

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6G 2E5

Editeur associé

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières
C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada
G9A 5H7

The editors will consider for publication submitted reviews of publications that are strictly educational textbooks. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words in length, and should be sent to the appropriate editor.

Les éditeurs considéreront pour fin de publication des recensions d'ouvrages qui se présentent comme des manuels destinés à l'enseignement. Ces recensions ne doivent pas dépasser 1000 mots; elles devront être envoyées à l'éditeur respectif.

Subscription prices for a volume of six issues:

Institutions: \$40.00 (Canada)	US\$40.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals: \$20.00 (Canada)	US\$20.00 or CDN\$24.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students: \$13.00 (Canada)	US\$13.00 or CDN\$17.00 (Non-Canadian)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de six numéros:

Institutions: \$40.00 (Canada)	US\$40.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Hors-Canada)
Individuals: \$20.00 (Canada)	US\$20.00 or CDN\$24.00 (Hors-Canada)
Etudiants: \$13.00 (Canada)	US\$13.00 or CDN\$17.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published bi-monthly / publiée bimestriellement

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing
P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1984 Academic Printing and Publishing

Vol. IV/4 August/Août 1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIERES

Annick Charles-Saget, <i>l'Architecture du Divin: Mathématique et Philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus</i> (Pierre Bellemare)	139
Louis Dumont, <i>Essais sur l'individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne</i> (Joseph Pestieau)	142
Michel Foucault, <i>This is not a Pipe</i> (Petra von Morstein)	144
Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge, eds., <i>The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus</i> (James Bogen)	148
Agnes Heller, <i>A Theory of History</i> (M.G. Anderson)	149
John J. Jenkins, <i>Understanding Locke</i> (Douglas Odegard)	152
Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., <i>Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives</i> (William R. Schroeder)	154
Georges -A. Legault et Maurice Gagnon, eds., <i>Philosophie et éducation</i> (Adèle Chené)	157
Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni, <i>La robe</i> (François Peraldi)	158
Carol McMillan, <i>Women, Reason and Nature</i> (Naomi Scheman)	161
Hugo A. Meynell, <i>The Intelligible Universe</i> (John Leslie)	164
John Morreall, <i>Taking Laughter Seriously</i> (Jenny Teichman)	165
Jeffrie G. Murphy, <i>Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life</i> (Albert Fell)	168
L. Pompa and W.H. Dray, eds., <i>Substance and Form in History: A Collection of Essays in Philosophy of History</i> (Albert Fell)	170
Régine Robin, <i>L'Amour du yiddish</i> (Marie Poirier)	172
Irvin Rock, <i>The Logic of Perception</i> (Bonnie Thurston)	175
Lewis Rowell, <i>Tbinking About Music</i> (Randall R. Dipert)	178
Francis Sparshott, <i>The Theory of the Arts</i> (John W. Heintz)	181
H.G. Brack, <i>Phenomenology of Tools</i> (Robert Burch)	183

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LOUVAIN

Fondée en 1894 par D. Mercier

Publiée par l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université catholique de Louvain. Paraît quatre fois par an.

Directeur: J. LADRIÈRE. **Comité de rédaction:** J. ÉTIENNE, H. VAN CAMP, Georges VAN RIET, F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, Chr. WENIN.

Adresse de la rédaction: Collège Thomas More (SH3), Chemin d'Aristote 1, B-1348 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE, Belgique.

Service des abonnements et administration: E. PEETERS, B.P. 41, B-3000 LOUVAIN. C.C.P. 000-0425099-45.

Abonnement: 1250 FB. Numéro séparé: 400 FB (port en sus). **Abonnement à la Revue philosophique de Louvain et au Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie:** 1900 FB.

Février 1984

M. ADAM, *L'empirisme devant le problème de la bêtise.*

L. ALLAIN, *Le moi et le temps chez F.-M. Dostoïevski.*

F. GUIBAL, *F. Nietzsche ou le désir du oui créateur.*

B. DUQUESNE, *Les calculs dans le psychologisme du jeune Husserl (Vers les sciences pures).*

Comptes rendus: *Philosophie de l'Antiquité — Anthropologie philosophique.*
Chroniques.

Chaque article est suivi d'un résumé en français et en anglais.

The Journal of Philosophy

Subscriptions at \$15.00/year; \$12.00 to students
\$20.00/year to libraries

Students' price extended to retired and unemployed philosophers. Published bimonthly 1904 to 1976, monthly thereafter. Complete volumes and all separate issues available back to January 7, 1904 (volume 1, number 1); prices as follows:

BACK VOLUMES (from the first to the penultimate year)
32-page issues, \$1.50; 64-page, \$3.00; special issues, \$4.00.
Volumes (unbound, volume indexes included), \$30.00 each.

CURRENT VOLUMES (this year and last)
64-page issues, \$2.00; special issues, 96-page or over, \$3.00.
Volumes (unbound, volume indexes included), \$25.00 each.

ALSO AVAILABLE

Cumulative Fifty-year Index, 1904-1953; articles classified by subject and author; 452 p.; cloth, \$12.00. Ten-year Supplement, 1954-1963: 98 p.; cloth \$3.00, paper \$2.00.

720 PHILOSOPHY HALL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NYC 10027

ANNICK CHARLES-SAGET, *L'Architecture du Divin: Mathématique et Philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus*. Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles-Lettres' 1982. 342 p. ISBN 2-251-32603-0.

Cet ouvrage de philosophie ancienne n'adopte pas vraiment une perspective historique, car Annick Charles-Saget a refusé (introduction 18-21) de faire sien la conception de Ph. Merlan, qui veut que le néo-platonisme soit étudié dans la continuité de son évolution. Elle a préféré repenser les rapports de Plotin et Proclus dans leur discontinuité, en les présentant comme des relations d'*altérité*. Ainsi donc, ce travail appartient plutôt au genre de la comparaison qu'à celui de l'histoire, même s'il n'offre pas de confrontation systématique de la pensée de Plotin et de Proclus. Des éléments de comparaison nous sont cependant fournis en grand nombre, dispersés dans les sections juxtaposées que l'A. consacre à ces auteurs, et il n'est pas difficile, au fil de ses nombreuses critiques et de ses commentaires, de se faire une idée de ses sympathies et de ses antipathies. Dans ce travail, l'érudition et le haut niveau de conceptualisation ne sont pas des obstacles aux prises de parti.

L'ouvrage se découpe en trois grandes sections: les deux parties principales portent l'une sur Plotin ('La Théorie plotinienne du Nombre,' 91-186), l'autre sur Proclus ('Les Mathématiques et l'Ontologie chez Proclus,' 187-296), et elles consistent en un examen de la place et du rôle des mathématiques à l'intérieur de la pensée de ces auteurs. Ces études sont précédées d'une introduction ('Platon et Au-dela,' 25-90) où l'A. s'attache à décrire l'origine de sa problématique chez Platon et à en poser les termes.

Ces trois parties ne présentent pas toutes le même intérêt pour le lecteur non spécialisé qui chercherait avant tout à se *renseigner* sur la fonction des mathématiques dans les philosophies étudiées.

A cet égard, l'étude sur Platon est sans doute la plus difficile. L'A. y suppose connus non seulement les textes classiques qu'elle utilise, mais même les points de vue des nombreux commentateurs face auxquels elle prend position. Son but est de montrer qu'il y a, chez Platon, autant de fascination pour

les ambiguïtés du langage ordinaire que pour la rigueur conceptuelle des mathématiques et que la tension qui résulte de ces deux tendances difficilement conciliables est à la source de l'opposition qu'elle voit entre les deux types de 'néo-platonisme' que représentent, selon elle, Proclus et Plotin.

L'étude sur Plotin est celle des trois qui nous informe le mieux sur son objet. Cela tient, en partie, à une sympathie spirituelle, non exempte de réserves toutefois, dont Mme Charles-Saget ne fait pas mystère, en partie également à la présence, au sein de son exposé, d'un résumé systématique du *Traité des Nombres* (*Enn.* VI, 6 [34]), le même d'ailleurs qu'elle a déjà publié dans l'introduction à une édition de ce texte, préparée par une équipe du CNRS et parue chez Vrin en 1980. L'étude de Mme Charles est la première en date à accorder une telle attention à la question des mathématiques chez Plotin. Certes, la conclusion est que Plotin avait, au fond, assez peu d'affinités pour ces dernières, mais l'A. a le grand mérite de montrer comment il ne pouvait pas en être autrement: Plotin se refusant à assimiler le nombre qui structure le monde intelligible au 'nombre monadique constitué d'unités' dont s'occupent les mathématiques, il ne pouvait pas se représenter la procession du multiple à partir de l'Un comme un déploiement structuré sur le modèle d'une démonstration de géométrie, mais devait se le représenter comme une surabondance, un don, un épanchement vital. Il en va tout autrement de Proclus pour qui il y a 'connivence' profonde de l'être et du mathématique, connivence poussée au point où, selon lui, la procession s'effectue dans le même ordre et avec la même rigueur logique, rigueur contraignante, qui président à l'exposition des théorèmes de la science des figures.

Avec Proclus, l'A. n'a pas craint de s'attaquer à un thème sur lequel nous disposons déjà de deux solides études, un opuscule de Nicolai Hartmann sur *Les Principes Philosophiques des Mathématiques d'après le Commentaire de Proclus aux Éléments d'Euclide*, (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909) et un ouvrage du père Stanislas Breton, *Philosophie et Mathématiques chez Proclus* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) (qui contient d'ailleurs une traduction française du texte de Hartmann). Le livre d'Annick Charles-Saget se distingue tout à fait de ses devanciers. Alors que Hartmann se proposait avant tout de révéler Proclus à l'attention du monde savant comme un philosophe des mathématiques de la plus haute stature, qu'il fallait relire dans le contexte contemporain des débats sur les fondements des mathématiques, Mme Charles nous prévient, dès le départ (avant-propos, 6), que, dans son livre à elle, les mathématiques en tant que telles seront 'quelque peu délaissées' (le travail de Hartmann n'y est d'ailleurs nulle part même mentionné, en dehors de la bibliographie). A l'intérieur d'une perspective plus 'métaphysique,' ce livre se distingue aussi de celui du père Breton. Celui-ci proposait à son lecteur de l'initier à une spiritualité qui était parvenue à intégrer la géométrie d'Euclide comme une de ses étapes et il ne cachait pas qu'il en était complice. Mme Charles n'est pas aussi favorable à Proclus. A la voie de la connivence, elle préfère celle de l'analyse structurelle et elle se montre très critique, très dure même, envers un auteur à qui elle reproche d'avoir substitué sa vision irrémédiablement statique et hiérarchique de l'être au dynamisme plotinien.

Une critique si radicale et si générale ne peut qu'être objet de controverse. L'A. elle-même paraît en convenir, au tout début de sa conclusion, lorsqu'elle parle de son interprétation de Proclus sur le mode hypothétique. Le spécialiste n'aura de toute façon pas besoin de partager les sentiments de l'A. pour tirer parti de son travail. Comme tous les ouvrages d'érudition en philosophie ancienne, celui-ci sera jugé sur son détail. On a d'ailleurs fait tout ce qu'on a pu pour nous en faciliter l'accès, au moyen de précieux *indices*, index des noms propres, des matières et des passages discutés. On n'a malheureusement pas mis autant de soin à réviser la typographie et la ponctuation.

Au terme de sa route, le lecteur est bien heureux de trouver une conclusion qui rassemble avec clarté l'essentiel d'une recherche dont il risque un peu d'avoir perdu le fil dans le dédale des multiples discussions de points de détail qui constituent le tissu de l'ouvrage. A vrai dire, il s'agit moins d'une synthèse que de la reprise du problème dans les termes les plus radicaux. Suivant une démarche déjà esquissée dans ce qu'elle a dit de Platon, Mme Charles-Saget suggère que la question du statut des mathématiques chez les auteurs néo-platoniciens nous renvoie à leurs conceptions respectives des rapports du langage et de l'être: Plotin aurait dissocié mathématique et ontologie sur le fond de l'idée que le discours, quelle que soit sa rigueur, ne peut jamais être entièrement adéquat à son objet, alors que Proclus aurait plutôt été enclin à penser que le discours, et singulièrement le discours mathématique, étant donné le caractère logiquement contraignant de son développement, a une certaine emprise sur l'être. Les pages stimulantes de cette conclusion laissent entrevoir d'autres pistes (on appréciera la suggestion de l'A. pour qui la pensée hiérarchisante de Proclus reposerait peut-être sur une structure patriarcale, 314-16), mais on doit regretter que l'A. ne se soit pas engagé davantage dans celle-ci, d'autant plus qu'il n'est pas dit qu'un examen appliqué du champ et de la fonction de l'indicible chez Proclus, en particulier, n'aurait pas pu contribuer à vivifier quelque peu le système de ce dernier.

Cet ouvrage parsemé de références éclectiques à des auteurs philosophiques modernes et contemporains restera, dans l'abondante bibliographie des travaux en langue française sur le néo-platonisme, le témoin d'une époque et d'un milieu, pour ne pas dire une *ambiance*, où on était avant tout sensible à la puissance de séduction et de répulsion des discours.

PIERRE BELLEMARE
Université d'Ottawa

LOUIS DUMONT, *Essais sur l'individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne*. Collection Esprit Seuil. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1983. 267 p. 79FF. ISBN 2-02-006613-0.

Voici un livre qui mériterait d'être mieux écrit. Louis Dumont n'est jamais facile à lire. Sa pensée est stimulante et non conformiste, mais, hélas, elle est aussi parfois obscure. Ce dernier livre renforce mon jugement. Il comprend sept essais dont la plupart ont déjà été publiés, soit en anglais, soit en français, soit dans les deux langues. D'une part, ces essais sont très divers. Ils traitent d'histoire, d'anthropologie, de politique ou de philosophie. D'autre part, ils continuent la réflexion que l'auteur a déjà poursuivie dans *Homo hierarchicus* et *Homo aequalis*, et donne une nouvelle unité à cette réflexion remarquable.

L'auteur critique l'individualisme occidental avec le recul que lui confère une longue pratique de l'anthropologie. Il envisage cet individualisme dans sa genèse et sous différentes formes qu'il a pu revêtir, en le comparant au 'holisme' ('idéologie qui valorise la totalité sociale et néglige ou subordonne l'individu [263]) qui se retrouve partout hors de l'Occident. Il montre aussi que la reconnaissance de diverses cultures, le respect de l'autre dans son originalité et son appartenance à une culture originale, est un processus difficile qui ne fut probablement possible qu'à partir de notre culture occidentale. 'Nous' qui parlons d' 'eux,' nous voyons en eux des semblables, nous pouvons apprendre à nous connaître en même temps que nous apprenons à les connaître. L'étude des autres et des différences concrètes entre eux et nous s'inscrit dans une anticipation de l'universel qui nous unit, mais cet universel n'est jamais donné, si ce n'est en négatif dans l'intelligence de l'altérité. Tels sont les grands thèmes qui traversent ce livre.

