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WALTER L. ADAMSON, *Hegemony and Revolution. Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1980. Pp. x + 304. US$22.50. ISBN 0-520-03924-6.

For some reason or other Marxism to this day continues to exercise a tenacious hold over a portion of Western intellectual society and serve as a curiosity piece for a somewhat larger group thereof. This fascination persists in spite of the seemingly never-ending spate of revelations of acts, perpetrated supposedly in the name of humanity by self-declared Marxists, which run directly counter to those values most cherished by Western society. In search of a way to reconcile the innate fascination offered by Marxism with contemporary Western standards of intellectual rigor and morality, many have turned an eye towards the so-called Hegelian Marxists of the pre-World War II generation. This latter group, taken to consist essentially of Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci with the possible appendage of the Frankfurt school theorists, offers the contemporary reader a view of society and history which in no way compromises one's own standards. Yet what can we possibly think today of a philosopher who, after having achieved some of the twentieth century's most philosophically probing insights into the human condition, went on to disclaim it all and pay political and, in effect, intellectual allegiance to history's most ruthless and blood-thirsty dictator. In the case of Korsch the insights won only proved later to be stillborn. He simply did not go on to elaborate those anti-positivist yearnings he found so essential to post-Second International Marxism and which were ever so succinctly expressed in *Marxism and Philosophy*.

Unlike as in the case of Lukács, Gramsci's moral and intellectual integrity was never compromised. Unlike Korsch, Gramsci *did* go on to produce the synthesis of this new 'Hegelian Marxist' outlook, albeit in a rather abbreviated, indeed almost outline, form. Scarcely more than a decade ago, however, there were few in-depth studies of Gramsci's thought in English. Of course the amount of literature in Gramsci's native Italy devoted to his thought is now staggering almost beyond belief. Yet, to be sure, by no means is it all of value, not to speak of great importance, for the understanding of his thought. English language literature on Gramsci has not only now increased many-fold in terms of sheer number, but increased immeasurably in depth such that it now ranks second to none. Adamson's new book strengthens this reviewer's conviction in this matter and justly deserves to be placed next to

Davidson's biography of Gramsci as among the best secondary studies of Gramsci in any language.

Adamson states that the task of his work is to present a 'thorough reading of the *Prison Notebooks* in particular' (2). Yet more specifically Adamson hopes to show how Gramsci's intellectual background saved him from a positivist and 'totalitarian' Marxism. In hopes of doing so Adamson traces insightfully and cogently Gramsci's formative years, showing how Gramsci veritably 'breathed in' the Italian intellectual currents of his day, most notably the thoughts of Italian neo-Hegelianism. Adamson also provides one of the best available short sketches of post-Risorgimento Italy and of the social movements seething just below the point of eruption. All of this and more constitutes the first part of Adamson's book.

The second part, consisting of four chapters, is concerned with the ideas presented in the *Prison Notebooks,* a work conceived and written during Gramsci's last years of enforced isolation. Yet Gramsci was not so totally cut off from outside information that he did not know of Stalin's usurpation of the United Opposition's stance. In reaction Gramsci recognized that Marxism needed a 'full-scale philosophical reconstruction' (p. 105) in order to purge it of its economistic and mechanistic tendencies. This is the inspiration for and leitmotiv of the incarceration writings.

Adamson's principal interest is not the elaboration of Gramsci's philosophy in the rigorous sense but rather philosophy as one part of a total picture whose emphasis is on the political, cultural, indeed intellectual education of the masses. This already has its roots deep within Gramsci's own view of the nature of philosophy. Yet this is not to say that Adamson's discussion of Gramsci's philosophy is a mere ancillary to something larger. Rather his philosophical views are in evidence on every page of Part Two, and it is to Adamson's presentation of these views that I wish now to turn.

Adamson clearly recognizes that Gramsci lagged behind Lukács in several notable ways. Given Gramsci's worldly activities one might expect that his philosophical penchant would be towards social philosophy. Yet it was Lukács, the 'armchair pundit' (138) who discerned the need for a theory of reification. As Adamson points out (5 and 132) Gramsci simply 'had no such problematic.' Unlike the early Marx Gramsci apparently felt no innate hostility towards the every-increasing rationalization and industrialization of labor and Western life in general. Instead Gramsci concentrated on political theory and ridding epistemology of metaphysics.

Adamson understands that in some way there is a phenomenology at least implicit in Gramsci's analyses (141). Yet unfortunately the former is none too clear on what he understands by this word. I say 'unfortunate' because the lack of clarity and precision renders impotent many of Adamson's most potentially trenchant philosophic comments. Presumably whatever sense we are to ascribe to 'phenomenology' and its cognates must be compatible with Adamson's ascription of a 'pragmatological dialectic' (130), whatever that is, and an Hegelian Marxism (5) to Gramsci.

Without doubt the latter did maintain the viability of the dialectic and did indeed borrow much, albeit by way of Croce and Engels, from Hegel. Yet would it not be better for us to explode this *myth* of Gramsci's 'Hegelianism' rather than accede to the historian's predilection to fit everything neatly into categories? Sure Gramsci learned something from his meagre reading of Hegel, but he also learned something from whatever he knew of Kant's philosophy and yet noone, to my knowledge, has yet labeled Gramsci a Kantian Marxist. Again much of what Gramsci himself considered as part of the dialectic is so much extra baggage which conceals rather than illuminates the vital core of his thought. Had he actively sought to divest Marxism once and for all of Engels's crude formulations of 'dialectics' Gramsci's own reconstruction would have adhered that much more to its anti-positivist intent.

Another point worthy of mentioning is Adamson's attempt to find a suitable definition of materialism so as to be consistent with his interpretation of Gramsci's thought and yet with the latter's continued, though reluctant, self-characterization. In this matter Adamson follows the lead of so many others, a lead which the present reviewer himself is guilty of following. Yet here again would it not be better for us to recognize Gramsci's timidity, his hesitancy to effect a genuine 'reconstruction' of Marxism and break with the now antiquated view that materialism is something revolutionary in itself. Gramsci may have had some internally consistent notion of materialism, but surely he saw that it had nothing in common with the traditional sense of that term. After all he knew the works of Engels and F.A. Lange. Why could he not simply, and consistently, I might add, admit the baselessness of Marxian materialism? Either we acknowledge the halfhearted character of Gramsci's critique or we must lower our own estimation of Gramsci's critical intelligence.

Lastly Adamson rejects the 'totalitarian' reading of Gramsci's theory of hegemony (174) enunciated by among others for example H. Stuart Hughes in *Consciousness and Society*. Adamson contends that in Gramsci's view the 'withering away of the state' means the withering away of the state's 'coercive element' (167). What is not so clear, however, is what is to prevent the state from adopting coercive tactics precisely in order to obtain the sought-for hegemony. Surely there is no theoretical nor ethical injunction to that effect. To endorse as Adamson apparently does (174) that Gramsci allowed for the ruled to enter the ruling 'group' (read: 'class' — TN) is to provide for no more 'democracy' and dynamism of thought and culture than that found in the 'people's democracies' of the Communist world. Many of the gentlemen in the Kremlin had 'lowly' origins.

The debate over the nature of Gramsci's thought is bound to continue as long as Marxism remains a living ideology confronting a pluralistically-minded people. Adamson's work is a worthy contribution to just this debate.

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Most readers will already know some of these papers on the history of philosophy, but few will know most of them, and no one will know all of them — for two are published here for the first time. But the volume is of far more interest than just its new pieces. Sporadic readers of Prof. Anscombe will have been struck by her eccentric blatherless style; put all the papers together, though, and there emerges not just a style but an impressive paradigm of a *method* in the history of philosophy. In those philosophical circles in Canada where the French and the English mingle and discuss, the question of method often looms large, and it can pose a real barrier to sympathy and understanding. Anscombe's work is the antithesis of what is called 'la méthode historique,' and it is work of most singular merit. It is in my view the model and exemplar of what the Oxonians, the analysts, the Angloamericans — in short, les anglais — aspire to in their peculiar way of doing the history of philosophy.

The method, of course, is distinctly unmethodical; it is perhaps more a manner than a method. There is no choosing a large canvas in youth and spending a career filling it with fine strokes. There is none of the stuff of research programmes or team projects. This is history of philosophy motivated not by the historian's passion for completeness and accuracy, but by — dare I say it? — the philosopher's passion for the truth. And what is interesting is Anscombe's capacity to find truth in surprising places: some of these papers may be described as rehabilitating old doctrines which have long been considered not just false, but wild.

Take, for example, the theory of forms. La méthode historique has given us a good supply of monumental and painstaking studies of the ingredients of this theory, or of its development over Plato's career — studies which, however, remain agnostic as to its truth. Another brand of exegesis has sought to illuminate such a funny old doctrine as the theory of forms by stepping, as it were, into Plato's boots, by discovering the now lost presuppositions, the now dissolved mind set, of a remote age. We might call this kind of exegesis the pathology of old doctrines. Its result is that we get an understanding at least of why Plato and his followers might have been tempted by such a theory. But Anscombe takes a new direction: she argues, in a previously unpublished paper on the early theory of forms, that the theory may, after all, be true: at least she shows that its most objectionable feature, the existence of forms as entities separate from and additional to the things which fall under them, is a feature which will survive unscathed a nominalizing attempt to rethink forms as classes. Anscombe defends Plato here by citing Quine on classes, and so shows how thoughtless we are in resisting the separate existence of forms. To my mind, it is a stunning piece of work.

And in an elegant dialogue-paper 'Understanding Proofs' Anscombe continues the discussion of the *Meno* about anamnesis, making Meno voice the objections that intelligent readers are always wishing he would voice, and finding Socratic answers to them. The doctrine of anamnesis emerges, along with that of the eternal pre-existence of the soul, perhaps not altogether rehabilitated, but at any rate much more thoroughly defended than it is in the works of Plato. The paper is also a stylistic tour de force: one would swear one hears a Greek original behind Anscombe's English.

But it would be misleading to suggest that Anscombe's enterprise is just the rehabilitation or the defence of old doctrines. Only a few of the papers have such a clearly positive outcome. Her real purpose is to get her head, and ours, into the argumentative nub of a doctrine — to get us driving around on the same spaghetti-junctions that Parmenides or Plato or Hume or Brentano drove around on. She tries to engage our minds with theirs, at the crucial junctures of their argument. Perhaps this is really the essence of the difference between this way of doing the history of philosophy and la méthode historique: where la méthode historique sets out to describe and understand an argument, Anscombe enters it, and, one way or another, carries it forward.

Her paper 'Parmenides, mystery and contradiction' may serve as an illustration. She reconstructs the core of Parmenides' argument as follows:

> It is the same thing that can be thought and can be.
> What is not can't be.
> ∴ What is not can't be thought.

(How refreshing to see it put so starkly, without having to sidle up to it through a miasma of grammatical observations on the Greek verb 'to be'!) She observes that the argument is valid only if the second premise is taken in sensu diviso, but that its only plausibility is in sensu composito, and then she charts the possible meanings of the first premise, and what is to be said for and against them. In what senses might we be tempted to agree that all that can be thought can be, and that all that can be can be thought? This is strong, interesting exploration. Parmenides, to be sure, doesn't come out of it very well, but we come out with a lot of fog lifted.

The treatment is of course rife with anachronism. Parmenides is made to defend his theses by carrying on a modern debate about what it is for properties to exist and about the nature of empty sets, and he is made to write his stuff in logical notation from time to time. La méthode historique would have little sympathy with such anachronism, I think. But anachronism is a vice to the historian; it is not necessarily a vice to the philosopher. It is one thing to show how an old philosopher can make a case for his views within the mind set and using the conceptual apparatus of his time; but if his position can be made to look good even to us, with our metaphysical coolness and our refined logical tools, then it has a claim to be timeless. La méthode historique

wants to know what a philospher *said;* Prof. Anscombe wants to know what that philosopher *says,* and whether it is true.

Of course, her kind of history of philosophy is no good in the hands of tyros; it is useless and stupid to try to transpose a single page of Aristotle into a modern key if you aren't well drenched in the other pages as well. But Anscombe is well drenched, not only in Plato and Aristotle, but also in Aquinas, Augustine, Hume, Brentano and Wittgenstein, and so she writes with authority.

The other great attribute of Anscombe, which makes this book such a valuable one, is that she writes only about the central questions of philosophy. Truth and necessity are the subject of both her famous paper on Aristotle on the sea battle and of a paper on Aquinas' doctrine concerning God's knowledge of the future. Intention is the issue in the paper on Aristotle's practical syllogism, and in her review of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt;* this latter seems to me a particularly clear and useful statement of some of her views about the will. Two papers on Hume treat of certainty and evidence, and of the principle of sufficient reason. Universals and predicates are the subject of a paper on the *Tractatus.* The last paper in the volume, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism' is a splendidly clear treatment of the paralyzing question whether grammar reflects the structure of the world, or creates it. And throughout her dealing with this list of very large questions Anscombe has the further virtue that she always jumps right in at the deep end: the result is a relatively slim volume, every page of which is entirely given to hard work.

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Dès son adolescence, deux thèmes captivaient Elizabeth Anscombe: la causalité et la perception (cf. intro., vii - viii). Et ce sont eux encore qui

resurgissent ici sous diverses figures à travers vingt et un articles publiés par elle entre 1947 et 1979. Ni sur l'une ni sur l'autre question, elle n'aboutit à une théorie unifiée mais elle oblige, par une foule d'arguments aussi originaux que stimulants, à revoir nombre d'idées reçues. La philosophie analytique contemporaine s'en trouve enrichie de façon appréciable.

