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FRANZ STEINER VERLAG GMBH · WIESBADEN/GERMANY

J.L. ACKRILL, *Aristotle the Philosopher*. Don Mills, Ont. & New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. viii + 160. Cdn\$12.95; US\$7.95. ISBN 0-19-289118-9.

This book aims at an audience unfamiliar with Aristotle's philosophical work and as such it is extremely useful both to the teacher and the student. It is well and elegantly written, and it is a distillation of many years of thinking about the subject. My reservations are that it may leave the philosophically uninitiated behind (because it is so compact), and even mislead such persons about Aristotle's achievements (because of its undue emphasis on 'ordinary language').

The scope of the exposition is wide, with chapters on change, explanation, the soul, the *Prior Analytics*, the *Posterior Analytics*, philosophical method, metaphysics and ethics all following two introductory chapters which are intended to convey the general flavour of Aristotle's philosophy. The method of exposition is to intersperse long, well-translated and well-chosen textual excerpts with philosophical commentary, the result being that the student gets good practice in reading Aristotle — a skill not easily mastered. Given the difficulty of reading Aristotle, the amount of textual, as opposed to doctrinal comment is perhaps too small, but the philosophical commentary may well serve as introduction enough, making textual difficulties more evident.

This book has what are, to my mind, two major flaws: it tends to cast the exposition into moulds fashioned too recently, and it pictures Aristotle as a philosopher of ordinary language.

An approach to Aristotle can be merely antiquarian: there is nothing more irritating than to read the bland and unconsciously biased accounts of 'merely historical' authors. Clearly Ackrill does not err in this direction. But it does not seem right either to write as though the *only* interest in reading Aristotle were to find in him anticipations of Kripke, Putnam and Ryle. The philosophy has an interest of its own, and this must be brought out by dealing with it on its own terms: discovering its motivations, its assumptions, its links

with other ancient thought and trying in the light of these to make sense of it. Ackrill does too little of the latter; he seems to think that non-Aristotelians will read Aristotle only if they can perceive a link to their contemporary interests.

The exposition of Aristotle's ideas is much marred by this tendency. For example, this is one of the summaries offered of the theory of categories:

Dogs, colours, sizes, times and places do not belong in the same ontological drawer; and you will at once fall into absurdity if you speak about one in terms appropriate to another. (How heavy is yellow? Where is ten o'clock?) (25)

Now I am not in the least persuaded that 'Where is yellow?' is absurd — what's wrong with the answer, 'Nowhere'? But, more seriously, I do not know what evidence there is that these Rylean points shed light on Aristotle's theory. For example what connection is there between a notion that yields category mistakes a là Ryle, and the Aristotelian conception of categories as kinds of *being*, figures of predication, etc.? Similarly the chapter on logic is more preoccupied with Aristotle's ignoring the fourth figure of the syllogism, and a discussion of the existential import of universal statements (questions motivated by recent discussions) than with the brilliant metalogical insights that led Aristotle to the construction of a logical system. (These have been ably discussed by J. Corcoran and T. Smiley, and more recently by J. Lear.) Why discuss what Aristotle did not think in preference over what he did think?

Even worse, in my view, is the portrayal of Aristotle as concerned with 'ordinary language.' Now it must be admitted that the phrase means different things to different people, and so it would be unfair to try to refute Ackrill's approach by commenting simply that Aristotle was concerned with 'things, not words.' (Having eliminated the spurious quotation marks in the Oxford translation of the *Categories*, he presumably knows *this*.) But it is disappointing to have the treatment of change in Book I of the *Physics* described in terms of Aristotle tabulating 'the implications of ordinary language.' The historical impulse for the discussion of change was the Eleatic dialectic that had made the scientific description of change impossible, much as the coherent description of geometrical ratios had been made impossible by the discovery that there are incommensurable magnitudes. Ordinary language gives no more support to Aristotle's introduction of the sub-stratum than it does to Eudoxus' theory of geometrical ratios, and certainly it does not bring out the importance of Aristotle's contribution. What ordinary language does, at most, is to give Aristotle useful examples in his exposition: 'the man who became musical, that's an example of a sub-stratum.' This tendency is even out of place in the chapter on ethics. Aristotle's ethical writings may make constant reference to what people say, (and even here, I think, he is concerned with *beliefs* not usage) but he is by no means content to leave it at that. His teleology, his theory of virtue as a mean, his accounts of weakness of the will and of friendship, and his emphasis on contemplation are all startling doc-

trines: not one of them is due simply to the patient recording of 'ordinary' thought or language.

These flaws ought not to obscure the virtues of the book. It contains some outstanding successes of exposition: the chapters on the soul and on ethics are examples. The artful combination of synopsis and detail is most admirable. On the one hand, it is the function of books like this one (and of introductory courses) to give the student an overview of the subject, but on the other hand the skill a student most urgently needs is the ability to look at the text in a critical way. Most treatments emphasize one of these needs over the other: I know of one course that does only *Metaphysics* A, and another that requires students to read Copleston and not Aristotle. But Ackrill's method of combining text and commentary achieves both ends admirably and I hope that teachers will learn from him.

MOHAN MATTHEN

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THEODOR W. ADORNO, *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique; Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies* (1956). Translated by Willis Domingo. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1983. Pp. vii + 248. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-262-01073-9.

Against Epistemology is both a document and a script. On the one hand, it finalizes the increasingly critical appropriation of Husserlian phenomenology in Adorno's dissertation (1924), later manuscript (1934-37), and journal articles. On the other hand, it gives stage instructions for Adorno's subsequent philosophy. This documentary script is crucial for understanding *Negative Dialectics* (1966) and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970).

Originally published in 1956 as *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, the book is also an important performance in its own right. It criticizes Husserl in order to develop a metacritique of idealist epistemology. 'Husserl's philosophy is the occasion and not the point of this book' (1). The point is rather to display and surpass the idealist antinomies that return in Husserl's phenomenology, remain under disguise in Heidegger's ontology, and serve ideological functions in capitalist society.

Against Epistemology can be called 'problem-historical' in approach and

'dialectical' in method. Each chapter treats a specific set of problems at a certain stage of Husserl's career. Husserl's apparent solutions turn out to be increasingly problematic at the hands of immanent critique. Adorno wants to use phenomenology's strongest suits to turn the tables. Truth is to be found by forcing phenomenology to confess its own untruth (5).

Adorno's concerns and method are presented in the Introduction. Like so many introductions in German philosophy, this one will perplex unprepared readers. It assumes considerable familiarity with German philosophy and Adorno's previous writings. Novices could begin instead with Adorno's 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 37 (1940) 5-18. The Introduction attacks 'first philosophy' — any philosophy that assigns primacy to one original principle. Adorno's ultimate target is Heideggerian ontology.

Chapter 1 addresses antinomies in Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. I (1900). Inherent tensions are unavoidable, Adorno says, whenever philosophers accept a scientific ideal for human thought but wish to remain philosophical. Furthermore, such philosophical 'scientizing' of thought, so common since Descartes, expresses and ratifies the commodity fetishism criticized in Marx's *Capital*. In both cases human products are taken at face value in isolation from their social context. The scientizing of thought is a form of 'reification.'

Despite frequent criticisms of positivism and empiricism, Husserl simply accepts the achievements of formal logic. These he makes definitive for every sort of 'objecthood' and consciousness. He turns highly formal propositions into irreducible, *a priori* 'states of affairs.' Pushed by Adorno, however, Husserl's reification of logic discloses despite itself the functional character of formal logic, the existential character of logical laws, and the genetic conditions of logical validity. The open sesame in Adorno's tightly argued interpretations is a subject-object dialectic derived from Hegel and a theory of ideology derived from Marx and Lukács.

Chapter 2 shows how the antinomies of Husserl's logical absolutism return in *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. II (1901), and *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913). 'Logical axioms, elevated to propositions in themselves, offer the model of fact-free, pure essentialities,' Adorno claims (89); Husserl simply transfers to epistemology and metaphysics the reductive procedure 'which logical absolutism conjured up' (91).

Adorno develops his claim by pointing up inherent tensions in methodological matters such as ideation, semantic analysis, intentionality, and eidetic variation. Fundamental incompatibilities emerge between Husserl's concern for essences and his turn to concrete lived experience. A resolution would require thorough criticisms of scientific methodology, the correspondence theory of truth, and the supposedly constitutive character of human consciousness. This critique belongs to the appropriation of Husserlian phenomenology sketched in Chapters 3 and 4.

In Chapter 3 we leave the problems of logic and methodology for a wider

epistemological dialectic in *Ideen* (1913). This chapter, the longest, is also the most convincing. It comprises four taut sections on the givenness of universal essences, the epistemic functions of perception and sensation, the correlation of noesis and noema, and what Spiegelberg has described as Husserl's 'system in reverse.'

The chapter has two recurrent themes: every epistemic immediacy is already mediated, and every constitutive factor in knowledge has already been constituted. Whether empiricist, rationalist, or phenomenological, epistemological foundationalism misreads the dialectics of human knowledge, just as first philosophy in general misconstrues the antagonistic social processes informing epistemic dialectics.

The final chapter begins with Husserl's philosophical and social links to his predecessors and successors. Idealism is the main line of continuity. By 'idealism' Adorno means the affirmation of an identity between object and subject. This affirmation assigns constitutive priority to the epistemic subject. In Adorno's judgment, idealism has been the dominant philosophical ideology in capitalist society since Descartes. Husserl's philosophical development amounts to a dogged attempt to transcend idealism idealistically. This assessment is tested first on Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition and then on the question of the monadological ego in *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* (1929) and *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1931).

Though failing to sublate idealism, Adorno concludes, Husserl's philosophy makes idealism's antinomies so transparent that all first philosophy is undermined. And, like any other consistent ideology, Husserl's antinomic idealism not only occludes but also accurately expresses the social processes from which it had to arise. 'The intertwining of illusion and necessity in idealism has seldom become clearer in its history than with Husserl' (234). For idealism to become both unillusory and unnecessary, fundamental social change would be required. Society would have to become really as rational as idealists have mistakenly claimed it to be.

Readers who persist to the end will find additional illumination by returning to the Introduction. They may note some irony in the Introduction's epigraph. 'A mortal must think mortal not immortal thoughts.' Which sense of 'mortal' fits Adorno's dialectical critique of Husserl's formidable phenomenology?

Some readers might wonder why their difficulties have been increased by a clumsy translation. A certain lack of elegance may be excusable in rendering German philosophic prose. Furthermore, some failures are understandable in approximating Adorno's idiosyncratic syntax, so succinctly described in the Translator's Note. But straightforward errors are inexcusable, and the botching of standard idioms is hardly understandable. These problems range from a dropped line (9) to a rendering of 'es gibt' ('there is') as 'it gives' (234). Their cumulative effect is to make the text much more obscure than Adorno's German. One can only hope that the book's intrinsic interest will carry readers past the mistranslations, and that these will be corrected in a subsequent edition.

Husserl specialists may wish to dispute some unfair or imprecise interpretations. A more serious problem is Adorno's frequent analogical arguments. These are more suggestive than convincing. Furthermore, they assume theses that would be most interesting to have developed and defended, namely that philosophical antinomies both resemble and interact with social antagonisms, and that a philosophy can be accurately read as a social ideology. By relying on analogical arguments, *Against Epistemology* risks serious misinterpretation and easy dismissal. These outcomes would be unfortunate for such a provocative book.

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RÉMI BRAGUE, *Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, Quatre études*. Coll. Épiméthée, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1982. 181 p. 115FF. ISBN 2-13-037217-1.

Les quatre études que l'auteur nous présente dans cet ouvrage ont d'abord servi d'exposés dans le cadre d'un séminaire sur le temps dirigé par P. Aubenque à Paris. Il s'agit d'analyses philologiques sur des textes courts dont deux de Platon et deux d'Aristote. L'auteur en dégage les problèmes que pose l'exégèse traditionnelle et s'efforce d'y apporter des solutions originales.

Le premier texte analysé est celui du *Timée*, 37d5-8 dans lequel on trouve la définition platonicienne du temps comme 'image mobile de l'éternité' (11-71). L'auteur s'étonne de ne trouver aucune trace de cette formule doxographique durant les trois siècles qui suivent la composition du *Timée*. On rencontrera une première trace de cette formule chez Philon d'Alexandrie, au Ier s. apr. J.-C. (III, 38, 15; 202, 25; II, 63, 11, éd. Cohn-Wendland). On la retrouve chez Plutarque, Albinos, Actius, et elle est définitivement fixée par Diogène Laërce (III, 73), au IIIe s. apr. J.-C. Notre formule est alors reprise par Plotin qui l'attribue à Platon, et c'est ainsi qu'elle passe dans le Néoplatonisme (*Ennéades*, I, 5, 7, 15; III, 7, 1.19; II, 20.29; 13.24). En réalité, selon R. Brague, la tradition nous donne deux définitions platoniciennes du temps: l'une qui lie le temps à la notion d'image, et l'autre qui la rattache aux notions de mesure et de mouvement (13-27). A partir de ces données de la tradition, R. Brague montre que la définition du temps comme 'image mobile de l'éter-

nité' n'est pas platonicienne, qu'elle ne se trouve même pas dans notre passage du *Timée*, 37d (27-31), ni dans les autres passages de notre dialogue qui se rapportent au temps (31-42). C'est ainsi que l'auteur nous propose une nouvelle lecture de *Timée*, 37d selon laquelle: 1. ce n'est plus le temps qui est une image, mais le Ciel, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des corps célestes, 2. le terme *aion* ne signifie pas l'éternité, mais l'âme du monde (43-71) (Comparer avec J.A. Festugière, *Le sens philosophique du mot aion*, PP 4(1949) 172-189; E. Degani, *Aion da Omero ad Aristotele*, Padova: Cedam, [1961], 158 p.). Selon cette nouvelle lecture, c'est le Ciel qui est une image mobile de l'âme du monde et le temps devient un mouvement ordonné du Ciel qui manifeste la structure numérique de l'âme du monde.

