perhaps, Lyons' positive account begins with an observation stressed by materialists, namely that descriptions of inner experiences are parasitic on descriptions of public objects: 'when we come to describe our alleged introspectings, we do so in terms of what we introspect, not in terms of what it is like to introspect ... We "see" introspectively our childhood nursery or "hear" grandmother's voice' (88). Introspection has no phenomenology. 'Introspecting' a perceptual experience of smelling a burning slipper, say, is simply to 'replay the experience' itself. Whereas the experience of smelling a burning slipper is normally caused by burning slippers, in 'introspection' 'the brain processes that are the end product of receiving signals through the olfactory nerve endings ... are reactivated by some purely internal causal sequence' (117). To discover what smelling a burning slipper is like, we don't

examine our experience of the slipper; we carefully recreate our examination of the slipper.

Lyons treats the introspection of cognitive processes similarly. My verbal protocols about how I am adding 158 to 373 — 'Now I'm adding 8 and 3 to get 11; now I'm carrying the 1 ...' — are part of a *theory* I am constructing as to how I came to the answer 531. Experientially, the answers to questions just come to me; the processes that yield them 'lie hidden in the brain' (114). Any account I can give of what went on must be based upon processes with which I am familiar, which means, ultimately, processes I have perceived. My protocols are 'edited highlights' of how I learned to add figures at a blackboard, for instance, or of my mother's voice teaching me the rules of arithmetic. Lyons supplements this argument with empirical evidence of the interpretive nature of introspective reports, and of perception itself — since perception involves processing by the brain, my reports of how I perceive must be fallible speculations about hidden processes.

This book will undoubtedly disconcert philosophers accustomed to claiming immediate awareness of a distinction between their seeing things and their scrutinizing their seeings. Yet weaker forms of introspection withstand Lyons' strictures, especially if one distinguishes awareness *of* an experience *e* from awareness *that* (an) *e* (-like experience) has occurred. Human beings regularly report the occurrence of events *e* just like those normally accompanied by a public phenomenon *p* even when *p* is known not to occur. That this internal occurrence *e* controls the verbal response '*e*' implies an ability to discriminate the internal accompaniments of external stimuli — an ability surely deserving the name introspection without sarcasm quotes. It is also a skill prefigured in the non-linguistic abilities of animals but not fully available to them — another attribute of introspection, at least as conceived by physicalists. Dogs can be affected by their internal states — a dog's imaginings may make him run or whimper — but the limits on conditioning animal responses to these internal states suggest that animals cannot discriminate them in quite the way men do. Apes can apparently be taught names for their emotions ('Koko sad'), but can they be taught to summon up upon request the memory of seeing a red ball?

These criticisms are not intended as final, merely as indicative of the direction likely to be taken by discussions of this book. Discussion there is sure to be, for it is highly readable as well as provocative. Apart from his obeisance to the tedious demands of feminist syntax (and even he must sometimes use the bare pronoun 'he' to avoid unmanageable awkwardness), Lyons is a good writer who displays a vein of pawky humor.

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GERALD C. MacCALLUM. *Political Philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1987. Pp. x + 198. US$15.95. ISBN 0-13-684689-0.

Gerald MacCallum's *Political Philosophy* is a recent addition to Prentice-Hall's esteemed Foundation of Philosophy series. As a piece of analytical political theory, it concerns 'the nature of the fundamental institutions of political life — the state, government, and citizenship' (1). Throughout, MacCallum is little concerned with the form such institutions should take, but much concerned with determining what is relevant to settling normative issues.

MacCallum makes his readers aware of the complexity of political phenomena. He displays a well-informed sense of the history of political life and of political thought. He always begins his investigations of fundamental institutions — as well as of satellite ideas like authority, legitimacy, consent, government, sovereignty, nation, representation, constitution, obligation, and civil disobedience — with extended discussions of the ins and outs of thought and argument concerning them. Readers who already know much political theory may appreciate the points he makes. Beginning and intermediate level students will sometimes, I suspect, find his discussion directionless and tedious, especially since issues are often left up in the air and conclusions when offered are not well marked. MacCallum's excessively convoluted style exacerbates these problems for students. Clarifying what conclusions the ins and outs of issues were subordinated to would have made the book more accessible.

MacCallum locates the need for political institutions in the opportunities and threats to living well that life with others presents to each of us. Systematic Mutual Reliance (SMR) — a systematic form of co-ordination which sustains the ability of human beings to rely on each other — provides the solution. When mutual understanding alone, as opposed to univocal orders and commands, will not secure SMR, political community is typically needed.

In a political community a government regularly issues orders and commands to the population of a geographical territory. Not only does it claim legitimacy for its orders as well as priority in obedience to its commands (unless formally subordinated to another government); it also secures conformity to its orders and, typically, provides coercive backing for them. Authority is a source of orders and commands governing the relations of persons. It involves entitlement or purported entitlement to issue orders, give permissions, and empower persons. Entitlement in a community to do these things is a special licence to do these things in a community. It consists in 'being able to do it without giving offense in that (actual or ideal) community (that is, it is not, given the circumstances, contrary to the practices and usages of the community), and (expectedly) receiving support from the community' (86). Here MacCallum seems to link violating the conventions and practices of a community with giving actual offense.

