

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

## Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

### Editor

Roger A. Shiner  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada  
T6G 2E5

### Acting Editor (Sept. '84 / Sept. '85)

Allen A. Carlson  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta

### Managing Editor

Ruth Richardson  
Academic Printing & Publishing

### Editeur associé

J. N. Kaufmann  
Département de Philosophie  
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières  
C.P. 500  
Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada  
G9A 5H7

The editors will consider for publication submitted reviews of publications that are strictly educational textbooks. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words in length, and should be sent to the appropriate editor.

Les éditeurs considéreront pour fin de publication des recensions d'ouvrages qui se présentent comme des manuels destinés à l'enseignement. Ces recensions ne doivent pas dépasser 1000 mots; elles devront être envoyées à l'éditeur respectif.

Subscription prices for a volume of ~~six~~<sup>ten</sup> issues:  **NOTE!!**

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Non-Canadian)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de ~~six~~<sup>dix</sup> numéros:  **NOTE!!**

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Hors-Canada)
Individus: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Hors-Canada)
Etudiants: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



**academic printing & publishing**

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,  
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1985 Academic Printing and Publishing

Vol. V/4 April/Avril 1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Leonard Angel, <i>The Silence of the Mystic</i> (Jan Zwicky) . . . . .	139
Aristoteles, <i>Kategorien</i> (Pierre Bellemare) . . . . .	142
Myles Brand, <i>Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory</i> (Irving Thalberg) . . . . .	145
Jacques Bouveresse, <i>Le philosophe chez les autophages</i> (François Latraverse) . . . . .	147
S. Carter, <i>Dimensions of Moral Education</i> (Howard Kamler) . . . . .	152
Paul M. Churchland, <i>Matter and Consciousness</i> (Steven DeHaven) . . . . .	155
Norman O. Dahl, <i>Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will</i> (Mark Thornton) . . . . .	159
John Earman, ed. <i>Testing Scientific Theories</i> (Richard Otte) . . . . .	161
Lewis S. Ford and George L. Kline, eds. <i>Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy</i> (James A. Keller) . . . . .	164
Joseph Margolis, <i>Philosophy of Psychology</i> (Stephen P. Stich) . . . . .	166
Sheila McLean and Gerry Maher, <i>Medicine, Morals, and the Law;</i> Michael Bayles, <i>Reproductive Ethics</i> ; Douglas N. Walton, <i>Ethics of Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems</i> , (Francis Myrna Kamm) . . . . .	168
Christopher Peacocke, <i>Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations</i> (Michael Tye) . . . . .	173
Hilary Putnam, <i>Raison, Vérité et histoire</i> (Yvon Gauthier) . . . . .	175
Jay F. Rosenberg, <i>Thinking Clearly About Death</i> (Douglas N. Walton) . . . . .	176
Raman Selden, <i>Criticism and Objectivity</i> (Dabney Townsend) . . . . .	178
Bernard Semmel, <i>John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue</i> (W. Huggett) . . . . .	180
Peter Unger, <i>Philosophical Relativity</i> (Francis W. Dauer) . . . . .	182

LEONARD ANGEL. *The Silence of the Mystic*. Toronto: Morgan House Graphics for The Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy 1983. Pp. iii + 99. ISSN 0317-5480, ISBN 0-919936-06-7.

The avowed enterprise of Leonard Angel's monograph, *The Silence of the Mystic*, is to render mysticism more accessible to the non-mystic. While it may not succeed in de-mystifying all aspects of the phenomenon, there can be no doubt that on the whole it is a sane, sensitive, respectful, and *reasoned* treatment of a notoriously ticklish subject. Against all odds, Angel has managed to lend a sympathetic ear both to the mystic and to the rational skeptic. The result is an investigation which is carried out in the spirit of genuine philosophical enquiry: as rare and precious a thing in this confrontationalist age as some of the experiences Angel takes as subject matter.

The meta-strategy of the book is embodied in Angel's overarching concern with taxonomic detail. The rationale behind this preoccupation is his more-than-justified contention that, in this field at least, 'muddy typology leads to muddy theory.' Thus in Chapter One he generates a typology of mysticism itself; in Chapter Two, he explores one class of reasons underlying ineffability doctrines; and in Chapter Three he develops and defends a typology of mystical doctrines related to contemplation and worship. In each case, his aim is the clarification of the subject for the uninitiate and the development of a basis for positive theory.

The typology of mysticism in Chapter One rests on the separation of three sorts of question: those of doctrine, those of practice, and those of subjective experiential content. Within each of these categories, it is possible to discern further types: for example, under matters of doctrine, we might group Christian and Muslim accounts as theistic, and Buddhist accounts as non-theistic. And so on. The development of a typology of mysticism, then, proceeds as follows: first, all the data is classified under its appropriate category — doctrine, practice, or experience; it is then sorted according to whatever divisions seem naturally to suggest themselves within each category; and then it is seen if horizontal patterns emerge. That is, the question, 'Are there types of mysticism?' will be answered by the existence or non-existence of empirical connexions between types of doctrine, types of practice, and types of experience. Angel's examination leads him to conclude that while there are close correlations between some types of practice and some types of experience, types of doctrine cannot be correlated with those practice-

experience groupings. Hence, he argues, an accurate typology of mysticism must be pluralist.

One must at this point, though, ask if there may not be a hidden agenda working. Angel says on p. 39, 'If the pluralist typology is the more accurate one, then, the phenomenon of mysticism may be a more accessible phenomenon than it is very often taken to be.' But by p. 83, this has become 'The more pluralist an accurate typology of mysticism must be, the more accessible the phenomenon *is*.' [Italics mine.] While I am inclined to give qualified assent to the former claim, the latter surely is incorrect, if intended as a remark about the *logic* of plurality and accessibility. The accessibility of Angel's analysis of mysticism is due to its balanced tone as much as it is to its pluralistic conclusion. In a way, I wish to suggest, his down-playing of unifying elements in mysticism may not be motivated as much by the evidence as by his desire to render the subject comprehensible. If this is correct, then it must ultimately work *against* what is in fact our strongest reason for finding mysticism, on his analysis, accessible: his remarkable combination of sympathy and critical objectivity.

Angel's program in Chapter Two is ingenious. Leaving aside silences which rest on the alleged incommunicability of their objects, Angel wonders if there might be cases in which the mystic would very much *like* to speak out, but refrains for reasons having nothing to do with difficulties of articulation. To this end, he first surveys a number of everyday circumstances in which one might decide not to communicate something which is communicable; and then shows that nearly all the circumstances could easily be instanced in a mystical context. Hence, he hopes to have shown that the silence of the mystic may not be as intractable a barrier to understanding as is usually thought: 'We all know what it is to keep a silence and it may be that mysticism is as much revealed by imaginative reconstruction of a much larger silence as by analysis of ineffability claims' (83). However warranted this optimism, it should be noted that Angel's catalogue of circumstances omits two of the most important 'praxiological' reasons one might have for being silent about mystical experiences: the desire to avoid ridicule and rejection; and the wish not to share something precious with an unappreciative or uncomprehending public. Angel does mention the first of these in passing at a later point in the chapter. Why, though, were neither included in the catalogue? As in his treatment of ineffability claims which opens the chapter, Angel has glossed over cases in which subjective phenomenology figures prominently. Is this because the subjective phenomenological reports reveal startling cross-cultural correlations — and so lend support to a non-pluralistic theory of mysticism?

In his final chapter, Angel moves on to examine Smart's argument that only within a doctrinal system which postulates a personal God is there an appropriate balance between the 'numinous' and the mystical aspects of the religious impulse. The 'numinous' aspect of religion is that aspect concerned with worship of something other than oneself, and the mystical aspect, in this chapter, is that aspect concerned with contemplation — which may take the

form either of complete identification with, or of partial participation in, the Divine. Angel's argument, though clear, (with the exception of the remarks at the bottom of page 76), is too lengthy to recount here. He concludes that Smart has been misled by a blurring of doctrinal considerations; and that if one pays attention to the requisite distinctions, one arrives at a dynamic picture of the relationship between worship and contemplation, a picture which does not require the supposition of a personal God in order to generate an appropriate balance between numinous and mystical aspects. These considerations lead Angel to propose an elaboration and extension of James's developmental theory of religious experience as a first approximation to an adequate natural 'theology.' Although Angel fears that the reader 'will soon lose patience with such grand speculation' (81), I found those pages among the most intriguing in the book.

The only worry of any substance which I have about *The Silence of the Mystic* is a lack of precision which infects the discussion from time to time. Especially in the first chapter, there are details of arguments which should be considered but are not; and presentations which are at best unclear, at worst careless. Of less importance, but pointing to a similar lack of attention to detail, the book is riddled with typographical errors (of which only 'Muslin mystic' arguably adds more than it detracts).

These, though, are minor worries. It is my strong hope, that even the most dogmatically suspicious will give *The Silence of the Mystic* a try. It sets forth a number of issues and problems clearly; and frequently proposes useful or sound conclusions. Although the book's primary audience must be those who have little or no acquaintance with the subject matter, those with an ongoing interest in the field will still find much here that both stimulates and clarifies. No reader, of whatever background, will fail to be impressed by the fine and generous tone of this book.

JAN ZWICKY  
University of Waterloo

---

ARISTOTELES. *Kategorien*. Übersetzt und erläutert von Klaus Oehler. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1984 (Coll. Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung. Band 1. Teil 1.). 296 p.

L'ouvrage de Oehler appartient à la collection des 'œuvres d'Aristote traduites en allemand' que les presses de l'Académie de Berlin (à l'Est) et la

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft de Darmstadt (à l'Ouest) ont commencé à publier il y a déjà plusieurs années. A ce jour, une dizaine de volumes (sur plus d'une trentaine) ont paru.

Cette collection porte un titre trompeur. Au lieu de traductions commentées, c'est bien plutôt de commentaires assortis de traductions qu'il faudrait parler. Qu'on en juge par le cas présent: la traduction proprement dite, imprimée en gros caractères, ne couvre que 24 pages (sur 296). Le reste est occupé par une introduction de 82 pages, en caractères plus fins, par une copieuse bibliographie de 31 pages, et par 135 pages de 'notes' d'une typographie extrêmement serrée. S'ajoutent à tout cela un index et des tables, dont une, très précieuse, met en parallèle tous les passages de son œuvre où Aristote soit dresse une liste de catégories, soit semble en utiliser une.

Cette série d'ouvrages de référence se distingue par trois qualités essentielles, qui sont autant de bonnes raisons de lui ménager une place de choix sur les rayons de nos bibliothèques universitaires. D'abord, elle regroupe des commentaires systématiques d'Aristote, c'est-à-dire des commentaires qui épiluchent le texte ligne par ligne. Ce sont là d'indispensables outils de référence, qu'il est toujours utile d'avoir à portée de la main. Ensuite, les auteurs de ces travaux déploient une impressionnante érudition. Ils semblent avoir lu absolument tout ce qui se rapportait à leur sujet et leur compétence s'étend souvent même jusqu'aux plus infimes détails des textes dont ils discutent. Enfin, lorsqu'elle sera achevée, cette collection aura comblé des vides importants. Les Allemands ont en effet entrepris de commenter tout Aristote. Or, à côté des traités du corpus qui ont déjà été commentés de façon systématique près ou plus d'une demi-douzaine de fois (comme *l'Ethique à Nicomaque* et le *De Anima*), plusieurs ne l'avaient encore été qu'une seule fois, ou encore pas du tout, du moins pas à l'époque moderne. Deux œuvres essentielles sont encore de ce nombre: le *De Interpretatione* et le *De Generatione Animalium*. Les *Problemata* et les 'éthiques mineures,' *l'Ethique à Eudème* et les *Magna Moralia*, en faisaient aussi partie avant que H. Flashar et F. Dirlmeier ne s'en chargent, pour la collection en question.

Le commentaire des *Catégories* représente aussi une sorte de première, ce qui ne laisse pas de surprendre, s'agissant d'une œuvre d'Aristote toujours très étudiée, qu'on a longtemps traitée comme une introduction à la philosophie entière et qui, à ce titre, a fait l'objet de plus de commentaires qu'aucune autre, au cours de l'Antiquité et du Moyen-Age. Pourtant, en dehors d'un travail italien (par Pesce, Padoue, 1966) que je ne connais pas et qui semble, d'ailleurs, n'avoir jamais suscité beaucoup d'intérêt, tous les commentaires modernes que nous avons de ce texte ne sont, en fait, que des séries de notes plus ou moins élaborées qui en accompagnent soit l'édition, soit la traduction dans une langue moderne. Certaines de ces séries d'annotations, explicatives ou critiques, tout particulièrement celles, très stimulantes, que Ackrill nous a données (Oxford, 1963), sont certainement du niveau de ce qu'on trouve, disons, dans les commentaires du *De Anima* par Rodier ou par Ross, mais aucune n'en a l'ampleur. Le travail de Oehler répond donc à un besoin.

Il le fait, disons-le, d'une façon admirable. Son érudition est redoutable, presque sans faille. Et pourtant, elle reste discrète, n'intervenant que lorsque cela est utile, mais présente chaque fois que cela pourrait être utile. Quant à sa bibliographie, elle contient tout ce sur quoi il a pu mettre la main, y compris des publications dont l'encre devait être à peine sèche lorsqu'il a remis son propre manuscrit à l'imprimeur. J'y relève tout de même un oubli, surprenant, celui de la traduction anglaise des *Catégories*, très annotée, par Hippocrates G. Apostle (The Peripatetic Press, Grinnell, 1980), oubli très étonnant par rapport à une liste qui énumère des versions en tchèque, en roumain et même en turc.

