

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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## 1985

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## REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LOUVAIN

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Novembre 1985

J. MICHOT, *Prophétie et divination selon Avicenne. Présentation, essai de traduction critique et index de l'«Épître de l'âme de la sphère»*.

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B. STEVENS, *Lire le «De Interpretatione»*.

Comptes rendus: *Philosophie contemporaine*.

Chaque article est suivi d'un résumé en français et en anglais.



SIMON BLACKBURN. *Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Cdn\$47.95: US\$32.00. ISBN 0-19-824650-1.

This is an introductory textbook on the philosophy of language that could only be used with very sophisticated students. It covers most of the important topics in the field, but from a personal point of view, reflecting Blackburn's interests and always presenting his conclusion to controversies. What will make the book valuable as a text is this unity of vision that relates various parts of the field. Perhaps fostered by developments in the 70's, Anglo-American philosophy of language has seemed to be fragmented into rival camps; Davidson's program, Grice's program, formal semantics, speech act theory, and the Wittgensteinians, each finding the others to have made fundamental mistakes or, at best, to be discussing a different subject. An introductory course can take the form of an historical survey of these camps. This is not Blackburn's view of the philosophy of language. Rather than presenting a series of revolutions in the field, Blackburn arranges his material by beginning with topics of current debates his students may be acquainted with, such as anti-realism or Wittgenstein on following rules, and then working back to classic issues. In the process it emerges that different schools are confronting the very same issues.

There are nine chapters split into two parts, the first devoted to the relation between language and the mind, the second to language and the world. After a preliminary chapter on compositional theories of semantics and inateness there are two chapters (2 and 3) titled 'How is meaning possible?', starting from two topics raised by Wittgenstein. The first is what Blackburn calls 'dog-legged' theories of meaning, those that account for our understanding of language by interposing a third element such as mental images, meanings as objects, or whatever. Repeating Wittgenstein's arguments from the *Philosophical Investigations* Blackburn then applies them to Fodor's 'language of thought,' theories of radical interpretation following Quine and Davidson and even Dummett's notion that understanding must be manifested. Each, Blackburn claims, has a dog-legged theory subject to the same criticisms. This is a rather striking example of Blackburn's synthetic vision.

Chapter 3 begins with another issue of Wittgenstein's philosophy; following a rule. Here Blackburn introduces the notion of a 'bent' rule, one that applies a term to the expected objects to some extent but suddenly diverges in future applications. This leads to a discussion of Kripke's recent views as well as Goodman's problem of induction. Far from giving in to any scepticism about the role of intentions in rule-following, Blackburn goes on in chapter 4 to give a Gricean account of linguistic meaning as conventionalized speaker's intentions. In doing so he modifies the account to avoid the baroque complications of 'mutual knowledge.'

The heart of part II is a discussion of anti-realism in chapters 5 and 6. In the course of presenting his own 'quasi-realist' alternative Blackburn discusses the nature of analysis and reduction programs, emotivism, bi-valence and the 'disappearance' theory of truth, a remarkable feat of interweaving issues. The positive view sees certain predicates as projected or 'spread' on the world rather than passively corresponding with objective features. Tying in the issues from Part I, Blackburn argues that there still can be rules for correct application of such predicates and that a language containing them will obey classical logic (hence the *quasi-realism*).

Chapters 7 and 8 cover truth, defending and adjudicating the traditional debate between correspondence and coherence theories. In chapter 8 Blackburn argues that Tarski's semantic conception is not a substantive alternative to classical views and then goes on to criticize Davidson's program which attempts to found a theory of meaning on Tarski's theory. Intensionality makes its brief appearance in the book in connection with Davidson's advocacy of extensional theories. Finally chapter 9, almost as an after-thought, swiftly covers the theory of reference, clearly indicating that Blackburn does not find it central to the philosophy of language.

Certainly such a wide survey must slight some topics to cover others in any depth. The emphasis here is on issues currently important to Oxford philosophers of language. ('currently,' for J.L. Austin does not appear in the index.) Others, perhaps those more interested in formal semantics, will be struck by the fact that students are expected to be familiar with (and already prejudiced about) notions like theory of 'force' and 'anti-realism,' but not with possible worlds (the two or three uses of the notion are hastily paraphrased) or even the quantifiers, which are avoided in the chapter on Tarski and only introduced, with excruciating care, in the final chapter on reference. Blackburn, has, however, presented a coherent and unified view of the philosophy of language which connects various seemingly distinct issues. He also takes stands on most issues and offers novel solutions to several problems, based on his current research. This will undoubtedly irritate the partisan instructor. Blackburn finds some fault with every position he discusses. He finds Wittgenstein's private language argument only partially successful, argues that Dummett's standards for manifesting understanding are too high, as are the standards of evidence for attribution of meaning maintained by Davidson and Quine. Lewis and Schiffer go wrong in requiring 'mutual knowledge' in a Gricean theory of meaning. Blackburn argues against Dum-



mett that anti-realist, expressive theories of language can allow classical logic, and against Geach that they can allow for logically complex sentences. Rorty and Putnam are right in criticising correspondence theories but endorse anti-realism in an incorrect, idealist fashion. Finally, Frege, Russell, Strawson, Gareth Evans, etc., are all wrong about the theory of reference.

There is more than enough material in this book for an introductory course for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students. One would certainly want to supplement it with the relevant original writings of Wittgenstein, Grice, Tarski, Frege and Russell. Most students will find it hard going, especially the turgid chapters on anti-realism. (Some sections, however, including surprisingly the neglected chapter on reference, are crisp and clear.)

This book will be most useful for those in other fields who want to catch up on current philosophy of language and for instructors who are looking for a way to unify their approach to the subject. Students may thus only benefit indirectly. Still, however, Blackburn has performed a good service for the field.

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PIERRE BOURDIEU. *Homo Academicus*. Paris, Les Editions de Minuit 1984. 289p. Cdn\$17.95. ISBN 2-7073-0696-7.

*Homo Academicus* peut être considéré comme un 'traité des passions académiques' offrant à l'auteur lui-même comme à d'autres 'l'instrument d'une socio-analyse' (16). Il ne s'agit pas, soutient Bourdieu, d'un essai propre aux 'objectivations partielles et partiales' de la connaissance commune ou semi-savante, ni, non plus, d'une étude 'hyperempiriciste' où le chercheur est guetté par l'envie et le danger de s'instituer comme juge 'au-dessus de la mêlée' dans une position de 'neutralisme scientiste.' C'est d'une 'histoire structurale de l'évolution récente du système d'enseignement' qu'il s'agit, étude circonscrite à la région parisienne et à la période historique conduisant aux événements de mai '68.

En abordant, dans le chapitre 1, le problème que pose cette 'nécessaire vigilance épistémologique' impliquée dans le projet d'une connaissance sociologique du milieu académique, Bourdieu livre, en même temps, le ton de

son discours en soulignant les enjeux qu'il soulève et les dangers auxquels il s'expose comme chercheur, d'où l'en-tête de ce chapitre: 'Un 'livre à brûler'?', qui renvoie à la caractérisation que 'Li Zhi, mandarin en rupture de ban, donnait à tel de ses ouvrages auto-destructifs, où il livrait les règles du jeu mandarinal' (15).

Les solutions théoriques que propose l'auteur pour répondre aux difficultés épistémologiques que sous-tend l'objectivation sociologique du champ académique, champ social bien particulier en ce sens qu'il est lui-même structuré par des pratiques réflexives plus ou moins 'scientifiques' (mais au sein duquel existent aussi des activités non-réflexives (quotidiennes) et des pratiques institutionnelles), trouvent leur inspiration dans la 'théorie générale des pratiques' que Bourdieu a progressivement élaborée dans ses ouvrages antérieurs. Cette 'théorie,' on s'en souviendra, se fonde en quelque sorte sur une transposition de la problématique théorique de l'économie politique (de sa terminologie et ses concepts) à l'étude de la structure d'ensemble des pratiques sociales et de leur mode de reproduction. Ce transfert métaphorique permet alors à Bourdieu de concevoir formellement la 'structure du champ universitaire' comme un 'marché' où s'affrontent dans la 'concurrence' divers groupes d'agents (professeurs, disciplines, facultés) occupant des positions définies en fonction de 'critères et propriétés' spécifiques (que sont les types de 'capitaux' qu'ils détiennent: 'culturel-social,' 'scolaire,' 'prestige scientifique,' 'notoriété intellectuelle,' 'pouvoir scientifique,' 'pouvoir universitaire' et 'pouvoir politique et économique') (61). La logique de cette concurrence met aux prises divers 'critères classificatoires' ('capitaux') qui constituent de ce fait à la fois l'instrument et l'enjeu de cette lutte pour la détermination (la conservation ou la transformation) du 'classement légitime' tel qu'institutionnalisé selon l'état du 'rapport de force.'

Dans le chapitre 2, Bourdieu passe à l'étude de la structure du champ universitaire pour montrer comment celle-ci reproduit la structure préexistante du 'champ de pouvoir.' Partant de sa conception de la 'structure du champ de pouvoir' (développée dans ses autres ouvrages) où s'affrontent, au sein de la classe dominante, deux fractions, l'une 'économiquement dominante et culturellement dominée' (dirigeants et cadres des secteurs publics et privés) et l'autre 'culturellement dominante et économiquement dominée' (artistes, professeurs, intellectuels, etc.), Bourdieu montre comment cette opposition est reproduite au sein de l'université entre les facultés 'politiquement et temporellement dominantes' (Droit et Médecine) et les facultés 'culturellement dominantes' (Sciences naturelles, Sciences sociales-Lettres). Il emprunte à Kant (*Le conflit des facultés*) les 'critères' lui permettant d'opérer cette opposition entre facultés en fonction de l'intimité ou de la proximité du rapport qui les relie au pouvoir temporel. Si Kant, en son temps, distinguait entre la 'faculté supérieure' temporellement (théologie, droit et médecine) en raison de sa capacité à procurer 'au gouvernement l'influence la plus forte et la plus durable sur le peuple' (88) et qui, de ce fait, était la moins autonome à son égard, et la 'faculté inférieure' (science historique et empirique et science rationnelle pure) 'qui n'ayant aucune efficacité temporelle' est



abandonnée 'à la raison propre du peuple savant, c'est-à-dire à ses lois propres' (89), on ne peut que s'étonner de la validité de cet emprunt auquel recourt Bourdieu pour rendre compte de la 'structure du champ universitaire' et de son rapport au pouvoir temporel contemporain. Force est de constater que depuis le commencement du XXe siècle, le rapport entre la dite 'faculté inférieure' et le pouvoir temporel a subi une véritable mutation. Comment ne pas voir aujourd'hui cette tendance à l'institutionnalisation du rapport entre ces sciences et le pouvoir sous la forme du technocratie et du technocratisme? Cette 'cécité' partielle chez l'auteur s'explique en raison de la conception qu'il se fait des modalités de structuration et de reproduction des pratiques sociales; cette conception d'une 'économie générale des pratiques' qui se présente aussi sous l'aspect d'une 'sociologie des intérêts.' L'objectivation sociologique du 'champ universitaire,' dans cette perspective, produit donc une vision singulière où la logique immanente aux luttes et conflits académiques s'explique entièrement comme 'concurrence' entre divers agents possédant des 'capitaux' et 'travaillant' 'à modifier les lois de formation des prix caractéristiques du marché universitaire et à accroître par là leurs chances de profit' (23). A tout le moins, on peut souligner que ces types de 'capitaux' qui s'affrontent dans le champ académique et les intérêts antagonistes qu'ils fondent, ne sauraient rendre compte véritablement de la logique des conflits propres à ce champ du social. Ils révèlent certes un aspect important des enjeux qui se font jour dans ce milieu, mais en contrepartie ils voilent cette autonomie relative, mais bien réelle, qui caractérise justement les *pratiques réflexives* engagées, comme elles le sont, dans l'objectivation formelle du réel social et naturel. Or, les enjeux que soulève, par exemple, le projet d'une connaissance de soi de la société, tel qu'incarné par les disciplines sociales, répondent à une logique 'conflictuelle' bien spécifique (débat épistémologiques, philosophiques, méthodologiques, etc.) non réductible à une 'concurrence entre capitaux' telle que conçue par Bourdieu. Il s'agit là d'enjeux qu'une sociologie de la connaissance et, plus encore, une 'sociologie des intérêts' ne sauraient rendre pleinement intelligibles. Ajoutons à cela, que de tels enjeux ne sont pas sans exercer une influence profonde sur la 'structure du champ universitaire' lorsqu'ils mettent en présence des 'écoles' et des 'courants de pensée' divergents.

Le chapitre 3 se présente comme un approfondissement de l'analyse portant cette fois-ci sur la 'structure de chaque faculté' et la position qu'y occupent les différentes disciplines selon les 'espèces de capital et formes de pouvoir' qui sont en jeu. Pour Bourdieu, il s'agit alors de montrer, en particulier, comment la 'structure de la faculté des Lettres-sciences sociales' s'organise selon le même principe d'hierarchisation qui structure l'espace des facultés dans son ensemble. Quant aux chapitres 4 et 5, ils sont consacrés à l'étude des facteurs structurels qui ont précipité le milieu académique dans la crise de mai '68. Bourdieu explique comment la 'structure du champ universitaire' en vigueur jusque-là, ne pouvait s'accommoder ou s'adapter à l'augmentation soudaine de la clientèle étudiante (socialement différente de la précédente) ce qui a nécessité une redéfinition des critères de recrutement



dans l'embauche de nouveaux maîtres-assistants. Situation qui allait profondément modifier les rapports de force au sein du milieu académique et les pouvoirs correspondants, et favoriser ainsi l'éclosion de la crise.

*Homo Academicus* apparaît surtout comme un ouvrage où l'auteur nous livre les 'règles du jeu mandarinal' proprement universitaire et, à ce titre, on y retrouve une analyse très fine du complexe des intérêts et pouvoirs, de même que des motivations et stratégies des agents, qui animent ce jeu. Quant à l'objectif plus large que s'était fixé l'auteur, à savoir le défi d'objectiver sociologiquement son propre milieu pour rendre compte du mode de structuration et de reproduction des pratiques qui le spécifient, il faut conclure à une certaine insuffisance qui marque le projet sociologique qu'a inauguré Bourdieu.