Le recueil est divisé en trois parties. La première ('The Philosophy of Mind') comporte dix textes qui concernent tous d'une façon ou d'une autre la problématique de la perception. Si je lis bien, il s'agit principalement d'échapper à ce phénoménalisme que l'A. trouve à la fois tentant et détestable. Comment y arriver? En déconstruisant la représentation fondamentale qui est sous-jacente à tout phénoménalisme: celle d'une sphère d'intériorité au sein de laquelle les sensations, les intentions, les pensées ou les passions se produisent comme événements privés. Anscombe rejoint ici un leitmotiv de la philosophie contemporaine: la critique de l'idée de sujet. Son originalité par rapport aux approches continentales est évidemment de prendre très au sérieux l'intuition — nietzschéenne d'ailleurs aussi bien que wittgensteinienne — selon laquelle c'est là une affaire de grammaire: 'The (deeply rooted) grammatical illusion of a subject is what generates all the errors which we have been considering' (36). D'emblée le premier texte du recueil associe à un titre apparemment phénoménologique, 'The Intentionality of Sensation,' un sous-titre révélateur: 'A Grammatical Feature.' Et la thèse à mon sens la plus intéressante de cette section porte sur le pronom personnel de première personne ('je') qui, selon Anscombe, n'est pas une expression référentielle: ' "I" does not stand for any object, not for anything presented. Or, as Berkeley put it, there is no "idea" of the self' (55).

La seconde partie ('Memory and the Past') est très courte — deux textes seulement — et fait office de transition. Elle prolonge la première en montrant que la remémoration ('remembering') n'est pas une sorte spéciale de sensation, une expérience caractéristique identifiable par des propriétés internes; c'est là, nous dit-on, un point de grammaire. Elle annonce d'autre part la section suivante par une analyse des rapports entre les idées de mémoire et de connexion causale.

La dernière partie enfin ('Causality and Time'), avec ses neuf textes, gravite principalement autour de l'analyse de la causalité. Les thèses y sont particulièrement audacieuses et en général inorthodoxes par rapport à la tradition humienne: la notion de causalité n'implique ni celle de connexion nécessaire ni celle de connexion régulière; l'idée que quelque chose *commence* à exister implique l'idée de cause; *'after'* et *'before'* ne dénotent pas des relations converses l'une de l'autre; les conditionnelles irréelles sont peut-être vérifonctionnelles; et ainsi de suite. Le rapport de toute cette problématique avec la philosophie de l'esprit apparaît en toute clarté dans le dernier texte de la série, le premier article en fait publié par madame Anscombe au cours de sa carrière (dans le *Socratic Digest* en 1947). C'est là que, s'en prenant à un passage de C.S. Lewis, elle propose son importante distinction entre cause et raison: donner les raisons qui justifient une croyance quelconque n'indique

jamais les causes de l'apparition de la croyance en question. La thèse, on le sait, trouvera pas mal d'alliés mais se heurtera aussi quelque quinze ans plus tard à l'opposition résolue de Donald Davidson. On ne déniche ici en tout cas rien qui permette d'élucider l'énigme principale suscitée par le 'dualisme' d'Anscombe: quelle sorte de rôle les 'raisons' peuvent-elles jouer dans le phénomène *empirique* de la croyance? L'A. l'admet dès l'introduction: 'I think we haven't yet an answer to the question...' (x).

Par delà les thèses mêmes et les arguments, ce qui dans ce livre frappe le lecteur — surtout le lecteur francophone, j'imagine —, c'est le *style* philosophique, cette démarche hésitante et autocorrectrice si caractéristique du dernier Wittgenstein. Explorations inachevées, détours tortueux, faux départs, retours en arrières, questions qui désarçonnent, exemples chocs et conclusions elliptiques: la discussion progresse comme en un labyrinthe, où les idées fusent de toutes parts mais où chaque paragraphe est une aventure périlleuse. Et qui d'autre qu'un wittgensteinien concluerait un article par une telle prescription:

> In conclusion, consider the following question and answer:
> Would this hall hold 2,000 people?
> It would hold 2,000 *and* stifle them. (207; souligné par l'A.).

L'A. au demeurant ne se fait pas prier pour reconnaître sa dette avec emphase:

> Everywhere in this paper, [note-t-elle dans un texte de 1950 — l'un de ses premiers donc] I have imitated his ideas and methods of discussion. The best that I have written is a weak copy of the original, and its value depends only on my capacity to understand and use Dr. Wittgenstein's work. (114, n. 3)

Au fond, c'est toute une conception de l'activité philosophique qui se joue dans ce style d'apparence décousue, celle justement que Wittgenstein annonçait dans les *Investigations:* 'La philosophie est la lutte contre l'ensorcellement de notre intelligence par les moyens de notre langage' (*Invest.*, parg. 109); 'En philosophie une question se traite comme une maladie' (ibid., parg. 255). Elizabeth Anscombe, souvenons-nous en, est la traductrice anglaise des *Investigations*. Pour elle comme pour Wittgenstein, la matière brute sur laquelle le philosophe travaille, c'est la tendance spontanée à parler de telle ou telle manière: '*one is inclined to say*...,' '*one wants to say* ...' sont des locutions qui reviennent à tout moment sous sa plume. A s'abandonner trop facilement à ses penchants linguistiques, on se retrouve vite dans l'embarras intellectuel ('*puzzlement,*' '*entanglement,*' '*perplexity*'): on ne comprend plus ce que l'on dit. Et c'est alors qu'intervient la thérapie philosophique. Il s'agit d'extirper les penchants maléfiques comme des mauvaises herbes du jardin de notre compétence linguistique. Pour cela, il faut montrer à quel point nous en sommes empêtrés, question d'abord de démystifier l'illusion de profondeur et de motiver le malade à guérir. Surtout, il faut diagnostiquer

correctement la maladie et en repérer les racines, généralement dans un jeu d'interférence entre différentes formes grammaticales, bref désentortiller l'usage linguistique. La cure est parfois difficile ('Overmastered by prejudice, someone may be unable to give up the idea of...', 127), mais lorsqu'elle réussit, elle ne débouche pas nécessairement sur des conclusions théoriques — 'En philosophie, disait Wittgenstein, on ne tire pas de conclusion' (*Invest.*, parg. 599): le patient, qui n'est autre que le philosophe même, finit par *voir* ce qui depuis le début était là sous son nez, la grammaire du langage ordinaire; '... our language just does go like that' (47), c'est ainsi qu'en dernière analyse se résolvent presque toujours les énigmes philosophiques.

Rien de tout cela n'est théorisé dans le présent recueil où l'on ne trouve à vrai dire que fort peu de 'métaphilosophie.' Mais pour l'essentiel c'est, me semble-t-il, la conception implicite qui est à l'œuvre dans la pratique d'Elizabeth Anscombe. Il y aura là de quoi impatienter — comme je le fus moi-même à quelques reprises — les amateurs de reconstructions logiques nettes et précises aussi bien que les métaphysiciens et les phénoménologues que le titre du livre aurait attirés dans ses filets. Mais l'expédition ne laissera personne bredouille. On y trouvera à tout le moins, sur la perception et sur la causalité, une pléthore d'arguments ingénieux qu'aucun philosophe, quelles que soient ses traditions d'attache, ne gagnerait à négliger.

Et puis, il y a tout de même une idée wittgensteinienne qui se trouve de facto réfutée par l'existence même du livre d'Anscombe, c'est celle du paragraphe 128 des *Investigations:* 'Si on voulait poser des *thèses* en philosophie, il ne serait jamais possible de les débattre, parce que tout le monde serait d'accord avec elles.'

<div align="right">
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Prof. Anscombe presents ten pieces under the heading 'Ethics,' two under 'The Philosophy of Religion,' two under 'Political Philosophy.' The middle section's 'On Transubstantiation' and 'Faith' will help philosophers who work seriously on such concepts; they can enlighten general readers who

simply want to understand better the inner life of devout, but tough-minded Catholic intellectuals. Less rewarding are the final essays on politics.

What then of 'Ethics'? Like the whole volume, as Anscombe's Introduction stresses, the first and longest section offers a mélange of materials for differing, if sometimes overlapping publics. Graduates of Greats, especially ones at home around the Middle Ages and the later Wittgenstein, will have least trouble with the cramped oracularguments of (1) 'The Two Kinds of Error in Action'; (2) 'On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected *in Foro Interno';* (3) 'On Brute Facts'; (4) 'Modern Moral Philosophy'; (10) 'Rules, Rights and Promises'. Number (5) 'Authority' oscillates between Town and Gown. Then there are four admirably written items that many sorts of reader could profit from discussing: (6) 'War and Murder'; (7) 'Mr. Truman's Degree'; (8) 'The Justice of the Present War Examined' [1939]; (9) 'You Can Have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer.' They lucidly express a remarkable conscience and piety. If one is fascinated with religious strands in books by still more noted Catholic converts of our century, writers like Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh, reading (6) through (9), then (11) and (12) should provide some insights. (Anscombe, for example, bitterly attacks the policy of Unconditional Surrender in ways that throw light on *Unconditional Surrender,* the surprisingly bitter last volume of Waugh's once deliciously witty wartime trilogy.) Here and elsewhere readers should feel refreshed by Anscombe's ways of discerning memorable links between philosophy and the joys, pains, rules and concepts of plain family life.

Alas, having once been converted to Rome rather like Anscombe, I long ago found myself returning after a decade to the eclectic fringes of Canterbury. I can admire her masterly prestidigitation with certain assumptions I once shared, while wondering now why such a number of good and clever people would want to cling to such premises in such a rigid and patronizing way. If someone adoringly cited in 1939 from Pope Pius XII's first encyclical a warning that victories in war may have bad aftermaths *whoever wins,* when the Vatican refused to say by encyclical to German and other Catholics that current imprisonments, torturings and executions of people on purely racial grounds was a mortal sin, that was a philosopher's victory for faith all right — a victory over Modus Tollens (cf. 80-1). If one was well aware in 1959 of 'Stalin's more murderous proceedings' (66), but could not see that President Truman in 1945 had a *very serious* reason (whether or not a *sufficient* reason) to end the war with nuclear weapons and check Russian progress into Asia, one demonstrates a philosopher's victory over Modus Ponens. Her attacks on pacifism when coupled with bewildering, condemnatory uses of 'killing the innocent' and 'consequences' bear a whiff of *amor contradictionis* — (honest people's equivalent of the dishonests' Double Think?). But, perhaps, it is *I* who am being too obtuse?

The best of the most academic essays on Ethics is 'Modern Moral Philosophy.' The title's 'Modern' seems to cover J.S. Mill and *Oxbridge* dons from Sidgwick to 1958 (33ff.). But many other younger ages' thinkers are

discussed, especially Aristotle and Hume. She begins with three central theses: (1) 'it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy ... until we have a philosophy of psychology'; (2) 'the concepts of ... *moral* obligation and *moral* duty ... ought to be jettisoned ... [being] survivals or derivative survivals from an earlier [Divine Law] conception of ethics which no longer survives and are only harmful without it'; (3) 'the difference between the well-known British writers from Sidgwick to the present are of little importance' (26) for they are rotten with 'consequentialism.' Her alternative for today's muddled irreligious masses and lecturers would be partly inspired by Aristotle's more naturalist, if teleological notions of *'justice'* and *'human flourishing.'*

On the contrary, I suspect, (12) (1a) that our philosophical psychology should be largely shaped by the modern moral challenge, which Anscombe grasps, of man's quite likely annihilating all life on this planet (or reducing it to *1984's* slavery). (See my *Self-Knowledge and Social Relations.*) Moralists should become cautious intuitionists and go back cautiously to Moore's *Principia Ethics,* especially the last chapter. It seems (1b) from Plato's *Republic* and from Sophocles' *Antigone* 441-503 that intelligent people can regard God-or-gods and moral laws-or-paradigms as somehow co-ordinately supreme — so that we (unlike Anscombe) are spared Moore-like questions about whether 'morally good' *means* 'commanded by God' and whether 'morally speaking, God is perfectly good' *means* 'God is perfectly self-commanded.' Coordinately supreme values can become supremely objective without religion. (1c) With God's Grace, and/or fantastic secular luck, the world might yet realize a vast congruence of religions' and secular agreement on moral, non-natural properties or Forms from which man may derive moral laws for all rational beings.

A gross, thumbnail sketch of a triple antithesis must suffice for a brief review. Anyway, Anscombe's gloomy reactions of 1958 to *very recent Oxbridge* ethics were largely in excellent taste. Earlier on she neglects the genius of Moore in *Principia Ethica* and of John Wisdom in several inspired essays. More generally, she misses the abundant richness of British moral thinking since 1848. For getting students to reflect wisely on Justice, Human Flourishing, Divine Laws and Modern Moral Philosophy, Oxbridge tutors in 1958 could valuably teach them the history of ethics (not so typically underplaying Aquinas or Marx) — but do so in tandem with requiring them to master some Dickens, George Eliot, Conrad, Shaw, Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, Tawney, George Orwell and Graham Greene. A moral feast!

Obviously Anscombe's *Ethics, Religion and Politics* offers many levels of useful reading. It shows fire in attacking injustice throughout the world. The courage of Bentham, the Mills and Bertrand Russell, as well as less known philosophers like M.B. Foster, marks her as heir to a nobly critical tradition among British philosophers. She is a distinguished opponent.

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RONNA BURGER, *Plato's Phaedrus: A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing.* University, AL: University of Alabama Press 1980. Pp. vii + 160. US$14.50. ISBN 0-8173-0014-7.

Socrates did not leave any writing. So Ronna Burger reminds us. But, for that matter, nor did some of the wisest of men: Pythagoras, the Buddha, and Jesus. Is there something about the written word which makes it antithetical to wisdom? This is the issue which Ronna Burger raises in her perceptive analysis of Plato's *Phaedrus,* an issue which any philosopher or teacher of philosophy might himself engage with profit. For the philosopher who reads or writes or the teacher who uses the written word in his class always faces the possibility of deceit within himself and his students. The fact that one can repeat words or recite arguments is not itself a guarantee of wisdom. For Plato, however, the matter is still more grave. For he who criticizes the artist for imitating the imitation is himself an artist, an imitator of Socrates' dialectical dialogues!

