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SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. XXIII, 1985. Individual copies $5.00. Free with each $10.00 annual subscription to THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152, U.S.A.

HENRY ALLISON, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense.* New Haven: Yale University Press 1983. Pp ix + 389. US $32.50. ISBN 0-300-03002-9.

Lewis White Beck's comment on the dustcover says (correctly) that Henry Allison's new book is 'the most comprehensive and substantial study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* written by any American philosopher.' This reminds us that as it happens the other large scale English works on this topic have been by other than Americans: Caird, Kemp Smith, Paton, Dryer, Jonathan Bennett. Certain other big works by Americans are more limited in topics taken up (Wolff, Melnick), and other English-language works reflect their authors' philosophical agendas as much as Kant's (Sellars, Strawson, and a work on Kant's ethics that does the same thing is W.D. Ross's *Kant's Ethical Theory*).

The work is not quite a commentary, for it does not faithfully discuss every passage, in the order Kant wrote it, though it does discuss nearly every major part of the first *Critique.* (Not discussed are the 'Ideal of Pure Reason,' the second and fourth antinomies, the first edition Transdencental Deduction, and Kant's philosophy of mathematics.) It can, however, be said to offer an interpretation of the point-of-view and argument of the first *Critique* as a whole. Nor are the parts of Kant's work discussed in their order in Kant's text. They are rather rearranged in a topical order for the purposes of Allison's own exposition.

The work is mostly interpretive, offering a critical account of Kant's arguments and his views, frequently together with a defense of those arguments and views against criticisms that have been advanced by other interpreters. This is in keeping with the book's subtitle: 'An Interpretation and Defense.'

However, that title and its subtitle, together with Part One, entitled 'The Nature of Transcendental Idealism,' might suggest another sort of book. The suggestion might be that Allison aims to defend Kant's special version of idealism as a viable philosophical view. This is suggested, for example, by his statement (3) 'Unlike most writers on Kant, I take much of the *Critique* to be not only "interesting" or to "contain more of value than is sometimes supposed," but to be philosophically defensible.' Reading all this one might think that Allison aims to revive some of the debates concerning idealism from around 80 years ago, by offering the sort of defense that would soon take him beyond any discussion of specifically Kantian views. But in fact

Allison's main undertaking is interpretive, and the defenses he offers are against the criticisms of other interpreters. Even the announced topic of transcendental idealism, which, Allison tells, us, is thematically to bind together the book, is close to the surface of discussion only in Chapters 1-3, 14 and 15, and to a lesser extent in 11, 12, and 13. (I say 'close to the surface of discussion' because Kant's idealism does affect his discussion of every topic in the first *Critique;* but'idealism as a theme in Kant's philosophy' is only intermittently a theme of Allison's book.)

These comments are not intended as criticisms of this new book. Considered as an interpretation of the main themes and arguments of Kant's first *Critique,* it is excellent, insightful, and ultimately a significant accomplishment. A broad range of the other secondary literature on the *Critique* is discussed and evaluated, including some of the French and German literature, and a broad range of other work by Kant is brought into the discussion as relevant, including a number of very useful discussions of some of Kant's 'Reflexionen' (unpublished notes, some of considerable length and continuity), which Allison sometimes uses to throw light on troubling passages in the *Critique.* The broad range of scholarship evidenced in the book is quite impressive, but even more impressive are the insightful and useful interpretations that emerge from his critical and analytical discussions of Kantian themes, arguments, and texts.

Part I considers the theme announced by the book's title: Allison indicates that his main interpretive targets — the authors who in his view direct mistaken criticisms at Kant — are Prichard and Strawson, both of whom regard Kant as something like a Berkeleyian idealist or subjectivist, and criticize him as such. Chapter 3 in Part one considers the Antinomies section of the *Critique* in relation to one of its announced aims: as a proof for Transcendental Idealism. This aspect of the Antinomies has not been much discussed, and Allison's results are revealing.

Part II, entitled 'Human Knowledge and its Conditions,' includes Chapters 4, 5, and 6. After an introductory Chapter 4, Chapter 5 discusses the doctrines of the Aesthetic. Allison argues (not entirely correctly in my view) that the mathematical basis of the Kantian doctrine of space and time is of secondary importance (98-102). By way of making good on this claim, Allison does have a quite interesting and penetrating discussion of Kant's other arguments for his view, especially the anti-Leibnizian and anti-Newtonian ones, making more of them than I had previously thought possible. Chapter 6 concerns the Metaphysical Deduction, and Kant's rationale for basing the table of categories on the table of the logical forms of judgment, another useful discussion.

Part III, entitled 'Categories, Schemata, and Experience,' includes Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10. Chapter 7 focuses on the second edition Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, which in Allison's view makes Kant's intentions clearer than the first edition discussion did. Chapter 8 is on the Schematism, followed by discussions of the First and Second Analogies in Chapters 9 and 10. On p. 180 (in Chapter 8) Allision tells us that 'a

transcendental schema is to be construed as a pure intuition.' I find this interpretation somewhat unclear, and there seem to be some difficulties with it: (1) It is better to say that schemata are determinations of pure intuition. (Analogously, the propositions of geometry are not based on the nature of a priori intuitions, but rather on constructions in a priori intuition.) (2) Schemata are not a priori intuitions but are rather rules used to specify determinations of a priori intuitions. (Analogously, Kant says concerning empirical schemata that they are not images, but rather are rules for generating images.) However, Allison makes little or no direct use of his interpretation of schemata, so even if his interpretation is incorrect, it does not affect the rest of his argument.

The final part, Part IV, entitled 'The Phenomenal, the Noumenal, and the Self,' contains Chapters 11-15. To me this part of the book was one of the strongest and best. The five chapters of this part take up a connected set of distinctions that are very important to Kant, though their importance is often below the surface. Chapter 11 discusses Kant's views on the thing in itself, and on whether and in what way it affects us when we perceive objects. Chapter 12 is on Kant's views on self-knowledge, the phenomenal self, and inner sense, centering on the doctrine that we know ourselves only as appearances, and the related distinction between inner sense and apperception. Chapter 13 continues discussing the topics of Chaper 12, but now in relation to Kant's second edition Paralogisms, which contain Kant's criticism of Descartes and other rationalist psychologists. Chapter 14 continues these same topics by discussing the refutation of idealism that Kant added to the second edition of the *Critique*. Chapter 15, though in a sense not necessary to complete the interpretive story that has already been told in this part, continues the discussion of the nature of the self in Kant by offering an interpretation of Kant's views on human freedom as they are presented in the first *Critique.* (Allison thinks that the later critical works on ethics present new views that kant had not yet worked out at the time he wrote the relevant passages of the first *Critique.)*

In sum, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* is an important new book interpreting the first *Critique;* a book that is very impressive for its breadth of scholarship, the broad range of interpretive issues discussed, and the penetration and insight those discussions provide.

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DAVID BLOOR. *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge.* Pp. xii + 213. New York: Columbia University Press 1983. US$25.00 (Cloth: ISBN 0-231-05800-4); US$12.00 (paper: ISBN 0-231-05801-2).

The greatness of great philosophers, like that of great works of art, may have something to do with the extent to which their though can admit of more than one interpretation and suggest developments in a number of directions. Different strands of though may be taken up by others and developed for their own purposes. Thus it may be as much a mistake to assume that there must be a definitive interpretation of a great philosopher's thought as it is to look for the definitive interpretation of a great work of art. In this respect philosophy may be closer to art than it is to science. Nevertheless while admitting all of this there remain questions about how far one can go in appropriating the work of a philosopher and claiming him as an authority whilst at the same time ignoring the clearly stated intentions of that philosopher. This issue is raised by David Bloor's book, not as its main theme to be sure, but nonetheless explicitly.

Bloor sets out to trace a theme in Wittgenstein's work, what he calls his social (sometimes 'sociological') and naturalistic treatment of knowledge. He is concerned here to emphasise the relation between language and activity which is undoubtedly central in Wittgenstein's work. Bloor's claim is that the full potential of these ideas has been neglected by Wittgenstein and his followers. Once so developed, along suitably empirical lines however, Wittgenstein's theme will yield a 'systematic theory of language games.' Hitherto Wittgenstein and his followers have failed to provide any adequate account (or even an inadequate one) of the variations in language games: Wittgenstein offers 'the dimensions along which forms of life will vary.... But neither he, nor his followers, have ever given us a comparative framework within which their variations can be understood and laws traced' (137).

Why anyone should want to produce such a framework is never clearly explained. Bloor does not provide any argument for what must be an assumption: that we do not have an adequate understanding of language games *because* we lack this sort of framework and thus a set of laws which will provide an explanation. One might ask here what language game is being played such that this is the concept of explanation at work. The answer seems to be social science or at least one conception of it. Wittgentein, it will turn out, must be developed through sociology. This is what Bloor seems to mean when he asserts that what we need here is an empirical study as opposed to the 'fictitious natural history' and 'imaginary ethnography' which Wittgenstein's own examples offer us.

What is most striking about this enterprise is that it is just the sort of thing against which Wittgenstein warns us. It suggests an attempt to make language systematic, to provide a set pattern for it — an attempt which will in the end distort language. It does not alter the case that this is supposed to be a social pattern rather than the logical ones against which Wittgenstein argues.

This empirical investigation of language games is to be something more than the consideration of particular examples. Bloor could hardly deny that Wittgenstein and his followers have made use of examples, although he discusses only a very limited range of the philosophical literature which has most obviously been influenced by Wittgenstein. Malcolm on dreaming, Melden on action and Winch on social science are discussed in some detail and held not to be the true heirs of Wittgenstein. These writers have offered only 'a dichotomy between the language games of science and the language games of everyday, social interaction. Even that was formulated with dubious accuracy and had little more than polemical significance' (147). This, we are told, is borne out by Malcolm's use of rhetoric. Bloor makes no mention of the influence which Wittgenstein's work has had in the philosophy of religion; but perhaps he thinks that philosophers who have written on these matters are so full of rhetoric as to be unworthy of mention. At any rate he does not show why a comparison of the language games of e.g., science, religion, morals cannot be conducted without this 'comparative framework'; yet this is just what some philosophers have been doing for some time. The answer must be that they are not 'systematic' enough.

The key to the systematic study of language games comes in the seventh chapter, after the tracing out of the social themes in Wittgenstein's work; in particular through the psychology, mathematics and logic to be found in the later writings. Bloor provides some examples to illustrate Wittgenstein's points, or perhaps to 'prove' them. This account is not unfamiliar, and does bring together the different aspects of his thought in a coherent way. From this account he takes the idea of language games, forms of life and family resemblances as central to his further development. The elements of the comparative framework come not from Wittgenstein but from the anthropologist Mary Douglas. Douglas distinguishes four ways in which we may respond to anomalies: indifference, exclusion, accomodation and opportunism. So 'just as a consistent policy of responding to strangers would create a recognisable social style, so a consistent policy of responding to anomaly will stamp a characteristic physiognomy on a language game' (140). It is not clear what Bloor considers to be the analogues of the way strangers might be treated when it comes to language games. That is, it is not clear which features of language are up for classification here. Is he concerned with the criteria for truth and falsity, or with ways of distinguising between the intelligible and the unintelligible, for instance?

How far are borderline cases to be seen as strangers? None of this is very clear, but Bloor claims that if 'there are only about four different ways of responding to anomaly, and if this is a deep property of a belief system, then there ought to be about four basic kinds of language game' (140). This seems remarkably optimistic since language games may treat anomalies, whatever they are, in more than one way. So e.g., heretics may be prayed for, argued with, burned at the stake, excommunicated — much may depend on the kind of heretic or stranger one is dealing with. Similarly in language there may be different kinds of borderline case. The more this fourfold 'typology of forms

of life' is unfolded the greater one's suspicion is that it does no more than redefine what is to count as a language game. Language is made to fit a pattern once more, and we have come a very long way from Wittgenstein.

Bloor in no way denies this: he does not claim to be simply offering an account of Wittgenstein, but to be developing his thought along empirical lines; and there is the suggestion that this is the *proper* way to develop it. He makes no claim to know whether his 'reading' of Wittgenstein 'makes him seem more consistent than other possible readings' (4), but recognises that his development might be seen as misguided and distorting. Bloor sweeps aside such suggestions; Wittgenstein's own views on this are referred to in one place as prejudices. As for the rest, their objections are seen as a response to a threat: 'The probability of such a response is high because delicate questions of ownership and territoriality are involved. If I am right, the competences to develop Wittgenstein's work do not belong solely, or even primarily, to philosophers. But it would be sad if philosophers were to conceive their professional interests in this narrow and unimaginative way' (184). This would not be the first time that philosophers have been advised to apprentice themselves to another discipline which can do a better job than they can; but before they rush off to do so they might do well to reflect on Wittgenstein's own image of language: 'Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses' (P I.18). Who would suppose that in such an ancient city there are only four styles of architecture?

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TOM BOTTOMORE, ed., *Modern Interpretations of Marx.* Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press 1981. Pp. 218. Cdn$17.50. ISBN 0-631-12708-9.