L'ouvrage, je l'ai déjà dit, se divise en quatre parties. Outre la traduction allemande, qui présente peu d'intérêt pour nous, il y a, en plus de la bibliographie et du commentaire proprement dit, une vaste introduction. Celle-ci se divise elle-même en quatre sections, dont trois ont un caractère historique et une quatrième (troisième dans l'ordre de présentation) constitue une interprétation d'Aristote. (I.) Fidèle à une tradition germanique déjà illustrée par Trendelenburg et par Apelt, l'auteur commence par tracer une 'histoire de la doctrine des catégories.' Cette histoire a pour objet non les *Catégories* en tant que texte, mais les catégories en tant que thème et projet philosophiques. (II.) Après ce premier survol historique, il en effectue un autre, embrassant cette fois-ci l'histoire de l'interprétation du texte d'Aristote, depuis le milieu du siècle dernier. Il fait apparaître, d'abord les divergences qui se sont fait jour dans les premières décennies de la recherche, puis les tangentes et les lignes de consensus qui ont commencé à se dessiner par la suite. (III.) La section suivante consiste en une 'introduction à la doctrine aristotélicienne des catégories.' L'auteur s'efforce d'y préciser le détail du consensus relatif qu'il vient d'esquisser, en se concentrant sur des questions préalablement (56) définies comme les grands axes de la recherche moderne: celle de la constitution de la table aristotélicienne des catégories, celle de son caractère exhaustif ou non, celle de son statut aux yeux d'Aristote et de celui que nous devrions lui prêter. Oehler estime qu'on doit traiter ces questions en prenant les textes groupes par groupes, en s'interrogeant d'abord sur les raisons qui ont amené Aristote à faire appel aux catégories dans chaque contexte donné et puis sur la façon dont celles-ci y remplissent la fonction qu'il a voulu leur y confier. Dans cet esprit, il procède à un examen des *Topiques* (où les catégories auraient une fonction strictement méthodologique), de la *Métaphysique* (où Aristote aurait tenté de les faire servir son projet de science de l'être, au prix de certaines transformations) et des *Catégories*. Pour lui, c'est la façon dont les aspects 'logico-dialectique' et ontologique de la pensée d'Aristote s'y entremêlent qui serait responsable de l'extraordinaire fortune historique de cet opuscule. (IV.) Enfin, dans la dernière section de l'introduction, il traite de l'histoire du texte lui-même, de son authenticité, des canaux par l'intermédiaire desquels il nous a été transmis.

En couvrant ainsi l'ensemble de la matière, cette introduction donne en même temps le ton du commentaire qui suit, de même qu'une bonne idée de ses orientations.

Disons d'abord que, sur le plan du langage, que le style de Oehler se caractérise par une extrême clarté de pensée, d'expression et d'exposition. De notoriété publique, ces qualités ne se retrouvent pas chez tous les écrivains de langue allemande. Elles sont ici préseutes au point où l'introduction et le commentaire se lisent tout autant en pièces détachées que comme des textes suivis. L'auteur a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour faciliter la tâche du lecteur, pour qu'il sache toujours exactement là où il en est, quelle question est discutée et à quel niveau se situe la discussion.

Disons ensuite qu'il s'agit d'un commentaire complet qui offre tout ce qu'on peut attendre de cette sorte d'étude, étant tout à la fois, et tout aussi bien, un commentaire systématique dans le sens traditionnel, un remarquable état de la question, c'est-à-dire des questions de détail comme des questions d'ensemble, et une magnifique contribution aux débats actuels. On est surpris par l'aisance égale avec laquelle l'auteur se meut dans chacun des domaines très divers qu'il doit aborder, que ce soit l'histoire, la philologie ou la philosophie proprement dite.

Sur ce plan, il affiche clairement ses couleurs. Il ne cache pas sa sympathie pour la tradition analytique d'interprétation, et particulièrement ses affinités pour les travaux de Michael Frede, qu'il cite et qu'il discute beaucoup. D'autre part, dans la première section de son introduction, il fait grand cas de C.S. Peirce, n'ayant que des éloges, non seulement pour la propre doctrine des catégories de ce dernier, mais aussi pour sa compréhension de celle d'Aristote. Il n'y a donc pas à s'étonner de voir Oehler, quand il s'engage sur un plan d'interprétation proprement philosophique, faire appel, par exemple, aux ressources de la logique des relations ou de la sémiotique peircienne pour clarifier plus d'une question difficile, notamment celle du statut ontologique des catégories. Mais il fait tout ceci avec un sens du texte aristotélicien et du type d'interprétations qu'il autorise que l'on n'est pas habitué de voir chez tous les commentateurs d'Aristote qui se sont engagés dans le 'linguistic turn.' Il est plus que personne conscient du fait que le langage n'a jamais eu pour Aristote la fonction centrale que nous lui prêtons aujourd'hui, conscient également des dangers qu'il y a d'interpréter sa pensée en partant d'une conception du langage qui n'était pas la sienne. Il en est si conscient qu'il s'est même fait un nom, dans les années soixante, pour avoir dénoncé les risques de 'l'emploi abusif de l'analyse linguistique dans les recherches aristotéliciennes,' dans une brillante plaquette intitulée *Ein Mensch zeugt einen Menschen* (Klostermann: Francfort, 1963, reproduite dans son recueil d'articles *Antike Philosophie und byzantinisches Mittelalter*, Munich: Beck, 1969, 95-145). Il a donc mis tout en œuvre pour que son Aristote, fruit d'une lecture renouvelée, enrichie par les perspectives du XXe siècle, reste en même temps l'Aristote de la tradition, en complète continuité avec elle. Mon avis est qu'il y est parvenu.

PIERRE BELLEMARE  
Université d'Ottawa

MYLES BRAND. *Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1984. Pp. xiii + 296. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-262-02202-8.

This is a careful, informative synthesis of developments in so-called 'philosophical action theory' (henceforth abbreviated 'PAT') and 'scientific psychology.' Myles Brand's worthy goal is to elucidate 'the nature of human action' by 'attempting to move PAT toward the scientific study of action' (x, xi). Brand's principal 'target' is intention, and his 'central claim' is that 'an understanding of human action depends upon a scientific reading of intention' (xi).

How does he think action is bound up with intention? To begin with, he says (33) it may be '*the* fundamental problem ... in PAT ... to adequately specify the nature of the proximate cause of action' (here abbreviated 'the PC or 'the PCA'). Brand assumes that the PCA must be a 'mental event' (for short, 'ME'). He acknowledges 'there are *diverse* causal chains leading to [i.e., distantly or proximately causing] the peculiar ME that [proximately] causes [or "initiates"] action'; yet he insists 'there is *one* kind of ME that proximately causes action' (35; my italics). Accordingly he shrugs off Donald Davidson's warning: 'to think ... there is a peculiar kind of ME that causes action' is no less mistaken than to think there is 'a common and unique cause of bridge failures, plane crashes, or plate breakings' (quoted by Brand, 34). Brand rejects at least one of these examples. He argues that 'the PC of a crash is the plane's heading for another body'; although it originally does this 'because of the weather ... or what not ... the proximate event causing every plane crash is the plane's heading toward another body' (35). Of course Davidson might attack Brand's own example. Is 'heading toward' causally sufficient, or necessary, for an aircraft to be involved in a crash with something else? Don't aircraft now and then fly or roll at high speed toward an object, and still avoid striking it — perhaps because the object moves even faster out of harm's way? Similarly, doesn't it sometimes happen that one aircraft heads *away* from another, and nevertheless gets in a mid-air crash because the other overtakes and rams it?

However that may be, 'heading for' is Brand's model for the PCA. What ME does he select to be the PCA? He turns down 'wanting plus believing': he says that although 'they appear to play some role in the initiation of action, they ... [do not] directly cause action ... Rather the best candidate for the PCA ... is intending,' in the narrow sense of 'intending to do something here and now' (31, 35).

Brand emphatically distinguishes wanting or desiring — and associated belief-states — from intending. Thus he remarks that 'the strength of a desire can change over time, but not so for an intention,' which 'cannot become weaker or stronger' (125). Again, a 'person [can] have incompatible desires but ... not ... incompatible intentions' (125). Surprisingly, Brand calls practical reasoning 'the process by which intentions are formed from beliefs and desires' (129).

As for cognitive states, particularly beliefs, Brand examines a vast array, and gives them work to do. There are 'action plans,' which we sometimes 'select' and 'alter,' and always 'follow' when we act intentionally (237ff, 23ff). We have 'complex pattern[s] of representations ... not ordinarily available to consciousness ... for the monitoring and guidance of bodily movement' (153). Our purposive behavior receives further guidance from the 'memory images' or ideo-motor 'response images' which we supposedly acquire as a result of previously doing what we now intend; but these images do not 'involve a representation' of our immediately intended behavior (173ff). Brand also makes room for 'scripts,' with their 'themes,' 'roles,' and stereotyped 'scenes,' particularly to facilitate our rote action (202-36).

These are all judicious borrowings from scientific psychology. They should enrich orthodox PAT. But in Brand's view, such cognitive goings-on cannot be all there is to the PCA. His refrain is: 'believing ... do[es] not directly initiate action ... A person must be moved' (94); '[a]ttending to a kind of action is, at best, necessary for acting ... The person must also be *moved to act* ... There must be ... a conative feature to the ME initiating action' (45); 'unless someone is *moved* to perform an action of [a given] type, he will not do so, no matter how completely [response images] of similar past actions occupy his consciousness' (176); '[a] ... representation of ... possible future ... activity, no matter how well articulated ... is not sufficient to initiate action ... this ... [is] a deep truth about the concept of action' (237); '[i]ntentional action initiation is a two-step process: first, a person is motivated to select a plan; and second, he is motivated to follow [it]' (240); you may 'have a master representation in memory, and ... motor systems capable of completing ... actions within [your] script ... [but] you do not [act if you] are not moved to act' (239). Incidentally, one might wonder why Brand allows purely cognitive MEs like representations to 'guide' — that is, redirect, keep going, perhaps rein in — actions which have already been 'initiated' by the conative element of our intending. I must exert myself to sustain my bicycle's motion on flat ground, as well as to get it started. Will our intendings, or their 'conative feature' have to take over guiding duties?

That is a minor issue, easily dealt with if Brand solves his 'fundamental problem of PAT.' He is determined to go beyond the hollow 'functionalist' claim that intending, and particularly its conative ingredient, just is '*whatever* event ... is' the PCA (174). Therefore he turns to scientific 'motivational psychology,' which — unlike the cognitive psychology that furnished him with action plans, representations, response images, and scripts, 'is currently in disarray' (xii). With regard to 'conative features,' he says, '[t]here is presently no scientific theory into which this ... concept can be transformed' (237). Nevertheless Brand tentatively conjectures that a 'theory of production systems,' consisting of 'conditional rules that codify procedural knowledge' or 'knowledge how' may do the trick (256, 266).

Philosophers who are not satisfied with this outcome may consider the alternative strategy of dissolving Brand's 'fundamental problem': Why assume that we are somehow by nature inert, and have to be '*moved* to per-

form an action'? Brand clearly seems to endorse the 'static theory [that] a subject is ... at rest until an activity is initiated' (184). His only apparent rationale is that a competing 'dynamic theory incorrectly presupposes that persons are always acting' — but '[s]urely they are not acting in the philosophically interesting sense of "acting" when having their hair cut, or generally, when being victimized by others ... sitting and daydreaming, or when asleep' (184). However, a dynamic theorist can say we are on the go *until* we are immobilized — by fatigue, injury, undernourishment, assailants and the like. The dynamist can add that we are not always supine when others act upon us. We chat with our hair stylist and resist muggers.

Whether or not devotees of PAT occasionally have such disagreements with Brand, they will find his book admirably thorough and lucid.

IRVING THALBERG

University of Illinois at Chicago

---

JACQUES BOUVERESSE. *Le philosophe chez les autophages*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, collection 'Critique,' 1984, 196p. 75FF. ISBN 2-7073-0678-9.

Jacques Bouveresse avait fait paraître en 1978 un 'Pourquoi pas des philosophes?' (Jacques Bouveresse, 'Pourquoi pas des philosophes?', in *La philosophie malgré tout*, *Critique*, N° 369, février 1978, pp. 97-122.) qui avait alors créé quelques remous. Il y entreprenait un examen de tendances caractéristiques d'une certaine philosophie française et de certains philosophes français\*. Une facilité peu commune à subir l'influence des modes, une forte propension au manichéisme dans l'évaluation des traditions, une inclinaison particulièrement dramatique à clamer *en philosophie* la

\*Le propos de l'ouvrage recensé ici a une certaine ambiguïté pour ce qui est de sa 'visée nationale': les auteurs retenus sont presque exclusivement français, les tendances dénoncées, si elles ne sont pas l'apanage de la France, sont exemplifiées presque uniquement par des cas français, les phénomènes de publicité, de mode, ce genre de choses, sont typiquement français, etc. En revanche, les auteurs cités pour établir le contraste et indiquer ce que la philosophie devrait être sont, à l'exception de Descombes, unanimement non français, de sorte que la polarité culturelle ou nationale est claire. L'A. a par ailleurs tendance à élargir sa visée, certains passages s'adressant à des problèmes qui n'ont pas d'implantation régionale particulière et la conception de la philosophie qui est défendue étant celle de la raison elle-même.

fin de la philosophie, une capacité sans égale et sans entrave à ne voir comme problèmes que ceux qui sont supportés par une caution culturelle et l'exagération qui en découle du rôle et de l'importance que le philosophe prête à sa mission sociale étaient quelques-uns des points alors relevés et dont les incohérences et les faiblesses faisaient l'objet de belles charges, partagées entre le 'credo' philosophique et l'attaque nominale presque totalement transparente.

*Le philosophe chez les autophages* (dont le titre provient d'une idée de Lichtenberg: 'J'ai déjà songé depuis longtemps que la philosophie finirait par se dévorer elle-même.') est à plusieurs égards la reprise et le développement de cette première intervention sur le terrain du procès de la philosophie, de ses vices et de ses vertus, de ses prétentions et de ses limitations. L'ouvrage est une prise de position face à la situation dans laquelle la philosophie française s'est enfermée elle-même et dont elle semble n'essayer de sortir qu'en en resserrant le cercle, en renonçant au courage nécessaire lorsqu'on veut rompre avec l' 'infantilisme' qui accompagne 'le culte des maîtres, des vedettes philosophiques, des héros et des modes' (10), en doublant les revendications dans lesquelles elle en appelle à l'esprit critique par des interrogations aporétiques quant à son propre aveuglement et en prolongeant chaque abjuration de foi par une adhésion à une religion encore plus fervente. L'A. avoue le peu de goût qu'il a en général pour ce genre d'intervention, mais trouve dans le caractère aigu et chronique de la situation un motif suffisant pour s'y attaquer, pour dresser son réquisitoire et pour établir son diagnostic. Il prend soin de préciser: '... comme il n'y a manifestement rien de plus dangereux pour un philosophe que d'être cru trop rapidement et trop facilement, ... le mode de pensée que je voudrais encourager ne peut évidemment s'imposer à quelqu'un que sous sa responsabilité personnelle et exclusive' puis, citant Peirce: 'Mon livre n'aura pas d'instruction à transmettre à qui que ce soit. Comme un traité mathématique, il suggérera certaines idées et certaines raisons de les considérer comme vraies; mais ensuite, si vous les acceptez, cela doit être parce que vous aimez mes raisons, et c'est à vous qu'incombe la responsabilité. ... Mon livre est destiné à des gens qui *veulent trouver*; et les gens qui veulent qu'on leur donne la philosophie à la cuiller peuvent aller ailleurs. Il y a, Dieu merci, des marchands de soupe philosophique à tous les coins de rue.' (20). De telles déclarations créent au moins autant d'obligations aux auteurs qu'elles le font pour leurs lecteurs, et on comprendra aisément que les textes qui les contiennent ne puissent attendre de leur seule vraisemblance ou de leur seule opportunité leur droit d'être reçus. Le présent essai, du fait qu'il se présente beaucoup plus comme l'instrument d'une polémique, avec ce que cela comporte d'actions et de réactions, que comme celui de la transmission de la connaissance, ne saurait avoir d'autre prétention à la vérité que celle que permet la dénonciation des erreurs d'autrui. La question est alors de savoir quelles sont les voies que cette dénonciation peut emprunter, jusqu'où elle doit les poursuivre et quels effets cela peut avoir.

