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PHILIP BEAN, *Punishment: A Philosophical and Criminological Inquiry.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Totowa, NJ: Biblio Distribution Center 1981. Pp. viii + 215. Cdn$43.75; US$40.00. ISBN 0-85520-391-9.

Philip Bean is a professor of Applied Social Science; his major aim in this book is to acquaint criminologists with the philosophical issues and problems concerning the justification of punishment. Another major aim is to attack rehabilitationist views of punishment and to defend a version of retributivism. In the course of his argument he also discusses the legal punishment of children and examines different trends in the British and U.S. penal systems.

Bean distinguishes three positions on punishment: retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. In his longest chapter, entitled 'The Great Debate,' he attempts to clarify each of these views and to explain their strengths and weaknesses. He thinks that each has a contribution to make to the understanding of punishment, but rehabilitation has been in practice, he says, a 'sad mistake' (195) and 'retribution has more merits than it is usually credited with' (9). Bean's central idea about punishment is that punishment is justified only when it is just; and it is just only when the person punished has committed an offense which is a basis for the punishment being deserved, and the extent of the punishment is roughly proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. Bean sees these as retributivist ideas and on the basis of these he criticizes deterrence and rehabilitation as permitting the punishment of the innocent and punishments greater than the offense warrants. These are not his only criticisms, but they constitute the major critical theme. His greatest venom is directed against indeterminate and semi-indeterminate (minimum and maximum times to be served) sentences and at the practices of probation and parole. These, which have been made typical by the great influence of rehabilitationist ideas, produce sentences longer than warranted (waiting for the offender to be 'cured') and give unjustified power to prison and parole officials to determine the length of sentences. They also lead to 'game-playing' on the part of prisoners — to show that they have been 'cured' or 'corrected'

— and manipulation on the part of officials. And the notion of a definite punishment as deserved and of punishment as paying one's debt goes by the board. The result is that, despite the humanitarian motives underlying rehabilitation, it has become a new tyranny which has failed to respect the dignity of the offender. Also, it has been deceitful, failing to see that treatment, when coerced, is not a substitute for punishment, but a form of punishment. And lastly, it simply has not worked — offenders have not been rehabilitated or 'corrected'.

I do not think that Bean's ideas will be unfamiliar to criminologists and penal officials — they reflect a current trend against the idea that the aim of punishment is to cure the offender. Nor will philosophers find his discussion of the philosophical issues involved in punishment especially new or innovative. He presents the philosophical issues competently, though his discussion is occasionally marred by lack of clarity, confusion on some basic philosophical points, and some strong assertions submitted with little defense. The writing can sometimes be a chore to read. While it is sometimes very clear, even elegant, it is often awkward and many points are repeated more than is necessary. Nevertheless, the use of the theoretical, philosophical background to make practical criticisms and suggestions works well and the book comes off, overall, as a sustained and persuasive argument.

I will end this review with brief comments on two features of Bean's theoretical framework where I think he can clarify and develop his ideas. First, while Bean is favorable to a retributivist account of punishment, he rejects a basic pillar of the retributivist view, that the fact that a person has committed an offence is a sufficient reason for that person to be punished. He sees that we do not erect rules and institutions of punishment simply in order to retribute wrong-doers and that we cannot be justified in doing so. Given this, Bean is led to hold that a retributivist must adopt a position once defended by J.D. Mabbott ('Punishment,' *Mind,* **48** [1939] 152-67), that punishment is deserved and justified whenever a rule has been violated and someone has been given the authority, by rules, to punish that violation, regardless of the goodness or badness of the rule, or the justice or injustice of the institution the rule is part of, and regardless of whether the rule-violation constitutes a moral wrong or not. Bean is unhappy with this, but to omit moral fault (which requires some justification of the rules) is to improverish and formalize retributivism and make it much less plausible than it can be. What Bean wants to hold, I think, is that the general justifying aim of punishment is the need to secure conformity to rules in order for social life to exist. Given this overall aim, what are we to make of the principles that justified punishment requires the offender to be guilty of an offence and that the punishment must be proportional to the offense? Bean would see these as retributive principles within an essentially deterrent framework. But there is another alternative: we can try to understand these as principles of ***distributive*** justice, based upon the idea of respect for persons and their rights to freedom from injury and deprivation of liberty. Such respect requires that people not be deprived of liberty or be made to suffer unless by their actions they have waived their

right to non-interference. Such a principle constrains the broad aim of securing compliance to rules by respect for persons and their rights, or, in other familiar terms, it limits the pursuit of utility or the general welfare by certain rights-regarding considerations. I think Bean's acceptance of retribution might be better construed as an acceptance of this sort of principle of distributive justice. This of course needs more exploring, but note that it is the sort of exploring that would make general issues in political philosophy relevant to punishment (a linkage which Bean wants to resist).

The second comment is this: how are we to distinguish between deterrence and rehabilitation? Bean is not as clear on this as he needs to be. We can say that the aim of deterrence is the promotion of the general welfare. This can be achieved through punishment in several ways: a) the punishment of the offender sets an example to others which inhibits their inclination to commit crimes; b) the punishment inhibits the offender from repeating his crime, i.e. reforms him; and c) the offender is prevented from repeating his crime during the period of incarceration. So *example, reform* and *prevention* can all be modes of deterrence. It follows that the rehabilitationist view cannot be distinguished from the deterrence view by saying either that it aims to reform the offender (while deterrence aims to reform others) or by saying that it aims to treat rather than punish offenders (for treatment can minimize crime and promote general utility). I suggest that the rehabilitationist view differs from the deterrence view only by having a different overall *aim:* the welfare of the offender alone. It seeks to make the offender better, to 'cure' him, independent of the effects of this on the general welfare. Given this, this third view of punishment might best be called the *paternalistic* theory of punishment. Given this, the aim of retribution can be seen as giving the offender his just deserts; of deterrence, the promotion of the general welfare; of paternalism, the betterment of the offender. But given this understanding, another objection to rehabilitation becomes very clear: it offends a basic principle of liberal society, that in John Stuart Mill's well-known phrases:

> the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ... His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.

This rules out the sole aim of punishment as the improvement of the offender. Of course the liberal view can be challenged. But to bring out the inconsistency of rehabilitation with liberalism is to show what a formidable burden of argument it must bear. Bean does partially express this objection in several places (especially p. 91), but I think the point needs to be made more explicitly. As such it constitutes a criticism of rehabilitation at least as powerful as the one Bean emphasizes — that it justifies punishments out of proportion to the offence. It does not just do that: its basic grounds of justification are illiberal.

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HANS BLUMENBERG, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Studies in contemporary German social thought), translated by Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1982. Pp. xi + 677. US$37.50. ISBN 0-262-02184-6.

On nous offre ici la traduction anglaise de la deuxième édition remaniée du magnifique ouvrage de Hans Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (3 vols, 1973, 1974, 1976).

En quoi le statut de légitimité ou d'illégitimité peut-il s'appliquer à nos temps modernes, voire à n'importe quelle époque? Du point de vue lexical, la légitimité a un sens surtout juridique et se réfère au bien-fondé d'un geste et de ce qui en résulte: lois, règlements, documents, situations. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, la question concerne la légitimité des concepts prédominants dans l'histoire des idées depuis l'avènement des Temps Modernes.

Si Blumenberg se sent porté à la défense de l'édifice conceptuel à la base des Temps Modernes, cela vient de son désaccord sur la caractérisation, en particulier par Karl Löwith, de notre époque comme illégitime. Analysant l'idée de progrès dans *Meaning in History* (1949), Löwith semble également montrer l'illégitimité des Temps Modernes comme tels à partir de sa thèse selon laquelle certaines des grandes idées modernes — dont celle du progrès — ne consistent qu'en la version sécularisée d'idées proprement chrétiennes du Moyen-Age. La thèse de Blumenberg: 'que les Temps Modernes sont impensables sans le christianisme' (30); cependant, cette thèse ne prend son sens que par 'une critique de l'apparition en avant-scène — ou mieux: de l'apparente présence en arrière-scène — de la sécularisation' (*ibid.*).

L'ouvrage comporte quatre parties: I — La sécularisation: critique d'une catégorie de tort historique. II — Absolutisme théologique et auto-affirmation humaine. III — Le 'procès' de la curiosité théorique. IV — Aspects du seuil époqual: le Cusan et le Nolan.

La première partie de l'ouvrage consiste en la critique fondamentale des théories — dont celle de Löwith — de la modernité comme le produit de la sécularisation d'idées chrétiennes. D'entrée en matière (I/1), Blumenberg nous rappelle la définition de la sécularisation: 'un processus visant à faire disparaître, autant de la vie privée que de la vie publique, les liens religieux, les rapports à la transcendance, l'attente d'une après-vie, les gestes rituels et les tournures de phrase bien ancrées' (3). Le monde devient plus mondain. Cependant, dit Blumenberg, nous nous trouvons encore dans 'l'horizon d'opération' de ce processus, ce qui seul nous permet de le constater et de le comprendre. La compréhension elle-même du phénomène de la sécularisation a évolué. Ce qui à l'origine pouvait sembler une perte — et une perte quantitative — prend maintenant l'allure d'un 'agrégat de transformations dénombrables et transitivement qualitatives' dans chacune desquelles on ne peut comprendre le produit de la transformation qu'à partir de son état initial (4). La sécularisation apparaît dès lors non pas comme une perte en substance mais comme le délaissement de bagages encombrants (6) et peut même paraître comme ayant pour effet une certaine purification du christianisme

(7). Ceci dit, l'auteur s'en prend aux abus de la catégorie de la sécularisation: sans aucun doute peut-on parler d'une sécularisation de la campagne devant un déclin des obligations des villages envers l'Eglise, mais dans le cas de l'assimilation de la valorisation capitaliste du succès en affaires à la doctrine protestante de la certitude du salut, 'un contenu spécifique quelconque est expliqué par un autre qui l'a précédé et d'une façon telle que la prétendue transformation de l'un dans l'autre n'est ni une intensification, ni une clarification, mais une aliénation de son sens et de sa fonction' (10).

Blumenberg discute les thèses de Löwith au troisième chapitre de cette première partie. Löwith interprète les philosophies de l'histoire des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles comme la version sécularisée des eschatologies judaïque et chrétienne. Alors que la religion et la philosophie de l'Antiquité reposaient sur une vénération du passé et du toujours présent, les religions juive et chrétienne consistent en la foi en l'accomplissement de l'histoire du monde par des événements 'finals' tels le retour du Messie, le Jugement dernier. En particulier, la rupture d'avec la vision hellénistique et romaine et l'introduction d'idées nouvelles, à savoir de la création *ex nihilo* et de la destruction finale et, pour le christianisme, d'une histoire du monde unique centrée autour d'une unique Incarnation et se dirigeant vers un unique Jugement dernier constituent, pour Löwith, la seule source possible du concept moderne de progrès. Pour Blumenberg par contre, Löwith ne cherche qu'à réitérer sa position initiale (dans son *Nietzsche* de 1935) de faire renaître une cosmologie cyclique en opposition à la doctrine moderne de la linéarité de l'histoire (28). De plus, il y a une différence formelle entre l'eschatologie et l'idée de progrès: la première parle d'un événement faisant irruption dans l'histoire, un événement hétérogène à l'histoire mais la transcendant, tandis que la seconde extrapole d'une structure présente à chaque moment vers un avenir immanent à l'histoire (30).

L'idée de progrès proviendrait alors de 'nouvelles expériences impliquant une si grande étendue de temps que le saut à la généralisation finale de l' 'idée de progrès' se donna comme étape naturelle. Une telle expérience est l'unité de la théorie méthodiquement déterminée comme entité cohérente se développant indépendamment des individus et des générations' (31). Et même, si l'eschatologie avait pu, au début, consister en des espérances, elle consistait bien plutôt, au moment de l'émergence de l'idée de progrès, 'en un agrégat de terreur et d'épouvante' (*ibid.*).

Dans la deuxième partie de son ouvrage, Blumenberg nous présente son explication de rechange de l'origine des Temps Modernes en montrant comment ont pu apparaître les concepts et les attitudes 'légitimes' des Temps Modernes. Il y a un lien entre les Temps Modernes et le gnosticisme de la fin de l'Antiquité et du début du christianisme, un lien qu'il faut interpréter 'dans le sens inverse: Les Temps Modernes sont le deuxième dépassement du gnosticisme. Une présupposition de cette thèse est que le premier dépassement du gnosticisme, au début du Moyen-Age, n'a pas réussi' (126). Un problème en particulier demeurait sans solution à la fin de l'Antiquité, à savoir celui de l'origine du mal dans le monde ('mal' pris dans les deux sens du

terme: le geste humain répréhensible et l'événement pénible ou désagréable). La métaphysique antique ne s'intéressait pas à ce problème, il apparaît seulement dans le néoplatonisme, puis dans le gnosticisme (II/1). Au Moyen-Age, la toute-puissance divine commença à poser des problèmes. Parce qu'il suffisait de la simple volonté de Dieu pour créer ou détruire, le monde fini devenait contingent et incertain. En même temps, cette toute-puissance, par 'l'état de grâce' qu'on ne méritait pas et qu'on ne pouvait mériter et par la prédestination, rendait vain tout espoir en l'au-delà (II/3).

L'émergence de la notion d'auto-affirmation (*self-assertion*), qu'il faut entendre non pas comme une pulsion biologique mais comme un programme existentiel d'insertion historique, provient de cette impasse. De cette notion émergea l'idée de progrès par le biais des philosophies de l'histoire: ayant abandonné les réponses 'chrétiennes,' les penseurs modernes en ont toutefois conservé les questions et ont voulu leur apporter des réponses 'modernes' sans se demander si ces questions avaient conservé leur pertinence avec le changement d'époque, 'réoccupant' ainsi un terrain délaissé par l'eschatologie chrétienne. (' ''réoccupation'' veut dire que des énoncés différents peuvent être compris comme des réponses à des questions identiques' — 466.) Deux exemples: l'idée du caractère dangereux du monde (avec son exigence d'un comportement particulier) réoccupe la position de l'idée de la providence comme téléologie (ayant également une exigence d'un comportement particulier) (II/2); le modèle mécaniste d'explication de la nature (avec son idée de 'matière absolue') réoccupe la position du nominalisme de la fin du Moyen-Age (avec son idée de 'volonté absolue') (II/3). Blumenberg fait d'ailleurs subir en passant un semblable traitement au *Manifeste* en I/7 *in fine*.