In his introduction Bottomore defines the problematic that unites these selections from the works of thirteen major Marxists: whether Marx's theoretical framework is best interpreted as a social science, a philosophical system, or both. Certain of the selections, such as Bottomore's original translation from

Hilferding's *Das Historische Problem,* pose this question in terms of epistemology and metaphysics. In this context, the assertion that Marxism is a science rather than a philosophy emerges as a denial of the mechanistic and categorical interpretations of historical materialism that were common especially in the early part of this century. Both Bottomore's introduction and the selections he has chosen, however, make it clear that he conceives the problem primarily in terms of an opposition between facts and values, between Marxism understood as a theoretical analysis of the way capitalist society is, on the one hand, and an articulation of a conception of human nature and social vision to guide action toward the way society ought to be, on the other.

A few of the selections, such as Bottomore's translation of a passage from Lucien Goldmann's *Marxisme et sciences humanies,* or the selection from Gramsci's criticism of Bukharin in the *Prison Notebooks,* take the position that the unity of theory and practice entails for Marxism the impossibility of separating factual and normative issues. Goldmann in particular claims that Marx's use of dialectical thinking implies a denial of the distinction between subject and object upon which the positivist separation of facts from values is based.

Most of the selections, however, exemplify an interpretation of Marxism either as a normative philosophical theory or a positive social theory, or at least, as in the case of the selection from Wellmer's *Critical Theory of Society,* assert a clear separation between the two approaches. Interpretation of Marxism as a normative theory is represented primarily in this volume by three Eastern European exiles, Petrović, Stojanović and Heller. Petrović articulates an understanding of the concept of human praxis as the self-creative activity of free conscious beings that he sees underlying Marx's theory of alienation. Heller asserts an ideal of social, as distinct from material, needs she sees projected in a Marxist vision of the good society. Stojanović lays out a more concrete programme for a Marxist ethics. He asserts that concepts like alienation, freedom, abolition of exploitation, disappearance of social classes, and the withering away of the state can serve as the starting point of a Marxist ethics that has yet to be developed.

Bottomore claims that of the two strands of Marxism he brings together in the volume, 'the most important work of the past two decades has been produced in an intellectual context which emphasizes the idea of Marxism as a social science' (16). Selections from Althusser's *Reading Capital* and Godelier's *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology* assert a clear rejection of 'humanist' interpretations of Marxism, and articulate a scientific program. The rest of the selections are less polemical, and simply address some particular issue of social analysis.

These focus in one way or another on the nature of the state and its intimate connection with economic life in contemporary capitalism. A selection from Desai, *Marxian Economics,* analyzes with unusual clarity the problems involved in applying the classical Marxian theory of capitalism to contemporary monopoly capitalism. He argues that the assumed separation be-

tween political and economic spheres is a major stumbling block to this effort. The excerpt from Poulantzas' *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* contains a similar line of thought. It argues that political and ideological relations, especially insofar as they are materialized in actions and institutions, are part of the determination of class structures. In this way he, along with most other major Marxian social theorists of recent years, rejects the crude formulation of the distinction between economic 'base' and political and ideological 'superstructure' typical of some interpretation of Marxism. Habermas' essay on 'Science and Technology and Ideology' stands in the volume as another example of social scientific analysis of contemporary society arguing that the state has become a crucial agent in the economy. For the first time in history, he argues, moreover, this state is legitimated not by normative appeals, but by a depoliticizing ideology of scientific expertism. The excerpt from Hededus' *Socialism and Bureaucracy,* finally, extends Marxian social scientific analysis to the social meaning of property relations, and their relation to social power. He argues that a number of possible state systems are compatible with abolition of private property, each of which have different implications with respect to power and the appropriation of surplus.

All the selections are clear and interesting individually, and fit together into a whole. With the exception of the translations of Goldmann and Hilferding, however, all the selections are taken from books that are widely available in English. Since Marx scholars are likely to be familiar with most of these works, and the context of debate they exemplify, it is not apparent that the volume offers anything new to that audience. The book presumes too much background in the debates of Marxism, on the other hand, to be accessible to those being introduced to issues of Marxian social theory and philosophy. It appears, then, that the volume might best serve as a teaching aid for those already familiar with issues of Marxian theory but not yet immersed in contemporary debates.

The volume ignores both the rich literature about Marx and Marxism that has been produced by contemporary feminists and the contributions to Marxian theory which have been made by contemporary non-European thinkers. A propos of the former, it is apparent from his introduction that Bottomore is aware of the feminist literature on Marxism. Yet he does not justify its exclusion from the volume. The omission of Third World Marxists, such as Samir Amin or Alfonso Sanches-Vazquez, to name but two, is unfortunately typical in British and American anthologies on Marx and Marxism. It is no more understandable for that reason, however, and perpetuates an incorrect impression that the only significant contributions to Marxism have come from Europe.

Bottomore might respond to both these criticisms that neither feminist nor Third World writings on Marxism fit the problematic of social scientific versus philosophic interpretations of Marxism that unifies the book. Certainly there are writings from both categories that perform sociological analysis as sophisticated as much of that in the volume, and there also exist writings which deal with the epistemological and normative status of Marxism. There

is nevertheless some truth to the claim that the thematic focus of the book excludes feminist and Third World response to Marx and Marxism. To the extent the claim is true, that may call the focus itself into question.

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GEORGE G. BRENKERT. *Marx's Ethics of Freedom*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1983. Pp. xii + 263. Cdn$37.50. US$29.75. ISBN 0-7100-9461-2.

There has long been controversy about Marx's ethics—whether there is or can be one in a scientific corpus and, if so, what sort of ethics it is (naturalist, utilitarian or self-realizationist). Brenkert's book argues painstakingly that there is a Marxian morality, and it claims with much judicious defense that this morality is one whose overriding value is *freedom:* by which is meant a 'way of life' such that 'one essentially determines, within communal relations to other people, the concrete totality of desires, capacities and talents, which constitute one's self-objectification'(88).

Most of what Brenkert argues is familiar in its general lines of justification. But what marks his work off is the very extended discussion he devotes to meeting the sort of objections that Anglo-American analytic philosophers would be inclined to raise against a Marxian ethic. Neither Marxist nor non-Marxist is apt to be too provoked by the patiently staked out position he defends.

Brenkert properly acknowledges from the outset that Marx's moral thought is only implicit (8). He also correctly insists that Marx's expressed contempt for moralizing is not a repudiation of moral principles per se, but only a rejection of moral positioning that is 'abstract,' 'transcendent,' 'impotent' and, in particular, 'a dreamlike acquiescence in the status quo' (10). Marx's implied morality, Brenkert contends, is, in systematic contrast to traditional moral philosophy, 'linked to practical interests,' 'historically grounded' and geared to 'effective action' (11-15).

A telling parallel Brenkert offers in support of his claim that Marx's rejection of standard moralities is no rejection of morality as such, is the current refusal of Marxists to espouse talk of 'law and order': not because they do not believe in the necessity for law and order (for what else is a social plan?). but

because they believe the phraseology in question has been 'pre-empted by the political Right' (14).

After Brenkert has made clear that Marx's moral position differs from the standard moral positions he attacks in *i* its rootedness in historical reality, *ii* its practical application and *iii* its concern to alter rather than sanctify the established class system, he proceeds to characterize it as an 'ethics of virtue' which, he says, finds the good (like Aristotle) in 'character' and 'way of life' rather than (like Kant) in 'duty' and 'obedience to obligation.' Brenkert emphasizes this traditional distinction often: for example, on pages 17, 19, 21, 54, 89, 160-1. But nowhere does he show it to be founded on anything Marx says. Since Marx does in fact often talk as if we *do* owe aduty or do have an obligation to alleviate the oppression of the working masses and to advance the rational self-government of mankind, these strains of moral outlook may not be so clearly disjunctive in his thought as Brenkert assumes.

Brenkert's next concern is to place Marx's implicit moral position within his overall theory. One controversial conclusion he comes to directly and holds to throughout is that a 'technological determinist account' of Marxism must be 'fundamentally mistaken' because it 'denies the freedom that morality requires' (28-36). But Brenkert wrongly assumes that technological determinism rules out moral choice. In truth, the former merely marks out determined *ranges* of historical possibility *within* which moral choice may operate. It does not uniquely determine *which* moral choices must be taken. Since Brenkert lists in his bibliography the work where I argue this point in detail *(The Structure of Marx's World-View,* Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978. Pp. 39-66, 216-17, 234-9).It is surprising he assumes the opposite view with no counter-argument to justify it.

Brenkert's question-begging disjunction of technological determinism and moral choice has far-reaching consequences for the rest of his argument. For once he has posed this incompatibility between productive-force determination of material possibility and moral freedom, the historical materialist base of Marx's ethics is lost to his explanatory view. Herein lies the most fundamental failing in Brenkert's book. For what is to Marx the very enabling foundation of all significant human option, the material wherewithal of tools, resources and practical knowledge upon which economic structures and moral superstructures arise, and by which they are eventually 'outgrown,' giving rise to new moral alternatives and structures in turn — this entire productive *Basis* of the Marxian moral view is completely missing from Brenkert's analysis. Moral positions are understood as merely justifying reflections of ownership relations, or effective critical standpoints on these relations, with no recognition at all that, on a deeper theoretical level, whether they are the former or the latter (and what type of either they are), finally dependes for Marx upon *productive force development* and what its requirements demand. The prime determiner of historical materialism, the material powers of production *to* whose development moral development is understood by Marx to finally 'correspond,' is simply liquedated in Brenkert's account. It is for this reason that Brenkert's work can end with the

theoretically disoriented conclusion that the 'historical sanction Marx provided for his [ethical] views' might be best viewed as 'excess Hegelian baggage' (213).

Yet there is a certain irony to Brenkert's debasing of Marx's theory of moral construction. For perhaps his most theoretically stimulating (if undemonstrated) point is that people's 'moral and value structures are directly relevant to and ... play a direct role in [their] performance of a job'(35): that is, he claims that morality is a *constituent of the productive forces.* Standardly, morality is consigned to the superstructural plane of Marx's theoretical framework, and is conceived as a subclass of ideology. So Brenkert animates a claim I do not remember having seen stated since H.B. Acton's *Illusion of the Epoch,* who uses it to criticize Marx's distinction between base and superstructure. Brenkert reiterates this claim again and again (for example, on pp. 39, 41, 42, 74, 77 and 138). What is most peculiar about his position here is that, if he is right, then his contention is in ultimate contradiction with his claim that productive-force or technological determinism rules out moral choice: for, clearly, what includes moral choice cannot also exclude it.

Oversights that are generated by Brenkert's failure to understand the productive basis of Marx's ethics crop up repeatedly in the remainder of his book. Brenkert properly emphasizes the socially 'harmonious' requirement of Marx's moral desideratum of freedom (e.g., 124-6, 224), but he does not recognize here that for Marx the necessary material basis of such a socially harmonious freedom is precisely co-operative work and production.

He correctly emphasizes the ultimate importance for Marx that 'self-determination' has as a value, but he explicitly opposes this idea to 'self-realization' (e.g., pp. 86-96, 130), though for Marx their synonymity is everywhere affirmed and not denied. Brenkert goes so far in his disjunction of these ideas as to assert that Marx's notion of a '*full* development' of human capacities is 'preposterous, romantic and silly' if taken literally (95ff): thus reducing Marx's idea of freedom as 'all-round realization' of capacities to a kind of unmeant hyperbole, for which Brenkert's paler and subjectivist concept of developing chosen desires and talents is substituted throughout. This reduction of Marx's idea of freedom to a matter of merely self-formed *interior* qualities ('desires, capacities and talents' ut sic) — subjective qualities that are, moreover, only partial as opposed to all-round in their development — qualifies and shrinks Marx's moral project out of recognition.

Here again it is the absence of Marx's undergirding productive base in Brenkert's explanation which lies at the heart of his problem. Reintroduce it, and the justifying grounds for Marx of a value of 'all-sided realization' become evident: in the short run as a 'necessity' for modern industry's demand for a 'fully developed individual fit for a variety of labours,' and in the long run, as the summum bonum of Marx's humanism. (See Karl Marx, *Capital,* [Volume I], trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, ed. F. Engels. Moscow: Progress Publishers 1965. Pp. 487-8.)

Though there are other weaknesses in Brenkert's work — its rather one-sided reliance on his very early work (in particular, the *Economic and*

Philosophical Manuscripts), its downplaying of Marx's anthropocentric vision of man's 'mastery of nature' (e.g., 99, 106-7, 109), and its peculiar view that for Marx punishment under communism will not be transcended by learning, but will become self-punishing guilt and shame (187 ff, 231) — these are more theoretically defensible than his gutting of historical materialism's ultimate value of human productivity.

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NANCY CARTWRIGHT. *How the Laws of Physics Lie.* Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. 221. Cdn $31.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824700-1); Cdn $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824704-4).