Un premier chapitre, 'Le coin des philosophes,' interroge le statut de l'activité philosophique et le sens que ses justifications lui attachent. Les relations

de la philosophie au pouvoir y sont examinées, en particulier pour ce qui est des revendications philosophiques à l'inutilité dans un monde régi par la rationalité fonctionnelle et à l'esprit critique dans un univers censé lui être réfractaire. Cherchant sa fonction du côté de la remise en question de ce que la société tiendrait (naïvement) pour acquis, la discipline ou l'institution philosophique risque de se donner d'elle-même une image bien illusoire, ne serait-ce que du fait qu' 'il faudrait être singulièrement naïf pour croire que la philosophie a par elle-même les moyens de maintenir en quelque sorte tous les systèmes conceptuels en état de crise permanente.' (29). Cette illusion semble, malgré tout ce qui devrait pourtant la rendre suspecte, continuer de caractériser la philosophie française, qui, répudiant par principe la tradition, fait de l'instabilité et de la rupture son pain quotidien et s'étonne (tout en s'en flattant) qu'une telle fonction ne convainque pas tout un chacun de son bien-fondé. C'est pourquoi on a eu vite fait de chercher dans le politique la justification de la philosophie, car c'est là qu'elle devait trouver d'une part un objet qui intéresse tout le monde (et mettre ainsi fin à son isolement et à sa stérilité) et d'autre part le lieu idéal pour faire advenir son esprit critique. Le bilan n'en est pas globalement positif: 'Si l'on considère ... l'évolution de la philosophie française depuis une quarantaine d'années, on est bien obligé de constater que, dans le domaine qui constituait pour elle ... l'épreuve décisive,' à savoir la prise de position politique, elle s'est surtout distinguée par ce que l'on ne peut percevoir aujourd'hui autrement que comme une inconscience et un aveuglement exceptionnels et, secondairement, par une aptitude remarquable à dénoncer après coup, comme si elles avaient été et étaient encore celles de tout le monde, des erreurs et des illusions qui étaient, en réalité, essentiellement *les siennes*' (24).

Au chapitre suivant, 'Droits et devoirs de l'imagination philosophique,' ce sont principalement le style et l'orientation disciplinaire de la philosophie française qui sont pris à partie, en particulier en ce qui a trait à l'attitude affichée à l'endroit de la science et de la rationalité scientifique, à la question de la démarcation entre science et pseudo-science, à l'orientation 'littéraire' largement caractéristique de cette pensée nationale et, d'une manière générale, à sa résistance à concevoir la philosophie comme une discipline argumentative. Ce chapitre, qui est à mon sens le plus faible parce que essentiellement pointilliste et consacré beaucoup plus aux obligations (faites) qu'aux droits (reconnus) de l'imagination, est l'occasion de donner les premiers assauts contre des représentants spécialement en vue de l'intelligentsia hexagonale, comme Serres et sa 'philosophie du mélange.'

L'ouvrage s'enchaîne sur 'L'éthique de la clarté contre l'éthique du progrès,' qui, à la faveur d'une distinction assez nuancée entre deux façons de se représenter les buts de la philosophie, approfondit les questions de la capacité de la philosophie à intervenir dans la rationalité (en particulier, scientifique) pour en fixer les limites ou en produire de nouvelles formes, de l'intersubjectivité des affirmations philosophiques et des garanties logiques et sémantiques que l'on peut exiger de celles-ci. La clarté (conceptuelle) non seulement apparaît être négligée de fait par les collègues de l'A., elle semble aussi faire de

leur part l'objet d'une méfiance d'autant plus radicale que l'exigence en serait dépassée, les philosophies qui en font un critère (que l'on peut grouper sous l'appellation 'philosophies analytiques') étant réputées s'occuper de problèmes résolus depuis longtemps et se trouvant en-deça de la mobilité du progrès qui nous solliciterait maintenant.

La question principale du chapitre qui suit, 'Sur une prétendue "démission" et les raisons d'une certaine "décadence" de la philosophie,' est celle de la 'psychologisation' du discours philosophique. Un passage donne le ton: '... lorsque les philosophes eux-mêmes ne reconnaissent plus aucune vérité autre que subjective, historique, culturelle, pratique et existentielle, à quel genre d'autorité professionnelle et d'autorité pourraient-ils encore légitimement prétendre? En matière d'intérêt personnel, d'agrément, de préférence et même, finalement, de conformité à l'esprit de l'époque, tout le monde est, par définition, également compétent et souverain. Le royaume de la non-vérité générale est incontestablement plus démocratique que celui de la vérité; et il a l'avantage d'échapper en quelque sorte par nature à la menace redoutable du professionnalisme' (87). Il s'agit ici d'évaluer, comme cet extrait l'indique, un genre particulier de la duplicité, celui dans lequel l'affirmation que la vérité n'est le fait de personne puisqu'elle vient du contexte tout entier voisin avec la revendication d'une liberté personnelle pour chacun. Il n'est pas étonnant que la psychanalyse, considérée comme phénomène, y prenne un relief spécialement accusé. Il s'agit moins là de la pratique psychanalytique, dont le droit de cité ne devrait faire en philosophie l'objet d'aucun contrôle particulier, que du destin auquel son institutionnalisation l'a conduite et qui l'amène à proposer des explications là où il s'agit d'abord de récits, avec toute l'exagération connue des effets que l'on peut en escompter. L'exploitation que l'antirationalisme fait des découvertes freudiennes constitue le coeur de la difficulté, surtout lorsqu'il est posé qu'on peut ou qu'on doit *substituer* à des raisons argumentées rationnellement pour guider l'action et la pensée des motifs subjectifs, des mobiles contextuels et des interprétations personnelles. Derrida et Veyne sont tour à tour pris à partie, le premier à propos de ce que le 'logocentrisme' aurait de fondamentalement erroné dans 'ses partis pris abusifs en faveur de choses comme la connaissance, la vérité, la rationalité ou la logique' (114-5), le second, pour ses prises de position contre les faits et pour les interprétations et contre la possibilité de distinguer parmi celles-ci des interprétations 'bonnes' et des interprétations 'mauvaises.' La décadence et la démission de la philosophie apparaissent ainsi tenir à un certain nombre de confusions réductionnistes (la connaissance est le pouvoir, la vérité est l'histoire, etc.) et compenser la perte de vigueur qui les caractérise par 'le développement d'autres aptitudes que la 'tyrannie' de la logique a trop longtemps étouffées' (117).

Ce développement trouve son inexorable apogée dans un cinquième chapitre, 'La philosophie a-t-elle oublié ses problèmes?', où un certain nombre d'idées de Wittgenstein, dont l'A. est un des spécialistes les plus incontestables, sont exploitées en direction d'une apologie de la philosophie, pensée comme analyse de problèmes réels et non des problèmes culturels

d'une époque ou d'une communauté particulières, sans renoncer pour autant au contexte historique et culturel où elle s'inscrit. Penser que certains problèmes reviennent essentiellement à la philosophie n'est pas penser que celle-ci a une nature atemporelle qui lui permettrait d'échapper à ce que Quine a appelé 'la sémantique migratoire d'un tétrasyllabe.' L'A. se montre sceptique quant aux possibilités qu'a 'le grand style évasif' pratiqué aujourd'hui de remplacer, malgré toutes les séductions qu'il exerce, la recherche de la vérité.

Si l'on ne craint pas de recourir à une formule démodée, mais parfaitement judicieuse, cet ouvrage apparaît avoir les défauts de ses qualités. Il était temps que, du point de vue d'une 'autre' philosophie, une évaluation soit faite de ces tendances qui la font percevoir non seulement comme autre mais aussi comme imbécile et aveugle, et l'A. a assez contribué à faire connaître en France les problématiques et les modes d'approche de la philosophie anglo-américaine et il a assez déploré la marginalisation qui en est faite pour qu'on lui reconnaisse au moins le droit d'intervenir lorsqu'il estime que la situation est devenue critique. Il est cependant regrettable que le procès qui est fait à une philosophie qui a renoncé à être argumentative se déroule lui-même sans argumentation véritable. La technique (pour ne pas dire la 'stratégie') utilisée consiste dans l'ensemble: 1. à instruire une cause dont le bien — fondé peut être universellement reconnu, 2. à citer à comparaître un certain nombre de témoins dont plusieurs doivent d'être convoqués d'abord à leur fortune publique (publicitaire), à l' 'effet' qu'ils ont eu, puis à ce qu'ils ont dit, 3. à aligner un grand nombre de citations (qui représentent facilement un quart de la 'charge utile' de l'ouvrage) dont le rôle est souvent uniquement d'appuyer le discours afin de le relancer (c'est ainsi que de nombreuses citations de Putnam, Quine, Wittgenstein, Kraus, Lichtenberg, Montaigne, ..., servent principalement à activer ce qui peut facilement apparaître comme les croyances personnelles et professionnelles de l'A.) et 4. à produire un résultat dont le parti pris et l'empathie seront malheureusement les arbitres ultimes. L'ouvrage a, dans son écriture comme dans son ironie, de remarquables qualités de séduction, mais cela est raison qu'il ne peut cacher qu'il cherche d'abord à dénoncer et à rallier, à professer et à pourfendre, bref qu'il est un essai essentiellement polémique. On peut penser qu'à ce titre même il ne va pas assez loin dans la voie où il s'engage: il aurait pu dresser un réquisitoire nominal plus systématique contre tel ou tel des auteurs incriminés et ne pas s'embarrasser de développer un plaidoyer ayant des allures neutres et objectives quant à une mission reconnue (dévolue) à la philosophie et qui, présentée dans ce contexte, ne peut apparaître qu'aussi personnelle que tout ce qui est dénoncé à quiconque n'est pas absolument convaincu a priori du bien fondé de l'accusation.

La surabondance des citations est elle-même problématique, car elle a pour effet dans ce contexte d'invoquer à chaque détour des sanctions qui ne sont ni plus ni moins que celles de l'autorité et de ne pas convaincre quiconque estime que ce sont d'autres autorités qui peuvent ou doivent prévaloir. Par ailleurs, l'A. laisse presque sans exception de côté les auteurs français dont la pensée est compatible avec les vues qu'il défend et ces aspects de la pensée

des auteurs qu'il pourfend qui ne sont pas absolument contraires aux idées qu'il développe. Cela ne fait rien pour réduire le caractère largement pamphlétaire de l'ouvrage, lequel se dessert en laissant coexister une écriture claire, inventive et agréable qui est le support heureux d'un grand nombre d'intuitions et de plaidoyers dont l'inspiration est très estimable, une culture philosophique riche et diversifiée (dans laquelle figurent plusieurs auteurs trop peu connus, comme Lichtenberg et Kraus), de même qu'une grande maturité en philosophie avec une construction qui, renonçant à une démonstration faite par autre chose que l'exemple, s'affaiblit en ne trouvant jamais le terme qui lui donnerait sa conclusion. Le réquisitoire que dresse Bouveresse pourrait ainsi être poursuivi fort longuement, sans pour autant avoir d'autre effet que celui, déjà appréciable à sa manière, de faire entendre une voix discordante dans ce qui est présenté comme un concert unanime (Une suite de *Le philosophe chez les autophages* vient de paraître [février 1985] sous le titre *Cynisme et rationalité*, Paris, Éditions de Minuit.)

FRANÇOIS LATRAVERSE

Université du Québec à Montréal

---

S. CARTER. *Dimensions of Moral Education*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984. Pp. xii + 242. Cdn\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-5640-7); Cdn\$10.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6840-6).

Robert Carter asks what moral education is. Morality is taught in the schools, so it might as well be done right. As things stand now, however, it is not. Two distinct incorrect moral education philosophies are vying for the hearts of our teachers and students. On the one hand, we find the traditional tendencies toward authoritarian moral absolutism — the view that there are particular 'right' values that ought to be taught to everyone. Certainly, though, 'right' values is a problematic notion. On the other hand, we find moral relativism with a strong lobby too among moral educators. The Values Clarification advocate would have us convince our children that every person has a right to pick his or her own values. But this 'anything goes' relativism is problematic too.

Carter's own answer to the moral education question steers a course between absolutism and relativism. His view is rich with interesting ideas about education in general and builds from a wide intellectual perspective, taking us

from issues of biology (J.Z. Young's brain theory) to issues of psychology (Kohlberg's work on the stages of moral development) to issues of meta-ethics (Moore's naturalistic fallacy and Robert S. Hartman's notion of value) to issues of existential philosophy (Camus on the problems of value choice-making for the moral agent). The view that Carter synthesizes from this is that there is an absolute method for thinking morally — there is a correct absolute moral point of view. It involves the moral agent's being both a careful critical thinker and an empathic feeler in moral situations. But although this method for thinking morally is absolute, the particular value decisions that result from employing the method may differ relativistically among honest people.