Il nous faut passer très brièvement sur la troisième partie, pourtant de loin la plus longue. Ayant montré que les penseurs modernes n'ont pas su se libérer de leur héritage de questions devenues périmées par l'avènement des Temps Modernes et ayant montré que ces mêmes Temps Modernes possèdent néanmoins une légitimité propre, entre autres par l'idée d'auto-affirmation (l'abandon du lien au transcendant), Blumenberg s'interroge alors sur la notion de curiosité théorique. En fait, toute la troisième partie sert à cerner le processus de légitimation de la curiosité théorique, d'où en même temps le statut de la science. Il y fait un tour d'horizon des penseurs occidentaux des Anciens à Freud et Feuerbach et conclut (j'abrège énormément) à la légitimité de la curiosité théorique par le fait de sa pénétration dans tous les domaines (III/11).

Dans la quatrième partie de son ouvrage, Blumenberg examine le 'seuil' entre le Moyen-Age et les Temps Modernes. La notion même de seuil pose cependant un problème en ce qu'il faut pouvoir montrer qu'il y a effectivement eu un changement d'envergure (468). Nicolas de Cuse (1401-1464) — le Cusan — et Giordano Bruno de Nola (1548-1600) — le Nolan — serviront de point de référence: ils posent en effet 'des questions homologues auxquelles leurs réponses, malgré leur opposition mutuelle, ont néanmoins un rapport' (470). L'auteur sait d'ailleurs très bien qu'en montrant de la sorte une certaine

coexistence, voire même une interpénétration des deux époques, il se trouve à enlever aux Temps Modernes tout fondement à une prétention à une originalité radicale.

Nicholas de Cuse, se réclamant du scolasticisme mais s'inquiètant en même temps de son déclin, cherche à penser la double libération de l'homme — celle (théologique) de la culpabilité et celle (philosophique) de l'appartenance à Dieu — et voit l'Incarnation comme la conséquence intrinsèque de la Création (542 ss.). Pour Bruno, l'Incarnation dans un temps historique constitue 'le scandale fondamental' (549): il n'y a pas de lien et encore moins d'union possible entre la nature finie et la nature infinie (575), Dieu a épuisé son potentiel dans l'acte de création (564). Il voit l'homme non pas comme une créature de Dieu mais comme un être capable de développement autonome (590) ss.). On voit ici ressurgir les notions de progrès et d'auto-affirmation.

Pour terminer, quelques remarques sur le texte et sur la traduction. Relevons pour commencer l'élégance de la traduction de Robert M. Wallace. On constate une maîtrise des deux langues et la limpidité du texte permet souvent d'en reconstituer l'original allemand. Le traducteur pèche cependant parfois dans le sens inverse et rend certaines expressions d'une manière trop littérale; il aurait également fallu découper certaines phrases trop longues ou devenues, en raison des déclinaisons allemandes, ardues ou même brouillées en traduction.

L'ouvrage lui-même se recommande par sa richesse, sa profondeur, son érudition. Cependant, ces mêmes qualités en font un ouvrage extrêmement dense qui n'admet pas bien une lecture cursive. L'auteur parle souvent au second degré, ce qui complique parfois la lecture et la compréhension du texte. Il n'y a d'ailleurs pas vraiment de conclusion à cette réinterprétation de l'Occident (quoique l'introduction du traducteur contient une assez bonne présentation), mais une série de résultats qu'il faut cueillir en chemin. Enfin, je signale en quittant ce beau livre que je le (re)lirais dans l'ordre inverse des sections, passant ainsi du plus connu au plus ardu, de l'historique au théorique.

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JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY, *Ordres et désordres. Enquête sur un nouveau paradigme*. Paris: Seuil 1982. Collection 'Empreintes', 282 p. ISBN 2-02006-279-8.

Malgré les apparences et tous les bruits de fond qui s'indignent de l'inculture

généralisée et de la disparition du livre, le monde de l'édition se porte bien — du moins si l'on prend acte du luxe traditionnel de l'édition française dans le domaine de la diffusion outre-mer ou hexagonale des idées. Les nouvelles collections se multiplient, la collecte quotidienne des lexèmes permet d'élaborer de nouveaux défis. Ce livre de Jean-Pierre Dupuy est composé pour l'essentiel de textes-recensions publiés entre 1975 et 1982, soit dans des revues courantes (*L'Arc, Esprit*...), soit dans des ouvrages collectifs tous accessibles aux catalogues des éditeurs parisiens (Gallimard, Denoël-Gonthier, Grasset). Le temps n'existerait-il que pour renforcer l'accumulation instantanée du même? auto-emprunts pour de nouvelles empreintes? Quoiqu'il en soit, le lecteur (français, américain, québécois) soumis aux restrictions budgétaires de ce que l'on appelle la crise des années '80 fera bien de vérifier les recoupements de textes dans sa bibliothèque, dans son laboratoire.

A ces compte-rendus s'ajoutent et s'imposent à l'intérieur de l'économie du livre: a. une longue introduction (11-28) qui raconte l'origine de ce nouveau paradigme — c'est-à-dire lors d'une rencontre fondamentale avec Ivan Illich et le cybernéticien déjà agé Heinz von Foerster, en janvier 1976, entre 'bougainvillées et flamboyants' de la région de Cuernavaca; b. une conclusion (273-8, publiée dans *Débat*) qui se veut auto-critique, et qui raconte l'histoire intellectuelle d'un Polytechnicien typiquement isolé par sa formation et la spécificité territoriale de son métier, s'ouvrant tout-à-coup aux 'affaires humaines' et découvrant non sans agacement et indignation justifiée l'univers sans fin des débats théoriques. Double situation qui fait comprendre à quel point la formation scientifique de l'auteur échappe à un certain seuil autocritique, lui permet même de charger avec autorité contre l'intelligentsia à formation littéraire (277, 'nourrie de philosophie et d'histoire', 127). Mais qui sont donc ces 'grands sauriens de la pensée, les dinosaures de l'intelligence' (27) que citent autour de lui les originaux qui obtiennent par là quelques succès aléatoires? Combats locaux trop locaux sur l'Ile-de-France.

Cet arrière-fond autobiographique et contextuel *se* veut important, luxe du détail, confession exorbitante du 'je.' Pour nous, il est extrêmement significatif de la manière par laquelle s'engagent la problématique du nouveau paradigme et l'approche moraliste de ses contenus. Livre moral, *Ordres et désordres* se construit autour de l'expérience/concept-clé d'auto-organisation, ou encore autour du thème de l'autonomie, telle qu'observée et formulée par un tiers dans une posture scientifique ou vécue de l'intérieur, par exemple 'dans ma propre vie'. Traduite, retraduite selon des lexiques et des problématiques relativement disparates, cette lancinante particule auto — en tant que réponse au problème d'une crise sociale des idées — décrit alors autant le fonctionnement réglé-régulateur des organismes vivants que leur limite souveraine. Individus et sociétés. Sur l'exploration de ce parallélisme classique dans l'histoire de la pensée scientifique (et même de la métaphysique, mais cela tient sans doute d'une autre histoire ...), entre les formules éclairs de Shannon, Ashby, Newcomb, les lectures de l'auteur s'accumulent: 'autonomie des gens et des petits groupes' chez Illich (contrant les effets désastreux de la contreproductivité industrielle), persistance et autonomie de

la violence primitive telle que la traduit l'hypothèse mimétique de René Girard — ce 'Hegel du christianisme' (Domenach) qui œuvre aux U.S.A., découvert en 1975 (15) et sur lequel en 1979, avec la collaboration du canadien Paul Dumouchel, il devait écrire un livre au titre significatif *L'enfer des choses. René Girard et la logique de l'économie* —, autonomie du social articulée par la puissante réflexion de Cornélius Castoriadis (qui mérite au passage un statut à part, avec raison). Sur d'autres longueurs d'onde: les notions d'autopoièse et de clôture organisationnelle chez le neurophysiologue chilien Francisco Varela (dont les *Principles of Biological Autonomy* paraîtront bientôt au Seuil, traduction française de Paul Dumouchel), le double principe d'ordre et de complexité par le bruit chez le biophysicien français et israélien Henri Atlan.

Bien! Ces travaux premiers à quoi nous sommes référés sont tous importants, passionnants à plus d'un titre, mais aussi pour d'autres raisons virtuelles. Cependant, par une sorte de procédure d'éradication conviviale, idées, disciplines et noms propres sont ici convoqués par le 'nouveau paradigme' pour répondre d'un nouveau projet, sur un terrain en apparence limitrophe: faire le pont entre le biologique et la pensée du social (que seule une minorité de scientifiques et de polytechniciens cultivés aux *two-cultures* peuvent penser, semble-t-il, cf. 277). Voilà qu'éclate à la limite la dimension morale du projet, reléguant derrière les rideaux son attirail gnoséologique. Expliquons rapidement. Si Jean-Pierre Dupuy reconnaît que 'ouvrir un chemin entre le biologique et le social n'a jamais été une activité innocente. Maints éclaireurs, parmi les plus habiles, laissèrent des plumes pour l'avoir oublié' (21), s'il nous met en garde et avec raison contre une certaine circulation des métaphores entre purs scientifiques et purs idéologues, tout le livre en exprime le démenti formel, accuse ainsi l'impensé de son propre paradoxe. Les trois seules pages consacrées à la justification de ce 'cheminement' (122-4) maintiennent l'ambiguïté à l'intérieur de l'économie du livre: ici, malgré une *Verneignung* toute locale, un certain usage des 'résultats de la science' contamine sans cesse la 'vérité éthique ou politique' que murmure le nouveau paradigme, et vice-versa. Pourquoi tout d'abord vouloir faire cette chaussée? Pourquoi tant insister si ce n'est là le nerf problématique de sa construction? D'où la forme centrale du questionnement: 'Comment des institutions, des médiations, des lois — sans lesquelles nous posons qu'il ne peut y avoir de société —, *donc une différenciation sociale,* peuvent-elles avoir le minimum de stabilité dans une société autonome, alors que leur contingence irréductible est visible aux yeux de tous? Peut-on donner sens à ce que l'on sait être, au moins *partiellement,* arbitraire?' (souligné par nous). Question dramatique qui connote a priori l'arrivée du thème de l'autonomie, ou pour le lecteur de bonne volonté, d'autres réponses historiques, datables: la récupération dictatoriale des instabilités trop fortes, la normalisation des a-nomies au nom d'une vérité quelconque, d'une Transcendance de droit, la jouissance humaniste et affairée d'un savoir qui n'aurait plus à créer des instabilités nouvelles puisqu'il n'y aurait rien à changer, à l'origine. Ambiguïtés qui font comprendre aussi cette banalité chrétienne dans la bouche du savant:

'L'amour n'abolit pas les différences, il est seul à pouvoir leur donner sens' (185, enrichissant un thème de René Girard), ou l'aveuglement touristique de l'intellectuel qui ailleurs ne sent plus les rapports d'oppression, comme si cela était une pure merveille: 'Au Brésil, on peut être exploité dans son corps et respecté pour son âme. Les énormes inégalités de revenus et de patrimoines ne sont pas un obstacle aux liens de réciprocité, à la solidarité organique, à l'intégration de tous dans une globalité commune' (191). Que l'Escadron de la Mort se rassure et prenne des vacances bien méritées: tout s'organise désormais au Carnaval de la compensation!

Que la recherche de la vérité amène avec elle l'illusion d'une trouvaille, cela est normal. Chercheurs, nous en sommes tous et toutes là. Et cela n'empêche pas de reconnaître le courage et l'honnêteté foncière de celui qui entreprend un tel projet. Encore faut-il pouvoir analyser comment se constitue ce courage, de quels lieux institutionnels il exulte. Peut être serait-il opportun un jour de reprendre résultats de la science et discours savant à l'intérieur du langage de la culture technicienne, pour y développer une autre thématique. Auto-réflexivité d'un corpus qui permettrait de distinguer, trancher dans le moralisme certes prométhéen de l'Utopie-Science mais qui demeure aussi un vieux refrain; qui situerait le lieu d'énonciation des sujets humains (trop humains?) ou de la communauté des sujets qui proclament cette loi d'auto-régulation des choses et de la vie, sans souvent prendre garde aux jeux irréfléchis de leur interaction, de leurs intérêts de connaissance. Observateurs de la lune observés, selon le proverbe indien.

Ordres et désordres est donc un recueil de recensions important; autant par la crise qui l'a préparé, le rapport lectoriel à certaines œuvres (d'où l'éclectisme stimulant), autant par la famille d'esprits qu'il risque de séduire dans le grand public 'éclairable': montrant par contre le *Kampfplatz* actuel d'une nouvelle intelligentsia gavée des gourous (soixante-huitards) des sciences humaines et des contre-séquelles un peu séniles, avec les mêmes facilités de style autorisé, le prophétisme de la 'scienza nuova' de demain (cf. la jaquette) — ce qu'a déjà analysé avec beaucoup de perspicacité Jean-Pierre Lamoureux, 'Nouvelle anciennes naïvetés,' *Spirale,* 34 (mai 1983) 12. Et puisque l'auteur nous annonce aux mêmes Editions la publication des Actes du Colloque de Cerisy (juin 1981) intitulé *L'auto-organisation: de la physique au politique* — dont quelques bribes laissent entrevoir de la part des invités une richesse et une densité autres —, le *lecteur nord-américain* pourra assurer son autonomie en prenant le temps de ruminer cette stratégie d'approche: a. comment créateurs et travailleurs de concepts situent eux-mêmes de leur laboratoire l'horizon de leur questionnement, b. jusqu'à quel point philosophes, épistémologues engagés et même vulgarisateurs peuvent formuler la critique des usages sociaux/politiques des sciences, ou penser les contradictions du développement de la science à l'intérieur de son quadrillage étatique (et servant de façon subtile, l'expansion des idéologies nationales, c. comment la publication d'un corpus culturel de questions à répondre peut ou non faire re-découvrir sa propre historicité (songeons à l'œuvre pionnière en France de Gilbert Simondon à la fin des années '50), d. à

l'opposé, jusqu'à quel point politicologues, practiciens institutionnels de la science, polytechniciens, créateurs de théories nouvelles, peuvent critiquer les présupposés idéologiques de la récente *biopolitics* américaine (ici non mentionnée par l'auteur) dont la *Paris Conference* de janvier 1975, entreprise ('sagacious philanthropy') sous les auspices de la Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation et du Conseil International des Sciences Sociales nous a laissé *Biology and Politics. Recent Explorations,* ed. Albert Somit (the Hague-Paris: Mouton 1976 — avec un essai bibliographique), 279-91. S'organisent sous les yeux du citoyen-lecteur (avec l'aide de David C. Schwartz, Peter A. Corning, Glendon Schubert, Roger D. Masters, David Easton ...) les implications politico-méthodologiques de l'éthologie, le moulage des *public policies* à partir des problèmes du 'genetic engineering' et du discours ancien-moderne du Darwinisme social; d'une façon globale, la recherche des corrélations entre variables physiologiques et comportement politique (style: les fondements biologiques des révoltes étudiantes, de la main-gauche-politique, du vote final, de l'*overexcitation* à quoi se réduisent les révolutions politiques dans la civilisation, cf. J.C. Davies, 'Ions of Emotion and Political Behavior: a Prototheory', pp. 95-125 et la critique accollée par l'anthropologue-politicologue originaire de Montréal, Lionel Tiger, pp. 261-7). La Science américaine n'a pas attendu le nouveau paradigme pour donner un sens précis, lourd de conséquences, à l'idéal transdisciplinaire (qui ailleurs, n'est souvent qu'un remuement de l'attirail topique de la science) d'un pont biopolimétrique, et s'abandonner à intervalles réguliers dans un lit militarisé avec cette ingénuité qui ne peut que faire plaisir à l'Etat, et à qui — auquel? comment filer cette double prosopopée ou ces 4 poupées russes selon la perspective? — elle rend toujours indirectement hommage. Subventions, lieux de recherche sanctionnés, remerciements.