Dans le premier essai, intitulé 'De l'individu hors du monde à l'individu dans le monde,' l'auteur voit les débuts de l'individualisme et de l'universalisme modernes dans le christianisme. 'L'âme individuelle reçoit valeur éternelle de sa relation filiale à Dieu, et dans cette relation se fonde également la fraternité humaine' (40). D'abord, la perfection est une affaire toute intérieure et l'Eglise est pensée comme unité organique où l'individu trouve refuge. Avec Calvin, se produit un tournant capital: l'individu se doit de manifester son salut par son œuvre dans le monde. Il n'a plus à se réfugier dans l'intériorité, ni dans la communion des saints, ni à l'abri de l'Eglise. Celle-ci ne sera bientôt plus qu'association de chrétiens individuels, de volontés agissantes selon la volonté de Dieu. La notion de 'sociétés' remplace la notion d' 'universités' non seulement pour penser l'Eglise mais aussi, comme on le verra dans l'essai suivant, pour penser l'Etat.

Le second essai traite de la catégorie politique à partir du 13^e s. A travers le nominalisme et la réforme, l'individualisme l'emporte sur le tout culturel dont dépend l'individu. On ne redécouvrira ce tout et cette dépendance qu'avec la sociologie au 19^e siècle. Hobbes reconnaîtra bien la nécessité de l'assujettissement à un Etat. Mais celui-ci n'est qu'artifice. Le donné initial, ce

sont les individus égaux et isolés qui s'unissent dans un contrat social. Comme Hobbes, Rousseau partira d'un individualisme extrême pour aboutir à un étatisme extrême. Pourtant, pour Rousseau, l'individu demeure 'idéal moral et revendication politique irrépressible' (101), alors même qu'il fait partie d'une société et que la volonté générale est sa vérité. Pour Hegel aussi, 'la loi n'est pas seulement *donnée* en opposition à la liberté de l'individu. Elle est aussi *rationnelle* comme la plus profonde expression de la liberté humaine' (110). C'est ainsi que l'on redécouvre que la société est bien plus qu'une association artificielle d'individus souverains.

Dans le troisième essai, l'auteur envisage les notions de peuple et de nation chez Herder. Il oppose la nation entendue comme individu collectif par les Allemands et la nation entendue comme collection d'individus par les Français. Ceux-ci se conçoivent essentiellement comme hommes, accidentellement comme français. Les Allemands se conçoivent comme hommes parce qu'ils le sont de façon concrète, nationale, appartenant à une culture particulière. Ils reconnaissent avoir besoin de l'encadrement étatique alors que les Français ne veulent voir dans cet encadrement qu'un moyen d'émancipation individuelle.

Le quatrième essai aborde le totalitarisme et le racisme d'Hitler. Chez ce dernier, la race remplace la nation: la lutte de chacun contre tous ne laisse subsister aucune communauté mais seulement la race des plus forts, individus biologiquement isomorphes.

Le cinquième essai est un hommage à Marcel Mauss et une présentation de sa contribution à l'anthropologie.

Dans le sixième essai, intitulé 'La communauté anthropologique et l'idéologie,' se trouvent opposées l'idéologie de la spécialité scientifique qu'est devenue l'anthropologie, et l'idéologie de la société moderne d'où émane l'anthropologie. La première, parce qu'elle doit penser le tout que constitue chaque culture, adopte un point de vue holiste et va à l'encontre de la seconde. L'auteur revient à ce propos sur l'originalité de Rousseau, chez qui l'individu ne réalise son humanité universelle que par son appartenance à une société particulière. L'anthropologie partage ce point de vue puisqu'elle présuppose que l'humanité est une (universelle) mais que les hommes n'existent qu'au sein de cultures concrètes. Remarquons que la culture dans laquelle l'anthropologie s'est développée, représente '*une forme particulière d'humanité*, qui est exceptionnelle en ce qu'elle se nie comme telle dans l'universalisme qu'elle professe' (193). Néanmoins, cet universalisme est une condition du développement de l'anthropologie. Il permet de reconnaître les autres comme hommes, comme semblables. Encore fallait-il que l'anthropologie reconnaisse l'altérité des autres cultures, reconnaisse que 'notre humanité est comme le jardin de Herder où chaque plante — chaque société — apporte sa beauté propre parce que chacune exprime l'universel à sa façon' (198).

Le dernier essai traite de la valeur et du relativisme moral des modernes en tant que phénomène exceptionnel. Pour les modernes, 'il n'y a pas un ordre du monde humainement significatif, et il revient au sujet individuel d'établir

la relation entre les représentations et l'action, c'est-à-dire en gros entre les représentations sociales et sa propre action ... [Cette situation] n'a été rendue possible que moyennant la dévaluation des relations entre hommes, qui généralement commandaient les relations aux choses' (255).

Ce résumé ne rend pas justice aux fines analyses de l'auteur. Je recommande particulièrement les essais 2 et 6 à l'attention des lecteurs.

JOSEPH PESTIEAU
Collège St.-Laurent

MICHEL FOUCAULT, *This is not a Pipe*. Illustrations and Letters by René Magritte. Trans. and ed. James Harkness. Berkeley: University of California Press 1982. Pp. viii + 112. US\$14.95. ISBN 0-520-0432-8.

It is becoming natural for Anglo-American philosophers to look for *philosophy in literature*. In Europe the view even that philosophy and poetry are inseparable has, with varying emphasis and degrees, been part of philosophical tradition with the tendency toward taking poetic revelation as the optional result of systematic philosophical discourse. This tendency, in this century, culminated with Martin Heidegger's work, and it was one of the reasons why the painter Magritte counted him among his favourite thinkers. Furthermore he believed in 'the ascendancy of poetry over painting' in order for painting to acquire the same power for showing truth that is hidden by discourse: neither poetry nor painting have the function of making us recognize what we have seen or can see independently from it, but rather they should disclose what familiarity hides.

Foucault's *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* — which could be read as *Prolegomena, postscriptum*, to *Les Mots et les Choses* — points to a view of the history of painting that centers around this distinction between 'classical' and 20th century painting: the former is determined by the — interconnected — principles of 'resemblance' and 'assertion,' the latter by that of 'similitude.' Accordingly the 20th century constitutes a complete rupture in the tradition of painting.

Resemblance, according to Foucault, is a dyadic relation, in terms of common and familiar properties, between a referens and a referent. The reader does not learn what the conditions are that the two terms of a resemblance relation must fulfill such that it counts as one essential to 'classical' painting.

Must they be particulars of the same kind? Must they be two sets of generic visual impressions? No rules are indicated for what it is for a painting to refer, and assert, by resemblance. This is what we learn about 'resemblance' from *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*: A 'classical' painting shows something that can otherwise be seen, by virtue of resemblance between what shows and what is shown: the two terms are within the same 'pedagogic space' (29). Classical painting bears 'the burden of discourse' (transl. intr., 8). What is shown is what is meant (29). The referens represents the referent and, thereby, asserts it — i.e., asserts, or is used to assert that the referent exists and has the properties it is shown to have by the referens: their common 'pedagogic space' is 'common place' (28-31). Pointing to a painting of a pipe, or pointing to a pipe, one may say with equal force: 'This is a pipe.' A 'classical' painting and what it shows, as well as words used to say what it shows have a 'common place' relationship.

'Ceci n'est pas une pipe' is not a title common to a painting by Magritte and a book by Foucault: the marks that shape words and those that shape an image are given at once in the painting whose title is *Les Mots et Les Choses*; it has its title in common with another work by Foucault. There is no 'common place' between Magritte's painting *Les Mots et les Choses* or any of its details, and Foucault's book *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*.

According to Foucault 'classical' painting is banal just because it depends on the 'common place' between words and things. He attends to three proponents of the alternative principle of 'similitude' in the 20th century: Klee, Kandinsky, and Magritte, who employ it by respectively different methods.

What is similitude? 'Similitude circulates the simulacrum as the indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar' (transl.'s quotation, from *Les Mots et les Choses*: the careful and spirited translator remarks on the difficulty of translating the French 'similitude,' and suggests "'likeness,'" "similarity," or perhaps "a-likeness".') By contrast with 'resemblance' which 'presumes a primary reference that prescribes and classes,' similitude, if I understand Foucault, is likeness (a-likeness) generated between two or more items entirely on grounds intrinsic to them and their interrelation within a non-referential system; such likeness is not accountable for in terms of independent criteria. Features of similitude, as opposed to those of resemblance, are not to be expressed by concepts. If such expression were possible it would be irrelevant to the constitution of the relation of similitude. Thus we are to conclude, on Foucault's behalf, that similitude consists in non-discursive likeness.

Klee's, Kandinsky's, and Magritte's works are put forward as paradigmatic for painting which is essentially determined by the principle of similitude: recognition of what is to be seen on their paintings as resembling things in the 'real' world cannot be a key to their work. Klee and Kandinsky are claimed to dissociate or eliminate resemblances with objects in the 'real' world whereas Magritte is said to employ it in order to pervert it by freeing it completely from any system of reference.

Klee, Foucault says, abolishes the principle of hierarchical order 'running

from the figure to discourse or from discourse to the figure' (32), 'by showing the juxtaposition of shapes and the syntax of lines in an uncertain, reversible, floating space (simultaneously page and canvas, plane and volume, map and chronicle). Boats, houses, persons are at the same time recognizable figures and elements of writing.' (33) — Kandinsky breaks the association between resemblance and affirmation by 'a double effacement simultaneously of resemblance and of the representative bond, by the increasingly insistent affirmation of the lines, the colours that Kandinsky called 'things,' neither more nor less object than the church, the bridge, or the knight with his bow. Kandinsky's is a naked affirmation clutching at no resemblance ...' (34). — As for Magritte, however: '... more than any other his painting seems wedded to exact resemblances, to the point where they willfully multiply as if to assert themselves ... And yet, Magritte's art is not foreign to the enterprise of Klee and Kandinsky. Rather it constitutes, facing them and on the basis of a system common to them all, a figure at once opposed and complementary' (35).

It is not clear what, exactly, the 'system common to them all' is. It is that system in terms of which 20th century painting is, in Foucault's view, radically distinguished from 'classical' painting. Classical painting depends on the 'common place' between *les mots et les choses*. The likes of Klee, Kandinsky, and Magritte create an autonomous space for painting. This forces the conclusion that only 20th century painting if and when determined by the principle of similitude is creative, and that 'classical' painting is banal in its hierarchical interdependence with empirical discourse.

This result does not mesh with what most people take to be the reality of the history of painting. What, if any, then is the fault in Foucault's theory that leads to it?

The radical distinction between 'classical' and 20th century painting rests on the implied view that resemblance (as tied with reference and assertion) and similitude are mutually exclusive. I disagree with the claim of their mutual exclusiveness whereas I do agree that similitude is essential for a painting to be a work of art. However, resemblance and similitude are compatible, and indeed referential representation (by virtue of resemblance) may function as a device in achieving similitude (Cf. Petra von Morstein, 'Magritte: Artistic and Conceptual Representation,' *JAAC* 41 (1982-83) 369-74). The same holds of conceptual representation. Whereas referential representation points to an independently identifiable individual, conceptual representation points to the schema of an object (von Morstein, 370). It should be noted, but is not to the point of the present discussion that details of Magritte's paintings are in most cases conceptually, rather than referentially, representational.

Resemblance is, of course, not a necessary condition for similitude. Nor, as has now been shown, is it sufficient for the banality of painting. In objection to Foucault we may now suggest that the principle of similitude which determines an artwork as incorporating, rather than pointing to, a kind of experience continues through the history of painting without break in the 20th century, and that different painters may modify traditional patterns of interrelation between resemblance and similitude.

Even for Foucault's three paradigms it is not beyond debate that, by virtue of the principle of similitude, purified of resemblance, a painting is completely freed from the realm of discourse. Kandinsky's 'naked affirmation clutching at no resemblance,' for instance, can be taken as analogous to self-verifying statements which assert themselves independently from anything other than themselves. However, for it to be possible for a particular statement to be self-verifying it is necessary that words (concepts occurring in it) can be used to refer to things other than themselves: self-verifying statements in general presuppose referential relations in general. Similitude in general presupposes resemblance in general.

There are objections to be generated from the periphery of Foucault's argument. Ingenious and illuminating though his account of Magritte's calligram '*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*' is he is wrong in saying that 'what is essential [to 'classical painting] is that verbal signs and visual representations are never given at once. An order always hierarchizes them, running from the figure to discourse or from discourse to the figure' (32-3). At least on the surface this is empirically false; there are counter-examples for instance, in the Renaissance (consider Perugino's paintings of the virtues or studies by Raphael) to the 19th century (e.g., engravings by Blake). If the surface does not go all the way it remains to be shown that words and images here are indeed hierarchically ordered. And not that Foucault *proved* that they aren't in Magritte's case.

And yet, this small work by Foucault is exhilarating to read, not so much as a contribution to the theory of art, but as a poem in similitude with Magritte's painting.

PETRA VON MORSTEIN

University of Calgary

LEONARD GODDARD and BRENDA JUDGE, '*The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.*' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* Monograph 1982. Pp. v + 72. US\$10.00.

According to the *Tractatus*, all there is (by which Wittgenstein means all we can talk about in an ideally complete scientific theory) is, or reduces to configurations of simple objects. All of the meaningful declaratives of ordinary language and the sciences are truth functions of strings of simple names

which Wittgenstein calls 'elementary propositions.' Simple names refer to simple objects, and their meanings are exhausted by this; they have no Fregean senses, and cannot be glossed by Russellian descriptions. What Goddard and Judge ('GJ,' hereinafter) do is to look carefully, imaginatively, and fruitfully at hair raising consequences, pretty much brushed aside by most commentators, of this scheme together with Wittgenstein's remarks about simples. The horrors they examine arise from the following considerations.

Each simple object is capable of concatenating with some and incapable of concatenating with other simples, and at each moment, each one actually is concatenated with some and not with other simples. But, if simples have any features beyond these, Wittgenstein held that they could not be named, or expressed by atomic sentences or their truth functions. It follows that if simples have intrinsic features at all, they are inexpressible. And if they are inexpressible, they are also unthinkable, for to think, according to the *Tractatus*, is to covertly assert elementary propositions or their truth functions. GJ argue that simples have no intrinsic properties at all — thinkable, expressible, or otherwise. I found their argument for this unconvincing. It fails to consider the possibility of inferring the presence of theoretical properties of simples from the differences in their possibilities for concatenation (cf. GJI/1). But even so, the weaker thesis that if simples have intrinsic features, they are unthinkable and unspeakable is enough to generate the difficulties with which GJ grapple. Here are some of them.