Carter's thesis is attractive. Would that we all could be critical thinkers and empathic feelers in our moral lives. Apart from some questionable meta-ethical claims he makes, some short shrift he pays to Mary Warnock's Aristotelian thoughts about the power of moral authority and blind value acceptance in one's developing a full moral sensibility, some overdone sympathies he throws to Kohlberg as a philosophical thinker, and a running together of issues of ethics with issues of life philosophy, there is not much substantively objectionable and there is much to praise about Carter's work, especially his scholarship and philosophical analysis of the work of Kohlberg and Hartman. There is, however, a central organizational problem with the book that detracts some from the reader's having a full appreciation of what Carter has done here. Carter fails to clearly distinguish the one question that he asks at the outset — What is moral education? — from the eight questions that he in fact tries to answer in different parts of the book. The dimensions of moral education would have become clearer had these questions and Carter's answers been explicitly made the book's structure. The questions include:

- (1) What is the distinctive 'moral' point of view, frame of mind, that needs to be taught to children? (Answering this question is in fact Carter's major preoccupation.)
- (2) What is the proper normative moral theory to teach our children?
- (3) What is the proper psychological set to teach children so that they then can go on to develop a moral point of view?
- (4) What are the aims of education per se and of moral education in particular?
- (5) How is the teacher to best teach the moral point of view? (What is the proper teaching method?)
- (6) How is the teacher to best teach the proper normative moral theory?

(7) How is the teacher to best teach the proper psychological set for becoming moral?

(8) Should ethics be taught in the schools at all?

In the summary of his work that follows, I shall show where Carter tackles each of these questions.

Chapter 1 argues for a Socratic view that the truly educated person has learned the skills of critical self-examination — what Carter dubs 'myopia' — and has used them to appreciate the subtleties and limitations of his knowledge, these being the major aims of good education (question 4). Carter also suggests that the art of teaching in general is the art of Socratic midwifery. (There are implications here for questions 5-7.)

In chapter 2, Carter refers to question 8 as 'the hottest education issue of the day' (46). His answer is that teaching ethics cannot and ought not to be avoided. What needs to be taught is the two-sided moral point of view (question 1). The cognitivist side of his Janus-faced answer is fully developed. The child must become a philosopher of sorts who thinks critically about moral theory and justification. (Mathew Lippman's work is certainly a nice complement to Carter's thoughts at this point.) In an analytic fashion, he must appreciate the sticky conflicts with which ethical situations are fraught. Carter also deals with question 2. In reviewing Kohlberg's work and then skillfully drawing out its meta-ethical implications, we are told that there is no one right normative view we can demand from the mature ethical thinker. At the highest stages of ethical development (stage 6 or 7) one thinks critically about moral theory and issues like justice, fairness, and social contract. There is no universal normative view, however, that all mature ethical thinkers must buy. But there are common normative trends at earlier stages — stage 2 egoism and stage 5 utilitarianism. Question 3 is also an important part of this chapter. The effective teacher of morality is one who by asking questions in the right way can get students to pass successfully through all the appropriate developmental stages. Finally, though, what is conspicuously missing in this chapter is what specifically the effective teacher must *do*. What is the right way of asking questions? What questions are to be asked?

In chapter 3, we see that the desirable habit of critical thinking unfortunately creates self-doubts about moral decisions. Maybe one's particular value choices are not the best (question 2, again). In a truly existential spirit, though, Carter tells us that we must nevertheless make value choices. One need not feel Camus' absurdity about making value decisions. Rather, one should see one's particular chosen values as the playing out of one's character and as an opportunity to take responsibility for being that character. But how? At this point, we are back to question 1: the moral point of view also requires that a person learn to empathically identify with how people experience their lives. Being sensitively empathic, one will tend to take a fuller responsibility for one's actions towards others.

Chapter 4 deals with questions 1 and 3. The making of a moral decision is the art of valuing another person. Carter explores what must go into the psychological process of valuation that must be taught. One must learn to be sensitive to issues of intrinsic value. Carter maps out nine different notions of 'intrinsic value.' Unfortunately, we are not fully told what the teacher must do to get the student concerned with intrinsic valuation other than the student's taking an ethics course, hardly something we could demand of all ethical beings.

Chapter 5 further elaborates the second face of Carter's answer to question 1. Teaching the moral sensibility is teaching a person to see the intrinsic worth of another. One must learn to attend to the other with an intensity which shuts out all else, focusing on the other's existential situation and no further consequences or other pragmatic consequences. Carter borrows Hartman's idea that in attending to the other in intrinsic valuation, one is attending to the other as 'the fulfillment of the intension of its concept' (175). Carter also reviews many of the twists and turns of the concept of intrinsic value. Moreover, he has another go at question 8 and tells us that the aim of moral education is to create an 'integrated, harmonious, and responsive personality' (174).

Finally, one must wonder how psychologically feasible it is to develop in the same personality such seemingly divergent traits as the full critical spirit and the full sensitively empathic spirit (Carter's complete answer to question 1). It is this wonder and Carter's failure to highlight important questions enough that are the major weaknesses of this book. However, even so, Carter is to be commended for doing something extremely significant. He has taken issues of importance for the value lives of our children and has raised them to the level of philosophical scholarship and debate where they can now be looked at with a fine conceptual comb instead of the dull emotionality of old authoritarian and relativistic ideology. Carter's own positions are important to consider, but *Dimensions of Moral Education* is perhaps more important for asking the right questions in a philosophically responsible way.

HOWARD KAMLER

Eastern Michigan University

---

PAUL M. CHURCHLAND. *Matter and Consciousness*. Cambridge: MIT Press 1984. Pp. 164. US\$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-03103-5); US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-53050-3).

Those who teach introductory philosophy of mind have in recent days faced a problem with regard to text selection. While there are any number of articles published and even the occasional decent anthology, few truly contemporary overviews of the area have been available. With *Matter and Consciousness*, Paul Churchland, writing in his typical lively and provocative manner, has solved this problem. And, in so doing, he has not only provided a frame within which to work, he has also presented an account and defense (albeit schematic) of his version of eliminative materialism, the view that '... it is the conceptual framework of a completed neuroscience that will embody the essential wisdom about our inner nature' (159).

In the first five chapters of the book (98 out of 160 pages) Churchland sketches and discusses many of what we might call the 'traditional' issues. But, as the reader acquainted with Churchland's writings might expect, his view that '... the nature of mind is not a purely philosophical question, but a deeply scientific question as well' informs the presentation. The remainder of the book turns more explicitly to the scientific. Chapter 6 provides a brief introduction to artificial intelligence, Chapter 7 to neuroscience. The final chapter provides a bit of frosting — a discussion of the distribution of intelligence in the universe followed by a lyrical evocation of the wondrous character of our future scientific introspection.

Churchland's tactic in the initial section of the book is to distinguish 'problem areas.' Chapter 2 considers the ontological problem; Chapter 3 the semantical problem; Chapter 4 the epistemological problem; and Chapter 5 the methodological problem. Chapter 2 is the longest and, perhaps for that reason, the most satisfactory in that a student could on his own gain some understanding of the various issues and arguments. This chapter opens with a consideration of dualism in its various forms, presenting some of the arguments pro and con. His discussion, while of the traditional, has a 'scientific' tone. For example, Churchland suggests that the mind-matter division proposed by Descartes is implausible given current accounts of matter. That is, our best current accounts, he says, characterize electrons as lacking extension (9). What Churchland wishes to instill from the start is that one has a competition between theories and that issues can be resolved in the end only by a consideration of factors germane to the assessment of theories. This is not to say that he neglects 'philosophic' puzzles, the section on the identity theory, for example, contains a lucid account of fallacious arguments from introspection. Rather it is to say that one who feels that philosophy is 'conceptual' or in some way 'independent' of particular science will feel ill at ease at the outset. The correct response would not, I think, be to dismiss the book as an option, but instead to use the book as one which presents a view of philosophy which must be considered even if one wishes in the end to reject it.

There are some worries about the book which one might have at this point. The general claim that science and philosophy are interdependent is perhaps uncontroversial. The claim that dualism is a theory is, if not uncontroversial, at least not too controversial. But the specific claim, which

Churchland requires, that conceptual schemes are themselves theories (the network theory) is rather more contentious than one would guess given the presentation. This seems in the end to be a quibble. Churchland does not hide the fact that he is an advocate. And, as the book moves on, some views used, e.g., the network theory of meaning, are spelled out and defended in a little more detail. One would presumably want, if one were using the book, to bring out oneself what is most contentious. What is not unrelated is Churchland's tendency to introduce, rather speedily, a fairly complex technical vocabulary, and a fairly complex set of technical claims. On page 34 one finds out that the brain uses more modes and media of representation than the mere storage of sentences. What representation is is left to the reader. In a way this is what makes the book of worth. A specialist can enjoy it as a presentation of a view. A teacher can use it as a means of organization which still leaves him with much to develop and much room to maneuver. And one must remember that the view which Churchland advocates is one which many of us, at least me, have persistently failed to bring to life at all. Perhaps my failure all along was due to a lack of appreciation of the technical backdrop necessary to make sense of the view.

The emphasis upon both broad coverage and brevity does, I believe, affect the utility of both Chs. 4 and 5. In Ch. 4, that on the epistemological problem, Churchland characterizes a traditional view about introspection as the view that 'one's candid introspective judgements about one's own mental states — or about one's own sensations anyway — are incorrigible and infallible; it is logically impossible that they be mistaken' (75). This is rather too much of a blurring together of what can be distinguished. In particular his arguments against this view would seem to show that our sincere judgements might be false; they would not seem to show that such judgements might not have some other special status, the appeal to which might either play a role in the development of a theory of mind, or in the explanation of the reluctance to embrace Churchlandian materialism. Here Churchland should have, I think, distinguished a few more special-status claims in a way similar to that in which he distinguishes varieties of dualism at the outset. And, in I would suppose the interests of comprehensiveness, he includes what he (correctly) describes as a brief sketch of the rich idealist and phenomenological tradition. The sketch is so brief as to be of little more use than a dictionary style entry. Hegel (and one is given his dates) thought the world is the Absolute Mind's struggle to reach self-conscious awareness. In the end the only reason for mentioning this is to say that it reflects the traditional view of introspection, and in so doing is subject to objections presented elsewhere in the book. All the sections are, as this one is, brief. But unlike this one, the others in this chapter play a role in the development of the overall point of view. The discussion of methodological behaviourism, for example, ties in both with the earlier sections on behaviourism and on meaning, while that on the cognitive/computation approach looks back to the discussion of functionalism and forward to the chapter on AI. Churchland could simply have

deleted the section and inserted a footnote noting that there are rich traditions which he will perforce neglect.

Churchland comments that an introductory book could well have ended with Ch. 5. But the book moves on (excluding the lyrical closing) to a presentation of, if not the plain facts, at least the overtly scientific. The relation between these chapters and philosophy is most apparent in the chapter on artificial intelligence. One thinks of such puzzles as that of whether computers can think, of whether they could be 'creative.' But the role of the chapter on neuroscience seems to me less clear. In part it seems only designed to elicit a 'gee whiz, look at how much we're finding out' response. In part it serves to break down residual feelings that we humans are in some 'ultimate' sense fundamentally different from other creatures. But, unlike the AI chapter, the presentation is not such as to enable one to tie in with thoughts, feelings, and the like. We would already have to be in the Churchlandian Valhalla to see that what is done here is the study of mind insofar as minds exist. Maybe Churchland will in the end be proven right, but it is as if I took time off in an action-theory course to study physiology. At this point knowledge of what we have obtained by means of the materialist 'bottom up' approach does not, I think, help us. For if what is at the bottom does lead, as he allows that it might, to desires and beliefs, etc. (97), I don't see how I would have been helped now by knowing what Churchland tells me about the brain. And knowing what he tells me now does not help me understand now that what I am doing is '... constructing a new and more adequate set of concepts with which to understand our inner life' (97). I personally would not use this chapter. The section on life elsewhere in the universe is cute; but the particular statistical arguments he presents are quite controversial, and quite beyond my competence to assess. Again the primary point would seem to be that we are not unique either locally or universally. One might, though, make something of the claim that our notion of intelligence, indeed our intelligence, is but a variation on a highly general theme. Of course this is a point about what Churchland takes to be the inadequacy of our current conceptual scheme.

As a text the book is admirable, even though, as I noted above, one might not want to use all of it. I do not know of any text which provides a clearly better way of schematizing and organizing a complex subject. Nor do I know of any more complete or clear defense of this brand of materialism. But in the end I think the book is an 'ideological' failure. I do not buy (nor I think will many buy) Churchland's claim that 'the genuine arrival of a materialist kinematics and dynamics for psychological states and cognitive processes will constitute not a gloom in which our inner life is eclipsed or suppressed, but rather a dawning, in which its marvelous intricacies are finally revealed — even, if we apply ourselves, in self-conscious introspection' (160). The reason for one's rejection is, I think, that Churchland mislocates and does not adequately discuss the problem we feel. Love and morality, we might say, are activities which we indulge in as users of our current conceptual scheme. To

contemplate the demise of the scheme just is to contemplate their demise. And this we cannot do with joy.

STEVEN DeHAVEN  
University of Alberta

---

NORMAN O. DAHL. *Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. xii + 302. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1245-5) US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1246-3).

Aristotle's ethics have attracted a lot of attention in recent years, partly because, with the demise of logical positivism, normative conceptions of human nature are no longer tabu, also because of increased interest in action theory and such associated topics as practical reasoning and weakness of will. Dahl's book is a solid, detailed and well-researched discussion of some Aristotelian texts pertaining to these two topics. All Greek words are transliterated, so even a Greekless reader should be able to follow the discussion. The first part of the book is mainly devoted to a rebuttal of Humean interpretations of Aristotle's views on practical reason, while the second part argues, in opposition to the 'traditional' interpretation, that Aristotle does acknowledge genuine cases of weakness of will (*akrasia*) in which the agent has conflicting motives. The book also contains two appendices on textual conundrums, forty pages of notes, a useful bibliography, an index locorum, and an excruciating general index: many contemporary commentators are referred to, even discussed, in the notes without appearing in the index (a handful, however, do receive this honour).