Le second texte analysé est celui de *Politique*, 271d3-6 où l'auteur montre que le *bōs nun* (comme à présent) apparaît dans ce passage comme un corps étranger (73-95). Il nous propose donc de lire le *bōs nun ... touto* comme une parenthèse dans laquelle le *tauto touto* jouerait le rôle de sujet d'une phrase nominale. Le sens de cette phrase entre parenthèses serait que le dieu règne maintenant sur certains endroits comme il régnait auparavant sur l'univers entier (84-85). A l'aide de passages d'Hésiode (*Travaux*, 169) et de Pindare (*Olympiques*, 2, 70) les endroits où le dieu règne maintenant sont identifiés aux îles des bienheureux qui représentent dans l'imagerie de Platon la vie philosophique (*Rép.*, VII, 519c5, 540b6; *Phéd.*, 111a6). A partir de là l'auteur dégage le sens profond du mythe en ces termes: 'C'est ensemble, quoique à l'issue de parcours rythmés par des temporalités différentes, que le dieu et l'homme parviennent à leur authenticité dans la philosophie: de même que le dieu n'est lui-même que quand, laissant le monde à son propre destin, il se voue à la contemplation, de même l'homme n'est lui-même que par son abandon de la cité et sa conversion à la philosophie. Et c'est *maintenant* que, le dieu suprême ayant laissé vacant le gouvernement du monde, la philosophie n'est plus une pure possibilité, mais la vie même du dieu et la vie du dieu même' (95). D'où le titre de cette étude: l'isolation du sage.

Une troisième étude porte sur la formule aristotélicienne ὄ ποτε ὄ (OPO) que l'on rencontre 7 fois dans la *Physique* (IV, 2, 219a19-21; 14, 223a25-29; 11, 219b12-15; 219b18-19; 219b25-28; 220a6-8; 219b10-12), 2 fois dans les *Parties des Animaux* (II, 649a14-16; 649b21-27), et une fois dans *De la Génération et de la Corruption* (I, 319a33-64) p. 97-144). L'auteur passe en revue chacun de ces textes et montre que la formule OPO est utilisée par Aristote à trois niveaux: celui de l'objet transporté, celui de l'antérieur/postérieur, et celui du maintenant. Au premier niveau, notre formule s'oppose à *logos*, tandis qu'au deuxième et au troisième niveau, elle s'oppose à *einai*. En d'autres mots, la pierre transportée est constituée comme *hypokeimenon* indépendamment du *logos*, alors que l'antérieur/postérieur et le maintenant sont constitués à l'intérieur du *logos* en s'opposant à l'*einai*. D'où l'auteur peut écrire: 'La sphère du *logos*, du 'dire', de la prédication, est ici le lieu naturel d'une réflexion sur le temps et sur le maintenant' (127). La formule OPO prend dès lors le sens de: 'ce qu'étant le maintenant est le maintenant' (127). Elle désigne une structure

antéro-postérieure dont l'actualisation à un moment donné premet au maintenant d'être maintenant et au mouvement d'être mouvement.

La quatrième étude porte sur un texte d'Aristote en *Méta physique*, VII, 1, 1028a31-b2 (145-66). Ce texte qui traite directement de la substance fait néanmoins allusion au temps. En effet, Aristote y montre que la substance peut être dite première en trois sens: selon le discours ou *logos*, selon la connaissance et selon le temps. La lecture traditionnelle de ce passage, tout en inversant l'ordre des raisons, se voit obligée de confiner la priorité selon le temps aux lignes a33-34, ce qui a pour effet de la rendre incompréhensible. L'auteur suggère alors un nouveau découpage du texte dans lequel la raison de la priorité de la substance selon le discours se lit en 1028a33-36, celle selon la connaissance en 1028a36-b2, et celle selon le temps en 1028b2-6. La priorité de la substance selon le temps serait une priorité chronologique, au sens où cette question de la substance aurait été soulevée par les plus anciens philosophes.

Le lecteur de cet ouvrage y trouvera des analyses philologiques marquées au coin de l'originalité et qui s'inspirent des méthodes heideggeriennes dont l'auteur a fait usage dans un ouvrage précédent sur le *Ménon* de Platon (*Le Restant. Supplément aux commentaires du Ménon de Platon*, Paris: Vrin/Les Belles Lettres, [1978], 246 p.). Nous parions que les philologues classiques ne pourront acquiescer facilement à toutes les thèses défendues par l'auteur dans cet ouvrage.

YVON LAFRANCE

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CONTARDO CALLIGARIS, *Hypothèses sur le fantasme*. Paris: Seuil 1983. 352 p. 79FF. ISBN 2-02-006553-3.

Montage, scénario imaginaire, 'Phantasie,' fantaisie, fantasme sont tous des mots pour désigner les processus intrapsychiques d'un désir inconscient parfois défensifs, parfois l'expression des rêves diurnes, parfois même pathogènes. Le fantasme n'est pas seulement un matériel à analyser, qui se donne du premier coup comme fiction (rêve diurne) ou que son caractère de construction sont à démontrer en contradiction avec les apparences (souvenir écran), il est aussi un résultat de l'analyse, un contenu latent à mettre à jour derrière le symptôme.

Freud a découvert l'importance des fantasmes dans l'étiologie des névroses. Il nous a enseigné à distinguer entre la réalité matérielle dans ses souvenirs dits traumatiques et la 'réalité psychique.' Il a dégagé des modalités typiques de scénarios fantasmatisques, tels que le 'roman familial.' Il nous a montré les trois destins névrotiques en rapport avec les trois scènes: la scène de séduction à l'hystérie, la scène primitive à l'obsession et la menace de castration à la phobie.

Calligaris nous apporte une précision sur la nature du fantasme. Il éclaircit la frontière de sa recherche ainsi: 'Les éléments des fantasmes sont au nombre de deux: la phrase que produit l'Autre comme désirant, et l'objet qui se propose au corps de cet autre pour en parfaire la jouissance.' Plus tard il nous parle du double effet de la phrase du fantasme: un effet symbolique de production de l'Autre comme sujet, et un effet imaginaire d'attribution d'un corps à cet Autre (68).

Dans la constitution du fantasme, face à un manque imaginaire du corps de l'Autre, le sujet fait offrande du réel de son corps comme bout imaginaire manquant à l'autre. L'Autre se 'spécularise' pour ainsi dire. Les rapports entre semblables (le registre imaginaire) sont aussi variés que les figures de l'Autre (le registre symbolique) qu'anime le choir de la neurose. Calligaris nous fait parcourir les aperçus cliniques pour conclure que le gain de savoir conscient obtenu au cours d'une analyse est gain dans le savoir qu'on a imaginé à la place de la vérité, et non pas gain dans la réalité. La détermination imaginaire d'un tel savoir, quel qu'il soit, est toujours en défaut.

Calligaris nous offre un résumé qui nous permet de reconnaître quatre temps dans la construction du fantasme:

- 1) désir indéterminé dans l'Autre
- 2) par l'énoncé du fantasme l'Autre se transforme en Sujet;
- 3) le Sujet ne peut se nouer si l'Autre ne prend pas corps, ou si son désir ne se fait pas demande;
- 4) ou la fonction du Nom du Père permet de répondre dans le symbolique à un manque imaginaire. Ce qui n'a pas été admis dans le symbolique (ce qui a été 'forclos') réapparaît dans le réel.

Avec la lucidité inspiré par Lacan il nous précise: 'Impossible qu'un objet déterminé soit offert au désir de l'Autre sans que celui-ci prenne le corps qui permet cette détermination, et, du coup, fait de son désir une demande. Impossible aussi de parcourir le tracé de la castration imaginaire et les contours du corps de l'Autre, jusqu'à entendre l'énoncé qui le fait Sujet, sans mettre en cause l'existence même de cet autre et toute détermination de l'objet qui lui est offert' (39).

C'est une étude remarquable, d'un élève de Lacan qui nous fait réfléchir aux questions fondamentales sur le fonctionnement de l'Inconscient. L'auteur a développé ses hypothèses dans les 250 pages du livre s'inspirant des écrits de Lacan surtout *Ecrits*, 1966 et *Séminaire XI*, 1964. Freud y est rarement cité. Il n'y a pas de bibliographie. Pour saisir le texte le lecteur doit comprendre le structuralisme — l'Univers de signes et les catégories linguistiques.

ques. Un glossaire aurait pu aider le lecteur qui n'est pas familier avec l'Ecole de Lacan et le courant hegelien et freudien de sa pensée.

Une étude davantage centrée sur les théories classiques et kleinienne du fantasme a été élaborée par Jean Laplanche et J.B. Pontalis dans 'Fantasme originale, fantasme des origines, origine du fantasme', *Temps modernes*, 1964.

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JOHN DEELY, *Introducing Semiotic, Its History and Doctrine*. Préface de T.A. Sebeok, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982, xvi + 246 p. US\$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-330807-7); US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20287-6).

Certaines disciplines éprouvent le besoin de récapituler leur histoire lorsque, parvenues à une certaine maturité, elles disposent d'un point de vue assez sûr et assez élevé pour pouvoir considérer les différentes étapes conduisant à leur état présent, ou lorsque, traversant des périodes critiques, elles croient trouver dans le repli historique des conditions d'identification de leurs problèmes ainsi que l'inspiration d'une éventuelle réorientation. Dans le cas d'une 'discipline' comme la sémiotique, la situation est ambiguë car s'il est facile de montrer que l'entreprise sémiotique est, sous une acception ou une autre de ce terme, plusieurs fois séculaire, elle ne s'en trouve pas pour autant à l'abri de crises profondes, qui atteignent jusqu'à la validité de son existence.

L'ouvrage de John Deely comporte deux parties (1. 'Le contexte historique', 5-84 et 2. 'Prospectives doctrinales,' 85-123), deux appendices (1. 'Sur l'idée d'une "doctrine des signes",' 127-30 et 2. 'Sur la distinction entre les mots et les idées,' 131-42), un imposant appareil de notes (143-203), de même qu'un index des noms propres et des concepts (235-46).

La partie historique veut répondre au souhait, plusieurs fois exprimé, d'une 'archéologie des concepts sémiotiques' (cf. les leçons d'U. Eco, International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Toronto, juin 1980). Cependant, alors que la reconstruction archéologique faite par Eco prenait pour objet le concept de *signe*, la présente partie historique s'organise

autour du concept de *logique*, au sens large de 'activité interprétative propre à l'entendement' (Poinsot, *Tractatus de Signis*, 1632). C'est ainsi que l'A. peut commencer son histoire avec l' 'ancien monde' où la figure d'Aristote est centrale, la poursuivre dans les développements 'latins' (c'est-à-dire scolastiques) qu'il résume en un tableau très englobant et assez détaillé (36-40) des distinctions, des concepts et des doctrines qui alimenteront la pensée sémiotique d'abord par une théorie de la connaissance (caractérisée succinctement pour les 13^eme et 14^eme siècles), puis, à la lumière de ce qu'on appelle ici une 'conscience sémiotique' (dont la constitution s'étend de 1350 à 1650), par la division que fait Locke de la connaissance en connaissance spéculative et connaissance pratique et par leur unification au moyen de la 'connaissance sémiotique', qui a trait aux moyens d'acquisition, d'élaboration et de partage de l'une et de l'autre. Il examine ensuite très rapidement l'intervalle qui va des 'temps modernes' (par ex., *La logique ou l'Art de penser*) à la période contemporaine (dont Peirce est la figure dominante, associée à celles de Frege, Boole, de Morgan, etc.). Au terme de cette rapide histoire (elle occupe 70 pages), l'A. estime avoir montré comment, si complexes qu'elles soient, les relations entre la logique et la sémiotique permettent de distinguer une conception formelle et une conception interprétative ou constructive. En ce sens, la sémiotique pourrait 'absorber la totalité de l'épistémologie et de la philosophie traditionnelle de la nature, du moins pour ce qui est des aspects fondationnels' (83). Le ton et le contenu de ce programme ne sont pas sans rappeler les espoirs des artisans de l'*Encyclopaedia of Unified Science* qui, au cours des années 30 et 40, donnaient aussi à la 'théorie des signes' un objet extrêmement ambitieux, dont le traitement a du reste été plus annoncé que réalisé.

La partie doctrinale est composée de trois sections: 1. 'Le langage,' 2. 'La connaissance' et 3. 'L'expérience.' En préface, T.A. Sebeok attire notre attention sur l'inversion de l'ordre de présentation de ces termes. Cette inversion est moins inattendue que S. semble le penser, car elle est entièrement prévue dans ce qu'on pourrait appeler la 'stratégie intellectuelle' de l'A. Dans la (faible) mesure où elle peut être définie, la conception de la sémiotique qui est favorisée ici reconduit le langage à l'ensemble de la connaissance et choisit de situer celle-ci à l'intérieur de l'expérience humaine tout entière. Ces sections ne comportent pas d'analyses, non plus qu'elles ne contiennent de considérations méthodologiques ou d'éléments théoriques permettant de voir comment ces niveaux sont effectivement reliés les uns aux autres. Il s'agit plutôt de présenter quelques lignes d'une philosophie *générale* qui se donnerait une orientation sémiotique et d'évaluer, en son nom, ce qui se présente par ailleurs comme théorie (par ex., les approches logiques des LN ou les principes de la GTG). L'A. fait ainsi une présentation très sommaire de quelques-unes des grandes idées qui agitent depuis longtemps non seulement la sémiotique générale, mais aussi une philosophie du langage conçue de manière extrêmement libérale.

Le titre de l'ouvrage est opportunément ambigu. Comme introduction à la sémiotique telle qu'elle est actuellement pensée et pratiquée, ce livre ne

saurait entrer en compétition avec d'autres travaux plus près de l'état de la 'discipline' et, il faut le dire, plus rigoureux. Comme présentation de la manière dont l' 'idée' ou la 'conscience' sémiotiques se sont introduites dans la pensée occidentale, il a des mérites non négligeables: la généralité de ses assertions est compensée heureusement par un travail fouillé sur les sources (comme en témoigne l'érudition des notes), il fournit des renseignements sur des périodes souvent négligées par les entreprises historiques (en particulier l'intervalle entre Ockham et Locke), de même qu'il replace dans leur contexte des termes et des problèmes contemporains (par ex., l'idée d'une 'doctrine des signes').

On peut penser que ce repli historique fait plus pour montrer ce qu'ont de perdurable certains questionnements philosophiques qu'il n'indique comment une sémiotique peut leur apporter une solution en passant en revue les divers états qu'ils ont connus. Le mot 'sémiotique' ne s'en trouve pas désigner une province du savoir mieux délimitée du fait de l'aval qu'elle recevrait d'une longue tradition. Ne disposant pas d'un objet dont les contours soient minimalement définis, cette tradition risque n'apparaître que comme un souci légitime à l'endroit de la dimension 'langagièr'e de tout ce qui dans l'expérience présente une certaine distinctivité. La question de Quine à son sujet ('What Is It All About?'), si elle trouve dans l'instruction historique qui en est faite quelques éléments susceptibles de l'améliorer, n'obtient pas pour autant sa réponse: ce n'est pas à démontrer l'insistance qu'ont des questions à se poser qu'on prouve que ces questions sont bien formulées et qu'elles parviennent à se constituer en une problématique identifiable, dont une discipline devrait s'occuper.