La science — mieux, les sciences constituant le mouvement de la rationalité scientifique — est passionnante, trop importante. Hommes et femmes ont trop lutté à travers les siècles pour lui assurer une autonomie méthodologique et l'arracher à son statut traditionnel d'*ancilla* (théologies, cléricalismes religieux du sacré, étatismes des régulations morales et civiles ...). Elle demeure pour nous le seul mot d'ordre à promouvoir, à situer. Parions pour l'instant sur l'innocence des hommes de science, des nouvelles intelligentsias savantes, mais demandons-leur de ne pas nous priver de ce qu'ils savent d'office des fantasmes, des contradictions du lieu, des collusions institutionnelles qui imprègnent le néocortex d'autres hommes de science. Serait-ce le droit à l'information fraternelle entre chercheurs? Rapportant leur propre guerre civile, démoralisant le débat par ce réel, ils permettront ainsi aux philosophes de poursuivre l'histoire d'un même travail de sape à l'intérieur de l'idéologie scientifique, Comment? En pensant en *négatif l'auto-hétéronomie* du désir qui les détermine et qui de ce manque fait croire (depuis notre très ambigu XVIIIe siècle) à une progression sacrale et consacrée *par* la science, *du côté* de cette néo-culture qui s'approprie le clivage des 'humanités.' Sur ce chapitre, soyons maintenant reconnaissants d'une certaine conscience planétaire: la rationalité scientifique n'assurera jamais en soi

le progrès social de l'humanité — ajoutons puisque (le) tout est complexe — ... et donc paradigmatique *stricto sensu*.

Le sujet semble ne plus avoir d'avenir? Au contraire, il suffit de ne pas régresser en avant sur la planche de salut. Aucun *projet critique* n'est inconcevable lors même où il s'avèrera inefficace parce qu'ineffectuable en dernière analyse, dans le laboratoire social et conceptuel d'où surgit précisément le problème. D'ou s'édite la réponse (problématique) du 'nouveau paradigme' qui lui-même reconnaît ce problème. Les sciences *se* fabriquent en feignant la non-limite (entendre le vieux précepte du *trial and error*), en produisant l'avenir, contre l'envers non-scientifique, 'mythique' et mythifié, de la médaille; mais la science *se* pense (Jean-Pierre Dupuy affectionne beaucoup le mot 'pensée') dans l'ordre inverse, à partir de sa propre limite historique, de sa tranche reconnue, de sa crise toujours et partout évidente, irrémédiable. S'il s'agit de faire penser, si un projet critique constitue en principe le moteur d'*Ordres et de désordres,* 'manuel d'exploration intellectuelle' entre les consciences, je n'aurai fait pour ma part que redoubler son empreinte textuelle, comme un coup de pouce.

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RACHEL ERTEL, *Le Shtetl: la bourgade juive de Pologne.* Paris: Payot 1982. 321 p. ISBN 2-228-27410-0.

Je tiens ce livre pour important. Pour la première fois, les lecteurs de langue française ont accès à une culture dans un de ses ancrages géographiques majeurs (la Pologne, dans ses fluctuations géo-politiques), et dans sa globalité. L'auteur, dans un esprit de synthèse, et avec clarté, tente d'abord de reconstituer 'la Genèse d'un lieu' et c'est un rapide survol historique, absolument nécessaire, de l'Histoire millénaire des Juifs en Pologne, de leur organisation sociale et politique, de leurs formes de sociabilité et de la prégnance du religieux. C'est aussi, après les terribles massacres de Chmielnicki, les mouvements messianiques que Rachel Ertel rappelle, de Sabbataï Zevi à Frank, l'envolée du khassidisme populaire. C'est enfin les multiples partages de la Pologne qui, entre autres conséquences, voient la population juive rattachée à l'Autriche (la Galicie), à la Russie (la plus grande partie qui va devenir la fameuse zone de résidence de laquelle les Juifs ne

pourront pas sortir sans autorisation), enfin à la Prusse, mais il s'agit d'une infime minorité, et ce, jusqu'à la fin de la Guerre de 1914 qui voit renaître une Pologne indépendante dans laquelle de nouveaux problèmes vont surgir pour les Juifs. Après avoir mis en place cette histoire, Rachel Ertel, dans une partie très neuve de son ouvrage, évoque les représentations multiples du Shtetl, de cette bourgade juive si difficile à saisir dans son objectivité (le Génocide a été pour le Shtetl la fin d'un monde) et si aisément repris par le discours littéraire ou folklorique. Rachel Ertel examine très rapidement quelques œuvres littéraires majeures. Elle montre que deux axes se dégagent nettement de cette Image littéraire. Un axe, disons folklorisant et nostalgique, qui de Mendele Mokher Sforim, Scholem Aleikhem, I.L. Peretz à Sh. Asch (avec d'énormes nuances qu'il serait trop long et trop complexe d'évoquer ici), axe qui s'est profondément enraciné dans la conscience juive du post-Génocide, si bien que lorsqu'on évoque le Shtetl, on évoque un monde presque immuable, décomposé, déclinant de toute part, un monde figé, condamné. A l'autre pôle, des œuvres comme celle de I.M. Waïssenberg (*Di Shtetl*) montrent la lutte de classe au Shtetl, des forces de renouvellement, une jeunesse impatientes, un échiquier très large d'opinions. Elle évoque aussi au niveau des représentations, les 'Yizker-Bikher', ces livres du souvenir que chaque communauté a constitué après la Guerre et qui est comme un vaste témoignage, une histoire par en bas de ce que fut la Pologne juive d'autrefois. Au-delà du problème méthodologique que pose toute littérature de témoignage, Rachel Ertel en montre la richesse multiforme: généalogies, roman familial, cycles de vie, événements-clé, bref quelque chose qui permet de creuser une continuité même fantasmatique, là où le tissu social et culturel s'est défait par la mort de millions et de millions de gens.

La partie suivante est consacrée à l'analyse socio-économique et culturelle de trois Shtetlekh: Zelt en Biélorussie, Belhatov au centre de la Pologne, Santz en Galicie. L'auteur étudie l'évolution de la population, la vie économique. Elle montre qu'au-delà de certaines similarités, chaque bourgade a sa spécificité socio-économique, comme sera spécifique ses réponses idéologiques aux transformations économiques et sociales qui vont secouer le Shtetl. Bien entendu, il y a, au-delà de ce qui se transforme, ce qui reste, ce qui dure, l'organisation traditionnelle du Shtetl avec ses personnages aujourd'hui légendaires, ses institutions, l'importance de la piété et de l'étude, de la charité, l'organisation d'un cycle temporel marqué par des fêtes religieuses et collectives. La suite du livre nous donne accès à 'l'Irruption des Idéologies' dans le Shtetl, à la modification de l'échiquier traditionnel de la sensibilité et de la définition du politique: Mouvement des Lumières ou Haskalah, courants sionistes de toutes obédiences, nationalisme culturel, mouvement socialiste juif avec le Bund. Très vite, le Shtetl rentre dans la lutte politique, la lutte d'idées. L'auteur écrit p. 171: 'La fougue avec laquelle la société juive, si traditionaliste de la fin du XIX^{e} siècle, s'était lancée dans la vie politique, n'était pas un phénomène fortuit. L'engagement politique quasi religieux d'une Intelligentsia issue elle-même des masses populaires, se répandit comme une traînée de poudre à travers les Shtetlekh de la zone de résidence.' La suite de

l'ouvrage évoque 'la Nouvelle Pologne et les Juifs,' les difficultés de la population juive en face de l'antisémitisme croissant et sa façon d'y faire face tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan culturel. La partie la plus neuve de cette seconde partie rend compte de 'la vie associative et (de) la vie politique dans le Shtetl'. C'est pour le lecteur une occasion unique de prendre conscience de la vie nouvelle du Shtetl: importance de la vie politique et du syndicalisme, affrontement entre les générations, prolifération d'écoles à caractère plus ou moins laïc en rupture ou non avec l'ancienne orthodoxie, organisations multiformes de la jeunesse. Un nouveau mode de vie s'instaure dans la bourgade plus moderne, chargé de contradictions mais passionnant à vivre. La conclusion de Rachel Ertel tient en cette phrase (301): '*On ne le dira jamais assez, il (le Shtetl) n'est pas mort de lui-même. Il a été assassiné.*'

Livre remarquable donc. Le spécialiste pourra toujours trouver ça et là à redire dans un ouvrage qui se veut d'abord pour le grand public, initiation à une histoire, à une culture méconnues. Je ferai très rapidement, faute de place, trois remarques qui mériteraient d'être amplement développées. Première remarque: la place que Rachel Ertel fait dans son étude à la représentation littéraire me paraît trop ténue. Il est vrai qu'elle s'appuie sur un livre remarquable de Dan Miron publié en yiddish sur le même sujet, mais elle a tendance, me semble-t-il, à opposer d'une façon un peu trop 'positiviste' Image littéraire et Image réelle du Shtetl. On pourrait longuement montrer que l'apport de la littérature à la connaissance (pas simplement à la représentation) du Shtetl est fondamentale y compris dans son parti-pris de néo-romantisme, son folklorisme, sa nostalgie. Deuxième remarque: Rachel Ertel est elle-même (comment y échapper?) prise dans une certaine vision idyllique et nostalgique du Shtetl. Elle a tendance à faire de l'ancienne organisation autonome de la Pologne juive (les Kehilloth) des conseils autogestionnaires alors qu'il faudrait plutôt évoquer une caste cléricale de l'establishment très traditionaliste et très conservatrice. Rachel Ertel a aussi tendance à atténuer les contradictions au sein du Shtetl au fur et à mesure que l'industrialisation avance et fait éclater les structures anciennes. Elle écrit (292): 'Une fois de plus on est amené à constater que la société juive d'Europe de l'Est, à cette période (entre les deux Guerres), ne correspond pas aux idées reçues. Son caractère traditionaliste maintes fois évoqué, exige et imprègne l'atmosphère du Shtetl. Mais désormais, entre la Tradition et la modernité, les rapports sont dialectiques.' Il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur 'cette dialectique' qui prend parfois des allures d'affrontement violent. Quant à l'idée que le Shtetl est mort assassiné! Il est vrai. Mais le Shtetl même revivifié par une jeunesse bouillonnante, à mon avis, se mourait entre les deux Guerres. L'émigration à l'étranger, mais surtout le départ vers les grandes villes rendait inéluctable son déclin (dans les formes qu'il avait connu. Dieu sait comment il se serait transformé sans le Génocide — question vaine de toute façon). Ma troisième remarque enfin touche à la Révolution russe et à la pénétration du communisme au sein des masses juives qui me semble plus forte que ce que Rachel Ertel laisse entendre. Ces quelques remarques de spécialiste n'entachent en rien la valeur de ce très beau livre interdisciplinaire qui fait à la fois

appel à l'histoire, à l'ethnologie et à d'autres sciences humaines. On souhaiterait rencontrer plus souvent ce genre d'apport clair sur le plan informatif, stimulant au plan de la réflexion et toujours sincère. Un grand livre.

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ROBERT W. HALL, *Plato.* Winchester, MA: George and Allen Unwin 1982. Pp. viii + 168. US$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-04-32014-8); US$8.95. (paper: ISBN 0-04-320146-6).

Plato is a contribution to a series devoted to 'Political Thinkers.' Hall examines the developments in political and legal philosophy in the context of historical considerations for both Greece and the biographical unfolding of the life and writings of Plato. The book will surely prove useful for introductory students; and I suspect the more advanced student of either Plato or political philosophy would also profit from a careful reading.

Plato is divided into eight chapters: Chapter 1, The Athenian Democracy, sets the political stage on which Plato shall perform; Chapters 2 and 3 examine the controversy between Convention and Nature as the basis for the State, and the inadequacy of Convention alone, according to the Platonic doctrine; Chapters 4 and 5 serve as an exegesis of two fundamental issues in the *Republic,* the Education of the Rulers, and the relation between Justice of the State and Justice of the Individual; Chapters 6 and 7 attempt to assess the constructive political doctrines in the *Republic* against the political philosophy of the *Politics* and the *Laws.* Finally, Chapter 8 briefly considers some political influence and consequences which may be observed in the heritage which emerges from the writings of Plato.