I found the first part of the book less satisfying than the second. Dahl says he started work on this book in 1971. At that time perhaps Humean interpretations were more current than they are now (cf. Dahl 4-5); but in the last ten years or so the Humean interpretation has, in my view, been totally refuted. (See, for instance, the articles gathered in Amélie Rorty's collection *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, 1980.) That interpretation rested on a simple-minded and mistaken understanding of Aristotle's means-end distinction. What is needed now is a full-scale exposition which starts from the point that Aristotle's dictum 'deliberation is of the means' is not to be taken Humeanly and proceeds from there to construct and defend an overall picture of Aristotle's views on practical reason. Vindicating a non-Humean account of Aristotle's

tle's views on practical reason (which Dahl does) is not at all the same as vindicating a non-Humean account of practical reason (which Dahl doesn't). Dahl clearly thinks Aristotle's approach is valuable but his account of its value (e.g., in Chapter 8) is too programmatic.

However, if Part One of the book is read simply as a refutation of Humean interpretations of Aristotle it is on the whole excellent. I did not like Dahl's definition of practical reason in terms of motivations to act (11-17): practical reason is concerned with reasons for doing things and reasons for doing things are not the same as motivations. But he gets more on track in the next section (17-20) when he sets out four necessary conditions for practical reason to provide a foundation for morality. The first of these is that practical reason must play a role in the acquisition of ends.

The text on which Dahl rests most weight is *NE* 1143a35-65, where Aristotle talks about 'starting points for the end' (*archai tou hou heneka*). Dahl interprets this as saying that *nous* (intelligence) apprehends ends by induction from particulars. He translates the phrase '*tes heteras protaseōs*,' not as 'the minor premise' (Ross), but (literally) as 'the other proposition,' i.e., particular as opposed to universal: 'what *nous* grasps are propositions indicating what is to be done or what is good in a particular situation' (44) and these form the basis of the induction. However, Ross's translation may still be correct since, as Dahl concedes (282, n. 22), the minor premise of a practical syllogism can be evaluative.

The 'traditional' interpretation of Aristotle's views on *akrasia* is perhaps more current than the Humean interpretation of Aristotle on practical reason. Kenny attempted to demolish the former in 1966 (in *Prohairesis*), but his own interpretation was so idiosyncratic as to detract substantially from the demolition. The 'traditional' interpretation has been revived by Wiggins (in Rorty, 248-50); but Dahl's discussion should discourage further revivals.

According to the 'traditional' interpretation, the *akratic* does not really know that he is doing what he ought not to; he knows general principles but is prevented by passion from applying them to the particular situation he is in. Dahl sets out this interpretation at length; then he presents several objections (mainly Kenny's) to this interpretation; next he replies to these objections from the standpoint of the 'traditional' interpretation; and finally, having by now provided the strongest possible argument in favour of the 'traditional' interpretation, he presents his own alternative interpretation and argues that it is more plausible.

Dahl's principle thesis is that, although Aristotle says that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, this does not preclude an agent arriving at a verbalized form of the conclusion even if he is prevented from acting on it. (It is this, not the minor premise, which is referred to in the phrase *hē teletata protasis*, 'the last proposition,' 1147b9.) He argues that the *akratic* is indeed 'prevented' (cf. 1147a30-1) by passion from acting on reason's syllogism. When the *akratic* is said in 1147b9-12 either (1) to lack knowledge or (2) to have it only in a way that does 'not amount to knowing but only talking, as a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles,' (1) refers to the

'impetuous' akratic who does not stop to deliberate (1150b22) and (2) to 'weak' akratics whose practical 'knowledge has not been sufficiently integrated to insure that they will act on it' (209). Although one could quarrel with details, it seems to me that Dahl's interpretation is plausible and well-argued.

Dahl's book can be recommended to those interested (either pro or con) in the Humean interpretation of Aristotle on practical reason or in the 'traditional' interpretation of his discussion of akrasia. It must be said, though, that it is written in a stodgy style rather too reminiscent of C.D. Broad.

MARK THORNTON  
University of Toronto

---

JOHN EARMAN, ed. *Testing Scientific Theories*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. viii + 484. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1158-0); US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1159-9).

*Testing Scientific Theories* is volume X in the *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* series. The articles in this book arose out of a 1980 conference which revolved around Clark Glymour's account of scientific confirmation as found in *Theory and Evidence*. Glymour's work on scientific confirmation has been enormously important in recent philosophy of science, and it is entirely appropriate that a volume of the *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* be devoted to his contributions. Glymour's work covers many areas; this volume contains six sections which deal with different aspects of his work.

The first section covers Glymour's bootstrapping theory of confirmation, and begins with an article by Glymour in which he both extends and modifies what was presented in *Theory and Evidence*. He presents three schemas for bootstrap testing of equations and inequations, and also explores ways to combine bootstrapping with knowledge of probabilities. The following article by Bas van Fraassen explores Glymour's treatment of the logic of evidential support, and an article by Aron Edidin presents modifications which he argues are needed by the bootstrapping account of confirmation. This first section ends with Paul Horwich's comparison of the bootstrapping theory of confirmation with the Bayesian and hypothetico-deductive theories of confirmation.

The second section of this volume revolves around Glymour's rejection of Bayesianism. Glymour recognizes that most current theories of confirmation involve probabilities in some sort of Bayesian framework, and in *Theory and Evidence* he gives several reasons why he finds that approach both inadequate and unpromising. One of his criticisms is that Bayesianism does not account for many of the features of scientific confirmation which almost everyone accepts. A theory of confirmation should explain the following: why ad hoc hypotheses are bad; why simplicity is desired; why a variety of evidence for a hypothesis is good; why old evidence can confirm a new theory; as well as several other methodological features of scientific confirmation. The essay by Roger Rosenkrantz, 'Why Glymour is a Bayesian,' attempts to answer Glymour and show that Bayesianism can account for many of these methodological features of scientific confirmation. He looks at a variety of problems including simplicity, novel predictions, irrelevant conjunctions, the consequence condition, and old evidence, and he attempts to show that an objective form of Bayesianism adequately deals with these problems.

Daniel Garber's article is a more detailed attempt to deal with the problem of old evidence. Garber claims that the problem of old evidence arises because the Bayesian requirement of coherent probability assignments require that rational agents be logically omniscient. Garber's solution to the problem of old evidence is to weaken the requirement of logical omniscience and allow the Bayesian agent to be ignorant of some logical truths, while retaining a version of the requirement of coherence. Richard Jeffrey also discusses the problem of old evidence and argues that Bayesianism can account for using old evidence in a new explanation. In the last article of this section Brian Skyrms discusses three ways in which one can learn by conditionalizing without losing information.

In *Theory and Evidence* Glymour also rejects the hypothetico-deductive method of testing scientific hypotheses. In the fifth section of *Testing Scientific Theories* Ronald Giere defends the hypothetico-deductive method and attempts to show that it can account for aspects of confirmation such as the desire for novel predictions. Giere further argues that objections to the hypothetico-deductive method, such as the claim that it satisfies the 'converse consequence condition,' are based on an oversimplified view of the hypothetico-deductive method.

In the other article in section five Henry Kyburg argues that there are no instances of what he calls 'the deductive model of science.' Philosophers such as Giere, Popper, and even Glymour defend many important elements of the deductive model. In response Kyburg argues that 1) the set of statements accepted by the scientist is not consistent or deductively closed, 2) scientific laws and hypotheses have no empirical content, and thus they can be neither confirmed by their instances nor refuted by counterinstances, and 3) there are no statements that incorrigibly express the results of observation. The denial of those elements of the deductive model leads Kyburg to conclude that

scientific knowledge and scientific change are best represented by an inductive model which he sketches.

A large section of *Theory and Evidence* is devoted to arguing that the bootstrapping method of confirmation provides us with a basis to reconstruct many cases in the history of science. Section four of *Testing Scientific Theories* is concerned with two historical case studies. Ronald Laymon presents an account of Newton's argument for universal gravitation and maintains that it is an historically more accurate account than the one offered by Glymour in *Theory and Evidence*. Michael Gardner discusses the question of realism and instrumentalism during the Copernican revolution. Gardner attempts to explain why there was a transition from viewing the Copernican theory as merely a good way to predict the positions of the planets, to viewing the theory as the literal truth about the motion of the planets. He then defends a version of realism which he claims is supported by the principles of reasoning that have been used in actual scientific practice. The topic of realism and instrumentalism also arises in section three of the book, where van Fraassen discusses the relation between explanation, evidence, and empirically equivalent theories. Glymour has argued that two theories may be empirically equivalent, and yet one of them might be confirmed more than the other. Van Fraassen presents objections to Glymour's theory of explanation and develops an account of theory acceptance which does not yield that result.

The last section of the book contains articles by Adolf Grünbaum and Paul Meehl on the testing of particular scientific theories. Grünbaum discusses testing hypotheses in Freudian theory, and Meehl discusses subjectivity in psychoanalytic inference as well as statistical paleontology and the completeness of the fossil record.

Overall the book is very well written. In *Theory and Evidence* Glymour presents philosophers of science with many criticisms of popular positions, as well as a novel alternative account of scientific confirmation. *Testing Scientific Theories* contains many replies to Glymour's arguments, and is an important contribution to the discussion of issues that Glymour's work has raised. This book should initiate much fruitful discussion among philosophers and play a significant role in the continuing controversy over scientific confirmation.

RICHARD OTTE

University of California at Santa Cruz

LEWIS S. FORD and GEORGE L. KLINE, eds. *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy*. New York: Fordham University Press 1983. Pp. x + 353. US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8232-1102-9); US\$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8232-1103-7).

This book is a collection of sixteen essays 'concerned in their different ways, to clarify, criticize, and develop key ideas and insights of Alfred North Whitehead' (ix). All but three of the essays had been previously published, most in the decade prior to the founding of *Process Studies* in 1972, including six from a special issue of the *Southern Journal of Philosophy* devoted to Whitehead (Vol. 7, No. 4 [1969-70]). One essay is the entirety of a small book by the late Stephen Lee Ely, *The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God* (1942), which is now out of print. All of the previously published essays except Ely's were revised for this book; this has the happy consequence that none of them seem to be dated or to belong to an earlier phase of the discussion of Whitehead which by now is of only historical interest. The book's usefulness is also increased by a rather detailed index.

The essays are grouped into four parts: (1) Whitehead as a Philosopher, (2) The Metaphysics of Process, (3) Creativity, Religious Experience, and God, and (4) Some Contrasting Interpretations. The first part is something of a catch-all, containing A.H. Johnson's report of some comments by Whitehead during a tutorial with him in 1936 and Granville C. Henry's discussion of Whitehead's response to the new mathematics and its influence on Whitehead's idea of eternal objects. In the second part, two of the five articles (William A. Christian, Sr.'s and George L. Kline's) are concerned primarily to elucidate various aspects of the analysis of process in Whitehead's system; the other three relate aspects of that idea of process to various traditional metaphysical issues (John B. Cobb, Jr.'s to freedom, Ivor Leclerc's to being and becoming, and Richard M. Rorty's to the debate between realism and subjectivist reductionism). The third part contains Donald A. Crosby's analysis of Whitehead's idea of religion, Ely's critique of Whitehead's idea of God, and two discussions of creativity — William J. Garland's analysis of its nature and its relation to the other categories of Whitehead's metaphysics and Gene Reeves' analysis of its relation to God. The final part contains two pairs of articles; each pair consists of a criticism of some aspect of Whitehead's thought and an article responding to the criticism (Robert C. Neville and Lewis S. Ford on the one and the many and creativity, and Justus Buchler and Charles Hartshorne on Whitehead's ascription of ontological primacy to actual entities). The final part closes with Ford's survey of criticisms and interpretations of Whitehead in three areas.

As the foregoing suggests, the articles differ in many ways. They range over a variety of issues. Some are very technical and concern details of interpretation; others are more wide-ranging and relate Whitehead's thought to other important philosophers and to important philosophical issues. Some are primarily expository, some primarily critical, and some primarily aimed at defending the adequacy of Whitehead's thought on this point or that. The

articles do, however, exhibit a consistent standard of excellence not often attained in anthologies. Thus, the book is a storehouse of ideas and insights for the student of Whitehead today. And this no doubt will be its prime use. Certainly it is not suitable as, nor is it intended to be, an introduction to Whitehead's thought: only Ely's essay contains anything of an introductory exposition of Whitehead, and even it is more useful as a critique of Whitehead than as an exposition. Otherwise, the essays presuppose some acquaintance with Whitehead's thought, much as do those in *Process Studies*.

However, as a source of ideas and insights the book has much to offer, even to those who know well the primary and secondary literature on Whitehead. In the space at my disposal, it is difficult to do anything more than suggest something of this richness. Johnson's article reports several comments relevant to disputed matters in the interpretation of Whitehead — e.g., that Whitehead denied that God prehends all details of past events (6-7). Henry's article suggests that Whitehead developed his idea of eternal objects by reflecting on mathematical entities, not simple *sensa*; this in turn suggests some interesting questions — e.g., if there are no simple mathematical entities, are there any simple eternal objects? Cobb argues that freedom in an incompatible sense requires an epochal theory of becoming. In his very carefully argued essay, Kline concludes that there is 'a sharp ontological — as opposed to merely functional — distinction between concrescence and *concretum*' (132), but he does not explain how he conceives the relation between a concrescence and 'its' *concretum-product*.

The four articles which deal with creativity indicate the importance of understanding this notion for understanding Whitehead's scheme, while the differences among the articles indicate the lack of agreement among scholars of Whitehead on the interpretation of this notion and the explication of its role in Whitehead's thought. Lack of agreement on these matters contributes to lack of agreement on how Whitehead's system would answer certain basic metaphysical questions — e.g., what is the relation between God and creativity, why there is something rather than nothing, and how the one and the many are related. The essays further the discussion of these issues. In particular, the exchange between Neville and Ford contains some worthwhile suggestions on what an adequate explication of the relation of the one and the many requires, as well as a discussion of Whitehead's view of the relation.

In closing, I would judge that this book would be a valuable addition to the library of anyone interested in Whitehead's thought. The articles all represent important contributions, and most of them were published long enough ago to make access to them available only through a major library; moreover, their having been revised makes their current form more valuable than their original form.

JAMES A. KELLER  
Wofford College

JOSEPH MARGOLIS. *Philosophy of Psychology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1984. Pp. xiii + 107. US\$11.95. ISBN 0-13-664326-4.

In this brief volume — the text is a scant 91 pages — Margolis discusses most of the major views about the nature of psychological theories and psychological states. The first chapter is devoted to setting out and attempting to motivate the sorts of questions the book will discuss. Identity theories and eliminative materialism are considered in the second chapter. The next two chapters are devoted to behaviorism and functionalism. And the final chapter focuses on cognitivism.

