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The Philosopher's Index

An up-to-date quarterly index with abstracts of philosophy books and journals. An annual cumulative edition is also published. In addition, two retrospective indexes have been published, i.e., the *Retrospective Index to U.S. Publications From 1940* and the *Retrospective Index to non-U.S. English Language Publications From 1940.*

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A computerized search service which provides custom bibliographies with abstracts on any logical combination of philosophical topics.

Philosophy Research Archives

The microfiche journal of philosophy which publishes articles, translations, monographs, and bibliographies.

Teaching Philosophy

Explores ideas about teaching and learning philosophy by publishing articles, discussions, and reports on new courses, methods, materials and their impact on philosophy. Textbook and audio-visual reviews are regular features.

American Philosophical Quarterly

A scholarly journal which publishes articles by philosophers of any country on any aspect of philosophy. (Formerly published by Basil Blackwell, Oxford)

Bibliographies of Famous Philosophers

Hardbound bibliographies have been published on Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred North-Whitehead, and Henri Bergson. Forthcoming bibliographies include works on Martin Heidegger and George Santayana.

Directory of American Philosophers

Covers the United States and Canada with information on faculties of philosophy, names, addresses, and specialties of philosophers, data on colleges and universities, philosophical societies, centers, institutes, journals, publishers, and data on fellowships and assistantships. Statistics on the profession. 1982-83 edition published January 1982.

International Directory of Philosophy

Covers Europe, Central and South America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. This directory provides names, addresses, and specialties of philosophers as well as data on colleges, universities, philosophical societies, institutes, journals, and publishers of philosophical works. 1982-85 edition published January 1982.

Directory of Women in Philosophy

A handbook of women in philosophy, with information on fields of specialization, degree (date and institution), dissertation or publications, position, institution, dossier source, address, and telephone number. 1981-82 edition published February 1981.

Mailing Labels

Labels of approximately 9,600 philosophers in the United States and Canada are available as well as addresses by specialty, i.e., Ethics, Aesthetics, etc.

Journal Typesetting

Journals are economically typeset using computer driven photo-composition equipment. Books, ads, and other documents can also be done.

LESLIE ARMOUR, *The Idea of Canada and the Crisis of Community*. Ottawa: Steel Rail Publishing 1981. Pp. xvii + 180. $14.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-88791-026-2); $9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88791-024-6).

While our eminent scientists since the days of Eddington and Jeans have not hesitated to write freely about science for the ordinary reader, our philosophers seem to shrink from exposing their wares too openly to the public gaze. William James had a flair for popular exposition; Bertrand Russell, after his experimental school ended in disaster, wrote a number of successful pot-boilers; more recently R.M. Hare has produced some admirable popular essays in his *Applications of Moral Theory*. But it is not long since C.E.M. Joad was made to bite the philosophic dust when his writings were dismissed, perhaps somewhat unfairly, as mere 'philosophic journalism.' G.S. Brett thought it was folly to set up the common man as the arbiter of philosophic excellence and Canadian philosophers generally tend, in this regard, to be a conservative lot. Having noticed from the blurb that it 'is his first philosophical work for the general reader,' some may immediately view Armour's book with suspicion. This may be increased when they discover that it contains a number of illustrations, something almost unheard of in philosophical literature. The illustrations consist of fourteen full-page reproductions of Canadian posters in which aspects of Canadian culture are portrayed and, sometimes gently, sometimes more caustically, satirized by Canadian artists. Armour insists that our philosophers must search out the sources of our Canadian problems in our Canadian experience and then try to make their findings intelligible to their fellow citizens. He is no closet philosopher, but he is still a philosopher. The pace is brisk, the style lively and, while 'the crisis of community' is surveyed in all its frightening complexity, a note of cheerful optimism keeps breaking in. If any of our wet-blanketing philosophers have put the book down unread they will have foregone the enjoyment of much wit, missed much ingenious argument, and in a time of gloomy foreboding, lost the opportunity of examining a reasoned, philosophical case for confidence about the future of Canadian unity.

Armour is becoming widely known for his studies in Canadian philosophy, past and present. Indeed he seems to have read everything Canadian, both in English and French, in literature, philosophy, politics and

economic theory. The result is a book as crammed with ideas as a Christmas pudding with plums. The ordinary reader will certainly not find it dull but he may at first find it a bit overwhelming. Armour has, however, foreseen this possibility and has thoughtfully provided thirty-three pages of notes and annotated bibliography in which terms are defined and people identified, to help the neophyte remain steady on course. In an area where reason and rhetoric are frequently confused he does well to keep so trim a ship.

It is impossible in a brief review even to mention all the considerations that arise but the gist of the argument, at least so far as it concerns the involvement of philosophy, may be briefly indicated. Philosophy for Armour is the art of resolving conflicting intuitions through reason. While any pluralistic society that recognizes the concerns of both communities and individuals is bound to incur tensions, Canadians are uniquely fortunate in having already laid down for them the philosophical groundwork of an organic theory of society. 'A society is organic if the parts work together to form an intelligible whole in which each has a unique part' (xii). Today the organic society is confronted by the nightmare of a unified, faceless, homogenized, impersonal world in which individuals cease perforce to be functioning moral units, and then begin clamorously to demand their 'rights.' But in the organic society duties come before rights and rights are related to duties. To see the present situation in perspective it is useful to survey the past. History is like travel. The traveller not only surveys new lands but returns to view his own in a new light. So the middle chapters are devoted to an examination of the development of a Canadian tradition in philosophy, its characteristics and its contribution to 'the idea of Canada.' Here Armour is much at home. We are introduced, among others, to McCulloch, Lyall and Schurman of Dalhousie, Watson of Queen's, Murray of Queen's and later of McGill, Brett, Blewett and Innis of Toronto, Keirstead of New Brunswick and, among the writers in the French language, Pâquet, Charbonneau, Lachance and de Koninck. This may seem rather a motley assembly of Hegelians, Thomists, individualists, collectivists, idealists, realists, radicals, conservatives, revolutionaries and gradualists amongst whom it might appear hopeless to anticipate unanimity. But the conclusion is reached that the original positions become so qualified in the details of exposition that agreement is reached on a sufficient number of fundamental points to enable the essentials of a common Canadian tradition to emerge. For example, Hegelian Watson and Thomist Lachance are 'both concerned to battle tyranny ... Both are quite clear about the limits of the authority of church and state' (87). 'They both maintain that there are known and established values to be protected' (88). They both 'oppose violent change,' yet both 'insist that a wide region of power and responsibility must properly be given to individuals in a way which will make social change more likely and more to the liking of individuals' (88-9). There are two principles which both would accept — 'the principle of the continuity of community ... and the principle of individual integrity' (90-1). Thus the organic society 'may also be pluralistic, for the one whole may be so organized as to serve a variety of cultures, communities and ways of life' (xiv). 'The

idea of a society at once organic and pluralistic has very old roots in Canada' (xiii). Two things follow: we need to take our history more seriously, and, specifically, we need to insist that 'all those who teach in universities ... have a thorough knowledge of the Canadian tradition in their own fields' (141).

Armour has written a timely, bracing and most readable book which speaks to our condition.

F. HILTON PAGE
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C.L. BAKER and JOHN J. McCARTHY, eds., *The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1981. Pp. xiv + 358. US$27.50. ISBN 0-262-02159-5.

This book contains the proceedings of a conference at the University of Texas in 1930 on linguistic work relating to learnability of natural languages. Despite its title, it is concerned neither with problems of logic nor with the psychology of language acquisition. The reference in the title to a *logical* problem of language acquisition alludes to the problem that Noam Chomsky has urged theoretical linguists to regard as the ultimate goal of their investigations: the problem of how any organism could possibly acquire fluent knowledge of a human language on the basis of the meagre and imperfect information that suffices for a human infant.

Learnability theory (as this work is usually called) is currently enjoying a surge of popularity. This is novel, for despite the program launched by Chomsky (1962) to connect the theory of grammar and the theory of language acquisition, the fact is that linguists paid virtually no attention to the seminal work of Gold (1967) on grammatical induction when it appeared, despite its clear relevance to their enterprise. In Gold's 'identifiability-in-the-limit' paradigm, 'learning a language' is formally modeled as a process of computing a series of tentative grammars, rejecting those that are incompatible with primary data (i.e. evidence concerning what sentences are in the language), ultimately arriving at a grammar that does not need to be modified on the basis of further data. Linguists are now beginning to pay attention to the kind of mathematical work on learnability that Gold initiated.

The first chapter in this book, 'Learnability, restrictiveness, and the evaluation metric' by Howard Lasnik, presents an orthodox Chomskyan

viewpoint on some philosophically important issues in this domain — for instance, whether natural languages are recursive sets of sentences and whether this property relates to the property of learnability (see Putnam 1961). But Lasnik's presentation is unfortunately peppered with errors on mathematical points, as pointed out immediately afterward in some very negative comments by Stanley Peters.

The second chapter, 'Some issues in the theory of learnability' by Kenneth Wexler, deals with some specific assumptions made by Wexler and Culicover (1980) in obtaining their proof that there is a certain class of limited transformational grammars that are 'learnable' (under a special definition of learnability), and discusses a selection of associated issues. Wexler also lets the reader down at crucial points where mathematical exactitude would be helpful. To take just one example, on pp. 46-7 he sketches a proof that his limited class of transformational grammars is finite. Yet he mentions that the theory allows 'morphological insertion' by transformations (albeit 'strictly limited'), stating that it 'can be ignored.' As far as I can see, given the (at least) denumerable infinity of distinct morphological elements (differently spelled words) that arbitrary natural languages might possess, the existence of transformations mentioning arbitrary morphological material clearly guarantees an infinite class of grammars.

Wexler's chapter is followed by a particularly interesting commentary by Steven Pinker, author of the best literature-review on learnability theory (Pinker [1979]). Pinker discusses, among other things, the ways in which being context-free (in the sense defined in formal language theory), or being drawn from a finite set (in the way that Wexler wrongly claims his theory can guarantee), can make a language easier to learn, but stresses that 'formal results (context-freeness or finiteness) are less important for easy learnability than the particular mechanisms that yield those results' (53). That is, it is the things that linguistic theory has to say to ensure the context-freeness or finite number of the grammars it permits that can make those grammars easier to identify (i.e. learn).

The chapters by Lasnik and Wexler are the only ones in the book that even allude to the mathematical work on learnability. The other chapters stem from straightforward linguistic description, not formal work on learnability-related properties. Four are about syntax: 'A readjustment in learnability assumptions' by Edwin Williams (comments by Per-Kristian Halvorsen), 'Form, function and the language acquisition device' by Jane Grimshaw (comments by Ellen Woolford), 'Strict bounding' by Mark Baltin (no commentary), and 'Learnability and the English auxiliary system' by C.L. Baker (comments by Thomas Wasow). One is about diachronic syntax: 'The history of noun phrase movement' by David Lightfoot (comments by Susan F. Schmerling), and one about morphology: 'On the deductive model and the acquisition of productive morphology' by Thomas Roeper (comments by Carlota S. Smith). The remaining two chapters are about phonology: 'On the learnability of abstract phonology' by Bezalel Elan Dresher (comments by Robert Bley-Vroman) and 'The role of the evaluation metric in the acquisition of

phonology' by John J. McCarthy (comments by Jonathan Derek Kaye). A number of these chapters are quite interesting, but in many cases they offer only informal speculations about learnability, as opposed to the mathematically informed modelling of grammar induction that is needed in this area of the study of language.

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PETER G. BROWN and HENRY SHUE, eds., *Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits.* Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1981. Pp. xvii + 216. US$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7011-2); US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7048-1).

This collection of original essays is the second in a series published by the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy established by the University of Maryland to research the values and concepts that underlie public policy. It is a fascinating contribution to the growing philosophy of international relations. The book falls into two parts.

The first part is a symposium on the political theory of migrant workers

(of whom there are now some twenty million in the western world alone). Michael Walzer argues that states have the right to regulate entry of migrant workers but that once arrived these people should be able to acquire full citizenship of the host country. Elsa Chaney objects that his argument is excessively theoretical and reviews a number of programmes that are in hand to ameliorate the condition of migrant workers. She maintains that the best realistic hope is that these workers may come to receive social and economic rights enforced by international agencies, but not political rights. Judith Lichtenberg goes further, arguing a cosmopolitan view of international society poles apart from Walzer's insistence on the vital importance of a sharp and serious doctrine of the state. In a brief reply to his critics Walzer is at his formidable best. An especially interesting remark with wider repercussions is that one should find Chaney's and still more Lichtenberg's devaluation of citizenship 'worrisome ... If all the ordinary benefits of citizenship are enjoyed by some substantial number of people without its special privileges and duties, then what is the point of the privileges and duties? "How shall men love their country," asked Rousseau, "if it is nothing more for them than for strangers, and bestows on them only that which it can refuse to none"?' (102).

After several readings I am still undecided whether Walzer or Chaney has the better of the argument. What seems to me clear is that Walzer has identified a problem of far-reaching theoretical interest (and, as always in his writings, of urgent practical concern). One aspect of the problem not discussed here is the nature of dual citizenship. Walzer has argued elsewhere that a necessary part of citizenship is liability to military conscription (*Obligations,* esp. Part Two). Does he now wish to say that the migrant worker must endure a double dose of military service? And what of the host country? States which have refused dual nationality have done so, I suppose, from fear of traitors and of being drawn against their will into foreign quarrels. Should the new internationalists be arguing that the permeability of the state is such nowadays that the traditional fears can be discounted?

The second part of the book comprises three independent essays. In 'Exporting Hazards' (written for this book, published in penultimate draft in *Ethics,* July 1981) Henry Shue reviews the arguments for being more lax about safety controls in foreign, especially developing, countries than at home. He comes to the unsurprising conclusion that the arguments are spurious. Thomas Biersteker in 'The Limits of State Power in the Contemporary World Economy' reviews the literature on non-state actors in the international system and argues for a conception of international society that shall avoid both 'the excesses of the "unreformed transnationalists" and "vulgar dependency" writers of a decade ago' and an exclusively state-centred 'version of political realism increasingly unrealistic for an interpretation of the emerging world order of the 1980s' (172). His emphasis is on the indubitable fact that non-state actors have important effects on international affairs. He does not address the question of whether these actors can be creative initiators or whether creative action must be mediated by the state.

Charles Beitz in 'Democracy in Developing Societies' takes on a fundamental issue: does what we know about developing societies prevent us from rationally desiring for them the democracy which we are rational to desire for our own developed societies? He finds the social science literature on this deficient in two respects: 'One is an unwarranted a priori belief that authoritarian regimes can be expected to govern more successfully than democratic ones; the other, which is related, is a failure to distinguish among the patterns of outcomes likely to be produced by authoritarian governments operating in societies with varying economic structures and political circumstances' (202). If correct, this is so important that one hopes it will be trumpeted forth to a larger audience than is likely to work its way through the intricate ruminations with which Beitz prefaces it. Beitz blunts the impact of his main finding in two ways: by lengthy reflections on the nature of democracy which seem to me neither necessary for his argument nor sufficient for general theoretical insight into the case for and dilemmas of democracy; and by leaning over backwards to be 'fair,' to a point at which he appears to be advancing a substantial criticism of 'the human rights orthodoxy' that democracy is good for countries however undeveloped. His argument on the latter is misleading because the ways in which democracy may fail (according to his criteria of failure) can as well be encountered in developed as in underdeveloped countries.

This book is further welcome evidence that English-language philosophers are finding their way out into the real world of politics. Its trenchant analyses of concepts whose currency in real life the authors document admirably furthers the development of a larger sense of the scope and potential of philosophy.

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TERRELL CARVER, *Engels*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; New York: Hill and Wang 1981. Pp. x + 85. Cdn$10.95; US$7.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-287549-3; 0-8090-4256-3): Cdn$3.25; US$2.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-287548-5; 0-8090-1422-X).

This slim volume represents a significant, if flawed, contribution to the current interest in better understanding the intellectual relation between Marx

and Marxism. For approximately a century, under the heading of Marxist orthodoxy, the relation between Marx and his followers has, mainly for political reasons, been mainly depicted as a seamless intellectual web. But conceptual differences between them have become increasingly evident in the recent discussion. In much of this discussion, the stress placed on a better grasp of Marx's own views has led to a comparative neglect of those of his followers. The intent of the present study is in part to redress that balance through a close study of Engels' own ideas designed to interest the reader in his thought, especially as concerns its implications for contempoary social science and politics. In this rapid, but careful study, Carver is successful in calling attention to the distinction between the views of Engels and of Marx. But in the final analysis, despite the important claims made on the former's behalf, it is not clear that, since Engels' ideas are admittedly in the main a series of imperfect glosses of Marx's, despite their acknowledged influence, they are of genuine intellectual importance.

Although short, this study is thorough, with chapters on the relation between Engels and Marx, the former as journalist, communist, revolutionary, Marxist, and scientist, and finally on the relation of Engels to Marxism. A number of interesting points are made in passing. At the outset, Carver notes that if, as he proceeds to demonstrate, the views of Marx and of Engels do not coincide, then the problem of their relation is complex and the attempt to show a strict continuity between them must surely fail (1-2). There is a sympathetic, but critical account of Engels' early literary activity, although unaccountably the significance of his insistance on the rise of the industrial proletariat for Marx's view is not stressed. The importance of Engels' 'Outline of a Critique of Political Economy' is noted, although, perhaps for reasons of space, neither its idealist character nor the fashion in which it is appropriated by Marx is stressed. It is difficult to agree, from what we now know, that the *German Ideology* is 'a genuinely collaborative work' (25). Indeed, that view is almost immediately undermined by the admission, which I believe to be correct, that the central theme of the 'Communist Manifesto' arose from Marx's premises in the *German Ideology.*

Carver is on firmer ground in his treatment of Engels' later career. The observation that Engels was the first Marxist is trivially true. But it must be regretted that, since the real and important distinctions between the views of Marx and Engels are repeatedly stressed, the obvious implication for the disparity between Marx and Marxism is never drawn. We are usefully informed that Engels' study of the peasant war in Germany, as the first Marxist study of history, set the terms for later Marxist work in this area. Carver helpfully points out that beginning with his reviews of Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* and following with *Capital* I, Engels assumed the role of the authoritative Marxist commentator. Carver is further correct to stress, as others have also recently done, that from this time on Engels' own views became increasingly influenced by concepts of teleology and scientific laws of development (44). But it is hard to concede that Marx did not also believe in historical necessity (50). Further the claim that Engels was a strict

materialist (51) has no meaning unless, as is not the case here, the distinction between the perspectives of Marx and Engels on this cardinal point is made clear. Finally, the attention to the source of the mixed metaphor concerning the overturning of Hegel's thought in Engels' *Feuerbach* is helpful, but incomplete, since this idea is already present in germ in the *German Ideology*.

The most impressive portion of this book concerns the useful discussion of Engels and Marxism. Carver asserts that Engels' main contribution is the materialist interpretation of history (63). This claim is based on the fact that Engels invented the label, which is correct, and the belief that he was its most effective exponent, which is questionable. Depending on how the term 'materialism' is defined, certainly Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* has an equal, if not better claim. It is also difficult to know how to evaluate the assertion that the grasp of the interrelation of ideas and economic life, which the author traces to Marx's *A Contribution,* but which was already present in the *German Ideology,* is 'the most influential idea of modern times in the study of man and society' (65), although the careful attention to the sense in which Engels' gloss differs from Marx's own formulation is important. In conclusion, despite the occasional difference of opinion, as noted, and although I am hesitant to conceed that Engels' own views are intrinsically intellectually signficant, the importance and comparative success of Carver's attempt, in brief compass, to draw attention to Engels' role as an uncertain interpreter of Marx's texts and the problems to which this gives rise is to be stressed.

