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Editor

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6G 2E5

Editeur associé

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières
C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada
G9A 5H7

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie is now entering its sixth year of publication. We have become established both academically and financially. Accordingly, the category of Sustaining Subscriber is being abolished. The Editors would like publicly to express their immense gratitude to those Departments who purchased sustaining subscriptions in our early years. The support to our morale from that act of faith has been as important to us as the financial support. We shall aim in the future to show our gratitude further by continuing to be a publication with which our supporters may be proud to have been associated.

Roger A. Shiner
J.N. Kaufmann

NOTE DES DIRECTEURS

La *Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie* a fait ses débuts il y a six ans. Nous avons établi notre réputation académique et financièrement. En conséquence la catégorie d'abonnement de soutien a été abolie. Les Directeurs voudraient exprimer publiquement leur immense gratitude aux Départements qui ont souscrits comme abonnement de soutien dans les premières années. Leur soutien moral que nous avons reçu par ce geste de confiance nous a été aussie important que le soutien financier. A l'avenir, nous essaierons de continuer à monter notre reconnaissance en continuant d'être une publication dont nos supporters auront raison d'être fiers.

Roger A. Shiner
J.N.Kaufmann

S.C. BROWN, ed. *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. vi + 262. US$12.95. ISBN 0-521-26940-7.

This is volume 17 in the annual lecture series of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. About half the papers deal largely with empirical contributions to the objectivity debate, stressing the limits of cultural divergence. Most of the remaining, more narrowly philosophical contributions explore the obstacles to and limitations of convergence.

As a series, the papers display important continuities of concern and content. Together they suggest an emerging consensus on a naturalistic view of human nature as the barrier to serious forms of relativism. History, biology, psychology, and sociology are seen to confirm and presuppose the unity of mankind and the intelligibility of human behaviour. Speculations about radical incommensurabilities do not exert the powerful fascination upon philosophers they enjoyed even 15 years ago. (In other professions this is less true. J.H.M. Beattie ['Objectivity and Social Anthropology'] provides interesting illustrations of the perils confronting scientists doing philosophy. He combats recent suggestions by fellow anthropologists that other cultures do not share our form of rationality and that the use of our categories to describe arrangements in other cultures inevitably misrepresents them.)

Four contributors explore the interaction of biological and cultural factors in human life. Paul Heelas ('Emotions Across Cultures') assesses two views of emotions — as completely constituted by culturally provided meanings and as so grounded in biology as to be impervious to beliefs. On the former view, the Chewong (who do not display anger or most of the other emotions familiar to us) lack social models enabling them to learn how to be angry. On the latter, they have the same emotions we do but suppress them. Heelas shows how these accounts can be made complementary rather than divergent.

A similarly diplomatic Roger Trigg ('The Sociobiological View of Man') demonstrates that the recent introduction of the concept of culture into sociobiology enables the theory to join forces with social science rather than pretend to replace it. The doctrine of gene-culture co-evolution rules out

both crude attempts to model human behaviour on insect societies and the idea of human nature as so malleable that it can only be understood and explained in terms appropriate to particular cultures. Ignoring biology makes it impossible to accept limits on human forms of life, as if another terrestrial culture could have as little point of contact with our own as with beings from outer space. In a somewhat slighter and more journalistic piece, Mary Midgley ('On Being Terrestrial') endorses Darwin's suggestion that morality is an inevitable result of the heterogeneous emotional purposes arising in the course of evolution and praises kin-selection as the central insight of sociobiology.

Ted Benton ('Biological Ideas and their Cultural Uses') seeks a wider rapprochement, arguing that not only social scientists but also the political left have a mistaken animus against 'biologism.' Culture creates an indeterminacy in the causal chain from genes to institutions, and if this is conceded nothing separates opponents and advocates of sociobiology. Since the autonomy of culture is itself a consequence of human biology, it is possible both to embrace biological determinism and to work for the end of capitalism. Repeated claims to the contrary, there is no convincing connection between conservatism and sociobiology. The same might be said about Ernest Gellner's assertion ('Tractatus Sociologico-Philosophicus') of a connection between a 'positivistic' scientific strategy and a liberal social order.

Among the more purely philosophical discussions, Frances Berenson ('Understanding Art and Understanding Persons') criticizes institutional theories of art which say that a work can be identified or appreciated only relative to a certain conventional framework. She maintains that the nature of language enables us to postulate a kind of universal human response which makes it absurd and counterfactual to tract cultural diversity as meaning cultural isolation. She urges philosophers to have done with gratuitous mysteries and attend to the real problems of understanding people different from ourselves. D.Z. Phillips ('The Devil's Disguises') might be read as taking her advice. The philosopher's job (giving reminders of the contexts in which religious and other challenged beliefs make sense) becomes difficult when we are only acquainted with these beliefs from an external and distorting perspective and mistake these external accounts for objective ones. He suggests turning to literature for these reminders when they are not available in our lives.

In a long and sophisticated defense of a sort of Aristotelianism, Jonathan Lear ('Moral Objectivity') ties the notion of objective reasons for action to the promotion of human flourishing and describes political society as the only context in which it makes sense to talk about such flourishing. He notes that although moral concern need not in principle extend to all human beings, the development of a world-community may mean that it is now true that concern should be universal. Susan Khin Zaw ('Morality, Survival and Nuclear War') also envisages changed moral requirements, suggesting that the future effects of accumulating changes in the world may make new virtues necessary now. We will be able to cope with the perils of total destruction only if we stop confronting them with old moral perceptions and begin thinking

about them more freely. Unfortunately this abstract proposition is not accompanied by any suggestion that might give it practical application.

Bernard Williams ('The Scientific and the Ethical') gives no reason to expect one. He argues that there is ethical knowledge but that it is undermined by reflective inquiry, so that there was more in the past than there is now. In science the ideal of convergence on an answer to problems involves the idea that the answer represents how things are, but in the area of the ethical there is no such coherant hope for a convergence of thought on reality in even distant analogy. If he is right, Renford Bambrough ('The Scope of Reason') can make little progress in battling objections to objectivity in moral knowledge by distinguishing his position from optimism about agreement. Both Williams and Bambrough are confronted by David Bloor ('A Sociological Theory of Objectivity'), who argues that objectivity in the sciences is social: the impersonal and stable character attaching to scientific (and presumably moral) beliefs derives from their being social institutions.

These are exciting disagreements and will encourage further fruitful discussion. The thirteen papers are literate, contemporary, and rather insular. The writers' philosophical idiom differs notably from that of North America, and they appeal to different authorities. Many of the problems discussed are common to Quine and Davidson who are hardly mentioned and unrecognized in the index of names. Most of the papers are nonetheless rich and satisfying, unlike the scanty and inadequate index of subjects.

EVAN SIMPSON
McMaster University

RICHMOND CAMPBELL and LANNING SOWDEN, eds. *Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 1985. Pp. x + 366. Cdn$19.95. ISBN 0-7748-0215-4.

Paradoxes is an anthology on the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem. Its organizational thesis is that the prisoner's dilemma (in at least one standard form) is essentially Newcomb's problem. And its motivational thesis is that these decision problems raise issues that lie at the heart of rational choice theory and challenge our understanding of a variety of phenomena, in particular, social cooperation. The first part consists of Campbell's introduction and guide to the papers assembled. The second part is on the prisoner's

dilemma. Davis presents an argument that if each prisoner knows that each will make the rational choice, then each ought to cooperate. Watkins investigates the consequences of supposing an interest in morality on the part of one or more of the prisoners. Gauthier argues that cooperation in prisoner's dilemmas is rational, in certain cases where reciprocity is expected, because it would be rational, if possible, to form a disposition to cooperate in those cases. McClennen claims that resolving to cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma is a rational alternative to precommitment to cooperation.

The third part is on Newcomb's problem. It begins with Nozick's classic presentation of the problem and Gibbard and Harper's argument that expected utility calculations using probabilities of counterfactuals support taking both boxes. Then Horgan claims that, properly interpreted, Gibbard and Harper's counterfactuals support taking just one box. Eells argues that given certain idealizations concerning the decision maker, expected utility calculations using conditional probabilities support taking both boxes. Jackson and Pargetter contend that Eell's argument does not apply to variations of Newcomb's problem where one person assesses the actions open to another. Next Eells and Horgan reply to critics. Finally, Levi asserts that Newcomb's problem is inconsequential and that the main problem with expected utility methods is the indeterminacy of probabilities and utilities.

The fourth part considers the relationship between the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem. Lewis maintains that in their most basic forms the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem are one and the same. Davis claims that the general idea of the argument for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma also supports taking one box in Newcomb's problem. Sobel contends that the conditions under which the prisoner's dilemma is Newcomb's problem are less likely to be realized than Lewis suggests.

The final part investigates repeated and n-person prisoner's dilemmas. Braybrooke argues that in standard circumstances rational people will not form a social contract, and that the only way to reach a social contract is to introduce new motivational factors or new conditions that favor cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Sobel replies that even in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas, *ideally* rational people will not cooperate. On the other hand, Axlerod asserts that in certain conditions some conditionally cooperative strategies for indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas are demonstrably better than noncooperative strategies. But Hardin contends that the arguments for cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas do not extend to n-person prisoner's dilemmas.

Campbell's introduction is perspicuous and instructive, and the papers complement each other and highlight the important features of the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem. The collection's only shortcoming, a minor one, is that it misses some points that further bring out the significance of Newcomb's problem for decision theory.

First, in Newcomb's problem the realization of an option provides information that forces a revision of the probabilities and utilities used to calculate

the expected utilities of options. Many interesting problems besides Newcomb's problem have this 'dynamic' aspect, for example, Gibbard and Harper's case of Death in Damascus (154 ff.), where every decision provides information according to which a contrary decision has higher expected utility. A natural rule for dynamic problems is to realize an option that has maximum expected utility on the assumption that it is realized. In other words, using terminology that Jeffrey introduces in the second edition of *The Logic of Decision* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983), a natural rule is to realize an option that is *ratifiable*. But this rule is too strong for cases with no ratifiable options, and it is too weak for cases with several ratifiable options. Furthermore, it seems that the considerations that resolve cases with no or several ratifiable options might turn out to support some nonratifiable option in standard cases. Thus Newcomb's problem reveals dynamic considerations that force a general reappraisal of expected utility methods. In this connection, see, for instance, Richter's 'Rationality Revisited' (*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **62** (1984) 392-403).

Second, decision problems that arise in game theory, problems of pure coordination and pure conflict as well as the prisoner's dilemma, are generally dynamic problems in the above sense. Consequently, revision of expected utility methods in the light of dynamic considerations will produce a more satisfactory decision theoretic foundation for game theory. For a start in this direction, see Harper's 'Ratifiability and Causal Decision Theory' (*PSA 1984* **2** [1985]). Third, in dynamic problems, the course of deliberation has special interest. Under certain ideal conditions, the early stages of deliberation determine the outcome of the final stages in an unexpected way. Skyrms has presented a model for deliberation in dynamic problems that opens up a new and rich branch of decision theory. See, for instance, his 'Deliberational Equilibria' (*Topoi*, forthcoming 1986).

Paradoxes would have enhanced its case for the significance of Newcomb's problem if it had reviewed the above material. But the case it presents is already strong. The anthology deserves high marks for bringing together and illuminating two provocative areas of contemporary work on rationality.

PAUL WEIRICH
University of Rochester

T.J. DIFFEY. *Tolstoy's 'What is Art?'* Dover, NH: Longwood Publishing Group (for Croom Helm) 1985. Pp. 165. US$26.00. 0-7099-0891-1.

In his essay *What is Art?* Tolstoy maintains that works of art are conduits that transmit feelings from an artist to his audience. The feelings conveyed are of a special sort. They are connected with the religious perception of the time, with humankind's striving after the meaning of life. Though Tolstoy here seems to characterize art as communication, his repeated insistence that a successful work *infect* its audience with the artist's feelings makes 'contagion' a far better model for his theory.

Because Tolstoy turns our received views about art topsy-turvy, few philosophers or critics take him seriously today. Tostoy rejects most masterpieces of the Western cultural tradition as counterfeit. He recognizes as art only morally uplifting works (*Uncle Tom's Cabin, Les Miserables, A Christmas Carol*, and so on [4]) and objects and activities traditionally considered outside the artistic sphere ('cradle-song, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of houses, dress, and utensils ... church services, buildings, monuments, and triumphal processions' [72]). Diffey does not believe that this gerrymandering is a sufficient reason to ignore Tolstoy's views. He declares that Tolstoy 'has valuable philosophical insights to offer' (6) and provides a careful study and appraisal of Tolstoy's doctrine.

Diffey begins his book with an introductory chapter chronicling the various responses Tolstoy's theory has received. A long second chapter discusses problems surrounding the recognition, expression and transmission of feelings. The three remaining chapters examine Tolstoy's basis for evaluating art, his notion of counterfeit art, and the relations he posits among art, science, and morality. Diffey concludes with a brief postscript exploring the rhetorical and stylistic devices Tolstoy uses to aid his argument.

Diffey offers the following four-part schema to summarize Tolstoy's account of the activity of art: A person (i) feels something at a particular time, (ii) evokes it later in himself, (iii) hands on the datum to an audience, and (iv) infects the audience with the feelings he has felt (12). Diffey then entertains assorted criticisms of this account. For example, he objects to claim (i) because it assumes that we can identify our feelings as they occur. Diffey quite rightly points out that this is not the case (20). Diffey also argues that the audience in stage (iv) can never precisely share the feelings of the artist in stage (i), because the audience is attending to an artwork. Theirs is a disinterested appraisal which lacks the visceral elements of the artist's emotional state and which includes such 'aesthetic' concerns as attention to form and plot (34-6).