By and large the tone of the book is negative. Each of the major positions considered is claimed to be 'seriously defective,' and just about all the authors whose views are discussed come in for some sharp criticism. In the final six pages, Margolis gives us a very brief overview of the terrain in which he thinks the right answers may lie. His central ideas are:

- (1) 'that the human sciences — psychology and the social and cultural disciplines — may well be significantly different from the physical sciences, both methodologically and ontologically.' (89-90), and
- (2) 'that the emerging forms of human consciousness are ineliminably *practical*, that is, causally grounded in and reflecting the historically changing and evolving activities of socially organized labor.' (90)

The volume is part of Prentice-Hall's *Foundations of Philosophy Series*, and like other volumes in that series it is intended principally as a text for use in undergraduate courses. Some of the other volumes in *Series* are splendid examples of what a short undergraduate text can be. Hempel's *Philosophy of Natural Science*, for example, is a model of clarity and organization. The lucid volumes by Quine, on the philosophy of logic, and by Chisholm, on epistemology, succeed in being accessible to the undergraduate with a little background in philosophy while simultaneously saying something of real interest to the professional philosopher. Measured against this standard, Margolis's book is very disappointing indeed.

Part of the problem is organizational. Time and again Margolis launches into a discussion involving various technical notions in philosophy or psychology and only gets around to explaining or defining the notions pages later. Thus, for example, Margolis offers us an explanation of the terms 'intentional' and 'intentionality' on p. 24. However, as the index quite accurately indicates, there are discussions of various views about intentionality on pages 13, 14, 15 and 23. How the student is supposed to follow these discussions before the notion has been defined is something of a mystery. Similarly, 'operant conditioning' and 'classical conditioning' are explained on p. 41, though they are invoked in a substantive way six pages earlier.

Careless organization is, sad to say, the least of the faults that beset this book. For when Margolis finally does get around to explaining what he is talk-

ing about, the explanations are often obscure to the point of incomprehensibility. When they are not, they are sometimes just plain wrong. Some of the blame for the obscurity of what Margolis writes must be shared with the authors about whom he is writing. It is notoriously difficult to understand Davidson on anomalous monism or Sellars on just about anything. But Margolis is certainly no help. There is a sort of perverse egalitarianism to Margolis's expositions. Even relatively clear writers like Armstrong come out sounding all but incomprehensible.

Perhaps the most egregious inaccuracy in the volume is its misrepresentation of Chomsky's views. Over and over again Margolis tells us that Chomsky holds knowledge of grammar, or linguistic competence, to be innate. (See, for example, pp. 69, 70.) This is a mad view and Chomsky has never held any such thing. What Chomsky has held is that we have innate knowledge of linguistic universals — the properties that all humanly learnable languages have in common. Since this innate knowledge radically restricts the class of possible right answers, Chomsky maintains, it facilitates the child's effort to learn the grammar of the language being spoken around her. But the grammar itself must be acquired. It is not innately known. Characteristically, Margolis gets around to explaining what he takes 'competence' to mean a dozen pages after he begins using the notion. Perhaps the best way to indicate the depth of his confusion in this area is to quote what he says:

By *competence*, Chomsky means an innately organized, species-specific capacity to apply to some cognitively significant sector of behavior or discrimination (the functional parts of language or perception, say) a system of universal rules (a grammar or analogous regularities) that are not introspectively accessible. (82)

This is so wrong in so many ways that one despairs of untangling it.

During the last decade there has been an explosion of interest in the philosophy of psychology. Those of us who teach the subject have long felt the need for a well informed, well organized, clearly written text. This isn't it.

STEPHEN P. STICH  
University of Maryland  
and University of Sydney

SHEILA McLEAN and GERRY MAHER. *Medicine, Morals, and the Law*. Hampshire, England: Gower Publishing 1983. Pp. ix + 214. US\$32.00. ISBN 0-566-00533-6.

MICHAEL BAYLES. *Reproductive Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1984. Pp. xiv + 141. US\$10.00. ISBN 0-13-773904-4.

DOUGLAS N. WALTON. *Ethics of Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1983. Pp. xv + 257. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-313-23752-2.

Of these three books, *Medicine, Morals, and the Law* is the most general, covering a wide range of topics in medical ethics from both a philosophical and legal perspective. Each chapter includes useful analyses of (primarily) British law and legal decisions. Bayles' *Reproductive Ethics* discusses a range of topics in reproductive ethics and the public policy of reproduction. The subject matter of Walton's *Ethics of Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems* is the most narrow of the three, dealing with the ethics of terminating treatment in intensive care units. I will discuss each book separately, making comparisons when appropriate.

*Medicine, Morals, and the Law* begins with a discussion of the 'sacredness of life.' The discussion contrasts deontological and utilitarian ethical theories, in general, and more specifically as the grounds for valuing life when it involves rational natures and when it involves simple consciousness of pain and pleasure. Leaving off from this first chapter, there is an emphasis throughout the book on life not being the preeminent value, and on patient's rights and autonomous choices, anti-utilitarian factors, as important.

The discussion of abortion to which the book proceeds exemplifies the book's general approach to philosophical argument: many different views are surveyed briefly, with McLean and Maher presenting a few criticisms and counter-criticisms. While they do argue for a particular position, the arguments are never as complete as one would like. There is, in my view, a mistaken dependence on a fetus' potential as a ground for the impermissibility of some abortions. A chapter on sterilization and contraception, which comes much later, assumes a strong right to reproduce, a view which is never defended.

The book continues with chapters on euthanasia, termination of treatment, and privacy, to which McLean and Maher believe there are moral rights which the law does not adequately recognize. They do not hold with a moral distinction based on the active/passive line, in part because an individual's autonomous functioning can be inhibited both by interference and by lack of help. They fail to see that one may care about people's *rights*, rather than autonomous functioning, and killing may interfere with a right, while not aiding does not. McLean and Maher also discount the ordinary/extraordinary distinction in care-taking, but it should be noted that they take the distinction to refer to what is standard as opposed to non-standard use of technology, rather than to what is non-excessive as opposed to excessive burden given expected benefits.

The chapters on consent and experimentation emphasize the right of the patient to be informed, and they reveal a skepticism about the necessity of much experimentation. This latter position is connected with their willingness to take seriously the view that improvements in health have not primarily been the result of a scientific, intrusive medical treatment of illness, but rather of environmental and preventive measures. Indeed, medicine may be a threat to health. The chapter on negligence, whose discussion of the law I found one of the most interesting in the book, argues that when medicine views itself as a science with fixed laws, it raises people's expectations as to outcomes and also ignores the particular aspects of a case, which may lead to maltreatment. The chapter discusses the absence of a clear idea of what a doctor is accountable for giving a patient, and the law's tendency to discount all risk to patients as necessarily attendant on the great benefit of medicine, an approach McLean and Maher strongly deplore.

The final chapter aims to show how many factors (value and otherwise) outside the expertise of medicine are involved in decisions made in medical contexts, and warns that medicine is too important to be left to doctors.

This book would be very useful in a survey course on medical ethics and sociology, especially, I think for the legal analyses. However, it would have to be supplemented with works containing more detailed philosophical analysis if that is a primary concern.

Unlike both McLean/Maher and Walton, Bayles has written a book which attempts to apply a particular ethical theory, a form of Brandt's Rule Utilitarianism, in which (roughly) the correct ethical rule is one which individuals with rational desires would approve for the society in which they live. Rational desires are ones that would withstand knowledge of all the facts and logic, and fulfillment of which would contribute something to *one's* life experience (5).

Two problems with this description of rational desires are that it seems to rule out the rationality of non-experiential goods (e.g., someone desiring that he have a good reputation after his death) and non-egoistic desires (i.e., wanting something solely because it will affect someone *else's* experience).

It is, in part, this view of rational desire that leads Bayles to argue in his chapter on contraception and conception that desires for offspring genetically related to oneself are irrational. There is no positive experience attached to there being such a genetic tie aside from the belief that it exists (13). In criticism of Bayles one might argue that the belief may be a source of happiness because the condition of genetic relatedness believed to exist is itself considered desirable, even though it isn't an *experiential* good. One might desire that something that has an important part in making one what one is, and what one's ancestors were, continue and play an important role in making someone else what he will be. Bayles believes that desires to bear and rear children need not be irrational because of the good experience involved. But, contrary to Bayles, part of the good of, e.g., bearing, may be nonexperiential: that one stood in the relation of being the one to nurture new life, whether one knew this was going on or not.

One of Bayles' principles is that freedom is a basic good, and so he defends the freedom to reproduce and not reproduce. It is odd, however, that Bayles (like McLean and Maher) fails to discuss any attacks on the right to reproduce, such as proposals for licensing parents. Bayles finds contraception and alternative means of conception — surrogate mothers, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination — permissible providing there is consent of parties involved, and providing the techniques do not endanger the health and welfare of the infant who will result.

Bayles' chapter on genetic choice and prenatal screening strongly opposes sex pre-selection as almost always sexist. But if one raises children in a sexist environment, would it then make sense to have girls first, since first born children are usually given more attention and encouragement? Bayles also importantly describes the use of genetic and prenatal screening for purposes other than aborting a defective fetus.

In his chapter on abortion, Bayles argues against the fetus' potential as a ground for its right to life, and for a right to life present in the seventh month of pregnancy. Prior to that point he thinks abortion is permissible, and after it only in extreme cases if the woman has been morally responsible for causing the pregnancy. Abortion may be compulsory in his view if the life of the infant would be significantly handicapped. Bayles condones intervention to prevent a pregnant woman from behaving in ways which may damage a new person (e.g., alcoholism) on the same grounds as prevention of child abuse. I believe that Bayles' position on abortion may fail to take account of the possibility that when actions which risk putting others' lives in jeopardy are carried out with reasonable precautions those responsible for endangering others would not be required to provide bodily support for their victims. If this is true, voluntary sex with safe contraception might relieve one of responsibility for supporting a fetus. Nor does Bayles consider the role that the fetus' not being worse off for living and dying may have in the permissibility of abortion. It may be that avoiding the deaths of even late fetuses should be treated differently from avoiding handicaps in such fetuses. This might also mean that people could enter pregnancies (because they wanted genetically related offspring) which had a very high probability of late fetal death, while they should not enter pregnancies with a high probability of a handicapped fetus surviving. (For more on this point see my article, 'The Problem of Abortion,' in *Ethics for Modern Life*, edited by R. Abelson and M. Friquenon [New York: St. Martin's Press 1982] second edition.)

In a chapter on childbirth, Bayles gives a very complete analysis of who should decide and how one should decide on the location and manner of birth, and in a chapter on defective newborns he offers an equally detailed analysis of who should and how one should decide on active and passive infanticide. In both chapters he is skeptical about the doctor's expertise giving her/him a right to make the decisions.

Bayles' final chapter is on possible future developments in reproductive technology. Like McLean and Maher, he is suspicious of medical experimentation done for its own sake, and wary of risking the welfare of new infants

who may be damaged by procedures such as cloning, repair of genetic material in live fetuses, the creation of new human types, and totally extra-uterine development. With respect to the latter, Bayles seems not to realize that those who think a basic cause of the inequality between the sexes is their different roles in reproduction may not find the use of some women as surrogate mothers (of which Bayles approves instead of extra-uterine development) as any more acceptable than freeing many women from housework by using some women as servants, rather than having men share equally in the tasks or using machines. (The importance of developing male contraceptive techniques so that these risks and burdens may be shared is another issue in this area Bayles neglects.)

Given his views on abortion, Bayles would prefer the destruction of pre-seven month fetuses to repair efforts on them, and he condones experimental use of the fetus, so long as it is killed before it gets a right to life. I suspect that perfecting people by genetic manipulation should not be as easily dismissed (especially by a Rule Utilitarian) as Bayles dismisses it. His opposition to sex-selection and genetic manipulation may stem from an overconfident position on the role of nurture (versus nature) in our development.

Bayles' book can certainly be recommended as a primary text in courses on reproductive ethics. Illustrative cases are discussed throughout, and there is an appendix of additional cases (some with the oddest conjunction of events since Victorian novels) with questions for discussion.

*Ethics of Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems* begins with a traditional overview of ethical theories, none of which Walton wholeheartedly endorses. He advocates ethical pluralism, and the dialectic of dialogue, as the method of arriving at mutual understanding and hopefully agreement.

The book proceeds to give a detailed description of the workings of an intensive care unit, and reviews prominent legal cases such as Quinlan and Saikewicz. Walton then argues for the distinction between death and vegetative states as reasons for terminating life support, and rejects anything but a whole brain death criterion, it being possible, he thinks, that consciousness might exist with only lower brain functioning. What is somewhat puzzling is that Walton does not equally emphasize that the possibility of consciousness should make us reluctant to label someone vegetative and therefore not worth life support.

Walton then proceeds to describe in detail cases which illustrate various ways in which to reach a decision about terminating intensive care. Each case presentation includes a summary of the patient's, relatives', and doctors' roles and views, a description of day-by-day changes in patient's medical status and doctor's prognosis, as well as definitions of the medical terms employed. This is followed by ethical analysis of the case. Cases in which the patient essentially decides are preceded by discussions of the notion of autonomy in both Kant's and Mill's sense. Cases in which the family is the major force in decision-making examines the notion of proxy and reasonable-person judgments. Cases in which the physician essentially makes the deci-

sion, are preceded by a discussion of paternalism and the role of the physician in providing expert information.

Standing fast to the value of the dialectic of dialogue, Walton sees patients as having the final say on whether treatment will continue, but as obliged to inform themselves of their condition and what they want done with them. The doctor, in Walton's view, is not merely a source of expert information; he or she may legitimately press his or her value-laden views on the ultimate disposition of the patient. Patient's and families who are at odds with doctors should enter into dialogue to find a mutually agreeable solution. Indeed, Walton thinks it is sometimes preferable for a doctor to make the final decision, if it will save a family from feelings of guilt. But why should a doctor's values delay a patient's decision, and should family's feelings be spared when it may be their responsibility to make a decision?

Walton reserves discussion of some theoretical distinctions for the last chapter of his book, an unwise decision I believe. He distinguishes, correctly I think, between a right to stop treatment and a right to commit suicide. He argues in favor of some moral distinction between intending death and foreseeing it on the grounds that a person who could not reasonably believe that death would not occur intends it, while someone who foresees it could reasonably believe that it might not occur. So, he says that it is unreasonable to believe that death will not occur when one shoots oneself in the head, but not unreasonable to believe it will not occur if Captain Oates walks out into a raging blizzard at the Pole. This seems untrue, and also irrelevant to a moral distinction between intention and foresight in cases in which it is not at all unreasonable to believe that an intended consequence will not occur.