According to Hall, Plato writes at a time when political 'relativism' was the order of the day, as were the ethical, epistemological, and ontological relativism which prevailed. This consequence was a result of the presocratic *physiologoi,* on the one hand, and the sophists on the other. The presocratics had 'secularized the universe and all that was in it'; they and the sophists demythologized the divine intervention 'and there was in physics no place for the gods' (13). Until the second half of the 5th century, the decree of human law, the *nomos* derived its authority from the gods. But, with the dismissal of

the gods, at the hands of the *physiologoi,* who insisted that Nature (*physis*) imposes order upon the universe by itself, and not from a source outside it, the *nomos* is reduced to dogma, agreed upon by popular consent and subsequently preserved by tradition. By the close of the 5th century BC, the *nomos* governed as mere 'convention,' and not because it accorded with or derived its authority by an appeal to the 'true' Nature *(physis)* of things. Plato's political philosophy sought to demonstrate the connection between human *nomos* and the *nomos* of *physis,* for it was in this light alone that the laws of the state which might be reasonably effective in maintaining social order, at the same time created the condition for making individual citizens moral (42). In brief, to see that there is a connection between the *nomos* of *Nature* and the *nomos* of *human Nature,* is to heed the call of our moral nature. From the IS of *physis,* we properly derive the OUGHT of the human *nomos,* the *nomoi* of the polis. The reader would profit from a thoughtful consideration of the 'ought implies can' in this mechanistic context of the *physiologoi,* and the question of whether Plato commits the 'naturalistic fallacy.'

In summary, 'The distinction between nature and convention removed any divine basis from society and its laws' (31). This is an important tenet in Hall's book. But this matter is not so simple, for the distinction alone does not argue for the point. The laws of the state are, according to the prevailing state rhetoric, delivered and sanctioned by the divinities from Olympus. The conservative orthodoxy finds Socrates guilty — at least on the ruse — of challenging the authority of the gods of the city by questioning the legal sanctions: this is part of the meaning of impiety, and corruption of the young. Perhaps the issue is not the distinction between nature and convention as such, but rather a specific interpretation of it. In the *Symposium* which Hall surprisingly passes over, we witness Pausanias' distinction — following the linguistic manuevers of his teacher, the sophist, Prodicus — between convention and nature. What is correct by convention is *not* always correct by nature; in order to assure the satisfaction of his own erotic appetite, Pausanias suggests that the conventional laws, derived from the authority of Zeus, are out of accord with *nature* properly understood. That true nature, represented by the pre-Olympian or Uranian gods, whose behavior sanctioned their own homosexual persuasion, dictated the real Nature according to which the conventions ought to be established. It is not the mere distinction between convention and nature which accounts for the moral decay which Plato found pervasive in his society. It is, however, the attendant collocation that 'Man (alone) is the Measure of all things,' which makes the denial of divinity, or trans-phenomenal value possible, which heralds in the decadence. And further, although the postulation of divinity is necessary, it is not sufficient to bring an individual to heed the *nomoi,* and hence engage in moral life. The critique of Pausanius suffices here; Pausanius wants to change the conventions, whose *nomoi* punish harshly for pederastic indulgence, and bring the laws more in touch with the 'true' nature which sanctions those practices. Plato, it seems, objects to the claim that acts are neither good nor evil in themselves, that moral value consists in the method of doing: noble or base.

The central claims of this volume on Plato's political philosophy are familiar from the scholarly literature on the topic; it is unlikely that Hall's book will change the course of Platonic studies. There are several points at which I disagreed with the author's contentions, but generally the disagreement was one of aspect or emphasis, and not one of substance. Hall has produced a useful book which brings together, in a single text, a sober and thoughtful integration of Greek political history and an introductory look at Plato's place in it.

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JONATHAN HARRISON, *Hume's Theory of Justice.* Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1981. Pp. xxiii + 304. Cdn$59.95: US$49.50. ISBN 0-19-824619-6.

This book is a commentary on Part II of Book III of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,* with an epilogue containing a discussion of those parts of Sections III and IV and Appendix III of *The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* that contain arguments not found in *The Treatise.* Three long Latin quotations are translated into English, surely a long-overdue help to most modern readers of Hume's works. The discussion proceeds section by section, with a summary preceding comments in each case. Harrison tells us that he replaced his original full summaries with brief precis in most cases in order to 'make the book more concise.'

Harrison stresses correctly that 'justice' does not have its ordinary modern significance in Hume's discussion. He is also well aware of the fact that Hume does not always use the word with the same meaning. Thus, respect for property rights, faithfulness to promises, allegiance to government and modesty and chastity are all discussed under the general heading of 'Of Justice and Injustice.' Harrison suggests that the virtue Hume is discussing in Part II of Book III is better named rule-abidingness. I welcome this suggestion because it makes it reasonable to include in the class of artificial virtues such a characteristic as 'being a responsible language user,' but the analogy between the origin of justice and language, meaning and property, is strongly suggested by Hume.

There is one serious danger in Harrison's procedure of discussing each section separately. The importance of what Hume says in a different part of *The Treatise* for the interpretation of a particular section may be missed. Thus, it is in Book III, Part III of *The Treatise* that Hume tries to show how we can overcome the natural bias of our passions. Bias is generally considered one of the principal sources of injustice. Justice is at the very heart of Hume's whole enterprise in showing how we come to react to people because of what we take to be their real virtues and vices. Virtues and vices are by definition qualities of mind or character, and to think that one has a virtue or a vice is to be proud or humble because of the belief that one has some such quality, pleasing or useful, displeasing or harmful. Hume would have been better served by choosing 'shame' as the opposite of 'pride.' To be humble or ashamed because of the belief that one has a quality of mind or character that is displeasing or causes unhappiness is to think one has a vice, faults being but minor vices. 'Vice' is used for defects in qualities of mind or character whereas virtues are valuable characteristics of this kind. The story of how people, biased by nature, come to form a fair (just) assessment of their own and other peoples' qualities of mind or character (virtues and vices) cannot be discovered by a paragraph by paragraph examination of that part of *The Treatise* alone which Hume himself calls 'Of Justice and Injustice.' If one is to assess the importance of what Hume had to say about justice and fairness, as now understood, some attention must be given to *The Treatise,* Part III. Perhaps Harrison's projected book on the Third Part of Book III of *The Treatise* will to some extent remedy the defects I have been complaining about. But, since he sees no relevance for Hume's moral epistemology in Hume's discussion of the indirect passions in Book II he is unlikely to see that Hume is in Books II and III of *The Treatise* struggling to make intelligible how creatures with essentially biased emotions can overcome these biases.

Hume's contention that the question of the morality of actions arises only when they are seen as caused by a motive in the agent is made more understandable by the fact that the indirect passions (love, hatred, pride and humility) have persons as their natural objects. The focus of *moral* interest is always upon the qualities of mind or character of the agent.

In an intricate and often subtle discussion of Sections I and II of Part II of Book III Harrison's failure to see the importance of the account of the passions in Book II makes unnecessarily mysterious Hume's claim that we only approve of action as indicative of certain motives.

Harrison also seems to me to pay too little attention to the passage in the chapter 'Of Promises' in *The Treatise,* Book III, where Hume says: 'All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us *after a certain manner,* we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us *after a like manner,* we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it.'

Of course we often simply fall in with the general evaluating practise of our society, particularly in our speech, but I don't think Hume ever thought

one could establish *real obligations* by discovering that of which all or most people approve or disapprove.

It is a curious feature of Harrison's two books on Hume that in *Hume's Moral Epistemology* Hume is represented as not having been able to make up his mind between five possible theories about the nature of moral judgments, but in *Hume's Theory of Justice* we are told that two of these five predominate in Parts II and III of Book III of *The Treatise*. One of these is that Hume thinks 'moral distinctions are known' by 'means of a moral sense,' whereas the other is that moral judgments assert the presence or absence of a sentiment of approbation in mankind and are thus to be settled by empirical observation. But, what does a person say whose moral sense reveals to him one thing and empirical investigation establishes another incompatible sentiment to be generally prevalent? (I refer the reader to Chap. 9 of my *Passion and Value* [Edinburgh 1966] for a discussion of this question.)

There is in *The Treatise* little evidence to support the view that Hume thought man endowed with a cognitive moral sense, in spite of the fact that 'Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense' is a chapter heading. But the significance of this is diminished by the fact that it is in this chapter that we find the claim that the very feeling 'constitutes our praise or admiration.' I think in general Harrison underrates the plausibility of attributing to Hume the view that judgments of virtues are emotions or passions and thus neither true nor false. The reason that is capable of opposing the passions, and replaces what traditionally was taken for reason as a faculty for discovering truths, is described as a certain calm passion, and it is stressed that the passions are neither true nor false, since they do not present themselves as representations.

Harrison's discussion of Sections I and II of *The Treatise* Book III, Part II demonstrates his view that one should read Hume critically, for only by so doing can the lessons be learnt that he undoubtedly still has to teach us. I agree that Hume makes in this part of *The Treatise* claims that appear to be inconsistent with a utilitarian foundation of the duty to be just, but am not convinced that Harrison says the last word on this topic. But, Hume undoubtedly poses us a problem for if what is usual is useful and what is useful is virtuous how can Hume claim as he does, that virtue may be much less usual than vice?

Harrison's discussion of possession and property, and the erroneous tendency in Hume to think that all property consists in owning a physical object, is most interesting. Harrison also rightly points out that it is difficult to see how Hume can avoid the conclusion that there cannot be such a virtue as justice if there is no natural motive to justice and virtuous actions derive their value from their natural motives. It is doubtful whether Hume succeeds in solving this problem.

Harrison's detailed discussion of Sections III, IV and VI is welcome, for these sections of *The Treatise* have hitherto been relatively neglected by commentators. Of particular interest is the discussion of the place of the imagination and utility in Hume's account.

Rather less satisfactory is the treatment of promises. It is rightly claimed

that Hume does not think that 'one ought to keep one's promises' is analytic. This follows from the fact that the origin of the practice of promising can be explained without any mention of moral motives, moral reasons or obligations. We might have a practice of promises where prudential motives alone move people to act. But, I don't think Hume considers meaning one's words as a promise a necessary condition for promising. His words clearly suggest that the joker who uses an expression that usually makes a promise is bound, unless he makes it reasonably clear that he is joking.

The suggestion that Hume may have thought that 'I promise' — in 'I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow' — is a statement, is a possible explanation of Hume's curious contention that people feign an act of willing an obligation to make intelligible how a form of words creates an obligation. But, those who think as I do, that promises are statements, have not been concerned with the 'I promise' part of the expression, for promises are typically made without the use of this expression or other expressions such as 'and that's a promise,' following the statement that you are going to do something. The reason for considering promises to be statements is that 'I shall meet you for lunch tomorrow and that's a promise, but I shall not meet you for lunch tomorrow' is clearly self-contradictory. Is 'I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow, but I shall not meet you for lunch tomorrow' different in a philosophically important way?

It is a pleasure to note that Harrison is entirely clear about the difference between the conventions that give rise to the artificial virtues, on the one hand, and contracts, on the other. This distinction is of course crucial in dealing with Hume's account of allegiance to government. I found the discussion of the part of *The Treatise* that deals with politics and the laws of nations particularly interesting and also found intriguing the references to natural selection as fitting people for special functions in political society. I do not, however think Harrison improves his book much by the references to Plato's *Republic*. I found particularly inappropriate the complaint that Thrasymachus ought not to have advocated injustice to others. Thrasymachus does no such thing. He believes that everyone is bent on serving his own interests and that the ideal life is that of complete injustice which includes both the inclination to serve one's ends at the expense of others and also the *power to do so.*

Of Chastity and Modesty is treated in a complex fashion, and contains a number of astute observations. But, surely Hume did not mean to imply that having a bad reputation is ever an offence. It seems to me clear that Hume was thinking of 'bad fame and reputation' as a kind of punishment.

Harrison certainly has great powers of analysis. But somehow his book does not present Hume as an exciting, imaginative visionary, introducing a 'new scene of thought.' However, the merits of the author's contribution to contemporary discussion of Hume's ethics are unmistakable.

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.* Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982. Pp. xxxi + 396. US$27.50. ISBN 0-253-17686-7.

On the first page of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,* 1927 Marburg lectures), Heidegger says that the work is 'A new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time.' Being and Time* (*BT*) omitted both division 3, which was to have dealt with the relation between time and Being, and all of part 2. The translator, Albert Hofstadter, argues that *Basic Problems* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) contain what was omitted from *BT*, along with additional material. Interestingly enough, *Basic Problems* is — like *BT* — incomplete. Projected to have three parts, *Basic Problems* only contains part 1 and the first chapter of part 2. What we do have, however, is a remarkable work whose vigor, clarity, and brilliance will prove inviting even to analytic philosophers who have avoided Heidegger because of allegedly obscure writing and thinking. This review can barely hint at its richness (for a more detailed discussion of the original German edition see my 'Heidegger's "Completion" of *Sein und Zeit,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 39 [1979] 537-60).

For Heidegger, phenomenology is 'the *method of scientific philosophy in general,'* and philosophy itself is ontology (3). Hence, the basic problems of phenomenology are essentially ontological. They are: 1) the ontological difference between Being and beings; 2) the basic articulation of Being (*essentia, existentia);* 3) the possible modes and unity of Being; 4) the truth-character of Being (24). Each of these problems was to have been examined in detail in part 2, but only the first problem actually receives attention, the rest of part 2 having been omitted. Yet here Heidegger attempts to answer the question that was to have been considered in the missing division 3, part 1 of *BT*: does time manifest itself as the horizon of Being? Before turning to this question, however, he first shows how earlier attempts to solve the four basic ontological problems failed because previous thinkers lacked an adeqaute understanding of Being and temporality.

In the first chapter of part 1, Heidegger shows that Kant, in order to claim that Being is not a real predicate, had some insight into the ontological difference between Being and beings. For Kant, 'reality' differs from 'actuality.' Hence, to say that Being is not a 'real' predicate means that the fact of existence (actuality) adds nothing to the essence of a thing. Yet Heidegger concludes that even Kant did not grasp sufficiently the distinction between essence (reality) and existence (actuality). In the next chapter, we learn that the Greek distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* was rooted in their understanding of Being as producing (*Herstellen*). *Essentia* means the ontological blueprint of a being and also its usability, while *existentia* refers to the presence (*Anwesen*) of what is thus usable and produced. Analysis of the intentional structure of producing reveals it to be one instance of the 'freeing'

or 'letting-be' involved in perception. The notion of perceiving as letting-be underlies Kant's notion of 'actuality.' Despite this inner link between ancient Greek and Kantian thought (a link that I have only hinted at here, but which Heidegger discusses in much detail), Heidegger concludes that we are still not clear about the relation between whatness (*essentia*) and existence, nor about the distinction between human existence and other modes of Being. To this point, the analysis discloses that Being involves a set of modalities. But what constitutes the *unity* of Being? This question is taken up in chapter three.

