

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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*Journal of Indian Council of
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Editor D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

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GEORGE ALLAN. *The Importances of the Past*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. xii + 260. US\$44.50. ISBN 0-88706-116-8.

The natural drift of things is towards increased entropy. The effort to make something, or even to preserve past accomplishment, cuts against the drift. The creation of anything of value requires a supporting environment. Tradition is the only way to overcome insistent entropy — a broadly gauged unity, a general structure of accomplishments, that can be the foundation for one's own lesser accomplishments. But a cultural heritage is dependent on freedom. Lacking the relative assurances of biological transmission, tradition disciplines freedom, by turning spontaneity into a servant of the orderly. Tradition is imagination at work, its more playful fantasies harnessed to a daring purpose. Freedom if pinned down by habit, sloth, and custom, by itself alone cannot make free. But liberty can only liberate when it is guided by resolve, loyalty and commitment. Tradition is the well-spring of human fulfillment and not its enemy; for under the tutelage of the past, values are created that are richer, deeper, more intense than could ever be otherwise attained.

The tragedy is, however, that our central traditions have died. 'I discovered to my horror how across the generations belief could fade into superstition, reappear as subjective taste, and finally dissolve into irrelevance, the victim of a criticism that in destroying the old was unable to offer anything of value in its place. Nor is there any turning back. Belief that sees itself merely as belief can no longer be belief at all. Truth understood as merely a function of imagination is truth devaluated and fragmented beyond recovery' (225).

Having shown that the problem with the traditions has not been their successful creation of a mental and social order but their exclusivity (222), Allan would seem to imply, in a time of intimately co-existing traditions, the need for a search for common wisdom, with, as a concomitant, the need for an adequate grounding of any claims to universality on the part of propositions. Instead, Allan seems to dismiss the claims of Western traditions as something that could not possibly have endured the onslaught of modern criticism, so they have next to nothing to offer such a dialogue with other traditions in the search for wisdom.

But Allan never shows how or why our traditions have been so successfully devastated. On the contrary, he does a brilliant job of undermining the credibility of one of the modern era's seminal 'critics,' Descartes. But he never draws the lesson: perhaps, running parallel to the subjectivism unleashed by Descartes, the traditions have maintained the kind of objectivist hold on reality for the appreciation of which Allan himself lays much epistemological groundwork — again without profiting much from it — in the early parts of the book. Somehow, under this onslaught of the voluntarists and subjectivists, the main traditions, the Christian especially, have died *for him*, as well as for many other individuals, and as our society secularizes, are being pushed to the margins of the consciousnesses of many intellectuals. 'Perhaps I am still within it but do not know I am, blinded by my arrogance and ignorance, blinded by the very vices against which I have been rebelling' (241).

But all the lovely poetry about abandoned churches Allan works into his reflections seems a bit strange to one who frequents filled churches, and has even been privileged to witness prayerful Shuls and ardent mosques. But all that has for Allan the force of his beloved Arthurian legends; it seems to him never to have been much more than an ethnic reality, the way a people forges an identity for itself, rather than streams of transmission of living truth, sustaining and transcending the ethnoi, the nations and cultures it brought into being, and formulatable in propositions meant even today to be confronted seriously by all human beings, regardless of nation or race.

The unfolding of this beautiful, profound, and personal meditation is indeed quite strange. Allan can write: 'The mythic framework of my worldview can be fully secured only if it reveals my cultural history as reaching back to origins that lie in some reality independent of it. My people must be shown to have roots in the very nature of things, in the powers that have caused the universe, in the sources of all ideals and therefore of every purposing' (128). But then he seems to think the Jewish and Christian traditions have proven incapable of offering any lasting insight into these matters. It is as though Genesis, Paul, Augustine, Thomas, Bonaventure, Calvin, Pascal, Newman, Gilson, Teilhard, Marcel have nothing to offer that is not of the order of dissolved myth. That's pretty arbitrary, 'arrogant,' to use Allan's word. And this on the part of a man who is obviously not arrogant, as even a casual perusal of this most open and honest book suggests.

What makes it still stranger is the effort, early in the work, to lay out an epistemology open to objectivity. In attacking the way Descartes has 'led me into solipsism of the present moment ... by denuding [it] of its valuational patina' (40), Allan sets out to rediscover 'structures that authorize belief in the reality of an objective world by making me directly aware of that world' (42). Such a salvaging operation, he says, 'would be quite literally soteriological.' His Chapter Three, 'Solid Ground' does indeed contain much solid ground, showing 'my present experience of the past [to be] experience of a relevant background to the present which is ordered in such fashion as to account for the present that has superseded it' (49).

In this short review I cannot summarize these long phenomenological

descriptions. The point is, they are a superb beginning for building an epistemological base which can support discussion of far greater truth claims than Allan seems willing, later in the work, to entertain. Perhaps a sentence like this gives a hint why he has lost his nerve: 'A cultural heritage is an especially difficult structure of inheritance because it is completely dependent upon freedom.' Allan is too preoccupied with cultures as pragmatic moldings of fantasy and freedom to make society 'work,' and not enough concerned with exploring the possibility that the reason why Christianity or Islam can transcend whole societies and cultures and continue to convert to their vision whole peoples today (e.g. 100,000 conversions a year to Catholicism in Indonesia, and Korea will probably soon be half Christian) is that they put forward an understanding of the human condition which makes considerable sense of people's experience. You can peruse this fascinating defense of the 'importance of the past' and miss the point that the collective 'treasurehouse of symbols,' as Voegelin terms the Christian traditions, are collectively refined systems of wisdom, reflections on experience meant to be put to the test of critical reflection, welcoming efforts to open them further to new experiences or old truths which the community has neglected, 'faith seeking understanding,' in Augustine's words. On the contrary, to read Allan one would think these wisdoms dissolve like fog under the noonday sun before the piercing eye of criticism. Kant did not 'refute' Augustine or Thomas; he was ignorant of them. So are most of our present 'critical' intellectuals. Hegel did not refute Christianity, he deformed its traditional message to become a carrier of his own gnostic vision. Fierbach and Marx are hardly impervious to counter-arguments.

If the earlier chapters in Allan's book receive the attention they deserve they will help renew reflection on how we know the past and how the past feeds the truth claims the traditions ask us to take seriously. In the later chapters, he shows the poor foundations of the deconstructionists, whom he attacks philosophically, while sharing ultimately much of their discouragement as regards the traditional wisdom. Hopefully, with his sound basic attitudes, Allan will find his way back to a re-appropriation of the sound traditions — not Arthurian legend giving a sense of glory to English ethnos, but to the traditions which are holding up to the world claims about the intrinsic dignity of all human beings.

THOMAS LANGAN

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JULIA ANNAS and JONATHAN BARNES. *The Modes of Skepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. 204. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-25682-8); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-27644-6).

Although contemporary philosophers often occupy themselves responding to (and sometimes creating) skeptical arguments, skepticism as a fully developed philosophical position is rarely taken seriously. In this brief, but marvelous, book, Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes attempt to remedy this.

Their approach is straightforward. After sketching the history of ancient skepticism, they focus on the Ten Modes leading to suspension of belief attributed to Aenesidemus. Chapter III presents a general characterization of these modes, and the succeeding ten chapters examine them individually. For each mode, they first present a translation of the mode as it is found in Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and, where possible, Philo of Alexandria. This is followed by an exposition of the argument found in the mode, comments on its historical precedents, and finally, an assessment of the mode's power to achieve its goal: the suspension of belief concerning the topic at hand. All this is done in brief compass, and, given the aim of the book to be accessible to the non-specialist, could not have been done better.

Concentrating on the Ten Modes is hardly an obvious way of introducing the reader to Pyrrhonian skepticism. These modes represent a late, more technical, development of much simpler ideas. Pyrrho, so the story goes, discovered by chance that an untroubled state of consciousness [*ataraxia*] arises when opposing positions are in perfect balance [*equipollence*] thereby producing a suspension of belief [*epoche*]. The task, then, for the skeptic sage was to find ways of keeping his mind in this state of non-committal equilibrium, and that meant finding for every argument an equal and opposite counter-argument. The great advantage of the Ten Modes was that they obviated the need for encyclopedic knowledge for the production of appropriate counter-arguments; instead, they provided a series of recipes for the production of equipollence on demand.

Annas and Barnes suggest the following schema for the interpretation of the Ten Modes:

- (1) X appears F in S.
 - (2) X appears F* in S*.
- but the appearances are equipollent, i.e.
- (3) we cannot prefer S to S* or *vice versa*,
- hence we arrive at suspension of judgment, i.e.
- (4) we can neither affirm nor deny X is really F or really F*.
- (25)

I think that this gets the things just right! In particular, it preserves the deep ambiguities that exist unresolved in the text. To see these ambiguities, it will help to fill out this schema with a particular example. In the Fourth Mode (it concerns circumstances) we are told that 'the same wine appears sour to people who have just eaten dates or figs, but it seems to be sweet to people who have consumed nuts or chickpeas' (80). Spelled out, the argument will look like this.

- (1) Wine appears sour to people who have eaten dates or figs.
- (2) The same wine appears sweet to people who have just eaten nuts or chickpeas.

but the appearances are equipollent, i.e.

- (3) We cannot prefer the circumstances of the fig/date eaters to the circumstances of the nuts/chickpeas eaters.

so

- (4) We suspend judgment as to whether the wine is really sour or sweet.

As it stands, this is almost a model of bad argumentation. In particular, what are we to make of the word *cannot* in the third premise? As a statement of fact, it seems false: people do, after all, prefer judgments made in certain circumstances over others. Wine tasters avoid figs, dates, nuts, and chickpeas, and sample wine with a clean palate. If, on the other hand, 'cannot' means 'should not,' then it is hard to see how the third premise is supported by the facts stated in the first two premises. Put more generally, and Annas and Barnes are right in insisting on this, mere differences in reaction support, *at most*, relativistic, not skeptical, conclusions.

There is only one place where I find myself in deep disagreement with the Annas-Barnes interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism: this concerns the targets of the Ten Modes. What were they supposed to make us doubt? Here Annas and Barnes are unequivocal. 'The doubt they expected to induce was ordinary non-philosophical doubt, it excluded beliefs, and it was therefore a practical doubt. Indeed, it was precisely by reference to the practical corollaries of their doubt that they used to recommend their philosophy: scepticism, they claimed, *by relieving us of ordinary beliefs*, would remove the worry from our lives and insure our happiness' (9: emphasis added).

The thought that someone might literally suspend common sense beliefs is certainly arresting. It makes skepticism exciting in the same way that certain lunatic views of existentialism made it exciting. But, in fact, Annas and Barnes cite no text that *directly* supports their interpretation, that is, they cite no text where a Pyrrhonian clearly draws a distinction between philosophical and common belief and then goes to say that it is not only philosophical belief but *also* — even *primarily* — common beliefs that are the target of the

skeptical attack. I don't believe that any such passages occur in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. What we find instead is page after page (actually, volume after volume) of attacks on philosophical dogmatism.

Here is another general way of interpreting the point of the Ten Modes: they present philosophical procedures for showing the equipollence of competing philosophical claims, thereby producing suspension of belief on all philosophical topics. If it seems paradoxical to use philosophical procedures to undermine all philosophy, we can at least note that Sextus embraces this very paradox in his image of throwing away the skeptical ladder after the ascent beyond philosophy has been made. (A more detailed defense of the interpretation I am challenging is found in J. Barnes: 'The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,' *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society* 29, 1982, 1-29. For a contrary view, closer to the one suggested here, see M. Frede: 'The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,' in *Philosophy of History*, ed. R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner [Cambridge, 1984].)

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FRANCIS X.J. COLEMAN. *Neither Angel nor Beast: The Life and Work of Blaise Pascal*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986. Pp. xii + 227. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-7102-0693-3.

This introduction to the life and thought of Pascal is intended for the general reader, but because of its interpretation of Pascal's apology and its comprehensive coverage of all Pascal's works it is of significance for philosophers as well. For example, it places Pascal's famous (or infamous) Wager Argument in a context which allows for a much sounder understanding of it and of Pascal's apology for the truth of Christianity.

Coleman claims that Pascal's life, style, and thought may best be interpreted as variations on a figure of rhetoric, the oxymoron. 'An oxymoron brings together a thesis and an antithesis, something positive and something negative ... Superficially a rhetorical antithesis appears contradictory, a flagrant denial of the supreme principal of thought, the law of non-contradiction. But on scrutiny, in the union of opposites — called antisyzgy — a new balance, a greater insight is attained. Behind the figure lies a philosophy: out of the conflict of opposites a new transcendence is generated' (15). He claims that

'Pascal's thought is ultimately based on the oxymoron of the infinite and the finite, with man as the epitome of the two extremes: limited in the brevity of his life, yet possessed of eternal longings; a speck in a vast cosmos; caught between misery and grandeur' (21).

The thesis is overstated. The oxymoron is indeed crucial for understanding Pascal's apology, but Pascal's three orders, that of the heart, mind, and body, is just as important. Indeed, it is because we cannot discover or verify supernatural truth as long as we remain within the order of the mind that the oxymoron acquires epistemological significance; for Pascal uses it to show that our nature and our condition utterly baffle us as long as we remain within the order of the mind. Not only do they baffle us but we remain in a state of misery, from which we constantly divert our attention because it is so unbearable. The supernatural truth of Christianity not only relieves our bafflement by accounting for our nature and condition, but it also promises us a remedy for our misery. It is the pressure generated by various oxymorons concerning our nature and condition which lead us to yield to the order of the heart. Only there can we find enlightenment and relief.

The three orders also give a proper context for understanding the intent of the Wager Argument. It is directed to what is *below* the order of the mind, namely the order of the body. Here one is under the control of passions and desires. They hold one from turning to Christianity even though the mind is allegedly satisfied that as far as the order of the mind is concerned, the truth of Christianity is beyond its scope to determine.