If all we can say or think about simples is that they are or are not concatenated with (or able to concatenate with) various others, we can't know which object any one simple is (cf. GJ I/1). But, if to understand a simple name is to know which simple it refers to, it seems to follow that we can't understand simple names. This leads to parallel difficulties for *Tractatus* ontology and theory of language. If macroscopic things are nothing but configurations of simples, their features must emerge from features of the configurations. If GJ are right and simples have *no* features beyond their possible and actual configurations, what features can there be at the level of configurations of simples for macroscopic features to emerge from? If the weaker claim is true, how could we understand (or even think about) what they emerge from or how they emerge? Here things look especially grim in view of the *Tractatus* doctrine that the constituents of the configurations are nothing but simples. If we can't know which object any given simple is, there must be configurations we can't know either. The parallel linguistic difficulty is that if elementary propositions are strings of simple names, and we can't understand simple names (because we can't know which objects they refer to), it's hard to see how we could know the truth conditions of the elementary propositions or their truth functions. All meaningful propositions are supposed to be elementary propositions or their truth functions, and the meaning of a proposition, on the *Tractatus* theory, just is its truth conditions.

GJ's book is of interest not only for the carefully argued exposition which makes the seriousness of such problems inescapably obvious, but for the results of their consideration of them. These include a dramatic reinterpretation

tion of the *Tractatus*, from which tantalizing suggestions are developed and applied to current issues in ontology and the philosophy of science. Among many other fascinating and unusual discussions is GJ's consideration of Hertz in ch. 3 which deals with features of Hertzian mechanics which are quite interesting in their own right, highly germane to the *Tractatus*, and ignored by most *Tractatus* commentators.

GJ's principle thesis is that in view of the problems roughly sketched above, a *Tractatian* ontologist or philosopher of science should not consider simple objects or their configurations as building blocks from which macroscopic objects are constituted and from which their features can be understood as emerging. Instead, they are 'limiting points' whose existence must be posited by an ontologist to account for what goes on in geometry and physics. Their theoretical role is thus more akin to that of Kantian noumenal objects (as they are commonly understood) than to that of theoretical entities whose properties and behavior figure in the explanation of macroscopic phenomena. Analogously, a *Tractarian* philosopher of language ought not to say that our actual use and understanding of spoken language sentences is built up in any way from simple names or elementary propositions.

Because GJ are primarily concerned with ontology, the latter point is left relatively undeveloped. I am dubious about the possibility of making it square with the *Tractatus* picture theory, and Wittgenstein's apparent insistence that the picture theory accounts for such features of linguistic competence as the ability to assert and understand new propositions, and the passages which most commentators have understood as claiming that the meaningfulness of all language depends upon propositions being a truth function of elementary propositions. In contrast, GJ have done enough to show that the ontological thesis is well worth considering. The space limitations of this review prevent even a cursory discussion of this, but I hope that I've said enough to whet the reader's appetite. The book is well worth reading, and I recommend it to any philosophically sophisticated reader with an interest in the *Tractatus*, or in fundamental ontological issues.

JAMES BOGEN
Pitzer College

AGNES HELLER, *A Theory of History*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1982. Pp. vii + 333. Cdn\$42.75: US\$35.00. ISBN 0-7100-9010-2.

Agnes Heller is a Hungarian Marxist who now teaches in the Sociology Department at La Trobe University in Australia. The present work is the third in an on-going series dealing with various aspects of philosophical anthropology. (The first two are *On Instincts* and *A Theory of Feelings*, Assen, Netherlands, Van Gorcum 1979.)

Heller makes frequent references to Jules Verne's novel, *The Children of Captain Grant*, in order to illustrate the problems of interpretation facing the historian. In this novel the passengers of a ship, the *Duncan*, find a bottle in the entrails of a shark. The bottle contains three documents in three different languages; however, water and time have blotted out most of the words, and only disconnected fragments remain legible. The rest of the story concerns efforts to reconstruct the messages. All of these efforts fail, and it is only by sheer accident that the real meaning of the documents is eventually discovered. As one tries to read Heller's book one encounters problems of interpretation that easily match those of the passengers on the *Duncan*.

The book is a long, intensely personal, poetic, and at times mystical meditation on a variety of philosophical and political issues having some relationship or other to history. A partial listing of the philosophical issues would include the following: the nature of historical knowledge, the relationship between facts and values, the relationship between consciousness and the world, historical explanation, truth, freedom, the meaning of 'progress,' and the 'sense' of history. A similarly partial listing of the political issues would include: what Marx really meant, what he should have meant, the role of utopian thinking in revolutionary ideology, and the nature of the ideal society. While one encounters occasional flashes of good philosophical (and political) sense, they occur too rarely to make the book at its best anything more than a poorly organized and obscurely articulated presentation of what has already been said much better elsewhere. Of course, I allow for the possibility that the 'message of Captain Grant' is yet to be deciphered and that when it is, it will be found to contain nothing but pure philosophical gold. On inductive grounds, however, I doubt it. The work contains too many false or highly dubious claims, too many analytic statements masquerading as important truths, too many invalid or paralyzingly obscure inferences, and far too much jargon to sustain any faith in 'hidden gold.' To illustrate this contention, I offer three examples:

(1) Rather inauspiciously, on page 3 we read,

We are historicity; we are time and space. The two Kantian 'forms of perception' are nothing but the consciousness of our Being. The consciousness of our Being is our Being.

In other words, what? Presumably, Heller is observing that we are conscious of ourselves as being in time and space; and from this she infers that we are time and space. One could as well argue that since we are (sometimes) conscious of wearing clothing, we are our clothing. This Hegelian identifica-

tion of consciousness with the object of consciousness unfortunately runs throughout the entire work, taking many curious forms. (For example, 'We have no other past than the one presented by historiography' (190). One wonders where this leaves Trotsky in the Soviet Union.) It also results in bizarre consequences if one assumes that identity is a transitive and symmetrical relation. For example, historicity must be time and space if we 'are' both. Those Marxists who believe (pace Lukacs and Kolakowski) that the master really did stand old Hegel on his head will be outraged by much that is claimed in this book.

- (2) On the fact-value issue(s) we are offered the following typical remarks:

The philosophy of history is only a special branch of philosophy — it follows from the general pattern of all philosophies. It contrasts Ought with Is, it infers Ought from Is. (215)

Every philosophy infers Ought from Is, but it is far from being the exigency of philosophy to *identify* Ought-to-Be with "It-Will-Be" and Ought-to-Do with "It-Will-Be-Done", only with "It-Can-Be" and "It-Can-Be-Done". (310)

If one follows Heller, therefore, Hume's philosophy is not a philosophy, nor is Kant's. Or perhaps it is not enough to repudiate explicitly such inferences in order to be excluded from the class of those who infer 'Ought' from 'Is'? Perhaps nothing more than a sociological claim about the actual acceptance of norms is being made. But in that case, why single out philosophy? As for the 'exigency' referred to, I am at a loss as to what to make of it.

(3) On the subject of progress Heller contends (following Collingwood) that 'we are only entitled to speak of progress if "there is gain without corresponding loss"' (301). She insists repeatedly that to do otherwise 'involves the use of human beings as mere means' (301). This idiosyncratic reading of the Kantian prohibition involves treating as unproblematic one of the most problematic concepts in Kant's philosophy. While the combination of Kant with Collingwood on this point is mystifying, even more mystifying is her conviction that the recognition of women's rights (or as she prefers to put it, the existence for the first time of 'the possibility for half of humankind to make history, and not only to suffer it') is 'a gain without losses, and as such it is progress' (306). She hastens to add that the *realization* of this possibility may involve substantial losses, and would not, in those circumstances, be progress. Progress apparently exists only in the coming into being of possibilities, but not in their realization, for it is clear that any social change (e.g., the abolition of slavery) results in *some* losses for *some* people. Also, doesn't the coming into being of a possibility involve the realization of some other possibility?

In conclusion, one can only hope that as Heller acquires a better grasp of the philosophical paradigms, methods, and idioms of analytic philosophy, her great learning and impressive intelligence will express themselves in more

satisfactory treatments of the problems, both theoretical and practical, which she tries to address in the present volume. No doubt the 'empirical understanding' of analytic philosophy is unable to grasp fully the 'all-embracing totality' of history. Perhaps it is the path of wisdom not to try.

M.G. ANDERSON
St. Cloud State University

JOHN J. JENKINS. *Understanding Locke*. New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1983. Pp. xviii + 256. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-85224-442-8); US\$ 15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-85224-449-5).

Jenkins bases his book on lectures given in a lower-level course and intends it as a general introduction to philosophy through a study of Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Most of the standard topics are covered, although there is nothing on faith and reason and very little on probability. Indeed, only about one fifth of the book is devoted to Book IV, a proportion that no doubt reflects Jenkins' disappointment in Locke's treatment of knowledge. There is an extensive bibliography, divided according to chapter headings.

The writing is clear and pleasant, the exposition generally accurate, and the assessment balanced. Since the book is an introduction, it is not designed to teach senior students and advanced scholars very much, either about Locke or about philosophy. But there are moments when it grabs the specialist's attention. And it does perform the introductory task well.

The exposition could be improved in a minor way in three places. First, early on Jenkins says that 'the essence of the empiricist thesis formulated in Book II of the *Essay* is that all knowledge comes from experience by way of the senses' (90). Such a remark obscures the fact that, although Locke thinks that the materials of knowledge come from experience, he does not hold — not even in Book II — that knowledge is always acquired by empirical observation. Jenkins himself eventually makes this distinction perfectly clear (185). But the point should be emphasized right from the start, in order to keep the work's overall plan in perspective.

Secondly, when he discusses Locke's definition of knowledge as the discerning of relations between ideas, although he rightly says that in this context 'ideas' includes propositions, he wrongly suggests that the knowledge of a syllogism's validity consists in discerning a relation between the argument's premises (187). The discerned relation would fall between the conjunction of the premises and the conclusion.

Thirdly, he fails to appreciate fully the logic of the concept of discernment when he criticizes Locke for treating the knowledge of existence as an instance of discerning relations between ideas. He argues that, since putting together the idea of x and the idea of existence merely produces the idea of an existent x , it does not produce anything that entails the actual existence of x and hence cannot give us knowledge of existence (196). But discerning a relation between ideas is not the same as merely putting ideas together. Indeed, in Book IV when Locke talks about joining ideas together, he typically has in mind the framing of a proposition; e.g., we join together the ideas of $2 + 2$ and of equality to 4 if we assert that $2 + 2 = 4$. Whether the proposition is true is then a matter of whether the ideas actually are related as they are put together in the proposition (E IV V 1-5). And whether the proposition is known to be true is a matter of whether we discern that relationship. Thus, if we discern an agreement between the idea of God and the idea of existence, we do more than simply join together the two ideas in our mind. And Jenkins offers nothing to show that this discernment cannot be the knowledge that God exists.

Philosophically, the negative remarks about Locke are usually sound. For example, Jenkins rightly objects to Locke's oversimplification of the innatist issue, to his insensitivity to the epistemological problems created by explaining meaning in terms of ideas, to his mere dismissal of Cartesian grounds for doubt, and to his reliance on memory at crucial points when he himself is critical of that very move. Yet sometimes Jenkins is too quick. For instance, he queries the possibility of a science of ethics merely on the ground that issues concerning something like the death penalty are too open (192-3). But a cognitivist can allow for fluidity at the level of specific judgments while still insisting on firm principles at a highly general level. Therefore more work is needed before cognitivism can be rejected on this score.

Similarly, his attempts to defend some of the more controversial parts of Locke are too sketchy to push things forward very far. For example, he endorses a time-lag argument for representationalism on the ground that having to concede that we do not perceive external objects directly is less odd than having to insist that we perceive the past (87-8). But nothing is added to ease the concerns of those who do not share his sense of comparative oddness. In particular, he says nothing to anticipate likely objections from anti-representationalists like Austin who can find no sense in philosophical talk about 'direct' perception and who probably would not be troubled by having to say that a star exploded long before we saw the explosion. Although Jenkins' suggestions can be a useful way to get students started on problems of this sort, they do not offer anything like the extended treatment one finds in studies by Bennett, Mackie, Woolhouse, or Yolton. Thus, although the book serves as a good introduction, it probably will be disappointing for someone who is looking for something more.

DOUGLAS ODEGARD
University of Guelph

DOMINICK LaCAPRA and STEVEN L. KAPLAN, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1982. Pp. 317. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-1470-9); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9881-3).

This book consists of ten essays drawn from a conference at Cornell in 1980: 'Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectory' by Roger Chartier; 'Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts' by Dominick LaCapra; 'Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate' by Martin Jay; 'Triangular Anxieties: The Present State of European Intellectual History' by Hans Kellner; 'The Future According to Foucault: *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and Intellectual History' by Mark Poster; 'Archaeology, Deconstruction and Intellectual History' by E.M. Henning; 'On the Problem of the Ideological Origins of the French Revolution' by Keith Michael Baker; 'Popular Dimensions of Modernist Elite Culture: The Case of Theater in Fin-de Siècle Munich' by Peter Jelavich; 'Reading Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*' by David James Fisher; and 'Method and Ideology in Intellectual History: The Case of Henry Adams' by Hayden White. The majority of the essays offer attempts to rethink the methods and assumptions of intellectual history on the basis of a recent movement or figure in European philosophy, e.g., structuralism, symbolic interactionism, Foucault, Derrida, Gadamer, Machery. A few of the essays are simply contributions to current ways of doing intellectual history and thus do not offer genuinely new perspectives. Although collectively the essays do not yield any final conclusions, they do indicate some ways in which this sub-discipline is attempting to rethink its foundations and assimilate recent philosophical thought.

In my opinion, the most interesting essays in the book are by Henning and Baker. Henning examines implications of the ideas of both Foucault and Derrida and argues that Derrida is the more radical thinker. He notes some important paradoxes and tensions in Foucault's thought, e.g., that Foucault's rules of discourse govern it like centers of power, that his theory of discontinuities is not easily combined with his genealogical narratives, that his own assumptions are overly positivist, and that he assumes that all institutions are repressive and thus that all transgressions are liberating. Henning then proceeds to clarify and defend the upshot of Derrida's work — a new vision of the dynamic of history itself. History is an ongoing struggle, a flux that never yields to chaos but also never reaches resolution or reconciliation, a process of continuous repositioning and revision, a regulated play whose players always remain attuned to their opponents. He insists that Derrida does not merely invert traditional intellectual dichotomies but undermines the 'logic of domination' that informs most of the history of Western philosophy. The Derridean thinker learns to refuse dominance to any of his own categories, to remain suspended between affirmation and negation, to be at once open and critical. This is a fresh way to think about the significance of Derrida's work.

Baker is the only one to offer a new definition of intellectual history. He argues that historians attempt to reconstitute the context which supplies meaning (purpose, motive) to human action and thus that intellectual historians strive to reconstitute the intellectual dimensions of this context — the intellectual tensions of which human actions are resolutions. He stresses the inseparability of thought and action, arguing that all actions have an intellectual base and all changes in thought eventually have practical consequences. He proceeds to study discourse as a field of social action and political discourse as a means of limiting possible political actions. He shows how a shift in political discourse helped make the French Revolution possible. Baker's general remarks suggest a useful way of construing intellectual history; it deserves greater elaboration and attention.