Here, Heidegger examines Descartes' attempt to distinguish between the modes of Being in terms of *res extensa* and *res cogitans.* While rejecting the Cartesian notion of ego, Heidegger claims that ontology requires an interpretation of the self — an interpretation that is not 'one-sidedly subjectivistic.' The phenomenon of human Dasein fits the bill. Dasein refers to the temporal transcendence, openness, or understanding of Being that makes possible the phenomena of subject and object. Parting company with Husserl, Heidegger says that transcendence is more fundamental than consciousness and intentionality. After arguing that Nature is disclosed, not created, in the 'world' established through Dasein's transcendence, Heidegger concludes that the difference between the present-at-hand (*vorhanden,* sometimes rendered as 'extant' by Hofstadter) and Dasein is still not clear enough to enable us to arrive at a unified sense of Being. Consideration of the transcendence of Dasein, however, has revealed that human existence is 'truth' or 'un-concealment.' In chapter four, Heidegger describes how Aristotle, Hobbes, J.S. Mill, and Lotze all fail to explain the meaning of the copula and of truth, in part because these thinkers did not fully understand the difference between *essentia* and *existentia.* For Heidegger, 'truth' means the self-manifesting of Being that occurs in the disclosedness of Dasein. An assertion is true only in a secondary or dependent sense. I can say 'the wall is blue' only because the blue wall first reveals itself within the temporal clearing called Dasein.

In part 2, Heidegger offers his own solution to the first of the four basic problems of phenomenology (ontology), viz., the ontological difference. It is here that he examines the relation between temporality and Being. Following fascinating discussions of the Aristotelian and common sense views of time, he explains that just as we understand a being in light of its Being, so we understand Being itself in terms of one of the three dimensions or ecstases of temporality: past, present, or future. Each ecstasis lets beings manifest themselves or 'be' in particular ways. The ecstasis of *praesens* or the present, for example, lets beings manifest themselves as present for use as tools. Temporal ecstases let us understand what a being *is,* while only such understanding makes intentional behavior possible. Heidegger's debt to Kant's transcendental philosophy is evident throughout this chapter. Although this chapter is very interesting, not all readers will be convinced that Heidegger really 'explains' the relation between Being and time. He spent the rest of his career working on this problem.

Some people will argue that *Basic Problems* shows that it is possible to discuss temporality and Being without having to make a 'detour' through the existential analytic, with all its talk about authenticity, guilt, Being towards death, and so on. But the fact is that even in *Basic Problems* Heidegger insists that ontology presupposes the analysis of Dasein's Being:

> Before we discuss the basic ontological problems, the existential analytic of Dasein needs to be developed. This, however, is impossible within the present course, if we wish to pose the basic ontological problem at all. Therefore, we have to choose an alternative and *presuppose the essential result of the existential analytic of Dasein as a result already established.* In my treatise on 'Being and time,' I set forth what the existential analytic encompasses in its essential results. (227-8 — my emphasis.)

Those people who would prefer to abandon *BT* in favor of *Basic Problems* must contend with Heidegger's own claim that an understanding of *BT* is needed for comprehending *Basic Problems.* One reason for this fact may be that, during this period of his thought at least, he believed that a true understanding of Being and temporality is possible only for the individual who exists authentically as Being towards death. For the young Heidegger, ontological 'knowledge' must be rooted in primal experience, not merely arrived at through conceptual analysis.

Hofstadter's translation is, for the most part, admirable — readable and accurate. My comparison of his translation with the original text indicates that he omitted nothing, but he does *add* words from time to time (e.g., 'thoughtlessly random' on p. 161, 'in outlawing it' on p. 167, 'that which stands over against' on pp. 200-1, and an entire sentence, plus changes in the original text, on p. 276). Although I appreciate Hofstadter's intention to clarify difficult points, I see no way of justifying the insertion of words that do not appear in the original. Surely the convention to place brackets around such insertions could have been followed. It would have been advisable as well to have italicized non-English words. In addition to his usually elegant translation, however, Hofstadter adds a very useful 55-page lexicon that cross-indexes the text.

In his introduction, Hofstadter alludes to some of the problems surrounding Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe,* particularly the way in which his lectures are being edited. Recently, Heidegger's son asserted that no 'improvements' — e.g., additions or changes based on the original handwritten notes or typescript — could be made in English-language editions of works from the *Gesamtausgabe.* Heidegger himself opposed a critical edition of his works, partly in order to avoid the deadening effects that scholarship so often produces. Despite this good intention, however, or even because of it, scholarly and acrimonious arguments have arisen about the *Gesamtausgabe,* arguments that threaten to distract attention from the matter at hand: thinking about what it means 'to be.' In *Basic Problems,* despite whatever short-

comings of the text available to us, Heidegger addresses himself to this question in a way that reinforces the claim that he is the greatest thinker/philosopher of the twentieth century.

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ROY J. HOWARD, *Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1982. Pp. xviii + 187. US$16.95 (cloth); US$5.95 (paper). ISBN 0-520-03851-7.

L'essai de Roy J. Howard se situe d'entrée de jeu dans le contexte du débat classique entre les sciences de la nature et les humanités (sont mentionnées l'histoire et les lettres) dont les méthodes ont été opposées au dix-neuvième siècle comme *explication* d'une part et *compréhension* de l'autre (x-xi), et qui correspondent grosso modo à ce que Dilthey nomme sciences de la nature et sciences de l'esprit, ces dernières prenant chez Rickert le nom plus moderne de sciences de la culture. Après une assez longue introduction sur l'origine de l'herméneutique philosophique au dix-neuvième siècle, l'auteur passe en revue, comme le titre l'indique, trois visages de l'herméneutique: 1) Le visage analytique à propos des théories de Georg Henrik von Wright et de Peter Winch; 2) le visage marxisant avec Jürgen Habermas; 3) le visage phénoménologique centré sur le célèbre ouvrage de Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Vérité et Méthode*.

L'introduction intitulée 'Origines du problème' est sans doute un peu trop rapide et succinte pour rendre compte avec une certaine précision de l'ampleur de la matière. L'exposé, aux pages 3 à 8, de la 'déduction transcendantale' de la *Critique de la raison pure* de Kant est simplifiée au point de frôler la contradiction, comme cela pourrait être démontré à propos du rôle des données de la perception à la p. 6. De même la position de Hegel sur le savoir, telle que résumée au bas de la page 18, est simpliste à outrance et la citation de la page 18 qui est censée l'appuyer n'a rien à voir avec ce qu'elle voudrait illustrer. Ce genre de citations mal articulées avec le contexte est fréquent dans l'introduction. Et, bien que l'œuvre allemande de Dilthey soit citée dans la bibliographie, l'aperçu que l'auteur nous présente de son herméneutique, comme de celle de Schleiermacher, est basé uniquement sur

des traductions et sur des ouvrages de commentateurs américains, procédé qui maintient inévitablement cette introduction sur les 'origines du problème' à distance de ses sources premières. L'absence d'analyse des textes originaux entraîne parfois une légère déviation, à peine perceptible, dans l'interprétation des concepts. Alors que l'interliaison (Zusammenhang) psychique tente, chez Dilthey, de rendre compte d'une réalité dont les composantes sont reliées dans le temps en une totalité mouvante, Howard comprend ce concept comme voulant désigner 'la qualité de l'objet culturel en tant qu'il est constitué par une continuité avec ses (nos) propres (one's own) structures psychiques' (p. 15). Pour Dilthey, l'interliaison est plutôt temporale, bien qu'il y ait un lien certain entre les diverses interliaisons superposées: vitale, psychique, historique. (Voir mon étude 'La connaissance historique via l'interliaison psychique: Wilhem Dilthey' in *Philosophiques* (oct. 1980): 189-209.) Il n'est donc pas exact d'identifier, comme Howard le fait à la page suivante, 'interliaison' et 'structure pour nous'. Le passage même de Dilthey cité au haut de la page 21 et où l'interliaison est pratiquement définie aurait pu lui mettre la puce à l'oreille et lui éviter une fausse piste. On sent que l'auteur évolue déjà plus à l'aise lorsqu'il aborde le positivisme logique à la page 23, mais lorsqu'il compare le langage idéal de la science unifiée (unified science) à l'aperception transcendantale de Kant (24), il trahit encore une fois l'imprécision évidente de sa connaissance de la philosophie allemande.

L'objectif de l'auteur dans les trois chapitres de ce petit livre consistera à montrer qu'à travers les philosophes contemporains qui se réclament de l'herméneutique sous l'un ou l'autre de ses trois visages: analytique, marxiste et phénoménologique, se dessine un rapprochement possible entre la tradition dite continentale et le courant analytique. En introduisant le premier de ces chapitres sur l'herméneutique analytique, Howard annonce triomphalement le progrès accompli si l'on passe de la distinction attribuée ici à Dilthey entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur à celle supposée plus objective entre deux processus, l'événement (happening) et l'action (acting). Or, dès qu'il veut fonder cette distinction nouvelle, soi-disant moins psychologisante, l'auteur est contraint de caractériser l'action par le fait qu'elle manifeste un dessein (purpose) ou une intention, c'est-à-dire une dimension intérieure. L'intentionalité présente dans ce qu'il appelle le réseau culturel (cultural network) n'est pas davantage un phénomène empirique. On n'aurait pas besoin d'aller plus loin pour assurer la perméabilité des deux traditions mentionnées plus haut, mais le progrès noté reste douteux.

La première section du premier chapitre est essentiellement un condensé des deux ouvrages de Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (1971) et *Causality and Determinism* (1974). Jouissant cette fois d'un accès direct aux originaux américains, Howard devient ici un guide plus sûr dans l'interprétation de l'argumentation parfois complexe de von Wright. Le point de départ est la réutilisation à bon escient des notions de condition nécessaire et de condition suffisante dans le traitement du problème de la causalité, ou, si l'on veut, des réponses possibles à la question 'pourquoi?'. 'Les réponses en termes de conditions suffisantes nous disent

quels événements sont susceptibles (are bound to) de se produire. Elles apparaissent de façon prédominante dans le type d'explications visant la prédiction. Les réponses en termes de conditions nécessaires nous disent comment un événement a été possible. Elles apparaissent de façon prédominante dans le type d'explications visant la rétrodiction (47).' Les états de choses dans le monde peuvent alors être reliés en systèmes par référence soit à des conditions suffisantes, soit à des conditions simplement nécessaires, soit à un mélange des deux. L'histoire entre dans cette dernière catégorie. Von Wright pose comme définition d'un système fermé 'qu'aucun état (ou caractère d'un état) à aucun stade du système n'a une *condition antécédente suffisante* se produisant en dehors du système' (cité 49-50). La vérification de l'existence d'un tel système fermé suppose une intervention dans le monde (suppression ou position de la condition), donc une action: 'Aussi la conception de la causalité comme base pour affirmer un lien nomique entre les éléments d'un système suppose-t-elle la conception de l'action (50).' Howard résume bien par la suite la démonstration wrightienne de cette thèse selon laquelle nous ne pouvons élever nos impressions de séquences causales dans la nature au rang de connaissance des lois causales sans notre intervention active dans les processus naturels. Dans les termes de von Wright: 'Penser une relation entre événements comme une relation causale, c'est la penser sous l'aspect d'une action (possible). Car *que* p est la cause de q ... *signifie* que je pourrais susciter q, si je pouvais (si bien que) p' (cité 55). Loin donc d'exclure le concept de liberté, le concept de causalité l'implique de quelque manière (56). Ici ressurgit la référence implicite à un aspect intentionnel de l'action, référence dont l'objet s'appelle chez von Wright 'l'élément contrafactuel impliqué dans l'action' (cité 57). On entre ensuite dans les détails de la démonstration wrightienne de l'impossibilité de la preuve d'un déterminisme universel et, étant donné l'existence d'événements admis comme intentionnels, l'impossibilité d'en fournir une explication causale. S'il y a explication, elle sera donc de type téléologique, c'est-à-dire fondée sur un syllogisme pratique.

Dans ce genre de syllogismes, la vérification de l'intentionnalité d'un des énoncés, prémisse ou conclusion, présuppose celle d'un des autres, alors que les énoncés d'une explication causale requièrent une vérification indépendante. Etablir la vérité des énoncés de schémas téléologiques, i.e. d'éléments contrafactuels intentionnels, est la tâche de l'historien. Ce qu'on appelle compréhension n'intervient plus, ici, qu'au moment de 'l'acte interprétatif qui établit l'objet de l'explication' (65).

Cet exposé est suivi d'un autre analogue, mais beaucoup plus bref, des ouvrages de Peter Winch, antérieurs à ceux de von Wright, *Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (1958) et *Ethics and Action* (1972). L'exposé des questions épistémologiques soulevées par Winch est à ce point sommaire qu'il est difficile d'en tirer des éléments éclairants pour la problématique générale traitée ici. On en retient que Winch relie les conditions de possibilité de la connaissance à l'interaction humaine et à la constitution du langage, comme le fera Habermas, si bien que l'idée d'une compréhension purement privée s'en trouve exclue (cf. p. 77), mais la spécificité de

l'œuvre de Winch n'apparaît pas clairement. La thèse est la suivante: 'Toute expérience de compréhension et d'intelligibilité au sens où 'compréhension' veut dire comprendre ce que cela signifie d'être capable de dire quelque chose, implique une société comme forme de vie dans laquelle des conventions sont établies pour les sens de 'même' et de 'règle à suivre' ' (77-8). Un accord entre les humains, leurs actions est à la base des relations logiques elles-mêmes (80). Nous sommes ici à une proximité étonnante des exigences de valabilité (Geltungsansprüche) de Habermas. Assez erratique dans sa composition, cette seconde section du chapitre I souligne surtout l'importance pour Winch d'un système social et langagier établi comme condition de possibilité de toute compréhension et de toute forme de savoir en général.

L'exposé sur Habermas s'étend des pages 91 à 119, exposé qui s'en tient aux livres et articles traduits en anglais et souffre par conséquent de certaines limites. Habermas a publié en 1982 un ouvrage important en deux tomes intitulé *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Suhrkamp Verlag 1982) et qui touche de très près au thème traité ici, mais vu la date de publication et le problème de langue, Howard ne pouvait y avoir accès. Tout ce chapitre sur Habermas s'avère à la lecture n'être qu'un résumé assez rapide de *Connaissance et Intérêt,* en particulier des sections de cet ouvrage qui portent sur Marx, Peirce, Dilthey et Freud. La présentation est claire et se lit aisément, mais la base de référence en ce qui a trait à l'herméneutique habermasienne est forcément assez étroite. Quant aux auteurs dont traite ici Habermas, ils sont par la force des choses doublement filtrés.