At the same time, however, he distinguishes *de facto* authority from *de jure* authority. The latter 'is in accord with the practices, and so on, whether or not it is (substantially) effective in the community' (88). The former 'pur-

ports to be and to some degree is (ordinarily) thought to be (whether or not it actually is) in accord with the practices, and so forth, and is effective in the given social group' (88). Authority is *effective* in a community when the community complies with its orders and does not interfere with its permissions. However MacCallum never explains what distinguishes what a community believes to be in accord with its practices from what actually is in accord with its practices, despite lengthy discussions of consent and preference. Clearly the effectiveness of authority and commands is no mark. Nor will offense be unless it can be made clear how a community could ordinarily believe orders and permissions conformed to or violated its practices without ordinarily having the appropriate feelings, or how members of a community might be offended by orders without feeling offended by them.

These puzzles are intensified when MacCallum claims that authority is legitimate (involves genuine entitlement) when it is 'in accord with accepted standards or conventions' (115). What distinguishes orders which are ordinarily thought to be in accord with a community's practices from orders which are in accord with accepted conventions? At worst MacCallum's position is hopelessly obscure; at best it needs to be shown how its components fit together into a coherent whole.

More seriously, MacCallum, along with contemporary communitarian political theorists, gives the impression that communities define and are defined by rather comprehensive, definite, and above all coherent sets of norms or practices. Legitimacy then is just consistency with the set of norms; illegitimacy is inconsistency. However, if social conventions and practices evolve at different times in response to different pressures to deal with different problems, it would seem nothing short of miraculous if the practices and conventions of a community complying with some source of orders and commands were coherent when taken as a whole. Instead, one should expect to find, with Marxists but not necessarily for precisely Marxist reasons, societies full of conflict or potential for conflict (contradictory tendencies) with no easy, non-arbitrary way to resolve them. (Conflict, of course, may be intra-personal, as well as inter-personal, because the practices and standards adhered to by an individual may lack coherence when taken as a whole just as much as those adhered to by the members of a group may lack coherence when taken as a whole.)

MacCallum might argue that societies are typically more homogeneous than this view of societies suggests. However, it won't be enough to find some way of describing practices so that they are both shared by large numbers of persons in a political community and coherent. The level of description can't be so abstract as to leave far too many alternatives compatible with it — specifically the alternatives the legitimacy of which is at issue.

In the absence of any good reason for denying this view of societies — a view I think historically plausible and supported by modern historiography — three responses are in order. With Marxists one might deny the applicability of the whole idea of legitimacy in politics. One might be sceptical of MacCallum's conception of the idea of legitimacy and thus search for another.

Alternatively, one might try to explain how authority might be in accord with conventions and practices which are not themselves entirely coherent when taken as a whole. These questions need to be addressed by anyone attracted by MacCallum's account of legitimacy.

MacCallum concludes with the issue of whether human life is perfected in political community. He contrasts Emma Goldman with Rousseau on freedom and self-development in political community, and also suggests that political life and intimacy are 'dissonant':

> The machinery characteristic of political life — rules, regulations, orders, commands, and the accompanying principles and standards — make their appearance and find their use when wordless mutual understanding is insufficient to sustain Systematic Mutual Reliance...and intrudes upon the relationships of people who are capable of proceeding rather far into schemes of Systematic Mutual Reliance through wordless mutual understanding alone. (187)

(Surely MacCallum does not wish to identify wordy relationships with political relationships.) MacCallum needs to reconcile his suggestion with an earlier argument that there is no necessary conflict between authority and autonomy when the latter takes the form of self-limitation by someone who recognizes the value of authority for himself and others. In any case, why is it a morally defective life in which intimate relationships are governed and constrained by rules which the partners recognize as just or necessary for a life which is best overall? Even if intimacy is a good (i.e., a life with it is better than a life without it, all things considered) it doesn't follow that life within political community but without politically unconstrained intimacy is defective. As MacCallum recognizes elsewhere, if a life with all the goodies is impossible, a life with some goodies is not defective in comparison to a life with all the goodies or even to a life with some other goodies instead. By not discussing the topics of the good, the greatest good, justice or rights in any detail, MacCallum's whole discussion of this issue suffers, as does his discussion of many other issues. For example: how to balance the opportunities for self-development mutual reliance provides with the threats to self-reliance and all-round development of a person's capacities it produces, how orders can be justifiable without being legitimate, how a form of government can be legitimate without being preferable to other forms of government.

In defence he mentions that these topics are discussed in other works in the series. Nonetheless, as a result he limits the appeal of his book to the general reader and reduces its value as a supplementary text in undergraduate political philosophy classes. The cost of these volumes makes the use of several, in addition to the usual classics, prohibitively expensive. Perhaps the editors shouldn't think different perspectives on overlapping issues a vice in the series. In any case, the volume needs an index.

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G.B. MADISON. *The Logic of Liberty*. New York: Greenwood Press 1986. Pp. xiv + 293. US$37.95. ISBN: 0-313-25018-9.