Kellner's essay examines some of the constitutive anxieties of his discipline. The first is the absence of a secure, distinctive subject matter; 'ideas' are the operating territory of the philosopher. If the task of the intellectual historian is to paraphrase and compare, the anxiety is deepened by contemporary doubts about the possibility of achieving semantic equivalence, i.e., about the possibility of paraphrase. The second anxiety concerns the lostness of the past and the fact that the past can only be recovered through present categories. Kellner notes that the major theories recently guiding intellectual history (deriving from Freud, Marx, and Saussure) have been attempts at reassurance. By positing unobservable, universally applicable categories, such theories overdetermine the events, making explanation too easy. Kellner offers no solutions to these anxieties; he simply clarifies the current situation.

The essays by White, LaCapra, Chartier, Jay, and Poster summarize the ideas of recent philosophers and discuss their significance. White presents an excellent synopsis of Machery's approach to reading texts and argues that this approach will yield better readings in the sense of being able to account for more features of the texts examined. Machery argues that texts are machines which establish their own authority and which situate readers at sites that encourage acceptance of this authority. White thus would have intellectual historians study the rhetorical processes of meaning production. He demonstrates this procedure for *The Education of Henry Adams*. By uncovering these processes, historians might better understand similar strategies in their own era and in their own writing.

LaCapra draws on Gadamer to formulate a dialogic approach to the activity of intellectual history, an approach that calls the historian into question as much as the period or thinker under study. LaCapra stresses the complexities involved in comprehending the relations between text and context and insists on heeding the historicity of the process of inquiry itself. But his description of his 'method' is so general that it could apply to virtually any humanistic discipline.

Chartier offers a clear synopsis of developments in the *Annales* approach to history of mentalities. This school has shown that all comprehension is both active and passive, operating through rules which constitute the object

as much as reveal it. Instead of conceiving culture as a superstructure, this school views it as complex sets of meanings suffusing the entire environment. The task is to discover their grammars using structuralist methods, but there is no guarantee that these grammars form one neat totality.

Jay offers a succinct account of the positions of Gadamer and Habermas on the nature of language, of their disagreements, and of their arguments against one another. He also suggests a nice reply to Gadamer's claim that all understanding is inevitably linguistic. Jay notes that all understanding eventually *comes to* language, but that it does not necessarily *arrive in* language; it draws on and articulates an experience that supports it. Jay seeks a combination of the two positions, but he fails to explain how this can be achieved.

Poster provides a reasonable summary of Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*. He presents Foucault's critique of assumptions still accepted by many intellectual historians. Rather than examine the intentions of thinkers, Foucault directs attention to the constitutive rules for their discourse; rather than search for progress and continuity, Foucault uncovers basic discontinuities and questions the whole idea of progress. Indeed Foucault is critical of the entire liberal tradition, claiming that advances of 'reason' and 'freedom' have only expanded the arsenal of domination. Poster raises a few criticisms, but does not press them very far.

Finally, two essays, Jelavich's and Fisher's, simply make contributions to some area of intellectual history without trying to rethink assumptions or methodology in any explicit way. Jelavich shows how the work of some important German dramatists was determined by differing reactions to both classical drama and to the popular culture of their day. The dramatists he examines are Panizza, Wedekind, Fuchs, Kandinsky, Reinhardt, and Brecht. Fisher offers a semi-Freudian and partially deconstructivist reading of Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Fisher reads this essay as an expression of Freud's ambivalence toward Romain Rolland, whose ideas are explicitly discussed in it. Fisher suggests that Freud's ambivalent conclusions about civilization are transferences from this other ambivalence. He studies Freud's rhetoric in the essay much in the way Freud might analyze one of his patient's dreams.

This book will have greatest value to practitioners of intellectual history who are not yet acquainted with the recent philosophers it discusses. It will not be of much value to those seeking new insight about them. It does show how thoroughly philosophical the constitution of a discipline is. Hopefully, it will promote more explicit discussion of the aims and assumptions of intellectual history.

WILLIAM R. SCHROEDER

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

GEORGES-A. LEGAULT, MAURICE GAGNON, éd. *Philosophie et éducation*. Actes du VIIe Colloque interdisciplinaire annuel de la Société de Philosophie du Québec. Les Cahiers de l'ACFAS, no 19, 1984. 259p. ISBN 2-89245-010-1.

Le numéro 19 des Cahiers de l'ACFAS présente les contributions au VIIe Colloque interdisciplinaire annuel de la Société de Philosophie du Québec qui s'est tenu à l'Université de Sherbrooke les 23 et 24 octobre 1982. A lui seul, le thème principal de ce colloque, *Philosophie et éducation*, ne pourrait s'épuiser si on osait lui demander de rappeler à la philosophie que l'éducation ne se dissocie pas de son histoire ou, à l'éducation, que la philosophie remet au monde le sens de ses pratiques.

Pourtant, c'est en quelque sorte ce rappel que l'on aperçoit à l'œuvre en filigrane dans les vingt-quatre communications réparties également autour des six sujets suivants: l'activité pédagogique et les inégalités; l'éducation à l'interdépendance, la compréhension, la coopération et la solidarité internationales; la formation morale; l'enseignement des sciences, l'éducation et la culture scientifique; la déconfectionnalisation et les modèles pour le Québec; l'éducation et les valeurs sociales. Certes les contributions sont inégales quant à la portée de leur méthode ou la richesse de leurs sources. Cependant, dans l'ensemble, le discours de ce Colloque ne faillit pas à sa tâche critique; il a aussi le mérite de s'enraciner dans les problématiques actuelles et des sciences de l'éducation et du milieu social québécois.

Retenons quelques points susceptibles d'apporter ce 'changement de regard' que, rappelle J. Boulard Ayoub dans l'allocution d'ouverture du Colloque, Platon assignait à l'éducation comme sa tâche la plus essentielle (7). D'abord, une 'conception renouvelée et plus adéquate de la justice dans et par l'école' semble encore possible à la condition toutefois que, selon L. Marcil-Lacoste (28-9), la pensée éducative distingue entre les différences rattachées à l'autonomie et au dynamisme individuels et les différences qui relèvent de l'injustice et qu'entretient la discrimination. Par ailleurs, après avoir fait repointer avec l'enseignement professionnel la problématique des inégalités sociales, C. Laflamme propose une 'véritable' orientation de la formation professionnelle qui demande à l'école primaire de s'axer sur la culture des milieux ouvriers et à la formation professionnelle de favoriser des modèles d'apprentissage axés sur la pratique et sur la méthode inductive (43).

Ensuite, en plus d'ouvrir le Québec sur le monde, les communications portant sur l'éducation internationale réussissent à préciser les rôles de la philosophie et de l'éducation en fonction des besoins actuels d'un monde interdépendant, à rappeler que ces rôles supposent des positions par rapport aux grands problèmes moraux et politiques de notre temps (S. Churchill, 77, 79) et à dénoncer le totalitarisme culturel occidental pour n'entrevoir de coopération internationale que dans une perspective interculturelle (R. Vachon, 94, 100).

Au sujet de la formation morale, on ne manque ni de conjuguer les données de la psychologie développementale et celles de la recherche sur les approches pédagogiques du développement moral de l'enfant, ni de préciser

les objectifs de la formation morale. Cependant, la problématique de la formation morale confiée à l'école publique trouve toute son ampleur dans l'analyse que développe G.-A. Legault des aspects pédagogique, social et théorique de la formation morale; en outre, cet auteur propose d'amorcer le développement de l'aspect moral de la personne, dès le primaire, par le biais du langage (144). L'analyse des fonctions du langage que suggère cette hypothèse a le mérite d'enraciner la moralité dans la communication et d'offrir 'une initiation à soi, à autrui mais aussi une initiation à la société et aux rapports sociaux qui traversent le langage' (146).

En disant maintes fois que la dimension épistémologique lui est essentielle, le débat sur l'enseignement des sciences cherche à protéger de l'idéologie la culture scientifique actuelle; il retient également l'objectif critique de l'éducation traditionnelle que l'on pourrait ainsi condenser: il importe moins d'apprendre les mathématiques que de s'entraîner à la mathématisation. Par ailleurs, le débat sur la déconfessionnalisation expose, avec l'éloquence même des positions différentes, la difficulté de concilier confessionnalité et pluralisme ou école publique.

Enfin, au chapitre des valeurs sociales, on ne saurait demeurer indifférent au défi de R. Joly d'appuyer les valeurs sociales sur une pratique généralisée du détachement (231) ni à l'harmonisation de la nature et de la culture, de l'individualité et de l'intersubjectivité, que A. Paradis met à l'œuvre dans l'action éducative soit quand il situe l'éducateur 'au coeur même de cet entre-deux entre le désir de l'enfant de savoir qui il est et ce qu'est le monde' (242), soit quand il assigne à l'éducation le rôle de 'développer le goût et la force de s'inscrire dans la complexité de sa société et de sa culture pour en créer le prolongement vers de nouveaux possibles' (247).

Ainsi se dessinent les contours du devoir-être de l'éducation ou, du moins, de son désir de transformation. Du discours de ce Colloque l'éducation émerge plus instituante qu'instituée, s'émancipant des représentations qui limitent ses pratiques.

Si l'on excepte les coquilles qui parsèment les textes, l'ouvrage se présente assez bien. Sa lecture a pour effet, et ce n'est pas le moindre de ses mérites, d'inviter la réflexion sur l'éducation à la prospective.

ADÈLE CHENÉ

Université de Montréal

EUGÉNIE LEMOINE-LUCCIONI, *La robe*, Essai psychanalytique sur le vêtement, suivi d'un entretien avec André Courrèges. Le champ freudien, collection fondée par Jacques Lacan, Nouvelle série dirigée par Jacques Alain-Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1984. 168 p. 65 FF. ISBN 2-02-006584-3.

Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni présente son dernier livre, *La robe*, comme 'un essai psychanalytique sur le vêtement' suivi d'un entretien avec André Courrèges. Quiconque a approché Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni ne manquera pas, malgré ses qualités innombrables dont la gentillesse n'est pas la moindre, d'être surpris qu'il lui soit échu en partage d'écrire sur la robe, elle, toujours si mal fagotée.

Ce livre ressemble aux vêtements qu'elle porte: il est disparate. Il s'inscrit tout entier entre ce disparate, ce dépareillé du vêtement d'Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni et un lapsus exquis dont ce n'est pas méchanceté que de l'attribuer à l'auteur plutôt qu'au typographe: 'Nous savons bien depuis Lamourette (sic) et Pichon, que la grammaire n'est jamais éloignée du sexe,' surtout lorsque les noms des grammairiens s'en mêlent, pauvre Damourette!

Depuis près de quinze ans que je pratique la psychanalyse, il ne s'est guère passé de semaine sans que je sois médusé par le vêtement dont certains analysants se parent. De cette naine qui, les jours de pluie, venait à ses entrevues drapée dans un imperméable fluorescent si long qu'on eut dit une pourpre impériale, à ce mannequin d'une beauté peu commune qui, en été, ne se parait que d'une sorte de tunique de mousseline à fleurs qui brouillait à peine les lignes admirables de son corps nu. Elle était spectaculairement provocante et je lui dus l'indéracinable réputation auprès de ma concierge de *tenir une maison de passe*. Ce ne fut que le premier des ragots sexuels dont je devais être l'objet par la suite et qui m'ont servi de travestissements imaginaires, autant qu'involontaires, les plus divers, si ce n'est les plus délicats, mon vêtement, autant que ma maison, servant d'écran à toutes les projections possibles des fantasmes sexuels plus ou moins refoulés de la foule des concierges dont j'ai croisé le chemin. (Je ne parle pas ici des analysants chez qui la projection est d'une toute autre nature.)

Ce n'est pas du vêtement en tant qu'objet culturel et social qu'il est question dans ce travail qui se démarque d'emblée d'ouvrages qui, comme celui de Barthes, considère le vêtement comme un objet sémiologique dans son rapport au discours, ou qui, comme le *Journal de Mode* de Mallarmé, le placent dans son rapport à la mode dont il tient sa valeur. Il se démarque également de ce qu'ont dit de leur création de grands couturiers comme Balenciaga, Fath ou même Dior quoi qu'en dise Courrèges dont les propos rapportés en appendice peuvent être tenu pour accessoires.

Le vêtement dont il est ici question — la robe — est le vêtement tel qu'il apparaît dans la relation psychanalytique d'un Sujet à un autre Sujet qui l'écoute, en tant qu'il cloche d'une part et que, d'autre part il voile et révèle dans son ratage les innombrables paramètres de la sexualité du Sujet en rapport à son corps érotique et à l'autre (sexe, éventuellement).

Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni étudie donc le vêtement sous le triple registre catégoriel du Réel, de l'Imaginaire et du Symbolique, emporté dans toute une série de jeux, de déplacements, de substitutions, d'analogies et de métamorphoses qui lui confèrent à la fois une multiplicité de fonctions comme embrayeur pulsionnel — si j'ose dire — et une grande valeur signifiante dans l'écoute et le mouvement du processus analytique.

■ C'est par ce qui lie le vêtement au signifiant (lacanien, bien entendu, plutôt que saussurien): la coupe, la coupure, qu'elle l'aborde et le travaille tout au long de ce véritable petit traité de psychanalyse lacanienne. Le signifiant lacanien ne vaut qu'en tant qu'il cloche, qu'il dérape, et c'est même par là qu'il se donne à entendre dans son mouvement de coupure radicale. 'J'ai rêvé d'une femme sans tête' me dit Nicole au début d'une séance. 'Une femme sans tête, une femme sans tête?' lui rétorquai-je, qu'elle entendit alors tout à fait différemment de ce qu'elle avait pensé dire, comme: 'une femme s'entête,' puis, après réflexion, 'une femme cent-têtes.' Deux amorces qui devaient s'avérer riches en matériel signifiant.

■ C'est très exactement dans ce mouvement du Sujet, prétexte à maintes élaborations, qu'Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni suit le mouvement historico-social et corporel de la robe dans son rapport au nu, dans sa fonction de capsule ou de masque, dans ce qu'elle voile, à l'espace près de l'échancrure, s'offrant ainsi comme support à l'image spéculaire, seconde peau qui ne recouvre, ni ne découvre rien, tant c'est dans le moment de l'éclipse que s'offre en se dérochant au regard l'obscur objet du désir. Objet fétiche parfois, dans son rapport ici insuffisamment pris en considération à la texture de l'étoffe, illustré par ces pratiques fascinantes du travestissement et/ou du transsexualisme où le vêtement joue un rôle central dans le jeu infini des métamorphoses spéculaires. Je repensais en lisant ces pages à un homosexuel d'allure plutôt efféminée (je ne dis pas féminine) qui s'habillait en homme mais de telle sorte qu'il eut l'air d'une lesbienne masculine. Le choix de son vêtement était l'objet d'une expérience du regard de l'Autre et d'un travail de la pensée tout à fait extraordinaires.