Dans son troisième chapitre, Howard passe à l'étude de l'ouvrage central de Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Vérité et Méthode,* dont je doute qu'il soit heureux de le présenter comme une 'herméneutique ontologique.' Le sous-titre du livre parle plutôt d'herméneutique philosophique. Gadamer ne construit pas une ontologie fondamentale à la manière de Heidegger. Ce qu'il semble avoir retenu de ce dernier, c'est surtout l'élaboration historiale des significations, qu'il applique aux domaines de l'esthétique et de l'historiographie, et non la structure existentiale du Dasein, bien qu'il prenne appui sur elle. En ce sens, Gadamer tente de s'éloigner de la question des conditions ontologiques de possibilité pour envisager la problématique du sens dans une perspective plus moderne, disons phénoménologique, qui ne sera pas étrangère aux analyses de Habermas. Sur ce point, les explications de Howard sont assez claires et satisfaisantes. Mais lorsqu'on en vient à l'exposé des exposés de Gadamer sur la philosophie kantienne de l'art (Critique de la faculté de juger) et sur la philosophie de l'histoire de Dilthey, on rencontre le même problème que plus haut: un condensé à la seconde puissance où la structuration interne des théories originelles et leur articulation entre elles est difficile à saisir, même pour le lecteur un peu averti. Néanmoins, en expliquant l'herméneutique proprement gadamérienne, le rôle qu'y jouent les préjugés dans l'interprétation et le caractère productif (et non seulement reproductif) de la compréhension, de même que la rencontre des horizons de compréhension, comme dans la recherche historique ou le contact avec des cultures étrangères, le texte de

Howard retrouve une certaine limpidité qui s'explique par l'accès plus direct à l'écrit original encore que toujours à travers une traduction.

La conclusion de ce livre est sans aucun doute ce que l'auteur a produit de plus clair et de plus clarifiant dans tout le livre. Son dessein originel prend forme et projette à rebours une lumière rassurante sur les trois chapitres précédents, plutôt morcelés. On y perçoit mieux les rapprochements et les distances entre les théories contemporaines de l'interprétation. L'auteur y présente le rapport entre explication et interprétation dans un tableau à double entrée assez ingénieux:

	A	B
	Explication	*Compréhension*
(1)	oui	oui
(2)	oui	non
(3)	non	oui
(4)	non	non

La ligne (4) du tableau serait le schéma du scepticisme radical dont on ne retrouve aucun représentant en épistémologie, peut-être un écho du nihilisme nietzschéen. La ligne (3) évoquerait une sorte de romantisme à la Schleiermacher ou à la Kierkegaard. La ligne (2) donnerait la forme du mono-méthodologisme positiviste et la ligne (1) résumerait l'état de la question dans l'herméneutique philosophique contemporaine tel que Howard la conçoit d'un point de vue assez optimiste. La conclusion se termine sur un résumé des positions de Ricoeur face aux auteurs qui ont servi de référence dans la démonstration de Howard. Une conclusion générale se dégage, toutefois, de ces analyses d'auteurs: c'est que l'intention fort louable de rapprocher les thèses continentales et angloaméricaines, en herméneutique comme ailleurs, risque d'entraîner une lecture trop rapide et superficielle des philosophies allemandes. La saisie authentique de n'importe laquelle de ces dernières suppose un long séjour dans les textes eux-mêmes et la familiarité péniblement acquise avec l'Esprit qui les traverse. De ce point de vue, l'essai de Roy J. Howard ne peut pas être considéré comme un guide parfaitement sûr.

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RUSSELL KEAT, *The Politics of Social Theory.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981. Pp. xi + 245. Cdn$34.95; ISBN 0-631-12598-1: US$25.00; ISBN 0-226-42875-3 (cloth): Cdn$14.95; ISBN 0631-12779-8: US$7.95; ISBN 0-226-42876-1 (paper).

Keat's *Politics of Social Theory* bears the subtitle: *Habermas, Freud and the Critique of Positivism,* which would lead one to expect an account of the whole range of problematics of critical theory and perhaps of fields beyond it. Indeed, the book touches on the entire series of epistemological issues related to critical theory, in particular Habermas's version of it, either by addressing Habermas directly or by discussing other scholars's reflections on Habermas's theory or on related themes. The first observation therefore that one makes of this recent contribution to the growing body of literature on critical theory is its considerable breadth, which, while accounting for its merit, also marks its weakness. Keat's general, sweeping review lacks the depth necessary for an illuminating discussion of critical theoretical issues. Keat's epistemological interest consists in reinstating the dichotomy between fact and value, theory and practice which the Frankfurt School's historico-political project was intent on dissolving. The breadth of the subject therefore is unavoidable, indeed necessitated by the theoretical objective, and it is to the credit of Keat to have assumed such an extensive undertaking. However, in its actual execution we note very little sustained and developed discussion of central theoretical questions and of their interrelations; we have rather a highly eclectic account which fails to address itself to basic issues related to the very meaning of science and knowledge — issues indispensible to an analysis of the very sense in which a particular relation, be it one of independence or be it one of unity, can be attributed to theory and practice, fact and value.

Keat begins his review of critical theory with an assessment of the Frankfurt School's critique of positivism which suffers, according to Keat, from a misunderstanding of the object of its critique. It is Keat's contention that the critical theory school shoddily lumps together as positivist a number of disparate currents of epistemological thought in an account bearing the marks of a vulgar polemic rather than of a theoretically rigorous critique. What the Frankfurt School conceives of as positivism, Keat contends, is a number of disparate doctrines, namely that of value-freedom, scientific politics, scientism and positivist conception of science, which have no necessary logical or historical interconnection. He bases his claim of a theoretical and historical autonomy of the doctrines on the contentions of particular practitioners of one or other doctrine. For example, both Weber and Popper defend the principle of value-freedom and theorize on the basis of it while clearly distancing themselves from some other principles — Weber from scientific politics, Popper from scientism. The success of this entire 'sorting out' exercise, therefore, rests on the effectiveness of a theoretical demonstration of a) epistemologically distinct, independent and contradic-

tory doctrines, b) the logical necessity of the value-free doctrine for an epistemologically defensible non-positivist critical social theory.

On neither of these levels is Keat convincing, for he provides definitions of each of the four doctrines in terms of undefined or unelaborated concepts — concepts which are however crucial for the defense of the non-interdependence thesis. 'Scientism,' for example, is defined in terms of 'science,' but science itself receives the most superficial definition in the form of the conception of science of the practitioners of scientism themselves: 'scientism is the view that science alone represents a genuine form of human knowledge,' and, taking Habermas's words out of context he proceeds to elaborate with the citation that 'scientism means science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as *one* form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science,' (16). Keat links scientism to the Vienna Circle as its best proponent and proceeds to give us a definition of its view of scientific knowledge as explanatory and predictive of observable phenomena in terms of logically interrelated general statements linked to universal laws. So ends his exposé on scientism. Keat continues along this very questionable methodological path to define the other doctrines in terms of the proponents' own conceptions noting declared rejection of this or that doctrine and the espousal of others. This, for Keat, is evidence of their constituting distinct theoretical currents. On the basis of this demonstration, the thesis of the logical non-interconnection between the four doctrines remains unconvincing.

The failure to propose a coherent view of science and to specify basic theoretical constructions such as rationality in terms of which the differenciation of doctrines could be argued and their possible contradiction revealed, has negative repercussions for the second of Keat's objectives, namely the reconstruction of an epistemology of value-freedom. Keat commits the same theoretical errors of omission in his defense of value-freedom as he does in his critique of the thesis of interrelatedness of the four doctrines. Here Keat argues for a value-free epistemology, that is, 'the logical independence of criteria of validity of scientific theories and acceptance or rejection of normative commitments of a moral or political kind' (38) and the non-scientific justification of values, without bothering to specify what can be understood by 'criteria of validity.' It is not a notion which is explored, and, not having seen 'science' discussed from which we could infer what criteria of validity Keat has in mind, we are once again in the dark about the justification of the logical independence between science and values proposition. The theoretical omissions are revealing, for it would seem that Keat accepts the empirico-analytical conception of science but he does so without reflecting upon its foundations and its logical structure as do the critical theorists and particularly Habermas.

Without a worked-out view of science from which Keat could assess Habermas' own notion of it, Keat brings very little illumination but considerable confusion to the discussion of Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. He implicitly applies one set of criteria of validity,

namely those determined by, in Habermas' terms, the categorial framework of work to assess whether or not Habermas' consensus theory of truth is justified. But does Habermas not propose the consensus theory of truth for communicative interaction whose categorial framework is distinguished not by the non-identity of subject and object, as is the case in 'work' but indeed by their identity? When Keat asks of Habermas why not a 'hermeneutic of nature' such that the practical interest constitutes the object domain of nature, he either denies this logical structure of Habermas' thought or declares it untenable. If the latter, we should be shown on what grounds one may claim untenability of the logical differentiation of work and interaction. If one were to venture a simple reply to the proposition of a 'hermeneutic of nature,' one may say that Habermas' view of human interests is not an arbitrary category; the technical interest cannot simply declare an identity of the dialectical structure of the man-nature relation where the logical structure is marked by a non-identity of subject and object in which the dialectic of the transformative process involves man's recognition of the internal laws regulating natural processes. The practical interest can constitute a hermeneutical knowledge in social communication precisely because of the subject-object identity of the logical dialectical structure of the man-man relation in communicative interaction.

The overlooking of the subject-object identity in the structure of interaction leads Keat to argue, against Habermas, for causal determinism and neurophysiological reductionism of psychoanalysis. Keat's contention is that beliefs and desires are causal determinants in purposive-rational action and have the same logical status as any non-psychic element. He thus replaces the subject-object identity of the communicative interaction model with the subject-object non-identity of the causal model. But here again the arguments are not theoretically grounded so as to show how and why the categorial framework of communication with the subject-object identity must be replaced or is reducible to the subject-object non-identity mediable by technical purposive-rational action and not by communicative interaction.

In the last chapter final efforts are made to establish theory's independence from practice and value from fact in the field of psychoanalysis. There are some interesting arguments regarding the complexity of social norms in practice which would lead to a challenge of the knowledge-constitutive interests theory for the simplicity of its constitutive norms. But here, too, Keat bases his critique on a misreading of Habermas with regard to the epistemological distinction of the form and content of two sets of norms in question. The norms of the knowledge-constitutive interests theory are of an epistemological quasi-transcendental order, the latter are historically determined norms constitutive of a social order at a given time in its development. This distinction may indeed be debatable and a critique of it would be a most welcome contribution to our understanding of it but it cannot be seriously undermined by simply assuming that both forms of norms are reducible to one and thus rejecting Habermas' account for its simplicity.

It is unfortunate that Keat chose to present his reflections on the relation-

ship between fact and value, theory and practice as a critique of critical theory in general and Habermas' theory in particular, for on that ground the book contributes very little to our understanding of the weakness and strength of critical theory. Without wishing to minimize the importance of critical dialogue and debate, I dare say that Keat's statement could have made a greater case for a value-free epistemology outside that context, for the level and quality of critical dialogue requisite of this theme demands a mastery of the opponent's theoretical tradition which Keat does not always display.

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ANDREW LEVINE, *Liberal Democracy: A Critique of Its Theory.* New York: Columbia University Press 1981.

In *Liberal Democracy,* Andrew Levine offers a thorough, well-argued evaluation of central notions embedded in liberal democratic theory. He does not provide exhaustive textual exposition and analysis of key thinkers in the tradition. Rather, he reconstructs what he regards as the core conception of this type of political theory. He then carefully investigates certain important flaws. Liberal democracy is, purportedly at any rate, an amalgam of liberty and democracy. Theorists of this ilk try to fuse the liberal judgment — 'there are aspects of persons' lives ... that ought to be immune from (coercive) interference ...' and the democratic judgment — 'political decisions should be determined collectively ... and ... collective decisions should be ... functions of individuals' choices' (1).

Levine's central contention is that liberal democratic theory is, without extensive revision and qualification, fundamentally incoherent. It is virtually impossible to combine liberal and democratic ideals such that only those social and political institutions that survive the tests of both judgments are acceptable. But the problems besetting liberal democracy are not merely ones that threaten this sort of consonance. As Levine shows, in gracefully-written prose, there are separate difficulties — some involving the theory of liberty, others involving the theory of democracy.

The notion of liberty is problematic. According to liberal democratic theory, one is free if one is not unfree. And one is unfree only if there is

deliberate interference, by others, with the pursuit of one's ends or into the performance of one's actions. As long as one is unconstrained, one is not unfree. Here, as at various points throughout the book, Levine notes enlightening contrasts with idealism. Thinkers such as Rousseau, Hegel, and Kant thought of genuine freedom as essentially rational, as action in accordance with ends of a real or true self. But liberal democracy — in its theory of freedom as in its theory of democracy — takes human ends as given by persons' actual wants or desires.

Levine shows that this theory of liberty is almost certainly overly restricted or excessively narrow. For instance, the poor and the otherwise underprivileged, in capitalist societies, who are unable to do much of what they most want — because of prevailing social conditions and political arrangements — are declared free. This is true because, according to liberal democratic theory, none of their actions are socially unfree because of deliberate interference. There are also great difficulties for liberal theorists with regard to their traditional aim of marking off a private sphere in which individuals are to be left free and a public sphere in which their liberty may be curtailed. The most important work on this subject is *On Liberty,* and Levine devotes a chapter to discussion of Mill's views. He shows, among other things, that Mill has great difficulty in consistently abjuring paternalism.

The sections focusing on democracy and collective social choice are more complex and more difficult. Levine notes, perhaps with somewhat excessive repetition, that social choices are to be made — according to liberal democracy — as functions of individual choices. Individuals are portrayed as maximizers of interests. The interests in question need not be selfish or even self-oriented. Indeed, there are no rational or moral constraints on what are to count as interests. A person's interests are ultimately analyzable in terms of his or her actual wants. (Here again, the contrast with idealist political philosophy is instructive. Democratic theorists in the liberal tradition shun notions of 'real interests of one's true self.' There is no room for ideas such as Rousseau's conception of the general will.)

Levine includes interesting, though largely derivative and unoriginal, sections which expose the technical difficulties involved in the democratic ideals of majority rule and collective choice. As noted, democracy itself, as construed by the theory of liberal democracy, is beset by difficulties of its own that are wholly unrelated to the liberal component. One of the most interesting sections is on representation. Levine shows that, in advocacy of representative government, liberal democracies effectively abandon both democracy and liberalism. Representive government is both illiberal and undemocratic.