The purpose of this book is stated with deceptive modesty as being: to understand the meaning and implications of liberty or freedom, the two terms being synonymous in Madison's usage. Hegel and Ellul are adduced as authorities who upheld the view that 'the history of the West is nothing other, at bottom, than the history of the development of the idea of freedom.' This 'idea' found 'its full expression in the form of a general political philosophy,' namely liberalism. Liberalism, we may say, is the self-consciousness of the West. This is a grave burden and one not usually borne by liberalism or by liberals. It is lightened by the fact that, to the extent that readers are self-conscious liberals, Madison is writing for an audience enjoying the sabbath of Western history. Even so, liberalism is not undisputed in its claim to give, or to have given, form to the history of the West.

Madison's first task, accordingly, is to straighten our crooked usages: liberalism is opposed to socialism and is not conservatism. Madison's is a 'classical liberalism.' Moreover, it exists in the form of a tradition that Madison would affirm and, in affirming, keep alive as a useful guide to policy and to the maintenance of public order. Madison's major sources are found in French and American writers of the eighteenth century and in the contemporary economists Hayek, von Mises, and Frank Knight. The argument seeks to rescue liberalism from the groundless charge that it is unmodern. As the self-consciousness of Western history it must be modern. Likewise it is 'an essentially revolutionary philosophy,' and 'essentially a philosophy of the future,' and 'mankind's only real alternative to barbarism.' Liberalism is a 'pure' philosophy, in that it is uncontaminated by references to nature, to a historical dialectic that is supposed to ensure a future without contradiction, or to a transcendent ground. 'It is a strictly human philosophy, and, like human freedom itself, it is its own justification.'

Part I is an account of the forces threatening liberty; Part II is an account of the principles that answer the threat. It is the simplest possible structure that an argument can take: (1) the problem and (2) the solution. The great merit of the book, illustrated in the foregoing quotations, is that it deals with Marxists and other progressive sectarians in a language they can understand. Anyone relying on Montesquieu, Hamilton or Hayek will bring commonsense to bear on the topic. But those same quotations indicate the book's great defect.

The topic that constitutes the problem is Tocqueville's nightmare, democratic despostism (see *Democracy in America*, II, 4:6). Madison shows easily enough that the modern world is enacting Tocqueville's bad dream. Equality has been invoked to suppress liberty; technology has become the form of life that delivers commodities by way of the interventionist welfare state. The great danger in such a regime is that its legitimacy is assured only so long as the economy expands. This condition of affluence, Madison fears, is temporary and, what is worse, it implies that governmental legitimacy is a result

of administrative competence rather than political virtue. Madison has indicated one of the great unresolved questions of modern political speculation: does the government serve to promote freedom and presuppose a virtuous citizenry or does it serve to promote affluence and presuppose a commercial society? In the course of arguing for the former, the author makes some useful criticisms of Habermas' notion of 'communicative rationality' and of Rawls' opinions about justice. He does not notice — and this is the book's defect — that he has committed a kind of decapitation of human life similar in principle to those he criticizes so well. It is safe to say that Madison was bound to do this once the commitment was made to a 'philosophy' that was its own justification, was revolutionary, and so on.

Within the limits of a review one can only hint at why this is so. The author rejects, again on grounds of commonsense, the modern doctrine of jurisprudence called legal positivism, but also the argument that goes by the name 'natural right.' To do so he distinguishes between positive statutory law and fundamental law, which is also enacted rather than experientially found, but which cannot easily be altered. Sometimes this is called 'the constitution' or 'constitutional law.' But it may be wondered whether the argument used against legal positivists by Madison — the argument that (and here Madison quotes Leo Strauss) the rejection of natural right implies the embrace of the notion that right is made and made up by legislators and courts — could not with equal force be directed against the fundamental law.

The example of the Constitution of the United States is used to meet this objection, and Madison gathers a great deal of evidence to indicate that many concur in the opinion that it was a sound document. The basis of that opinion was and is that it secured a decent political regime, not that it secured an affluent society. Without entering into the question of the decency of the regime (a question disputed by Loyalists, among others), it is sufficient to observe that, in the absence of any analysis of the principles of the American founding, we are left with conflicting opinion. Questions of principle include such 'metaphysical fictions' as the truth or falsity of the claim that men are created and so endowed by their creator with certain rights. Instead we get a recounting of the doctrine of checks and balances and some intemperate remarks on Burke.

Madison has written a practical book, designed to stiffen the spines of liberals in the face of threats by socialists and new kinds of tyrannies associated with interventionist bureaucracies. Such threats to freedom, and thereby to the presumed meaning of Western history, induce an understandable anxiety and fear of 'barbarism.' It is not from a malicious design to interfere with a cure to such anxieties that I would insist this is not a political philosophy. It is a kind of Varronic civil theology interspersed with *ex cathedra* pronunicamentos on such genuine political philosophers as Plato and Machiavelli and, yes, Leo Strauss. Dogmatic assertions that 'there is no place for teleology in the realm of scientific discourse' indicate the author's allegiance to a simple, nineteenth-century conceit regarding the meaning of science.