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JERRY A. FODOR, *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1983.
Pp. ix + 145. US\$17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-06084-1); US\$8.50 (paper:
ISBN 0-262-56025-9).

The fundamental idea of computational psychology is that cognition is the transformation, according to well defined rules, of internal representations. These representations provide the input, the rules of transformation the program, the operation of which together eventually issue in intelligent

behaviour. Fodor's newest book is squarely in the tradition of computational psychology, and the issues raised all presuppose a background of agreement about the basic model for the mind's operations.

The contentions involve the functional architecture of the mind, specifically whether some cognitive abilities or capacities are to be best understood as relatively independent *faculties* or *modules*.

Mental modules are functionally distinguished cognitive abilities, that is to say, computational systems, which are marked by several features, namely: (1) domain specificity, (2) innate specification, (3) non-assembly, (4) hardwiring and (5) computational autonomy. A computational system is domain specific if its operation is restricted to a certain class of internal representations. The systems subserving vision, for example, are perhaps domain specific in that they deal with (and are only able to deal with) representations of the structure of the visual field.

A system is innately specified if its structure is not formed by some learning process. A system is non-assembled if it has not been 'put together from some stock of more elementary subprocesses' (37). By a system's being hard-wired Fodor means that it is 'associated with specific, localized and elaborately structured neural systems' (37). Finally, a system is computationally autonomous if it does not share cognitive resources such as memory and attention with other computational systems.

Fodor claims that an important group of our cognitive abilities is in fact modular — roughly speaking, this group is that of the 'input systems,' presumably the senses and language parsing. His strategy is to employ, entertainingly and persuasively, a wide range of empirical evidence drawn from various psychological experiments to bolster and illustrate his arguments and positions. Many of these are truly fascinating, no matter their interpretation. Two of note involve 'slide recognition' and 'speech shadowing' (the repetition of what you hear as you hear it). Speech shadowing experiments reveal the incredible speed at which we process spoken language: people can shadow with latencies of about one-quarter second (a time which, as Fodor notes, includes the time required to perform the motor functions involved in vocalizing). Slide recognition experiments reveal the remarkable ability to recognise a previously seen slide with a 90% accuracy rate, under the condition that each slide is seen for no more than ten seconds and that the test class contains 2,560 slides! The sheer speed of these processes indicates to Fodor autonomy, hardwiring, etc. Hence both language comprehension and visual recognition are modular.

Granting the thesis of modularity, more philosophically interesting features of Fodor's views begin to emerge. First, modular computational systems will tend to be what Fodor calls 'informationally encapsulated.' This means that the system at issue has access to only a limited subset of the *total* information available when generating and testing its characteristic hypotheses (Fodor maintains that *all* cognition is essentially the inductive production and confirmation of hypotheses couched in a 'language' of the internal representations). For example, Fodor would explain the Muller-Lyer illusion

by claiming that the high-level information about line length is simply not available to the informationally encapsulated system which produces our 'visual picture' of the world. One difficulty here stems from the fact that people can quickly recognise slides on the basis of a previously given verbal description. These descriptions may employ concepts inaccessible to the encapsulated visual input system. Does this mean that all high level descriptions have low level simulacra — certain shapes and colours which are somehow equivalent to the high level concepts?

Fodor's main target is the 'relentlessly top down' approach to cognition and perception characteristic of recent work in Cognitive Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. This doctrine is familiar to philosophers as the claim that all perception/cognition is thoroughly theory-laden. Thus Fodor's views on encapsulation suggest a new way of defining the observation/theory distinction: the observable is that which is represented in the output of the visual input system. Whatever observation/theory distinction can usefully be drawn will *emerge from* our theories of perception and cognition. It is thus interesting to see the beginnings of this effort from within Cognitive Psychology.

Finally, Fodor leaves behind the encapsulated, modularized input systems to consider the mysterious central processes of general cognition. The mystery remains. What Fodor has to say here is mostly, but not entirely, negative — thought is *not* encapsulated and *not* modular. Instead it is *isotropic* and *Quinean* (these are Fodor's labels, but they are happily chosen). Isotropic cognitive processes are those wherein hypothesis production and confirmation has at least potential access to all the information currently within the system. 'Quinean' processes are such that any information within the system may be actually *relevant* in the production and confirmation of hypotheses. Fodor's model of central cognition is nothing less than the scientific enterprise itself. Science, considered as an abstract computational process is taken to be both isotropic and Quinean. Consideration of this model leads Fodor to some pessimistic conclusions about current efforts to understand central cognition (such as Minsky's 'Frames' or Schank's 'Scripts'). These all attempt to atomize or even, we may say, modularize thought, and if Fodor is right are thus doomed from the start. It is worth noting here that Fodor's discussion of central cognition entirely ignores the problems of consciousness and qualitative states, but these have *never* been satisfactorily attacked by the Cognitive Psychologists.

It is of course early to judge on such matters, but Fodor's book is a stimulating, entertaining and important lesson in one way of looking at the mind's operation. Its importance grows when one thinks that this way of looking is in fact the only detailed and principled approach to the mind that we have.

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JOHN GRAY, *Mill on Liberty: A Defence*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983. Pp. xiii + 143. Cdn\$25.75: US\$17.95. ISBN 0-7100-9270-9.

In the past Mill's essay *On Liberty* has been discussed in isolation from his other works. These discussions have often been misleading and superficial. But there is now an acknowledgement of the connections between the arguments of *On Liberty* and Mill's accounts of justice in *Utilitarianism* and of the Art of Life in *A System of Logic*. The late John Rees and Alan Ryan first drew our attention to some of these connections, and more recently the important contributions of D.G. Brown, David Lyons, and Richard Wollheim have spelt out the complexities of Mill's utilitarianism and his defence of individual liberty. Now John Gray, in this perceptive study, has produced a detailed, systematic, and coherent defence of Mill's case for liberty which takes account of the insights of other commentators while at the same time breaking new ground of his own.

The problem that Gray tries to solve is that of reconciling Mill's utilitarianism with his quasi-absolute principle of liberty which permits the curtailment of individual liberty only when the vital interests of others are at risk. If utilitarianism dictates that one should always act to maximize happiness, then direct appeals to utility might suggest that, for example, conduct which offends the majority should, under appropriate circumstances, be prohibited. In any case it would appear that a utilitarian calculation would have to be sensitive to local variations in the intensity of the offence caused and the number of people who are offended, whereas Mill's principle of liberty ignores such considerations.

Gray's solution is to point out, firstly, that Mill's principle of utility does not operate at the same level as his principle of liberty. Unlike the principle of liberty, Mill's principle of utility is not a moral principle but a more general axiological principle which specifies that happiness is the only thing intrinsically valuable. This in itself does not commit us to any action. But Gray thinks that Mill also subscribes to what is called the principle of expediency which maintains that maximally expedient acts (i.e. acts which produce the best consequences) ought to be done. Taken together, the principles of utility and expediency maintain that the act ought to be done which produces the most happiness. But the principle of liberty is a moral principle, and for Mill there is a conceptual connection between morality and punishment in the broad sense which includes not just legal sanctions but also the sanctions of conscience. So right acts are only a subclass of maximally expedient acts, namely those maximally expedient acts whose non-performance it is maximally expedient to punish. Wrong acts, on the other hand, are those whose punishment would be maximally expedient.

Gray further argues that the principle of liberty regards as wrong, and therefore as punishable, only those acts which harm the vital interests of others in autonomy and security. This restriction on the class of acts which

are punishable is justified by Mill's indirect utilitarianism which prohibits as self-defeating direct appeals to utility. The principle of liberty presupposes the equal distribution of moral rights to security and autonomy, and the equal distribution is adopted by Mill as a strategy which, on the basis of certain empirical claims, will best promote the utilitarian goal of maximizing happiness. The formal relationship depicted here between the principle of liberty and Mill's utilitarianism is the same as that between the two levels of moral thinking recently expounded by R.M. Hare. On Gray's account the principle of liberty is a principle of intuitive thinking (in Hare's sense), or everyday moral thinking constrained by the pressures of time, imperfect knowledge, and partiality towards one's own interests. But the goal of maximizing happiness features as the sole principle at the critical level of moral thinking which is conducted under ideal conditions of knowledge and motivation.

To this formal account, Gray adds both the empirical claims and Mill's analysis of the concept of happiness without which there is no reason to suppose that it is the principle of liberty rather than some contrary principle which promotes maximum happiness. He argues that, according to Mill, the direct pursuit of utility will produce social instability because it sometimes requires people to sacrifice their vital interests, a sacrifice which they would regard as unreasonable. On the other hand, the principle of liberty, by protecting the vital interests, sets reasonable terms of social cooperation. Mill's distinction between the higher and lower pleasures is a distinction between different kinds of activity or forms of life. Autonomous choice is an ingredient of the happy human life of those who enjoy the higher pleasures by expressing their different individual natures. Liberty is valuable partly as a constitutive element of autonomous choice and partly as an instrument for the discovery of the variety of individual natures. Mill's argument for liberty relies on the empirical claim about the irreversibility of liberty, namely that those who are used to making their own choices would want to continue to do so.

Gray ably charts the complex relationships in Mill's theory between the central concepts of happiness, autonomy, and liberty. As he tries to effect the reconciliation of liberty with utility, Gray's arguments are sometimes compelling, and always illuminating. But in the final analysis, I doubt that the attempted reconciliation succeeds.

According to indirect utilitarianism, direct appeals to utility must be ruled out once the principle of liberty is accepted. So at that stage the preferences of those who wish to suppress non-harmful acts may be ignored. But the argument about whether the principle of liberty should be adopted in the first place must be an argument about whether its adoption is the best strategy for maximizing happiness. At *this* level, all preferences are relevant. Since Mill's arguments for the principle of liberty are conducted at this level, he cannot discount the strong anti-liberal preferences of the majority unless his conception of happiness is already impregnated with some non-utilitarian elements. Of course some support for the principle of liberty is provided by the alleged irreversibility of liberty. But, as Gray concedes, the claim of irreversibility is

for Mill only a conjecture lacking in the certainty that a science of ethology could have provided. Against the uncertainty of the conjecture about future liberal preferences, we are confronted with the certainty of widespread and deep-seated illiberal preferences. So if Mill were carrying out a purely utilitarian calculation on the best strategy for maximizing happiness, the arguments which Gray attributes to him are by themselves too speculative to explain the strength of his liberal convictions in the face of those anti-liberal sentiments whose presence he fully acknowledged.

In any case Mill did not subscribe to the version of the irreversibility of liberty thesis that is required in order to sustain a utilitarian defence of liberal beliefs. Even if it were certain that those who have experienced liberty would never wish to give it up, there is massive evidence that many of them show no similar tenderness towards the liberties of others. Mill was aware of such evidence, and indeed his plea for liberty was made in the context of the intolerance of religious and moral majorities who themselves already enjoyed the very freedoms which they sought to deny others. No doubt some utilitarians underestimate the depth and durability of illiberal preferences. But Mill was not guilty of this, and his case for liberty was accordingly fought on 'the higher ground' of principle where 'intrusively pious members of society' have to 'mind their own business'.

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FRANCIS JACQUES, *Différence et subjectivité*, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne 1982, Collection 'Analyse et raisons'. 423 p. ISBN 2-7007-0295-6.

L'ouvrage développe une pragmatique de la communication inspirée par la pragmatique transcendante de K.O. Apel. Il fait suite à un premier ensemble de recherches intitulé: *Dialogique, Recherches logiques sur le dialogue* (Paris: PUF 1979). L'originalité du projet philosophique qui soutient ces analyses réside dans la façon dont l'auteur y conditionne la production de la subjectivité comme *personne* par son insertion dans des rapports de communication. C'est comme personne qui est toujours à la fois énonciateur et allocutaire d'elle-même et des autres que cette subjectivité s'identifie à quoi que ce soit, qu'elle se fait elle-même identique à elle-même ou, tout au moins, qu'elle fait *l'effort* d'être ce qu'elle cherche à être. Le sous-titre: 'An-

thropologie d'un point de vue relationnel' vient souligner le fait que l'homme n'existe comme être humain, comme personne responsable de ce qu'elle fait d'elle-même et d'autrui, que dans les *relations* qu'elle entretient communicationnellement avec autrui (avec l'autrui que sont les autres dans la communication courante aussi bien qu'avec l'autrui qu'on est pour soi dans la communication avec soi qu'est la pensée). Cette reconstruction des relations de communication doit permettre, aux yeux de l'auteur, d'éviter de réduire la personne à l'individu bio-social (qui n'est que le support de ces relations personnelles) aussi bien qu'à un système d'opérations (à la façon du structuralisme). 'La stratégie de l'auteur est ici relativement simple: détacher le problème de la subjectivité de la conscience de soi pour l'articuler au problème plus fondamental de la personne. Ensuite, instruire ce dernier en adoptant une approche communicationnelle. L'énonciateur est un sujet dans la mesure où parler, pour lui, consiste à s'identifier au cours et à travers les communications où il lui est donné de participer. Cette stratégie enveloppait une méthode: poser la question de la personne en fonction du problème de l'identité personnelle' (cf. jaquette). L'auteur reprend ainsi à son compte et à sa façon le leitmotiv des analyses qu'offrait E. Ortigues dans 'Identité et personnalité' (*Dialogue*, déc. 1977, 605-18).

Chacun n'adopte ses croyances, ses désirs, ses sentiments et ses jugements (qu'ils soient les plus privés ou les plus communs) qu'identifié à son rôle d'interlocuteur: porté par ses communications passées et ce qu'elles ont fait de lui, porté par son identification présente à son allocataire mais aussi par son identification à tous ses allocataires futurs éventuels, chacun se produit à partir de la relation générale d'identification qu'il entretient avec un auditoire universel et virtuel. C'est toujours du point de vue de l'auditeur qu'il est pour lui-même, et tel qu'il se trouve identifié à tous ses récepteurs possibles, qu'il se fait adhérer ou désadhérer à ce qu'il s'exprime à lui-même ou à ce qu'il exprime aux autres. La personne qui se fait ainsi se produit indissociablement comme noeud de croyances, de désirs et de jugements communs, fruits de *rencontres* communicationnelles effectives, et comme noyau des croyances, des désirs et des jugements qui la singularisent par rapport aux autres et l'en différencient en fonction des expériences qui lui sont propres. Voulant affirmer le primat de cette relation de communication dans la construction du sujet, l'auteur n'hésite pas à sertir son affirmation dans une formule percutante: 'je parle mais nous disons' (29). Comment cela est-il possible? L'énonciateur peut-il être identifié au *nous* de la communauté universelle autrement que dans son imagination? L'identification à l'auditoire universel, à supposer qu'elle soit possible, permet-elle au sujet qui respecte les lois de cette identification, d'être aussi 'universel,' 'rationnel,' 'personnel' dans ses pensées les plus 'privées' que dans ses pensées 'communes,' dans les pensées déjà homologuées comme universelles et rationnelles par des consensus de fait?