■ Je ne ferais ici qu'une remarque critique qui vise les fondements méthodologiques et théoriques de ce travail et qui s'origine d'une certaine irritation. J'aime trop les vêtements pour ne pas avoir été agacé par le réductionnisme structuraliste de certains avatars du lacanisme. 'Tout le vêtement se réduit en substance à un tuyau' déclare d'emblée Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni en ajoutant que 'le tout du vêtement est dans sa coupe.' C'est effacer d'un seul coup de structure ces vêtements dont se parent des centaines de millions d'hommes et de femmes en Orient: les saris et les sarongs, qui ne sont surtout pas coupés ni cousus. Quand donc les analystes apprendront-ils à voyager?

■ Comme signifiant tout le vêtement est dans la coupe, mais tout le vêtement n'est pas réductible au signifiant. Il est également signe et matière et sa matière, pour être secondaire dans l'écoute analytique (on peut d'ailleurs se demander pourquoi) est cruciale dans l'art de la couture. On ne coupe pas du jersey comme on coupe de la soie, et la 'matérialité' du tissu est à ce point fondamentale pour le 'tombé' du vêtement et la réussite de la coupe que Balenciaga a choisi de se retirer plutôt que de continuer à travailler avec les tissus médiocres que lui offraient les nouvelles techniques de fabrication des tissus. De leur côté, Comme-des-garçons, Yamamoto ou Issey Miyake traitent les tissus médiocres du marché dont ils disposent de façon à leur donner une texture spécifique qui leur a permis de réinventer une coupe bien particulière,

architecturalisée en fonction des tissus traités, à partir de la coupe traditionnelle des kimonos de soie.

On pourrait multiplier à propos du masque, du rapport peinture/couture, les exemples de ce réductionnisme appauvrissant et centripète. Il illustre bien tout un courant de l'après-Lacan, le courant gestionnaire, qui me semble parfaitement antinomique à l'extraordinaire ouverture du travail que Lacan poursuivait dans son séminaire. Tout ici semble devoir être rapporté à l'ensemble désormais figé en un dogme des concepts et des catégories forgées par Lacan.

En voici un autre exemple, navrant en son stéréotype, à propos de la passion du psychiatre De Clérambeault pour les drapés féminins et l'intérêt de Barthes pour la mode féminine: 'Quel autre objet se cache en effet sous l'objet scientifique (le traité de Clérambeault et *Le système de la mode*), sinon la mère, qu'ils approchent ainsi en s'en écartant sous prétexte d'étude?' Pourquoi faire semblant de poser une question puisque la réponse était donnée d'avance. Réponse qui, d'ailleurs, ne s'applique même pas à Barthes qui n'avait nul besoin de ce détour pour parler de son attachement extrême et complexe à sa mère. Les questions chez Lacan étaient d'un tout autre ordre. Elles faisaient perpétuellement vaciller les concepts psychanalytiques qu'elles ne cessaient de pétrir, de relancer, de déplacer dans un perpétuel mouvement d'aller et retour, de prise et de déprise, dans n'importe lequel des champs de la pensée et de la culture qui, à tel moment de son élaboration, pouvait intéresser Lacan. Travail centrifuge, travail de déplacement et de refonte épistémologique du discours freudien, radicalement anti-réducteur.

Il n'est pas, je crois, de spectacle plus attristant que de voir l'orthodoxie prendre sa revanche sur cette grande pensée qui s'est tue.

FRANÇOIS PERALDI
Université de Montréal

CAROL McMILLAN, *Women, Reason and Nature: Some Philosophical Problems with Feminism*. Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1982. Pp. x + 165. Cdn\$35.75: (ISBN 0-631-12496-9); US\$17.50: (ISBN 0-691-07274-4).

Carol McMillan's book may prove more influential than it deserves to be because of two misunderstandings: the one it is based on and the one it is likely to be subject to. It is based on McMillan's misunderstanding of contemporary Western feminism, and it is likely, oddly enough, to be read as an attempt to move the issues raised by feminists onto a new and progressive plane, despite

her concluding endorsement of both Rousseau and the Catholic Church on the proper role of women.

McMillan attributes to 'all feminists' a ludicrously broad egalitarianism (one that would require giving infants the vote and regarding intelligence as irrelevant to hiring decisions). Somewhat more intelligibly, she accuses 'all feminists' of having a notion of personhood and agency that is based on reason as opposed to nature and expressive of a desire (previously available only to men) to escape the bonds of necessity through the use of technology.

Such a view does appear in some feminist writing. No wonder: it is the view of personhood and agency expressed in liberal individualist thought, and such thought is both ideologically dominant and, in theory anyway, supportive of women's rights (if only because it has been unable *coherently* to deny them). Liberal feminism is, after all, liberal. However, very little feminist theory of the so-called second wave (from the later 1960's on) has emerged from this perspective, in part for the sorts of reasons McMillan gives: the liberal view of persons as autonomous units makes impossible a respectful account of what has traditionally been women's work. It considers as full persons only those who have grown up and left home, that is, left the realm in which that work is done (that they nearly all return to it each night is something liberalism averts its eyes from, in the name of privacy).

Paradoxically, a similar view of persons, in a more extreme because *genuinely* egalitarian form, turns up in the very radical book that is usually McMillan's sole support for her claims about 'all feminists,' Shulamith Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex*. *The Dialectic of Sex* is a brilliant, idiosyncratic work from the very early days of the second wave of feminism in the U.S. (Its publication date of 1970 is obscured by McMillan's bibliographic reference to the British edition, published in 1979.) The most idiosyncratic thing about it is what McMillan takes as most representative — its identification of women's oppression with our natural connection to childbearing and of our liberation with the technologizing of that process and the severing of *nearly all human ties to the realm of necessity*. *On her opposition of necessity and freedom*, Firestone is following Marx, something most later feminists have not done, recognizing that around issues related to gender, Marx and Engels are liberals. (This point is well-argued by Catharine A. Mackinnon in 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State' in *Signs*, Spring 1982.)

Thus, McMillan attacks a position she calls feminist both for denigrating as less than fully human women's mothering and for deriding as merely conventional the shaping of our identity around the demands of that work. She marshals Wittgenstein to argue that the sets of expectations that shape our lives are as deep as anything about us, and that the dream of shedding all such expectations in the name of freedom is conceptually incoherent. So far, so good: unfortunately for McMillan's purposes, no serious feminist I know of would argue against her on this point.

But she goes on to argue not just that *some* norms of socialization are necessary for our lives to be human, but that the ones that we have are both (on what she takes to be Wittgensteinian grounds) uncriticizable and rooted

in women's biological capacity to bear and suckle children. That is, she parts from feminism not where she claims to, in the break with liberal conceptions of personhood and agency, but in her biologically rooted conservatism about the particular forms of life within which we live.

She is, of course, not alone in claiming Wittgensteinian support for such a position, though I am not alone in regarding this reading as a complete failure to appreciate the deeply radical nature of his work: he did not mean to throw us back onto the conservative horn of the dilemma about the sources of meaning and our relation as individuals to them. Both Wittgenstein and radical feminists are concerned to change the horned beast altogether — to fashion a conception of personhood that is neither denaturedly transcendent nor uncritically accepting of the deepest structures of our lives (which structures Wittgenstein was as ready as feminists to describe as diseased).

McMillan does legitimately claim the support of Rousseau and the Catholic Church: she thinks women's education and work outside the home should differ from men's, she opposes abortion and is equivocal on birth control, on the grounds that they incorrectly separate 'the sexual act' (by which she means intercourse) from procreation, and she rails against anaesthetized childbirth (which she claims feminists desire in the absence of extra-uterine reproduction; again, this applies to virtually no feminist I know of) with romantic paens to the human value of suffering.

It is something of a puzzle how such a book can be regarded as 'indisputably feminist,' as Benjamin R. Barber calls it in an article tellingly titled 'Beyond The Feminist Mystique' (in *The New Republic*, 11 July 1983). Here lies the second misunderstanding. Barber is not alone in regarding liberal feminism as radical, as attempting to articulate a serious, specifically feminist theory. Such theories *are* being developed by women McMillan does not refer to, and they involve deeply different conceptions of the self.

But the media, including the academically respectable media and most work in universities, has rendered such truly radical thought largely invisible; what happens is that something *else*, in this case liberal feminism, is put forth as the extreme position, pushing other, more threatening alternatives off the conceptual map.

Thus, a theoretically bankrupt liberalism has been taken — notably but not only by McMillan and Barber — as the position of 'feminism,' even of 'radical feminism,' and the problems inherent in liberalism get taken as licensing a retreat back to the old, oppressive structures, with the acceptance of oppression masked as the mature acknowledgement of necessity.

McMillan makes fairly frequent reference to philosophers and philosophical ideas, nearly always either misleadingly or irrelevantly. It ought not to require any great degree of philosophical or political sophistication to dismiss her arguments; unfortunately it may require rather more of both than is common these days.

NAOMI SCHEMAN
University of Minnesota
Twin Cities

HUGO A. MEYNELL, *The Intelligible Universe*. Agincourt, Ont.: Gage; New York: B + N Imports (for MacMillan) 1982. Pp. 153. Cdn\$56.25; US\$26.50. ISBN 0-389-20253-3.

Meynell's interesting, often impressive book tries to prove God's existence by considering the existence and causal structure of the world. Chapter 1 urges convincingly that revelation, religious experiences, and commitment to a religious way of life, all need support from actual arguments for God's reality. Chapter 2 gives fair and expert summaries of Standard Cosmological Arguments and Counter-Arguments. Chapter 3 shows that knowledge is had through finding best explanations for phenomena; without some Principle of Sufficient Reason we could never take data as evidence of anything. However, reasons can be sufficient when *enabling* without necessitating, as (perhaps) in the case of radioactive decay and (definitely) in that of human or divine choices. Seeking reasons, we must deny that the real world consists of actual and possible sense data, or of Kant's unknowable things-in-themselves. 'What kind of conception is that of the real or actual universe?' It 'can be nothing other than that of what tends to come to be known' by persistent questioning of Experience (51). Among Experience's deliverances is knowledge of human agency. Hume would deny us any insight here, saying, e.g., that arms just are regularly experienced as rising when we so will. But the notion that we lack knowledge of external things is 'self-destructive' and so we must pass beyond Hume's mere *regularities among experiences*, reaching *actual interactions with an outside world*.

Chapter 4 then asks how we can make sense of something we know 'a priori,' through the very conception of reality (remember page 51), namely, 'the curious manner in which the world seems as it were pre-fitted to our intellectual and rational faculties' (75). Responsibility for this must lie in 'something analogous to human intelligence.' This 'something' is most reasonably conceived as 'a single being' whose 'intelligent will' explains why events form a single world. Since the being has nothing on which it could depend, no 'coherent question' could arise as to why it exists. Meynell finds no attraction in A. C. Ewing's suggestion *that God exists because this is valuable*. Prior to the existence of moral agents, how could Value have any influence?

Chapter 5 applies all this to the Standard Arguments of Chapter 2. Chapter 6 sums up. An Appendix discusses Ayer's *Central Questions of Philosophy*.

The package includes many shrewd points about knowledge, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and the stupidities of philosophers. It demonstrates considerable learning. Yet its main argument can well seem unsatisfactory.

First: Meynell is odd in making it a priori that the real is knowable *and then saying* that this depends on a 'curious manner' in which the world is 'pre-fitted' to our intellects. Detecting the unacceptable character of Kant's necessarily ungraspable realities, he has swung the pendulum right over to the perhaps equally unacceptable notion that realities are graspable — and Cartesian Demons impossible — *by the very conception of reality* (again,

remember page 51); and next, here he is squeezing curious and theistic juices out of what he has just made conceptually necessary. But if a 'fit' between intellects and realities is a priori, how could it possibly be 'curious'?

Second: Why does the world's structure present any problem? Meynell is too quick in dismissing 'the boggy of scientific determinism' (16), treating it as obvious that a determinist could never say, 'It's up to me.' He seemingly reasons that brains (unlike Cruise Missile guidance systems?) could not interpret and find uses for internal maps (81). He seemingly confuses treating *agency* as an 'ultimately dispensable' notion (so that the world is fully describable in terms of, say, atoms) with 'ruling out' the idea that humans are agents (88-9). And, having thus set up a perhaps illusory puzzle of how things *so very different* as minds and collections of atoms could interact smoothly, he attacks the Regularity Theory account of causal interactions in ways suggesting that Hume in his phenomenalist moments was its most sophisticated defender. Worse still, the a priori nature of Meynell's arguments makes him unconcerned to show, by detailed consideration of actual causal laws, that the world appears divinely designed to favour life and intelligence.

Third: It is unclear that Meynell's divine being supplies any specially satisfying explanation. (a) The being *would have nothing on which it itself depended* — but if the being does not exist, then that same remark can seem to apply to the world around us, so why introduce the being? (b) Again, why generate a colossal Problem of Evil by supposing (128) that God exercised a creative freedom *such that he would not necessarily have selected some far better world*, had such a world been possible? (c) Meynell is too dismissive of Ewing. Using terminology developed elsewhere (see my *Value and Existence* 27-81), Meynell's position may be paraphrased as follows. Even if the existence of something good (a divine being, or a good universe) could be ethically marked out for existence in an unconditional way, it could be *effectively* marked out for existence, marked out *with creative success*, only if an agent's will *also* marked it out for existence. But, I ask, what is specially intelligible in *that*? When we know about paralysis, why think that Experience reveals that acts of will are themselves productively sufficient? And when we know of forceful attempts to solve the Problem of Evil, why assume that ethical requirements cannot act creatively?

JOHN LESLIE
University of Guelph

JOHN MORREALL, *Taking Laughter Seriously*. New York: State University of New York Press 1983. Pp. x + 144. US\$39.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-624-7); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-643-5).

Some generalisers generalise only half-unseriously that Americans are incapable of understanding irony. In regard to this Morreall is unfortunately no white raven — on p. 119 of his book he says of Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly* that it is actually supposed to be in praise of folly and he writes: '... its central argument is ... folly ... allows us to live together and even to love one another.' In fact Erasmus's 'central argument' (if anyone is interested) is threefold: (i) Folly, in the sense of a carefree light-hearted amusement-loving attitude, is natural to youth, and is forgivable and often likeable in young people (ii) Folly, in the sense of moral defect, is very far from being likeable. Every trade and profession has its characteristic follies: Kings love flattery, flatterers are sleazy and undignified, theologians and philosophers argue about important matters in a trivial way, lawyers are lazy and greedy, monks and priests are hypocritical or addicted to ridiculous logic-chopping; and so on (iii) Religious faith, which is regarded by practical men of affairs as folly, is the only 'folly' truly worthy of praise. But *it* isn't really folly at all. — The rather clumping irony of the title and the contents is lost on Morreall. In any case, Erasmus was not writing *about* humour even though his book is humorous: he was writing about foolishness in its various kinds.