When it comes to actual practice, in contrast to stating his thesis, Coleman does not rely solely on oxymorons but uses Pascal's three orders. Why he states what he is doing in such a misleading way puzzles me. Perhaps it is because it gives a way to view Pascal's life, style, and thought from a single perspective. At any rate, the essential role the oxymoron figure plays in Pascal's thought is hardly known among philosophers. This book makes its prevalence in Pascal's style and thought so evident that anyone who teaches Pascal no longer has any excuse to be ignorant of it. Coleman's own style and relative freedom from either pro- or anti-religious prejudices makes the book a pleasure to read.

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K.G. DENBIGH and J.S. DENBIGH. *Entropy in Relation to Incomplete Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. vii + 164. US\$34.50. ISBN 0-521-25677-1.

A wide range of special features of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics ranging from the apparent description-relativity of entropy in thermodynamics, through Gibbs' Paradox to the need for an a priori probability distribution of points over the allowed phase-space region for a system in statistical mechanics, have led a large number of physicists and philosophers of physics to speak of thermodynamical and statistical mechanical concepts and laws as 'subjective.' This slim book is devoted to a systematic attack on the claims that some feature or other of thermodynamics or statistical mechanics makes those theories any more subjective than any of the other standard theories of physics.

The first chapter takes up the allegation that entropy is 'subjective' in thermodynamics, arguing that both the entropy of a system and the increase of entropy demanded by the Second Law of thermodynamics are objective features of the world. Chapter Two pursues the issues into statistical mechanics, arguing that neither the appearance of probability in the theory, nor the necessity for an a priori posit of a probability distribution, nor the redefinition of thermodynamic concepts in the theory (entropy, in particular) introduces any new elements which make the theory 'subjective.' Chapter Three takes up the role of coarse-graining of the phase-space and its use in defining new coarse-grained features (such as Gibbs' coarse-grained entropy which he contrasted with the fine-grained entropy provably constant in any dynamical evolution). While the authors seem less sure here that coarse-graining introduces no element of 'subjectivity' into the theory at all, they are once again at pains to try to show that the resulting description of the world is, overall, as 'objectivist' as the descriptions offered by other standard physical theories.

Chapter Four takes up the issues of indistinguishability in statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. The two problems of micro-indistinguishability (leading to the new way of calculating the partition function necessary in quantum statistical mechanics) and macro-indistinguishability (which leads to Gibbs' Paradox in thermodynamics) are distinguished from one another and, correctly, held to be two quite distinct issues. Finally Chapter Five takes up the role of 'entropy-like' concepts in information theory, and is devoted, primarily, to arguing that statistical mechanics cannot be said to have its ground or origin in the much more general results of information theory and that the careless identification of entropy as 'negative information' leads to far more obfuscation than it does to clarification.

Overall the authors make out a persuasive case that claims of 'subjectivity' in analyses of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are often ungrounded and frequently rest on hasty and superficial argument. Their case could be more persuasively made in the context of a broader, more comprehensive foundational analysis of the concepts of thermodynamics and statistical

mechanics, though, as the narrow scope they allow themselves here frequently requires them to put off the hard work of offering a fully worked-out analysis of the relevant concepts which would do much to bolster their claim. It is, for example, right to point out that the use of symmetry or 'insufficient reason' arguments in establishing a priori probability distributions does not by itself make the posit of the probability distribution 'subjective,' for it can be construed only as an hypothesis which requires its confirmation by empirically determined frequencies to be accepted as justified in the theory. But a fuller account of just what probabilities really are in the theory, how they are to be determined, what the truth-conditions for their assertion amount to, how they function in explanatory contexts, etc. would be what is needed to really disabuse the subjectivists of their mistakes, and only hints at how this might go can be offered in the narrow confines of the book.

While the authors frequently take the plausible line that subjectivists often confuse subjectivity with relativity to some objective feature of the world (so that the relativity of entropy to a choice of macroscopic variables is taken to be sufficient ground for calling entropy 'subjective'), they sometimes offer other ways of countering subjectivist claims that are less persuasive. It won't do to counter a claim of subjectivity in a 'ontological' sense to point out that a variety of measurements all lead to the same thermodynamic values, a kind of argument the authors sometimes want to use. That they want to use it is something of a surprise since they themselves carefully distinguish subjectivity as lack of inter-personal agreement from subjectivity as relativity to the existence or nature of human beings or their minds. Nor do they give the more persuasive argument in its clearest abstract form. Given that the confusion of relativity of a feature to an inertial reference frame with subjectivity which so infected discussion of relativity theory in past years has been so often exposed for the confusion that it is, it is surprising that the parallel confusion of relativity of entropy to macroscopic level of description still leads so many to infer automatically that entropy is 'subjective.'

In the treatment of coarse-graining it is something of a surprise to see no mention of the important, and now well-known, work on dynamical instability and its connection to such features of systems as being mixing, K-systems or Bernoulli systems. Surely it is there that we should look if we wish to understand why coarse-graining, despite its apparent 'arbitrariness,' ought to be understood as 'objective' in the results obtained by its use. On the other hand the treatment of Gibbs' Paradox in Chapter Four offers an interesting and illuminating new way of trying to understand both what the paradox really is and how its disturbingness can be mitigated by a more thorough look at the way entropy actually functions in accounting for the irreversible behavior of systems.

LAWRENCE SKLAR
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JANINE FILLION-LAHILLE. *Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions*. Paris, Klincksieck (Collection 'Études et commentaires,' no 94) 1984. 359 p. 155ff. ISBN 2-86563-082-X.

Il n'y a pas de travaux d'érudition historique qui soient en général plus arides et, soyons francs, plus ennuyeux que les études de sources. Ce livre de plus de 350 pages est une étude des sources du *De ira* (traité 'de la colère') de Sénèque. Pourtant, il n'est que rarement aride et jamais ennuyeux. C'est sans doute qu'il se rapproche de l'idéal du genre, qui est de réussir, en partant de l'analyse des éléments constitutifs d'une seule oeuvre, à faire revivre toute la tradition dont elle s'est nourrie. Tant et si bien qu'il finit par être tout autre chose qu'une simple étude littéraire: une contribution appréciable à l'étude du Stoïcisme ancien et même l'esquisse d'une histoire de l'une de ses problématiques principales.

Ce qui permet à Mme Fillion-Lahille d'opérer cette heureuse transmutation des genres, c'est d'abord la thèse centrale de l'ouvrage, à savoir que le traité de Sénèque récapitule, dans l'ordre même des matières, les trois grandes étapes du développement de la philosophie stoïcienne des passions (1ère partie, 3ième chapitre). Dans le premier livre, où le philosophe romain s'attache à montrer qu'on ne doit jamais s'abandonner à la colère, non plus qu'à aucune autre passion, mais qu'on doit plutôt tâcher de s'en délivrer, il faudrait voir une application à un cas particulier de la doctrine stoïcienne orthodoxe des passions. Cette doctrine avait trouvé son expression classique dans le 'traité des Passions' (*Peri Pathôn*) de Chrysippe (280-207 av. J.C.), le maître à penser de 'l'Ancien Portique.' Le second livre, où l'analyse psychologique s'affine et se double d'une riche thérapeutique préventive, refléterait les transformations que Posidonius (vers 135-50 av. J.C.), la figure dominante du 'Moyen Stoïcisme,' aurait fait subir à l'héritage chrysippéen. Quant au troisième livre, où l'exigence d'une thérapeutique curative, très concrète, de la colère se fait jour, il témoignerait surtout des préoccupations du 'Stoïcisme impérial,' dont Sénèque lui-même (4 av. J.C., 65 ap. J.C.) est l'un des principaux représentants.

L'autre facteur qui fait le prix de cet ouvrage est, curieusement, une raison de contrainte. En fait, il y a deux contraintes. La première comme nous le rappelle l'A. (1ère partie, chapitres 1 et 2), est que presque rien n'a survécu des nombreux traités stoïciens de la colère antérieurs à celui de Sénèque. Il ne lui a donc pas été possible de pratiquer la critique des sources au sens strict, c'est-à-dire de retracer les emprunts *précis* que Sénèque a pu faire à ses prédécesseurs. C'est pourquoi elle a décidé de 'se rabattre' (ce dont des philosophes ne peuvent que la féliciter) sur la considération des doctrines *générales* des passions qu'avançaient Chrysippe et Posidonius dans leurs *Peri Pathôn* respectifs. Or, voilà une seconde contrainte: nous n'avons plus ces oeuvres. Nous disposons tout de même encore d'un assez grand nombre de fragments qui proviennent presque tous du *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* de Galien. Mme Fillion-Lahille a courageusement entrepris de reconstituer ce qui pouvait l'être des oeuvres en question (2ème partie, chap. 2-5; 3ème partie, chap. 2)

et du *Peri Psukhès* (le 'traité de l'Âme') de Chrysippe (2ème partie, chap. 1). L'entreprise pouvait paraître risquée, car ce genre d'exercice très hasardeux, jadis trop généreusement et trop inconsidérément pratiqué par les philologues, éveille de nos jours une méfiance presque systématique. Mais l'A. a réussi à mener sa tâche à bonne fin et profit, surtout en ce qui a trait aux deux *Peri Pathôn*.

De celui de Chrysippe, elle démontre 'qu'il n'est sans doute pas autant perdu qu'on pouvait le croire': le fait que les extraits que reproduit Galien s'ajustent très exactement aux diverses parties d'un exposé schématique de la doctrine stoïcienne des passions qu'on lit dans la 4ème *Tusculane* de Cicéron permet de croire que nous avons là le plan de l'ouvrage même d'où ils sont tirés. Ce ne serait pas étonnant d'ailleurs, vu l'autorité dont jouissaient les écrits de Chrysippe dans l'école stoïcienne.

Quant au *Peri Pathôn* de Posidonius, il posait deux graves problèmes: un problème d'interprétation, qu'on verra dans un instant, et un problème de 'mauvaise réputation.' Posidonius est, en effet, de tous les philosophes anciens, celui dont les oeuvres ont fait l'objet des essais de reconstitution les plus hardis et les plus divergents. Il est l'exemple même de l'auteur sur lequel on désespère d'en apprendre plus. C'est donc tout à l'honneur de Mme Fillion-Lahille d'avoir réussi à proposer une solution nouvelle et éclairante au problème d'interprétation sans, me semble-t-il, jamais laisser prise au soupçon d'avoir avancé des hypothèses trop 'spéculatives.' Elle y est parvenue en s'en tenant aux règles de critique les plus sûres et les plus prudentes, celles-là même qui ont présidé à la constitution du recueil des fragments de ce philosophe par Edelstein et Kidd (1972): elle n'a pris en considération que les seuls textes et doctrines que nos sources attribuent explicitement à Posidonius et elle en a tiré le meilleur parti possible. J'ajoute, qu'en plus de citer les textes grecs et de les encadrer de commentaires, elle en a fourni une traduction, rendant ainsi pour la première fois accessible aux lecteurs francophones une ample série de textes importants et difficiles. (Seul le *Peri Psukhès* avait déjà été traduit [par G. Blin et M. Keim]: 'Chrysippe: De la Partie Hégémonique de l'Âme,' in *Mesures*, avril 1939, 163-74.)

Après avoir esquissé le plan de cet ouvrage et avoir brièvement caractérisé ses apports, il est temps d'en considérer de plus près le contenu.

On sait que l'éthique stoïcienne ne vise rien moins que la suppression pure et simple, totale, et toutes les passions. Le sage serait l'homme qui saurait maîtriser et refouler ses émotions au point de pouvoir les annihiler. Dans ce contexte, la colère apparaît comme une passion prodigieusement intéressante: elle est la plus soudaine, la plus violente de toutes, et paraît souvent difficile, sinon impossible à contrôler; enfin, il semble qu'on ne soit parfois que trop justifié de l'éprouver. Comment même un sage pourrait-il s'empêcher de la ressentir, lorsqu'il assiste, par exemple, au massacre de sa famille? A supposer même qu'il puisse étouffer cette émotion, est-il vraiment souhaitable qu'il le fasse? N'est-ce pas là une impulsion naturelle, normale, qui nous est même bénéfique, car elle nous aide à rassembler en nous les forces nécessaires à l'action? Platon, Aristote, Epicure, bref les grands maîtres à penser des écoles rivales

du Portique, soutenaient tous, à divers degrés, qu'il est bon d'éprouver des passions, pourvu qu'on sache les contrôler et qu'on apprenne à canaliser les énergies qu'elles déclenchent.

Selon le Stoïcisme orthodoxe ou, si l'on veut, selon Chrysippe (puisque c'est la même chose), la passion n'est, au fond, que l'acquiescement de l'esprit à une fausse opinion. On s'emporte parce qu'on est convaincu (à tort) que c'est la chose à faire dans telle ou telle circonstance donnée et parce qu'on a jugé que les circonstances où on se trouvait étaient précisément de celles qui demandent qu'on s'emporte. Ainsi donc, quand je me fâche en voyant un truand tenter de violenter ma fille, c'est que je l'ai voulu, que j'ai décidé de le faire. C'est aussi que je ne suis pas sage: il eût été préférable que j'eusse gardé mon calme, car j'aurais alors été, entre autres choses, mieux à même d'intervenir de façon intelligente et efficace.

Les Stoïciens ont eu fort à faire pour défendre cette thèse extrême. Ils ont dû lutter contre les Péripatéticiens d'abord, puis contre leurs adversaires de toujours, les Epicuriens. Mme Fillion-Lahille emploie la 4^{ème} partie de son ouvrage à présenter les positions des uns et des autres (chap. 1 et 3) et (chap. 2 et 4) à retrouver dans le *De ira* des traces de la batterie d'arguments que les Stoïciens avaient déployés pour se défendre. (Cette partie est la seule dont l'A. avait déjà publié une partie du contenu: cf. 'La Colère chez Aristote' in *la Revue des Etudes Anciennes*, LXXII, 1970, 46-79; 'Une méprise à propos du *De ira* de Sénèque: la polémique du livre II ne vise pas Aristote, mais Epicure,' in *la Revue des Etudes Latines*, XLVIII, 1970, 296-308.) La grande question demeure néanmoins de savoir si leur pire adversaire n'est pas sorti de leurs propres rangs, si le grand Posidonius lui-même ne s'est pas rallié, sur ce point, aux troupes ennemies.