L'énonciateur a beau être placé dans une relation asymétrique par rapport à son allocataire, le 'Je' qu'il est parle toujours à partir du point de vue du 'Tu' de cet allocataire (vu ainsi comme énonciateur virtuel) et à partir du point de

vue de l'allocataire virtuel qu'il est lui-même vis-à-vis de cet interlocuteur. L'énonciation est toujours allocutive, la relation de communication est toujours un effort commun d'identification mutuelle des interlocuteurs à elle-même, elle réussit ou non à devenir une relation interlocutoire où la compréhension mutuelle implique l'assentiment mutuel. De même les interlocuteurs ne sont tels et n'acquièrent une identité personnelle que s'ils réussissent à s'accorder, c'est-à-dire à s'identifier à cette relation interlocutoire elle-même, à n'être qu'elle dans leur parole présente, mais aussi dans les perceptions, les actions, les sentiments et les croyances qu'elle décrit ou implique.

Ce faisant, énonciateur et allocataire se donnent l'un à l'autre la possibilité de se considérer l'un l'autre comme les porteurs de la relation interlocutoire elle-même, comme un 'il' ou un 'lui,' comme quelqu'un dont l'autre parle: 'C'est au moment où je m'adresse à *toi* et où je reconnaiss ce qu'on dit de *moi* comme d'un *lui*, que j'ai l'occasion de m'identifier comme *je*. Et de même pour la personne d'autrui: c'est au moment où il s'adresse à moi et où il reconnaît ce que je dis de *lui* qu'il a l'occasion de s'identifier comme un moi personnel' (357). C'est cette constitution réciproque des sujets en relations interlocutoires, en termes de cette relation et en thème délocutif de leur propre discours qui en fait des personnes. Cette constitution interlocutoire des sujets détermine la canonicité du code de leurs relations: la réciprocité présupposée entre les interlocuteurs (cf. Habermas) oblige les interlocuteurs à ne comprendre et à ne s'échanger comme énonciations que celles dans lesquelles ils respectent cette réciprocité, dans le contenu de leur énonciation, dans la force illocutoire de celle-ci aussi bien que dans les modes d'échange adoptés. 'La seule façon légitime de parler d'autrui, c'est de le faire de telle manière qu'on pourrait en parler avec lui ... "Traite la personne d'autrui, dans le discours que tu tiens sur elle, toujours en même temps comme allocataire possible"' (136).

Mais comment les interlocuteurs peuvent-ils quitter leur propre individualité du seul fait qu'ils se parlent? Comme Austin recourait au verdict d'appropriation de l'énonciation au contexte pour en justifier l'occurrence conventionnelle, comme Searle recourait au paradigme de l'acte illocutoire de promesse pour faire de tout acte de parole un acte illocutoire, l'auteur recourt ici à l'amour pour y voir la relation où la réciprocité respecte la singularité des termes de cette relation (les amants) et produit leur identification mutuelle à lui-même comme à la relation qui engendre toutes leurs autres relations personnelles. L'amour n'est durable que s'il est bilatéral; à la longue, on ne peut aimer sans être aimé (cf. 106). 'Aimer quelqu'un, ce n'est pas aimer ce qu'il est (encore moins ce qu'il a), mais aimer qu'il soit et qu'il existe ... L'amour fait être ceux qui aiment. Faire croire à l'existence d'autres êtres humains comme tels, cette croyance est l'amour. Et à son existence propre. Il est littéralement vrai que vivre sans amour nous frustre de la première chose indispensable: de l'existence' (109). Cette interaction pragmatique est le modèle, le véhicule et le produit de la communication vécue, pensée, conduite et réfléchie de façon canonique, c'est-à-dire dans le respect des condi-

tions de réciprocité et de symétrie des partenaires. L'interaction communicationnelle elle-même est mise en oeuvre par chaque participant de l'a priori formel que constitue l'adoption alternée des différents rôles communicationnels liés aux positions du 'je,' du 'tu' et du 'il': elle ne réussit que si chacun se soumet dans ses actes de parole à la loi de substituabilité des interlocuteurs qui régit le développement de l'interaction communicationnelle. Cet a priori formel fonctionne donc comme a priori transcendental qui rend possible la communication elle-même.

Il semble difficile de pousser plus loin que ne le fait l'auteur l'identification à l'idéal pragmatique: sa propre identification aussi bien que celle de ceux qui communiquent et réfléchissent leur communication comme il dit que chacun le fait. Il reproduit en effet (sans pourtant signaler qu'il en soit conscient) le mouvement que le romantisme allemand de Novalis et de F. Schlegel avait fait faire à l'idéalisme allemand de Kant et de Fichte en replaçant 'la foi et l'amour' (*Glauben und Liebe*) au centre des interactions des hommes entre eux et des hommes avec le monde. Rejetant l'objectivisme de l'idéalisme kantien (qui concevait le monde à partir de la première analogie de l'expérience, celle de la substance et des accidents) et l'idéalisme éthique de Fichte (où la subjectivité, cause d'elle-même, était conçue selon la seconde analogie, celle de la cause et de l'effet), les romantiques reconstruisaient les relations internes au monde, celles que les hommes entretiennent entre eux et celles qu'ils entretiennent avec le centre de l'univers selon la troisième analogie ou principe de la communauté: 'toutes les substances en tant que simultanées sont dans une communauté universelle, c'est-à-dire dans un état d'action réciproque.' De la même façon, l'auteur invente un nouveau paralogisme psychologique: à côté du paralogisme de la personnalité relevé par Kant dans la psychologie rationnelle (qui projetait dans l'âme les catégories de substance et d'accident) se forge ici un nouveau paralogisme, qu'on pourrait appeler paralogisme pragmatique: l'auteur projette ici la catégorie d'interaction dans les rapports psychiques aussi bien que dans les rapports communicationnels pour faire de l'identification mutuelle des interlocuteurs à ce qui est dit, le lieu d'une causalité réciproque, simultanée et idéalisée. Puisqu'on a voulu à tout prix éviter la réduction de la subjectivité à une pure conscience de soi, on constraint (comme chez Novalis, Schlegel et Schelling) la relation d'interlocution à s'effectuer nécessairement *de façon aveugle* et ce, même si elle s'objective constamment en s'exprimant et en se reconnaissant elle-même au moment où elle se produit. Pourquoi? La relation dynamique d'appels et de réponses qui anime ces échanges de vivants à vivants est empruntée à ce que l'auteur appelle le 'support' biologique individuel de la personne: comme appels de vivants à d'autres vivants, lancés parce qu'ils ont besoin de la réponse de ces derniers pour vivre. Enonciations d'énonciateurs et réponses d'allocutaires suivent la même loi: ils se fixent les uns les autres à ce qu'ils se disent ou ils reconnaissent qu'ils ne peuvent s'y fixer, sans pouvoir savoir ce qui leur arrive lorsqu'ils adhèrent à leurs croyances, à leurs amours ou à leurs accords ou lorsqu'ils y désadhèrent, dans l'incroyance, la haine ou le désaccord. Pour pouvoir se produire, la communication apparaît en effet organisée

comme production de sens et d'assentiment où contenu propositionnel transmis et force illocutoire de l'acte de parole anticipent leur propre réussite: l'accord interlocutoire; comme dans un mouvement d'expérimentation, énonciateurs et allocutaires ne peuvent qu'enregistrer la réussite ou l'échec effectifs de ce mouvement communicationnel qui se présumait pourtant déjà réussi pour pouvoir se produire. Ils ont donc beau se produire et produire autrui en s'identifiant les uns les autres à ce qu'ils se disent (à l'image du Dieu créateur qui identifie ses créatures à ce qu'il en dit, en les faisant venir à l'existence par la parole, cf. 264), ils se retrouvent *affectés* de l'assentiment ou du dissensément d'autrui, ils enregistrent les effets de croyances, de désirs ou de jugements qui leur arrivent par le canal des énonciations comme ils enregistrent l'attrait ou le dégoût que provoquent les choses et les personnes. Comme Searle et Austin confiaient la production de l'acte illocutoire à la magie de sa désignation autoréférentielle lors de l'énonciation, l'abandon à la magie de la relation interlocutoire et à l'éthique qui en dérive confie ici les interlocuteurs à un destin de compréhension ou d'incompréhension, d'accord ou de désaccord. Ce destin est présumé récompenser l'identification à l'amour et l'obéissance à la logique du dialogue par le succès, il est présumé sanctionner la désidentification narcissique et autistique au langage par l'incompréhension et le désaccord d'autrui, sans qu'on sache pourquoi. L'auteur a donc beau affirmer la présence de l'esprit dans la communication, sa position est tout aussi aveuglée en son principe que celle des behavioristes qui vouent les interlocuteurs aux stimuli, aux réponses et aux actions consomatoires biologiques. Cette position ne fait que refléter la façon dont les interlocuteurs réfléchissent leur adhérence au sens: en se disant qu'ils se 'comprendent,' ainsi que leur adhésion aux croyances et aux désirs énoncés: en s'accordant.

Cette structure d'aveuglement me semble directement dériver de la façon dont l'auteur refoule indistinctement le sujet comme conscience de soi, comme hyperconscience (cf. 24), comme sujet narcissique et autistique (cf. 219-20). Si la réflexion est communication avec soi, il en résulte que la vie mentale consiste à faire parler les autres en soi, puis à s'écouter: en toute pensée, le sujet recherche son propre assentiment sans avoir autre chose à faire qu'à constater l'assentiment ou le dissensément provoqué en lui par cette pensée. L'universel s'éprouve en l'homme comme écoute et comme l'effet d'assentiment ou de dissensément que celle-ci déclenche. Cet universel impose alors aveuglément sa force d'accord ou de désaccord en fixant aux croyances et aux désirs communs tout comme il le fait en fixant aux croyances et aux désirs privés: dans les deux cas, les sujets ne cessent de s'y percevoir comme porteurs d'une force universelle d'accord ou de désaccord. Dans ce jeu de forces, disparaît la force critique qui permettrait de distinguer l'universel de l'individuel, le public du privé, le rationnel de l'irrationnel, la 'personne' responsable du support biologique et, avec elle, disparaît la faculté de juger.

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PHILIP J. KAIN, *Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Ideal of Ancient Greece*. Toronto and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press 1982. Pp. xii + 179. Cdn\$25.00. ISBN 0-7735-1004-4.

This study aims at illuminating Marx's thought by bringing together two perspectives which have generally been separate in the literatures (I use the plural advisedly to suggest the multiplicity of discourses on Marx and associated topics). First, and of most obvious contemporary interest, Kain is concerned with this question: to what extent is there continuity, discontinuity, or forms of both from the 'early' to the 'later' Marx? Second, he is interested in showing what Marx did with the tradition of idealizing (and sometimes criticizing) the aesthetic model of society found in ancient Greece, or at least in the views of that society taken by German romanticists and idealists from Schiller's time to Marx. These inquiries are connected, Kain argues persuasively. In order to assess a thesis like Althusser's, which claims that there is an 'epistemological break' between an earlier, humanistic Marx and a later, strictly scientific one, it is necessary to know whether, as the proponents of the thesis claim, the mature Marx abandoned the Hegelian and humanistic tendencies that are so evident in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844. Kain's specific contribution is to clarify such discussions by placing them within the context of a rich and specific tradition of German thought which was devoted to the question whether the aesthetic and non-alienated life of the Greek *polis* could serve as a viable model, in whole or part, for the modern world. Although Kain explains that this is his topic in an introduction, the book's title and subtitle are slightly misleading, for they suggest that Schiller, Hegel, and Marx are to be given roughly equal attention in regard to the relation of 'state' and 'society' to 'the aesthetic ideal of ancient Greece.' In fact Schiller and Hegel are considered almost exclusively from the standpoint of assessing Marx's series of positions on alienation and the possibility of overcoming it.

Kain's writing is crisp and concise. The study combines historical insight with conceptual analysis by identifying a few crucial issues and topics, making clear distinctions, and developing all of the themes without the addition of any extraneous material.

Kain writes 'For Schiller, Hegel, and Marx, the fundamental problem of their own world was precisely the absence of ... humanistic wholeness, spontaneity, and unity and instead the presence of alienation and estrangement (or more generally, fragmentation)' (8-9). That is, all three thinkers defined their own world as non-Greek; this has political, social, and artistic implications. Politically it means a state which appears separate and independent from its citizens. Socially, it means that individuals are confined to narrow tasks and alienated from the products of their labor. In art it means that 'the artist is separated from and opposed to nature' and that modern art represents a decline from Greek art. While the most frequent diagnosis which the three thinkers offer of the modern world's non-Greek tradition is that it stems from

the division of labor characteristic of the modern economy, they differ in significant ways (and sometimes change their own views) on the mode in which the division of labor might be overcome and even on the possibility of overcoming it.

Kain's account of Schiller succeeds in articulating the varied and sometimes competing models, all roughly based on the Greeks, to which the philosopher-poet had recourse in order to formulate a vision of a human life that was not torn apart by the conflicts of the sensuous and the intellectual or those of biological need and reasonable conduct. Schiller's determination to formulate such a reconciling ideal was not matched by his ability to construct a plausible version of it. Although such observations are made often in the critical and philosophical literature on Schiller, Kain's treatment is notable for highlighting the problems analytically and concisely, as in his discussion of Schiller's ambiguity about whether all men or only an elite are to be the subject of his aesthetic education (cf. 21-2).