It is interesting to compare Morreall's book with D.H. Monro's *Argument of Laughter* (Melbourne, 1951). Morreall does not list Monro in his bibliography or index, but the two books cover some of the same ground, and there are several curious coincidences. Thus Morreall's chapter titles in Part One follow quite closely the chapter titles of Monro's Part Two; both authors refer to much the same list of sources — including Bain, Bergson, Dewey, Eastman, Freud, Hobbes, Leacock, Ludovici, Spencer and Sully — and they even on occasion use the same jokes to illustrate a point; e.g., Harry Graham's verse about Aunt Maud, and Oscar Wilde's witticism about modern Youth's disrespect for dyed hair. Nevertheless there are also differences. Monro, an Antipodean, has an ironical, self-effacing, mildly skeptical tone of voice which to my mind better suits the topic than Morreall's rather less objective standpoint. Monro, again, is more careful, better informed about history, and more philosophically alert. He draws distinctions, and is not tempted to try to solve problems by formulating generalisations.

Morreall *is* rather given to generalising, thus he offers a 'new theory,' embodied in 'a formula for characterizing laughter situations in general' (39). This formula is designed to cover hysteria and embarrassment as well as humour: it runs: 'Laughter Results from a Pleasant Psychological Shift.' In the chapter called 'The Variety of Humour' Morreall lists different kinds of jokes but does not attempt to define, or describe the differences between, wit, buffoonery, practical jokes, irony, sarcasm, tall stories, clean humour, dirty humour, etc. This is a pity because there is a philosophical task here which needs doing. This lack of interest in making distinctions leads Morreall into naiveté, thus he does not consider the possibility that Lord Chesterfield's attack on laughter was anything other than an attack on humour per se. But Chesterfield, in the very passage quoted by Morreall, distinguishes between 'low buffoonery' and 'true wit' — after all, he lived in an age of wits (e.g.,

Sam Johnson, David Hume, David Garrick). Morreall also fails to notice that Plato's attack on laughter and humour is in fact an attack on low jokes, and on loss of self-control — it does not apply to the sly digs and unkind ironies which he himself puts into the mouth of Socrates. Many attacks on humour and joking, when you look at them closely, turn out to be attacks on certain kinds of humour, whether or not the attackers realise this. Morreall's most outrageous generalisation concerns the teaching profession, to whose defence I feel I now must rush. On p. 88 he says: 'The traditional attitude of teachers toward laughter and humour, I think it is safe to say, has been that they are frivolous activities that pull us away from what is important.' On p. 97 he adds: 'The reason why many teachers do not have any humour in their teaching, and indeed fear humour when it comes from their students, is that their own view of the world is relatively humourless.' This is a gross libel on a bunch of hard-working under-paid men and women! British prep-school teachers are notorious for their jokes — actually, for the feebleness of their jokes, but still. Is Morreall speaking only of North America, perhaps? My son tells me he once heard a grade-school teacher in Edmonton, Alberta, make a very passable joke. And of all the American professors I myself have met at least four or five could understand jokes, I think. Finally I once knew an American professor who made jokes in class. He was talking in class once about drug-addiction when a student asked a question:

Student: Please sir, is it true that cigarettes cause impotence and sterility?

Professor: Only if you drop one in your lap.

But I digress. Having said a number of slightly savage things about this book it is now time to say that, actually, it is rather a good book, on the whole. This is because of the contents of Part Two, where Morreall raises some important questions not dealt with by Monro, or, as far as I know, by any other philosopher this century. These questions are: What lies behind the hostility towards laughter and humour expressed by some authors? And: What, if anything, is the importance of humour? Morreall notes, correctly, that wit is a weapon (e.g., against political oppression); that humour is a sign of spiritual freedom, and a protection against ideological servility; that it is aesthetic, or akin to the aesthetic; that much literature and some visual art is humorous (I would add that music too can be humorous); that jokes may be the only possible response to an unbearable situation; that humour reduces megalomania, and enables one to distance oneself both from one's natural selfishness and from one's real troubles; that jokes of all kinds are capable of increasing one's understanding of the world, of art, and of language; and that humour has a social function the importance of which has been gravely underrated. All these excellent points are crammed into too little space, but they are there, and as I have said, they are true. I would advise people to buy the book for the sake of Part Two.

JENNY TEICHMAN
New Hall, Cambridge

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, *Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1982. Pp. xii + 158. US\$14.95. ISBN 0-8476-7147-X.

As a moral philosopher, Murphy's interest in this book is to evaluate sociobiology's application of evolutionary thinking to morality. He believes that sociobiology, particularly the version of E.O. Wilson, 'has greater relevance for ethical theory than many of its often hysterical humanist detractors have been willing to see or admit' (98). Critics from both philosophical and theological quarters argue against sociobiology because of a perceived threat to such views as the inherent dignity of human nature, the rational autonomy of moral agents, or a transcendent meaning in life. But the threat, he argues, is without basis, not because of logical flaws in sociobiology but because of certain rational pretensions on the side of its critics. The philosophical import of sociobiology, on Murphy's interpretation, is precisely to undermine those pretensions, to show that human life does not ultimately depend on reason but on desires and instincts, and, as a result, to shift ground from a justification of moral behaviour in terms of known principles to an explanation of its origins in terms of evolutionary biology. In this, Murphy notes, the aims of sociobiology are neither entirely new nor misguided in principle.

Consequently, he aligns sociobiology to the intellectual tradition in moral philosophy that includes Hume, Darwin, Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx. Despite obvious differences, these thinkers share 'the belief that a study of the causal *origins* of moral judgments is central to a philosophical understanding' of morality (23). Initial appearances notwithstanding, their intent is not so much to challenge morality itself — and religion for that matter — as to reject a thoroughgoing, yet purportedly spurious, rationalistic approach to it. In outline, Murphy's formulation of the argument is this: When it comes to justifying morality and meaning in life, whether in a theological or philosophical context, theory and reason ultimately fail. Yet despite this failure, life goes on just the same in a fairly coherent fashion. When reason and theory run out, as they do in face of sustained skeptical challenges, human life does not disintegrate and does not cease. We hold on to basic convictions and beliefs and act on them *as if* we had certain knowledge of them. The fact that we do is a fact about our affective, rather than intellectual, nature and shows that human life never depended on reason and theory in the first place. Instead, it depends on pre-theoretical preferences, desires, or instincts, which call for an explanation of their origin and persistence. It is at this point that it makes sense, according to Murphy, to start talking about biology and evolution. Understood in this way 'as a critical reflection on the nature and foundation of moral philosophy, as an attack on its insulated criteria of theoretical adequacy,' (109) Murphy concludes, the philosophical import of sociobiology's excursion into morality lies not in its normative claims but in its meta-ethical claims. Thus, sociobiology, on Murphy's view, is not a replacement for moral

theory but a much-needed and welcome corrective as well as complement to it.

By using a number of fairly standard arguments, chapter 1 challenges the adequacy of both theological and philosophical attempts to justify moral values and purpose — as well as the contrary view that nothing in life matters — and, thus, clears the way for the subsequent discussion of evolutionary biology. Chapter 2 treats of Darwin's theory of evolution in its general outlines and dismisses its supposed competitor scientific creationism. Chapter 3 critically handles Darwin's concept of morality and his evolutionary account of its origins. Chapter 4 clarifies and evaluates the improvements of sociobiology over its Darwinian predecessor. A brief Introduction provides an overview of the subsequent chapters; a Conclusion summarizes the significance of sociobiology to moral philosophy. Two appendices and an index complete the book. The first appendix is the text of Judge Overton's decision in the recent case *McLean vs The Arkansas Board of Education*, rejecting equal treatment of creation-science alongside evolution-science in the school curriculum; the second is a critique by Larry Laudan of the implicit concept of science employed in Overton's ruling.

For those as yet unfamiliar with sociobiology, Murphy's book constitutes an informative and sympathetic introduction to its philosophical implications. But those already acquainted with the related philosophical issues will find his treatment of many of them much too brief. To be sure, he repeatedly admits to this shortcoming. It is in part explained — though not excused — by the fact that the book derives from a series of lectures 'aimed at a general audience' (ix). Nevertheless, it seems to me to perpetuate the all-too-common practice of conflating *simplification*, desirable for a nontechnical, interdisciplinary audience, with *superficiality*, unnecessary for an educated one.

A more troublesome point, though, centers on the concept of justification Murphy employs throughout, although never explicitly formulates and defends, in his critique of what he calls traditional moral philosophy and more particularly rational theology. Neither discipline can claim knowledge for its foundations, only if 'justification' is narrowly conceived along strictly empiricist lines. Thus in the case of religion or theology, for instance, Murphy's underlying attitude seems to be this: religion or theology is either based on faith or reason. If it relies on faith, then there is no point to object because religion would have no truth content anyway; and if it relies on reason, then it claims a knowledge which lacks justification in the sense of proof from empirical premises. But the dichotomy between faith and reason is not as neat and exclusive as all that. There are recent approaches to theology (Hugo Meynell's, for instance) that employ an epistemology impervious, I believe, to Hume's and Murphy's skeptical challenges. At the same time, those versions would also object to so-called scientific creationism without giving up the theological concept of creation; would feel less threatened by evolutionary theory in general, yet would not concede to sociobiology's reduction of reason, religion and morality to biology, even if the reduction is the sophisticated version of Murphy's interpretation.

If it is judged by the extent to which it provokes thought, and not by the originality of its content, then many will find this a good book. Despite its brief discussion of a variety of controversial philosophical issues and its often caustic tone in its treatment of opposing views, Murphy's book could serve well in a variety of philosophy courses touching on morality, religion, or science, especially at the introductory level.

JOSEPH A. BUIJS

St. Joseph's College, University of Alberta

L. POMPA and W.H. DRAY, eds., *Substance and Form in History: A Collection of Essays in Philosophy of History*. New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1982. Pp. xii + 198. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-85224-413-4.

W.H. Walsh, in whose honour this Festschrift was published, has had a distinguished career at the Universities of Oxford and Edinburgh. His interests — well documented in a bibliography of his published writings at the end of the book — have been broad, encompassing Kant, Hegel, the British Idealists, general problems in epistemology and metaphysics and, perhaps most distinctively, the philosophy of history, an area in which all of his other interests tend to converge. The thirteen essays in this collection are a fitting tribute to Walsh and demonstrate the vitality of recent work in the philosophy of history both in the reexamination of the classics of the field, and in original treatments of current problems. About half of the book is devoted to each of these broad areas. Kant's reflections on history are examined by R.F. Atkinson. Hegel's moral philosophy and dialectical method are analysed by Patrick Gardiner and Leon Goldstein. Dennis O'Brien compares Hegel and Freud on history, and Nathan Rotenstreich traces an affinity between Vico and Marx.

Isaiah Berlin argues that Vico and Herder were not relativists in their conceptions of value but rather pluralists and objectivists. He traces the roots of the current problem of the purported relativity of knowledge and value to later thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, Dilthey and Mannheim. The argument is convincing as far as it goes, but it seems important to add that none of the 'relativists' mentioned wished to jettison the notion of objectivity altogether. More attention needs to be paid to the attempts of these writers to articulate a

more adequate concept of objectivity which would take into account the interested character of knowing and valuing and the perspectival nature of our accounts of the world.

Rex Martin argues for the compatibility of Collingwood's theory of absolute presuppositions and the possibility of historical knowledge. Absolute presuppositions are shown to be neither simply descriptive, nor gratuitous, but rather analytical reconstructions of assumptions men are driven to accept. Martin does not share the idea of historical knowledge as 'reliving' if that implies acquiring the interior dimension of life in the culture being studied, but he does accept the contention that there is a significant difference between the natural sciences and history on the grounds that though the former have absolute presuppositions, their subject matters do not, whereas the sciences of mind, including history, study something which itself has absolute presuppositions.

The distinction between speculative and critical philosophy of history, basic to the literature since the appearance of Walsh's *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* in 1951, is questioned by Louis Mink. Mink argues for their inseparability on the grounds that metaphysics and epistemology presuppose each other, and also for the existence of a middle ground between them. He uses the recent work of Haskell Fain, Peter Munz, and Hayden White to press home the continuity of historical and philosophical work from the implicit deployment of concepts in narrative emplotment, on the one hand, to their explicit statement and development on the other. In this way Mink reveals how the basic categories of philosophy of history have shifted during the past decade, though he does not himself come to terms with the absence of concern for objectivity in the recent work to which he refers.

This task is directly or indirectly addressed in the papers by J.L. Gorman, P.H. Nowell-Smith, W.H. Dray, and Leon Pompa which constitute a good sample of recent work in critical philosophy of history. Both Nowell-Smith and Gorman simply state that literary merit is one thing and cognitive adequacy another (though this is just the kind of distinction which might be questioned in the Hermeneutical tradition), and they are at pains to show that cognitive adequacy is achievable in history. Nowell-Smith argues that history can meet the generalization and deducibility requirements of sound explanation and that there is no good reason to require of history, in addition, the limited lexical and syntactical forms which have inappropriately become canonical because of the prominence among philosophers of paradigms drawn from mathematics and the natural sciences.

Gorman shows that the objective superiority of one historical account over others can be established in terms of maximising statement truth and *relevant* information, and the involvement of an acceptable conceptual scheme of classification, and that precision is not central, ordinary language being precise enough for most, if not all, projects which historians pursue. A striking feature of Gorman's paper is his contention that since historical statements are typically singular in form, and since conclusions can be validly deduced from a finite number of singular statement premises, there is no

prima facie reason to reject the search for justification and certainty in history in favour of the fallibilist approach Popper has shown appropriate for scientific theories. Until good reasons are presented, Gorman says, historians should aim at descriptions which are superior to any *possible* alternatives and that objectivity should be understood in this demanding sense. It could be pointed out that even if there is no analogue in historical reasoning to the problem of induction, the contingent character of all historical statements renders the achievement of logical rigor in historical arguments no guarantee of cognitive certainty.

Pompa counters the idealist tendency of much recent work — including Goldstein's claim that many forms of realism depend upon a verificationally vacuous notion of reference — with an analysis of the correct role of the reference requirement of history. The idealist account disallows the necessary causal connection between historical evidence and the real past. The notion of a true premise cannot then be given any content, a difficulty not faced by realism whose assumption of the ontological independence of the past from the present evidence governs historical investigation.

Dray advances the theory of colligation which he considers Walsh's most significant contribution to philosophy of history. Dray shows that colligation — 'the placing of events in their context by tracing a myriad of connections between them and other events with a view to discovering and characterising the larger historical wholes which they jointly composed' (156-7) — is not inherently teleological, even in history (pace Walsh), requires the use of general terms even when its interest is primarily idiographic, and must be achieved in the end from the point of view of the historian not that of the historical agents. On this last point Dray argues that 'presentism,' in any damaging sense, is avoided since colligation does not entail a history infused with practical rather than theoretical concerns, and makes use of ideas the historical agents could not have had in order to make the past intelligible to the historian and his age.

I have not been able in this short review to do more than suggest the content of these carefully argued and compact papers. Their quality is uniformly high and they will well repay the close attention which they require.