Liberal Democracy contains enlightening discussion on relations between capitalism and the liberal democratic commitment to the maximization of welfare. The sections on exploitation are particularly interesting. The book would have perhaps been even better had these discussions been expanded. Also in need of broader — and deeper — inquiry is the material (presented by the author much too sketchily) on human rights. The chapter on 'Freedom

and Exploitation,' for instance, might have been more rewarding if the discussion of human rights — relegated to an earlier chapter — had been taken up again.

Levine's book is a major contribution to political philosophy. It is worthy of the attention of everyone interested in its major topics.

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JOHN E. McPECK, *Critical Thinking and Education.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; New York: St. Martins Press 1981. Pp. 170. Cdn$37.50: ISBN 0-85520-383-8; US$18.95: ISBN 0-312-17507-8 (cloth); Cdn$13.50 (paper: ISBN 0-85220-384-6).

The topic of 'critical thinking' has for some time been of research interest to those in the field of education — meaning here primarily primary and secondary education without excluding post-secondary education. The literature on this topic however, shows considerable disagreement and even confusion on how to define 'critical thinking.' What seems to be in mind here is some process or method for helping students to think more clearly.

There is quite some intersection of this topic with concerns of recent philosophy because of the recent controversies within philosophy on whether or not 'applied logic' or 'informal logic' exists as a respectable, worthwhile, or coherent discipline. Many of the so-called 'informal logic' school think that formal logic is not applicable for their needs (Scriven for example). And formal logicians, to the extent that they concern themselves with the applicability of formal logic to realistic argumentation in natural language, tend to be skeptical about the prospects (Massey, for example; notable exceptions are Hamblin and Hintikka).

All this means that there could be considerable interest within the philosophy of education in the project of comparing notes between developments in critical thinking and informal logic.

McPeck canvasses a number of the most hopeful sources of enlightenment or methodology for the would-be teacher of critical thinking. In the end he concludes that critical thinking is exclusively subject-sensitive to a particular discipline, e.g. there is no pure discipline of 'critical thinking' in mathematics, apart from mathematics itself. He therefore feels that informal

logic, or logic of any sort, has nothing to offer to the consumer of critical thinking pedagogy.

McPeck dismisses Johnson and Blair's brand of informal logic by arguing that the word 'logic' does not serve to distinguish between their subject and rhetoric, and that therefore informal logic only serves to confuse more than to clarify. McPeck also argues that Johnson and Blair's faith rests on the 'unfounded' assumptions (1) that the justification of reasoning must reside in some further principles and (2) that a principle in one area of experience can be applied to others. He concludes that there is little to distinguish informal logic from rhetoric. While McPeck is certainly right that standards of correctness and relevance have not yet been developed in a precise or well-founded way in informal logic studies, I feel he refutes Johnson and Blair by an *ad ignorantiam*. Because their work is pioneering and foundational, it does not follow that we can (at least on McPeck's arguments) reject that work as impossible, false, or incoherent.

In attempting to refute the work of C.L. Hamblin, McPeck makes an even more egregious error. He writes that Hamblin, in his system of formal dialectic in *Fallacies* (London: Methuen 1970) is prepared to countenance the view 'that instances of fallacies are subjective insofar as they are dependent on the belief state or commitment state of individual agents. This has the effect of rendering certain fallacies objectively characterizable but contingent in each case upon the idiosyncratic belief states of individual participants' (76). These statements of McPeck's constitute an unfair and sophistical interpretation of Hamblin's whole argument for his system of formal dialectic of a tool for the study of fallacies.

Hamblin thinks of the commitment-store of a player in a dialectical game as a set of statements attributed to that player that may or may not be closed under logical operations. Hamblin writes: '... we emphasize that a commitment is not necessarily a "belief" of the person who has it. We do not believe everything we say; but our saying commits us whether we believe it or not. The purpose of postulating a commitment-store is not psychological' (264). In fact Hamblin is extremely careful to steer clear of the language of belief, and in some cases even suggests that the well-known difficulties in doxastic-epistemic logic makes its use dubious as a clear framework for the study of fallacies. Thus McPeck makes a very bad error in interpreting Hamblin on formal dialectic.

Scriven's influential text, *Reasoning* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1976) is dismissed as being both 'unoriginal' and 'unhelpful' in its widely cited techniques of extended argument analysis. Once again, the dismissal is presumptuously abrupt. Perhaps enough has been said to show that many philosophers will find this book controversial and the subject interesting. But many of them may be expected to be outraged by it, and others will be disappointed by the lack of 'critical thinking,' or perhaps fair treatment, shown by the author. For all that, McPeck is quite justified in pointing up the theoretical shortcomings of the attempts to found a coherent subject of practical logic. However, the arguments he uses are clumsy and unfair.

Philosophical readers who want a concise and readable introduction to the field of critical thinking in education studies may find the book useful. In particular, one chapter outlines and examines the tests currently used for the purposes of measuring critical thinking. McPeck, as we might now be led to expect, argues that these tests decisively fail to measure critical thinking in any reasonable sense.

To sum up, this book should be of interest to philosophers not least because of its challenge. The author argues that formal logic (because it is sterile) and informal logic (because it is confused) can neither of them teach anyone to think more clearly. Therefore, philosophers have no business pretending to people in other fields that philosophy can tell them anything about how to think more clearly in their special fields. If that's not a challenge to philosophy, it's hard to know what would be.

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WALTER J. ONG, *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality and Consciousness.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1981. Pp. 231. US$14.95. ISBN 0-8014-1342-7.

Ong has written a speculative and provocative book about biological 'resources' and the ways that males typically think. His fundamental thesis is this: Partly because all men endure a variety of 'biological disadvantages,' males are universally attracted to contests. Consequently, according to Ong, male identity and typically male ways of understanding the world develop in and through contest.

The male endowment, described by Ong primarily in biological terms, is not a particularly good one. For instance, it is the female of various animal species who is literally or figuratively 'devouring.' She produces the larger reproductive cells and, in some cases, can generate offspring without male assistance. Throughout the animal kingdom, the female can 'have' a male where the reverse, of course, is not true. Frequently, in some species, males have to fight other males for the mere privilege of becoming progenitors of the next generation. Females, for the most part, are guaranteed such participation.

In sum, Ong depicts males as expendable, biologically dependent on

females for their very existence, in danger of being enveloped by or absorbed into the maternal. Consequently males, as a group, are profoundly insecure, vulnerable and, in important ways, impotent.

Encountering life under such a bio-psychological handicap, men view contesting as an attractive and useful mode of behavior. Men need to meet stiff challenges in order to 'prove' that they are, after all, capable. They need to demonstrate that they are not female, show superiority over other males, win an argument, debate, risk, outdo. Ong notes that men fight more than women do, refuse to obey, take risks, engage readily in verbal polemic, take on a variety of quests (sometimes as 'clowns' or ineffectual Don Quixotes), and typically deal with other men in a friendly-aggressive fashion. Male-dominated higher education itself is shown to have deep roots in oral, agonistic behavior. Ong argues that many scholars in male-controlled universities of past centuries learned such subjects as grammar, logic and rhetoric by 'fighting over them.'

Ong's purpose is not 'prescriptive,' or 'diagnostic,' but rather 'interpretive.' He does not attempt to show strict cause and effect between biological condition and behavior. Yet, he argues that the relationship is not entirely accidental either. While Ong is not interested in reducing human behavior to a set of hidden biological factors, he clearly wants those factors exposed and the important part they play in human activity acknowledged. Thus, Ong's work is not 'reductionist' or 'deterministic' but rather 'socio-biological' and 'noobiological.'

Ong's analysis is based upon two principle claims, either one of which could be true without the other one also being valid. The former proposition — that specifically male consciousness and identity develop in and through contest — might be true even if the latter thesis — that a signally important factor in the attractiveness of contest for males is biologically grounded — were not the case. Men might be drawn to contests for other reasons.

On the other hand, were the biological claim true, it would not necessarily follow that contesting is the only, or even primary, logical response to masculine insufficiency. Men might 'hide' their lack of stature through the avoidance of conflict.

Ong's explanation, however, for the prevalence of contesting in male behavior is certainly a plausible one. Both claims need to be taken seriously.

The prior thesis is the more easily verifiable of the two. Contesting behavior seems to thoroughly pervade the activity of both human and non-human males. Much as Huizinga drew attention to the prevalence of play in the development of culture, Ong has uncovered a mode of behavior through which male consciousness and capability can be better understood. Ong's analysis of the history of higher education through the camera lens of 'agonistic activity' is particularly illuminating. Though hardly quantifiable, the role played by contest in the evolution specifically of male identity and consciousness would seem to be extensive.

It could be asked, however, if it is always 'contest' that Ong has in mind. In some of his discussions it seems that *any* challenging, problematic or

dangerous situation would satisfy the 'psychological requirements' of the individuals involved, *whether or not* this is also a contest. In other words, it is not clear whether it is simply the meeting of stiff challenges which is primarily attractive to men (i.e. taking good *tests*) or meeting like challenges better than at least one other human being (i.e. having good *contests*). Is showing superiority over other human beings particularly poignant? And if so, why is *this,* rather than merely the successful meeting of some challenge, more closely connected to the male's biological resources? In several places Ong himself seems to suggest a slightly revised thesis — namely, that specifically male identity and ways of understanding the world develop in and through attempts to meet various challenges, some of which are also contests.

Ong's second claim is more difficult to validate. Males do not consciously meet contests as 'offspring' of their biological condition. Nor can they adequately deduce a biological influence from the mere fact that they are attracted to tests and contests.

However, Ong's non-reductionist thesis has a good deal of face validity to it. If it can be expected, for instance, that those with withered appendages, large feet, muscular shoulders, balding heads, handsome smiles or bulging waistlines all encounter the world somewhat differently because of the unique bodies that they are, it does not stretch the imagination unduly to think that being male or female likewise would have a significant effect on behavior. Ong does a masterful job of showing that human consciousness can be deflected and molded by the biological 'accident' of gender, as well as by environment and acquaintance.

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COLIN RADFORD and SALLY MINOGUE, *The Nature of Criticism.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1981. Pp. x + 180. US$30.00. ISBN 0-391-02273-3.

Radford and Minogue maintain that criticism is logically rich. They attempt to demonstrate this richness by examining a variety of critical judgments and arguments. They are partial to the criticism of literary critics like Christopher Ricks and F.R. Leavis. Whether what are typical features of this criticism are typical features of the criticism of, for example, a Derrida or a Harold Bloom is left to the reader, independently familiar with the latter criticism, to decide. And this is how the authors believe it should be: 'if general claims

about the nature of criticism are implicit' in their discussions of the judgments and arguments in question (such discussions occupy the first three chapters) 'their correctness, the extent to which they apply, can only be established by looking at further examples' (7). Criticism is 'a motley of cases' and 'not a monolithic activity.'

In Chapter 1, 'The complexities of critical judgments,' the authors attempt to show that even banal critical judgments like 'Hamlet is a tragedy' are complex. While they allow that there are different kinds of critical arguments, for example, 'deductive arguments may sometimes have a role to play' (62), they believe that 'much more frequently, and characteristically' critical arguments are what they call 'demonstrations' as opposed to proofs (Cf. Chapter 2, 'The nature of critical arguments'). One of the reasons they give for the predominance of 'demonstrations' over proofs is the fact that critical arguments very often contain 'characterizing,' or 'sensitizing remarks,' remarks 'which "give a face" to the work' (49-50). The test of 'correctness' for such remarks is whether readers of them can experience the works in the terms they suggest. For example, Cleanth Brooks claims that the line in a Housman poem in which 'headpiece clever' occurs suggests school boy slang. According to Radford and Minogue this critical claim would be 'correct,' if and only if readers accept that the line does suggest this. Its 'correctness' would not 'depend on whether "headpiece" is indeed school boy slang' (64).

The authors point out they have not proven that they 'have put the right, or appropriate, construction on Brooks' claim' (64). Rather they say they are advancing 'an empirical thesis about how in fact remarks of this sort are treated by critics and readers of criticism' (64). They notice, moreover, that Brooks' critical claim, 'though correctly characterized as non-substantial,' can become a substantial one, viz., a true empirical claim, for if the claim is widely read and accepted it would be true that 'headpiece clever' suggests schoolboy slang. This statement of intent suggests that their enterprise is an entirely descriptive one — they are describing how such critical remarks are treated, rather than, for example, recommending how they should be treated. But since they say early on that critics may well misunderstand the nature of their own activity (5), if there were this critical misunderstanding, they would not be describing what critics and their readers say, or would say, about how they are treating these remarks; they would be describing how in fact these people do treat these remarks. Their enterprise would be prescriptive to the extent that critics and their readers ought to regard certain claims as characterizing if they want to understand their own judgments and responses.

In order to assure critics that they are accurately representing critical practice, they provide a detailed discussion of a longer piece of criticism in Chapter 3, 'The logical richness of criticism: an analysis of Ricks on Tennyson.' Chapter 4 considers whether there are any necessary conditions of excellence in art and Chapter 5, 'Reasons, causes and targets,' considers whether reasons in criticism are logically singular or general.

The authors, a philosopher and a literary critic, are interested in the

philosophical problems raised by criticism, in particular literary criticism. They believe, moreover, that the only ways these problems can be successfully studied is by examining particular cases, for they believe that 'highly theoretical' works in aesthetics, works which abstract various critical concepts like 'interpretation,' description,' 'evaluation,' 'from the business of criticism itself,' and which treat these concepts as though their 'terms had meanings identifiable separately from particular critical judgments,' (6) are seriously misguided. The authors claim that they will show that 'what is meant by "description," "interpretation," "evaluation," etc. tends to vary from one bit of criticism and one critical controversy to another. We may be clear about what we mean by "interpretation" in one case, but unclear as to whether we would mean the same thing by that word in another case' (6).