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FRED I. DRETSKE, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1981. Pp. xi + 273 US$18.50. ISBN 0-262-04063-8.

Few who read this book will fail to profit. It is an intelligent, imaginative, well-informed, well-written investigation of important issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind. The book itself is well-produced and sensibly priced. If *Consumer Reports* rated philosophy books, this one would be a BEST BUY.

The book has three parts. Part I, Information, is a self-contained presentation of the basic concepts of information theory. Dretske develops his ideas here with a wealth of illustrations and meticulous attention to detail. A sum-

mary gives little idea of the value of this part of the book, yet to grasp the point of the book, one must have some familiarity with the ideas developed here. In particular, suppose we have an object *s*, a source of information, which may be in any of n states s_1, ..., s_n with associated probabilities $p(s_1)$, ..., $p(s_n)$ respectively. The information generated by the occurrence of any given state s_i, the *surprisal* of s_i, is

$$(1) \qquad I(s_i) = \log_2 1/p(s_i).$$

To get some intuitive feel for this definition, notice that as $p(s_i)$ approaches 0, $1/p(s_i)$ grows without bound and so does $\log_2 1/p(s_i)$; i.e., the less probable a state, the more information associated with its occurrence. Conversely, the more probable a state ($p(s_i)$ approaches 1), the less its surprisal ($1/p(s_i)$) approaches 1, so $I(s_i)$ approaches 0).

Next we suppose there is some receiver (or bearer) of information, *r*, which can be in any of states r_1, ..., r_m. The amount of information about some source s in a particular state of the receiver or signal, r_i, is

$$(2) \qquad I_s(r_i) = I(s_i) - E(r_i).$$

In (2) the quantity $I_s(r_i)$ is just the amount of information generated at the source, $I(s_i)$, less the quantity $E(r_i)$, the *equivocation* associated with r_i, which has the following formidable definition:

$$(3) \qquad E(r_i) = -\sum_{j=1}^{n} p(s_j/r_i) \bullet \log_2 p(s_j/r_i),$$

($p(s_j/r_i)$ is the conditional probability of s_j given r_i). Notice two simple consequences of (3). If there is some state s_j of s such that $p(s_j/r_i) = 1$, then $E(r_i) = 0$, since $\log_2 p(s_j/r_i) = 0$ and for all values of k-j, $p(s_k/r_i) = 0$. And conversely if $E(r_i) = 0$, there must be some value s_j of *s* such that $p(s_j/r_i) = 0$.

The stage is now set for Dretske's fundamental philosophical moves. Any theory of information, he claims, should preserve what he calls the Xerox Principle: If A carries the information that B, and B carries the information that C, then A carries the information that C (57). In a form of argument that recurs throughout the book, Dretske deduces a striking consequence from the Xerox Principle. Imagine that a signal carries the information that *s* is in some state (Let us now write this as '*s* is F') from *s* to *r* although there is some small but positive equivocation associated with the signal. Then the information that *s* is F should similarly be carried from *r* to *q*, from *q* to *t*, and so on by similar signals. But no matter how small the degree of equivocation that one imagines associated with each message, as long as it has some positive value, one can construct a chain of signals along which the equivocation of the informational links sum so that (a) the message arriving at the final link carries

the information that *s* is F but (b) the arrival of this message gives arbitrarily low probability to *s*'s being F. The conclusion that Dretske draws from this reductio is that information can *flow* from source to receiver only when the equivocation associated with the signal is zero.

This conclusion is crucial because Dretske defines knowledge, the (perceptual) knowledge that *s* is F, as the belief that *s* is F when caused (or causally sustained) by the information that *s* is F. Part II, Knowledge and Perception, is an elaboration and defense of this definition. In particular, a knower K is in a position to know that *s* is F only if he possesses the information that *s* is F. A signal bearing this information must, therefore, travel from *s* to K — a signal, that is, which has an associated equivocation of O. In turn, we have seen that if the equivocation is to equal O, then the receipt of this signal must give probability 1 to the state of affairs that *s* is F.

Given this concept of knowledge, the skeptical question immediately arises: can one ever know? In this context, the skeptic denies that any signal can ever give probability 1 to an event or state of affairs at its source. Is there not always some alternative condition of the medium (or channel of communication) such that the same signal would in fact, and perhaps unknown to us, indicate an alternate state of the source? Could it not be, we ask almost reflexively, a white object in red light?

Dretske confronts this challenge in Chapter 5. He admits (insists, in fact) that knowledge that *s* is F does not admit of degrees, is absolute. If K knows that *s* is F, then the information he has received eliminates all relevant alternatives to *s*'s being F. It makes no sense, then, to speak of K*'s knowing that *s* is F any better or worse, any more or less, than K.

But what are these relevant alternatives? The skeptic, according to Dretske, *recommends* that we consider all logically consistent possibilities relevant alternatives and thereby concludes that we never know. But that strategy is like saying a warehouse is not empty (another absolute concept) if it contains air molecules. What *counts* as a thing in the warehouse depends upon context and purpose. If we wish to know how much merchandise is currently in the warehouse, then it is empty even if it has rats; but if we wish to use it as a giant vacuum chamber, it is empty only if it has not even air molecules.

Similarly there is a context-dependent, social, or pragmatic aspect to knowledge that has its roots in the context-dependency of communication. What conditions count as not having relevant alternatives and hence as being part of the communication channel rather than the source of information just depends upon the regularities governing these conditions and upon our purposes and values in a given situation. *Relative to* fixing the genuine alternatives, such knowledge as there is in that situation is absolute.

Dretske's discussion clarifies and sharpens the difference between the skeptic and the anti-skeptic, no mean feat in itself. His recommendation, that we recognize and preserve the relativity or pragmatic dimension of knowledge as well as its absoluteness, is sane and attractive, yet it may be worthwhile to consider briefly some limitations of his position.

Dretske's arguments are specifically limited to one paradigm of knowledge — knowing of an object that it has a certain property or stands in a certain relation. For example, suppose that there is a one gram weight on the table before me. My eyes work well; there is no other weight that I would confuse with the one gram weight; no one is trying to fool me, etc. In these circumstances Dretske has shown that I can see that (and hence can know that) *s* is a one gram weight. Similarly, I can see that *s* is on the table.

Do I know, however, that one second from now *s* will still be on the table? In *The Anatomy of Science,* Chapter VI, G. N. Lewis calculated that if a weight of 10^{-8} grams, kept in a box at a constant temperature of 65°F, were checked once every second, we would find the weight 10^{-7} cm above the floor of the box 6.32 times every million years. Clearly the probability of finding a one gram weight discriminably above the surface of the table is much less — a fantastically small number, in fact, but still non-zero. This probability arises, not from some imaginary skeptical possibility, but as a quantitative consequence of fundamental natural laws. If the basic physical laws are statistical, then Dretske's approach to knowledge commits him to the view that I can not know that one second from now *s* will still be on the table.

It is important to understand that this argument constitutes neither a refutation of nor a counterexample to Dretske's position. It is not a refutation because his information-theoretic approach may yet be extendable in some way to deal with knowledge of the future. Perhaps we can, within such a framework, be shown to know that one second from now *s* will be on the table with probability *p*, and perhaps that is all one can know of the future in a stochastic universe.

And even if we ordinarily say or strongly intuit that we *know* that *s* will be on the table one second from now, Dretske's program is not upset. He is not telling us what we mean by 'know' but rather what knowledge is (see Chapter 4). He is not playing the old analytical game, as he did in *Seeing and Knowing,* but one more sophisticated, interesting, and fruitful. Its rules are less clear, but some deviation from ordinary use and some outrage of intuition are permitted, when there is sufficient theoretical justification.

In Part III, Meaning and Belief, Dretske completes his epistemological project by characterizing belief in information-theoretic terms. This definition rounds out his metaphysical project as well, which is to show that the notion of objective information developed in Part I provides 'all that is necessary for understanding how purely physical systems could occupy states having a content (meaning) characteristic of knowledge and belief' (xi). There are still questions to be answered, particularly about de dicto belief; but Dretske has made a clear and compelling start, and that is a major achievement.

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GEORGE ENGLEBRETSEN, *Logical Negation.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press (for VanGorcum) 1981. Pp. x + 62. US$5.75. ISBN 90-232-1814-0.
GEORGE ENGLEBRETSEN, *Three Logicians.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press (for VanGorcum) 1981. Pp. x + 118. US$9.50. ISBN 90-232-1815-9.

Much philosophical writing suffers from compression or want of it, with the latter predominating. George Englebretsen's two slim monographs manage to suffer from both. *Three Logicians* — Aristotle, the inventor of syllogistic, and Leibniz and Sommers, extenders of syllogistic — explores the 'war' of traditional syllogistic with modern mathematical logic, while *Logical Negation* treats action along one of its fronts. Englebretsen has but poorly digested the two dozen or so of his articles on which these books are based; repetitions within each and from one to the other, as well as ineptly formatted, unhelpful notes, are among the symptoms of this indigestion. VanGorcum would have done better to insist that he forge his material into one coherent study.

The books explain both too much and too little. Englebretsen's synopses of mathematical logic go far enough to irritate the initiate but not far enough instruct the novice. He refers constantly to sources — mostly standard, a few arcane, frequently his own articles — for discussions of topics brought up but not examined in his text. People moderately conversant with the field don't need the references; beginners would profit much more from even a short exposition ready to hand. Englebretsen has no compunction, for instance, about attaching 'syncategorematic' loosely to the end of a discussion, hinting that understanding it is especially helpful, and leaving it unexplained save for a reference to the late Father Boehner's *Medieval Logic (TL,* 77). Anyone who cares about syncategoremata has already read Boehner, while prospective enthusiasts, as yet without this specialist vocabulary, are turned off by Englebretsen's coyness.

Englebretsen's aim appears to be to win converts to his view that traditional syllogistic is an instrument of philosophical investigation superior to all others, particularly to mathematical logic. His tone is unfortunately polemical rather than simply controversial. Polemics are usually out of place in philosophical discussion and are the more so here, because there is a deal of published material giving evidence not only of a truce between the two sides but of their peaceful and profitable coexistence. (Englebretsen even cites a sample of this literature — John Corcoran, ed. *Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations* [Dordrecht: Reidel 1974].) If he was determined to engage in polemics, Englebretsen might just have issued a broadside. Instead, he has included much basic and historical material, distracting from his main thrust and too biassed to be instructive.

His claim for the superiority of Sommers-style syllogistic rests on two counts: that it preserves natural syntax (*TL,* 109-11; *LN,* 56-9, and elsewhere throughout both books) and that it provides an arithmetical analogue for logical reckoning (*TL,* 111; in Sommers notation, affirmation is symbolized

by '+', denial by '−', while '−' serves for universal quantity, '+' for particular, and logical contraries differ in sign). Englebretsen makes fun of the way mathematical logic recasts sentences of ordinary language, but he is so carried away with the conviction that categoricals (subject and predicate terms joined by copulas) are predications par excellence that he doesn't himself blanch at proposing, for instance:

all (whatever) | are (is) | bigger than | all/some (the) |

sun | are | bigger than | all/some (the) | moons. (*TL*, 87)

Examples like this, accompanied by branching diagrams labelled at the joints with upper and lower case letters, are supposed to show that the 'new syllogistic' makes room for relationals. Aside from wondering what a parodist like Mark Twain, say, would do with something which seems already so broadly to be parodying itself, one has to ask what such stuffing of relationals into categorical form can possibly do to help us understand them or perform operations with them. Inferences in which this sort of stuffing occurs are justified by the elegantly named Rule of Composition (Comp): $-S+P \therefore -(S+Q)+(P+Q)$, where 'Q' is 'any adjective term (monadic or relational)'! Identity suffers a similar fate: 'Identities, like relationals, are genuine categoricals' (*TL*, 83). Englebretsen and Sommers bring off this trick by allowing singular terms — names of individuals — to serve as predicates. Aristotle did not allow this. (Cf. *An. Pr.* 43a34-5, and my discussion in 'Corcoran on Aristotle's Logical Theory' in Corcoran [1974].)

Propositions asserting existence are also made to fit the categorical mold. Englebretsen is right in saying that syllogistic logicians have not been troubled by existential import for either universally or particularly quantified sentences (*TL*, 104-5). He also reminds us of one way of looking at the question when he mentions that Leibniz took variables to range over 'logically possible things, existent or nonexistent' (*TL*, 105). He goes on, however, to argue that 'exists' is a predicate and 'easy proofs' of its being such are possible. For Englebretsen, a domain of discourse is specified not for the whole language L, but separately for each sentence of L by its predicate, which is said to 'span' or determine a category. Thus the category determined by 'red' (the category's name is written '/red/') consists of everything of which 'red' can be affirmed or denied and excludes those things of which it cannot be affirmed or denied. So far, so good. But he proceeds to define '/E/' for '/exists/' as follows:

$$/E/ =_{df} -(-E+E)$$

or, as Englebretsen renders it, 'what is /E/ is by definition what is either E or nonE' (*TL*, 106). Perhaps Englebretsen does intend here to specify just his whole Leibnizian domain of logically possible things, for that is what he has done. Any sentence in which E is a predicate will, then, be about something

determined by a category which includes everything whatsoever. Such predications obviously can be made, a fact recognized by Aristotle, who nonetheless held that these predications are vacuous. For Aristotle, unqualified 'is' and unqualified 'is one' are predicates of everything (*Top.* 121b7; cf. 121a17-8), distinguish nothing (*Top.* 140a29-30), and are synonymous one with the other (*Metaph.* 1003b22-4). So far from being a category in the Aristotelian sense — is there another? — Englebretsen's '/E/' is just the unsorted notion that substance and the nine accidents were devised to sort out.

Sommers's tree diagrams may be useful for explaining certain kinds of predications to certain kinds of undergraduate students. His arithmetical analogue may also be handy for checking out the validity of syllogisms, although 'Barbara, Celarent, ...' is probably as easy to master. His analogue breaks no new ground, as one is left with the suspicion that it is a parlor trick, arrived at by knowing in advance which moods were valid and fiddling with the algorithms until they came out right. The cover blurb for *Three Logicians* states that 'the author has sought to extend and strengthen considerably the theory of propositional form in ways which are, in a sense, reflective of the discoveries of linguists such as Chomsky.' The sense must be tenuous, because, having been invoked on the cover, Chomsky's name appears nowhere in either volume nor is any work of his cited.

Englebretsen's background in the logical literature is wide-ranging and he shows a refreshing willingness to take on the analysis of predication and of undeservedly neglected topics like logical contrariety. It is a pity that he has allowed himself to be drawn off into a hasty grinding of the slight ax of 'new syllogistic.'

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FRIEDMAN, GEORGE. *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1981. Pp. 312. US$17.50. ISBN 0-8014-1279-X.

The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School treats the works of Benjamin, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse as if they formed a more or less coherent whole. The book's principal aim is to elucidate the basic structure of

this whole. Its strategy to accomplish this aim is, first, to examine the influence of particular thinkers on the School (Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Spengler, Freud, and Judaism); then to provide a general account of the School's diagnosis of the crises of modernity (especially in philosophy, art, and politics); and finally to explicate the vision of the truly human life which the School thought within humanity's grasp, and the various political, psychological, and aesthetic ways the School hoped to foster the achievement of this vision. As can be seen from this description, the title of the book is somewhat misleading: its account of the Frankfurt School is very much wider than the narrowly political, and it does not especially address what are usually taken to be political problems.

The strengths of the book are obvious. A genuine focus is gained by treating the School as a unity, even though the image captured is a little forced and somewhat ragged at the edges. For the most part one is grateful to have the thought of these thinkers unified in its basic outlines and interrelated on such a broad range of topics. Most importantly, by employing this approach, Friedman is able to convey the depth, the seriousness, and the guiding passions of the members of the School. He does this by probing to the deep core of the ideas of its members, showing how these ideas derive from a common center of attitudes and beliefs about the modern world, its peculiar dangers and possibilities, and about the nature of man and society. Moreover, by proceeding in this way, Friedman can ignore the more local differences among them and so reveal the large and fundamental notions which constitute the real achievement of the School (its analysis of reason, of art, of labor, of the erotic, of bureaucracy, and so on).

I should hasten to add that there are some places in which the genuine differences within the School cannot be papered over utilizing Friedman's approach, and that at these times the picture he presents of the School is distorted. For instance, Adorno and Marcuse differed deeply with Benjamin over the nature of modern art and its relation to politics. And again, Adorno and Marcuse were fundamentally opposed in their attitudes towards the narcissistic, erotic person Marcuse thought the fulfilment of human potential. In these and other places, to talk of *the* Frankfurt School requires either that one misleadingly play down the differences (as Friedman does in the first instance), or ignore the conflict by presenting the thought of one thinker almost to the exclusion of the other (as Friedman does in the second, by overplaying Marcuse).

Because Friedman relates the ideas of the School to its intellectual heritage, the picture which he presents is very rich and developed. This is so not primarily because one can thereby understand the origins of these ideas, but because one can see them in all their fine, complex detail. Moreover, this approach gives one a sense of the tradition of discourse in which the School was operating, and so an understanding of the concerns, questions, ambitions, and conceptual resources of the School. That is, one understands better where it was coming from.

Of course, some aspects of this are done better than others. The chapter

on the School's (and especially Marcuse's) appropriation of Freud is brilliant, exceedingly clear and illuminating. The chapter on the relation of Marx to the School is subtle, nicely capturing the ways the School was and was not Marxist. However, the chapter on Heidegger is obscure and, insofar as I understood it, wrongheaded. The chapter on Nietzsche is interesting as far as it went, but is just too thin. And though the inclusion of Judaism was inspired, the discussion of it is unnecessarily complicated. Also, a disappointment was the absence of a discussion of Weber, whose ideas of disenchantment, rationalization, and bureaucracy were crucial in the development of the School's position.

Except for a few places in the main body of the text and for the concluding chapter, Friedman is content to explicate the School's thought rather than critically examine it. Though I think Friedman largely succeeds in his own terms, I think the strategy of pure explication was a mistake on Friedman's part, one which led him to write a book not quite as stimulating as he was capable of making it. I think this shows itself in two different ways.

In the first place, though Friedman writes in an elegant and usually clear manner, because he has adopted the role of pure expositor, he is too tied to the style of thought and mode of expression of the School itself. This is a great pity, because the school is notorious for its lack of analytic rigor, its penchant for jargon, and its use of rhetorical flourish to hide conceptual weakness. Friedman's book does not escape entirely from these same defects. It needed to be a little more careful, more prosaic, more concrete, and more attune to everyday modern experience than it is. By adopting a more critical, and hence more distanced, stance toward the School, Friedman might well have written a sharper, tougher, more penetrating book.

In the second place, if one wants to avoid making the School a mere historical curiosity, and instead to insist that it is a vital center crucial for the development of our current understanding of ourselves, then it behooves one to expose and think through what in hindsight are obvious problems for the School. Judging by the last chapter, I take it that Friedman believes the School led itself into a dead end (principally because its vision of man cannot deal with the fact of death). But he also believes that its failure is revelatory for us, and so worth chronicling. But in his discussion of the School's ideas regarding art, philosophy, politics, and so on, he does not indicate what we can take from the School and what we can discard, and so he doesn't show in precisely what ways its ideas are revelatory.