ALBERT FELL
Queen's University

REGINE ROBIN, *L'Amour du yiddish, Ecriture juive et sentiment de la langue (1830-1930)*. Collection 'D'autres histoires.' Paris: Editions du Sorbier 1984. 332p. ISBN 2-7320-0019-1.

Avec L'Amour du yiddish, Régine Robin vise à faire entrer l'histoire culturelle juive d'Europe de l'Est 'dans le champ des préoccupations épistémologiques.' Elle analyse un siècle de débats sur la (les) langue(s) des écrivains et des in-

tellecueluels juifs entre 1830 et 1930: le yiddish, l'hébreu, la langue du pays (russe, polonais, etc.).

Elle décrit en particulier l'évolution du yiddish: son développement comme langue littéraire, l'affrontement entre les tenants de l'hébreu et du yiddish dans les années 1900, l'éclosion de la modernité littéraire yiddish après la première guerre mondiale et le statut du yiddish en URSS. Hors de la chronologie se situe le yiddish rêvé, celui de Franz Kafka qui était fasciné par la culture yiddish et dont l'œuvre a été influencée par elle.

Dans la société juive traditionnelle, chaque langue jouait un rôle précis. L'hébreu était la langue des prières, de l'éducation religieuse et des textes rabbiniques. Le yiddish, langue germanique écrite en caractères hébraïques, était parlé quotidiennement et les traductions de la Bible, les histoires édifiantes et les livres de prières en yiddish étaient destinés aux femmes qui n'avaient pas accès aux études religieuses. La langue du pays, que la majorité des Juifs ne maîtrisaient pas, servait d'intermédiaire avec les non-Juifs. Le débat sur la langue a surgi vers 1830 lorsque le mouvement de la *baskalab* (modernité juive) a remis en question la société traditionnelle, y compris son équilibre entre les langues.

Pour l'écrivain juif, 'l'exil est d'abord dans la langue.' Dans quelle langue écrire? Le yiddish était la langue maternelle des Juifs d'Europe de l'Est, mais sa légitimité était niée par les intellectuels. Dans un contexte laïc, l'hébreu n'était lu que par une élite. S'il choisissait la langue du pays, il n'était pas accepté à part entière par les non-Juifs et l'identité juive se diluait.

Intéressée à la psychanalyse, à la théorie marxiste et à l'application de la linguistique à l'histoire (*Histoire et linguistique*, 1973), Régine Robin trouve matière à réflexion sur certains thèmes constants comme le nom (recours aux pseudonymes, changements de nom, dans la réalité et dans la fiction, analyse du nom, thème cher à Kafka) et l'imagerie sexuelle et féminine dans la description des langues (l'hébreu comme maîtresse, le yiddish comme l'épouse vouée au quotidien). Elle révèle le non-dit derrière le texte, sans aller aussi loin que certains auteurs qui nient la réalité du yiddish et le qualifient de langue de l'inconscient.

Dans un livre précédent, *le Cheval blanc de Lénine ou l'histoire autre* (1979), Régine Robin avait fait ses adieux au discours argumentatif, jugeant que la fiction était plus révélatrice. Dans *l'Amour du yiddish*, elle revient à l'analyse discursive. En cette période politiquement trouble, dit-elle, il est important d'être clair. De plus, elle a observé en France un abus de la spontanéité, du 'vécu' qui masquaient des arguments déficients et un manque de rigueur.

Régine Robin veut rendre accessible au public francophone les textes yiddish et la recherche américaine sur le yiddish. A cause de la nouveauté relative du sujet en France, elle fournit maints détails biographiques et historiques dans le texte et dans les notes explicatives et elle laisse parler les auteurs en les citant longuement (jusqu'à une page). Elle est consciente que les spécialistes ne trouveront rien de nouveau dans *l'Amour du yiddish* mais, si les faits leur sont connus, les opinions émises sont polémiques.

Par exemple, elle décoche des flèches à l'endroit des ouvrages récents sur l'URSS qui rejettent a priori le système comme un enfer, sans analyser sa complexité et ses contradictions. De tels livres, écrit-elle, 'ressemblent plus à la kremlinologie des années 50 qu'à de l'histoire.' Elle a mis le doigt sur une tendance de la pensée française à brûler ce qu'elle a adoré, c'est-à-dire de passer ici du panégyrique de l'URSS à la condamnation sans appel.

Le chapitre sur le yiddish en URSS veut illustrer l'effervescence culturelle et la diversité des idées dans les années vingt. Ce n'est pas par hasard que la périodisation s'arrête à 1930. Ceci exclut la montée de l'antisémitisme en Europe et les purges de Staline en 1936-37 et 1948-53 (qui sont mentionnées en passant). Mme Robin saisit ainsi la culture yiddish en pleine gloire, avant son déclin et sa fin tragique. Par le fait même, elle évite une période dérangeante de l'histoire soviétique, susceptible d'ébranler certaines de ses convictions politiques.

Mme Robin manifeste un intérêt personnel pour son sujet parce que la culture et l'idéologie yiddishiste qu'elle reconstitue est celle que sa famille juive socialiste de Varsovie lui a inculquée. Mais point de nostalgie pour un monde disparu; son objectif est tout autre. Depuis quelques années, elle remarque que le laïcisme juif est décrié dans la communauté juive. On le considère responsable de l'assimilation, on l'accuse de naïveté pour avoir cru au progrès et à la fraternité. Régine Robin veut réhabiliter cette culture juive progressiste de la diaspora parce qu'elle est attachée à ses valeurs qu'elle considère toujours actuelles.

Même si le laïcisme juif hérité d'Europe orientale est remis en question, ses manifestations culturelles et idéologiques (littérature hébraïque et yiddish, mouvement ouvrier juif, sionisme) demeurent les sujets de recherche dominants en histoire juive moderne, reflétant les préférences des chercheurs. Mais ces domaines sont trop souvent étudiés en isolement du reste de la société juive (et non-juive), ce qui donne l'impression d'une société divisée en deux camps hostiles et étanches: les religieux traditionalistes et les laïcs, et l'importance de ces derniers est surestimée. Cette vision des choses néglige l'étude des milieux religieux, leur évolution (exemple: l'adoption de l'éducation religieuse pour les filles) et leur transplantation en Amérique du Nord et en Israël après la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Il ne faut pas critiquer injustement *l'Amour du yiddish* sur ce point. Son sujet était l'écriture juive et non la société juive d'avant-guerre. Le bagage culturel de Mme Robin, plus vaste que celui de la plupart des chercheurs dans le domaine, donne un livre stimulant et intéressant à lire. On regrette malgré tout qu'elle n'ait pas appliqué à l'Europe de l'Est les techniques de recherche historique qu'elle avait utilisées pour sa thèse de doctorat (*La société française en 1789: Semur-en-Auxois*, 1970). Celles-ci auraient fourni des pistes nouvelles à un sujet qui a besoin de renouvellement. Mais j'ai l'impression que Régine Robin n'a pas dit son dernier mot sur le sujet.

MARIE POIRIER
Université de Montréal

IRVIN ROCK. *The Logic of Perception*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1983. Pp. xiii + 365. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-262-18109-6.

In his preface, Irvin Rock confesses to having 'summoned up [his] courage to speculate' and he describes the resulting book as being addressed not only to both advanced and beginning 'students of perception' but as well 'to those in other disciplines such as philosophy' whom he says he knows to be 'interested in the subject' (xi). Philosophers are indeed profoundly interested in the subject of perception and they are, moreover, in what is surely the relevant sense, professional speculators. Rock's speculative remarks about the nature of perception are surely legitimate objects of philosophical assessment. Regretfully, they do not constitute a coherent and important contribution to this perplexing and centrally important philosophical issue. The voluminous wealth of experimental data (which I will leave to the psychologists to evaluate) notwithstanding, *The Logic of Perception* is philosophically confused.

The mix of psychological examples and philosophical conclusions is a dangerous one since Rock tends to draw the latter on the basis of the former with nothing remotely resembling genuine supportive argument intervening. He makes generous use of the device of scare quotes as a means to weakening or modifying a claim — as in 'inference,' 'knowledge,' 'description' — but never comes to grips with what that modification involves. He also makes frequent use of the word 'logically' in places where the defensibility of its occurrence is far less than obvious and where his actual defence of its occurrence is conspicuously absent. When its occurrence is justified by the fact that what follows it is taken by Rock to be an argument or premise thereby described, the description is often strikingly false.

Rock claims that there are, 'a priori,' three possible theories of perception, themselves classifiable into two categories, 'depending upon whether specification of the relevant stimulus for every perception is deemed sufficient (stimulus theory) or it is not and some major contribution of the organism by means of internal processing to transform the stimulus is considered necessary (constructive theory)' (28). Constructive theory is then further subdividable, 'logically,' into what Rock calls 'spontaneous interaction theory' and 'cognitive theory' (31-2). Rock quickly dismisses the stimulus theory and concentrates on showing that of the two constructivist theories, only the cognitive one will do.

Rock contends that perception is the result of 'thoughtlike operations' (1): It involves such processes as description, comparison, decision, rule-following, inference and problem-solving (e.g., 32, 36). The thoughtlike processes involved in perception differ from ordinary thought processes, however, in being non-conscious and non-verbal (19, 41); elsewhere, they are said to involve non-natural language (51). The notion of non-conscious cognitive events is a problematic one and Rock admits as much. He is prepared to countenance the postulation of what he calls interchangeably an 'executive agency' or a 'homunculus' as a means to explicating it: 'cognitive

theory at its essence incorporates the homunculus concept' (39). The executive agency postulated by Rock 'has available to it the proximal input, which it can scan, and it then behaves in a manner very like a thinking organism in selecting this or that aspect of the stimulus as representing the outer object or event in the world' (39). A psychological theory which invokes the notion of a homunculus, the psychology of which goes itself unexplained, is highly unsatisfactory and only very powerful arguments could force one to resort to such a view. Rock's arguments are not of that sort.

It is not even clear what Rock thinks the homunculus view amounts to. He does not suppose it to involve any form of dualism as he explicitly assumes that all theories of perception are at bottom neurological (33, 269). He attempts to lean on the fact that workers in artificial intelligence 'occasionally do have recourse' to the notion of an homunculus (39). But the type of support Rock needs is not forthcoming from the AI field (and certainly not from Neisser, to whom Rock refers; see Neisser's *Cognitive Psychology*, 295-6). Although workers in AI do make reference to homunculi, they are ultimately concerned to exorcise homunculi. Thus AI strives to give an explanation of intelligent behaviour in terms of the behaviour of homunculi which, as Dennett puts it, are 'so stupid (all they have to do is remember whether to say yes or no when asked) that they can be, as one says, "replaced by a machine"' (*Brainstorms*, 124). To use the notion of homunculi in a way which involves attributing any degree of intelligence to the homunculi themselves is to do what Dennett calls taking out 'intelligence loans' (*Brainstorms*, 12). Progress is made, according to Dennett, '[i]f one can get a team or committee of *relatively* ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculi to produce the intelligent behavior of the whole' (*Brainstorms*, 123). Progress is made, in other words, if one can secure an intelligence loan by means of which one can, somehow, reduce one's original intelligence debt. But Rock has taken out a loan at least as big as, if not bigger than, the original debt.

In fact, Rock seems committed to finding a debt where there may not even be one! Consider his argument for the conclusion that form perception must presuppose description of the proximal stimulus by an executive agency as opposed to, perhaps, 'a picturelike internal representation of the retinal-image shape' (43). He is discussing a set of experiments which tested for recognition of two dimensional figures at fixed time intervals subsequent to initial exposure. Not too surprisingly, the results showed that recognitive ability correlated with the complexity of the figures used. Rock argues that:

...logically, it seems to me to be difficult to explain why, if everything is adequately perceived, some features do not establish memories. Therefore, I would explain these results by maintaining that form perception entails description but that given great complexity, and no *focusing* of attention on specific details, what will be described is the global character of the shape, and not the details. (56)

But surely there is no logical entailment running from perception to memory. From the fact that a state of affairs is perceived, it does not logically follow

that it will be remembered; nor is it true that all adequately perceived features of a state of affairs must be, of logical necessity, equally well remembered. Of course, if to be 'adequately perceived' just means, for Rock, to be the object of a perception which establishes a corresponding memory, then we would have to grant him his premise. But even granting him both that premise and his suppressed second premise based on the experimental data (to the effect that amount of exposure time required to permit subsequent recognition increases with degree of complexity in the test figure), his conclusion does not follow. Admittedly description is a process which takes time to complete. But surely description is not the only process which could progressively record the details of a figure. In particular, a process of the sort which Rock wishes to rule out involving picturelike internal representations could also do so (consider the emerging image in a Polaroid print). Nothing in Rock's argument constitutes a reason for favouring description as the process underlying form perception (or, more accurately, as accounting for the establishment of memories of perceived forms) as opposed to any other process which takes time to complete.

Why, when almost everyone else is trying to purge psychology of the intentional notion of rule-following in favour of some non-intentional form of mere law-like connection, does Rock believe that we must hypothesize, even in the non-conscious depths of perceptual processing, rule-following by a homunculus? Speaking of the perceptual constancies and in particular of size constancy, he says:

... information about distance is immediately 'known' to be what is relevant for interpretations of the visual angle of the retinal image (i.e., the size of the retinal image of an object measured angularly), so that such an interpretation occurs without further ado on the basis of 'knowledge' of certain rules relating distance to visual angle. 'Inference' seems an apt description of what is going on here because the system must infer or deduce a conclusion given certain premises. (17)

There is no argument here in favour of the intentional, rule-following interpretation over the non-intentional, merely law-like interpretation.

Much later, speaking again of the rules which he believes to be being followed by an executive agency in bringing about our perceptual experiences he says that it is:

... difficult at this time to imagine what the substantive nature or language of such rules might be, since they clearly are not in the form of natural language. But the fact that they are represented symbolically in some form is what leads me to speak of them as 'rules' rather than simply to say that the system behaves lawfully, 'as if' it knows how to apply certain rules but in fact does not 'know' anything. (311)

No argument or evidence is ever given in support of the 'fact' to which Rock here alludes. No one — certainly not the spontaneous interaction theorist —

is denying that the process involved is somehow encoded in the brain. But to be represented symbolically involves much more — and indeed involves precisely what Rock seeks to establish. Fifteen pages later Rock endorses as plausible the possibility — one which is presumably in direct conflict with his earlier attempt to show that perceptual processing presupposes description rather than pictures — that the rules followed by the executive agency are not propositional but are 'analogic' in form! He speaks there of 'visual imagery' and of 'read[ing] off' spatial relations!

One can hold (as I do) that perception is irreducibly cognitive without having to adopt an extreme view of the sort which Rock has endeavoured to defend. The fact that our central nervous system operates in a law-like way and that perception would certainly not be possible without that smooth law-like functioning does not undermine the possibility of an essential role for cognitive, and I daresay, conscious processes. Unlike Rock, I am prepared to recognize that to endorse the irreducibly cognitive and thus the irreducibly intentional is to endorse the irreducibly mental.