Galien le prétend. A l'en croire, Posidonius aurait 'préféré la vérité à Chrysippe' et il aurait reconnu le caractère naturel et, jusqu'à un certain point, positif des forces irrationnelles qui agitent l'âme humaine. Cette apostasie a généralement été admise comme un fait, sur la foi de ce témoin capital qu'est pour nous Galien, mais elle ne laisse pas à la fois de surprendre et de gêner. Elle surprend, car on peut se demander comment quelqu'un qui aurait jeté par-dessus bord la pierre angulaire de l'éthique stoïcienne a pu tout de même continuer à se considérer comme un Stoïcien et même a pu être regardé comme un des grands penseurs de leur école par plusieurs générations de Stoïciens bon teint. Cette défection gêne surtout, parce qu'aucune de nos sources anciennes autres que Galien ne semble en avoir entendu parler et aussi parce qu'il apparaît que, dans tous les autres secteurs où s'est déployée son immense activité, Posidonius s'en est toujours scrupuleusement tenu à la 'ligne du parti,' se contentant (ce qui n'était pas peu de chose) d'enrichir les perspectives d'une philosophie chrysippéenne trop exclusivement rationaliste.

Tel est 'l'irritant problème' de la 'dissidence du Moyen Portique' qui n'a cessé de hanter les historiens du Stoïcisme.

Mme Fillion-Lahille résout ce problème, de façon satisfaisante, me semble-t-il, en faisant tout simplement jouer les textes de Posidonius, pour la plupart cités par Galien, contre l'interprétation qu'en donne ce dernier: elle prouve

que cette lecture, fortement imprégnée d'un parti-pris anti-stoïcien repose sur un choix et une présentation tendancieux de textes qui ne s'y ajustent pas. Certes, Posidonius s'est singularisé par rapport à ses prédécesseurs en tentant de faire une part aux dimensions irrationnelles de la nature humaine: on trouvait chez lui toute une physiologie de la passion, destinée à expliquer comment des pulsions aussi vives que la colère peuvent apparaître soudainement, puis s'effacer peu à peu sous l'effet du temps. Ces préoccupations scientifiques s'apparentent à celles des Péripatéticiens et suggèrent l'adhésion à une sorte de dualisme. Dualiste, Posidonius l'était certainement, dans une certaine mesure, mais ce que Galien n'a pas vu ou n'a pas voulu nous laisser voir, c'est que cette 'volte-face' par rapport au monisme intellectualiste de Chrysippe ne l'a pas empêché de rester fidèle à l'idéal stoïcien d'élimination complète des passions. En fait, comme l'établit Mme Fillion-Lahille (3ème partie, chap. 3), on retrouve chez lui tous les éléments-clé de la doctrine de Chrysippe, y compris l'idée que les passions ne sont que des 'maladies du jugement' et qu'on ne trouve absolument rien de tel chez les bêtes brutes. Ce dernier point est essentiel, car il permet de comprendre en quoi le dualisme posidonien demeurerait, malgré tout, un stoïcisme. Selon Posidonius, en effet, les impulsions émotives spontanées, communes à l'homme et aux animaux, ne doivent pas être identifiées aux passions elle-mêmes. Elles n'engagent pas l'action humaine: ce qui l'engage c'est la *décision volontaire* que prend la *raison* de leur céder ou, au contraire, de leur résister. En quoi le philosophe d'Apamée restait ce qu'il était certainement convaincu d'être: non pas un critique, mais un fidèle continuateur de Chrysippe.

L'interprétation de Mme Fillion-Lahille a l'avantage de la rigueur et de la finesse. On pourrait, peut-être, seulement lui reprocher d'avoir un peu trop insisté sur les 'erreurs' de Galien et pas assez sur ce qui les a amenées. Galien a probablement faussé la pensée de Posidonius plus qu'il ne l'a vraiment trahie. Il ne cache pas qu'il était plus ou moins d'accord avec Posidonius. Or, qu'est-ce qui pouvait donc attirer un adversaire intelligent et résolu des Stoïciens dans cette philosophie? La question est importante par rapport à ce qui demeure le débat de fond autour de l'anthropologie posidonienne: la détermination de son influence sur d'autres éclectiques eux aussi tentés par le platonisme, les Pères de l'Eglise. Il serait intéressant d'utiliser l'interprétation de Mme Fillion-Lahille pour rouvrir la discussion, monnée par Jaeger (1914) et par Koch (1921) dans leurs travaux sur les sources du *De Natura Hominis* de Némésius d'Emèse, à propos du rôle des références philosophiques dans la constitution de l'anthropologie chrétienne.

Cette réserve étant faite, le grand mérite de Mme Fillion-Lahille est d'avoir introduit plus de continuité dans notre représentation de l'évolution du Stoïcisme. Comme elle le suggère dans sa reconstitution (2ème partie chap. 5) du *Therapeutikon*, c'est-à-dire du 4ème livre du *Peri Pathôn* de Chrysippe, les anciens Stoïciens s'étaient montrés à peu près incapables de proposer une médication prophylactique efficace des passions. Posidonius aurait correctement diagnostiqué cette faiblesse: elle procédait des insuffisances de leur étiologie de la passion; et il aurait entrepris d'y remédier au moyen, précisément, de

sa physiologie. C'est cette physiologie qui lui aurait permis de proposer une ébauche de programme thérapeutique, ébauche par la suite largement développée par le Stoïcisme impérial.

La 5ème et dernière partie, qui traite des penseurs et des oeuvres contemporains qui ont plus directement formé l'auteur du *De ira*, dévoile un peu après les 4 autres, surtout parce que l'optique y finit par se retrécir à un seul homme, 'l'homme derrière l'oeuvre,' Sénèque. Dans de belles pages, l'A. s'attache à cerner ce que ce dernier a mis de lui-même dans son livre. Elle montre que son stoïcisme à lui se distingue de ceux des classiques de l'école par son souci de faire de leur idéal de sagesse l'objet d'une ascèse quotidienne. Pour ma part, j'aurais aimé que l'A. ne consacre pas tant d'énergie aux pionniers du Stoïcisme romain, sur lesquels on ne peut avoir que peu de certitudes, et ajoute un court chapitre sur Epictète et Marc-Aurèle. La comparaison aurait facilement été établie, je pense, que l'apport de Sénèque est aussi la caractéristique générale de la 3ème et dernière étape de l'histoire du Stoïcisme antique. Telles qu'elles sont, ces pages demeurent néanmoins un superbe hommage à ce grand maître en humanité dont j'avoue avoir trouvé, en relisant le *De ira*, que plusieurs de ses conseils valaient encore qu'on les médite. Celui-ci, entre autres, avec lequel il clôt son propos: la vie est trop courte pour qu'on en cède une part aux désirs de vengeance.

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JOHN FORESTER, ed. *Critical Theory and Public Life*. Cambridge, MA and London, England: MIT Press 1985. Pp. xix + 337. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-262-06087-3.

Within sociology the Frankfurt School tradition has had difficulty overcoming its image as mere 'philosophy'; within political science it is relegated to the anachronistic status of 'normative theory.' The present collection attempts to counteract these stereotypes through what the editor refers to as 'the applied turn in contemporary critical theory.' Since such a strategy was explicitly precluded by the older critical theory of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, the book seeks to 'appropriate' the critical communications theory of Jürgen Habermas 'to explore issues of public life ... in workplaces, in schools, in planning processes, and in broader social, political, and cultural settings' (ix). The result is a rather unique 'applied turn,' one very distant from either the ap-

plied social science envisioned by Popper's 'piecemeal engineering' or the world-historical 'praxis' of Marx's theory of revolution.

As befits such diverse interests and critical theory itself, the contributors are currently affiliated with the three disciplinary areas most strongly influenced by the Frankfurt tradition: sociology (Ben Agger, John O'Neill, Peter Grahame), political science (Timothy Luke, Stephen White, Daniel Hallin, Frank Fischer), and policy studies (Forester and Ray Kemp in planning; Dieter Misgeld in education; Trent Schroyer in environmental studies). Habermas stands alone as an academic philosopher.

The papers in the first section are the most broadly framed and seek an alternative to the upbeat, mainstream literature on the emerging 'post-industrial' or 'informational society.' Agger argues that Habermas develops a 'new Marxism' which complements the original critique of political economy with a theory of 'the monopoly of information and dialogue chances.' The resulting critique of technological guidance processes is thus ideally suited for analyzing the new 'high tech' or 'Atari' capitalism and revealing its emergent crisis tendencies in 'pink-collar service work, domesticity, and higher education' (16). Following an excellent introduction to Habermas's more recent concerns, Luke and White then attempt to extend his colonization of the lifeworld thesis by analyzing the role of 'informational capitalism' in invading cultural reproduction, how the new technologies have an ambivalent character (promoting new forms of autonomy as well as domination), and how radical ecology may be in the process of providing bench marks for an 'alternative modernity of ecological reason.'

In the second chapter O'Neill presents a reading of Paulo Freire and Franz Fanon which draws out their convergent conceptions of language, power and decolonization — themes which are held to be complementary with critical social theory. Misgeld follows with a wide-ranging discussion in which Habermas and Freire are used to develop a critique of the 'rationalization' proposed by the instructional objectives movement in education.

A third chapter begins with Hallin's essay which is ostensibly concerned with the American news media, but is more successful in reviewing the general implications of Habermas's work for mass communications. Grahame's analysis of consumer literacy, on the other hand, questions an assumption of traditional critical theory: the consumer as passive victim. The concrete study of 'mundane reasoning' is proposed as a form of 'cultural pragmatics' which could reveal the more specific obstacles to fundamental critique and thus complement the more abstract analysis of 'universal pragmatics.'

The fourth and fifth chapters focus on planning theory and policy analysis. Kemp uses a case study of a public hearing in Britain concerned with the construction of a nuclear processing plant to demonstrate the utility of the ideal speech situation notion as a counterfactual standard for judging public discourses and evaluating constraints on communication. Forester attempts to outline the 'practical' contributions of critical theory to democratic planning. This theme is extended in another paper which instructively contrasts the approach of critical theory (Habermas) with conventional policy analysis

(Wildavsky) and shows how they might learn from each other. And in a case study of the Project Head Start, an American program designed to provide compensatory early education to facilitate equality of opportunity for disadvantaged children, Fischer outlines a strategy for evaluating public policy which should be required reading for anyone concerned with the logic of evaluation research. Building on Habermas, as well as the work of Toulmin and Paul Taylor on informal reasoning, he tries to develop a multimethodological logic of critical evaluation which interweaves empirical, hermeneutic and normative arguments.

In a final chapter on 'Critical Historical Studies,' Schroyer begins with a provocative re-interpretation of the history of American political culture which attempts to explain the failure of sustained radical movements by postulating a 'cultural surplus' of latent utopian possibilities which have been reified by various conservative movements. Though 'from the perspective of the American cultural surplus, Marxist socialism is simply a variation of technocratic corporatism,' a careful recovery of the 'original intentions of American libertarianism' reveals for Schroyer a traditional civic ethics whose universal principles converge with the 'notion of rational consensus as developed analytically by communicational ethics' (311). Though Habermas's concluding essay on 'Modern and Postmodern Architecture' provides a suggestive analysis of the relationship between architectural and ideological movements, it relates rather too obliquely to the volume as a whole.

Yet in general this collection is remarkably even with respect to continuity and quality; and by the standards of this tradition the writing is lucid and accessible. Though there is no concern with comparing critical theory with other radical analyses of advanced capitalism (e.g. structuralist Marxism or neo-Marxism generally), this strategy facilitates focusing on the 'applied turn' and provides significant evidence of the school-building force of Habermas's theoretical program.

The papers concerned with policy and planning are most effective in the more empirical sense of application and suggest that critical theory will likely become the basis of an influential counter-tradition of research. The essays on decolonization, education, and consumer literacy illustrate the 'phenomenological turn' in critical theory at its best; but the specific form of application implied will continue to encounter academic resistance and does not fully outline — even if in part exemplifying — an alternative tradition of research. The paper on mass communications is weakest in this regard. Finally, the essays on the dialectics of deindustrialization and informational capitalism necessarily remain tentative and speculative; further, their anticipation of crisis and struggle conflicts with the quasi-reformist tone of the planning and policy essays. Schroyer's paper on cultural surplus introduces the theme of cultural specificity which is otherwise lacking, though the collection is generally oriented to public life in the United States. Symptomatically, though several of the authors are located in Canada, public life north of the border never intrudes.

For those sympathetic to critical theory this volume will remain for some

time a source of inspiration and reflection with respect to a needed 'applied turn'; for critics and for students of the philosophy of social sciences it may serve as an exemplary text for analyzing the project of those who, against all odds, persist in that post-Enlightenment aspiration to educate the educators and to change the world rather than merely interpret it.

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DAVID FRISBY. *Fragments of Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986. Pp. viii + 319. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-06103-1.

As the end of the twentieth century approaches, another of the periodic waves of questioning the meaning of modernity seems to be building. This time, indeed, the sense of crisis is often felt so severely that many wonder whether we still live within the modern period. Yet there is no term to characterize the new era but the abstractly temporal designation, 'post-modern,' which may best be understood as yet another manifestation of the thoroughly modern penchant to exceed itself. As Ortega noted sixty years ago in *La Rebelion de las Masas* the very notion of a 'modern' period is a conceit or vanity guided by the premise that in every essential respect the human condition has been defined once and for all. Yet along with this sense of finality goes another judgment that something new is on the horizon, which will burst the ideational constraints that we have created for ourselves. And this, too, is an integral part of the dialectic of the modern mind. At the very end of his work on three twentieth-century thinkers who explored the perplexities and ambiguities of modernity — Georg Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin — David Frisby captures the self-canceling drive for a bounded boundlessness and a boundless boundedness: 'The mere experience of the ever-new forgets that its fundamental precondition is the ever-same reproduction of the social relations necessary for the ever-new to appear. To speak of post-modernity, on this view, would therefore be premature' (272).