The authors not only claim that a term like 'interpretation,' for example, can change meaning from one critical context to the next, they say that their own use of critical terms is not univocal. However, it is not clear to me what the authors count as a meaning change. If they could show that interpretive remarks were heterogeneous, that different sorts of remarks counted as interpretations — e.g., *Animal Farm* is about totalitarianism; in Tennyson's *In Memoriam,* the surviving friend is more dead than the departed friend, or the lines express the ebbing and flowing of Tennyson's grief and hope — this would not show that the concept of interpretation is equivocal. Moreover, the authors seem to believe that the making of an interpretive judgment, and not the making of a descriptive one, always requires 'something beyond a mere understanding of the language.' For example, they say that when the claim '*Hamlet* is a tragedy about revenge,' concerns what *Hamlet* is literally about, it is not an interpretive claim, although when it concerns whether the play is centrally about revenge, it is (24). To say that a stanza of *In Memoriam* is about paying a social call seems to them not clearly interpretive since the poem says what it is about, but saying it is a grim parody of paying such a call clearly would be interpretive (91). While the authors' positive characterization of an interpretive judgment is, if not trivially true, vague, it suggests the authors may be working with some non-equivocal notion of interpretation.

While I believe the authors have given us examples of interpretive remarks that are heterogeneous, and have shown why features thought by some to be necessary for an interpretation, e.g., it had to be contestable or problematic or about meaning in some single sense of 'about meaning,' are not necessary, they have not, I believe, demonstrated that theoretical works about interpretation or description, etc., must necessarily fail to account for the richness and complexity of critical judgments and critical arguments. Since I believe that such theoretical works are not merely not misguided, or to use their term 'academic,' but are essential for an understanding of critical practice, I find the discussion of particular critical examples in the first three chapters useful but not philosophically satisfying.

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ALFRED SCHMIDT, *History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History.* Translated by Jeffrey Herf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1981. Pp. xxviii + 146. US$ 17.50. ISBN 0-262-19198-9.

This book confronts Althusser's structuralist reading of Marx, a reading which de-emphasizes the historical dimension of Marx's thought, eliminates Marx's Hegelianism, and by rejecting the fundamental role of the human subject in history adopts an antihumanist perspective. For Althusser, history is to be studied as the transformation of social structures, not as a product of the activity of human subjects.

For Schmidt, Althusser's great merit was to have shown that there is a structuralist dimension to Marx's thought as well as in rejecting a naive, linear, and evolutionist understanding of history. Schmidt too rejects this concept of history and in fact claims that Marx never held such a view. On the other hand, in opposition to Althusser, Schmidt wants to defend Marx's Hegelian heritage as well as a view of history compatible with structuralism.

For Marx, the possibility of historical study depends upon a conceptual construction. In the 1857 Introduction to the *Grundrisse,* Marx's method begins analytically by working out the relationships that hold between the abstract categories which express modern society; it seeks to connect these categories into an abstract theoretical structure; and, for Marx, we must do this *before* it is possible to empirically study modern society or trace its past historical development. *Capital,* for example, begins with a study of the abstract concept of the commodity, then connects it with other concepts, and only ends, in the chapter on primitive accumulation, with an historical examination of the rise of capitalism. Historical study is only possible as interpretation using an abstract theoretical structure — or what we might call a paradigm.

It is quite true for Marx that society as well as the categories which express it are the outcome of historical development. Nevertheless, we cannot understand society or its history *until* we work up this structure of categories and we can *only* understand history *through* this structure. Marx's structuralist method is not opposed to and does not eliminate history; it grounds and makes possible the historical study of the actual world.

This method, as Schmidt shows, is much like Hegel's, except that the movement from the abstract structure of categories to the real world, for Marx, is merely a matter of method, the way our mind must work; it is not, as with Hegel, the actual generation of the world from the Idea.

So far, Schmidt is correct. But Schmidt seems to think that this method, which appears for the first time only in the *Grundrisse,* can also be found in Marx's earlier writings, especially in the *German Ideology* of 1845-46. Moreover, Schmidt seems to reject Althusser's claim that there is a break or a fundamental shift in Marx's thought. Here, I think, Schmidt is mistaken. The method described in the *German Ideology* is quite different from that of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital.* In the *German Ideology,* we are to start

straightaway by studying the actual historical conditions of a particular epoch and we are to do so in a rather straightforward empirical way. We trace the historical development of the forces and relations of production and only afterwards are we able to grasp and understand the ideas that arise in this period. Categories or ideas, let alone their interconnection in a theoretical structure, do not come first, and in fact play no significant role in the method at all. Marx says that they 'have no value whatsoever' except for summing up general results (*German Ideology,* in *Marx Engels Collected Works* [New York: International 1975ff.], V, 37). Here, historical study is not understood as interpretation requiring a paradigm or theoretical structure. In the *German Ideology,* Marx's historical method seems quite close to the smooth, linear, evolutionary approach that Schmidt wants to deny he held. Here, Schmidt is further from the truth than Althusser.

Nevertheless, Schmidt is still correct in rejecting Althusser's view that the thought of the later Marx is antihumanist. Marx's humanism emerges most clearly in his discussion of the fetishism of commodities in *Capital.* For Marx, fetishism means that a relationship between persons comes to appear as a relationship between things; the interaction between products on a market appears to go on independently of the will of any of the individuals involved and it comes to dominate their activity. This fetishized structure of things, however, is a surface appearance which masks an inner reality. The surface structure is the outcome of a certain form of historical interaction among human beings and if this social interaction were to be transformed in a socialist fashion the fetishized surface structure would disappear. At that point human interaction would be recognized as the reality behind the appearance and human beings could begin to consciously control their interaction so as to realize themselves as ends.

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RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *Culture.* Toronto: Wm. Collins 1981. Pp. 248. Cdn$7.95. ISBN 0-00-635627-3.

Raymond Williams' *Culture* is one of a new series, *Fontana New Sociology,* each volume of which reviews and explores some issue or inquiry at the cen-

tre of contemporary sociology. In a lengthy introductory chapter Williams summarizes the various interests and analytical traditions within the history of sociology which have converged in the modern sociology of culture. Historically, the main theoretical orientations have been *idealist* or *materialist.* The former has involved forms of thought about culture which primarily emphasize the 'informing spirit' of an entire way of life, which is manifest within the whole social order but is most evident in specifically cultural activities, like forms and styles of art, and kinds of intellectual work. On the other hand, the materialist approach has concentrated on the organizational structure of the social order, and has seen the specifiable culture, in styles of art and intellectual activity, as a secondary product of more primary social organization. Williams describes a new kind of convergence of these orientations as forming, or beginning to form, contemporary sociology of culture. In common with the materialist approach, much of this very recent work is centrally concerned with the organizational aspects of the whole social order. But this concern is now combined with an insistence that manifest cultural practice and production are not simply, and secondarily, derived from an otherwise constituted social order, but are themselves major elements in its constitution. In this insistence on the *constitutive* aspect of cultural practices it now shares something with idealist sociology. However, in place of an appeal to an 'informing spirit,' as significantly determining social organization, and especially manifest in cultural production, it sees culture as essentially the complex *signifying system* through which a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced, examined, and explored. This contemporary approach, therefore, has the effect of combining an interest in culture in the broad sort of anthropological sense, as a 'distinct whole way of life,' with the more common sense of culture as 'artistic and intellectual activity.' Through the emphasis on a general signifying system the notion of culture is broadened to include, not only the traditional arts and forms of intellectual activity, but also any of the 'signifying practices' which express or explore the organization, values, and views of a society — from language through education and the arts, to film and media, pop culture, journalism, advertising, and fashion. Williams writes within the framework and terms of this contemporary concern with the social processes and effects of all forms of cultural production.

The second and third chapters offer a brief sociological history of cultural institutions, and forms of organization of cultural producers. The fourth chapter is among the most general, complex, and ambitious in the book. It is concerned with the social relations and effects accompanying invention and development in the material means of cultural production and reproduction. As I understand it, the main argument is that as technologies for the reproduction of cultural production (printing, graphics, radio, film, television) gradually develop within a dominantly capitalist market, there follows increasingly divisive social relations and effects. Williams speaks repeatedly here of 'asymmetry' and 'asymmetries' between 'cultural production and general social and cultural reproduction.' (98, 99 ff.) The only sense I have

been able to make of this concept of 'asymmetry' is that of a certain contrast between an earlier social situation of relatively limited and rigid forms of cultural reproduction, and a later situation of diverse and manifold reproduction technologies in market conditions. On this interpretation, the condition of asymmetry essentially consists in various tensions and conflicts between older, dominant, and received cultural traditions and institutions, and the cultural products of a highly technological market. For example:

> A Marxist book, an anarchists' guide, attacks on the institution of the family, songs celebrating illegal drugs, films and television plays celebrating physical violence or showing crime as justifiable or successful, can and do become, whatever their varying cultural sources, profitable commodities in a market within a state and culture which officially (and no doubt, within the terms of its insoluble contradiction, really) disapproves of or opposes all these things. The older though continuing tensions between cultural authority and cultural independence have been transformed by the increasingly dominant social relations of the new means of production and reproduction. (103)

The fifth chapter is concerned with the ways in which 'culture' and 'cultural production' are socially identified and distinguished. Williams rejects any attempt to distinguish art from non-art on the basis of purely conceptual criteria. He persuasively argues that this distinction, as well as the distinction between aesthetic intentions and responses and others, are themselves 'variable social forms within which the relevant practices are perceived and organized' (130). Historically, these forms develop as complex and varying systems of social signals for the recognition of art. This is the basic idea that Williams explains and expands. There follows a discussion of the relative merits and deficiencies of both formalism and structuralism in the analysis of the arts.

The sixth chapter concerns the relationship between specific artistic forms and certain forms of social relationship. And chapter seven is a general discussion of the processes of cultural production in a very broad sense, including both education and tradition.

The final chapter is an attempt to integrate many of the various themes and analyses of the book under the general concept of cultural organization. The central unifying notion is that of culture as a complex signifying system, which at this point receives a much needed elucidation.

Culture is a very complex and difficult work. In large part this is due to the extreme abstraction and generality imposed by its aim of comprehensiveness over the whole field of sociology of culture. However, a certain density and convolution of style contributes to this as well. Nevertheless, it is a fine and informative book, and well worth the struggles with interpretation.

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C.A. WRINGE, *Children's Rights: A Philosophical Study.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge &Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. xi + 180. Cdn$46.95: US$27.50. ISBN 0-7100-0852-X.

Do children have moral rights of freedom in relation to the use of drugs, alcohol and tobacco and the exercise of sexual freedom? As pupils, do children have the right to participate in the management of their schools? Do they have rights of demonstration and protest? In his closely argued book, C.A. Wringe responds to these and several other controversial topics by posing and answering three questions that he takes to be logically prior: What is a moral right? What justifications do we demand when moral rights are claimed? Is the usual justification of particular rights claims affected by the fact that the person on whose behalf the claim is made is a child? (20) It is Wringe's suggestion that we must first get clear on how we are to answer these questions before we can examine those particular issues that constitute the contemporary debate about children's rights.

Wringe discovers that there is no single answer to the question 'What is a right?' He argues that the assertion 'A has a right to ...' may in fact be used in a number of different ways. The importance of this finding, he suggests, is that 'different kinds of rights claims are susceptible to different modes of justification and criticism' (37). Accordingly, he considers five main categories of rights: rights of freedom in the sense of liberties, claim rights of freedom, rights of democratic participation, special rights, and welfare rights. In each case, the right in question has its own particular justification. Consider, for example, Wringe's treatment of rights of freedom in the sense of liberties. To say that an individual, A, has a right of freedom to do act X in the sense that A is 'at liberty' to do X is to say 'A may do X if he can, and that in doing so he does no wrong' (47). Hence, to have a right to freedom in the sense of liberty is to be distinguished from the notion of a claim right of freedom. In the latter case, the possessor of such a right has a claim against others that they ought not to prevent him from doing the act in question. But in the former case, no such claim is implied. It follows that if one wished to *deny* that another has a right of freedom in the sense of liberty, then one must show that the act in question 'is wrong, breaks some moral principle or unjustifiably infringes on one of the various kinds of claim rights of another individual' (48). It also follows that if one cannot show that the contemplated act or kind of action is wrong, then one has a right to do it (in the sense of being 'at liberty' to do it). For example, if I wish to go mountain climbing alone this week, and someone asserts that I have no right (I am not at liberty) to do this, then the burden is clearly on them to show that there is or would be something wrong in doing this. If they fail to supply a good reason for thinking that my act is wrong, then I have the right to go mountain climbing.

Consider now the case of children. Suppose that my ten-year-old child asserts that he also has the right (in the sense of being at liberty) to go mountain climbing alone this week. If Wringe is right about what he proposes for

the meaning of the assertion 'A has a right of freedom (in the sense of liberty) to do X,' and about how he thinks we justify such an assertion, then unless I can show that there is something that is somehow wrong in my child's act of going off to the mountain unescorted, then my child has the moral right to do this. Is there anything wrong in what my child proposes to do? There are various reasons for affirmative replies to this, but Wringe believes that the most plausible reason for thinking that it would be wrong for my child to do something like going mountain climbing alone is that such actions would violate certain of my parental rights of security (102). As my child's parent, I would be held responsible for any injury that he should incur, and I may be damaged in both my social standing and my material interests by my child's action. 'This would appear to make certain actions wrong when done by children for whose acts others were held responsible, even though they would only be regarded as mildly eccentric or foolhardy if done by adults' (102).

It is important to notice the novelty of Wringe's approach to the question 'Do children have rights of freedom in the sense of liberties?' Most who have written on this question assume that it can be answered once we discover whether children have the capacity for rational choice. Roughly put, the idea is that only moral agents have moral rights of freedom and only those who have the capacity for rational choice are moral agents. Hence, if one thinks that children are by definition beings who lack the capacity for rational choice, then children have no moral rights of freedom. On the other hand, if one thinks that only some children can be said to lack this capacity, then the question whether children have moral rights of freedom should be replaced by the question 'At what age do children acquire the capacity for rational choice?' The assumption has been that if we can determine the appropriate age, then children at and above this age have all the moral rights of freedom possessed by adults.

It is at this latter step that Wringe departs from the company of others who have written on the topic of children's rights. He agrees that rights of freedom cannot be extended to children who are non-rational, for the non-rational child 'cannot ... be seen as a morally independent agent whose acts can be described as right or wrong' (99). However, it does not follow that rights of freedom can be extended to all children who *are* capable of rational decision. For the reasons given earlier, there are many actions that it would be wrong for children, but not adults, to do.

I have given a complete account of one of Wringe's answers to the several questions he poses about children's moral rights because I wanted to illustrate his method of approach. Debates about children's rights have frequently generated more heat than light. Wringe is to be commended for the light he sheds in his clear and analytical treatment of an enormously rich and complex topic.

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