BONNIE THURSTON

University of British Columbia
and Stanford University

LEWIS ROWELL, *Thinking About Music*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts 1983. Pp. 308. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-87023-386-6.

This book, which surveys a number of important views in the history of music aesthetics, and which touches on a great many important questions in contemporary aesthetics, is nevertheless bound to disappoint the professional philosopher. This disappointment would stem not from the fact that the book is poorly written or factually inaccurate. It is in fact a very well-written text, thoroughly researched and carefully edited. The disappointment would instead stem from the limited extent to which it fulfills its dual titles: 'Thinking about Music' and 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music,' — a problem that is in fact not unique to Rowell's book but inhabits a long row of 'humanistic' or 'classical' texts on aesthetics.

The difficulty does not consist in a disagreement about claims in the philosophy of music (indeed, where Rowell takes positions, he seems to show rather good sense). It is rather a deeper disagreement about a fruitful philosophical *method* of discussing such issues — in short, about

metaphilosophy. Rowell's approach consists almost entirely in collecting, selecting, and comparing in very broad strokes, positions in the philosophy of music. As such, the book would be far better entitled 'Thoughts about Music' than 'Thinking about Music.'

Rowell hardly ever criticizes or revises a theory he discusses, which of course strikes one as refreshingly tolerant — but also leaves one to wonder at the end of each chapter what the *truth* of the matter is, or even what Rowell thinks is true. Neither is there an effort to develop a comprehensive new theory — a failure which is what one would expect, given the fact that there is so little criticism of the old theories, and that these theories, although inconsistent with one another, are somehow, one gets the impression, good enough to answer the many puzzles in the philosophy of music. Finally, certain chapters (4-7 and 10-11) are not so much discussions in the philosophy of music as they are a loose-knit discussion of the historical influence of philosophy on music, or, more rarely apparently according to Rowell, music on philosophy. These chapters are nevertheless some of the best in the book (the chapter on Romanticism is particularly lucid), but are better seen as cultural or intellectual history, and not as part of *the philosophy of music*. (Here, the subtitle should be: 'Philosophies and Musics.')

Rowell's unwillingness to criticize other views, to synthesize them, or to form a unifying conception of his own, reaches a climax in the last chapter, which treats philosophical issues raised by New Music. Here we find a loose collection of quotations, observations and alternative theories, presented with no unifying theme or point. At the beginning of the chapter, for example, there is an extensive discussion of the 20th century politicization of music, and of Soviet aesthetics. The Soviet and National Socialist politicization of music, however, hardly seems to be especially characteristic of the 20th century, and would appear to be a characteristic of conservative or autocratic societies throughout history, whether they be Plato's *Republic*, Monteverdi's Venice or Wagner's Germany. This caricature of Nazi and Stalinist aesthetics, although politically significant, takes the place of what could have been an exploration of more subtle political or socialist theories of music, such as one finds in the works of Adorno or Eisler.

The historical discussions are usually adequate, and it is pleasant to find mediaeval philosophical theories seriously and knowledgeably discussed. It is odd however that Plato's harsh and influential criticism of music is hardly mentioned (nor the revisionist view of Plato that softens this traditional picture). A more grievous failing is the very sloppy — if not outright false — summary of Kant's views (141), which equates noumena with 'objective' *physical* characteristics and phenomena with 'subjective' attitudes. Schopenhauer's subtle theory of music is similarly misdescribed (and underdescribed), when the Will (*one* of whose direct objectivations is music) is casually described as 'the irrational, limitless urge that moves the universe' — whereas the central point of *The World as Will and Idea* is that the world is not just 'moved by' the Will, but is a projection of it. Given the importance Rowell sees of German Idealism for the Romantic tradition, these are flaws of no small pro-

portion, and seem to indicate a poor grasp of the major features of Idealism. It is also curious that Nietzsche's views (and compositions) are virtually ignored, and that the one mention of Leibniz uses the Anglicized spelling not seen since 1900 ('Leibnitz').

Concerning the purely music-theoretic aspects of the book, one central figure in music analysis and theory is conspicuous by his absence: that of Heinrich Schenker. In the hypercharged halls of contemporary American musicology and music theory, the absence of Schenker's name amounts to a condemnation of the tradition he inspired. Although a discussion of the murky observations of this perhaps overly-valued theorist is not always welcome, it is a pity that Rowell does not consider Schenker's theory as embodying a philosophy of music. For one thing, as the introductory chapters of his works (usually left untranslated) and his German vocabulary make crystal clear, Schenker is heavily indebted to German Idealist thought. For another thing, it is almost exclusively in the broad tradition inspired by Schenker — including here the recent work of Jackendoff and Lehrdahl — that the contrast between aesthetic 'surface' and 'depth' in music — discussed by Rowell on pp. 132-3 — becomes something more than a loose metaphor.

Rowell's choice of musical examples is extremely rich, extending to composers infrequently praised in more exalted musicological circles (Tchaikovsky, Vaughn Williams, Britten) and to a useful discussion of Japanese and Indian Music. Yet their breadth, as opposed to the intensive consideration of a small set of better-known works, will present difficulties for the use of the book as an introduction to the subject. Could an undergraduate be expected to know — or go listen to a recording of — the orchestral prelude to Tchaikovsky's *The Queen of Spades*? Or Vaughn William's *Riders to the Sea*? How many professional musicologists would recall these works?

Seen in the light of contemporary analytic (and traditional) aesthetics, several features of the volume stand out. There is an understandable, but nevertheless peculiar, unwillingness to take a clear position on many crucial issues — the definition of 'music,' the ontological status of pieces of music, the perception (epistemology) of music, the nature of performances and their relationship to works, or the many questions in the theory of value. This is in several places quite irritating, as is an unwillingness to draw distinctions that are commonly made in music aesthetics. Rowell, for example, does not distinguish between physical sounds and the hearing of them as tones, a distinction whose importance was underscored by Zuckerkandl and discussed extensively by phenomenologists and psychologists (as well as, very recently, by Roger Scruton). Beardsley's famous three-pronged criterion of value is endorsed (or rather, endorsed as a *prima facie* guide to value), but then values of 'ideas, content, manner, rhetoric [and] structure' are simply added to them, with no amplification of what these values are or discussion of whether they might be related to Beardsley's standards. There is a sustained tone favoring an 'objective' position in the theory of value, but whether this objectivism is merely cultural relativism (as suggested at several places), Kantian inter-subjectivism, or true *objectism*, is never made clear.

The nature and value of performance, a not unimportant question in the experience of music, is given no serious discussion, in spite of Rowell's recognition that the distinction between works and performances has had great importance since the Renaissance. The best performance is said to be simply, 'that which best articulates and balances properties of excellence.' Excellence in general? Excellence(s) of the work?

In all fairness, it is clear that the work is intended to be used and read primarily by musicians. The standards of contemporary professional philosophy should, perhaps, not be used then to assess the book's suitability for its intended audience. Yet one cannot help but frown at the tradition which this book sometimes eloquently represents. Why are there so few clear questions being posed? Why are the standards of *explanation* and *solution* so tepid? The problem undoubtedly lies in the lamentable fact that few prospective readers have paradigms of the posing of difficult but clear questions, and the definitive answering of these by recognized modes of explanation, that one has seen in the natural sciences, in mathematics, sometimes in philosophy and increasingly in the social sciences.

RANDALL R. DIPERT
SUNY College at Fredonia

FRANCIS SPARSHOTT, *The Theory of the Arts*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1982. Pp. xiv + 726. US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07266-3); US\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-691-10130-Z).

This book presents 'a theory about theories of art' (vii). It attempts 'a rational reconstruction of the logical relationships whose half-systematic exploration has formed the history of the philosophy of art' (8). 'It claims that anyone who wants to think about art in the most general terms, and to find a pattern of thought in which whatever anyone intelligibly says when theorizing about art will find a determinate and appropriate place (or, if he is confused, a set of places), will find the considerations marshaled here helpful in respects in which other ways of talking and thinking will hinder' (464).

These snippets give the flavor of the book and a fair idea of its scope. For the texture one must dip into the work itself. Sparshott expounds, and demonstrates the value of, his theory by discussing very many thorny problems, locating them in such a way that their relevance and relationship to

other issues is clear, suggesting solutions, and giving sane answers to quite a few of the hard questions about art. The result — with 200 pages of notes and references to artists, critics, dealers, anthropologists, and philosophers; with short, sharp discussions of grand theories and small points of logic — is a rich fabric, a large-scale map with all the little byways and outbuildings filled in. If *Languages of Art* is a Mondrian painting, then this book is a Flemish tapestry.

It has two main parts, 'The Arts' and 'Art.' In the first, Sparshott develops the 'Classical Line,' derived from Plato, that identifies the fine arts as some among the arts in general: those organized bodies of skill and knowledge directed to a kind of outcome. Such an art will have a public, and standards:

Where there is art there are standards, and where there are standards there must be people to formulate, impose, and imply them. An art would hardly get organized if there were no one whose purposes it served, and it is unlikely (if not impossible) that it could become established without an organized group of people having an avowed common interest in its products. (40)

An artist, on this view, is defined by his or her art. An artist does not exist as a lone, inspired soul, but only because there is the art which he or she has mastered, and which has a role in society which (at least partly) determines what sort of products shall be made, and how they shall be evaluated.

It is in this context that Sparshott introduces his technical term 'performance' for 'anything made or done, as one conceives it when one attends strictly to the making and the doing' (41). We may or may not cherish the pot or the poem, but what we criticize — praise, blame or admire — is what the potter or poet did in producing just that pot or poem in just that way.

In aesthetics we usually distinguish such things as pots and chairs from poems and symphonies. The latter are products of the fine rather than the useful arts, and theories of art are primarily concerned with the fine arts. The Classical Line runs into trouble trying to specify just what distinguishes the fine from the practical arts. Sparshott considers two accounts. The first identifies the fine arts as the arts of 'imitative play,' 'the disengaged use of communicative skills' (59). This fits poetry and painting well enough, for saying and showing are our main communicative skills. The definition is stretched to fit music: music imitates by 'expressing' inner meanings or feelings (85). The definition is stretched right out of shape with architecture. It is claimed that 'all normal beholders impose the same [formal] requirements' on works of architecture, so that architecture imitates 'the constant element in the formal hungers of the human mind' (92).

So Sparshott tries another tack: the fine arts are the arts of beauty: '... they are directed toward the production of objects whose primary value is exhausted by the quality of the experience to be obtained in cognitive relation to them ...' (102). This definition, too, runs into counterexamples — all the works of art which had another primary purpose. Works of religious art and works of architecture are the obvious examples.

Emphasizing the fine arts as institutions is correct as far as it goes, but

what accounts for the maintenance and preservations of these institutions? What makes art *important*?

The second part of the book is devoted to theories which redefine 'Art' to answer these questions. The Poetic Line sees Art as purely innovative, never the product of *an* art (297). According to the Expressive Line nothing counts as Art except acts of making emotions expressible (308). The Mystic Line finds the purpose and power of art in just those 'processes and products which represent, symbolize, or control those forces' which are not captured by theories of positive science (373). The Purist Line picks out the life of the artist as contrasted with the lives of ordinary people who are caught up in economic determinants. The artist's life is valuable because it is useless (417).

Each of these alternative Lines has had significant adherents. Collingwood and Croce, in particular, are discussed thoroughly as proponents of the Expressive Line. But each of these lines is parasitic upon the Classical Line. Whatever its troubles in identifying the fine arts, these others are hopeless. Their definitions exclude many of the things we all count as works of art or works of fine art. They include things we would count as neither. It is only because we have a good sense of what the fine arts are that arguments for these Lines can be brought in to explain the importance we ascribe to the arts and their works.

Sparshott accepts the incompatibility of these lines and the need for (something from?) all of them in any complete and general account of art. So the tensions and ambiguities of the work remain unresolved, but are embraced.

The Classical Line has great appeal in the way it handles perennial problems about the arts: the role of the artist, the role of the critic, the value of art. Much of the book's value lies in the detailed discussion of such problems and of other attempts to deal with them. One can find some mention of just about every theory (sane or cockeyed) somewhere in the book; Sparshott's comments are pithy, droll, and usually on target. A big book, and a fun one.

JOHN W. HEINTZ
University of Calgary

H.G. BRACK, *Phenomenology of Tools*. W. Jonesport,; Pennywheel Press 1982. 35 pp.

Human being, we are told in the opening stanzas of this poetic 'recollection,'

— an *Andenken* in Heidegger's sense —, 'historicizes with ontical and ontological tools' (4). Tool-wielding is not merely one human activity among others, but the very way in which we come to be essentially as beings in time. 'Tools' include not only the instruments and artifacts of everyday *praxis* (ontical tools), but all that which comes into play through our transcendental constitution and mediates our relation to the world (ontological tools). 'Unwise wielding' is thus more than troublesome; it could signal our 'doom' (33).

But this is just what the current situation portends according to Brack. Blinkered by the prevailing 'discursive symbolism of science' (26), and under the sway of an unrestrained will-to-power, we threaten in our present exploitive and violent use of tools to 'destroy ... the Ground of our Being' (35). What is called for in response is a radical 'reform of our repertoire of tools' (35), to which Brack's own meditation is itself a contribution. He seeks to awaken us to those compassionate possibilities of tool-wielding in speaking and acting, and hence to possibilities of human being itself, which present uses tend to conceal and close-off.

Yet what is most original in this account is also what is most troublesome. For in itself the language of 'tools' favours the pretension to an 'anthropocentric' control of ourselves and of our world which lies at the base of the current problem. Thus to speak of 'ontological tools' works against the very transformation of our being that Brack invokes. It was one of the virtues of Heidegger's account (to which Brack pays explicit homage) that tool-use as an ontic activity was situated in an ontological context that was itself neither a 'tool' nor an 'object' of wilful manipulation. Here, as elsewhere, Heidegger insisted on the 'ontological difference.' Where Brack ignores this instruction, he only confuses the issue.

ROBERT BURCH
University of Alberta

SUSTAINING SUBSCRIPTIONS

Any person or institution wishing to give substantial support to C.P.R./R.C.C.P. may become a Sustaining Subscriber by payment of \$75.00 more per volume. The following have purchased Sustaining Subscriptions, and C.P.R./R.C.C.P. is extremely grateful for their support:

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria
Department of Philosophy, University of
Western Ontario

ABONNEMENTS DE SOUTIEN.

Toute personne ou institution qui désire contribuer substantiellement à C.P.R./R.C.C.P. peut obtenir un abonnement de soutien en payant \$75.00 ou plus pour un volume. Les institutions suivantes ont pris un abonnement de soutien, et C.P.R./R.C.C.P. leur en est très reconnaissant:

Département de Philosophie, Université d'Ottawa
Département de Philosophie,
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

ADDITIONAL SUSTAINING SUBSCRIPTIONS

Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge
Department of Philosophy, University of New
Brunswick