Frisby's work, which builds and expands upon his earlier study of Georg Simmel as a 'sociological impressionist,' may be understood fruitfully as an important contribution to the contemporary discourses on modernity and post-modernity, teaching the lesson that the sense of being trapped in a chaotic whirl of the fragmentarily novel, which should, we think, be tending in some

direction, but which only brings us back to tedious mundanity, has long been with us, originating perhaps with Baudelaire, Marx, and Nietzsche, and continuing with such stranger-geniuses as the thinkers he addresses. For Frisby, Simmel, Kracauer, and Benjamin represent a suppressed tradition of insight into the modern, which has been obscured by the hegemony of that most anti-modern of the moderns, Max Weber, who stressed homogeneous rationalization at the expense of the explosion of variety, what Benjamin identifies as 'phantasmagoria.' At first glance it might seem that Frisby has gathered an odd assortment: Simmel is a liberal of the turn-of-the-century generation, whereas Kracauer (though he was Simmel's student) and Benjamin are heterodox critical intellectuals of a Marxist tendency of the inter-war period, at the fringes of the Frankfurt School. But given a careful reading of his text, the assemblage works to enlighten us about our own situation.

Most generally, all three of Frisby's thinkers experienced the collapse of ideal unities of life and then attempted to reground wholeness, permanence, continuity by working their ways through the fragments of concrete and mutating everyday life to some deeper structure. None of them was successful in his quest to recapture unity, but along the way each one of them provided piercing observations of a wrenching alienation at the heart of urban existence, symbolized by the 'sites' of Berlin and Paris. Basing his discussion of Simmel primarily on the turning-point text *Philosophie des Geldes*, Frisby shows how the reproduction of disjoint novelty came to be grounded in the abstract relations of exchange, making Simmel, in the process, too much, perhaps, a Marxist *manqué*. In the cases of Kracauer and Benjamin a Marxist hermeneutic is more appropriate, and Frisby amply demonstrates the painful efforts of the former to identify 'exemplary instances' of modernity (for example, the detective novel, the white-collar worker incarcerated in a 'pleasure barracks' of leisure, the plunge of art into 'decor' in Offenbach's operettas) and of the latter to discover the 'pre-history of modernity' in a 'archaeology,' reminiscent of Foucault's methodology, revealing the 'drabness' of mid-nineteenth-century Paris, centered in its arcades. Throughout Frisby's commentaries one is reminded of the Canadian philosopher George Grant's image of the modern individual experiencing a 'plush patina of hectic subjectivity' while being locked in the 'iron maiden' of the technostructure. That is, Frisby has opened up a significant aspect of a German discourse on modernity that can be linked to recurring themes of recent Western thought.

Fragments of Modernity is admirable for the richness with which the thought of Frisby's three subjects is displayed and for giving the ideas of Kracauer and Benjamin a showcase that they deserve, removed from the more ponderous and frequently less insightful productions of the mainline Frankfurt School. In addition, the tradition that he chooses to highlight, which seizes upon the appearances of everyday life and then struggles to grasp an elusive reality that generates them, allows one to illuminate contemporary issues of post-structuralism and deconstruction, though, unfortunately, it is left entirely up to the reader to make those connections. Indeed, some of the apparent strengths of Frisby's presentation are responsible for its greatest weakness,

which is the lack of any systematic comparisons and contrasts of his thinkers, the failure to tie any of them to their contemporaries and ours, and, most importantly, the absence of an integrating theoretical perspective. It is as though Frisby reproduced the fragmentary aspect of modernity, though not its novelty, in his text, providing none of the reconstructive work that one expects of a sensitive commentator. The disinclination to make an attempt at even a tentative synthesis is unfortunate because Frisby's guiding idea that the underlying structure of modernity is the ever-same reproduction of the ever-new in a fragmented and disheartening explosion might prove important for current investigations. Perhaps one reason for the incompleteness of his text is that Frisby recurs to Marx too much and to Weber too little. Is it capitalism or the more generalized processes of rationalization, objectification, and externalization of life that grounds the implosion of meaning into image and the displacement of intelligible experience to simulacrum? This is but a question that might guide explorations beyond the confines of Frisby's pregnant text.

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S.A. GRAVE. *A History of Philosophy in Australia*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press 1985. Pp. 252. US\$37.50. ISBN 0-7022-1697-6.

Professor Selwyn Grave, Formerly of the University of Western Australia, has written an instructive, carefully balanced and therefore most useful history of a regional philosophy. At times reminiscent of the approach adopted by John Passmore in his *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, Grave combines an overall description of some tendency, school or particular position, with judiciously selected quotations from the period or author concerned. The generalities from which no historical expositions can escape are also balanced by an attempt to include references — even if only by quoting a crucial sentence, or part of it — to practically every philosopher of some impact. As a result, Grave's history is illuminating in respect of the main streams, reliable in respect of individual philosophers and comprehensive in respect of the diverse components that have made and are still making philosophy in Australia what it is. Moreover, it is a lively book.

Though on the whole Australian philosophy has had more connections with British than any other philosophical traditions, it is curious that the first im-

pulse, in the mid-nineteenth century, came from America's — and specifically Emerson's — transcendentalism. But this was soon overwhelmed by the more hard-hitting Spencer and, to a lesser extent, by Hamilton, J.S. Mill and such earlier Scots as Reid and Ferrier. By the turn of the century philosophy had been taught for some time in most Australian universities; while the classics (Plato, Aristotle, the rationalists and the empiricists, Kant, German Idealism) were an integral part of instruction, Melbourne's W.R. Boyce Gibson introduced the suggestive Rudolf Eucken, and later translated the first volume of Husserl's *Ideas*. Another non-British influence was Bergson, but the thirties also saw a definite swing back to philosophical thought originating in, or transmitted through, the British Isles.

In retrospect, the most distinctive period in Australian philosophy was the line-up, from the late thirties to the fifties, between Wittgensteinian Melbourne and Andersonian Sydney. Wittgenstein's renown was spreading throughout the English-speaking world; in contrast, more typically and more lastingly Australian was John Anderson, even if he was an intellectual immigrant from Scotland. (A very recent Australian publication, *The Greats: The 50 Men and Women Who Most Helped to Shape Modern Australia* includes only one philosopher: John Anderson.) As he wrote little and his influence extended mainly through austere classroom lectures, John Anderson is still relatively unknown internationally. But the power of his systematic thinking, unparalleled in Australia, is acquiring delayed-effect recognition. An uncompromising empiricist, a critic of fashions in philosophy and, of course, of religion, patriotism and vocationally oriented education, Anderson constructed a position which in its comprehensiveness reminds one of Hegel — whose idealism he had naturally rejected. It is a position that includes objective ethics and aesthetics as well as a realist stand on traditional philosophical issues, and which incorporates a number of theoretical contributions made by Freud and Marx (but without the latter's political claims and certainly opposed to Lenin's authoritarianism).

Wittgensteinianism constituted the other pole in the 'classical' period. While Anderson produced John Passmore, Eric Partridge, David Armstrong, Eugene Kamenka, John Mackie, it was in Melbourne that the *Tractatus* and the later Wittgenstein flourished. Introduced by George Paul in the late thirties, Wittgenstein was expounded, expanded and modified by Douglas Gasking, A. C. Jackson, Kurt Baier, to name only a few. The list might have to include Melbourne students Paul Edwards and Alan Donogan who later went to America.

To some outsiders Australian philosophy will conjure up the image of hard-headed materialism. This is certainly another distinctive phase, that of the post-war Identity Theory of Mind, developed first in Adelaide by two immigrant Oxonians, U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (and taken up in various modes, and sometimes only temporally, by Michael Bradley, Brian Ellis, Graham Nerlich, Ian Hinckfuss, Max Deutscher, Brian Medlin, Alex Hyslop and others). The theory received a partly inconsistent exposition in a collected volume, *The Identity Theory of Mind*, but its main thesis is conveyed roughly though vividly by the favourite analogy of the parallel between the identity of the conscious-

ness with brain process on the one hand, and the identity of lightning with electrical discharge on the other. It was David Armstrong who offered a more definitive exposition in his *A Materialist Theory of Mind*.

There has been less unity in other philosophical areas. Moral theory has oscillated between Anderson's rigorous ethical objectivism, Oxford-inspired linguistic analysis of moral terms of and — perhaps most widely accepted — utilitarianism in its several varieties. In this context the outstanding names have been Kurt Baier, J. J. C. Smart, D. H. Monro, H. J. McCloskey, Julius Kovesi and, more recently, Peter Singer. A similar variety obtains in the area of social and political thought, though here, after a basic consensus about the primacy of democracy, the question is only that of which sort of treatment of politics is properly philosophical. A very lively area has been that of the philosophy of science, linked with such names as J. J. C. Smart, Brian Ellis, Graham Nerlich (on space) and, more recently, Cliff Hooker. More work has been done in this domain than in its socio-political counterpart. This domain has also been supported by a long tradition of interest in formal and philosophical logic (Len Goddard, the New Zealander Arthur Prior, Charles Hamblin) and at present in relevance logic, centred around the Australian National University.

Grave's typescript was completed at the beginning of this decade. Have there been changes? The first impression, probably correct, is that the post-war diversification has increased. Feminism, sometimes linked with Marxism, is widespread, with 'Women and Philosophy' being a normal part of the annual philosophy conferences. *The Australian Journal of Philosophy* follows a rigorous analytic line, its papers displaying a wealth of logico-mathematical symbolism, but a new journal, *Critical Philosophy*, has turned to a historical and cultural view of philosophy, reflecting the new and hardly stoppable interest in contemporary Continental philosophy. There has been an unprecedented growth of departmental publications and of mini-conferences on specific topics (phenomenology and Hegel being conspicuous examples). Variety, not concerted unity, appears to be the mark of today's Australian philosophy. Grave's book has shown most competently how this has come about.

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RUSSELL HARDIN, JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, GERALD DWORKIN, and ROBERT E. GOODIN, eds. *Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1985. Pp. vii + 395. US\$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-31702-1); US\$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-31704-8).

All of the essays in this volume have appeared in the journal *Ethics*, most of them in the April 1985 issue. But in these times in which the over zealous economic control of information through copyright laws is becoming increasingly oppressive such collections can be of great use in the classroom. With the recent growth in the number of philosophical courses on the problems raised by nuclear deterrence, the primary role for this book would be as a text, and as such it is one of the best I have seen.

The majority of the essays in the collection stems from a conference which was supposed to bring together members of two extremely disparate communities — the nuclear strategists and moral philosophers, but the clear focus of the collection is on ethical questions. The range of positions and arguments considered within the collection is vast, and it is difficult to find any common theme. I believe this is a strength of the volume, however, for the recognition of how differences in moral stance engender complexity and demand deepened argumentation is surely one of the main lessons of moral philosophy. If only for the sake of this point, the inclusion of the strategists is illuminating, for they often espouse positions which philosophers seem generally to shy away from (and, in this volume, they generally try to argue for a moral, in addition to a pragmatic, justification of their positions). So, for example, Josef Joffe, in 'No First Use and European Order' argues for NATO's stated option of possible first use of nuclear weapons; and Colin Gray, in 'Strategic Defence, Deterrence and the Prospects for Peace' argues in favour of the Strategic Defence Initiative, even if one grants that it is not likely to offer much protection for the civilian population.

It is perhaps no surprise to find American strategists acting as apologists for the official positions of their paymasters, yet here they provide grounds and reasoning which it is the very business of philosophy to respectfully consider. Furthermore, they bring a kind of pragmatic conservatism which is refreshing in a realm which sometimes smells a little too strongly of the philosophical *a priori*. They also tend, perhaps unwittingly, to stress one of the fundamental lessons of this debate: the importance of empirical fact in the consideration of ethical issues. Of course, philosophers have seldom denied this, yet they often try to avoid it, to the ultimate cost of their conclusions.

I would like to illustrate this point by briefly considering the paper of David Gauthier, 'Deterrence, Maximization and Rationality.' Gauthier's argument is quite straightforward. If the expected utility of threatening nuclear retaliation is greater than that of not so threatening (by disarming unilaterally, say) then the threat is rational, and since 'morality ... follows rationality' (119), according to Gauthier, it is also moral. In order to determine these expected utilities some probabilities must be known, in particular, the probability that one will

suffer a nuclear strike given that one makes the threat and the probability of this given that one forgoes the threat. As Gauthier notes, the assessment of such values 'is a difficult empirical question' (110), which he, in true philosophical spirit, will not attempt to estimate. It should also be pointed out that one needs to know the utilities of the various outcomes (certainly one must know whether any of them are infinite). The conclusion he draws is thus the purely *a priori* one that under certain conditions deterrence would be rational, hence moral. Still, by p. 119 he can state that 'nuclear deterrence ... is a moral policy.' I have looked and am pretty sure that between p. 110 and p. 119 there is no hidden calculation of the relevant probabilities and utilities. No, the empirical aspect of the problem has been buried under a snowstorm of theory (a kind of nuclear winter?). Gauthier's paper raises many other more important questions which suggests to me that the case of nuclear deterrence may be a true 'test case' for his project of deriving morality from rationality conceived as personal utility maximization.

That philosophers ignore empirical niceties is no great surprise but there is a more disturbing aspect of this problem which appears in several places in the collection and is quite wide-spread in the debate at large. This is the assumption that somehow the world is neatly divided into two camps such that every person on earth is in one or the other, or that any person not in either camp is somehow insulated from the effects of the actions of those in the camps. No one now holds this assumption in the bald form just stated. If the debate about the plausibility of the nuclear winter hypothesis (another purely empirical question) has done nothing else, it has seen to this, but the assumption stills wields some pernicious influence. Let me illustrate this by considering Christopher Morris's 'A Contractarian Defence of Nuclear Deterrence.' The argument is roughly this: In the face of a nuclear attack on X by Y, the conditions of justice break down leaving X and Y in a 'state of nature.' In such a state there are no moral constraints on X's actions so nuclear retaliation would not be impermissible. Morris then argues that therefore an earlier threat would be morally permissible since it is permissible in certain situations to deter by threatening what it would not be impermissible to do (this argument thus gets around the problems involving the so-called 'wicked intention principle').

