

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor/Directeurs:

Robert Burch

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann

Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

Managing Editor:

Steven Scott

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Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

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KARL-OTTO APEL. *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental Pragmatic Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1984. Pp. xii + 293. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-01079-8.

The extent to which we, as members of society and as culturally determined beings, can intervene in our environment, as well as understand the environment without influencing it, is a preoccupation of radical political theorists. It has been argued that such intervention can be accomplished only by adopting the scientific method in the social sciences. Apel argues that this is too narrow a view, which ascribes to scientific knowledge a superiority it does not deserve and which fails to appreciate in human activity a significant element differentiating it from the subjects of scientific analysis.

Through a critique of G.H. von Wright's *Explanation and Understanding*, in which he places that work on a continuum with work by Hempel, Kant and others at one end and Beckermann and Toumela at the other, Apel elaborates his own theory of 'transcendental-pragmatism.' He proposes at page 236 a distinction in the social sciences 'between a quasi-natural, scientific, explanatory account of actions and a hermeneutic, interpretive one complementary to the first' (his 'complementarity thesis'). In other words, the study of the social sciences must involve explanation (aiding predictability) and understanding (taking free will into account). He argues for the expansion of the concept of scientific rationality. In doing so, Apel seems to be falling into the same error he attributes to others: he seems to accept the fundamental superiority of natural science. His analysis of the role of the social sciences, and the applicable methodology, has its initial reference point in the natural sciences.

But, of course, the natural and social sciences have distinct subjects of analysis. Unlike in relation to natural phenomena, it is difficult to make generalizations about human behaviour which transcend time and space. Human behaviour differs from natural behaviour in being motivated. Furthermore, human beings enjoy free will. Thus, quite simply, human beings can change their minds — or the same behaviour can result from different motivations. Arising out of this appreciation of human behaviour is an important political proposition — that human beings can direct their own actions and end their

own oppression. But human behaviour is not always (and often is not) consciously motivated or deliberate. To overcome the effect of this, we must establish a reference point outside the system being explained, enabling us to take control over our own actions by revealing causes of which we were unaware. Apel's analysis is intended to permit us to transcend our own environment (culture, values, norms, traditions) and to bring to bear upon our explanation of our own behaviour an understanding of irrational considerations. It is not enough to interpret (the 'hermeneutic perspective'), because that interpretation is tainted by irrational and culture-bound norms and assumptions. Therefore, Apel argues, we must extend the objectivity of the scientific method, enabling us to stand outside the system and uncover its irrational and underlying (hidden) norms. It is not sufficient merely to explain. Apel is concerned 'not with the schema for explaining the occurrence of an event, but rather a schema for understanding the rationality of human actions' (115).

The transcendental-pragmatic approach presupposes an interventionist causality which is involved in and is necessary to 'understanding our capacity to make or produce things' (as in handicraft), corresponding to our 'ability to make' in experimental science where 'we can produce the initial conditions of those material processes nature itself completes in confirming our causal-nomological hypotheses' (59). We must take a position that supports 'practical, bodily (*liebhaft*) engagement in the sense of categorical lines of questioning' (64). We must base our analysis on experience and 'abandon the attempt to lift ourselves in cognition to a position outside the world from which its structure can be grasped in purely theoretical, ontological terms.'

The major value of the transcendental pragmatic approach, with its inclusion of understanding, is that it can go beyond the 'hermeneutic imagination, because it concerns means as well as ends or goals. The hermeneutic approach is restricted to needs, values, norms and maxims behind goal intentions; the transcendental pragmatic approach introduces the 'new dimension of understanding... [which] refers to understanding the reasons for acting and thus concerns the goals that human beings have posited as worthy of their aspirations, as well as the ways or means they regard as suited to attaining them' (100). This permits intrusion into goals and means.

The political implications of promoting understanding as well as explanation, and of rejecting the necessity of the scientific method, are enormous. For example, Apel notes at p. 41 that '[w]hoever holds the social sciences up to the model of the nomological and experimental natural sciences, and considers only those forms of social science legitimate, will be inclined to consider social technology and social engineering as constituting the only possible connection between the social sciences and practice.' Scientism holds that problems can be solved technically 'without appealing to normative or political values' and indeed, by 'seemingly' taking social and economic organization outside the realm of ideology and moral choice ...' (Agger, Ben. 'Dialectical Sensibility I: Critical Theory, Scientism and Empiricism' 1 CJPST 3). In looking for rules or general laws, we tend to give up our freedom of choice and

our freedom of action to those who have shown themselves capable of discerning and applying the laws (shades of Locke).

More importantly, 'universal' rules or patterns or norms, sought through application of the scientific method, may not be (and are not likely to be) universal at all, but merely the rules, patterns or laws which those with power have applied or followed. The end of oppression requires minority groups to particularize — to redefine the world in their own language and by reference to their own situation. For example, this is at the heart of feminist analysis. Scientism is the analysis of the majority; recognizing and articulating an independent status for the social sciences is the obligation of those whose task is to end oppression.

But such an approach cannot be the task of an elite. Apel writes at p. 139 that 'an explicative interpretation of human actions rests on the methodological postulate that, in principle (that is, given sufficient schooling), the actor must be able both to participate in the language game of the social scientist and to confirm the empirical-hermeneutic accuracy of the descriptive interpretation of their actions and institutions. This they do by recognizing the meaning attributed to their actions by the description as one that is more or less well grounded in their intentions.' The interrelation between these two forms of understanding 'is unique to the human sciences.' It is particularly ironic, then, that this kind of work is so jargon-ridden, making it inaccessible to most people except those initiated into its mysteries. Why employ language as armour, when it can be used to invite participation, as it is by, for example, Doris Lessing who, at p. 25 of *Prisons We Choose to Live Inside*, a book of personal essays, lauds the importance of human self-knowledge, testifying that the social sciences 'collectively... amount to a completely new attitude towards ourselves, our institutions — the detached, curious, patient, investigative attitude that I think is the most valuable thing we have in the fight against our own savagery.' At pp. 230-1, Apel claims that the resolution of the controversy is vital to the survival of the human species; it is also vital to the kind of existence we enjoy. It is, then, the worst form of arrogance to present one's means for resolution in a manner so inaccessible to those it is meant to benefit.

PATRICIA HUGHES

Toronto, Canada

MICHAEL ARBIB. *In Search of the Person: Philosophical Explorations in Cognitive Science*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press 1985. Pp. xii + 156. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-87023-499-4.

Someone who just saw the title of this book might be misled into thinking that this was another philosophical investigation of the foundations of cognitive science. (There are a lot of those around; in fact, we may have more foundations than superstructure at the moment.) However, the philosophy in the title is more like the philosophy of common parlance, the one the taxi-driver means when he tells you his philosophy of life, than like the technical academic discipline. This is really Arbib's philosophy of life, the musings of an intelligent and very decent-minded cognitive scientist on such questions as: What is the nature of mind, language and society? Is there a God? Do we have free will? How can we be members of a society and still be critical of its institutions?

An academic philosopher, or even a philosophically sophisticated cognitive scientist, will find Arbib's philosophical naiveté a little disturbing. For example, Arbib discusses reduction, the problem of consciousness, and other central philosophical issues in cognitive science without any references to Putnam, Fodor or Dennett, and we are referred to Sir John Eccles for a discussion of the mind-body problem. Instead, there's a collection of references to various thinkers, from Freud to Marx to Habermas, whose relevance to cognitive science is marginal at best. This is fairly typical of what happens when scientists, even very good scientists, write books like this. But this is actually not typical of cognitive scientists; philosophy after all, is one of the key strains in that interdisciplinary hybrid, and it's a little surprising and rather disappointing that a cognitive scientist would be this philosophically unsophisticated.

Of course, this book might inform philosophers about cognitive science without necessarily being informed about philosophy. But the book also fails to accomplish this. The cognitive science Arbib describes here is almost entirely his own work on what he calls 'schema theory.' Arbib imports Piaget's notion of a sensorimotor schema, a mental construct that is derived from experience and guides action, to explain human knowledge. There are several aspects of Arbib's account of the mind that are attractive. He emphasises the holistic nature of knowledge, all the schemas are interconnected and interact in complex ways; he emphasises the degree to which experience is structured by the knowledge we have already acquired, even perception is affected by the schemas; and he emphasises the importance of learning, the schemas are themselves always being modified by experience. But while these general features of Arbib's account are attractive they are hardly startling. All these ideas are to be found in Piaget himself, and many of them are commonplaces of contemporary cognitive psychology, if not always of the M.I.T. school of cognitive science. The challenge is to embody these ideas in a theory, to give a plausible and detailed account of how a mind like this could work. And here Arbib is no better off than Piaget and in some ways is worse off. Piaget attempted to show how sophisticated and abstract forms of knowledge could be developed and to do so in a coherent way. Arbib's schema theory seems to have been derived from accounts of very low level sensorimotor behavior, like the frog's pursuit of flies, or a robot's attempt to coordinate vision and

action, and it has little coherence. In fact, as Arbib himself admits, 'schema theory' isn't so much a theory as a set of hints about how to do research. This makes it hard to evaluate.

It's also a little disturbing to see that Arbib's discussion of Piaget is not much more sophisticated than his philosophical discussion. For example, Arbib suggests that Piaget's theory is a maturational one, that the progression from one stage to the next is the unfolding of some innate maturational process. This is a fairly common misconception, but it's hard to see why. In fact, Piaget is emphatically and clearly opposed to this view. For Piaget, the stage changes are analogous to paradigm changes in science rather than to a maturational change like puberty. Different children are likely to enter a particular stage at about the same age because they have been exposed to similar amounts of information about the world and come to similar conclusions, just as different scientists may independently converge on the same new theory at about the same time. In addition, Arbib acts as if assimilation and accommodation are well-understood principles of psychological development rather than being vague pointers in the direction of an as yet unknown theory of learning.

It is most disappointing that there is little informative discussion here of either neuroscience or artificial intelligence, the areas of Arbib's expertise. The discussion there suggests a certain naiveté in this area as well. In particular, Arbib seems naively confident that neuroscience can be mapped on to artificial intelligence and psychology in useful ways.

This is not, then, a book for philosophers to turn to to understand cognitive science or for cognitive scientists to turn to to understand philosophy. But in spite of all this the book is actually a very nice example of the philosophy of life genre. Arbib's heart is so extraordinarily in the right place, his attempts to grapple with important questions are so well-motivated and his answers so fundamentally decent, that his naiveté ends up being more appealing than irritating. His picture of the mind as a constantly changing holistic network of schemas is probably right and his picture of human progress as an attempt to improve or rework those schemas, rather than as an approach to some absolute ideal, is eloquently stated and morally admirable. It's hard to get mad at anybody who espouses the twentieth-century virtues of pluralism and tolerance this sincerely and deeply.

It's not a bad idea for ordinary scientists to work out their philosophy of life sometimes. And when the philosophy is a pretty good one, even academic philosophers may benefit from listening.

ALISON GOPNIK

Department of Psychology
Scarborough College
University of Toronto

ANNE BAYEFSKY and MARY EBERTS, eds. *Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Toronto: Carswell 1985. Pp. xliv + 661. Cdn\$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-459-37380-3); Cdn\$45.00 (paper: ISBN 0-459-37490-7).

When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted in 1982, one section was set aside to come into force three years after the rest. That was

15. Equality Rights

Equality before & under law and equal protection and benefit of law

- (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular without discrimination based on race, national and ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Affirmative action programs

- (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

The reason for the delay was that the powers put into the hands of various individuals and groups by this clause of the Charter were thought to be so far-reaching that time was needed to prepared the country's institutions for their impact. So it was that section 15 came into force only in 1985; and almost concurrently, *Equality Rights* ... has appeared in order to assess its legal import.

The size of the book is commensurate to the event that prompted its publication: one third of a million words, penned by sixteen contributors (three articles have dual authorship). Every nook and cranny of section 15 is explored, both for what is there and for what is not. An initial essay, the most general, seeks to unravel the quadruple ('before and under,' 'protection and benefit') equality right bestowed us by the first 23 words of subsection (1), and then considers how that right squares with yet a fifth, the immunity from discrimination ascribed by the rest of the subsection. As will be noted, some grounds of discrimination are explicitly prohibited: race, religion, sex, age (young or old), disability (physical or mental). Each of these discriminations has an essay devoted to it; plus two others not specified in the Charter but presumably also ruled out by the overall immunity: discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, and discrimination based on marital status (or lack thereof). The final three essays deal with the relation between the rights and immunities bestowed by section 15, and freedoms, rights and restrictions provided else-

where in the Charter or Constitution Act. For instance, sect. 28 says that 'the rights and freedoms referred to in [the Charter] are guaranteed equally to 'male and female persons': well, exactly what does this add to the protection from discrimination on grounds of sex contained in 15(1)? More contentious: the Constitution recognizes the existence of collective rights, especially the rights of our so-called aboriginal people, Inuit and Dene (sect. 25, Charter; sect. 35, Const. Act). Well, do these sections bestow them the right to deprive of Dene status Dene women who marry non-Dene? Which has greater weight here, the rights that the Dene as a group hold against non-aboriginal Canadians, or the protection from discrimination bestowed women by sect. 15? The final essay discusses the fundamental question of whether the provisions of the Charter (sect. 15 in this instance) apply only to the activities of public agencies, or constrain also private transactions. Section 32 says that the Charter applies to 'the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament' and to 'the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.' Does 'all' also mean 'only'? Can a private club continue to exclude, say, women or non-whites? 'Yes' was the opinion of Jean Chrétien, the minister of Justice when the clause was being debated prior to enactment. Other constitutional thinkers have taken the opposite view, and the author of our final essay adds to their voices.

These, then, are the contents of *Equality Rights*... Of course, it is not a philosophy book; it's written primarily by lawyers and for lawyers, reviewing recent legislative and judicial history relevant to the rights under discussion, and assessing the likely legal impact of the constitutional guarantee of these rights that has just been enacted. I'm not a lawyer, but for what it's worth, my impression is that the book as a whole is of high professional standard in terms both of scholarship and deftness of reasoning, and that it will be an indispensable work of reference in forthcoming equality cases litigated under the Charter. What's more, despite the multiple authorship, it is animated by a common spirit. By and large the contributors advocate a broad and liberal interpretation of the Charter, one that would have the courts scrutinize very closely any claim that the Charter is *not* being violated, and would also see them be bold and innovative in the remedies they are prepared to fashion in response to such violations. The author of the essay on 'Religion and the Right to Equality' notes with approval (178) the recent decision of the Supreme Court in *R v Big M Drug Mart* that the effect as well as the purpose of a piece of legislation might be examined in order to decide its constitutionality. Or again (267) the authors of the chapter on (old) 'Age Discrimination and the Charter' argue that the courts should be the forum where the value of claims that compulsory retirement is a BFOQ (= Bona Fide Occupational Requirement) is decided. Similar advocacy of strong judicial involvement occurs throughout the volume.

Philosophers can learn a good deal from this book. For instance, they can gain clearer insight into the rôle of the judiciary. I was much struck by the evidence marshalled by Saunders in 'Equality and Indian Status' (an essay some-

what more sceptical or relativistic in tone than the rest of the volume) to show that in hard cases involving equality, it is unreasonable to expect judicial boldness in the absence of a general political will for change (562). There is also much subtle thinking about what makes a certain ground for discrimination objectionable: I learnt much from Black's discussion of how to demarcate religious from secular faith, and of why it should be thought worse to suffer discrimination for one's religious belief than for being, say, a hedonist. Or again, the reader is made to reflect on the general question of what counts as discrimination: left-handers are clearly victims if no seat with the appropriate arm rest is provided in a university lecture hall; but is it also discrimination if the majority refuses to alter its script so as to make penmanship easier for the minority? Complexities such as these are well brought out in the subtle and searching analysis (361-80) by Lepofsky and Bickenbach of what would constitute discrimination against the physically handicapped.

Finally, of course, this book is a treatise about equality. Here, many contributors have arresting things to say. De Montigny's argument for a broad construal of sect. 32 (insofar as it bears on 15) rests on the premiss that protecting private transactions from the reach of the Charter, so far from being one way to strike a balance between liberty and equality, precludes any such balance from being struck (594). What view of equality subtends this thesis? Well, it's one that appears in many essays of this book, but is expressed most starkly in the first, Bayefsky's. She distinguishes 'equality of opportunity' (all start the race together) from 'equality of result' (in its strongest form: all finish together); and puts forward two propositions. One: sect.15(1) is meant to secure at least some form of equality of result. Two: *that* is its main aim; protection from discrimination is subsidiary (26). I believe both propositions to be false. It's a good bet that most cases litigated under 15 will be argued in terms of discrimination, not equality. As for equality of result (meaning perhaps: roughly equivalent quality of life), this may well be a worthwhile ideal for any society to pursue. But can it really be maintained that each individual member of it has a *right* to this? and that the Charter has been enacted to enforce such a right? Equality of result is often thought to be an aim of affirmative action; and affirmative action is indeed countenanced by the Charter. But — and that is the crucial point — it's countenanced not as a right but as the curtailment of a right: 15(2) says that 15(1) 'does not prelude' programmes of affirmative action! Bayefsky's (misguided, I believe) keenness to find result-equality in the text of subsect.(1), i.e., to construe it as the object of a *right*, is reflected in a bizarre yet glaring lacuna in what is otherwise such an excellent book: whereas every detail of 15(1) is gone over with a fine tooth comb, there is not a single essay on 15(2)! In fact, in this vast book devoted to equality, affirmative action hardly rates a mention; let's hope that this gap is filled in a subsequent edition.

ANDRÉ GOMBAY
University of Toronto

DONALD L. BERRY. *Mutuality: The Vision of Martin Buber*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 121. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-929-9); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-930-2).

This book deals with three aspects of Buber's thought that have aroused varying degrees of criticism: the possibility of standing in an I-Thou relationship with inanimate objects and animals, the possibility of an I-Thou relationship between unequals such as a teacher and a pupil, and Buber's interpretation of Christianity. The author devotes a chapter to each of these topics and then, in a concluding chapter, he discusses his view of mutuality which connects the three topics discussed. Berry's attitude is sympathetic to Buber's thought, but not so much so that he loses critical distance.

The I-Thou relationship is usually understood in the human context where two human beings related to each other and each addresses the other as a Thou. Even here, the possibility of non-mutuality arises: one person may relate to the other as a Thou, but the other may not reciprocate and view his fellow as an It. Can someone be a Thou to me to whom I remain an It? Even if we answer this question in the affirmative, we must remember that the Thou to whom I am an It is a Thou who could change and, perhaps as a result of the strength of my relationship to him, come to see me as a Thou. But can a tree become a Thou to me? The non-mutuality here is integral to the relationship, since I will never be a Thou to the tree.

As Berry points out correctly, Buber does envisage I-Thou relationships between persons and inanimate objects and animals. One of the best known passages from Buber's *I and Thou* (quoted by Berry, 9-10) deals with Buber's youthful encounter with a horse whose 'mighty mane' he strokes and which thereby 'placed itself elementally in the relation of Thou and Thou with me.' This passage and a similar one dealing with a tree aroused considerable criticism. How can the tree be a Thou to Buber when Buber is clearly not a Thou to the tree? In the context of idol worship, one can assume that the idol becomes a Thou to the worshiper. This may very well be the crux of the biblical horror of idol worship. In the light of this, Buber's willingness to extend the I-Thou relationship beyond the realm of man's relationship to God and his fellow humans becomes even more problematic.

Berry is not prepared to join Buber's critics. While conceding that full mutuality is possible only when two human beings are involved, Berry claims that there are degrees of mutuality. He does not interpret 'degrees' quantitatively but qualitatively (35) as 'modes [or kinds] of mutuality.' In the context of an I-Thou relationship with an inanimate object, mutuality means recognizing the uniqueness and otherness of the object, letting it be in its nature, not subject to the will of man. In short, it means ecological responsibility.

Berry next addresses himself to three human relationships that are defined by a task to be performed: physician-patient, teacher-students, and priest-penitent. Here, too, he argues, we are dealing with a degree of mutuality. The task to be performed does not make full mutuality possible but it does not

rule out a mutuality appropriate to the relationship and to the nature of the encounter.

The third area of mutuality that Berry deals with is that between Judaism and Christianity. Here Berry does not stress the I-Thou aspect of Buber's thought, but rather his concrete evaluation of Jesus and Christianity which he finds defective in several ways. 'For all of Buber's Jewish location of Jesus' time and space, the creative and novel aspects of his teaching and of his religious views remain untouched' (85). Berry speaks of Jesus' unique claim to authority and his sense of unique relationship to God as well as 'a view of the possibilities of God's relation to humanity that was genuinely subversive of the Temple establishment' (85). Finally, Berry objects to Buber's attempt to distinguish the historical Jesus from the kerygmatic one. While in the apostolic writings we can hear the voice of Jesus, to penetrate to that voice 'requires a much different kind of hermeneutic from the sort in which Buber was prepared to engage' (86). Berry does not tell us more about the hermeneutic that will do the job, nor how it differs from what Buber has done.

The encounter with Buber has clearly meant much to Berry. The I-Thou/I-It distinction appears crucial to his thinking, as does the Jewishness of Jesus which has also, it would seem, been mediated for him through Buber. Still, some misunderstandings creep in. Speaking of Buber's attitude to *halacha* (Jewish religious law), Berry writes: 'But Buber thought it possible to be "nonobservant," as it were, and still to be religiously Jewish; indeed, for him, he thought it the only possibility.' While it is true that Buber was not a halachically observant Jew, he never denied the authenticity of halachic Judaism. He was only able to obey the law when he found himself personally addressed, but he never denied the possibility of others being addressed when he was not.

In a footnote, Berry writes: 'no Christian can live in Israel for any time without an increased awareness of both the Jewishness of Jesus and the courage of his struggle against Pharasaic [sic] Judaism' (118). It is particularly painful to find such a sentence in a book written by a Christian as sympathetic to Jewish-Christian reconciliation as Berry. One would have hoped that the time is past when the praise of Christianity requires a teaching of contempt of Pharisaism. The negative features in the religious life of Israel to which Berry is apparently referring are a parody of authentic rabbinic Judaism and are fought in Israel by authentic rabbinic Jews such as the religious kibbutz movement. All religions can and have been distorted and to compare distorted Judaism with authentic Christianity, traditional as such a distorted comparison is, is no longer acceptable. We would all be better served if distorted Judaism were compared with distorted Christianity and the best in Judaism with the best in Christianity.

MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD

Baruch College, City University of New York

ALAN BLUM and PETER McHUGH. *Self-reflection in the Arts and Sciences*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1984. Pp. viii + 159. US\$13.45. ISBN 0-391-02877-4.

This book is concerned with the problem of whether and how our most fundamental principles (on which the arts and sciences rest) can be legitimated. The authors quote Wittgenstein's remark that 'To the *depth* that we see in [mere "conventions" such as objects, mind, intention, rules] ... there corresponds the *deep* need for convention' (136, ellipsis and emphasis in text), and they conceive their own quest in terms of our 'deep need' to ground and validate the rules by which we function. The attempt at such a grounding is what they mean by self-reflection.

Blum and McHugh argue that 'the positive sciences ... [usually conceive] self-reflection as technology,' i.e. the application of rules (4-5). By contrast their own position is presented in terms not of rules but principles, a distinction which the authors portray as elusive. 'The difference between the principled speaker and the rule-guided speaker is difficult to grasp; indeed, it is the very difference between them that makes it so, since a rule cannot be consulted to resolve the difficulty' (123). Thus, 'in order to understand our reading, one must see that we are using as a resource the very distinction between rule and principle that we want to elucidate, because we must read the tradition as if *it* is speaking in a principled way about self-reflection (this is our principle)' (129). And yet the distinction does not seem very hard to grasp after all. Rules are instrumental relations to ends (126) and can therefore be merely accidental or conventional (129), while principles are on the contrary good in themselves (127) and therefore necessarily good (124). The two are related as 'right opinion' is related to 'knowledge' in Plato (129).

I do not dispute the authors' claim that there is an ineluctable circularity in all enterprises of self-reflection (see especially p. 101) but the difficulty (and circularity) seems not so much in saying how principles differ from rules, but in *discovering* principles. Perhaps that is what the authors mean, for they are sensitive to this difficulty, and fault the positive sciences for not recognizing it. 'The technologist tends to disregard the way in which the rules that he follows are rooted in the deep need to ground the validity of these rules in a principled conception of good discourse' (5).

We can see from this that for Blum and McHugh grounding the rules in principles is not like grounding them in more fundamental or even absolute rules; rather it means grounding them (discovering 'the way ... [they] are rooted') in the very *need* for such grounding. Thus, 'the oriented actor ... *needs to orient to the need to orient to the question* (and he knows that he needs this) *of whether the convention is worth doing*' (120, emphasis in text). The reason that our procedural rules can only be grounded in an ultimate need, rather than in an ultimate principle, is that an ultimate principle is ultimately and in principle unattainable: 'the great insight of theorizing is to affirm our need to live enjoyably with this irony: That the absolute character of the "ul-

ultimate truth" is denied by its dependency upon discourse and by the need to be grasped and expressed, and that the absolute character of discourse (of the speaker, of the ego) is denied by its being *en media res*' (143-4).

Self-reflection thus has an ultimately aporetic character, and in this respect the authors' position has some affinity with Plato's, although in another way it is closer to Hegel's. Like Hegel (and Heidegger), and unlike Plato, they believe that 'the ultimate truth needs discourse ... I am needed by the ultimate truth as much as it is needed by me' (148). But discourse can never be *adequate* to the ultimate truth, despite the rigorously Hegelian account they give of the 'self-development of the notion' (144-5), since self-reflection is always limited by what they call 'irony': 'What is worked out by the theorist, then, is the development of the notion and not the development of the "absolute truth"' (147).

The book is intelligent and judicious, and concerns itself with a problem of fundamental importance and difficulty. In general it contains much of interest, but it is a very difficult book to read, partly for stylistic and partly for organizational reasons. The style of writing is aloof and self-absorbed, often neglecting to accommodate itself to the needs of comprehension. Sometimes this takes the form of a failure to define quasi-technical terms. For example, they first use 'irony' without explanation as a technical term on p. 102: 'Adequate discourse would then be that which provides for itself in the face of this ["open" texture of language], not by claiming to be unambiguous, but by offering up its grounds as its principled claim to adequacy: such a discourse would ironically draw attention to itself as rational rather than as "unambiguous".' What does 'ironically' mean here? Not until p. 144 is it shown that self-reflection is necessarily 'ironic' in that the absolute principle that it seeks is unattainable, and therefore that 'irony' may be a term for the aporetic nature of self-reflection.

At other times the problem is a stilted technical prose. In a book defending linguistic and conceptual openness, and attacking technicism, it is surprising to find such a propensity for artificial jargon rather than natural language. Here is an extreme example: 'The social order problem is the self-reflective actor's version of the member's "problem," when the member is construed as if he is in position to orient to the problem that, in actuality, only the self-reflective actor is consciously oriented to (the problem of self-reflection)' (104).

The organizational problem with the book is that the authors develop their thesis concurrently with extended exegetical critiques of other writers — Marx, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Saussure, Heidegger, Weber, Simmel, Berger & Luckman, Garfinkel, Habermas, Cavell, and Piaget — which often makes it difficult to get one's bearings. It would have been helpful to present the material of the final chapter before beginning the extended comparisons with other thinkers, for not until one has read chapter 8 can one see what Blum and McHugh are getting at, and until then one cannot fully appreciate what is at stake in their dialogues with other authors, nor what we are thereby meant to learn about the authors' own position. The first two chapters concluded

with helpful summaries of the 'argument,' but for some reason this running synopsis was abandoned in the five succeeding chapters.

KENNETH DORTER
University of Guelph

PAUL CARRICK. *Medical Ethics in Antiquity: Philosophical Perspectives on Abortion and Euthanasia*. (Philosophy and Medicine, Vol. 18.) Boston: Reidel 1985. Pp. xxvi + 242. US\$37.95. ISBN 90-277-1825-3.