Anti-realism seems to be in vogue these days. Cartwright's book develops an intriguing variant of this thesis. She believes in the 'facticity' of the phenomenological laws of physics — these are deemed true, or true-for-the-nonce (54) — but she does not believe that the fundamental theoretical laws, embodied in the equations of theoretical physics, describe true facts about reality. She does, however, believe in the existence of theoretical *entities* if they are involved in causal explanations. If we explain a phenomenon by describing the concrete causal process by which it is brought about, the explanation succeeds only to the extent that the process described actually occurs. An acceptable causal explanation therefore requires that we believe in the causes described, and these may well involve theoretical entities, processes, and properties. 'If we accept Descartes' causal story as adequate we must count his claims about hooked atoms and vortices as true. But we do not use Newton's inverse square law as if it were either true or false' (75).

For Cartwright, causal stories are true or false, but a theoretical demonstration of a phenomenological law is a matter or organizational convenience: 'As I have often urged in earlier essays, like Pierre Duhem, I think that the basic laws and equations of our fundamental theories organize and classify our knowledge in an elegant and efficient manner, a manner that allows us to make very precise calculations and predictions. The great explanatory and predictive powers of our theories lies in their fundamental laws. Nevertheless the *content* of our scientific knowledge is expressed in the phenomenological laws' (100).

The essays collected in this volume argue for this thesis using a wealth of sophisticated examples (quantum damping, calculation of the small signal properties of an amplifier, quantum theory derivations of the exponential decay law, the quantum theory of the laser, the Lamb shift). Basically, the aim is to show that the fundamental theoretical laws of physics do not function as covering laws in the explanation of phenomenological laws. Take Schrodinger's equation and the Weisskopf-Wigner derivation of the exponential decay law, for example. Approximations and idealizations are required in order to yield a theoretical counterpart to the exponential law. Cartwright argues that since the decay is really exponential, we must take the approximations as improvements on the original Schrodinger equation, and not as departures from the truth. 'The fact remains that the data, together with any reasonable criterion of simplicity... speak for the truth of an exponential law, but such a law cannot be derived rigorously. Thus it seems that the approximations we make in the derivation take us closer to, not further from, the truth (113).

A 'simulacrum' account of explanation is sketched in Essay 8 as an alternative to the D-N account. Roughly, to explain a phenomenological law in physics involves constructing a model that fits the phenomenon into the framework of the theory so that we are able to derive an analogue of the phenomenological law in the model. The model is a specially prepared, usually fictional description of the physical system (a 'simulacrum'), involving idealizations (infinite potentials, perfectly rigid rods, frictionless planes) as well as 'pure fictions' such as the probability distributions of classical statistical mechanics. The fundamental equations of physics are true of the objects in the model, not of the objects in reality. Within the model, we derive the laws which correspond more or less to the phenomenological behavior we are interested in describing. The point of constructing a model or theoretical explanation of the phenomenon is essentially a matter of convenience. For example, the harmonic oscillator model is used repeatedly in quantum mechanics to explain the behavior of such diverse systems as the hydrogen atom and the laser. But if we are simply aiming for descriptive adequacy and not the 'tidy organization of phenomena,' then 'we can write better phenomenological laws than those a theory can produce. (160).

I cannot see that Cartwright has made out a case for the 'non-facticity' of theoretical laws as opposed to phenomenological laws. The derivation of Kepler's phenomenological laws of planetary motion in Newtonian mechanics requires an artificial model of the planetary system, but this is not incompatible with the D-N account. The relevant covering law is presumably something like the following: Whenever we have a system of bodies $[S, p_1, p_2, \ldots]$ whose motion is governed by Newton's inverse square law of gravitation, and the mass of S is very much greater than any of the masses of the p_i, so that the resultant force on each p_i is essentially that due to S, then given appropriate initial velocities the orbits of the p_i are ellipses about S with certain characteristic properties. In fact, the planets do not really move in ellipses, so Kepler's phenomenological laws are false. We are able to derive perturbations

to these elliptical orbits in a suitably constructed Newtonian theoretical model, where the theoretical detail in the model corresponds to the level of accuracy required for the perturbations. It appears that the approximations required to derive the original phenomenological laws take us *further* from the (theoretical) truth in this case. Similarly I would assume that the exponential decay law is an approximation to the theoretically derived law, and that in principle deviations would become apparent over sufficiently long time intervals (perhaps too long for any practical measurement).

The final Essay shows 'how anti-realism can be put to work' (20). The claim is that the measurement problem of quantum mechanics is resolved by taking unitarity as an abstract concept that plays a merely organizing role and does not represent any genuine property of physical systems. As formulated by von Neumann, the measurement problem arises in the following way: There appear to be two modes of evolution for quantum mechanical systems. The first mode characterizes quantum mechanical processes in general and involves a deterministic transition of the quantum state of the system to a new state, where the time evolution is governed by Schrodinger's equation. This is a unitary transformation of the state. The second mode occurs whenever a system is measured and involves a stochastic transition of the quantum state, governed by the projection postulate, to one of a given set of states associated with the possible values of the physical magnitude measured. This is a non-unitary transformation of the state. Since measurements presumably involve nothing more than physical systems in interaction, the problem is to bring measurement transitions under the general framework of unitary transitions. Cartwright suggests that non-unitary transitions occur spontaneously in many quantum processes, not only measurement (whenever a quantum system is prepared in any eigenstate, when one particle scatters another, when a radioactive nucleus disintegrates). The problem may therefore be reformulated as the 'characterization problem': What determines whether a system will undergo a unitary or a non-unitary transition to a new state? This problem is dismissed as an 'artefact of the mathematics' (198). in quantum statistical mechanics a single time evolution equation covers both kinds of transition, i.e., transitions may be unitary or non-unitary. Why, she asks, should there be any physical difference corresponding to the distinction between unitarity and non-unitarity?

Cartwright's solution amounts to this: In quantum mechanics, systems sometimes evolve deterministically (via the Schrodinger equation) to a new state, sometimes indeterministically (via the projection postulate) to one of a set of states. The quantum probabilities are to be construed as transition probabilities associated with these stochastic transitions. Measurement processes always involve stochastic transitions governed by the projection postulate; in fact, just the right sort of stochastic transitions. Now, this proposal works only to the extent that we are prepared to accept non-unitary transitions as theoretically on a par with unitary transitions. As they are introduced in quantum statiscial mechanics, the non-unitary transitions have the status of approximations: they characterize 'open systems' which are parts of larger

closed systems undergoing unitary state transitions (see p. 205). The proposed solution therefore amounts to much more than a re-interpretation of quantum mechanics. If microsystems literally undergo stochastic transitions governed by non-unitary time evolution operators, then we need a new theory to replace quantum mechanics as well as quantum statistical mechanics. The measurement problem arises in quantum mechanics just because there are no such transitions according to the theory, while the possibility of measurement seems to require them. It is not a solution to the problem simply to proclaim the real existence of such transitions.

Both realists and anti-realists will find grist for their respective mills in Cartwright's brand of anti-realism. The unusually sophisticated examples from theoretical physics are elegantly presented and bring a new dimension to bear on the debate. This contribution, more than the thesis itself, will perhaps prove to be the lasting impact of these essays.

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JAMES A. DIEFENBECK. *A Celebration of Subjective Thought.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1984. Pp. xix + 248. US$24.95. ISBN 0-8093-1088-0.

This speculative 'celebration' succeeds to the extent that it develops explicict conceptual tools of explanation beyond its overall thesis (xvii). To this end, the organization of the text is straightforward, a critique of absolute objective thought preceeding a defence of active-dialectical, personal-social/historical, thought. The descriptive table of contents outlines long sections on 'predictable' objective laws (vii) contrasted with Diefenbeck's goal of self-controlled thought and action via a 'coherence' philosophy. Although Diefenbeck has chosen not to provide any specific textual references, there are clear capsule interpretations and applications of key notions from figures like: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and Collingwood which assist us in understanding the historical and philosophical problems of predictability and absolutism.

He begins by tackling some troublesome logic. Traditional universalism cannot work in explanations of particular entities because every identifiable

entity, ***with character***, is discovered through accidental properties. 'When we have a law that refers to every entity, it can predict virtually nothing' (34). This is because nature is 'animistic' (22) not passive. Berkeley, for example, understood that 'truth' is not

> ... the correspondence of ideas to... substance. (62)

> ... The possibility of knowledge requires the existence of an active spirit or subject, ... as the source of the regular orders the knower passively perceives. (63)

And in another crucial historical reference, Diefenbeck asserts: 'Parmenides (was) right: We can have *complete* objective knowledge only if the world is totally simple and permanent' (69). Diefenbeck concludes:

> Thus, objective thought is unable either to give us any knowledge of activity ***as such*** or to relate and compare the diverse subjective assertions... which actually appear within the spectrum of scientific thought ... . The ***thorough*** validation of any law ***demands certification*** of the subjective foundation ... yet objective knowledge is, ***in principle,*** incapable of such a foundation. (66) (my emphasis)

However clearly stated, the general treatment does not enable Diefenbeck to refute the belief that scientific theories are models of explanation which generate pragmatic experimental and philosophical explanations. Though this book will not unsettle most philosophers of science, it does clarify some weaknesses of relativism by the way it defends subjective thought as a philosophical polar opposite transcending absolute objectivity.

His Critique of the traditional philosophical 'god' uncovers

> ... a watchmaker who constructs a single timepiece which he never again touches. (73)

> ... If he were to create a total order of existence in terms of total permanence ... necessary for total prediction, then He would have ceased to be a free and originative agent. (74)

The focus of experience, the epistemological self, must be the reference for knowledge claims, according to Diefenbeck's elimination of absolute objectivity contrasted with irreducible subjectivity. But, unlike mathematics which generates its thesis by steps of necessary connection, the self-revealing realm of human experience deals with a full range of creative activity (125). In step with Collingwood's absolute presuppositions, Diefenbeck argues that each instance of subjective truth is, in its own way, an absolute, definitive confirmation based in the process of experiential growth (133).

This process is a reflective or dialectical activity emerging from the opposition of ***absolute*** commitments of different experiencing subjects (155). If objectivity produces static concepts or values such as the Platonic forms, then

we will turn to the actual assertions of knowledge which are put forward by individuals, collective groups and society. The result is an Hegelian 'progressive opposition' (156) and not a transcendent idealism where assertions ultimately cannot depend on anything beyond themselves. In this case, the actual opposition between selves is the ultimate source of knowledge (157). To this end the ontological argument has been denied its traditional role as the metaphysical first principle. 'The passage from idea to existence is not inevitable; an entity exists ... if it has actually been brought about by an active subject' (197). The mind works towards an expanding unity, where past commitments are *totally* absorbed and justified by the growing coherent perspective (210). 'Truths' endure as ever more explicit knowledge emerges (216-17).

Consciousness is not reduced to a generalized perspective; an *absolutely* explicit personal-social existence is uncovered with a world that is not completely under our control (229). 'It is only as a subject adopts a non-objective relationship with other subjects that he can ... maintain the autonomy he was seeking' (through an objective absolute) (230). The goal of philosophical enquiry is the understanding of 'minds as active centers of relationship' (233) where ongoing individual actual(izing) thought results in a coherent, mutually experienced, non-relative, rationally explicit, world. Such expansive theorization, though based in a logical outline does require, according to Diefenbeck, 'reflective faith ... that act of thoughtful self-trust by which we move beyond ourselves' (243). Essentially, Diefenbeck is affirming a rational reality through the coherence of the creative existential process. The stalemate of static objective theory criticzed forcefully in the first part of the book has been supplanted by the irreducibility of individual claims to knowledge. This enables us to attempt a systematic account of the 'world' at the level of subjective analysis.

Despite Diefenbeck's logically adroit and well written text, I think we can question the advisability of reasoning from first-person knowledge claims, clear 'givens' which may have little more than an epistemological function, to an outline of a unifying philosophical system. This *is* an act of faith because Diefenbeck's definition of 'subjectivity' depends on its opposition to a concept of objectivity that has only been dealt with in a critical outline. However, overall, Diefenbeck's adventuresome analysis fuels the fires of traditional metaphysical speculation and revitalizes our interest in troublesome paradoxes that are the basis of key epistemological and metaphysical issues.

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ROBERT EDEN. *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida 1984. Pp. xx + 348. US$25.00 ISBN 0-8130-0758-5.

Eden's *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche* (PLN) is a timely meditation in the same year that not only witnessed the publication of the first volume of a planned 32 volume *Gesamtausgabe* of Max Weber (see *Die Zeit,* Oct. 5, 1984, 33) but also Reagan's sweeping political victory. Although not the first to draw comparisons between Nietzsche and Weber, Eden's text demonstrates, thoroughly and convincingly, that Nietzsche is essentially a political thinker and perhaps one that should be more thoughtfully reconsidered. While, for example, Tracy B. Strong (*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* 1975) uses Weber passim as a foil to illuminate some of Nietzsche's ideas, and although Eden might appear at first to be doing just the reverse, namely, 'taking Nietzsche as the foil for Weber's enterprise' (37), Eden's study really places Weber in 'an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche' (41).

The overall aim of PLN is to disclose what significance, if any, Nietzsche and Weber have for the future of American politics, particularly in determining by what standard American political leaders can and should be ranked. There is no pretention or suggestion of assessing either Nietzsche or Weber in anything but their potential service for American politics which Eden sincerely believes to be endangered. Unfortunately, there is no simple transition either of the problem or of Eden's solutions to the Canadian model of government in spite of some real similarities: a trusted, charismatic leader being driven by a suspicious political machine. However, there is a surprising amount of political, as well as cultural, osmosis across our southern border which makes Eden's text less foreign than, one might conjecture, a philosophical text on Canadian political leadership.

In chapter 1, the most political (all-too-political) chapter, Eden compares Weber's Freiburg lecture of 1895 with Woodrow Wilson's dominant view of political leadership. At times, Eden shares much of the fervour found in Weber's tyro piece. It is not surprising to evoke, at times, even to provoke in his readers his own sense of 'disquieting awareness' (xx), not simply of the presence of political nihilism, but of the real and present dangers which exist in attempting to deal with it, politically. But to understand fully the raison d'etre of Eden's task, the last chapter (Ch.7. 'Nihilism and the Limits of Leadership' 211-44) should be read first. It not only contains excellent, detailed summaries of his arguments from the previous chapters but offers a personal reflection (§2. 'The Iron Cave' 221ff) on just why this problem, namely, nihilism and political leadership, is thought to be both 'disconcerting and amazing' (225). Something intrinsically Canadian may prevent some from sharing much of the worry Eden has about American leadership (230ff) in spite of the proximity of the border.

Chapter 2 assesses the weaknesses inherent in Weber's position and the subsequent revisions he made in the face of Nietzsche's nihilistic experiment:

in nuce an attempt to revitalize man by first demoralizing him. However, a genuine, philosophical treasure for any serious reader of Nietzsche is to be found in chapters 3 and 4: an in depth analysis of *Beyond Good and Evil*, parts 6 and 9 respectively. In this 'Nietzsche contra Weber' section, Eden demonstrates exactly how and why politics permeates many (if not all) of Nietzsche's key concepts: pathos, *ressentiment*, decadence, 'God is dead'. the overman, Nietzsche's doctrine of self, and the will to power. There are however three major highlights: a rather ingenious interpretation of the eternal return as a political imperative (126ff); a head-to-head measuring up of Nietzsche and Thucydides (110ff); and a persuasive mapping of the content of BGE, part 9 and the three essays which form Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*.

In chapters 5 and 6, Eden reconsiders Weber's reworked model of political leadership but finds it unable, as it stands, to cope with Nietzsche's critique. But in spite of the gaps and weaknesses inherent in Weber's position, there is sufficient value in what remains for Eden to advocate, through Weber, a three-fold standard for ranking limited political leadership, in a moderate form of self-government, based on three kinds of citizens.

There is one serious omission in Eden's study though it too might 'be the subject of a separate book, perhaps devoted primarily to Nietzsche' (241), namely, an analysis of how 'man alone can disregard or redirect instinct' (44), how 'the passions of the body are harnessed by intelligence' (61). Eden mentions an 'anatomical postmortem' (39) but never does one. It is necessary in order to understand precisely what it means to say 'Great passions create their own horizons' (17) or Nietzsche's concept of 'physiological valuations' (BGE 20). It would even help to resolve one of Eden's own difficulties: 'Nietzsche's reliance upon instinct makes the boundary between lower and higher forms of life problematic' (109). True. Now what? However, after reading Eden's study, it is impossible not to want to reread and rethink, Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*. Whether his reflections on the future course of American politics are regarded as another 'Never cry wolf' story, only time will tell.

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IVAR EKELAND, *Le Calcul, l'Imprévu*, les figures du temps de Kepler à Thom. (Collection Science ouverte). Paris: Seuil 1984. 169 p. 69FF. ISBN 2-02-006683-1.

L'ouvrage d'Ivar Ekeland se veut avant tout une présentation, à l'adresse d'un public non spécialiste, des différentes représentations du concept de changement que la science nous a données à travers l'histoire. Trois moments de cette épopée seront successivement privilégiés. Ainsi le chapitre I, intitulé 'La musique des sphères,' se construit autour de la rupture qu'a constituée l'introduction par Kepler de ses fameuses lois.

Après nous avoir rappelé l'essentiel du système ptoléméen et montré en quoi consiste la rupture képlérienne, l'auteur nous introduit à la révolution newtonienne, c'est-à-dire à la mécanique céleste. Le chapitre se termine sur une discussion du déterminisme classique.

Le second chapitre, 'Le cristal brisé,' centré sur Poincaré, nous fait assister à l'effondrement du rêve laplacien: il est impossible de trouver une solution complète au problème des trois corps. L'apport original de Poincaré, soit l'étude des équations différentielles à solutions non périodiques en mécanique céleste, nous est alors présenté. L'auteur nous montre ensuite comment on peut concilier théorie déterministe et comportement aléatoire (l'exemple est développé à partir de la transformation dite du boulanger). Le chapitre se termine sur la présentation de la notion d'attracteur étrange.

Le troisième chapitre, 'Le retour de la géométrie,' est consacré à la théorie des catastrophes et à son créateur René Thom. Les notions de potentiel, de système dissipatif et de catastrophe sont introduites, alors que la théorie elle-même, plutôt qu'exposée, nous est illustrée par de nombreux exemples.

Le chapitre IV, 'Fin et commencement,' conclut l'ouvrage en effectuant un retour aux sources, opposant le temps de l'*Odyssée*, marquant le passage du passé vers le futur, à celui de l'*Iliade*, marquant la singularité de l'instant présent. Entre ces extrêmes s'insère la conception moderne du temps qui nous est proposée par René Thom: la reconnaissance de formes types à travers la mouvance du temps.

L'ouvrage d'Ekeland n'est et ne se veut décidément pas un livre savant, ni par sa forme, ni par son contenu. Il faut donc éviter de succomber à la tentation de le juger et de l'évaluer comme tel. En tant qu'essai de vulgarisation scientifique, la tentative apparaît comme un succès. Le sujet est dificile et l'on ne peut que féliciter l'auteur des exemples choisis, en particulier toute la section consacrée à Poincaré où l'on assiste successivement à la disparition de l'ordre quantitatif à la suite de petites perturbations (problème de la divergence) et à l'apparition de l'ordre qualitatif (entres autres le très bel exemple des figures tracées à partir des formules de Héron). Tout cela l'auteur le réussit en ne supposant connues de son lecteur que des notions d'arithmétique élémentaire!

L'auteur ne s'est cependant pas limité à une tâche de vulgarisation scientifique; tout au long de l'ouvrage, on sent une prétention à transmettre une certaine conception du rôle des mathématiques dans l'élaboration des différentes conceptions du monde. Doit-on alors considérer cet ouvrage comme un essai de vulgarisation philosophique (si une telle chose est possible)? A ce point de vue, le lecteur risque de rester quelque peu sur sa faim. Considérons par exemple la première partie de l'ouvrage. Bien que la thèse ne

soit pas explicitement soutenue , il semble bien que pour Ekeland la véritable révolution cosmologique ait été képlérienne et non copernicienne: c'est l'abandon de l'exclusivité du mouvement circulaire comme méthode pour 'sauver les phénomènes' qui marque la véritable rupture avec l'Antiquité et non le passage à l'héliocentrisme. La thèse est osée et jaurais aimé la voir argumentée. Mais je ne voudrais pas faire à l'auteur un procès d'intention et mon attente dépasse sans doute les prétentions de l'ouvrage.

D'une écriture agréable, quelquefois un peu lyrique, *Le Calcul, l'Imprévu* demeure on ouvrage intéressant malgré une certaine naïveté épistémologique (l'auteur semble présupposer des thèses extrêmement réalistes qu'il n'explicite jamais) et constitue même un document pouvant être utilisé pour un cours d'introduction à la philosophie des sciences.

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DAVID GALLOP. *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments. A Text and Translation with an Introduction.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984. Pp xii + 144. Cdn$20.00 ISBN 0-8020-2443-2.

A beautifully produced volume, Gallop's *Parmenides* has an introduction, text and translation of the fragments of Parmenides, translations of the fragment contexts and testimonia, notes on sources, and bibliography. The text is accompanied by apparatus, and the translation by notes on important divergences from the English translations of Burnet, Cornford, Kirk and Raven, Mourelatos and Taran (though surprisingly not Barnes). The package is so useful that it is hard to see how anybody interested in Parmenides could, in conscience, refrain from acquiring it. The introduction is philosophically the most interesting part of Gallop's enterprise, and I shall confine my comments to it.

The exposition of the Way of Truth begins in a standard way. The Goddess enjoins Parmenides to tread the path of 'is,' and to avoid the path of 'is not.' What do these grammatically incomplete occurrences of 'is' mean? What are the intended subjects, and complements if any? Gallop's answers to these questions are heavily influenced by G.E.L. Owen and, unfortunately, they are infected by that philosopher's naivete concerning logical and grammatical matters.

According to Gallop the Parmenidean 'is' means 'exists,' on the grounds that Parmenides' logic of 'is' closely resembles the logic of 'exists.' This is a familiar enough doctrine, and I believe it is correct. But one cannot, today, defend it without coming to grips with the extensive criticism it has received from Charles Kahn. Kahn points out, first, that many uses of 'is' are indeterminate between existential and copular interpretations. What is the difference between 'There *is* one restaurant that is renowned for vegetarian cuisine' (which contains what is presumably an existential 'is') and 'One restaurant *is* renouned for vegetarian cuisine' (which is copular)? The difference must be rhetorical, because the two statements affirm the same state of affairs. But then if there is a distinctive logic of existential 'is' how does it come to apply to the second 'is'? Secondly, Kahn (and Furth independently) points out that the supposedly existential 'is' is used by Greek philosophers to qualify very disparate sorts of objects, including states of affairs, attributes etc. One such use occurs in connection with Parmenides' claim that what-is is unchangeable — that it is 'held immobile by the constraints of great chains' (B8.26-8). this claim is linked to his earlier rejection of genesis. But suppose that a thing is ungenerated. How does it follow that it is changeless? Gallop says:

> [W]here *F* and *G* are taken to be incompatible properties, then if the subject is to be *F* at one time but *G* later, *F* must perish and *G* must come into being. But if all genesis and perishing are impossible, no such change could take place. (17)

What this fails to appreciate is that is *F* can be thought of as coming-to-be simply because something comes-to-be *F*, then one cannot uncritically make so sharp a distinction between the absolute and predicative uses of 'come-to-be,' and consequently one cannot so sharply distinguish between existential and predicative uses of 'is.' At least, one cannot do this without addressing these problems.

Gallop claims that the prohibition of the road of 'is not' 'has a striking affinity to the contemporary problem of understanding negative existential statements.' This problem is glossed as follows: 'It seems that the subject terms of such statements cannot be assigned a referent without self-contradiction.' Anyone who has absorbed Russell's 'On Denoting' will be astonished to hear that this is a 'contemporary problem.' And Parmenides too would, I think, disown the problem. A negative existential is a statement of the form 'X is not.' Parmenides accepts at least one such statement: 'What-is-not. Presumably he does not 'assign a referent' to its subject — he abhors positing what-is-not, and takes followers of the path of 'is not' to be doing just that. In fact Gallop's focus on negative existential *statements* (derived from Owen), which incorporate the finite verb phrase 'is not,' simply fails to explain Parmenides' attitude toward the participial form 'what-is-not' (*to me on*). (Gallop recognizes, by the way, that Parmenides would accept 'What-is-not is not' [24], but he does not seem to see the problem that this poses for the

claim that negative existential statements are *as such* what the Goddess objects to.)

In addition to finding 'X is not' logically unacceptable Gallop (again following Owen) finds 'X is not, here' — local exclusion — unacceptable too.

> [I]n saying of cold that is does not exist here and now, mortals are implicitly treating it as existent. For it has already been argued that the non-existent cannot be spoken or thought of. Hence in speaking of cold at all, mortals...[presuppose] that it does exist, even in the very act of maintaining that it does not. (12)

But Parmenides does *not* equate non-existence-in-a-place with non-existence; in fact he warns against this very error in fragment 4 where he insists that something 'away from here' (*apeonta*) can nevertheless be something-that-is. The mind should not be concerned with such spatial distinctions, he says.

Finally, Gallop accepts Owen's suggestions that the grammatical subject of the Parmenidean 'is' is 'what is there for speaking and thinking of,' a phrase that occurs at B6.1. The trouble with this suggestion is that the syntactically non-standard naked 'is' is used by Parmenides several times in widely separated parts of the poem — in fragment 2, as well as in fragment 8, lines 2, 5, 9, 11. The claim that a phrase that occurs *once* in fragment 6 can serve as the grammatical subject for *all* these occurrences of 'is' is, to my mind, implausible. I do not think that there is a decent alternative to the thesis, advanced by Mourelatos for example, that the 'is' is *meant* to be naked. What Parmenides meant by the naked 'is' is of course another question.

A puzzle about Parmenides' Way of Truth is its juxtaposition with the Way of Seeming, an elaborately detailed cosmogony that apparently commits all the errors exposed in the Way of Truth. What is the point of the section? (Given the garrulity of the poem, one is tempted to answer 'Padding' — but serious classical scholars would not accept such an answer.) Gallop rightly rejects the answer that the Way of Seeming explains the illusion of the sensible world, and proposes that the cosmogony is put forward as an example of what the 'best' science can produce. Innoculated against the best of science, the disciple will find every other scientific enterprise specious. This is as good a solution to the problem as there is. But I wonder whether some such view as this is not possible. In the Way of Truth Parmenides acquaints us with the *form* of the ideal science — it will tread the path of 'is.' Now he shows us a science that needs to be reformulated. The challenge, then, is to *preserve* what can be preserved of the cosmogony, to purify it by recasting it. Mendacious it is, but make it better, says the Goddess to the disciple — I have shown you how.

My critical comments on the treatment of the Parmenidean 'is' should not be taken as an outright rejection of Gallop's approach to Parmenides: the Introduction is in fact a coherent, well-presented and philosophically defensible essay on Parmenides. However, analytic philosophers have been active in Parmenidean exegesis and one would think that, given Gallop's interests in

the logical and linguistic issues concerning the Parmenidean 'is', he would have done well to convey more of the results of this research. By perpetuating Owen's superseded exegesis — which was valuable enough in getting analytic philosophers going, but almost unbearably quaint when read today — Gallop does not serve his readers, especially those from classics, as well as they should have been served.

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ROBERT C. HOLUB. *Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction*. London and New York: Methuen 1984. Pp. xiv + 189. US$18.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-416-33580-2), US$8.95 (paper:ISBN 0-416-33590-x).

What does aesthetic experience mean, asks Hans Robert Jauß, one of the major German reception theorists. What were its conditions of manifestation in the history of art? Is it of any interest to us in respect to the present situation of art? These questions very rarely took centre stage in aesthetic inquiries based on phenomenological, metaphysical, psychoanalytical, marxist, anthropological or semiotic presuppositions, just to name a few of the more important schools of thought. Even philosophical hermeneutics, Jauß continues, does not specifically deal with these questions, which were set aside in aesthetical discourse because of other problems, which above all reflected upon the ontology of nature and art, of truth and beauty, of form and content etc. In other words, traditionally mainly the productive conditions of aesthetic experience were analysed; its receptive and communicative functions in the social realm remained neglected to a considerable extent. Thus, in contrast to the conventional approach in the area of literature, which deals with the investigation of the author-work relationship, reception theory encompasses the work and reader-response axis, which in some way can be related to the reader-response criticism in America.

In Germany a dramatic rise of interest in reception theory occurred as a possible resolution to a crisis in literary methodology by the end of the sixties, especially after the publication of Jauß's essay 'The change in the paradigm of literary scholarship' in 1969. Today, as Robert C. Holub observes, 'virtually every methodological perspective and area of literacy

endeavor has responded to the challenge raised by reception theory' (7), and traces of this method have affected even adjacent disciplines like sociology and art history as well. In order to give an idea of the extent of the literature dealing with this problem, it should be mentioned that already as early as 1977 Gunter Grimms book entitled *Rezeptionsgeschichte* (History of Reception) lists in his bibliography over eleven hundred titles dealing with reception theory and its history. Considering this vast quantity of source material credit is due to Holub for succeeding admirably with his critical introduction into reception theory to inform the English speaking reader in a very clear and transparent way about this important and complex methodological trend in literary scholarship.

His presentation and approach to the problem follow a straight and logical sequence. After discussing the principles of reception theory, he introduces the reader to influences and precursors, which he rightly recognises in Russian formalism, in the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, in Jan Mukařovský's and Felix Vodička's contributions to Prague structuralism, in Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, and in the methodological perspectives of the sociology of literature. He then deals extensively and expertly with Hans Robert Jauß and Wolfgang Iser as the major theorists of this method. The discussion of alternative models and controversies, especially the debate with marxist reception theorists, and central problems together with the present status of reception theory conclude this volume. The bibliography, even though somewhat restricted, with its brief annotations proves to be a helpful tool for those readers who wish to expand on the topic. Preference is given to volumes that have appeared in English.

In reading the book, it soon becomes apparent that only a fraction of the material consulted, as Holub states, is listed in the bibliography. Holub is very well read in the field. One of the major positive points of his presentation, however, is the fact that he manages to present the central discussions and arguments of the primary sources, which are extensive and complex, in a clear and above all elucidating way (Jauß' and Iser's writings, not to mention Gadamer, are not necessarily the best examples, from the linguistic point of view, of German discourse), so that even the reader who is somewhat familiar with these source materials finds himself surprised with numerous clarifications and new insights into the problem. Of special interest are also the two last chapters. 'Alternative models and controversies' and 'Problems and perspectives,' in which Holub discusses a range of questions in their respective historical and contemporary context of parallel theories in Germany, France, and the United States, questions arising from the methodology and application of reception theory.

Getting finally to the task of finding some words of evaluation, I should like to quote a sentence from the preface, where Holub states: 'While a good portion of what follows may not relate anything radically new for Germanists, I hope that it will provide either — at worst — a thorough and accurate review, or — at best — a stimulus for rethinking this important body of criticism' (XIV). Considering the many critical points which Holub raises during his

presentation, but which cannot be discussed here, I believe both his objectives have been achieved.

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GEORGE KATEB. *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil.* Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1984. Pp. 204. US$24.95. ISBN 0-8476-6757-X.

A hallmark of this sensitive, searching, and fair-minded study of Hannah Arendt's many contributions to contemporary thought is how well its author has acclimated himself to the air of paradox and irony that pervades her work. George Kateb, distinguished professor of political theory at Amherst, is fully receptive to the endless flow of psychological insights from a thinker who was so averse to psychologizing and reductionism. He appreciates Arendt's lifelong preoccupation with moral decisions and moral character, even though she herself kept insisting on the sufficiency and redemptive power of autonomous 'political action' alone. And he appreciates what is undoubtedly her grandest gesture in this regard:

> ...the only transference of action outside the public realm she emphatically makes is to locate the most intense and extensive activity in thinking, the dialogue of me with myself. She does this in the last words of *The Human Condition* and ends a book in which she has done everything possible to avoid such words by surrendering to them. It is as if only a philosopher and poet as generous as herself could have been self-denying enough to imagine that political action could achieve what people had usually said only philosophy and poetry could — to justify life. (42)

In the five chapters and appendix of this book Kateb, himself something of a polymath, shows a mastery of the immensely rich Arendtian corpus far superior to that of most of her growing legion of expositors, critics, and detractors. More than that, his book continues the critical dialogue she fueled concerning modernity and its institutions: precisely the mode of recognition she herself valued most.

A highlight of the first chapter, entitled 'The Theory of Political Action,' is Kateb's insight that in her 'Periclean' identification of the *polis* as the arena of

self-fulfillment Hannah Arendt was seeking (as Rousseau had sought before her — a fact of which both she and Kateb seem unaware) an antidote to modernity's ceaseless and tedious self-absorption, its foundering in what is called, perhaps euphemistically, a 'culture of narcissism.'

> The real self can be only a defined self; it cannot be the infinite possibilities of inner process and outward response. Political action is the great definer and concentrator of the self, the great stimulus to the formation of the self out of its own welter. Political action introduces coherence into the self and its experience. (8)

Unfortunately, Kateb compromises his own insight when he proceeds to argue that political action can only mean speech, indeed talk *about* politics (such as takes place in council meetings). And he seems to miss the point of the Periclean and Arendtian assessment of the distinctive qualities of 'public happiness' altogether when, in the rest of the chapter and repeatedly later on, he attempts to relocate them in the exercise of the responsibilities of ordinary citizenship in today's so-called representative democracies.

Chapter two, 'Totalitarian Evil,' is a perceptive and judicious treatment of Arendt's first major contribution to contemporary political theory. Kateb recognizes exceptional courage of mind in Arendt's willingness to emphathize — not sympathize — with totalitarianism's racist and imperialist precursors, even with its most reprehensible perfectors, in her unprecedented effort to think through what others had found sheerly incomprehensible. Finding much to admire in Arendt's struggle to get at the principle underlying the terrifying *banality* of evil in the likes of an Eichmann, Kateb is understandably skeptical that 'nonhuman blankness' (74) is an adequate answer; and he delicately chides her for tending to overlook the numbing thoughtlessness one finds at times in the noblest and deepest of German spirits, not excluding Kant.

In the remainder of the book Kateb provokes reflection on the great unrevolved problems of our era, repeatedly using Arendt's critical insights as antidotes to her own excesses, notably her tendency to divorce authentic political activity from the 'social question' (economic management is basically what Arendt meant) and to emancipate the former from the constraints of conventional morality. In the course of this venture Kateb's sharp focus on Arendt's thought keeps blurring on one point, but it is a decisive one. Perhaps because he has more compassion for the modern age and its underlying agenda — the emancipation and acculturation of the masses — than did she, Kateb never again manages to get right her elusive concept of 'action.' At times he concurs in what her critics are forever reducing it to: something exotic, romantic, at best anachronistically heroic. On other occasions he confuses it with what sustains and memorializes it: the assortment of legislative, artistic, and historical processes that together fabricate the 'space of appearances' *in* which such action takes place (see in particular 90ff).

What finally eludes Kateb here happens to be the very core of Arendt's philosophical anthropology. Only we (and what proportion of our species

this 'we' actually encompasses is a vexing question, one which perhaps only Kateb's world, should it prosper, might some day answer) can act — i.e., do and say things that need no further reason for being other than themselves. And only the actualization of this capacity enables us as individuals and as species ever to transcend utilitarian calculi and our own questionableness as 'ends in ourselves,' to emerge as persons having 'infinite worth and thus as being entitled to inalienable rights. Kateb struggles so vigorously against Arendt's intolerance of, indeed outrage at, any world that does not put this sine qua non of worldliness at the top of its hierarchy of values, that in the end he loses sight of the point of the combat itself. Representative democracy may be the only appropriate, the only decent, perhaps even the highest form of organization accessible to mass society. But to take for granted the *political* character of this form is to beg rather than to resolve what is surely one of the most challenging questions Arendt has posed: Is human action by nature something capable of being represented at all? On this question at least, Hannah Arendt, though she expressed little more than contempt for the modernist sensibilities of a Rousseau, was of one mind with him.

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JOSEPH MARGOLIS, *Culture and Cultural Entities.* Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company (in Can. and US Higham, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishing) 1984. Pp. xiii + 170. US$34.95. ISBN 90-277-1574-2.

This book reads like the printout from a user-friendly, computerized encyclopedia of philosophy, in response to a 'command' like 'argue for the merits of attribute-dualistic emergentism relative to all other philosophies of mind and social science.' Little could give a stronger impression of these 136.5 pages of argument than purely typographical facts — facts of a sort which, according to Margolis, should be least relevant to an intensional, hence intentional, artifact like this book. The text contains 79 different proper name types (of philosophers, psychologists, linguists, ethologists, and other social scientists, of whom all but a few are contemporary); there are another 99 (types) in the endnotes. Margolis actually discusses the views of 34 of the referents, yielding a 4.01 pages/person average discussion density.

Despite this relatively low figure, the book is not at all choppy, but nicely coherent, due to Margolis's artful interweaving of one discussion into another, each new twist effecting the gradual emergence of his own position. It is a scholarly, erudite book, with a 5.35 text-to-note ratio. It is not a radical book: Feyerabend is mentioned only once (not counting jacket notes), Rorty only once. 'Chomsky' appears 89 times, but only to claim for its bearer the dubious distinction of being the person with whom Margolis disagrees most often, thereby placing this book in the mainstream. It is Wittgenstein who emerges, sui generis (one of Margolis's favorite expressions for characterizing the emergent) in the last chapter, as the savior risen, to a chorus of congruences with Margolis's own position, and the implication that it is Margolis who (like so many others) is the only true neo-Wittgensteinian.

Of seven chapters, the first five are dedicated to detailing and defending *attribute dualism.* Here the key words are 'emergent,' 'irreducible,' and 'sui generis.' They are used to characterize the mind, language, the social, the cultural, the intensional, and the Intentional (which by some unexplained honorifics achieves first-letter capitalization on its 16th occurence in the book, on p. 10, a distinction it manifests on and off until the last page where it appears 8 times in full dress). Now, attribute dualism is not a new thesis for Margolis; he has presented and promoted this doctrine in at least two other books (*Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism, Synthese Library*, Vol. 121, *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. LVII; Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978; and *Philosophy of Psychology*, Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984). The central idea is that even though straightforward dualism of the Cartesian sort is untenable, a more sophisticated dualism is not merely tenable but necessary. More specifically, we would be wrong to think that there is such a mental thing as the mind, but there are nevertheless some properties of the physical animal, homo sapiens (and other animals), which are neither physical nor reducible to physical properties: they are *emergent, sui generis*. Thus we confront the central mystery which must be plumbed by any would-be explicator of attribute dualism: in what sense can the merely physical have properties which are explicitly, nay emphatically, not merely physical? Further questions come to mind: What are Margolis's reasons for saying, 'Ontic dualism entails attribute dualism, but not vice versa' (2)? Why dichotomize properties at all, if properties from either side of the categorial gap can apply to some things? Presumably we are guilty of a category mistake when we apply the attribute 'thinker' to a cup, but what more does the dualism-induced category error amount to than the mistake of supposing a cup to think? We similarly make a category mistake if we say the cup is even, odd, or easy to park; why then do we not have other property dualisms in the offing?

Margolis does not confront these sorts of question explicitly, and faces only some of them implicitly (though there is somewhat more in the books cited above). The book as a whole should demonstrate the benefits of thinking in the attribute dualism mode. One major gain is supposed to be that the natural and social sciences become one, in a *New Unity of Science*, as heralded in the

subtitle of the book, and as Margolis is at pains to demonstrate in the first five chapters. But for materialists of the reductive or eliminative stripe, the hallowed unity was never lost, and a paradise not lost can scarcely be regained. Since Margolis is explicitly a materialist ('the most viable form of attribute dualism cannot but be a form of materialism', 3), we have reason to suspect that regaining the unity of science became a problem for him only when he embraced attribute dualism. In any case, Margolis's case for the unity of science might just as well be entitled the case for the autonomy of the social sciences. The social sciences, according to him, differ radically from the physical sciences. In the attribute dualism manifesto which comprises the last page or so of the book, thesis number xxv is simply, 'any plausible reformulation of the unified science conception must accomodate the foregoing theses' (159), where most of the previous 24 theses are either high-hurdles or insurmountable obstacles to anything like what is plausibly meant by the *unity* of science; for examples, 'causality does not imply nomologicality,' 'causal explanation need not be deductive,' and 'in the human sciences, at least, phenomena may be explained under, possibly only under, covering institutions [as opposed to covering laws]' (158, items x, xi, xii).

However, attribute dualism aside, the book is filled with pertinent information and illuminating discussion especially concerning the phenomenon of human language, the thread that runs through *Culture and Cultural Entities*. Those readers who do not have a taste for inconclusive arguments, and would rather not stir up hornets' nests, may happily distil workaday truth from contention, and thereby join the discussion without having their credulity stung. Applying the Quinean 'principle of charity' in our translation of the words 'irreducible' and 'emergent.' we we get the following: whatever regularities obtain at the psycho/sociological level are *irreducible* to regularities at the physical level, in just the innocent sense in which the geological regularities of the Earth (such as that is gets hotter towards the center) are not derivable from the laws of physics alone; the psycho/sociological phenomena are *emergent* upon the biological in just the innocent sense in which pressure is emergent for gases upon molecular phenomena (i.e., pressure is not defined for individual molecules of gas). The psycho/sociological is both irreducible and emergent, and may be called sui generis.

Given that the text allows such a reading, what emerges in the last two chapters of the book is a penetrating discussion of the views of Chomsky, Grice, Hjelmslev, de Saussure, Ziff, and, pre-eminently, Wittgenstein. The account of language which Margolis hereby provides pays close attention to the empirical facts, while avoiding the oversimplifications and platonistic tendencies which are rife in this field. Chomsky's notion of 'universal grammar' is (once again) demonstrated to be either incoherent or implausible. Grice's account is shown to presuppose precisely what needs most to be explained. The others listed above have more to offer, and Margolis synthesizes these offerings nicely to provide a view which, though schematic, at least accomodates such facts as that languages evolve diachronically, that no single

speaker can internalize all the supposed rules of his language, that such rules are idealizations, and so on. If what we end up with looks more like a natural history of language than a science of linguistics, this can hardly be a problem for Margolis, but for aspirant linguistic scientists.

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BEN MIJUSKOVIC. *Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time and Mind*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins for B.R. Grüner Publishing, Amsterdam. Pp. 214. ISBN 90-6032-254-1.

This work is not a defence of metaphysical immaterialism (contingent or otherwise) because Mijuskovic is committed to the existence to a *material* external world (96).In a word, its author believes that matter is real enough. What is presented is a philosophy of mind which holds that the mind (consciousness) must be immaterial because the elements of consciousness in general, and more specifically in this work, meanings, freedom, and time, being unextended, must be immaterial. The work attempts therefore to argue against materialistic or physicalist theories of mind which are identified as behaviorism, mechanism, and the identity thesis of Armstrong and (incredibly!) Ryle who is lumped in with Armstrong. (89, n. 1). Examples given of the 'behavior' theory of mind are Epicurus, Hobbes, Locke ('at times') and it is a theory which 'is generally shared by materialist, empiricist, and phenomenalist systems' (90). The only other two 'paradigms' (this term is both misused and vastly overused in the work) of consciousness are the intentional and the reflexive. Apparently the intentional, which is attributed to Brentano and Husserl, is really something like the first 'paradigm' because it is characterized by 'undirectionality' (92) (whatever that means) but is unlike the first because it is based, like the 'reflexive,' theory, on immaterialist assumptions. The third theory, the 'reflexive,' is the one that Mijuskovic wishes to defend and is the theory which was advocated by Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, all of continential philosophy from Descartes to Bergson, and finally H.D. Lewis. It would appear that the essence of this theory is to hold that in some 'strong sense,' human beings are self-consciousness and primordially so.

In order to achieve his purpose, Mijuskovic employs what he calls a history of ideas approach. At the start, he identifies what he calls the 'simplicity argument' which holds that a) the essential nature of the soul con-

sists in its ability to think; b) thought, being immaterial, is unextended, i.e., simple, without parts; and c) what is simple is indestructible, a unity, and an identity (3). From this point on, a substantial portion of the work is taken up with showing that practically everyone in the history of philosophy, either consciously or 'unconsciously' (96) has held this view. In fact, the only exceptions appear to be the atomists, Epicurus, Hobbes, Armstrong, and Ryle! (Even Kant, who destroyed the argument in the first *Critique*, actually held the view himself! [156]). A vast array of literary figures are also invoked to make the point that the view is very widespread and possesses great historical continuity. Unfortunately, the marshalling of a vast number of believers adds nothing to the validity of what is believed.

What is the force of the term 'contingent' in the title? One might have thought that it was an attempt to echo, on the immaterialist side, Armstrong's claim that the mind-brain identity relation is contingent. But this is not the case. Mijuskovic writes:

> I wish to hold that...it is actually the case that matter produces an *existent* "nothing," i.e. self-consciousness, or, that there actually is a creation of nothing (consciousness) from something (matter). And I wish to christen this doctrine "contingent immaterialism." (96)

The force of 'contingent' then is that matter *conditions* mind; that is, matter can exist without mind but not the other way around (144). Mind, being immaterial, is not reducible to matter, and although it is a 'nothing,' 'it is inhabited by' meanings, (which are immediate a priori synthetic relations or structures), freedom, and time (96-7).

Does this not mean that Mijuskovic is a dualist? He says not because 'matter is a true substance' and there is 'only one substance' (144). He maintains that 'matter produces "nothing," i.e., consciousness,' and 'consciousness is ... an immaterial property of material conditions' (145).

Finally, all of this leads up to the conclusion that man is utterly lonely because the theory of mind put forward holds that 'each of us dwells alone in immanent time' (171). Lonliness is both psychologically and metaphysically the nature of man (183-93) but Mijuskovic cannot define it because it is 'a feeling as well as a meaning' (182). Moreover, not only philosophy, but a whole list of writers testifies to this truth. (the list is actually given on p. 199!). The consciousness of man has 'created an Absolute Nothingness' and it 'creates or posits meanings, ... essences. The ontological argument (therefore) ... valid for human consciousness, ... makes God ... a contingent being while man ... alone is a necessary existence but, ... infinitely alone' (211).

Apart from the remark that Mijuskovic is very confused about most of the thinkers with whom he deals, I really can say nothing more.

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CHARLES PARSONS. *Mathematics in Philosophy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983. Pp. 368. US$42.50. ISBN 0-8014-1471-7.

This book brings together eleven of Parsons's penetrating essays on the philosophy of mathematics. Students of the subject will have read and reread most of these before, but all will find the orienting introduction and the four updating postscripts helpful. Some will miss Parsons's enclyclopedia article 'Mathematics, foundations of.' Two of the essays are entirely new.

The book is divided into three parts. The first — 'Mathematics, Logic, and Ontology' — consists of three articles from the early seventies: the wellknown 'Ontology and Mathematics,' in which Parsons assesses the ontological commitments of elementary and constructive mathematics without requiring Quine's regimentation into classical first order logic, and incidentally introduces two of his important themes, the perception or intuition of mathematical entities and the connection of mathematical existence with modality; 'A Plea for Substitutional Quantification,' in which he argues (contra Quine) that substitutional quantification does express a real concept of existence, but (contra Sellars) that not all quantification over abstraction entities can be taken substitutionally; and 'Informal Axiomatization, Formalization and the Concept of Truth,' which assesses the significance of Tarski's and Godel's limitative theorems, and introduces a thrid important theme, the idea that the universe of sets is too irreducibly potential to be quantified over classically.

Part Two, 'Interpretations,' consists, naturally enough, of interpretations of the positions of three other philosophers of mathematics; all but the last of these essays were first published in the sixties. The first two concern Kant's theories of space and of arithmetic, respectively. 'Infinity and Kant's Conception of the "Possibility of Experience" ' argues that Kant's theory of space cannot explain our purportedly synthetic a priori knowledge of geometry, and 'Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic' investigates the role of intuition in Kant's theory of number. (In a new postscript to the second of these, Parsons replies to some objections of Hintikka.) 'Frege's Theory of Number,'the third essay of this section, identifies the undeniable centrality of the logical notion of one-to-one correspondence in the analysis of number as the residue of truth in the defunct thesis of logicism. (Here another postscript replies to Steiner).

This interpretative section concludes with a brand-new, thought-provoking essay, 'Quine on the Philosophy of Mathematics.' Parsons lets Quine's argument against the a priority of mathematics stand, and asks whether this is enough to show that mathematics is not necessary. In fact, Quine seems only interested in maintaining that there is no 'more austere' form of necessity than physical necessity. Parsons argues that mathematical necessity is no less general than logical necessity, and that mathematical necessity is needed to explicate mathematical existence (again the second theme mentioned above). Quine, of course, holds that there is only one type

of existence, but Parsons finds the claim that there is no clear line between mathematics and natural science implausible. He concludes with the interesting observation that Quine actually treats set theory as more like logic than like physics, and traces this to Quine's conviction that only the Fregean, not the iterative, conception of set is natural.

The final section of the book, 'Sets, Classes, and Truth,' consists of three papers from the seventies, and a newly-published, technical follow-up to the last of these. The first, 'Sets and Classes,' develops the third theme mentioned above, the idea that the universe of sets is not determinate enough to be quantified over, and concludes that the language of set theory should be understood as systematically ambiguous: there is always a more inclusive point of view from which the range of my universal quantifier (my proper class) is really just a set. A parallel treatment of the truth paradoxes is presented in 'The Liar Paradox,' (Another postscript discusses subsequent work of Kripe, Burge, Herzberger, Gupta, and Chihara.) Finally, 'What is the Iterative Conception of Set? ' argues against Wang's idealistic interpretation of the cumulative hierarchy, in favor of a Cantorian notion of multiplicities that are absolutely infinite and not constituted by their elements, and concludes with the beginnings of a modal interpretation of set theory. The final essay, a new one entitled 'Sets and Modality,' reports on the technical side of this project.

Taken together, these essays underscore the importance of Parsons's contribution to contemporary philosophy of mathematics. Few have devoted themselves so uncompromisingly to problems among the most difficult our subject has to offer. Never one to over-simplify, Parsons is a difficult writer, given to stylistic awkwardness and even obscurity, but careful study of his dense and suggestive works is always repaid.

Perhaps most of all, the appearance of these essays, collected in this form, will produce an eager anticipation of the next volume. References to recent works reserved for the sequel, and to 'work in progress or projected,' promise additional insight into the open questions of most interest here. On the theme of mathematical intuition, we can look forward to Parsons's analyses of the extent to which mathematical induction can be considered intuitive (24), of the intuitability of objects that aren't 'quasi-concrete' (25), of the intuitability of finite sets of intuitable objects (26),and of the relation of mathematical intuition to mathematical formality (26). Though the work presented here is neutral on the question of Platonism versus constructivism (26, 31), there is the suggestion of more work on the notion of a mathematical object (17, 19) and its incompleteness (25, 189-90). And finally, we might hope for a clearer conception of the crucial difference between two possible worlds which both contain a certain multiplicity of objects, but only one of which contains the set of these (e.g., 293-4).

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H.P.RICKMAN. *The Adventure of Reason: The Uses of Philosophy in Sociology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1983. Pp. viii + 172 US$27.95. ISBN 0-313-23871-5.

H.P. Rickman's *The Adventure of Reason* is a sustained inquiry into ways in which philosophy, as represented by four major philosophers — Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, has relevance for sociology. The legacy of philosophy, through these thinkers, can be accurately dubbed the philosophy of reason because of a general adherence to four basic principles — (1) 'only accept as true what is based on sound, critically examined evidence and valid reasoning,' (2) 'reality is knowable because it has a rational and therefore rationally intelligible structure,' (3) 'if everything must be examined rationally, the mind must turn its critical scrutiny even upon its own activities,' and (4) 'reason can be practical, can guide action by providing moral principles, as well as prudential consideration, which can be rationally discussed.' (9-11) If this is what philosophy stands for, and, considering what sociology is, the 'unique link between the philosophy of reason and sociology' becomes evident:

> ... the latter has reason and its products for its subject matter. Man himself, as he appears in the sociologist's perspectives, is a rational being — clearly not always, perhaps only occasionally rational, but capable of reason nevertheless and using this capacity in decisive ways. It has enabled him to create complex, highly organised societies which contain and depend on laws, moral codes, institutions, organizations, and an accumulation of knowledge. All these manifestations, which bear the stamp of reason, are part of the sociologist's subject matter.

Plato has particular importance for the sociologist because of his pioneering work into the notion of social roles; for example, during his conversation with Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, Socrates, in effect, analyzes the role of the ruler as he considers what the goal of ruling is. Further, Plato shows that we can identify different societies as we vary the basic ordering principle; thus, make wealth the dominant principle and we get an oligarchy. Such an analysis of how societies would function, in principle, in the absence of external influences, is, Rickman tells us, what Weber later referred to as 'ideal types' (37). Descartes stands for demanding a method epistemologically grounded and can be read, Rickman thinks, as having worries of the exact nature as sociologists:

> But I suggest that behind Descartes' elegant use of skeptical arguments lie more genuine worries about personal bias, cultural relatively, and prejudice as sources of uncertainty, confusion, and controvery. (63)

All scientists are given a green light for thinking they can render fully a scientific explanation of reality with Spinoza's thesis of the identity of God and nature. And sociologists, Rickman says, will find Spinoza's discussioon of

God of particular interest, since it involves an analysis of whole-parts relations. Among the contributions of Kant is the compromise he effected between the positions of empiricism and rationalism. Rickman brings out how such a move opens the door to the sociology of knowledge:

> Once we accept that knowledge is not a simple matter of something imprinting itself on the mind, it becomes possible to consider if and to what extent the patterns we impose on experience are socially conditioned. (120)

Rickman's intended audience seems primarily to be one populated by sociologists unfamiliar with philosophy. It is for this reason I gather, that he finds he must introduce the reader to what philosophy traditionally stands for and to how the views of some of its major exponents are of interest and relevance for sociologists. In effect, Rickman derives for the sociologist, from his exposition of the traditional philosophers, many of the issues that have long been part of the standard repertoire of the philosophy of the social sciences. So the work is not even an introduction to the philosophy of the social sciences or sociology as much as it is an apology for philosophy directed at, again, the unenlightened sociologist, Rickman brings this off very well; he clearly knows his philosophy, loves it and sociology.

If Rickman has tailored his writing well for his intended audience, he may have done so at the expense of its having an uncomfortable fit for other readers. Conspicuously absent from the work is any but a passing mention of major sociologists and their ideas. Weber, I believe, is the only sociologist mentioned and, he only once. Arguably, even the sociologist would find the discussion of works familiar to him useful as a conventional reference point. Without this, the work, I think, will remain uncomfortably myoptic for most readers, either too prosaic for philosophers because of its perspective that the reader's philosophical mind is tabula rasa or too specialized for the generally educated reader because of its perspective that the reader needs some philosophy but no sociology. But, again, it probably is just right for the sociologist who does not know his philosophy.

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ROLF SARTORIUS, ed. *Paternalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983. Pp. xii + 287. US$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1172-6); US$12.95 (paper : ISBN 0-8166-1174-2).

This is a collection of fourteen essays — about half of them previously published — dealing in various ways with the title subject. Leading off are 'Legal Paternalism' by Joel Feinberg and 'Paternalism' by Gerald Dworkin. These well-known and widely-reprinted essays stand as the most thorough discussions of the justification of paternalism in the book. Other contributions are generally more specific in focus.

Several of the volume's offerings are critical discussions of paternalistic or partially paternalistic rationales for certain actual or proposed practices in modern society. Two essays by Daniel Wikler criticize paternalistic arguments for governmental coercion designed to alter health-endangering lifestyles and for protective restrictions on the mildly retarded. An article by Allen Buchanan attacks arguments supportive of medical paternalism and one by Rolf Sartorius argues against paternalistic rationales for civil commitment.

Other essays take up matters touching on paternalism in more varied ways. A new essay by Gerald Dworkin reconsiders the definition of paternalism and looks more directly than his previous article had done at the choice between hard and soft paternalism. Jack Douglas's contribution offers a distinction between 'cooperative paternalism' and 'conflictful paternalism' and an historically-based analysis of the conditions which give rise to and maintain cooperative forms of paternalism. A new article by Joel Feinberg explores the concept of 'noncoercive exploitation' and suggests that advocacy of criminal prohibition of such exploitation may involve tacit appeal to legal moralism more than to legal paternalism or the harm principle. Donald Regan's discussion focuses on ways in which paternalism may maximize freedom and on the relationship between past, present, and future selves as it affects the justification of paternalism.

Fuller discussion of a few of the essays will suggest something more of the character of the issues addressed in the volume. Consider, for example, Herbert Morris's exploration of the possibility of a paternalistic rationale for punishment. Punishment, he suggest, may be justified on the grounds that it furthers the good of potential and actual wrong doers by promoting their identity as morally autonomous persons attached to the good. By this he means, roughly, that they appreciate the wrongfulness of the acts for which they are punished. Because the wrongdoer's autonomy is the good to be promoted, Morris sees this theory as consistent with respect for autonomy. However, Morris does not come to grips with the fact that he is embracing a very strong form of paternalism.

Morris's view would seem to permit paternalistic interventions whenever the aim is to help the person appreciate the good, provided that the person is capable of doing so and shares a general commitment to society's underlying values and that these values are generally just. Paternalism is thus authorized with respect to those who selectively dissent from particular aspects of the society's shared morality while accepting its basic components. But is it not just such selective dissenters whose autonomy many have seen as threatened by society's imposition of its judgement in, e.g., the sphere of sexual morality? Not only does Morris's view tacitly endorse efforts to 'improve' such per-

sons, it also short-circuits criticism of such paternalism on grounds that it violates autonomy. Morris does nothing to make persuasive his supposition that an account of autonomy which does not permit challenging paternalistic treatment of the selective dissenter can be adequate. The principal element which he fails to consider, it seems to me, is the way in which respecting autonomy is a matter of respecting the choices actual particular persons do or would make.

Precisely such choices take center stage in Allen Buchanan's critique of the way that courts have used the idea of substituted judgement in deciding whether to continue medical treatment for incompetent persons. Courts attempt to determine what incompetent persons would, if competent, choose, but in assessing this they sometimes rely on assumptions about what most reasonable persons would choose. Buchanan argues that this fails to respect the incompetent person because it does not allow for the possibility that his or her choice might diverge from that of most persons. He also objects to the attempt to impute choices to those who have never been competent (e.g., severely retarded adults) on the ground that there can be no evidence about what such persons, if competent, would choose. He concludes that the substituted judgement standard is inapplicable to many cases.

What Buchanan has done is to define the substituted judgement standard so that the only choices which may properly be imputed to an incompetent are ones based on that individual's actual past competent choices. But why must past competent choices be the only legitimate guides to what a presently incompetent person would, if competent, choose? If we encountered an unconscious accident victim in need of prompt medical attention, we would feel justified in providing treatment because we would be virtually certain that the person would, if competent, want treatment. Yet we may make this judgement without knowing *anything* about this individual's past competent choices. Moreover, I submit that nothing is changed if the accident victim happens to be someone who has never been competent. There is simply no reason to confine the evidence on which we make assessments of the preferences of an individual to past choices of that individual, and consequently, no reason to think that the substituted judgement method cannot be used for the never-competent. As for the possibility of divergence between the choice imputed to the incompetent individual and the choice of reasonable persons, this is preserved so long as individualized evidence, *when available*, is given priority over directly conflicting evidence based on choices of most reasonable persons.

The role of respect for competent choice is also taken up in Dan Brock's discussion of consequentialist versus rights-based approaches to paternalism. He argues that when rights-based approaches make the subject's incompetence a necessary condition of justified paternalism, they fail to achieve their intended purpose of protecting at least some bad decisions from interference. They fail because bad decisions seem to qualify as incompetent and thus not to receive protection. Brock's response to this is to propose a

consequentialist theory according to which paternalism is justified when it in fact maximally promotes the good of the subject.

Norman Dahl's essay responds to Brock by focusing on the conception of a person used by Brock. An alternative challenge can be made by questioning Brock's assumptions about the function of incompetence conditions on justified paternalism. As Brock recognizes, such requirements have been proposed as *necessary* conditions. As such they must be combined with other conditions before a sufficient justification for paternalism exists. Brock fails to show that these other conditions cannot or do not provide the protection for some bad decisions that he assumes must come from incompetence requirements.

Space remains for only a single summary comment. Study of these essays will be of value for all students of the problems of paternalism.

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CLAUDE SAVARY et CLAUDE PANACCIO, (dir.) *L'idéologie et les stratégies de la raison*. (Collection "Brèches"), Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1984. 286 pages, ISBN 2-89045-623-3.

L'*idéologie et les stratégies de la raison*, qui vient de paraître aux éditions Hurtubise, reprend les textes remaniés et complétés de la plupart des communications données lors du Ve colloque interdisciplinaire 'Science et Idéologie' de la S.P.Q., tenu en 1980 à l'Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières.

Divisé en trois sections, intitulées respectivement, 'approches théoriques,' 'la science dans l'idéologie,' 'analyses de situations,' le recueil comprend dix textes précédés d'une présentation de la problématique d'ensemble et de l'organisation thématique par Claude Savary (de l'U.Q.T.R.). Ce dernier dégage la cohérence profonde du questionnement tout en soulignant ses principales lignes de force et ce qui fait l'intérêt de sa distribution.

Nicole Laurin Frenette (de l'Université de Montréal) ouvre par une question bombe le premier ensemble de textes. Ne faudrait-il pas se désintéresser des théories de l'idéologie (idéalistes ou matérialistes) disqualifiées pour cause de métaphysique ou de spéculation abstraite? Ne serait-il pas plus fertile, se demande l'auteur, de faire une 'analyse critique' qui se préoccuperait, plutôt

que de théoriser à vide, en quelque sorte, de recueillir 'ce que dit l'idéologie et ce sur quoi elle fait silence...' (29)?

Le point d'impact de cette question redoutable s'enregistre, à mon sens, à travers les trois sections de l'ouvrage; et ce n'est pas son moindre attrait que ce regard neuf jeté par chacun des auteurs sur les anciennes problématiques. Que ce soit sur le plan des intentions ou des présupposées théoriques des textes réunis ici, le lecteur s'apercevra vite que les textes centraux en appellent à un réalignement de l'appareil conceptuel ou à une réévaluation des stratégies de l'analyse.

Claude Panaccio (de l'U.Q.T.R.) commence par dénoncer, à juste titre, 'l'imbroglio conceptuel' (35) dans lequel se trouve la théorie de l'idéologie. Il propose, en vue de la reconstruction nécessaire de la problématique, le renouvellement du réseau conceptuel et une série de définitions dont le noyau est constitué par les notions de 'système de croyances' et de 'justifications.' Il tente ensuite de les adapter à l'analyse des idéologies, laquelle est divisée à son tour selon les problèmes d'ordre différent qui se posent à 'l'idéologiste,' dirions-nous pour reprendre le terme de Tracy, en analyse interne et analyse externe.

Roberto Miguelez (de l'Université d'Ottawa) examine les enjeux de la perspective interprétative de l'idéologie, lorsque celle-ci est considérée comme 'action significative.' Pareille perspective sera présentée dans le troisième et dernier texte de cette section par Alfred Dumais (de l'Université Laval), 'Herméneutique et Idéologie.' Miguelez montre les limites des perspectives qui, privilégiant le versant 'pratique signifiante' de l'idéologie, oublient les effets produits par son versant 'pratique sociale.' Si la question du pouvoir est mise au premier rang, dira l'auteur, on risque moins de méconnaître, d'une part, les déterminations que fait peser sur le discours idéologique la réalité politique, d'autre part, le poids des conditions sociales sur la pensée.

Après cet ensemble de textes qui discutent de problèmes généraux posés par la critique des théories de l'idéologie, on trouvera dans les deux autres ensembles, l'examen soigneux de problèmes plus sectoriels. La deuxième section traite des rapports entre science et idéologie. Ne s'attardant pas aux vieilles lunes, comme on dit, aucun des textes n'enlisera le débat dans les termes caducs de l'approche althussérienne orientée par la théorie engelsienne de la démarcation universelle. A partir du problème engendré par les relations entre le champ de l'activité scientifique et ses conditions sociales, il s'agira de déterminer la portée idéologique de certaines thèses adoptées par des scientifiques. Chacun des trois auteurs de cet ensemble posera la question qu'il a jugée adéquate pour 'entrer' dans le problème. L'angle d'ouverture de cette question correspondra, à mon sens, aux représentations que chacun des auteurs s'est formé de ce concept d'idéologie aux entrelacs complexes et aux effets polymorphes, comme on le sait.

Ainsi Normand Lacharité (de l'UQAM), plus sensible à ce qu'enveloppe de politique la notion d'idéologie, distinguera de manière féconde entre le plan épistémologique et celui où se déroule la 'lutte idéologique,' pour se demander si ce n'est pas seulement dans sa 'fonction de légitimation'

(politico-sociale) que réside l'enjeu idéologique de la thèse de non-neutralité de la science, soutenue par l'épistémologie marxiste contemporaine. Il analyse cette thèse selon sa version exposée par un groupe de physiciens marxistes italiens dans un livre récent L'*Araignée et le Tisserand*, publié dans sa traduction française au Seuil (1979) sous la direction de G. Ciccotti. Robert Nadeau (de l'UQAM), privilégiant l'aspect idéationnel de la notion d'idéologie, questionnera la recevabilité des thèses kuhniennes relatives au système de 'valeurs épistémologiques' (concepts logico-méthodologiques) lequel fonctionnerait d'après Kuhn comme 'idéologie de la science.' Jean-Claude Guédon (de l'Université de Montréal), attentif surtout à la notion de 'lutte sociale' et, partant, à des fonctions comme celles 'd'usurpation' (151) et 'd'appropriation' (149), discute les thèses de Canguilhem puis celles de Bourdieu, en montre les limites pour s'interroger, enfin, sur le rôle effectif joué par des éléments reliés à l'idéologie dans le développement même de la science.

Le troisième ensemble de textes met en lumière certains problèmes concrets posés par l'évolution de la culture dans nos sociétés. Ainsi David Braybrooke (de Dalhousie University) dont le texte a été traduit en français par C. Savary, réfléchit sur la figure actuelle du travail. L'auteur, d'une part, brosse la situation nouvelle, du point de vue culturel et social, où se trouve 'l'homme au travail' lorsqu'il est confronté aux progrès de la science et de la technologie; d'autre part, il indique les effets axiologiques sur l'aperception du travail, effets suscités, tout ensemble, par la 'mentalité' bourgeoise et par l'idéologie au sens marxiste. Georges François (de l'Université de Moncton) reprend les éléments principaux du texte de Braybrooke pour les commenter. Marcel Fournier, (de l'Université de Montréal) sur le texte duquel se termine l'ouvrage, envisage les facteurs d'ordre intellectuel et social qui ont permis 'l'entrée dans la modernité' du Québec entre les années 1920 et 1950: de quelle manière on peut parler à ce propos d'un 'effet de génération' (215), de l'effet de l'idéologie du progrès, l'idéologie commune d'alors (220) ou encore des nouveaux rapports à la réalité culturelle et politique (222) qu'instaure la 'nouvelle classe moyenne.'

La lecture de ce livre aura été enrichissante à tous égards. Il est rare de trouver dans un recueil collectif, de manière soutenue, autant de textes d'une densité théorique aussi vigoureuse, aux analyses aussi rigoureuses, à l'écriture aussi incisive. C'est un témoignage stimulant de la vitalité et de la fertilité du travail qui se fait sur cette question toujours actuelle de l'idéologie et toujours aussi controversée.

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HERBERT SCHNÄDELBACH. *Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933*. Trans. by Eric Mathews. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. x + 265. US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22793-3). US $ 12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-251-29646-3).

Hegel had so thoroughly dominated the philosophical scene in Germany in the opening decades of the last century that his death in 1831 really did seem to bring philosophy to an end. His death (not of old age, but cholera) occasioned a philosophical vacuum because no one else understood how to do Hegelian philosophy, and it precipitated an identity crisis in philosophy because it was unclear what was left to do and worth doing after Hegel.

The century after 1831 saw rapid and fundamental changes. The key to these changes may well be the change in the conception of science. With Hegel it had still been a thoroughly theoretical enterprise, the attempt to gain a unified comprehension of the ultimately intelligible nature of things. But after Hegel the practical side of science comes to dominate. What was wanted was something with technological applicability, an explanation of phenomena which would give control over these phenomena. Science is transformed into techno-science.

Beside this rising tide of experimental science philosophy appears fragmented. There are attempts to strike alliances between science (or one or other of them) and philosophy; and there are attempts to preserve philosophy's autonomy and priority.

Philosophy itself changes as an academic enterprise in the century after 1831. The day of the great philosopher seems to be gone. Increasingly the role of the philosopher is seen on the model of the scientific researcher. He is a trained member of an academic community with a specialized vocation, a philosophical worker putting in his regular hours on problems ready for him on the job site. The transformation of philosophy into a job like any other is, left open as a possibility for the decades after the middle of the present century.

This shift in the nature of academic philosophy removes the philosopher from centrality in our attempt to understand the philosophical period and replaces him with the philosophical problem. Schnädelbach is sensitive to this shift and accordingly organizes his book around problems rather than people. Not that there isn't a list of great names. Think of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Husserl, Heidegger. But these people either are not normal academic philosophers or their real influence does not fall into the period under consideration.

Schnädelbach is an erudite scholar in confident command of his material. This material is admirably organized around the themes of history, science, understanding (Verstehen), life, values, being and man, with an Introduction and some seventy-eight further subdivisions. A helpful chapter on the political, social and cultural history of the period is an unusual and worthwhile addition to the standard format for essays in the history of philosophy. Schnädelbach's book will handsomely repay the effort of reading it.

It will, however, require effort. German translated into English just isn't

easy reading, and this book is no exception. At times the text congeals into unacceptable opacity. For example, take a deep breath and test your cortex on the following passage.

> The objective universal in historical knowledge ... which is not merely invented, constructed or arbitrarily producible, is, as that in which the abundance of the historical individualities is to find its synthetic unity, at the same time to make possible the knowledge of this individuality. Anyone who can knowingly put himself in the place of that universal gains understanding of the chaos of the historical manifold,since he sees it in the perspective of that on which it ultimately depends; at the same time, he also thereby comes to know himself, for he himself belongs to that universal as an element of the whole. (47)

I cannot say to what extent the opacity of passages like this is the contribution of Eric Mathews, the translator, since the book was written especially for translation and publication by Cambridge University Press and the original was not available to me. Mathews, however, does not only translate Schnädelbach's German but also all the quotations from German authors whose work had already been translated into English (with a few exceptions of quotations from Max Weber which Mathews had previously translated and published with Cambridge University Press). This was a mistake. Not only does it present us with a number of examples every bit as opaque as the one given, but it results in some mistranslations. For example,'*Dasein* is a being which does not present itself only under other beings'; and Heidegger's term 'Befindlichkeit' is translated as 'Situatedness'; 'the absence of content of declining neo-Kantianism, positivism and psychologism in the concept of our century'; and 'lay' is used where 'lie' is correct in one translation of a passage by Nietzsche. I'm sure the old walrus would shudder, if he could, at being thus associated with American prime time television English. I haven't checked all the footnotes but suspect that there may be an unacceptable number of mistakes there. A cursory reading shows mistakes in Ch. 2 note 3, Ch. 7 note 4 and Ch. 7 note 11, which range from the trivial to the serious.

Every book has some flaws and this one is no exception. But it is well done in general and there is no other quite like it.

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TIMOTHY SPRIGGE *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism*. New York: Columbia University Press for Edinburgh University Press 1983. Pp. xiv + 291. US$30.00. ISBN 0-85224-455-x.

Timothy Sprigge, professor of Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh, offers herewith a dramatic redirection of twentieth century British philosophy. Two earlier books, *Facts, Words and Beliefs* (Humanities 1970), and *Santayana* (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974), anticipated this more complete systematic metaphysical treatise. The volume, an outgrowth of seminars presented at La Trobe University, offers the culmination of a lifetime of reflection upon, and sympathy for, metaphysical idealism.

The philosophical background for these reflections lies in the work of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Santayana, William James, Whitehead, and especially F.H. Bradley, with whom he is quite ready to disagree, but by whom he remains most seriously influenced. Consequently, British philosophy now comes nearly full circle since the days of early twentieth century British idealism, having survived a brief excursus into the anti-metaphysical and linguistic concerns of analytic philosophy. This is unashamedly a treatise on metaphysics, but steeped in the background of recent analytic philosophy, although Wittgenstein is mentioned but twice. Sprigge is careful to analyse various recent philosophies of mind and physical reality in detail in order to note their difficulties and build his case. He does metaphysics and does not just talk about it, for he would initiate a 'sea change' in contemporary British philosophy. At Edinburgh he carries the strong tradition of W.H. Walsh to a most systematic conclusion. Both metaphysics and idealism are alive and well and living in, of all places, the David Hume Tower. This is not the only sign of a revival of metaphysical idealism in contemporary philosophy, but it is, perhaps, the strongest sign to appear in Britain. Contrary to most expectations, the twentieth century may end as a neo-Hegelian period, although Hegel is seldom mentioned.

The book continues much of the usual British distance from the philosophical debates of contemporary Europe, although it is clear that Sprigge is acquainted with these philosophers. He is especially conscious of the influence and importance of his project of the work of Husserl, who receives sympathetic attention.

The methodology appropriate to such a metaphysical adventure is not to begin from 'scratch,' but to survey the metaphysical options, rejecting the incoherent and accepting the 'intuitively fulfillable.' This concept of 'intuitively fulfillable' plays a central role which Sprigge likens to the methodology of DesCartes, Hume, and Hegelian dialectic. Thereby we can achieve 'literal truths,' and arrive at the intelligible nature of the real.

The central argument begins with the interpretation of experience. Nature does not present particles but 'centres of experience,' thereby offering an alternative to physicalism. The only coherent reality possible beyond one's consciousness is further consciousness. The most ultimate unit of reality is a state of consciousness or a centre of experience, and reality, 'psychical through and through,' is composed of such centres. Physical data is phenomenal inevitably hiding a noumena, which is psychical. Particular data thus become 'concrete universals' manifesting their noumenal reality. Sprigge

offers detailed analysis indicating that alternative interpretations of the physical are unintelligible.

He then turns to an elaboration and defense of panpsychism. The noumenal reality or 'backing' of the physical is 'innumerable mutually interacting centres of exerience,' flows of experience, of which we are a 'high-grade instance.' For every physical reality there is a psychical 'in-itself.' The physicalists, including Armstrong, 'have their boot on the wrong foot,' for it is consciousness that is immediately known, and the physical lying beyond consciousness remains the 'something-we-know-not-what.' Physicalism is thereby blind to lived experience and ultimately nonsensical. In regard to the body-mind problem he finds some sympathy with Feigl, but argues that Feigl, when thought through, will involve a panpsychism.

Sprigge then offers an elaborate analysis and defense of a psychical monism, for all finite centres of experience are but parts of a cosmic centre of experience. We are moments of cosmic experience with distinct feelings of ourselves, and 'the universe as a whole is a single unitary experience.' Sprigge offers a detailed examination of the concept of relations, including Russell's, and, not surprisingly for an idealist, concludes that all relations are internal relations providing an experiential unity, an experience which the universe has of itself. Here, especially, Sprigge draws heavily upon Bradley and Whitehead.

He is then prepared to speak of the Absolute, a kind of 'specious present,' timeless, not an element in a larger process nor a being of successive phases. This conclusion is a result of two lines of reasoning to the effect that nouminal reality is psychical, and that all relations are holistic. We are such 'psychical occurents' in the symphony which is the Absolute. Even when we feel apart, we thereby point to what lies beyond us. (Royce is surely not far away.) The variety of experiences are eternally there in the Absolute, which lacks any 'restlessness and dissatisfied itching to be onto something else.' Process philosophers should take note.

Further reaction should focus upon two intertwined considerations. Methodologically ambiguity remains as to starting point, for one might have expected, with Sprigge's sympathy for Husserl, Hegel, and the tradition of idealism, that we would be offered a presuppositionless philosophical position with reason sufficiently self-reflexive to not only inquire about itself but to justify its activities. Such is not the case, however, for 'starting from scratch' is explicitly renounced. Consequently the initiation of the position, which is always the difficulty in philosophy, remains ambiguous. This is increasingly strange after it is delared that 'Being, and knowing, and being known are, in the case of consciousness, all one.' But how one establishes that most seriously contended claim remains unclear, and introduces a futher problem. It is unfortunate that Sprigge does not reflect upon the critique of idealism offered in Europe since Hegel. Amazingly, Kierkegaard is never mentioned, and the post-Hegelian debate of modern Europe, which may be the ultimate test of his position, is almost totally neglected. The book is carefully considered and well written, although the sentence structure is quite com-

plex with one sentence occupying seventeen lines. It will be a shame if this book is neglected, for it offers a major challege to the dominating tradition of contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

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