Morris kindly admits that if retaliation would 'destroy life on the planet' it would be ruled out (and he admits an abstract principle of proportionate harm). But this is hardly sufficient. There is some question why X's interests justify the taking of even one innocent life unconnected to either X or Y. It is an empirical question, again, how many people unconnected to the U.S.S.R. would die by a massive retaliation by the U.S. on the U.S.S.R. but it is very, very likely to be more than 300 million (a recent U.N. document claims that more than 2 billion people would die from a nuclear exchange). Only the view that somehow American citizens are 'more important' than those of other nations could lead Morris to think that the principle of proportion would not immediately come into play and that his argument is of *anything* but purely theoretical interest.

Still, if one is to philosophize about such issues one must argue, and this collection provides a vigorous set of ethical arguments defending a startling range of possible nuclear policies. The issue of nuclear deterrence is a wonderful playing field for ethical theorizing, for the events considered are so terrible that intuitions are easily marshalled, and the institutions that perpetuate the possibility of these events are so pervasive. There is, in the end, a certain irony that this collection brings out *this* point so very well.

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DONALD N. LEVINE. *The Flight From Ambiguity. Essays in Social and Cultural Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1985. Pp. x + 248. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-226-47555-7.

This book reflects twenty-five years of research and thought. It is a collection of nine essays written for a variety of occasions, and almost all of the essays have been previously published or presented at conferences. The theme of 'ambiguity' was first embraced by Levine in connection with his research among the Amhara in Ethiopia, which resulted in his celebrated book, *Wax and Gold*, in 1965. In the present volume, chapters 1 through 4 explain and elaborate the theme of ambiguity and its opposite, usually referred to as 'univocality' (by which Levine appears to mean simply *precision*). The other five chapters deal more specifically with controversies in the history of sociology, concentrating on Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons, about all of whom Levine has written extensively. These later essays have quite a different thrust, and involve the author's concentrated attempt at what he calls 'disambiguation' of a number of concepts dear to many sociologists. Finally, there is a three-page Epilogue which breaks out into two cheers for ambiguity in science — presumably leaving one cheer for plain talk!

In the Preface, Levine openly declares his love for ambiguity, but the distinction between the need for a certain ambiguity in everyday interaction, for example to facilitate the expression of sentiments or the management of tensions, and, on the other hand, the open espousal of writing about social phenomena ambiguously (at least for a while), is never spelled out. He devotes many pages in the early part of the volume to discussing univocal discourse as a vital aspect of modernization (e.g., technology, commerce, legal codes), but stresses that this ought to be *added* to the previously less differentiated

patterns of traditional culture, not substituted for them. He insists that the latter has happened in the United States, and that the repudiation of ambiguity has gone too far, so that the creative use of analogies, metaphors and symbolism has all but disappeared from daily conversation. Up to this point it is easy to follow the author, but when he moves to a higher level of abstraction and writes about the importance of enjoying the 'dialectical tension' in discourses *about* society, or that there are definite benefits to be derived from semantic confusion, it is no longer clear what exactly he has in mind. Levine is certainly aware of this problem, because he admits: 'I have stopped short of a sustained effort to disambiguate the essentially contested concept of ambiguity' (219).

In case what I have written so far makes the whole book appear unduly opaque and convoluted, I want to stress that chapters 5 to 7 in particular don't deserve these labels and are very worthwhile in themselves. Chapter 5 addresses the various distortions and misinterpretations in the English-language literature dealing with Simmel's short excursus on 'The Stranger,' in particular the tendency to conflate the stranger with the marginal man, first perpetrated by Robert Park in the 1920s. Levine develops a typology of six possible stranger relationships and concludes that Simmel dealt merely with one segment of the sociology of strangerhood, but it was only by wading through the distorted readings of his book that this gradually became clear.

Chapter 6 is the longest one in the book; it had been available previously only in German. Levine attempts to illustrate how Simmel was neglected and rejected by Durkheim and Weber (who were his own generation), by Lukács and Park (who were his students), as well as by Parsons, who could not see a way to fit Simmel into his convergence thesis advanced in *The Structure of Social Action*. Levine believes that Simmel differed from all five of the above authors in being more tolerant of ambiguity, while they tended to pursue the univocal. A consequence of this has been that those sociological theorists who came to reject Durkheim and Parsons in the 1960s and 70s often turned to Simmel as a founding father, thus leading to a flurry of new translations and commentaries.

The next chapter is probably the most audacious of all; it addresses the connection between rationality and freedom in the work of Max Weber, and is reprinted from *Sociological Inquiry* (1981) with only minor changes. Here ambiguity is eschewed completely in favor of bringing more order to Weber's formulations and stating his analyses more systematically. This is a complex topic and there has been a great deal written about it. Levine sets himself two major goals: (1) to distinguish between 'subjective' rationality and 'objectified' rationality in Weber's publications, and (2) to argue that there is no necessary link between the growth of rationalization (i.e., formal rationality) and the curtailment of human freedom.

From a perspective which is similar to that of Karl Löwith (e.g., *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, 1982 — first published in 1932), Levine tries to demonstrate not only that at times rationalization enhances freedom, but that freedom may even be dependent on increased rationalization. There is virtually no sup-

port for such a contention in Weber's own writings, and a careful reading of Löwith's essay makes it clear that he relied exclusively on secondary sources in order to buttress his conclusion that what Weber espoused was 'not freedom from the rationalized world but freedom within the "iron cage"' (1982, 52). Levine, on the other hand, identifies quotations in Weber to support his position, but he takes them out of context. Many of the references to 'rationality' and 'rationalization' are found in Weber's essays dealing with *Verstehen* or with the construction of ideal types, and are not concerned with objectification in the sense intended by Levine. A more cogent approach to linking Weber's affirmation of freedom in his methodological writings with his rationalization thesis was recently outlined by Lars Udéhn (see: *Acta Sociologica*, 1981). Udéhn agrees that Weber saw bureaucracies as autonomous forces independent of persons, but he believes that the writings on methodology and the existentialist statements found in Weber's speeches dealing with science and politics as vocations were not addressed to just anyone, but only to a narrow segment of the population: those who dominate either as capitalist entrepreneurs or as plebiscitary leaders. The activities of everyone who works inside bureaucracies, for example, are not determined by his or her own motives and hence are not 'action' in Weber's sense at all; they do not even fit his definition of sociology. Udéhn's arguments are compelling, and it is obvious that Levine has not yet given us the final interpretation of this central ambiguity in Weber's opus.

Two further chapters round out the discussion of Weber. In a comparison with Freud, major attention is devoted to the non-rational dimensions of human action, while in a comparison of Weber with Simmel and Parsons, Levine asks how each one of them addressed the tension in modern life between subjectivity and objectivity. He identifies some intriguing parallels.

How does one evaluate a book which sets out to celebrate ambiguity? If at the end the reader is confused, does that imply the author has been successful? What does it mean to insist that the concept of ambiguity ought to remain ambiguous? I find the book very much in the 'spirit' of Simmel, but like his work, it lacks a center. Levine's concluding prayer reflects this well:

Lord, give me the capaciousness and wit to tolerate and enjoy ambiguity when it is appropriate, the clarity of mind and firmness of will to be unambiguous when it's not, and the wisdom to know what time it is.

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JOHN J. McDERMOTT. *Streams of Experience. Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture*. Foreword by Norman Grabo. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1986. Pp. xxiii + 266. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-87203-496-X.

One index of a worthwhile book is the ratio of memorable lines to the number of printed pages. On an arithmetical scale, Shakespeare ranks right at the top, whereas Darko Suvin is somewhere near the bottom. Happily, McDermott is more Bardic than Darkic. But his aphorisms are more than just special verbal effects. They support his main theme: 'The deepest contemporary problem is that of homelessness' (54). When we moved (in Koyré's words) from a closed world to an infinite universe, the emotional consequences were catastrophic. McDermott proves this phenomenologically: 'Some of our idiomatic questions and phrases tell us of our concern for being in place. Do you have a place? Set a place for me. This is my place. Why do we always go to your place? Would you care to place a bet? I have been to that place. Wow, this is *some* place. Win, place, show... I am getting someplace.... I seem to be no place' (135). Imagine O.K. Bouwsma cloned to Cyra McFadden and you can appreciate, if not imitate, McDermott's debunking style. Who else would dare to begin an essay on architecture by saying 'the human body is neither a container nor a box in a world of boxes.... Allow me to offer a way out of this Platonic cave... I prefer us to experience the world as if we were in a permeable sheath rather than trapped in a linguistic condom' (198).

It isn't all Bacchanalian revel. McDermott can be straight, too: 'Our impending death is not the major obstacle to our becoming truly human. The obstacle is found in our running for cover on behalf of our escape from death' (168). And in being preoccupied with it — as someone might have told Heidegger. 'Coming to consciousness has nothing to do with the traditional pursuit of happiness ... rather, the signal importance of how we come to consciousness is precisely that such a process is all we are, all we have, and all we shall ever be' (198). More succinctly, ashes to ashes, dust to dust. It's only when he tries to be deep that McDermott descends into platitude: 'Water has the capacity to bathe the soul and to provide a stimulus for the symbolization of the environment' (207). Alas, they can't all be gems.

Like many writers, McDermott is best when he reminisces about his childhood (87) or explains the anguish of being a parent (220). Whereas, when he tells us about clock time or the impersonality of skyscrapers (201, 203) he is just a faint echo of Lewis Mumford and Ivan Illich. Philosophy is not autobiography, as James once alleged; but books like this almost make me believe that it should be.

McDermott contends that '... the religious and metaphysical originality of America is strapped to its belief in the sacredness of time, its celebration of journey and transiency, and its aversion to ideology, eschatology, and final solutions. The inversion of this order of priorities will sink us as a culture' (64). I'm not sure I agree. What's more, I'm not sure I understand. For if (as

Benjamin Barber remarked) the essence of America is to have no essence, then nothing can be sacred, not even money, with which Franklin equated time. Hence everything from 'trekking' (71) to being '... the Marlboro man, free of entanglements of any kind and self-individuating' (87) is both cause and consequence of despair. By definition, America is anomic. You can't build a community on the premise that everyone is free to go their own way — even, or especially, when that proves to be a lie. The closest you can come is to construct an icon, like Huck and Jim on the raft. Too often, it turns out to be Rojak buggering the maid. We have already been sunk for over two centuries. Can't you hear me burbling?

Despite his emphasis on developments in American life, McDermott pays no attention to M.M.M.M.M.: mass media as a myth-making machine. Nor does he explain why post-Copernican science cannot generate emotionally satisfying narratives in which we can regain a 'natural place.' Since 'we are recombinant organisms in a cosmic DNA chain' (134), there ought to be some solace in being a branching node at one end of a protoplasmic drama (see William Day, *The Genesis of Planet Earth*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1984). Granted, we may yet contrive a Wagnerian immolation scene that will upstage the extinction of the dinosaurs. But evolution doesn't have to be apocalyptic to capture our fancy. If it can inspire Stephen Jay Gould, why is it unfit for Mircea Eliade, let alone the rest of us?

But these aren't criticisms, just reminders. To reproach the author for what he didn't write would be like grading a love affair. Socrates told his disciples that he didn't fear death, because the next life would give him a chance to talk things over with Homer. If conversation is allowed in hell, I request McDermott around my eternal fire. My only complaint is that the book is mislabeled. McDermott should have titled it 'After Dante.' (I apologize for using 'American' (three times) as a chauvinist synonym for 'people and events in the United States.' Like racism and sexism, Uncle Samism dies hard.)

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MARY MIDGLEY. *Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears*. London and New York: Methuen 1985. Pp. ix + 171. US\$33.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-416-39650-X); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-416-39660-7).

This is a beautiful little book, a jewel-box packed tight with eighteen small gems of chapters, each exquisitely cut and fired internally by an angry intelli-

gence. Midgley's thesis is that around the purely scientific theory of evolution near-religions have grown, seeded and tended, quite often, by those who take it as their business to sneer at the genuine religious hopes and fears of ordinary folk. It is not that there is something basically wrong with the urge to produce, along with our scientific theories, our dramas as she also calls them. We are, after all, animals who find ourselves impelled to seek meaning. It is just that so much of what is tendentiously presented to us in the guise of the strictest scientific thought is not even drama — it is cheap and tawdry melodrama.

As religions may take on lighter or darker hues so these scientific melodramas, as bleached copies of them, have their optimistic and pessimistic forms. There is what Midgley calls the view of 'the irresistible escalator' where all that is worthwhile about human kind is supposed to lie in the fore-ordained evolutionary future when 'superman' (Nietzsche) or 'omega-man' (William Day) or goodness knows what kind of 'man' honours the universe with his birth. This view is both morally corrupt and corrupting in that it regards ordinary humans as mere means to the supposedly glorious evolutionary end. Here Midgley makes explicit what would be involved morally in carrying out the experimental work necessary to bring about profound genetic changes in the human population. And, she argues, supposing the moral objections overcome and that, for the sake of some far-off generation's perfection, parents will allow their children to be treated as genetic Lego sets, we still have no guarantee that the biological technology is remotely possible. Revealingly, the standard reply to this objection is 'Have faith!'

But even escalator enthusiasm will wane if the moving-stair drama of evolution is placed on a large enough stage. We can put our faith whole-heartedly in a future only if we forget that that future will, itself, become a past. In this respect Midgley makes a connection with some remarks of the cosmologist Steven Weinberg that the universe is pointless and that one of the few things worthwhile about humans, but only barely, is their attempt to understand it.