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GEORGE DICKIE. *The Art Circle: A Theory of Art*. New York: Haven Publishing 1984. Pp. viii + 116. US\$12.00. ISBN 0-930586-8.

George Dickie's latest book, *The Art Circle*, resembles the work of the painter Jasper Johns in a way that the eye cannot decry. As Arthur Danto observes in the 1964 essay (Arthur Danto. 'The Artworld,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 6 [1964]) which stimulated some of Dickie's later work, Johns's art objects can't be imitations because copies of the subjects of Johns's art necessarily are as 'real' as what they copy. That is, Johns's paintings of subjects are functionally identical to their subjects: each painting of a target, map or numeral also is a target, map or numeral. Similarly, *The Art Circle* presents a metatheory about the nature and limitations of traditional aesthetic theorizing, but that metatheory turns out to be functionally identical to a traditional aesthetic theory.

*The Art Circle* contains Dickie's most recent rendition of the Institutional Theory, which has provoked readers from its first presentation in 1969 in 'Defining Art' (George Dickie. 'Defining Art,' *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 [1969]) through several other publications including the 1975 book *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis* (Dickie. *Art and the Aesthetic*, New York [1975]). Not since it was the rage to refute Expression

Theory has work in aesthetics occasioned so much denunciation and dissent as have been leveled at Dickie's Institutional Theory.

No doubt *The Art Circle* will prove as irresistible a target. No doubt points against it can be scored. Dickie's intensely clear writing illuminates his theory's gaps and flaws as relentlessly as floodlights reveal a blemished complexion. Nevertheless, the context in which Dickie introduced the Institutional Theory in 1969 helps explain why, despite its flaws, this theory has seemed to deserve so much attention.

In the 1950s, authors such as Weitz (Morris Weitz. 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,' *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 15 [1956]), Kennick (William Kennick. 'Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?', *Mind*, 67 [1958]), Gallie (W.B. Gallie. 'Art as an Essential Concept,' in Elton, *Aesthetics and Language*, [1954]) and Ziff (Paul Ziff. 'The Task of Defining a Work of Art,' *Phil Review*, 62 [1953]) argued effectively that art cannot be afforded an essentialist definition because, as the history of modern art demonstrates, there is no property which suffices as a purely logical and necessary ground for ruling out certain kinds of objects as art. Convincing as these arguments seemed, they were countered by the equally forceful conviction that neither logic nor history inclined us to conceive of the class of art objects as including everything there is. In this context, Danto's talk of the artworld appeared to provide a nonessentialist account of aesthetic or artistic criteria compatible with the history of modernism and post-modernism. Dickie typically acknowledges Danto's work as having influenced the direction of his own explorations. However, although Dickie may have set out for Danto's artworld, the artworld he found was mainly of his own construction.

In *The Art Circle* Dickie revises the 1975 version of the Institutional Theory, according to which '...two conditions are required for art: 1) artifactuality and 2) status of candidacy for appreciation having been conferred on some aspects of the artifact by a member of the artworld...' (this is Dickie's *Art Circle* account of his earlier view, 58) and 'arthood was achieved as a result of two actions occurring within the context of the artworld: creating an artifact plus an act of conferral' (58). *The Art Circle* introduces at least the following changes in the Institutional Theory:

- a) The artifactuality condition, which Dickie earlier took to be self-evident and consequently uninteresting, herein is seen as requiring defense and consequently as informative. 'In the new version of the theory, the whole approach is through the artifactuality condition, and although the new definition retains the two-part form, it will be evident that the two parts are intimately related' (11). As a result of his revised approach to artifactuality, Dickie no longer contends that artifactuality is a status that can be conferred. He converts artifactuality into a property essential for delineating the class of art from the class of nonart.
- b) The notion that any member of the artworld can transform any ob-



ject into art by conferring the status of candidate for appreciation is ejected from *The Art Circle*. 'In the new version, it is the work done in creating an object against the background of the artworld which establishes that object as a work of art' (12). Dickie attributes this revision to two incentives: Beardsley's argument that the conferral or change of status envisioned by Dickie in his 1975 work required a set of institutions more formal or law-like than could plausibly be thought to regulate the artworld, and Dickie's own conviction that expanding the role played by the artifactuality condition would take up any theoretical slack left by eliminating the claim that the status of being art is something that is conferred.

- c) In the 1975 version of the Institutional Theory Dickie insists that his account has philosophical virtue *despite* being circular. In *The Art Circle* he proposes that his revised account has virtue *in consequence of* being circular. This is not to say that Dickie takes circularity to be philosophically virtuous in itself, but rather that he now takes circularity in an aesthetic theory as evidence of how faithfully the theory renders the interlocking conceptual structures of the artworld.

Unlike his earlier versions, in which artworld denizens seemed able to designate objects as art under no constraint from aesthetic or artistic criteria, Dickie now construes the Institutional Theory as providing for an *essential* framework 'in which an artist in creating art fulfills a historically developed cultural role for a more or less prepared public' (66). The opportunity to decide whether Dickie's essentialist revival is compatible with the artworld phenomena appealed to as evidence for anti-essentialism by writers like Weitz constitutes one of the benefits of reading this book. *The Art Circle* stimulates discussion of the logical structure any framework must possess to accomplish the Institutional Theory's appointed tasks. In this regard, it is strange that Dickie describes 'the essential framework' as providing for historically developed cultural roles, but neither illuminates how these roles develop and function by profuse illustrations drawn from the histories of the arts, nor takes the opportunity to turn his criticism of the art historical perspectives of Danto and Kendall Walton to more productive use by offering a fuller art historical perspective of his own.

Too much of this text is taken up with detailed responses to Dickie's critics. While it is civil of Dickie to acknowledge critics who have effected revisions in his view, I prefer less space devoted to details of the last decade's journal articles and more attention to how the revised Institutional Theory accommodates the phenomena of the artworld. In this as in Dickie's earlier work, the example of Duchamp's *Fountain* is made to bear more of the burden of evidence than its aesthetic significance warrants and while it is admirable that this small volume contains eight photographs of art works, these are completely disjoined from and not illustrative of anything in the text.

The lack of examples and illustrations somewhat mars *The Art Circle's* usefulness as a text for undergraduates. It may be difficult for such students to see what implications the revised theory has for art criticism. But for members of the aesthetics world, able to appreciate *The Art Circle* in the historically developed cultural context of philosophical aesthetics, this slim volume elicits appreciation and interest as aesthetic appreciation and interest are provoked by the target paintings of Jasper Johns. As exhibited in *The Art Circle*, the Institutional Theory functions both as art theory and as a commentary about itself as art theory.

ANITA SILVERS

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LOUIS DUPRÉ. *Marx's Social Critique of Culture*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1983. Pp. v + 299. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-03082-7.

Dupré's object in this 'essay in hermeneutics' is to interpret and raise internal questions about the theory of culture that he takes to be implied by Marx's theory of society. The theory's fundamental concept is the concept of alienation. In modern society an estrangement exists between man's economic activities and his attempt to develop his sociocultural potential. For this estrangement to be overcome, all aspects of productive activity must be united into an organic totality. Marx expects this to happen in communism. Dupré is not so sanguine: in his view, phenomena of alienation, such as fetishist relations and attitudes, result less from the nature of capitalism than from the cultural priority of material production.

Culture for Marx is a historical process, a progressive attempt to humanize nature. Marx's view of history rests upon the philosophical conviction that history develops towards ever greater rationality through human praxis. Each period in the development of history must be studied in its full specificity. This 'principle of historicity,' which governs Marx's historical writings, excludes 'an abstract general theory of history.' Thus Marx and Engels did not pretend to provide a master key that would unlock the secret of all historical developments. In particular, they did not suppose that inner economic necessity alone explains the transition from one historical stage to another. External factors also determine the course of history.



As a revolutionary, Marx needed a method which would enable him to predict the future of history with certainty. He found it in the dialectic. There are actually two dialectics in Marx, historical and structural. The historical is the dialectic of a reality moving by opposition towards rationality. The structural is a model for the interpretation of economic structures. Each dialectic presupposes the other. Central to both is the idea of a dialectical contradiction. Such a contradiction results in a necessary resolution — thus Marx's dialectic requires a teleological assumption. Moreover a dialectical contradiction is an internal contradiction, and a theory of internal contradictions is idealist. To save the dialectic from the assumptions of an idealist teleology, Stalinists interpreted it as the law of an evolutionary system of nature. But in so doing they turned it into an empirical method incapable of providing certain knowledge of the future and thus of justifying the confidence of Marxists in the outcome of the revolution.

Marx applies his dialectical method to economics. Dupré's demonstration of this point begins with an account of the classical theory of value and its modifications in Marx. As against Smith and Ricardo, Marx insists on the historical character of value. Far from being the essential category of production as such, it symbolizes a particular stage of economic production — capitalism — beset by inner conflicts. The contradictions of capitalism will cause its demise: the capitalist economy is a closed system that will self-destruct and necessarily give rise to a communist society. But such an 'economic determinism' is incompatible with the thesis that an intrinsic connection exists between the economic and the social. And this is a central thesis of Marx's social theory. A thesis of his social *critique* is that the economic and the social are not properly integrated in modern society: capitalism allows economic production to function independently of all other interests and concerns. Marx deplores this state of affairs, yet he continues to assert the primacy of the economic. The result is an ambiguity in his work and a threat to his social critique.

There is also a tension within his social theory between two models of society — the base-superstructure model and an organic model. Admittedly the dialectical method can combine these models, but only by redefining the primacy of the base in a relative way — as the priority of the more elementary (activity required for survival) over the less elementary. Dupré makes this argument in the course of examining the theme of ideology in Marx's critique of culture. By way of background, he traces the history of the term 'ideology' and of the quest for the origin of ideas. Then he considers the meaning ideology has for Marx and for certain of his successors before turning finally to two areas of significance for the critique of ideology not explored by Marx himself — psychology (in particular psychoanalysis) and aesthetics.

Dupré is critical of the priority Marx assigns to the economic factor and of the more general priority he assigns to praxis. In universalizing the primacy of the economic factor, Marx weakens his principle of historicity. Moreover the economic factor is not in fact primary in periods of history other than Marx's own, for, except in that period, it cannot be clearly distinguished from

other aspects of culture. Nor is it right to assign priority to praxis, for praxis must be subordinated to theory to some extent if it is to be properly human. As for Marx's vision of a total praxis that reunites theory with practical activity and culture with economic production, while it appears to be a utopian prospect it deserves serious consideration.

This book is a work of scrupulous and wide-ranging scholarship. Dupré is a superb historian of ideas. He is at his best here in his historical accounts of dialectical thought, the labour theory of value, and the concepts of alienation and ideology. Not that these are beyond criticism: his discussion of Marx's version of the labour theory of value, for example, pays no attention to *Capital* I's important distinction between value and exchange-value. There are other defects. Though written with great lucidity, the book is disjointed in parts and repetitive. Though interesting and informative, in the end it has little new light to shed on Marx. Moreover, and partly accounting for this deficiency, there is a persistent failure to dissect certain concepts crucial to the argument, most notably — and surprisingly — the central concept of an integrated culture. As a result, despite its obvious and considerable merits, the book suffers by comparison with recent work on Marx by analytic philosophers.

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CHRISTIAN DUQUOC. *Messianisme de Jésus et Discretion de Dieu*. Genève: Editions Labor et fides, Publications de la Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Genève, N. 9, 1984. 257 p. ISBN 2-8309-0017-0.

Ce volume du théologien Christian Duquoc traite de questions que l'on pourrait présenter sous le titre, 'Christianisme et politique'. Plus précisément, l'auteur tente de ressaisir le sens du messianisme de Jésus, dans le but d'éclairer les théologies radicales de la mort de Dieu, mais surtout les théologies politiques et celles de la libération développées dans le Tiers-Monde.

La thèse centrale constitue une réinterprétation de la messianité de Jésus: 'Celui qui a récusé de son vivant le pouvoir messianique et dont le refus fut sanctionné par sa condamnation est le même dont on confesse la messianité sur la base de sa Résurrection' (175). Durant sa vie, le Nazaréen a refusé de réaliser le désir inhérent à la fonction messianique; il n'a pas réalisé l'utopie.



Comment comprendre que la communauté primitive l'ait confessé Messie? L'auteur suggère d'interpréter les titres du Ressuscité en prenant pour norme la pratique de Jésus. Or, les paroles et les actions du Nazaréen le font sortir de la logique de l'idéologie messianique, qui est de conquérir à son tour le pouvoir; ce sera précisément la raison de sa condamnation. Par là même, cependant, l'agir de Jésus est 'subversif'; il juge en toute liberté les grandes instances, reçues jusqu'alors avec évidence, de la justice, de la loi et de la tradition, dans leurs effets présents à l'égard de ceux qui n'ont personne pour les défendre. La subversion des actions et des paroles du Nazaréen a un aspect messianique, parce qu'elle implique une promesse de libération pour les sans-espoir. La portée politique de son agir n'est évidemment pas directe car, si Jésus est exclu de l'ordre établi, il ne se fait pas le leader des exclus. Il demeure dans la marge, assumant l'impatience des pauvres et des opprimés, mais il n'entreprend pas lui-même d'organiser la société.

À partir de cette réinterprétation du messianisme de Jésus, l'auteur déploie un ensemble de positions, parmi lesquelles nous retenons les suivantes. Au point de vue méthodologique, l'insistance à régler l'interprétation sur la pratique du Nazaréen oblige à recentrer autrement la christologie: celle-ci délaisse de plus en plus la problématique métaphysique pour s'orienter vers un modèle sociopolitique, en regard duquel il est possible de poser d'une façon nouvelle la question de Dieu. Le type de messianisme attribué à Jésus pose le problème important de la réalité ou de l'illusion de l'espoir de libération proposé par le christianisme; reliée de très près à ce problème est la question de la relation entre la lutte contre l'oppression et la violence. Les théories révolutionnaires accusent volontiers le christianisme d'exacerber l'espoir de libération, mais de refuser les moyens de l'accomplir. On sait que ce problème a donné lieu à plusieurs essais de réponse au cours de l'histoire: la tendance à réaliser dans l'histoire le Règne de Dieu et à punir les oppresseurs; la tendance à renvoyer à la fin de l'histoire la réalisation du Règne et le jugement final porté sur les oppresseurs. Selon l'auteur, toutes les théories de la rétribution consistent à infinitiser la violence; il importe donc de procéder à une démythisation du cadre apocalyptique, en référence à la pratique de Jésus, qui refuse de guérir la violence par une violence divine. Mais, en même temps, le messianisme de Jésus ne contraint pas à l'acceptation du règne de l'oppression: 'il oblige à ne pas requérir la puissance du Dieu comme appoint aux luttes humaines' (238). Positivement, la non-violence de Jésus, qui signifie le retrait, ou la discrétion, de Dieu, incite les pauvres à devenir les acteurs de leur histoire, non pas les sujets passifs d'un leader, fût-il divin. C'est cet aspect que développent les théologies engagées: elles anticipent dans l'histoire une cité fraternelle, mais elles savent que le droit implique toujours un certain usage de la violence.

Ce volume constitue un effort stimulant et lucide pour penser les expériences poursuivies particulièrement en Amérique Latine par les communautés de base et pour poser un regard à la fois critique et sympathique sur les théologies correspondantes de la libération. Sans développer longuement cette question, l'auteur laisse entrevoir la complexité, faite de connivences et

de réticences, des rapports qui naissent de la rencontre entre les théologies de la libération et les théories révolutionnaires, surtout marxistes.

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DOROTHY EMMET. *The Effectiveness of Causes*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. ix + 136. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-940-X); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-941-8).

Emmet aims to capture more of the flavour of real causation than a Humean analysis can permit: 'I shall be claiming that an adequate view of causation will have to show change as involving transition, and not only change as defined as difference of properties at different times. It will need to be a view not only of an *eventum* which is the outcome of the change, but of an *eveniens*, which is the happening of one' (10). The basic problem, as she diagnoses it, stems from the twin assumptions of event-analysis and transeunt causation. Here one event, the cause, acts upon another event external to it, its effect. Since causation is then a relation *between* events, there is no place for it to happen, for there is *nothing* between the events. Then we have 'Causation in a Zeno Universe' (the title of chapter two), in which Zeno's moving arrow is reduced to a series of frozen instants. Events are only the unchanging units of change. Although causation can be described in terms of the differences between cause-events and effect-events, there cannot be anything dynamically effecting the causation in the void between events.

To remedy this situation, Emmet introduces the contrasting idea of immanent causation. Persistence, conceived as a strong causal notion, gives us a clue as to the passage of nature, whereby something later displays the same character of something earlier by virtue of its internal activity (cf. p. 84). Thus causal activity is conceived to take place within an over-arching event. This does not exclude transeunt causation, because each instance of immanent causation apparently can be analyzed in terms of subevents exemplifying transeunt causation (77). The systematic exclusion of immanent causation, however, has impoverished our theorizing about causation. She indicates various forms immanent causation may take:



1. It can be co-temporal, co-variable change within a system, where variables are distinguishable, and one can depend on another.
2. There can be growth and development within the system as a whole.
3. There is the mere fact of persistence as dependent on an on-going activity.
4. There may be ways in which one activity works through another, but these activities cannot be distinguished, still less measured, as co-variables. (87)

Emmet develops her critique of transeunt causation by situating her own undertaking with respect to the discussion of causation in the contemporary literature. This is the burden of the first seven chapters, which consider events, event causation, actions, select and multiple causation by discussing the theories of such thinkers as Alan R. White, Donald Davidson, D.H. Mellor, J.L. Mackies, Richard Taylor, Jennifer Hornsby, L.J. O'Neill, A. Michotte, Jaewon Kim, Sidney Shoemaker, G.E.M. Anscombe, H.A. Prichard, J. Feinberg, A. Danto, and Zeno Vendler. There are many summary analyses of the various current theories marched out one-by-one to lead the reader to appreciate her point of view. The positive, and more metaphysical portion on immanent causation is to be found in the last four chapters. It is a very chastened metaphysics, however, eschewing the 'panpsychist' tendencies of her mentor Whitehead. She distances herself from the later Whitehead, but admires Whitehead's earlier philosophy of nature. Whitehead doesn't explicitly obtrude any more than other thinkers. His implicit importance to her enterprise, however, is another story.

The event ontologies of Russell and the early Whitehead (cf. pp. 22f) do have the difficulties she ascribes to event causation, but I suspect she underestimates the degree to which Whitehead's later theory of 'concrecence' (i.e., the coming into concrete actuality of a natural event) can be construed as an instance of immanent causation. Whitehead was concerned with other things as well: how to analyze the way in which that which is not (yet) a unity attains the unity of a being, how to do justice to any element of final causation, freedom, and intentionality, conceiving all this within a very generalized theory of subjectivity. Those who are put off by the complexity of Whitehead's metaphysical endeavour will appreciate Emmet's unintended achievement. For from one point of view, at least, it looks as what she has done is to isolate the one strand of efficient causation in Whitehead's later thought, showing how elements derived from the past can effectively constitute the present actuality in terms of the process inherent within that natural event.

This result is partially obscured from us because Whitehead conceived all 'actual occasions' to be very small. He did need a class of very small natural

events to stop the endless subdivision that would otherwise result, and to explain change in terms of the differences between successive events. Yet why couldn't there also be larger natural events inclusive of the smallest? This turned out to be extraordinarily difficult, as Whitehead could find no way to distinguish between the inclusion of any smaller events and the way past actualities were included. Since he needed the smallest natural events, and could provide no theory of inclusion, Whitehead was stuck with them. The smallest natural events turned out to be the *only* natural events his philosophy could admit.

Since Whitehead's theory allowed for no extended events, causation must first be analyzed in terms of an initial appropriation of past activities, before these can become causally efficacious in the formation of the present activity. This initial appropriation of the past is formally an instance of transeunt causation, and many have concentrated upon it as Whitehead's theory of efficient causation. Whitehead himself may have thought so, but the real activity of causation occurs within the concrescence after the initial appropriation, not in that initial appropriation itself. The initial appropriation changes nothing; it is really simply a device for changing perspectives from the causal activities of the past world to the their ingreience in the new concrescence. Whitehead later remarks on this identity: 'The initial situation with its creativity can be termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be terms the 'actual world' relative to that occasion' (*Adventures of Ideas*, 1933, 230). Once within the occasion, the past causes effectively constitute the final outcome in a dynamic happening quite consistent with the workings of immanent causation.

Emmet introduces an important distinction between 'events' and 'participants,' seeing the events as merely 'edited descriptions of features of what is actually going on. When we ask what is actually going on, events are occurrences which come and go, and their descriptions record something happening to the participants in these occurrences.... The events so described record adventures of their participants. They are not basic particulars in their own right' (37). We are not told precisely what these participants are: they are not merely material objects but 'may be persons, or systems of very short duration. They certainly need not be unchanging substances' (37). I like to think of them as larger natural events including the small causal events within themselves. A theory like Whitehead's which can only accomodate the smallest of natural events must then treat that causal events are basic particulars, and would not be permitted the flexibility of Emmet's event/participant distinction.

Immanent causation is particularly useful in analyzing the body/mind problem, especially as transeunt causation seems implausible or dualistic or both. Materialistic theories of the mind have the edge simply because transeunt causation by physical objects seems plausible where any reciprocal activity by the mind upon the brain does not. Immanent causation adopts a whole/part model which can provide some room for the mind's activity.

Finally, in the chapter on 'Efficacious Grace,' she seeks the divine power



'as activating from within, but not identical with what it activates' (115). Reviewing the argument of the book, she finds some 'effects are changes measurable as exchanges of energy in transeunt causation. . . . Some changes — the overall growth of organisms, their searching behaviour, the use of memory in present experience — are not so explicable. They appear to come through a process in nature which is carried forward in the individual from stage to stage, establishing patterns, breaking them down, and establishing new ones by an internal integrating activity' (117). Can this immanent causal activity, particularly of mentality, be used as an analogy for divine activity? In many ways, yes, but Emmet shies from conceiving of God as the world-soul, because she does not think the universe has the unity of a single organism: 'The formative action in the world is focused in individual centres, multiply related indeed, but still individual centres' (118).

*The Effectiveness of Causes* makes a strong case for immanent causation as a necessary supplement to our usual analysis of causation solely in terms of transeunt causation, but its inherent caution often leaves us less clear than we would like to be about the nature of this kind of causation. That could be just as it should be, however, if this is simply the way it is.

This book is also an excellent example of some good bridgework between analytical philosophy and metaphysics. Metaphysicians should appreciate the instruction in the analytical literature on causation, while analytically oriented philosophers can see how her constructive metaphysical discussion is not just arbitrarily based, but grows out of a judicious and careful use of the most current analytical work. Many have urged a closer conversation between these two camps, but this is a concrete demonstration of its fruitfulness.

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GENEVIEVE LLOYD. *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. x + 138. US\$27.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1381-8); US\$10.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1382-6).

Is reason male? The answer, according to Genevieve Lloyd, depends upon what we mean by 'reason.' Lloyd distinguishes between the canons of truth and rationality, on one hand, and character ideals of the rational man, on the

other and sets out to show that, from the pre-Socratics to de Beauvoir, reason as an ideal character trait has been conceived to be masculine as opposed to feminine.

The book moves by briefly synthesizing the relevant work of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Sartre and de Beauvoir. Its thesis is that throughout the history of Western philosophy, ideals of reason have demanded the exclusion or transcendence of the feminine. As a result, femininity itself has been understood as the non-rational: in early views it was seen as antithetical to masculinity; in later ones, as complementary to it. We do not find many philosophers dealing directly with the male-female distinction, nor arguing straightforwardly that reason is a male character trait. Lloyd finds the evidence for her thesis in the imagery, analogies and associations found in the philosophical texts. Thus, the Pythagorean table of opposites associated the female with the bad, with the unlimited, and opposed it to the male, associated with the good, the limited, and so on. And as Lloyd points out, these associations of the male with the determinate or definite and the female with the vague and indeterminate appear again in the form/matter distinction. Thus, in the *Timaeus* Plato compares 'the role of limiting form to that of the father, and the role of indefinite matter to the mother' (4) and this association resonates in passages such as those from the *Phaedo* where Socrates argues that the life of the mind depends upon the rational soul's escape from the body. In this way, the feminine is associated with that which must be excluded or transcended by those seeking the intellectual life.

Philo explicitly uses woman as a symbol for the non-rational in his version of the Genesis story: woman symbolizes sense-perception while man symbolizes the mind, tempted by the pleasures of sense-perception and 'fallen' into the flesh and wretchedness. Because moral progress, on Philo's view, 'involves mind's transcending the corrupting influences of sense-perception and bodily passion,' Lloyd points out that the association of woman with passive sense-perception makes moral progress — based on transcending feminine sense-perception — very difficult for women. Women must leave behind the very traits that characterize them as female (27). Men, on the other hand, need only strengthen their characteristic traits, activity and rationality.

Lloyd does not speculate about the intentions of philosophers propounding such anti-feminist theories. But since Augustine and Descartes claim that women are as rational as men, she does argue that it is spite of their intentions, not because of them, that their views have been used to keep women in their non-rational, second place. For example, although it was Descartes' intention to make knowledge accessible to all, 'even women,' his method has had quite a different influence. The radical separation of mind and body led to a distinction between Reason, which is associated with pure thought, and the inferior senses, which are reliable in the practical affairs of life. This separation leads to a 'sexual division of mental labor' whereby men transcend the sensuous world of practical reason for which women are responsible and enter the world of pure intellect. 'The way was thus opened,' Lloyd tells us,



'for women to be associated with not just a lesser presence of Reason, but a different kind of intellectual character, construed as complementary to "male" Reason' (50).

The notion that women have a different kind of reason, complementary to male reason, is presented first, Lloyd argues, by Rousseau and Kant, and developed by Hegel, Sartre and de Beauvoir. As Hegel describes it, male consciousness is concerned with Civil Society, with the universal community; the man's is a self-conscious existence and as such participates in a higher form of Spirit precisely by transcending the particularity of Family Life. Female consciousness, on the other hand, is stuck back in the life of the Family; thus, a woman's ethical life depends upon her making her particular family universal, being concerned with Husband and Children, not just with this husband and this child. But even if she accomplishes this feat, her ethical life is impure. She participates in the 'upward movement' to a higher form of Spirit only through her relation to a man.

In the closing and perhaps the strongest sections of the book, Lloyd sets out the Hegelian underpinnings of the account of women's transcendence offered by de Beauvoir. On Hegel's view, women stand outside of the struggle for self-consciousness set out in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the well-known master-slave story, inasmuch as that struggle takes place in the world outside of the particularity of Family Life, outside of the 'nether world' of women. Sartre makes use of that master-slave account of transcendence in his theory of 'the look': in the struggle between two consciousness, only one can emerge as the subject or the looker. The loser, the looked-at, will be an object; moreover, as Lloyd points out, 'existence as a self-conscious being, for Sartre, depends not just on the fact of the other's recognition, but on what kind of self the other recognizes me as being: "As I appear to the Other, so I am"' (95). De Beauvoir borrows from Sartre in her argument that women constitute the sex which is always the object of the gaze with respect to men, who are always the transcendent subjects, the lookers. By their 'look,' men have, with the connivance of women, constituted women as passive, dependent and inferior.

Although de Beauvoir offers the first theory of women's transcendence, Lloyd argues that using accounts of transcendence derived from Hegel and Sartre presents conceptual obstacles to genuine transcendence for women. De Beauvoir 'presents the female predicament as a conflict between being an inalienable free subject, reaching out to transcendence, and being a body which drags this subject back to a merely natural existence. It is as if the female body is an intrinsic obstacle to transcendence, making woman a "prey of the species"' (99). Why, Lloyd asks, should this be so for the woman's body and not the man's? Because transcendence has always been a transcendence of the feminine, associated in Sartre with 'a repudiation of what is supposedly signified by the female body, the "holes" and "slime" which threaten to engulf free subjecthood' (101). Transcendence is a male ideal inasmuch as the male can and must leave intact what he leaves behind; the female has 'no such realm which she can both leave and leave intact.'

Lloyd's book is among the first in an important new area of critical philosophy: feminist criticism of the supposed gender (as well as race and class) neutrality of central epistemological concepts. Her distinction between reason as a measure of truth and reason as a trait of character allows her to limit the book to consideration of the latter and to make a good case for the maleness of our character ideals while staying clear of the current debate over the relativity of reason and truth. She remarks only that it 'seems highly implausible to claim that what is true or reasonable varies according to what sex we are.' However, her very success leaves the door invitingly ajar for the next, more heretical step: are our canons of truth and rationality gender-neutral after all? Nor is it clear that, because the suggestion that our canons of rationality are androcentric seems implausible, the question is closed. In the twentieth century, canons of rationality have been most carefully worked out in the philosophy of science, most notably by the positivists. Since the demise of positivism, historians and philosophers of science have turned increasingly to actual case studies of science and scientists; however, doing so reveals that if one holds to traditional canons of rationality, actual science turns out to be irrational. (See, P.K. Feyerabend, 'Against Method,' in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, IV, M. Radner and S. Winokur, eds. [University of Minnesota Press 1970].) But if one responds by loosening up the traditional criteria of rationality, one is hard pressed to maintain the traditional view that what is considered rational is always and everywhere the same. (See Larry Laudan, *Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977] and David Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976].) The methods Lloyd uses to make her case — attention to association, allegory, symbol and metaphor — may not be sufficient to address the more radical question; the project of assessing the androcentrism of our canons of truth and rationality requires, just as the philosophy of science does, careful case studies of rational behavior, particularly science studies, and case studies showing how those people with cognitive authority are able to determine for a society what counts as rational. (The term 'cognitive authority' is taken from Kathryn Pyne Addelson's 'The Man of Professional Wisdom' in *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science*, S. Harding and M. Hintikka, eds. [Dordrecht: Reidel 1983].) Unless we wish to do prescriptive epistemology, such studies are necessary for attempts to determine whether a given set of criteria of rationality and truth are androcentric and, if so, how they got that way.

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SABINA LOVIBOND. *Realism and Imagination in Ethics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983. Pp. 252. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1268-4); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1269-2).

This book is an exciting, closely argued and clearly presented contribution to the project of articulating a non-foundationalist moral theory. Lovibond sees her task as that of developing a realist theory of morality which will avoid the pitfalls of those theories grounded in a metaphysical interpretation of realism. Her moral realism is based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein's expressivist philosophy of language which allows her to account for distinctions between factual and evaluative discourse without appealing to any metaphysical rift between facts and values.

Lovibond's position is one which dissolves the false dilemma between non-cognitivist and foundationalist or objectivist theories. She successfully defends the view that we need not be relativists if we reject transcendental foundations for the objectivity of morals, nor need we appeal to a standpoint outside the contingent experiences of a particular culture in order to avoid the inadequacies of non-cognitivist ethics. In taking on this task she does a great service to moral philosophy which is all too often caught within this dual framework.

Moral agents are always unavoidably members of a particular language community. The natural education and upbringing of a person involves their progressive induction into the use of the moral concepts employed by that community: induction into its various moral language-games. Membership in such a community, and induction into its ways is the constituting condition of any form of moral rationality. This perspective on the relation of the individual to the language community Lovibond finds both in Wittgenstein and in the Hegelian conception of *Sittlichkeit* or concrete morality.

Assimilation to a community's moral practices takes place in degrees. It is, therefore, possible to speak of 'recognition-transcendent moral facts' (69) and hence to criticize the moral judgments of individuals for failing to say what is true. Moral concepts, that is, have what Lovibond, following Mark Platts in *Ways of Meaning*, calls 'semantic depth' (31). It is possible to have a grasp of the truth-conditions of a concept for some situations, yet fail to be able to recognize its application in different ones. In this way Lovibond makes room for the exercise of concepts of error, truth, and authority within moral discourse. There are moral facts, and these are constituted by the use of moral language within a community. There is no need, according to Lovibond, to appeal to any metaphysical correlates outside that established linguistic usage. At the same time, though, we need not deny the possibility of 'getting it right' in moral judgment.

If objectivity and the proper use of moral concepts is something we establish as participants in the community's discourse about morals, then our participation in an established form of language-game entails complicity in the institutions that serve and sustain it. It is, therefore, of central importance

to Lovibond's project that moral realism be shown compatible with moral critique. That this is possible, she recognizes, is not immediately obvious. If our only access to moral concepts is the access provided by the community, how, it might be asked, is it possible to criticize that community morally and rationally and envisage a better society? This question is central to Lovibond's project in part because of the conservative use some philosophers have made of historicist insights such as Wittgenstein's to justify a rather narrow allegiance to tradition. Lovibond singles out Bradley and Iris Murdoch for especial criticism.

The possibility of moral critique may be justified for at least two reasons. First, drawing on Quine's notion of the 'pull-toward-objectivity' (58), she argues that this pull may be stronger or weaker depending upon the language-game. The pull is paradigmatically strongest in natural scientific discourse where any deviation from the game is simply error. Within moral discourse, however, Lovibond maintains that the authority relations dictating the proper use of moral concepts are not always so strong that deviation is immediately identified as mistake. Disagreement in application of moral concepts, hence in moral judgment, is, then, constitutive of certain moral practices.

The second point follows from the first one. It is a mistake, she says, to see a community as having one monolithic moral code, only one set of moral language-games. Criticism of one set is possible from the standpoint of 'recessive' language-games, i.e., practices and moral authorities that are present, though not dominant. Moral critique is possible, therefore, by extending 'deviant' models of moral action and judgment through one's own moral activity. And this extension is possible to the extent that moral discourse, unlike natural science, tolerates degrees of internal disalignment.

One of Lovibond's more interesting contributions to a non-foundationalist ethics deserves further development. Lovibond introduces the concept of the imagination as the 'vehicle for speculative thinking' (198) about moral change. Here she agrees with Collingwood who sees the imagination as that which can construct possible worlds for future judgment or action to make real (198). In a remark reminiscent of Kant's discussion of the judgment of taste in the *Critique of Judgment* (which Lovibond surprisingly does not refer to), Lovibond writes: 'The process of seeking new moral perspectives by cultivating a receptive attitude towards the perceptions reported by others ... is essentially a matter of enhancing one's ability to *talk* intelligently about questions of values' (198). This ability she links to the imagination.

Having given the imagination a place in a non-foundationalist, realist ethics, Lovibond does not pursue the details of its structure, its possible uses and limitations. For all the fact that Lovibond is acutely conscious both of the multiplicity of 'recessive' moral practices within society, and hence of the limitations of the dominant morality's authority for those practices, she does not seek to explicate how exactly this is possible. Although she indicates the existence of a link between language-games and underlying material institu-



tions of authority, she does not differentiate between the hold of the dominant institutions and those which must presumably support deviating language-games. Nor does she provide a satisfactory account of how individuals can relate to either or both sets of practice. Deviation from the dominant moral language-games happens, for Lovibond, and is a sign of alienation, but the mechanism and motivation for this ironic distancing within the imaginative capacities of the individual require further elaboration.

This incompleteness in the project does not detract from the book's value. It is a stimulating work. Lovibond discusses figures such as Wittgenstein, Quine, and Platts, but also Hegel, Nietzsche, and Adorno. Anyone interested in Wittgenstein or in the status of moral and political discourse and the possibility of a non-foundationalist critical theory of the present will benefit from studying it.

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S. MANSION. *Etudes aristotéliciennes*. Recueil d'articles par J. Follon. Louvain-la-Neuve, Ed. de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie 1984, XX1 + 550p. 1.300FB. ISBN 90-6831-007-0.

S. Mansion est née le 30 juillet 1916 et est morte le 27 août 1981. En hommage à la mémoire de l'éminente aristotélicienne, J. Follon a réuni dans cet ouvrage 28 des 36 études publiées dans divers périodiques et ouvrages et mentionnées dans la bibliographie au début de ce recueil (XVIII-XXI). Ces études ont été classifiées et numérotées selon les divers secteurs de la philosophie: introduction (1) (1-51), Aristote, critique de ses prédécesseurs (2-5) (53-151), logique et théorie de la connaissance (6-11) (153-239), métaphysique (12-16) (241-343), philosophie de la nature et de la vie (17-20) (345-410) et éthique (21-23) (411-61). En appendice J. Follon a ajouté cinq études portant sur Aristote, Platon, Plotin et S. Thomas (24-28) (463-522). Le recueil se termine sur trois précieux index: un index des passages d'Aristote cités dans les études (525-38), un index des auteurs anciens et médiévaux (539-43), et un index des auteurs modernes (544-5). La table des matières nous donne le lieu de publication de chacune de ces études (547-50). Le tout est précédé d'un *Avant-Propos* de J. Follon (V-V1) et de l'Eloge académique de S. Mansion, prononcé par J. Ladrière à l'occasion des funérailles (X1-XV11) (voir aussi de ce dernier:

*In memoriam Suzanne Mansion, RPhL* 79 (1981) 600-11). Sous l'apparence presque inévitable de la dispersion, l'ensemble de ces études présente néanmoins une unité profonde que nous aimerions dégager dans ces pages.

S. Mansion n'a pas été seulement une historienne d'Aristote, mais aussi une authentique philosophe en quête du réel. Dès sa recherche doctorale sur le jugement d'existence chez Aristote dont elle livrait l'essentiel de ses conclusions en fascicule séparé (*Le rôle de la connaissance de l'existence dans la science aristotélécienne*, 1941, 183-203), S. Mansion avait repéré dans le *Corpus aristotelicum* une problématique qui allait la situer au cœur même de la pensée du Stagirite. En accord avec son maître Platon, Aristote soutenait la thèse selon laquelle il n'y a de science que de l'universel et du nécessaire. Mais comme il rejetait la théorie des Idées, Aristote se trouvait acculé à une antinomie fondamentale: comment un savoir universel et nécessaire peut-il rendre compte des êtres particuliers et contingents? La solution de cette antinomie, S. Mansion devait la trouver dans les œuvres mêmes d'Aristote en montrant que celui-ci avait remplacé la théorie des Idées par la distinction entre l'ordre logique et l'ordre réel, l'ordre des concepts et l'ordre des choses. Elle écrit: 'Ce qu'il faut montrer en effet, c'est comment un savoir immuable, nécessaire et universel peut porter sur des êtres contingents et particuliers. Aristote accepte cette antinomie, mais il pense pouvoir la surmonter. L'essentiel de sa solution gît dans la distinction qu'il fait entre le logique et le réel (184) (sur cette distinction, voir le célèbre article de A. Mansion: 'Sur la correspondance du logique et du réel', *Rev. Néoscol. de Louvain* 35 (1932) 305-40). C'est à la lumière de cette distinction que S. Mansion pourra ensuite établir l'une des thèses fondamentales de son interprétation d'Aristote, à savoir que tout jugement scientifique implique à la fois la saisie d'une essence et la saisie d'une existence particulière à l'état abstrait et indéterminé. Sans cette saisie de l'existence on ne peut arriver qu'à une définition nominale de l'objet, et non pas à une définition réelle. 'Il en résulte, écrit-elle, que l'affirmation d'existence fait partie intégrante du savoir scientifique et joue un rôle important dans l'élaboration de celui-ci' (183). Cette thèse fondamentale devait être approfondie dans l'ouvrage qu'elle présentait en 1946 pour obtenir le grade de Maître Agrégé et dont elle donnait une seconde édition en 1976 avec un ajout considérable de notes (313-58 in *Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote*, 2e éd. rev. et augmentée, Louvain, Ed. de l'Inst. Sup. de Philos., 1976, 372p.). Par cet ouvrage, S. Mansion, à peine âgée de trente ans, acquérait une autorité scientifique que sa longue carrière ne fera que confirmer.

L'année même de sa mort, elle se posait encore le problème du statut de l'universel dans la théorie aristotélécienne de la science (*La signification de l'universel d'après An. Post.* I,1, 1981, 155-68). Quel est le rapport, se demandait-elle, entre la connaissance universelle et la connaissance particulière, entre le syllogisme ordinaire et le syllogisme d'application? Sa réponse était simple: le rapport entre les deux est celui de l'acte et de la puissance. La connaissance universelle est réelle, mais seulement virtuelle. Elle devient réelle en acte lorsque le cas particulier est connu. Elle écrit: 'Il



(Aristote) déclare impossible, aussi bien de connaître l'essence d'un objet sans savoir si cet objet existe que d'appréhender son existence sans savoir au moins quelque chose de son essence' (166). C'est à la lumière de ce rapport étroit entre la connaissance de l'essence et celle de l'existence qu'elle analyse les formules aristotéliciennes: 'plus connu en soi' et 'plus connu pour nous' ('*Plus connu en soi,*' '*plus connu pour nous.*' *Une distinction épistémologique importante chez Aristote*, 1979, 213-22). Elle soutient que le 'plus connu en soi' est explicatif par rapport au 'plus connu pour nous,' mais souligne en même temps une nette différence sur ce point entre Platon et Aristote. Tandis que Platon fonde cette différence sur la distinction entre une réalité sensible et une réalité intelligible, chez Aristote cette différence exprime deux types d'appréhension d'une même réalité qui est effectivement la réalité sensible. Cependant, cette connaissance du réel concret et existentiel ne devait pas conduire dans l'esprit de S. Mansion à une négation de l'essence, ni à une dépréciation de l'ordre des concepts. En comparant la théorie aristotélicienne de la connaissance avec celle des phénoménologues français, S. Mansion montrait que seule une philosophie du concept pouvait permettre de surmonter la facticité de la condition humaine prônée par les phénoménologues (*Aristotle's theory of knowledge and French phenomenology*, 1964, 223-39). Par ailleurs, contre l'interprétation panlogiste de Robin et contre l'interprétation rationaliste de Le Blond, S. Mansion soutenait une interprétation réaliste d'Aristote. Citant entre autres passages *An. Post.*, II, 2, 92b4-5, elle montrait que, chez Aristote, l'appréhension conceptuelle d'une essence est toujours la saisie d'un être réel, si bien que la pensée abstraite est en dépendance totale du réel (*Quelques réflexions sur le réalisme d'Aristote*, 1947, 205-11).

Cette problématique épistémologique de l'universel et du particulier, de l'ordre des concepts et de l'ordre des choses, du logique et de l'ontologique, du syllogisme ordinaire et du syllogisme d'application devait ouvrir un nouveau champ de recherches à l'éminente exégète d'Aristote. Il s'agit de la théorie des Idées dans la dernière philosophie de Platon et de la critique qu'en fait Aristote dans ses écrits de jeunesse. Très tôt dans sa carrière S. Mansion s'intéresse au rapport entre Platon et Aristote qu'elle considère comme un problème à la fois philosophique et historique. Dès 1949, elle fait une analyse minutieuse des arguments d'Aristote contre les Idées pour conclure que cette critique qui se développe à l'intérieur même du système platonicien est justifiée, rigoureuse et honnête (*La critique de la théorie des Idées dans le peri ideôn*, d'Aristote 1949, 99-132). Elle revient sur le même sujet dans une étude critique de l'ouvrage de P. Wilpert intitulé: *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre* (1949) (*Deux écrits de jeunesse d'Aristote sur la doctrine des Idées*, 1950, 133-51) où elle prend nettement position sur quelques points fondamentaux: 1. il est légitime, comme l'a fait Wilpert, de se servir du commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise à la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote pour étendre le contenu du traité *Sur les Idées* (134-5); 2. on doit reconnaître la valeur du témoignage d'Aristote sur l'existence séparée des Idées. C'est précisément cet aspect du *chorismos* qu'Aristote critique dans la doctrine (136); 3. la dernière doctrine des Idées-Nombres ne signifie pas un abandon

de la théorie classique des Idées, mais seulement un développement de celle-ci (141-4); 4. selon le traité *Sur le Bien* il existe deux principes de toute la réalité: l'Un et la Dyade indéterminée (151). Cette interprétation des deux phases de développement de la théorie des Idées permettra à S. Mansion de soutenir plus tard une présence seulement implicite de la théorie des intermédiaires dans le passage sur la Ligne en *République* (VI, 509d-511e) (*L'objet des mathématiques et l'objet de la dialectique selon Platon*, 1969, 475-98). Deux études sont consacrées au *Protreptique*. La première est une analyse détaillée de l'argumentation d'Aristote en faveur de la philosophie (*Contemplation and action in Aristotle's 'Protrepticus'*, 1960, 413-32), la seconde essaie de dégager une métaphysique du bien à partir des divers 'critères du meilleur' utilisés par Aristote pour défendre la philosophie (*Les critères du meilleur dans le 'Protreptique' d'Aristote*, 1973, 433-45). S. Mansion ne prend pas position sur la présence de la théorie des Idées dans cet écrit (thèse de Jaeger niée par Gadamer et Düring), elle reconnaît néanmoins en celui-ci une oeuvre de transition empreinte de l'influence de Platon, mais possédant aussi certaines caractéristiques de la pensée d'Aristote (431-2).

Sur cette lancée épistémologique S. Mansion allait hisser sa propre réflexion sur le texte aristotélicien au plan proprement métaphysique, comme en font foi les neuf études qu'elle a consacrées aux catégories, à la substance, à la matière, à la forme, aux objets respectifs de la métaphysique et de la physique. Très tôt dans sa réflexion sur le texte aristotélicien, S. Mansion avait décelé une différence entre la notion de substance dans le traité des *Catégories* et celle qui se lisait dans les autres traités du *Corpus aristotélicum*. Ce qui l'amena à suspecter l'authenticité du traité des *Catégories* (*La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le traité des Catégories*, 1949, 305-8). Ce en quoi elle était sans doute préparée par son oncle, A. Mansion (voir son *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*, 2e éd. 1945, 8-10). Elle souligne une autre différence entre le traité des *Catégories* et les traités du *Corpus*, mais qui touche cette fois la nature même des catégories (*Notes sur la doctrine des catégories dans les 'Topiques'*, 1968, 169-181). Elle écrit à la fin de cette étude: 'la doctrine des catégories présente déjà dans les *Topiques* le caractère d'une théorie ontologique basée sur des considérations d'ordre logique. Cette manière de concevoir les catégories est substantiellement en accord avec celle qu'on trouve dans les *Analytiques*, la *Métaphysique* et la *Physique* ... Au contraire, le lien entre l'aspect logique et l'aspect ontologique de la théorie semble inexistant dans le traité des *Catégories*' (179-80). C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'elle aborde la notion d'*ousia* chez Aristote, elle écarte d'entrée de jeu le traité des *Catégories* pour baser son analyse sur la *Métaphysique*. Elle cherche à montrer que l'*ousia*, au plan logique, est conçue comme le sujet dernier d'attribution, et au plan ontologique, comme un être qui subsiste par lui-même (*La première doctrine de la substance: la substance selon Aristote*, 1946, 283-303). Aristote aurait été le premier, selon S. Mansion, à élaborer cette notion de substance qui ne se trouve nulle part chez Platon. Par ailleurs, les notions de matière et de forme sont analysées à partir du livre Z de la *Métaphysique* auquel S. Mansion a consacré deux études (*Sur la com-*



position ontologique des substances sensibles chez Aristote, Mét. Z, 7-9, 1971, 309-21 et *La notion de matière en Métaphysique Z 10-11*, 1979, 323-40). L'analyse du devenir dans les chapitres 7-9 du livre Z permet de mieux comprendre le rapport entre la matière et la forme, et de cette façon, éclairer l'analyse de la substance sensible dans les autres chapitres du livre Z. Par ailleurs, les chapitres 10 et 11 du livre Z montrent qu'Aristote s'intéresse à la matière en corrélation avec la forme, comme principes internes de la substance sensible. L'objet ou le contenu du concept de substance sensible est donc une essence composée, mais celle-ci laisse toujours un écart entre la matière comme élément de cette essence composée (par ex. homme) et la 'matière dernière' propre à l'individu Socrate. C'est pourquoi S. Mansion ne craint pas d'écrire: 'L'individu, qu'il soit une substance sensible ou un être mathématique, est indéfinissable' (335). Elle revient sur les notions de matière et de forme dans une étude consacrée aux exemples du 'camus' et du 'concave' utilisés par Aristote pour illustrer respectivement la forme liée à la matière et la forme non liée à la matière (*Tò simón et la définition physique*, 1969, 347-55). Ces deux exemples s'avèrent inadéquats pour illustrer la nature des concepts physiques et celle des concepts mathématiques. Comme métaphysicienne, S. Mansion s'est aussi intéressée à la nature de la science métaphysique et de la science physique dans trois études remarquables (*Les apories de la métaphysique aristotélicienne*, 1955, 243-81; *L'intelligibilité métaphysique d'après le Prooemium du Commentaire de saint Thomas à la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, 1978, 509-22; *Un passage obscur du deuxième livre de la Physique (chap. 2, 194a27-b8)*, 1975, 357-64).

Le troisième domaine de réflexion de S. Mansion sur le texte aristotélicien a été celui de l'anthropologie. Une intelligence aussi vive en quête d'une explication de la totalité du réel ne pouvait certes pas échapper aux problèmes de la nature de l'homme et de ses activités. S. Mansion s'étonne devant deux définitions de la vie données par Aristote: celle du *Protreptique* où la vie est définie comme une capacité de percevoir et de connaître, et celle du traité *De l'Âme* où elle est définie comme une capacité de se nourrir, de croître et de dépérir. Elle montre que cette différence s'explique par une évolution doctrinale d'Aristote et qu'elle a une portée proprement philosophique (*Deux définitions différentes de la vie chez Aristote?*, 1973, 365-90). Dans une autre étude, elle examine la double fonction attribuée à l'âme dans le traité *De l'Âme*: celle d'être principe de vie et celle d'être principe d'activités mentales (*Soul and Life in the De Anima*, 1978, 391-410). Le problème de la relation entre l'âme et le corps est abordé dans une étude où elle compare la conception de Platon avec celle d'Aristote, à l'avantage de ce dernier (*Esquisse d'une conception du corps dans la philosophie grecque jusqu'à Aristote*, 1981, 465-74). Elle cherche à montrer derrière l'analyse du couple matière-forme dans le *De ente et essentia* de saint Thomas, une anthropologie latente (*L'anthropologie latente du De ente et essentia*, 1978, 503-8). Après avoir adopté les conclusions de Festugière sur les trois traités concernant le plaisir (EN VII, 1152b37-1154b34 et X, 1172a19-1176a29), dont celui tiré de la *Grande Morale* est déclaré inauthentique, S. Mansion montre que le plaisir et la peine

sont considérés par Aristote comme le lieu d'où naît le jugement éthique (*Le plaisir et la peine, matière de l'agir moral selon Aristote*, 1976, 447-61).

Dans la rédaction de toutes ces études, S. Mansion, philosophe et métaphysicienne, n'a jamais pour autant négligé les questions proprement philologiques et historiques. En réalité, toute sa réflexion philosophique demeure intimement liée, lorsque cela s'avère nécessaire, aux particularités linguistiques et au contexte historique du texte aristotélicien. Dans trois études cependant elle apparaît davantage sous l'angle de l'historienne. Elle appuie sans arrière-pensée tout le mouvement contemporain de recherche de l'Aristote historique et, dans un jugement nuancé, reconnaît que, si l'idée d'une évolution doctrinale d'Aristote n'a pas modifié radicalement notre conception de son système, elle en a cependant changé tout l'éclairage. On est plus conscient aujourd'hui de l'apport platonicien à la philosophie du Stagirite, même après son rejet de la doctrine des Idées (*Les positions maîtresses d'Aristote*, 1957, 3-51). C'est aussi dans une perspective historique que S. Mansion s'est interrogée sur le rapport d'Aristote à ses prédécesseurs. Son jugement nuancé sur Aristote, historien, penche plutôt du côté de Guthrie que de Cherniss. Si Aristote n'adopte jamais l'attitude objective de l'historien à l'égard de ses prédécesseurs (concession à Cherniss), il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il ne juge pas ses prédécesseurs du haut d'une doctrine toute faite, mais à partir d'une pensée qui se cherche. Les thèses de ses devanciers lui servent soit à confirmer ses vues, soit à clarifier les données d'un problème (*Le rôle de l'exposé et de la critique des philosophies antérieures chez Aristote*, 1961, 55-76). Par ailleurs, S. Mansion considère comme valable la critique que fait Aristote du monisme des Eléates (*Aristote, critique des Eléates*, 1953, 77-98).

Suzanne Mansion n'est plus. Mais elle nous a laissé une œuvre digne de notre admiration et de notre respect et que nous n'avons pas fini de consulter. Ce bref résumé de ses positions maîtresses dans sa lecture d'Aristote ne veut être qu'un hommage rendu par quelqu'un qui a eu le privilège de s'abreuver à ses leçons et d'être guidé par ses précieux conseils. Notre dissidence à l'égard du modèle à l'intérieur duquel elle a réalisé son œuvre de philosophe et d'historienne n'enlève rien aux richesses d'un esprit aussi élevé dans ses intérêts scientifiques, aussi rigoureux dans sa méthode et aussi honnête dans sa poursuite indéfectible de la vérité. A notre avis, sa seule faiblesse a été de croire que la vérité d'Aristote pouvait être encore *notre* vérité. Et ceci arrive presque inévitablement à quiconque n'a pas pris soin de séparer la pratique spéculative de la philosophie de la pratique positive de l'histoire de la philosophie. Mais tout ceci est une autre ... histoire.

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RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN. *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1984. Pp. 355. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-262-13195-1.

Many natural types depend for their continued instantiation on the reproduction of relatively perishable tokens, and evolutionary theory explains their ongoing existence. Why not extend the resource of evolutionary historical explanation to *all* such types whose tokens are ephemeral? In particular, why not view language types (including words, syntactic structures, moods and inflections) and thought as *biological* categories, surviving and proliferating due to successful adaptation? Ruth Garrett Millikan so views them, squarely placing them within the natural world. And she extends her approach beyond language and thought, and accordingly revises epistemology and ontology within her naturalism, finding it to be supportive to her views of language and mind. The book has several logical strata, and is rich both in overall conception and in detail. Only a few of its main themes can be mentioned here.

The foundation of the book is a series of technical definitions of types of function, designed to clarify the deep analogies and disanalogies Millikan perceives among, for example, 'body organs, tools, purposive behaviors, language elements, inner representations, animals' signals, etc.' (38). These devices, as she is inclined to call them, can have 'proper functions' if, roughly, one explains the continued existence or proliferation of the device as being, in part, a result of its being able to execute its proper function (Ch. 1). Thus, proper function is conceptually distinct from what occurs in the majority of cases, since continued survival can be secured even if only a few individuals execute their proper function (e.g., sperm), and it is distinct from any deliberately intended function, which may be absent. Hearts, for example, exist in part because of the evolutionary advantages conferred by their function of circulating blood. Devices can have many functions, and stand in intricate relations to many other devices with functions of their own; Part I details the possibilities. Millikan importantly considers the functions of 'cooperating devices' (like speakers), who use language devices (which include 'words, syntactic forms, inflected word endings, tonal inflections, stress patterns, etc.' [29]); these devices have 'stabilizing and standardizing proper functions' (31, Ch. 3, 4), i.e., coordinate functions which tend to anchor language devices in largely consistent and stable uses. Biological categories are composed of individuals typed by proper function (29).

The theory of intentionality and a general theory of signs are developed simultaneously in Part II. Millikan traces the intentionality of both sentences and inner representations to a single source, a specific proper function. 'Intentional icons' have as their proper function *mapping truly* onto the world (95). Millikan redefines 'sense' as the mapping function which links the sentence to its 'real value,' her modification of the concept of the referent (111). In her correspondence theory, false sentences are neatly disposed of: they are simply malfunctioning. Part III, 'A Short Lexicon For Philosophers,'

applies her approach to the familiar linguistic curve balls: indexicals, descriptions, existence claims, quotations, intentional contexts, negations, and universal generalizations.

*Representations*, a type of intentional icon, are defined as follows:

Representations are intentional icons the mapping values of the referents of elements of which are supposed to be identified by the cooperating interpreter. (96)

From this definition a good bit of the theory of mind, epistemology, and ontology follows. First, producers and cooperating interpreters are internalized: we coin inner intentional icons (whose intentionality derives from the same source as that of sentences) as a part of perception. Later, new experiences are likewise tagged. Identifying the referent of either intentional icon consists in recognizing that both icons map to the same object or situation. The point, of course, is to recognize recurrent situations and apply past learning to them, as well as to identify what other speakers are referring to (Ch. 15). Given her correspondence theory, she is committed to realism with respect to identity, for which she finds additional support the last part of the book.

Among all of the realignments and re-visions of classic views and their conundrums, one of the most striking is her lively denunciation of 'meaning rationalism,' the view that we are infallible conscious knowers of what we mean when we use words and signs, either in public or in the sessions of sweet silent thought (Ch. 5, Epilogue). Meanings, which trace to the history of a sign, are quite independent of the armchair suppositions and intentions of users. So error about what we mean, and even *that* we mean, is possible. The history of a token so overrides every other consideration that if a perfect duplicate of a person were to come into being fortuitously, by a cosmic accident, that being's thoughts — as indeed his heart and liver — wouldn't be thoughts, nor heart nor liver at all (93). But Professor Millikan bites this bullet bravely, for the sake of an overall theory which is coherent, expansive, and overcomes many entrenched headaches.

Professor Millikan stresses that the defense of her theory lies mainly in its general coherence, and its 'power to unravel paradox and produce understanding' (92, 14). Her naturalism is coherent in the sense that no part of the theory contradicts any other part. But, except for some direct corollaries of the theory of proper functions, no part of her theory strictly entails the details of the rest. So its strength really does reside in the strength of individual chapters. That strength is usually there, and even when it is not, her approach is suggestive and enlightening. This is a book to awaken one from dogmatic slumbers.

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KAI NIELSEN and STEVEN G. PATTEN, eds. *New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy*, Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume VIII 1982. Pp. 234.

While there is no unifying theme which ties these essays together (except the 'umbrella' of the book's title), this is still a very worthy volume for reference purposes and possibly to read right through to see how diverse are the issues in applied ethics today, but also how close to mainstream and classical concerns in moral theory. The best and most original essays, those by Lichtenberg, Kleinig, and Woodruff, are superb. Caplan, Young, and Arneson also offer very thoughtful and provocative papers. Thornton's and Faden-Beauchamp's papers are informative and carefully argued. Even the weaker papers in the volume have something to offer.

Judith Lichtenberg's 'The Moral Equivalence of Action and Omission' defends the thesis of its title through the most careful analysis of arguments and examples on this topic to date. Lichtenberg concedes that actions and omissions are often asymmetrical in terms of motives and intentions, but here postpones evaluation of agents in order to study evaluations of conduct. She carefully distinguishes and clarifies the moral relevance of such factors as the certainty or probability of the connection between an act or omission and the harm to be avoided, the sacrifice or cost to the agent in having to forebear or to act, and the degrees of the agent's responsibility for the plight of those harmed or left unaided. In so doing and through careful analysis of several valuable examples, she argues effectively that the fact that 'a strand of behavior involv(es) an action or omission is morally irrelevant' (20).

John Kleinig's 'The Ethics of Consent' offers an extremely clear and persuasive account of the nature of consent as an act, not a state of mind, and specifically as an act 'in which a person explicitly tends to facilitate the initiative of an other' (93). The article carefully examines the conditions of consent (voluntariness, knowledge, and intention) and the effects on consent of coercion, fraud, deceit, and exploitation, as well as the problems of tacit consent and voting as consent, and locates the account within a more general theory of social interaction.

Paul Woodruff's 'Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers at the Expense of Civilians' is as clear an account of the principle of self-defense as there is. His thesis is that, when thoughtful, principled soldiers defend killing non-combatants because they judge it necessary in the defense of their lives, the argument based on the principle of self-defense which they offer does not justify their actions. Nevertheless, in many circumstances, their argument does show that their action, while not morally justifiable, is excusable under the principle of self-preservation (and that blame for the wrongfulness of the killing lies with others). Woodruff's argument, developed in connection with a carefully delineated case, sheds valuable light on many facets of moral reflection in life-threatening situations, including the notion of causal respon-

sibility that is necessary to define an 'attacker' within the principle of self-defense, the importance of the defender's responsibility for the existence of the life-threatening situation, and the consequent basis of the traditional distinction between soldier and civilian.

Arthur L. Caplan's 'Mechanics on Duty: The Limitations of a Technical Definition of Moral Expertise for Work in Applied Ethics' is the opening essay in the book. It begins with a survey of critiques of the burgeoning sub-discipline of applied ethics, critiques which indicate, Caplan proposes, that the field of applied ethics is not clear about what it has to offer, i.e., the nature of moral expertise, or what it can hope to accomplish. From papers by Singer, Beauchamp, and others, Caplan formulates the 'moral engineering' account of moral expertise in which conceptual analysis and knowledge of moral theory are joined to a deductive methodology to produce answers to concrete moral questions. Caplan critiques this notion of moral expertise, stressing the importance of 'moral diagnosis' (in addition to conceptual skills and knowledge of moral theory) and 'moral judgment' (in addition to deduction) in actually assisting the moral reflection of real world decision-makers. Both of these elements, he argues, are missing from the current analyses of what constitutes expertise in applied ethics. 'The engineering model ...,' he concludes, 'degrades and distorts the contribution that those in applied ethics can make to public policy and practical affairs' (17).

Robert Young's 'Autonomy and Paternalism' begins with a careful examination of flaws and ambiguities in the arguments for 'weak paternalism' (i.e., interference when there is, or is believed to be, a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with and for which consent would presumably be forthcoming if the capacities in question were to be restored) and arguments against 'strong paternalism' (i.e., intervention to protect or benefit a person despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary). Young then argues for 'selective strong paternalism' because in some situations the 'global sense of autonomy,' in which 'a person's career, life-style, dominant concerns will be central to his (or her) conception of life' (60f), will make forfeitures of a more 'occurrent' autonomy worthwhile.

Richard Arneson's 'Commerce and Selfishness' examines two sets of arguments which claim to show that market relations foster the character trait of selfishness or at least elicit narrowly self-interested conduct. One set of arguments is from Marx, especially the *1844 Manuscripts*; the other is from Richard Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship* (1971), which is a comparative study of paid and voluntary systems of blood supply for transfusions in Britain and the U.S. In both sets of arguments Arneson identifies serious flaws, most importantly a conflation of the effects of market exchange with the effects of unequal distribution of the means of exchange. Nevertheless, he argues, there is still an important way in which the stereotype of the market as purely neutral in regard to selfishness is inaccurate.

M.T. Thornton's 'Rape and Mens Rea' begins with a detailed examination of the distinction (or lack thereof) in the law of rape between 'recklessness,' in which a man adverts to the possibility that a woman may not be consenting



but proceeds with intercourse anyway, and 'negligence,' in which a man proceeds with intercourse without adverting to this possibility at all, though a reasonable person would have. He then discusses the sufficiency of negligence for mens rea in rape, and argues for its sufficiency on the basis of a principle of respect for persons.

Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp's 'The Right to Know in the Workplace' examines moral and legal issues connected with the right of employees to know about workplace hazards and the correlative duties of employers to disclose such information. In defending this right of employees, Faden and Beauchamp detail many elements of current law and public policy on these matters, especially of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and offer valuable comparisons between this issue and the issue of informed consent in experimentation and health care.

Lawrence Thomas's 'Acts, Omissions, and Common-Sense Morality' is a clearly worked reminder that examples designed to prove or disprove the act/omission distinction must not overlook the role of the agent's desires, motives, and intention.

James Woodward's 'Paternalism and Justification' aims to contrast consequentialist justifications of paternalistic interventions with non-consequentialist strategies. His analysis of various forms of paternalistic intervention is informative. But the form of consequentialism that Woodward criticizes is so narrowly drawn that our understanding of methods of justification regarding paternalism is little advanced.

A.T. Nuyens's 'Moral Contracts and the Morality of Abortion' offers the interesting suggestion that intended pregnancies involve an implicit contract with consequent obligations to bring the pregnancy to term. But the proposal that the mother makes this contract with herself and the conclusion that unintended pregnancies may be morally terminated, precisely because no such contract is involved, are poorly supported.

In sum, there is much of value in this book. It is worth a careful look.

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NEL NODDINGS. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press 1984. Pp. xi + 216. US\$15.95. ISBN 0-520-05043-6.

This book is written in rejection of the many current studies in ethics which

take as their goal the development of a theory of morality or a theory of moral reasoning, and which focus on such concepts as justification, fairness, and justice. In contrast, *Caring* aims at developing an ethic based on 'psychic relatedness,' in which the central concept and the source of all ethical behavior is the relationship between two people, a carer and a one-caring, i.e., one who is cared-for. Insofar as the source of ethical behavior is located in affective response, this ethic is characterized as feminine (not feminist).

The paradigm of the ideal caring relationship is the mother-infant relationship, which provides a clear way of understanding both the strengths and the weaknesses of this kind of ethic. A mother responds to the needs of her infant out of a sense of caring, rather than out of a sense of duty. Indeed, it would be an unnatural mother who must remind herself that she has a moral obligation to feed her infant when he cries. On the other hand, if this is to be the basis of all ethical behavior, one must begin to wonder about one's relationship to those persons to whom one does not happen to feel a caring attitude.

Basing ethics on sentiment is not new, of course, and although Hume is mentioned only briefly, it is helpful to think of his basic sentiments of benevolence and sympathy, for caring is explained as apprehending the other's reality, feeling what he feels (16), and acting out of affection and regard (24). Morality arises from two feelings, Noddings says: a) the sentiment of natural caring and b) the feeling of 'I must' which occurs in response to another's need which may conflict with our own desires and occurs as the result of the memory of our own caring and being cared for (79-80).

The difference between Hume's theory and Noddings' ethic is that Hume adds to the basis of sentiment the mechanism of the ideal observer, which guarantees some degree of objectivity and universality. Noddings says only that caring is universal in that the relation of caring is universally accessible (5) and that there is an ethical ideal, which is and should be the ideal for everyone. The ideal is simply to be one-caring and cared-for (49), i.e., to be in a caring relationship.

Although commendable both for its simplicity and its refreshing return to a focus on the nature of relationships between good-natured and well-motivated human beings, this central notion of caring will not do either as explanation or prescription to cover the whole range of real life situations, conflicts, dilemmas, or even relationships in the modern world for which we need ethical concepts and precepts. Conflicts between nations, interactions between business corporations, custody decisions between divorcing parents will not be resolved by appeal to caring. So, unless one writes off these areas of life as appropriate only for legal legislation and not coming within the realm of ethical consideration at all, Noddings' suggestions will not apply.

There are some people with whom we are not in caring relationships, yet we need to be ethical in our dealings with them, and there are some people we need to consider, with whom we are not in reciprocal relationship at all. Noddings is well aware of the implications and limitations of what she says, and accepts them willingly, if somewhat callously. 'In situations where I do



not naturally care, when considering a particular other person brings revulsion and disgust,' she says, 'then I must withdraw' (17). One might speculate that Kant's philosophy is more genuinely 'caring,' for he tells us we must act ethically toward other human beings and treat them as ends in themselves whether or not we have a natural inclination to do so. As for the starving children in Africa, with whom we have no particular relationship, Noddings takes the view that we have no obligation to them. 'Our obligation is limited and delimited by relation. ... We are not obliged to summon the "I must" if there is no possibility of completion in the other' (86).

Other ethical issues find simplistic solutions in this book: the ethic of caring conveniently leads to the same guidelines about abortion as the Supreme Court recommends because the question is not when life begins but when caring begins, and caring and therefore obligation increase as the possibility of relationship increases (88). Still other issues are left with a frustratingly vague comment: concerning the ethics of vegetarianism, she says, 'This is a conflict that cannot be resolved but only lived awarely and sensitively' (155).

The last chapter of the book, which may have been the whole point of writing it, is on moral education. There Noddings becomes both more specific and more romantic in tone, and recommends that teachers take an attitude of caring toward students and that there be changes made in educational institutions to optimize the possibility of this happening. One change that she suggests, without much defense, is the elimination of junior high schools. Her recommendations are innocuous, but not a particularly original or profound response to the current wave of serious and deserved criticism of American schools. Moreover, the notion of caring, applied to the teacher-pupil relationship, begins to sound very much like none other than the Kantian precept of treating persons with respect.

It is difficult to give an assessment of a discussion of ethics which explicitly disclaims any status as theory (3). Perhaps the greatest value in reading the book is that it helps us notice a dimension of the ethical life which may get overlooked in more main-stream theories based on either utilitarian or formalist principles. One of the nicest statements of the different focus of her discussion is this: 'The father might sacrifice his own child in fulfilling a principle; the mother might sacrifice any principle to preserve her child' (37). However, if one comes to this book in hope of finding a feminist ethics which can be used as an alternative to the traditional theories, the reader will be disappointed.

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JOSEPH NUTTIN. *Théorie de la motivation humaine*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (Collection Psychologie d'aujourd'hui) 1985. 383 p. Cdn\$35.50. ISBN 2-13-038622-9.

Comme le précise l'avant-propos, l'ouvrage a pour but d'élaborer une conception de la motivation humaine inscrite dans un 'contexte humain' où le comportement sera considéré avant tout comme une 'fonction de relation' à l'environnement. Le projet de l'Auteur s'inscrit en faux contre toute démarche mécaniste de type behavioriste, mais veut, au contraire, développer une perspective à la fois globale et différenciée du comportement, et dans laquelle les notions psychologiques de motivation, de personnalité et de comportement 'se compénètrent à un tel point qu'elles doivent entrer dans le cadre d'un même modèle conceptuel' (11). Cet objectif est poursuivi à travers cinq chapitres qui, après les généralités historiques et théoriques des deux premiers, traitent, successivement, du modèle relationnel comme tel, du contenu de la motivation et, enfin, des processus en jeu, cognitifs en particulier.

Du point de vue historique, l'Auteur note que le concept de motivation est demeuré confus, voire quasi inexistant, car les premières revendications d'objectivité de la psychologie ont attribué peu d'intérêt à l'influence des aspects cognitifs sur le comportement. Le premier chapitre montre ainsi comment l'impact du canon de Morgan et, plus tard, le connexionnisme de Thorndike amenèrent à éliminer la cognition comme 'processus et contenu sui generis' en faveur d'une conception associative et quantitative fondée sur la motricité. L'implantation du behaviorisme qui s'ensuivit favorisa les hypothèses physiologiques au détriment des facteurs cognitifs. Seules exceptions, la psychologie de la Forme et, par après, la psychologie cybernétique revalorisèrent quelque peu le rôle des processus cognitifs dans la motivation. Différents modèles motivationnels sont nés de ce contexte: conception en termes d'équilibre homéostatique et de décharge d'énergie; philosophie de la 'boîte noire' où l'organisme est vidé de tout processus et contenu; cas où la motivation désigne une variété d'états physiologiques; optique qui en accentue le rôle adaptatif. Toutes ces approches sont réductionnistes, car aucune ne tient compte de la motivation en tant que 'structure cognitivo-dynamique orientée vers des buts.' (13); aussi, afin de remédier à cette insuffisance, l'Auteur propose de leur substituer un cadre conceptuel non restrictif dont l'objet sera le 'traitement cognitif et conscient du dynamisme comportemental' (35).

Le lien substantiel qui unit toute conception de la motivation à la philosophie sous-jacente du comportement amène l'Auteur à rappeler, dans le second chapitre, le cadre de référence général qui sous-tend son modèle théorique. Il rejette d'abord tout point de vue qui tend à réduire le comportement à une juxtaposition de fonctions, ou encore à la ramener à quelque agglomérat de type behavioriste. De même il dénonce, d'une part, les positions dualistes qui cherchent à mettre en parallèle les processus mentaux et le comportement, car il y a 'dualité d'aspects et non d'objet' et, d'autre part, celles



qui visent à isoler le sujet du monde ou de la situation vécue, car la motivation est concernée par 'un sujet *motivé qui agit sur le monde*' (44) Cette action sur le monde est régie par la finalité d'un 'projet' ou 'plan d'action,' leitmotiv dominant de l'ouvrage qui sensibilise déjà le lecteur au rôle capital que tient la cognition dans le processus motivationnel. Trois phases principales caractérisent cette action: la construction d'un monde comportemental d'abord, l'action subjective sur celui-ci ensuite et, phase intermédiaire traitée dans les chapitres subséquents, la composante dynamique à la base de cette action. La première de ces phases est comprise comme étant 'une construction significative du donné physique' (47), appelée à composer avec un 'monde perçu' et un 'monde conçu': le premier, orienté vers la recherche de signification, tant sur le plan pratique que symbolique, tient compte avant tout du rôle fonctionnel de l'objet et du réseau complexe des rapports dans lequel celui-ci est inscrit; le monde conçu, quant à lui, renvoie au langage et, en général, à la communication ainsi qu'à l'élaboration de ses 'substituts symboliques' qui spécifient un mode de présence cognitive 'largement indépendante de la proximité et de la simultanéité' (64). Quant à la phase exécutoire, le texte accentue surtout le rôle de régulation qu'exerce à chaque instant sur l'acte le but cognitivement élaboré.

C'est dans le troisième chapitre que sont établies les coordonnées fondamentales du 'modèle relationnel de la motivation.' En premier lieu, l'ouvrage souligne l'unité fondamentale des rapports fonctionnels entre l'individu et l'environnement (I-E) qui définissent 'un réseau fonctionnel de relations mêmes' (103) où 'l'individu et l'environnement en sont les deux pôles.' (102) C'est dans le cadre de cette bipolarité qu'émerge le dynamisme comportemental dont l'origine est dans le 'besoin' qui 'tend à établir, maintenir ou modifier une constellation de relations' (102). Notion fondamentale dans l'optique défendue, il est important de remarquer que le besoin n'est pas défini en fonction de quelque carence, mais en termes d' 'orientations fondamentales' constructives du développement vital de l'individu, orientations issues de l'unité originelle du système interactionnel (I-E); ce dernier étant lui-même caractérisé par 'un accord de base' d'où l'individu a acquis ses particularités biologiques et sociales. Ces besoins appellent ainsi des 'relations requises' au milieu et sont caractérisés par une 'directionnalité de base' qui se traduit par la recherche de certains types d'objets, non définis à l'avance, car variables selon le monde personnalisé et unique que chacun s'est construit. Dans cette perspective, la capacité relationnelle devient l'attribut essentiel de la personnalité, comprise alors comme 'ensemble structuré d'interactions actuelles et potentielles avec un monde comportemental ... lui-même construit, progressivement, sur la base de ces mêmes interactions' (122), et dont le contenu fait appel à un 'monde intentionnel' où tout acte ou objet, perçu ou conçu, sera enregistré et modelé par l'effet d'une cognition personnalisée.

C'est à la détermination des orientations dynamiques fondamentales et, en particulier, aux objets qu'elles visent, que sont réservées les larges discussions du quatrième chapitre. La démarche suivie se situe à l'opposé de toute entreprise quantitative visant à l'établissement de quelque liste de besoins. Au

contraire, il faut, à partir de la 'mosaïque chaotique' des relations objectales chez l'homme, tâcher d'identifier la fonction commune à une variété de formes concrètes de relations requises. Ainsi le fonctionnement relationnel avec le monde constitue lui-même un besoin de base que l'Auteur justifie en invoquant trois ordres de phénomènes: le fonctionnement sensoriel et ses effets déterminants sur la structure même du cerveau, l'importance d'une exploration active du milieu, social en particulier et, finalement, le besoin de 'causalité perçue.' D'un autre côté, la structure motivationnelle peut être caractérisée en fonction de son orientation privilégiée vers l'un des pôles (I-E), l'Auteur distingue ainsi le mouvement 'vers le sujet' de celui 'vers l'objet': le premier cherche à préserver l'identité personnelle et tend vers l'autodéveloppement afin de réaliser le 'fonctionnement optimal' au-delà des conduites spécifiques; le second implique nécessairement le passage par l'objet, surtout social. Principales capacités fonctionnelles avec les aspects cognitifs, les relations interpersonnelles constituent un type de relation requise dont on peut déjà déceler l'expression dans les rapports originels avec la mère: ceux-ci ne peuvent être ramenés à des contacts tactiles, besoins physiologiques, ou encore à quelques processus de renforcement et de généralisation comme l'affirment certaines thèses behavioristes, mais ils possèdent leur dynamisme propre de recherche de contacts avec autrui. L'Auteur discute alors différents types de relations sociales: le caractère héréditaire du comportement altruiste où le modèle relationnel est confronté aux thèses de la sociobiologie; les rapports entre la motivation individuelle et l'entreprise collective; le degré d'implication dans le travail selon que ce dernier fait appel à des motifs extrinsèques ou intrinsèques. Pour sa part, le dynamisme cognitif est marqué d'un caractère coercitif dont on peut voir les effets, d'une part dans la 'nécessité d'investigation' des objets qui leur donnent leur valeur d'attrait et, d'autre part, dans la construction d'un 'monde idéal' et de 'substituts conceptuels.' En particulier, c'est aux 'formes supérieures' de ce monde idéal que l'Auteur s'arrête pour souligner l'intensité des rapports intrasubjectifs qu'il suscite par l'intérêt, entre autres, que manifeste l'individu pour comprendre le contexte de sa propre existence ainsi que pour construire un 'ordre objectif' des choses.

Le dernier chapitre est réservé à l'examen des mécanismes en jeu dans le traitement cognitif des besoins, clef de voûte de la motivation humaine. En premier lieu, l'Auteur rappelle les conceptions sur la motivation issues des courants associationnistes et énergétiques en psychologie qui, pour la plupart, ont mis de l'avant le caractère homéostatique des besoins et ignoré de ce fait la 'phase ascendante' de la motivation, c'est-à-dire la capacité qu'a l'individu de se créer et d'intégrer de nouveaux buts et tensions dans une structure de plus en plus complexe. Le modèle dérivé de la théorie de l'information illustre ce type de carence; car il ignore la construction personnelle de standards qui règlent toute l'opération comportementale ultérieure. Or, précisément, cette opération vise le 'fonctionnement optimal' de l'individu en ce qu'elle implique l'évaluation continue — la 'discrepance' — de la distance entre la situation perçue et la conception de soi. La discrepancy ne



constitue cependant qu'un maillon de la chaîne qui conduit du besoin au projet d'action, les processus d'élaboration cognitive correspondants s'effectuent en quatre étapes successives: 'la position de but' où 'l'état de besoin active et dirige l'ensemble des fonctions cognitives' (254); le 'projet d'action' qui répond à la construction d'un réseau de moyens-fins vers un but; la disrépance; le passage à l'action manifeste. En particulier, l'Auteur voit dans la motivation instrumentale un bon exemple des rôles complexes et dynamiques qui relient les divers objets-moyens à l'objet-but. La dernière partie du chapitre traite des facteurs qui déterminent le caractère personnel de la motivation: l'autorenforcement comme agent de personnalisation des besoins; la conception de soi comme facteur d'autorégulation; la volonté dont, finalement, le 'dynamisme ... n'est autre que celui des besoins' (299); les comportements 'personnalisés' — équivalents préférés aux termes d'acte libre —, et qui sont 'la résultante d'un processus d'autorégulation cognitive et consciente' (303).

On peut savoir gré à l'Auteur d'avoir exposé la théorie relationnelle dans un texte clair — quoiqu'un peu redondant — bien étayé par de nombreuses références expérimentales, théoriques, voire philosophiques à l'occasion, et aéré par de très nombreux exemples judicieusement répartis. L'ouvrage présente une facture épistémologique prononcée, car sa lecture exige, outre l'attention heuristique nécessaire à la compréhension du modèle original proposé, la remise en question quasi constante de concepts courants de la psychologie dont la nouvelle articulation théorique modifie quelquefois radicalement le sens habituellement véhiculé. Par ailleurs, l'intégration dans une théorie unitaire de différentes composantes comportementales, comprises dans la perspective des rapports 'Personnalité-Monde,' dont la psychologie d'un cadre conceptuel apparemment exhaustif et dont la généralité et la valeur ne cesseront probablement de s'affirmer. Après avoir parcouru tous les méandres des questions relatives à la motivation, l'Auteur montre un intérêt certain à disposer d'un tel cadre conceptuel lorsqu'il affirme, en toute humilité dans le contexte et tout en reconnaissant la difficulté de validation expérimentale du modèle, que celui-ci est 'de grande utilité dans la position des problèmes, la formulation d'hypothèses et l'interprétation des résultats de la recherche' (328).

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ZENON PYLYSHYN. *Computation and Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1984. Pp. xxiii + 292. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-16098-6.

Zenon Pylyshyn's *Computation and Cognition* is an ambitious study of the foundations of cognitive science research. He uses his foundational study to argue that Cognitive Science is an independent science and to frame current issues in the field. He doesn't give a detailed defense of the foundational assumptions themselves, which, as Pylyshyn predicts (xix), will disappoint philosophers, but he gives an excellent presentation of the assumptions and their implications.

Pylyshyn believes different regularities emerge when we describe events in cognitive categories rather than physical ones. Cognitive and physical events are type diverse so that the physical sciences can't explain events under a cognitive description. Cognitive Science rests on the assumption that a natural set of cognitive generalizations exists outside the domain of the physical sciences; it's devoted to their discovery.

We must view the mind as both representational and computational to develop these generalizations, according to Pylyshyn. Once we do, cognitive processes can be explained at three levels. The mechanical (functional architecture) level concerns the mechanisms by which representational-computational processes work, the symbolic level concerns the material form that encodes the content of representations and the semantic level concerns the semantic content of representations themselves.

Since cognitive processes are computational, they can be modeled by computer processes. Degrees of modeling range from weak equivalence or mimicing to instantiating the same algorithm in the same program in the same computer. The relation between a cognitive process and its computer model lies between the two extremes at a point Pylyshyn calls 'strong equivalence.' Processes are strongly equivalent just if they can be represented by the same program in the same theoretically specified virtual machine. The sort of virtual machine relevant to the strong equivalence of cognitive and computer processes is one in which the functional architecture represents the right level of specificity at which to view mental processes; that is, one in which the right behavioral regularities are attributed to mechanisms rather than to representations and the processes operating on them. Pylyshyn presents two empirical criteria, complexity equivalence and cognitive impenetrability, for determining the right functional architecture for constructing models of cognitive processes. He uses the latter criterion to argue that the transduction process that relates a cognitive organism to its environment should be part of the functional architecture of a cognitive model.

Pylyshyn uses his discussion of functional architecture to argue that representationalism isn't as limited as some think. He concentrates on im-agistic reasoning in particular.

The main points of philosophical interest are the assumptions that lead Pylyshyn to the view that Cognitive Science is an independent science and to



the representational-computational view of the mind. Several issues here need more attention than Pylyshyn gives them. I'll indicate a few.

Pylyshyn's foundational study reveals a similarity between Cognitive Science and Interactionist Dualism. Interactionist Dualists say that (a) mental substances/properties are distinct from physical ones and can't be explained by the laws that govern physical ones, but (b) we can scientifically explain mind-body interaction. It's hard to see how the second claim can be true given the first. Cognitive scientists assume (a) mental states are type diverse from physical states, but (b) we can explain mind-body interaction scientifically. It's again hard to see how the second claim can be true given the first. How can we explain mind-body interaction scientifically, if mental state types and physical state types must be understood by different principles? Pylyshyn confronts this problem in his discussion of transduction. He says, 'No lawlike (counterfactual supporting) generalizations contain both cognitive and biological descriptions, *not, that is, unless the cognitive categories happen to be coextensive with biological categories*' (143; my emphasis), and he assumes that here, where it's convenient, mental state types and physical state types suddenly do match up. The cognitive state in question 'happens to be type-equivalent to a physiologically described state' (142). This assumption may be true, but Pylyshyn gives no justification for it; it's hard to see how he can justify it in light of his initial claim about the general type diversity of mental and physical states.

Suppose cognitive and physical states are type diverse, that cognition can't be explained in physical terms and that it can only be explained within the context of a representational view of the mind. Why should we take the next necessary step on the road to Cognitive Science by deciding mental processes are computational? Pylyshyn says we must to reconcile our representational view of the mind with materialism: '(O)nly one solution has been proposed to the problem ... of reconciling a belief in materialism with the view that certain psychological generalizations (let us call them *cognitive generalizations*) must be stated in terms of the contents of, for instance, beliefs and goals. The solution is that the semantic contents of such mental states are *encoded* by properties of the brain in the same general way the semantic contents of the computer's representations are encoded — by physically instantiated symbol structures' (258).