Walton suggests a conceptual distinction between killing and letting die based not on action versus omission (since terminating treatment is action and he sees it as a case of letting die), but on whether we make something happen without relying on another power or release the latent agency in some other power and let it kill. These descriptions are not very clear, for removing a pin on a hand grenade seems like releasing latent agency, and if it results in death, it would be a killing. Would a case in which a stranger maliciously unplugs someone from a life-support system not be a killing? Would a case in which a doctor's terminating treatment for the good of a patient (suffering from an infection) causes the patient to have a heart attack be a killing or a letting die? Walton thinks the distinction between killing and letting die can have moral significance because when we kill we try to assure the death and show that we would do other acts to assure death, when we let die we are not ready to assure death. 'Let die,' he says, is compatible with 'let live,' 'kill' is not. But, I believe, sometimes not aiding will, in fact, assure death, and doing it only when it does so, indicates that we wish to assure death. Not being willing to do everything that is necessary to achieve our goal of assuring death does not mean that we do not have this goal. On the other hand, we may do an act that will kill, without either intending to assure or without in fact assuring death, and be unwilling to do another act that will

assure death. 'Let die,' if not construed as a 'success' verb may be compatible with 'let live,' but so may 'acting to kill.'

Walton's book can be recommended, I believe, for those who are interested in detailed study of many clinical cases, and in philosophical discussion at a moderately intense level.

FRANCES MYRNA KAMM  
New York University

---

CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE. *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. ix + 221. Cdn\$45.75, US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824703-6); US\$13.50 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824702-8).

*Sense and Content* deals with issues in the philosophy of mind, the theory of meaning, and the philosophy of psychology. It is organized as follows: Chapters 1 and 2 discuss some conceptual issues connected with the representational content of conscious experience. Chapter 3 attempts to answer the question 'What, minimally, is required for the possession of psychological states with spatial contents?' This question is deemed important, since it seems plausible to suppose that the capacity to undergo attitudes with spatial contents must be possessed by any being to whom we are willing to attribute psychological states. Chapters 4 through 6 are concerned with the exercise of observational concepts and of demonstrative and indexical thought about objects. Peacocke here presents an interesting treatment of demonstratives and he compares and contrasts his own views with those of Gareth Evans. Chapter 7 argues that, suitably revised, Russell's famous Principle of Acquaintance states an important and basic constraint on the ascription of psychological content. Finally, Chapter 8 presents an intermediate position between Dennett's instrumentalism with respect to folk psychology and Fodor's claim that propositional attitudes involve relations to sentences in an inner language of thought. This chapter is self-contained, and it can be read without first reading the preceding chapters.

Peacocke tells us that his aim has been to make the book intelligible to final year undergraduates specializing in philosophy. He also says that he hopes the work will be of interest to philosophically-minded psychologists. I think it unlikely that *Sense and Content* will be fully understood by more

than a handful of either undergraduates or psychologists. It is highly compressed, and it presupposes that the reader already has considerable philosophical sophistication and background in the relevant areas. Another general problem with the book is that many of the more interesting ideas are not fully developed. Still, there is much in *Sense and Content* that should be thought-provoking to professional philosophers working in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology, and I recommend the book to this audience.

For the remainder of this review, I want to comment very briefly on some of the ideas in Chapters 1 and 8. The main thrust of Chapter 1 is to argue that every perceptual experience has some sensational property. By a 'sensational property,' Peacocke means a property an experience has in virtue of some aspect, *other than* its representational content, of what it is like to have that experience. Peacocke argues for the view that all perceptual experiences have sensational properties by presenting examples of cases which pose difficulties for the opposing view that perceptual experiences of mature humans only have representational properties, that is, properties an experience has in virtue of features of its representational content. As Peacocke admits, it is not clear who holds this opposing view, which I shall call 'extreme representationalism.' But the distinction between sensational and representational properties is an important one, and there is room for much further discussion of this distinction in the philosophical literature.

One problem case Peacocke adduces in support of his view is this: suppose you are facing two trees, one a hundred yards from you, the other two hundred. These trees are on opposite sides of a road which stretches from you in a straight line to the horizon. Your visual experience represents these objects as being of the same physical dimensions. Yet, Peacocke claims, 'there is also some sense in which the nearer tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree' (12). Hence, Peacocke concludes, your experience has non-representational sensational properties.

It is not clear that this case is really a problem for extreme representationalism, at least as Peacocke conceives it. Let me explain. According to Peacocke, another way of saying that a visual experience represents physical objects in the environment of its subject as being so-and-so is to say that it visually appears to the subject that these objects are so-and-so. Given that this is the case, it can be argued that the nearer tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree in virtue of the representational content of your experience. For it certainly appears to you that if the more distant tree were moved in line with the nearer tree (while remaining the same distance away), then the latter would totally obscure the former.

A curious feature of Peacocke's discussion in Chapter 1 is that, despite several references to the work of psychologists, there is no mention of the important recent psychological theory of perceptual and imagistic representation developed by Stephen Kosslyn, Roger Shepard, and others. This much discussed theory, which has it that perceptual and imagistic representation are quasi-pictorial, lends weight to the line Peacocke wishes to defend. For if

perceptual experiences are identified with neural processes, then a distinction can be drawn, within the pictorialist theory, between the medium of perceptual representation and its representational content. This is because, on the pictorialist approach, the relevant neural processes and structures function as analogues of pictorial arrangements of blobs of paint. Thus, just as real pictures have both non-representational and representational descriptions (e.g., that they are sometimes painted in oils and that they are sometimes *of* buildings, say, respectively), so too do perceptual experiences.

Turning now to Chapter 8, I think that many philosophers of mind will find Peacocke's responses to Fodor's arguments for his 'language of thought' approach to commonsense propositional attitudes and other states discovered by cognitive psychology especially interesting. These responses seem to show that from the fact a psychological theory is both computational and representational, it does not *follow* that there exist quasi-linguistic mental representations. I myself have independently arrived at the same view. My line of argument is that talk of storage and retrieval of linguistic representations within cognitive psychology can be reconstructed adverbially so as to avoid reference to or quantification over such representations (See my *The Metaphysics of Mind* in preparation.) Peacocke's reasoning, however, is quite different, and the elementary model he constructs as an alternative to the 'language of thought' view is worthy of careful study.

MICHAEL TYE

Northern Illinois University

---

HILARY PUTNAM. *Raison, vérité et histoire*. Traduit par Alain Gershenfeld. (Collection 'Propositions'), Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1984. 244 p. 120 FF. ISBN 2-7073-0699-1.

C'est là la traduction de *Reason, Truth and History* paru à Cambridge University Press en 1981. Comme il le dit dans sa Préface, il s'agit pour Putnam de desserrer l'emprise qu'un certain nombre de dichotomies exercent sur la pensée philosophique. En fait, c'est le couple objectif-subjectif qu'il veut désunir, de l'épistémologie à la philosophie des sciences et de l'axiologie à l'éthique. Les paires qu'il dénoue ainsi sont la vérité — correspondance et la vérité-cohérence, le réalisme et l'anti-réalisme, fait et valeur, rationnel et irrationnel.

Le style de Putnam est à la fois analytique, direct et naïf. Il prend les problèmes à leur état brut et leur donne un tour sophistiqué sans que la démarche en soit alourdie. Il n'y a pas ou peu d'histoire dans ce livre, quelques citations et beaucoup de 'dialogue de la pensée,' même si Putnam veut supposer à la fin qu'il existe un concept-limite, *Grenzbegriff* de la vérité idéale au-delà du dialogue (244).

Le meilleur exemple de la manière de Putnam se trouve certainement dans la première moitié de son livre (11-117) où il discute longuement le problème de la référence s'appuyant sur le théorème de Löwenheim-Skolem, sur Wittgenstein et sur Quine. Putnam démontre que l'énoncé: 'Nous sommes des cerveaux dans une cuve' est faux, ssi nous sommes des cerveaux dans une cuve. Cette démonstration philosophique réfute la thèse référentialiste de la vérité-correspondance. Putnam montre aussi comment l'anarchisme épistémologique d'un Kuhn et d'un Feyerabend est 'auto-réfutant.'

Dans les derniers chapitres de l'ouvrage, Putnam développe ses vues sur la prégnance axiologique ou 'value-ladenness' des faits. Le texte est émaillé de remarques sur Foucault et l'irrationnel et sur Althusser et l'idéologie.

La traduction d'Alain Gershenfeld est bien faite et respecte le style familier et sans prétention de Putnam. Les quelques défauts typographiques de l'ouvrage ne déparent pas l'ensemble.

YVON GAUTHIER  
Université de Montréal

---

JAY F. ROSENBERG. *Thinking Clearly About Death*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1984. Pp. xv + 235. US\$18.70. ISBN 0-13-917559-8.

This book is a highly analytical treatment of the concept of death and related issues. It begins with a study of the classical metaphysical questions of life after death and goes on to analyze the language of bodies and minds. Then it moves from a discussion of death and personhood to several ethical questions related to death and dying that have been the subject of much recent work in medical ethics — these topics include mercy killing, letting die, rational suicide, and attitudes towards death. Even so, the book is emphatically not a textbook or treatise on medical ethics. It is really a linguistic-metaphysical analysis directed mainly to philosophical colleagues, although it could possibly be used in any advanced undergraduate or graduate courses that might have enough content on the topic of death, and where a linguistic or analytical approach would be appropriate and welcome.

What this book sets out to do, it does very well. The argumentation

throughout is carefully reasoned, clearly expressed, and judiciously structured. What the book does not set out to do, namely to confront the real, emotionally significant questions that most (student or non-professional) readers are likely to have about death and dying, could mean disappointment. So the important thing here for a potential reader is not to take this book for something it is not meant to be. That said, it is gratifying to see that some careful analytical philosophy can help to clarify some of the fuzzy thinking on this topic, and thereby treat some of the basic problems with greater philosophical depth than is usual. For it remains true that the basic concepts of 'person,' 'potential person,' and the like, that have figured so pivotally in the recent disputes on abortion and euthanasia, still conspicuously lack a clear or consolidated analysis as philosophical notions, at any satisfactory depth.

According to Rosenberg (116), the concept of person is inherently ambiguous, and we need to distinguish three ideas: (1) the concept of an animal belonging to the biological species *homo sapiens*, (2) the functional concept of an entity with performance concepts of reasoning, purposive action, etc., (3) the moral concept of a being with rights and obligations with respect to others. The problem is to sort out the kinds of relations each of these concepts has to an entity in such a way that we call that entity a person.

For example, although a child, an unconscious person, or a severely retarded person lacks property (2) at a particular time, we still say that such an individual is a person. No doubt this is partly related to (1) and (3), but it may also be connected to the supposition that such an individual bears certain relationships to (2). Sorting out these relationships in relation to the concept of death is the subject of much of Rosenberg's work.

The main strength and weakness of Rosenberg's book is its determined linguistic subtlety and fine-grained analysis of nice philosophical distinctions. This approach is a strong advantage if analytical discrimination amongst imaginative, hypothetical possibilities is what you are looking for. On the other hand, this type of approach will be often frustrating and annoying, and to a large degree ultimately unhelpful to those who seek understanding of the very real problems faced by all of us in our daily confrontation of the sorts of situations we encounter in hospitals or in our personal experiences.

In an epilogue (213 f.), Rosenberg himself admits that his book will probably have been a disappointment to the typical reader who expects deep philosophical insights or 'spiritual realities.' What the reader gets instead, as Rosenberg concedes (213), is 'page after page of language lessons and logical gymnastics.' However, Rosenberg is not apologetic about taxing some readers' patience in taking them through a 'jungle of logical consequences,' for he sees his project as his title clearly indicates — the task of thinking clearly about death. And while it is true that the topic of death strikes to the depths of human feeling, Rosenberg reminds us that there is a difference between thinking and feeling.

As medical ethics has shifted away to some extent from the 'mortal dilem-

mas' of death and dying that originally inspired wide interest in the area, there has been a trend toward a more detailed study of particular problems of decision-making that may not be immediate decisions of life or death. This trend has been salutary and natural, but to some extent we philosophers may be open to criticism for not getting to the deeper roots of basic concepts of life and death. Rosenberg's book offsets that trend, and is a valuable contribution towards giving biomedical ethics studies greater metaphysical depth on the topics he discusses.

DOUGLAS N. WALTON  
University of Winnipeg

---

RAMAN SELDEN. *Criticism and Objectivity*. Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin 1984. Pp. vi + 170. US\$19.50. ISBN 0-04-800023-X.

Selden shows a remarkable range in *Criticism and Objectivity*; he considers sympathetically critical theory and practice ranging from Anglo-American text-oriented critics and Russian formalists to contemporary post-structuralists. Selden's own position seems to owe most to the Marxism of Louis Althusser, but it is developed in a constructive dialectic with the alternative positions. It is no small achievement in itself to engage post-structuralism constructively in this way.

Selden develops a defense of objectivity in critical theory, but it is an objectivity which is tied to an historical framework. The objectivity of scientific positivism he calls a 'curious dinosaur.' At one extreme he sees the post-structuralists for whom reading is always misreading and any metalanguage is impossible. At the other, there is the formalism of Anglo-American autotelic texts. Between the horns of this dilemma, Selden proposes to slip a modified Marxist historicism; he explains, 'I am proposing an objectivist position which recognizes, on the one hand, the multivalence of discourse and, on the other, the validity of metalingual operations' (9). On his view, texts are 'overdetermined'; the critic must take account of both the conditions of production and the conditions of reception which are located in history.

Selden draws upon Thomas Kuhn's discussions of the shifts in scientific paradigms to argue that 'knowledge is more like a mode of production than a mirror reflection' (35). From Althusser he takes the argument that individuals are constituted as subjects by ideology, and this combines to produce a view of scientific discourse which relates change to ideology and history. Thus one is led to a new dialectic between the historical developments which define the subject and the claims of knowledge which are 'subjectless.' This makes possible a history of the innovative moments of history itself.