There can, then, be pessimistic varieties of religious evolutionism and Midgley sets about their examination through an encounter with Jacques Monod's influential *Chance and Necessity*. Here she brings out the need many scientists feel for a dramatic expression of their faith in science and how Monod supplied it. As she cuttingly puts it, 'He simply took the Popperian map and projected existentialist colouring on it to satisfy the imagination' (77). What we get, after all of Monod's protest about the 'animism' of most human conceptual schemes, is a crassly poor argument for the view that the 'ethic of knowledge' is the only genuine, freely chosen moral value. As 'knowledge' here means 'knowledge of physical science' what we have, as we did with the dreams of the escalator theorists, is the unthinking glorification of science, and its practitioners, at the expense of all other human endeavour.

But if the escalator theory is, in both its happy and gloomy forms, largely cheap nonsense dressed up as profundity, much of what the sociobiologists say is ugly nonsense undisguised. Midgley is able to show this, damningly, by letting these modern Hobbesians speak for themselves. No matter how much

they plead the use of convenient metaphor they time and again betray themselves by sliding frictionlessly from selfish gene talk to sermons about the underlying selfish *motives* for social behaviour. Midgley effectively exposes this move, most notably by making the point that the existence of altruistic behavior is *presupposed* by sociobiology as something which needs explanation by natural selection. Here, however, I have the smallest of quibbles. Telling the story of J.B.S. Haldane's sudden announcement in a pub, 'I am willing to die for four uncles or eight cousins,' Midgley objects: 'Haldane spoke as if the answer to his genetic calculations could *decide* whether he would — or perhaps should? — die for his relatives' (121). Haldane, whether or not he made that remark, would not have made that mistake. He was, after all, a bit of a wag.

If we are, in the name of science, being presented with these pilfered and degraded elements of religion then the further questions arise of the proper natures of these human activities and the relations between them. Midgley does not shirk this discussion which she cleverly weaves in as background to the attacks on the main enemy. We are not presented with easy solutions and the difficulties are squarely faced if not always fought to a decision. There are nicely pointed remarks on the positivist and falsificationist accounts of science and its distinction from metaphysics, on the relation of values to facts, on modern scepticism ('Narrow-minded, conformist sceptics and immoralists are now a standard issue' [109]) and, particularly interesting, an examination of a strange bagful of 'mixed antitheses' which, she claims, 'has for the last century usually been issued to English-speaking scientists with their first test-tube' (98). An interesting conclusion is that the scientific attitude, 'if given its full scope and not reduced artificially to a mere mindless tic for collecting, is continuous with a typically religious view of the physical world' (112).

Midgley's book, in short, is a brilliantly written and argued work. As a public service copies of it should be slipped into the satchels of biology students along with their dissection manuals. Sadly, many of their teachers will find nothing in it but sentences and nothing within them but words.

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ANTOINE PROST. *Eloge des pédagogues*. Paris: Seuil 1985. 224 p. 79FF. ISBN 2-02-009007-4.

Même si A. Prost se défend d'être polémique, il est bien difficile de ne pas situer l'*Eloge des pédagogues* dans le contexte du débat français des dernières

années sur l'école, surtout que l'auteur y a poussé plus avant des arguments qu'il avait plus tôt fait valoir contre le discours de la restauration des savoirs (*Le Débat*, no 31, septembre 1984).

On dit en France, mais ici également, que l'enseignement est en détresse, qu'il n'y a plus le défi d'apprendre et qu'il faut retourner aux matières de base. Or, c'est en se déplaçant vers la classe que A. Prost choisit de parler du fait scolaire et en prenant en compte la réalité sociologique et psychologique des élèves d'aujourd'hui qu'il cherche à faire voir l'ampleur de la tâche des pédagogues.

Le livre se divise en neuf chapitres. L'option de l'A. est claire dès le départ. Après avoir signalé le retour depuis les années soixante-dix des pédagogies plus scolaires, il choisit pour l'enseignement une problématique des études selon laquelle les savoirs se reconstruisent par le travail assidu des élèves. Toutefois, il constate que les maîtres qui savent leur métier sont placés aujourd'hui devant la tâche presque impossible de faire travailler des élèves qui perçoivent l'école comme une contrainte. Pour mieux comprendre la situation et les attitudes des jeunes au centre des problèmes actuels de l'enseignement et montrer que l'école ne peut à elle seule réussir la socialisation des jeunes, l'A. brosse ensuite les grands traits des changements survenus depuis vingt-cinq ans dans le système scolaire et la société française. Il souligne le phénomène massif de la croissance de la scolarisation relié au désir de promotion sociale, le transfert à l'école d'apprentissages qui s'effectuaient auparavant dans la famille, la nouvelle éducation familiale, la contradiction entre le discours de l'absence de contraintes et du plaisir de vivre et celui du travail, de l'effort et de la responsabilité. Puis, il montre comment les réformes successives depuis le décret Berthoin ont structuré en véritable système l'ensemble des établissements scolaires. En même temps que la 'démocratisation de l'enseignement' donnait lieu à la sectorisation et engendrait une orientation par l'échec, les savoirs enseignés devenaient plus abstraits et les motivations des élèves, plus utilitaires, quand ces derniers n'étaient pas carrément hostiles. Ainsi la tâche de l'enseignant est-elle devenue plus difficile, impuissante à tout le moins à contrer les effets destructeurs sur des milliers d'élèves du renforcement de la sélection produit par le système.

Dans les chapitres centraux du livre, l'A. suggère quelques stratégies pour conserver de fortes études dans un enseignement de masse, défendant ici et là les positions de son rapport sur les lycées (1983). D'abord, il traite de l'équilibre entre le temps des cours et celui de l'étude, de la nécessité de mettre à la disposition des élèves des espaces convenables et, surtout, des centres de documentation et d'information. Puis il développe les points suivants: la concertation dans l'organisation du travail des élèves, l'individualisation des études, le contrat pédagogique et la décentralisation, condition sine qua non de la mobilisation des enseignants dans le projet éducatif de leur établissement. Enfin, dans un texte reproduit de *Pouvoirs*, no 30, 1984, il discute de la nécessité d'une réforme du baccalauréat français.

Dans les trois derniers chapitres l'A. aborde la formation et la recherche. D'abord, il critique la forme scolaire de l'enseignement professionnel et les

carences de l'enseignement général en regard des savoirs pratiques, puis il suggère la création de modules d'adaptation à l'emploi qui pourraient accueillir des travailleurs et qui, couronnant la formation initiale pour les jeunes, conjuguerait la formation en milieu de travail et la formation dans l'établissement scolaire. Au sujet de la formation des professeurs, sa position est catégorique: la formation académique ne suffit pas au métier d'enseignant. Dans la classe, les savoirs disciplinaires ne peuvent se passer de didactique ou d'épistémologie, ils ne sont pas indépendants de l'organisation du travail des élèves, de la gestion de la classe, de la communication ou de l'évaluation. Il préconise pour la formation des professeurs trois orientations: une formation initiale sérieuse, une procédure de recrutement des candidats et de sanction des études qui rehausse le statut de la formation, ainsi que le développement intensif de la recherche en éducation, particulièrement dans des foyers régionaux décentralisés. L'A. consacre le dernier chapitre à la recherche, justifiant avec les attitudes qu'elle développe son intégration à la formation des enseignants et taillant les exigences et les lieux respectifs de la recherche sur les pratiques et la recherche fondamentale ou théorique.

L'*Eloge des pédagogues* contextualise les données du fait scolaire et son intérêt est très actuel. Toutefois, les orientations préconisées pour la formation des maîtres ne paraîtront guère originales dans notre milieu et on s'étonnera que l'A. ne se soit tourné vers les expériences étrangères, celle de l'Angleterre par exemple, pour penser la formation des enseignants.

Par ailleurs, quand il dit que 'l'Etat ne paie pas (les professeurs) parce qu'il a le devoir d'entretenir la flamme de la culture ou de la science, mais parce qu'il faut s'occuper des centaines de milliers de jeunes' (176), A. Prost consacre la distance qu'il prétend réduire entre le savoir et la classe, et nous continuons de nous demander comment les enseignants peuvent se réconcilier avec leur métier. Finalement, comme il s'applique à montrer ce que l'enseignant peut tirer de l'observation de la pratique pédagogique, l'A. aurait gagné à joindre aux mérites des savoirs positifs et expérimentaux ceux des modèles de recherche en émergence en éducation.

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NICHOLAS RESCHER. *The Strife of Systems*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1985. Pp. xii + 283. US\$34.95. ISBN 0-8229-3510-4.

I have not read this book in its entirety and I do not recommend other people do so, unless time hangs heavily on their hands, or unless they are devotees

of Rescher, in which case I do not recommend they read this review in its entirety.

This is a celebration of the ultimate futility of philosophy, of philosophy as hobby, philosophy as decoration. In keeping with the theme, the book, as a physical object, is very handsome. No one should be ashamed of its appearance on their shelves. The main colour of the binding is burgundy, with royal blue on the spine, lettering and decoration in gold. I once had a friend in college for whom such things were of importance. He would take books down and stroke them, glorying in the fineness of their construction and the beauty of their appearance. The content mattered much less to him. I don't know what has become of him.

It's not that Rescher does not like philosophy: he obviously loves it. It's that he does not think it achieves anything, except greater elaboration and defence of a variety of philosophical positions which have been picked by their adherents for their cognitive virtues. But philosophers do not change their sets of cognitive values, in Rescher's view. He considers what he calls philosophical conversion logically possible, but barely psychologically possible. I have taken note of Rescher's stubbornness. I shall not try arguing with him. I'll save my breath to cool my porridge. Sad. How widely true of *philosophers* is this tough unwillingness to make shifts in deep matters? How few of them engage in discussion out of mutual willingness to learn from one another about what to value, as well as about whether an argument goes through? I don't know, but I had thought there were more than nearly none.

Rescher's thesis is, roughly, that philosophy is the effort to solve problems posed as sets of attractive but mutually inconsistent theses; that which exit we choose from this cluster is determined by our cognitive values — things like consistency, simplicity, explanatory adequacy, closeness to common sense; that there is no sensible hope for unanimity on values — I do not think he would think they are the kind of thing one even argues about; therefore, there will always be disagreement among philosophers; but don't worry, the disagreement will lead to you elaborating the arguments for your position; and, don't forget, respect other people's views. (I had not thought to see him trying to derive a duty from this relativism, but there it is on p. 273.)

I completely agree with him about the centrality of problems in philosophy and I agree that no interesting philosophical problem has a knock-me-down solution, and that there is no sensible hope for unanimity across all thinkers. But I am less stubborn than Rescher about all my cognitive valuations, more open to persuasion that I might assign less weight here and there to this or that value, and more optimistic that when I engage in a discussion those I talk with will be similarly open. This leaves room for me to hope that rational discussion, including discussion about our values, may lead me to improve my beliefs, in the sense of getting them more nearly true. I am sorry for the stubborn ones. To the extent their views are wrong, they are stuck with them.

The book is very nicely printed. I did not detect any typos. The argument is conducted neatly, step by step, as tightly as Rescher can get it, and larded with scholarly apparatus. The subject index is not very full and not very ac-

curate: topics you might want to check out could easily not be there, and there is much discussion of the topics that are there on pages the index does not list.

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JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ DE MURILLO. *Der Geist der deutschen Romantik: Der Übergang vom logischen zum dichterischen Denken und der Hervorgang der Tiefenphänomenologie*. München: Verlag Friedrich Pfeil 1986. Pp. 398. DM 28. ISBN 3-923871-09-0.

This text is the revision of a *Habilitationsschrift* done in 1983, but the closing date for the bibliography seems to be c. 1980. It may be regarded then as an earlier contribution to a resurgence of mysticism in West German philosophical discourse. The book is carefully printed and well bound, although there is no index.

It is divided into three loosely connected sections. Part A (47-123) reviews the 'spirit of Romanticism.' Part B (125-337) focuses primarily on Franz von Baader, whom Sánchez considers a wrongfully neglected Romantic philosopher. There is also a lengthy flashback to Jacob Böhme (187-257), who was a major influence on Baader. The relatively short Part C (345-70) attempts to point the way to a 'language of nature as language of the spirit of the sake of the world' (362), against a superficial technical thinking.

It is more difficult to outline the arguments, not least because of a tedious reiterative tendency. There is also a confusion of the exposition of method with applications. This method, the so-called 'Tiefenphänomenologie,' which might be rendered in English as 'depth phenomenology,' attempts to outflank the historicity of all discourses by postulating a fundamental temporality — a kind of cosmic time — about which there is now a need to speak. Depth phenomenology will be enabled to do this speaking: 'Being is time which passes away. But that which thus *is* passing away, is the remaining. The deep time is thus the substance. And the philosophy which thinks upon the movement of substance is called depth phenomenology' (43). This then is an effort to reach a more fundamental level than Heidegger had in *Sein und Zeit*.

But the actual opponent is Kant, who is held responsible for the modern triumph of 'categorical, i.e. commanding thinking' (18). Reasoning in the tradition of the Enlightenment represented by Kant is supposedly no longer ade-

quate for the crisis of the technological age: 'Finite reason has no hold on the meaning and cause of the confining threat to itself of the age' (13).

Rather than attempt to refute Kant directly or provide a critique of the superficial thinking of the technological age, Sánchez resorts to a kind of history of lost ideas. There he seeks an alternative thought. Key names in this neglected tradition are Böhme, Lessing, the German Romantics (F. Schlegel, Novalis) and Baader. Unfortunately, they are not introduced chronologically, so it is difficult to grasp the historical dimensions of their thought, as if Lessing confronted the same challenges as Böhme or Baader. Sánchez has a familiar and largely derivative understanding of Romanticism, although he couches his analyses in a philosophical voice. The irrational is depicted as counter-rational, and since rational has been presumed to be negative, the counter-rational is positive.

One crux clearly is the issue of whether matter is alive or not. The deadness of matter implied by the Newtonian and Kantian physics is contrasted with dynamic matter in the mystical and ultimately neoplatonic tradition of Böhme and Baader. Throughout, one cannot tell whether Sánchez is merely reporting these ideas or whether he is propounding them. It seems as if the close paraphrases are supposed to have the force of argument, but they fail insofar as an interpretation of another's text is a remove away from the world as such. For example, the reading of embodiment via Baader seems very abstract, especially contrasted with the work of Merleau-Ponty and Erwin Straus.

The failure to turn to the forsaken confounds any hope that Sánchez might have brought us towards the salvation of an age in dire need. The reliance upon the 'spirit of romanticism' is self-deceived because Romanticism was already woven by dark satanic mills. The hope that nature might be brought back to life is a hope of technology. It is precisely technology which insists that matter be alive. Modern physics has sought light in darkness and found it more intense than Böhme or Novalis or Baader could have imagined.

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GEORGE N. SCHLESINGER. *The Range of Epistemic Logic*. (Scots Philosophical Monographs, No. 6). Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press 1985. Pp. xv + 116. US\$26.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-032416-9); US\$18.50 (paper: ISBN 0-08-032417-7).

This monograph displays many of the philosophical virtues George

Schlesinger's past writings have led us to expect. The positive claims are bold, the argumentation forceful, and the pace vigorous. Typical of those with a passion for their subject, Schlesinger tends to be unsparing in his criticism and confident in the truth of his position. What he perceives to be a missed point, error, or wrong-headedness is subject to unadorned correction.

Surprisingly, Schlesinger takes the fact that some users of epistemic logic have gone 'so spectacularly astray' as 'a true mark of the potency of this branch of applied logic.' One of the main themes of the work is that epistemic logic offers a high philosophical return on a small logical investment. The point is illustrated with a tour of how it can be profitably applied to Descartes' dream argument, issues of privileged access, fallibilism, scepticism, understanding, confirmation and the verification criterion of meaningfulness. Perhaps because of space limitations, the itinerary does not include past attempts to apply epistemic logic to Moore's problem, the prediction paradox, and classic fallacies such as *ad ignorantiam*. Nor is there any exploration of a connection with epistemic semantics (as propounded by Brian Ellis and Bas van Fraassen). The omission of any mention of Jaakko Hintikka's *Knowledge and Belief* is especially salient. Just passing reference to this literature would have quickly strengthened Schlesinger's case for the utility of epistemic logic. Just a few pages appraising Hintikka's seminal work would have given the monograph a more well-rounded (that is, historical) feel and would have satisfied one's natural curiosity as to where Schlesinger stands on the more formal, model theoretic approach to epistemic logic.

Schlesinger does not restrict himself to giving a critical survey of issues in epistemic logic. For in the sixth of eight chapters, he advances the thesis that deontic logic is a replica of epistemic logic. However, if the two fields are isomorphic, shouldn't deontic and epistemic puzzles overlap? Indeed, says Schlesinger, and he commences to present his solutions to contrary-to-duty puzzles, the arbitrary permission anomaly, and problems concerning moral dilemmas and disjunctive permissions. As he observes, the isomorphism thesis is more fertile than the frequent claim that there are many parallels between ethics and epistemology. For the isomorphism imposes an adequacy condition on the compilation of valid theorems, viz., that candidate theorems hold only if their epistemic (or deontic) counterparts hold. Hence our evidence for claims within each field is effectively doubled.

Schlesinger is a well-known proponent of a verification theory of meaning and he turns to this topic in the final chapter. His point of departure is J.L. Mackie's account of how propositions of the form 'p but it is unknown that p' pose a problem for verificationism. The gist of the argument is that since such propositions are both consistent and yet unknowable, verifiability cannot be a necessary condition of meaningfulness. Unfortunately, Schlesinger is too hasty in his response. Its origin is mistraced to H.L.A. Hart. (F.B. Fitch was the first to publish something on it. W.D. Hart revived it and emphasized its anti-verificationist consequences.) He truncates Mackie's account in a way that is likely to mislead many readers. And Schlesinger's key objection, that there is a difference between knowing that p and possibly knowing that actu-

ally p, is alas, condensed into a single paragraph. To get an idea of the modal gyrations needed to make this distinction work, one needs to read Dorothy Edgington's 'The Paradox of Knowability' (*Mind* XCIV [1985]). Schlesinger's only hint at such complexities appears with his concession that the failure to draw the distinction is 'a somewhat subtle error.' Our reluctance to draw the distinction has deeper roots in modal theory than this concession suggests. Perhaps deeper excavations will be undertaken in Schlesinger's future work.

Given the brevity of the monograph, Schlesinger achieves a variety of goals with an admirable degree of success. The reader does come away with an appreciation of what epistemic logic applies to, how it applies, and how little needs to be invested in order to arrive at interesting results. In the process, I might add, the importance of familiarity with probability theory is driven home. Last, but hardly least, we are offered detailed support for a bold philosophical conjecture that unifies two apparently disparate fields of applied logic. Thus Schlesinger's monograph itself embodies the virtue of yielding a large return on a small investment.

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CARL SCHMITT. *Political Theology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985. Pp. xxvi + 70. US\$15.00. ISBN 0-262-19244-6. Translated with introduction by George Schwab.

Schmitt's book (1922; 2nd ed.: 1934) can be read either as a powerful polemic or as a suggestive work of theory but it can hardly be read at all without knowledge of its historical context. Here Schwab's introduction is useful, but brief. The Weimar Republic was torn by endemic constitutional and armed political conflict; thus the political basis for legal order was in jeopardy. According to Schmitt, legal theory must ask how law is politically possible.

The book is divided into four chapters. The first two define and defend the concept of Sovereignty; the third presents the suggestive hypothesis that 'All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts' by virtue of their 'systematic structure' (36); the final chapter presents a thinly veiled critique of the liberal's denial of the political: fascinated with 'discussion,' the liberal abhors the 'decision' (62-3).

Schmitt's main polemical and theoretical aims include:

- a) Forcing legal theorists to recognize that the validity of law depends upon real, and *contingent*, sociopolitical circumstances, ultimately on the Sovereign's decision; the study of these circumstances (called 'sociology') is part of the substance of the law.
- b) Winning a strong hand for the person who would have to decide when the context of normal legality has been so disrupted that they must take charge in the interests either of restoring the old constitutional order or of instituting a new one.

Schmitt's abrupt and paradoxical style and his polemical involvements make the extraction of his arguments difficult. In sum, Schmitt claims 'every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium' (13). The very validity of the law depends upon the 'normal situation' and thus the conditions that secure normalcy must concern legal theory. 'This effective normal situation is not a mere "superficial presupposition" that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to [a norm's] immanent validity' (13).

If legal theory must study conditions for *securing* normalcy, then it must also study the juridical aspects of requirements for *restoring* normalcy disrupted by political crisis. Such a legal/political crisis or 'exception' (*Ausnahmезustand*) 'can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like' (6). Since 'the precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated' (6), in the exception law will be imposed but outside of the normal context of legality; *auctoritas, non veritas facit legem*, or as Schmitt turns it, 'authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law' (13).

In the exception 'it is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes' (12); the state must decide whether a crisis is at hand and how to manage it. Thus, the state is 'sovereign': 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (5). This decision is 'a decision in the true sense of the word' (6), for it is not determined by the content of law; the law cannot abrogate itself nor determine how one should proceed once it is suspended.

The foregoing summary hardly does justice to the richness of Schmitt's discussions, but it is enough to provoke some questions. Schmitt's relation to Weimar explains in part his emphasis on the 'exception,' but doesn't this skew his view of the normal context of legality and the place of sovereignty within it? If in the normal situation the 'autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum' (12), how is it that 'the exception proves everything' (15)? Indeed it rather seems the sovereign may not exist in the normal situation, except potentially.

Schmitt's comments on the homologies between theological thought and political thought are most interesting but remain sketchy, particularly when he comes to speak of the modern-liberal era. His fertilization of legal theory

with sociology reveals his status as a founding father of 'political science.' His perception of the liberal bourgeoisie as a 'discussing class,' 'wanting to evade the decision' (59), has great polemical bite, but is the 'decision' always at issue?

Schwab's translation is very literal and has the virtue of retaining the conciseness of Schmitt's prose. Unfortunately, at times it also retains his obscurity. The book has an index; bibliographical information is sometimes provided in footnotes.

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ROGERS M. SMITH. *Liberalism and American Constitutional Law*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1985. Pp. 328. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-674-53015-2.

Although substantial segments of this ambitious book are concerned with decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the book deserves the attention of moral and political philosophers with little interest in the constitutional law of the United States. It is the author's purpose to provide a more coherent and determinative basis for thought and action about freedom of speech, due process of law, apportionment, economic welfare, and related issues and his discussions of these questions are informed, in some detail, by the public law traditions of his own country. He argues, however, that the deficiencies of that tradition exemplify difficulties in a much wider body of thought, deficiencies that cannot be entirely remedied by appeal to features of that tradition itself. As his title indicates, much of his reflection is framed by the category 'liberalism': but because this is a less than closely circumscribed category, and because he addresses critics as well as proponents of liberal views, his discussions range quite widely in moral and political thought from the 17th century forward.

The main thesis of the book is that liberalism can resolve its grave difficulties only by reviving and suitably revising John Locke's notion of 'rational liberty' as the objective or guiding purpose of politically organized society. The 'higher law' doctrines against which Locke himself reacted, although still from time to time prescribed as remedies for the ills of liberalism, are untenable on philosophical grounds and are in any case too far outside of the consensus of liberal societies to win acceptance. On the other hand, skeptical attempts to eschew guiding moral ends and purposes, whether by appeal to

purely procedural conceptions of democracy or by adopting neoKantian views such as those of Rawls, leave liberalism without resources to respond to criticisms from either its left or its right, and, more important, unable to resolve the conflicts that continuously present themselves from within liberal theory and practice.

The main philosophical interest of the book lies in the concept of rational liberty and the argument that this should be the master notion of liberalism. Smith seems to condone uses of 'liberty' and 'freedom' that are not conceptually tied to 'rational.' Locke himself not only recognized merely 'physical liberty' but believed that most human beings 'will risk life itself rather than endure' its loss (203-4). But the conception of liberty that Locke promoted 'is positively opposed' to defenses of liberty 'that do not identify freedom with reason' (30). Anticipating the views of later proponents of so-called positive theories of freedom, Locke thought that those whose conduct is impelled by 'unexamined, unrestrained inclinations' are in a kind of 'captivity,' one much worse than loss of merely physical liberty (203-4). Taken as a goal that is worthy of pursuit, or rather as *the goal* that liberal societies ought to pursue, liberty equals 'the preservation and enhancement of human capacities for understanding and reflective self-direction' (200), that is, those capacities that allow human beings to escape from and avoid the 'enslavement' of mere inclinations and passions. Endorsing this understanding throughout, Smith deplores both 'the misguided tendency ... to identify liberalism's premises with Hobbes's egoistic psychology' and the proclivity 'to link any higher moral aspirations in liberalism' to the empty or at least largely indeterminate formalisms of 'Kant's transcendental egalitarianism' (201).

Smith's construal and defense of rational liberty is not without ambiguities and uncertainties akin to those which, as he reminds us (see esp. pp. 201-16), detract from Locke's formulation of the notion. As Smith reports and guardedly endorses it, the core of Locke's view is the 'pragmatic psychological empiricism' (202) of the *Essay* and its picture of human beings as fundamentally 'uneasy' with themselves and their condition. Deprived of the assurances provided by classical and medieval essentialisms, humankind is, frighteningly, thrown back on its own resources. In this circumstance, 'the most genuinely satisfying experience is the relief that comes when we enhance our understanding of the circumstances that affect us and increase our ability to control not only them but our own responses to them. ... [T]o increase our capacities for rational self-direction is the proper response to the basic, underlying, and most enduring uneasiness that moves us' (205).

Smith is well aware of the numerous objections to this view of freedom and concedes that the ideal it promotes 'cannot be shown to be morally obligatory by reason alone' (207). Perhaps because he nevertheless wants to promote it, he occasionally permits himself language reminiscent of those parts of Locke's theory that are difficult to square with pragmatic psychological empiricism. Liberal societies must uphold the belief that 'capacities for rational self-direction are *intrinsically* morally valuable' (217, my italics); 'neither happiness nor a sense of moral value *can* be attained in the long run unless we

accept the personal responsibilities for systematic reflection' (220, my italics). But these beliefs, while reasoned in the sense that within broadly liberal cultures there are reasons for accepting them, are not rationally necessary. Their rationally optional character, moreover, extends to the more particular decisions and choices through which the beliefs are implemented in this or that circumstances. Thus in 'upholding' the beliefs through such means as socialization, education, moral praise and blame, and the coercive instrument of law, liberal societies cannot avoid acting against beliefs that accord with their most fundamental commitment.

Smith's awareness of the limitations of his own argument (his own skepticism as we might say) may explain the tempered quality of some parts of his discussion. Enhancing the capacities necessary to rational liberty 'is ultimately largely a personal achievement' which the state can do no more than assist (257). If 'the state prevents persons from taking actions essential to their emotional fulfillment, ... and these actions are perfectly consistent with preserving rational liberty in themselves and others, then something central to their rational self-governance, or their pursuit of happiness, has been infringed' (237). Most generally, the rational liberty view 'authorizes the community to do little more than decide on what is minimally rational ... to decide, not what behavior the community finds truly good or rationally correct, but rather what conduct expresses a process of rational deliberation, and conversely, what actions endanger a person's continuing capacities for rational deliberation. Only the latter can rightfully be prohibited. This determination is much more likely to find a broad range of individual and group behaviour legitimate than is any direct inquiry into what the community thinks wise or desirable, and so this approach is consistent with both general self-government and extensive tolerance' (213). In doctrinal terms, Smith finds it easy to dismiss attempts to 'restore the absolutist orthodoxies of the past' (184), but has great difficulty in disposing of anti-perfectionist theories such as Rawls's.