Moreover, such remarks reveal a regrettable unawareness of the achievements of political science, the Aristotelian *epistēmē politikē*, over the last generation or so.

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KENNETH MALY and PARVIS EMAD, eds. *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*. Queenston, ON and Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press 1986. Pp. x + 186. Cdn$59.95; US$59.95. ISBN 0-88946-305-0.

This review will represent an interpretation of Maly's and Parvis', and others', interpretations of Heidegger's interpretation(s) of Heraclitus. In other words, the reader has entered a hall of mirrors. There is also a little Parmenides thrown in, especially in the essay by Jean Beaufret (which is nice to have available in English), as also in the essay 'Dissensions' by Heribert Boeder. Indeed, one can only agree with the latter (175) that the question of ἀλήθεια became a central issue only with Parmenides, something that the reader might have liked to know earlier.

The aim of the volume is a presentation of Heidegger's thinking-reading interpretation of Heraclitus, as distinct from that of the tradition or the 'philologists,' so that there might be a 'thinking through the issues which Heidegger raises' (7). The editors are convinced that this reading takes place 'from within phenomenology' (ix), and that ' ... for Heidegger Heraclitus' thinking is phenomenological thinking' (5).

The book usefully gathers together in one place (9-68) the Heraclitean fragments (or parts thereof) which Heidegger quotes in his various works: the Greek text from Diels (with whatever Heideggerian emendations), then Heidegger's German translation(s), followed by the English translation of Heidegger's German translation(s). One quickly comes to appreciate the truth of the Heideggerian view that a translation is already an interpretation. Heraclitus' 'sleepers' quickly become 'everyday *Dasein*.' Such *termini technici* as *Lichting* and *Seinsgeschick* find their way into the trans-lation. But this is all familiar Heidegger.

The editors, in their 'thoughtful resumé(s)' concentrate primarily on the material from lectures given by Heidegger on Heraclitus in 1943 and 1944 and published in vol. 55 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Kenneth Maly on the 1944 course *Logic: The Teaching of Heraclitus on Logos*, and Parvis Emad on the 1943

course on Heraclitus' fragment 16. There are also two spin-off essays from the 1944 lecture course, one by Steven Davis, 'Philosophy in its Originary Pre-Metaphysical Sense,' and one by Davis and Maly reading Heraclitus' fragment 112, in which the authors use that fragment to sum up Heidegger's lecture course on Heraclitus.

The authors speak good Heideggerian, some of which is always troubling when it comes to understanding the ancient Greek philosophers. For example, they note (95) Heidegger finding an identification between ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη in Plato and Aristotle. I do not find it. On the contrary, in the *Metaphysics* 981a 1-3 Aristotle says that it only seems (δοκεῖ) they are the same; really both come to human beings through experience (ἐμπειρίας). Similarly, in Plato's *Republic* 422c there is a tie-up between ἐπιστήμη and ἐμπειρία, and also a mention of the art of boxing and its possible relation to fighting in war; but these would presumably stand in closer relation to 'experience' than to science.

In his essay on Heidegger's reading of fragment 16 in the 1943 course Emad is certainly correct in saying (134) that Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus is deeply rooted in his views on language, and that this view of language prepares the way for the treatment of language that occurs later in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Nevertheless, I have my doubts that the view of authentic language in *Sein und Zeit* (*Rede*), after 'the switch' (*die Kehre*) is of a piece with the later notion of language as *Sage*. This latter is less formal discourse (*Rede*) and more formal silence: it is more listening (to the Unsaid? the Unthought?) than speaking. Therefore, I am not certain what is meant when it is said that *Sage* is 'phenomenologically directed' (126). In other words, I have a great deal of difficulty viewing Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus, or of any other philosopher for that matter, as 'phenomenological.' Indeed, one may suspect that the very reason Heidegger turns to the ancient pre-Socratics is precisely in order to escape the sort of subjectivity which he came increasingly to associate with (Husserlian) phenomenology: does not 'Descartes' often become a code name for Husserl in the Heideggerian corpus? There may be 'relativity' in Heraclitus, but certainly not subjectivity in some post-Cartesian sense.

Heidegger, it may rightly be said, has insured that the battleground of contemporary philosophy after 'the end of philosophy' will be back at the beginning with the pre-Socratics. And this volume can assist in that *Auseinandersetzung*. Still, while reading the collection of material I could not help but reach for my trusty Volume I of the *History of Greek Philosophy* to remind myself how the *philologist* Guthrie took the 4th century B.C. Greek usage of the word *Logos* and made it cast an ancient light upon the meanings of the one Aristotle designated ὁ σκοτεινός, the obscure.

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MICHAEL NILL. *Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon, and Democritus*. Leiden: E.J. Brill 1985. Pp. 123. US$14.50. ISBN 90-04-07319-1.

The purpose of this book is to provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of what Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus had to say about the compatibility of morality and self-interest. These three predecessors of Plato were selected because 'there is a logical progression in their views and a steady advance in their understanding of the issue ... '(2). The author claims that his 'analysis will show that these theorists ... argued systematically for their views ... ' and 'that they fully laid out the central issues and many of the arguments which are relevant to the question of the relationship between morality and a person's egoistic good' (3). The book consists of a short introductory chapter and three longer chapters each of which is devoted to the moral view of one of the theorists in question.