Literary criticism requires an account of the conditions of production of a 'decentered' text. The objectivity of criticism depends on the historical conjunctures which can be discovered for a text. The historical conjunctures and the history of production act as limiting features on the plurality of readings, not by restricting reader-reception but by establishing the possibilities which will count as a dialectical engagement of the text. Confronted with a particular example (the multiple 'readings' of a Degas Painting), Selden writes:

Certain contradictions (between mimetic and formal values, and between scientific and subjective values) are not simply arbitrary, ahistorical dichotomies which may be imposed at will by critics; they are distinctions inscribed within the historical conjuncture, which make up the work's conditions of production. From this perspective, if we examined the various actual and possible readings of the work, some would be derived to a greater extent than others from the determinate set of conditions of production; some would reinscribe the work's textual space in a more violently reductive way than others. (89)

Here Selden is objecting to what he considers an a-historical intertextuality in post-structuralism. Texts are not underdetermined so that the reader 'writes' the text but overdetermined so that multiple readings are always possible. We have neither the centered structure of an autonomous text nor the a-historical chaos of semiotic codes. Selden concludes:

The approach I am suggesting begins by proposing the need for a critical labour whose task is to produce the knowledge of a text's conditions of production. This knowledge will enable us to distinguish those readings which are produced from determinate historical conditions (biographical, intertextual, socio-economic, ideological), and those which 'force' the text against the grain of history. This does not entail the assumption of a single correct meaning... . The knowledge being proposed is not of the text's meaning, but of the conditions of its meaning. (114)

Objectivity thus results from the ability to distinguish between readings which are produced by the text's possibilities, understood historically as conditions of production, and readings which are 'forced' against those possibilities. This is a sense of objectivity which depends on being able to distinguish history from other theoretical structures and which denies the priority of reader-reception when it comes to the determination of historical 'conjunctures.' The subject must be defined in relation to this historical objectivity, therefore, and not the other way around.

In a book which ranges as widely as this one, there must always be questions of interpretation when one considers particular writers and traditions. I suspect that these might arise in almost every case over matters of detail. For example, Selden finds in R.G. Collingwood a 'refutation' of Oxford 'realists' on the question of the truth and falsity of linguistic propositions. I doubt that Collingwood's notion of 'proposition' really engages the issue, or that Collingwood's historical methodology leads in the direction Selden thinks it

does. Similarly, I would tend to associate Samuel Beckett more closely with Sartre than Selden seems to. But these are quibbles which, in a way, illustrate Selden's point, for they can be seen as questions about the proper historical conjuncture for these texts.

A more serious question would concern whether Selden has succeeded in establishing the independence of the Marxist analysis of history which he requires. One might ask whether there are conditions of production for the conditions of reception of texts. If there are, the enterprise will either collapse back into an historical determinism, or it seems open to a vicious regress. If there are not, then the post-structuralists seem to be correct in claiming that one cannot escape the reader's position. The conditions of reception seem to 'deconstruct' the determinate text which is produced by the conditions of production and the historical conjuncture with a reader.

Nevertheless, whatever doubts this book may engender, it is an exciting and provocative engagement of the issues which deserves careful attention. It will be particularly interesting to see if the compressed arguments here can be expanded to provide both critical theory (to the extent that 'theory' remains possible) and critical practice.

DABNEY TOWNSEND  
University of Texas at Arlington

---

BERNARD SEMMEL. *John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 212. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-300-03006-1.

Semmel begins by confessing that he has learned much about Mill and his thought by using the method of analysis, but that in the present work he has adopted instead the approach of an historian of ideas. And although there are, as he acknowledges, strongly divergent views on several topics central to Mill's thought, he has intentionally played the role of a conciliator by taking a middle ground.

A recurrent and dominant theme throughout the book is that Mill shared an ambivalent faith in both free will and determinism, positions which Semmel believes are inconsistent with one another. The conflict between the two, he further claims, profoundly marked Mill's life and thought riddling them both with a radical inconsistency. But in fact he gives little reason for believing that the doctrines are indeed inconsistent. There is no more than a passing and unsupported remark to that effect taken from Whitehead's

*Science and the Modern World*. Nor does he present any evidence to show that Mill's life or career were themselves marred by that supposed inconsistency.

To be sure, in his earlier years Mill was under what he called the 'awful shadow' of necessity, which he despaired of reconciling with his own deep commitment to the doctrine of free will. But in a letter to a Unitarian minister, quoted by Semmel, he says of the doctrine of necessity that he has since 'got from under it.' How he did so may be inferred from a passage in his *Logic* which is also quoted by Semmel. Necessity is there said to be a simple invariability of sequence, and as such can imply no mysterious compulsion. It would seem therefore that on the free will-necessity issue at least, Mill would repudiate Semmel's inconsistency claim in favour of the middle ground of compatibilism.

The topic of freedom and necessity is the main theme of the first chapter of Semmel's book and again of the fifth. In the second chapter he presents Mill's views on female emancipation and the equality of the sexes. Consistent with the history of ideas approach, Semmel gives the historical background of these ideas as found in the writings and activities of the Saint-Simonians and of Comte and his followers. These activities took a rather bizarre turn when some members of the Saint-Simonian faction set off for the Near East in search of the female messiah who, they were convinced, would be found in a Turkish harem! Their expectation was that she would reveal a new moral law regulating the relations between the sexes.

The third chapter is concerned with Mill's views and activities in the political arena. Semmel expounds at length upon Mill's 'Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy' in order to draw attention to some of the central points of philosophical difference between Bentham and Mill. The outcome is that he charges Bentham with being oblivious to virtue and commends Mill for promoting the practice of virtue as an end in itself. Mill's evident concern for the public interest throws some light on his otherwise puzzling positions on such matters as the death penalty and the secret ballot.

In the fourth chapter Semmel examines views held by prominent nineteenth century historians and philosophers of history on such matters as historical determinism and the role of the individual in history. The writings of Comte, Tocqueville and Buckle receive most attention. The latter admired Mill greatly and believed he had followed Mill's philosophical and methodological ideas in his *A History of Civilization in England*. Mill's extensive correspondence with these authors, quoted by Semmel, shows that he found some things to admire in their writings but that he also had significant criticisms and qualifications to offer.

In the fifth and final chapter Semmel reverts to the topic mentioned in the book's title. He demonstrates by means of abundant quotations how Mill reasoned his way 'from accepting pleasure as the greatest good to erecting a virtue that transcended the lower pleasures and became the most important element of happiness.'

Throughout the book Semmel demonstrates great familiarity with the

body of Mill's writings, and he eminently possesses the organizational ability to draw this material together and to present it in a coherent manner. But I do have a reservation to make about the entire enterprise and it is a rather serious one. I suspect that a reader with even a modest familiarity with Mill's career and philosophy will find little, if anything, that might occasion a fresh perspective or deeper understanding of specific issues. To be sure, such a reader may have been unfamiliar with some of the more minor figures and topics that play their part in Mill's deliberations, but their contribution to a fuller understanding of Mill are not shown to be more than minimal at best. What one misses most throughout the book is a sensitivity to the strictly philosophical aspects of Mill's thought. And on this matter it is regrettable that Semmel has not adopted the more analytic and critical approach he renounced in the preface.

W. HUGGETT  
University of Toronto

---

PETER UNGER. *Philosophical Relativity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. x + 132. US\$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1233-1); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1235-8).

Though difficult to reconcile with philosophy's practice of seeking *truth*, its history invites the suspicion that philosophical problems lack objectively *correct* solutions — a hypothesis Unger asks us to consider seriously in his *Philosophical Relativity*. With a delightful lack of dogmatism, Unger conjectures that the philosophical relativity of a class of problems is due to a conjectured semantic relativity of the crucial terms, and in broad outline his conjectures are the following.

Everything between the utterance of sounds and the effect achieved on the listener's thought and behavior are explanatory posits. Clearly, in the context of choosing a croquet field, the utterance 'The field is flat' brings about the listeners' thought that the field is as good as any in terms of being flat (enough) for playing croquet at their level of ability. The explanation of this effect can be parsed in two ways: (a) The semantic meaning of 'The field is flat' is context sensitive so that the words in the context literally meant something like: according to the contextually relevant standard, the field is sufficiently close to being such that nothing could ever be flatter. The psychological explanation of the acquired belief would simply be the listener accepting the statement asserted by the utterance. (b) The semantic meaning

of 'The field is flat' is: the field is absolutely flat so that nothing could be flatter. The psychological explanation of the acquired belief might involve the following unconscious reasoning: since the utterer can be presumed to be making a relevant conversational contribution which expressed his belief, he means to convey that the field is sufficiently flat for the purpose at hand. The contextualist's parsing (a) involves a complex semantics and a simple psychology while invariantist's parsing (b) has a simple semantics and a complex psychology or pragmatics.

The bulk of the book argues that there are no objective grounds for choosing between (a) and (b). For example, though (a) appeals to common sense by making most of our statements true, this only relates to proposed explanatory properties of posited entities and not to the objective facts — the utterance and the listener's acquired belief; furthermore, this 'extra-theoretical' advantage of (a) is partially offset by the plausibility of (b)'s view that the meaning of terms and the truth of utterances are independent of the interests at hand. The suggested conclusion is that 'This is flat' has no determinate meaning and is neither true nor false. If we think otherwise, that may be because we (falsely) believe that 'This is flat' expresses our belief — hence, the faulty impression that 'flat' determinately applies to fields like this.

The move from semantic to philosophical relativity can be exemplified by supposing that we know only if we can rule out relevant competitors. For typical uses of 'know,' the meanings assigned by the contextualist and the invariantist differ on a small or large set of competitors and low or high standards for ruling them out; for example, the invariantist, unlike the contextualist, counts the Cartesian demon hypothesis as a competitor. Do we know? There is no objectively correct answer because there is no objectively correct choice between the invariant or contextual semantics for 'know.' Thus we have philosophical relativity: it would be a matter of *convention*, and hence, a departure from established usage, to opt for common sense or skepticism, and neither convention will conflict with any objective facts. Unger offers similar diagnoses for 'Are we free?' and a few other puzzles.

*Philosophical Relativity* is rich in its suggestions, refreshingly adventuresome, and a delight to read. Though provocative in intent, *arguing* with Unger would miss the spirit of his open minded investigation of possibilities. Still, several worries might be expressed, and let me briefly pursue one. To start, notice that semantic relativity has plausibility only as a localized phenomenon: A coherent claim of a term's semantic relativity seems to require terms in the neighboring regions having determinate meanings. Claiming the semantic relativity of 'flat' involves substantiating alternative hypotheses of the objective data — viz., a current utterance of 'It's flat' resulting in the hearer's beliefs that the field is flat enough for the purpose at hand (which he falsely believes can be expressed by 'It's flat'). Thus, the coherence of the relativity claim requires the neighboring term 'flat enough for the purpose at hand' having a determinate meaning (at least in the context at hand) — i.e., the semantic relativity of a term requires a non-relativistic basis. Near the end, Unger notes that though the claim of relativity seems to

need invariant terms for its expression, only contextual terms may be available. Whether or not this problem of an independent semantic basis can be dispelled and contextual terms be relied upon, it's clear that a *non-relativistic* basis is needed for a coherent statement of relativity.

Given that semantic relativity is localized in the way indicated, one wonders if it's sufficient to sustain philosophical relativity of an interesting sort. Though flat fields occasion less interest than knowledge, the structure of Unger's diagnosis should be the same in both cases. So, let's abandon the indeterminate 'Are there flat fields?' and convene 'flat<sub>c</sub>' to mean the indexical but invariant 'flat enough for the purpose at hand' and 'flat<sub>i</sub>' to mean 'absolutely flat.' Whatever puzzles the original question posed seem completely dissolved by saying: though there are no flat<sub>i</sub> fields, there are plenty of flat<sub>c</sub> fields. Two conditions seem to account for this: (1) The existence claim using the new *c*-expression captures the common sense view which we mistakenly thought could be expressed by the indeterminate 'flat.' (2) By and large it is unproblematic whether the new *c*-expression applies in given cases. Somehow we suspect that the problem of knowledge cannot be similarly dissolved. Suppose we convene 'know<sub>c</sub>' to mean: can rule out competitors which are relevant for the purpose at hand. This seems to satisfy (1). But is (2) clearly satisfied? Is it straightforwardly unproblematic that the demon hypothesis is irrelevant to the purpose at hand? If not, relativity may break out at the convened level. Suppose we convene 'know<sub>c</sub>' to mean: can rule out competitors which we take seriously in determining our actions in contexts of this sort. The demon hypothesis is now unproblematically irrelevant, but is (1) satisfied? To capture the common sense view, mustn't the convened *c*-expression distance itself from the carelessness and inattention Hume recommended as the remedy for skepticism?

If there is no coherent common sense view which we mistakenly thought could be expressed by 'know,' this signals an outright victory for skepticism, not philosophical relativity. Hence, the worry that any *c*-convened 'know'-expression satisfying (1) may fail to satisfy (2) and signal the absence of a non-relativistic basis. Of course there may be better *c*-convened 'know'-expressions than the meager two considered, and Unger takes finding such conventions to be a task of relativistic philosophy. But one worries about the prospects given the strong suspicion that the problem of knowledge isn't going to dissolve like the problem of flat fields. If there should be an ineliminably deep rooted relativity, should we try to make sense of it or treat it as a reductio and admit that the problem of knowledge is after all a non-relativistic one which is insoluble or soluble only in the skeptic's favor? It should be clear that if my worry is well placed, we would be faced with unpleasant choices.

FRANCIS W. DAUER  
University of California at Santa Barbara

#### SUSTAINING SUBSCRIPTIONS

Any person or institution wishing to give substantial support to C.P.R./R.C.C.P. may become a Sustaining Subscriber by payment of \$75.00 or more per volume. The following have purchased Sustaining Subscriptions, and C.P.R./R.C.C.P. is extremely grateful for their support:

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta  
Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge  
Department of Philosophy, University of New  
Brunswick  
Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa  
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto  
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria  
Department of Philosophy, University of  
Western Ontario

#### ABONNEMENTS DE SOUTIEN

Toute personne ou institution qui désire contribuer substantiellement à C.P.R./R.C.C.P. peut obtenir un abonnement de soutien en payant \$75.00 ou plus pour un volume. Les institutions suivantes ont pris un abonnement de soutien, et C.P.R./R.C.C.P. leur en est très reconnaissant:

Département de Philosophie, Université d'Ottawa  
Département de Philosophie,  
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières