

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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GEORGE BERKELEY. *Œuvres*, tome I. Edition publiée sous la direction de Geneviève Brykman aux Presses Universitaires de France (Collection *Epiméthée*) 1985. Pp. 432; avec annexes. 260 FF. ISBN 2 13 039200 8; ISSN 0768-0708.

Mil neuf cent quatre-vingt cinq aura marqué le tricentenaire de George Berkeley (1685-1753), que de nombreuses manifestations ont célébré: une conférence à Dublin, comme de bien entendu, ainsi que bon nombre de publications lui auront été consacrées. Le monde philosophique francophone ne sera pas demeuré en reste: La *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* lui aura consacré un numéro, quoiqu'à vrai dire, seuls deux articles y aient paru en français (et que, de même, en 1953, bicentenaire de sa mort, la participation francophone ait été plus importante: trois revues, la *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, la *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* et la *Revue Philosophique* avaient marqué l'événement). Mais il aura paru, récemment, trois ouvrages importants: ceux de P. Dubois (*L'Œuvre de Berkeley* [Vrin]), de Geneviève Brykman (*Berkeley, philosophie et apologétique* [Vrin]), ainsi que le premier tome de cette nouvelle édition en français des œuvres du philosophe irlandais.

Du vivant de Berkeley, son œuvre n'aura pas été aussi bien accueillie ni sa pensée aussi largement diffusée en France que celle de Locke ou même celle de Hume. Le fait qu'il se soit réclamé, en partie, de Malebranche, n'aura pas agi en sa faveur. Il est vrai qu'au moins deux de ses œuvres (*l'Alciphron* et les *Trois Dialogues*) auront été traduites assez tôt (1734 et 1750). Mais il est loin de s'être mérité l'attention que Voltaire, par exemple, accorde à Locke et à Newton dans ses *Lettres anglaises* quoique, de l'aveu de Voltaire, ils aient eu plusieurs entretiens durant son séjour en Angleterre. 'Le paradoxe [sc. l'immatérialisme] de Berkeley,' écrit-il dans son *Dictionnaire philosophique* (art. 'Corps'), 'ne vaut pas la peine d'être réfuté.' Berkeley n'aura pas non plus retenu l'attention des Encyclopédistes, eux qui, au contraire, accueillirent Hume avec quelque considération sinon quelque chaleur. Seuls Condillac et Maupertuis lui reconnaissent une certaine dette; d'Holbach lui consacre bien un chapitre de son *Système de la Nature*, et Turgot s'attache surtout à le réfuter.

Il y aura sans doute de nombreuses explications à cette carence, mais il en est une que nous aide à reconstituer l'introduction de G. Brykman: c'est que

Berkeley se considère davantage apologiste que philosophe, qu'il prend sa foi religieuse comme donnée indiscutable, et que, pour lui, sa philosophie — dont il prétend qu'elle ne s'écarte pas du sens commun — n'a pour fonction que la défense de cette foi. Dans cette perspective, il aurait été plutôt étonnant, en effet, que Berkeley n'ait pas été boudé par un monde intellectuel dont les tendances vers la libre pensée, le scepticisme et l'athéisme s'affirmaient avec une netteté croissante. Quant aux préférences morales qu'il exprime dans *La Désobéissance passive*, elles ne sont pas pour lui attirer de la sympathie. Et cela, en dépit d'une perspective empiriste par laquelle il devrait pourtant se recommander aux penseurs du XVIIIe siècle.

Le XIXe siècle ne semble pas avoir été bien plus accueillant envers lui: rares sont les ouvrages qui le mentionnent. Par contre, il commence à occuper la place qui lui revient dans diverses histoires de la philosophie datant du début de notre siècle, telles celles de Rivaud et de Bréhier. Courg publie la première traduction du *Commonplace Book*, sous le titre de *Journal philosophique de Berkeley* (1907). Il faut aussi tenir compte des traductions des *Principes de la connaissance humaine* par Ch. Renouvier (paru d'abord dans *La Critique Philosophique* en 1889; réimp. 1920), des *Dialogues d'Hylas et Philonous* par P. Lemaire (1926) et de *l'Alciphron ou le Pense-menu* par Jean Pucelle (1952). Encore plus près de nous, M. Gueroult et A.-L. Leroy lui consacrent d'habiles et pénétrantes études (1956 et 1959).

Depuis quelques années déjà, les travaux de Geneviève Brykman sont à la pointe des études berkeleyennes en France. A part l'ouvrage que nous venons d'en citer, elle a à son actif un certain nombre d'articles dont les plus récents ont paru dans la *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* et dans le dernier volume de *Recherches sur le XVIIIe siècle* (C.N.R.S.). Et s'il est vrai que cette édition, qu'elle dirige, des œuvres de Berkeley n'est pas la première à paraître en français — celle d'André-Louis Leroy la précède de plus de quarante ans — il semble bien qu'elle s'annonce comme la plus importante, la plus fournie (car elle ne prétend pas être complète) et certainement la plus utile aux lecteurs de langue française qu'intéresse l'immatérialisme de Berkeley.

Il est inévitable dès lors de se demander ici comment se justifie cette nouvelle édition. Mais les moyens d'y répondre ne nous sont disponibles qu'en partie: le fait est que ce premier tome ne nous renseigne que vaguement sur ce que doit être le choix définitif des textes berkeleyens retenus pour ce projet. En effet, aux indications que fournit G. Brykman, il semble que cet ouvrage ne s'étendra que sur deux tomes; mais il semble aussi que toutes les décisions concernant le contenu du second tome n'aient pas encore été prises: *l'Alciphron* et la *Siris* en sont, 'du moins provisoirement' mis à l'écart, nous informe l'éditrice (13). D'autre part, il est impensable que les *Trois Dialogues* ne paraissent pas; mais ils n'occuperaient que cent à cent-cinquante pages, soit du quart au tiers d'un volume comparable au premier. Tout ceci porte à croire que bon nombre d'opuscules jusqu'ici inédits en français feront leur apparition dans le volume suivant.

Si le choix des textes n'est pas encore arrêté, en revanche, le critère par lequel ce choix doit se faire l'est: les éditeurs se proposent d'isoler et de ne

publier que les œuvres proprement philosophiques; et en premier lieu, celles qui se rapportent spécifiquement à l'immatérialisme. Pour le reste, elles doivent se justifier par le degré de rapprochement qu'elles portent aux doctrines immatérialistes. Ceci implique que les ouvrages d'apologie et autres en seront exclus au départ. Or comme l'édition de référence (celle de Luce et Jessop) occupe neuf tomes, et que ces neuf tomes contiennent un nombre considérable d'opuscules portant sur une multitude de sujets, on peut comprendre la difficulté qu'éprouvent les éditeurs à opérer des choix assez judicieux pour donner, en français, ce qu'ils souhaitent être 'une bonne image de l'œuvre de Berkeley.' La difficulté en est accrue du fait que certaines œuvres chevauchent plusieurs thèmes: ainsi la *Siris*, destinée à vanter les bienfaits de l'eau de goudron, prétend le faire en se basant sur des considérations d'ordre philosophique, et se réfère, dans ses dernières sections, aux systèmes des physique de Descartes, de Newton et de Galilée, ainsi qu'aux doctrines philosophiques de Platon et d'Aristote. C'est sans doute ce qui explique les hésitations des éditeurs quant à la *Siris*; car comment justifier, autrement, la parution dans ce premier tome d'un opuscule portant sur la philosophie des mathématiques (*Des Infinis*), si ce n'est parce qu'il se rattache, par son traitement du calcul différentiel et intégral de Newton, à la polémique concernant la concevabilité des quantités infinies ou infinitésimales?

Contentons-nous donc, pour le moment, de prendre note de ce que ce premier tome apporte de nouveau. Y paraissent, en plus des *Notes philosophiques* (nouvelle traduction du *Commonplace Book*), de l'*Essai pour une nouvelle théorie de la vision* et du *Traité des principes de la connaissance humaine*, la traduction inédite d'une *Introduction manuscrite aux Principes*, (dont vient à peine de paraître la première édition en anglais), ainsi qu'un minuscule ouvrage intitulé: *Des Infinis*, déjà paru en 1982 dans les pages de la *Revue Philosophique*. Remarquons, en outre, que ceux de ces textes qui ne sont pas traduits pour la première fois, font tous l'objet d'une traduction nouvelle.

C'est l'*Introduction manuscrite* cependant qui retiendra l'attention des historiens: en effet, Berkeley, qui ne publia jamais l'ensemble des *Principes* (ceux-ci portent invariablement la mention: 'Première Partie' que ne suit jamais aucune 'Seconde Partie'), y révèle un projet — essentiellement apologétique — beaucoup plus ample que ne le laissent paraître les *Principes* que nous connaissons. La présentation de ce texte constitue ce qui se rapprocherait le plus d'une édition diplomatique (si la chose était possible en français). Presque tout y est: corrections, ratures, dates (fournies, en marge, par Berkeley lui-même) notes paraissant au verso du manuscrit, etc.: on ne saurait souhaiter davantage.

De même, les *Notes philosophiques* subissent un traitement systématique: elles reproduisent les signes marginaux paraissant dans les manuscrits et par lesquels Berkeley — qui ne les définit qu'en partie — semble indiquer les sous-titres d'un regroupement éventuel de ces pensées. En outre, les éditeurs ont retenu, semble-t-il, le meilleur de ce que la critique a établi jusqu'ici: ils ont donc opté pour le texte établi récemment par G. H. Thomas (1976), mais l'ont assorti de la numérotation des notes et adopté l'ordre des carnets (B-A plutôt que A-B) de A. A. Luce.

Dans la mesure où nous pouvons, provisoirement, émettre un jugement sur cette édition, il semble que la présentation en soit irréprochable. Les éditeurs se sont donné pour but de mettre à la disposition des lecteurs francophones, non pas la totalité, mais bien la partie la plus importante des œuvres philosophiques, et de le faire de la façon la plus exhaustive possible: le soin qu'ils ont apporté à la reproduction du plus grand nombre possible de données manuscrites, aux choix faits parmi les manuscrits mêmes, et à la présentation générale de l'ouvrage fait que si le deuxième tome de cette collection ne dément pas la qualité du premier, cette édition devrait constituer, à son tour, le texte de référence, en français, de l'œuvre de Berkeley.

Un tel travail se doit d'être jugé sur la qualité des traductions. Ce qui aura rendu la tâche ardue aux traducteurs, c'est que le langage de Berkeley est d'autant plus limpide qu'il est idiomatique. Car Berkeley n'aura que trop bien suivi sa propre recommandation de 'penser avec les érudits mais de parler avec le vulgaire.' Dans le cas des *Notes philosophiques* et de l'*Introduction manuscrite*, ils auront dû faire face à une difficulté supplémentaire: celle de traduire une phrase de telle sorte que les mots raturés ou rajoutés dans les manuscrits puissent être traduits littéralement, sans que la structure ni le sens des phrases qui en résultent ne s'en ressentent. Mais ces difficultés mises à part, il aura aussi fallu aux traducteurs se servir de plusieurs équivalents là où l'anglais n'a qu'un terme: c'est le cas, en particulier, des mots *mind* et *spirit*, qui, bien entendu, sont fréquents chez Berkeley. Les éditeurs ne se sont pas fait défaut de signaler au lecteur les difficultés ainsi encourues, ainsi que les moyens mis en œuvre pour y pallier. C'est ainsi que, d'un côté, les *Notes philosophiques* sont le résultat d'une traduction collective, ce qui de prime abord, n'est pas une recommandation. Par contre, le texte est assorti de plusieurs annexes, dont en particulier, un index thématique complet, destiné non seulement à faciliter la recherche mais aussi et surtout à permettre au lecteur d'identifier les termes anglais aux traductions multiples.

D'autre part, quoique chacun des autres textes semble avoir été confié à un seul traducteur, l'ensemble garde une certaine uniformité. Ceci est dû sans doute à l'adoption, par l'équipe des traducteurs, de règles communes telle celle de se rapporter uniquement à l'usage du français moderne. Il est néanmoins possible de relever certaines particularités: par exemple, que la traduction des *Principes* s'inspire, d'un côté, de celle de Leroy, mais que de l'autre, elle n'est pas aussi littérale qu'elle: le texte de Leroy épouse davantage la tournure des phrases de Berkeley. De ce fait, il devient difficile de le surpasser. Dans le cas de l'*Essai pour une nouvelle théorie de la vision*, par contre, la traduction présentée, ici est, par certains endroits, plus fidèle que celle de Leroy, par d'autres, moins. Les écarts, de part et d'autre, semblent minimes, et il n'y a vraiment pas lieu de se plaindre: la clarté de pensée de Berkeley n'en est pas affectée. Signalons cependant — faute sans doute insignifiante — ceci: dans sa traduction de *Of Infinities*, D. Berlioz-Letellier 'corrige' Berkeley qui aurait, selon lui, rebaptisé *Treatise* l'*Essai* de Locke; or il n'en est rien; l'original (Luca

et Jessop, vol. IV, p. 235) porte bien: 'treatise of *Humane Understanding*,' le mot 'treatise' n'étant pas intégré au titre. Simple détail qui ne saurait déparer l'ensemble.

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PIERRE BERTRAND. *L'Artiste*. (Coll. 'Positions philosophiques') Montréal: L'Hexagone 1985.

Nietzsche, Miller, Deleuze, Krishnamurti, Foucault, Proust (pour ne nommer que ceux-là) viennent entonner dans cet ouvrage l'éloge de l'artiste et préciser la nature de cet être inactuel dont la présence est si intempesive qu'elle passe inaperçue. Pour P. Bertrand, il n'existe pas d'option possible entre avoir le courage amoureux de glisser sur les choses comme le fait l'artiste au sens vrai, et vouloir réussir à tout prix et s'adapter socialement comme le fait l'artiste narcissique moderne. Être artiste, c'est savoir assumer le risque de sa propre monstruosité; c'est aussi se tenir vivant, alors que les autres se meurent. Humilité aidant, le coeur évidé bien souvent, l'essentiel est que quelque chose en lui (les forces fulgurantes de vie, de joie) demande à être et qu'il se rende translucide pour le laisser passer. Humble, oui, mais fou. Fou parce qu'il cesse de craindre la folie. Humble, oui, mais malade. Malade de cette 'grande santé' qui le fait chanter de la vie et de la mort. Car une grande lucidité habite aussi celui qui est critique de l'univers et de lui-même, et sa démesure s'exerce donc aussi dans la souffrance. Son étrangeté et sa solitude contrecarrent le sentiment d'autoglorification qui couvre les troupes élitistes de l'art.

Mais, dans cet univers monstrueux, les complexités sont fragiles et tentent la fuite. L'ouvrage présente celle-ci comme 'excursion dans un piège' d'où l'on ne revient pas et comme 'seule manière de vivre' en train de se faire et qui se fait malgré l'artiste dans le processus d'écrire qui est un processus de désir. Devenir 'inutile,' 'imperceptible,' ce sera pour cette grande individualité, se jeter dans l'élément aquatique de la création, pour laisser subsister, sans mode d'emploi, la lueur qui l'a éveillé un jour et qui seule, le rend authentique. L'artiste doit choisir de 'perdre la face' dans une volonté d'anonymat, et dans cette expérience de mise en transparence, il doit vaincre obstinément la peur au moment même où sa différence l'effraie. Il n'est pas donné à tout le monde d'être

artiste: telle une 'mauvaise herbe' qui émerge de l'asphalte, il doit tracer sa 'ligne de fuite' en s'écartant des routes de l'Idée, du Je et des fleurs entretenues par les stéréotypes dominants.

Ecrire, vivre, aimer, c'est connecter des flux pour l'auteur. Les plus grands l'ont compris, qui ont désappris à aimer pour imposer leurs excès. Ecrire c'est 'empoigner ce qu'il y a de plus près,' ce réel inaccessible aux non-artistes; c'est commencer n'importe où, plutôt que de 'caresser des idées' comme le font les esthètes. L'essentiel est de s'ouvrir par 'empathie' avec l'autre qui d'abord a écrit. Car ce qui importe n'est pas tant que telle combinaison ait lieu (niveau 'molaire' ou conscient), mais ce qu'elle fait advenir (niveau 'moléculaire' ou inconscient, celui des 'heccités'). L'artiste ressemble à l'artisan qui joue corps à corps (sans objet ni sujet) avec le monde. Le seul vrai danger qui le guette dans son échappée n'est pas tant la distance et l'identification, que le retournement du processus en mort ou en folie. Ecrire n'est pas un projet, c'est un 'pur voyage en intensité sur le corps sans organes de l'écriture.' Cela consiste, entre autres, à accepter ses limites, et à les voir s'évanouir aussitôt. Ainsi la vie pourra-t-elle déjouer ses déceptions comme elle a su, aussi, déjouer ses attentes. Le sens de l'ouvrage ne peut être saisi sans la définition de la vie sous le mode du penser oriental: passage d'un état à un autre, et non pas permanence.

Il faut dire que l'écrire de l'artiste se situe dans le vide Zen, au-delà même d'un mysticisme exacerbé, sans concepts ni bavardages, dans l'état du 'nagual' plutôt que dans celui du 'tonal,' dimension qui n'est accessible que par une mort dans la vie. Bref, l'artiste n'est tel qu'après avoir modifié son attitude, qu'après avoir quitté l'art (la manière de peindre) pour mieux le créer (comme manière de vivre). Au lieu de plaindre celui qui détruit ses tableaux ou déchire ses cahiers, il faut considérer que quelque chose a été réussi par lui pour la collectivité. L'objectif du livre est de nous montrer qu'il n'existe vraiment pas d'alternative pour l'artiste, entre réussir sous le masque du mort (vivant pour le cliché), et accomplir l'art et la vie sous le masque du raté (en le transgressant toujours).

Mais *L'Artiste* est aussi un appel au 'faire advenir' qui nous donne la combinaison à la fois de sa planche de salut et de son propre enlèvement: les œuvres des autres, les autres phrases, l'autre artiste que la société encense, l'autre lecteur qui n'aura pas compris. Nous ne croyons pas qu'il n'existe que deux types d'artiste dans la société, et, même si l'auteur les caractérise pour mieux privilégier sa catégorie (l'Artiste avec un grand 'A'), son propos général dévoile encore plus la teneur du cliché qu'il s'évertue à bannir. Au niveau du détail, nous repérons de nombreuses associations libres, des digressions (souvent avouées) et des généralisations. Mais, ce qui est plus surprenant c'est que l'auteur puisse se laisser prendre quand même à l'un des pièges 'mineurs' qu'il donne à contourner: l'identification. Ainsi, tout comme l'artiste, il se jette dans l'élément 'aquatique' des citations, tellement innombrables, qu'au lieu de provoquer le plaisir, comme le disent certaines théories en esthétique littéraire, l'arrêt dans la lecture fait perdre la saisie. De plus, l'auteur va jusqu'à mimer l'identification elle-même: (nous citons hors contexte) 'ces morceaux mis bout à bout finiront bien par constituer quelque chose,' 'même emprunter est positif,' etc.

Les embûches de la lecture ne sont pas simplifiées non plus par les citations en anglais qui nous arrivent sans traduction en pleine page; par les notes qui apparaissent dans le texte alors qu'elles auraient pu figurer ailleurs avec la mention complète de l'éditeur et la date de l'édition. Enfin, l'organisation de l'ouvrage n'est pas homogène (certains chapitres sont très courts, d'autres très longs) et le tout est couronné par une absence de bibliographie. C'est pourquoi, durant l'angoissante expérience de trouver le fil de l'argumentation, les yeux pris entre parenthèses et guillemets, nous nous sommes sentie à plusieurs reprises comme le personnage de 'Histoire de peindre' (1985) de Stefano Filipi, reproduit sur la couverture: aliénée et souffrante.

Et pourtant, ces remarques mises à part, cet ouvrage comporte un message important, même si le lecteur doit 'travailler' à le faire surgir: l'état d'âme fondamental et le statut social déplorable de l'artiste. Le livre présente aussi de beaux passages et des éléments autobiographiques intéressants. Le titre semble provocateur aux temps des esthétiques théoriques, mais l'application des analyses nietzschéennes convient bien à son type d'artiste. Du point de vue de sa contribution à l'esthétique (n'en déplaise à l'auteur), la dimension communicative de l'œuvre et de l'attitude artistique, conjuguée à la fonction sociale de l'art, sont à signaler. Il faudrait préciser pour conclure que l'orientalisme explicite ne s'adresse pas qu'aux convaincus, mais aussi aux individus qui se nourrissent d'autre chose que de pouvoir. Somme toute, même si l'effet de l'ouvrage nous semble pessimiste, il faut mentionner que *L'Artiste* ne consiste pas tant à 'vaincre le cliché' qu'à proposer un mode de vie comme issue ultime. En ce sens, il tente de court-circuiter le jugement et les 'ismes' de notre société désenchantée, et le genre de collection s'y prête.

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ROBERT DAHL. *Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press 1985. Pp. ix + 113. US\$14.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8156-2334-8); US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8156-0196-4).

Policies regarding the development and control of nuclear weapons are among the most important issues ever to face mankind. Yet they have historically been resolved with very little input from an informed public. Dahl explores this mat-

ter in the context of American policy making, using it as a focal point for an analysis of the merits of democratic as opposed to Guardianship accounts.

There is a key difference, Dahl argues, between delegating authority to a neutral expert and alienating authority to someone whose expertise we cannot, in the final analysis, appraise and over whom we can have no meaningful control. So far as nuclear weapons are concerned, American citizens have alienated control: 'we have in fact turned over to a small group of people decisions of incalculable importance to ourselves and mankind.' Democratic theory is based upon a Strong Principle of Equality, according to which adults are adequately qualified to participate in making the collective decisions they will be required to obey and no minority among them is so much better qualified that its members are entitled to make all the collective decisions. A Guardianship theory, while recognizing the equal intrinsic worth of persons, denies that all adults are suitably qualified, while asserting that some minority among them either is, or could be.

So far as nuclear weapons policies and many other current issues are concerned, the Strong Principle of Equality is very hard to maintain, for complex technical knowledge is very relevant to the resolution of these problems and few among us have it. We tend to think that we can adjudicate ends, that technical knowledge is pertinent only to issues of means, which we can safely leave to experts in bureaucracies controlled by elected officials. The realities of contemporary politics belie such a model in many obvious ways: issues are so simplified in elections that there is often no clear mandate on a matter of policy, many issues are about means as much as ends, and so-called experts and neutral bureaucrats typically have ambitions and agendas of their own.

In such a context, Dahl urges, the Guardianship model made famous by Plato merits further exploration. A true guardian would be suitably qualified if he or she had moral understanding, virtue, and technical or instrumental knowledge. A combination of the three yields political competence. Obviously many citizens lack political competence relevant to such issues as nuclear weapons, pollution, and health care policies, on this understanding. Many are consumption-oriented egoists given little encouragement to think in terms of collective goods and very few have the relevant technical knowledge. These circumstances make a Guardianship model seem interesting, if not inevitable. However, there is little hope of founding a special elite group with political competence in this sense, because there is no reason to expect that moral qualifications and technical knowledge go together and there is, in fact, some evidence that the specialization required for technical competence works against moral sensitivity and a tendency to work for the public good.

Dahl develops this case in more detail with special reference to nuclear weapons issues. He identifies five key moral questions relevant to nuclear weapons policy. Is nuclear war ever morally permissible? Is nuclear deterrence morally permissible? In what circumstances, if ever should nuclear weapons be used? What targets are morally permissible? When, if ever, would it be right to yield to an enemy? In fact, many more moral questions could have been mentioned. What fallout exposure is morally permissible, both for present gener-

ations and for future generations, in order to implement present decisions on weapons and foreign policy? What risks are Americans morally entitled to impose on citizens of other nations, in implementing their own defense and foreign policy goals? Is it morally right to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve political goals more at the level of national interest than of national security? Dahl's basic point is sound, however. Technical expertise on nuclear weapons systems and strategies does not amount to moral competence to answer these difficult moral questions. There is a need to unify moral and technical knowledge and a need to assess risks, uncertainties, and trade-offs. The elite which has in fact been making weapons policy is not any more politically competent to do so than the public which has not been making it.

The Guardianship model will not work for nuclear issues, because there are no experts in the relevant sense. Furthermore, those who have taken on the role of experts have made significant mistakes. Dahl mentions the MIRVing of missiles, the carelessness in ensuring adequate command and control communications in time of crisis or war, and the absence of adequate briefings for American presidents about the 'football,' the briefcase which carries coded messages for use in launching nuclear forces. The list Dahl gives is too short — exposure of military and civilian personnel to radioactive fallout in testing and callous disregard for the health of South Pacific natives should surely have been added. When women on South Pacific islands held in 'trusteeship' are giving birth to jellyfish babies as a result of nuclear contamination of their lands, regard for citizens' welfare by those developing nuclear weapons is surely in question.

The dilemma is that we have neither politically competent guardians nor politically competent citizens. Dahl nevertheless wishes to defend equality for decision-making. Experience argues against paternalistic institutions and collective interests are ultimately grounded on personal interests. Every person's interests extend to aspects of the community, but that community is not something that can have interests of its own, over and above those of the people in it (66). There is no real alternative to the egalitarian model. 'An imperfect democracy is a misfortune, ... but an imperfect authoritarian regime is an abomination' (50).

Dahl sketches a quasi-utopian solution to the problem. Giving people more input into decision-making is worthless unless they are given more information. However, unbiased information is hard to obtain. A partial solution is to make available a wide variety of materials, designed to suit various different levels of citizen capacity and interest, through modern telecommunications technology. Academic groups, such as the National Academy of Science, might participate in working out materials, and citizens, scholars, and other interested individuals could determine which issues were of sufficient interest to merit this treatment. At present, only determined and well-educated people are able to get reliable information on such problems as nuclear weapons policy. That limitation could be partially overcome. Dahl also suggests the formation of a 'minipopulus,' a group of citizens selected at random to become highly informed, over a year's time, and make decisions which would represent public

opinion; such a group could 'stand for' the public, lacking the special interests and ambitions of politicians and bureaucrats and escaping the moral myopia and specialization of technical experts. Yet it would be better informed, because of its special opportunities, than the public at large.

This book is more about democracy in an age of complexity than it is about nuclear weapons. Dahl claims that nuclear weapons merely provide an especially profound and extreme case, not a unique case. The problem is a general one. Dahl's practical suggestions are interesting and would surely improve public participation. The problem is, if anything, more extreme than Dahl makes it sound. A more detailed description of actual politics regarding nuclear weapons and the way decisions have in fact been made in this area would have enriched the book considerably.

As Dahl's analysis makes abundantly clear, we cannot expect infallible decision-making either in a democratic or in a non-democratic political process. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, error can be absolutely terminal. Such thoughts have led others to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons. That such a prospect goes unmentioned in this work is disappointing.

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GILLES DOSTALER, MAURICE LAGUEUX, dir. *Un échiquier centenaire. Théorie de la valeur et formation des prix*. Paris: Editions de la Découverte/Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec 1985 (Collection 'Economie critique'). Pp. 242. 110 FF (ISBN 2-7071-1543-6); 14.95\$CAN. (ISBN 2-7605-0381-X).

En 1885, lorsque Friedrich Engels lançait son fameux défi aux 'économistes à la Rodbertus' en concluant la préface à la première édition du livre II du Capital, il n'imaginait sans doute pas qu'en 1985, exactement cent ans plus tard, paraîtrait un ouvrage dans lequel plusieurs auteurs contesteraient encore la solution de Marx à l'apparente incompatibilité entre la théorie de la valeur et la loi de l'égalisation des taux de profit. Solution qui ne fut d'ailleurs publiée qu'en 1894 lors de la parution du livre III du Capital. Malgré les convictions d'Engels sur l'exactitude de la solution de Marx à cette apparente incompatibilité, on doit bien constater aujourd'hui qu'elle n'a jamais entièrement satisfait les générations de chercheurs du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle qui ont examiné de très près cette question.

L'anthologie que nous proposent Gilles Dostaler et Maurice Lagueux, qui contient onze articles d'auteurs de différentes tendances théoriques, nous fait connaître l'histoire du débat qu'allait susciter la solution de Marx et nous instruit sur l'état des discussions qui aujourd'hui l'anime.

Dans le premier texte, l'introduction, Dostaler et Lagueux, en plus de nous présenter un résumé des onze articles du recueil, nous décrivent les grandes lignes de la solution de Marx et nous présentent une synthèse de l'histoire du débat que cette solution allait déclencher.

Le problème auquel Marx s'était confronté, problème que déjà Ricardo avait rencontré au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle sans toutefois pouvoir le résoudre, était le suivant: d'une part, on admettait depuis Ricardo qu'une parfaite mobilité des capitaux et un même taux de risque pour chaque investissement devaient produire une égalisation des taux de profit; d'autre part, selon la théorie de la valeur-travail, cette égalisation ne pouvait se produire qu'à la condition supplémentaire que toutes les entreprises aient la même composition organique du capital, c'est-à-dire la même proportion de capital constant par rapport au capital variable. Or, en abandonnant cette condition, qui de toute évidence ne correspondait pas à la réalité, la théorie de la valeur-travail ne pouvait plus rendre compte de l'égalisation des taux de profit, puisqu'on se retrouvait avec autant de taux de profit différents qu'il y avait de compositions organiques différentes. Marx pensait avoir trouvé la solution à ce problème en montrant de quelle façon on peut transformer la valeur d'une marchandise en son prix de production. Ce nouveau concept lui permettait alors de rendre compte de l'égalisation des taux de profit. Bien que cette transformation impliquât que les marchandises ne devaient plus s'échanger proportionnellement à leur valeur mais à leur prix de production qui pouvait différer de ces valeurs, il n'en restait pas moins que ces prix étaient fondamentalement déterminés par la théorie de la valeur-travail. D'ailleurs, au niveau macroéconomique, Marx montrait que la somme des prix de production était égale à celle des valeurs et que la somme des profits était égale à celle des plus-values — deux égalités auxquelles Marx attachait beaucoup d'importance.

Après la publication de la solution de Marx en 1894, la première contribution notable fut celle du mathématicien russe Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz. S'inspirant des travaux des économistes russes Mikhail Tugan-Baranovski et V.K. Dmitriev, et à la faveur d'une lecture du *Capital* que certains diront ricardienne, Bortkiewicz publiait en 1906-07 trois articles dans lesquels il proposait des corrections à d'importantes erreurs que Marx aurait commises. Selon lui, l'erreur fondamentale de Marx résidait dans une transformation incomplète des valeurs en prix de production. Après avoir transformé la plus-value en profit de manière à obtenir des prix de production, il avait oublié de transformer les autres éléments de la valeur d'une marchandise, à savoir le capital constant et le capital variable. Comme le souligne Dostaler et Lagueux dans leur introduction 'pour parler en termes modernes, Marx avait transformé ses extrants, mais il avait omis de faire la même opération pour les intrants' (14). La conséquence de cette erreur était importante: une fois qu'on avait transformé les valeurs en prix de

production avec la méthode de Marx, on pouvait montrer que les conditions de la reproduction simple n'étaient plus respectées. La correction qu'allait proposer Bortkiewicz eut des conséquences pour le moins inattendues. Comme le note Dostaler et Lagueux: 'Il se trouve toutefois que cette "transformation corrigée" ne peut préserver simultanément l'égalité entre la somme des valeurs et des prix et celle entre les plus-value et les profits. ... Plus encore, il est possible de montrer que, dans le modèle général de calcul en valeur et calcul en prix de Bortkiewicz, on peut aisément se passer du premier calcul' (14).

Ces conséquences de la correction de Bortkiewicz allaient être exploitées abondamment par certains économistes après la publication en 1960 de *Production des marchandises par des marchandises* par Piero Sraffa. Cette publication allait marquer profondément l'orientation du débat sur le problème de la transformation en donnant naissance à ce qu'on appelle le courant de pensée néo-ricardien. L'originalité de Sraffa consista à montrer de quelle façon il était possible de trouver une mesure du surproduit totalement indépendante de toute théorie de la valeur. Cette mesure est une mesure en marchandise, donc en bien physique, qui n'a rien à voir avec une mesure en valeur qui dépendrait plus ou moins du temps de travail socialement nécessaire. Il n'en fallait pas plus pour convaincre certains économistes, notamment Ian Steedman, de considérer comme évanoui le problème de la transformation. Puisqu'on pouvait se passer de la théorie de la valeur-travail pour expliquer la formation des prix et l'égalisation des taux de profit, il devenait donc inutile de se demander comment cette théorie pouvait rendre compte de cette formation et de cette égalisation. Le défi d'Engels portait en somme sur un faux problème.

Tel qu'on peut le percevoir à partir des onze articles réunis par Dostaler et Lagueux, le débat actuel sur le problème de la transformation est pour le moins alimenté par plusieurs courants de pensée différents. De ce point de vue, il est possible de rassembler ces articles en trois groupes: le premier représente l'opposition entre les néo-ricardiens et les marxistes de tendance plutôt traditionnelle; le second fournit le point de vue d'auteurs qui se rapprochent d'une nouvelle école marxiste marquée par les travaux de Carlo Benetti et de Jean Cartelier; le troisième comprend deux articles dont les propos se distinguent de ceux tenus dans les deux premiers groupes. Le premier groupe de textes nous offre un exemple typique d'opposition entre deux écoles de pensée. Du côté des néo-ricardiens: les textes de Pierangelo Garegnani 'La théorie classique de la répartition et le problème dit de la "transformation" chez Marx' et de Ian Steedman 'Ricardo, Marx et Sraffa'; du côté des opposants, c'est-à-dire des marxistes plus traditionnels; les textes de Paul Sweezy 'La théorie marxienne de la valeur,' de Susan Himmelweit et Simon Mohun 'La réalité de la valeur' et de Anwar Shaikh 'L'économie néo-ricardienne.'

Le tronc commun partagé par ces deux représentants et chefs de file de l'école néo-ricardienne se distingue, au moins, par les trois thèses suivantes: 1. Il n'y a pas de coupure radicale entre les théories de Ricardo et celles de Marx, tous deux se situant dans le courant de pensée de l'économie politique classique; 2. Ricardo et Marx défendent une même approche de l'analyse économique: l'approche par le surplus social, qui se distingue fondamentale-

ment de l'approche par l'offre et la demande des marginalistes; 3. La théorie de la valeur-travail n'est pas nécessaire pour rendre compte des taux de profit et des prix relatifs. Sur cette dernière thèse, qui se rapporte plus directement au problème de la transformation, on peut repérer certaines différences entre les néo-ricardiens. Ainsi, Garegnani défendra l'idée qu'il existe deux méthodes indépendantes, mais équivalentes, pour déterminer les taux de profit et les prix relatifs: la méthode qu'il appelle 'méthode des équations du surplus' qui utilise la théorie de la valeur-travail, et la méthode dite 'méthode des équations des prix' dont les mesures ne s'expriment qu'en termes de quantités de marchandises. Steedman, pour sa part, développera un point de vue beaucoup plus radical sur la pertinence de la théorie de la valeur-travail, en essayant de montrer qu'en plus de sa redondance, l'utilisation de cette théorie a des implications indésirables sur le progrès des recherches, dans la mesure où 'toute théorie de la valeur-travail représente nécessairement un obstacle au développement de l'analyse en termes de surproduit' (185).

Du côté de l'école marxiste, l'opposition aux néo-ricardiens est totale. Pour les partisans de cette école, le passage de Marx à Ricardo ne doit pas être vu comme une continuité, au sens où Marx, par exemple, raffinerait et sophistiquerait les théories de Ricardo, mais plutôt comme une nette coupure. Pour Shaikh, par exemple, 'L'analyse de Marx est, pour moi, largement supérieure à tout ce que l'on peut imaginer dans l'espace conceptuel des néo-ricardiens' (195). Pour leur part, Himmelweit et Mohun estiment que la coupure entre Ricardo et Marx dépend en partie de l'apparition chez Marx du concept de travail abstrait, dimension qualitative fondamentale qu'on ne retrouve pas chez Ricardo. Ces trois auteurs vont ainsi tenter de relever le défi d'Engels, en montrant que la théorie de la valeur-travail de Marx demeure au centre d'une solution adéquate au problème de la transformation. L'article de Sweezy s'inscrit également dans cette opposition aux néo-ricardiens. Selon lui, abandonner la théorie de la valeur-travail, comme le propose Steedman, ne peut conduire qu'à une vision superficielle des choses: 'La réalité se compose *aussi bien* d'apparences que d'essence. Les prix de production relèvent du domaine des apparences, alors que les valeurs appartiennent à l'essence. Si nous ne pouvons passer de l'un à l'autre au besoin, nous ne pourrions jamais dépasser une compréhension superficielle au capitalisme' (27). Pour Sweezy, ce passage des 'essences' aux 'apparences' se rapporte précisément au problème de la transformation auquel Marx s'était attaqué. Bien qu'il juge, à l'instar des travaux de Bortkiewicz, que la solution fournie par Marx comporte des failles importantes, il continue tout de même à défendre l'idée que des solutions de plus en plus adéquates, respectant les concepts fondamentaux de l'analyse marxiste, se sont développées.

En dehors de cette opposition entre néo-ricardien et marxistes, il existe un ensemble d'auteurs, ceux du deuxième groupe, qui s'attaquant au problème de la transformation n'hésitent pas à redéfinir ou à réinterpréter à des degrés divers des concepts fondamentaux de la théorie de Marx. On peut compter, dans ce groupe, les textes de: Alain Lipietz 'Le débat sur la valeur: bilan partiel et perspectives partiales,' Michel de Vroey 'La théories marxiste de la valeur, version

travail abstrait. Un bilan critique,' Patrick Maurisson 'Systèmes de prix normaux, rapport salarial et révision des schémas marxistes de la transformation,' et finalement Pierre Salama 'Valeur, prix de production: une approche différente.' Cette opération de redéfinition culmine dans le texte de de Vroey, où est finalement évacué l'essentiel de la théorie de la valeur-travail. Ce type d'approche, tout à fait différente par ailleurs de l'approche néo-ricardienne, s'apparente aux travaux de Benetti et Cartelier.

Le troisième groupe de textes comprend deux articles: celui de Maurice Lagueux 'Le principe de conservation de la valeur et le problème de la transformation' et celui de Louis Baslé "'Loi de la valeur'" et "'socialisme-communisme.'" Quelques réflexions.' L'article de Lagueux, dont le propos se situe également en dehors de l'opposition entre néo-ricardiens et marxistes, nous présente une réflexion épistémologique stimulante sur la signification même du défi d'Engels. Si, à l'époque de Marx et d'Engels, la recherche d'une solution au problème de la transformation des valeurs en prix faisait sens, il faut se demander si, aujourd'hui, les enjeux théoriques rattachés à cette solution ont une signification aussi importante. A la lumière notamment des conséquences que l'on peut tirer de la correction de Bortkiewicz et à partir des mutations qui se sont produites au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle au niveau des conceptions épistémologiques, Lagueux tente de montrer qu'aujourd'hui cette problématique de la transformation a perdu l'essentiel de sa substance. Indépendamment de la validité de cette thèse, on observera dans l'article de Lagueux une intéressante tentative d'établir l'influence des théories physiques du XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles sur la façon marxienne de poser et de traiter le problème de la transformation.

Pour sa part, le texte de Baslé, original par son propos, nous offre, entre autre, une synthèse 'des diverses conceptions soviétiques contemporaines de la loi de la valeur sous le socialisme' (216). Trois conceptions sont analysées: la première, actuellement dominante, représente les points de vue traditionnels: le socialisme permet d'utiliser consciemment la loi de la valeur en fixant les prix des marchandises en fonction du temps de travail socialement nécessaire à leur production; la deuxième conception, plus hétérodoxe, regroupe les partisans d'une 'fonction d'utilité sociale' qui rejettent toute forme de planification des prix des marchandises qui se fonderait sur leur valeur; les tenants de la troisième conception, plus près des points de vue traditionnels, n'hésitent pas cependant à utiliser les concepts des théories marginalistes pour essayer de démontrer qu'il existe une et une seule allocation optimale des dépenses de travail. Pour eux, 'le travail socialement nécessaire, c'est le travail alloué optimalement dans l'entreprise URSS' (224).

Il y aurait encore beaucoup à dire sur les sujets qui sont abordés dans ce livre tout à fait pertinent pour qui veut connaître l'état actuel du débat, encore extrêmement vivant, autour du problème de la transformation. Le lecteur pourra aisément trouver d'autres références relatives à ce problème, dans la mesure où on nous fournit, à la fin du livre, une impressionnante bibliographie comportant plus de 270 entrées.

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J.N. FINDLAY. *Wittgenstein: A Critique*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984. Pp. 262. US\$37.50. ISBN 0-7102-0330-6.

As Wittgenstein says in *On Certainty*, there can be people who are 'intellectually very distant' from oneself. This is, to a large extent, true of Findlay's relation to Wittgenstein. Findlay holds the very perspective on language, consciousness, intentionality, and generality that Wittgenstein debunks throughout his philosophical life. For Findlay, Wittgenstein's attempts at demystification are in fact attempts to treat what is real as 'phantasms, and to try to scare them away, thereby impoverishing his discourse and his vision of the world' (3). Where Wittgenstein sees mystery-mongering that ensnares us in futile philosophical puzzlement, Findlay sees acknowledgement of profound truths that enrich our lives. It is this deep conflict that makes Findlay's book interesting. His objections to Wittgenstein are not rooted in a functionalist theory of mind or a causal theory of reference or any of the other more familiar contemporary philosophical positions, but in a commitment to the reality of conscious intentionality and the necessity of a God's-eye view to ground reference, infinity and generality.

Though Findlay raises many objections, his criticisms fall for the most part into four general areas: that meaning and reference need both an act of intending and a God's-eye view; that infinity (and rules) require a God's-eye view; that Wittgenstein's rejection of inner mental acts rests on a 'gross sensualism'; that the publicism and conventionalism of Wittgenstein's later work reverse the relation between language and reality.

The problem of meaning or reference is one that persists throughout Wittgenstein's writings. In the *Tractatus*, the pictorial relation in which the picture 'reaches right out' to reality is intended to address this problem. In the *Investigations*, ostensive teaching is to effect a meaningful use of words. On Findlay's view, neither 'solution' is adequate. The obscurity of the pictorial relationship, Findlay argues, is 'not cleared up by the enigmatic aphorisms §§2.1511-1515, whose metaphors almost savor of superstition' (86). To have the pictorial relationship give way to the acquisition of meaningful language by means of ostensive teaching is to replace the obviously obscure for the unobvious. Findlay's general point is that neither talk of pictures mirroring reality nor of communities using words can sidestep the need for 'my acts of meaning or reference, my significant intentions, that alone can provide anything like such feelers' of reality (86). Equally, in coming to learn a language (i.e., to master the use of the words), we must have a 'phenomenological language, a language of conscious lights or stresses, in which things primitively come before us, whether for notice or reaction' (199). As Findlay goes on to say, 'it is only because our experience is always of things in certain lights, that we can learn the words that express such lights' (200). We must bring a conscious intentional direction to bear in order to give words a use.

Findlay's second argumentative strategy concerns infinity — infinite sequences and transfinite numbers. Throughout Wittgenstein's writings, the in-

finite is treated in terms of succession and particulars. In the *Tractatus*, 'since ... meaning cannot go beyond the range of objects that there are, infinitist talk will be meaningless or self-contradictory in a finitist world' (109); and in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein restricts understanding of the infinite to 'what can be exhausted by a temporal process of counting' (182). Findlay's objection to both accounts is essentially the same: 'Succession may be of the essence of the Wittgensteinian language-games, but it is not, arguably, of the essence of our conscious intelligence, which can conceive of extensions of consciousness which transcend its actual powers' (110). Though Findlay repeatedly says that the God's-eye view, which takes in the transfinite at a glance, is an arguable claim, he never actually constructs that argument. Rather he seems to appeal to the obviousness of our ability to conceive just such an intelligence. Being confronted by the concept of the transfinite is enough to convince us that no counting procedure can possibly be adequate. Only the God's-eye view which grasps the transfinite in a non-successive and nontemporary way can make the concept of the infinite intelligible (157).

The third line of criticism concerns only the later philosophy. Findlay takes on Wittgenstein's repeated rejection of the idea that the mind is a realm of inner mental acts and processes. The distinctive criticism raised here is that Wittgenstein's thought reveals a failure of sensitivity to the nuances and richness of our interior life. Wittgenstein's early attraction to engineering and mechanics manifests itself in his philosophy of mind as a kind of 'object sensualism' (213) of the sort characteristic of the Wundt school of psychology. Findlay implies that such an outlook wilfully ignores much richer accounts of mental life that were to be found in the works of Brentano, Husserl, and the Wurzburg school of psychology. Sensitive introspection reveals case after case of observed pain, unexpressed thought, conscious intentionality without language, and so on.

Finally, Findlay takes on what he calls Wittgenstein's anthropologism, characterized by his physicalist publicism and conventionalism. This anthropologic approach to language and knowledge, Findlay claims, is misguided, for it fails to acknowledge that 'the generalities that we call the natures of things certainly restrict what they will do in given circumstances, and all reference to things in the world must embrace such restrictive generalities, if they are to concern anything at all' (214). As Findlay says, 'it is only the baleful idea that generalities have neither meaning nor causal relevance apart from the particular cases of their application, that causes our problem' (214), that problem being 'Wittgenstein's own perverse attempt to explain rule-obedience reductively' (215). Far more perspicuous on Findlay's view is Malebranche's position that 'we see all things in God, or with the assistance of a God. Certainly such a transcendental Idea would greatly ease the many problems of reference and inference and generalization' (170). Just how this would be done is not argued.

In the end, it seems, Findlay's understanding of Wittgenstein and so his objections turn on what he sees as Wittgenstein's hubris in attempting to usurp God's role. But where, in Malebranche's philosophy, we can find a grounded-

ness for meaning, reference, generality and infinity in the transcendental intentionality of a God, we can only find the arbitrary dogma of a man of admitted genius in Wittgenstein's writings. Findlay suggests that the charisma and intensity of the man carry the weight where argument is thin or even non-existent. Findlay sees Wittgenstein's thought, even his physicalist publicism with its emphasis on our (read 'Wittgenstein,' according to Findlay) being the measure of normality and acceptability, as rooted in Wittgenstein's lifelong struggle against and fascination with solipsism, a solipsism expressed by a man with 'the soul of a poet, and the mind of a laboratory technician' (236). This theme relating Wittgenstein's philosophical views to solipsism and to his personal struggle with solipsism is quite interesting. It would have added greatly to the interest of the book if Findlay had developed and defended this idea. It suggests that what Findlay openly attributes to a God's-eye view, Wittgenstein in an unacknowledged way cedes to himself. However, this is not explicitly argued by Findlay. Rather most of the book is given over to rather introductory exegesis of Wittgenstein's key texts. Much of Findlay's interpretation can be disputed, especially his discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, the private language argument, and rule-governed practices.

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ANTONY FLEW. *Thinking About Social Thinking: The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1985. Pp. vi + 222. US\$13.75 (paper: ISBN 0-631-14189-X).

ROGER TRIGG. *Understanding Social Science: A Philosophical Introduction to the Social Sciences*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1985. Pp. viii + 224. US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-14161-8).

In his lively and interesting introductory book Antony Flew aims not only to explain the traditional methodological and epistemological problems of the social sciences, but also 'to bring out that and why so much of what is both offered and accepted as social science is so bad' (2). To facilitate the latter goal he includes considerable material from both classical and contemporary sources, on which he targets his frequently scathing criticisms. Flew hopes that this aspect of his book will provide a 'coaching guide' to the reader's 'general in-

tellectual self-improvement' (2). However some of the material he cites seems to presuppose more acquaintance with the intricacies of local English politics than New World college students are likely to possess. But Flew does not confine his criticisms to specimens of alleged social science; he also claims that 'many, perhaps most' currently available philosophy books in the field 'fail adequately to treat several topics which ... are fundamental, and ... ought to be central' (3-4). One such topic, Flew thinks, is 'whether statements of laws of nature carry implications of practical necessity and practical impossibility' (4). He claims that contemporary philosophers neglect this topic because they uncritically accept Hume's 'constant conjunction' analysis of statements of causal connection and laws of nature generally. But Flew denies that 'statements of mere "just as it happens" regularities [can] be equivalent to authentically nomological propositions' (4). In his view 'the concept of a law of nature does include notions of physical necessity and physical impossibility' (5). (For Flew's extended discussion of these matters, see 81ff.)

Another but closely related topic which philosophers have badly neglected or mistreated, according to Flew, is the role of 'choice' in human affairs. He insists that 'we are, and ... know that we are, creatures which make ... choices; and hence, in that very high proportion of all our behaviors which are actions, whatever we do do, we could have done otherwise' (5). Consequently, 'there neither are nor can be any laws of nature necessitating human action' (82, 102 — cf. 97 ff. for extended discussion).

Unfortunately, Flew fails to provide sufficient argument to support this thesis of the incompatibility between human freedom or agency and laws governing actions or social phenomena generally. Granting that laws in some sense necessitate the phenomena they cover, in order to establish incompatibility Flew would have to show that 'could have done otherwise' can't be given a tolerably satisfactory conditional causal analysis, as for instance Donald Davidson tries to do in his essay 'Freedom to Act' (cf. *Essays on Actions and Events* [Oxford: O.U.P. 1980] 63-83). On Davidson's view, freedom to act is itself a causal power and hence compatible with there being causal laws governing actions. But even if we waive this objection, Flew's rejection of behavioral and societal laws is difficult to sustain, although admittedly we can't state many such laws with precision. Here is just one example: Flew writes that both Adam Smith and Darwin 'were showing how something which one might be very tempted to put down to design could and indeed must come about: in the one case without direction, in that direction; and in the other without any direction at all.' They uncovered 'the mechanism operative in the two cases,' says Flew (59). Smith supposedly uncovered the mechanism which determines the production of unintended social consequences of intended actions by individuals. If Flew is right and society really does operate in accordance with such mechanisms then there must be societal laws (economic laws in the case of Adam Smith); for where there are mechanisms there are laws in accordance with which the mechanisms function. Indeed, a candidate for such a law — one that belongs to political science instead of economics — is cited by Flew himself when he writes: 'a pluralist, "vote the scoundrels out," political democracy can be main-

tained only on the basis of a pluralist and largely private economy' (15). Many similar examples of lawlike statements connecting societal facts occur in Flew's book. Since as Flew insists it is absurd to deny that human beings exercise choice, if there really are laws governing human actions then they must be compatible with 'the realities of choice.'

One of the basic problems in philosophy of social science concerns the place, if any, in social science of explanations of conduct in terms of the agent's reasons for acting, i.e. his beliefs, desires, purposes or intentions. Flew vigorously and persuasively defends the thesis of the indispensability of such explanation for social science (20-53), but he denies that explanation of this type conforms to the causal or covering law model of explanation which is typically found in the physical sciences. As he points out, conduct, to be explained by the agent's intentions, has to be 'intelligibly related and appropriate to' the reasons cited in the explanation (22), but this requirement seems to conflict with the claim that a person's intentions or reasons for acting 'cause' his intentional actions, and that explanations of the sort just referred to ('rational explanations' as we may call them), are genuinely causal explanations. Flew's solution to this problem is to argue (echoing Anscombe and others) that intentions are not like physical causes and that rational explanations are not 'causal explanations' in the usual sense (22ff., also 96ff.). However Flew seems to overlook the possibility that, as Davidson says, reasons for action might be causes of action *under a description*. Moreover, if reasons are not causes in the usual sense of sufficient conditions, then rational explanation would fail to explain why an action occurred. For an agent could have a reason for acting, and act as he intends, and yet that reason might not be why he performed that action. (Cf. Davidson, 9.)

Despite Flew's failure adequately to support some of his more interesting and controversial philosophical views, his book is one of the best introductions to the philosophy of the social sciences currently available. He provides an accurate analysis of Hume's and Max Weber's views on the significance of 'the fact-value dichotomy' for the social sciences (Chapter 6), and he gives clear treatments of the 'subjective objective' and the 'relative absolute' distinctions (Chapter 7). His discussions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and their followers are also quite illuminating, although the reader should be warned that he is not excessively sympathetic with their methods and conclusions. Finally, in many instances he does succeed in exposing logical fallacies which are evidently quite prevalent in contemporary social thinking and which have a deleterious effect on important decisions concerning social policy (examples may be found on pp. 105 and 107). These various features certainly contribute to the book's educational value as well as its interest.

Although in his introductory text Roger Trigg covers some of the same ground as Flew (e.g. 'facts and values,' 'sociology of knowledge,' 'subjectivism,' and so on), and often reaches similar conclusions (e.g. that there are no 'laws' governing human actions or social phenomena [181ff.]), unlike Flew Trigg is concerned almost exclusively with contemporary methodological issues. Furthermore, Trigg has a very different conception of the nature of social science.

Although Flew rejects the pure 'unity of method thesis' of logical positivism, he, like Max Weber, never doubts that social research is or ought to be conceived of as a broadly empirical science. But Trigg questions this idea almost from the very first page. He provides extensive expositions of relevant views of Wittgenstein, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, and in the main he joins in their respective attacks on 'empiricism' (1-40). In particular he places great emphasis on the importance for social science of Wittgenstein's doctrines of 'seeing as' and the cultural relativity of 'rationality' (83 ff.). But at the same time Trigg seems to think that there is a universal 'human nature' which imposes limits on the scope of relativism and subjectivism (see, e.g., pp. 53 ff. — this is a theme which recurs throughout the book). He contends that the recently created science of sociobiology implies such limits, and he pays considerable attention to the negative implications of sociobiological doctrines for the question of the autonomy of social sciences (Chapters 8 & 9). But these reflections seem to imply that social research is a broadly empirical science after all. Finally, he assesses the significance of contemporary continental tendencies in social inquiry, such as 'structuralism' (188) and 'hermeneutics' (195).

One of Trigg's principal claims is that the philosophy of the social sciences 'is the indispensable starting-point for all social science' (205). By this he seems to mean that a working social scientist must be more concerned with his 'philosophical base' than, say, a biologist or a physicist, and that conducting significant social research involves actually doing philosophy, while this is not true of physical science. But I doubt that Trigg's arguments are strong enough to establish these interesting conclusions. For instance, in summarizing his position late in the book, he writes that '[w]hat physical and social science must hold in common is not an empiricist methodology. Instead they must each hold fast to their aim of discovering the nature of whichever reality they are investigating' — 'physical reality' in the case of the physical sciences and 'social reality' in the case of the social sciences (202). By taking this stand Trigg in effect defines the physical and social sciences by their respective allegedly ontologically distinct objects of investigation. But he leaves us quite in the dark about 'the concept of social reality' which social scientists supposedly use to guide them to their proper subject matter. That is, he never explains what he means by 'social reality.' Moreover Trigg seems to confuse two quite distinct issues which arise in this connection. As he observes, on the one hand 'difficulties creep in ... because the concept of physical reality seems less problematic than that of social reality.' On the other hand: 'One of the most vexed issues facing the social sciences is whether there is a reality to be discovered at the social level or whether everything of significance must be dealt with at the level of the individual' (202). However, the former passage questions the existence of a concept of social reality and the latter the existence of something answering to that concept. If it should turn out that there is nothing answering to the concept then it follows from Trigg's own premisses that social scientists would have nothing to do — no subject matter to investigate — which of course is absurd (they can still investigate social relations at the level of individuals). Furthermore, Trigg's theory of the relation of philosophy to the so-

cial sciences tends to obscure the important distinction between *social philosophy*, which is concerned with a priori questions such as the basis of legitimate authority or whether citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law, and *empirical social research*, which is concerned with a posteriori problems such as why large-scale industrial organization originated solely in northwestern European culture during the modern era, or what would be the effect on a certain country's economy of a currency devaluation.

As Flew refreshingly remarks, '... what social science is wanted and needed for is, not to conceal and to mystify, but to reveal and to clarify, the actual workings of our social institutions' (53). If we hold fast to this simple but sound idea then many of the 'vexed issues' of contemporary philosophy of social science will seem like bad dreams which disturb our sleep but happily vanish when we awaken.

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WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH, with PAMELA M. HUBY and ANTHONY A. LONG, eds. *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work* (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities. Vol. 2). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books 1985. Pp. ix + 355. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-88738-009-3.

The tradition has been unkind to Theophrastus, leaving extant a few complete books on more-or-less peripheral issues, a handful of substantial fragments on matters of major philosophical importance, and the usual crop of brief citations and unreliable late doxography. But Aristotle's immediate successor in the Lyceum, the man who took over and pursued his research programs, is someone of obvious intrinsic interest, interest attested in antiquity and which has recently revived in the scholarly world. This renaissance is exemplified by Project Theophrastus, an ambitious, long-term undertaking under the tutelage of William Fortenbaugh, the editor-in-chief of this volume (which is its first significant fruit).

The volume is broad in scope and ambition: its fourteen articles include interpretive essays on Theophrastus' contributions to logic, rhetoric, style and delivery, theory of music, history and politics, natural explanation, and the emotions; there are surveys of the remains of Theophrastus in the Arabic tradition; an assessment of his influence on the Medieval dispute about the na-

ture of the intellect; and there is a new text, with notes and critical apparatus, of Diogenes Laertius' *Vita Theophrasti*' by Michael Sollenberger. This last is an intrusion which the editors themselves feel some need to excuse. While it is a competent piece of scholarship, of particular value in collecting other ancient references to works mentioned in Diogenes' Theophrastean bibliography, it seems misplaced here, and could have awaited the publication of the new collection of sources planned by Project Theophrastus. But perhaps unintentionally it serves a vital function: it reminds the reader how much the reconstruction of the more obscure areas of Theophrastus' alleged output rests squarely and solely on Diogenes' skeletal report.

The attempted recovery of the doctrines of fragmentary ancient authors is standardly but appositely compared to criminal detection, and generally there are two types of detective-work: the brilliant insight derived from the flimsiest of evidence; and the slow, methodical leg-work that issues in the formulation of limited, tentative hypotheses. The first is exciting, heady and dangerous; the second dull, sober and safe. This volume contains examples of both styles of detection, and exhibits the strengths and weaknesses of each.

The virtues of Jonathan Barnes' essay on Theophrastus' logic will come as no surprise to connoisseurs of his work: it is exciting, challenging, logically interesting, and its tone is unmistakeable. It is unapologetically detection of the first type: his reconstruction of an exhaustive Theophrastean hypothetical syllogistic is elegant enough, but it is extremely speculative, and built on the sandiest of foundations. Its further ascription to Theophrastus uses available sources in a manner most kindly described as creative (and is in admitted contradiction with the testimony of Boethius, which Barnes has to psychologise away). I submit that no jury should be satisfied with the prosecution's case — it is not clear whether the crime was even committed, much less whether Theophrastus is the guilty party.

The second type of antiquarian detection is best exemplified by the essays on Theophrastus in the Arabic tradition. Increasingly, classical scholars are turning to Arabic in an attempt to recover material which has been lost from the Greek and Latin streams. Papers by Dimitri Gutas and Hans Daiber deal with the mechanics of transmission, and the known extent of the Arabic reports and fragments. They are prolegomena to serious study of Theophrastus in Arabic — necessary prolegomena, but dry, scholarly and particular, rather than rich and rewarding. They render classical scholarship an undoubted service: but they are not for the general reader.

A second paper by Gutas takes matters further: do the later Peripatetics' injunctions on how and where to begin the study of Aristotle have a Theophrastean origin? Gutas' approach is sober and cautious: he warns against too ready an acceptance of material coloured and distorted by the schematising tendencies of the Arab scholars. His conclusion is equally cautious, indeed Pyrrhonian: there is no good reason for fathering any such injunction on Theophrastus (but, equally, there is no reason for thinking that he definitely didn't offer such advice).

Such depressing, negative conclusions are par for the sober course. Forten-

baugh discusses the nature of Theophrastus' account of the importance of delivery in rhetoric, a subject long believed to be a Theophrastean innovation. But the evidence for this is slim and to an extent contradictory; it rests ultimately on the inclusion of the title 'On Delivery' in Diogenes' bibliography. Some of Fortenbaugh's remarks point to an exciting program, that of recovering original Theophrastean views on the relation of delivery to style — but here again the matter becomes hopelessly speculative: 'there are no named texts ... but Theophrastus almost certainly would have considered'; 'we can only say that Theophrastus is likely to have': such statements abound, and even they overstate the case. The truth is that for all these issues we just don't know, and we won't until anything more substantial turns up. When Fortenbaugh stays on safe ground, his conclusions are unexceptionable, but they are also unexciting: 'the ... impression will be that ... Theophrastus was building on the work of others: certainly on Aristotle and perhaps on earlier writers ...'.

This review may seem over-critical: as a corrective, let me say that where the scholarship rests on substantial fragments and reports, or better still on properly surviving texts, the results can be both interesting and impressive. James Lennox makes a persuasive case for Theophrastus as carefully delimiting and restricting the apparently all-pervasive scope of Aristotelian natural teleology; Robert Sharples carefully assesses Theophrastus' account of tastes and smells, and relates it to his Aristotelian inheritance (although Sharples' use of Galen is highly selective); and Fortenbaugh, in another paper on emotion, suggests ways in which Theophrastus built on his Aristotelian legacy, most particularly in the classification of and distinction between emotions by degrees of intensity. This procedure is intrinsically interesting, and has obvious Peripatetic antecedents which Fortenbaugh points to (although he omits to mention the early essays in the logic of comparative concepts attempted within the canonical framework of categorical syllogistic).

A general introduction would have done much to commend the work to a wider audience: but perhaps that mistakes the intention of the editors. Unforgivable in such an undertaking is the absence of a general index: and it should have been part of the editorial work to ensure that at the very least references to ancient authors were standardised. There is the usual crop of literals and carelessnesses: none that I discovered were seriously misleading, although they were irritating ('Thucydides' for 'Themistocles' on p. 240 is a particularly gross example).

It is too early to evaluate the success of Project Theophrastus: any such judgement should wait on the publication of the complete fragments; but one can perhaps offer a conditional assessment of its possibilities (and those of similar projects). The stimulation of interest in unjustly neglected philosophers is an admirable thing, and the Project has certainly achieved that (its second major conference took place last year: the first, in Liverpool in 1983, was the proving-ground for much of the material in this volume). But in dealing with fragmentary sources, diminishing scholarly returns quickly set in. There is matter of value in this book to the scholar of the period, and at least some of the contributions have an interest independent of specialist concerns; but this is not,

in general, a book for ordinary readers interested in broadening their knowledge of the early history of Aristotle's school.

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MOLTKE S. GRAM. *The Transcendental Turn: The Foundation of Kant's Idealism*. Gainesville, Fla: University Presses of Florida 1984. Pp. xii + 260. ISBN 0-8130-0787-9.

According to Gram, the most recalcitrant problems affecting contemporary interpretations of Kant's theoretical philosophy can be traced back to the conflation of causation and affection. This conflation is responsible for the failure of both the 'Two Worlds Theory' (TWT) and the (standard) 'Two Descriptions Theory' (TDT) of the appearance — thing in itself distinction; but without an explication of this distinction, the entire doctrine of Transcendental Idealism collapses.

The doctrine of 'double affection' (DA) advanced by Adickes and others holds that appearances must arise in consciousness as the result of something not itself an appearance — e.g. a thing in itself; but then the thing in itself seems to have acted *causally* on the ego, contrary to Kant's assertion that cause can apply only to appearances. So there must be a double affection — between the thing in itself and the ego in itself, on the one hand, and between the appearance and the phenomenal ego on the other. Gram raises a number of objections to this view — most notably, that it requires an 'appearance in itself' — and sets out to show how the original problem can be resolved without DA.

Gram begins by examining the nature of the thing in itself, and determines that it 'must satisfy two mutually incompatible conditions,' the 'Affection Condition' and the 'Cognitivity Condition.' The first requires it to generate appearances; the second requires that it *not* be an object of sensory awareness. But, claims Gram, anything satisfying the first condition must, on the current interpretations, necessarily fail to satisfy the second. The result is that the thing in itself collapses into the notion of a phenomenal substance. This would be fatal, since phenomenal substances have, and things in themselves must lack, spatio-temporal characteristics.

The Two Worlds Theory [TWT] is seen as incapable of resolving this problem because it does not distinguish between things in themselves and noumena:

but Gram maintains that these must be distinct, since the thing in itself can affect sensibility but noumena cannot. The standard Two Descriptions Theory (TDT, Dryer cited) fails because the two descriptions are incompatible: insofar as an object satisfies one description, it cannot satisfy the other. And as long as Transcendental Idealism is given an ontological rather than an epistemic reading, the problem must remain unsolved.

Gram, however, proposes a revised version of the TDT: appearance and thing in itself are two 'states of enlightenment' about one and the same object. This gives an epistemic reading of Transcendental Idealism, and enables the simultaneous satisfaction of both the Affection Condition and the Cognitivity Condition, and in this way keeps affection and causation distinct.

This allows us to understand the attacks leveled against the thing in itself by Jacobi, Fichte, Schopenhauer and Hegel: they derive from a misinterpretation of Transcendental Idealism as ontological rather than epistemic. Misinterpretations of the First Antinomy (e.g., that of J. Benardete's *Infinity*) likewise result from the ontological reading, and we can only obtain a satisfactory interpretation on the basis of Gram's revised TDT theory. The Third Antinomy is in a similar state. The standard interpretations (TWT and TDT) fail to provide an adequate interpretation because of what Gram calls the Duplication Problem: the dichotomy between a free and a determined world arises again in the realm of things in themselves — though it turns out that if we rigorously distinguish between causation and affection (Gram's revised TDT), the problem disappears. Gram sums up his principal conclusions in a 'postscript,' and the central controversies are summarized in an appendix.

Most readers will not, I think, be convinced in the end that a solution has been found to the affection problem — or even that the problem has received an adequate explication. Gram's arguments are elaborate and complex, but analysis often reveals that they rest on foundational positions which are far from self-evident, and which receive little support either from argument or from the text. A notable example is the view that things in themselves are not noumena (46, 162ff., etc.), a position both systematically implausible and at odds with the text (cf. *KdV*, B307, B423 note, B310). The related claim that 'what we call a thing in itself is an object in our world that can be schematized differently in other possible worlds' (164) is not rendered either clear or plausible, and the distinction between an occurrence and an event (177f., 195) seems forced.

A more general criticism is that, whereas the shortcomings of the TWT and the standard TDT are presented in great detail, very little time is spent on the details of Gram's revised version of the TDT represented as the solution of the affection problem. The extent to which it differs from the standard TDT seems slight, unless the latter is given an 'ontological' interpretation; but then it is unclear that anybody holds it. In any event, the differences and peculiar merits of the proposed solution need to be spelled out in more detail.

Most of the book's chapters were originally separate papers, written over a 15-year period. As a result, there is a certain repetitiveness at the beginning of every chapter where the basic thesis is outlined once again. Some of the chapters — notably Chs. V and VI — seem not to advance the central thesis

at all: though of course the First and Third Antinomies dealt with in these chapters have something to do with the affection problem, Gram's solution at the end of these treatments seems no more plausible than it did at the end of Ch. III.

In sum, Gram has correctly identified the problem of affection as a central concern of the Critical philosophy, and quite properly set out to analyze the problem and provide a solution. But the analysis is hard to understand and arguably incomplete, and the nature and ramifications of the proposed solution remain obscure.

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MAURITA J. HARNEY. *Intentionality, Sense, and the Mind*. The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Phaenomenologica 94) 1984. Pp. x + 203. ISBN 90-247-2891-6.

J.N. MOHANTY. *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy*. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Phaenomenologica 98) 1985. Pp. xxxii + 249. ISBN 90-247-2991-2.

Harney sees all extant intentionality theories as failing to accommodate harmoniously the two theses necessary for an adequate theory, i.e., that mental phenomena attain objective reference, and that the objects of mental phenomena need not exist. Giving too much emphasis to the first thesis results in a blurring of the mental/non-mental distinction; giving too much emphasis to the second leads to mentalism (the view that objects of thought are mental phenomena or reducible to psychological processes). The solution? Rework the Fregean interpretation of the Brentano intentionality theory, incorporating Husserl's improvements on Frege's notion of sense.

Harney begins by pointing out the inadequacies of Brentano's position. He erred on the mentalistic side as a result of his uncritical dualism (e.g., his inner/outer perception distinction), his misdirected concern with the ontological status of the objects of thought, and his improperly drawn act/object distinction. Chisholm's linguistic reformulation of Brentano's position mitigates many of its ills, particularly its psychologism. He puts us on the right track by exploiting Frege's idea of indirect reference (reference to sense) in the service of identifying specifically linguistic intentional criteria. He uses Frege's idea

of sense as the basis for an intentionalist account of language, and this then is used to explicate linguistic intentionality. But Chisholm's own account is flawed. (Harney did not have access to Chisholm's recent book, *First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality*, in which there are important new developments.) Harney points out the difficulties with Chisholm's frankly Fregean position, as well as with the at least not obviously anti-Fregean position of Anscombe. Both argue for the irreducibility of the psychological to the physical and hence for a real distinction between sentences about intentional phenomena and sentences about physical phenomena. But they do so by smuggling in something uncomfortably similar to the ontological dualism that vitiated Brentano's position. Further, because both disassociate intentionality and objective reference, neither does justice to the 'objective reference' requirement of an adequate theory.

They have missed or at least not exploited what Harney herself has gleaned from a careful and subtle reading of Frege's doctrine of sense — that its cognitive and semantic dimensions can be clearly distinguished, and that the cognitive dimension can be shown to account for the mind-relatedness of sense while the semantic dimension can be shown to account for how sense can be a vehicle of reference. Full development of her theory follows a critique of non- (or anti-) Fregean approaches to intentionality.

Against the usual opinion Harney argues that Russell's theory of reference is fundamentally non-Fregean, however much Frege influenced its development. By opting for a two-levelled semantical framework (sign-referent) as opposed to Frege's three levelled framework (sign-sense-referent) Russell forfeits the chance of an adequate theory. In the end, he blurs the logical/psychological distinction and reverts to some of the less happy features of Cartesian epistemology. Russell's relational theory of belief fares no better as a possible substitute for an intentional account of mental behavior — it either subverts intentionality by reducing intentional sentences to extensional ones or, more flamboyantly, it reduces the psychological to the physical (behaviorism) thereby tossing out the mental dimension altogether and of course intentionality with it.

Contemporary two-levelled semantical framework theorists think they can avoid the Russellian pitfalls without reverting to a Fregean notion of sense, which they take to entail either mentalism (Quine) or a psychologistic theory of the determination of reference (Putnam). Harney thinks that they are wrong, both in their reading of Frege and in believing in the viability of a two levelled framework. Frege did however allow their mis-readings of him in virtue of what he did not say about the relatedness of mind and sense. The mere fact that he opposed psychologism does not guarantee that his theory cannot be twisted in that direction. Husserl provides that guarantee and does so without entertaining the defects of Chisholm's account. Follesdal has shown us the similarity between Frege's idea of sense and Husserl's idea of noema. The difference between these two ideas is that Frege's idea can be read psychologically whereas Husserl's cannot. If one injects Husserl's purely phenomenological account of sense into Frege's semantic theory, a mentalistic or psychologistic

account of Frege becomes impossible. Husserl's concept of the noema does all the work of Frege's concept of sense in an intentional theory, and does it in such fashion that the tension between the two requirements of an adequate theory — that it show how meaning is both mind related and the vehicle of reference — does not arise. Thus Frege's suspect ontological commitments which permit the conflation of the logical and the psychological are avoided.

Harney's book is certainly to be recommended. Her critique of opposing positions is well prosecuted. Her sketch of an adequate intentional theory, heavily indebted to Husserl, must be seriously considered. Whatever worries we have about it centre on fears that it goes no way at all toward solving the original epistemological problem but merely substitutes a potentially more manageable conundrum (this time about language) for the original. We worry too about neutralizing the epistemological dimension of Husserl's notion of the noema, despite the readiness with which linguistic philosophers claim to be able to do just that. The very sense of 'noema' is tied to that of 'noesis,' a fact which cannot fail to condition its linguistic purity.

Mohanty's book is a collection of fifteen essays written between 1960 and 1983, all but three of which have appeared previously. Here as elsewhere he shows that he understands, as Harney apparently does not, the limitations of a linguistic/semantic interpretation, and the virtues and limitations generally of a philosophy restricted to a linguistic or semantic plane. He has long since made the case for the mutual dependence of the linguistic/semantic and transcendental philosophical approaches. Here he shows more plainly than ever how the linguistic/semantic approach harbors within it a transcendental dimension. Ultimately the case he makes (although he does not make it so clearly as he might) is that the transcendental perspective is indeed a possible perspective to adopt and, once we understand that, we must understand also the necessity of favoring it over, but not to the exclusion of, other philosophical perspectives.

The introductory and perhaps most important essay, 'On the Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy,' is new. In it Mohanty argues for the logical possibility of transcendental philosophy, using as a foil Donald Davidson's argument against the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual scheme. He shows also that there are other senses of 'possibility' in which a transcendental philosophy is possible. Kinds of transcendental philosophy are distinguished. Difficulties with the idea of a transcendental argument are disassociated from difficulties with the possibility of a transcendental philosophy. The method, transcendental reflection (together with *epoché* and reduction) appropriate to transcendental philosophy is explicated. One line of objection to transcendental philosophy based on Rorty's reading of foundationalism is circumvented and a viable form of foundationalism is delimited. This leads to the disclosure of a workable form of transcendental philosophy in the Husserlian project of meaning clarification. This project is carefully disassociated from Kantian transcendentalism and its attendant problems. The obvious advantages of developing a viable transcendental philosophy are briefly pointed out. Twelve of the remaining essays

obliquely support this central theme — that there is one sense of 'transcendental philosophy' in which a transcendental philosophy is possible. The final three return to it directly.

The first six essays relate phenomenology to problems in analytic philosophy. They concern: a) Harney's problem — how Husserl rescues Frege from his latent psychologism; b) why a theory of intentionality is of necessity a transcendental theory; c) the limits, and ultimate failure, of a possible worlds semantics approached to understanding Husserl; d) how the *de re/de dicto* distinction might be applied to Husserl's theory of intentionality and why it is likely inappropriate to do so; e) how Rorty misrepresents Husserl, and where he errs in tying transcendental philosophy to epistemology and hence in dismissing the former with the latter; f) how proponents of various holistic theories and of the theory of the causal order of nature not only fail to subvert the intentionality thesis but in fact presuppose it.

The next six essays look at the theme of transcendental subjectivity from various angles: a) the concepts of truth and self-evidence are situated within the concept of intentional consciousness; b) the concept of the *Lebenswelt* is shown to be an enrichment of, not a substitute for, the concept of transcendental subjectivity; c) the intentionality thesis, it is argued, not only fails to run afoul of Cartesian dualism but in fact 'solves' the mind-body problem; d) Gurwitsch's thoughts on the congenital ambiguity of 'consciousness' — on the fact that consciousness lends itself to both a causal-explanatory and a phenomenological-descriptive account — are pushed further; e) reasons are offered for preferring Husserl's concept of transcendental consciousness to Heidegger's *Dasein*, and Husserl's ideas on the genetic constitution of objectivity and logic are juxtaposed with similar views in Quine and Piaget.

The final three essays build, on the basis of the intricate picture of transcendental subjectivity that can be gleaned from the previous six essays, an account of what a viable contemporary transcendental philosophy might look like: it will look more like a form of phenomenology devoted to meaning clarification than one bent on describing essences; it will comprehend, rather than be opposed to, the idea of the mundane (and hence empiricism); it will be perforce reconcilable with a hermeneutical concept of consciousness.

Although it is useful to have yet another collection of this fine scholar's work it is disappointing that, having reflected so long and so deeply on the possibility of transcendental philosophy, Mohanty does not make a more direct and sustained case for it. Rather than the monograph he had hoped to write on his important theme, we are given the kit for a book — a tantalizing introduction and a group of old essays through which the theme lies scattered — which we are to assemble ourselves. Nonetheless the exercise is valuable. There is enough here to convince one that the ghost of transcendental philosophy is anything but laid. Nor is there cause to wish that it were.

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STEPHAN KÖRNER. *Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function*. Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 238. US\$39.50. ISBN 0-521-26496-0.

This is an erudite and instructive book. It offers an account of the nature of metaphysics. Only in the final chapter are the author's own metaphysical views sketched. A very large number of topics are discussed, none in much detail. The reader is often referred to Körner's previous works for fuller explanations. There are even chapters on ethics and on aesthetics. I do not have space to consider each of the seventeen chapters and will concern myself with what I take to be the substance of the book.

Central to it is a roughly Kantian distinction between reality as it is in itself and reality as it appears to us and especially as it is constrained by the 'categorical framework' which we happen to have. Unlike Kant, however, Körner is a 'pluralist'; he allows for a variety of mutually inconsistent categorical frameworks. One's categorical framework consists of the supreme principles in accordance with which one organizes one's experience, and is described also as one's immanent metaphysics. Contrasted with the latter is one's transcendent metaphysics, which consists of one's speculations about the nature of reality as it is in itself. It is an empirical fact (Körner describes his method as philosophical anthropology) that (almost) all human beings possess both an immanent and a transcendent metaphysics. Philosophers who reject metaphysics in fact have their own but fail to see this. For example, their immanent metaphysics may consist of the basic assumptions of classical logic and of physics, and their transcendent metaphysics may be just a simplistic belief that these assumptions are true of reality as it is in itself. On all this the author shows much good sense and refreshingly differs from current fashion.

Most of the book is devoted to explaining ways in which categorical frameworks differ, especially with respect to the logic and mathematics on which they are based and the maximal kinds they allow. But any conceivable framework differentiates experience into particulars and attributes and accepts at least the weak principle of noncontradiction ('not all propositions are acceptable'). Frameworks may differ with respect to whether and how this principle is strengthened. Without it the acceptance and rejection of propositions, and deduction itself, would be pointless. But it need not be so strengthened as to preclude the possibility of inexact attributes (which violate the classical law of noncontradiction — e.g., some things are both green and not green, since the concept of green allows for borderline cases), or the rejection of the principle of excluded middle.

A categorical framework will include also 'a set of intersubjectivity-concepts, i.e., concepts which, if applied to subjectively given particulars (particulars given in a person's perception), confer intersubjectivity upon them.' Kant's categories are examples of such concepts. But, pace Kant, they are not unique. What framework one accepts is generally a function of what is suggested by one's scientific, mathematical, religious, moral, aesthetic, etc., beliefs, and itself affects the latter. They differ from age to age and from culture to culture. Hence Körner's pluralism.

The author describes his view of transcendent metaphysics as perspectivism, meaning by this that the various categorial frameworks (immanent metaphysical systems) are different perspectives of transcendent reality. No ordinary argument can support a transcendent metaphysics, since the principles of ordinary arguments are principles of one's categorial framework, which may not be shared by others. But it is possible to engage in what the author calls 'honest metaphysical rhetoric,' examples of which are Socratic arguments and appeals to moral considerations. Körner's own categorial framework is unremarkable: its logic is finitist and inexact (it assumes only a finite domain of individuals and allows for inexact attributes, which share borderline cases with their complements); its maximal kinds, or categories, are persons, animals, and inanimate things. (Körner is unable to regard animals, to say nothing of persons, as a species of material objects.) As to his transcendent metaphysics, he avows agnosticism regarding the existence of God and of immortal souls, on the grounds of being unable to grasp the concepts required for both asserting and denying their existence, and believes that a good case can be made for a strong sense of human freedom.

Despite its evident historical, logical, mathematical, and scientific sophistication, the book, as I have already remarked, rests on a rather simplistic and in any case unargued distinction between reality as it is in itself and reality as it appears to us, the import of the distinction being evident in frequent talk about the subjectively given, the organization of experience through the application of concepts, the transformation of subjective particulars into objective particulars through the application of intersubjectivity concepts. The distinction and this sort of talk presuppose the familiar idea that we are encircled by our sensations and ideas. If so, our cognition consists largely in fussing about what is within the circle, and the question, what if anything lies outside it, becomes pressing but perhaps unanswerable. But, as both G.E. Moore and later Sartre argued at some length, this whole picture of the relationship between consciousness and its objects is untenable. Moore held that to have a sensation or an idea is already to be outside the circle. And Sartre held that consciousness has no inhabitants, no contents, that it exhausts itself in its object.

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C.B. MCCULLAGH. *Justifying Historical Descriptions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. x + 252. US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-26722-6); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31830-0).

'An historical description is here understood to be a statement which is intended to describe the past, though in fact it may not do so, or may not do so accurately' (1). The problematic of the book, then, is to determine the main conditions under which people are justified in believing such factual statements about the human past to be true (see, e.g., x, 3, 10, 33) or, alternatively, to be reliable, warranted, or well-supported (see, e.g., 6, 10, 234; also 236). McCullagh tends to conflate these two ways of talking (6, 10), but there may be some point in distinguishing them. Thus, I take McCullagh to be talking principally about our grounds for believing historical factual statements to be well-supported, that is, by available evidence.

Here the book concerns a fundamental problem in historical science. It addresses the issue of how historians reason, or should reason, so as to reach well-supported statements of what happened, statements which can themselves be regarded as reliable or credible descriptions — and in that sense true descriptions — of some event(s) in the human past. This is a topic that is less frequently addressed in philosophy of history than one might suppose, and often less competently addressed than it is in the present book.

McCullagh carries out his basic program as follows: three chapters are devoted to different models for justifying *singular* statements of historical fact (chs. 2, 3, 4), a chapter applies these models to actual historical practice (ch. 5), another is devoted to the topic of *generalized* factual statements, as distinct from singular ones (ch. 6); finally, two chapters concern causal judgments in history (chs. 7 and 8). And two additional chapters (chs. 1, 9) frame the entire enterprise and lay down some of the more general assumptions and conclusions. Among the more important of these is McCullagh's fundamental judgment, sound in my opinion, that we can separate — at least for purposes of preliminary analysis — the issue of a reliable description of what happened (as determined from evidence) from that of explaining what happened, given this description (14, 211).

Regarding *singular* historical descriptive statements McCullagh identifies three main models for justifying their reliability. Such a statement can be justified as (a) the best hypothesis, as (b) statistically supported, as (c) supported by conceptual criteria — e.g., as to what is intended or as to what is an effect — or by analogy. These models are associated, respectively, with (a) Peirce and Collingwood, (b) Hume, and (c) certain recent philosophers of history such as Cebik and Gorman. Since the third of these models or theories (c) reduces to the other two in McCullagh's view (see 83, 89-90), I will discuss only (a) and (b).

The first theory is that one is rationally justified in believing a statement to be true, or reliable in that regard, if certain conditions obtain. These conditions, seven in all, for a 'best hypothesis' are spelled out on p. 19 and subsequently elaborated (in particular, on p. 27).

I will not venture a discussion of how one might undertake to satisfy the comparative, largely statistical or probabilistic, judgments involved in several of the conditions; nor, if one were successful in that task, a discussion of how one could ultimately distinguish model (a) from model (b).

The main alternative model to justifying a statement as 'best hypothesis' is to justify it merely statistically, that is, simply by reference to relative frequency considerations (48). Thus, for example, the Latin initials, V.S.L.M., inscribed on a tombstone, might be given a reliable interpretation simply on statistical grounds (45-7). Two points are worth making here. Many historians use such markers as 'probably' or 'frequently' or 'likely' in their arguments; often, though, there is no statistical data known to the historian (or to anyone, for that matter) that would support such probabilistic judgments. That is, one could not translate the judgment — given the historian's knowledge or general knowledge — into a true statistical statement asserting a relative frequency of, say, 0.3. McCullagh seems aware of this point (51), but it is not clear what difference this would make to his second (or statistical inference) model or, more important, to the probabilistic-like judgments involved in his first (or 'best hypothesis') model. McCullagh does not, however, adequately note another point: that sometimes (and here I follow Dray), when a historian says 'probably,' the historian means that it is reasonable or rational for someone doing or thinking A also to do or think B. Judgments of this kind are not (even in intent) of a relative-frequency sort. Nor could such judgments reduce to relative-frequency statements as their proper form, though any such judgment might involve *some* statement of low-level relative frequency (or at least the grounds of such a statement) as one of its conditions of assertion.

Let me turn now to my main criticism of McCullagh's argument. Suppose we grant that McCullagh has provided a sound account of two models for justifying historical factual statements. Suppose next, for example, that we as historians had successfully described, given available evidence, certain features of a policy in accordance with one or the other of the two models McCullagh has proposed. Now, if this policy were an action, or some set of actions, then arguably we would not properly explain that policy unless we could identify the thought-factors (the relevant purpose, situational motivation, means/end beliefs, etc.) that lay behind the deed(s) in question and unless we could regard it as intelligible or sensible that, for instance, someone with such a purpose (so described) would do such a thing (so described) as a means to, or as part of accomplishing, that end.

In sum, we might regard the factual statements here as evidentially well-grounded on the models McCullagh has provided. But we still might not regard the statements as reliable indicators of what actually had happened unless we could use these statements in an intelligible explanation. For it does seem clear that where we cannot see a certain piece of conduct as, say, an intelligible means to a given end, then we would not take the descriptions involved, however well-founded in evidence they might be, as reliable indicators of what had happened in the past. Rather, we base our judgments of reliability with regard to

descriptions of action elements and the events that flow from them on a confluence of evidential support with explanatory intelligibility.

Thus, if McCullagh's goal is to determine when historical descriptions or statements are reliable indicators of what happened, as distinct from being simply evidentially well-supported statements, then he must go beyond his models to explore certain theories or types of historical explanation as well. If this is so, then McCullagh's models do not, simply by themselves, provide us with a sufficient basis for saying that an historical statement is a reliable indicator of what actually happened.

The book's principal drawbacks as a theoretical treatise are the two I have mentioned: a confusing exposition of the 'best hypothesis' model and an overbold claim to the reliability of historical statements (as true accounts of the human past) where they accord, or largely where they accord, with McCullagh's two models.

McCullagh's book is, nonetheless, interesting and would repay careful reading. Certain of its chapters should prove especially valuable for classroom use (chs. 5, 7, and 8 in particular, for they offer a wealth of helpful examples).

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ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, LARS LINDAHL and BERT van ROERMUND, eds. *Theory of Legal Science*. Boston: D. Reidel 1984. Pp. xv + 666. ISBN 90-277-1834-2.

This substantial volume (regrettably, of single-spaced justified typescript) records the proceedings of the Conference on Legal Theory and Philosophy of Science at Lund in December 1983. There are 45 papers in all, collected into sections on Theory of Science and Theory of Law, Ontology and Epistemology in Legal Science, Objectivity and Rationality of Legal Justification, Technical Rationality in the Law, Rationality and Legitimacy in the Law, Interdisciplinary Bridges between Legal Research and Other Sciences, Analysis of Legal Norms and Juristic Propositions, Logical and Preference-Theoretical Structures in the Law, as well as a section on topics in Contract and Tort. Each section has a helpful introductory essay by one of the editors.

Perhaps the most interesting section is that on the objectivity and rationality of legal justification. Most contributors want to defend the latter notions, but in a muted form. Hermerén regards objectivity as more of an ethical than

an epistemological notion, based on agreement among scholars as to shortcomings in research, and he finds an objectivity of this kind in the legal community. Weinberger defends a strictly pragmatic conception of rationality which presupposes non-cognitivism. MacCormick discusses the role of coherence in legal justification. Normative coherence within legal rulings is a genuine, if weak, constraint. Legal rulings themselves must possess narrative coherence with the factual evidence. The paper hovers on whether this sensibly applies to all factual evidence or merely circumstantial evidence. Wróblewski introduces elaborate logical machinery in pursuit of a Kuhnian conception of legal reasoning as based on paradigms. Leader argues plausibly against Dworkin that the requirement to integrate judicial decisions with background political morality opens the way to a 'contingent pluralism' rather than to the thesis that every legal question has a right answer. Golding allows that a Realist emphasis on the context of discovery has a place when more than one opinion has justifying reasons in its favour. Bergholtz defends the attempt to see the reasons for a judicial decision as also its causes.

The editors each contribute papers of great interest. Peczenik takes further the theory of his *The Basis of Legal Justification* (Lund 1983). He regards the law as a system of four interrelated components — linguistic units, overt behaviour, inner mental processes, and an official or other qualified account of all of them. Legal validity is presented as an 'emergent' property not deductively derivable from properties of the system. Van Roermund's paper draws on post-structuralist literary theory to present an account of legal inferences as transformational. He distinguishes three levels within a legal text — the directive to a particular norm-subject, the institutionalized general norm, and the root evaluative or practical demand. These levels are connected not inferentially but transformationally. A theory of the nature of these transformations is at bottom a theory within social science. Lindahl, starting from the thought that Dworkin's Hercules represents an ideal of judicial decision-making, points out that legal requirements fall to different degrees short of such an ideal. He then develops a formal mechanism for the assessment of legal urgency and legal worth which draws on both lexicographic preference theory and deontic logic.

Other papers by authors whom *CPR* readers will recognize are the following. Aarnio and Broekman are each concerned with the application of Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' to legal dogmatics, and each in different ways argues for a continuity in legal development of a kind Kuhn's theory seems to rule out. Castañeda draws on previously published work to present an account in very abstract terms of the autonomy and overall unity of the social sciences. Summers responds to MacCormick's criticisms elsewhere (58 *NYULR* 239 [1983]) of his conception of 'goal reasons' in the common law. Hanen discusses recent work in the theory of contract law and Goodman's work in the philosophy of science in order to draw general morals about the nature of theories of law. She argues that theories are not mirrors of reality, and may have a plurality of other functions. Ost and van de Kerchove attempt first to define an external point of view which takes account of the internal point of view, and then to

outline an interdisciplinary version of such an external point of view, a version which seems to them most likely to reproduce accurately that constellation of different interests which a legal system constitutes.

As will already be clear, the bulk of the contributors to this volume are legal theorists from civil/code law, rather than common law, jurisdictions. In civil/code adjudication, the court declares a verdict which is supposed to be rationally derivable from the general principles of the code. There is no room for the analogical or case-by-case reasoning of the typical common-law opinion. A common law theorist can afford to be sceptical about and disinterested in legal rationality, legal science, legal dogmatics, and the like, because there is no clear institutional place for such notions. The civil/code law theorist cannot see past the need to understand and reconstruct such notions for similar institutional reasons. Problems which are for the common law theorist at best problems in ideal theory are for the civil/code law theorist real problems in compliance theory. It would evince cultural insensitivity to wonder what all the fuss in much of this volume is about.

Proceedings of international conferences are not normally the places one goes to for the deepest insights and the most thoroughly worked out theories. This volume is no exception. The papers tend to be programmatic and speculative; many of them seem, somewhat incestuously, simply to debate the theories of other contributors. Nonetheless, there is much work of interest here. The book is well worth an attentive browse or two (or three), even if not a term's exclusive study.

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J.G.A. POCOCK. *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. x + 321. Cloth: ISBN 0-521-25701-8; paper: ISBN 0-521-27660-8.

With this collection of essays, one of the premier historians of early modern political thought demonstrates once again his astonishing virtuosity. All but two of the essays in this collection were first published between 1976 and 1982. To a large extent they represent the fruits of Pocock's efforts to probe in greater depth some of the topics treated in (or raised by reviewers of) the closing

chapters of his sweeping history of civic humanism from the Florentine Renaissance to the American Constitution, *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975). Prefixed and appended to these collected essays are two previously unpublished pieces: a fascinating introduction explaining and defending the author's methodology and a critically important concluding essay on the varieties of 'Whiggism.' Taken together, the studies in this volume document Pocock's continuing development as a British intellectual historian — from a primary concern with particular aspects of seventeenth-century English thought in his first book on the ancient constitution (1957) and in subsequent work on Harrington and the neo-Harringtonians, to a broader mastery of British (i.e. Scottish and American as well as English) discourse from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries.

To write the history of discourse is to explore the interplay of paradigmatic languages or idioms. This is the cornerstone of Pocock's methodology. Whether the focus is on particular topics or issues, such as conceptions of property, authority, time, and Whiggism, or on the work of particular thinkers, such as Hume, Gibbon, Tucker, and Burke, each of these essays is principally concerned with the tension between conflicting idioms that underlie all discourse. Pocock is particularly interested in the tension between the now-familiar civic humanist or classical republican tradition — with its emphases on the virtue and independence of land-owning, arms-wielding citizens — and three interconnected modes of discourse that were adapted or developed by the eighteenth-century opponents of civic humanism: the 'law-centered paradigm' of the jurisprudential tradition, which concerned itself with 'rights' rather than 'virtue' and viewed property not as the foundation of citizenship but as 'a system of legally defined relations between persons and things, or between persons through things' (104); the rhetoric of commerce that countered civic ideals of virtue with 'modern' notions of wealth and prosperity; and the closely related rhetoric of 'politeness' that exalted the refinement and cultivation made possible by economic prosperity and transformed virtue or *virtù* — in the civic sense of undivided devotion to the public good — into virtues or manners. The unifying theme of this collection of essays is the way in which supporters of the eighteenth-century Whig establishment employed these idioms to defend their society against civic humanist charges that certain features of the 'modern' world were in fact manifestations of 'corruption' and foretellings of doom.

The brilliant concluding essay on Whig political culture constitutes an ideal means of bringing together the book's leading issues. The fundamental assumption of that essay is that eighteenth-century Whiggism was thoroughly dichotomous: it had a commonwealthman or radical component that was essentially civic humanist, and it had a conservative component that was, paradoxically, liberal and modern, in the sense that it utilized the idioms of legal rights, commercial prosperity, and politeness in order to refute the civic humanist challenge. Around 1700 the battle lines were firmly drawn, with commonwealthmen like Toland, Trenchard, and Fletcher of Saltoun using classical republican language to attack the public debt, the standing army, and the growth of royal patronage

and power while moderns like Defoe were using liberal rhetoric to defend the establishment. As Pocock puts it, 'The confrontation of Fletcher with Defoe supplies an antithesis between virtue and commerce, republicanism and liberalism, classicism and progressivism. The Old Whigs identified freedom with virtue and located it in a past; the Modern Whigs identified it with wealth, enlightenment, and progress toward a future. Around this antithesis, it is not too much to say, nearly all eighteenth-century philosophy of history can be organized' (231). This essay climaxes in a discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment, which Pocock believes carried 'the mobilization of commerce and politeness in support of Whiggism and the union' to 'a state of imaginative completeness' by developing the celebrated 'four-stage scheme of history' that associated economic growth and politeness with temporal progress (252-3). One may disagree with Pocock's claims about the relative insignificance of 'virtue,' as opposed to 'commerce,' in the Scottish Enlightenment, but there is no denying his point that the tension between virtue and commerce was one of the central issues with which the Scottish literati contended.

If one were to restate Marshall McLuhan's famous adage in Pocockian terms, it might read: 'the idiom is the ideology.' Thus, Tory and Old Whig, commonwealthman and country, are portrayed as 'semi-interchangeable modes of protest' (257) because the same civic humanist rhetoric shaped their criticisms of the Whig establishment. This is both a profound and a dangerous insight — profound insofar as it opens up new and fruitful ways of understanding eighteenth-century political thought and ideology, and dangerous insofar as it suggests the possibility of a linguistic tyranny that fails to distinguish adequately between words on the one hand and sentiments, ideals, and objectives on the other. Another danger suggested by Pocock's methodology is that of losing sight of real historical actors by focusing too sharply on 'ideal' debates between idioms, which may provide the building blocks of discourse but have never actually been known to speak or write. At times the author comes close to succumbing to these dangers, yet he never does so. The methodology discussed in the introduction and practiced throughout the volume is definitely not for everybody, but in the hands of a master like Pocock it works splendidly. This is a wonderful book that no student or scholar of eighteenth-century British thought can afford to miss.

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ADAM PRZEWORSKI. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. London: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. 269. ISBN 0-521-26742-0.

What are the options for a socialist movement within a capitalist society? This is the fundamental question which Przeworski addresses. Should socialists participate in elections? Should socialists rely exclusively on the working class? Should socialists try to reform capitalism or try to abolish it? The title of the book reveals the direction that Przeworski looks for an answer: social democracy — 'the prevalent manner of organization of workers under democratic capitalism.'

Rejecting the confident determinism of German Social Democrats such as Karl Kautsky and the empty voluntarism of Leninist critics of social democracy, Przeworski seeks to preserve what neither of these viewpoints allows — a concept of mistakes. The very possibility of committing mistakes, the author tells us, assumes a choice (contra determinism) among socialist strategies within limiting conditions (contra voluntarism). The book is an effort to learn through the errors of social democratic historical experience.

I will enumerate only some of the lessons that Przeworski claims to have discovered in his historical examination (aided by mathematical models) of social democratic experiments in seven countries.

Among the things that social democrats should have learned is this: successful participation in elections requires broad public support which necessarily negates the special status of the working class and which subsequently reinstates a classless vision of politics. The resulting de-emphasis on class conflict means that the social democratic party loses its unique appeal to workers — causing workers to see society as composed of individuals and themselves as members of collectivities other than class (region, religion, ethnic group). This disintegration of working class consciousness becomes necessary because the proletariat in the narrow sense (manual industrial workers) constitutes a minority of modern capitalist society; electoral success requires winning the maximum number of supporters, whoever they may be. This is the dilemma: the social democratic party can remain an exclusively working class organization only by giving up electoral success (and paradoxically losing support of the practical minded workers) — or — it can opt for electoral success and thereby abandon the classical socialist concern with class conflict and class consciousness. An efficacious social democratic party cannot remain a party of workers alone and yet it can never — as a socialist party — cease being a workers' party.

A second lesson that social democrats must learn, according to Przeworski, is that reforms are not sufficient to bring about socialism. Reforms can lead to socialism only if they are irreversible, cumulative in effects, conducive to new reforms, and essentially directed towards socialism. In historical fact, reforms are reversible, not necessarily cumulative or conducive to new reforms, and not necessarily tending towards socialism.

Whether reforms are in fact successful depends of course on what one means

by *socialism*. If by *socialism* one means a society with full employment and equality, then it can perhaps be reasonably concluded that reforms in some countries (Sweden, for example) have neared the goal, with little likelihood of reversal. If, however, by *socialism* one means a society with maximum freedom from employment (free time), collective rationality, and universal individual autonomy — then no society is near the goal. Indeed, we can not really know today what this socialist society would be like precisely because we do not know what human beings would want and what they would do if they were free. Perhaps the Swedish experiment is a first step toward a libertarian socialism of the second kind. Is it likely that it will be transformed into this kind of society?

The book raises a fundamental question for social democrats: does democratic capitalism generate the need for freedom, a need which must exist if there is to be a political transition toward socialism in the second sense? Here Przeworski's lesson for us is pessimistic. He points out that socialists have assumed that workers' interest in a continual improvement in their material conditions will lead them necessarily to prefer socialism — that socialism is more efficient in satisfying workers' economic needs than capitalism. The author attempts to demonstrate the antithesis: if it can be shown that the transition to socialism involves a deterioration of workers' welfare and if workers have an option of improving their material conditions by cooperating with capitalists, then the socialist orientation cannot be deduced from the material interests of workers. This state of class compromise is a democratic state of the kind envisioned by Keynes. This compromise is tenable as long as it can provide employment and material security.

With the breakdown of the Keynesian project and its replacement by a right-wing supply side economic project (Reagan/Thatcher) — the future of democratic capitalism is itself in doubt. What is now possible is a bourgeois revolution which would free accumulation from all the fetters imposed upon it by democracy (something Przeworski calls 'the Chileanization of capitalist democracy'). On what basis are we to defend the goal of socialism against the promise of capitalism freed from its democratic fetters?

One of the important conclusions of the book is an answer to this question. Przeworski warns us that because socialism is not necessarily more efficient than capitalism — in the sense of better satisfying consumption needs — a powerful case cannot be made for the economic superiority of socialism. If we wish to give reasons why socialism would be preferable to capitalism, we must abandon the narrowly economic view of socialism. The only kind of socialism which is preferable to capitalism claims superiority because it would permit society as a whole — that is, all individuals through a democratic process — to decide collectively which needs should be satisfied in the process of accumulation — something capitalism cannot do because it is necessarily directed (impersonally and autonomously) toward the production of commodities.

Przeworski never explains why society as a whole should ever be motivated to transcend its consumerist orientation and choose freedom. He raises serious doubts about whether reform of capitalism will ever lead to socialism in

his preferred sense. He provides us with every reason to believe that capitalism will sustain popular support as it continues to offer an opportunity to improve material conditions (thus gaining workers' consent to the perpetuation of profit making institutions) and that when it does not it will be maintained by force. In the meantime, we are told, the 'conditions of socialism continue to rot.' He nevertheless supports a reformist strategy and social democracy. We are left with something very anemic: 'a gnawing obsession that forsaken possibilities are hiding somewhere behind the veil of our everyday experiences.' This is socialism with a very pale face. The book is a kind of *One Dimensional Man* for the 80s. This, of course, does not make it false — only depressing for socialists.

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NICHOLAS RESCHER. *Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1985. Pp. xi + 154. US\$19.95. ISBN 0-268-01556-2.

For centuries scholars have taken great delight in refuting and ridiculing Pascal's infamous wager argument (WA). Rescher's discussion valiantly attempts to demonstrate that the WA is in fact sound and, within the context of a certain form of Christian apologetics, persuasive as well. Scholars have repeatedly failed to appreciate this simply as a result of their 'callous refusal to accept the argument on its own terms' (2). A good deal of Rescher's discussion involves setting out exactly what those terms are. Despite being excessively repetitive at times, the book is well-written and fills an important gap in the literature. However, the methodology which Rescher follows is flawed and his project of vindicating the WA is, I believe, ultimately a failure.

The WA states that one is more likely to be better off believing that God exists than not believing. The argument purports to justify an action, rather than to establish a fact. For Pascal, belief in God is rationally warranted on pragmatic and not evidential grounds. According to Rescher, the WA is an unproblematic instance of the general strategy of probabilistic decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Belief in God is warranted for those individuals (i) whose subjective probability measure in God's existence is nonzero, and (ii) who believe that God is of such a nature as to bestow an infinite reward upon

all and only believers. Under these assumptions the expected value of believing in God is greater than the expected value of not believing (13-16, 90-1). The mathematics is incontrovertible. Prudence dictates that one ought to believe. (How one actually goes about inducing within oneself a belief in God is, Rescher argues, a separate psychological question with which the WA proper is not concerned.)

Critics argue that the WA rests on a number of contentious presuppositions and that it will not persuade anyone who questions those presuppositions. For example, the WA will not move the convinced atheist, the radical sceptic who rejects all uses of reason including expected value calculations, the hedonist who lives only for the present as well as all those who subscribe to rival (non-Christian) theologies or (within Christianity) have 'non-standard' ideas about the nature of God (25). Rescher disarms all of these critics in one fell swoop by claiming that Pascal never intended the argument to be directed beyond a very specific audience. The WA is set in an apologetic context. Man, in his natural condition, is selfish, shameful and unworthy. The WA meets man on those terms and speaks, in particular, to the clever and calculating worldly cynic who, though a nominal Christian, is concerned only with his own well-being (34). (The intricate mathematics of the argument is thus essential to it.) Pascal is out to persuade only the cynic who believes no more than that God *might* exist, and yet is dogmatic enough on theological matters that he is not willing to entertain non-standard hypotheses such as that God may not infinitely reward belief arrived at on the basis of prudential calculations, or that God may mercifully reward believers and unbelievers alike. Rescher concedes that all others are untouched by the argument. However, 'it lies in the very nature of things that no argument, however cogent, can exert rational constraint on those who do not accept its premises. This is simply a fact of life and nowise a defect or limitation of the [WA] (25). It is important not to misrepresent what an argument is attempting to accomplish, and in this sense Rescher's remark is well-taken. However in his zeal to salvage the WA no matter what, he fails to appreciate the force of some of the better existing criticisms. Rescher overlooks the basic fact that the premises and presuppositions of an argument can themselves be legitimate objects of rational appraisal. Sometimes it is irrational to operate within the confines set by a given argument. I understand the best critics of the WA to be saying that that argument presupposes just this sort of irrationality, even amongst those to whom the argument is purportedly directed.

Pascal argues that theoretical reason can tell us neither what God is nor that He is. It is because of this inherent limitation of pure reason that practical reason must take over. Yet the WA presupposes some very sweeping epistemic commitments — most notably that one believes that God is of a very specific nature and that either that very God exists or no God at all exists. These are very odd beliefs for a calculating and purely self-interested evidential sceptic who is gambling with his life to be operating with. Surely if he is overlooking some real possibilities it is not rational to wager under these conditions.

Rescher offers an incredulous reply to this worry. 'For most people the idea of God has its limits — the range of god-possibilities they are prepared to con-

sider as real possibilities (prospects whose probability is nonzero) is *one at most*' (97, my italics). Never mind for the moment that this is just empirically false. The main point is that it is irrational for Pascal's worldly cynic to be so utterly naive and dogmatic on theological matters. Rescher says that the best that anyone can do is to adopt that conception of God which is standard in his or her own culture-context (100). But if that literally means refusing to assign *any* non-zero subjective probability to the existence of even minimally non-standard gods then (leaving the convinced atheist aside) I would say that no self-respecting rational sceptic could function within the parameters of this game. The WA presupposes an indefensible parochialism. The WA could convince only the most unreflective and moronic gambler. And that is *not* the sign of a good argument.

This is not an original criticism. I take myself here to be merely reiterating similar points made by recent critics of the WA such as Cargile, Flew, Hacking, Penelhum and Scriven. Rescher has left these critics unanswered. The verdict of history stands; in Hacking's words, the WA is 'worthless as apologetics today.'

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PAUL RICOEUR. *Temps et récit*. Tome III: *Le temps raconté*. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1985. ISBN 2-02-006372-7 (édition complète). ISBN 2-02-008981-5 (volume III).

Voici le couronnement de la grande entreprise de *Temps et récit*. Commencée par l'analyse du cercle entre récit et temporalité, continuée par celle des discours narratifs de l'histoire et de la fiction, elle s'attache enfin dans ce dernier volume aux solutions que ces discours proposent ou, mieux, impliquent par rapport aux apories de la temporalité que la pensée philosophique contemporaine n'aurait fait ni n'aurait pu que rendre plus éclatantes. Il s'agit bel et bien du couronnement de l'entreprise puisque si, au départ, il était question de savoir comment et dans quelle mesure les récits *configurent* le temps — et ceci dans leurs deux modalités fondamentales, sinon uniques, l'histoire et la fiction — ce n'était que pour voir comment et dans quelle mesure ces récits peuvent, conjointement, le *refigurer* et, par là, éclairer et même transformer notre expérience du temps. Ce que suppose l'entreprise et la justifie est l'hypothèse que seule la forme discursive du récit semble pouvoir arriver à bout

— certes, relativement, comme nous le verrons — des difficultés inextricables que pose la compréhension de la temporalité à la réflexion philosophique.

Ces difficultés se résument ou se condensent dans l'irréductibilité, voire l'occultation l'une par l'autre d'une saisie du temps comme temps qui ne peut être que vécu — et dont le projet, bien entendu, est celui d'une phénoménologie — et d'une perspective objective ou 'cosmologique' du temps. Mais cette aporie première et qui, en quelque sorte, déclenche la problématique de la temporalité ne devrait pas reléguer au deuxième plan deux autres: celle qui naît de la représentation du temps comme un singulier collectif, et celle qui concerne la représentabilité — ou, mieux, l'irreprésentabilité — ultime du temps. Quoi qu'il en soit de la conscience de leur existence et de leurs articulations respectives, ce sera la première aporie que privilégiera Ricœur.

Toute la première section de ce volume, en effet, déroule sous forme de polémique — Aristote contre Augustin, Kant contre Husserl, les tenants du prétendu 'temps vulgaire' contre Heidegger — le mouvement de l'aporétique contenue dans l'opposition temps phénoménologique/temps cosmologique afin de montrer, surtout sur les deux exemples considérés canoniques de la phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps chez Husserl et de la phénoménologie herméneutique de la temporalité chez Heidegger, que la pensée réflexive et spéculative ne peut, dans les meilleurs des cas, que porter à son paroxysme cette aporie. Par ailleurs, cinq des sept chapitres de la deuxième section du volume seront entièrement consacrés à la réponse que la fonction narrative offre à cette aporie. Cette disproportion, Ricœur lui-même la reconnaît dans les 'conclusions,' et l'explique par la dimension de la difficulté que semblait représenter la première aporie. Mais c'est aussi que la fonction narrative paraît offrir, au fur et à mesure que l'on passe d'une aporie à l'autre, une réponse de moins en moins adéquate ou satisfaisante, l'enseignement dernier étant alors que la poétique du récit ne saurait saturer entièrement l'aporétique de la temporalité, que le récit n'abolit pas le mystère du temps. Soit donc, d'abord, cette première aporie qui oppose temps de l'âme et temps du monde. L'échec majeur de la théorie augustiniennne, dira Ricœur, est de n'avoir pas réussi à substituer une conception psychologique du temps à une conception cosmologique, de n'avoir pas réfuté la théorie essentielle d'Aristote — celle de la priorité du mouvement sur le temps — tout en ajoutant cependant une dimension légitime à la problématique. Car le défi de la temporalité consiste justement à pouvoir tenir les deux bouts de la chaîne: le temps du monde et le temps de l'âme.

Les trouvailles de la phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps de Husserl, qui marquent un progrès indéniable dans la compréhension du vécu de la temporalité, s'accompagnent cependant d'un paradoxe qui remet sur scène la thèse kantienne de l'invisibilité du temps objectif, de sa condition de présupposition. Tout se passe, en effet, chez Husserl, comme si l'analyse du temps immanent ne pouvait se faire sans des emprunts répétés au temps objectif mis hors circuit, lequel, selon ses déterminations essentielles, reste un temps kantien. Mais, d'autre part, ces déterminations ne semblent pouvoir se soutenir que par une phénoménologie implicite dont l'argument transcendantal marquerait alors à chaque pas la place en creux.

La longue analyse réservée par Ricoeur à la phénoménologie herméneutique de la temporalité de Heidegger, si elle peut constater le dépassement que celle-ci implique du débat entre Husserl et Kant — et encore plus de celui entre Augustin et Aristote — n'en vérifie pas moins ou croit vérifier son échec dans la genèse du concept vulgaire du temps. Or, pour Ricoeur, c'est cet échec qui porte l'aporicité de la temporalité à son comble et résume l'échec de toute notre pensée sur le temps et, au premier chef, de la phénoménologie et de la science (Ricoeur, 1985: 138).

Face à cette aporie, comment réagissent l'histoire et la fiction? La thèse de Ricoeur est que l'histoire répond par l'élaboration d'un tiers-temps — le temps proprement historique — qui ferait médiation entre le temps vécu et le temps cosmique. De son côté, la fiction répondrait à l'aporie avec une solution opposée à la réinscription du temps vécu sur le temps cosmique qu'effectue l'histoire, à savoir les variations imaginatives, les jeux avec le temps. Mais ce qui apparaît d'abord comme opposition ne s'avérerait enfin que rapport complémentaire: l'intentionnalité historique ne semble pouvoir s'effectuer qu'en incorporant à sa visée les ressources de fictionnalisation relevant de l'imaginaire narratif, tandis que l'intentionnalité du récit de fiction ne produirait ses effets de détection et de transformation de l'agir et du pâtir que montre une théorie de la lecture qu'en assumant symétriquement les ressources d'historicisation que lui offrent les tentatives de reconstruction du passé effectif (Ricoeur, 1985: 150).

Cette rapide — trop rapide — description de l'essentiel de la problématique développée autour de la première aporie laisse dans l'ombre un nombre très considérable de thèmes explorés, de positions décrites et discutées, d'hypothèses parfois à peine esquissées. Par endroits — et c'est une caractéristique des trois tomes de *Temps et récit* — l'ouvrage pêche même par un excès de minutie ou de pédagogie lorsque Ricoeur s'arrête longuement à l'exposé plus ou moins glosé de diverses théories. Une des conséquences de cette organisation de l'ouvrage est un certain éclatement ou foisonnement thématique qui rend malaisée la construction d'un compte rendu fidèle à l'ensemble du texte. Qu'il nous soit donc permis de ne nous référer qu'à certaines questions soulevées par les trois apories.

Rien de plus acceptable sans doute que d'essayer de rendre justice à des opérations de l'intellect ou de l'esprit qui ne relèvent pas pourtant de la pensée, de la spéculation ou de la réflexion: ce que Ricoeur appelle les poétiques. On ne saurait louer trop cette sensibilité que Ricoeur avait déjà montré dans la *Métaphore vive* aux fonctions instructives de langages qui ne se veulent ni de près ni de loin théoriques: somme toute, bien avant que les hommes ne se mettent à comprendre théoriquement le monde et leurs vies, ils les saisissaient par le mythe. Mais à supposer que seule la poétique du récit fait face aux apories du temps, et à supposer encore que la spéculation philosophique n'a abouti, dans les meilleurs des cas, qu'à exacerber l'aporétique de la temporalité, qu'est-ce qui rendrait cette spéculation à jamais impuissante face au temps? Ni l'introduction de la dimension psychologique avec Augustin, ni la phénoménologie husserlienne de la conscience ni, enfin, l'herméneutique de la temporalité de

Heidegger n'arrivent à tenir les deux bouts de la chaîne, le temps de l'âme et le temps du monde — encore moins, les tenants de l'objectivisme. Mais qu'est-ce qui permet à Ricœur de passer d'une impossibilité constatée dans les faits, à une impossibilité considérée comme de droit? Par ailleurs, c'est trop vite et presque au passage que Ricœur veut bien 'prêter l'oreille à ce que disent les scientifiques et les épistémologues les plus attentifs aux développements modernes de la théorie du temps' (Ricœur, 1985: 133). Le discours de la science sur le temps ne méritait-il pas, surtout à la lumière des bouleversements radicaux que la physique contemporaine a provoqués dans nos conceptions du temps objectif ou cosmologique, une considération au moins comparable à celle que Ricœur accorde à la théorie physique aristotélicienne? L'affirmation fondamentale de Ricœur, à savoir qu'il n'y a de temps que raconté (Ricœur, 1985: 349) ne paraît pas être exactement celle que toute l'entreprise justifie. Ce que celle-ci montre ou essaie de montrer est plutôt le temps que le récit permet de penser, et tout particulièrement dans sa différence avec ce que la démarche phénoménologique sous une forme ou sous une autre arrive à penser.

Ce n'est pas peu, mais ce n'est que cela sinon les limites que la fonction narrative avouerait dans la représentation du temps seraient des limites absolues non pas de la poétique mais de toute fonction concevable de représentation. Ricœur veut parer aux conséquences d'une telle conclusion lorsque, dans les dernières lignes du livre, il écrit que 'le mystère du temps n'équivaut pas à un interdit pesant sur le langage,' qu'il suscite plutôt l'exigence de penser plus et de dire autrement' (Ricœur, 1985: 392). Mais s'il n'y avait pas de temps pensé que raconté, et si la narration s'avérait impuissante à saturer entièrement l'aporétique de la temporalité, comment penser le temps plus et autrement? La troisième aporie de la temporalité, celle de la représentabilité du temps ne soulève pas seulement la question des limites d'adéquation de la poétique du récit à l'aporétique du temps: ne finit-elle pas aussi par s'imposer à l'entreprise elle-même de *Temps et récit* comme aporie réellement 'intravaillable'?

La deuxième aporie, bien qu'à distinguer clairement de la troisième, ne préparerait pas moins l'apparition de celle-ci en soulevant la question de la totalité du temps, de sa représentation *incontournable* comme un singulier collectif en dépit de la dissociation des trois ek-stases du temps: futur, passé, présent. Ricœur croit trouver dans le récit historique la solution pratique de cette aporie, d'abord comme renoncement à la solution spéculative apportée par Hegel, ensuite comme substitution du problème de la totalisation à celui de la totalité, et comme traitement de cette totalisation en tant que fruit d'une médiation imparfaite entre horizon d'attente, reprise des héritages passés et incidence du présent intempestif. Or, ce que cette totalisation supposerait ce serait justement l'unicité du temps mais en tant qu'idée directrice. Retour à Kant qui, par ailleurs, aurait philosophiquement le sens d'un deuil du savoir absolu.

Pourtant, est-ce le travail du récit historique, de ses présuppositions et de ses fruits qui est ici réellement décrit et examiné ou, plutôt, le point de vue de Ricœur sur ce que le travail de l'histoire doit ou devrait produire? 'Comme Kant, écrit Ricœur, je tiens ... que l'humanité n'est une espèce que dans la mesure où elle a une histoire; réciproquement que, pour qu'il y ait histoire, l'humanité

entière doit en être le sujet au titre de singulier collectif' (Ricœur, 1985: 312). En fait, nous retrouvons ici l'idée avancée dans le volume I de *Temps et récit* suivant laquelle la société humaine est un quasi-personnage, un 'grand individu' (Ricœur, 1983: 278) — ce que Husserl avait déjà appelée une 'personnalité de rang supérieur.' Nous avons signalé dans notre compte rendu de ce premier volume les objections que suscite une telle considération surtout à la lumière de l'analogie organiciste qui la soutend (Miguelez, 1983: 303-4). Elle s'avère maintenant la condition de réponse du récit historique à la deuxième aporie de la temporalité. Est-ce pourtant la réponse du récit historique ou celle d'une certaine historiographie?

Nous arrêtons ici un questionnement que le lecteur, nous sommes certain, ne manquera pas de pousser autrement plus loin. Car, tout comme la thématique foisonne surtout dans ce dernier volume de *Temps et récit*, le questionnement qu'elle éveille n'en est pas moins pourvu d'interrogations. Pourrait-il en être autrement au vu de l'aveu du mystère du temps?

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DOUGLAS H. RUBEN, comp. *Philosophy Journals and Serials: An Analytic Guide*. Westport, Connecticut and London, England: Greenwood Press 1985. Pp. xxvi + 148. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-313-23958-4.

TERRENCE N. TICE and THOMAS P. SLAVENS. *Research Guide to Philosophy*. Chicago: American Library Association 1983. Pp. xii + 608. US\$40.00. ISBN 0-8389-0333-9.

Douglas Ruben has information on 335 philosophical journals and serials arranged alphabetically by title. Most entries consist of two parts. The first part provides facts about such things as title changes, frequency of publication, price, publisher, editor, circulation, manuscript selection, inclusion of book reviews,

target audience and acceptance rate. These facts were gathered via a questionnaire sent to publishers and editors. The second part attempts to portray the serial's or journal's scope, purpose and editorial policy, including comparisons to related journals and serials.

What uses might this book have? The frontmatter mentions three basic uses. It aims at providing a consumers' guide for those considering subscribing to philosophical serials or journals: libraries and professionals with spare money. Another use hoped for is as a research tool to point scholars toward the journals and serials most likely to be helpful on a particular subject or project. The third use is to aid those attempting to publish their own work in these journals or serials. One wishing to submit work may find the most appropriate serial or journal, the one most likely to accept one's submission, or the one which will give one's endeavor the broadest exposure. The information about required formats for manuscripts will also be useful to some.

This book's best chance of being helpful lies with this third use. For beginning students of philosophy and others unfamiliar with these journals or serials, no substitute for browsing through the latest few issues — skim-reading articles of interest — could really provide a trustworthy and unprejudiced impression. For researchers doing philosophy, those with specific topics will find this book makes no reference to many topics: neither *Hume Studies* nor *Kant-Studien* is listed. These philosophers do not even appear in the index although Jung and Rand do. On the other hand, those looking for articles 'off the beaten path' on some general subject will need to browse in any case. This book will save philosophers very little time over the simpler entries found in the more comprehensive list in *Ulrich's International Periodical Dictionary*.

As to *Philosophy Journals and Serials* being of use of anyone wishing to have an article published, on the one hand, the editor's assessment of the percentage of submitted papers accepted for publication should prove useful. This information is not available in *Ulrich's*. This feature may enable one to maximize the chances of having a paper accepted, and also aid others in evaluating the 'value' of one's publications. On the other hand, a few warnings are in order. First, the information found in the first parts of these entries will have a rather short half-life. Prices, editors and even the publishers will change. The latest issue of the serial or journal, or the latest edition of *Ulrich's* will be a safer source for much of this information.

More seriously, this book includes a number of confused or even misleading statements. Of *Creation Evolution* we are told that a 'typical issue fills the reader with inspiration.' Fortunately, the side favoured by this journal is made clear earlier in its entry. I was also surprised to learn that in the *Objectivist Forum* 'short moving papers put to rest the illusory concepts of justice, economy, education and philosophy.' One wonders whether universities might now put to rest the corresponding faculties and departments. Learning that the editors of *The Journal of Philosophy* give 'special attention ... to an extended analysis of topics covered in *Ethics*, [The] *Monist* and *Mind*,' one might think that more footnotes to recent articles in *these* journals a good strategy for getting submissions accepted. Nor am I sure in what sense *The Review of Metaphysics*

'contrasts its new ideas with the more classic writings of ... *American Philosophical Quarterly* and [The] *Monist*.' Perhaps the most misleading entry is that for the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Even though this error has been pointed out elsewhere, it bears repeating that this journal is not only for 'sharply focused essays on Aristotle.'

Of course, the well informed reader would not be misled by these odd statements, but then he will not need this book, and anyone who might need this book cannot trust it.

Next year is the twentieth anniversary of the publishing of *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Given the busy pace philosophers have maintained during the last score of years, organizing a supplementary volume (perhaps for the twenty-fifth anniversary) would be a good idea. This *Research Guide to Philosophy* does not attempt to be this, but rather aims at describing the main developments through the past hundred years. The first part deals with work on the major historical schools and thinkers. The second part covers sixteen central areas of contemporary philosophy. At the end of each subsection is a list of representative and exemplary books including special volumes from philosophy journals. In Part III an annotated bibliography for reference works in philosophy is provided.

This is for the most part an interesting and useful book. Even so, I could not recommend it to the beginning student and I must caution users to proceed with care. Consider the lengthiest subsection from part II, 'Ethics: Moral Philosophy.' The one sentence directly on *A Theory Of Justice* calls its author a utilitarian. John Rawls's theory certainly has some utilitarian elements, but it also has Kantian elements. So some qualification or word of caution would have been in order to protect the beginner. Pointing out eight pages later that A. Donagan thinks Rawls has basically produced a theory of human rights is too little qualification, too late.

More puzzling is citing of J. Jaynes's *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* in the subsection of the Presocratic philosophers. Jaynes's book has only one chapter on the Greeks (and another on the the *Iliad*), and deals more with Homer and Solon than the Presocratics. The central thesis of this book is an historical/psychological one about when humans first had roughly our mental capabilities or level of consciousness. Jaynes's training is in psychology and most commentators think he has overstated his case. This book simply is not either 'representative' or 'exemplary' as recent literature on the Presocratic philosophers.

All in all, these sorts of slips are rare, and the book is well worth consulting for the lists of works cited. One might not always agree with the authors' impressions of this or that work or of what is of central importance in a particular subsection, but they mostly keep their points brief and interesting.

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FREDERIC SCHICK. *Having Reasons: An Essay on Rationality and Sociality*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1984. Pp. 158. ISBN 0-691-07280-9.

Some people lie quietly on white tables with needles stuck into their veins, giving blood for the benefit of those they will never see. In the well-known Milgram experiments, volunteer 'teachers' obediently administered what they supposed were 450-volt shocks to slow 'learners,' an unwelcome reminder of recent history. Less dramatically and further back, Adam, seeing that Eve wanted red wine for dinner and Ida wanted white, brought home red, thereby obliging Eve and crossing Ida. Apparent beneficence, malice, kindness and spite — what explains them?

One answer is that people always pursue their own interests. We act for the benefit (or detriment) of others, if we do, in the expectation of some indirect benefit to ourselves. This is the rationalist's explanation.

Schick's aim is to show the necessity of, and propose a plausible candidate for, a more adequate theory of human behavior: *sociality*. We sometimes act directly for the benefit (or detriment) of others, without going through the narrow and twisted passages of the self-interested self.

Schick is no cheap antagonist. He provides the rationalist with arms before shooting him down. How, for example, can the rationalist explain that people sometimes cooperate, at the risk of personal loss? He suggests that we may have reasons, independently of lures or threats: we are responsive to others.

Adam's interests (preferences, desires, utilities) are *responsive* to Eve's 'where he has these interests because of what he thinks hers are ... or where he *would* have certain interests if he had an opinion on what hers are and would have them because of that opinion' (80, 81). So Adam may bring home the red wine for Eve, not because he is hoping for some return on his investment later on in the evening, or is fearful of her resentment, but because he is swayed by Eve's desire and adopts it as his own. He wants what Eve wants because she wants it. Thus cooperation, and even altruism, can be explained in rationalist terms — as second-hand self-interest.

This accounts for a wide range of human behavior, Schick argues, but not enough, not all of it. There is another possibility: Adam chose solely on the basis of what Eve wanted; he did not *come* to want it himself and then choose it. Some reasons may be social and not rational. To the imagined critic's 'surely he did it to please her' Schick replies that the 'surely' begs the question, 'for the only backing it has is the idea that all choices are rational, and that is just what is in question' (115).

Similar objections can be made to the rationalist interpretations of the behavior of the blood donors and the volunteer 'teachers,' though Schick does not press them. He argues, more generally, that the rationalist is guilty of misplaced arrogance. Why should a person choose socially? What could move him? 'The challenge comes from a rationalist who feels himself secure,' Schick says (117). But a counterdemand can be made: Why does a person choose rational-

ly? What reasons could he have? The silence is about equal. Our reasons, social and rational, are unsupported by other reasons.

Schick claims he has no arguments, but this is egotism or false modesty. The best we can hope for in explaining ourselves is plausibility, and in this respect he succeeds, with few exceptions, admirably. People *do* sometimes give blood, among other things, simply because others need it, i.e., without thinking of what they might get in return or of their own exemplary altruism. What horrifies us about the volunteer 'teachers' supports Schick's view: they simply followed orders, and 'obedience is a sort of sociality' (98).

One exception is his Humpty Dumpty use of words such as 'want' and 'choose.' According to Schick, 'we don't choose what we want — we choose something and *then* come to want it, for choosing is *coming to want*' (11). That's not the way I want to live, even if it would make happiness easier.

Another is his view of ethics. Schick argues that 'every set of ideals is an ethics' (135). But, as he notes, a person may be vindictive. 'Suppose that Adam (still tasting that apple) wanted all men to spite all women. Would then "Spite every woman you can" be a moral precept?' (133) He concludes that it cannot be ruled out *a priori*, but it can be rejected. 'The line to take against it isn't that it cannot derive from an ethics but that it does not derive from ours' (135). The line is too liberal. On this view, an avowed subverter of morality, conventional or otherwise, would be the possessor of an ethics. 'Evil be thou my good' could be a moral precept. Reverse utilitarianism — 'Inflict unnecessary pain whenever you can' — would deserve the attention of moral theorists. And what would rule out a commitment to bodybuilding, say, as a moral ideal? The objection is not moral but conceptual: 'Everything is what it is and not another thing.'

But the philosophical insights outweigh the infrequent implausibility, and the book has aesthetic merits as well. It is beautifully written (in English, for the most part, although those with a taste for rigorous formal proofs of the obvious will not be disappointed). Schick has a talent for clarity, an eye for the ridiculous, and he speaks in a human voice (except for the academic 'we' he occasionally reverts to in the preface).

We are more than clever little self-interested animals. Our reasons are various. We are sometimes mean and spiteful, beneficent or uncommonly kind. Rationality should be kept in its place. In defending these common-sense claims, Schick has made a valuable contribution toward an adequate theory of why we do what we do. The apparent is sometimes genuine.

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ROBERT L. SIMON. *Sports and Social Values*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1985. Pp. xi + 157. ISBN 0-13-837881-9.

Simon defends an ideal theory of sport, which finds the essence of sports competition in a mutual quest for excellence between persons, as opposed to a 'zero-sum game,' a means to self-improvement, a form of self-aggrandizement, an outlet for aggression, an arena for socio-political conflict, or any other thing one might associate with competition in sports. Though conceding that these other things may indeed be features of sports in the actual world, the ideal theory affords a perspective from which they may be criticized and thus a foundation for reform. The strategy is as old as the *Republic* and as contemporary as *A Theory of Justice*, and its perennial problem is a bewildering distance between concrete reality and the remote vantage point of ideal theory. Simon inherits this sort of problem, as can be observed in his rejection of the view that competition is selfish and egoistic. 'Competitors need not have as their primary motive the desire to beat opponents,' Simon says, for 'although as good competitors they try their best to win, they may value the competition not primarily for its outcome but for the process of testing oneself against other athletes' (20). What they 'may value' here, the testing, is an expression of that quest for excellence which Simon's theory idealizes. The leading question this raises for *non*-ideal theory is whether this value is sufficiently expressed, or expressible, in actual institutions of sport; or whether other, less attractive values dominate the motivation of sports competitors, and perhaps are bound to do so in virtue of the actual dispositions of competitors to which institutions of competitive sport give rise. Unfortunately Simon tends to deal with such matters with heavily qualified intimations about what one 'may' or 'need not' value. The sceptical reader can easily induce stalemate by rehearsing equally qualified thoughts, such as 'Competition may, just conceivably, cater to and foster a desire to thrash one's opponents' or 'Boxers need not be as concerned with ability-testing as with trying to knock each other out.' If reflections of this latter sort were borne out over a broad spectrum of competitive sports, Simon's ideal theory would have been proven unhappily utopian; it would be a defense of a value in competition which is not sufficiently valued, which cannot muster adequate support in the real world. To lay this doubt to rest he must descend from ideal theory and reply to those who would argue that sports competitions should be played down in our lives, because of their moral, social, and psychological costs. Otherwise, simply distinguishing 'competition as such' from 'objectionable features of actual competitive practices' inspires no conviction (28). So one is not convinced by Simon's thought that boxing is essentially controlled aggression rather than a genuine example of violence (49) and that football is 'not violence but the controlled use of force' (60). The retreat to ideal theory implicit in these remarks begs the question whether boxing and football *as they are* can be detached from their violent aspects so as to correspond to what they are 'as such,' in the ideal theory. The question is not answered by the delicate reply that one 'need not' enjoy boxing for the violence of it, that one 'may' see in football merely the controlled use of force.

The winners of an athletic contest, Simon holds, 'need not be viewed as 'winners' in any larger sense and losers need not be bad or inferior persons' (26). Unfortunately he does not sustain this admirable thought, and the passage just quoted merits comparison with his case for ranking competition as mutual quest for excellence as more fundamental than competition as self-improvement: 'Suppose for example that airline pilots were given the following advice. "Don't worry about whether you are good or bad pilots. Just try to get better and better every day." Surely both passengers and pilots have a right to know not just whether individual pilots are improving but also what level of achievement each individual actually has attained' (24). The comparison of sports competitors to pilots is preposterous, of course, and disastrously so, since nothing more is advanced in favor of Simon's derivation of a right for competitors to know how good they are, corresponding to the airline pilot's and his passengers' rights. Did the inventor of the Hula Hoop have a right to know that he was the best Hula Hooper? Did I violate his right by getting involved with Hula Hooping but in a non-competitive way? The pilot/athlete comparison is tailor-made to awaken the fear that we *do* tend to take competitive sports too seriously. Those who have this fear regard the excellences of competitive sport as either trivial compared to the various costs they are inextricably connected with (What is so great, they would ask, about the controlled use of force that is inseparable from playing football?), or else separable and transferable to non-competitive contexts (the healthy bodies of competitive athletes can be attained in any number of non-competitive activities). At times Simon suggests that institutions of competitive sport, such as intercollegiate athletics programs, foster broad-based virtues which are desirable in almost any cooperative practice, and for this reason he defends such programs as 'logically parallel in some respects to an academic honors program' (sic, 153). This is the *form*, certainly, of a reply to the sceptic about the value of sports competition, but the content lacks credibility. Even Simon, in a less whimsical moment, is sceptical about the alleged character-building quality of competition, noting that sports participants may manifest desirable character traits though the participation itself does not cause those traits (18).

Simon applies Mill's Harm Principle illuminatingly to boxing; he says intriguingly if overly schematic things about personal identity in connection with performance-enhancing drugs; he rebuts Rawls's dim view of appeals to desert (though with marginal connection to his topic); he deploys Dworkin's distinction between equal treatment and treatment as an equal, by way of staking out a position on sex equality in sport; and, in general, he has interesting things to say when he refrains from relying on ideal theory.

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MARY TILES. *Bachelard: Science and Objectivity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. xxii + 242. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-2480-5); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28973-4).

This monograph on Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science, the first to be written in English, is part of a *Modern European Philosophy* series devoted to 'contributions by philosophers who have worked in the analytical tradition but now tackle problems specifically raised by philosophers of the main traditions to be found within contemporary Europe' (Editor's Introduction, xiii). Mary Tiles' contribution will be especially welcomed by those who have worked on the 'main-trend' debates concerning rationality, objectivity and conceptual change in science, as found in the writings of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend.

Philosophy of science has traditionally assumed that rationality is the hallmark of scientific endeavour. The analytic question about the structure and function of scientific theories, however central it appears to be, has invariably been subordinated to the question of their epistemological assessment, this mode of evaluation being taken to constitute their characteristic feature. The main intent was of course to show the possibility of a rational and objective evaluation of scientific theories. The rationalists' approach was to develop epistemology as a branch of the *theory of rationality* by providing a *theory of method* which underwrites and explains the rationality and objectivity of knowledge. Popper's *critical rationalism* is quite explicit in this respect: for him, all knowledge is fallible and scientific method is a matter of conjecture and refutation.

Bachelard's *applied rationalism* follows essentially the same general pattern (namely a theory of rationality coupled with a theory of method) in that a notion of *recurrent history* comes to play a methodological role in his epistemology. Like Popper, Bachelard is committed to the rationality of science: *la science est la rationalité en marche*. His theory of rationality, however, is more Hegelian than Socratic in tone: science is both a *product* and a *producer* of rationality. Thus, science not only relies on its own method, it is moreover guided by its own history (which is always re-told and brought up-to-date, unlike most other history). True, Bachelard takes the dialectical process of science's self-construction to be revealed in History much more than in Method (or, for that matter, in Language, since Bachelard never makes the 'linguistic turn'). (See also D. Lecourt, *Bachelard, le jour et la nuit*, 1974, in which it is argued that Bachelard never really arrived at a full-fledged methodology.) Nonetheless, one can also detect a bachelardian methodology in his works on the history of scientific concepts. So where Popper develops a methodology for sentences or *statements* (the only entities of which 'falsifiability' is predicable, strictly speaking), Bachelard implicitly pursues a methodology for *concepts* by inquiring into their historical applicability.

Parallels abound between Popper's *scientific method* and Bachelard's *scientific thought* and have indeed been noted by many, but Mary Tiles is right in

warning us against superficial similarities. Her introductory chapter deals with philosophical methodology and the problems related to comparative epistemology. She then goes on to present in successive chapters the main aspects of Bachelard's characterization of contemporary scientific thought, namely 'Non-Cartesian Epistemology,' 'Non-Euclidian Mathematics,' and 'Non-Baconian Science.' The originality of her treatment, however, lies neither in this tripartition nor in the affiliations of Bachelard's philosophy of science with Descartes, Kant, or Duhem that she outlines, but rather in her comparison of Bachelard's approach with Frege and his attempts to logically reconstruct scientific theories. Tiles seems to share with Bachelard the belief in the relative sterility of logic as compared to the fertility of mathematics for providing a conceptual framework for physical science. The last chapter on the 'Epistemology of Revolutions' will leave some readers thirsting for more, since Tiles admittedly falls short of a systematic comparative treatment of Bachelard's *epistemological ruptures* and the *Weltanschauung* views of Kuhn and Feyerabend. (On this issue, the English reader will have to rely on Bhaskar's 'Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science' [*New Left Review*, 1975] and Gaukroger's excellent 'Bachelard and the Problem of Epistemological Analysis' [*Studies in the History and philosophy of Science*, 1976].)

Tiles' interest in Bachelard seems to have been prompted by the possibility of using his work to throw light on the much debated *incommensurability* theses. For Bachelard held a model of scientific evolution which involves strong moments of discontinuity. But of course, incommensurability, *dans la lettre comme dans l'esprit*, is nowhere to be found in Bachelard, since his whole approach stresses the *rectification of concepts* and science's peculiar way of incorporating or internalizing its own history. I cannot but fully agree with Tiles that the discussions of incommensurability are locked in problems which are 'generated more by the framework of discussion ... than by the phenomenon supposedly under discussion' (xvi). But having noted that, she immediately indulges in raising incommensurability to the (meta)level of philosophy of science and sees no other *modus operandi* than to assess Bachelard's philosophy of science with respect to science itself; this is why she misses the opportunity to engage systematically into comparative epistemology.

This is somewhat disappointing since e.g. Lakatos' *methodology of research programmes* is similar in important respects to Bachelard's view. (Unfortunately, Tiles brushes Lakatos off in a single footnote [14].) Both philosophers take the history of science to provide a quasi-empirical basis for the critical assessment of different historical methodologies, and both make a rather questionable appeal to 'rationally reconstructed history' (compare Bachelard's *histoire sanctionnée*).

It should not be surprising, then, that Tiles' most innovative remarks pertain to the contrast between Bachelard's spiritualism and Frege's logicism, which deeply influenced the early logical empiricists. She makes excellent comments on Bachelard's psychologism; she discusses his view that the mathematical formalism of a physical theory is inseparable from its heuristic component (as well as its empirical content); and she shows Bachelard's vindication of the

untenability of regarding some observational strata of experience as being exempt from theoretical re-interpretation. This makes for a valuable contribution towards rectifying the undue neglect of Bachelard by philosophers in the analytic tradition.

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WALTER WATSON. *The Archetectonics of Meaning: Foundations of the New Pluralism*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 205. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-072-2); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-073-0).

Watson claims that philosophic diversity, i.e., the current pluralism of pluralisms in which 'the truth admits of more than one valid formulation' (ix), is not cause for lamentation but for rejoicing. 'There is something marvelous in this state of affairs' (1). Watson's aim is 'to bring into awareness the multiple modes in which we become aware of the world' (168); 'to clarify this situation [the pluralism of pluralisms] by investigating the foundations of pluralism' (x). He generates his overview in part through the principle of reciprocal priorities which he claims 'underlie all philosophic differences' (10). For example, 'each archic perspective could be a perspective on perspectives, and each reality a reality of realities' (71).

*In nuce*, Watson looks at the whole universe as if through the wrong end of a telescope. This allows him to condense his view into a respectable schema, one chapter and one variable at a time, to establish a philosophical star chart, so that we too may be able to pick out the various constellations or procedural patterns ('arbitrary or conventional elements inseparable from the nature of thought itself' [ix]) into which all human endeavours *qua* texts are to be found. In some respects, Watson's archic matrix table (151) is not unlike Kant's table of categories (B 106) though it is certainly more all-encompassing. Kant understood architectonic as 'the art of constructing systems' (B 860). But Watson performs an 'architectonic of architectonics' (149) subsuming not only Kant but all philosophies, the arts, sciences, and social sciences as well. Watson is looking for interpretative universals in a 'universal tradition' (171), so an overview of his overview, an awareness of his 'awareness of awareness' (170) could easily have competed against Stace's foldout roadmap of the Hegelian subcontinent.

Watson offers a sweeping and scholarly purview of over 100 texts ('used in a broad sense to include any expression of thought' [13]). 'Every text is not only an argument [Ch. IV: method] by an author [Ch. II: perspective] about a subject matter [Ch. III: reality], it is also for the sake of some end or purpose or function [Ch. V: principle]' (101). 'The basic fact here is that the one world can be known in multiple ways, and the causes, and the archic matrix, identify these ways. The whole of every text is the work of an author [1], is about a reality [2], is an ordering of parts in a whole [3], and is for the sake of some function [4], and we can approach the whole text through any of these as a starting point' (160). Hence a matrix with four variables.

Perhaps the easiest entry into Watson's system of systems is to review the examples which he uses, to great advantage, to illustrate each of the archic values of the four variables. The matrix establishes only procedural or formal categories and function independently of content.

I. *Perspective* or the point of view taken by the author of the text: personal or individual (21); objective or scientific (26); diaphanic or transcendent (32); disciplinary or shared (37).

II. *Reality* or what is discussed in the text: existential or apparent (50); substrative or materialist (57); noumenal or ideal (60); essential or general (68).

III. *Method* or how the text is presented: agnostic or pragmatic (77); logistic or formal (84); dialectic (91); problematic or analytic (99).

IV. *Principles* or why the text is presented: creative or arbitrary (114); elemental or observational (125-6); comprehensive (135); reflexive or self-caused (147-8).

Once these archic variables are uncovered, they are used to analyse the structure of various disciplines, the 'internal determinants of the text' (14) in general and to interpret several philosophical, scientific, and literary works specifically.

Watson's project, apart from its universal scope, is ingenious, even if he does say as much himself: 'This book presents what I take to be the most significant philosophic discovery of the present century' (ix). However, it is not entirely convincing. He anticipates several key questions; for example, 'what mode are we in when we talk about the matrix itself?' (155). Both Watson, and his architectonics of meaning, fall into the Aristotelian mode, the elements of which 'preserve the cognitive content of all the other modes in a determinate pluralism' (153). This comes as no surprise. All of the elements in the 'Sophistic mode' are derived from what is nearest and most evident to us (37, 42, 73, 103). The Aristotelian mode, on the other hand, is the alternative left over after the others appear to have been exhausted (32, 61, 91, 136). Although this mode must be considered furthest from us and least evident to us, its strength is said to lie in the reflexive principles which 'bring the different philosophies of the different traditions together as complementary components of a single science' (165). Watson asks why the matrix has only these four variables and no others (155). The more convincing and sustained argument is that the pure modes of the matrix map the four Aristotelian causes (158). However, his first argument is particularly weak: 'since these four variables suffice to produce a functioning

whole, there is no need for any more. Each of them is necessary, and together are sufficient. There are these four and no others' (101). You could also argue that no motor vehicle can have more than four wheels because it does not function with just three but works just perfectly with four.

However, the matrix serves as its own panoply. As Watson admits, 'thinkers in other modes cannot be expected to agree either on the existence of such a matrix or on its particular elements. Were everyone to agree on the archic matrix, it would *ipso facto* be refuted' (168). 'All such criticisms serve to confirm the matrix and establish its validity' (169). In the face of this dilemma, Watson himself should offer the most telling criticism of his project: 'we may anticipate that once the character of the archic elements become clear, the differences among them will seem obvious and even, because non-substantive, of no great importance' (22).

Archic analysis means making an archic matrix composed of archic elements ('real features of texts' [27]), viz., archic variables and their respective archic values generating an archic profile which results in an individual's archic mode, be it pure or mixed. Since each profile has four variables and each variable four possible values, there are 256 'possible starting points' (151; cf. 162). Watson identifies four profiles in which the elements have an affinity for one another resulting in what he calls 'pure modes.' 'The synthesis of heterogeneous elements in the mixed modes presents difficulties at the sutures' (154), but it is debatable whether certain combinations of the elements, when not 'abstractly considered' (162), can actually be sutured together.

Although Watson deals with over 120 authors (texts) in light of one or more of the variables, less than a third of them receive complete profiles. More often than not the reader has to piece the four parts of the analysis together in order to get a completed picture. Of the 57 authors mentioned under but one variable, Wittgenstein and Socrates deserve complete profiles. But it is a book worth reading.

There are also several typographical errors to be corrected: x, 23, 36, 38, 50, 57, 68, 72, 75 (2), 78, 123 (2), 130, 205.

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ALAN R. WHITE. *Grounds of Liability: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985. Pp. x + 128. US\$35.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-876191-0); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-876197-X).

Someone picking up a book with this title, and discovering that it is meant

to be both an introduction to and an example of jurisprudence — the philosophy of law — might expect to find in it some discussion of the general principles of liability, as well as of the concepts through which those principles are applied: some discussion, perhaps, of the fundamental principle that criminal liability requires both an *actus reus* and *mens rea*, and of the principles which underpin legal interpretations of these concepts. Such a reader is due for a surprise: for Professor White offers an account, and an example, for jurisprudence as a kind of conceptual analysis which is entirely distinct from both empirical (e.g. historical) and evaluative enquiries — from both historical and censorial jurisprudence. The proper and distinctive task of jurisprudence, as an exercise of the philosopher's peculiar skills, is the analysis of concepts; and such analysis must be sharply distinguished both from any historical enquiry into the development of the substantial principles of liability which inform a system of law, and from any evaluative enquiry into the principles which *should* inform a system of law.

After two introductory chapters on the character of philosophical and jurisprudential analysis, we are thus offered analyses of the concepts of act, *actus reus*, and voluntary conduct; of intention, recklessness and negligence; and of truth and falsity as they apply to statements about the future. In each case White analyses the ordinary extra-legal use of the concept, and its use within the law (i.e. by courts in deciding cases); he argues that, in most cases, the legal concept is identical with the extra-legal concept; and he criticises mistaken philosophical and jurisprudential analyses of the concept. The style of analysis will be familiar to any reader of White's previous work (or of Ryle and J.L. Austin). Close (though in White's case schematic) attention is paid to the details of ordinary usage; concepts are explicated, and distinguished from others with which they might be confused, by a series of examples and contrasts: examples of what we would say when ... ; contrasts between the ways in which different concepts can be used or qualified, and between the kinds of context in which they are appropriate.

White's detailed analyses are often sensible and useful (for instance on intention [66-82]) — though they are sometimes so concisely expressed and argued as to tax the understanding, especially of one who looks to this as an introductory book (see, for example, the argument against volition theories of action [31]; or the analysis of 'voluntary' [49-51]). But the book suffers seriously from the limits which White imposes on his enterprise.

First, the enquiry is rigorously ahistorical. Just as (13) philosophers from Plato to Ryle have offered competing accounts of the same concept of knowledge, so jurists from Austin to Williams have offered competing accounts of the same concept of e.g. intention or recklessness, which the courts have been using for the last century or so. Just as we can analyse *the* concept of knowledge, as it is used in ordinary discourse, so we can analyse *the* concept of intention or recklessness, as it is and has been used by the courts. No attention is paid to the possibilities that, firstly, the use and meaning of a legal

concept may change through time; and that, secondly, there may be contemporaneous disagreement not just between analysts *about* the proper account of a concept, but between courts (as concept-users) *in* their use of a concept.

Second, White does not do justice to the way in which courts, unlike ordinary language-users, are both users and analysts. He recognises (19) that the authoritative role of the courts in determining the legal use of a term creates a disanalogy between legal and extra-legal language; but he fails to reconcile his claim (16) that an analysis of a legal concept is answerable to the use of that concept by the courts (that it is correct insofar as it provides an accurate account of that usage), with the claim that courts may make mistakes in the way that umpires may make mistakes (20). What is meant to reconcile these claims is the further claim that, as courts themselves insist, the legal meaning of the relevant concepts is usually identical with their extra-legal meaning; thus judges can make mistakes — albeit mistakes which are binding until overruled — in their analysis of the extra-legal meaning of a term. But why should we take this (by no means universal) aspect of the judges' account of what they are doing as authoritative, rather than saying that they are in fact sometimes giving new and different meanings to familiar terms, whilst giving a mistaken account of what they are doing?

Third, White eschews any attention to the arguments of principle which often underpin judicial accounts of the meaning of legal concepts. The point here is not (just) that an understanding of the 'grounds of liability' is radically incomplete without some account of the principles which determine these as the grounds; it is also that the meanings of legal concepts are and must be determined in part by an understanding of the values and principles which those concepts are used to express and apply. We cannot hope to understand the legal controversies about, for instance, the proper meaning of 'intention' or 'recklessness' without attending both (as White does attend) to the philosophical assumptions which underlie the competing accounts, and (as White does not) to the more basic principles of liability which must justify an interpretation as being appropriate to the proper concerns of a system of law. This is not to say that the philosopher must engage in arguments of principle if she is to carry out her task; there is still room for philosophy as neutral analysis. It is to say that any worthwhile philosophical analysis must analyse more than the surface usage of terms; it must also seek to understand the principles which inform that usage. White's failure to engage with this dimension of the enquiry undermines his own stated aim of understanding the concepts in terms of which the grounds of liability are expressed.

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GEORGE F. WILL. *Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does*. New York: Simon and Schuster 1983. Pp. 186. US\$13.95. ISBN 0-671-42733-4.

There was a time when politics and moral philosophy were easier companions than they now seem to be. In the contemporary imagination each, as in William James' distinction between the tough and soft minded, is separated by a disdainful regard of the other. Reality as we moderns insist, being tough, places politics not moral philosophy at its centre. The one, politics, lends itself to the terrain of action, strategy and smoke-filled back rooms where, as modern mythology would have us believe, the future is shaped by tough and cunning folk pitting personal ambition against the wiliness of an unfathomable political marketplace. The other, moral philosophy, a softer minded pursuit emanating not infrequently from on high as from the pulpit or the university lectern is, within the same modern mythology, seen as an innocuous, indeed harmless sport wherein politely disputatious folk seem to go about insisting that others discern the good from evil much as they do. The centrality of politics and marginality of moral philosophy is, of course, a cause of celebration to some. Thus those who talk well and frequently of the need to keep the state out of the bedrooms of the nation or the church and its imaging of good from evil out of the formal contours of the body politic will be somewhat bothered by George F. Will's *Statecraft as Soulcraft*.

To Will, the marriage of politics and philosophy is necessary for several reasons: some philosophical, some political, some historical and perhaps even some personal. Starting with the personal and moving on through to the philosophical, it is vital to recall that Will, an ex-philosophy professor with a sterling Oxford Princeton pedigree, has as he ages turned from the lectern to the tough back rooms of politics. Will is not a politician per se but as readers of his influential column on politics and power for *Newsweek* know, he is a man to be reckoned with, a conservatively minded man who has the ear of presidents, prime ministers and those who purport to act legitimately as heads of state. Now when a sensitive, articulate man like Will turns from talking moral philosophy to undergraduates to talking politics to the powerful, one ought not be surprised when he expresses a need, a strong personally grounded one, to pull the two together. This is more than some appeal to a psychological law of consistency or balance but a logically feasible philosophical position. Since Plato's philosopher King it has been held high as an ideal that when politicians act a bit more like moral philosophers and moral philosophers a bit more like politicians the world of each, and indeed of all of us, would be far better off.

Will's position stems from his belief that all is not well in the practice of statecraft when shorn from soulcraft. Indeed when youth views politics as amoral, objective and instrumentally calculable and accepts this state of affairs, then the moral consequences of political action are forfeited. This is the despair of the technocrat, the marketer, the pollster, the huckster and the image maker as they like ants to a sugar spill tumble. Will is no simple namer of current names, no whistleblower here. Will's explanation of the emergence of the

schism between statecraft and soulcraft is grounded not in the immediacy of the political disputes between liberals and conservatives, democrats and republicans, labour and management or left and right, but, as Leo Strauss does so well, in the tension between the 'ancients' and 'the moderns.' Will's suturing of the severance of statecraft from soulcraft to the tension between the ancients and 'moderns' is actually a naming of villains and heroes in Will's personal reading of the history of ideas. The extreme objectivism and pluralism which create a disdain for matters of the soul, matters of value, of absolute good and evil have emerged from the pen and lips of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Smith and interestingly the founding fathers of the United States. These individuals have insisted that at the heart of real politics is self interest and that the law is concerned solely with external behavior, not the inner life and workings of Homo Sapiens. These theorists have imbued modernity with a notion of political realism which masks the essential and, to Will, necessary alliance of statecraft (the external world) with soulcraft (the internal).

The heroes in Will's reading of the history of ideas bear a message seeped in the wisdom of the ancients. They — namely Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas and Burke — are the legacy of the pure 'Conservatism' which unfortunately for us in the western world is not being practiced even by those who call themselves, as Reagan, Thatcher and Mulroney certainly do, 'Conservatives.' In Will's heroes he locates voices in whom law involves the fusing of reason and passion not merely the insistence upon reason as the criterion of enlightenment. The role of the state is more than a mere night watchman over private property but an embodiment of the public passions, an expression of the collective values as experienced not merely as embodied in concretized desires, in material goods.

Will has put his finger on the pulse of a problem at the heart of politics. It has indeed become cold and serves the body but neither the heart nor spirit of its citizens. It is the era of the specialist; however, its two dimensionality apparently finds in Will less a variation on an analysis of alienation than an excursus into the history of ideas. Will laments the lack of ideas in politics but keenly believes that his ideals, those of Burke and the like, are indeed the ideals which will rekindle the possibility of the university professor and philosopher as king. It is too bad that when one weds idealism to politics one often finds in the sub-text just another hidden agendum igniting 'reasonable passions' in the name of political health, wealth and well-being.

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