It is problems like the last that are taken up by Hegel and Marx and which justify the progression announced by the book's title. As Kain points out, Hegel saw both in his early and late work that there were two distinct Greek ideals: that of the state, which fostered general participation in political life, and that of work, in which men had not yet been alienated from their labor and its products by the division of labor. The first is exemplified in fifth century Athens, the second in the heroic age depicted by Homer. Hegel saw soon, after his initial idealization of the Greeks, that individuality was the principle of the modern world and he believed that individuality could not be reconciled with the Greek ideal of work but required the forms of exchange of labor and products involved in what he calls 'civil society' in the *Philosophy of Right*. Skilfully building on a careful discussion and discrimination of alienation and estrangement, and using Hegel's *Phenomenology*, *Aesthetics*, and *Philosophy of Right* Kain constructs this view of Hegel: Hegel sees that alienation (surrender of a power by a subject) leads in some cases, but not in all, to estrangement (transformation of the object into a hostile power over against the subject). Alienation is necessary if human beings are to fulfill their potential as rational, spiritual beings, for they must surrender those connections with nature that prevent them from developing and recognizing their universal rationality. Therefore the Greek aesthetic ideal belongs to the past and is replaced in the modern world by philosophical recognition of human unity with the world, most importantly the citizen's recognition of the rationality of the modern state as an expression of his own rationality.

In his last two chapters, which occupy about half of the book, Kain uses his analyses of Schiller and Hegel in order to explore Marx's development. He marks a division between an early Marx (1835-48) and a later one (1849-83) that offers a plausible alternative to roughly parallel distinctions drawn by Althusser and others. Kain's early Marx is relatively Schillerian, being impressed by the problem of alienated labor and believing that with the abolition of the division of labor human work will become a form of free enjoy-

ment and expression in which men and women will recognize themselves in their products. This gives rise to the question whether the artist is in fact the model for such non-alienated labor. Kain also asks why it is that the cessation of the division of labor by itself should necessarily lead to free enjoyment and self-expression in labor. The division might be 'overcome' by the members of a society regularly exchanging functions; but many of these functions (cleaning, filing, work on the assembly line) would still be relatively boring and repetitive. Although Marx does not discuss such questions explicitly, Kain argues that they are implicit in his work after 1848. In the later work Marx no longer aims at overcoming the distinction between labor and leisure, but at articulating the conditions of a rational arrangement which will minimize labor and maximize free time. He comes close to Hegel in his elegiac farewell to the 'normal childhood' of the Greeks who were close to nature in a way no longer possible for the moderns and acknowledges that the individual in a highly developed industrial society cannot expect to see himself in the product of his labor. Yet this surrender of some of Schiller's aesthetic ideals is accompanied by an insistence on the importance of democratic political forms, even in the transitional stages to communism, which recalls Hegel's modification of the political form of the Greek ideal. Kain, along with many other critics, finds an ultimate vagueness in Marx's thought about the forms of human activity and association in communism. He provides a valuable if all too brief articulation of some of the possible readings of Marx's relevant remarks, drawing on the issues and traditions identified with Schiller and Hegel.

This book is one in a series devoted to 'the history of ideas' (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas). As such it has some of the characteristic strengths and limitations of the genre. On the one hand, it proceeds by assuming that it is possible to isolate a number of topics, e.g. the division of labor and its possible overcoming, within the history of thought and to treat them in relative abstraction from their systematic context within the work of the thinkers in question. On the other, it does a remarkably thorough job, once the topics have been isolated, of analyzing their various formulations in a succession of thinkers or within the different strands or stages of the work of a single thinker. But the philosopher may be left with an unsatisfied craving to understand whether and how the formulations fit within a larger systematic context; surely, for example, there is something strange about a book largely devoted to Hegel and Marx which scarcely takes notice of dialectic (a term which does not appear in Kain's useful index). From the historian's point of view (and he or she might be a historian of philosophy) there is another omission. Although the topic is one in the history of philosophy, and one which involves philosophical reflection on the meaning and relevance of a particular period and its culture, there is no concern here with the historical context of the work of Schiller, Hegel, and Marx themselves. Yet it would be relevant and illuminating to look at these thinkers in the light of the different stages of the development of Germany, Europe, or industrial society which they represent and reflect upon. For ex-

ample, Kain finds 1848-49 to be the great watershed in Marx's thought concerning the possibility of establishing a modern version of the Greek ideal of work. Yet there is no mention of the fact that Marx was immensely impressed by the failure of the revolutions of 1848. Since Hegel declared that 'philosophy is its own thought comprehended in time' and Marx is arguably a Hegelian in so far as he agrees, such considerations are relevant. Nevertheless, to have explored such themes would have required the writing of a different and probably much longer book.

Although there is little extended discussion of other interpretations of the major thinkers in the main body of the text, the careful reader will be able to reconstruct a dialogue between Kain and some other contemporary critics by a careful reading of the notes.

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ANTHONY KENNY, *The Computation of Style: An Introduction to Statistics for Students of Literature and Humanities*. New York: Pergamon Press 1982. Pp. ix + 176. US\$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-024282-0); US\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-08-024821-2).

In the opening line of his Preface to *The Computation of Style*, Anthony Kenny writes that, 'This book is intended as an elementary introduction to statistics for those who wish to make use of statistical techniques in the study of literature'; and that, quite exactly, is what Kenny then provides, with the same clarity and conciseness that his readers have associated with his more explicitly philosophical writing. I do not mean by this last phrase to suggest that Kenny uses the topic of his volume as a 'cover' for introducing issues more deeply philosophical than frequency curves or standard deviations: he has written here an accessible, literate, and, so far as I am able to judge, generally accurate account of statistical techniques as they might be applied in the stylistic analysis of texts in the humanities. But his own interest in such analysis was influenced most immediately by a philosophically relevant issue (the status of the three common Books of Aristotle's *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*), and the topic of style itself has roused considerable interest recently in aesthetics and in literary theory and criticism. Thus, if it was not

Kenny's purpose in this volume to address such concerns in detail, he says enough that bears on them to give some idea in general of why *philosophers* (not more so perhaps, but as well as, other readers in the humanities) might, or even *ought to* be interested in the methods of stylistic analysis.

Admittedly, the answer to that question that Kenny emphasizes applies to philosophy no differently than it does to other humanistic disciplines: this is the usefulness of stylistic analysis for authenticating texts or establishing authorship. So, for example, Kenny cites the application of statistical stylistics (e.g., in comparing the frequency of usage of certain terms) by Mosteller and Wallace who then determine that the 12 Federalist Papers of disputed authorship were written by Madison; he refers more immediately to the statistical basis for his own claim that the three Books in common of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* resemble the general context of the latter, not the former. This function of stylistic analysis is much like that practiced in connoisseurship of the visual arts, and like the latter, too, its importance is potentially more than merely antiquarian. So, for example, the order of the Platonic dialogues or the dating of the books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* arguably have importance well beyond the determination of those historical 'facts,' and it is conceivable that extension of the techniques that Kenny describes might yield more productive accounts of such problems than has yet been the case. (Kenny himself does not cite these — or other — instances of a possible program; it would have been useful to have from him a systematic consideration even of the *kinds* of textual problem that might be susceptible to stylistic analysis.)

In Chapter 1, where Kenny does explicitly discuss the possible applications of statistical stylistics, he emphasizes mainly its usefulness for identification, suggesting at an extreme the possibility of stylistic 'fingerprints' that would identify writers as surely as do their physical prints (the difference between the two, Kenny points out, would be in living writers who might deliberately 'change' their stylistic prints). One reason why Kenny does not much consider uses other than that of identification is probably due to the statistical requirement that whatever is to be analyzed must be quantifiable. Given the introductory purpose of the book, the examples that Kenny then cites are almost exclusively such easily quantifiable features as word-length and sentence-length or frequency in the usage of specific words. These examples are certainly sufficient for introducing statistical methods, but they also restrict the focus of stylistic analysis to problems of identification when its possible significance is much broader. Kenny himself alludes to Suitbert Ertel's 'dogmatism quotient' — a means of comparing parameters relevant to dogmatism (terms of 'confidence,' degrees of assertiveness) that suggest — predictably, as Kenny notes — a high quotient for Marx and Heidegger, a low one for Russell and Locke. Taken by itself, such analysis may seem only a bit of academic high jinx (if not an example of *petitio principii*), but the potential implications of stylistic analysis taken along these same lines are more substantial. For if style, as has often been argued, is expressive and thus linked to the textual content that it is expressive of, there may also be a means of

representing *this* connection by stylometry. The difficulty here, of course, is in identifying parameters that are at once quantifiable and expressive in some significant way; but this difficulty, even granting the need to allow also for variations in modes of expression among fields of the humanities, need not be insuperable. To take one possible line of development: Stephen Pepper, in *World Hypotheses*, outlines a theory for the reading of the history of philosophy which distinguishes four principal traditions in that history, grouped (respectively) around four 'root-metaphors.' Pepper's own correlation of individual philosophers with those root-metaphors is plausible, but is construed, even on his own account, by a mixture of informal textual sampling and intuition. It should be possible, one assumes, to analyze the philosophers whom he cites (or others) for the metaphoric content of their work — for example, to categorize the types and extent of metaphoric usage that they employ — and to do this precisely by the sort of quantitative analysis that Kenny describes. To be sure, to do so presupposes a typology of metaphor that would, again, be both quantifiable and able to pick out metaphoric structures in philosophical discourse that were relevant to the philosophical issues at stake — and it is possible that these conditions cannot be met or that, if they can, they might still yield results of no great philosophical interest. But without the attempt, one could not know this either — and the available evidence, moreover, suggests in fact that such results are both possible and potentially important. There are, of course, numerous stylistic parameters other than the one mentioned that might be assessed — ranging from other types of literary figuration to the literary 'operators' that govern the 'point-of-view' of the author to correlations between the content of philosophical assertion and grammatical syntax *in* the assertions. The crucial theoretical presupposition required for all such efforts is no more than the claim that the surface of philosophical language is related more than accidentally to its interior (or content or denotation). *With* that premise, what Kenny presents here as a handbook useful mainly for textual authentication or identification might turn out also to be a useful, sometimes perhaps decisive, means for critical understanding — and so for the work of philosophy itself.

The volume as presently composed includes no bibliography; that would, it seems to me, be a valuable addition, both for information on works mentioned in the volume and on others concerning style or statistics more generally.

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YVON LAFRANCE. *Méthode et exégèse en histoire de la philosophie*. Soutenance de Paris-Nanterre. Montréal: Les Editions Bellarmin 1983. 133 p. ISBN 2-89002-522-2.

Le genre de ce petit livre n'est guère répandu et on peut le regretter. L'auteur est historien de la philosophie. Depuis vingt ans, il laboure en tous sens le texte platonicien, et en 1981 il a fait paraître une étude remarquable sur la théorie platonicienne de la *doxa*, dans laquelle on peut voir un condensé de son intense travail de lecture et d'interprétation (Yvon Lafrance, *La théorie platonicienne de la doxa* [Montréal et Paris: Bellarmin et les Belles-Lettres 1981]). Juste une année plus tard, Yvon Lafrance rassemblait ses publications scientifiques depuis 1963 et les présentait en octobre 1982, assorties d'une introduction de méthode, devant un jury de doctorat d'Etat à l'Université de Paris. Notre petit livre reproduit le texte de cette présentation.

L'intérêt d'une réflexion de ce genre est de fournir à l'auteur et à son lecteur une occasion de revenir sur un ensemble dispersé de textes et de tenter d'y saisir, au travail, une méthode, une position, et en un certain sens, une philosophie de l'histoire de la philosophie. On peut affirmer sans hésitation que chez Yvon Lafrance, cette philosophie était là, toute entière dès le début et qu'elle n'a fait que s'expliciter. Au point de vouloir s'annuler dans une méthode, pour laquelle l'auteur convoque d'abord les prédicts de la scientificité. Dans son chapitre premier (De la philosophie comme histoire à l'histoire sans philosophie), il passe en revue les conceptions traditionnelles de l'histoire de la philosophie, surtout dans l'école dite française (Guérout, Souriau), pour en arriver, dans leur sillage, à concevoir l'histoire de la philosophie comme un renoncement à la philosophie (25). La pratique de l'histoire de la philosophie n'est pas un questionnement sur la vérité des textes ou des systèmes, mais un travail scientifique de description, de restitution et d'interprétation.

Le chapitre II, sans doute le plus provocant du livre, est chargé de défendre ce positivisme en histoire de la philosophie. Tout au long de son parcours, Yvon Lafrance a rencontré diverses méthodes, la plupart formulées à partir de modèles extérieurs à la philosophie. Par exemple, la méthode linguistique, la méthode idéologique, la méthode freudienne, l'herméneutique. À toutes ces perspectives modernes, Lafrance oppose la 'méthode historique', dont la définition est plutôt donnée par les travaux de ceux qui l'ont illustrée que par une caractérisation de leurs principes ou de leurs procédés. La liste de ces maîtres est longue (Cousin, Brochard, Rodier, etc. ...) et chacun y reconnaîtra en effet une catégorie d'historiens interprètes, soucieux de rigueur, respectueux de la philologie et méfiants à l'endroit d'interventions philosophiques modernes dans le texte platonicien.

C'est dans cette lignée que Lafrance veut situer son propre travail. Il n'est pas certain que tous les modèles qu'il reconnaît auraient accepté de se retrouver dans le profil positiviste dessiné par l'auteur. Quel est ce profil? Lafrance exige d'abord que l'historien soit doté d'une 'conscience philosophi-

que,' c'est-à-dire d'une aptitude à s'orienter dans l'univers conceptuel d'un philosophe. Lafrance propose d'en saisir les traits au moyen de l'analyse conceptuelle anglo-saxonne, dont il retient d'abord l'attitude. Celle-ci est conforme à l'ensemble des règles méthodologiques de son histoire positive de la philosophie: lecture attentive du texte, c'est-à-dire philologiquement rigoureuse, interprétation des textes par l'ensemble du contexte philosophique d'une oeuvre et prise en charge des facteurs pertinents du contexte historique.

On peut se demander, bien entendu, ce que ces règles excluent, car chacun est tenté d'y souscrire. Lafrance n'est guère loquace sur le type d'histoire de la philosophie qu'il n'aime pas, mais on comprend, — et on sait par plusieurs des études critiques qu'il a publiées —, qu'il rejette des lectures formulées à partir de modèles étrangers au texte interprété. Les trois règles qu'il nous donne, il les soumet ensuite à des principes, et d'abord à une exigence d'objectivité. (40) Aux objections de l'herméneutique, Lafrance répond par la 'conscience naïve et pragmatique.' La réponse est un peu courte, et on aurait souhaité ici une discussion moins complaisante des problèmes de l'interprétation qui sont balayés d'un revers de main. En lieu et place, l'auteur passe derechef à un principe de vérification, c'est-à-dire à l'exigence qu'une interprétation puisse être vérifiée par des textes et recevoir l'assentiment de plusieurs interprètes. Ce principe est fragile, et c'est néanmoins sur lui que repose toute la démonstration de la pertinence d'un positivisme. Peut-il y avoir en histoire de la philosophie un 'savoir positif, fondé sur une vérité vérifiable' (45)? Lafrance ne fournit pas de démonstration, mais un programme, un idéal, celui de l'historien-savant, érudit, soucieux de ne pas confondre 'une pratique historienne de la philosophie et une pratique proprement philosophique.'

En seconde partie de ce livre, le lecteur trouvera quatre exemples d'exégèse proposés par Lafrance. D'abord un retour sur son approche des problèmes de la *doxa* platonicienne, où l'auteur résume le traitement qu'il a accordé dans son ouvrage de 1981 aux principales difficultés d'interprétation liées à ce concept et à son riche vocabulaire. L'approche de Lafrance est rigoureusement conceptuelle et il discute avec une grande subtilité les contextes dans lesquels ce concept intervient. L'auteur propose ensuite une discussion de l'analogie de la ligne, dans la *République*. Il s'agit d'un texte passionnant, dont les clefs de lecture sont puisées à l'histoire des mathématiques grecques. Le troisième exemple porte sur le *Théétète* et sur les débats autour de la conception de la science. Lafrance tente de montrer que Platon a, en quelque sorte, suspendu la théorie des Formes intelligibles dans ce dialogue et qu'il est inutile, comme les analystes ont tendance à le faire (pace Bluck), de chercher à réconcilier le *Théétète* avec le platonisme de la maturité. L'hypothèse est riche, séduisante, mais on ne peut pas dire que la démonstration en soit fournie dans ce livre. Enfin, un hors-d'oeuvre sur le concept kantien de bonne volonté tente de faire entrevoir que la méthode scientifique peut s'appliquer ailleurs que sur le terrain de l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne.

Je ne pense pas que la validité d'une méthode puisse s'éprouver sur quatre morceaux d'exégèse, construits en bonne partie dans un but de conformité avec cette méthode. En fait, les textes de Lafrance, et non seulement ceux qui sont dans l'ouvrage, mais ceux de toute sa bibliographie qui figure en appendice, sont l'exemple d'une application de principes de rigueur, de fidélité, d'austérité. Le propos de faire de ces principes, que je conçois personnellement comme l'équivalent des vertus, un ensemble de règles, dont l'économie serait celle des procédures du travail scientifique, ne me semble ni utile, ni nécessaire. C'est pourquoi je répugnerais à parler de méthode. Il s'agit d'attitudes, de règles peut-être, mais au sens des règles de l'entendement cartésien: attention, sobriété, neutralité. Et dans cet ensemble, il y a sans doute plus de philosophie que l'auteur n'en veut concéder. La méthode, au contraire, commence avec les procédures, avec le traitement descriptible, protocolaire, des textes. De cela, Lafrance ne parle pas, mais la lecture de son travail montre que derrière les attitudes et les principes, dont il souhaiterait pouvoir parler comme d'une méthode, opèrent en fait un ensemble de procédures, propres à la philologie, et qu'il serait impérieux de décrire pour mieux les contraster sur toutes ces procédures dites modernes, empruntées à la linguistique, à la sociologie des mentalités, etc ... La philosophie de Lafrance consiste à vouloir limiter l'histoire de la philosophie à un ensemble restreint de procédures, mais il n'est pas démontré que cet ensemble soit le seul susceptible du prédicat de scientificité. Ni même de ce beau vocable de 'scholarship.' Tout le travail de Lafrance fait certes honneur à l'idéal du scholarship, mais on peut penser que c'est davantage en vertu des attitudes qui furent les siennes qu'en raison de la restriction de ses procédures à un ensemble tacite qu'il ne décrit pas.

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NICHOLAS LASH, *A Matter of Hope: A Theologian's Reflections on the Thought of Karl Marx*. Toronto: Westminster House; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1982. Pp. xiv + 312. Cdn\$44.95: US\$19.95. ISBN 0-232-51494-1.

In defining his aim, Lash begins by noting the indifference Christians have shown to Marxist theory, despite their practical obsession with Marxism. In

particular, little attention has been paid to Marx's own texts, even in 'liberation theology,' which openly acknowledges Marxist influence. The general approach by Christian theologians has been apologetic, which means assertive and defensive. Lash conceives academic theology as interrogative, not assertive. He wants to take Marx seriously, to investigate his meaning, to learn from him, without knowing or deciding in advance what form eventual agreement or disagreement might take. His book is a study of Marx's own thought, not of Marxism in its varieties. While he does not confine his attention to Marx's explicit critique of religion, he does select those themes — fundamental to Marx's thought as a whole — which raise issues of relevance to Christian belief and theology. What we are given, then, is a careful, demanding study, closely controlled by Marx's texts, of key topics in his thought in their relationship to Christian belief.

The book falls into two unequal parts. The first, the shorter part, is entitled 'Preliminaries' and, besides the Introduction, dealing with scope and method, contains three further chapters. The continuity between the early and mature Marx is defended against the background of recent debate. The meaning of Marxism is determined because, although the book is concerned with Marx not with Marxism, the study of Marx's texts is bound to be influenced by the prior conception or pre-understanding of Marxism. Finally comes a brief exposition of the Preface and first chapter of *The German Ideology*. Lash here follows the suggestion of David McLellan that *The German Ideology* is the best way into the thought of Marx, and he uses the exposition to show how the various themes he selects for treatment in the second part are related in Marx's thought.

The second part reflects in detail upon fourteen themes in as many chapters. The sequence is not linear, but the chapters fall into unequal groups. The opening one argues that Marx's dialectic of appearance and reality is a secularized doctrine of revelation. It leads into the next two chapters on the meaning of history and on correctness and truth. Lash sees the Marxian account of truth, which he carefully examines, as calling into question any merely theoretical relationship between Christians and the truth they confess.

The next five chapters cluster around the question of materialism. In what sense was Marx a materialist? Needless to say, Marx was not a materialist in the vulgar sense of worldliness or obsession with material possessions. On the contrary, his critique of capitalism was the denunciation of such an attitude. Lash argues that 'materialism' for Marx meant the dependence of consciousness on social, material conditions. That did not imply for Marx any form of monistic materialism, which holds that all there is in the last analysis is stuff. Marx's materialism is thus not incompatible with Christian belief. Nevertheless, there is an incompatibility between Christianity and Marx's naturalistic assumption that the 'natural', including the human, exhausts the totality of actual and possible objects of action and discourse. Lash then goes on to elaborate a concept of Christian materialism, declaring that the debate between materialism and idealism has long been internal to Christian theology itself. While some Christians — the idealists — hold that divine

agency is an alternative or complement to human and natural agency, there are other Christians — materialists — for whom God acts only in and through nature and history, so that all that occurs is explicable without direct reference to the reality or agency of God. Further, that form of Christian life and practice is materialist in Marx's sense in which growth in faith, hope and charity coincides with socially transformative practice. For Lash the materialist form of Christian belief and practice is closer to the gospel.

The next two chapters deal directly with Marx's critique of religion. It was the Promethean strand in Marx's anthropology that necessitated the suppression of the question of God. But if there is a God, the assumption that all objectification of God must alienate is to fall into the Hegel's confusion, condemned by Marx himself, between objectification and alienation.

Lash, in the two following chapters, raises the question of language and what Marx meant by science. There is an unfortunate tendency in Marx to identify critical knowledge and uses of language with theoretical or scientific knowledge and language. The distinction between theory and practice is not flexible enough to embrace the various forms of human action and reflection.

The last two chapters turn to the question of the future. They give an excellent analysis of Christian hope as one form of the tragic vision, as always articulated in the interrogative mood, not claiming to know the answers, but remaining in the form of a question. This contrasts with Marx's vision of the future, which remained optimistic, prematurely trying to transcend despair in the imagination and not therefore maturing into hope.

In a postface, Lash explains why he cannot join himself to the Marxist tradition as a Christian Marxist. There is a basic incompatibility in Marx's insistence that the question of God and the question of man are necessarily antithetical.

Lash's book contains an immense amount of matter for reflection, far more than can be touched upon, let alone discussed in a review. I will raise only one point. Lash remains a firmly orthodox Christian theologian in maintaining that the events of Jesus of Nazareth ('a word once spoken, a deed once done, a life once lived') is of definitive and unsurpassable significance for human history and for the interpretation of that history (29, 149, 279). However, in my judgement, any Christian claim to permanent supremacy and exclusiveness is incompatible with the fundamental insights of historical materialism concerning the dialectic between social being and social consciousness and with the Christian materialism advocated by Lash. An historical event or word may be the bearer of transcultural truths and values, but in its particularity as historical it is culturally relative. Nor does it make sense to speak of its unsurpassability as though history had come to an end — which is indeed what Christians have held, against the empirical evidence. An historical event in a particular social setting may indeed be decisive by its subsequent influence for the whole of history, but unless we are to embrace a basically irrational dogmatism neither the fact nor the possibility of complementary, equally decisive events, past and future, can be denied. Belief in divine agency does not imply an idealist as distinct from a materialist

understanding of history and humanity, but an exclusive claim for the particular Christian form of that agency is necessarily idealist. That is why, the Christian conception of divine agency has, more often than not, been idealist in Marx's sense. Lash is trying to eat his cake and have it.

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JAY NEWMAN, *Foundations of Religious Tolerance*. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press 1982. Pp. viii + 184. \$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-5591-5); \$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6507-4).

I am inclined to put this book into the hands of the next person who informs me that conceptual analysis is a pointless or trivial academic exercise. The fact is that close attention to the meaning of words can be an astringent lotion for the intellectual and moral consciousness. It is rather dangerous not to be clear about what tolerance is, and why and within what limits it is desirable. In general, we assume that it is a good thing. Should we then tolerate rape or child abuse, or even the light talk which makes them appear laughing matters?

When it comes to religious tolerance, as Newman says, people seem specially unclear as to its nature; we need a more profound and self-consistent notion of it than is possessed by the man in the street. Tolerance appears to be a kind of acceptance or endurance. But there is a half-heartedness about it; we certainly cannot be said to 'tolerate' what we love or actively approve of. So far as we think of tolerance, as of course we often do, as a virtue, it has a normative as well as a descriptive aspect; but it need not do so. I may criticize another person, or even myself, for merely tolerating what I should strongly respect or actively support; or for tolerating what I should strenuously oppose, like injustice or arrogance.

It is commonly but wrongly believed that tolerating a belief is mainly a matter of making a judgment about its content. Jews and Unitarians as such hold that orthodox Christian belief in the Trinity and the divinity of Christ are seriously mistaken, and that the doctrines in question are false. Still, they may yet be tolerant on the matter; and such tolerance will consist in a certain attitude to the orthodox Christian's believing what he does. Tolerance, it may be concluded, is a half-hearted acceptance or endurance not of a belief *in itself*, but of *someone's holding* that belief. The pernicious relativism with which philosophy and the social sciences have recently been afflicted has

misled some into supposing that the Jew, atheist, or orthodox Christian in this case, will only be truly tolerant if he regards his own beliefs as not significantly better or worse than the contradictory set of beliefs. There is indeed an important question as to how far one *can* tolerate someone else's believing propositions which one regards as both false and important.

Some forms of intolerance are wholly irrational, and we have regrettably to use force to prevent bigots from doing excessive harm; but in the long run the only way to deal with irrationality is to promote rationality, through education. But there are relatively rational forms of intolerance, which are usefully divided by Newman into three kinds, philosophical, altruistic and prudential. Each kind is distinguished by the motive underlying it; one may try to change the religious beliefs of others because one is concerned with truth, the welfare of others, or one's own welfare. A zealot with the first of these motives might be persuaded to greater tolerance of other people's religious beliefs if he could be shown that his own were not obviously true. Has the young missionary who knocks on your door really studied as much as those distinguished philosophers and theologians who differ from him? It is worth remembering in this connection that it is one thing to love truth for its own sake, another to claim to do so. An altruistic bigot cannot tolerate other people doing themselves harm; he may even torture us or burn us at the stake to prevent us from doing so. Such a person might be brought to see that Moses, the Buddha and Jesus were teachers, not bullies; and that according to the majority of great religious teachers, being tolerant is an important aspect of being religious. The intolerance of the prudent man is perhaps the most difficult to deal with. Such a person is apt to regard the religious outsider as a threat to the unity of his own religious group. The existence of such outsiders may provoke the insider to ask questions and to challenge authority. If one fears the spread of apostasy and secularism, force may seem the only available resort. Newman insists that one ought to have some sympathy with such views. However loathsome theocracies are — being in effect, of course, run not by God but by dictators — it is by no means absurd to fear that ideological pluralism is bound ultimately to issue in a lowest common denominator of laws and standards within a society. And even the most liberal person can hardly be unrestrictedly tolerant of all religious views which differ from his own. Is he to alter his entire lifestyle to accommodate the requirements of religious minorities? Does he not have the right to expect minorities, just because they *are* minorities, to do most of the accommodating?

Given the persistence of religious intolerance in human beings, it is difficult, as Newman says, not to be pessimistic; but we must resist the temptation. If the prospects are not bright, we must try to make them a little brighter. 'Reflect ... on the words of the greatest of all champions of religious tolerance, that most persecuted of philosophers, Spinoza: "But all things that are excellent are as difficult as they are rare".'

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SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, *The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions*. Don Mills, Ont & New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. viii + 133. Cdn\$25.75: US\$12.95. ISBN 0-19-824657-9.

In this book Scheffler is concerned to investigate the philosophical motivations underlying rival non-egoistic conceptions of right action. His discussion is guided by the following taxonomy. A (non-egoistic) conception of right action qualifies as *consequentialist* or, more precisely, act-consequentialist if it provides a scheme for ranking states of affairs from best to worst (giving no special weight to the welfare of the agent) and requires 'that each agent in all cases act in such a way as to produce the highest-ranked state of affairs that he is in a position to produce' (1). If, on the other hand, a conception of right action implies that it is sometimes morally permissible *not* to produce the highest-ranked state of affairs that the agent can produce, the conception is said to be *agent-centered*. (The reasons for this name are below.) Two kinds of agent-centered views are possible. A view with *agent-centered restrictions* is one that implies that it is sometimes morally impermissible to produce the highest-ranked accessible state of affairs. An example would be a view that required one not to kill an innocent person even if a worse state of affairs would then result, including, say, the killing of five innocent persons. The other kind, and the one that Scheffler favours, is a conception of right action with *an agent-centered perogative*. On this conception it is *always* morally permissible, but not always required, that the agent produce the highest-ranked accessible state of affairs.

How important is this taxonomy? One's answer depends on how interesting one finds the idea of an agent-centered perogative. Scheffler's strategy for motivating this 'hybrid' moral conception is to argue that it combines the merits of the alternative conceptions of right action in a principled way while avoiding their shortcomings. Three main considerations advance his argument in this direction.

First consider values like distributive justice and minority rights. Restrictive agent-centered conceptions of right action can provide explicit protection for these values (e.g., by making it morally impermissible to sacrifice them for the sake of utility) while it is always more or less problematic whether a strictly utilitarian scheme can satisfactorily accommodate them. Those for whom fairness and rights are primary values will be strongly motivated, therefore, to endorse a restrictive agent-centered moral outlook. But Scheffler argues that it would be a mistake to reject consequentialism or, for that matter, a view with an agent-centered perogative on the ground that utilitarianism is poorly motivated with respect to these values. His reason is that it is possible to construct various *non-utilitarian* consequentialist conceptions that explicitly protect these values. How? All the consequentialist has to do is to take these values into account in ranking the state of affairs that an agent might produce. Likewise for anyone favouring an agent-centered

perogative. In the case of distributive justice, for example, Scheffler favours a ranking scheme that 'gives *much greater weight* to benefiting those who are worst-off [but] does not give *absolute priority* to doing so' (31). He explains, however, how one could give absolute priority to benfiting the worse-off by a system of lexical ordering. Moreover, since the act necessary to produce a state of affairs is included as part of it (see note 2 on p. 1), it is theoretically possible for virtually any 'deontological value', e.g., keeping promises, telling the truth, or giving just deserts, to figure in the ranking scheme. Thus, whatever the shortcomings of utilitarianism, no restrictive agent-centered point of view can be more soundly based on such values than *every* consequentialist view or *every* view with an agent-centered perogative.

Are the three main approaches, then, equally well motivated? A second consideration cuts against restrictive agent-centered views. Consider again the example of refraining from killing an innocent person with the consequence that five innocent persons will be killed by someone. Let us assume that the disvalue of someone killing an innocent person is the only consideration relevant to ranking the alternative states of affairs. Any restrictive view that implies that it is not morally permissible to kill the innocent person should explain the motivation behind this restriction. But, as Scheffler argues at length, it is hard to see how any satisfactory explanation is possible. Obviously the explanation cannot be simply that 'negative duties' have priority over 'positive duties,' since that response only begs the question. Nor can the explanation be that there is great disvalue in someone killing an innocent person, since that explanation would provide an argument *for* the act (on the assumption that two or more such acts have more disvalue than one). But then what can the explanation possibly be? Scheffler believes that the example illustrates a systematic difficulty that would arise for *every* agent-centered restriction.

Any view with an agent-centered perogative escapes this diffiulty because any such view implies that it is always permissible to produce the highest-ranked state of affairs. In this respect such a view is on a par with consequentialism. But in another regard the two approaches are fundamentally different in their motivations. From a consequentialist perspective, whatever value is assigned to a person's projects and commitments (e.g., to one's commitment not to kill an innocent person or simply to care for those one loves), once this value for each person has figured in the ranking of states of affairs, the latter determines straightforwardly what one may or may not do. Scheffler believes that this perspective does not accord with the way most persons understand themselves as moral agents. In particular they do not think of themselves as mere instruments to serve an end determined by an impersonal calculus which identifies 'the right course of action for the individual, no matter how his own projects and plans may have fared at the hands of that calculus, and despite the fact that from the impersonal standpoint his own deepest concerns and commitments have no distinctive claim to attention' (57). On the contrary, each person sees that '*his* point of view is independent of the impersonal point of view, and this independence is typically evidenced by the fact

that *he* cares differentially about his projects just because they are *his* projects' (57). Significantly, an agent-centered conception of right action recognizes the moral independence of this personal perspective and thus allows that it is sometimes morally permissible *not* to do what is best from an impersonal standpoint. A conception of right action based on an agent-centered perogative therefore has the advantage of recognizing a person's moral autonomy without denying the legitimacy of impersonal moral demands.

But is such a conception fully coherent? Scheffler needs to explain just what it is about my projects and commitments being *mine* that makes it sometimes morally permissible for me not to do what is best from an impersonal standpoint. Note that the explanation cannot concern the content of my projects and commitments or my need for some personal freedom in order to do my best. Any value there has, by hypothesis, already been figured into the calculation of what is best. Rather, the moral legitimacy of my agent-centered perogative must have to do with the fact that my projects are mine rather than yours. Scheffler has not made it clear how there is a basis for a *moral* distinction here.

Let me put the problem in another way. Scheffler takes pains to emphasize that an agent-centered perogative does not reduce to egoism (8, 21, 69-70). After all, to say that *sometimes* it is morally permissible to ignore what is morally best is not to say that it is always permissible or that it is morally permissible just when what is morally best happens to coincide with self-interest. This point must be granted. Still, one wants to know what makes the difference. If the basis of the perogative is merely that my projects are mine, then since this is always so, it must always be permissible to favour my own projects over what is best from an impersonal standpoint. And that would be egoism. Among non-egoistic conceptions there would be no middle ground between consequentialism and agent-centered restrictions.

It is noteworthy that Scheffler's taxonomy does not extend to forms of consequentialism that are not act-oriented. He mentions that there are forms besides act-consequentialism and says that he believes his main lines of argument could be extended to cover them, but he offers no further explanation (2). It is not hard, however, to think of rule-utilitarian conceptions of right action that at least purport to make room for supererogation and hence for its being sometimes morally permissible not to do what is morally best. In effect, such a conception would include some non-restrictive agent-centered rules of conduct with a utilitarian and therefore *non-egoistic* backing. Wouldn't this kind of consequentialism be able to solve the problem raised in the last two paragraphs? Might it not also explain the motivation behind some agent-centered restrictions?

In my opinion these questions represent serious gaps in Scheffler's argument. In a work not so short they might have been closed. My disappointment is that he did not extend his argument, which is very good as far as it goes.

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AMARTYA SEN and BERNARD WILLIAMS, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1982. Pp. vii + 290. US\$37.50 (cloth; ISBN 0-521-24296-7); US\$12.95 (paper; ISBN 0-521-28771-5).

In this book we're offered a multidimensional look at contemporary utilitarianism, its shortcomings, and its competitors within the (broadly) Liberal tradition. There are two distinct parts. Contributions by Hare, Harsanyi, and Mirlees represent three near-canonical versions of utilitarianism. The rest of the selections (including the introduction by Sen and Williams) enter into battle with the canon.

The Hare piece will fool no one. His views are ever the same, and this particular effort simply tries (rather feebly, it seems to me) to paper over holes punched in his theory by innumerable critics. Harsanyi's main strategy is to argue that the main criticisms of utilitarianism hold only for simplistic versions of the theory, and that utility measures can be found which are sophisticated enough to handle, say, the objections to utilitarianism offered by those who emphasize rights and liberties. As is usual in this sort of effort, one of the main questions remaining at the end is whether utilitarianism beefed up to deal with all the criticism is still utilitarianism. Sen and Williams discuss this issue in their introduction. Mirlees' contribution is a presentation of utilitarianism in its economicistic form. Its charm is that it involves nearly every contested issue of the last thirty years within, say, welfare economics, and relentlessly plumps each time for the utilitarian alternative — always on the ground that Mirlees is 'not persuaded' by standard criticism. We're left to decide on our own, unencumbered by any arguments on Mirlees' part, whether he was right 'not to be persuaded' or not. We are, of course, stirred by his optimism, and that of Hare and Harsanyi, that any satisfactory theory must be an utilitarian one. This optimism, however, simply raises the question of the persuasive scope of their efforts. The situation begins to look rather Anselmian.

The remaining contributions are all by theorists who are unquestionably in the first rank of those currently working within the confines of Liberal social and political theory. Consequently every selection has a richness and subtlety that I fear won't be adequately reflected in my brief selective remarks. However, certain thematic issues emerge that readers ought to keep in mind. First of all, the word 'Liberal' that I cavalierly toss over the whole gamut of theories focussed on utility and bourgeois rights and liberties is a highly contested word. Within the compass of this anthology (and related writing) the point is to contrast theories whose emphasis is on the social welfare of end states with theories emphasizing rights and liberties, with the latter constituting 'liberalism.' The 'null hypotheses' defining the ends of the gamut are, at one end, pure maximization without regard to distribution, entitlement, etc., and at the other end something like the nearly pure entitlement of Nozick's minimal state. Familiar terrain. The overall project is to find a theory somewhere on the terrain which will be internally consistent and

satisfy 'our' intuitions, that is, roughly, satisfy the sober sensibilities and convictions of right-thinking Anglo-saxons brought up in the post-christian, post-industrial west. So the first thing to keep in mind is that there are theories not located on the Liberal terrain that may be eligible alternatives in much of the world. Non-Liberal theories generally don't conform well to Liberal 'intuitions,' but, then, Liberal intuitions are internal to Liberal theory, not independent criteria of adequacy.

Second, virtually every theory along the Liberal spectrum has been subjected to trenchant criticism by advocates of theories elsewhere on the spectrum. These criticisms are never 'added up.' In other words, now that the level of sophistication within Liberalism itself is so high, we may be in a position to ask whether the array of requirements for adequate Liberal theory are even minimally consistent in Liberalism's own terms. The thought experiment to be recommended in this regard is to pit each contribution to this volume against every other — pairwise and in multiple combination. Then decide what shakes out at the end. For example, what is the ultimate impact of Schick's observation that objects of want, desire, or preference are intentional objects? At stake, it seems to me (see *Ratio* June 1983), is the very possibility of establishing identity criteria strong enough to support utility or commodity spaces in any way that will yield a meaningful conception of welfare. Taylor's discussion of qualitative as opposed to quantitative theories of the good life will fit well into any subsequent discussion of this point.

Or, how, in the end, does the Liberal attempt to build an ethics in the absence of an ethos handle the questions raised by Amy Gutman's excellent discussion of education, or Rawls' and Elster's attempts to articulate the conditions of moral character development? It's far from clear to me that any theory on the Liberal spectrum will succeed on this count, and Rawls produces passages throughout his works which betray his own ambivalence on the matter.

Or, what decisions will ultimately be made about (probability weighted) estimates of utility ex-ante versus ex-post? Involved here are questions of individual autonomy (favoring ex-ante estimates), the eventual social coherence of social end states (favoring ex-post estimates), and the old question of real versus perceived interests. Hammond raises the issue in a powerful way and others touch on it, but in the end it's far from clear that the tensions are resolvable consistent with the Liberal agenda.

Or, finally, what happens as theorists begin to broach the problem of social dynamics, so long ignored by Liberalism? The quasi-statics of standard utilitarianism would have to be rejected in favor of a genuinely dynamic theory. But then what uniformities, what discipline (applied in what way), what executive management would be required in an ongoing utilitarian society? This is no academic question, for in prospect are worlds containing Baptists and Shiites, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Quebec Separatists, etc. The standard Liberal proposal for baseline uniformity is that everyone be a rational economic person. But this is a *particular* conception which urges a *particular* way of life. It rules out all those for whom an alter-

native way of life is a non-negotiable commitment. What's to be done with these inconvenient others? Well, the hard line is found in Hare: lump all recalcitrants as fanatics. This is absolutely traditional (recall St-Just), and Hare is evidently placing his money on missionaries and gunboats — in these days multi-national corporations and U.S. Marines — to facilitate the export of the required human character. Other contributors are more sensitive. Frank Hahn raises serious questions about the very possibility of calculating utilities in domains which mutate in (I would say) perfectly normal ways among people who are not fixed once for all in personality, values, and knowledge. Rawls, as usual, relies on the notion of primary goods as the foundation of social unity, and contrasts it with the alternative notion of shared higher-order preference functions. But neither notion is at all obviously successful — even on Liberal grounds. Scanlon, like Rawls, expresses a preference for a basic contractarian orientation rather than basic utilitarianism. This simply raises questions about the nature of the contracting parties and the terms of the contract which are and promise to be the subject of endless dispute. Perhaps the most revelatory view of Liberalism's need for underlying uniformity is provided in Dasgupta's remarks on Hayek. Indeed, the contentious thesis that Fascism constitutes a constant internal possibility in Liberalism has seldom been argued more lucidly or persuasively. In general we're led yet again to worry about what happens when the apparently benevolent theorising of Liberalism gives way to the building of social and political institutions in the Liberal mode.

In a reply to a paper of Professor Sen I once suggested that the very best of the Liberal theorists, especially those with economic sophistication, are currently involved in constructing higher and higher order epicycles in an attempt to save the Ptolemaic Liberal worldview. The volume under review, containing the best theorizing of the best theorists, confirms my view. For, in addition to providing the most elegant of epicycles, the contributors (when their critical remarks are added together) strongly suggest the radical inadequacy of Liberal theory, and the need for new general orientations.

Students will need a fair amount of background in both philosophy and economics in order to benefit from the contributions to *Utilitarianism and Beyond*. It sustains a level of discussion uniformly and brilliantly at the 'state of the art' from beginning to end. Everyone ought to make the effort to reach the required level of sophistication. I do hope, however, that as people examine the state of the art they really do reflect upon the state of the art.

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R.S. SUMMERS, *Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1982. Pp. 295. US\$24.50. ISBN 0-8014-1511-X.

'With a few exceptions, perhaps most notably Jeremy Bentham and Rudolph von Ihering, most Western legal theorists have sought to advance their subject by working within one of three great traditions: continental natural law, British and Viennese analytical positivism, and historical jurisprudence. If I am right, however, pragmatic instrumentalist legal theory constitutes a fourth basic type of theory, and its American version qualifies as an instructive instantiation of this mode of thought' (268). The classical pragmatic instrumentalists include the following: John Chipman Gray (1839-1915), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935), John Dewey (1859-1952), Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), Walter Wheeler Cook (1873-1943), Joseph Walter Bingham (1878-1973), W. Underhill Moore (1879-1949), Herman Oliphant (1884-1939), Jerome Frank (1889-1957), Karl N. Llewellyn (1893-1962), Felix S. Cohen (1907-1953) (23). Many of these thinkers are known as 'legal realists.' Summers, however, offers several reasons for changing the name to 'pragmatic instrumentalists.' One may add the following reason: legal realism presented itself in many countries. The most known Scandinavian legal realists were Axel Hägerström, Vilhelm Lundstedt, Karl Olivecrona and Alf Ross. In Russia, the Polish thinker Leon Petrażycki created a similar school. The cores of these theories were, however, different. Petrażycki's theory was organized around some theses concerning the proper scientific method and its application to the law. The Scandinavians started from an ontological assumption, that is, stated that what cannot be placed in space and time does not exist. The Americans, on the other hand, were much less theoretically minded and rather emphasized the practical use of both the law and legal theory as means to some social goals.