To take two examples. The School thought that we live in an accepting, uncritical political culture which is monistic, uniform, numbed, and 'massified' — a 'one dimensional' political culture. But events in the last twenty years, at least prima facie, call this into question. We live in one of the most politically active periods the world has ever known, a time of confrontation, dissent, frustration, and revolt. What are we to make of all of this activity, given the School's approach? By failing to discuss this, Friedman tacitly makes the School irrelevant to our own concerns. Or again, the School claims that modern art is 'affirmative' and uncritical, that it 'requires only limited at-

tention,' tolerating the 'distractedness of the masses' (148); Adorno cites jazz as a particularly good example of these features of modern art. But, given the music of Charlie Parker and John Coltrane in the last thirty years, isn't this just *obvious* nonsense? Again, by failing to comment on this sort of thing, Friedman makes it impossible for us to know just what we are to take seriously about the school's account of art which he so diligently explores.

Too often the picture of modern life offered by the School seems in retrospect a caricature. This, combined with the failure of Freidman to provide the necessary critical guidance, led me to put down this book feeling very much better informed about the Frankfurt School but *not* feeling that this informing had given me a better understanding of the world in which we live. For me to have gained the latter from the book, it needed to have more of Friedman himself in it than it has. Given his obvious intelligence and learning, I wish this had been the case.

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THOMAS C. GREY, *The Legal Enforcement of Morality: Essay and Materials in Law and Philosophy.* New York: Random House 1981. Pp. 259. n.p. ISBN 0-394-32997-X. (cloth; — New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1983).

Grey's text is copyrighted by the American Bar Association in its project to make law a subject accessible to undergraduates studying liberal arts. Its format is the typical casebook, right down to its softbound 8½ x 11 pages and numerous typos. Several questions follow each section, which effectively bring the legal texts towards philosophical problems, rather than just adding further information.

The materials gather around three focuses: sexual freedom, the treatment of corpses, and the obligation to rescue. This last section briefly inserts non-liberal ideologies with a civilian essay and a marxian, after essays showing anglo-american resistance to rescue. Grey suggests that liberal principles should no more allow moral sentiments to be made statutory for dead bodies than for sexually active ones. Treatment of corpses is presented by older caselaw, new model statutes, plus Dukeminier's 'aye' and Hans Jonas' carefully distinguished 'nay' to 'harvesting the dead.'

By far the most lengthy section of the three, and the one which contributes most directly to Grey's philosophical theme, is the caselaw on sexual freedom. Starting from *Griswold* on privacy in contraception, Grey tests its principles in brief summaries on marital restrictions, abortion and parental authority, and then briefly in caselaw about obscene publications and homosexual activity. Instead of cruising down the slippery slope into S&M, Grey turns from criminal enforcement to civil remedies of homosexual marriage nullity, firings and revision of child custody arrangements for sexual unfitness.

Grey's selecting is meant to be and generally is impartial, in that it can serve the teaching practice of philosophers with conflicting moral commitments. Nonetheless he works 'without striving for ultimate neutrality,' and makes his own moral commitments clear in his introductory essay. There Grey lays out the debate on legal enforcement of morals over the last twenty-five years, relates it to Mill's 'harm principle' as its lynchpin, and then sets out a paradigm of what argument based on that principle would look like. He concludes that defenders of the principle are unable to uphold it against defenders of codified morality.

Millians place 'definite limitations' (viz., liberty short of harms) upon moral legislation while their opponents admit only 'matters to be taken into account' (including liberty, harms and morals). Under this rubric, the burden is on the Millian to show that his proposal is definite so as to be justiciable, that it is not just a matter of degree to be taken into account. The burden is more than the principle can bear. It is stated either so simply that it disables acceptable policy; or it is qualified into a vague admonition to be taken into account in making complex decisions. Grey recognizes that the issue is decided procedurally, by allocating the burden of philosophical proof; for neither can the opposition prove that immoral conduct would lead to the disintegration of society. But the claimant must make the proof, so the Millian who would put general limits upon the legal power to enforce morality must carry that role; but he cannot. Grey repeats the argument that collective harms (e.g., perjury) and psychic harms (e.g., threats of assault) must be prohibited in addition to physical harms; but these cannot be restricted only to harms done to public sensibilities, nor be satisfactorily translated into proprietary harms, as he finds Mill demands.

Much needs to be done with this argument. Mill's is not the only philosophical principle capable of limiting moral legalism. Nor is moral legalism Mill's sole means of controlling the public moral climate, as it seems to be for any opponents. Nor is self-enslavement the only exception Mill makes to his own principle; detrimental reliance is another, whose handling the courts have defined since *Hedley Byrne* ([1964] A.C. 465). Anti-Millians' 'taking matters into account' is itself a selective and a generalized activity, demanding some principle and then some argument; they share Mill's burden of proof. Just denying Mill's principle has been proven yields neither its philosophical disproof nor an alternative legal policy. Even the limit-cases of collective and psychic harms may be managed under a 'rule-liberalism'

wherein only that *sort* of act which imperils individual freedom can be prohibited by law. However, to develop the anti-Mill argument is not the thrust of Grey's whole book, but only of his introductory essay.

The book is useable for its purpose, provoking undergraduates philosophically by law. It is accessible to them, and maintains interest, upon a limited range of problems. Grey says it is ideal to read this along with Hart and Mill; but it requires a teacher's input to supply moral culture beyond them. Canadian students will puzzle over 14th Amendment rationales, but can soon master them; prior to the *Canada Act,* one might wonder whether it was worth the effort. Homebred materials could suffice for rescue and for corpses — 'The Ogopogo' over *Tarasoff,* the *Code civil*'s articles 20-23 over the *Unified Anatomical Gift Act.* The dissents on sexual enforcement read familiarly: judges don't legislate. What is unavailable in Canada is the Mill-like liberalism of the prevailing opinions — *Wade* over *Morgenthaler, Paris (GA) Adult Theatre* over *Vancouver Sun.* Whether that unavailability is our gain or our loss, is what the book is about.

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M. KLEIBER, M. van de KERCHOVE et autres, *La loi dans l'éthique chrétienne.* Bruxelles: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis 1981. Pp. 254. ISBN 2-8028-0020-5.

La loi dans l'éthique chrétienne est le résultat d'un projet pluridisciplinaire. Ce projet, qui a pris la forme d'une session théologique, a été réalisé aux Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis de Bruxelles, à l'hiver 1980, par l'Ecole des sciences philosophiques et religieuses.

A l'origine de la recherche, il y a la reconnaissance d'une contradiction. D'une part, on constate que la sensibilité morale contemporaine rejette l'idée de loi, D'autre part, 'le concept de loi joue un rôle opératoire central dans diverses sciences humaines qui se trouvent à la pointe de la culture contemporaine' (7). En écoutant ce que ces sciences peuvent révéler de positif, les participant au projet espéraient 'apporter quelques éléments utiles au débat éthique contemporain' (7). Effectivement, chaque collaborateur, dans le cadre de son champ particulier, a cherché à indiquer comment le terme de loi, de norme ou de règle opère. Les collaborations retenues ont été celles de la

philosophie (Morand Kleiber), du droit (Michel van de Kerchove), de la sociologie (Jean Rémy), de l'exégèse (Pierre-Maurice Bogaert pour l'Ancien Testament et Jean Giblet pour le Nouveau), de la psychanalyse (Jean Florence) et enfin de la théologie (Philippe Weber).

Avant de présenter les contributions particulières, je voudrais me permettre quelques remarques sur la réalisation du projet lui-même. Il s'agit d'un projet pluridisciplinaire; plusieurs disciplines y sont effectivement présentes. Elles sont malheureusement juxtaposées les unes à côté des autres. Le dialogue est inexistant. Pourquoi ne pas avoir, par exemple, présenté une réflexion-synthèse sur le concept de loi et ses sens multiples dans les sciences modernes? *L'avant-propos* au volume évoque cette difficulté en affirmant que 'la diversité manifeste des contributions traduit autre chose qu'une insuffisante coordination' (9); elle respecte l'autonomie des régions où la loi opère. Cette recherche aurait cependant gagné énormément en intérêt si elle avait dépassé le simple côte à côte. Dans le même sens, je comprends mal l'ordre dans lequel les articles sont présentés. Pourquoi avoir placé le chapitre sur la psychanalyse entre le Nouveau Testament et la Théologie? Dans cette perspective, il faut considérer ce livre comme un point de départ utile plutôt que comme un point d'arrivée.

Le premier chapitre est écrit par le philosophe Morand Kleiber qui tente de répondre à deux questions. Quel est le concept de la loi et quelle est la place de la loi dans l'éthique? Parler de la loi, est-ce en parler au sens de la morale comme Kant le fait ou en parler au sens juridique à la manière de Kelsen? La thèse de l'auteur consistera à montrer la complémentarité des deux dimensions. Sa position est clairement marquée par la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin. Malgré les différences spécifiques entre les divers sens du mot loi que l'on retrouve dans l'histoire (la *Torah* juive, le *Nomos* grec et la loi au sens scientifique), l'idée de règle y est toujours présente. La loi est une règle: 'elle est ligne et mesure de conduite' (32). Par rapport à la loi, il y a une double obligation, l'une qui lui vient de la soumission à la règle ou à la raison, l'autre qui lui vient de l'autorité qui l'impose. Dans le premier cas, la soumission ne s'oppose pas à la liberté, elle en est la condition; dans le second, la contrainte, malgré sa légitimité, est contraire à la liberté. La distinction entre ces deux types d'obligations inhérentes à la loi apparaît nécessaire si l'on veut établir une distinction entre la loi positive et la loi naturelle ou rationnelle. Pour l'auteur, non seulement la loi a-t-elle une place dans l'éthique, mais elle en est, avec la liberté, une catégorie fondamentale.

La second chapitre est l'une des plus intéressantes contributions du volume puisque l'analyse objective de la loi dans le cadre du droit n'est pas séparée d'une approche critique. Michel van de Kerchove va développer deux thèmes: le fondement éthique du caractère obligatoire du respect des lois et la place de la loi proprement dite dans la hiérarchie des normes juridiques. L'auteur fait d'abord voir que, tout au cours de l'histoire du droit, on a voulu fonder le respect dû au droit sur des dimensions qui lui sont étrangères. Ainsi, tour à tour, la loi divine, la loi naturelle détachée de son fondement divin et les sciences modernes ont-elles été appelées comme fondement à

l'obligatoriété du droit. L'analyse de van de Kerchove l'amène a conclure ainsi la première partie de son chapitre: l'appel à un fondement éthique occulte la dimension proprement politique de l'élaboration du droit. Dans la deuxième partie de son article, l'auteur s'intéresse au déclin du principe de légalité dans la société contemporaine. Au 18e siècle, le principe de légalité joue un rôle important. Si son déclin peut aujourd'hui nous réjouir, une question cependant inquiète car la démystification du droit et son déclin s'accompagnent de nouvelles formes de mystifications et de dogmatismes dont l'inflation législative actuelle n'est qu'une des formes.

Jean Rémy, sociologue, se fixe, dès le départ, un double objectif: présenter le problème de la loi éthique d'un point de vue sociologique et l'insérer dans une réflexion sur l'agir chrétien dans la société contemporaine. Le premier objectif est longuement présenté; le second, bien qu'il apparaisse en filigrane tout au long de l'exposé, est surtout visible dans la conclusion. Lorsque l'on réfléchit sur la notion de règle, on se rend compte que certains gestes concrets sont régulés par une morale de l'acte, sans adhésion intérieure du sujet, et que d'autres règles sociales n'ont de sens que s'il y adhésion intérieure. Pourquoi, se demande l'auteur, dans une même société, certains domaines ressortent-ils à une morale de l'acte alors que d'autres relèvent d'une morale de l'intention? La réponse est la suivante: 'une société ne peut tolérer des choix individuels et valoriser le pluralisme dans des domaines qui sont vécus comme essentiels pour sa cohésion et son dynamisme' (93). Les situations existentielles liées à la survie et aux orientations prioritaires du groupe vont déterminer les secteurs qui appartiennent à chacune des deux morales. Après la présentation de ce cadre d'interprétation, deux problèmes particuliers sont soulevés. Le premier est celui du conflit qui surgit dans une société lorsqu'il n'y a pas accord sur la distribution des secteurs. L'autre question abordée est celle de la tension qui se produit entre l'ordre institué et les formes nouvelles qui cherchent à s'imposer. En conclusion, l'auteur insiste sur la relation complémentaire qui doit s'établir entre le regard de foi du chrétien et le discours proprement sociologique.

Pierre-Maurice Bogaert a écrit un chapitre consacré à la signification et au rôle de la Loi dans l'Ancien Testament. Dans cette section, il ne s'agit pas tant de présenter la *Torah* dans sa relation au Nouveau Testament mais de mettre en relief l'importance de la Loi dans la Bible juive et surtout dans le Pentateuque. L'article est divisé en trois parties principales. L'auteur rappelle d'abord le cadre institutionnel dans lequel prend frome la loi juive: unité fondamentale avec la droit oriental et spécificité du droit israélite. La seconde partie du chapitre est la plus importante aux yeux de l'auteur. Elle est consacrée à situer la loi dans la conscience d'Israël. P.-M. Bogaert fait ici une présentation historique des sens différents qu'a eu la loi dans la vie d'Israël. Quatre moments importants sont retenus: l'Exode, l'exil, la littérature de sagesse et l'après-destruction du second Temple. A chaque étape, la Loi en sort grandie pour ne pas dire indiscutée. La place centrale de la Loi ne risque-t-elle pas de paralyser toute éthique qui serait ainsi réduite à une pratique purement légaliste? Cette question sert de trame à la troisième partie du chapitre.

L'auteur présente quelques lieux où ont pris racine, en Israël, des réflexions critiques sur la Loi, S'il y a bien un début de réflexion éthique qui prend forme à travers les grands spirituels, il faut surtout retenir que le rôle éducateur et sauveur de la Loi tient, pour utiliser le langage de B.-H. Levy, dans sa sublime hétéronomie qui 'sauvegarde la vraie liberté en la faisant échapper au robot qui, dormant en chaque homme, lui rend la servitude acceptable' (137).

La Loi du Christ est le titre du 5^{e} chapitre qui a été rédigé par Jean Giblet. Dans un premier temps l'auteur s'efforce de rejoindre l'enseignement et la pratique de Jésus en face de la Loi juive. Pour y parvenir, il étudie les deux sources les plus anciennes de la tradition évangélique: l'évangile de Marc et la source commune de Mathieu et de Luc. On retiendra des premières traditions évangéliques la conclusion suivante. Même s'il s'inscrit dans la grande tradition d'Israël et partage les manières de vivre de son peuple, Jésus a cependant une nette conscience de la nouveauté de l'Evangile du Royaume par rapport à la Loi. Dans un deuxième temps, Jean Giblet étudie l'évangile de Mathieu qui a été vraisemblablement écrit dans une communauté restée proche de ses origines judéo-chrétiennes. Dans ce cadre du christianisme palestinien, comment la Loi est-elle interprétée? Une différence très marquée existe entre la lecture chrétienne de la Loi et celle des légistes. La troisième section est consacrée aux premières phases de l'activité missionnaire en milieu hellénisé et au grand débat que l'on désigne souvent sous le nom de concile de Jérusalem. La portée historique de la décision était importante, 'la conception juive de l'histoire du salut, qui n'envisageait pas d'autre voie que la pratique rigide de l'ensemble des commandements et interdits, était remise en question' (180). Saint Paul qui est confronté aux problèmes de l'entrée des païens dans l'Eglise va pousser plus avant la réflexion. Au cours des trois étapes de son étude, l'auteur fait, à chaque fois apparaître, que, pour le Nouveau Testament, l'amour est le sens même de la Loi.

Jean Florence a rédigé le sixième chapitre intitulé 'Le désir de la Loi.' L'auteur, psychanalyste, procède selon la méthode de sa discipline. Son point de départ est le procédé des représentations associatives; aussitôt surgit l'ambivalence du rapport à la loi. Cette première démarche va permettre d'aller plus loin i.e. de saisir les fondements subjectifs de la loi. L'expérience de l'analyse nous conduit à poser, à l'origine, de l'existence personnelle la nécessité de la Loi de l' 'Autre.' L'Autre détient les clés de mon désir. La loi, dans ce sens, demeure une énigme: l'homme invente une foule de moyens pour la faire parler et la faire taire. Le mythe et l'analyse font particulièrement ressortir cet aspect de la loi. Florence étudie alors l'Œdipe, ce dernier étant présenté à partir de la *Colonie pénitentiaire* de Kafka. Cette analyse permet a l'auteur de faire voir que le sujet se structure par rapport à la Loi mais que les aboutissements de cette dernière sont absurdes lorsqu'elle est détachée de sa source. La psychanalyse ne veut pas libérer le désir de la Loi, elle vise à une moindre méconnaissance de son désir en amenant qui veut y risquer sa parole, à surmonter l'angoisse de castration.

Le dernier chapitre est l'œuvre du théologien Philippe Weber dont la contribution s'intitule 'Loi et vie chrétienne.' Après avoir brièvement évoqué la

spécificité de l'approche théologique par rapport à d'autres disciplines, l'auteur cherche à préciser l'intitulé de son chapitre. Faut-il comprendre la relation entre 'Loi et vie chrétienne' en termes d'extériorité ou dans un sens inclusif? Une analyse des concepts en cause livre certains jalons de réponse. Mais, c'est surtout en considérant la fonction de la loi morale (loi naturelle, conscience, option fondamentale) dans l'édification de la vie chrétienne que Weber affirme que la loi morale cherche à mobiliser la personne dans sa totalité, y compris surtout dans son intériorité libre. L'article se termine par quelques remarques sur le rapport entre la loi morale et la loi juridique canonique ou civile.

Si les contributions dans leur ensemble ne permettent pas aux spécialistes d'avoir une intelligence nouvelle de ce qu'est la loi dans l'éthique chrétienne, ces textes cependant permettent de mieux cerner le sens du mot loi pour chacune des disciplines représentées dans cet ouvrage.

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MURRAY KRIEGER, *Arts on the Level: The Fall of the Elite Object.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press 1981. Pp. x + 71. US$7.50. ISBN 0-87049-308-6.

The central problem which occupies Krieger's critical attention in this short volume is the recent tendency to view art works on a level, i.e., the tendency to do away with artistic masterpieces and to view works of art, whether great or small, trivial or profound, on equal footing inhabiting a democratic realm in which every member is equal in value and dignity to every other member.

The book is composed of three essays presented as the John Hodges Lectures at the University of Tennessee in the Fall of 1979. In the first lecture, Krieger studies the historical basis of elitist aesthetics. He considers two factors which underlie the rise of the art work as an autonomous reality. (1) It was Kant, Krieger argues, who first articulated the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness according to which the art work should be (a) treated autonomously and (b) perceived objectively, for its own sake, for what *it* has to offer. (2) The establishment of the museum in the eighteenth century helped to divorce art from the mainstream of ordinary living: the art object

became a closure with internal purposiveness; it became a precious object, an idol to be worshipped in the museum. Even the literary art work, which lacks the material conditions to acquire the status of a *material object,* began, with the rise of elitest aesthetics, to be viewed as an autonomous, precious object — but how? Are 'words' the stuff, basis, of this 'objecthood'? If so, how does the artist weave a novel object out of these words? Again, what is the relationship between the language of literary criticism and that of the literary work? After Krieger discusses these questions in some detail, he considers the anti-elitist position on the leveling of the arts. Critics of traditional aesthetics question the concept of disinterestedness, and especially the claim that the art work embodies intrinsic or absolute value. This sort of criticism is also directed, Krieger argues, against literature.

In the second lecture, the author focuses attention on 'criticism and its special role in the leveling of the literary art' (27). Until about a decade ago the main role of the critic consisted in interpreting, explicating, the poem, or the novel. Critical activity is, accordingly, secondary, derivative: the raison d'être of the critic is grounded in the being of the literary work. While the latter is a genuine example of creativity, the former is conditioned, dependent, on the logic, subject, and value of the primary work. Hence criticism is a secondary and not a primary activity. The anti-elitist attack consists primarily in elevating criticism to a primary activity, to viewing this activity as creative sui generis, and to viewing the critical piece as an autonomous, precious object. The critic becomes an artist par excellence. Krieger outlines the main principles and arguments of the levelers of literary works of art. He also assesses these principles and arguments cogently, insightfully, and convincingly. The premise which he defends is that the claim to critical autonomy is excessive and that although the work of the literary critic is useful, intrinsically valuable, and creative, it remains a secondary art.

In the third lecture, Krieger discuss in greater depth the process of leveling the arts as well as the consequences of such a process upon contemporary criticism. He shows how works of art are reduced to non-art objects, to ordinary goods or commodities, without special aesthetic value, which is tantamount to a rejection of the concept of aesthetic masterpiece. (Aesthetic egalitarianism seems to march hand in hand with political egalitarianism.) A major thrust of contemporary movements and schools of art, for example, pop, concept, and minimal art, seek consciously to obliterate the distinction between art and non-art (yet paradoxically upholding the being of art): the Pompidou Centre in Paris may be cited as an example. In spite of its spiritual orientation, literature has not escaped the impact of this thrust. The structuralists with their emphasis on *écriture* as a 'single blanket term' and the advocates of the New Criticism in allowing maximal freedom in interpreting and evaluating the poem have in effect reduced literature, at least in principle, to a minimal art. But this sweeping reduction, Krieger argues, is unjustified. He attempts to show that there is a place for the masterpiece. Though short, his remarks on this point are instructive; they reveal a profound understanding of the history of art and the basic yearning of the human imagination for

form, order, or beauty, a yearning which has inspired the poet and sustained the sensibility of the perceiver in its enjoyment of art works.

Although the book is addressed mainly, but not exclusively, to a literary audience, it is kept in the lecture format in which it was delivered, and although so many of its historical references and arguments are compact — to which features some readers may mildly object — the book is, in my opinion, an important contribution both to aesthetic theory and to literary criticism. It brings into sharp focus many of the basic problems which face the artist as well as the philosopher and the aesthetic critic.

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LAGUEUX, MAURICE, *Le marxisme des années soixante — Une saison dans l'histoire de la pensée critique.* Montréal: Editions Hurtubise HMH 1982. Pp. 350. ISBN 2-89045-512-2

Cet ouvrage rassemble une série de textes publiés ou exposés entre 1974 et 1980 dont la plupart ont été considérablement remaniés et auxquels l'auteur a ajouté, en vue de la présente publication, un avant-propos, un texte d'introduction destiné à justifier le sous-titre de l'ouvrage, et une conclusion sur l' 'Avenir de la pensée critique.' L'ensemble est organisé en trois sections principales (Epistémologie, Economie: valeur et reproduction, et Histoire) et, sous la forme dubitative de 'corollaire,' un chapitre portant comme titre 'En quel sens peut-on se dire "néanmoins marxiste"?' Comme le signale l'auteur dans l'Avant-Propos, ce recueil ne se veut en rien une synthèse des débats théoriques rattachés à la pensée critique marxiste qui ont eu lieu au cours des années soixante, encore moins, aurait-il pu ajouter, un historique du développement multiforme de cette pensée pendant une période qui fut pour elle exceptionnellement riche. Il s'agit, pour l'essentiel, de l'examen critique d'un certain nombre de thèses ou d'hypothèses avancées par certains représentants importants de la pensée critique, tout particulièrement du courant marxiste français contemporain inspiré par L. Althusser. On pourrait se demander, comme le fait l'auteur lui-même, par la signification actuelle d'une discussion qui trouverait sa place exacte plutôt dans un 'marxisme des années soixante.' Il faudraid cependant voir dans cette discussion 'un effort pour mettre en relief mais aussi pour comprendre certains traits un peu étranges d'une démarche théori-

que qui aura dominé, en un sens, toute une époque' et qui 'en aura fait un moment important dans la prise de conscience de questions qui demeurent fondamentales et que l'on aurait bien tort aujourd'hui de croire dépassées' (14).

La section 'Epistémologie' comprend deux chapitres: 'Une théorie de la connaissance qui se voulait inspirée de Marx,' et 'L'usage épistémologique de la sociologie marxiste de la connaissance.' Dans le premier chapitre, M. Lagueux se propose de reconstituer les avatars historiques d'une théorie de la connaissance qui aurait voulu trouver chez Marx sinon son projet au moins la source de son inspiration. Dans la tradition marxiste 'orthodoxe,' signale M. Lagueux, la question gnoséologique est censée occuper une place philosphique centrale et, en ceci, cette tradition ne fait que reprendre la thèse d'Engels suivant laquelle la grande question fondamentale de toute philosophie ne serait que celle du rapport de la pensée et de l'être. Cependant, et dans la mesure où cette question gnoséologique se trouve, chez Engels lui-même, doublée d'une question purement ontologique — et associée intimement à celle-ci-, à savoir la question de l'antériorité de la matière par rapport à la conscience, la solution du problème gnoséologique semble se présenter tout naturellement sous la forme de thèse du 'reflet': en reconnaissant la priorité de la matière sur la conscience, et en soutenant que la matière engendre la conscience et non l'inverse, ce marxisme n'aurait pas eu de mal à conclure que les objets matériels sont connaissables puisque l'idée que s'en forme la conscience, dans l'acte de connaissance, est justement engendrée par eux. Le malheur, dirait M. Lagueux, est que, d'une part, et comme Lénine lui-même l'a reconnu, il ne serait même pas possible de définir les notions de 'matière' et de 'conscience' de façon satisfaisante, d'autre part le pragmatisme scientifique sur lequel finit par se rabattre Engels afin de rejeter toute forme d'idéalisme ontologique ne suffit pas, à lui seul, à justifier les prétentions de la thèse réaliste. Bref, il serait vain de s'efforcer d'assurer le triomphe définitif d'une thèse 'qu'on ne saurait prouver de façon concluante' (72). Davantage, ce qu'on pourrait trouver chez Marx ce serait plutôt une sévère mise en garde contre le caractère 'passiviste' de la gnoséologie matérialiste traditionnelle. Rien de moins, mais rien de plus aussi. Et c'est alors à l' 'étonnante' lecture althusserienne des remarques gnoséologiques de Marx que se consacre M. Lagueux pour n'y voir, à la fin d'un pénible trajet spéculatif, qu'un véritable cul-de-sac théorique, davantage l'impossible transmutation 'en trait de génie' de 'ce qui s'offre au lecteur ordinaire sous les décevantes apparences de l'affirmation gratuite' (87). Le lecteur de ce chapitre ne peut qu'être impressionné par la méticulosité de l'analyse de M. Lagueux mais ne peut non plus ne pas sentir un certain malaise de voir considérer comme vaine toute tentative de (bien) fonder (définitivement?) une thèse philosophique, et de voir réduire toute la réflexion gnoséologique althusserienne à une espèce d'acrobatie intellectuelle autour d'une affirmation gratuite.

Est-ce à dire qu'il n'y aurait rien, chez Marx, qui puisse constituer une contribution à l'étude critique du problème de la connaissance? M. Lagueux verra plutôt cette contribution du côté de la sociologie de la connaissance et non

pas de celui d'une philosophie gnoséologique ou épistémologique, et c'est à cette thèse qu'il consacrera alors le deuxième chapitre de cette première section de son ouvrage. Ici encore l'objectif premier de M. Lagueux est d'essayer de montrer l'inanité des efforts d'une certaine pensée marxiste qui voudrait maintenant résoudre le problème (gnoséologique) de l'objectivité sur la base d'une sociologie — ou, formulé d'une autre manière, échapper au relativisme d'une certaine sociologie de la connaissance grâce à une thèse elle-même sociologique, celle d'un groupe ou classe sociale historiquement privilégiée du point de vue de l'accession à un savoir. L'apport de Marx se situerait donc en deça d'une telle prétention, dans l'idée d'une relation entre phénomènes socio-économiques et phénomènes culturels et cognitifs, voire même dans le simple postulat d'une 'corrélation' entre ces deux types de phénomènes (99). Lorsqu'on sait qu'une corrélation, aussi 'forte' soit-elle, n'a en elle-même aucune signification nécessaire, et qu'aucune science ne peut donc se déployer sur la base des seules corrélations constatées, on peut se demander si la modestie du programme proposé par M. Lagueux à la sociologie de la connaissance ne lui apporte plutôt la fin de tout espoir de se constituer en discipline réellement scientifique. Mais, avant, on peut se demander si ce n'est pas aller trop loin que de voir Marx ne postuler que de simples corrélations entre phénomènes socio-économiques et phénomènes culturels et cognitifs, et le ravaler ainsi à une espèce d'empiriste plutôt vulgaire.

La deuxième section de l'ouvrage comporte, à son tour, deux autres chapitres: 'Marxisme annonciateur et marxisme dénonciateur,' et 'Le recours au concept de "paradigme" dans l'analyse de la pensée économique.' Il s'agit dans le premier de fonder, sur la base d'une analyse de trois exemples tirés du *Capital,* l'hypothèse voulant que le discours de Marx est, en fait, un discours double, annonciateur en tant qu'il essaie de dégager des tendances ou d'orientations générales et 'à peu près invérifiables' du mouvement historique, tout particulièrement de celui du capitalisme, dénonciateur lorsque, par contre, il met l'accent sur l'existence d'équilibres 'peut-être factices mais souvent étonnamment stables,' sur la puissance d'un capitalisme 'qu'il fallait dénoncer comme un adversaire coriace et retors' (121). Cette bipolarité, il va sans dire, assurait au discours marxiste le double avantage d'être un discours encourageant et, en même temps, réaliste, optimiste sans être utopique. Elle assurerait encore l'avantage inouï de l'irréfutabilité car'les marxistes peuvent alors se payer le luxe de voir confirmer par les faits invoqués au moins un aspect (soit le déclin du capitalisme, soit son pernicieux pouvoir de régénération)' (123-24). Ce que M. Lagueux, hélas!, n'examine pas lorsqu'il étudie les trois paires de thèses annonciatrices/dénonciatrices c'est justement leur articulation dans le discours marxiste, c'est-à-dire en quoi elles sont —ou peuvent être— compatibles (ou incompatibles). D'où la conclusion quelque peu surprenante que tirera M. Lagueux de cette étude: l'intérêt d'une telle construction théorique se trouverait dans cet essai de 'parvenir à cerner l'évolution des sociétés dans ce qu'elle a d'ambigu et même de contradictoire' (118) avec une théorie présumée ambiguë et contradictoire! Mais peut-être faudrait-il trouver un réconfort dans l'idée qu'il ne s'agirait pas, dans le

Capital, d'une théorie scientifique (plus ou moins vraie ou fausse) mais plutôt d'une 'intuition philosophique géniale d'ailleurs' (154).

Que l'analyse économique marxiste ne peut pas être considérée comme une science, même pas comme un 'paradigme scientifique' -opposé, par exemple, au 'paradigme néo-classique'-, c'est justement le thème du deuxième chapitre de cette section. En tout cas, conclura M. Lagueux, s'il y a eu un paradigme marxiste, 'c'est dans un passé déjà lointain qu'il a connu une heure de gloire' (177). Il n'en demeurerait, pour M. Lagueux, que son inspiration critique, la tradition d'un criticisme dont les économistes radicaux sont peut-être alors les dépositaires, et qui permettrait d'exercer vis-à-vis la science économique moderne la même attitude dénonciatrice que Marx avait inaugurée par rapport à l'économie classique. Il faut en déduire que les économistes radicaux et/ou marxistes ne font jamais de la science mais plutôt de la critique, même pas de la critique économique mais plutôt de la critique presque philosophique (idéologique). On ne peut certainement pas reprocher à M. Lagueux de ne pas se porter au secours de l'activité philosophique en élargissant ainsi son domaine ...

La troisième section de l'ouvrage, consacrée à l'Histoire, comporte trois chapitres. Le premier constitue une critique acerbe de la solution offerte dans le cadre de ce qu'on a appelé le 'structuralisme marxiste français,' au problème de la détermination économique 'en dernière instance.' Grâce en particulier à l'usage d'une analogie entre rapports des instances (économique, politique et idéologique notamment), et rapports de forces entre équipes nationales de hockey (canadienne, soviétique et suédoise notamment), M. Lagueux essayera de montrer la 'faille logique' des arguments construits sur la distinction entre 'détermination' et 'dominance,' et l'interprétation de la détermination (économique) comme détermination de la *forme* de la dominance. Aux yeux de M. Lagueux, c'est réduire la portée de la contribution de Marx que d'assurer *a priori* des droits privilégiés à l'instance économique au lieu de poursuivre la recherche en mettant partout en évidence l'efficace de facteurs -certes, souvent économiques- que l'histoire conventionnelle négligeait. (Nous nous permettons de renvoyer le lecteur intéressé plus particulièrement à ce thème, à notre étude 'Détermination et dominance,' *Revue canadienne de sociologie et d'anthropologie,* **19** [1982], dans laquelle nous examinons aussi cette critique de M. Lagueux).

Le chapitre suivant aborde la question de l' 'ambivalence et pertinence de la philosophie marxiste de l'histoire' à la lumière de quatre dimensions que M. Lagueux repère dans les grandes philosophies de l'histoire surtout du XIXeme siècle: les dimensions 'dynamique,' 'instigatrice,' 'régulatrice' et 'libératrice.' Par ce biais, M. Lagueux essayera encore de prouver entre autres choses que moins qu'une affirmation dogmatique de la primauté des forces économiques, ce qu'on trouve chez Marx c'est plutôt l'idée que les rapports de production ont des répercussions historiques plus décisives et souvent plus intéressantes que d'autres rapports et, surtout, une conception féconde de la pratique du métier d'historien fondée sur le refus de séparer l'historique du social, du politique, de l'économique et du culturel.

Le troisième chapitre de cette section examine, enfin, le concept de 'faux besoins' sur lequel semble bien reposer la critique qui, au cours des années soixante en particulier, a fait de la 'société de consommation' le 'bouc émissaire' par excellence des révolutionnaires de toutes tendances. Après avoir passé en revue les difficultés que soulève une caractérisation satisfaisante des 'vrais besoins,' M. Lagueux se penche sur la dynamique du double processus de transformation du monde (plan de la *technê*) et de l'homme (plan de l'*éthos)* qui semble être constitutive de la problématique en question et qui amène presque inexorablement à concevoir une société alternative sur la base pas toujours reconnue de l'avènement d'un homme nouveau caractérisé par une sobriété inexplicable mais tout à fait opportune dans les circonstances ... L'argumentation tient pourvu, cependant qu'on accepte que la définition des 'faux besoins' renvoie à celle des 'vrais besoins' -plutôt qu'à celle de 'besoins vraiment définis par l'ensemble de la communauté.'

En quel sens pourrait-on se dire 'néanmoins marxiste' aujourd'hui, à la suite des avatars historiques d'une théorie et d'une pratique déjà centenaire et qui, on le voit, ne cesse pourtant d'alimenter inlassablement les critiques même lorsque la belle saison, dit-on, a déjà passé pour elles? A la manière d'un corollaire aux problèmes des trois sections abordées, M. Lagueux examinera en détail ce qui relève presque d'un éventail logique de réponses possibles à cette question pour conclure qu' 'à la limite la seule connotation authentiquement révolutionnaire ou radicale qui a toujours été associée à la pensée de Marx pourrait bien constituer le seul 'aspect' permettant encore de se dire marxiste lorsque ce projet de transformation est choisi en toute bonne foi-même s'il demeure sans lendemain' (283).

L'ensemble d'études qui composent cet ouvrage semble donc dominé par deux préoccupations: il s'agit, d'une part, de refuser à la pensée marxiste toute prétention a une scientificité —au moins, de nos jours—, et de revendiquer plutôt sa valeur philosophique; d'autre part, et dans la même veine, de nuancer, relativiser, fixer des limites à ce qui peut être considéré comme la contribution de Marx —sans enlever pourtant à cette contribution son importance historique. A la lumière de ces préoccupations on comprend bien le thème central de l'introduction ('Une saison où la gauche avait le vent dans les voiles'): la 'lecture' épistémologique de Marx vers laquelle se tourne la pensée critique des années soixante et qui vise à dégager notamment dans le *Capital* le point de départ d'une science marxiste de la société ne peut alors être qu'une 'étonnante' lecture bien que, pour des raisons plutôt extra-théoriques, elle ait eu le vent dans les voiles le temps d'une saison.

L'ensemble de ces études, arrive-t-il à rendre ces préoccupations justifiées? L'argumentation déployée ne manque jamais de rigueur et elle est encore exercée avec les ressources d'une langue dont l'ironie ajoute parfois décisivement aux effets persuasifs de la rigueur elle-même. La question qu'on peut se poser à la fin de l'ouvrage est si cette sorte de bilan sur lequel M. Lagueux essaie de fonder la plausibilité de son approche critique d'ensemble est, en fait, un bilan ou peut être reçu comme tel. Car il est difficile d'accepter qu'une

période aussi 'exceptionnellement riche' de la pensée critique (13) en philosophie, en économie, en histoire —pour ne pas parler du reste des sciences sociales et humaines— se laisse inventorier en sept chapitres consacrés même parfois à des problèmes très locaux. Encore moins d'accepter qu'une telle richesse de pensée passe comme les saisons passent, c'est-à-dire comme les modes.

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LUDWIG LANDGREBE, *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays* (edited by Donn Welton). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1981. Pp. 205. US$19.50. ISBN 0-8014-1177-7.

Donn Welton has performed a major service for the English-speaking philosophical community by making readily available this important collection of Ludwig Langrebe's essays. These essays, devoted as they are to two concepts crucial to Husserlian phenomenology, namely world and consciousness, both provoke a reconsideration of Husserl's philosophy and present several of Landgrebe's own significant extensions of that thought. Welton's introduction sets forth with splendid clarity the principal issues with which the essays are concerned.

Landgrebe shows that the Cartesian framework of Husserl's *Ideas I* came to be recognized by Husserl himself as incompatible with central elements of his phenomenology of the lived body, perception, temporality, and world. True to his own insistence upon fidelity to the phenomena, Husserl accordingly departed from Cartesianism. The first glimmerings of a need to go beyond Cartesianism can already be found in *Ideas II* and *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.* Then, in the second part of *First Philosophy,* lectures given in 1923-24, Husserl attempted to secure definitively with new results what had been set forth in *Ideas I.* Husserl himself never authorized the publication of these lectures, for, though he worked on them until 1930, he came to realize that his aim of completing the Cartesian project of *Ideas I* was unworkable. Landgrebe calls this text the history of a shipwreck, but of a creative shipwreck. In this text, as Husserl himself could only gradually come to see, Husserl shatters the very traditions of modern thought which he sought to fulfil and broaches a new way of

reflection. The fruits of what was sown in these 1923-24 lectures ripen in the *Crisis,* a work in which history, facticity, and temporality all are grasped in a new profundity. Landgrebe, in these essays, takes advantage of Husserl's breakthrough to achieve further important results about the topics of world and consciousness.

Though the achievements of these essays, presenting as they do such important results gained by Husserl and Landgrebe, deserve comment in their own right, it will perhaps be helpful to emphasize here the connection between these results and the works of other philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, especially Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger.

Even though his work in *First Philosophy* left Husserl with an equivocal and scarcely consistent concept of 'transcendental subjectivity,' one which would have this subject be both an ego which can be fully objectivated in reflection and at the same time a subject who, as free and 'called to its responsibility,' always eludes complete objectivation, he does provide the resources whereby Landgrebe can point to a conception of subjectivity which can be both constituting and at the same time historical. In Landgrebe's words: 'The universal structure of subjectivity consituting the life-world, its "intentionality [Willentlichkeit]" (Husserl), would be intentionality in the sense of "always-being-out-beyond-itself" (transcendence in Heidegger's sense) and of not being able to grasp itself in an objectifying reflection' (200).

This understanding of transcendental subjectivity develops and includes Husserl's recognition in *Ideas II* that the functions of corporeality, especially kinaesthesia, belong to transcendental subjectivity. 'Thus the lived body is not only constituted but also constituting' (56). Genetically speaking, the 'I move' precedes the 'I can' or 'ruling in the body' which in turn precedes the developed ego-consciousness. Landgrebe compares the 'awareness' which precedes the developed ego-consciousness to Heidegger's concept of attunement *(Befindlichkeit)* which effects the first disclosure of the world. Phenomenal corporeality 'is the corporeal living-experiences, my consciousness of my to-be-able as ruling in the body, that are constituting, and it is the body as apprehended that is constituted' (63). Consciousness in its original disclosure is a practical, not a theoretical consciousness. Landgrebe stresses the primacy of historical praxis, freedom, and responsibility in the constitutive performances of subjectivity by calling it an ethical ego.

Given the worldly, historical character of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl was unable to subsume the free ethical ego under the reflective theoretical ego and thus formulate a definitive idealistic concept of absolute subjectivity as the absolute foundation of being. Landgrebe concludes that transcendental subjectivity should be understood as a subject which 'is not itself the absolute but the place where the absolute is experienced' (119). 'The' absolute is the subject's absolute certainty of itself as free and responsible experiencing the world and worldly beings.

As Landgrebe indicates, one can readily detect important links between those elements in Husserl's work which Landgrebe develops and stresses in

these essays and central concepts and themes in the works of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, thinkers who are regularly said to have broken with Husserl. Sartre's non-egological conception of the subject is evidently foreshadowed in the tension between Husserl's descriptions of the 'theoretical' reflective ego and the 'practical' creative ego. Similarly, the ambiguity of both corporeality and the ego, inasmuch as each is both constituting and constituted, meshes in substantial ways with Merleau-Ponty's 'philosophy of ambiguity,' particularly as articulated in *Phenomenology of Perception*. Recall, for example, the importance given by Merleau-Ponty to kinaesthesia and to the phenomenon of touching-touched. And even though Merleau-Ponty later repudiated his notion of the silent cogito, the function of the silent cogito in *Phenomenology of Perception* is much like that of the Landgrebe-Husserl subject, namely 'the place where the absolute is experienced.'

Most importantly, Landgrebe's essays show that at least from the early 1920's Husserl was working over issues upon which Heidegger would focus in *Being and Time*. During this time, Husserl and Heidegger were in close contact. Far from it being the case that they simply stood in opposition to one another, their works bear striking similarities to one another. Heidegger's stress on Dasein's worldliness and historicity is matched during this period by similar emphases in Husserl's work. Even though the Husserlian reflections on these issues were still in tension with his lingering Cartesianism, Landgrebe's studies show clearly how mistaken it is to view the Heidegger of *Being and Time* and the Husserl of *Ideas II* and *First Philosophy* as simple antagonists.

These rich essays deserve a wide audience. Welton deserves appreciation for having made them readily available. One small to medium size complaint, though. The index is misleading because many of its references to names are very incomplete.

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LOUIS E. LOEB, *From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1981. Pp. 382. US$24.50. ISBN 0-8014-1289-7.

'Locke's project in the *Essay*,' Louis Loeb argues in this radically revisionary study, is nothing less than 'to provide a theoretical foundation for the con-

structive thesis that Cartesian standards for knowledge can in principle be satisfied with respect to truths of morality and natural philosophy,' which is to say that for Locke 'physical laws can in principle be known a priori.' The standard picture of Locke and Descartes being opposed to one another as Empiricist and Rationalist turns out to be no mere oversimplification; it is wildly misconceived. For Locke is prepared to assert that 'if we could discover the figure, size, texture and motion of the minutest constituent parts of any two bodies we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle ... we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill and opium make a man sleep.' Far less sanguine certainly than Descartes when it comes to the actual feasibility of a physics cognitively on a par with geometry, Locke is at one with Descartes here when it comes to pure theory. So at any rate Loeb insists even while conceding that his own account is far less interesting, philosophically speaking, than is the standard travesty which at least has the excitement of an epistemological Punch and Judy show.

The emergence of Locke as rationalist merely serves as the opening salvo in a full-scale assault on the received account of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Actually, Locke is fairly peripheral to the major theme which is defined rather by the sub-title of the book. The glaring deficiencies of the standard account are not to be traced to any mere stupidity. It is hardly an accident that histories of philosophy undertake to 'maximize the philosophical interest of the material discussed,' seeing that there is a whole 'network of rewards and incentives within the profession' that work to that end, not least of which is to be found in the 'vast pedagogical virtues' of the standard account. Fighting words! Loeb is probably right to expect that his views will be instinctively felt to pose a professional threat. His own hermeneutic, precisely by being designed above all to aim at fidelity to historical fact, enables Loeb to seize upon *philosophical* weaknesses in the standard account that others have preferred to recognize in a fairly subliminal fashion.

There is one such weakness that lies at the very center of his inquiry. Burman asks, 'How can the soul be affected by the body and vice versa, when their natures are completely different?' Descartes replies, 'Here our experience is so clear on this point that it just cannot be gainsaid.' If Descartes can acquiesce so readily in the causal interaction of mind and body, how then explain the nearly universal agreement of the commentators that finds in that interaction the gravest sort of threat to the Cartesian system? Well, didn't Spinoza regard that feature of Descartes' philosophy as a positive howler? Yes indeed, but how are we to explain *that*? A clue is provided in the very terms of Burman's query. The difficulty has to do with the heterogeneity of mind and body. Here then may well be the beginning of an answer but after canvassing the commentators Loeb finds it 'somewhat shocking ... after Hume' that they can simply rest content with that observation as constituting anything like an adequate reply. His own researches lead him to the conclusion that the so-called mind-body problem in Descartes to which Malebranche, Spinoza and

Leibniz are presumed to be reacting proves to be largely a myth; and *their* systems, taken as responses to that pseudo-difficulty, cannot but be seen in consequence as fairly quirky exercises that need to be explained in no small measure in extra-philosophical terms. Even in the case of Descartes extra-philosophical considerations need to be invoked. How else explain his implausible doctrine that the brute animals feel no pain? Otherwise their souls, too, would qualify for immortality.

If the iconcoclasm is refreshing, still, one must be allowed to express certain reservations. Will Locke really countenance an a priori physics? He writes, 'Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium and man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch whereby it performs its operations ... we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill and opium make a man sleep: *as well as* a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper laid on a balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed' (my emphasis). How well is that? One must thus ask what sort of a priori knowledge the watchmaker has.

Much more challenging is this whole question of how precisely the heterogeneity of mind and body is supposed to militate against their causal interaction. Loeb succeeds in tracing the putative difficulty to Descartes' principle (in the third *Meditation*) that there must be at least as much reality in the (total) cause as in the effect, and he recognizes that the Principle somehow requires of cause and effect some sort of likeness between them, but at that mystifying point the trail grows (prematurely) cold. Simply by blowing the whistle on the widespread waffling characteristic of modern scholarship regarding this critical juncture in the era of so-called Continental Rationalism, Louis Loeb has performed an important service. One general, extenuating comment may be appropriate, however. Spinoza and Leibniz, even Plato and Aristotle — these are (alas) somewhat exotic luxuries for the professional philosopher today whose bread and butter, as far as history of philosophy is concerned, remains pretty much confined to the epistemological story proceeding from Descartes to Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. That at any rate is authentic. Interest in anything outside that line of succession is always liable to have an artificial air about it, perhaps even an element of fakery.

On the specific issue at hand there is somewhat more evidence available than Loeb quite allows. In the third *Meditation* Descartes is by no means content to advance his Principle on a take it or leave it basis. He undertakes to justify it by means of certain rhetorical questions where the Latin is perhaps a bit more explicit than the French. How can the cause *give* what it does not have? What we have here, then, is a transmission theory of causation where cause stands to effect as input to output. No one can suppose that something might be found in the output of a causal process that was not antecedently present in the input. How, then, can the physical event of my arm rising constitute the output of a process whose input consists of some mental act of volition? How could a volition possibly transmit motion to an arm, seeing that it fails to have what it takes? In fact no motion is transferred; the mind succeeds only in changing very slightly the direction in which the pineal

gland is moving. But surely that is no more intelligible in the light of the transmission model of causation. In his Reply to the Second Objections when Descartes discusses the counterexample to his Principle of flies and other animals being produced by sun, rain and earth he insists afresh that 'the same thing' must be found in cause and effect. If there is reason to believe that the transmission model of causation dominates philosophy as early as the pre-Socratics in their physicalism, what is less obvious is my conjecture that even with the shift from material to formal causes in Socrates and Plato the model continues to exercise all its original authority albeit now in an anti-physicalist fashion. Only recently Quine has chosen to understand 'the root notion of causality in terms of the flow of energy' (*The Roots of Reference,* 5). To the confirmed Humean all of this material will doubtless have only antiquarian interest, and it is thus no wonder that Loeb should fear that his researches may be felt to be lacking in inherent philosophical significance.

In his extensive discussion of Leibniz Loeb argues that 'Leibniz is unable to produce any serious direct argument for the denial of interaction' between monads. One such argument is packed into the following vivid if fugitive remark, 'Accidents cannot be detached from substances and march about outside substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did,' regarding which Loeb comments, 'Leibniz illicitly invites the reader to picture causal interaction as involving the transmission of accidents.' Just so, but the argument is not to be lightly dismissed. If the motion of this billiard ball is to be transmitted to that one, it must somehow cease to be a mere feature of the former and become an entity in its own right before becoming re-converted into a feature of the latter. A dubious business, certainly.

Loeb succeeds in showing that it is not so much the mind-body question that emerges as the decisive issue in Continental Metaphysics as the more general and more elusive question as to the nature of causation. That question fails to surface, however, in any fully explicit form until the hero of the book (Hume) comes to address it thematically. Malebranche is a pivotal figure in the story when he insists that 'a true cause ... is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect,' adding that 'the mind perceives a necessary connection only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects.' If God's will were not realized he would be less than perfect. Berkeley gets included in Continental Metaphysics on the strength of his aprioristic denial that ideas, being entirely open to view, can have causal efficacy. An important piece of detailed Spinoza exegesis in its own right, the chapter on Spinoza features a brilliant dissection of a duality built into Spinoza's very definition of a mode.

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G.B. MADISON, *Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatic Analysis.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1982. Pp. 356. US$35.00. ISBN 0-313-22483-8.

Le livre a beaucoup d'interlocuteurs qui sont invités à prendre la parole à loisir. La citation est donc constante et les sections de notes ajoutées aux neuf chapitres sont considérables. Ainsi beaucoup d'auteurs interviennent dans les discussions, directement ou sous forme de commentaires en aparté. Une fois le procédé admis, on reconnaît qu'il anime le dialogue en plus d'être instructif.

Le but poursuivi est annoncé à plusieurs reprises et de différentes manières. Il s'agirait, d'une part, de se confronter avec la mentalité technologique et son déterminisme, son matérialisme et son positivisme. Non pour échapper à la technologie, mais pour réintégrer la technique comme un moyen et la science comme une activité humaine parmi d'autres dans une perspective et une culture plus compréhensives et plus larges que celles qui se présentent comme scientifique et technologique. Il s'agirait aussi d'une critique fondamentale du rationalisme ou de la pensée dogmatique; une critique qui vise ses fondements mêmes: épistémologique, c'est-à-dire sa théorie de la compréhension, et métaphysique, c'est-à-dire sa théorie de la réalité. Il s'agirait également d'élaborer une théorie de la réalité. Et, enfin, comme le titre l'indique, l'objectif serait d'établir une théorie générale de la compréhension humaine. Ces différentes formulations sont-elles le signe d'un éparpillement? Il faut répondre non. Il faut plutôt voir là la reconnaissance de la situation présente de la pensée occidentale dans laquelle celle-ci, après un long parcours, doit rouvrir la question de l'être et de la pensée.

Il n'y a là ni éparpillement, ni contradiction, mais prise au sérieux du rapport essentiel et inéluctable entre comprendre et être.

La discussion de la notion d'un langage idéal univoque, la considération de la capacité de comprendre d'autres cultures, la comparaison de la magie et de la science, la résurgence de l'analogie pour rendre compte de l'habilité humaine à comprendre d'autres cultures et à communiquer avec elles, l'étude des modes de la compréhension et du rôle de la métaphore et de l'imagination dans toute pensée créatrice y compris la science, conduisent à la réflexion suivante: décrire l'acte de comprendre, c'est, d'un point de vue réflexif et pragmatique, rendre compte de ce qui est compris. Car la commune capacité de tout langage est de créer des mondes. Ce que les gens croient et appellent la réalité est une construction sémantique. Ce qu'on appelle 'réalité' ou 'vérité objective' est une fiction dont la nature fictive a été oubliée. La vérité et la réalité ne sont rien d'absolu; elles sont toujours relatives à un système de croyances ou à un cadre interprétatif.

On voit apparaître ici le spectre du relativisme en lieu et place du dogmatisme rationaliste. Mais l'auteur le conjure en définissant sa position comme étant celle d'un sceptique non-dogmatique. Celui-ci voit que la compréhension humaine est naturellement dogmatique. Tout système, théorie ou cadre d'interprétation pose sa propre 'réalité' et oublie qu'il la pose. Il croit

que c'est là la réalité. Voilà le trait commun aux différentes croyances ou théories. Il faut chercher la Réalité dans le processus même de la formation de la croyance ou dans la compréhension. Ainsi le lieu de la Réalité est l'expression créatrice de l'expérience humaine qui se dit toujours dans et à partir d'un système interprétatif.

On comprend la Réalité quand, dans la perception d'une chose quelconque, on voit qu'à la fois elle est et n'est pas ce qu'elle est ou ce qu'on croit qu'elle est. Pour cela il faut que la chose soit dite métaphoriquement. Car la métaphore implique simultanément ce double 'est' et 'n'est-pas.' A cause du 'n'est-pas' qui accompagne le 'est' du discours métaphorique, celui-ci est le seul à pouvoir dire quelque chose à propos de quelque chose sans hypostasier cela à propos de quoi il parle. Ainsi il maintient possible l'expérience humaine qui, comme Gadamer l'a bien fait voir dans *Vérité et méthode,* a aussi un élément de négativité qui lui permet d'être toujours ouverte pour d'autres expériences.

Ici Madison retrouve Gadamer sans le dire expressément. Alors que ce dernier parle d'une tâche infinie de l'interprétation constitutive du devenir historique, l'auteur de *Understanding* voit dans son interprétation de la compréhension la libération des illusions dogmatiques de celle-ci comme face négative de l'ouverture ontologique dans laquelle nous agissons dans et avec des 'réalités' tout en étant attentif au signe de la Réalité.

L'auteur retient ce terme de Réalité pour parler du sens d'être. Il tente non sans un certain succès de le délester de ses lourdeurs métaphysiques qui sont, en fin de compte, rien d'autre que la charge de 'réalité' donnée naturellement par la compréhension humaine à toutes ses créations sémantiques. Mais le langage métaphorique élève au-dessus de la barrière naturelle des mots en faisant éclater la pétrification du sens. En posant la question du sens d'être, l'auteur critique et dépasse la philosophie anglaise du langage qui a été forcée de négliger la question ontologique en raison de son approche formaliste traditionnelle.

L'histoire de la pensée occidentale ne culmine pas nécessairement dans l'univocité du langage scientifique ni dans l'impérialisme du faire technologique. Le pyrrhonisme n'a pas cessé, au cours des temps, de suggérer au dogmatisme de s'ouvrir à la *question.* L'auteur s'applique à le montrer. Il tente aussi d'esquisser une théorie non-dogmatique de la Réalité, qui reconnaît ses allégeances par rapport à un scepticisme de fond sans toutefois donner dans l'impasse du relativisme total qui met un terme à la pensée. Son entreprise semble en cela devoir être comprise comme une poursuite digne d'éloges des tentatives heideggérienne et gadamérienne d'amener à la conscience la finitude humaine appelée à 'l'infini' historique de la question et de l'interprétation.

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JAMES McCAWLEY, *Everything Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know About Logic.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981. Pp. xv + 508. Cdn$52.50; US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-12614; 0-226-55617-4); US$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-226-55618-2).

James McCawley is a noted linguist whose concern with semantic matters in dealing with linguistic issues is well-known amongst philosphers of language. McCawley's goal here was to write a textbook that surveyed all those areas of logic he thinks are potentially of use in analyzing natural language. By this he includes 'not only "basic" areas of logic, but areas such as presuppositional logic and fuzzy logic that are usually ignored in elementary logic courses.' It gives 'heavy emphasis to considerations of the analysis of natural language,' and is 'especially aimed at advanced undergraduate and first year graduate linguistics majors.' It therefore presupposes some knowledge of elementary transformational linguistics (but less than might be supposed from McCawley's introduction — most upper level philosophy students could follow the discussions). As McCawley conceives a course in elementary logic, it should concentrate on those issues which in other textbooks have been lumped together and treated as issues of 'translation into logical notation.' But on the other hand, this *is* a first course in logic; thus another thrust of the book is to make students conversant enough in elementary logic to allow them to continue in mainstream logic should they desire it. The book is weak in this latter task, since it does not treat the standard issues in a standard manner. As McCawley notes, his students, even the good ones, will never be able to pass as native speakers of standard logic.

McCawley's conception of his course is therefore different from that conception which philosophical logicians have of a course covering the issues McCawley thinks central. The course covering these issues would be called 'philosophical logic' or 'philosophy of logic' and would concern itself with issues in the formal semantics of natural language. The students coming into this course would have had a firm, one-year background in logic (using perhaps Thomason or Kalish and Montague as text) and perhaps an elementary transformational syntax course. Such are the students who are ready to take up the general issue of how best to represent ordinary language in such a way as to exhibit its logical form and further discuss what general features logical form is supposed to illuminate. McCawley's students, on the other hand have no background in formal logic. It is difficult to see, for example, how a novice with no previous logic is in a position to evaluate claims about whether, say, unrestricted quantification 'is the most pernicious and perverted doctrine in the history of logic' (xiv) before the student has even seen it in action and understood what formal metatheoretic properties follow from it.

McCawley claims to cover the material in this large book in two consecutive one-quarter courses. Presumably this can be done because of the nature of his students; but it would be very difficult to do this with lower-

level students in a standard introductory course. However, even with his advanced students, one suspects that many of the topics covered only receive cursory treatment. For, besides the standard material on propositional and predicate logic (with metatheory and extensive discussion of the justification for using them), there are chapters on set theory; speech acts and implicature; presupposition; modal and relevance logics; possible worlds; many-valued and fuzzy logics; lambda calculus, intensional logics, and Montague grammars; and a final chapter discussing other quantifiers, mass terms, generics, branching quantifiers, and multiply variable quantifiers. In these areas, each of which has generated a sizeable literature of its own, McCawley takes substantive and interesting philosophical positions; and it is difficult to see how a class of philosophically and logically naive students can get a fair grasp of the full range of issues involved.

The book *is* well-suited to the 'philosophical logic' course, though. There are several reasons for this — the wide range of topics covered; the wide range of positions surveyed on any particular topic; McCawley's ability to relate the abstract discussions to well-chosen natural language examples; and McCawley's taking stances with which other teachers using the book are sure to disagree.

Out of the many controversial positions McCawley takes, I shall here comment on two. First, McCawley holds that unrestricted quantification is 'responsible for an immense volume of pseudo-problems (particularly the alleged difficulties raised by the recognition of 'non-existent objects') that have consumed the energies of otherwise productive philosophers.' McCawley's solution — to use 'restricted quantification' along the lines of Hailperin ('A Theory of Restricted Quantification,' *JSL* 1957) or Bacon ('A Simple Treatment of Complex Terms,' *Jour. Phil.* 1965) — has no real bite because the truth conditions of his restrictedly quantified sentences are exactly the same as those of the corresponding unrestrictedly quantified sentences; McCawley has only made a pointless gesture toward English syntax without any corresponding real change in the semantics. Just as in standard logic it is hard to see that 'All men are animals' is better translated as $(\forall x)(Mx \rightarrow Ax)$ than as $(\forall y)\, Fy \rightarrow Gy)$, so too is it hard to see that McCawley's $(\forall{:}Mx)\, Ax$ is better than either. The reason behind one's indifference amongst these translations is that the semantics makes them be true in precisely the same circumstances. Similar remarks could be made about McCawley's choice of '$\wedge$' and '$\vee$' as being a variable polyadicity rather than binary connectives, and about his choice of a Polish notation.

McCawley's general response to all these criticisms is that he thinks that much more is relevant to a translation than just those things which affect truth conditions, and much of what he says in this regard is of considerable interest (although perhaps not in an elementary logic class). He also offers one 'semantic' argument in favour of restricted quantification: other quantifiers (*most, many, few,* etc.) must be treated in the restricted manner. By uniformity, one might also wish to treat *every* and *some* in the same way.

The second topic I wish to discuss is fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic takes the

view that a proposition can take not only the two values 0 (false) and 1 (true), but any of the non-denumerable values between them. This is alleged to give sense to such claims as: (a) 'Either Bernie is tall or he isn't tall' (said of 5'11" Bernie) is not tautologous, i.e., is not valued 1; (b) There are degrees of counterexamplehood to such sentences as 'All fat people are jolly.'

McCawley shows extreme sensitivity to the difficulties involved in constructing truth conditions for a fuzzy logic (and their interaction with rules of inference), and indeed shows that there is no happy compositional method of giving the truth conditions for such a logic. In the course of this discussion McCawley considers (and rejects) the possibility of giving truth conditions for sentences like 'Some tall people are obnoxious', translated as (∃:Tx) Ox, so that these conditions come out different from those of 'Some obnoxious persons are tall', (∃:Ox)Tx. If this could be made to work, McCawley would have had some real ammunition in his war against unrestricted quantification, which forces them to be the same. But his solution was unfortunately doomed from the beginning. Scarpellini ('Die Nicht-Axiomatisierbarkeit des Unendlichwertigen Pradikatenkalkuls von Lukasiewicz,' *JSL* 1962; for a summary of this, and other suggestions about fuzzy logic, see Morgan and Pelletier, 'Some Notes Concerning Fuzzy Logics,' *Linguistics & Philosophy* 1977) proved that the class of formulae of any full fuzzy predicate logic which always take the value 1 is not recursively enumerable; hence the search for a correct natural deduction system must fail. What McCawley has done though, is show some clear and simple places where it will fail.

In sum, then, this is a very good book to use in an upper-level philosophical logic course — and I intend to so employ it. But it is not a suitable textbook for an introduction to symbolic logic of the traditional sort.

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JOHN O'NEILL, *Essaying Montaigne: A Study of the Renaissance Institution of Writing and Reading.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982. Pp. x + 244. Cdn$41.25. US$35.75. ISBN 0-7100-0937-2.

Très tôt dans le *Discours de la servitude volontaire,* Etienne de La Boétie écrit que la 'nature' a cherché 'par tous moiens' à assurer 'nostre alliance et

société,' et qu'elle 'ne vouloit pas tant nous faire tous unis que tous uns: il ne faut pas faire doute que nous ne soions tous naturellement libres, puis que nous sommes tous compaignons; et ne peut tomber en l'entendement de personne que nature ait mis aucun en servitude nous aiant tous mis en compaignie' (éd. P. Léonard [Paris: Payot 1978], 119). Tous les êtres humains sont libres et égaux, aucune servitude naturelle, aucun désaccord en nature. Cette alliance et cette compagnie, dira-t-il en arrivant vers la conclusion de son texte célèbre, est la marque toute naturelle de l'amitié:

> l'amitié c'est un nom sacré, c'est une chose sainte; elle ne se met jamais qu'entre gens de bien, et ne se prend que par une mutuelle estime; elle s'entretient non tant par bienfaits, que par la bonne vie; ce qui rend un ami asseuré de l'autre c'est la connoissance quil a de son integrité; les respondans quil en a c'est son bon naturel, la foi et la constance. (Ibid., 160)

La lecture des *Essais* de Montaigne qu'élabore John O'Neill dans le volume que nous présentons ici, en est une lecture *amicale,* une lecture qui suit le mouvement des *Essais* en même temps que de s'essayer elle-même, une lecture qui ne cherche pas à situer Montaigne là où il n'est pas (ou bien où il n'est que partielle- ou partiale-ment), mais qui cherche à travailler le texte lu comme un processus toujours en cours. La fidélité à l'amitié de La Boétie — Anthony Wilden et d'autres nonobstant (j'y reviens) — n'est pas à situer dans une tentative désespérée pour remplir un creux, mais dans la pratique de la communication amicale, du texte comme 'ami': comme 'the work of a friend, or rather a work between friends, [les *Essais*] are themselves the generative place of Montaigne's own friendship with his readers' (19).

Il s'ensuit d'une telle conception des *Essais* et de leur 'travail,' que le texte produit par O'Neill se doit de faire ce qu'il dit — tout comme ceux de montaigne eux-mêmes. A travers le processus constant des *Essais,* Montaigne aurait cherché (et réussi) à se rendre présent dans le monde — monde concret, social, humain —, il aurait cherché (et réussi) à se rendre présent aux autres. D'où cette notion, centrale aux *Essais* et au travail qu' O'Neill en fait, de l'écriture comme processus du rythme même du corps: du corps écrit comme l'expression concrète et constante de plaisir et de sens, de joie dans la communauté amicale de la lecture et de l'écriture, expression qui 'produit' l'être de Montaigne tout en le mettant dans le monde, et en permettant au lecteur amical de faire de même. Les *Essais* vivent ainsi 'not as a mask but as a memorial whose literary authority remains alive so long as it still compels us as readers; as indeed it does' (209). Toute lecture des *Essais* et toute écriture qu'ils provoquent marquent la solidarité de ceux qui y participent, en même temps que de permettre l'établissement de cette dialectique qui aurait caractérisé la véritable communauté 'amicale' préconisée par Montaigne et La Boétie: 'expression, as we learn from the *Essays,* is always an act of self-improvisation in which we borrow from the world, from others, and from our own past efforts, towards a synthesis of authority and tradition, imitation and novelty' (99).

D'où la conception de mouvement, de processus, de création constante de soi: lieux communs, pourrait-on dire, de la critique de Montaigne (ainsi que l'a indiqué Jean Starobinski dans le titre même de son ouvrage, paru également en 1982: *Montaigne en mouvement).* Certes, mais là où O'Neill s'en distingue, c'est d'abord par le concept que le lecteur authentique de Montaigne doit s'impliquer lui-même dans ce processus — lire Montaigne, c'est effectivement s'essayer soi-même, nécessairement —, et ensuite par le fait qu'une telle approche n'est ici aucunement ahistorique, hors de l'histoire. Tout au contraire, le processus d'auto-création et de présence à autrui n'est possible que parce que Montaigne vit dans le monde, un monde marqué par sa réalité tout à fait concrète: guerres de religion, centralisation politique, accession au pouvoir d'un nouveau groupe social, conquête du Nouveau Monde, et ainsi de suite. Car l'étude de soi est toujours, 'beholden to the events and places of this world and needs the company of our fellow men for its reflection' (12); ou encore, reprenant la pensée de Lukács, dans la mesure où l'essai se conçoit 'as a medium of the work of the intellect at grips with life' (5). Aussi les *Essais* vus comme la mise en présence d'un passage transformateur sont-ils bien plantés dans un monde tout à fait spécifique (d'où un chapitre consacré à la pratique et à la théorie de la vie publique et privée, 139-62). De même le lecteur, O'Neill, lui-même, vivant également dans un monde en transformation, reprend ce même travail dans le mouvement de *sa* lecture de Montaigne — amical processus de s'essayer, de se produire, de refuser lui-même le point fixe d'une certitude dominante.

Car dans ce texte d'O'Neill trois 'techniques' le rapprochent particulièrement de Montaigne. Tout d'abord celle de créer un lien avec son lecteur tout semblable à celui qu'il cherche à entretenir avec Montaigne: 'an act of carnal inquiry', 'a loving effort to keep body and soul together in family life,' 'to reinvest conversation with the trust it needs, while simultaneously testing its fidelity in the most audacious enterprise of self-inquiry' (2). La préface que fournit O'Neill agit ainsi comme celle de Montaigne lui-même, comme 'the dialectical centre of the relation between reader and writer' (4), dans laquelle la relation n'est pas 'commencée' ou 'mise en place' mais toujours *essayée* ironiquement (d'où, bien sûr, le titre du livre d'O'Neill comme de celui de Montaigne). Il s'agit d'être admis dans une amitié mutuelle, une relation interpersonnelle de dialogue et d'essai: si Socrate est constamment 'derrière' et 'avec' Montaigne, nous pouvons dire que le texte d'O'Neill entretient un rapport tout semblable avec la présence de Merleau-Ponty.

La deuxième technique est celle de s'entretenir constamment avec d'autres interlocuteurs — ici, la plupart du temps, des discussions avec la foule des 'interprètes' de Montaigne. Ici il y a un thème majeur qui parcourt le texte d'O'Neill, celui justement de la problématique du texte, de la lecture, et de l'écriture. Pour O'Neill, le texte de Montaigne n'est jamais *'là,'* pour devenir l' 'objet' d'une critique tyrannique, imposée par une lecture inamicale: 'Montaigne would have had little patience with the kind of literary criticism that produces nothing but a reader wholly dependent upon the factual status of the text before him, impressed upon him by the scholar's love of

chronology and his anxiety to place himself in his own critical community' (54). Et cette idée se base non seulement dans un certain concept de lecture provoqué en particulier par Montaigne, mais sur une certaine saisie historique de la Renaissance (montrée récemment par des érudits, tels Terence Cave et Thomas Greene), selon laquelle toute l'époque peut se voir comme une période d'essai, où l'on cherchait à recueillir, tel — de façon exemplaire — l'Erasme des *Adages,* 'a patchwork of ancient wisdom with the purpose of handing on an immense culture to which its users might apprentice themselves with more or less ingenuity' (58). Ainsi, dit O'Neill, Montaigne 'kept an open house' (61). Bien sûr, 'there is also an incredible dispersion to be risked in these activities unless, as Montaigne found, they can be brought to a measured order, as a watchful practice that strengthens solitude and society, while fearing to fall into emptiness and its crowded consolations' (16).

De là donc le projet de laisser dialoguer Montaigne, et de ne pas le cerner dans (et comme) un lieu fixe, comme le font la plupart des interprètes. Ces derniers cherchent le plus souvent à 'expliquer' les *Essais* à partir de quelque lieu 'autre' — telle l'allégorie de la Création, grâce à laquelle les *Essais* répéteraient et incorporeraient — tout en la sécularisant — une certaine théologie médiévale que Montaigne ne peut plus avouer (Regosin, 55-60); telle la notion des *Essais* comme le remplacement pour l'absence d'un moi solidement ancré (Glauser, 61-2; Barrière, 103-14); ou comme une tentative de se centrer dans le texte, de présenter et défendre quelque 'véritable' Montaigne (Butor, 168-78); ou encore, comme un essai désespéré de présenter le moi comme une 'Cartesian-like rock of stability' (64), qui se trouverait dans un rapport d'aliénation par rapport à l'Autre, capable de se voir uniquement comme une propriété (Wilden, 64-81). Ainsi, dans le cas d'Anthony Wilden (le dernier que je mentionnerai ici), on chercherait à faire des *Essais* l'expression du désespoir ou de l'espoir de la perte d'une plénitude personnelle, individuelle ou d'une régénération sociohistorique, la trace d'un moment entre la plénitude du moi dans son amitié pour La Boétie et une plénitude encore absente mais qui n'en reste pas moins potentielle qui serait celle d'une certaine histoire politique (celle du socialisme) (75-77), le signe d'un moment capté entre 'feudal society and mercantile capitalism' (66). O'Neill a raison de commenter la 'violence' faite aux *Essais* par de telles lectures: 'hostile to Montaigne's ideals of friendship and family' (71).

Lui-même, il remplacera une telle violence par sa troisième 'technique': chacun de ses chapitres est un Essai. En partie il sera complet en lui-même, traitant en dialogue avec Montaigne et divers critiques d'un *topos* donné. En partie, il renverra spécifiquement ailleurs: parfois à une question particulière et centrale chez Montaigne — 'On living and dying as we do' (118-38), 'Writing and embodiment' (82-99), ou le rapport de son écriture à la tradition (11-29), par exemple —, parfois à ce que nous pourrions considérer comme les marges du texte de Montaigne — comment le lire (1-10), ou le rapport entre écriture et plaisir du texte (30-46) —, parfois à ce que l'on pourrait considérer comme des thèmes spécifiques qui parcourent les *Essais* — le con-

cept de la vie publique et privée, par exemple (139-62). Accompagnant cette 'technique' on trouve toujours la discussion de et avec autres interprètes, et surtout la vision de toute écriture et de toute lecture comme un processus constant de la présentification de soi et de la 'mise en communauté.'

Cette idée de l'essai comme un processus de la production du sens 'that cannot be given ahead of its own course of work' (10), comme 'an experiment in the community of truth, and not a packaging of knowledge ruled by definitions and operations' (9), comme 'that constant shifting of words to match the living oscillation of his thoughts and moods,' est censée faire de nous aussi, en tant que lecteur, quelque chose comme un 'self-conscious accomplice' (190). Si O'Neill rejette des interprétations qui figent Montaigne dans une certaine posture, qui se permettent d'y voir une critique de la politique française économique et colonialiste (Etiemble, 196-9), une sécularisation d'une certaine théologie, ou une recherche d'un moi cartésien absent, ce n'est pas parce qu'il trouve nécessairement 'fausses' de telles interprétations, mais parce qu'elles sont partielles et partiales, parce qu'elles tyrannisent les *Essais* avec une vision imposée, au lieu de chercher à s'y engager, à s'y risquer à se laisser créer — aussi — dans un échange avec le texte de Montaigne. Ainsi, pour terminer, les deux essais Des Coches et Des Cannibales se laissent lire comme une expansion de ce processus constant, une tentative d'appliquer à notre compréhension de l'humain en général ce que le projet des *Essais* cherchait toujours à faire pour leur auteur et son lecteur particulier. Ces deux essais chercheraient à comprendre l'humain de la même manière que Montaigne cherche à se rendre présent et 'nu' lui-même, à voir ce qui peut se dire authentiquement 'humain,' comme toujours *en cours,* derrière nos masques dites de la 'civilisation' et devant elle: chez ce que nous appelons le 'barbarisme.' Le problème de 'compréhension' et de 'lecture' est alors identique à celui qui se pose pour Montaigne lui-même, se présentant, se créant au monde, et pour son lecteur, cherchant à le 'comprendre' à travers ce dialogue jamais terminé, et qui recommence devant l'œuvre de chaque lecture 'amicale' de l'œuvre de Montaigne. Montaigne est joyeusement généreux, se mettant 'à nu,' il se présente au lecteur en 'returning thought to the level of feeling' (102), travaillant pour que l'homme se présente dans un mouvement communautaire et non comme une certitude tyranniquement figée. O'Neill travaille à faire de même.

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Philosophy of the Social Sciences, **11** 3 (September 1981). Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Pp. 156. Cdn$5.00.

This is a collection of new papers in the sociology of knowledge, with the emphasis on a subdiscipline, the sociology of science. All are wriiten by sociologists, with one exception; Brazerman is from an English department. The first three papers are theoretical; the later three consider empirical data of various sorts, but the emphasis remains on the theoretical significance of the data.

Yearley's paper, the least satisfying of the empirically-based papers, consists of an examination of a geological paper written by the Irish scientist Richard Kirwan, and published in 1802. He aims to discredit a particular conception of the formal scientific paper, namely, that it is a partial record of how the scientific community uses (perhaps unsuccessfully) universally accepted standards of induction and deduction in its quest for knowledge. Instead, Yearley claims that such papers are contributions to debates between individuals with divergent interests, and that despite superficial appearances, such papers contain a great variety of subtle rhetorical devices. Apart from the issue of whether one case proves the point, Yearley's paper fails because his ad hoc techniques for textual analysis are not theoretically justified, nor do they produce results of any inherent interest.

Brazerman's paper is also an excercise in textual analysis. He compares three short pieces (which are reprinted as appendices): a 1953 paper on DNA by Watson and Crick, a portion of a sociology paper by Robert Merton, and an exegesis on a Wordsworth sonnet by G.H. Hartman. The analyses are based on a 'minimal theory' of textual discourse, namely, that the text must be related to four 'contexts': the object under study, the previous literature, the audience, and the author. Brazerman shows how the different authors emphasize, deemphasize, and generally exploit the various contexts in order to solve their particular problems of communication. The result is a perceptive set of observations, which shows that a 'minimal' theory, if handled skilfully, can be used to assemble a catalogue of subtle 'facts' about textual communication, facts that must be taken into account by anyone attempting to construct a more philosophically satisfying theory of texts.

Mulkay and Gilbert conducted interviews with thirty-four biochemists to determine what they knew about Popper's philosophy of science and whether or not it played any role in their activities. Numerous quotations give the paper a gossipy tone, but the conclusions are, I think, serious. Although most of the scientists understood and agreed with the broad outlines of the falsifiability doctrine, they differed radically on how to apply it in practise. The authors offer two explanations: (1) there is an essential indeterminacy involved in selecting actions from *any* codified set of prescriptions, including Popperian rules of scientific activity, and (2) Popper, like most other philosophers of science, has tended to focus too much on the pro-

duct of scientific activity, rather than the activity itself. Nothing can be done about the first problem, but, according to Mulkay and Gilbert, the Popperian goal of providing useful tools for praticising scientists can be better achieved if philosophers of science shift their focus somewhat.

The three theoretical papers are representative of recent theoretical work in the sociology of knowledge, which, in my opinion, means that they are almost entirely worthless. The poor quality results from the practise of *'hygiène cérébrale.'* As part of his crusade against theological and metaphysical thinking, Auguste Comte, the man who coined the term *'sociologie,'* advocated a naturalistic, scientific approach to all intellectual matters. Our desire for intellectual synthesis should be satisfied by an integrated 'hierarchy of sciences,' with sociology at the apex. To be a theorist working at this lofty height is not an easy task, so it is perhaps understandable (but not condonable) that later in his life Comte lightened the load somewhat by advocating that the new intellectual should not clutter his mind with too much reading. Rather, he should confine his studies to a small library selected by Comte himself.

There are many important and striking differences between Comte and the resurgence of activity in the sociology of knowledge over the past decade or so, but the ambitions and failings of both are remarkably similar. There is the same attempt to naturalize (sociologize) epistemological issues, and unfortunately, the same self-imposed *'hygiène cérébrale.'* The new library excludes almost all Anglo-American philosophy except one school of the philosophy of science, that being the relativistic and historicist approach represented by such writers as Feyerabend, Hesse, Kuhn, Lakatos, and the later Wittgenstein.

This one-sided contact with the philosophical literature provides a poor foundation from which to address the many fundamental theoretical issues raised in these papers. Take Barnes' paper for example. His purpose is to demonstrate the 'inalienable social, collective dimension' of knowledge. Along the way he develops a representation of the referential apparatus of a culture that he calls a 'Hesse net.' (He states that this representation should not be ascribed to Mary Hesse.) Stripped of its idiosyncracies, the Hesse net is similar to the 'traditional theory of reference' as outlined by Kripke in 'Naming and Necessity.' Then Barnes makes the incredible move of claiming that the very same Hesse net is also an adequate represenation of the *beliefs* held by a culture or individual. He then freely applies all his claims about the conventionality and historical flexibility of *referential structures* to *belief systems,* without any further argument. (He appears quite innocent of the causal theory of reference with its implication that referential structures are not all that flexible.) Sloppiness of this sort is found on every page of the papers by Barnes, O'Neill and Knorr-Cetina, with the result that it is difficult to see anything more than bits and pieces of insight; their papers do not add up to coherent totalities.

For the record, Knorr-Cetina is arguing that there is less difference between the natural and social sciences than is commonly believed, but she is assimilating the natural sciences to the social sciences, rather than the other

way around. O'Neill makes a similar point and attempts to use it to resolve what he takes to be a contradiction in Marxist theory.

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REINER SCHÜRMANN, *Le principe d'anarchie; Heidegger et la question de l'agir.* Paris: Editions du Seuil 1982. Pp. 383. (Coll. L'ordre philosophique). ISBN 2-02-006249-6.

'Quand écrirez-vous une éthique?' Cette question fut adressée à Heidegger peu après la parution de *Etre et Temps.* Le fait qu'une telle question puisse être formulée n'est pas uniquement symptomatique de l'incompréhension dont le premier livre de Heidegger a été l'objet, mais plus manifestement encore cette requête traduit un réflexe vieux de deux millénaires, à savoir la distinction tranchée entre théorie et pratique, distinction qui voile d'autant mieux l'intérêt porté précisément à la dépendance réciproque des deux pôles. Aussi, en posant la question de l'agir, le livre de R. Schürmann ne prétend pas tenir lieu d'un chapitre non rédigé par Heidegger; la question de l'agir ne constitue pas une dimension oubliée de l'œuvre, à laquelle il faudrait encore adjoindre une éthique. Dès *Etre et Temps* Heidegger est très catégorique sur le caractère artificiel de la distinction entre la contemplation pure et l'action; en fait la question de l'être se redouble déjà de la question de l'agir, puisque l'accès au sens de l'être requiert d'emblée de la part de l'être-là un 'comportement' authentique. De même, le dernier Heidegger ne cessera d'affirmer que la véritable pensée est à proprement parler un agir.

La thèse de Schürmann tient déjà dans le titre 'principe d'anarchie' dont l'aspect paradoxal devient manifeste dès lors que le mot *archê* dans 'an-archie' est traduit par principe. Il peut sans doute être encore question de 'principe' chez Heidegger dans la mesure où celui-ci, par la question de l'être, renoue avec le thème central de la métaphysique traditionnelle; mais au moment même où la question est à nouveau formulée, c'est tout l'édifice qui s'en trouve disloqué, pour ne pas dire détruit, si bien qu'à partir de là quelque chose de tel qu'un principe ou *archê* devient problématique au plus haut point. Schürmann intervient alors pour porter au jour les conséquences anarchiques de ce renversement face au problème de l'action, conséquences trop

souvent demeurées dans l'ombre chez Heidegger. Aussi toute la question consiste à savoir quelle portée l'auteur entend conférer à l'anarchisme heideggerien. Pour répondre à cette question, il faut se rappeler la fonction de la *prima philosophia* aristotélicienne qui, en remontant aux fondements derniers de ce qui est, fournit l'orientation ultime pour la décision en vue de ce qui doit être. Quand la vérité n'est plus considérée pour elle-même, mais dans le but de fournir le fondement 'rationnel' à l'action, quand la métaphysique, pourtant science de l'être en tant qu'être, n'est plus là que pour servir de soubassement à l'éthique, c'est alors avouer que la question de l'être est tombée dans l'oubli, c'est dire du même coup que la vérité est restreinte au domaine de la justification, de la véracité, de l'imputabilité. Avec Aristote s'instaure une conception de la philosophie, comme science des principes, qui finit par réduire la vérité à un contexte de justification sous forme d'*adaequatio,* de rectitude. Ainsi, la dimension de calcul présente dans la notion de responsabilité au sens où l'on doit 'rendre compte de' ses actes (*Rechenschaft ablegen)* culmine à l'époque moderne dans le déchaînement de la technique comme arraisonnement. En situant le début du règne de l'*arché* et de la téléocratie chez Aristote, l'entreprise de Schürmann se trouve dès lors immunisée contre des tentatives comme celle de Tugendhat (212) qui s'en prend au concept heideggerien de vérité en vertu d'un critère de véridicité et de responsabilité commandé par un impératif éthique non questionné. Schürmann peut établir également ses distances à l'endroit de théories soit-disant exemptes de métaphysique, telle la pragmatique transcendantale de Apel (104, 181, 194) qui, parce qu'on persiste à réclamer un 'fondement ultime', ne se départit pas de l'exigence d'un principe recteur, nécessairement violent. Est-ce à dire cependant que l'auteur tient à tout prix à faire basculer Heidegger dans un anarchisme sauvage qui ne soit qu'une négation abstraite de toute *archê?* Cela serait encore inexact puisque par exemple le décisionnisme (292) que Marcuse se croit autorisé à déduire du concept d'*Entschlossenheit* dans *Etre et Temps* est encore tributaire du même cadre: si décisionnisme s'oppose à normativisme, on n'a toutefois pas encore dépassé par là la souveraineté d'une subjectivité qui procède en fonction de l'arbitraire de ses propres décrets. La dimension anarchique de la pensée de Heidegger ne peut être saisie qu'en vertu du dépassement conséquent de ce champ clos que constitue l'histoire de la métaphysique.

Or, même si Schürmann prend pour point de départ l' 'hypothèse de la clôture de la métaphysique' avec l'âge de la technique, cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il s'en tienne uniquement au Heidegger de la déconstruction de la métaphysique, c'est-à-dire aux écrits qui gravitent autour de la problématique du *Nietzsche*. L'interprétation se réfère ici à l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Heidegger, et elle met à profit tout son corpus connu. La lecture de ce corpus se place aussi sous le signe de l'unité, si bien qu'elle s'interdit un partage net entre Heidegger I et Heidegger II. La question de l'être demeure constante à chacune des trois étapes qu'il est possible de dégager sur ce chemin: 1) L'être abordé en fonction de son 'sens': c'est le problème de la compréhension de l'être qui dans *Etre et Temps* s'articule autour de l'être-là.

2) La 'vérité' de l'être, à savoir l'étape où, à partir de la *Kehre,* Heidegger s'enquiert de l'histoire de l'être à travers les diverses époques de la métaphysique. 3) La 'topologie' de l'être, c'est-à-dire le moment où le caractère multiple (quadriparti) de la venue à la présence est pris en considération. C'est par une lecture régressive à partir du dernier Heidegger que l'auteur parvient à retracer la continuité de ces trois étapes, continuité caractérisée par un anti-humanisme croissant déjà amorcé par la critique de la subjectivité dans *Etre et Temps.*

Le pivot de toute l'interprétation réside dans la déduction historique des catégories de la présence (chap. IV). En fait, il s'agit de montrer le bien fondé de la totalité circonscrite par Heidegger comme histoire de la métaphysique si l'on veut être en mesure de faire voir que l'anarchie est la conséquence nécessaire de la fin du règne de la métaphysique, cette garante des principes fondateurs. Schürmann s'assigne donc la tâche de montrer que la métaphysique est effectivement une constellation historique close, ayant un début (Platon et Aristote) et une fin (Nietzsche); pour ce faire, l'auteur propose de retracer les repères catégoriels dont se sert Heidegger pour marquer l'inauguration et la clôture de cette histoire. Pour chacune des deux bornes Schürmann retrace six catégories dont l'appartenance réciproque tient au fait qu'elles sont, d'une extrémité à l'autre, rigoureusement symétriques; c'est dire par le fait même qu'elles transpercent de façon prospective et rétrospective toute cette histoire. Les six catégories prospectives dans l'antiquité grecque (204-22) sont *eon, physis, alétheia, logos, hen* et *noûs.* Les catégories, nietzschéennes, de la clôture de la modernité (222-45) se présentent par ailleurs comme la volonté de puissance, le nihilisme, la justice, l'éternel retour du même, la transmutation de toutes les valeurs et le surhomme. A ces catégories rétrospectives, l'auteur fait succéder les 'catégories de transition' qui chez Heidegger démarquent encore timidement le champ auquel fait accéder le saut hors de la métaphysique. Là se manifeste enfin librement au jour la multiplicité des modes de venue à la présence par opposition à l'orientation traditionnelle de la pensée vers un principe unique, coercitif parce qu'exclusif, de type onto-théologique. Schürmann insistera aussi sur les conséquences subversives de la pensée de Heidegger pour la question de l'agir, dans la mesure où les concepts de finalité, de responsabilité, d'affaires *(Betrieb),* de destin et de violence sont désormais destitués. La stratégie délibérée adoptée par Heidegger à l'époque du déferlement de la technique réside dans une forme d'anarchie non violente, dans le laisser-être de la chose, dans un délaissement qui n'a pourtant rien d'une pure passivité.

En définitive, le *Principe d'anarchie* constitue une étude sérieuse et fort bien documentée à propos de la question de l'agir chez Heidegger. A première vue, on sera sans doute porté à reprocher à son auteur le caractère par trop provisoire du premier chapitre, à déplorer aussi le côté parfois fastidieux de certains passages soit en raison du caractère fragmentaire des thèmes exposés, soit en raison de l'allure trop schématique des différentes 'tables' de catégories. Ce dernier trait n'est d'ailleurs certes pas dans le goût de Heidegger. Mais on touche là précisément toute la difficulté d'écrire un commentaire

sur une telle oeuvre. Face au danger constant de s'en remettre à la lettre du maître pour n'en pas quitter les ornières, Schürmann opte pour une distance critique lui permettant d'établir sa problématique de façon autonome à propos d'un thème aussi délicat somme toute que Heidegger et la politique. Cette prise de distance fait en sorte que l'auteur ne cède en aucun cas à une 'lecture partisane' de Heidegger cherchant à l'inculper ou à le disculper des résonances politiques immédiates qu'ont pu avoir ses textes. Schürmann reste par ailleurs assez fidèle à son auteur pour tirer les conséquences concernant l'agir à partir des textes eux-mêmes de sorte que le lecteur à l'affût d'une nouvelle 'théorie' de l'action à la mesure de l'âge postmoderne sera sans doute déçu de n'y trouver ... qu'un commentaire.

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JOHN R. SEARLE, *Sens et expression: études de théorie des actes de langage* (traduction et préface par Joëlle Proust). Paris: éd. de Minuit 1982. Pp. 243. ISBN 2-7078-0621-5.

John Searle a réuni ici sept articles parus entre 1975 et 1979 dans divers périodiques ou ouvrages collectifs, et qui s'inscrivent dans le prolongement direct de la théorie des actes de discours développée dans Searle (1969). Le livre tire toute son unité thématique des chapitres 2, 4, 5 et 6, qui abordent différents aspects de la distinction et de la relation complexe entre le sens littéral d'une phrase et celui, éventuellement non-littéral, de ses énonciations. C'est donc sur eux que j'attirerai surtout l'attention.

Searle se rallie au chapitre 5 à une forme de holisme sémantique qui n'est pas sans rappeler Quine, mais aussi et surtout Wittgenstein. Il tire ingénieusement parti de quelques exemples pour défendre l'idée qu'une phrase, même univoque et dépourvue d'éléments déictiques, n'a généralement de sens littéral (i.e. dans le cas d'une phrase à l'indicatif, de conditions de vérité) que relativement à un ensemble d'assomptions contextuelles d'arrière-plan qui ne sont pas représentées dans sa structure sémantique. Elles ne peuvent y être représentées, selon Searle, parce qu'elles sont variables (différentes assomptions déterminant différentes conditions de vérité), indéterminées en nombre aussi bien qu'en contenu, et que chaque assomption ne peut être spécifiée

qu'au moyen d'une phrase qui fait elle-même intervenir d'autres assomptions, de sorte qu'on s'engagerait ainsi dans une régression à l'infini.

Bien que les mêmes raisons devraient apparemment interdire toute spécification de ces assomptions, Searle refuse d'endosser cette conclusion et s'empresse de préciser qu'il a seulement voulu montrer que ces assomptions ne font pas partie du contenu sémantique de la phrase, et que par conséquent on ne peut parler du sens d'une phrase indépendamment de tout contexte. Cette précaution à mon avis toute rhétorique n'empêchera sans doute pas la thèse de Searle sur la relativité du sens littéral d'exciter l'agressivité de nombreux théoriciens du langage, et cela d'autant plus qu'elle est sous-déterminée par les exemples invoqués. Je remarquerai, pour ma part, qu'il n'y a aucune absurdité à admettre la relativité des conditions de vérité sans admettre celle du sens littéral et que la régression dans la spécification des assomptions contextuelles, à supposer qu'elle soit bien réelle, est aussi inoffensive que la régression dans la hiérarchie des niveaux de langage. Les questions soulevées par Searle méritent en tout cas d'être examinées de façon beaucoup plus minutieuse qu'il ne l'a fait lui-même.

Si, comme Searle l'affirme, la thèse de la relativité du sens littéral ne remet pas en question la légitimité de la distinction entre le sens littéral d'une phrase et le sens (éventuellement non-littéral) de ses énonciations, elle pourrait cependant affecter considérablement la conception des rapports entre le sens littéral et le sens non-littéral développée dans les autres parties du livre, car elle présuppose une attitude orthodoxe à l'égard du sens littéral. On devrait se demander, en effet, comment distinguer les assomptions contextuelles qui permettent de déterminer le sens littéral de celles qui permettent de déterminer le sens de l'énonciation.

Searle distingue deux façons dont le sens de l'énonciation peut s'écarter du sens littéral de la phrase énoncée: le locuteur peut soit ne pas vouloir dire ce qu'il dit (i.e. ce que la phrase énoncée signifie littéralement) mais autre chose, soit vouloir dire ce qu'il dit, mais aussi autre chose. Les énonciations métaphoriques (chapitre 4) se rangeraient dans la première catégorie, tandis que les énonciations qui servent à accomplir des actes illocutoires indirects (chapitre 2) ou qui utilisent référentiellement des descriptions définies (chapitre 6) appartiendraient à la seconde. Cette distinction m'apparaît fort utile, importante et bien fondée, bien que Searle donne l'impression de ne pas l'utiliser avec tout le discernement voulu.

Searle s'en prend aux théories comparatives et interactionnistes de la métaphore, qu'il critique efficacement et auxquelles il reproche, en substance, de n'avoir pas apprécié l'importance de la distinction entre le sens de la phrase, qui est toujours littéral, et celui de l'énonciation, qui seul peut être non-littéral. Le problème de la métaphore, tel que le conçoit Searle, est essentiellement de formuler des règles d'interprétation des énonciations métaphoriques, c'est-à-dire, dans le cas (le seul examiné par Searle) d'une phrase de la forme [S est P], des règles permettant de trouver le(s) R tel(s) que le locuteur veut dire que S est R en énonçant [S est P]. Ces règles se répartissent en trois catégories: (1) celles qui permettent d'établir si l'énonciation

donnée doit être interprétée métaphoriquement, (2) celles qui déterminent les valeurs possibles de R, et (3) celles qui visent à restreindre les valeurs de R à celles que le locuteur veut vraisemblablement appliquer à S. Searle s'acquitte relativement bien de la tâche dans les deux premiers cas, mais il ne propose, dans la catégorie (3), qu'une reformulation du problème qui ne fait guère avancer l'analyse.

Selon Searle, le locuteur qui énonce 'Pouvez-vous me passer le sel?' dans les circonstances habituelles accomplit simultanément deux actes illocutoires. D'une part, il accomplit l'acte illocutoire littéral qui consiste à demander à l'allocutaire s'il est en mesure de lui passer le sel, et d'autre part il prie l'allocutaire de lui passer le sel. Cette prière indirecte, qui constitue ce que Searle appelle l'acte illocutoire primaire de l'énonciation, est ainsi accomplie par le biais d'une interrogation littérale, qui constitue alors l'acte illocutoire secondaire. Searle n'aborde pas, dans le chapitre 2, le phénomène des actes de discours indirects dans sa généralité, mais limite l'attention à certaines constructions qui sont couramment utilisées pour accomplir indirectement des actes illocutoires (du type commissif ou directif). Il s'agit, en termes gricéens, de constructions qui induisent des implicatures conversationnelles généralisées.

Le problème des actes de discours indirects est taillé sur le même patron que celui de la métaphore. Searle ne donne pourtant aucune règle générale permettant de déterminer si le locuteur accomplit ou non un acte illocutoire indirect en énonçant une phrase donnée; or un tel principe est nécessaire, puisqu'on peut très bien concevoir que le locuteur demande (littéralement) à quelqu'un s'il peut lui passer le sel sans vouloir le prier de lui passer le sel. Il semble même y avoir une contradiction entre la caractérisation générale qui est proposée du phénomène, à savoir que lorsqu'un acte illocutoire indirect est accompli, l'acte littéral l'est aussi, et l'analyse qui est développée dans les cas particuliers examinés par Searle. Ainsi, la reconstruction du raisonnement par lequel l'auditeur en vient à reconnaître qu'en énonçant 'Pouvez-vous me passer le sel?' le locuteur a voulu le prier de lui passer le sel passe par la conclusion que le locuteur n'a pas voulu poser une question, alors que la thèse de Searle est précisément que le locuteur accomplit dans ce cas deux actes illocutoires simultanément, une question et une prière. Searle formule toutefois un ensemble de principes généraux qui, si on suppose résolue la question de savoir si un acte illocutoire indirect est effectivement accompli, suffisent à identifier l'acte illocutoire indirect dans les cas paradigmatiques examinés.

Searle se propose dans le chapitre 6 de montrer que la distinction introduite par Donnellan (1966) entre un usage référentiel et un usage attributif des descriptions définies est sans fondement, et qu'on peut rendre compte des phénomènes mis en évidence par Donnellan au moyen des notions disponibles dans la théorie des actes de discours.

Un locuteur utilise une description définie référentiellement, selon Donnellan, lorsqu'il l'utilise pour référer à un individu particulier qu'il a en tête, tandis qu'il l'utilise attributivement lorsqu'il veut parler de l'individu, quel

qu'il soit, qui est dénoté par cette description. La caractéristique principale de l'usage référentiel est que le locuteur peut réussir à référer à un individu particulier, et donc à faire une affirmation vraie ou fausse à son sujet, même quand il n'est pas dénoté par la description utilisée.

Searle cherche à rendre compte du phénomène en le rapprochant de celui des actes de discours indirects. Quand un locuteur accomplit un acte illocutoire indirect, il accomplit un acte illocutoire primaire au moyen de l'accomplissement littéral d'un acte illocutoire secondaire. De la même façon, Searle admet qu'on puisse faire référence à un individu sous un certain aspect en utilisant une expression qui représente littéralement un autre aspect (qui peut ne pas s'appliquer au même individu, ou ne s'appliquer à aucun individu). L'aspect primaire de la référence serait alors celui que le locuteur a en tête lorsqu'il utilise une description définie, et qui doit déterminer un individu, faute de quoi son affirmation est dépourvue de valeur de vérité. La description est utilisée 'attributivement' lorsqu'elle exprime littéralement l'aspect primaire, tandis qu'elle est utilisée 'référentiellement' dans le cas contraire; elle exprime alors un aspect secondaire.

L'analogie avec les actes de discours indirects devient problématique quand Searle ajoute que dans l'emploi référentiel le locuteur réfère à l'objet satisfaisant l'aspect primaire en accomplissant l'acte de référence qui exprime l'aspect secondaire (littéral), c'est-à-dire, qu'il accomplit simultanément deux actes de référence et par conséquent aussi deux actes illocutoires. Ceci a la conséquence, à mon avis indésirable, que le locuteur qui en énonçant 'Le meurtrier de Smith est fou' utilise 'le meurtrier de Smith' référentiellement pour renvoyer à l'homme qui est assis dans le box des accusés veut affirmer à la fois que le meurtrier de Smith est fou et que l'homme qui est assis dans le box des accusés est fou, qu'il croie ou non que l'accusé a bel et bien tué Smith ou même que Smith a été assassiné. Dans ce cas cela ne peut être le propre de l'aspect 'primaire' d'être celui que le locuteur a en tête, car il doit alors avoir en tête deux aspects simultanément: l'aspect primaire de la référence secondaire (littérale) et l'aspect primaire de la référence primaire (indirecte), qui est exprimé par 'l'homme qui est assis dans le box des accusés.' Cela ne me paraît pas très cohérent, ni permettre d'expliquer comment l'auditeur peut reconnaître que le locuteur veut dire quelque chose de plus que ce qu'il exprime littéralement. Assez curieusement, Searle ne soulève ni cette question, ni celle de savoir comment l'auditeur peut identifier l'aspect primaire de la référence, après avoir reconnu qu'il était différent de l'aspect littéralement exprimé. Ce sont pourtant ces questions qui guidaient son étude de la méthaphore et des actes de discours indirects. Son explication de la distinction entre usage référentiel et usage attributif reste donc, au mieux, incomplète.

Deux des trois articles qui complètent le volume sont ce que j'appellerais des pièces mineures, qui entretiennent des liens plus ou moins étroits avec la problématique centrale du discours non-littéral. Il s'agit des chapitres 3 et 7. Searle examine dans le second les tentatives de quelques sémanticiens générativistes pour rendre compte des forces illocutoires et des actes de

discours indirects, et n'a guère de peine à montrer la supériorité méthodologique de sa propre théorie. Il aborde dans le premier la question du discours de la fiction, dont la caractéristique serait de contenir des énonciations non-sérieuses c'est-à-dire des énonciations qui ne servent à accomplir aucun acte illocutoire, ou qui servent à feindre d'accomplir des actes illocutoires. Il y aurait, selon Searle, des conventions spéciales qui permettraient de suspendre les engagements illocutoires normalement associés aux énonciations, et qui seraient invoquées dans le discours de la fiction. Quant au chapitre I, où Searle présente sa taxinomie des actes illocutoires, c'est un excellent article, qui serait toutefois plus à sa place en appendice à une réédition de Searle (1969).

Ce livre contient tout compte fait beaucoup d'idées et de matériaux indispensables, mais qui restent encore à développer et à organiser en une véritable théorie du discours non-littéral. Enfin je m'en voudrais de ne pas signaler le travail de Joëlle Proust, dont la préface permet d'apprécier l'orientation générale des travaux de Searle en les situant dans une perspective plus large, et dont la traduction est presque impeccable.

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SVETOZAR STOJANOVIĆ, *In Search of Democracy in Socialism: History and Party Consciousness.* Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1981. Pp. 145. US$16.95. ISBN 0-87975-161-4.

One of the central problems of twentieth-century Marxism has been the problem of how to build a party which can effectively mediate between the proletariat's actual trade union consciousness, and its imputed class consciousness. In most discussions of this problem, for example Lukacs' *History*

and Class Consciousness, concern with the principles of internal party organization and the ethics of the revolutionary has been incidental to concern with the relation of the party to the proletariat. The principles and ethics of the party in relation to its members are at the center of attention in Svetozar Stojanović's *In Search of Democracy in Socialism.* The shift in emphasis indicated by the subtitle, *History and Party Consciousness,* is in response to a problem raised by Stalinism, namely, how parties initially dedicated to democracy, human emancipation, and personal dignity could produce undemocratic societies in which the very members of the ruling parties have been subjected by their leadership to unusual degrees of personal degradation.

Stojanović provides two kinds of answer to this problem. The first, taken up in the part entitled 'Authoritarian and Democratic Communism,' is an account of the conditions necessary for democratic communism and a theory of charisma applied to Marxist parties in the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia. Stojanović argues that 'Socialism cannot develop so long as there is continued mass *poverty,'* both material and political poverty (51). ('Political poverty' is the lack of opportunity for citizens to participate meaningfully in fundamental social decisions [51].) socialist revolutions occuring in these circumstances have resulted in *'authoritarian-pauperistic communism* as a revolutionary response to social immobility, inequality, injustice, and privilege' (51). Among its characteristics are 'a centralized revolutionary party that aspires to establish a power monopoly ... and total subordination of the individual to the collective undertaking' (51). In such circumstances, the authority of both the party and its leaders becomes charismatic, in proportion to the magnitude of political poverty (62).

This account seems at first glance to be a deterministic nomological description of revolutionary decay. While Stojanović rightly points out that the failure of socialist revolution in Russia in no way vitiates the prospects for democratic communism in more favorable circumstances, it would seem that authoritarianism and charisma in Russia and China were inevitable. But Stojanović provides another answer in which critical choices, avoidable errors, and mistaken ideas are indispensable causes of the triumph of Stalinism. Stojanović thus rejects orthodox Marxism's strict determinism, arguing that it is incompatible with Marx's teleological theory of action and with the role assigned to individuals and to 'superstructural' causes in Marx's approach to history. He argues further that in spite of the 'humanistic continuity in Marx's thought,' there are contradictions in it between a 'strict' and a 'tempered' determinism, requiring a revision in favor of the latter, which asserts the existence not of laws, but of tendencies, and allows for *mutual* conditioning between forces and relations of production, and between economic base and social and political superstructure (21-38).

These are familiar themes. But Stojanović goes on to show what has happened as a result of adherence to a strict determinism. First, it has led Marxists to overlook the role of great personalities in history, and hence not to take sufficient precautions against Stalin. Second, it has provided the ideological

underpinnings of Stalinist party-mindedness, the view that the communist must be prepared to sacrifice not only his life, but also his self-respect for the party (100). Belief in strict determinism, and hence the denial of the importance of individual actors and their *subjective* intentions, paradoxically can lead to a heightened sense of responsibility: each person is merely a link in a causal chain, and hence is *'objectively'* responsible for whatever happens as a result of what he/she does — even for those consequences which are unintended and unforeseeable. But Stojanović shows how this doctrine of 'objective responsibility' leads to irresponsibility of the party and its leadership, and to the self-abasement of the party member. Since the party and its leadership become the sole interpreters of the 'objective meaning' of history, no restraints are placed upon the caprice of the party. The party member is obliged through humiliating self-criticisms to assume responsibility for events no one could have foreseen, denying signficance to his/her subjectivity and judgment, and hence abandoning personal dignity before the party.

In contrast, Stojanović argues for the absolute inviolability of the dignity of the individual person, in particular the individual revolutionary (141).

The Marxist reader might balk at what appears to be a retreat to an ahistorical and absolutist Kantian ethics here, but Stojanović has anticipated such criticism, first, by himself criticizing Kantian ethics as too formalistic and rigoristic (133), and then by offering what amounts to a consequentialist justification of the Kantian principle: abandonment of dignity will lead to failure of the revolution (141-2). Stojanović attempts to support this position with criticism of what he sees to be crucial errors by leading revolutionaries, such as the precedent-setting humiliating self-criticisms by Trotsky, et. al. in 1926 (100), concluding that 'in no way can it be shown that readiness to sacrifice one's personal dignity is also essential to the revolutionary's activity' (140; see also 66, 56-8).

Perhaps readiness to sacrifice one's dignity is not essential, but, particularly in conditions of material and political poverty, can the social and psychological pressure to do so be resisted? To answer this, Stojanović would have to provide us with a more complete account of the relationships between human freedom, and those conditions which tend to limit it. Also, his account of intra-party dynamics, and the ethics of the revolutionary would be more incisive if integrated with some sort of class analysis revealing the interests which the working class and other parts of society might have in furthering or opposing democracy. In addressing the moral questions in abstraction from a sociological analysis, Stojanović has not entirely escaped the 'helpless moralizing' he warns us against (81).

Thus, concerning those conditions of material and political poverty in which Marxist revolutions have occured Stojanović leaves one wondering whether, had the leaders behaved more responsibly, party members and the working class could have been sufficiently responsible to resist the phenomena of charisma and hierarchy which have been the legacy of Stalinism, and which continue to haunt revolutionary practice. Nevertheless, he has rendered a service by tracing some of the responsibility for Stalinism to

the theory and practice of leading Marxists, and he does so with a remarkable sensitivity to historical detail, and to the variety and subtlety of human action, recognizing the susceptibility of Marxism to ideological distortion while not discarding its humanistic promise.

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IAN E. THOMPSON, *Being and Meaning: Paul Tillich's Theory of Meaning, Truth and Logic.* New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1981. Pp. xii + 244. US$30.00. ISBN 0-85224-388.

In his preface, Thompson describes this work as an 'attempt to defend a new interpretation of Tillich as a Christian ideologist in which his pre-war and wartime experience is regarded as definitive in providing the impulse towards the systematic formulation of his ideas' (ix). To some extent, the description is accurate; for here, much more than has usually been the case, Tillich's own indications that his thinking derived from his experience are shown to be so. That the result is, however, a 'new interpretation' is more than a little dubious. The study is, rather, an extended exploration of an interpretation that Tillich himself offered on any number of occasions. It might be regarded as a new interpretation only if one were to load the term 'Christian ideologist' in a way that seems contrary to Thompson's intention.

The strength of the book lies in its part one, comprising chapters 2 and 3. In these chapters, Thompson retraces Tillich's critique of supranaturalism, which was the substance of Tillich's habilitation dissertation *Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen* (the published part, which Thompson uses, is only half of it), and his continuing critique of nominalism. Much of the criticism made of Tillich for his rejection of supranaturalism is based on a conception of supranaturalism different from the one he had in mind, and Thompson's recovery of the treatise in which Tillich formulates his position, by showing the inner contradiction (or 'dialectic,' as he called it there) of the Protestant supranaturalists in the period right after Kant, is helpful for understanding what Tillich was attacking and why he was attacking it. Thompson is also surely right in seeing a connection between that dissertation and Tillich's later repudiation of quietistic Lutheranism and Barthian supranaturalism. He

seems to me to be wrong, however, in suggesting that Tillich's own solution to the theological problems in the background of supranaturalism and of historical thinking requires moving from thinking to something else, namely, to a 'commitment' or a 'living demonstration of ultimate concern with being and meaning' (54); similarly, he seems wrong in stating that Tillich 'was primarily concerned with practical rather than theoretical ends' (209). For, quite apart from Tillich's own serious reservations about the idea of 'commitment,' the character especially of his early works through the 1920's demonstrates that, in his case, thinking itself *was* the experience in which both the radical question and the radical answer were found, and hence the theoretical and practical were not opposed but the same. On this point, it appears to me that Thompson has not fully grasped either the radicalness or the unity of Tillich's thought.

However that may be, Thompson has presented an aspect of Tillich's writings that is not commonly found in the literature, and he has endeavored to set these writings into the philosophical context of the last two centuries. Readers familiar with Kantian and post-Kantian idealism will surely find his account of idealism deficient. It is, for example, startling to read that Kant's 'general position' was 'that metaphysics can be derived from reflection on the forms of logic' (35) and, for anyone interested in that history, it is disappointing to find Hegel still being described as one who ignored the boundaries that, presumably, Kant had prescribed for cognition. The study would have been improved by an account of that whole nineteenth-century idealist movement more in accord both with Tillich's understanding and with the last half century of scholarship on it. This is, however, a failure so common in Tillich studies that one hardly expects anything else.

The second part of the book (chapters 4 through 8) is thematically the heart of the study. It is an analysis and critique of Tillich's 'metaphysics of meaning, truth, and logic.' Much work has gone into these chapters, and Thompson provides a kind of accountant's weighing of the debits and the credits in Tillich's theory, which on the whole achieves a fair estimate, given the fact that the standards of measurement are mostly extrinsic to Tillich's system. But the author has not really worked through Tillich's *System der Wissenschaften* (which, since this book was written, has now appeared in English translation at the Bucknell University Press) well enough to see the architectonics and the inner consistency of Tillich's thought. Some of the questions that purportedly derive from Tillich's confusions — it seems de rigueur in all philosophical analyses of Tillich to say that he was confused — might vanish if time were taken to work through that system. Even more important, Tillich's conception of norms, which are *creative* syntheses of thought and being into a meaning (*Sinn*), is of such fundamental importance that it should not be overlooked (or brought in only through quotations from Tillich) in an account of his theory of meaning.

Originally a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Durham, Thompson's book has some of the typical faults of dissertations, but not obtrusively so. The major ones are, perhaps, that the author tends to overstate what has been

accomplished (there is, for example, no clear indication of how one does read Tillich for what his 'style' discloses) and that the way of putting the theses runs the risk of distorting matters beyond recognition: when it is said, for example, that Tillich 'is ultimately concerned to recommend to others the need for ultimate concern' (17), one can scarcely avoid wincing. But, unaccountably for a dissertation, which one expects to be bibliographically complete, some pertinent sources are not used: a discussion of the criteria of truth should not omit the essay on religious symbols at the beginning of the symposium edited by Sidney Hook (*Religious Experience and Truth),* which, like *The Dynamics of Faith,* is more explicit than the *Systematic Theology.* The same could be said of the unpublished 'Rechtfertigung und Zweifel' (1919), which contains a more extensive treatment of the problem of subjectivity in theology than the essays that Thompson treats.

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CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, ed. *Realism and the Cinema.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. 320. Cdn$33.95; US$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7100-0477-X); Cdn$17.95; US$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7100-0478-8).

'Discussion of realism, in film as in other art forms, tends to be tortuous or circular.' So opens *Realism and the Cinema,* one in a series of volumes devoted to central issues in film studies recently published under the auspices of the British Film Institute. The BFI Readers in Film Studies aim at bringing together materials which have not previously been collected and which are not readily accessible outside the pages of specialized journals. The series has been prepared for an audience of serious students of film.

Certain features of the book's format are therefore puzzling. The book differs from other available collections in its juxtaposition of commentary with selections from film makers, theoreticians and critics. Such a format lends itself well to the proposal of novel theories (as, for example, Auerbach's treatment of literary realism, where selections from literature are marshalled as evidence for an independent thesis), but not to the more minimal functions of editing a compendium of basic texts. If, as it appears, it is the latter the

series intends, one might justifiably ask why the editorial comment and material excerpted from elsewhere are not kept separate.

In the present arrangement, Williams' voice is set off from the selections by a slightly larger type face, but after several pages of one or the other, this distinction becomes obscured. The absence of sharp delineation and the abbreviated character of some selections combine to erode the reader's sense of context. This is exacerbated by the practice of identifying passages only by author and date, leaving the full reference to a separate listing at the back of the book. Even this listing omits exact page references to the original works.

These somewhat minor details about the mechanics of presentation nonetheless make it difficult for the reader, even one familiar with the literature in question, to locate quickly a discussion for which his appetite has been whetted.

A related but more serious reservation concerns the commentary itself. Williams has set himself the task, as he explains in the introduction, of tracing the conceptual rather than chronological patterns of the realist debate, yet it is just this conceptual clarification that is lacking. The realism/anti-realism dispute in cinema, as in more strictly philosophic arenas, centers on the question of what these two terms entail. In *Realism and the Cinema,* however, this question is never successfully addressed.

Since Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* appeared some years ago, the recognition that realism in art is the achievement of artifice, not of 'mirroring nature,' has become commonplace. Williams' own views on the subject are by no means naive, as is clear from his emphasis of the role technical processes and stylistic devices play in promoting realism. Nonetheless, the reader accustomed to the rigors of philosophical analysis may well feel disappointed that no attempt is made to distinguish views which identify realism with specific constraints on subject matter from those imposing constraints on camera or editorial technique. Similarly, the discussion would benefit from a closer examination of the epistemological assumptions underlying individual positions, and, since the collected pieces range over both fiction and documentary film, of the concept of documentary.

Williams' remarks are largely confined to the noting of broad similarities between articles written from widely divergent standpoints over a span of fifty years. The editorial interpolations are not long enough or systematic enough to crystallize the dominant issues for the reader using *Realism and the Cinema* as an introductory text, nor to improve the understanding of the reader who is more advanced.

Despite these drawbacks, the selections themselves have been astutely chosen. Williams has wisely stressed unexplored regions in the classics of realist theory (e.g., the works of Bazin and Kracauer) and extended the field of film theory into some less well-known corners. Thus, for instance, the collection includes what little Brecht wrote on the cinema, a comparison of the image 'leaps' of cinema with the alternation of line in poetry by the Russian Formalist, Yuri Tynyanov, and an illuminating analysis of the nineteenth-century realist novel by Colin MacCabe.

An annotated bibliography and a listing of films suitable for courses on realism complement the text. The Reader thus serves as a valuable starting point for pursuing one of the perennial issues in film studies.

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