The metaphors inherent in Tolstoy's theory encourage us to view artworks as containers into which feelings are deposited. This is quite misleading. For example, it implies that works of art are to be valued primarily for the feelings they transmit. Diffey criticizes this instrumentality, noting that Tolstoy 'construes the work of art as a sign of a state of mind and holds

that what interests us is the state of mind which the sign is merely the means of revealing' (48). However, Diffey's main objection is that Tolstoy fails to explain *how* art communicates. He leaves entirely unanswered the crucial question 'How can a work of art infect people with feeling?' (30)

When he focuses on the religious and moral aspects of Tolstoy's theory, Diffey has an easy target. We are quite uncomfortable today with the notion that art must serve some higher purpose, and Tolstoy never defends his stipulation that genuine art be judged according to the standard of religious perception (69). However, in his final chapter, Diffey offers a more systematic criticism of the normative dimension of Tolstoy's theory. Diffey proposes a distinction between apology and evaluation — between the questions: (a) what makes art good as a human activity, institution, or enterprise? and (b) what makes a particular work a good work of art? (134) Diffey argues that apologies and evaluations differ in kind and that Tolstoy errs in running them together (134).

I don't believe this succeeds as a knock-down criticism of Tolstoy. For one, Diffey's explanation of the central distinction seems confused. He offers two examples to clarify that distinction — cricket and marriage. His sample apologies for cricket include the following: 'We may play for pleasure, health and exercise, companionship, for excitement in an otherwise quiet life, to earn a living, because we are schoolboys compelled to play, for the love of glory, etc.' (134) This list cites people's reasons for playing or watching the game, statements of personal motivation. These reasons can be quirky and idiosyncratic (to win a bet, to impress a friend, to lose five pounds). In such cases, they bear no relation to the reasons we'd offer to justify the game overall. They are not apologies for cricket.

Because Diffey's examples of apology conflate normative considerations (whatever justifies a practice overall) with psychological ones (whatever motivates individuals to enter into that practice on particular occasions), one pole of his distinction remains unclear. But even granting that the distinction made sense, Diffey's discussion has not convinced me that the two enterprises of apology and evaluation must be insulated one from the other. Perhaps they can share a fundamental principle or criterion. Moreover, I am not convinced that art *has* an apology. Since Tolstoy's question 'What is art?' has proven so vexing and has generated so many competing philosophical theories, it seems likely that art does many things and has many apologies.

Classics in philosophy are not, fortunately, valued for getting things right, and Tolstoy surely got very little right in grappling with the question 'What is art?' But Diffey's study neither enfranchises Tolstoy's views nor uses the critical occasion to put forward a competing view of its own. After working through Diffey's volume, I am not left with any synoptic view of what Tolstoy has done (or alternatively, of what he should have done). Some of the fault may well be mine. Let me add in closing that my difficulties in making out Diffey's view were exacerbated by the volume's terribly cramped and

unattractive photo-offset type. The publishers should surely have done better by a book on aesthetics!

STEPHANIE ROSS
University of Missouri — St. Louis

FREDERICK A. ELLISTON and MICHAEL FELDMAN, eds. *Moral Issues in Police Work.* Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld 1985. Pp. 309. US$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7191-7): US$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7192-5).

Elliston and Feldman's volume prints the papers from a 1981 conference on police ethics. Their short essay orienting the field is excellent, as is their overall bibliography. Each of the four topics is treated to a helpful introduction, and contributors' own bibliographies abound. Half of the editors and authors are philosophers, half social scientists, including law and law-enforcement people. And the latter's pieces are far from being the least interesting morally. Something of the original conference flavour is retained by contributors' often referring to each others' papers; but none are commentaries on others. The same flavour arises from the typewriter font used, and from the not infrequent typos.

The four topics are police discretion, deceptive techniques, use of deadly force, and police corruption. The first two receive the most penetrating treatments. But surprising linkages as to how the police role is conceptualized run across the parts. In fact, this is in general the technique of moral argument that is used: if we countenance such and such a role, we cannot reject its responsibilities; or, if we do that, we must change the former.

Why do we 'call the cops'? Police have the job of enforcing the law. When and how much they choose to do so depends on the jobs of peacekeeping and social service which they do not have, but which we expect of them. How, then, justify their discretion? How act without authorization, but without lawlessness?

It is social acceptance which gives whatever legitimacy officers' discretion has — the book's other moral commonplace. Since 1970 Egon Bittner has located their role as dealing with situations that may require 'non-negotiably coercive means.' Harold Cohen spills the role over partly into social service: officers bear 'stand-in authority,' to intervene when other social service personnel who bear it regularly are absent. The end point of this technique,

authorization by reassignment, comes in Joseph Betz' essay from a later part, wherein the 'military' model is simply abandoned and the 'social service' model fully replaces it — 'Florence Nightingale in pursuit of Willie Sutton' to quote an older Bittner title. How are they different from other civil servants? Because the situations they deal in are emergencies and require force.

But then why call this merely social service? Carl Klockars gives the discretion problem a hard-bitten edge as the 'dirty Harry problem': can we reject the bad means we have approved for good ends? His answer is as cynical as the problem: police can justify their acts; but we can't accept them; so we must punish them; but this only makes us the Dirty Harrys.

Social choice continues to be the determinant of morality when moving from the first topic to the second, deception. Wayne Hanewicz, still on discretion, locates its problematic core in our tendency to resolve problems by invoking social institutions. He offers only either less control, or less responsive men. Again, Jerome Skolnick accepts the 'morality of practical necessity' for deceptive practices, if our society continues to insist on enforcing consensual crime statutes.

Answering 'Who really gets stung?', Gary Marx counts costs of 'the new deception' not just against criminals, but also upon third-parties hurt by police-supported crimes, upon police themselves by corruptive affiliations, and on society generally by rousing the same paranoia totalitarianism does. But, a social choice again, the more police violence is gotten under control, the more some substitute investigative tool like deception is needed.

Once more, reconceptualization of the police's role is at the root of the moral issue. For if police are 'at war with crime,' then no holds are barred, and no costs too great for victory; whereas if police and deviants are in a struggle sustained in part by social choices, then some prices may be too high to pay for a tactical advantage.

A further moral issue is the profound difference between investigating whether someone is breaking the law, *is* corrupted; and investigating whether someone can be induced to break the law, is corrup*tible*. Skolnick perceives that the objective test for deception (Does it offend decency?) slides off idealism once the crime worsens, into the subjective test (Would he have committed it otherwise?); and this makes criminal reform impossible, since in effect it means: Has he a record? Grant Stitt and Gene James conclude from the same base that all entrapment should be prohibited, while Isidore Silver concludes that even a 'shock the conscience' criterion is better than the current lack of standards.

Ferdinand Schoeman sets simple criteria to control undercover observation, by determining what a moral self is owed. He also alone enters mainstream legal philosophy in defending this ploy. He first observes, positivistically, that a society which really did restrict itself to maintaining public order would be a very different one from our own; and second, more conceptually, that it is impossible to identify a body of law as criminal at all, independently of important moral elements.

On the third topic, deadly force, while Betz found a 'social service' model

enough to confine Dirty Harry's violence, Jeffrey Reiman finds that 'social contract' can do it, allowing weaponry only for self- and other-defense. But William Geller's empirical study of shootings is the most illuminating. Not being shot, but suicide and accidents most threaten officers, especially plainclothesmen, whether on tactical duty or off-duty. While minority officers and civilians most often shoot and are shot, he denies systematic bias, contrary to the editors' assertion about this study. Besides policy remedies such as shooting review boards, this research allows structural changes to place officers where the lowest shooting rates occur. For example, if many shootings occur off-duty, then disarm off-duty officers, as only half the police departments do; the other half require twenty-four hour arming, and a few permit it.

The off-duty officer should bear not only no gun, but no higher duties of conduct than the rest of us, says Frederick Elliston in the final section on police corruption. Also on-duty, agrees Michael Feldman, accepting small gratuities is not corrupting. But accepting them does distribute even physical presence in an unequal manner, which officers themselves find improper once apprised of it, and so immunized from it. Nor does Lawrence Sherman find 'the free cup of coffee' corrupting, although the editors appear to interpret him differently. But when corruption does occur, the small gratuity is indispensible, since the idealistic recruit can degrade herself only by a series of choices each of which redefines her self and activity, neutralizing in turn each moral hesitation as no more socially harmful than the preceding act. The slide is also part of the cynical fallout from enforcing statues against 'victimless' crimes, he says. This brings us back to all the authors' central moral reasoning.

CHRISTOPHER B. GRAY
Concordia University

JOSEPH FLAY. *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1984. Pp. xi + 448. US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-877-2): US$24.50 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-878-0).

Joseph Flay's text and notes on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, reflecting years of labor and immersion in the literature, can be appreciated for their wealth of insights into both the *Phenomenology* and the secondary literature.

However, the volume has a clear unifying thesis which is not without paradox. For to describe the *Phenomenology* as a 'quest for certainty' and then (1, 8) reconcile this quest with 'rejection of the modern epistemological orientation in the quest for certainty' (164) is to cultivate paradox. Any *Hegelian* quest for certainty is surely far removed from the one criticized by Dewey in his 1929 book. The *Phenomenology's* Humean starting point in sense-certainty is steeped in modern epistemology. But the quest for certainty in modern philosophy dissolves, as the *Phenomenology* advances, in a realization that the fear of error is the first error, and that the proximate criterion of knowledge is public recognition.

Flay's equation of the 'quest for certainty' with the quest for the 'absolute standpoint' (12) is apt to mislead. The Pythagorean metaphysical project traditional to philosophy from its origin, which Hegel took over, is no epistemological quest for certainty — Euclidean or empiricist — but an endeavor to define the Absolute, i.e., the cosmic telos. A given definition holds so long as attempted refutations circularly reaffirm it. Certainty as an appeal to private self-evidence has no place in the dialectic: '... it is the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come ... we must accept that the individual thinker needs that this should be so in order to verify what is as yet a matter for himself alone ' (*Phenomenology*, tr. Miller, 44). Private insight calls for public confirmation, but its certainty is time-bound even with it.

Yet there is greater paradox in Flay's critique of Hegel than in his exposition. He represents a deconstructionism which sees radical discontinuities in experience not integral to a single systematic perspective. But this misconstrues Hegel's dialectic of our historical education in self-awareness as including all possible or at least actual standpoints. Hegel admits standpoints outside the dialectic, making no contribution to this education — e.g. certain lost perspectives of prehistory; or cutting us off from that education, uprooting our established identity, and imposing a dialectically unmediated identity — e.g. the Middle Americans after the Spanish.

The question is not whether there are dialectically discontinuous standpoints, but whether such standpoints are vital to our identity. But Flay's vindication of *Phenomenology's* dialectic as a continuous development of logical self-criticism (e.g., p. 10) runs against his claim that Hegel fails to show all standpoints in the totality of the self to be dialectically integrated. Flay admits he owes us another book (265). For the present this critical claim seems a mere assertion — short of being uninterestingly weak: 'There are many frameworks of intelligibility and categories of comportment, and they are *not necessarily* continuous with each other' (265; my italics).

Flay illustrates the discontinuity of standpoints by the experience of shifting between the perspectives of doing house repairs and that of doing speculative philosophy (264). There is a temporal break here. But Hegel argues that the standpoint of objective spirit — embracing the modern family, civil society and its technology — belongs to a dialectic which ends in philosophy, i.e., in the self-knowledge of objective spirit. Temporal discontinuity in passing between these two standpoints in no way refutes the claim

that the second standpoint is dialectically potential in the first. Flay's own commentary shows how different standpoints can and do emerge through a continuous development.

Through associating Hegelian dialectic with Socrates and hence Zeno, Flay suggests that the development is logical, one of indirect proof (17). Putative presuppositions (23) appear to function as an assumption in indirect proof. The motor of dialectical progress lies in the recognition that a particular putatively intelligible system of cosmological thought affording (non-omniscient) knowledge of the Absolute leaves out something essential — the determinate negation or other of that system of thought (26). The system is thus not actually intelligible. Its successor system, with a novel definition of cosmic purpose, regains comprehensive intelligibility only by incorporating the determinate negation of the previous system.

So much is acceptable. Further, Flay is correct that Hegel throughout presupposes that 'the Absolute' and 'infinite self-knowing spirit' are identical in reference though not sense. This, I take it, is what he means when he writes that 'the presupposition (of the *Phenomenology*) is that *the referents for the principle or ground of totality and for the principle or ground of intelligibility are one and the same*' (252). (I have not accounted for the fact that he has not put a simple Fregean point in simple Fregian language.) The 'principle of intelligibility' is a definite description defining the individual essence of the Absolute, while the 'principle of totality' is a referring expression such as 'the Absolute' which denotes the cosmic totality in a relatively undescriptive way. Due to the discontinuity and finitude of conceptual schemes, Flay must disallow that a relatively underdescribed Absolute objectively satisfies a relatively definite descriptive definition (e.g., the Absolute = Self-knowing Spirit). But his denial of the above presupposition only reaffirms it, asserting that the Absolute satisfies the definite description of being objectively indescribable. This Neoplatonic description of the Absolute is refuted in Book Two of the *Logic*. We know definite descriptions can be used to single out referents which fail to satisfy the descriptions in question (e.g., the rising sun = the chief light source on earth). Thus even if a systematic 'principle of intelligibility' misdescribes the Absolute, it may still be used to refer to it. Patently, the referents of the 'ground of totality' and of the 'ground of intelligibility' *are* the same. And if the Absolute can be misdescribed it can also be correctly described. Here are some issues which Flay must work through in a new work.

However, it would be unfortunate for reviewers to be distracted by meta-dialectical reflections from the very real strength of this book as a retravelling of the phenomenological dialectic. If the reader must finally turn from Hegel commentaries in general back to the original for further illumination, this is not a criticism of Flay or his colleagues. There was never doubt that Hegel's original needs interpretation. The text is not immediately self-intelligible. It becomes more intelligible through the alternative readings. Aside from his meta-systematic position, his reading of the *Phenomenology* is credible. Eschewing Neoplatonic or panlogist interpretations, he rightly places the

Phenomenology in the tradition of humanistic hermeneutics, viewing it as Western humanity's self-discovery through an emphathetic reliving of its own self-education (165).

But Flay's hermeneutic model for understanding the *Phenomenology* underscores again the gulf between Hegel and the epistemological model invoked in his title. The dialectical method — historically interpretive and not just logically deductive — is uncertain in its results. Furthermore, even if the history of the philosophical self-analysis, -criticism and -transformation of the natural common-sensical standpoint *were* more a quest for certainty than for the Absolute, the interpretive reenactment of this quest could lay no claim to certainty. Hegel is no foundationalist.

CLARK BUTLER
Purdue University,
Indiana-Purdue Fort Wayne Campus

JEAN HAMBURGER. *La raison et la passion. Réflexion sur les limites de la connaissance*. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1984. Pp. 166. ISBN 2-02-006935-0.

Membre éminent de l'Académie des Sciences et de l'Académie Nationale de Médecine, Jean Hamburger est un chercheur français qui a d'abord et avant tout fait sa marque en néphrologie au cours des cinquante dernières années (sa *Physiologie de l'innervation rénale* a vu le jour à Paris, chez Masson, en 1936). On lui est également redevable d'avoir introduit le concept de la réanimation médicale (cf. *Techniques de réanimation médicale*, Paris, Flammarion, 4e éd., 1964). Sa carrière d'essayiste philosophe a débuté en 1972 par la publication de *La Puissance et la Fragilité. Essai sur les métamorphoses de la médecine et de l'homme* (Paris, Flammarion) et, en un sens, c'est la même réflexion qui se trouve ici continuée. Avant d'y venir, signalons qu'entre ces deux ouvrages, il y eut *L'Homme et les Hommes. Essai sur l'originalité biologique de l'individu* (Paris, Flammarion, 1976), puis *Demain, les autres. L'aventure médicale en contrepoint de l'aventure humaine* (Paris, Flammarion, 1979), et *Un jour, un homme...Cet arrière-neveu de limace qui inventa le calcul intégral et rêva de justice* (Paris, Flammarion, 1981), et enfin *Le Journal d'Harvey* (Paris, Flammarion, 1983).

L'ouvrage se divise en deux parties d'inégale importance, la première l'emportant d'emblée sur la seconde. Hamburger s'adresse d'abord à la ques-

tion des 'limites de la vérité'. Son but est de mettre en évidence 'les faiblesses de notre sens commun'(88) quand, réfléchissant et raisonnant à un certain niveau ou à une certaine échelle, nous nous croyons fondés de généraliser nos conclusions comme si elles avaient en elles-mêmes une validité universelle sans borne. Illustrant son propos surtout d'exemples tirés de l'histoire contemporaine de cette discipline que Claude Bernard appelait la 'science des corps vivants,' disciplines qu'il connaît d'autant mieux qu'il en a été une des figures paradigmatiques, Hamburger insiste à son tour sur l'essentielle discontinuité entre le processus de la connaissance scientifique authentique et le jeu de la conscience quotidienne. Ici, la notion de 'césure' sert précisément à faire voir que les concepts scientifiques ont une aire de validité spécifique, que les méthodes mises au point en science expérimentale n'ont d'efficace que dans un champ de recherches nettement circonscrit, que les postulats posés au début des systèmes d'explication scientifique dans quelque discipline que ce soit sont non seulement indispensables mais qu'ils sont également le plus souvent non transposables d'une discipline à une autre. C'est pourquoi celui qui n'aperçoit pas clairement les limites à l'intérieur desquelles la rationalité scientifique fonctionne efficacement dans un domaine d'investigation donné ne se rend pas compte que, pour absolument privilégiée qu'elle soit, cette forme de rationalité n'en occupe pas moins un territoire délimité et qu'on ne saurait exiger d'elle qu'elle traite les questions qui le débordent. Mais avant de franchir avec Hamburger les frontières de la pensée scientifique, repérons le message central de la première partie de l'ouvrage: il est une multitude de questions, qu'on qualifie ici d'*impropres*, qui ont l'allure de questions scientifiques mais qui ne sont que les questions d'un sens commun convaincu à tort qu'elles font encore sens en science: un premier exemple sur lequel insiste Hamburger est celui de la fameuse question du commencement du monde, question de fait que l'on pose maintenant en acceptant la plausibilité et le bien-fondé de la théorie de l'explosion initiale, comme si la notion même de 'commencement', au sens usuel du terme, continuait d'avoir un sens pour les astrophysiciens et les cosmologues d'aujourd'hui. Un second problème à l'aide duquel il illustre sa pensée, et qui a déjà reçu beaucoup d'attention au cours du dernier quart de siècle, c'est celui de la validité de la pensée finaliste et du risque d'anthropomorphisme qu'elle fait courir aux modélisations scientifiques. Une troisième question, enfin, sur laquelle Hamburger attire l'attention, c'est celle de la valeur et de l'opportunité de l'explication causale en science et de ses rapports avec le déterminisme. Car si, à l'échelle macroscopique où tout un chacun s'agite journellement, la question de savoir 'quelle est la cause' de ce qui se produit semble légitime, il importe de voir qu'à l'échelle microscopique qu'adopte régulièrement l'esprit scientifique, dans les sciences physiques à tout le moins, cette question ne tient plus la plupart du temps.

Jean Hamburger établit donc sans peine qu'à l'intérieur des limites du questionnement qui lui est propre, la raison purement scientifique fait des merveilles lorsqu'elle s'applique méthodiquement à construire des modèles d'explication, à élaborer des théories, à constater des faits. Il devient patent

que lorsqu'elle s'auto-analyse, la raison scientifique apprend de plus en plus et comprend de mieux en mieux que faits, théories et modèles d'explication scientifiques sont directement fonction de la perspective méthodologique adoptée: faire varier le point de vue équivaut en science seulement à élargir sa vision des choses mais aussi et surtout à se rendre compte que la réalité dont on parle n'a pas d'identité accessible qui soit complètement indépendante du mode d'observation, et que l'idée d'une Science qui épuiserait le Réel ne fait pas sens. C'est pourquoi Jean Hamburger consacre la deuxième partie de son ouvrage aux 'vérités sans limites' que d'autres façons de pensée, non scientifiques celles-là, cherchent à formuler. Si la connaissance scientifique n'est pas à même de tout donner ce qu'on attend de l'exercice de la pensée, peut-être l'imagination à l'œuvre dans les 'croyances,' lorsque mue par l'appétit de transcendance, et la créativité qui s'exerce dans les 'passions,' lorsque marquée au coin de la lucidité plutôt qu'à celui des forces aveugles, peuvent-elles non pas se substituer à la pensée scientifique là où elle agit admirablement bien mais en prendre le relais là où nécessairement son emprise est nulle. C'est ce 'nouveau dualisme,' celui qui oppose non pas la *res cogitans* et la *res extensa* mais plutôt les 'œuvres de raison' et les 'œuvres de passion' (144), que prône Hamburger. Et il vise ici aussi bien ce qu'on pourrait appeler les passions éthiques (amour et haine, justice, pouvoir, etc.) que les passions esthétiques, au premier rang desquelles Hamburger place la créativité artistique.

Si nous nous accordons tout à fait avec lui pour affirmer que le 'vrai' ne saurait être légitimement réduit au 'scientifiquement établi' (117), nous ne le suivons plus lorsqu'il affirme que, si la raison scientifique a ses limitations intrinsèques, il y a 'effacement de toute limite dans les autres mouvements de la pensée' (121). Une forme de pensée qui n'a pas en elle-même ses limites propres est épistémologiquement paradoxale: elle est impensable pour nous, par nous. Et si ce qui fait la toute première force de la pensée scientifique authentique, c'est la capacité de reconnaître systématiquement ses faiblesses lorsqu'elles se montrent de manière à les éliminer progressivement, on ne peut en dire autant des autres 'mouvements de la pensée': ce qui fait leur vice rédhibitoire, c'est de se croire, justement, sans limites assignables, vision des choses que semble malencontreusement accréditer Jean Hamburger. Et dans la mesure où il ne paraît pas y avoir d''erreur' possible dans le cheminement de la croyance religieuse ou dans la manifestation des passions qui nous servent souvent de moteur psychique, on peut difficilement concevoir qu'il puisse y avoir là quelque chose comme un apprentissage critique: alors que la pensée scientifique se corrige au moyen d'arguments, la foi religieuse s'amplifie (quelquefois très dogmatiquement ou encore en devenant pure mystique) ou le plus souvent s'étiole, tandis que la passion peu à peu s'évanouit et cède la place à celle qui suit, et cela dans un ordre tout à fait aléatoire, au fil des cheminements personnels et au hasard des rencontres. Il ne peut donc pas véritablement être question de comparer, comme le voudrait Jean Hamburger, ce qu'apporte l'œuvre de la science et ce à quoi aboutit l'action passionnelle. Et il devrait être encore moins question de reconnaître au second

registre de pensée une validité et une portée plus grandes que celles que nous, post-positivistes, sommes maintenant enclins à reconnaître au premier.

Si l'argument complet développé dans ce livre n'emporte pas d'emblée d'adhésion, l'ouvrage, admirablement écrit, mérite néanmoins d'être lu. On y évite presque toujours 'les pièges tentateurs d'une terminologie floue' (151), sauf peut-être lorsqu'on y affirme que 'le besoin de croire est une propriété physiologique fondamentale de la pensée humaine' (127-8), car c'est là, manifestement, une erreur de catégorisation. Dans ce petit livre sans prétention, Jean Hamburger met en scène de très nombreux penseurs (citons entre autres, pêle mêle, Emile Meyerson, Jacques Monod, François Jacob, Erwin Schrödinger mais aussi Aristote, Leibniz, Kant, Laplace, Nietzsche, John Stuart Mill, Gaston Bachelard, Condillac, Voltaire, Diderot, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Habermas, Kuhn, Popper, Quine) qu'il a bien assimilés.

Une note, en fin de propos, qui ne manquera pas de réjouir l'amateur de clarté. On saura gré à Jean Hamburger d'avoir diagnostiqué ce qu'il appelle une des principales 'maladies de l'esprit d'aujourd'hui, à savoir la confusion: ce livre n'en souffre pas, du reste, puisqu'il plaide par lui-même pour l'écriture limpide. Il ne faut plus tolérer qu'on croie qu'on n'est profond que lorsqu'on est obscur. Il n'y a rien d'irrévérencieux à clamer au contraire qu'une pensée insondable sonne irrémédiablement creux.

ROBERT NADEAU
Université du Québec à Montréal.

JAAKKO HINTIKKA, in collaboration with JACK KULAS. *The Game of Language*. Boston: Reidel 1983. Pp. xii + 342. US$34.50. ISBN 90-277-1687-0.

This volume contains three new papers and seven recently published ones, all of which appeared in 1979 or later. It thus represents the latest stage in Hintikka's development and application of game-theoretical semantics (GTS), which he pioneered in the early '70s and which has been pursued mostly by him and his associates. The three new papers (chapters 3,4, and 6) were written with Jack Kulas.

The breadth of the studies contained here is a measure of Hintikka's creativity, and of the great promise of GTS as an approach to issues in theoretical linguistics and philosophy of language. Of secondary importance,

but of great interest nonetheless, are papers on the relationship of GTS to Godel's *Dialectica* (functional) interpretation, and that of GTS to the views of certain historical figures, e.g. Kant and Aristotle.

The topics of the chapters can be divided roughly into four areas: (a) semantics of natural language, (b) theory of meaning, (c) functional interpretations, and (d) historical discussion.

Chapter 1 is the closest thing yet to appear to an introduction to game-theoretical semantics. In a cursory way, all the basic notions of GTS are presented, and applications to a number of problems are sketched (branching quantifiers, the analysis of *any*, ambiguity of *is*, the non-recursive-enumerability of English, compositionality, donkey sentences). Most of the topics of this chapter are discussed at length in later ones.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 concern issues in the semantics of natural language: respectively, negation, tenses, and definite descriptions. Chapter 4 provides an instructive account of the severe difficulties which attend any semantical analysis of negation, but Hintikka & Kulas's proposed solution to these difficulties is somewhat disappointing: they introduce the *SPS Principle* (for *semantics parallels syntax*) to explain the ungrammatically of certain negated quantifier phrases (e.g., *not some*, *not any*) in contrast to the grammaticality of others (*not every, not a*[*n*]), and to determine the structure of certain semantical games in order to achieve appropriate interpretations of negated belief-attributions, *knows whether* constructions, and quantificational *only*, where *any* occurs in the embedded S. The scope of this new principle and the mechanism of its effect remain mysterious, however.

The basic notion of the GTS treatment of tenses described in chapter 5 will not surprise the cognoscenti: a past-tense sentence, for instance, undergoes conversion to a present-tense sentence, and one of the players of the semantical game chooses a time prior to the time associated with the original sentence, with respect to which the new sentence is interpreted. What is remarkable is Hintikka's use of this notion to attack problems which are only indirectly related to the semantics of tenses: for instance, the collective/distributive ambiguity of certain sentences containing quantifiers or conjunctive noun phrases, and Davidson's event-ontology. Despite its rather loose and programmatic presentation, chapter 5 is one of the high points of the book, not least because of its possible bearing (unacknowledged by Hintikka) on metaphysical questions concerning time and tense, e.g. McTaggart's A- and B-series, and the current realism/anti-realism dispute concerning the meanings of past-tense sentences.

The treatment of definite descriptions is a GTS rendition of the relativization of the Russellian mechanism to a contextually determined quantificational domain. This chapter contains the seeds of a general account of anaphora on which Hintikka and Kulas have recently been working. Their account of the semantics of definite descriptions contains no real surprises, though some interesting intricacies are developed. The account is apparently susceptible to the objections presented by David Lewis in 1979 ('Scorekeep-

ing in a Language Game') against contextual determination of domains for definite descriptions.

Chapter 2 concerns deeper philosophical issues upon which GTS bears. Hintikka begins by repeating his familiar claim that the logic of the first-order quantifiers rests upon seeking-and-finding activities which are codified in the game rules for the quantifiers. The bulk of the chapter, though, consists of an extended criticism of the neoverificationist theory of meaning associated with the names of Dummett and Prawitz. Hintikka objects to the Dummett/Prawitz approach on the grounds that their tendency to generalize from a quasi-intuitionistic account of mathematical language to ordinary language leads them to think of verification as analogous to proof. If this were so, Hintikka's objection would be forceful, but in fact the generalization to nonmathematical language does not lead these authors to suggest, as Hintikka claims, that the truth of a nonmathematical assertion can be established by anything like formal proof procedures. On the contrary, the neoverificationist account of mathematics should be seen as an application to a special case of general principles arising from their understanding of the slogan 'meaning is use.' Indeed, the primary philosophical importance of GTS lies in the potential for providing just such a verificationist theory of meaning for nonmathematical discourse as Dummett envisions. The key notion in developing this potential is that of a restriction of allowed strategies in semantical games to effective ones. Hintikka's aversion to the Dummett/Prawitz position prevents him from recognizing this.

Chapter 3 concerns the much-discussed notion of *subgame*, and its relation to Godel's *Dialectica* interpretation. This connection strikes me as a very rich one, articulation of which provides insight into the logical features of natural language, as well as its more obvious bearing on issues in foundations of mathematics. The subgame analysis of conditionals does not result in precisely the *Dialectica* translation, due to the 'backward' functional dependence apparent in Godel's translation of the conditional. (This should be understood in analogy with 'backward pronominalization.') However, the subgame analysis provides closely related translations. The fundamental notion here is that the skolemization of quantifier prefixes corresponds to existence claims for winning strategies in the games associated with the sentences undergoing translation.

The remaining chapters (7 through 10) concern, respectively, the hallowed view that *is* is multiply ambiguous (identity, existence, predication, and class-inclusion), a reconstruction of Aristotle's notion of categories based on the apparent many-sortedness of English quantification and a structural analysis of English NPs, a defense of Hintikka's notorious *any*-thesis and his associated argument that English is not an r.e. language (this includes a compelling response to Chomsky's rebuttal of Hintikka's conclusion), and finally a minor masterpiece on compositionality, wherein Hintikka isolates four (possibly five) components of this central notion. Space does not permit discussion of each of these chapters; it must suffice to register my impression

that the final two pieces are of considerable significance. The book also contains an exhaustive bibliography of GTS and related literature.

The Game of Language has its ups (chapters 3, 5, 9, and 10) and downs (chapters 2 and 4). Nonetheless it is an important and valuable work, and should serve to draw greater attention to game-theoretical semantics than GTS has heretofore received. The book contains some important contributions, and also is a suggestion of the profound consequences we may expect from further examination and application of the game-theoretical semantical apparatus. Together with the 1979 Saarinen volume *Game-Theoretical Semantics* and Hintikka's 1976 work *The Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics*, which employ GTS, it is required reading for philosophers of language and theoretical linguists.

MICHAEL HAND
University of Oklahoma

MARTIN HOLLIS. *Invitation to Philosophy*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1985. Pp. x + 179. Cdn.$32.50: US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-14225-8): Cdn$12.50; US$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-14226-6).

This is an introduction with character. It meets high standards of competence, rigor, sensitivity and interest. It is not everyone's introduction to philosophy. Hollis recommends skipping the 19th century, his contemporary interests are hard-core anglophone, and he espouses no political causes. The curriculum is otherwise broad, however, and more than a dozen historical figures are used with serious respect.

Though it will take a bright student to read the whole without a guide, every student will find many inviting moments. Lecturers struggling to (re)design introductory classes will find much to borrow or emulate. The compendious 'American' college text-book often has a section on the major paradoxes. Hollis uses paradoxes, too, but he makes them driving forces of the subject. A picture-puzzle in which 15 philosophers become 14 is offered in the opening chapter as an invitation to 'wonder.' (If I may interrupt, the crucial dotted line in fig. 1 has been transposed from fig. 2 where it belongs.

The picture was supplied by Simon Hollis; I venture the guess that Simon had it right, and Martin put it wrong.)

The paradoxes of the surprise examination, and the liar, appear in the chapter on logic, where they serve the very serious purpose of indicating that logic has limits. Hollis, having thus cautioned us, continues to make conspicuous use of logic (deductive and inductive, with a glance at probability). The free-will paradox now becomes the set-piece for the rest of the book, allowing Hollis visibly to interrelate his chapters on epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and political theory.

In chapters 3-5 we meet two-worlds hypotheses, the veil of perception, and Cartesian skepticism. 'Ants, Spiders and Bees' introduces the familiar empiricist and rationalist; both are foundationalists. The bee attempts to mediate between them, using among other things Wittgensteinian arguments against foundations. Hollis evades Kant's *Kritik* on grounds of difficulty, but proposes a bee who has an active rather than a passive intellect, and who espouses a Quinean pragmatism about the furniture of the universe. Chapter 5 proceeds to place the bees' 'web of belief' in the context of current philosophy of science.

Chapters 6-8 begin with the metaphysics of the self (the *cogito*, dualism and materialism), and suggest that persons and actions are categories more fundamental than mind and body. Plato's Lydian shepherd makes rational self-interest central to the discussion of facts and values, the categorical imperative and the happiness principle. In Chapter 8, a social contract bridges the gap between individual rationality and common good, but the bridge is sapped by prisoners' dilemmas. Hollis is at his most committed when he concludes this chapter claiming that ethics requires a thicker conception of human nature, an account of human needs which includes honest relations with others, and which only a 'positive' idea of freedom can support.

Hollis has a recurring dread. We are reminded many times that 'we cannot climb out of our own heads.' This notion is given some analysis, but it is overworked trying to support Hollis's pragmatic, social and agent-centred middle-ground. In the final chapter, he explains why compatibilism cannot constitute the middle-ground. Free-will he locates not among conflicting desires but among conflicting reasons, 'at the stage of judgement and in the power to act on what one judges the better reason' (167). This leaves the problem structured much as it was in Hollis's *Models of Man* (Cambridge 1977), and still 'very much alive.'

The text reads smoothly, without intrusive footnotes, but with carefully restated conclusions at each chapter's end. There is a very usefully annotated reading list, as well as a brief index, taking up the final nine pages.

S.A.M. BURNS
Dalhousie University

SUSAN JAMES. *The Content of Social Explanation*. Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press 1984. Pp. viii + 192. US$37.50. ISBN 0-521-26667-X.

The Content of Social Explanation has a much narrower scope than its title might suggest to some of us. Susan James sets out to understand and unravel the tangled skeins of argument about the nature of social explanation that has divided holists from individualists. Individualist theories are, she thinks, over-represented in our circles of discourse, and as a result we tend to miss what is important in holistic approaches. James wants to remedy this situation. Therefore, the major focus of her book is on the various modes of holistic explanation offered by some representative social theorists. She reviews the differences between explanations offered by absolute holists and 'concessive' forms of holism. Her principle aim is to show that concessive holism offers a superior theoretical basis from which to develop social explanations than either individualism or absolute holism.

The first part of her book considers the theoretical and metatheoretical debate between holists and individualists. Here she sorts out the theoretical divisions between holists and individualists. What are their respective theories attempting to do? The second part examines specific examples of holist positions representing the range from absolute to concessive. After describing with clarity and fairness the theoretic account of these forms of holism, she then considers their practical application and also examines specific examples of explanation offered in the context of history and the social sciences.

With respect to the theoretic issues in part one, James shows that individualists and holists often differ in their basic conceptions of what constitutes individuals, social wholes, and their interrelationships. Their differences revolve partly around different conceptions of the world, but, most importantly, also around different interests. Individualist theories attempt to explain all social events in terms of the decisions of individual human subjects acting, from a variety of motives, in self-willing ways. Their main aim is to understand individuals as agents and how their choices affect the social world. Holism, especially of the more extreme form, attempts to analyze the individual subject away as consisting of relationships in a process of dynamic social wholes. The holists focus on explaining how classes of humans are formed and controlled. Yet, as James points out, extreme versions of holism at some point appeal to social processes in a language that is curiously voluntaristic. One then gets the impression that social wholes are subjects (and agents) which have many of the qualities that the holists deny but individualists affirm of human subjects. Individualists, on the other hand, fail to answer the question posed by Marx: it is true that a talented individual might be an important agent in a particular historical setting, but what made the individual what he or she was? There are social processes which transcend any particular individual, into which each and every one of us is born and into which we become enculturated.

In some respects, then, the extreme forms of both individualism and holism, in their attempts to be theoretically pure, end up with theories which are detached from the practical settings in which our intuitions and experiences are embedded. In those settings the content of social explanation includes both subject and object (or agent and processes), both the individual agents of history and the larger patterns of process and activity in which agents move and live, the social (and other) wholes. Agents are both affected by these larger processes and in turn affect them. Thus James adopts a 'pragmatic approach' in order to justify the 'main general conclusion to which [her] whole argument has been directed: that the way to heal the rift between holism and individualism is to recognise that concessive holism offers a superior approach to the business of social explanation' (175).

In addressing the issues of practice involving holism in social explanation, James considers the work of Althusser, Poulantzas, and the Annales school of history. Althusser provides her with an example of an absolute holist theory. Althusser gave what is considered by most Marxists to be an extreme interpretation of Marx's analysis of history and capitalism. Althusser took Marx's corpus to represent a radical break with the liberal tradition of individualism, which in many respects it was, since it offered a dialectical, process oriented conception of human society, which was based on material (not 'ideal') considerations. Marx did not deny that individual agents play a role in history, nor was he an economic determinist, even though he tended to emphasize the power of productive activities in shaping human consciousness and society. But Althusser takes Marx as a determinist and a holist in the extreme sense. Althusser attempted to work out the details of this absolutist interpretation of Marx. Poulantzas then tried to apply the framework which Althusser provided. James gives a fair airing to both the theory and its application, and does an admirable job of critical evaluation that turns up the shortcomings on both ends. As we have previously noted, she finds more sensible, useful and defensible a concessive holist position.

In the case of concessive holism, James takes for a representative practice the French Annales school of historiography. The Annales school criticised European history, as it was traditionally practiced, as consisting primarily of a narrative about prominent persons, based on their diaries and political activities. It tended to ignore the larger sphere of social life that would be the appropriate concern for a history that was scientific and not just an anecdotal series of stories. History, the Annales school argued, should be broadened from political history to total history. The Annales school, therefore, undertook historical studies which sought to explain events by using an 'eclectic research into such diverse topics as economics, populations, social institutions, technologies and climate, designed to contribute to a complete picture of social life' (159). James applauds this wider vision, but cautions that the Annales school, in its concern to avoid the unrigorous faults of the earlier historiography, moved too far in the direction of quantitative analysis. However, she observes that '[h]istory of this [total] sort ... has been enormously successful in the past thirty years or so ...' (164). And so it has. Today, as

we survey the last 30 years, we can see how our specialized disciplines, developed as a division of labour to solve the practical problems involved in studying the world, led to a kind of extreme myopia. And in many respects the Annales school can be seen as a movement toward interdisciplinary integration of the knowledge won by this specialization. In more recent years we have witnessed a similar movement in explanation and practical problem solving in such areas as environmental studies and in studies of technology and the human context.

One of the lessons which emerges from the failure of efforts to build comprehensive theories of social change, based on the work of a single discipline or interest, is that such theories cannot be complete and comprehensive. Moreover, their explanatory power, when applied to actual situations, is often lacking in bite. Social events do not occur in the vacuum imagined by any one discipline's abstract theory. They have economic, moral, aesthetic, biological, psychological, etc., aspects. Theories of history that attempted to explain the 'rise and fall' of civilizations by reference primarily to political, military and economic factors, often overlooked the role also played by the soil and agricultural practices on which the civilizations were based. What was its type and how was it farmed? In other words, they often failed to consider the ecological constraints which were part of the total process of rise and fall. It is important to remind ourselves that there can be 'more than one legitimate interest' in the context of social explanation. The pursuit of one interest in explanation does not rule out the appropriateness of other different interests yielding other perspectives and insights. James concludes, then, that 'concessive holism should be adopted as the most fruitful approach to social explanation' (179), for it is open enough to encompass the interests of individualist explanation and the insights of holism.

This book is a very competent piece of work, and if its subject is within your interests, you will find it well worth reading.

ALAN R. DRENGSON
University of Victoria

ANTHONY KENNY. *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1984. pp. xv + 150. Cdn$31.25; US$24.95. ISBN 0-631-13705-x.

Kenny's latest work on Wittgenstein is not new work. All ten essays in the book, written over a period of some twenty years, have appeared elsewhere.

Consequently, I doubt that those familiar with Wittgenstein scholarship will be especially excited by the publication of this collection. On the other hand, small libraries who do not have an extensive periodical collection will be, or at least ought to be, excited since now they too can have Kenny's always thoughtful essays on Wittgenstein. In addition, the book should be welcomed by those engaged in undergraduate education, not only for the convenience of having so many fine articles in one volume, but also because of the themes emphasized in the essays: the continuity between the early and late Wittgenstein and the continuity between Wittgenstein and other philosophers e.g., Teilhard de Chardin on philosophy and Cartesianism, Aquinas and intentionality, Descartes and the problem of the 'I,' Chomsky and Russell on language and mind. The second of these themes is of particular importance to Kenny. In fact, he tells us that he was moved to publish this collection because of his frustration over what he calls Wittgenstein's declining influence.

As Kenny notes, he expected Wittgenstein's ideas to have a monumental and irreversible effect on future developments in philosophy. Instead, philosophy, especially in the Anglo-American world, has turned even more strongly towards formalism and scientism. This trend, according to Kenny, has stifled Wittgenstein's critique of such scientism and eclipsed the influence he might have had in better circumstances. Kenny hopes to counteract this trend by 'illustrating the relevance of his [Wittgenstein's] work to the study of language and mind whether by the philosopher or the scientist' (viii). Since this is Kenny's avowed aim in the book, I thought it might be instructive to concentrate on just one or two of the essays and see whether Kenny successfully discharges his intent: Does he show the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for the ongoing concerns of either philosophy of mind or of language?

In 'Language and Mind,' Kenny argues that Chomsky's failure to appreciate Wittgenstein's distinction between criteria and symptoms contributes to Chomsky's confused notion of the mental. This confusion becomes evident in Chomsky's argument that an inability to use English is irrelevant to the claim, '*x* knows English,' while the absence of a certain physical structure is not. For Kenny, such a position is untenable: 'But the supposition that someone can use English as Chomsky does and yet not know English is not just a miraculous supposition: it is a piece of literal nonsense' (145). Clearly, Kenny is right even if the point is compromised: use of English is as necessary to the claim 'knows English' as having certain hardware. (I put the point this way because I do not agree with Kenny that finding only sawdust in a defunct Chomsky 'would not cast the slightest doubt on what we all now know, namely, that Chomsky knows English extremely well' [145]. We would not be having all this debate about computers if this were true. For example, Searle would certainly object if the language in question were Chinese.) Yet, one wonders how seriously one should take Kenny's criticism when he concludes with the following remarks: 'The philosophical confusions that I have claimed to detect in Chomsky's presentation of his theories

of knowledge of grammar are in no way organic to the theories themselves' (147). If they are not organic and therefore not really critical of Chomsky, why bother? Is Wittgenstein's thinking only of marginal significance for a critique of Chomsky? I think not. In fact, to put the point dramatically: the claim, Wittgenstein's ideas about language and the mental are antithetical to Chomsky's, is criteriological, not symptomatic of the relation between their ideas.

A similar half-heartedness (or perhaps it is understatement) infects a second essay in the book, 'The Homunculus Fallacy.' Kenny's goal here is to show the danger of attributing to parts of human beings or to computers predicates whose normal range of application is the whole human being, e.g., 'the eye sees.' If only computer experts and psychologists knew their Wittgenstein better, they would never make such egregious errors. However, once again, the problem seems much deeper. That these people make such errors bespeaks of a completely different conception of the nature of mind, knowledge, etc. As Wittgenstein would say, this joke goes deep. And Kenny says things in this article that make it clear that he is aware of the depth of their disagreement: 'Consequently, an explanation of seeing must be an explanation not only of the acquisition and storage of information, but also of what makes the containing of this information into knowledge — i.e., its relation to behaviour' (130). Why then does Kenny worry about the predicates, and not about the larger issues? While I know the answer to this question — to worry about the predicates (words) is to worry about the larger issues — this is not what others, the people we want to convince, hear. They hear, or rather supply, the conclusion that Kenny uses in the Chomsky piece, namely that this criticism is not organic nor central to the ideas of computer scientists, et al. And this surely is wrong. Either the point goes deep and is worth our attention, or it is not worth bothering about.

In terms of my original question, I think I can say yes, Kenny shows the relevance of Wittgenstein to contemporary issues in language and mind even though Kenny fails to make the point as strongly as I believe it ought to be made. Why he backs off, God only knows; however, that he does is revealing. Perhaps, Wittgenstein's declining influence is less a matter of the growing scientism, than of our failure, those who consider themselves Wittgenstein scholars and exponents, to use Wittgenstein in a more forceful fashion to criticize and deconstruct positions such as Chomsky's. Kenny's work is a step in the right direction, but it must be done with more determination.

JUDITH GENOVA
The Colorado College

GABRIEL MARCEL — GASTON FESSARD. *Correspondance (1934-1971)*, présentée et annotée par HENRI DE LUBAC, MARIE ROUGIER et MICHEL SALES. Introduction par XAVIER TILLIETTE. Paris: Beauchesne (Bibliothèque des archives de philosophie, Nouvelle série, 45) 1985. Pp. 522. 210 FF. ISBN 2-7010-1111-1.

'Il ne s'agit pas précisément, comme on pourrait s'y attendre, disent les Éditeurs de ce livre dans leur *Avertissement*, d'une correspondance philosophique ou théologique, mais avant tout d'un échange intime, amical et spirituel' (5). Ces lettres témoignent, en effet, d'une amitié exceptionnelle de quarante ans entre deux êtres à la personnalité hors du commun. 'Elles font pressentir l'inoubliable qui les unissait,' écrit Xavier Tilliette dans l'*Introduction*. 'Leur caractère unique d'intimité et de confidence n'a pas facilité la décision de les publier, mais leur qualité spirituelle et ce qu'elles révèlent de deux êtres rares emportent les hésitations' (9).

Le courrier commence le 22 janvier 1934 par une lettre du P. Fessard S.J. qui, après avoir lu 'Le Monde cassé' de G. Marcel, demande un rendez-vous au philosophe. Il se termine le 30 septembre 1971 avec une lettre du P. Fessard qui remercie G. Marcel de l'envoi de son dernier livre: *En chemin, vers quel éveil?* et félicite l'auteur pour cet ouvrage.

Ce GABRIEL MARCEL — GASTON FESSARD. *Correspondance (1934-1971)* comprend une Introduction intitulée: 'Une grande amitié,' par Xavier Tilliette S.J. qui a été l'ami personnel de l'un et de l'autre et qui trace un saisissant parallèle entre les deux correspondants, en faisant ressortir leurs personnalités contrastantes. La correspondance a été divisée (arbitrairement, me semble-t-il, puisque la raison de cette division n'est pas indiquée) en trois parties: du 22 janvier 1934 au 2 mars 1941; Été 1941 au 11 août 1956; 12 octobre 1956 au 30 septembre 1971. Cinq annexes complètent le contenu de l'ouvrage: I. Allocution du Cardinal Daniélou prononcée aux obsèques de G. Marcel. II. Texte polycopié de G. Marcel sur 'La Sagesse à l'âge technique.' III. Échange de lettres entre le P. Fessard et Georges Bernanos en mai 1946. IV. Alexandre Kojève: Trois lettres au P. Fessard et deux recensions inédites. V. Réponse du P. Fessard à Rachel Bespaloff.

Au fil de ses lettres, G. Marcel apparait comme un homme d'une grande lucidité, débordant de confiance et de gratitude envers son correspondant, mais en même temps 'impulsif, hypersensible, impressionnable, alarmé par la dernière nouvelle, prompt à envisager le pire' (*Introduction*, 11). Chez le P. Fessard, dont il avait lu l'étude consacrée au livre de Jankélévitch sur 'la Mauvaise Conscience' (parue dans *Recherches de science religieuse*, avril 1934, pp. 165-198), G. Marcel avait tout de suite pressenti une intelligence remarquable: 'vous êtes philosophe, lui écrit-il, le 21 avril 1934, c'est l'évidence même et je suis convaincu que vous êtes de ceux qui peuvent apporter la contribution la plus précieuse à cette grande oeuvre de reconstruction doctrinale dont je sens quant à moi si fortement la nécessité' (40). G. Marcel avait vu juste. Toutes les publications du P. Fessard, en particulier son livre *Pax*

Nostra, se sont avérées d'une grande rigueur d'analyse et d'une constante recherche de la vérité, dans lesquelles perce une lucidité métaphysique et théologique remarquable. Il a eu entre autres le mérite de reconnaître le génie de Hegel et son importance hors pair pour l'intelligence de son temps. Il fut aussi, en France, le spécialiste (et peut-être le seul) reconnu du communisme.

Du philosophe Gaston Fessard, Xavier Tilliette rapporte que G. Marcel disait: 'Je ne le comprends pas, ce qu'il écrit est beaucoup trop fort pour moi' (12). 'Le grand rationalisme du P. Fessard pouvait lui paraître distant et désincarné' (18). Mais 'ce n'était sûrement pas celui qu'abhorrait G. Marcel' (12). Le P. Fessard était en effet capable d'un haut degré d'abstraction; il était un 'penseur très autonome, original et tenace' (15); lui-même 'se savait difficile, implicite, abstrait, il excusait d'avance la rareté des échos' que suscitaient ses écrits, 'il s'y attendait' (17). C'est par intérêt philosophique que le P. Fessard avait été attiré par l'œuvre de G. Marcel; il aborda celle-ci avant de connaître l'homme.

Converti au catholicisme en 1929, à l'âge de quarante ans, G. Marcel passait par des moments extrêmement douloureux et pénibles, doutant très souvent de l'authenticité de sa foi. Durant les périodes dépressives de son existence, G. Marcel trouvait chez le P. Fessard, non pas le philosophe, mais le religieux qui se révèle, à travers ses lettres, un directeur de conscience au doigté remarquable, des plus compréhensifs et clairvoyants.

Que peut apporter la lecture de cette correspondance? Ces lettres, où perce un rapport asymétrique entre le directeur et le dirigé, offrent un intérêt autre que proprement philosophique.

Longuement annotées par Henri de Lubac, Marie Rougier et Michel Sales, avec une note substantielle sur Jacqueline Boegner-Marcel, signée Anne Marcel (179-181), ces lettres font saisir sur le vif, au fil du prosaïque quotidien, le milieu intellectuel ainsi que l'environnement amical et familial dans lesquels ont vécu les deux correspondants, avant, pendant et après la guerre 1939-1945. Y sont évoqués les noms et les événements autour de Charles Du Bos, Jacques Maritain, Henri Bergson, Jean Wahl, Edmond Michelet, Emmanuel Mounier, Martin Heidegger, Raymond Aron, J.-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, Gustave Thibon, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Alexandre Kojève, Jeanne Delhomme, Jeanne Hersch, etc., etc... Y figurent les relations avec des amis d'origine juive pour lesquels G. Marcel et le P. Fessard s'inquiétaient durant la guerre. Y sont inscrits les voyages, les conférences, les publications des correspondants. Y est relatée la vie mouvementée autour des revues *Esprit, Études, Vie intellectuelle, Témoignage chrétien*, etc... Y sont consignées ces innombrables souffrances provoquées par la guerre, la maladie, les deuils qui ont atteint tour à tour G. Marcel et G. Fessard.

Ces lettres ne laissent percevoir que la pointe émergente d'un iceberg: les deux correspondants avaient beaucoup d'échanges autres qu'épistolaires, puisqu'ils pouvaient se téléphoner et se rencontrer très souvent. Il y eut sans doute, en dehors des 138 publiées dans ce livre, des missives qui ont été perdues. Aussi ces lettres ne dévoilent-elles qu'une facette de la personnalité de G. Marcel, celle qui reste inaperçue dans l'œuvre philosophique et dramati-

que qu'il a laissée; nombre de ces lettres sont un cri de détresse lancé par l'homme à un ami auprès duquel il cherche lumière et réconfort. A mon avis, cet aspect inconnu de la personnalité par ailleurs primesautière de G. Marcel ajoute un point de plus à la crédibilité de son oeuvre et témoigne éloquemment de l'honnêteté intellectuelle du philosophe. Il devient évident que G. Marcel parle d'expérience quand il analyse, soit l'angoisse métaphysique, soit l'inespoir, soit le pessimisme, soit le 'désespoir et ... la trahison qui sont là et qui nous guettent à tout moment' (*Du Refus à l'Invocation*, 227). 'Je passe par une période de tristesse et presque d'accablement, écrit-il. C'est comme si j'étais déserté par le principe de création qui seul peut rendre pour moi la vie acceptable. Fatigue sans doute après une année lourde. Mais j'ai toujours l'impression que c'est un déclin définitif, et c'est très cruel... Je pense beaucoup plus à ma mort que je n'avais coutume de le faire, et cela ne vaut rien pour moi...' (391). 'Si vous saviez comme je suis las — comme il me serait facile et doux de mourir, pourvu que je ne souffre pas trop et que les miens puissent m'assister, pour ce passage!' (362).

Ces lignes extraites de leur contexte surprendront sans doute ceux qui connaissent G. Marcel comme le métaphysicien de l'espérance et qui ont lu dans son oeuvre ses exhortations en faveur du 'gaudium essendi' (*Pour une sagesse tragique et son au-delà*, p. 73). A travers sa correspondance avec le P. Fessard, G. Marcel dévoile sa vulnérabilité humaine, la simplicité de son humilité indéniable et, en même temps, son ouverture à la grâce et ses sursauts d'espérance quand filtre un peu de lumière... Il fallait à cet homme exigeant pour lui l'assurance d'être en accord avec le plus essentiel de lui-même (384); il se montre prêt à déroger aux conseils de son directeur plutôt que de faillir à une obligation de sincérité envers lui-même (385). Bien souvent mécontent de lui, il se demande s'il croit et même s'il a jamais eu la foi (410). Il s'afflige de n'être pas à la hauteur de sa 'vocation spirituelle' et il va jusqu'à déclarer: 'Il me semble que je roule au-dessous de *tout* ce que j'ai pensé' (364). La lecture de cette correspondance pourra convaincre du contraire ceux qui ont cru que G. Marcel a été emballé par le christianisme et influencé par celui-ci dans sa pensée philosophique. Ils verront jusqu'à quel point le P. Fessard devait réconforter son ami et même lui rappeler les grands thèmes de l'œuvre qui lui a valu la notoriété: espérance, fidélité créatrice, présence-absence de l'être cher disparu...

Une figure essentielle, mais infiniment discrète, domine la correspondance Marcel-Fessard: celle de Jacqueline Boegner, épouse de G. Marcel, décédée le 13 novembre 1947, dont le départ a infligé au philosophe une blessure inguérissable. Il vaut la peine de lire ce livre pour la découvrir.

Il faut souligner l'abondance et la qualité des notes qui complètent cette correspondance, ainsi que les nombreux renvois au livre autobiographique: *En chemin, vers quel éveil?* [1971], qui fourmille de détails significatifs sur la vie et l'œuvre de G. Marcel. Ces sources se complètent; de plus, les renvois d'une lettre à l'autre unifient l'ensemble des informations fournies.

Il est regrettable cependant qu'un bon nombre d'erreurs se soient glissées dans les références et aient échappé à la lecture des épreuves. Le grand

reproche que je ferai à ce livre, en terminant, c'est de ne pas offrir d'index ni thématique, ni onomastique. Un index onomastique, en particulier, aurait transformé ce livre (qui devient frustrant quand on essaie de retrouver un nom) en un instrument de travail appréciable pour ceux qui s'intéressent aux correspondants et à la vie intellectuelle française de leur époque.

SIMONNE PLOURDE
Université du Québec à Rimouski

REX MARTIN. *Rawls and Rights*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1985. Pp. xii + 244. US$25.00. ISBN 0-7006-0266-6.

Martin proposes to 'use Rawls' account of rights to restructure his entire theory' (viii). The book begins with an argument to show that utilitarian or consequentialist moral theories cannot provide a 'satisfactory account of basic moral rights.' The utilitarian can allow for subordinate moral rules (including systems of legal rights), but the utilitarian must be willing to allow that any such rules can be justifiably ignored if doing so will maximize utility. This argument is nothing more than an appeal to the author's intuitions. Martin makes no attempt to justify his assumption that certain moral rights should be respected, regardless of the consequences of doing so. Chapter 2 is an explication of the role of rights in Rawls' theory. The rest of the book is devoted to Martin's project of criticizing and revising Rawls' theory for reasons 'internal to the theory itself.' Martin devotes individual chapters to such problems as fair equality of opportunity, the difference principle, the priority of liberty, and conflicts of rights.

Two of the revisions proposed by Martin are described below. 1) In *A Theory of Justice* Rawls' second principle of justice, the difference principle, is usually formulated along the following lines: 'social and economic inequalities are not permitted unless they enhance the prospects of the least advantaged members of society.' Martin proposes the following alternative characterization of the difference principle:

> Social and economic institutions in the basic structure are to be arranged so that (a) the offices and positions are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, (b) the resulting distribution of economic primary goods is pereto efficient, and (c) the inequality between the most favored and the least advantaged is minimized. (Regarding priorities, fair equality of

opportunity is lexically prior to pareto efficiency which in turn is lexically prior to egalitarianism.) (97)

Martin proves that this principle is extensionally equivalent to Rawls' formulation of the difference principle, given Rawls' assumption of 'chain connectedness' (197-201). Martin argues that his formulation of the difference principle is superior to Rawls' in that it can be justified without appeal to the much criticized maximin rule for decision making under uncertainty. He claims that his 'pareto-egalitarian' formulation of the difference principle is justified by appeal to the idea that talents constitute a collective asset and the idea that social institutions should be for 'mutual advantage' (102). 2) Martin deals at some length with Rawls' attempt to establish the priority of the first principle of justice over the second. He argues that liberties are not of overriding importance qua liberties, but rather that *some* liberties are of overriding importance qua rights. Some liberties such as the liberty to own capital are not basic rights. Similarly, some basic rights, such as the right of the least advantaged to a just share of society's goods and resources are not liberties. Martin abandons Rawls' doctrine of the priority of liberty over the difference principle and claims that the central thrust of Rawls' theory is better captured by the idea that 'rights have priority over all aggregative schemes with respect to both liberty and the other social primary goods' (126). Martin does not follow Rawls in holding that rights to liberties take priority over other kinds of rights, but rather attempts to show that rights can be defined so as to rule out the possibility of conflicts between rights (Chapter 7). This allows Martin simply to ignore questions about the priority between different kinds of rights.

Martin's book is an extremely clear and accurate exposition of the main arguments of *A Theory of Justice*. It is especially helpful for its thorough discussion of Rawls' writings subsequent to *TJ*. Martin's proposals for revising Rawls' theory are generally helpful. His book goes far beyond the exposition and refutation which we have come to expect in commentaries and is a model for what commentators should do. However, the book is weak in its discussion of questions about the justification of principles of justice. Martin rejects the notion that the original position should be set 'apart as a favored arena for philosophical discussion' (viii). However, Martin gives no reasons for rejecting the OP 'as ...' and offers no clear alternative to the OP as a basis for justifying principles of justice. Martin makes extensive use of the following arguments: 1) The idea that since natural endowments are not deserved, differences in natural abilities should be viewed as a collective asset; 2) the view that social institutions should be designed for the mutual benefit of all who take part in them; and 3) the idea that the ability to formulate a conception of the good and the ability to have a sense of justice are essential to one's being a moral person. 1) and 2) are used to establish Martin's pareto-egalitarian principle and 3) is used to show that certain liberties are basic moral rights. But the connection between these arguments and the principles which they are supposed to justify is not entirely clear. (See p. 102 for a par-

ticularly egregious example.) An even greater problem is Martin's failure to give reasons why we should accept any of these arguments or suppose that they serve to justify certain principles of justice over others. For example, why should the correct principles of justice afford special protection for those capacities which Rawls and Martin claim to be essential to the development of one's moral personhood?

THOMAS L. CARSON
Loyola University of Chicago

MARY MIDGLEY. *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984. Pp. viii + 224. Cdn$37.50; US$29.95. ISBN 0-7100-9759-X.

This book, which grew out of the Gilbert Ryle Lectures that Midgley gave at Trent University in 1980, addresses the problems of wickedness. Philosophers have largely ignored philosophic questions which arise because people often treat themselves and others so badly. Of course, the problem of evil — why is there so much suffering if a good god made the world? — has received lots of philosophic attention. But the problems of wickedness — what is it? how is it possible? what motivates it? what can be done about it? — have not received sustained attention. Midgley's twin aims are to get others to look at these questions and to contribute her own bit towards answering them.

Midgley sees the main problem to be one of individual human psychology: what makes people do dastardly deeds? She realizes that before dealing with this quesiton she has to address two forms of scepticism about individual wickedness. The first form of scepticism holds that human actions are best explained by economic or social causes, rather than by such things as individual virtue or vice. But if we are to understand, and take seriously, individual cases of human wickedness, we have to suppose that they are not solely attributable to causes external to the individual agent. The second form of scepticism holds not only that individual wickedness is unimportant because it does not appear in the best explanations of human behavior, but that wickedness is logically impossible given our common-sense notions of in-

dividual responsibility. Midgley does an excellent job of showing why using external causes to explain cases of wicked behavior is so appealing and of sorting out why such accounts leave no room for notions of individual responsibility and, hence, no role for real wickedness — the deliberate and willful causing of harm to oneself and/or others. But her response to this problem is not so clear. Against those who would prefer to explain all human behavior in terms of economic or social causes, Midgley simply claims that social and individual causes always operate together. Against those philosophers (she discusses Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams) who argue that our common-sense conceptions of action and responsibility allow no conceptual space for the possibility of hard-core wickedness, Midgley simply claims that common-sense often leads to odd results and that this should not worry us since common-sense also tells us that genuine wickedness is logically possible. Against both forms of scepticism, Midgley seems to beg the question. Although most of us will be inclined to accept her conclusion here, I doubt that many readers will find her argument for that conclusion satisfactory.

Suppose that, contrary to what some philosophers and social scientists have thought, one can do wrong and do it willingly. The problem then is to figure out what sort of thing wickedness is and what motivates people to do it. Midgley tries to show that evil is best thought of not as a positive force, but in a negative way, as a lack of some good. Thinking of it as a positive force leads to well-known Manichean paradoxes. But thinking of wickedness (or any other form of evil) as a lack of goodness also leads to well-known paradoxes. What always made it so attractive to think of evil as the absence of goodness was the belief that a good god made the universe. If one takes this as a fact one has to consider, then the reasons for not thinking of evil as a positive force are quite strong indeed. However, if god's existence is not a given (and for Midgley it isn't), then it is hard to see why one must think of evil in this Augustinian way.

The book really shines when Midgley turns to the question of what actually motivates people to commit evil deeds. Midgley's view is that there is no single motive for wickedness. Rather, people do evil things when certain motives are not properly balanced by others. In the course of an only partially successful attempt to clarify and substantiate this claim, Midgley provides us with excellent discussions of Nietzsche and Freud, an interesting collection of insights from several other thinkers, careful and often penetrating analyses of several wisely chosen sample cases drawn from literature, and a good discussion of the relevance of evolution to this project.

In short, then, what we find in Midgley's book are excellent statements of the problems which confront anyone who wants to provide an account of human wickedness, coupled with a series of helpful insights into how one would complete this project. What we do not find is any systematic statements of that project. In this sense, then, the book is stimulating but ultimately unsatisfying. It is a good place to start exploring the problem and is

fertile ground for anyone who seeks a solution. But Midgley does not go very far in telling us, even in broad outline, what that solution will look like.

SHELDON WEIN
McGill University

TERENCE PENELHUM. *God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism*. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1983. Pp. xiii + 186. US$34.95. ISBN 90-277-1550-5.

This is a welcome new contribution to lively current discussions in the epistemology of religion. The bulk of the book is devoted to a careful critical study of the great fideists and sceptics of the modern world — Erasmus, Montaigne and Pierre Bayle; Pascal, Kierkegaard and David Hume. These chapters are both historically and philosophically illuminating. Penelhum has in other works made a major contribution to the understanding of Hume and his section on Hume here enlarges this. Hume was regarded, in the older Reid-Beattie interpretation, as a sceptic who started from Locke's 'way of ideas' and showed how this leads inevitably to unanswerable doubts about our perception of an external world, about induction, and about continuing self-identity. However, Kemp Smith in the 1940s revolutionized Humean studies by presenting him as teaching that our beliefs in the external world, in induction, and in self-identity are 'natural beliefs' which neither need nor are capable of rational support. We are so constituted that we can hardly help holding and living by them; for the cost of rejecting them would be the loss of our ability to live successfully in the world. Penelhum suggests that the old and the new interpretations are not rivals but that the later includes the earlier. 'If Hume's objective is to reveal the sources of our beliefs and evaluations in human nature, it is a perfectly proper part of such an inquiry to argue that these beliefs and evaluations do not result from our having discovered good reasons for them, and are unaffected by the subsequent revelation that no good reasons for them exist' (123).

Hume's concept of natural belief has given rise to what Penelhum calls the parity argument that religious as well as perceptual beliefs should be absolved from the requirement of rational justification. If we can sanely believe in the reality of the external world and of other persons without any satisfactory philosophical proof of their reality, why should we not also believe in the

reality of God without any supporting philosophical proof? Although there are passages in Hume which seem to support such a parity argument, Penelhum identifies two Humean reasons for rejecting it. One is that perceptual belief is unavoidable, universal and biologically necessary, whereas religious belief is (according to Hume in his *Natural History of Religion*) not universal but arises from fears of the unknown, fears which we can learn to control. Sceptical philosophers, at least, can do without religious beliefs although they cannot do without perceptual beliefs. The second reason, representing the outcome of the *Dialogues*, is that the positive conclusion of natural theology is so thin — a bare minimal deism — that it amounts to a mere philosophical theory rather than a religion.

In a careful discussion, which readers will need to study for themselves, Penelhum shows the inadequacies of this Humean resistance to the parity argument. He concludes that Hume 'does not show that our supposed psychological inability to sustain doubt about common-sense beliefs makes it consistent to decline religious beliefs. Nor does he show that the indispensability of our secular beliefs is not a feature of religious beliefs as well — unless one means "secular indispensability" when one says "indis pensability." His attempt to concede a vague general theistic commitment but to evacuate all real content from it does not so much counter the Parity Argument as show it to point toward a general, rather than a specific, religious commitment' (147). Penelhum's conclusion is that a defensive form of parity argument stands up; and in arriving at this conclusion he engages with the partly analogous positions of Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga.

The whole book is characterised by the scrupulous care, the responsible use of texts, the consistent intellectual candour, and the cautiously constructive aims, with which we have become familiar in Penelhum's other writings.

JOHN HICK
(*Department of Religion*)
Claremont Graduate School

[Due to an unfortunate misunderstanding for which neither editor is responsible, this review is also appearing in *Toronto Journal of Theology* **1**.2 (Fall 1985). Ed.]

GEORGE ROBINSON and JANICE MOULTON. *Ethical Problems in Higher Education*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1985. Pp. xii + 108. US$11.95. ISBN 0-13-290198-6.

These days philosophers, like other academics, feel obliged to demonstrate that their discipline can be practically useful. Robinson and Moulton contend that ethical problems which arise in running institutions of higher education can be exposed, and that we can 'work toward a better understanding and resolution of them' (95) thanks to philosophy. Does the book lend credence to these three claims?

Certainly most academics will have encountered first-hand ethical problems of the sort selected for treatment. They are grouped under the broad headings of relation to society, hiring and evaluation of faculty, research, and teaching. Identified through interviews, discussions and correspondence with members of the academic community, the problems (perhaps unduly emphasizing those experienced by junior faculty and graduate students) are traced to very general and fundamental sources: to 'differences in power and influence in academia' and 'the effect of outside funding on research and educational directions' (95-6).

'Nothing new here,' one may say. And the authors' self-congratulatory declaration in the last chapter that 'Now we can directly confront issues that used to be ignored' (95) is clearly unwarranted. Nor need one be a professional philosopher to recognize that these *are* ethical issues.

How do the other two claims about the unique contributions of philosophy fare? 'Understanding' ethical issues is a complex business. For the book's authors, it appears to involve the identification and explication of relevant ethical theories and principles. Thus in the first chapter the reader is offered 'a core set of ethical principles' which 'are used to determine the morality of actions and are employed by several major theories' (7). The four principles are: 1) fairness; 2) maximizing benefits; 3) universalization; 4) treating others as ends in themselves, not merely as means. These may, we are told, 'converge on the same solution to an ethical problem,' while one has 'interesting' cases in which the principles 'lead to different ethical decisions' (8).

Now this optimism about the possibility of unanimity on which principle(s) to employ receives little support from the discussions which constitute the body of the book. Moreover, given the authors' stress upon the degree to which values determine not only our judgement of what is morally right but also our selection of factual data, this assessment is not warranted by their own analysis of ethical problems.

Should one excuse the superficial and misleading characterization of ethical theory (as involving four generally accepted principles applicable to the range of issues canvassed in the book) on the grounds that the primary intended readership is students in liberal arts and preprofessional courses? Surely not. Perhaps the significant question prompted by their treatment is whether attempts to produce an ostensibly practically useful text for non-philosophers inevitably falsifies the character of ethical theorizing. I'll come back to this. First a few words on the evidence in the book that philosophy helps 'resolve' ethical problems in higher education.

Specific examples of conflicts over the morality of practices are described, relevant ethical principles are identified, and implied right courses of action

noted. Boxed off from the main text are ethical questions, sometimes accompanied by specific cases (factual or fictional?), which demand answers before action can be taken. The striking feature in all of this is the wide range of conflicting judgements which reflection is shown to deliver as 'solutions' to any given issue. As for the authors, they generally simply drop an issue once the supposedly relevant principles and possible course of action are identified. When they do present a judgement as the 'right' one (e.g. in defending affirmative action [40-1] and the need for open dissemination of research findings [58]) it seems to be social benefit which is supposed to justify it. But no underlying social values are provided or shown to warrant universal acceptance.

In brief, on the few occasions when a resolution of an ethical problem is proposed, it is not clear why it satisfies the authors or should satisfy their readers. Paradoxically, this book (one of a series of six on 'occupational ethics') suggests that the answer to what the general editors identify in their preface as an 'inescapable question,' viz. whether philosophical ethics 'can help resolve these job related acute problems' (ix), is 'no.' Is the goal itself overly ambitious? Perhaps in their effort to show that philosophy possesses more than intrinsic value, the editors and authors have claimed too much. Rather than talk of helping to resolve ethical problems, one could propose only to show what limits on action specific theories imply for those who profess to hold them. So we arrive at the topic to which I promised to return: the nature of ethical theorizing and its potential usefulness for non-philosophers in the resolution of ethical problems. Alistair MacIntyre in his well-known paper on cost-benefit analysis (in *Ethics and the Environment* [Prentice Hall 1983], 151) has argued that, in our culture at least, moral arguments are 'unsettlable.' Exposing moral conflicts among decision-makers may well produce 'unmanageable conflict.' What he calls 'arbitrary considerations' always enter into the resolution of ethical problems. Concede MacIntyre his points. What follows? One might find a way out through Habermas' notion of critical discourse. Abandon the idea that an absolutely 'right' answer on ethical matters can be reached. Consider as a 'resolution' or 'solution' that to which the participants agree following a full, rational exploration of their beliefs and of the situation demanding action. Here, the philosopher might be a sort of consultant on the reasoning processes employed. But equality among participants is a necessary condition for uncoerced debates and decisions. The hierarchical structure of universities, other institutions of higher education, and virtually every institution in our society, renders the proposal unworkable. A transformation of society is needed. How is the philosopher to gain acceptance for his social ideal or to get people to act upon it? He must follow Marx's advice and 'take off his gloves' (as R.G. Collingwood put it) — refuse to rest content with describing the world and try to improve it.

Philosophers can make a significant contribution to the resolution of practical problems by becoming political activists. The general editors of the series, the authors of the book, most philosophers, and certainly university administrators and funding agencies, would find such 'practical' contribu-

tions quite unacceptable. But do ethical and academic values demand that we stay off the streets and in our studies — or quite the reverse?

CATHERINE BEATTIE
McMaster University

GILLIAN ROSE. *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1984. Pp. viii + 232. Cdn$21.25. ISBN 0-631-13194-4.

This is an extraordinarily impressive critique of post-Structuralist thought (Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault), probably the most important to have appeared. It deserves to be widely read and discussed. It combines exceptional scholarly acumen with a tenacious and passionately argued attacked upon what Rose refers to as the meretricious 'deconstruction' of a valuable tradition of philosophical thought concerning the problem of law (a tradition which is allegedly 'deconstructed' as a part of the larger project of 'deconstructing' metaphysics generally). The fact that this 'deconstruction' represents itself in part as a new and emancipated theoretical jurisprudence brings forth special contempt from Rose. In her view this 'deconstruction' of metaphysics involves a reconstruction (falsification) of the history of law which blinds us to the very tradition which it disowns, and then ignorantly recapitulates that very same tradition in crude form, when it does not simply render the problem of law altogether beyond thought.

The post-structuralist claim to have slipped free of the snares of reason in all its established forms — Kantian metaphysics, Hegelian dialectics, universalist history, etc. — concerns Rose no less than the immediate topic of jurisprudence. Her impassioned defense of what she terms a tradition of 'jurisprudential wisdom' is equally a defense of the claims of reason, and of the modern philosophical traditions which have acknowledged those claims.

The 'problem of law' which motivates the argument derives from Kant. Indeed it is not a single problem, but rather all the problems involved in thinking through the metaphysical presuppositions of law in relation to nature and society which she intends. In the first chapter Rose evokes the courtroom metaphor of the trial of reason employed by Kant in the first Critique (A 84-5/B 116-17). The *quaestio quid juris* upon which she focuses is the claim of the moral subject to freedom and autonomy, along with all the con-

nected problems concerning the capacity of reason to reconcile the kingdom of ends with the kingdom of nature, autonomy with heteronomy, and reason in its practical employment with reason in its theoretical employment.

Beyond these standard *aporiai* in the critical philosophy, Rose persuasively argues for the existence of still more radical difficulties centered on the distinction between persons and things. She claims, in an intriguing and persuasive argument which cannot be reproduced here, that Kant's usages of these crucial terms are taken directly from Roman law, and inextricably entangle his treatment of the kingdom of ends in the political and economic categories of Roman *dominium* (the doctrine of absolute property) in such a way as to render the kingdom of ends essentially incoherent. Her first chapter documents these various problems in Kant's treatment of law, which are thereafter collectively designated as 'the antinomy of law' or simply 'the *quaestio quid juris*.'

The challenge of overcoming these antinomies, accepted by successive generations of Western thinkers, has brought into being a tradition of 'jurisprudential wisdom' in terms of which we have articulated our deepest insights into the notions of law, reason, and society, in Rose's view, notwithstanding the general failure to resolve the antinomies themselves.

In fact, the tradition of 'jurisprudential wisdom' which Rose wishes to recover runs deepest, according to her, in the work of the Marburg and Heidelburg neo-Kantians, preeminently Hermann Cohen and Emil Lask. Cohen's work in particular looms over the entire argument, advancing the Kantian tradition, providing the context of Heidegger's work on law and history, and pre-figuring the post-structuralists' thought (however surprising they may find that claim).

The method of her argument is an immanent critique of the tradition which she wishes to rescue and restore (the first half of the book), followed by a relentless critique of the treatment of that tradition at the hands of the main post-structuralist thinkers (the second half of the book). They too see themselves as pursuing a tradition, of course, one derived from Nietzsche and Heidegger. The earlier existentialist wave of reception took the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger to overcome morality; the more recent post-structuralist wave has taken them to overcome legality. The history of this would-be alternative jurisprudence is what Rose labels 'the dialectic of nihilism.'

Nietzsche and especially Heidegger are pivotal figures in her argument, for obvious reasons. Rose argues that Heidegger's treatment of various dimensions of the problem of law and history have their beginnings in Heidegger's attempts to come to terms with the thought of his neo-Kantian contemporaries, especially Cohen and Lask. More strikingly she argues that the *outcome* of Heidegger's thought on these problems never gets very far from the orbit of Hermann Cohen's thought. Indeed she traces numerous parallels between the two thinkers, and exhibits both as finally trapped in analogous antinomies. Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five are all devoted to substantiating these claims.

That accomplished, Rose turns to Part II of her work, now in a position to carry out an especially intricate analysis of the fate of the problem of law involving Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, and the appropriation (now seen in many respects as a misapprehension and misappropriation) of Nietzsche and of Heidegger by Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault — the so-called 'dialectic of nihilism.'

The post-structuralists, she claims, would close all access to the tradition of rational jurisprudential inquiry and render much of the problem of law simply beyond thought. This follows from their general claim, phrased in a variety of ways, that knowledge, being only a form of discourse and like all discourse a product merely of institutional or other forces, can never establish its putative claim to truth, can never exhibit its grounding in reason. Reason as an ideal is left powerless and irrelevant to the human situation. For Derrida, law and reason alike are swallowed up in an origin which is itself prior to critical reflection, namely 'writing.' With similar effect, Foucault posits 'power' as the rationally inscrutable origin of our allegedly rational systems of jurisprudential thought. The details of Rose's painstaking reconstruction and critique of their thought cannot be rehearsed here. However, there is little reason to doubt that her work will stand up exceedingly well to critical scrutiny, and emerge as a definitive critique of post-structuralism.

PHILIP T. GRIER
Dickinson College

KENNETH M. SAYRE. *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1983. Pp. x + 328. US$37.50. ISBN 0-691-07277-9.

This ambitiously conceived and carefully constructed study proposes significant new interpretations of central developments in Plato's later thought. It concentrates on controversial texts: *Parmenides, Philebus*, and passages in Aristotle and his ancient commentators which treat Plato's 'unwritten teaching.' It offers interpretations of difficult passages that in ways seem preferable to other current views. Frequently, however, the arguments are not so persuasive and the evidence not so clear as S. hopes, and misreferences, misquotations, mistranslations, and misinterpretations of the

Greek turn the scholarly virtue of checking references (which here must be done without an *index locorum*) into a virtual necessity.

The book's richness and complexity permit hardly more than a bald summary of its main conclusions. S. begins by arguing that criticisms of the theory of Ideas which appear early in *Parmenides*, 'were not intended ... to be conclusive ... but that they ... highlight those aspects ... which Plato thinks must be reexamined' (20). The aspect attacked most severely is the separate existence of Forms, but the existence of Forms is conceded to be necessary for thought and discourse (135BC). S. notes (interestingly) that Socrates' resistance is neither vigorous nor dialectically able, and he accepts the second part of *Parmenides* as a demonstration of the correct method for discussing the Forms (37).

S. argues that the hypothetical method introduced here improves on that discussed in earlier dialogues and he provides a new reading of *Parmenides*' eight hypotheses which is interesting in itself and from which he concludes that this section of *Parmenides* continues to attack radical separation (46-7), rejects Parmenides' own doctrine of One Being (48), and canvasses the possibility of Pythagorean derivations of numbers from the One and of sensible things from numbers (58-9). A difficulty for S.'s interpretation is that the method requires the assumptions that a certain thing exists and that the same thing does not exist (136A), and each assumption must be considered in four different ways. Hence the eight hypotheses. However, S.'s interpretation rests heavily on the claim (45-7) that hypotheses 1,4,6 and 8 are about one subject and 2,3,5 and 7 about another.

Since, continues S. (61-2), the discovery of incommensurability had plagued Pythagorean ontology, Plato needed a method for handling incommensurables if he wanted to adopt a Pythagorean approach. S. finds this method in the theory of proportion attributed to Plato's teacher Eudoxus, which has close parallels with Dedkind's definition of numbers, including irrational numbers (103ff). Pressing the correspondence very hard, S. concludes that 'there existed in Plato's time arithmetic techniques for defining both the rational and irrational numbers'; 'these techniques involved the concept of series of quantities which are exclusively Great and Small in relation to the limit that they approach from opposite directions' (Cauchy sequences converging on the number being defined), and 'Plato was well aware of these techniques' (109). S. admits that this result is conjectural, but claims to find some support in Iamblichus and Proclus (111-12). The evidence is pitifully weak, and does not persuade me that the ancients defined number after Dedekind's fashion. S. is concerned (107) that Eudoxus' definition applies to magnitudes, not specifically numbers (a qualm which *Posterior Analytics* 74a17 should settle), but the problem is rather the crucial point that Eudoxus does not define irrationals (he defines what it is for irrationals to be equal, assuming that they exist), whereas Dedekind does. (Eudoxus' method of exhaustion might well have been considered in this regard.) This objection gains force since the derivation of number at *Parmenides* 142-4 does not follow Dedekind's approach.

The book's main purpose, however, is to show that Plato's 'unwritten teaching' can be found in Plato's writings, principally *Philebus*. S. approaches this thesis through Aristotle's summary of Plato's ontology in *Metaphysics* A6. Five problematic claims are identified (94): (a) numbers come from participation of the Great and the Small (G&S) in Unity; (b) sensible things are constituted by the Forms and G&S; (c) Forms are composed of G&S and Unity; (d) Forms are numbers; and (e) the Good is Unity. Passages from the Greek commentators on Aristotle are used to establish several synonyms for 'G&S,' including 'the Indefinite Dyad,' 'the Unlimited,' 'the Unlimited Nature,' 'the Greater and the Smaller,' and 'the More and Less.' (But how precise *are* these identities? For example, Simplicius *In Phys.* 453.32-3 says that the More and Less is posited to be *of* the Unlimited Nature, not that it *is* the Unlimited Nature. Similarly 453.34-5, 455.9-10.) Since the Unlimited Nature in *Philebus* involves becoming more and less (24E), the ontological principle of G&S is found in Plato. Similarly Unity is the *Philebus'* principle of Limit. Hence S. claims that (a) describes the generation of numbers, where G&S 'is a continuum that admits division into exclusive sets of greater and smaller factors' (111) by the imposition of Limit. S. sees the key to (b) and (c) in *Philebus* 16C9-10, 'those things that are always said to exist are composed of one and many, having Limit and the Unlimited within them connaturally.' He takes (controversially) 'those things' to include both Forms and sensibles. Interpretation of 23E-27B suggests that the Unlimited 'comprises all ranges of qualitative differences that are continuous in the sense of admitting more or less in degree at any given point,' whereas Limit 'comprises all numbers and measures by which such continua can be subdivided into determinate elements' (155). S. argues that (c) such limits correspond to Forms and (b) sensible particulars, which occupy individual places along indefinite qualitative ranges, are given identity, and made determinate and intelligible by reference to the Forms (= Limits) as paradigms. Thus sensibles are composed of the same Unlimited as Forms, and so Plato abandons the radical separation thesis attacked in *Parmenides*. (d) Saying that Limit consists of 'anything that relates as number to number or measure to measure' (25B1) amounts to saying that 'Limit consists of numbers' (= measures [cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 219-20 and S. p.110]). (e) *Philebus* gives first prize in the competition for the Good to measure, which is imposed by Limit (= Unity), i.e., because of Unity a mixture becomes good, and so the Good is Unity (173).

Both S.'s arguments and his conclusions demand close consideration, and the book is bound to be controversial. Nevertheless, its broad scope, clearly stated theses, and interesting arguments make it a welcome contribution to the literature on Plato's later philosophy.

RICHARD D. McKIRAHAN, Jr.
Pomona College

JOHN R. SEARLE. *L'intentionalité: Essai de philosophie des états mentaux*. Traduit de l'américain par Claude Pichevin. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit (Collection 'Propositions') 1985. Pp. 341. 180 FF. ISBN 2-7073-1031-X.

A peine deux ans après sa parution en anglais, l'édition française de *Intentionality* voit le jour grâce à la traduction efficace et instruite de M. Claude Pichevin. Il faut certes se réjouir de la diligence avec laquelle les Editions de Minuit ont procédé dans ce cas précis, mais cette publication doit être saluée aussi pour d'autres raisons. Le lecteur trouvera dans l'ouvrage de John R. Searle un exposé qui pourrait très bien servir d'introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (ou à la 'philosophie des états mentaux', comme M. Pichevin suggère que soit traduite l'expression 'philosophy of mind'). On complimentera aussi le traducteur d'avoir laissé transparaître le style vif et incisif de Searle, tout entier consacré à l'analyse des concepts. Plus généralement, c'est à la manière des philosophes analystes que le lecteur est convié et il est heureux qu'un livre illustrant cette manière et portant sur une problématique chère à la 'philosophie continentale' atteigne le public français. La traduction m'est apparue soignée et Claude Pichevin doit être félicité d'avoir ajusté sa terminologie à celle déjà fixée en partie par Joëlle Proust dans la traduction de l'ouvrage précédent de Searle, *Sens et expression*. Le lecteur trouvera en plus un lexique très utile qui fournit des définitions pour une trentaine de termes appartenant à la théorie de l'intentionalité développée par l'auteur.

Searle tente d'élaborer une 'théorie naturaliste de l'intentionalité' (140, 194, 312), c'est-à-dire une théorie qui suppose que les phénomènes mentaux intentionnels font partie de notre histoire biologique au même titre que les états physiologiques. Les expériences intentionnelles de désir, de croyance et de perception, autant que la respiration, la digestion et le sommeil, sont des traits caractéristiques réels d'organismes biologiques. Les états intentionnels sont causés par des processus neuro-physiologiques et sont réalisés dans la structure du cerveau (31,313). Ils ont cependant ceci de particulier que, contrairement aux autres états physiologiques, ils sont susceptibles d'entrer dans un réseau complexe de 'relations causales intentionnelles.' Le concept de causalité intentionnelle s'avère être le concept central du livre puisqu'il permet de justifier le point de vue naturaliste de l'intentionalité en attribuant une caractéristique distinctive aux états intentionnels sans toutefois accréditer un point de vue dualiste. (Chapitres I et 10) Il trouve en outre une application fondamentale dans les phénomènes de perception et d'action. (Chapitres 2 et 3) L'importance du concept amène d'ailleurs l'auteur à lui consacrer un chapitre entier. (Chapitre 4) Enfin, le concept est aussi utilisé par Searle dans sa théorie de la référence. (Chapitre 9)

La relation de causalité intentionnelle se distingue de la relation causale humienne par le fait qu'elle peut être expérimentée directement (dans la perception et l'action), qu'elle n'implique pas l'existence de lois, mais surtout par le fait qu'elle constitue en même temps une relation logique (149 et suivantes). Une expérience perceptuelle est en relation logique avec l'objet de

perception, bien qu'elle soit en même temps causée par cet objet et une action intentionnelle est en relation logique avec l'intention, mais elle est aussi causée par cette même intention, et c'est la raison pour laquelle il faut dans les deux cas parler de causalité intentionnelle. Certains états font intervenir accidentellement la causalité intentionnelle alors que d'autres la font intervenir essentiellement. Par exemple, un désir peut parfois contribuer causalement à la réalisation de ses conditions de satisfaction et il entre alors dans une relation de causalité intentionnelle avec l'action, mais il pourrait aussi bien être satisfait sans une telle contribution causale (152). Les expériences de perception et d'action, par contre, ont dans leurs conditions de satisfaction une condition sui-référentielle à l'effet qu'ils entrent dans une relation de causalité intentionnelle. Une expérience visuelle ne peut être satisfaite que si l'objet existe et cause l'expérience, et une intention ne peut être satisfaite que si l'action se réalise et que l'intention contribue causalement à sa réalisation (115).

Aussi important soit-il, le concept demeure cependant une notion confuse et incohérente et Searle a tort d'avoir cru discerner des relations qui seraient à la fois causales et logiques dans les expériences intentionnelles de perception et d'action. Dans une expérience perceptuelle, la relation logique (l'implication matérielle) est entre l'expérience perceptuelle entière et l'objet perçu alors que la relation causale affecte l'objet et le contenu intentionnel de l'expérience. De la même manière, l'action intentionnelle entière implique logiquement l'existence d'une intention, mais la relation causale n'intervient qu'entre l'intention et le comportement observable. Dans les deux cas, s'il y a relation causale, elle se trouve entre les constituants de l'expérience et aucune relation logique n'intervient entre ces constituants. L'auteur signale certes que la relation logique postulée n'est pas l'implication, mais nulle part précise-t-il de quelle relation logique il s'agit (151,156). Searle semble vouloir jouer sur le fait que, dans une expérience visuelle, l'objet se trouve en quelque sorte déjà tout entier anticipé dans le contenu de l'expérience, de telle sorte que l'expérience 'implique' en un certain sens l'objet. Comme Searle devrait cependant le reconnaître lui-même, l'existence d'expériences visuelles hallucinatoires nous oblige à admettre que la relation entre la vision et l'objet est purement externe. L'expérience visuelle, en vertu du caractère sui-référentiel du contenu intentionnel, est à la fois une représentation de la relation causale entière et un terme de la relation, mais ce n'est pas là une raison suffisante pour prétendre que la distinction entre le contenu intentionnel et le monde naturel des objets est court-circuitée (96). L'expérience est peut-être une présentation de l'expérience perceptuelle entière, mais elle ne lui est pas identique et seule l'expérience entière entretient une relation logique à l'objet. L'idée de Searle paraît au départ plus défendable lorsqu'appliquée à l'action puisque l'intention préalable fait advenir causalement une action intentionnelle et que celle-ci, en retour, implique l'existence d'une intention. Malheureusement, l'intention logiquement impliquée est l'intention dans l'action et l'intention dans l'action contribue causalement à l'existence d'un certain comportement observable et non à l'action intentionnelle entière.

La caractérisation de l'expérience visuelle et de l'intention dans l'action

est de toute façon extrêmement problématique. Il s'agirait, selon Searle, d'expériences intentionnelles dont le contenu est en partie *sui-référentiel* et qui *présentent* la relation causale dans laquelle elles apparaissent comme un des termes (122-3). Etant donné leur caractère sui-référentiel, les notions d'intention et d'expérience visuelle vont inévitablement recevoir des définitions imprédicatives. Ensuite, puisque la relation causale intervient à l'occasion d'une relation de présentation, il faudra aussi renoncer au principe traditionnel de l'antériorité temporelle de la cause. Enfin, on soulignera le caractère problématique des formules qui représentent ces notions et dans lesquelles Searle autorise l'entrecroisement des parenthèses (94,270).

A la tentative infructueuse de réaliser une 'intentionalisation de la causalité' viennent s'ajouter les difficultés relatives au projet de 'naturalisation de l'intentionalité.' On peut en effet s'interroger sur l'utilité qu'il y a à faire appel à un concept de causalité quel qu'il soit pour l'analyse de l'intentionalité. Il apparaît contre-intuitif de dire des états intentionnels qu'ils 'causent' quoi que ce soit; mais même si de telles locutions sont acceptées, l'intentionalité de l'action et de la perception reste malgré tout inexpliquée. On sait très bien, par exemple, que même si une action est réalisée et que l'intention contribue causalement à sa réalisation, cela ne suffit pas à la rendre intentionnelle. Searle discute de tels contre-exemples seulement pour affirmer que le contenu intentionnel lui-même doit être 'un aspect causalement pertinent sous lequel il cause l'action' (152,168). A la difficulté de comprendre en quel sens un état intentionnel peut causer une action s'ajoute donc la difficulté de voir comment le contenu de cet état intentionnel peut bien avoir une efficience causale quelconque. On peut certes vouloir adopter une théorie causale de la perception et même une théorie causale de l'action (dans l'hypothèse où toutes les actions se réduisent, sur le plan ontologique, à des actions basiques), mais cela ne paraît justifié que si l'on renonce du même coup à leur caractère intentionnel et que l'on est disposé à ne parler d'intentionalité que 'dans les descriptions.'

Les chapitres cinq à neuf sont consacrés à des questions fondationnelles en philosophie du langage. Searle y défend le point de vue que les conditions de vérité des énoncés sont déterminées par un arrière-plan d'assomptions préintentionnelles (176 et suivantes). L'auteur semble confondre le fait empirique que dans l'usage des langues naturelles, la signification déborde largement la sphère linguistique et la question théorique de savoir si, en principe, les conditions de vérité dans n'importe quel langage sont déterminées par un arrière-plan ou un 'réseau' d'attitudes propositionnelles. Il faudrait pouvoir montrer que le concept de signification conventionnelle est réductible à celui de signification intentionnelle et donc être en mesure de fournir une caractérisation de la signification intentionnelle qui ne présuppose pas le concept de signification conventionnelle. Searle ne peut pas vraiment prétendre avoir montré comment l'intentionalité du langage est dérivée par rapport à celle des états mentaux. Tout au plus peut-il prétendre avoir montré que l'intentionalité des *actes* de langage est dérivée de l'intentionalité des états mentaux. Cela ne pourrait compter comme une réduction de la signification con-

ventionnelle que si les actes illocutoires appartenaient à la signification conventionnelle, mais il n'en est rien. On peut très bien prétendre que la présence de marqueurs illocutoires dans les langues naturelles est un trait inessentiel de celles-ci et qu'un langage ne contenant que des phrases au mode indicatif aurait les mêmes capacités expressives (bien qu'il serait sans doute moins efficace). Par ailleurs, Searle veut sans doute lui-même garantir le caractère public des contenus d'expériences intentionnelles et s'il renonce à postuler des 'sens' appartenant à un 'troisième monde', comment alors leur objectivité peut-elle être assurée si ce n'est qu'en les faisant dépendre du langage? D'un point de vue strictement méthodologique, on reconnaîtra certes qu'une théorie sémantique se doit d'être complétée par une pragmatique de l'usage et donc par une théorie de la compréhension, de la référence, de la présupposition, de la métaphore, des actes de discours, etc., mais elle ne saurait être identifiée à cette pragmatique.

Je dirai peu de choses concernant la théorie descriptiviste de la référence défendue par Searle parce qu'elle ne comporte pas de véritable innovation. En effet, sa théorie des 'faisceaux' suppose que la référence est déterminée par une disjonction de descriptions définies, mais une disjonction de descriptions n'est rien d'autre qu'une description complexe. Pour ce qui est de sa tentative d'intégrer les acquis de la théorie causale à la théorie descriptiviste par l'utilisation de son concept de causalité intentionnelle, l'entreprise m'apparaît compromise pour les raisons évoquées plus haut.

En somme, l'ouvrage me semble comporter des lacunes importantes et la théorie confrontée à des difficultés insurmontables. Malgré l'originalité du point de vue, on ne peut donc parler de véritable contribution et le lecteur ne devrait pas penser qu'il a sous les yeux un exemple de ce qu'il y a de meilleur dans la philosophie analytique anglo-saxone. Cela dit, l'ouvrage me semble receler une vertu pédagogique certaine et sa publication pourrait s'avérer utile pour cette raison.

MICHEL SEYMOUR
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

The Works of John Locke: A Comprehensive Bibliography from the Seventeenth Century to the Present, compiled by JOHN C. ATTIG. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1985. Pp. xx + 185. US$35.00. ISBN 0-313-24359-X.

Since the material in this book is compiled by a professional librarian, judgments about its degree of completeness should be made by a librarian (for

example, by Jean S. Yolton, with whose work this book is in competition). Attig has not overlooked any of the works with which I am familiar.

Of each of Locke's major works, Attig briefly states the circumstances which gave rise to it, when and where it was written, its reception and influence, and its various printings in English and in the nineteen other languages in which some of them have appeared. Of particular interest is the third of the book's three indexes. It lists Locke's works in translation. If one may assume some measure of correlation between frequency of publication and degree of influence, then this index reveals at a glance a good deal about Locke's importance to especially French, German, Italian and Spanish readers. Again assuming this correlation, this index also reveals various periods of peak influence over the past three hundred years. It confirms what was already widely suspected: readers have always been at least as interested in Locke's educational theory as in his general philosophy, and apparently more so in the former than in his political writings — a fact which makes the dearth of *good* discussions of Locke's educational thought a surprising phenomenon.

Attig's work more than combines the bibliographies of Christophersen (Oslo 1930) and Hall & Woolhouse (Edinburgh 1983). However, its competition with Jean Yolton's published work, and with the forthcoming work of Jean Yolton and Roland Hall (the Clarendon Press has commissioned Yolton to do a bibliography of Locke's printed works, and Hall a selective annotated bibliography of works on Locke) makes one wonder how necessary Attig's contribution really is. The wonder increases in view of Attig's awareness of OUP's plans (cf. p.140, entry 861).

PETER A. SCHOULS
University of Alberta