Part One of the book deals with theory of value and the relation between means and goals. The former includes the following topics: maximal satisfaction of wants and interests, a concern with consequences, an empirical approach and an emphasis on particulars. The latter ends with the following deep insight: 'The instrumentalists ... tended to assume that setting goals is a relatively straightforward process that, once accomplished, signifies that we have already gone far to determine means. But means also delimit and help to determine goals ... Goals tentatively point to means, and means then indicate some reformulation of goals ... In the course of lawmaking and law administration, a specific means-goal complex or hypothesis is the usual object of evaluation, not goal alone or means alone' (79).

In Part Two, the author presents and criticizes the instrumentalist theory of valid law. He thus rejects 'the validity of law as determined by reference to official action' (102-11) and states, what follows. 'Some critics of the instrumentalists interpreted them to be recommending source-based criteria ("valid law is whatever officials have acted on or laid down") instead of merely describing the standards at work in the system' (112). He also rejects the predictive theory of valid law, according to which 'the prophecies of

what the courts will do in fact are ... the law' (Holmes, cf. 116). 'In general a good lawyer does not work like a weather forecaster ... Instead, ... he will identify applicable law (by reference to independent standards of valid law) and then interpret and apply this law to the facts of the client's case, all in accord with generally accepted interpretational and applicational technique. It would be a distortion to characterize this as a process of prediction. Indeed, it is possible for a lawyer to practice law for very long periods of time without ever predicting ... that a judge will do anything' (127).

Part Two includes a chapter on Legal Method, especially an elaborate discussion of the instrumentalist's attack on formalism in the law, summarized in a table of 12 'meanings of formalism' (157). The last of these is, what follows. 'Context ... Models of ideally justified decisions. Formalistic view ... Conclusions deductively entailed by premises (?). Instrumentalist "Contrary" ... Conclusions appropriately supported (nondeductively) by reasons (?)' (158). The question marks are the author's and rightly indicate the controversial character of the problem. The instrumentalists often accused legal formalists of abuse of logic. In Summers's opinion, 'instrumentalists most often used the phrase "abuse of logic" to refer not to the abuse of canons of deductive entailment but to abuses of the two other kinds,' that is, to an unsound reasoning from what the formalists 'claimed to be inherent meanings of words such as "offer" and "right",' and to giving 'too much weight to the argument that arises thereby' (155). This remark is both insightful and true. On the other hand, Summers uses this opportunity to express his own opinion on the role of logic in the law: 'Determinate reasons of authority do not have to be constructed as deductive. They can be constructed merely as strong nondeductive "supporting arguments", rather like the legs of a chair and unlike the links of a chain, the metaphor John Wisdom once used' (156). In my opinion, however, the matter is more complex and deserves more than such metaphors (see *The Basis of Legal Justification* [Lund 1983] 3ff and 70ff). Legal reasoning involves many nondeductive steps. A nondeductive step (in my terminology, a 'jump') is performed from p to q if, and only if, the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) Truth of p is a sufficient reason for truth of q ; and (b) p does not deductively entail q . Yet, one can and should try to present as extensive a part of legal reasoning as possible as logical deduction. One can thus convert a 'jump' into a deductive reasoning through adding or changing some premises or inference rules. However, these new premises or inference rules require justification. By definition, they cannot be logically necessary. They can be certain from the point of view of the contextually sufficient tradition of legal discourse. On the other hand, one cannot convert a 'jump' into a deductive reasoning through adding a finite number of premises or inference rules that are certain from the point of view of deep justification, giving to one's conclusion as much support as one meaningfully can give at all, not in the legal discourse but, for instance, in a moral or political debate. For example, the premise 'one ought to observe the constitution,' indubitable for a lawyer, is open to doubt in an Anarchist context. Nondeductivity of legal thinking thus does not mean that deduction does not apply to the law

but merely that one works with infinite sets of premises of deductive reasoning.

The final chapter of Part Two deals with the separation of law and morals. The author concludes 'that law is essentially a mix of authoritativeness with reasonableness, including moral reasonableness' (187: see also *Basis*, 76ff). Part Three, The Implementation and Functioning of Law, discusses, inter alia, the problem of law as technology, the so-called 'decision theory' of law, and the role of coercion and force in the law. Part Four, finally, contains interesting reflections concerning the efficacy of law. The book ends with General Conclusion.

One cannot possibly summarize this rich, elaborate and comprehensive work. Let me merely emphasize two points. First, the author rightly defends the instrumentalists' disposition to 'mix analytical, empirical, and evaluational issues in one overall scheme of thought' (270). Second, he presents a very instructive 'balance sheet' of 'vices' and 'virtues' of American pragmatic instrumentalism. The 'vices' include, what follows. The instrumentalists emphasized wants and interests and neglected 'the just, the right and the good' (278). They did not work out a general theory of justification. They failed to grasp the continuum of means and goals. They misdescribed the criteria of legal validity. They insisted on a wrong theory of separation of law and morals. They overstated the role of coercion. On the other hand, the 'virtues' include the fact that the instrumentalists 'saw the importance of formulating a general theory of value' (279); 'introduced technological rationalism and empiricist mentality into legal thought'; and 'opened up several relatively new branches of legal theory ... including ... the nature and variety of the means at law's disposal, the law's varied and complex goals and goal structures, the element of personnel in law, and the limits of law's efficacy' (*ibid.*). Although Summers tries to do justice to the instrumentalists and emphasize rather the 'virtues' than the 'vices,' the reader must conclude that the latter prevail. The instrumentalists asked good questions but seldom provided good answers. By the way, the same can be said about other forms of legal realism.

The balance of 'virtues' and 'vices' of Summers's book is quite another matter. Among the 'virtues' one must mention the incredible fact that his work constitutes the first thorough survey of the American instrumentalism. In spite of the tremendous influence of this form of legal theory, no other work attempted this kind of a systematic presentation and criticism of it. Moreover, Summers shows impressive erudition, breadth and insight. Last but not least, he uses this opportunity to indicate his own theory of law, much more sophisticated than the instrumentalists' and in my opinion mostly true. Any student of American instrumentalism in legal theory simply *must* read this book. Any legal theorist in general will gain very much from this lecture, especially if he tries to understand Summers's profound insights about the nature of law and legal method, mostly indicated in a particular context of pragmatical instrumentalism and yet possessing universal importance.

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EMMANUEL TODD, *La troisième planète. Structures familiales et systèmes idéologiques*. Collection 'Empreintes'. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1983. 252 p. (cartes, tableaux, bibliogr.) ISBN 2-02-006341-7.

Il s'agit d'un livre à la fois passionnant et énervant. Emmanuel Todd ne manque pas d'audace en prétendant nous démontrer qu'à chaque type de système familial correspond 'un type idéologique et un seul,' un seul type de comportement politique. Il couvre la planète pour nous présenter avec brio sept types de structures familiales plus ce qu'il appelle 'les systèmes africains.' A ces types correspondraient des tendances d'organisations politiques et idéologiques constantes et qu'on ne peut changer, la force anthropologique des structures familiales ramenant toujours vers elles des organisations politiques qui leur sont congruentes. Le plus fort dans ce livre, c'est qu'il est crédible mais au prix de bien des risques, d'impasses et de contradictions théoriques.

Après une introduction où l'auteur présente son hypothèse et sa volonté de la démontrer 'comme on le ferait dans la plus banale des sciences exactes' (26), il précise au chapitre premier les caractéristiques des sept types de structures familiales qui couvrent, dit-il, 95% de la population du globe. Les chapitres qui suivent reprennent en détail la thèse de l'auteur appliquée à chaque type de structure familiale. Une brève et décevante conclusion, logique toutefois avec la thèse principale, termine ce livre brillant et critiquable.

Je reprends ici avec quelques détails le contenu de ce livre avant d'en proposer une lecture critique.

Les sept types de structures familiales sont les suivants, j'y ajoute entre parenthèses les caractéristiques principales et signale un exemple typique:

1) *La famille communautaire exogame* (égalité des frères définie par les règles successorales, cohabitation des fils mariés et de leurs parents, pas de mariage entre les enfants de deux frères; exemple typique: la Russie et la Chine)

2) *La famille autoritaire* (inégalité des frères définie par les règles successorales: transmission intégrale du patrimoine à l'un des enfants, cohabitation de l'héritier marié et de ses parents, peu ou pas de mariage entre les enfants de deux frères; exemple typique: Allemagne et Japon)

3) *La famille nucléaire égalitaire* (égalité des frères définie par les règles successorales, pas de cohabitation des enfants mariés et de leurs parents, pas de mariage entre les enfants de deux frères; exemple typique: France du Nord, Amérique Latine)

4) *La famille nucléaire absolue* (pas de règle successorale précise: usage fréquent du testament, pas de cohabitation des enfants mariés et de leurs parents, pas de mariage entre les enfants de deux frères; exemple typique: le monde arabe)

6) *La famille communautaire asymétrique* (égalité des frères définie par les règles successorales, cohabitation des fils mariés et de leurs parents, interdit sur le mariage entre les enfants de deux frères mais préférence pour le mariage des enfants d'un frère et d'une soeur; exemple typique: l'Inde du Sud)

7) *La famille anomique* (incertitude quant à l'égalité des frères: règles successoriales égalitaires en théorie mais souples en pratique, cohabitation des enfants mariés et de leurs parents repoussée en théorie mais acceptée en pratique, mariages consanguins possibles, parfois fréquents; exemple typique: Cambodge, Indonésie)

A ces types s'ajoutent les systèmes familiaux africains qui couvrent l'ensemble de l'Afrique noire (instabilité du groupe domestique, polygynie).

Ces structures familiales promeuvent, ou ne promeuvent pas, certaines valeurs et certains rapports de préséance entre ces valeurs. L'auteur établit sa classification sur les caractéristiques de chaque type concernant la liberté ou l'autorité, l'exogamie ou l'endogamie au moment des mariages, les relations aînés-cadets et surtout la relation père-fils, l'égalité ou l'inégalité des descendant(e)s. Ces valeurs s'organisent différemment selon les types et forment au cours de l'apprentissage éducatif une structure mentale compatible avec certaines idéologies seulement et notamment celles qui régissent le pouvoir politique.

L'auteur s'attarde à démontrer de mille façons, utilisant aussi bien les statistiques de tout genre que les inférences logiques, que ses classifications tiennent, que sa thèse est inattaquable et qu'il faut conclure auurre des organisations politiques qui prétendraient durer dans des pays où les structures familiales ne leur sont pas compatibles.

S'il ne s'agissait que d'établir des rapports entre structures familiales et organisations politiques, je pense que nous friserions l'évidence mais ce qui gêne c'est la manière d'établir ces rapports et l'ampleur qui leur est donnée. A force d'aller trop directement de la famille au politique, on finit par faire des idéologies politiques et des façons de gouverner des *reflets* des organisations et idéologies familiales alors qu'elles en sont des *transformations*. Mais ceci aurait exigé de prendre en compte l'épaisseur des *médiations* entre familles et politiques qui seules donnent accès à la notion de transformation. En ne le faisant pas, l'auteur risque des analogies-miroirs beaucoup trop simples. Emmanuel Todd se permet heureusement certaines facilités, contradictions et digressions qui donnent par accumulation une crédibilité limitée à ses propos.

Il admet bien sûr que sa typologie 'repose sur l'application de quelques principes a priori; elle est une description parmi une infinité de descriptions possibles, de la réalité familiale' (34). Mais sa description se fonde sur *un trait commun: 'un certain degré de constance dans les relations entre individus, dont le modèle est la stabilité du couple'* (35). On comprend aisément alors la difficulté qu'il éprouve avec les systèmes africains! Mais Todd sort vite des contraintes qu'il s'est données. Son analyse n'échappe pas par exemple à son appartenance sociologique à une tradition de famille nucléaire égalitaire qui transparaît clairement dans les jugements de valeur qu'il fonde toujours par rapport à cette tradition. En voici un exemple — je pourrais en citer plusieurs autres:

'Même en Emilie, le PCI bute sur un maximum de 47% des voix. Dans les régions de famille communautaire exogame du centre de la France, de Finlande ou du Sud du Portugal, il existe toujours une majorité d'individus

comprise entre 75 et 60% pour refuser le choix collectiviste, *pour ne pas se conformer aux déterminations de l'anthropologie*. Constatation rassurante mais qui ne suffit pas' (66). Emmanuel Todd a droit à ses opinions, mais il n'y a pas de rapport entre ses hypothèses et ce genre de jugement de valeur. On remarquera également les italiques de l'auteur lui-même qui signale ici un cas qui contredit ses hypothèses (voir aussi 149-50).

Todd ne tire rien des limites de ses hypothèses; il est beaucoup plus intéressé à foncer et prend le risque de voir les structures familiales expliquer tout et leur contraire. Certes Todd ne prétend pas comparer terme à terme les types familiaux et les types politiques; il montre bien qu'à un type familial peuvent correspondre plusieurs types d'organisation politique. Mais prenons un exemple typique de son raisonnement (99-102): 'Dans l'ensemble de l'Europe, dit-il, la tendance est au vingtième siècle, à une baisse de l'âge au mariage ... Dans les régions de famille autoritaire, chacune des étapes de cette baisse s'accompagne, localement, d'un phénomène de conversion au socialisme bureaucratique et d'atténuation de la religiosité traditionnelle' (99). Qui ne voit ici le cercle vicieux du raisonnement? Cercle vicieux parce qu'on ne peut à la fois dire que la baisse de l'âge du mariage entraîne des changements politiques et que les modèles politiques reprennent les modèles familiaux. Ce serait décidément trop vite passer sur les raisons qui amènent la baisse de l'âge du mariage, raisons qui permettraient de sortir du cercle vicieux de l'argument. Il ne s'agit pas ici de nier de possibles corrélations mais de signaler que ces corrélations ne s'expliqueront qu'en passant par des facteurs supplémentaires, autrement dit qu'il n'y a pas ici de corrélations suffisamment directes pour que la baisse de l'âge du mariage *explique* le passage au socialisme bureaucratique. Ce serait trop facile.

Malgré les intuitions et propos fascinants de l'auteur qui joue avec la politique mondiale en la fondant sur les structures familiales, on est plus porté à la critique qu'à l'adhésion. Todd ne nous dit pas assez les limites de ses hypothèses; le lecteur critique se doit alors de freiner les élans d'un auteur qui finit par conclure à l'aléatoire, comme si adopter un point de vue historique équivalait à nier le hasard. Cela aussi est trop facile.

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