In each of the substantive chapters the author is faced with a dual task. He must first uncover (or at any rate, speculate as to) the content of the moral theory of the thinker in question. Second, he must indicate how that theory contributes to understanding the relationship between morality and self-interest. We will consider first his manner of accomplishing the former task, and conclude with a brief evaluation of his success with the latter.

Nill is faced with considerable textual problems in identifying the moral thought of each of the thinkers he has chosen. The extant fragments attributed to Protagoras, for instance, number eight at best. None of these deals directly with moral theory. The chapter on Protagoras is thus devoted to reconstructing what his moral views must have been given Plato's discussion in the *Protagoras* and in the *Theaetetus*. Nill is aware that Plato was less than sympathetic to Protagoras, and that all that is attributed to him in these dialogues cannot be taken at face value. Consequently he endeavors to 'attribute to Protagoras only those moral claims likely to have been made by him' (4). What follows is an interesting reconstruction — and to some extent a transformation — of the two dialogues in question. The *Protagoras* is no longer an examination of whether or not virtue can be taught, but rather a discourse on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a political community. In the process it is discovered that 'Protagoras' views are remarkably similar to the recently propounded minimal natural-law theory of H.L.A. Hart' (23). The discussion of the conditions of knowledge, presented in the *Theaetetus*, is construed as background to what Nill takes to be the two major issues of that dialogue (31), namely the question of whether or not Protagoras is a skeptical relativist in matters of morality, and of the role of the wise man in advising a political community. Nill concludes the chapter by suggesting that his study 'may indicate that Plato saw as the most objectionable feature of Protagoras' moral theory, not its relativism, but its inability to show that acting morally necessarily benefits the agent' (51).

Textual problems of a different nature are faced in the discussion of Antiphon. The task here is to make coherent the seemingly incompatible positions

presented in the Stobaeus fragments (dated from the fifth century A.D.) and the papyrus fragments discovered in this century. Here Nill provides an interesting discussion of the relationship between *nomos* and *physis* as conceived by Antiphon. While it may be excessive to claim that the 'views in the papyrus and Stobaeus fragments are entirely consistent' (53), Nill nevertheless does make some significant progress in the direction of that conclusion. In that the discussion of morality and self-interest is carried on in this chapter in the context of the relationship between *nomos* and *physis*, the material presented there is the most convincing and valuable portion of the book.

Although the majority of the 298 fragments attributed to Democritus concern ethical matters, he is not generally known for his moral theory. He is a natural philosopher, and his ethical writings are often considered to be either inauthentic, or trivial. Nill, however, believes the fragments to be both authentic (75), and the moral view presented there to be quite complex. His discussion of these fragments centres on Democritus' conception of *euthymia* (cheerfulness), which includes a distinction between objective and subjective goods (83). Nill argues that Democritus largely internalized man's good, thus making a significant advance over Antiphon and Protagoras (83). Thus 'his importance in the development of Greek moral theory is indisputable' (91). This last is puzzling in that up until now Democritus has virtually been ignored as a moral theorist, and Plato makes no reference whatsoever to his moral views. Given Plato's silence we are left with a paradoxical situation. If Nill is correct in attributing a sophisticated moral view to the author of these fragments, their authenticity is even more disputable than if one maintains that the view presented there is trivial. But of course if the view is trivial it is uninteresting as far as Nill's present project is concerned. In fact the view that Nill finds expressed in these fragments has some parallels in Stoic and Epicurean thought which he does not consider here. So while there may be some contributions in this chapter, they do not help to establish the overall thesis.

The major failing of this book is that Nill assumes the problem of morality and self-interest as discussed by the ancients, is identical to the problem of *rational* self-interest as it is addressed by contemporary theoreticians such as Gauthier (92). This is simply not the case. The ancient view might be more accurately characterized as *teleological* self-interest in that the discussion always assumes a *telos* toward which both the individual and society are progressing. The tension is thus not between being rational and being moral — which finds its birth in Hobbes — but between that which is natural (*physis*) and that which is conventional (*nomos*). The problem is one of explaining apparent inconsistencies when the latter fails to reflect the former. In attempting to link the views of these three ancient philosophers to a contemporary problem which is not their own, Nill is often guilty of forcing his interpretation of them.

There is some interesting (even valuable) material in this book, but given the failure to establish the overall thesis the chapters may best be read as independent essays.

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ZENON W. PYLYSHYN and WILLIAM DEMOPOLOUS, eds. *Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation 1986. Pp. xi + 264. US$39.50. ISBN 0-89391-372-3.

This interesting volume arises from a conference at the University of Western Ontario in 1981. The delay in publishing derives from its unusual nature: in addition to four main position papers and eight commentaries, there are transcriptions of many comments made at workshops on the principal papers.

The four position papers contain material that is familiar from other sources. Jerry Fodor's 'The Modularity of Mind' summarizes the view developed more fully in his book of the same title. Allen Newell's 'The Symbol Level and the Knowledge Level' overlaps some of his other published discussions of the topic. Similarly, many of the ideas in William Woods' 'Problems in Procedural Semantics' and in Hilary Putnam's 'Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory' have been presented elsewhere.

Nevertheless, this is a useful book. Fodor's paper is accompanied by discussions by Scott Fahlman and David Kaplan, and the general discussion includes a reply by Fodor as well as comments by Ronald de Sousa, Patrick Hayes, Hilary Putnam, Pat Churchland, Steve Zucker, Ned Block, Allen Newell, and Zenon Pylyshyn. Newell's paper is discussed by Brian Smith and Daniel Dennett and commented on by Michael Friedman, John Haugeland, Jerry Fodor, and Patrick Hayes. William Woods' paper is followed by commentaries by John Haugeland and Janet Fodor and remarks by Patrick Hayes, Ronald de Sousa, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Ned Block, John Macnamara, William Harper, and Michael Lipton. Finally, Hilary Putnam's paper is accompanied by discussions by Michael Lipton and Robert Matthews as well as comments by Jerry Fodor, Patrick Hayes, William Woods, Dan Dennett, Edward Stabler, Paul Churchland, and Steve Zucker. As this cast of characters indicates, the 1981 conference brought together some of the leading figures in cognitive science and the resulting book provides an informative racapitulation of what must have been an exciting event. One advantage of this format is that the speakers are sometimes less carefully guarded than they would be in a more formal presentation, therefore revealing more of their positions. Another is that the discussions show the give and take of philosophical and scientific argument at a level of detail rarely seen in print.

Fodor's paper recapitulates his claims that the mind has innate modules for functions such as language. Fahlman argues in reply that greater attention to parallel mechanism in the central knowledge store shows how input modules could make extensive use of that knowledge rather than being encapsulated. Kaplan discusses the relevance of research on neuropathology to Fodor's thesis, arguing that it suggests levels of representation in language processing and interactions between modules of a language processor. The general discussion touches on many interesting philosophical and psychological questions.

Newell's paper presents his and Herbert Simon's view of computers and people as physical symbol systems. He describes the knowledge level as a way of talking about what can be done computationally with certain symbols and processes even though one may not be able to know exactly how the system will behave. Smith questions whether the notion of computational levels is as clear and fixed as Newell maintains. Dennett points out that his idea of the intentional stance is very close to Newell's idea of the knowledge level and defends them. One highlight of the discussion is Friedman's historical discussion of designation and logical syntax.

Woods' paper claims that there is a concept of semantics emerging from work in artificial intelligence and addresses some of the problems to be worked out in developing a procedural semantics for natural language. Haugeland attempts to clarify several central issues of semantics and to point to those to which procedural semantics is relevant. Janet Fodor warns against what she sees as the verificationist and behaviorist leanings of procedural semantics. In the discussion, Block makes some interesting points about an emerging 'two-factor' theory of meaning.

Putnam discusses whether the mind uses some kind of formalized language both as medium of representation and medium of computation. He rejects his earlier view of mental states as functional states. Lipton compares the views of Putnam and Pylyshyn on sameness of content. Matthews challenges Putnam's argument that there is no principled criterion of sameness. The discussion touches on numerous issues concerning computation and meaning.

Because of the high level of discussion, this book is not suitable for someone looking for an introduction to central issues in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. For readers already investigating topics such as modularity and meaning, however, this painstakingly compiled volume will make for enjoyable browsing.

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TOM REGAN, ed. *Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1986. Pp. xii + 270. US$24.95. ISBN 0-87722-411-0.

This book consists of nine essays, the last seven of which were originally delivered at a 1984 London conference sponsored by the International Association Against Painful Experiments on Animals. Tom Regan, who was Conference Chair, writes a very brief Preface, but otherwise remains in the background as editor.

The views of the contributors are not to be confused with Regan's own. There is, indeed, no single view that emerges from this fascinating juxtaposition of religious traditions. Regan's main point in the Preface is that philosophical ethics is far ahead of religious ethics in dealing with animal issues. For the most part religious thinkers have not even raised these questions. A similar point is made by John Bowker in his Introduction, which alerts the reader that there will be no simple religious clarity on the topic. Religions embody fundamental evaluations. Just as their evaluations and value-laden beliefs differ profoundly on the character of the human condition, they differ as well on the status of animals.

A second introductory chapter was added by Sidney Gendin to describe essential facts about the experimental uses of animals, world wide. Though by no means 'neutral' in language or effect, this chapter was needed in addition to the Conference papers to show the scale (500 million animals killed each year!) and the variety of the book's ethical subject matter.

The collection's main substance consists in seven chapters on ethics and animals reflecting eight religious perspectives: Jewish (J. David Bleich), Anglican (Andrew Linzey), Roman Catholic (James Gaffney), Muslim (Al-Hafiz B.A. Masri), Hindu (Basant K. Lal), Jaina and Buddhist (Christopher Chapple), and Confucian (Rodney L. Taylor). These wonderfully various chapters beg for detailed treatment not possible here. We can, however, note certain striking aspects they have in common.

One obvious point made by virtually all the authors is that the explicit subject, the ethics of the use of animals in science, is blatantly anachronistic if sought as such in any of the ancient traditions. This is essentially a modern issue; any religious pronouncements upon it will be extrapolations from doctrines or rules or attitudes formed long before the day of laboratory science and research imperatives. All the contributors, however gladly or reluctantly, are modernizers when it comes to that issue.

This gives rise to a second commonality: the modern theme is usually dealt with very briefly, in a concluding section added to a much fuller exposition of the approach of some religious tradition to animals in general — toward slaughter and meat-eating, kindness and cruelty, hunting and pet-keeping, husbandry and ritual sacrifice, immortality and reincarnation, or the like. This is no complaint, since the main lines of these general religious attitudes will

in many ways be more interesting to philosophers than the obligatory concluding homilies.

A third common theme is the marked absence of support for 'animal rights.' Most of the traditions agree that there are limits on what human beings should do to animals. But there is hardly a hint that animals themselves could have any claims against us. If there are limits, they are either ritually established, or imposed on us by a divine ethical lawmaker, or accepted for our own human purity and ethical maturation.

The latter point, fourth, illustrates the surprising degree of anthropocentrism — at least relative to animals — in the great religious traditions. Even in the least anthropocentric of all the religions discussed, Jainism, the human state is crucial as the only one in which *jiva* can be freed from the bondage of *karma* (215). Hinduism goes further, picturing inferior lower forms as suffering for their prior misdeeds, thus forfeiting any claims on their human superiors (206). Buddhism, too, though rejecting animal sacrifices, sees rebirth in animal form as a punishment (219). Confucianism firmly insists on the priority of human relationships over those between humans and non-humans (239). Islam claims 'vice-regency' for the human race (177). And the biblical religions of Judaism and Christianity both have the well-known heritage of 'dominion' doctrines to deal with.

Fifth, even though constraints against human abuses of animals remain mainly extrinsic to the animals concerned and mainly calculated on a net-benefit-to-humans basis, there emerges a significant consensus among these religious positions against inflicting pain on animals in the development or marketing of 'frivolities' like cosmetics or other items pandering to human vanity. Most approve of discriminating and minimal use of animals in medical research. There is no consensus at all over the propriety of using animals simply for educational training (e.g., in high school biology classes) or for general research.

Philosophers who read this book will recognize that Tom Regan was right. Many of the issues crucial to philosophical ethics are hardly raised here. (1) Despite many vague appeals against 'unnecessary' pain or killing in pursuit of human goods, hardly any explicit attention is given the criteria of what counts as necessary, though these seven gentlemen all seem to recognize 'frivolity' when they see it in the cosmetics industry. (2) When medical experiments on animals are approved '*if and only if ... the benefits humans receive far outweigh the pain animals endure*' (208), no attention is paid to the conceptual issues of distributive justice involved in weighing pain (however much or great) suffered by one group against benefits accruing only to another. (3) The bounds of moral considerability are sometimes blurred when appeals to the protection of animals rest merely on their status as being part of God's creation. To say, 'animals are valuable *in themselves* by virtue of their creation by God' (134), fails to distinguish animals from anything else, since ex hypothesi everything in the world falls into the same class, and on this ground even absolute vegetarianism or walking on the earth could be morally objectionable. (4) Conditions of intrinsic value, as in (3) above, are not carefully explored.

This book should thus be seen as an important departure for students of religion and as welcome grist for philosophers' continuing discussions. As Bowker said in his Introduction: '... this book is not the conclusion — it is the beginning of an argument and debate' (12). So it is; and so it should be.

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JOHN SALLIS. *Delimitations: Phenomenology at the End of Metaphysics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986. Pp. xi + 210. US$22.50. ISBN 0-253-31691-x.

Sallis' book is a collection of fifteen essays grouped into four sections according to their themes: three essays inspired by the contemporary Continental notion of the end of metaphysics and the issue of the role of imagination in metaphysical construction; three methodological reflections on issues raised by Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger; seven interpretive essays on Heideggerian texts; and two essays on the beginning of metaphysics in Greek thinkers. Some of the essays, generally the most lucid and accessible ones, were originally presented as lectures; others were published in journals or anthologies.

The first two essays are worth considering in the most detail since they provide the motive and recurring motif for the collection. In the opening 'Imagination and Metaphysics' Sallis' attempt to show that imagination was the source of metaphysics acknowledged by Plato's Socrates is undermined by the problems he himself points out. Sallis regards Socrates' attempt to find the *logoi* of things as prompted by Socrates' suggested analogy to the procedure of studying a thing in an image rather than looking at it directly, but he properly notes that Socrates revokes the suggested parallel by claiming that his procedure actually inverts this representative relation by really going from the image of a reality as found in a sensible thing to its original reality in a form, i.e., its *eidos*.

Sallis suggests that the distinction between the two segments of the divided line which represents the sensible world is a matter of *eikasia* or imagination apprehending the image character of images and grasping the originals which they represent. Thus begins the progress up the divided line. As Sallis concludes, 'In this sense, then, one may say that metaphysics is a matter of

imagination, provided, of course, that one distinguished between imagination and mere fancy. It is a matter of eikastic imagination, not of phantastic imagination' (6).

However, Plato seems to regard *eikasia* as much closer to mere fancy than Sallis allows, not a source of truth or a means to knowledge but a dwelling in illusion. *Pistis*, not *eikasia*, makes the first step up the divided line by recognizing the original from which the image comes. Even the image-making demiurge of the *Timaeus* surely operates by *epistēmē*, not *eikasia*, as Sallis suggests (8); it creates images but only on the basis of knowledge of the original *eidos*. As Sallis notes, the Platonic Socrates constantly criticizes imagination and bemoans its dangers as employed by the poets and painters. If imagination was not given credit as the source of metaphysics to begin with, then Sallis' ensuing argument about its suppression in subsequent philosophers such as Pico della Mirandola and its recollection by Kant and Nietzsche falls through.

The next essay, 'The End of Metaphysics: Closure and Transgression' (17-28), examines the task at the end of metaphysics. Sallis distinguishes four perspectives from which metaphysics has been said to be at an end: those of Nietzsche; Kant and Hegel; Heidegger; and Husserl. The three strategies of 'transgression' which Sallis suggests are capable of moving us beyond these ends of metaphysics all are based on the Heideggerian idea that traditional metaphysics went wrong because of its fixation on presence.

Yet this notion, mentioned often in the course of the book, remains unclear. Why is Socrates' claim about the *logoi* any more tied to presence than Thales' 'It's all water'? True, *logoi* are not subject to the flux of the sensible world (5ff.), but, then, this might be grounds for calling philosophy a search for a metaphysics of eternality, not presence. This still mysterious Heideggerian notion needs extensive, direct explication, not continual but passing mention. At the end of the second essay Sallis' reiterated appeal to imagination as a means of freeing metaphysics from its obsession with presence, justified on the grounds that imagination invokes what is absent, leaves one wondering what kind of new insight into reality is to be gained by, to use Sallis' examples, imagining a castle thousands of miles away or viewing a self-portrait by Dürer (27). And how is such imagination different from 'mere fancy' if not by its reference to an at least once present reality whose essence is to be captured? Sallis clearly has interesting thoughts on this issue, but they need to be developed in detail.

The three essays of the next section are concerned with the method of phenomenology. 'Hegel's Concept of Presentation' (40-62) is immersed in Hegel's discussion of method in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind* and does not bring any external perspective to bear which would help the knowledgeable reader who is still perplexed by the Hegelian system. The next discussion of 'Image and Phenomenon' (63-75) justifies phenomenology's claim that it reaches to 'the things themselves' by a subtle account of the differences between things and images but then only proceeds to conflate the two by suggesting that when we see a thing through its profile (as we always do) we are seeing something like an image of it. The last essay of this group provides a

very good discussion of the reason why phenomenology must be hermeneutical and perhaps ultimately even 'deconstructive' of itself.

The seven essays of the next section offer excellent, lucid interpretations of issues and passages from Heidegger texts, mostly from *Being and Time*. Both tyro and specialist will benefit from Sallis' close readings. The two essays in the concluding section of the book take the reader on an excursion into Heidegger's thought on the beginning of metaphysics. The last one, 'Hades' (186-93), is a delightful piece of Heideggerian hermeneutics on Heraclitus' dictum that 'Souls smell in Hades.'

The audience for the book must be tailored to particular essays. Some of the essays on *Being and Time* would be useful for undergraduate students of Heidegger as well as advanced scholars; but other essays, e.g., the one on Hegel, may be dense and unyielding even for teachers of the subject. The book is appropriately possessed by libraries that accommodate both advanced undergraduates and scholars of the field of contemporary Continental philosophy.

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REINER SCHÜRMANN. *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*. tr. Christine-Marie Gros. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987. Pp. ix + 406. US$37.50. ISBN 0-253-32721-0.

The original version of this text, published in 1982 by Editions du Seuil under the title *Le principe d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question d'agir*, was reviewed in *CPR/RCCP* 3 (1983) 94-7. For a summary and critique of its main thesis, the reader is referred there. The present translation appears in the Indiana University Press series 'Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy' (General Editor, James M. Edie), and was made by Ms. Gros 'in collaboration with the author.' The result is felicitous.

The English text, however, is somewhat more than a translation. At various points, Schürmann has enlarged the original, devleoping some issues more fully and supporting some arguments in more detail. By and large, these changes constitute additions rather than revisions. They do not alter the main thesis (cf. *CPR/RCCP* 3 [1983], 94-5), but they do serve for a better understanding of it. In this way, the English text improves upon, without going beyond, the original. There is, however, one difference between the two versions that deserves note. The French title, *Le principe d'anarchie* is clearly ironic, evoking

thought about the relation of 'principle' to the '*archē*' and its negation in 'anarchy.' In contrast, the English title is much less subtle, signaling in a less interesting way with respect to being and acting, the 'overcoming' of metaphysics. Yet this is only a cavil. In either version, Schürmann's study is an important and learned contribution to the interpretation of Heidegger, as well as a response in its own right to the question 'What is to be done at the end of metaphysics?'

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