To adopt materialism and representationalism, we must say that if cognitive states have different representational contents, they are token identical to different physical states with different causes and/or effects. Why go further and say the brain's physical states 'encode' the representational content of the corresponding cognitive states in the same way a computer's physical states 'encode' the representational contents of its corresponding cognitive states? Some (e.g., John Searle, 'Minds, Brains and Programs,' *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 3:3:417-57) have offered what may be a good reason not to take this step: The symbolic codes instantiated by a computer's physical states don't encode the content of particular representations;

a computer's symbolic codes only have whatever content we give them, and we can give them a variety of contents.

Pylyshyn tries to meet this objection by a functionalist account of semantic content, according to which the semantic interpretation of codes is fixed by their complex function in the organism's overall behavior (38-45). Yet, he doesn't develop the account, argue for it, or explain how he would meet the objections of those who reject such functional accounts on the basis that states can be functionally identical without being identical in representational content.

In all, Pylyshyn gives an excellent presentation of the basic assumptions of Cognitive Science; now he and others need to defend them against the criticisms that have been and will be made.

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MICHAEL TOOLEY. *Abortion and Infanticide*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. 441. Cdn\$56.95: US\$39.95. ISBN 0-19-824674-9.

Twelve years ago, Michael Tooley wrote an article entitled 'A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide.' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs* 2:1 [1972]) *Abortion and Infanticide* is an argumentationally improved, bibliographically augmented and generally refurbished restatement of his original position. The ultimate conclusion, once again, is that neither abortion nor infanticide (prior to three months of age) is murder in the ethical sense (411 et passim.). This conclusion is reached by a train of reasoning that involves four stages or Parts. In Part I, Tooley gives 'a brief account of the nature of philosophy in general, and of ethics in particular' (1), as well as a 'brief discussion of some relevant, but unresolved, issues in meta-ethics' such as 'whether moral principles can be objectively justified, and if so, how,' and 'the question of the role that appeal to moral intuitions may appropriately play in an evaluation of ethical views' (1). In Parts II and III he turns to the main foci of the book: abortion and infanticide. The fetus — so he argues — does not have a right to life because 'It is a conceptual truth that an entity cannot have a particular right R unless it is at least capable of having some interest I which is furthered by its having right R' (99). The right to life is here but a special instance. The



concept of interest, in turn, he explicates as follows: 'A subject of interests, in the relevant sense of "interest" must necessarily be a subject of conscious states, including experiences and desires' (118-19). Now, 'To have a desire for one's own continued existence presupposes that one possesses the concept of a continuing subject of experiences, and that one is aware of oneself as a subject of experiences' (105). Not only that: it is crucial 'that this desire belong to one and the same subject of consciousness' (120). Tooley takes care of this for the paradigmatic case of a person in an allegedly ontologically neutral fashion by introducing the notion of causal dependence. 'If desires are to be inter-related in a morally significant way, there must also be a *recognition of the continuity* by the enduring mental substance in question. Later mental states must be seen both as causally dependent upon, and as "flowing from" earlier mental states' (132). In short, what makes an individual a person and therefore a repository of rights — the right to life among them — is 'the property of being an enduring subject of non-momentary interests' (303) where, causality aside, 'there are a number of necessary conditions that something must satisfy including the possession, either now or at some time in the past, of a sense of time, of a concept of a continuing subject of mental states, and of a capacity for thought episodes' (419-20). While Tooley allows that this may admit of degrees — an admission that forces the introduction of the category of quasi-person — (407-12 et pass.) it suffices to rule out potential and possible persons as repositories of the right to life (420 et pass.). Since both fetuses and infants (before three months of age) fall under the latter two rubrics, deliberately bringing about their death is not murder. In Part IV, finally, Tooley summarizes the main lines of argument and restates his conclusions.

Clearly, this is merely a sketch of Tooley's argumentation. In the course of his analysis he cites, considers, and disposes of a great number of ethical positions different from and sometimes opposed to his own. I shall not, however, consider any of this beyond noting that his critique is not always penetrating, (Cf. his critique of English, 92ff; or of Kluge, 151f.) nor to the point, (e.g., his remarks to the effect that Donagan's system does not agree with the intuitions of most people, 238) nor always fair (cf. his critique of Aquinas — which resembles nothing so much as a caricature, 333 ff). Comments on comments, in the words of Russell, are subject to the law of diminishing fleas. Instead, I shall focus on Tooley's own position under three rubrics: meta-ethical speculation, applied ethical and associated reasoning, and factual claims.

The first of these can only be described as thin: Not merely in the sense of counting pages — although the claim to be able to give even a brief account of the nature of philosophy in general and of ethics in particular, deal with the problem of objective justification of moral principles, consider and evaluate ethical scepticism, cognitivism and to defend a type of non-epistemic justification of ethical claims, all in some twenty-five pages, does strain the credulity of the philosophically sophisticated reader. It is thin because it takes little if any cognizance of most of the major work that has been done on the nature of moral rights, values, and obligations. Traditional positions like those of Mill, Kant, the natural rights theorists, etc. are scarcely even men-

tioned; and as for discussions of Dworkin, Melden, Sesonke, Rawls, Rescher, Smart and so on — to mention but a few — one looks for it in vain. As to the reasoning in support of his own position, the following gives a representative taste: 'The more nearly universal a particular moral judgment is, the more likely it is that it corresponds to an objectively justified principle' (27). Next we shall be conducting opinion polls to arrive at objectively justified ethical principles! Already Socrates had something to say on that score. Or consider the following analysis of rights:

"A has a right to X" means the same as "A is capable of wanting X, and if A does want X, others are under a *prima facie* obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him of it." (108)

Rapists and murderers would be happy to hear that. But of course Tooley does not leave matters here. In response to various considerations he successively modifies this analysis (111-15) until it eventuates in the following:

"A has a right to X" means the same as "A is such that it can be in A's interest to have X, and *either* (1) A is not capable of making an informed and rational choice, whether to grant others permission to deprive him of X, in which case, if it is in A's interest not to be deprived of X, then, by that fact alone, others are under a *prima facie* obligation not to deprive A of X, *or* (2) A is capable of making an informed and rational choice whether to grant others permission to deprive him of X, in which case others are under a *prima facie* obligation not to deprive A of X if and only if A has not granted them permission to do so". (115-6)

In what sense is this an improvement over the original? Clearly, what one wants here is an elaboration and defense of the right-interest connection. Already in 1978 I made a similar point ('Infanticide as the Murder of Persons,' in Marvin Kohl, ed. *Infanticide and the Value of Life* [Prometheus, 1978]). All we get in 1983 is an extended discussion of the relation between interest and desire. The fundamental meta-ethical issue receives no defense. Furthermore, Tooley explicates the notion of interest by saying the X cannot be in A's interest unless A either has or at some time in the past has had or can have a desire for X (121 clause 2), and spells out the having of a desire in terms of the possession of the relevant concept: An individual cannot have a desire for  $\Phi$  unless he possesses the concept of a  $\Phi$  (121 clause 3). When this is instantiated for life — 'An individual cannot have a desire to continue to exist as a subject of consciousness unless it possesses the concept of a continuing self or mental substance' (121) — it is a foregone conclusion that nothing but a person in Tooley's sense of 'subject of non-momentary interests' will meet these conditions. But does all this really establish Tooley's position? And isn't there just the slightest shift from 'desire to live' to 'desire to live as a subject of consciousness'? And isn't it the former that is really at stake? To say nothing about the analysis of interests and desires themselves.

Relatedly, Tooley's definition of 'person' is crucial for what he is about,



and he does consider definitions other than his own: definitions that focus on rationality, capacity for action, and self-consciousness (123-46 pass.). Limitations of space once again prevent detailed exposition and analysis of his, ultimately negative, treatment of them. The following, however, anent self-consciousness, is illustrative of his style and approach: Self-consciousness cannot be definitive of personhood. Why? Because in 'the first place, the notion of interest plays an absolutely crucial role in most present-day moral theories ... [and] Second ... [the] attempt to connect morality with interests is deep-rooted indeed, owing in large part, I think, to the fact that establishing some connection between morality and interests appears to be one of the most promising ways of attempting to make sense of morality' (145-6). This can scarcely be considered an argument, let alone a decisive refutation. As to Tooley's own candidate — 'subject of non-momentary interests' — it is not without problems. Not only does it presuppose acceptance of the role of interests (which is never really argued), it also requires an account of the continued identity-over-time of the subject who has them: An ontology of persons. Tooley presents nothing even remotely resembling this. He merely suggests that causal relations among interests and desires (123-33) rather than merely bodily continuity, coupled with awareness, will suffice: '... when one [thus] shifts from an account involving spatio-temporal continuity to one based on causal dependence, there is no longer any bar to applying the account to mental substances as well as physical ones. ... [D]esires are to be viewed as belonging to a single, morally significant group if and only if they belong to mental states that stand in certain relations of causal dependence' (129). Has the problem of how the category of causality can apply to mental, phenomenal entities, then, been solved? And has the relationship between the mental and the material been satisfactorily explained?

All this should put the reader into a somewhat sceptical mood vis-à-vis Tooley's overall conceptual framework. Let us now look at his integration of the latter with the biological reality via factual claims. Most of the latter can be found in Chapter 11. Infanticide and a fortiori abortion is not murder because neither infant nor fetus is a person. Why not? Because both lack the person-making characteristic: Neither is a subject of non-momentary interests. How do we know? Tooley here adduces data from developmental psychology (351-72) and neuropsychology (372-407). Focussing on the latter, he cites insufficient dendritic spination prior to about three months after birth, incomplete myelination until still later, and incomplete and uncomplicated cortical layering.

All this would certainly constitute a weighty case were the data correct and the reasoning trenchant. Neither is the case. First, his dismissal of Purpura's 1975 data on dendritic spination as inconclusive ignores the fact that already Cajal (one of Tooley's favourite authorities) found that this development, which indicates the 'functional maturity of the neuron,' was present around 28-33 weeks gestation (Quoted by Purpura in the work Tooley cites, at p. 47). Nor does he mention that Purpura's results were replicated in 1977 and have since gone unquestioned ('The normal and aberrant neuronal de-

velopment in the cerebral cortex of the human fetus and young infant,' in N.A. Buchwald and M.A. Brazier, eds., *Brain Mechanism in Mental Retardation* [New York 1977]). In fact, Purpura even found that at 33 weeks gestation 'the axons intertwined with the dendrites in a complex fashion' (Loc. cit. p. 44). Second, while Tooley does mention that Robinson questions the importance of complete myelination, he quotes Bergström, Schulte, and Yakovlev as stressing its importance (378 et pass.). What he fails to mention, however, is that Yakovlev's and Lecours's data are decades old; and that at the very same 1968 conference from which he cites Bergström and Schulte in support, Robinson's reply to the question, 'Can we get anything out of Yakovlev's studies on myelination in the human brain in terms of cortical function?' was 'I question whether we get much out of these studies in terms of any function' and that this reply went unchallenged by Lipsitt, Ploog, Wolff, Prechtl, and Kaufmann *as well as* by Schulte and Bergström. (R.J. Robinson, *Brain and Early Behaviour* [London, 1969] 347) It is against this background that Tooley's remarks must be considered. However, most damaging to Tooley's overall factual argumentation is not this but the simple fact that almost without exception the data he cites in support of his position are at least a decade old: those of Yakovlev and Lecours even older. This also applies, third, to his claim about cortical layering. The current position here is that a four-layer composition arises around 8-10 weeks gestation and that the final six-layer one arises by the 24th. It has even been found that the transvers temporal gyrus (essential for language decoding and comprehension) develops around the 31st week. As to the infant's development, the following assessment by a respected neuropsychologist speaks for itself:

The [perceptual] abilities currently attributed to infants are much more numerous, active, and non-reflexive than those listed 25 years ago. Since then, data on adultlike linguistic perception in the infant have accumulated concurrently with data on lateralization of this perception in adults. (O. Spreen, D. Tupper, A. Risser, H. Tuekko, D. Edgell, *Human Developmental Neuropsychology* [Oxford University Press 1984] 55)

*Abortion and Infanticide* is replete with argumentation and discussion, a fact that gives it an air of profundity, reasonableness and cogency. It also addresses many of the relevant ethical issues head-on. For that reason it will undoubtedly have an impact on the philosophical community. Furthermore, it contains a wealth of biological data not usually known by the purely philosophically oriented reader. That, too, will lend it appeal. The fact that the data are dated and the reasoning is frequently less than sound will likely disappear under the sheer mass of presentation. The most important audience of a book like this, however, ought not to be the professional philosopher but the health-care professional actively involved in the issues, and the legislator responsible for the relevant laws. Tooley's original article had little impact on either of these (e.g., the Law Reform Commission of Canada's *Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life* [Ottawa 1979] mentions it only once, en passant, and



almost as a curiosity in note 144). The present book, while it may 'advance the issue' in Tooley's sense, will probably not fare much better.

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ALFRED TARSKI. *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*. J.H. Woodger. 2nd. edn., ed. and intro. John Corcoran. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1983. Pp. xxx + 506. US\$29.50. ISBN 0-915144-76-X.

This new edition of Tarski's papers is essentially a reprint of the first, with large numbers of typographical errors corrected, the addition of a brief introduction by Corcoran and an analytical index. The corrections were made under Tarski's direction so this should serve as a definitive edition. This famous collection of Tarski's papers is important not only for the only complete version of 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' (occupying 126 pages), but also for the other papers in formal semantics. They not only founded the modern subject of model theory but also played an important role in the history of analytic philosophy, containing analyses of such notions as consistency, definability, axiom and formal language which influenced not only philosophical semantics but also the study of the 'deductive sciences.' Tarski's work influenced the Vienna Circle which previously under the influence of Wittgenstein had been sceptical of semantics. It also provided the apparatus for the logical analysis of natural science from a semantic point of view that has characterized the school and its descendents ever since. This book is an important document in the history of logic, semantics, metamathematics and the philosophy of science.

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