This study tackles an excellent subject but offers, in places, a disappointingly superficial discussion. Professor Carrick devotes his first three chapters to the background, to such questions as the social status of the physician and to theories of health and disease in general. The second part of the book deals with the rise of medical ethics, with some discussion of the ancient Near Eastern background but focussing chiefly on the Hippocratic Corpus and especially the Hippocratic Oath. In part three he turns to analyse the problems of abortion and euthanasia and to consider the physician's moral responsibilities as these were understood in antiquity.

Such an arrangement of the principal topics is clear but no great sophistication is displayed on the question of the difficulties of reconstructing ancient views on death and on well-being. In particular the problems of the relationship between high culture and low culture, and of possible divergences between the beliefs expressed by the literate elite on the one hand and those that might have been entertained by ordinary citizens — or slaves — are hardly allowed to surface, despite the fact that most of the doctors' patients fell in the latter category while some of the doctors saw themselves as belonging to the former.

But the principal shortcoming of this investigation is the excessive dependence on outdated or superficial secondary sources. Thus on the problem of Greek theories of health and disease we are given little more than a précis of the views expressed in Sigerist's *History of Medicine*, according to which the four-humour theory set out in *The Nature of Man* is canonical. But Professor Carrick accepts too readily that other positions found in the Hippocratic treatises lead up to that found in that work. This involves him first in some highly dubious chronological speculations, taking *On Ancient Medicine* to be one of the earliest treatises in the Corpus, followed by *On Breaths*, followed by *On Disease* (by which is meant *On Diseases IV*), with *The Nature of Man*

'somewhat later.' More importantly it leads Professor Carrick to underestimate both the heterogeneity of views expressed on the role of humours (which are sometimes treated as constituent elements, but sometimes as pathogenic substances and sometimes again as the products of diseases) and the variety of other theories of disease that make no reference to humours at all.

Elsewhere a similar pattern is repeated. Heavy use is made of B.L. Gordon's *Medicine Throughout Antiquity* (1949), for example for Aristotle's zoology and for Galen, and of Will Durant's *The Story of Civilization* (Vols 1 and 2, 1939, 1944), for example on demographic questions, while reliance on R. O. Moon's *The Relation of Medicine to Philosophy* (1909) leads to the gross error that the atomic theory formed the basis of Methodist medicine. Some sensible use of Amundsen, Kudlien and especially Edelstein is made, but such classic works as Burkert's *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (1972), Wesley Smith's *Hippocratic Tradition* (1979) and the recent important collections of articles on death edited by Humphreys and King (1981) and by Gnoli and Vernant (1982) are not mentioned.

The level of the scholarship displayed in this study leaves much to be desired. But what of the substantive issues investigated? First there is the question of the significance of the Hippocratic *Oath*, where Professor Carrick follows Edelstein in the main. The work is not necessarily to be dated to the fourth century B.C., nor is it exclusively Pythagorean. Certainly the combination, in the *Oath*, of (1) the unqualified proscription of the administration of any 'deadly poison' (here taken to apply particularly to voluntary euthanasia, though the prohibition is quite general), (2) the similarly unqualified proscription of abortion and (3) the refusal to 'use the knife' (though that work is left to others) cannot be seen as tallying *exactly* with the known views of any independently identifiable philosophical or religious sect. But when, following Edelstein, Professor Carrick countenances the possibility that the doctors who swore to the *Oath* formed some kind of reform movement, that expression might suggest that there was more of an orthodoxy in what there was to reform than may have been the case. But on the fundamental point Professor Carrick is undoubtedly correct when he puts it (88) that 'it does seem likely that at best only a small number of physicians in antiquity actually swore and abided by the *Oath*'s moral directives.' Yet by the end of the book that conclusion is expressed in an appreciably stronger form, that the majority of Greek and Roman doctors were 'repelled by the single-mindedness of the Hippocratic *Oath* (if they ever heard of it at all), and so paid it little nor no heed' (176).

On ancient attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, Professor Carrick's discussion concentrates on the evidence in the Pythagoreans (where there is some unguarded use of late neo-Pythagorean sources as evidence for the views of Pythagoras himself), Plato, Aristotle and Seneca especially — relevant materials in Theophrastus, in other Stoics and in the Epicureans being largely ignored. Yet while the ethics of suicide were much debated by moral philosophers, euthanasia is not a problem for most of the medical writers. No ancient doctor was faced with the problem of when to switch off complex life-support systems. But not all such questions related to high technology medicine: yet

the issue of when it might be justified to put patients out of their misery is not as a general rule discussed by the Hippocratic writers even though they graphically describe the pain their patients suffered often enough.

Abortion and infanticide were, however, another matter, in the main because of a fairly deep-rooted (though not unanimous) belief that the unborn child, indeed also the young infant, do not rank fully as persons. Professor Carrick's discussion of Aristotle's views on this issue misses the intricate treatment, in the *De Generatione Animalium*, of the successive actualisations of potentialities that occur as the embryo develops, nor does he point out that Aristotle holds that children, like animals, do not have moral choice. But of course abortion, at least, was no mere theoretical issue of interest to philosophers drawing up blue-prints for the ideal state, but one of practical concern to the physician. The extensive debates and discussions from the Hippocratic writers down to Soranus and beyond illustrate the conflict of obligations — to their female patients and to the unborn child — that doctors faced and the compromises they had to make. Thus Soranus reports the view that abortion is justified only when the mother-to-be is in danger, not to preserve good looks or in cases of adultery: he advocates contraception to avoid the problem, though as Professor Carrick notes many of his contraceptive prescriptions are ineffectual, as indeed are several of the 'milder' techniques he recommended to procure abortion if need be.

Since the effective treatments available to ancient doctors were so much more limited than those of their modern counterparts, it would be tempting to deem medical ethics in antiquity as only of very minor interest at best. Yet that would be a mistake, for three main reasons. First there is a whole area of the topic that Professor Carrick mentions only in his epilogue and then just as a possible subject for further investigation, namely the ethics of experimentation, for medical purposes, on human or animal subjects. He notes work by Edelstein and Ferngren in this area but does not himself discuss either of the two main problems where the issue was raised, namely (a) trying out drugs, including especially poisons, and (b) the practice of animal and human vivisection in anatomical research. Yet on the latter topic Celsus, especially, provides a quite detailed discussion of the arguments used on either side, both by those who condemned human vivisection on moral and epistemological grounds and by those who defended such investigations, who denied that it was cruel that 'with the sacrifice of just a few criminals remedies should be sought for whole populations of innocent people down the ages.' Thus some of the issues that are so much in dispute today — the costs, in pain and lives, that can be tolerated for the possible gains for medical care — are already broached in antiquity.

Secondly in a situation where the legal provisions governing medical practice were only of the most general kind, and where neither professional bodies nor social expectations laid down clear moral guidelines, the liberty the ancient doctor enjoyed to make up his own mind on moral issues went, in some cases at least, with the utmost seriousness in confronting the problem. The very openness of the situation he was in, the possibility of disagree

ment and debate, meant that in certain respects the ancient doctor had to work harder to make up *his own* mind. He was certainly more directly vulnerable to *personal* challenge to justify the particular view he took on disputed issues, and we may be sure that many of them took their responsibilities to extend far beyond the merely negative moral obligation not to abuse their position for financial gain or sexual exploitation.

Thirdly and more generally there is at least in some ancient medical writers a notable recognition of the need for the doctor to establish a relationship of mutual confidence with the patient. The doctor should enter into dialogue with the patient, for the patient is an important, perhaps the most important, source of information about his or her complaint: and by the addition of 'her' a point of substance is intended, since it is clear that with women patients, as well as with men, some Hippocratic writers advocated enlisting the patient's support, both in the discussion of the illness and its diagnosis, and in its treatment, and this despite the well-known considerable barriers that existed in the ancient world to communication between the sexes. But whether with male or female patients, the *ideal* at least was to build up a close human relationship, even a partnership in the fight against illness. Nowadays with the increasing professionalisation and specialisation of medicine, and its ever-growing dependence on high technology, such a relationship between doctor and patient is more and more difficult to achieve. But that does not mean that the ideals expressed in ancient writers are irrelevant, but rather, on the contrary, that they should not be lost from sight.

G.E.R. LLOYD

King's College, Cambridge

JOHN J. CLEARY, ed. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium In Ancient Philosophy, Volume I: 1985*. Lanham, MD & London: University Press of America 1986. Pp. xlviii + 330. US\$30.25 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5132-7), US\$16.25 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-5133-5).

The proceedings here assembled consist of ten papers, seven accompanied by commentary, that were presented as public lectures in the 1984-85 program of the BACAP. The papers cover a broad spectrum of ancient philosophy.

Three of the contributors have concentrated on Greek moral philosophy, and each has called attention to the danger of attributing modern philosophical assumptions to the ancients. After noting this danger, Terence H. Irwin,

in 'Aristotle's Conception of Morality,' nevertheless claims, against Bernard Williams, that Aristotle has a conception of morality and moral virtues that is not significantly different from the modern one. He supports this claim with two lines of argument: (a) he joins virtue and the fine (*to kalon*), pointing out that Aristotle describes the fine as providing the motive for the virtuous person's actions; (b) he recalls that, for Aristotle, 'general justice is the same state of character as complete virtue' (139). Irwin concludes (142): 'We can quite well attribute to Aristotle a conception of morality and at the same time give proper weight to the eudaimonistic aspects of his theory, which affect his views about the justification of morality.' In 'Plato's Ethics as Ideal Building,' Julius M. Moravcsik observes that modern theorists have tended to approach Plato from a utilitarian or a deontological point of view, and that this approach is misleading, for 'Plato's main concern is with ideal building' (4). Plato's theory of the Good, he writes, is directed toward 'the construction of an ideal for humans,' (1) an ideal in terms of which the individual is enabled to recognize his proper aim in life. Moreover, since aims are set for humans, 'we must know what a human life is,' (2) and thus Plato accepts the further task of providing a conception of the self. Moravcsik here provides us with a new manner in which to approach Plato's ethics, and he forces us not only to re-think our thoughts about Plato, but also to re-examine our own lives as individuals morally bound to concern ourselves with the welfare of others. Martha Nussbaum's 'The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality' opens with the question, 'Is practical reasoning scientific?' Against many contemporary theorists — including social choice theorists — Nussbaum sides with Aristotle in answering in the negative. Like Aristotle, she holds that 'it is in the very nature of the truly rational practical choice that it cannot and should not be turned into a science' (152-3). She offers extensive analysis of three 'closely interwoven' dimensions of 'Aristotle's attack on a scientific, or pseudo-scientific, conception of rationality': 'an attack on the commensurability of the values; an argument for the priority of particular judgements to universals; and a defense of the emotions and the imagination as essential to rational choice' (153). Regarding the third of these dimensions — which significantly reinstates emotion as a positive feature of moral reasoning — Nussbaum sums up her position quite clearly (187): 'In short, Aristotle does not make a sharp split between the cognitive and the emotive. Emotion can play a cognitive role, and cognition, if it is to be properly informed, must draw on the work of the emotive elements.'

Hans-Georg Gadamer has contributed two papers to this collection. In 'Natural Science and Hermeneutics: The Concept of Nature in Ancient Philosophy,' he investigates the history of the Greek concept of *physis*, detailing the manner in which language functions in the formation of concepts. In 'Religion and Religiosity in Socrates,' he argues that Socrates' relation to Athenian religious tradition is essential to our understanding of Plato's dialogues, and he inquires into what 'religion' meant for Socrates and his contemporaries. John M. Cooper's 'Plato, Isocrates, and Cicero on the Independence of Oratory from Philosophy' may provoke those contemporary historians of rhetoric

who have attempted to revive an interest in the field with the goal of returning to the pedagogical ideals of the rhetorical tradition, for he attempts to show that the tradition possesses no firm philosophical foundation. In 'Aristophanes' Socrates,' Lowell Edmunds argues that the *Clouds* can be gleaned for information regarding the historical Socrates that is compatible with that offered by Plato and Xenophon. Along the way, he offers many provocative suggestions regarding both Socrates' personal religious beliefs and his relation to traditional Greek religion. Charles Kahn, in 'Plato and Heraclitus,' attempts to determine the extent of Heraclitus' influence on Plato, arguing that Plato was not as concerned with opposing the positions of Heraclitus and Parmenides as he was with synthesizing them, and that Plato adopted Heraclitus' doctrine of flux as his starting point in his movement toward the doctrine of the Forms. In 'Platonic Hermeneutics: On the Interpretation of a Platonic Dialogue,' Stanley Rosen undertakes a 'deconstruction' of the Platonic dialogue with a critical eye to Derrida's 'La pharmacie de Platon.' Against Derrida, Rosen maintains that 'what is, as it were, "sous rature" is not to be erased, but must be preserved in an irresolvable tension with the "rature" itself. In other words, it is not what is represented by the Ideas that is deconstructed, but epistemic discourse about the Ideas' (273). Briefly stated, Rosen's claim is that Plato was already deconstructing himself. And finally, John P. Anton, in 'Mythos, Katharsis, and the Paradox of Tragedy,' building on Gerald Else's view of catharsis as an inherent feature of the structure of tragedy (and not as an emotional response on the part of the viewer), argues that myth and catharsis, in tragedy and elsewhere, played a central role in the development of *sophrosyne*, 'along with the other cardinal virtues' (324), concluding that myth and catharsis are thus best understood in political terms. Anton's goal is, in part, 'to connect tragedy to the broader doctrines of practical knowledge and productive knowledge' (300), and his paper offers intriguing suggestions regarding the relation of aesthetics to politics.

John Cleary, the present Director of BACAP, is to be congratulated for his decision to publish these papers. And if this collection is representative of the lectures and commentaries to be presented at future programs of the Colloquium, we can eagerly await the publication of future volumes in this series.

JEFF MITSCHERLING

The University of Guelph

MICHEL DELSOL. *Cause, loi, hasard en biologie*. Préfacé par Pierre-Paul Grassé et François Dagognet. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin (Collection 'Histoire-Science-Philosophie') 1985. 241 p. 126 FF. ISBN 2-7116-9268-X.