Owing to these provisos, Smith's theory allows us to *ask* questions that are conceptually foreclosed by full-fledged theories of positive freedom. We can ask whether we should, at least sometimes, be left at 'physical liberty' to act in nonrational or even irrational ways. As is indicated by the (troubled) qualifiers just quoted, however, on Smith's view it will be easy to return negative answers to such questions, much more difficult to sustain more latitudinarian views concerning them. Even freedom of expression, which Smith thinks deserves a wider tolerance than Locke and other early proponents of rational liberty would have accorded it (Chapter 4), must be regarded as 'an aspect of the basic aim of promoting rational liberty, not as an independently justified right' (305, note 23). Accordingly, 'expression that is non-cognitive in form and ... conveys an emotive message' is 'sufficiently removed from the rational liberty concern with promoting thoughtful self-determination to be considered as outside the speech that the First Amendment protects' (242). Again, rational self-direction may be a 'personal achievement,' but students should nevertheless 'be *required* to reflect systematically on the possible modes of life, values and ideals ... and this reflection should be presented as morally

estimable' (299-300, note 38, my italics). Consideration is owed to all persons, but 'as part of this consideration we should estimate how seriously others take their reflective responsibilities, and we should then treat them accordingly. Those whose habitual characters display only the most minimal concern for deliberative self-direction or respect for others should receive less moral esteem, even if they have committed no sharp violations of the equal respect edict' (219). Generally, the 'Ethos of rational liberty would ... stress the duty and benefit of self-control more plainly' than those many forms of liberalism that are 'prone to be corrupted into a licence for lawless behavior' (235).

These conclusions are easy to reach, hard to avoid, because the highly valorised notion of liberty has been construed so as to support them. When we restrict expression, require certain forms of study and reflection, issue stigma-creating reproaches, we do so in the name of liberty itself. The need to justify such actions against the claim that they interfere with and diminish liberty, the sense of a conflict between liberty and other values that needs to be resolved, has been eliminated.

This familiar objection aside, it is doubtful that Smith's notion of rationality does or could do the heavy work that he requires of it. But even if there is or could be a conception of rationality that would be serviceable for his purposes, one of the striking features of Smith's book is his profound lack of confidence in the rationality of the members of his society. As with more than a few of his predecessors in the rational liberty tradition, he is impressed by the less than rational character of much of what goes on around him, inclined to think that rationality will only or at least will best be enhanced through the discipline and control of social, educational, and political authority.

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JOHAN VAN BENTHEM. *Modal Logic and Classical Logic*. Naples: Bibliopolis 1985. Pp. 234. US\$50.00. ISBN 88-7088-113-X.

This book is mainly concerned with an area of modal propositional calculus (MPC) Benthem calls *correspondence theory* (c-theory), though it also includes chapters on modal algebras, incompleteness theory and second-order logic. Since Benthem is himself probably the leading contributor to c-theory, the book is authoritative, and, so far as publication time-lag allows, state-of-the-art. It is too advanced to be used as a text in teaching even the later stages of a first course in modal logic, but it is the logical sequel to Hughes and Cress-

well's *Companion* and should be accessible on its own to formally sophisticated philosophers (a review of 3.1 and 3.2 of Chang & Keisler helps). Bentham does not waste words, but overviews and proofs are presented very clearly: there is only one 'obviously' which I am still having trouble fathoming.

A model M for MPC is a triple $\langle W, R, V \rangle$ where W is a set of worlds, R is the accessibility relation on W ($R \subseteq W^2$) and V is a function which assigns each sentence letter a subset of W . ' $M \models_w \varphi$ ' is defined as usual, and ' $M \models \varphi$ ' means that $\forall w \in W, M \models_w \varphi$. If R is e.g. reflexive [$(\forall x)Rxx$], then M is said to be reflexive. C-theory deals with the relationship between such structural properties of R and modal formulae.

For example, it is well-known that ' $\Box p \supset \Box \Box p$ ' ($\Box 4$) is intimately related to transitivity of R . But it seems wrong to say that the formula *expresses* transitivity of R , since it can hold in models where R is not transitive: suppose each R -successor u of w has as its R -successors only worlds which agree with u on $V(p)$ for each sentence-letter p . However, this condition restricts V . If a model $M = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ is not transitive but verifies $\Box 4$, there will be some other interpretation V' such that with the same W and R , $\langle W, R, V' \rangle \not\models \Box 4$. This motivates the following: a *frame* F is a pair $\langle W, R \rangle$; $F \models_w \varphi$ iff for all V , $\langle W, R, V \rangle \models_w \varphi$, and $F \models \varphi$ iff $F \models_w \varphi$ for all $w \in W$. Then we can say that $\Box 4$ 'expresses' transitivity in the sense that for any $F = \langle W, R \rangle$, $F \models \Box 4$ iff F is transitive.

To generalize this, let L_0 be a non-modal first-order language with a two-place predicate symbol R as its only non-logical expression. Any $\langle W, R \rangle$ is a model for L_0 , so ' $F \models \alpha$ ' means that F has whatever property the L_0 -sentence α describes. The idea of 'expresses' then divides into two notions: a modal formula φ is *locally* first-order definable (lfod) iff there is an L_0 -formula α in one free variable such that for all F , for all $w \in W$, $F \models_w \varphi$ iff φ is true in F with w assigned to its free variable, i.e. iff $F \models \alpha[w]$; and φ is *globally* first-order definable (gfod) iff there is an L_0 -sentence α such that for all F , $F \models \varphi$ iff $F \models \alpha$. $\Box 4$ is both lfod and gfod, but though local implies global definability (\forall -Introduction on α) the converse fails, ' $(\Box 4) \ \& \ (\Box \Diamond p \supset \Diamond \Box p)$ ' being a counterexample (84).

The first two-thirds of the book investigates specific cases of definable and undefinable formulae and gives general characterizations of classes of definable formulae and their relationships to other interesting classes. To give the flavor: ' $\Box p \supset \Diamond \Box p$ ' is lfod by (*) ' $(\exists y)(Rxy \ \& \ (\exists z)(Ryz \ \& \ Rxz))$ '. For suppose $w \models \Box p$. Then by (*) we have y and z such that Rwy and Rwz and Ryz ; since Rwz , $z \models p$, since Ryz , $y \models \Diamond p$, and since Rwy , $w \models \Diamond \Box p$. Conversely, if (*) is false when ' x ' is assigned w , then either (i) w has no R -successors, or (ii) some R -successor of w has no R -successors, or (iii) we have Rwu , Ruv and can choose V so that $u \in V(p)$, $w, v \notin V(p)$. In all cases, $w \models \Box p \ \& \ \sim \Diamond \Box p$. On the other hand, Bentham proves that a formula is gfod iff its truth-value is the same in any two frames which make the same L_0 -sentences true (91) and lfod iff (roughly) it is well-behaved with respect to forming ultraproducts (92). Thus we can establish e.g. that ' $\Box \Diamond p \supset \Diamond \Box p$ ' is not gfod by exhibiting a frame

where it holds and an L_0 -equivalent frame where it fails. The frames involved in undefinability proofs are typically quite complex.

The perspective of L_0 may also be taken. A simple example is: $\lceil (\forall x)(\forall y)Rxy \rceil$ ('R is universal') does not define a modal formula, for a moment's reflection will confirm that no modal formula (or set of modal formulae) can distinguish a frame whose domain W is a single R-equivalence class from a frame whose domain consists of more than one such class (meaning R is not universal). A more general result is: the set of L_0 -formulae which locally defines a modal formula is closed under conjunction, disjunction and $\lceil (\forall x)Rvx \supset \rceil$ (v any variable), but not under negation — $\lceil Rxx \rceil$ is a counterexample — or $\lceil (\exists y)(Rvy \ \&) \rceil$ — consider $\lceil Ryy \rceil$ and $\lceil (\exists y)(Rxy \ \& \ Ryy) \rceil$ (155).

Finally, Benthem investigates how things change if we extend L_0 in various ways. Every modal formula corresponds to a second-order condition on frames, since each such formula translates into a universal second-order formula with a single two-place predicate constant, a so-called $\pi_1^1(R)$ -formula. For example, $\lceil \Box p \supset p \rceil$ becomes $\lceil (\forall P)[(\forall y)(Rxy \supset Py)] \supset Px \rceil$. But what of languages of intermediate expressive power? Some L_0 -undefinable formulae are definable in $L_{\omega_1\omega}$ but Lob's Formula, $\lceil \Box(\Box p \supset p) \supset \Box p \rceil$, which says that R is transitive and its converse well-founded, is undefinable in any $L_{\alpha\omega}$; however, it is definable in a second-order language with $\lceil (\forall P) \rceil$ restricted to finite properties (186).

A final example of a more general result is a characterization of $\pi_1^1(R)$ -definable classes of frames. For K a class of frames, $\text{Th}_{u_1}(K)$ is the set of universal first-order sentences true in all $F \in K$, and $\text{Mod}(\text{Th}_{u_1}(K))$ the class of models of $\text{Th}_{u_1}(K)$. It is well-known that $\text{Mod}(\text{Th}_{u_1}(K))$ is closed under isomorphism, substructures and ultraproducts. Benthem introduces second-order counterparts of these notions and proves an analogous result for $\text{Mod}(\text{Th}_{u_2}(K))$, where 'U2' stands for ' $\pi_1^1(R)$ -sentence' (204-9).

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ROBERT YOUNG. *Personal Autonomy*. London and Sydney: Croom Helm 1986. Pp. viii + 123. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-7099-2914-5.

This comprehensive study offers an analysis of autonomy, seeks to say why autonomy is valuable, and argues for several ways in which people's autonomy ought to be limited. The book's unifying theme is that, although autonomy is a very great moral value, nevertheless the individualism of Western liberalism seriously misconstrues both its nature and its value.

A key part of Young's analysis is the distinction between occurrent and

dispositional autonomy. Occurrent autonomy describes the way we might act on some specific occasion. Dispositional autonomy, on the other hand, is the character-ideal of being able to shape one's life in accord with a self-chosen plan (8-9). It is dispositional autonomy which Young places at the centre of his analysis, and which allows him, as he sees it, to expose the weaknesses of liberal individualism.

Young argues that autonomy's main value is that it provides a foundation for self-esteem and dignity; and that this is to see autonomy as having intrinsic rather than instrumental value. But if we value A because it is the foundation for B, can we really be valuing A intrinsically? Young needs to say more about how autonomy, self-esteem and dignity are actually related.

One of the strengths of Young's emphasizing dispositional autonomy is that it allows him to give a coherent account of the obstacles to autonomy. The question then becomes what factors prevent people from being able to shape their own lives.

Young considers the sceptical position that nobody has autonomy because we are all shaped by socialization. His strategy here is analogous to that of the soft-determinist; distinguishing, for example, between mere socialization and indoctrination, and emphasizing how becoming aware of the factors which socialize us can increase our autonomy. Young skillfully makes the right distinctions; but, as with soft-determinism, this strategy does not so much defeat the sceptic as it bypasses him, and the sceptic's taunting smile remains to haunt us.

If socialization does not necessarily restrict autonomy, Young nevertheless wants to emphasize how other external factors like poverty can do so. Relevant here is Young's discussion, later in the book, of how autonomy can be diminished as a consequence of the workings of a free-market economy. Young argues that the unintended and often unforeseeable consequences of voluntary exchanges can severely limit people's ability to shape their own lives. This may occur, for example, when free-market exchanges lead to enormous discrepancies of power. The implication of Young's argument is that more state intervention is justified in the liberal democracies in order to promote people's autonomy. Young's critique is perhaps correct. The question always arises, however, of how to organize an alternative which does not result in an equivalent or greater loss of autonomy. Young says that a discussion of the alternatives is beyond the scope of his book. But I am not sure he has the right to allow himself this luxury.

Apart from external obstacles to autonomy, there are also internal ones. Young sees self-realisation as integral to autonomy, and he describes how neuroses, lack of coherence in our desires, and weakness of will can frustrate self-realisation. Young makes good criticisms against those, from Plato to Davidson, who would explain weakness of will away. Young's discussion would have been stronger, however, if he had shown some appreciation of why thinkers have wanted to explain weakness of will away in the first place. Does 'weakness' really help us understand why we sometimes voluntarily act against our best judgment?

Granting that autonomy ought to be promoted as an important value, there still remains the question of when people's autonomy is justifiably limited. One such accepted category within the liberal tradition would limit autonomy when a person harms himself and, moreover, has an undeveloped or impaired capacity for rational choice. Young argues that this condition is too weak, and that we are sometimes justified in limiting people's autonomy for their own good even though we would grant that their capacities are not undeveloped or impaired. Cases in which strong paternalism (as Young calls it) might be justified include stopping people from voluntarily selling themselves into slavery or from 'participating in unnecessary, risky experiments' (68). Young's argument hinges on his distinction between occurrent and dispositional autonomy. He argues that, since it is dispositional autonomy which is the primary form of autonomy, we are sometimes justified in impinging on the former in order to maximize the latter. Young's discussion here makes it clear that he sees autonomy as one value among others which, in a consequentialist way, we should seek to maximize (all things being equal, the more the better). But one can also see autonomy, in a Kantian sense, as grounding the respect we owe to people. Viewed in this way, impinging on a person's occurrent autonomy would be a much more serious matter than it is from Young's perspective. Liberal individualism, in its strongest form, owes as much to Kantian intuitions as it does to utilitarian ones. Young's critique of the liberal tradition on paternalism, therefore, would have been stronger if he had been able to show how the Kantian perspective on autonomy is inadequate.

Young then goes on to consider possible justifications for limiting autonomy when what people do affects others. The primary justification, of course, is that what is done causes harm. Young has a good discussion of this issue, as well as worthwhile related points to make about the values of privacy and free speech.

The question of limiting autonomy on the grounds that what is done offends people (rather than outright harms them) is a more vexed issue for someone who values autonomy. Young justifies intervention in some cases of offence, though he hedges his position with stiff qualifications. Though Young's argument here is thorough, he leaves the impression of having given ad hoc justification to intuitions he started with at the outset: his argument will be persuasive only for those who already share his intuitions, albeit in a less articulate form.

Although Young's discussions are always intelligent, nevertheless on several key issues, such as paternalism and economic relations, he does not make advances over arguments currently in the literature. The major strength of Young's book, on the other hand, lies in its emphasizing the idea of dispositional autonomy, and in its bringing this concept to bear on a diverse set of issues. One *does* see the questions he discusses in a more unified way after reading the book. There is a very useful bibliography.

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