Il ne fait aucun doute que le dernier livre du Professeur Michel Delsol représente une contribution majeure au champ de l'épistémologie de la biologie. Par un procédé de comparaison fort habile entre la philosophie, la physique, la chimie et la biologie, l'A. rend accessibles même au lecteur peu familier avec ce secteur de la recherche, sa riche expérience de biologiste et ses réflexions sur sa pratique scientifique. L'épistémologue de métier y trouvera également son intérêt car c'est une source de première main pour parfaire sa connaissance des théories biologiques contemporaines.

Bien que cela ne corresponde pas tout à fait à l'ordre que l'A. a voulu donner à la suite de ses chapitres, nous diviserons notre résumé en quatre parties. Dans une première partie, le Professeur Delsol trace une ligne de démarcation nette entre la philosophie (incluant l'épistémologie et la métaphysique) et la science. Le philosophe 'essaie de comprendre,' de répondre à la question 'pourquoi?'; il s'intéresse à la valeur de la connaissance scientifique ou à la finalité dans l'univers — des questions qui de toute évidence ne peuvent recevoir de réponse 'scientifique.' Le philosophe voudrait dévoiler l'essence des choses; il cherche à dégager derrière l'apparence des phénomènes leur signification profonde ou leur raison d'existence. Au contraire, le scientifique se contente 'd'explorer' (c'est-à-dire d'intégrer les faits scientifiques nouveaux et inconnus aux lois connues en cherchant la 'cause') et se limite strictement à la question 'comment?' à ce qui peut être expérimenté en évitant toute option métaphysique. Notons l'ambivalence de l'A. face à la question de la relation entre la philosophie et la science. Dans une 'réflexion' sur sa pratique, le scientifique ne doit pas ignorer le philosophe car 'aucune réflexion scientifique n'est possible sans une philosophie de la connaissance explicite ou implicite' (9) — c'est pourquoi, il n'hésite pas, comme le note François Dagognet, 'à plonger dans la mer des problèmes philosophiques les plus agités.' Cependant, dans sa pratique courante, 'L'homme de science peut travailler sans se soucier des problèmes de métaphysique, pas plus que de certains problèmes d'épistémologie' (26); face à ces questions son attitude est celle du 'sens commun.' Accorder trop d'importance aux problèmes insolubles (scientifiquement) de la philosophie conduirait à empêcher le travail scientifique 'concret' de se faire.

Dans une seconde partie, l'A. s'interroge sur la spécificité de l'objet de la biologie, c'est-à-dire sur l'épineux problème de la définition de l'être vivant. A l'encontre des vitalistes, Delsol soutient que la vie est le produit d'actions physico-chimiques: la vie est une 'super-chimie.' Néanmoins, les êtres vivants se distinguent de la matière inerte étudiée par le physicien ou le chimiste. Pour Delsol, la différence entre ces deux types d'objet est à la source du retard théorique qu'accuse la biologie par rapport à la physique ou à la chimie. Les êtres vivants sont constitués de 'cellules' qui forment des 'structures' beaucoup plus complexes; ce sont des systèmes thermodynamiques 'ouverts' — échappant ainsi à la loi de l'entropie; ils sont en état de 'turn over' permanent (les éléments qui les constituent se renouvellent constamment), leur constitution est programmée dans une chaîne d'A.D.N. et ils ont des capacités évolutives. La différence entre les 'cellules' du biologiste et les atomes du physicien

est éclatante: 'leur noyau, écrit-il [31], comporte le jeu complet des chromosomes et des gènes héréditaires de l'être tout entier, c'est-à-dire le jeu complet de l'information qui permet aux cellules de fabriquer cet être.' Les structures cellulaires comme les structures atomiques se constituent selon des 'lois' mais en biologie, les éléments étant par nature 'hétérogènes,' il est beaucoup plus difficile de les formuler de façon claire et précise. Ceci n'est pas pour signifier que le biologiste devrait renoncer à chercher et à formuler (tentativement) de telles 'lois' biologiques. Puisque le but de toute science est de formuler des 'lois,' l'A. invite les biologistes à persister dans cette recherche.

Ce dernier point introduit harmonieusement la troisième partie où le Professeur Delsol traite du but de la science et de la méthode scientifique en biologie. A ce niveau également, les différences entre la biologie et la physique ou la chimie sont manifestes. Le biologiste doit consacrer beaucoup plus de temps à l'observation et à la description des phénomènes biologiques plus 'hétérogènes,' comme nous le disions. A cause de cette hétérogénéité, autant aux niveaux élémentaire que structural, il est très difficile de 'généraliser' et 'd'induire' des 'lois' en biologie. Le biologiste ne peut pas, comme le chimiste, 'purifier' les éléments sur lesquels il travaille de façon à les rendre le plus homogène possible. Delsol se démarque de G. Bachelard à propos de la valeur du baconisme en affirmant que 'Bacon et Stuart Mill avaient bien reconnu les principes fondamentaux de la recherche en sciences naturelles' (95). L'A. est de toute évidence un 'inductiviste' de la méthode. A l'exception des mathématiques, toutes les 'lois' scientifiques sont 'à l'origine issues d'observations, c'est-à-dire obtenues par induction' (118). C'est pourquoi, en biologie, il faut commencer par établir des corrélations afin de s'approcher (par induction) de 'lois' véritables. Pour formuler de grandes théories scientifiques, l'usage d'analogies nous guidera vers de bonnes pistes. Il importe cependant de respecter deux principes méthodologiques: 1) celui de la cohérence des choses (la compatibilité avec la connaissance scientifique contemporaine) et 2) celui de l'approfondissement des corrélations étranges ('plus une corrélation paraît étrange et incohérente par rapport aux données classiques, plus son étude doit être approfondie, précisée et, si possible, mesurée' (116). Les résultats ainsi obtenus ne s'imposent pas d'eux-mêmes, comme en physique ou en chimie, mais ils sont largement justifiés par 1) l'harmonie qu'ils permettent d'établir entre en ensemble de résultats observés et 2) par l'absence de données contradictoires. C'est pourquoi le biologiste hésite tant à appeler 'loi' ce qui se produit de façon générale en laissant la porte ouverte aux exceptions.

Dans la quatrième partie, l'A. tire certaines conséquences de ces particularités de la biologie. 'Pour toutes ces raisons, écrit-il [167], le rôle du hasard est donc ressenti comme beaucoup plus important en biologie que dans les autres disciplines scientifiques.' Ainsi, une petite mutation dans une portion d'une molécule d'un chromosome peut avoir des effets démultipliés absolument imprévisibles sur la constitution des êtres vivants. L'indétermination est ici beaucoup plus grande que dans les incertitudes de Heisenberg à propos de la position et de la vitesse des micro-objets. Cependant, ne nous y trompons pas. Cela ne contredit aucunement l'existence de 'lois' biologiques. Reprenant

la définition de Cournot (qu'il montre compatible avec l'indéterminisme de la physique quantique), l'A. considère le hasard *objectivement* comme 'la rencontre de deux séries causales indépendantes l'une de l'autre' (172). Le hasard est donc un phénomène réel pouvant agir sur la nature mais, tout comme le libre-arbitre humain, il ne peut rien créer de lui-même. Hasard et libre-arbitre ne font qu'exploiter les possibilités déjà existantes, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne peuvent que déclencher le fonctionnement de 'lois.' En supposant qu'il n'y a que trois types de production de phénomènes — loi, hasard, ou finalité (libre-arbitre) — et que le hasard et la finalité n'agissent que grâce à des lois existantes, la conclusion de l'A. est incontournable. 'TOUT EST LOI DANS LA NATURE.'

Sans vouloir entacher le magnifique ouvrage du Professeur Delsol, il importe de se demander cependant, dans quelle mesure l'évidence subjective que confère une longue pratique de la biologie peut 'justifier' de tout simplement faire abstraction de toutes les discussions (autant chez les scientifiques que chez les philosophes) à propos du problème de l'induction? Dans quelle mesure l'autorité que confère la pratique de la profession peut-elle 'justifier' de ne pas tenir compte d'un ensemble de distinctions importantes de l'épistémologie contemporaine (notamment entre le contexte de découverte et le contexte de justification d'une théorie qui est directement pertinente à la discussion sur ses options inductivistes)? Nous pensons que l'argument de l'A. ne fait pas le poids.

FRANÇOIS TOURNIER

Université Laval

NORMA E. EMERTON. *The Scientific Reinterpretation of Form*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1984. Pp. 320. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-8014-1583-7.

The author is a crystallographer, and the book is essentially a prehistory of crystallography. Its topic is the treatment of a general problem in mineralogy up to the end of the eighteenth century: how is the apparent constancy of natural kinds to be accounted for? This had been the preoccupation of Aristotle's natural philosophy: 'man begets man.' Aristotle had concentrated on biology, living things being most elaborately structured and most sharply differentiated. Emerton prescind from biology altogether, and traces the heritage of Aristotle's scanty and opaque attempt to deal with the same issue in the mineral kingdom. Precious gemstones, useful metals, and other phenome-

na show regularities that attract practical attention long in advance of any adequate theory of their structure and composition. The story of the interwoven strands of consequent speculation is intricate, relatively unfamiliar, and important. Emerton's treatment of it in terms of the concept of form is original in conception and masterly in execution. She keeps track of everything, with abundant cross-references and recapitulations; but the story remains hard to follow and impossible to summarize.

In this story, Aristotle establishes the ubiquitous effectiveness of four 'causes': the efficient (the operative forces), the material (the four supposed elements), the formal (a formative agency), and the final (the purpose — not relevant in these contexts). It is stipulated that the formal cause must be somehow inseparable from the material. Controversy arises about whether this formative agency, which gives things their essential natures, is a blending force, a set of seeds established at creation, or what. A defect of this line of thought is that it ignores the geometrical character of crystals and crystallization, suggesting a close link between outward shape and inward essence. This deficiency is met from Plato's *Timaeus*, bringing into the picture a world soul and a divine will transmitted via the heavens. Things are further complicated by the forlorn hope of explaining form preservation in terms of Democritean and Lucretian atomism. Emerton shows how mineralogical speculation operates with transformations of these ideas until the new chemistry of Lavoisier and his contemporaries sweeps it all away — except that its final transformation successfully lays the foundations for scientific crystallography.

Emerton's attribution to Aristotle of the notion that the 'formal cause' is a formative power, though supported by citations, is a serious anachronism. The theory of four causes had to do with the factors necessary to any explanation: the 'formal cause' is nothing but the correct account of the nature of the phenomenon to be explained, the efficient cause is whatever caused the phenomenon to become what it is, the material cause is whatever it consists of. Emerton nowhere alludes to this crucial idea; what she substitutes for it is a scholastic transposition of it to the specific context of physical inquiry in a creationist context for which all form and activity is imposed onto an inert or resistant materiality. What Emerton and her medieval authorities call the efficient cause is what Aristotle calls 'necessity' and allows no specific explanatory value. In fact, Aristotle's theory is entirely formal and general in scope, and indicates only what questions a full explanation must answer; it contributes nothing to any specific inquiry. Hence, the isolation of the 'substantial form' as an efficacious entity is as empty (almost superstitious) a move as seventeenth-century anti-Aristotelians said it was; but that was not Aristotle's fault. Emerton does not see (or does not mention) this, and lumps together texts (such as one by Albertus Magnus) that refer to Aristotle's actual thoughts and texts that belong to the scholastic perversion of it. Since references to Aristotle pervade the book, one might think this weakness in the foundations would spoil all. In fact, though, it does not, because the tradition she is tracing is permeated by the same and similar confusions. The idea of 'form' is sus-

ceptible of the suggestive and sometimes fruitful transformations that Emerson traces just because it embodies a tantalizing muddle.

Somewhat similarly, the account given of Plato's theory of 'forms' rests on remarks wrenched from their explanatory contexts; but this too is unimportant, because what Emerson presents as Plato is pretty much what the tradition took up. Once we get on to Philo and the presupposition that nature is the work of a creative and providential deity everything is fine, and Emerson's account sustains the reader's confidence.

For the details of the history I have to take the author's word. The perspective is new; the alignments and emphases are persuasive. The book provokes many reflections; here are three.

Lavoisier's revolutionary chemistry, which finally renders all these speculations obsolete, is itself largely formulated within the nexus of questions Emerson explores. Oxygen is oxygen just because it is identified as a common element in the acids that are the universal reagents in the old chemistry; to deal with it entirely within the context of the theory of combustion (as we were taught in school) is to give the intellectual world the wrong shape. Similarly, Paracelsus, odd as his views often were, figures here not as an eccentric but as dealing constructively with continuing concerns of speculative mineralogy.

Emerson manages without referring to 'scientific revolutions' and 'paradigm shifts,' though the rise of analytic chemistry seems to cry out for such language. Perhaps she thinks her account speaks for itself in this regard. But her reader may be led to wonder whether dramatic accounts of such revolutions do not overemphasize contrasts between specific bodies of theory and practice and their supposed replacements, when what has happened may be a redistribution of work. The continuities of concern that Emerson deals with seem very strong, and there are questions that do not go away.

Lastly, we note the discontinuity between the principles, concerns and ways of thinking of the mineralogists and those prevalent in the better-remembered field of mechanics. Part of the reason may be that mineralogy is literally an earth science, its necessary concern the apparently unique make-up of the terrestrial globe and its constituents. The world here is not pre-Copernican but non-Copernican. For centuries, the domains of science are quite out of phase.

For those who would look to the pit whence they were digged and the rock whence they were hewn, this splendid book is a good place to start.

FRANCIS SPARSHOTT

Victoria College, Toronto

RICHARD T. de GEORGE. *The Nature and Limits of Authority*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas 1985. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-0269-0); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-0270-4).

Richard de George begins his study with the observation that, in the wake of 1960s radicalism, there persists considerable uncertainty as to how the concept of authority should be defined, when it is justified and when it should be challenged and resisted. De George offers his book, *The Nature and Limits of Authority*, as an effort to fill the need for a 'comprehensive philosophical analysis' which answers these questions.

De George seeks to explain authority, not just as a political concept, but in all its forms. He thus casts his net widely, beginning with a discussion of the nature of authority in its 'epistemic' and 'executive' forms, and the sources and symbols which embody them. He then moves on to analyse political authority and the anarchist case against it. The last part of the book deals with 'authority and the private realm,' including morality, religion and the university as settings for relations of authority.

While the aim of comprehensiveness is attractive, depth is sacrificed for breadth. In the place of cogent analysis, the book abounds in bald statements which are either unargued for, or trivially true. For example: 'Authority is a fact of social life. Most often it is simply accepted. When abused, it turns into authoritarianism' (1). The study lacks a clear idea of what authority is. De George advances a 'working model' in Chapter 1, wherein someone has authority if she or he stands in relation to another as superior in respect of some realm, field or domain (14). But this 'initial formulation' glosses over many complexities intrinsic to the idea of authority. If contentful, it suggests that authority is synonymous with superiority, but it is not at all clear that a claim to authority is made on the basis of a claim to superiority. Often authority is the result of a collective's decision to delegate their decision-making capacity, for the sake of efficiency or in the absence of an established pattern of cooperation. Hence democrats, while confirming governmental authority, would be reluctant to conceive this as a consequence of government's superiority over its citizenry.

De George's formula is not made any more rigorous in the discussion that follows, which presents an unfocused survey of instances of this 'relational quality.' The level of generality of the discussion is manifest in the noticeable lack of footnotes. De George is known to eschew references in his other works, preferring to offer an unencumbered, original discussion. But in this instance one wonders whether this tactic is used to best effect. Certainly Joseph Raz's recent writings constitute some of the best contributions to the understanding of authority, which de George would have done well to discuss. Raz offers a persuasive conception of authority as inhering in one whose commands are based on dependent reasons, that is, reasons which apply to a subject notwithstanding the authority relationship, and exclusionary or preemptive reasons, that is, reasons which take priority over and displace other reasons for

action. In any case, the reader should not be misled to believe that the dearth of footnotes is an indication that de George's text is wholly original; in many instances, he presents a simpler version of others' arguments, without citation. For example, H.L.A. Hart's well-known distinction between the gunman who *obliges* one to obey, and someone who *obligates*, is marshalled by de George in his discussion of executive authority (65).

It turns out that de George's vague definition cashes into a *carte blanche* to attribute authority relations to the most unlikely social phenomena; for example, the member of a group of friends who is delegated with the task of buying theatre ticket is a bearer of authority, on de George's conception (80-4). Not only is this a contentious example of authority relations as they are customarily understood, on de George's hierarchical understanding of authority the example of a friendly arrangement seems especially ill-conceived. Moreover, it seems to be poor methodology to try to analyse political authority by calling non-political associations polities.

Further, the book's expansion of the parameters of authority to include virtually all conceivable human relationships holds little reward. This project could have critical potential, revealing the power structures of supposedly non-political relationships. (E.g., Steven Lukes's *Power: A Radical View* has taken analytical philosophy some distance in understanding the extent to which power penetrates spheres beyond its official jurisdiction.) But it turns out that this is far from de George's concern. The market and the university figure as yet more manifestations of a catch-all generalisation. Insofar as de George takes a stand on the legitimacy of the authority of these institutions, it is to take a Panglossian view that 'whatever is, is right.' Consider, for example, assertions like 'society' grants individuals and groups the authority to use the nation's resources as they wish, or that freedom is the 'fundamental assumption' with respect to human resources (168-9).

Perhaps the central flaw in *The Nature and Limits of Authority* is its inability to distinguish between authority as a power, and as a legitimate claim to power. While he posits a difference between *de jure* and *de facto* forms of authority, de George is unable to provide and apply clear criteria for determining whether an authority is justified, often treating an existing practice of authority as though it were an analytical model for justifying it, and vice-versa. While competence and knowledge would seem to figure as fairly uncontroversial criteria, de George does not analyse how an authority's mistakes are to be construed. As Raz notes, the point of an authority is to be authoritative in all instances, on the assumption that its judgement, while not infallible, is, if consistently adhered to, more reliable than one's own. De George's proviso that an authority is unjustifiable or illegitimate if it ceases to act in the interest of its subjects, instead acting in its own interests, is unnecessarily extreme. The anarchist is concerned, not just with the instances of aberration, wherein those in authority use their position for self-aggrandisement, but the very principle of narrowing the sphere of individual decision-making which an authority relationship entails. It is not tyranny, but incompetence, which the subject most fears when submitting to an authority. In any case,

authority is not justified simply in terms of the interests of those subject to it; a military commander, for example, has authority over his army to act in the interest of the nation, not that of the soldiers (cf. Raz). De George's own example of employer-employee relationships presents the same problem.

The Nature and Limits of Authority thus emerges as, at best, a simplification of complex problems in a difficult area of moral and political philosophy. At worst, the book is confused and mistaken, its feeble arguments obfuscated by de George's rather turgid prose. In the face of a number of intelligent writings on the subject, de George's work stands as a disappointment.

CHRISTINE SYPNOWICH
Balliol College, Oxford

MARY GIBSON, ed. *To Breathe Freely: Risk, Consent, and Air*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1985. Pp. xv + 294. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8476-7416-8.

Despite containing some essays of limited appeal, this collection is an interesting and even important addition to the critical examination of the relationship between individual consent and governmental policy decisions. It focuses on the philosophical and policy problems raised by the risks associated with air pollution. However, its greatest contribution may lie in its attempt to collect into a single volume essays which are both empirical and philosophical while being intricately connected. It is divided into three parts plus an epilogue.

Part I contains three essays on the risks of airborne contaminants. The first deals with passive smoking, the second discusses air pollution in the work place, and the third describes risks from transported air pollutants. These three essays intend to be descriptions of the historical and current situation in their respective fields and to lay the empirical foundations for what follows. It is to be regretted that the first, by James L. Repace, is clearly biased and, at times, obnoxious.

Part II includes six articles on the meaning and role of consent. The opening essay by Samuel Scheffler, which serves as an appropriate introduction to the section, presents three views on the moral foundations of consent. It is followed by an interesting and unusual critique of Lockean natural rights theories in which Peter Railton argues that a conception of morality 'that pictures individuals as set apart by propertylike boundaries' (119) is not adequate to the situation that people are in fact in, for they are interconnected by means of their mutual environment. He contends that the application of Lockean the-

ories, if injuries due to air pollution are considered comparable to other sorts of injuries, will prove exceedingly restrictive of individual liberties, whereas if risks are emphasized rather than injuries, adoption of the same theories will prove extremely flabby as a shield against individual harms.

These essays are followed by two which lack explicit connection to the topic at hand. Baruch Fischhoff's piece is an examination of informed consent as optimality decision making, and Judith Jarvis Thomson critiques 'pure risk imposition' where the case of 'pure risk' is that in which 'each time the agent acts he imposes a risk of an unwanted outcome, and it may be that he never at any time actually causes an unwanted outcome' (124). The final essay of Part II, by Michael Baram, provides a clear and informative analysis of the present location of consent for workers in the United States. According to him, consent is located in tort law, yet tort law is rarely used to deal with workers' injuries. Substituting for tort law are workers' compensation and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, neither of which addresses questions of consent.

Part II contains one other essay, 'Consent and Autonomy' by Mary Gibson. In many ways, it is the premier essay in this collection. In the first place, the author composed it with the entire collection in mind. There is frequent and relevant reference to other articles and synergy between theory and application, along with an attempt to ground consent philosophically. Gibson finds the philosophical basis for consent in autonomy: 'I suggest,' she says, 'that the ideal of autonomy, understood as self-determination or being in control of one's life, is the central value behind the moral significance of consent' (141). She takes the stance that, although intrinsically valuable, autonomy is not a given; it must be exercised to be attained. For this reason, she makes the rather un-Rawlsian move of concluding that, in order for autonomy to be secured, it must not be inferred or hypothetical, and 'more sophisticated algorithms for making decisions' will not increase it. Rather, autonomy must involve people who make actual, direct, and informed decisions for their own lives for themselves (163).

Part III, which addresses public policy, is sometimes descriptive to the point of superficiality. Of interest in this section are the views of the authors on the moral and strategic consequences of including cost-benefit analysis when policy goals for air quality are considered. The authors' views differ. Of curiosity is the authors' unanimous disregard of tobacco price supports as part of public tobacco policy.

The epilogue by Langdon Winner provides a fitting denouement. It discusses bias in risk assessment. He finds a bias which he construes as conservative because (he says) the risk debate ignores deep political and ethical issues like the redistribution of goods; instead it concentrates on the collection of data and the redefinition of 'threat' as 'risk.' This collection of essays, although it deliberately offers neither a single perspective nor a summary conclusion (xv) bears out Winner's contention. The more descriptive essays conclude that air pollution is in many ways a complex unknown; more data are required. The more philosophical essays frequently lead the reader to feel that a drastic

alteration in the structure of capitalistic power relationships furnishes the only method for nurturing autonomy and franchising individual consent about air pollution; 'grassroots' (as they say) worker and citizen participation in decision-making is required.

What is unique and important about this volume is that it assembles in one place works both empirical and philosophical on air pollution, treating risk, consent, and governmental policy as profoundly related issues. They are. Too often public policy research and discussion strive to be purely empirical, and frequently philosophy aspires to be immaculately theoretical. Considering the tendency toward this dissociation, it seems relevant to remark that the collection under review would serve nicely as a text book for an introductory philosophy course precisely because it demonstrates the crucial importance of philosophical analysis for issues which too often are discussed as if they are exclusively empirical, while it emphasizes the relevance of empirical data for contemporary extensions of philosophical investigations.

PATRICIA WILLIAMS

University of Guelph

D. W. HAMLYN. *Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. 220. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24449-8); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28690).

A new book on metaphysics is always welcome, since so little currently appears in this area. Professor Hamlyn's work attempts to cover a substantial chunk of traditional metaphysical problems: ontology, substance, particular and general, monism and pluralism, space and time, minds, personal identity and survival. Each problem is set in a fairly elaborate background, where views of prominent philosophers, historical and contemporary, are explained and criticized. The author then argues his own position on the subject. With so much material covered in so few pages, there is an expected result. Both the setting and the author's own ideas tend to be fairly briefly stated. It is sometimes hard to discern what Hamlyn himself wants to maintain, as it tends to get buried in its surroundings. Whether more expanded versions of Hamlyn's ideas would be more valuable remains unclear, since it is difficult to decide how much more of interest and novelty would make its appearance. What he has given us, however, is a nice, readable book with material presented in a clear, accessible way, at least to some one familiar with the problems and solutions dis-

cussed. Whether or not it could be understood by a beginner, it makes a nice refresher course to someone who has not thought about these problems for a while.

The method which Hamlyn says he wishes to follow — 'to set out in the most general and abstract terms what must hold good of conscious beings and the world in which they live, if that world is to constitute reality for them' (8) — has two results. First, the world with which we seem to be familiar is always presented as real, complete with real metaphysical problems whose solutions, if correct, would describe some aspect of reality. However, secondly, he tends to suppose the capacities of human beings quite limited, finding views unthinkable which are deserving of more careful consideration. Often, little acknowledgement is given to the fact that sound reasoning gives a metaphysical position a claim upon our thinking which may be stronger than any prephilosophical ideas, regardless of their source. Examples where Hamlyn does not, in my view, adequately consider what might reasonably be said against his ideas follow.

(a) Hamlyn is of the opinion that a material thing is no more than the sum of its coinstantiated properties. We are misled into thinking the thing to be something more because we fail to notice that our concepts 'thing' and 'property(s)' are different, and hence not interchangeable (57). Important arguments like those against the Identity of Indiscernibles are here ignored by Hamlyn. (b) He argues that individual things or substances, are necessary to a world of permanence and change (69). But even if we grant that a purely static world or a world of pure flux are inconceivable, why must there be material objects, as we know them, to function as the permanent entities in which change takes place? Change can be perceived to occur when a particular cloud moves across a formation of others, when designs on a computer screen change their patterns, when one thought is replaced by another. (c) It is supposed to be necessary to our thought modes about things that each thing have a unique spatio-temporal history (75). But this is, at best, true only of things of a certain type, which will not form mixtures with other things of their type. Alcohol and water will mix in the same glass, as will two personalities in the same human body. These are two examples of pairs of things coming to share a certain spatial-temporal history. To deny such examples is to claim that mixtures of two or more things are not really possible, that what passes for a mixture is instead a conglomeration of very small qualitatively distinct parts of a single thing, occupying small but distinct places in the spatial-temporal history of the whole. Such a denial of an obvious phenomenon like mixtures needs some argument. (d) Particulars are supposed to have a certain 'primacy' over universals because only instantiated universals may exist (104). Hamlyn's argument seems to be that the easiest way to verify the existence of a universal is to find an instance of one. But we do find reason to believe in more (or less) than we can find. And in the case of universals, we tend to think of them as existing in natural groups — colours, sounds, rays, weights. We may not want to say a species of dog exists, if we find no dogs of that species; but this is because dog species qualities are complexes which invite

the use of Occam's razor. On the other hand, natural groups of simpler qualities seem to have their existence best supported by reasoning which would support (or fail to support) all of the group indifferently, giving no primacy to found members. If one colour exists, they all do, whether or not any particular things bears the colour. (e) After some consideration, Hamlyn decides to make many questions about space and time, such as whether either is bounded, 'factual' questions not amenable to being settled by philosophical method. He is quite interested in maintaining, however, that the notions of past, present and future, albeit anthropocentric, are important objective aspects of time (147). The idea, once again, is that they are important to us because 'we are temporal beings' (158). But don't we want to know what, if anything, corresponds to them in time apart from our temporal experiences, and why? (f) Hamlyn's remarks about minds, persons and survival are, as might well be expected, grounded in claims about what must be the case to make human existence conceivable. Suffice it to say, this is controversial terrain. Well-respected thinkers have held different views on this subject and given their supporting reasons. One cannot argue, as briefly as Hamlyn does, that only a single view on each subject can comfortably find its way into and settle in the human mind.

ANNE C. MINAS

University of Waterloo

LEON INGBER. *L'Egalité* — Volume IX. (Collection Travaux du Centre de Philosophie du Droit de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles.) Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruylant 1984. 198 p. 1999FB. ISBN 2-8027-0338-2.

Dans sa Préface ('La recherche de l'Egalité, hier et aujourd'hui'), Léon Ingber souligne que, par ce neuvième volume consacré à l'étude de la notion d'Egalité, le Centre de Philosophie du Droit de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles rend en quelque sorte hommage au Siècle des Lumières et à ses idéaux. Cet ouvrage accueille certaines des contributions qui ont été présentées sur le thème *Recherche de l'Egalité* dans le cadre du VI^e Congrès international des Lumières tenu à Bruxelles en juillet 1983. D'autres communications, qui n'ont pas été retenues pour le présent recueil, doivent être publiées dans un dixième et dernier volume portant entièrement sur le thème *Egalité et Enseignement*.

Corrado Rosso ('L'Egalité selon Necker: mythe aussi ruineux que fallacieux ou réalité?') rapporte les idées que Necker expose dans un petit ouvrage intitulé *Réflexions philosophiques sur l'égalité*, qu'il avait conçu dès la fin de 1793

bien qu'il ne l'ait publié pour la première fois qu'en 1796. C'est plutôt par confusion que Necker donne à ses réflexions une prétention philosophique. Il s'agit en fait d'un ouvrage polémique où il dénonce l'idée d'égalité et prend à partie les philosophes pour leur influence négative au XVIII^e siècle. Dans son réquisitoire, il s'ingénie à retracer les nombreuses impossibilités qui frappent l'idée d'égalité, et cela suivant différents points de vue. La démarche de Necker repose, d'après Rosso, sur un équivoque fondamentale entre visée descriptive et visée normative, puisque son discours tend à présenter l'égalité comme étant à la fois ontologiquement impossible et axiologiquement condamnable. Somme toute, nous tenons là l'écrit d'un moraliste dont les conséquences de certaines idées pourraient paraître réactionnaires au plan politique. Aussi, trouvera-t-on très étrange que Necker n'examine aucunement les liens entre l'exigence d'égalité et l'aspiration à la justice.

Florence Gauthier ('De Mably à Robespierre, un programme économique égalitaire 1775-1793') étudie les conditions d'apparition d'un projet de société anti-capitaliste, c'est-à-dire l'application d'un système 'd'économie sociale,' selon l'expression employée par Buonarroti, opposé à un système de liberté économique illimitée. Dans son étude, elle privilégie deux moments de référence: l'épisode de la Guerre des Farines de 1775 et l'épisode robespierriste du programme du maximum en 1792-1793. C'est dans un ouvrage intitulé *Du Commerce des Grains* que Mably, en développant une critique perspicace des physiocrates comme des libéraux, jette les bases d'un projet de société égalitaire, suite aux politiques économiques expérimentées par Turgot. Analysant les intérêts contradictoires des groupes sociaux en présence, Mably démasque le caractère de classe de ces politiques économiques qui se réclament de l'intérêt général. Il prolonge sa critique de la liberté illimitée du commerce par une critique de la conception individualiste du droit de propriété, qui l'amène à proposer des mesures pour la limitation stricte de l'exercice d'un tel droit. Dans les mois qui suivent la Révolution de 1789, prend place une seconde expérience de liberté du commerce dont l'application suscite des résistances populaires et conduit à une critique du libéralisme, donnant peu à peu forme au 'programme du maximum' pour le prix des grains et l'étendue des exploitations. Comme dans la critique de Mably, le débat est de nouveau centré sur la question de l'exercice du droit de propriété, qui doit être limité et subordonné par le droit social.

Wolfgang Asholt ("L'Effet Mably" et le problème de l'égalité dans le roman dialogué "Des Droits et des devoirs du citoyen") part du constat que l'œuvre de Gabriel Bonnot de Mably donne lieu à des interprétations divergentes qui voient en lui soit un précurseur du communisme révolutionnaire soit un théoricien de la démocratie représentative, alors que tous s'accordent pour ne pas lui attribuer une grande valeur littéraire. Prenant le contre-pied de cette unanimité, l'auteur tente une analyse du caractère littéraire du roman dialogué de Mably, écrit en 1758 et publié pour la première fois en 1789. Il se propose d'étudier l'influence d'une description utopique du passé, comme celle qui apparaît dans certaines parties du roman, sur le cours de l'histoire ultérieure et aussi les conséquences qui s'en sont suivies pour la réception du

roman. Le caractère fictionnel de la forme littéraire adoptée par Mably permet, par l'utopie rétrospective d'une égalité originelle, de développer une critique politique de l'état présent de la société humaine où le fait de la propriété privée apparaît bien définitif et irrémédiable. Lors de sa publication posthume, au printemps de 1789, le roman semble parfaitement adapté aux événements politiques en train de se dérouler et sert de référence dans les débats. L'on se réclame de Mably de tous les bords à la fois. Selon Asholt, c'est le caractère fictionnel de cette œuvre de Mably qui fait qu'elle ait pu susciter des méprises aussi contradictoires. D'une certaine façon, l'utopie littéraire, en annulant momentanément les nécessités de la situation historique, permet de miner une action politique à laquelle l'on a déjà renoncé. En conclusion, rien n'autorise à y voir fondamentalement une critique de l'état social propre à éveiller des attentes susceptibles d'être réalisées.

Eric Golay ('Égalité populaire et égalité bourgeoise à Genève au temps de la révolution [1789-1798]') s'intéresse aux luttes politiques qui secouent le patriciat de Genève dès le début du XVIII^e siècle, en se demandant si l'on peut vraiment les mettre au compte de la recherche de l'égalité, puisque les revendications en question ne concernent qu'une partie restreinte de la population. Ces revendications ne connaissent que des succès limités jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789 qui leur confère un nouvel élan par l'appel aux principes politiques venus de France. Des circonstances extérieures, l'encerclement de Genève par les troupes françaises, amènent la chute de l'ancien patriciat. Dès lors, deux visions de l'égalité s'affrontent, l'une bourgeoise et légaliste, l'autre populaire et révolutionnaire. À partir de 1795, l'on observe un certain reflux du mouvement populaire qui perd peu à peu de son influence, alors que les principaux acquis de la nouvelle constitution sont néanmoins maintenus. L'auteur étudie cet épisode dans l'histoire de Genève où deux conceptions de l'égalité apparaissent irréductibles l'une à l'autre.

Lily Willens ('Lafayette's Emancipation Experiment in French Guyana, 1786-1792') note que rien ne prédisposait Gilbert du Motier marquis de Lafayette à devenir un fervent partisan de l'abolition de l'esclavage. Cependant, sa participation à la Révolution américaine le met en contact avec le but de l'égalité, ce qui n'est pas sans contribuer à son évolution politique. L'auteur s'attache à étudier la maturation des idées de Lafayette qui devait en faire un champion de la liberté. D'abord indifférent au problème de l'esclavage, Lafayette devient de plus en plus avisé de la condition faite aux esclaves. De retour à Paris, il fréquente les cercles de penseurs libéraux de l'époque. C'est pourquoi une partie de l'article traite de l'évolution de la mentalité en France sur la question de l'esclavage et du développement du mouvement abolitionniste. Ainsi, Lafayette en vient à formuler un projet d'émancipation des esclaves noirs qu'il propose à Georges Washington. Il va même jusqu'à tenter une expérience d'émancipation graduelle dans une plantation achetée par lui en Guyane française. La confiscation de ses biens sous la Terreur a pour effet de mettre fin à cette expérience originale.

Alice M. Laborde ('Madelaine de Puisieux et Diderot: de l'Égalité entre les sexes') veut montrer les convergences et les divergences des vues exprimées

par Madame de Puisieux dans l'ouvrage publié en 1750 avec le titre *La Femme n'est pas inférieure à l'homme*, puis repris dans une seconde édition en 1751 sous le nouveau titre *Le Triomphe des dames*, et par Diderot dans ses textes intitulés *Essai sur les femmes* (1772) et *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville* (1773-1774). L'ouvrage de Madame de Puisieux apparaît en fait comme une version modernisée de l'œuvre de Poulain de la Barre diffusée dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle. Elle y présente des revendications féministes dans une perspective qui, toutefois, s'accorde mieux avec les conceptions philosophiques du XVIII^e siècle. Et même, sur la question des phénomènes physiologiques, ses considérations devancent celles de Diderot qui fait encore siennes des croyances superstitieuses sur l'hystérie des femmes. Par ailleurs, pour ce qui est du rôle des passions et du problème de la domination de la femme par l'homme, Madame de Puisieux et Diderot se rejoignent. En revanche, sur l'impact décisif de l'éducation pour expliquer la discrimination dont sont victimes les femmes, l'auteur remarque avec justesse que Madame de Puisieux s'avère beaucoup plus perspicace que Diderot.

David G. John ('Women and Men as Equals in German Comedy of the Enlightenment') observe qu'en dépit des apparences d'émancipation, la soumission sociale des femmes est généralement vue comme une nécessité naturelle à l'époque des Lumières en Allemagne. L'auteur entreprend de vérifier cette affirmation par une étude des personnages et des rôles dans le répertoire des pièces comiques écrites entre 1730 et 1770. Dans ces pièces, les héroïnes doivent plier devant la volonté de leurs supérieurs mâles. Cependant, il est loin d'être évident que la femme soit tenue pour intellectuellement inférieure à l'homme dans les pièces de Gottsched et Lessing. D'une certaine façon, cela reflète l'argumentation tautologique de double standard développée par Christian Wolff pour justifier la domination de l'homme sur la femme. Ce dernier proposait de ne faire aucune différence dans l'éducation des garçons et des filles, mais il se ralliait néanmoins aux conventions sociales de son temps. Pourtant, avec les comédies de Krueger les choses vont quand même un peu plus loin, puisque l'une de ses héroïnes rejette l'institution du mariage, y voyant le plus grand empêchement à l'égalité des sexes.

G.A. Starr ('Egalitarian and Elitist Implications of Sensibility') remarque que l'on accepte généralement l'idée que le culte du sentiment au XVIII^e siècle porte atteinte à la hiérarchie sociale traditionnelle et qu'il est au service de la liberté, peut-être même de l'égalité. Cependant, il se demande si l'on ne pourrait pas au contraire voir dans ce mouvement la mise en place d'une sorte de nouvelle aristocratie de la délicatesse de la sensibilité, qui aurait plutôt tendance à maintenir la hiérarchie sociale existante. Cela apparaît très nettement dans la littérature qui fait une ample exploitation du sentimentalisme, puisqu'elle n'a pratiquement pas d'impact sur la transformation réelle de la société et qu'elle demeure au niveau du rêve d'évasion. L'auteur fait référence aux ouvrages de Austen, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Chateaubriand, Goethe, Rousseau, Sterne. Le sentimentalisme développe, enfin, un élitisme de la finesse de l'esprit dont la bienveillance égalitaire ne peut être qu'apparente.

Glen Campbell ('The Search for Equality of Lesage's Picaresque Heroes')

étudie la signification du thème de l'égalité dans les romans picaresques d'Alain René Lesage, plus particulièrement sous les aspects de la description de modèles sociaux rigides et du problème de la mobilité sociale dans la classe bourgeoise du début du XVIII^e siècle. Il s'agit en fait de romans de mœurs qui ne répondent pas en tout point aux caractéristiques des romans picaresques et dont les héros sont moins de purs aventuriers que des ambitieux aspirant à la richesse et au prestige social. Pour le héros de Lesage, l'ascension sociale commence par l'accroissement du sentiment de sa supériorité personnelle, même alors qu'il se trouve dans la position de valet. A cela, vient s'ajouter l'indépendance financière où se révèle le rôle niveleur de l'argent dans une société en pleine mutation. Selon l'auteur, on ne doit pas mésestimer l'impact de l'œuvre de Lesage pour la reconnaissance sociale de la nouvelle force que représente la bourgeoisie avec son esprit capitaliste, bien qu'il n'y soit jamais question de réformes sociales profondes.

Paul H. Meyer ('The Breakdown of Hierarchical Concepts in 18th Century French Society, Literature and Art') rappelle que la représentation de la mobilité sociale, c'est-à-dire l'idée que les individus n'ont pas à occuper une place fixée une fois pour toutes dans la hiérarchie de l'organisation sociale, remonte à la fin du XVIII^e siècle. Par contraste, l'auteur s'attache à montrer toute l'importance du concept de hiérarchie dans la société française du XVII^e siècle et encore dans celle du début du XVIII^e siècle. C'est ce qui explique le choix des sujets historiques en peinture, la suprématie de la tragédie sur la comédie, le dédain qui frappe le roman et l'opéra. Peu à peu, au cours du XVIII^e siècle, devait se concrétiser la destruction du concept de hiérarchie, ainsi qu'il apparaît par le triomphe du style rococo en architecture et en sculpture. De même, la montée du genre dramatique, avec Marivaux, Diderot et Beaumarchais, consacre un changement des mentalités. L'évolution des arts au XVIII^e siècle montre que, même sans une intention subversive explicite, les idées créatrices ont tendance à saper la représentation de la hiérarchie.

Georges Barthel ('L'égalitarisme de Dom Deschamps') retrace les grandes lignes de la doctrine de l'universel proposée par le concepteur du *Vrai Système*. L'homme social actuel vivant dans 'l'état de lois' est incapable d'atteindre l'universel positif, dans la mesure où les différentes activités humaines privilégient tel ou tel aspect. Par sa faculté métaphysique de participation au tout, l'homme peut dépasser sa particularité propre et accéder au plan de l'harmonie. L'égalitarisme de Dom Deschamps ne procède donc pas de l'absolutisation de l'individu mais d'une sorte de gnose de l'universel. C'est ce qui lui permet de développer une critique sociale, tout en jetant les fondements d'une autre forme d'organisation qu'il appelle 'l'état de mœurs,' où se révèle pleinement la tendance à rétablir l'égalité dans l'unité originarie. Afin de mieux marquer les positions définies par Dom Deschamps, l'auteur est conduit à effectuer des comparaisons avec la pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. En effet, au lieu de chercher des institutions qui puissent échapper aux contradictions, Dom Deschamps tente plutôt de dépasser la politique par une métaphysique de l'égalité.

Guy Haarscher ('The Idea of Equality') se propose de montrer que

l'«égalitarisme pur» n'est pas possible ou, en d'autres termes, que la notion d'égalité ne suffit pas à elle seule pour exploiter la problématique égalitaire et qu'elle doit nécessairement être replacée dans le contexte théorique plus large qui lui apporte toute sa signification. Le texte de l'auteur s'articule en deux grandes sections, l'une où il examine la question de l'égalité posée à l'extérieur de l'Etat de droit et l'autre où il se penche sur le problème de l'égalité considérée à l'intérieur de l'Etat de droit. Dans la première section, il traite du totalitarisme et de ses relations avec les présuppositions philosophiques du marxisme. C'est dans la philosophie de l'histoire des Temps Modernes comme telle, et plus précisément dans sa conception 'dialectique,' qu'il faut chercher, d'après lui, le fondement apportant la légitimation à des attitudes qui conduisent à l'étrange paradoxe de l'égalitarisme inégalitaire. Dans la deuxième section, il passe brièvement en revue une typologie heuristique des quatre significations distinctives que peut revêtir la notion d'égalité dans le champ de la théorie de l'Etat de droit. Il y a 'l'égalité devant la loi,' 'l'égalité politique,' 'l'égalité des chances' et 'l'égalité des résultats.' En conclusion, l'auteur croit utile d'indiquer les liens entre les deux grandes approches pour prévenir les malentendus entre égalitaristes et réalistes. Il entrevoit la nécessité d'une réflexion sur les exigences éthiques, afin de parer au danger d'un positivisme à courte vue.

Les onze premières études qui composent ce recueil pourraient n'intéresser que des dix-huitiémistes, tant elles sont de facture spécialisée. Elles ont en général un caractère plus littéraire que philosophique, ce qui n'indique aucunement qu'elles soient sans intérêt pour un lecteur philosophe. Si dans l'ensemble l'ouvrage apparaît plutôt propre à stimuler la réflexion, cela se vérifie probablement dans une moindre mesure pour l'étude que nous propose Georges Barthel. Cet auteur ne me semble pas, en effet, être parvenu à donner, de manière pleinement satisfaisante, une résonance actuelle à l'œuvre de Dom Deschamps, ce qu'il aurait été possible de faire par le biais du problème de la constitution de l'identité personnelle dans la société moderne. Quant au texte de Guy Haarscher, qui a été rajouté en dernier par l'éditeur, il apporte des éclairages théoriques indispensables sur les très nombreuses difficultés que comporte la conceptualisation de l'égalité.

JOCELYN R. BEAUSOLEIL

Département des sciences de l'éducation

Université du Québec à Montréal

TERENCE IRWIN, trans. *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company 1985. Pp. xxx + 441. US\$19.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-65-0); US\$6.75 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-66-9).

This work consists in a complete translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with notes, an annotated glossary, and a list for further reading. Irwin's intent is 'to make Aristotle's terse and concentrated Greek fairly intelligible to those who read him in English' (ix). Without pretending to be a full scale commentary, the notes and glossary are supplied 'to make the translation more intelligible' (ix). The primary target of the book is the person just beginning his or her studies of the *Ethics* who neither reads Classical Greek nor has an extensive acquaintance with the relevant literature.

The Introduction serves both to familiarize the reader with Aristotle's life and habits of thought and to encourage the reader to take Aristotle's ethics seriously as a coherent and stimulating moral theory. It concludes with a description of the edition that alerts us to the importance of the notes and glossary to understanding the translation. The Introduction is followed by a Note on the Text citing the text used (Bywater's) and Irwin's variations. In addition to the translation of all ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, there are also numerous insertions: chapter headings, section headings and bracketed textual additions. Together, the chapter and section headings provide a running synopsis. The textual supplements expand Aristotle's compressed and elliptical prose into clear, self-contained English sentences. The text is followed by notes, a glossary and two lists of references. The Notes perform a number of functions: here Irwin explains individual passages, refers the reader to the Glossary for the further discussion of particular terms, gives alternative and literal translations, cites other relevant passages in the *Ethics* and elsewhere in the corpus, and mentions, in addition, similar passages in Plato's works. The exhaustive and lengthy Glossary of terms does double duty, serving on the one hand to give detailed definitions and on the other to press the line of interpretation adopted in the translation and the Notes. In the next section, Aristotle's Literary References, Irwin summarily cites the sources for the sentences Aristotle quotes. The annotated list of works entitled Further Reading, however, affords a comprehensive introduction to the literature on the *Ethics*.

Since all too often completely literal renderings of Aristotle's Greek into English result in nearly unintelligible prose, a translator must make a strategic choice between clarity and precision. In addition, Aristotle's Greek is not elegant and hence a translator must also decide between fluent prose and literal readings. Irwin chooses clarity over literalness but the literal over the eloquent. The result is a very clear and cogent translation that, given his interpretive strategy, is as literal as possible. For the most part, Irwin uses different English terms for different but synonymous Greek terms. Although he regularly employs different English terms to translate the same Greek term, his choices in the same or related contexts are usually consistent. (One notable exception

is *ergon* which in similar contexts is variously translated as function, work, product and achievement.) Moreover, Irwin brackets lengthy or controversial textual supplements, and he often mentions literal translations in the notes. The desire for clarity also leads Irwin to transpose sentences, paragraphs and in a few instances even larger portions of the text. This is probably a mistake. There is no textual warrant for these changes. A reader who is comparing Irwin's translation to another translation or to the Greek text has to root out the transposed text. In the translation, the sole indications of these changes are the marginal Bekker numbers, which only an experienced scholar is likely to notice. The number of insertions in the text is also somewhat troublesome. While the section headings provide a helpful structure, they break chapters up into numerous parts and hence detract from the unity of an extended discussion or argument. A different format placing the headings in the margins would have solved this problem. Individual passages are also broken up by frequent insertions in brackets. While there is much to be said for this technique, as it allows Irwin to expand and make the text clearer while letting the reader know what is being added, its too frequent use is aesthetically displeasing and tends to destroy the inherent cogency of passages.

With a few exceptions, Irwin's rendering of key terms and phrases accords with standard practice. *Kata*, however, when followed by *areten* (virtue) or the name of a particular virtue is translated 'expressing.' This is an inspired innovation. Thus the definition of the final good at 1098a16 becomes 'the soul's activity that expresses virtue' (17). This sentence captures Aristotle's emphasis on living virtuously far better than the more familiar formula, 'the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.' Similar employments of *kata* receive the same treatment throughout with the same good result.

The notes with cross-references to the Glossary and other texts are a valuable source of information. Irwin does a beautiful job of articulating the structure of some of Aristotle's arguments. Where the text presents us with a puzzling and obscure piece of reasoning, he presents us with a perspicuous statement. When an elliptical remark by Aristotle constitutes a potential red herring, Irwin quickly points out that the remark properly construed is unproblematic. Unfortunately, he sometimes chooses to offer truncated and tentative analyses instead of detailed ones. There are also omissions. Neither interpretations different from Irwin's nor references to other commentators are found in the Notes. Another serious omission is the failure to refer the reader to the Note on the Text or to the Literary References when appropriate. Furthermore, for a single passage, one may need to consult the Notes, the Glossary, the Note on the Text and the Literary References. A more compact and integrated set of notes would be much easier to use than the present arrangement.

Two features make this translation of the *Ethics* appealing and important: Irwin's thorough-going commitment to clarity and the comprehensive variety of supplementary materials. The former explains not only the shape and character of the translation but also the pursuit of a single, cogent and charitable line of interpretation in the Notes and Glossary as well. Irwin's Aristotle is

sensible and accessible. Ironically, the very same features are the source of its major shortcomings — from the unwieldiness of the supplements to Irwin's failure to grapple with interpretations other than his own to the loss of the sense of *aporia* that so often seduces the unwary and draws them into the further study of Aristotle's writings.

Irwin has, nevertheless, succeeded admirably in his stated objections. His translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is wholly intelligible. The exegesis found in the Notes and Glossary clarifies Aristotle's positions (as Irwin understands them) and makes them more persuasive. Any other question the reader has is likely to find an answer in one of the other appendices.

DEBORAH K. MODRAK

University of Rochester

R. KANE. *Free Will and Values*. Albany: SUNY Press 1985. Pp. x + 229. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-101-x); US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-102-8).

One tends to greet new books on free will and determinism with a certain amount of skepticism. Although they may be lucidly written and cogently argued, one wonders whether they will advance the subject much beyond the point to which centuries of dispute have already brought us. In *Free Will and Values*, Kane promises to give us something new. This something new is an incompatibilist conception of free will that does not identify free will either with the mere absence of causation or with the operation of an agent. The trouble with identifying free will with the absence of causation, Kane says, is that free will becomes nothing more than chance (the chance objection), and the trouble with the theory of agency is that its central concept — nonoccurrent causation — is 'obscure' and 'mysterious.'

Kane devotes almost half of his book (Chapters 5-8) to explaining his new conception of free will. This conception is tied to a modified ethical relativism, which asserts that although there is no one 'true good' in a choice situation, there are several goods, 'each of which could be reasonable because each could represent a true good for us' (112). Without this form of ethical relativism, Kane claims, free choices are irrational, since they are arbitrary; but with it free choices are rational, since each of several chance-selected alternatives can be reasonable in some way. Thus, free choices for Kane are combinations of chance and reason, which means that we have only partial control over them (it is the chance element that limits control). He admits that traditional

libertarians will be dissatisfied with this concession to the chance objection, but believes that no other conception of free will satisfactorily meets the usual objections.

One of these objections is that the presence of reasons does not eliminate chance from free choice, because the selection of the reason itself, to be free, must possess the very feature which is supposed to make the choice a matter of chance, namely, being able to be different even if everything just prior to it were to remain the same. Kane himself uses this argument in Chapter 4. But it is hard to see how Kane's own conception of free will, for all its subtleties and sophistication, avoids this argument. If the selection of one of several goods is to be free, it must be able to be different, so that the whole choice is a product of chance, not just part of it.

A more promising refutation of the chance objection challenges the identification of the absence of causality with chance. This identification is often simply assumed by proponents of the chance objection, and Kane, too, adopts the identification without either arguing for it or considering objections to it. One might claim that the ability to be different with which the absence of causality is identified is really the same as being in control of a choice, and not the same as chance. Making this claim and supporting it with conceptual analysis and other philosophical strategies would be a novel approach in the free will debate. Although this approach initially may seem implausible, something like it must be correct if the chance objection is to be met, since, as Kane so nicely argues in Chapter 4, none of the traditional responses to that objection work.

Agency theorists will object to Kane's swift dismissal of agent-causation as obscure and mysterious. They will see this dismissal as nothing more than a product of twentieth century familiarity with event-causation. They need not set Kane's book aside, however, since his concept of free will, though not including agency, is compatible with it. Kane does present a decisive argument for the inability of agency to meet the chance objection, but that is not a refutation of agency itself.

Although Kane's main aim in his book is to explain why the concept of free will must be connected to a modified ethical relativism in order to be intelligible, he discusses other issues as well. In setting up the problem of the book, he deals with the concepts of will, indetermination and control. His discussion of what he calls 'covert nonconstraining control' is especially good. To show why a new response to the chance objection is needed, he shows why four traditional responses ('special cause strategies') do not work. In explaining the connection between free will and ethical relativism, he develops a 'value empiricist' answer to the question 'Why be moral?' This is the view that 'value systems ... must be tested by experiment and cannot be shown with certainty to be superior or inferior for a given person or group *a priori*' (128). This view, he claims, is essential to a libertarian account of free will.

After making his case for the intelligibility of the concept of free will, Kane devotes part of a chapter to the question whether people actually have free will. He leaves this question unanswered because he believes it is 'ultimately

for scientific study and not for armchair speculation' (166), and the factual evidence, he says, is not decisive. Kane also devotes part of a chapter to a consideration of the ways compatibilists and incompatibilists have differed on the way in which we view ourselves and 'our place in the universe' (175). When philosophers have not been able to settle the issue by conceptual analysis and factual evidence, they have turned, justifiably, Kane asserts, to such a consideration. Because his predilection is for incompatibilism, Kane describes six attractions it has, among them its ability to account for our belief that we have ultimate dominion over our wills, and for our belief that we live in an open universe. Kane's last chapter deals with the connection of his concept of free will to political and social freedom. Because free will presupposes ethical relativism and value empiricism, it has anti-utopian and anti-authoritarian implications.

Kane's writing is clear and logical; his analyses quickly get right to the heart of the issue, and he makes crucial distinctions when needed. Although he covers old territory, he does so with thoroughness and often with fresh insights. The reader will appreciate Kane's readable style, but at times may be put off some by a feeling of cumbersomeness. More importantly, the reader will wonder whether Kane's concept of free will is as new as he claims, or whether it is basically a traditional theory with a relativistic modification.

CLIFFORD WILLIAMS

Trinity College, Illinois

CLAUDE LAGADEC. *La morale de la liberté, ses bases biologiques*. Montréal (Longueuil): Le Préambule 1984. 211 p. ISBN 2-89133-051-X.

Le livre de Claude Lagadec est constitué d'un ensemble de réflexions, généralement assez bien menées, qui s'articulent autour des rapports entre l'autonomie, les morales et les contraintes biologiques. L'auteur y examine la morale sous un angle particulier: comment rendre compte du phénomène de la moralité étant donné la diversité des codes moraux et leur prétention exclusive à la 'vérité' en matière morale? Pour éclairer cette question, l'auteur prend comme point de départ l'altruisme fondé sur la sélection de parenté et cherche dans certains codes moraux (souvent d'inspiration religieuse) des illustrations de celle-ci. Selon Lagadec, 'la morale humaine est faite avant tout d'amour des parents et des enfants, de respect pour les proches, de devoirs familiaux' (60). Puis, l'auteur, en considérant le relativisme des morales, com-

parativement à leur prétendue universalité, soutient que ce qui est universel aux morales, c'est leur tribalisme, leur régionalisme, leur mise en forme d'un double standard qui réglemente les rapports internes au groupe et qui crée une bonne part de la réalité sociale en posant les bornes nécessaires à l'existence de cette réalité. Ceci, associé à une imperméabilité des sentiments moraux aux discours théoriques ou, même, aux principes, amène l'auteur à tenter de cerner le phénomène moral de l'extérieur. Pour ce faire, il doit trouver une fonction à ce phénomène ainsi qu'un processus pouvant assurer son maintien. C'est alors qu'il fait appel à la sélection de groupe. Il aboutit donc à une vision de la morale où les éléments sociobiologiques priment. Le tout est fait honnêtement, avec le mélange de faits et d'extrapolations habituellement présents dans ce genre d'ouvrage.

Il y a cependant un hiatus entre le genre d'approche de Lagadec et une bonne partie des études récentes en éthique qui n'est pas seulement dû au caractère embryonnaire de la sociobiologie actuelle. Dans l'ouvrage de Lagadec, cela transparait particulièrement parce que ce dernier met l'accent sur la question de l'autonomie morale. Premièrement, l'auteur prend comme point de départ le relativisme moral, et ne porte pas son attention sur la rationalité des différents codes, rationalité qui se trouve ultimement dans les divers types de fondements des jugements moraux (commandement divin, loi naturelle, kantisme, utilitarisme, etc.). Ces types de fondements n'ont pas tous la même valeur! En fait, le hiatus vient en partie de ce que certains mettent tous les codes moraux sur le même pied d'égalité ce qui n'est pas surprenant puisqu'ils négligent de distinguer entre le niveau des sentiments moraux, des intuitions morales (lieu du dressage moral) et le niveau de la pensée critique, le niveau des fondements (lieu de l'autonomie morale). Il n'est alors pas surprenant d'en arriver à dire, comme le fait Lagadec, 'qu'à travers ses opinions morales, c'est sa tribu qui parle.' Une fois la distinction faite entre les différents niveaux, le discours tribal demeure présent, mais seulement à un niveau. Au niveau de l'analyse critique du fondement des jugements, le comportement du musulman envers sa femme devient tout simplement indéfendable, alors que, selon Lagadec, il serait contradictoire d'admettre l'autonomie morale de chacun et de condamner du même souffle des pratiques allant à l'encontre de nos sentiments moraux. Deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne la prétendue imperméabilité des sentiments moraux aux théories et aux principes moraux, nous sommes en complet désaccord avec l'auteur: nous n'observons pas cette imperméabilité mais plutôt un va-et-vient entre les sentiments et les jugements ultimes. Si certains sentiments semblent inaltérables (comme les *prima facie duties* de Ross), c'est qu'ils sont justifiés par la plupart des types de fondements admis actuellement. De plus, il n'y a qu'à examiner certains dilemmes moraux (par exemple ceux faisant intervenir différents critères de justice) pour voir qu'il y a interaction entre ces composantes de la moralité et que contrairement à ce qu'en pense Lagadec, les principes et les sentiments ne sont pas dans des ' tiroirs séparés.' A ne vouloir se situer qu'au niveau des sentiments, on n'analyse que les différents dressages moraux et on fait, une 'morale du préjugé.' Et c'est bien le dilemme fondamental de Lagadec: il veut rendre compte des

rapports entre l'apprentissage moral et l'autonomie morale. Mais il en est ici comme pour d'autres formes d'apprentissage, on passe par des étapes; il y a dressage et, par après, il peut y avoir autonomie. L'autonomie en matière de morale ne peut mener à n'importe quel code moral une fois que l'on est d'accord pour dire que 'moral' signifie tout au moins universalisation. Or, on se retrouve alors très loin du tribalisme dont parle Lagadec et qui se manifeste, entre autres, dans sa caractérisation des éléments premiers dont sont composées les morales.

Il semble que mettre de côté la question de la rationalité comparée des divers fondements des jugements moraux ne peut mener qu'à une étude de l'extérieur des codes moraux qui place au même niveau l'utilitarisme-kantisme de Hare et les commandements d'un Dieu vengeur et belliqueux... Les analyses sociobiologiques mettent de côté les rationalisations, ce qui est justifié, mais elles négligent, du même souffle, les raisons. C'est simplifier les choses. Ce hiatus entre les explications fonctionnelles d'un phénomène qui lie à la fois des sentiments, des principes idéaux, des principes justificateurs et la rationalité que les rationalisations constituent, selon nous, un problème important qu'on ne peut passer sous silence.

Le livre de Lagadec est tout de même intéressant, malgré certaines inégalités. Il met en relief, sur un ton personnel, inhabituel et intéressant, des éléments qui pourront plaire à des lecteurs voulant prendre connaissance d'une analyse inspirée par la sociobiologie. Le lecteur plus au fait de l'évolution des idées dans ce domaine trouvera stimulantes certaines observations de l'auteur.

PIERRE BLACKBURN

Collège de Sherbrooke

DAVID LAMB. *Death, Brain Death and Ethics*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. iii + 120. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-121-4); US\$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-122-2).

The author of this small volume has one principal objective: to argue that death of the brain(stem) is a necessary and sufficient condition for death of the human being. The context for argumentation is strictly biological; within it, death of the human person, as contrasted with death of the human being, is of negligible concern.

'Irreversible interruption of physical continuity' is the minimum requirement in any coherent concept of death of the living being. Such 'irreversible

interruption' was once equated with putrefaction of the body. In the more recent past, the human being who experienced cessation of heart/lung function was identified as having experienced this 'interruption.' With the advance of medical technology, such cessation is not necessarily irreversible; further, in biological terms 'irreversible interruption' is now located more precisely in failure of an organism's integrating control system (rather than in failure of a single organ/system leading in turn to failure of that central system). In human beings, the system of critical importance is directed by the brain; brain failure is irreparable and brain function irreplaceable. Death can thus be said to occur before putrefaction sets in and beyond the point of heart/lung failure. In consequence, a reformulation of the traditional way of thinking about death is required: 'irreversible loss of function of the organism as a whole.'

With this concept in place, a philosophical foundation for use of current clinical (read, biological) criteria concerning diagnosis of death has now been provided, but the need for definition remains. In defending the definition provided as original premise, the author is critical of a variety of contemporary definitions of brain death: dual-death formulation (cessation of heart/lung function or absence of spontaneous brain function), the dual-criteria formulation (irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory function; if on machine, then irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain function), the whole-brain formulation and the upper-brain formulation. Each of these designations can be shown to be theoretically inadequate, if not clearly self-contradictory. In legal terms, as well as in philosophical and practical terms, 'death of the brain as a whole' is seen as the most acceptable formulation of all. In that view, death of the brainstem, the physiological 'kernel' of brain death, is the key factor. The author maintains that only this formulation will satisfy all the elements necessary for definition, given the concept adopted and the criteria in current use.

As responding to the book's overall content, those anxious to coordinate (identify?) biological with philosophical thinking in this area will find the book helpful. The author provides a synopsis of contemporary views and critiques of a definition of brain death together with a well-reasoned, if lengthy, defense of the viewpoint presented. Those seeking a discussion of ethics (as implied by one reading of the book's title) will come up short: no serious ethical analysis of questions like justice in resource allocation, 'allowing to die,' non-resuscitation, treatment of irreversibly-comatose patients, circumstances under which organs may be removed for transplant. Under a quite different interpretation of the title, however, the requirement of clear definition of death prior to discussion of related ethical questions is ably explained and defended. Most problematic and disappointing is the chapter on 'Brain Death and Personal Identity.' It is not clear from the author's comments whether this section is meant to: identify human being and person as so different that the first is discussed plausibly without reference to the second; illustrate the view that considerations of person are not germane in this context; argue that personal identity is not a topic for serious discussion in any case. (As examples: 'the concept of a person belongs to a different logical space to that of living

human beings'; 'unlike the biologically-based concept of death as a loss of function of the organism as a whole, the concept of loss of personal identity is of philosophical and psychological origin and lacks clear empirical criteria'; 'the Report of the President's Commission rejects personal-identity theories of death ...'; 'the concept of loss of personal identity ... is inherently vague' [85,86].) This section of the book demands further discussion or none.

Overall, the book's merit rests not so much on the author's successful defense of the definition originally proposed as on his unswerving fidelity to a less explicit objective: support of the 'U.K. medical view' in the matter of brain(stem) death.

ABBYANN LYNCH
Westminster Institute for
Ethics and Human Values
London, Ontario

FRED WILSON. *Explanation, Causation and Deduction*, The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 26. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1985. Pp. xviii + 385. US\$49.00. ISBN 90-277-1856-3.

Wilson has returned to a debate whose heyday was the fifties and early sixties. He staunchly aligns himself with the deductivists, philosophers such as Popper, Hempel, Bergmann, and Braithwaite, who argued that scientific and historical explanations presuppose general laws and statements of initial conditions from which explanandum statements are validly deduced.

In 1961, at the height of the controversy, Weingartner stepped back from the fray and assessed it astutely: 'what appears to be a dispute about the precise nature of historical explanation is in fact the product of a disagreement about the nature of philosophical method' ('The Quarrel about Historical Explanation,' *The Journal of Philosophy* 58, 2 [Jan. 19, 1961]).

Wilson, apparently, does not subscribe to Weingartner's diagnosis, for he proceeds as if there were only one possible starting point: 'I take it to be a part of the idea of a scientific explanation that ... the occurrence of the initial conditions somehow *necessitates* the occurrence of the explanandum' (76).

This motivating conception was fiercely attacked in the fifties and sixties by Scriven, Collins, Dray, etc. But if it was a subject of dispute then, two subsequent developments have made it more suspect now. The first was the recognition within the deductivist camp itself of the cogency and ineliminability

of certain explanations containing statistical premises. But, clearly, arguments that include statistical premises do not necessitate their conclusions, do not show, as Wilson requires, that 'the explanandum must occur' (76). The other development has been occasioned by the explosion of research on Expert Systems. Critics of Expert Systems have strongly challenged the assumption that explanation and understanding are achieved only by subsumption under general rules (laws). They have argued that human comprehension of situations often proceeds by recognizing directly, i.e. without the mediation of generalities, similarities between unfamiliar and familiar situations.

Wilson ignores both of these later developments. The result is that his opening defense of the deductive model, encompassing the first 85 pages, is badly out of date and gives the appearance of having been written a generation ago.

The book picks up considerably when it moves from a general defense to a rebuttal of specific objections to the deductive model. Nonetheless serious problems remain.

To the objection that there are explanations in which true laws do not figure, Wilson allows that 'imperfect laws' can go proxy for perfect (process) laws. To the objection that arguments whose premises include 'imperfect laws' do not provide explanations, Wilson allows that explanations come in degrees of goodness, and that valid inferences from 'imperfect laws,' while offering only imperfect knowledge, can nonetheless be explanations. To the objection that the principle of predictability, *viz.* that all explanations could be used to yield predictions, rejects many bona fide explanations, Wilson allows that 'the essential idea of "prediction" is not that of an inference to the future, but the more general idea ... of an inference from the known to the hitherto unknown' (137), and later, 'All the deductive model requires is that prediction be possible, i.e. ... that the statement of initial conditions be ... true' (163). And so it goes. Wilson is able to accommodate nearly all counterexamples within his liberalized conception of deductive explanation. The trouble is, however, that the cumulative effect of such maneuvers, far from strengthening the theory, in fact weakens it, removing from it much of the boldness and rigor it originally promised.

In sections 3.2 and 3.3, Wilson turns his attention to rebutting counterexamples (of e.g. Kim, Omer, etc.) which allegedly undermine the adequacy of the *formal* criteria laid down by earlier deductivists. It is here, with in-house critics who are operating within the same framework as himself, that Wilson is at his best. Even so, the upshot is unexpected: '... neither tinkering ... nor informed adjustment will yield a set of formal criteria capable of eliminating all ... counter-examples' (207). To contain the damage, Wilson argues that formal criteria must be supplemented with the principle of predictability. Where earlier it had seemed that Wilson was weakening the principle, it is now clear that Wilson has reverted to the original, strong version. But Wilson's reviving the principle of predictability can only serve to renew the anti-deductivists' complaints that the deductive model illegitimately denies scientific status to, e.g., evolutionary theory, after-the-fact explanations of stock market fluctuations, etc.

In the end, dialogue between Wilson and the anti-deductivists breaks down. 'Explanation,' for the anti-deductivists, is a success term: a putative explanation which does not impart understanding to the person seeking an explanation, is no explanation at all. But Wilson's goal is to construct a 'normative' theory, and so he prescribes limits on the philosophy of science which explicitly preclude any such consideration: '[whether an explainee will accept an explanation] is of no interest to the philosophy of science, which is interested in explanations and their relative worth, and not whether they can be successfully communicated' (175). This suggested circumscribing of the philosophy of science is reminiscent of an analogous claim sometimes made about logic, *viz.* that logic should concern itself only with formal aspects of language. Again, deep philosophical differences are at play. Many contemporary philosophers — rightly or wrongly — repudiate such injunctions, arguing that they impose arbitrary limitations on the philosophical enterprise. Such philosophers will not accept Wilson's narrow conception of the philosophy of science.

Wilson's view of the history of science is similarly bound to raise serious objections. Wilson admires and commends Veblen's notion of 'idle curiosity' which he explicates as interest in 'explanations for their own sake' (xii), in contrast to "'practical research" which has some "application" in mind' (81). But Wilson's identification of the historical origins of 'idle curiosity' is implausible: '... only since Galileo has idle curiosity ever been a motive in the search for lawful knowledge' (81). Historians might object, for example, that Aristotle's *Physics*, and Ptolemy's *Almagest* were not entirely motivated by 'practical applications.'

Content aside, the book shows little evidence of having been properly copy-edited or proofread. The prose is often infelicitous, and typos abound.

In short, this book is not of the elevated quality of its progenitors, the classic writings, e.g., of Popper and of Hempel; still less does it supersede those seminal works.

NORMAN SWARTZ
Simon Fraser University