Yet it was Theuth, whom the Egyptians identified with Hermes Trismegitus, thrice greatest, who brought writing to the Egyptians. Theuth, the Egyptian Prometheus, Burger reminds us, was also the god of *healing*! Do words have the healing power of reminding one of truth? Or are words 'drugs,' hindering at best and precluding at worst any genuine memory of truth, as is the rebuke of Thamuz, the sovereign god? Theuth insists, as writers and teachers of philosophy may want to insist too, with Plato, that words may be necessary aids to the re-covery of truth and hence the discovery of wisdom. Burger's answer: should the words remain external to one's memory, they are but drugs; but should they be ingested and internalized, they can be a healing aid to the memory of truth. Plato's point is that there is a great 'distinction between the acceptance of human opinion and one's discovery of the truth' (95).

Burger points out Plato's extreme sensitivity to the inherent danger of the *written word.* Its apparent authority, the fact that people can quote it without themselves understanding it, the power of reputation it affords such people, the power of self-deception for those who by reciting it think themselves wise, the tendency for such people to be uncritical, the persuasive power of the written word, the love which one can develop for the word rather than for the truth to which it points: these are a few of the dangers of writing. A further difficulty with the written word is that it 'remains the same no matter who receives it, not knowing when to speak and when to remain silent (*Phdr* 275d); the written speech displays no erotic impulse toward a particular audience' (97). The writer, to be a genuine midwife of the listener or reader's soul, must 'know the truth about each of the being of which he is to speak' (*Phdr* 259e). The nondialectical written word, explains Burger, remains 'external to the soul of the learner' (cf. *Phdr* 275d). 'Only when the potential ambiguity of the product of writing is acknowledged, thus obliterating trust in

its clarity and firmness, does it have the power to set in motion the internal process of thought (cf. *Phdr* 277d)' (77).

According to Burger, as a philosophical writer, Plato is aware that his readers might make two mistakes: first, they might think themselves wise just because they could recite the words which Plato, or any other writer, for that matter, wrote, hence falling prey to that against which Socrates labored all his life, namely *doxosophia,* 'that pretense to wisdom which constitutes the most recalcitrant obstacle to the pursuit of wisdom' (93); and second, the reader might take the words themselves to contain all the necessary clarity, insight, and firmness in truth, which comes to the reader's consciousness, *not* by reading, but rather by the *self-disclosure* of the *truth* of which the words are but a *reminder.*

Sentences and paragraphs of written words are, in Burger's words, 'gardens of letters with a river of ink'; yet if they are to do their work, they must be planted in the soil of the soul. 'Insofar as it represents the fruit of the seeds of knowledge sown by Socrates in the ground of Plato's soul, sowing in turn its own seeds in the ground of the souls of its readers, the dialogue itself constitutes the model of the immortal process of dialectic' (101).

Thus when Ronna Burger reflects on the *Phaedrus,* she concludes that the dialogue is the means through which the mind and soul of the reader may be awakened to understanding and truth. Her very work is itself a dialogue with a dialogue, a continuous interacting with and conversation with the *Phaedrus.* The work is written in such a way that the reader of her book is forced, by her style and reflection, to dialogue with her dialogue of Plato's dialogue. In this very process, the reader finds himself drawn into the issue and draws out of himself his own level of understanding the very process of philosophy or philosophizing.

With Socrates dead, the dialectical written word of Plato calls attention to its own ambiguity and inadequacy; it warns the reader of the necessity of making his own journey of self-disclosure which is required in the search for truth. As such, Plato's dialogue becomes 'the legitimate *logos,*' which 'provides the necessary support for the mortal father whom it replaces' (99). In a similar fashion, Burger's *Plato's Phaedrus* is itself a record of an illuminating odyssey of self-understanding which further elucidates the dialogue about which it was written. I would urge serious philosophical writers to take this journey with Ronna Burger to clarify their own motives and philosophical awareness of their own activities in both publishing and teaching.

In an insightful passage, Burger suggests that the *Phaedo* (99a-102a) 'silently suggests that the separation which constitutes the practice of dying is in fact accomplished by the Platonic dialogue itself, replacing the individuality and spontaneity of the living Socrates with the *logos* of a written word' (42). For, according to this interpretation, 'Socrates reveals his own understanding of the practice of dying as an attempted separation, not of the soul from the body, but of concern with the *logos* from concern with the self' (42). To die to self, then, is to forget the self in the remembrance of the *logos;*

thus the writer of the truly philosophical word must likewise be forgetful of self and 'possessed' by the divine *logos* or wisdom. For, as the *Phaedrus* makes evident, it is only by possession by divine *eros* that one is stimulated into recollection, which is the necessary condition for wisdom (*Phdr* 249d-250d, *Phaedo* 73b-76a). Burger writes: 'The ultimate mystery, the divine madness which is the object of Socrates' praise, is none other than the act of reasoning, the particular power of the philosopher, who thus constitutes the standard of what it means to be human' (60).

But it seems to me that this is an overly intellectual interpretation of Socrates and Plato, of the *Phaedrus* and the *Phaedo*. If the philosopher is to be the paradigm of the human, he must embody, in so far as he can, the qualities of the paradigms of human being, the Christ and the Buddha: Love and Wisdom. Indeed, the very word 'philosopher' is derived from the Greek roots of these two words. To come to know the truth is not to be dependent himself or to encourage his students to be dependent themselves on the written word: rather it is to die to the written word. It is to be resurrected from the dead word and to become a living Word, an embodiment of the truth to which the word points or of which it is a reminder. It is not enough for a 'real' 'philosopher' to know texts which he has read; it is required that he *embody* their truth. For he who rightfully may bear the appellation 'philosopher' must be a Silenus, as Alcibiades called Socrates, inside of which reside images of God (*Symposium* 215b). Perhaps the first steps along this path would include reflection on the philosopher Socrates as Plato depicts him. The *Phaedrus* would be an important text on which to reflect. And Burger's book would well provide an experienced companion for the trip.

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This is a welcome addition to the expanding literature on Mahāyāna Buddhism. Sprung overcomes the great difficulty of translating into a simple, but effective, English prose the ideas which Candrakīrti expresses in his sparse

Sanskrit prose. It is evident that Sprung has gone to great lengths in his search for a correct rendering of the subtleties of the original text. At times, however, it would have been helpful if he had included, between brackets, the word or the expression he is translating. For instance, the inclusion of √*gam* would have made the use of the verb 'move' (78) more intelligible. In English the verb 'move' does not mean 'to comprehend,' as '*gam*' does in Sanskrit. Likewise, 'movement in traverse' reads like an awkward expression. It would be more tolerable if the reader were informed that it is the equivalent of '*gamyamānasya gamanam*' (78). Again, 'ontologize' is too strong a term for '*parikalpayet*' (131) when 'suppose' would have been more appropriate. Further, it is regrettable that the translator has left out the poem from the SAMĀDHIRĀJA which concludes Ch. IX of Candrakīrti's text.

'Indologists' too often emphasize the 'philosophy' aspect of the Buddhist texts. They neglect the essential feature of Buddha's dharma which is certainly a good deal more than merely a 'philosophical system.' On the other hand, if one persists in reading into the Mādhyamika only a dialectical system of thought or a critique of all philosophy, one would find it difficult to reconcile it with the spectacular aesthetic expression of the mahāyāna religion. Most, if not all, specialists of the Mādhyamika, and of Mahāyāna in general, tend to overlook the organic relationship between its metaphysics and the great art it has inspired. Nāgārjuna is a good example of a genial philosopher who does not hesitate to borrow from folk expressions, legends, myths etc. to support an argument. The *Mahāprajña-pāramitā-śāstra* is not a text where only dry rationality prevails. Nāgārjuna gives free rein to imagination, to emotions, though they are subsumed under a rigorous pursuit of logical reasoning that purports to bring out the mystical experience on which the buddhist doctrine is established. The Mahāyāna philosopher must be placed in the total context of his cultural milieu. *Śūnyatā* must be viewed in its relation to ethics and to art. That is why the lyrical *Samādhirāja* ought to have been included, as well as the sermon *Sarvadharma-pravrtti-nirdeśa-sūtra* which concludes the 24th Chapter of the *Prasannapadā*.

It is still desirable to read the translation together with the original text. Then the reader can realize that 'ungenerate existence' (240), for instance, is the equivalent of *duhkha*. Nor is there any reason to interpret *anitya* as 'perishable' when 'permanent' would have been more appropriate. *Śūnya* is rendered by 'devoid' (242, 244) when the now familiar 'void' or 'empty' would have been sufficient. *Staulya* (139) and *kārakā* (128) are evidently printing mistakes for *sthaulya* and *kāraka*. The bibliography is informative and exhaustive, but an index would have been helpful.

The Introduction is a forceful, well-thought analysis of the Mādhyamika philosophy. It examines critically the key concepts of the middle way and their interpretations by Schayer, Stcherbatsky, Murti and others. Sprung claims to offer a new interpretation of '*śūnyatā*,' though it is not clear to what extent he does advance our understanding of this notion, by saying: 'Dependent origination is itself *śūnya*, neither in being nor not in being, is, indeed,

synonymous with *śūnyatā,* as both Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are careful to explain, and so could not serve as a primary datum against which beliefs must test themselves.' He also advances the opinion that his interpretation of the Middle Way is original, though it is difficult to see in what respect his explanation adds anything to what T.R.V. Murti, for example, has written about it. The theme that runs through the different systems of Indian thought is that philosophical inquiry has a negative function in removing wrong knowledge or error. Too often, unfortunately, specialists in Buddhism fail to grasp fully that Buddhism must be viewed against what Paul Mus has called 'la totalité indienne.' In this regard the *Mādhyamika* stands as a synthesis which culminates in the affirmation of an authentic negation of both subjectivity and objectivity. Professor Sprung is aware of this, though he stops short of proceeding beyond considering the Middle Way as a problem of interpretation (24).

It was time that a translation of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* be made available in English. Jacques May's French version is richer for its elaborate, detailed cross-references to both primary and secondary sources. But Sprung provides the serious student of the *Mādhyamika* with a valuable source material which is indeed more directly accessible and easier to read. In particular, Chapters IV, X, XII, XIII, XV, XVIII and XIX are brilliantly and faithfully translated. Scholars who frown upon philologists' versions of the classics of Indian Philosophy will welcome, with a feeling of gratitude, this translation written from the standpoint of a philosopher — one who has also succeeded, in no small measure, in remaining faithful to the intention and expression of Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā.*

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BRIAN F. CHELLAS, *Modal Logic, An Introduction.* New York: Cambridge University Press 1980. Pp. xii + 295. US$ 42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22476-4); US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-29515-7).

This is a modern and comprehensive textbook on propositional modal logic intended for advanced undergraduate level. The clarity and transparency of the text make it equally suitable for the classroom as for self-study.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I provides an intuitive introduction to truth and possible worlds by discussing the classical system S5 and a general exposition of logical preliminaries, such as filtrations and canonical models, for later use in the book. The logical basics outline the general program that is followed in Parts II and III. Thus the fundamental methods for proving soundness, completeness and decidability are first presented in broad lines and later fully applied to the normal and classical modal systems. Such a structure of exposition seems very successful, for students easily grasp the main lines of thought and methods of the field.

Throughout the book and particularly in Part I formal rigour is mostly avoided. Such a policy is appropriate in an introductory text, but at some (admittedly very few) points a more rigorous presentation would be desirable. For example this is the case with the description of the decision procedures obtained by the finite model property, where the concept of model isomorphism is needed but not mentioned.

Part II discusses normal systems of modal logic using the semantics of standard Kripke models. The treatment is lucid and clear. Noteworthy is the fact that the dual forms of some central theorems are explicitly stated and proved, not just casually mentioned. This feature makes the text a good source of reference for the working philosopher, who may not be so well-versed in dualities. Also, the text succeeds well in presenting the different normal systems and their logical interrelations, and provides a good sample of theorems and alternative characterizations of the systems.

Part III discusses classical systems using the minimal models semantics. Again, there is a generous supply of closure properties and theorems of the respective systems. The relationship between standard and minimal models in connection with the normal systems is spelled out in detail.

Both Part II and III contain an example case of using modal logic in the analysis of philosophical problems. Part II considers deontic logic and Part III conditional logic. These sections are by necessity rather short, but nevertheless illuminating and contain up-to-date material. Perhaps a more comprehensive bibliography could have been added specially for these chapters.

All in all, the book is very well written and is likely to supplant most of the existing textbooks on propositional modal logic.

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WILLIAM DRAY, *Perspectives on History.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. x + 142. Cdn$28.25; US$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7100-0569-5); Cdn$14.95; US$10.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7100-0570-9)

This volume consists mostly of versions of Dray's 1978 Ryle Lectures at Trent University. Part One, which has three chapters, is concerned with three central topics under discussion in recent critical philosophy of history: the problem of understanding (with emphasis on the theories of R.G. Collingwood), the problem of objectivity (on those of Charles Beard), the problem of the relationship of individual and group (on those of J.W.N. Watkins). Part Two takes up the issue of the nature of historians' judgments about causation, focussing specifically on the controversy between A.J.P. Taylor and his critics regarding the causes of the Second World War. The third (and final) part provides a brief review of one of the important theories from the stock of traditional, 'speculative' philosophy of history, that of Oswald Spengler. The chapters on Collingwood and Taylor have been published elsewhere, in more or less their present form. The chapters on Watkins and Spengler use material from Dray's articles in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* The book is introduced by a helpful five-page sketch of the five chapters. I will concentrate on the chapters on Collingwood, Watkins, and Taylor.

Dray takes up three problematic issues in Collingwood's account of historical understanding: the distinction between inside/outside, the contrast between explaining what happened (thought to be characteristic of history) and explaining why it happened (thought to be characteristic of natural science), and the doctrine of re-enactment. On the last of these points Dray is concerned to contrast a methodological approach to re-enactment (that is, *how* it is accomplished, a topic that has occupied more Collingwood's critics than Collingwood himself) with a conceptual approach; here re-enactment concerns the goal, not the procedure, of historical inquiry (22). Dray's remarks in elucidation are partly clear and helpful, partly not. The clear part is his claim that the thinking which explains an agent's action must take the form of a valid practical argument (23); the obscure point is that, since one is said by Collingwood to understand an action by rethinking the agent's thought, it follows that there is 'a logical connection between these two notions' (22; see also 48). Unfortunately, Dray spends too little time on the promising idea of 'the form of a valid practical argument' and concludes, rather lamely, that for Collingwood all this adds up to saying that historians adopt 'the standpoint of human agency' (26), a point that has been made many times before, by Dray and others.

The chapter on Watkins examines the convoluted issue of methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism. Dray considers four arguments by Watkins designed to show that social phenomena consist in and in some significant sense are reducible to the actions (and tendencies to act) of

individuals together with the consequences, some of them unintended, of these actions. The third of these arguments — concerning the explanation of actions through their intelligibility — and the one he finds most appealing (60) allows Dray to reconsider points made in connection with Collingwood in chapter 1. Dray's main use of what might be called intelligibility-based explanations is to argue that the fact of such explanations does not conclusively favor the individualist stance. For it is possible to provide an *alternative* account of intelligibility or of understanding, e.g., the one provided by the general law theorists in which social phenomena — for instance, a depression or a war — are explained, hence understood, by referring them to conditions from which the occurrence of the phenomenon in question could have been predicted.

It seems to me that Dray's argument here rests on an equivocation respecting the term *understanding* (or *intelligibility*). The argument says in effect that, since each of these modes of explanation yields understanding, the claim that we *understand* social phenomena could not be used to signal a preference for one of these modes over the other. But the issue is not whether each of these modes yields understanding; it is, rather, whether the kind of understanding we have of social phenomena is more like that advanced in the Collingwoodian diagnosis or more like that found in law-based predictions of social facts by reference to large-scale trends and conditions. If it is more like the former then a reasons approach to intelligibility probably is in operation, and this would tend to favor the individualist position. On the other hand, if the latter or predictions approach seemed to prevail, it is not evident to me that either the individualist position or the collectivist one is going to be favored; it would really depend on further analysis as to which one gained the advantage. Ultimately, it seems that Watkins actually favors the predictions approach (see 66); hence, it would appear that the positions of Watkins and Collingwood are actually quite divergent, despite what Dray suggests (58, 60), and that Dray's formulation of Watkins' third argument requires considerable expansion.

The chapter on causation (on Taylor and the causes of the Second World War) sets up five distinct paradigms for talk of cause in history; thus, something could be accorded causal status if its effect or result was intended, if it interrupted a normal or ordinary sequence, if it compelled or forced other people to act, if it allowed for the placing or shifting of moral onus, if it allowed things to happen or be done — or, in the rare case, was a sufficient condition of their happening or being done (see 92). The chapter artfully traces the dispute, especially between Taylor and Trevor-Roper, by reference to these distinct paradigms. And the main conceptual issues are identified in a concluding section, pp. 92-96 (which has been added new to the book as a supplement to the article material).

Since 1957, with the publication of his monograph, *Laws and Explanation in History,* Dray has been a notable, even a conspicuous figure in the domain of philosophy of history. Indeed, he may well be today the most signifi-

cant contributor to that subject, at least in the sense of being the one whose talents and continuing preoccupation most clearly suggest an expectation of further significant work. In the light of this promise and of his current standing, the book by Dray under review does not measure up to that mark. The book is workmanlike. While a good one, and useful in its various parts, the book does not, with the possible exception of the chapter on causation (which is, for the most part, a reprint), make for a real advance on any of the topics it takes up.

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JAMES R. FLYNN, *Race, I.Q., and Jensen.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston; Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. vi + 313. Cdn$39.50. US$27.50. ISBN 0-7100-0651-9.

The dust-jacket of this book promises (a) a point by point refutation of Jensen's views and (b) clarification of the ethical significance of the I.Q. debate, based on the author's 'special competence as a philosopher.' The first promise is more-or-less kept and, insofar as the truth of Jensen's research is relevant to, but does not settle, the ethical issues associated with the I.Q. debate, this book is of some interest to some philosophers. Regrettably, the second promise is not kept. The issue of racism and free speech is limited to one line of discussion in the book; the debate on the morality of affirmative action programs (programs which many argue are a necessary condition of making racial equality a reality in our society) is generally ignored; and the moral status of Arthur Jensen is settled, in favour of Jensen, by reference to Jensen's *verbal* commitment to humanism, thus ignoring his stated opposition to any affirmative action programs. And finally, the historical and current causes of racist ideology, knowledge of which is surely a necessary condition of maximizing the rationality of one's ethical stance on I.Q. testing, are simply never discussed.

Although Flynn devotes one chapter to arguing that most of Jensen's critics are mistaken, the remainder of the book attempts to demonstrate that Jensen is mistaken, and thus that the I.Q. test gap between blacks and whites

is best accounted for in terms of environmental and not genetic differences. Nevertheless, his initial defense of Jensen against the latter's critics is, I believe, seriously flawed. Flynn sides with Jensen against philosophers who argue that some theory of intelligence is necessary before one can defend I.Q. tests. '... [E]ven if we did not know how a thermometer works, we would have a certain level of confidence in it because of what we experience when we interact with it: when we get a high reading, we feel hot, when we get a low reading, we feel cold. Unless the reader is very different from myself, when he does I.Q. tests he often finds that he is doing some thinking or reasoning of some sort' (31). First, because we acknowledge that intelligence is being *used* in I.Q. tests, it does not follow that intelligence is being *tested* by these tests, let alone tested accurately. Secondly, one does indeed notice that there is some sort of higher-hotter correlation between the readings on the thermometer and one's bodily sensations. But does one also notice that one feels or is more intelligent the higher one scores on an I.Q. test? What's the analogy here? Flynn also seems unconcerned with, and even in sympathy with, Jensen's support of Charles Spearman's concept of 'g' or general intelligence. 'G' is supposed to explain why people who do well on some I.Q. test items also do well on other quite different I.Q. items. But the intercorrelation of test items on I.Q. tests does not prove or even suggest an underlying 'g,' since items are not placed on the test unless they first correlate with each other. This a priori method of test construction seems hopelessly unscientific. (For additional arguments against the scientific value of 'g,' and especially its reification by Jensen, see Stephen Jay Gould, 'Jensen's Last Stand,' *New York Review of Books,* May 1, 1980.)

In Chapter 3 Flynn considers the direct evidence for the environmental hypothesis. He argues that racial admixture studies done in the context of I.Q. scores suggest an environmental explanation of black-white I.Q. score differences. But, he adds, before they carry more weight, these studies must be replicated and replicated with improved research methodology. More compelling is Flynn's reworking of the I.Q. data on the offspring left by black and white occupation forces in Germany after World War II. His conclusion: contrary to what might be expected if Jensen's views are correct, it seems to make little difference for the children's mean I.Q. scores whether their father was white or black.

Chapter 4 succeeds in showing that Jensen's h^2 or hereditability estimates of .8 are suspect, and here Flynn's arguments are often quite ingenious. In Chapter 5 he tentatively argues for the existence of 'blindfolds' to explain I.Q. differences, suggesting that Jensen has underestimated the extent to which black experience in America does blacks grave harm in terms of intellectual development, 'that thanks to child-rearing patterns, relations between the sexes, the values and traditions of black culture, blacks really do end up damaged' (210). He ends the chapter by expressing his scepticism against those who believe that the black-white I.Q. test gap is to be explained primarily in terms of defects in the tests themselves. These individuals claim

that black children are not linguistically deprived or cognitively underdeveloped; 'that while their language patterns are different, it is racist to assert that white language patterns are better than black' (211). Flynn (and I) are unsympathetic to this sort of extreme cultural relativism: 'an unjust and deleterious environment damages one's capacities as well as one's opportunities' (211).

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ALAN HUNT, ed., *Marxism and Democracy*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. 188. US$20.75. ISBN 0-391-01879-5.

Marxism and Democracy contains seven papers originally presented by the Sociology Group of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1978 which were revised and published in 1980. They reflect a variety of contemporary British Marxist thinking on such topics as democracy, the state, socialist politics, reform vs. revolution, populism, and strategies for the transition to socialism. The articles address these issues either conceptually in terms of analyzing concepts of democracy, the state, etc. (Jessop, Mercer and Jones), historically in terms of debates on these issues in the Marxian tradition (Hunt, Hindess and Sassoon), or in terms of contemporary politics (Hall and Jones).

The background to the articles is the rise to power of a virulently right-wing government in England and the failure of 'actually existing socialist societies' to provide models of socialist democracy attractive to the West. In this historical conjuncture, the contributers are convinced that Marxists to-day must take democracy seriously and must offer a democratic socialist alternative to capitalist democracies in order to win a democratic base for socialist transformation. This position leads the contributors to a reconsideration of democracy within the Marxian tradition and to criticisms of Leninism and traditional Marxian conceptions of class politics. It also leads to re-consideration of Marxian theories of class, the state, the relation between politics and economics, and socialist strategies for structural transformation in the West.

One of the most striking trends in the studies is the sustained criticism of

Lenin by these British Marxists. For previous generations of European Communists, Lenin was sacrosanct and immune from criticism. The sharp criticisms of Lenin throughout the volume signify the breaking up of the hegemony of Leninism within European Marxism and the search for new models and analyses.

The most important contributions to developing a Marxian concept of the state that goes beyond the limits of Leninism are the articles by Jessop and Mercer. Jessop proposes that the state be 'seen as a complex, hybrid institutional ensemble' (72). This concept of the state enables one to see state institutions, apparatuses and practices as a response to demands of various blocs and strata of the ruling class and to demands and struggles by sections of the working classes and underlying population. Seeing the indeterminacy of relations of classes and popular forces requires strategies for developing alliances and practices in accordance with the actual class strata and popular forces existing in a given political conjuncture rather than dictating, for instance, that the state is a tool of the ruling class which the working class should seize and destroy. In sum, Jessop is arguing that socialist politics should be organized 'to exploit the opportunities offered by the political indeterminancy of bourgeois democracy' rather than following the dictates of some 'orthodox' Marxian theory and politics (76).

Along these lines, Mercer argues, following Antonio Gramsci, for a concept of the 'integral state' that conceptualizes ' "...the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" ' (Gramsci, cited on p. 114). This requires perceiving at once the repressive and democratic aspects of the state and the complex relations between the state and 'civil society' in which the state is constituted through a 'complex and historically and nationally variable interplay of economic, political and ideological forces' (119) which it yokes together 'in a relatively stable equilibrium which Gramsci characterizes as a "contradictory and discordant ensemble" ' (120). This Gramscian conception opens 'new terrains for struggle' and requires articulating 'a strategy for the process of the formation of the new society ('historical bloc') with an analysis of the modalities of this process based on the actually existing complex relation for forces' (117). In this conception, socialists must develop strategies for political intervention throughout 'civil society' in order to organize forces and blocs into a 'counterhegemony' which can then confront the existing state and transform it and the entire society into a socialist democracy.

All the contributors agree that Marxist theory must conceptualize the terrain of parliamentary democracy and devise a democratic politics that can use this terrain to begin the transition to socialism. Whereas Lenin 'illegitimately conflates states and politics' (115), the contributors to *Marxism and Democracy* propose a variety of forms of politics not limited to insurrectionary or parliamentary activity that could help build popular blocs or forces for radical structural transformation of the capitalist state and society in the

direction of democratic socialism. The contributors tend to follow Gramsci's call for an expansion of democracy throughout social and political life to win the people to socialism and to give people experience and training which would make them capable of directly governing their socio-economic and political life. The key concept is *hegemony* in which, prior to seizing and transforming state power, control is wrested from the capitalist class in the spheres of civil society, culture, ideology and everyday life so that capitalist and conservative traditionalist values no longer dominate and thus no longer provide hegemony for the ruling class.

Although the articles break new theoretical ground in developing Marxian theories of the state and the need for new political strategies, they do not provide much in the way of actual strategic perspectives for socialist politics. All the contributors attack 'reductionism' which reduces politics to economics in various ways and argue for the 'autonomy of politics' and expansion of politics beyond parliamentary activity, but they do not really contribute much to actually expanding the discourse and field of socialist politics. Their actual proposals for a new politics generally list issues acceptable to almost any Marxist or even liberal (i.e. Jones on p. 154). In fact, there is no real theory of socialist cultural politics, ideological intervention, or media politics in the collection which would theorize the program of expanding and democratizing socialist politics. There is an implicit program of cultural critique and ideological intervention, for instance, in Hall's analysis of the ideological strategies of the Right in Britain, but no corresponding left strategy. Although there are two isolated recognitions of the role of the media in contemporary politics (pp. 47 and 71), there is no development of a socialist media politics.

Furthermore, there is no indication of how traditionally separated economic, political and cultural struggles could be fused into a new totalizing socialist strategy for Western parliamentary democracies. While all contributors assume that trade union activities will not in themselves bring about socialism, there is no reflection on how economic and political struggles might be linked or fused — the sort of reflection that distinguishes the work of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Korsch and Gramsci. Whereas most contributors seek to expand the terrain of politics beyond parliamentary activity, there is little reflection on forms of socialist cultural politics that would produce a socialist hegemony and there is little sense of how expanded political activities could be linked or fused with more traditional political activity and economic struggles. Curiously, socialist political discussion in Britain and North America has lagged behind, on this issue, the level achieved by Luxemburg, Korsch, Lukács, Gramsci and Austro-Marxists who theorized the relations between economics, politics and culture in the project of developing a socialist politics capable of intervening in all these spheres as essential preconditions to creating a new democratic and socialist society. The contributors to *Marxism and Democracy* see many of the problems of classical Leninism, Social Democracy and other dominant forms of contemporary

leftist politics, but while they have broken new ground much more work demands to be done in order to develop a democratic socialist politics appropriate to the conditions of parliamentary democracies in the West. Only then can socialists hope to redeem the promise in Rosa Luxemburg's slogan: No Socialism without Democracy, No Democracy without Socialism.

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CAROL A. KATES, *Pragmatics and Semantics: An Empiricist Theory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1980. Pp. 253. US$19.50. ISBN 0-8014-1288-9.

Distributional (pre-Chomskian) linguistics focused on regularities in speech. Grammar described these regularities (or structures) in a somewhat idealized manner. Structures were supposed to be acquired according to a behaviorist model. The whole picture was an empiricist one.

Chomsky challenged this picture, in at least two senses. On the one hand, he insisted on the inadequacy of the behaviorist model of language acquisition. On the other, he claimed that distributionalists had no explanation for linguistic creativity (or competence): the fact that speakers are able to produce and interpret novel acceptable utterances. Distributionalists like Bloomfield had tried to handle competence in terms of analogical construction, but their notion of analogy, according to Chomsky, was a vague one.

In Chomsky's own model, competence is explained by postulating that speakers possess language in the form of a set of abstract rules, that generate all grammatically acceptable utterances. According to Kates, this account of competence makes 'language acquisition an impossibly difficult task' (25), and the problem is solved by positing 'an innate, a priori knowledge of any linguistic structure that cannot possibly be said to be learned by speakers' (26). Though Chomsky tried to relate the innateness hypothesis to genetics, he himself recognized that his theory has 'a distinctly rationalist cast' (28).

Kates has a number of criticisms of Chomsky's view: one of them will be mentioned below. But most of her work is constructive. Though philosophically inclined to empiricism, she has misgivings about traditional empiricist approaches to linguistic phenomena. In particular, she recognizes

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that 'there are at this time no convincing behaviorist theories of language acquisition' (20), and she feels the need to 'explicate the nature of the "analogies" ... speakers use to produce and interpret novel utterances' (34). So on the one hand she wants to construct an empiricist alternative to both behaviorism and innatism, and on the other she wants to flesh out the notion of analogy.

Kates' main philosophical tool — which she borrows and adapts from phenomenology — is that of a (perceptual) structure. A structure is the result of 'bracketing' some sense-contents and treating them as irrelevant. A structure is an ideal, but observable object. It is ideal because it does not have a definite spatio-temporal position (such a position has been bracketed), but it is observable because it is 'constituted within experience' (163). Thus a reference to structures does not contradict 'the basic empiricist premise that perceptual experience is the source of all knowledge' (158), but can help to avoid the inadequacies of traditional empiricism, 'which chose the nominalist route of denying the reality of ideal objects', thus failing to 'provide an adequate account of generic reference, category formation, and the distinction between necessary and contingent truths' (157).

A clear model of a system of structures is given by Jacobson's work in phonology. 'Phonological theory reveals how a number of acoustically different sounds ... will be "heard" as essentially the same, while other, perhaps very similar sounds, will be heard as essentially different, as a function of the phonological system operating within a language' (164). The reason — Kates explains — is that irrelevant differences are bracketed: as a result, 'English phonemes [such as] /p/ and /t/ are ideal objects' (165).

According to Kates, 'the model of structural classification that Jacobson applied to phonology is relevant to any system of perceptual categories' (166). In particular, she claims that speakers possess a language when they have acquired 'a common set of ideal structures (linguistic categories) ... through which they can overcome the psychologically contingent elements in their experience in expressing and interpreting referring intentions' (169).

Putting the emphasis on structures (rather than abstract rules) allows Kates to handle her two main problems in what is — at least prima facie — a relatively simple way. On the one hand, language acquisition is not an impossibly difficult task. Since what is to be acquired is a set of observable (though ideal) entities, observation and experience are in principle viable instruments of acquisition. In two of the most substantial chapters of her book (3 and 4), Kates fills in some of the details of her conception of language acquisition. In this conception, 'the child hears and understands the referential function of a word in some situation (as indicated by such signs of attention as appropriate shift of gaze) and attaches that word to the referent as a label or name. At this point, the referent is an unarticulated or global situation or event with aspects in which the child is especially interested and other aspects, of little importance, that remain in a sort of murky and undifferentiated background' (57). On the other hand, as far as competence goes, 'there

is no mystery in the fact that language provides a means of expressing new referring intentions. Speakers have only to select those features or invariants that are of interest in any novel situation, and, having framed the intended object in that way, to choose the speech forms that express that categorical judgment' (141). Thus, analogy is construed as identity of structure, and competence as the ability (a) to recognize this identity by focusing on some 'aspects' of any given situation and bracketing all the others, and consequently (b) to apply to the situation as thus 'framed' the relevant linguistic categories.

I said that these are prima facie simple solutions of the two problems. Now I want to justify the qualification 'prima facie.' First, language acquisition. What Kates says about it is interesting. That the child's referent be at first 'an unarticulated or global situation' is an intriguing and plausible claim, but it is not clear how he/she can get to have such a referent in the first place. To mention 'signs of attention' such as 'appropriate shift of gaze' will not do if the child does not already have a notion of attention operating or is not in a position to capture the referential import of a shift of gaze. And here is precisely where a rationalist (or genetic) hypothesis might help. Kates says that 'no one would dispute the claim' that 'there is ... a genetic basis for language acquisition' (27), but she does not say much as to what this basis might be.

On the other hand, when Kates says that competence 'is no mystery', or that 'the ability to bracket out sense-contents ... is no mysterious power of consiousness,' for 'it is used constantly in the activity of classifying perceptual information' (161), I think she is missing the main point of a Chomskian theory of competence. The point is not — I take it — to dispute that such things happen all the time. The point is to ask how they *can* happen. To paraphrase Kant, one may wonder what makes bracketing out possible.

These remarks suggest that — pace Kates — there may be no major substantial disagreements between Kates and the Chomskians: that they might just be addressing different (kinds of) problems. The phenomenology of linguistic experience — and in particular of language acquisition or linguistic creativity — is certainly an interesting subject, but I do not see how it can explain what brings that very experience about.

Of course, Kates would probably claim that one should be doing phenomenology *instead of* rationalist metaphysics. Her many criticisms of the very nature of Chosmky's enterprise are relevant to this point. But most of these criticisms are not convincing.

To give just one example, in Chapter 5 Kates rightly emphasizes the importance of pragmatic factors in linguistics. She argues very convincingly that 'once one approaches language as a communicative system ... it becomes clear that intutions about the grammatical acceptability or meaning of an utterance reflect the judgment that it does (or might) successfully convey a particular intention in some situation' (129). But then she refers to the inevitable complications pragmatic factors introduce into the study of language to sup-

port her claim that 'no grammar can generate all and only acceptable utterances of a language' (*ib.*), and to reject Kate's attempt to account for these factors by means of pragmatic rules. I do not have an opinion about this impossibility hypothesis. However, I find it interesting to mention the following fact.

In Chapter 5, Kates refers to the Russell-Strawson debate on definite descriptions, emphasizing the role played in it by Strawson's 'pragmatic' notion of presupposition. Well, Strawson indeed went so far as concluding — in the course of that debate — that natural language does not have 'an exact logic,' and to propose that a new 'logic of language' be devised: an informal, vague, imprecise discipline able to deal with such an informal, vague, imprecise subject. Since Strawson however, this discipline — later renamed philosophical logic — has become very formal, and one of its most striking successes has been a formal analysis of Strawson's notion of presupposition and other pragmatic notions! Just to be on the safe side, philosophers should usually avoid judgments of impossibility, especially when their main ground for them is that the matter is too complicated.

At any rate, these arguments do not detract from the value of Kates' most constructive proposals. Chapters 3 and 4 are a very accurate and informed analysis of current studies on the acquisition of lexical and grammatical paradigms. The analysis of pragmatic structures conducted in Chapter 5 was already commended above. (Incidentally, note that pragmatics is becoming more and more important these days. Not only linguists and logicians but even philosophers of science find it essential to refer to it.) Chapters 7 and 8 analyze the notion of a perceptual structure. Chapter 10 contains a phenomenological study of logical truth, and Chapter 11 one of metaphor. All in all, I think, this is a worth-while book.

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KOVACH, FRANCIS J. and ROBERT W. SHAHAN (eds.), *Albert the Great. Commemorative Essays.* Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press 1980. Pp. xix + 297. US$ 12.95. ISBN 0-8061-1666-8.

This is one of several collections of essays published in 1980 in observance of the 700th anniversary of the death of Albert. It contains 9 essays ranging in length from Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg's 14 pages on Albert's conception of

form as applied to the soul to Francis Kovach's 75 pages on action at a distance (the advantages of being an editor). They are all by competent scholars, and the book is a must for any decent collection on medieval philosophy. The essays are grouped as bearing on logic (Ralph McInerny: 'Albert on Universals'), physics (John Quinn: 'The Concept of Time' and the aforementioned paper on the soul), metaphysics (Leo Sweeney: 'The Meaning of *Esse* in Albert the Great's Texts on Creation in *Summa de Creaturis* and *Scripta Super Sententias*' and Francis J. Catania: ' "Knowable" and "Namable" in Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Divine Names*'), physics and metaphysics (Léonard Ducharme: 'The Individual Human Being in Saint Albert's Earlier Writings' and the aforementioned Kovach paper), and history (James Weisheipl: 'Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron. A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism' and William Wallace: 'Galileo's Citations of Albert the Great'). Clearly, the range of topics surpasses the competence of a single reviewer, so I will limit my remarks to the logic and metaphysics papers.

McInerny, clear and interesting as far as he goes, really only scratches the surface, as he admits. It is odd that while he refers (and all too briefly) to Albert's very densely written presentation in *Metaph.* 7.5.1, he says absolutely nothing about the three-chapter digression at *Metaph.* 5.6.5-6-7. Also, at p. 15, he calls the view of essence in Albert's *De intellectu* bk. I, tr. 2 a 'harbinger' of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine in the *De ente et essentia*. Since the latter is dated 1252-1256, while Albert's work is dated 1254-1257 (and with reason to put it later rather than earlier), I suggest there is too much of a tendency here to see Albert as a predecessor of Thomas, rather than as a contemporary aware of what his former pupil was writing.

Sweeney's paper studies the meanings of the word *'esse'* in a few texts related to creation in Albert's *De quattuor coaequaevis* (written before 1246) and *Sentences* (written before 1249). In general, Sweeney is interested in judging to what extent *'esse'* has an existential meaning in these texts, and to what extent existence is seen as the very essence of God and as, in creatures, the proper effect of God: i.e. he is interested in seeing to what extent Albert agrees with Thomas Aquinas. He has a good questionnaire (71-2) and some healthy skepticism concerning the judgments of Geiger and Wieland (73-4). The texts Sweeney considers are brief and obscure, and I am not entirely happy with his interpretations. Above all, I would say that the lengthy section entitled 'Conclusions' is far too ambitious when one considers the narrowness of the base. Sweeney rightly criticizes Geiger's methodology and insists on the importance of keeping in view the chronology of texts. However, that surely does not mean, when one is dealing with texts in which much interpretation is demanded, that one should not look at later treatments of the same issue to see if they shed light on the earlier. Thus, I am surprised that Sweeney makes no use of Albert's *Commentary on the Divine Names* (written in 1249-50) in his efforts to understand the texts he is reading. There, for example, one sees Albert take as a matter of course the view that God,

precisely because his first effect is *esse*, is more principally praised by the name *'Existens'* (cf. c. 5, no. 23: ed. Cologne, t. 37/1, p. 316.9-29). Certainly the vocabulary of being in the mid-thirteenth century is bewildering, and especially in Albert. I am very far from thinking we have it under control as yet. A very minor point, but illustrative of the difficulties: at p. 76, n. 31, Sweeney is wondering about Albert's use of the word *'subsistendi'* in a passage, and he raises the question of the meaning of *'subsistere'* in the *Summa de creaturis;* he seems unaware that Albert in the passage in question is quoting from Aristotle's *Categories,* c. 12 (14a29) in the Latin of Boethius: i.e. the word *'subsistendi'* is imposed upon Albert by Boethius in that passage.

Catania's paper aims to show 'that Albert is much more "agnostic" in his claims to knowledge of God than the work of Ruello, for example, appears to have discovered' (127). This is brought out primarily through an exploration of the point that for Albert no created intellect, either in this life or in supernatural blessedness, is capable of knowing God in the mode of knowing called *"quid est"* (what the thing is). The paper is a very thoughtful exploration, though my general impression is that Catania shapes his translation and comments to maximize his agnosticist thesis. Thus, e.g., at p. 121, it is deceptive to say: '...we do not know the manner of God's being; we simply know it is not our manner of being.' It would be more faithful to the thought of Albert to say: '...we simply know it is *above* our manner of being'. Or again, he translates: 'We have to say that "philosophers" have not arrived at God through reason by means of any sort of intellectual analysis' where the Latin reads: 'Et dicendum, quod Philosophi non pervenerunt per rationem in deum sicut in id in quo stat resolutio intellectus...' (104, n. 32). The point of the Latin is that while philosophers *have* made use of rational analysis to arrive at God, God, so arrived at, does not have the role of 'that in which intellectual analysis is terminated'. The English underplays the role of the intellectual analysis in reaching God. (At p. 126, n. 105, Catania quotes a text in which we are said to know God as *'terminus resolutionis'* but he does not comment on this shift of expression.) Catania's general point is valid enough without this sort of pressure.

At p. 115, Catania runs together the natural knowledge had by angels and separated human souls, and the knowledge proper to blessedness. This is highly questionable. The natural knowledge is not had without a created medium (*sine medio*). At p. 111, n. 51, the English translation omits the key statement: '...God is a certain quiddity and essence...'

Catania shows us enough of Albert's fascinating *Commentary on the Divine Names* to make us aware of its many problems (though at p. 127, n. 106, he should have included the part of the text where Albert says God and creatures have nothing in common even by analogy: '...*neque per analogiam...' DN* p. 445.53). One wonders, in considering the many ten-

sions in Albert's various statements, whether Catania's quarrel is not more with Albert himself than with Ruello (cf. pp. 116-117, n. 68 at end).

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In Lamb's interpretation, Hegel's *Phenomenology* systematically criticizes all appeals to unquestionable (or self-evident) foundations, for the reason that every reference to an initial certainty is the product of a social context. He illustrates this thesis from Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy:* the conflict between Socrates and the Athenians was not between the self-evident imperatives of a good conscience and a non-reflective appeal to tradition, but the two were contrary moments of a single cultural transformation. Similarly in the *Phenomenology* the empiricist appeal to sense certainty presupposes conceptual universals; and the religious search for self-evidence in immediate feeling or revelation must make way for a philosophical description of all human activity. The reliance on foundations fails most poignantly in biology, where neither taxonomy nor the reduction to primitive laws can do justice to the systematic nature of organisms.

Hegel's purpose, according to Lamb, is to develop the philosophizing subject — or philosopher — to the point where he or she not only mediates the various moments of reality but also describes their inherent connections. Thus, like Wittgenstein, Hegel sees the task of philosophy to be descriptive. But unlike Wittgenstein this description is systematic and governed by the concept — in German 'conceiving' is etymologically related to 'grasping' (177) — not left to an intuition that exploits the aesthetic imagination.

In developing this interpretation, Lamb intentionally takes his distance from Hegel: 'We cannot acquire the Hegelian method from Hegel, but must have reached this standpoint ourselves' (205). Lamb's technique uses analogues from contemporary philosophers. Some of these are positive: Hegel's approach is like that of Feyerabend, von Bertalanffy and Wittgen-

stein. Others are negative: his method contrasts with those of Russell or Moore. But in the positive analogies Lamb cites only the similarity and does not specify the significant difference. And in his contrasts he frequently does not explain why Hegel would disagree. The sense of these elliptical allusions is not evident. Somehow the reader is to grasp the specific character of the analogical similarity or the determinate reason for the indicated contrast. This means that Lamb is presupposing in the reader the kind of philosophical comprehension which is to be the achievement of systematic thinking. As with Hegel, then, Lamb's text needs to be reread two or three times if one is to comprehend what is both the thesis and the argument of the book. But unlike Hegel and like Wittgenstein, the argument is justified even in the second or third reading only by the appeal to an intuition (or grasp) that correctly spots the analogues. Therefore although a number of the chapters develop themes from Hegel's writing, a perplexed student would not find them unpacking the density with which Hegel describes the systematic transitions from one state of consciousness to the next.

Central to Lamb's thesis is his identification of the quasi-intuitive grasp of conceptual thinking with the term systematic. 'Philosophical knowledge is achieved by bringing together that which at first sight may seem disconnected. ... This "bringing together" or "seeing connections" is an adequate account of what Hegel means by "conceptual form" ' (178). The sense of the whole enables the philosophical subject to recognize patterns by which the various aspects of reality are interconnected. No one part has priority over any other. Yet the mediation which generates the pattern cannot be precisely defined. Never static, it reflects 'the fluidity of mind's categories' (187). Although this mediating dynamic is 'rule-governed' (195), the way it is expressed philosophically appears queer because language is to 'be taken in a different sense than what is called ordinary usage' (197). Lamb's only positive characterization of the rule-governed mediation is that it is a form of speech 'saturated with the concept' (197). In other words the mind's fluidity overcomes the rigid distinctions in grammar or in foundational thinking because it grasps the whole as a single totality. This combination of fluidity and conceptual form, the presupposition for a philosophical description, happens only in the philosopher as subject and as such cannot be described in objective language. It is appropriated by one who has been educated to see the world in this way. This is why Hegel dismisses those who want to do philosophy by reading simply the prefaces of books. For philosophical wisdom can be achieved only by discovering experientially that each static foundational commitment has its footings in the sand.

Lamb's vision of Hegel is attractive. But he appears to fall afoul of Hegel's own strictures. By and large Part Six, on 'The System of Philosophy,' uses texts from Hegel's prefaces to the *Phenomenology* and to the *Science of Logic*. Elsewhere key discussions appeal to Hegel's early fragments or his lecture comments. Apart from the discussions of 'Sense Certainty' and 'Observing Reason,' there is little reference to the substantive discussions of the

Phenomenology and *Logic*. Yet it is in the last chapter of the Logic (on The Absolute Idea) that Hegel finally spells out the nature of a philosophical system. And it is in the *Phenomenology* chapters on Self-Consciousness, on Spirit, and on Knowledge that Hegel develops the character and nature of that subject who is to be the mediating agent in 'systematic description.' The detail and the extent of those chapters suggest that the achievement of wisdom is not simply an intuited combination of fluidity and seeing connections. That would have landed Hegel in the camp of the romantics — those who do not take seriously enough the process of analysis. Despite all his strictures against formal understanding, however, Hegel affirmed against Schelling and Novalis the need for precise determination. 'The activity of separating the elements is the exercise of the force of understanding, the most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the absolute power' (*Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, 93). System does not shun a determinate analysis of its own method. It separates its elements into their determinate structures, it dissolves that isolation into a more comprehensive fluidity; and it precisely describes the relation between analysis and fluidity. By concentrating on an intuited fluidity while dispensing with understanding's analysis, Lamb provides only one half of a picture, and therefore no adequate defense for Hegel.

Perhaps he did not intend a defense. Just as the book does not make it easier for a neophyte to make sense of Hegel's dark prose, so it does not discuss criticisms of Hegel. It is a meditation, presupposing a familiarity both with Hegel and with modern English philosophy. It brings them together into the fluidity of mind's categories and grasps them as an intuitive totality. The vision it presents is illuminating, but not ultimately instructive.

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FRANÇOIS OST et MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, *Bonnes moeurs, discours pénal et rationalité juridique. Essai d'analyse critique*. Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis 1981. ISBN 2-8028-0022-1.

Le discours pénal tel qu'il se présente lors des jugements s'articule à partir des législations et de la situation concrète des mises en cause. En choisissant l'étude de la jurisprudence sur les bonnes moeurs, les auteurs s'inscrivent, à

l'intérieur du droit, dans une démarche de clarification du discours pénal afin de spécifier, à partir de sa forme, la rationalité juridique qui le sous-tend. Optant pour une démarche interne, les auteurs ne prétendent pas uniquement décrire un phénomène mais aussi confronter, d'une manière critique, le discours de la jurisprudence avec la rationalité juridique, de là le sous-titre: *Essai d'analyse critique* (introduction).

Lorsque le législateur définit une infraction en des termes généraux comme 'l'outrage aux bonnes moeurs,' il laisse aux tribunaux le soin de préciser et de définir cette notion, en compréhension et en extension. La jurisprudence analysée révèle, d'une part, la multiplicité des codes utilisés pour définir cette notion: 'Nous retiendrons ainsi les codes suivants: juridique, moral, esthétique, hygiénique, physique, psychiatrique, statistique, 'technique' (adaptation des moyens aux fins poursuivies), socio-économique, anthropologique et politique'. (23) D'autre part, l'analyse révèle le phénomène de surcodage et de la surdétermination de l'objet. Ainsi, le jugement s'articule davantage sous la forme du commentaire et de la tautologie que de l'analyse explicative (ch.1). De plus, les caractéristiques du discours jurisprudentiel en matière d'outrage aux bonnes moeurs — infraction touchant la sexualité — indiquent que la rationalité qui le sous-tend est d'ordre moral, anthropologique, idéologique et politique.

Au niveau moral, la jurisprudence réintroduit, par le biais des bonnes moeurs, l'ensemble de la problématique morale à l'intérieur du droit, ce droit libéral qui, selon plusieurs auteurs, se distingue par son affranchissement de la morale et de la religion. L'interprétation jurisprudentielle en ce domaine ne se limite donc pas à l'acte commis dans un lieu public mais à tout acte ayant une portée publique. Ainsi, l'interprétation non seulement regroupe les sphères du privé et du public, mais les fusionne en une morale sociale. La moralité, fondement du droit, apparaît ainsi comme un pôle de la rationalité juridique (ch.2).

Le code anthropologique utilisé dans la jurisprudence, tantôt pour disculper toute production pouvant porter atteinte aux bonnes moeurs au nom de la science et de l'art, tantôt pour condamner une production analogue parce qu'elle était conçue en vue du lucre, révèle une conception dualiste de l'homme (ch. 3). Cette conception anthropologique justifie la rationalité morale et la nature même de l'intervention législative dans la société.

Inscrire dans une loi une infraction relative aux bonnes moeurs suppose que le tout social est ou devrait être indifférencié en ce domaine. Certaines personnes marquant des différences, et d'autres, pouvant devenir différentes, voilà l'enjeu de l'outrage. Les personnes pouvant devenir différentes sont dès lors considérées comme plus vulnérables que d'autres, d'où la nécessité d'assurer leur protection afin qu'elles ne se différencient guère du tout indifférencié. Trois groupes sont principalement visés: les femmes, les jeunes et la jeunesse ouvrière (ch. 4).

L'interprétation judiciaire doit supposer, pour interpréter l'infraction

relative aux bonnes moeurs, que celles-ci sont l'objet d'un consensus social. Or, ce consensus est formel et abstrait puisque la vérification empirique de l'outrage ne détermine pas le contenu du jugement. Le juge devient dès lors l'incarnation du consensus en ce domaine et grâce à son pouvoir déclaratoire, rejoint le consensus formel et abstrait de la loi de la majorité, base des régimes dits démocratiques (ch. 5).

L'interprétation d'une infraction relative aux bonnes moeurs conjugue en un même lieu les rapports entre la morale et le droit, les fonctions judiciaire et législative, marquant ainsi la rationalité juridique dans son mouvement d'intégration et de distorsion des autres formes de rationalité en fonction du pouvoir ou de la validation du contrôle (conclusion).

La rationalité juridique en acte, tant au niveau législatif que judiciaire, n'est-elle pas, dans sa pratique, un long discours moral qui se dit malgré les efforts de le taire?

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CARLOS G. PRADO, *Illusions of Faith: A Critique of Non-Creedal Religion.* Dubuque, IA: Kendall-Hunt 1981. Pp. xii + 93. US$5.95. ISBN 0-8403-2176-1.

In this brief but judiciously argued monograph Carlos Prado identifies and evaluates a position on the nature of religion whose roots are found in Kierkegaard, a position that can be discerned from the writings of Tillich, Bultmann, Paul Van Buren, and Sam Keen. Prado labels this position 'non-creedal' or 'secular' religion and is careful not to impute it to any one contemporary writer, simply because no one individual has clearly propounded all aspects of it. It is identified in terms of three theses: (i) the thesis that religious experience is basic to religiosity, as opposed to propositional belief being basic and being enhanced by such experiences; (ii) the thesis that religious language is in some sense wholly metaphorical or non-literal and is essentially an expressive medium as opposed to a communicatory one; and (iii) the thesis that worship is essentially identical with a certain 'vision'-guided way of life, as opposed to homage paid a deity, and that religious ritual is celebratory as

opposed to reverental' (79). Prado argues that secular religion 'leads to vacuity and illusion' (90).

The key thesis is the second. Claiming that the word 'God' does not stand for some transcendent entity and wishing to defend the use of traditional Christian language as legitimate, the secular religionists wish to claim that such language is non-literal. Religiosity, therefore, cannot be arrived at by familiarization with, and meditation on, creeds. Instead, one must rely on personal experience of the religious kind. And, of course, with God no longer seen as a beneficient creator, worship has to be re-conceived — it can no longer be homage to a worthy transcendent entity.

Prado's main argument is that secular religion has no logical or epistemic justification. It is a version of Wittgenstein's private language argument against the possibility of giving meaning to a symbol by private ostensive definition. The secularist, Prado says, insists that the content of the religious experience is ineffable (i.e., unconceptualizable) but yet it can be the basis, as knowledge, for religiosity. This requires claiming that there can be preconceptual knowledge. But we cannot establish the authenticity of religiosity arising from this 'knowledge' because it is not cognitionally accessible. Thus, Prado claims, there is no way to distinguish between religiosity and the illusion of religiosity. This is not a problem of verification but one of meaning. The claim to have had a religious 'vision' will be semantically empty because no criteria are available to govern the application of the expression 'religious vision', and since it lacks meaning anything can count. The secular religionists need not accept this argument. They may claim that the knowledge acquired from religious experience is conceptual but non-linguistic, non-linguistic because of the nature of the experience and inherent limitations in our ability to embody the concepts in linguistic symbols.

The book would have been more satisfying if it had included an explanation of how religious language could be regarded as non-literal. The use these secularists make of it cannot simply be metaphorical. Metaphors are based on analogies and much religious language does not rely on analogy. Perhaps these people are in the position of those who continue to refer to 'sunrise' and 'sunset' even though we have come to believe the turning of the earth is responsible for the phenomenon. The sun does not really rise, yet we regard the assertion 'The sun rises at 7:00 a.m. today' as true (on occasion) in a sense. Such assertions do not contain metaphors. Rather, we have given them a new sense by operating with revised truth conditions. I realize that the writers who espouse secular religion do not articulate sophisticated semantic theories about religious language, but the whole exercise would be more interesting if they could have been supplied with one.

Regarding the plan of the book, it seems that most of Chapter Two ('Religious Experience') is not needed even though it is well done. A description of the secularist view of religious experience as interpretivist may be all that is required here. Prado himself admits (34) that that position is on a different logical level from the five types of religious experience he discusses.

The main contribution that this work can make is to bring the logical and epistemic disreputability of secular religion to the attention of those reflective adherents of Christianity who might be seduced by it. Secularism of this kind has considerable appeal, after all. Those who espouse it are immune (in their own minds) to philosophical critics of traditional religion because such criticism is based on taking religious creedal statements literally. Thus, they are better protected from the doubts endemic among those of Christian faith. Furthermore, secular religionists can have the advantages that go with associating with traditional Christians because they feel entitled to behave linguistically in the same way as they do. They can have the institutional support and freedom from doubt as well. All in all secular religion is an intellectually and religiously disreputable position and Prado's book can serve as a well-reasoned exposée.

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MICHAEL RESNIK, *Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1980. Pp. 244. US$16.50. ISBN 0-8014-1293-5.

Resnik's book presents some of the main positions in the philosophy of mathematics and discusses their evolution since the time of Gottlob Frege. A chapter is devoted to each one of the main positions: psychologism, formalism, deductivism, John Stuart Mill's empiricism, and finally, Frege's own brand of logicism. For each view, Resnik gives clear statements of the major opposing arguments, arguments which are both historically and philosophically significant. And for each view, Resnik thinks he has found strong arguments which have gone unanswered. He does not attempt to resolve these difficulties and determine the correct position in the philosophy of mathematics. This book is not a new *Principia,* but it is a useful compendium of arguments, for both experts and amateurs in the field of the philosophy of mathematics.

For several reasons, Frege's work is an appropriate focal point for Resnik's discussion. First, Frege introduced standards of rigor which immensely improved the caliber of argument in the field. Secondly, Frege

showed that, in the form which they then had, his opponents' views would not withstand the scrutiny of mathematical logicians, although Frege himself did not completely refute these views. Finally, Frege's own views were straightforward and compelling. He believed (1) that the principles of mathematical reasoning are logical principles, (2) that logical principles are objective, certainly not a mere description of the way people actually reason, and (3) that the existence of mathematical objects, numbers, follows from the principles of logic. Further, he was a Platonist. He took numbers to be the extensions of certain concepts; thus he believed in the reality of both classes and functions. Since his time, any opposing view has had to meet the challenge posed by this tidy picture. On Frege's view, the theorems of mathematics are *literally* true. Their logical form is as similar to their grammatical form as the logical form of simple English sentences (indicated by their paraphrases into first-order logic) is to their grammatical form. Most opposing views deny the literal truth of mathematics in this sense. Thus they must bear the special burden of reinterpreting mathematical theorems.

The main problem with Resnik's work is that, since he does not attempt to advance current discussions in any significant way, he inherits some unconvincing arguments. I shall try to illustrate this in the case of deductivism.

According to the deductivist, the axioms of a mathematical theory, even of number theory, need not in any sense be *true*. The mathematical truths of such a theory are not its axioms nor its theorems, but rather propositions of the form: if axioms A hold, then so does theorem S. There are basically two ways to construe these propositions. According to the *first option,* which we might call *deductive formalism,* these are propositions to the effect that the sentence S is a first-order logical consequence of the axioms A; or equivalently, that any model for the axioms A is a model for the sentence S. According to the *second option,* which I shall call *deductive logicism,* these propositions are of the second order, asserting that any relations (or sets) satisfying the axioms A also satisfy the schematic sentence S; or better, that any relations which bear the second-order relationship expressed by the axioms A also stand in the second-order relationship expressed by S. Under this view, higher-order logic (or set theory minus the Infinity Axiom, since that axiom can always be added to the axioms A) may be employed as a background theory in mathematical proofs, in proofs that the second-order relationship expressed in a theorem S follows from the relationship expressed in axioms A.

Against deductivism, Resnik argues that mathematicians can arrive at truths by other means than logical deduction from axioms. Indeed, sometimes mathematicians have proved theorems in mathematical theories which had never been axiomatized. But in that case, then what mathematicians know is not always of the form: If axioms A hold, then so does S.

But there is an obvious line of response, at least for the deductive logicist. The axioms A of a mathematical theory isolate a certain kind of relational structures, but they are not *essential* to the mathematicians' understanding of

that kind of structures. Certainly other axioms could be used to isolate the same kind, and it is even conceivable that this kind of structures could be isolated nonaxiomatically, perhaps as a generalization of some physical structure whose laws are not perfectly known. And however the mathematicians isolate the kind K of structures, what they know when they arrive at the theorem S is that *if a relational structure is of kind K, then S is true in that structure.* This is, to be sure, a modification of the deductivist position as previously formulated, since we have dropped any reference to an axiom system. It seems to preserve the *spirit* of deductivism, however, and it does meet Resnik's objection.

Resnik goes on to raise the problem of application. A mathematical theorem S is applicable, according to the deductivist, only if we can identify relational structures of the appropriate kind K. But often the relational structures considered by mathematicians are infinite, and Resnik argues that no such structures are actually identified when mathematics is applied:

> My concern is with the application of sophisticated mathematical theories, such as the theory of real numbers or analysis. To determine that the axioms for such a theory are satisfied, one would have to be convinced that a fairly complex infinite structure exists. We have ample reason to believe that no such structure is found among purely physical objects. So the existence of such structures will involve infinitely many abstract entities. On the deductivist account, the question as to whether there are structures satisfying the axioms of analysis is of no concern to the mathematician. But it seems also not to be of concern to the working physicist, insofar as his attention is devoted to physical objects. (134-5)

I make several points in reply: (1) It is not clear that there are no infinite structures among purely physical objects. For example, the stages in the life of a rabbit seem to form an infinite continuum, either a simple continuum of instantaneous stages, or a complex continuum of extended and overlapping stages. And according to one of the more popular forms of nominalism, all 'spatio-temporal chunks,' including rabbit stages, are physical objects. (2) It is a distortion to say that on the deductivist account, the existence of structures satisfying the axioms of analysis is of *no* concern to the mathematician. To be sure, the actual existence of nonexistence of such structures does not affect the *truth* of the theorems of analysis, according to the deductivist. If there are no such structures, the theorems are true, vacuously, of *all* of them. But surely the deductivist may also claim that the existence of such structures is what makes analysis a particularly *interesting* and *fruitful* mathematical theory. (3) It begs the question against the deductive logicist to suggest that physicists are only concerned with concrete objects. On the face of it, there seems to be a strong case for the contrary. When physicists employ real numbers to express, for example, distances between particles, are they not countenancing an infinity of states which a pair of particles might have? And how do we account for this infinity of 'possible states,' except through the actual existence

of an infinity of *abstracta*, relations of distance? Surely these questions require some response.

Resnik's book does not make major advances in the philosophy of mathematics, but then it was not Resnik's purpose in this book to do so. His goal is rather to give us a better, more comprehensive understanding of how things now stand in this field. Judged by this standard, which is surely a worthwhile one, his book is a success.

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PETER ROBSON and PAUL WATCHMAN, eds., *Justice: Lord Denning and the Constitution*. Brookfield, VT: Renouf 1981. Pp. xvi + 253. US$31.25. ISBN 0-566-00399-6.

In *Enderby Town Football Club* v *Football Association* ([1971] 1 All E.R. 215) Lord Denning unequivocally stated his answer to an age-old jurisprudential question: 'I know that over 300 years ago Hobart C.J. said that "Public policy is an unruly horse" ... So unruly is the horse, it is said, that no judge should ever try to mount it lest it run away with him. I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control.'

The question, of course, is whether the function of judges should simply be to decide in accordance with relevant pre-existing law when it is clear what that law is and how it applies to the instant case, or whether judges should sometimes alter the law or its interpretation for the sake of what is loosely termed 'public policy' or 'public interest.' In short, should judges be restricted to administering 'justice according to law' (4) or should they be allowed to seek ' "justice" at the expense of the "law"'? (4) The principal aim of this collection of essays, all written by academic lawyers, is to demonstrate that Lord Denning's answer to this question is mistaken; that there are serious limitations and dangers in Lord Denning's 'policy-directed' approach to judging. To this end, the authors have set out to investigate how well the approach has fared in the hands of The Master of the Rolls and the English Court of Appeal under his guidance (since 1962). The verdict is unanimous: Lord Denning has seriously failed to tame the unruly horse of public policy.

Parts I and III contain attempts to 'situate Lord Denning in his judicial context' and to 'relate [him] to the society in which he works' (xiii). In 'Palm Tree Justice and the Lord Chancellor's Foot,' Paul Watchman provides a very useful overview of the impact Denning and his methods have had on English law and the English legal community. He also rehearses the standard arguments against policy-directed judicial decisions concluding that policy 'should not be the basis of judicial decision-making' (34). In 'Problems of Judicial Study,' Peter Robson discusses the popular image of the judge, as impartial and politically independent adjudicator, in the light of the 'proposed judicial scrutiny of a Bill of Rights' and the role of English judges as heads of politically sensitive government enquiries submitting that there is 'an obvious contradiction' here (55). Those who are concerned about the Canadian Charter of Rights and the great political powers it potentially gives our judges will find this essay of particular interest. In 'Media, Politics and the Judiciary,' Peter Robson notes the admiration and reverence accorded Lord Denning by the media. This situation greatly concerns Robson and his co-contributors for they fear that uncritical admiration for Lord Denning will (or has) become uncritical admiration for 'the Denning method of judging.'

It is this fear which motivates the contributors to Part II who undertake to evaluate critically the impact Lord Denning has had in various areas of English law. Areas covered include the law relating to medical negligence, social security, housing, divorce, sexual morality and crown privilege. Typical of the essays in this section is 'Resisting the Unprivileged' by the editors Robson and Watchman, who argue that, in many cases involving social security and the homeless, Lord Denning has employed vague conceptions of public policy to curtail and override the legal rights of the unprivileged. They detect 'no obviously discernible criteria other than distaste for those involved...' (120), and submit that Lord Denning's decisions on these issues illustrate the dangers and limitations of his policy-directed style of judging. Their concern, one which is shared by all the contributors to Part II, is that private prejudice and idiosyncrasy is too easily masked (consciously or otherwise) by expressed concern for 'public policy.' Of related and equal concern is the degree of arbitrariness and uncertainty which the policy-directed style of judging introduces into the law. This is the main thrust of Eric Young's 'Developing a System of Administrative Law?' where it is argued that Lord Denning's '[a]rbitrary exercises of judicial power' to review the decisions of administrative bodies has made it 'more and more difficult to predict when and how judicial control will be exercised' (180). Young also notes the extent to which concern for perceived public interest has led Lord Denning to run roughshod over statute (c.f. Kenneth Miller's excellent essay 'The Labours of Lord Denning'). In Young's view, the decisions of Lord Denning serve to illustrate how concern for public interest and policy can easily lead to the substitution 'for the straightforward words of [a statutory provision] the judge's view of what Parliament *should* have said' (161).

This collection has much to offer for anyone concerned with the social,

political, legal or moral implications of a policy-directed judiciary. Complex legal issues are presented and discussed, for the most part, in a manner which is easily understood by those unfamiliar with the intricacies of English law. It is not always clear, however, that the difficulties detected can, with fairness, be placed solely on the shoulders of Lord Denning (cf. 173). Nor is it always clear whether those difficulties can be attributed specifically to Lord Denning's *policy-directed* style of judging. The first point is perhaps not too troublesome; the principal target of the collection is not Lord Denning but the method he typifies. The second point, however, is not so easily dismissed. One is left wondering whether the moral is that judges should never attempt to ride the unruly horse of public policy, or simply that Lord Denning's equestrian talents are less than is commonly supposed and that we ought to be very careful in deciding who we place in the saddle.

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MORRIS SALKOFF, *Analyse syntaxique du français: grammaire en chaîne.* Linguisticae Investigationes: Supplementa, Etudes en linguistique française et générale, volume 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 1979.

Cet ouvrage poursuit un travail antérieur (*Une grammaire en chaîne du français: analyse distributionnelle* [Paris: Dunod 1973]), dont il raffine les analyses et dont il étend la visée à des phénomènes dont le traitement n'avait été qu'esquissé ou qui avaient été négligés. L'ouvrage se compose d'une introduction et de quatre chapitres.

L'introduction présente essentiellement un résumé de la *Grammaire en chaîne* (GC): les chapitres de GC sont repris en abrégé et les principaux points théoriques et descriptifs en sont rappelés. Après les définitions (chaînes, ajouts, grammaire), les *chaînes* centrales (du français) sont établies, de même que certaines structures d'inversion de ces chaînes, les *objets* (c'est-à-dire la séquence de catégories grammaticales qui suit le verbe dans la chaîne centrale) dont on a auparavant identifié 70 espèces sont répartis en 3 catégories (objets simples, objets verbaux et objets phrastiques), la structure du groupe nominal est définie ainsi que deux types d'expansion (expansion du nom, à droite et à

gauche, et l'expansion du type *Qu de N* (c'est-à-dire Quantificateur de Nom)), puis les *ajouts* à la phrase (chaîne centrale) introduits par des éléments comme 'pourtant,' 'jusque,' 'en définitive' ou 'dans ce cas.' Les chapitres qui suivent sont consacrés à l'analyse détaillée de problèmes spécifiques.

La *conjonction* fait l'objet du premier chapitre. Elle pose en effet des problèmes particuliers pour une approche d'analyse automatique comme celle qui est visée ici. On y distingue la conjonction dans la chaîne centrale (par exemple, 'Pierre mange la poire et Paul cuisine la viande') et ses cas (conjonction de sujets, conjonction de verbes, et, comme dans l'exemple qui vient d'être donné, conjonction de chaînes centrales), la conjonction dans le groupe nominal ('ces beaux mais gros garçons') et les conjonctions couplées ('ni...ni...,' 'non seulement...mais...'). Finalement, des problèmes résiduels sont posés, comme celui de l'intercalation ('Pierre et Marie jouent du piano et du violon, respectivement').

Le second chapitre s'attaque à une tâche particulièrement complexe pour tout projet de construction d'un analyseur automatique d'une langue naturelle: la spécification du *lexique*. Il faut en effet savoir comment on déterminera l'appartenance des 'mots' à telle ou telle catégorie grammaticale, définir de manière détaillée les catégories grammaticales au-delà des catégories grossières comme Nom, Adjectif, Verbe, et limiter au minimum le recours à des données de nature sémantique. Ce dernier objectif constitue cependant plus un idéal qu'une réalité que l'on pourrait immédiatement atteindre (et c'est la raison pour laquelle la présente analyse se restreint à des textes scientifiques, qui manifestent des phénomènes moins nombreux et plus nets que les textes 'naturels'). On examine d'abord un système de classification des unités lexicales, en insistant sur les questions classiques des règles de sélection et des contraintes, pour ensuite passer à l'établissement des sous-classes (distributionnelles) des noms, des verbes, des adjectifs, des adverbes et des prépositions. Cette classification est faite en fonction des structures de surface des chaînes (l'économie de la 'profondeur' étant du reste un des principaux objectifs théoriques de l'ouvrage). Les traits sémantiques actifs dans l'établissement de ces sous-classes sont limités aux traits 'humain,' 'animé' et 'concret,' l'ensemble de la classification répondant à des critères structuraux, les seuls qui soient automatisables dans l'état de nos connaissances.

Le troisième chapitre a une double visée. D'une part, il est théorique: il s'agit d'évaluer la grammaire en chaîne par rapport aux grammaires CS (context-sensitive) et CF (context-free) et, en définissant la grammaire en chaîne comme un langage formel, de montrer que cette grammaire a une capacité générative comparable à celle d'une grammaire CF. D'autre part, il est 'appliqué': il s'agit alors de construire une grammaire CF du français sur la base de la théorie élaborée par GC et qui tienne compte, entre autres, des règles de sélection du verbe. Cette grammaire vise l'analyse automatique présentée au chapitre suivant, et qui est appelée à la valider empiriquement, mais elle est également invoquée pour montrer 'à quel point ses règles sont semblables à celles d'une grammaire transformationnelle de la langue,' de

manière à présenter la grammaire en chaîne comme une variante (plus courte) CS de cette grammaire CF du français. L'A. estime qu'elle 'rend compte de manière naturelle de tous les phénomènes grammaticaux observés dans la langue' (202). Il fournit des 'schémas' de règles plutôt que les règles elles-mêmes: un schéma peut correspondre à des règles dont le nombre est de l'ordre de 16 000 (lesquelles ne sont évidemment pas toutes réalisées).

Le dernier chapitre consiste en l'analyse automatique d'un texte, 'Mécanismes biochimiques et génétiques de la régulation dans la cellule bactérienne' (Plus précisément, il s'agit des 15 premières phrases de cet article.) de F. Jacob et F. Monod, dont la majeure partie avait déjà fait l'objet d'une analyse (identique, à l'exception du traitement des prépositions) dans GC (167-83). Contrairement à ce qui se produit souvent, le corpus analysé n'est pas taillé à la mesure de l'analyseur: le texte a, selon l'A., été choisi de manière arbitraire (la seule exigence étant qu'il s'agisse d'un texte à caractère scientifique) et il comporte des phrases longues et complexes (dont une comporte 88 mots, ce qui en fait 'la phrase la plus longue qui ait jamais été analysée par un programme d'analyse automatique'), alors que de nombreuses analyses ne fonctionnent que pour des énoncés élémentaires. L'A. voit dans le succès de l'analyse de ces 15 phrases la preuve de la qualité du programme et de la grammaire: toutes les analyses sont justifiables sémantiquement et grammaticalement du point de vue de la grammaire en chaîne.

Mesurée à la réussite de l'analyse qu'elle permet, cette grammaire ne présente pas de failles: elle identifie effectivement la structure des phrases d'une manière cohérente et l'épreuve qu'elle subit dans son application garantit sa validité empirique. Sans minimiser l'importance de ce résultat, on peut néanmoins formuler deux remarques. La première a trait à la taille de l'échantillonnage et, plus accessoirement, à sa nature. En favorisant une approche du type 'top-down,' l'A. produit une batterie analytique considérable dont la puissance est pour l'instant évaluée sur un corpus relativement restreint, alors que d'autres approches procèdent à l'inverse et analysent des corpus considérables au moyen de batteries analytiques beaucoup plus réduites parce que construites en quelque sorte en interaction avec le texte. Il est certain que cette grammaire, estimée valide pour l'ensemble des phénomènes grammaticaux de la langue, doit pouvoir s'étendre au-delà du corpus analysé, les phrases de ce corpus étant à tout le moins des exemplifications de structures appartenant à la langue. On peut cependant souhaiter que l'analyse soit appliquée à des textes plus étendus et qui n'auraient pas les caractères relativement réguliers des textes scientifiques. La seconde remarque, dont il faut noter qu'elle est radicalement étrangère au point de vue adopté par l'A. et au type de projet qu'il poursuit, a trait à ce qu'on a pris l'habitude d'appeler la puissance explicative d'une théorie linguistique. Limitée délibérément à la segmentation des suites de surface, la grammaire dont il est ici question ne prétend rien expliquer (en un quelconque sens de ce mot) et n'est afférente ni à une faculté de langage dont il s'agirait de rendre compte ni à quelque théorie de l'apprentissage que ce soit (qu'il s'agisse d'un

apprentissage humain ou d'un apprentissage mécanique). Certains peuvent voir dans cette retenue quant à la profondeur une limitation insatisfaisante, d'autres, une saine sobriété.

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JOHN B. THOMPSON and DAVID HELD (eds.), *Habermas: Critical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1982. vii + 324 p. US$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-20043-0); US$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-262-70023-9).

Plusieurs études entièrement consacrées à l'œuvre de Jürgen Habermas ont paru ces dernières années. Pour ne retenir que les plus récentes, mentionnons celles de Zygmunt Baumann, 1976, Thomas McCarthy, 1978, Garbis Kortian, 1980 et David Held, 1980. Le livre de Thompson/Held s'en distingue par une nouveauté: il s'agit d'un ouvrage collectif où des auteurs, représentatifs des universités allemandes (Bubner, R., Ottmann, H., Schmid, M.), anglaises (Giddens, A., Held, D., Hesse, M., Lukes, S., Thompson, J.B.) et américaines (Arato, A., McCarthy, Th.) — équipe à laquelle s'est jointe Agnes Heller, d'origine hongroise —, examinent de manière critique les aspects principaux de l'œuvre de J. Habermas. Ce dernier donne, dans l'essai de clôture (texte de loin le plus long de tout l'ouvrage), une réplique très substantielle et fort détaillée à ces critiques, réplique qui contient des reformulations majeures de ses propres thèses. L'ordre des contributions est un peu aléatoire, mais les éditeurs rappellent dans l'introduction les grands thèmes qui traversent l'œuvre de Habermas, ce qui permet de situer les différentes interventions. La structure du livre peut être reconstruite à partir de l'essai de Habermas, qui regroupe les diverses contributions autour de cinq points reflétant précisément les aspects de son œuvre placés dans la ligne de tir: 1. relation de Habermas à Marx et au marxisme (Heller, Giddens); 2. statut de la théorie critique (Bubner, Ottmann); 3. raison et nature (Habermas ne répond pas ici aux auteurs du livre, mais à des polémiques dont il fait l'objet: distance d'entreprises fondationnelles à caractère métaphysique et épistémologique, reproche d'eclectisme (de Kant à Weber, de Hegel, Marx, Lukàcs à Horkheimer, de Peirce à Searle, de Parsons, de Piaget...) (Joel Whiteboek,

1979), impossibilité de réconcilier à l'intérieur de sa théorie de l'action et de la communication une conception subjectiviste et une conception objectiviste de l'homme (McCarthy, 1978), ...); 4. universalisme (formalisme) de l'éthique de l'argumentation (Lukes, McCarthy); 5. topiques concernant la théorie de l'action, de la communication et de la science (Giddens, Thompson, Hesse); 6. analyse des sociétés modernes, crise de légitimation et évolution (Schmid, Held, Arato).

Relation de Habermas à Marx et au marxisme. Dans l'examen de l'entreprise de reconstruction du matérialisme historique par Habermas, Agnes Heller fait ressortir deux thèmes chers à Marx et par rapport auxquels Habermas a pris ses distances: le problème du rapport entre la théorie et la pratique ou l'idée de *praxis* chez Marx, et celui de la nature et de la fonction des forces productives dans la théorie matérialiste de l'histoire. Contre Marx, dont la théorie aurait servi l'unique but de fonder la thèse de la mission historique du prolétariat, Habermas montre, selon Heller, qu'en suivant la leçon de l'histoire récente (stalinisme, fascisme, nazisme), ce n'est plus une classe particulière qui peut défendre un intérêt universel, mais que cette mission historique incombe à la raison pratique de tous les hommes, l'intérêt (universel) pour l'émancipation de la domination n'étant plus porté par le prolétariat contemporain. Marx aurait bien reconnu cet intérêt d'émancipation, mais c'est Habermas qui en fait la trame de son analyse, tout en rejetant l'action révolutionnaire (violente); celle-ci peut être remplacée par un dialogue rationnel entre partenaires antagonistes, moyennant lequel on peut créer une situation de communication où les partenaires sont obligés de s'écouter. Habermas rejette également l'analyse marxiste du mode de production capitaliste en montrant qu'elle est inapplicable à la société contemporaine, puisque le rôle des forces productives a changé. Habermas n'accepte pas, d'après Heller, que les forces productives, qui engendrent, indiquent et constituent le progrès, soient totalisables et assimilables aux intérêts d'un prolétariat avec une présumée mission: ce prolétariat aujourd'hui ne sert pas l'intérêt émancipatoire, ni d'ailleurs les forces productives techniques/scientifiques — lesquelles, tout au contraire, servent à légitimer la domination.

Dans sa réplique, Habermas se montre bien d'accord avec cette lecture, et il réaffirme que ce sont des vérités historiques qui le séparent de Marx (si on lit Marx dans une perspective scientifique): les contradictions internes du capitalisme ne l'ont pas fait éclater, et la paupérisation du prolétariat n'a pas eu lieu, les crises 'prévues' étant contrées par une intervention grandissante de l'Etat dans les affaires économiques. Ceci a complexifié, selon Habermas, les rapports de production à un point tel qu'une action révolutionnaire représenterait un risque énorme. De plus, à la critique de Heller voulant qu'il aurait escamoté la dimension romantique, c'est-à-dire feuerbachienne ou anthropologique du concept de 'travail' chez Marx, Habermas répond que l'autoréalisation de l'espèce humaine ne se fait peut-être pas avant tout par le travail (action instrumentale) mais par l'action communicationnelle.

Le statut de la théorie critique. La théorie critique, qui devrait inaugurer

des disciplines nouvelles, comme la sociologie critique, l'économie critique, etc., dans le but de distinguer dans les différentes sciences humaines les régularités nomologiques authentiques (s'il y en a) des pseudo-régularités ('loi de l'offre et la demande'), semble avoir un statut qui n'est pas clairement identifiable, du moins d'après les attaques des 'rationalistes critiques' (Popper, Albert). Dans sa contribution, Bubner retrace l'origine de l'ambiguïté de la théorie critique dans le double héritage de Marx: critique dans le sens de Kant (critique épistémologique), c'est-à-dire mise à l'épreuve de la validité d'un savoir; critique au sens de la gauche hégélienne (Bauer, Ruge), c'est-à-dire négation et destruction notamment de l'illusion idéologique. Cette fusion se serait opérée chez Marx et aurait été maintenue jusqu'à Habermas, pour qui la libération des apparences trompeuses s'accomplirait par l'interaction communicationnelle, dont la supposée rationnalité serait constamment guettée par le danger de la 'rhetorical delusion.' Bubner pose donc le problème, non résolu par Habermas, de savoir à partir de quelle théorie de la connaissance on peut désillusionner la conscience trompeuse, théorie qui ne serait pas ellemême simple contre-idéologie.

En guise de réponse, Habermas argumente que la confusion alléguée ne se réalise ni chez Marx ni chez lui. Quant à l'objection de la 'rhetorical delusion,' Habermas en profite pour contre-attaquer les néo-conservateurs, lesquels voient dans la théorie habermasienne de la communication 'une volonté de puissance d'intellectuels obsédés par l'Aufklärung (Maurer),' 'pur discours comme l'alibi des gangsters' (238).

L'universalisme (formalisme) de l'éthique de l'argumentation. Lukes, bien qu'il débute son essai sur une méprise concernant le statut d'une norme d'action (assimilant 'richtig' [correcte, juste] à 'wahr' [vrai], deux prétentions à la validité que Habermas a clairement distinguées), situe néanmoins correctement le problème des conditions qui doivent présider à l'établissement de toute entente discursive au sujet de normes d'action. Il pose en effet la question: comment établir ces conditions qui doivent être telles qu'elles garantissent l'émancipation (de l'idéologie, du pouvoir) tout en permettant d'échapper au décisionnisme des techniques politiques? En suivant Habermas, ce serait par la méthode de la 'reconstruction contre-factuelle,' c'est-à-dire en anticipant comment des acteurs libres de toute contrainte, supposés capables d'interpréter leurs besoins... etc., réaliseraient le consensus à propos de normes, donc par une expérience de pensée, qu'on parviendrait à savoir quels intérêts sont généralisables. Lukes voit dans ce procédé au moins deux problèmes. Quelle est la 'distance' qui sépare la situation actuelle de la situation contre-factuelle? La méthode permet-elle vraiment de distinguer les intérêts généralisables de ceux qui ne le sont pas? En confrontant la méthode de Habermas avec les tests d'universalisation de normes proposés par Mackie, Lukes ne voit plus ce que Habermas entend par 'intérêt généralisable.' Tant que ce point n'est pas éclairci, Habermas n'éviterait pas le décisionnisme ou l'arbitraire du pluralisme moral.

Ces questions, surtout la dernière, me paraissent aller au cœur de l'en-

treprise de Habermas, qui est construite sur la base d'une présumée rationnalité éthique. Répondant à la première question, Habermas rappelle sa conception de la 'situation idéale de discours' dont les conditions doivent être satisfaites à chaque fois qu'une entente discursive se réalise. Il ne s'agit pas d'un idéal en dehors de toute situation concrète et ayant un contenu utopique (comme Lukes paraît le supposer). Quant à la seconde question, Habermas reconnaît qu'il n'a pas encore complètement établi sa théorie de l'action communicationnelle. Le problème soulevé concerne la possibilité d'une fondation ultime des normes d'action. Habermas propose un test d'universalisation: une norme d'action est valide si tous les acteurs concernés par elle peuvent aboutir, par discours et argumentation pratiques, à un consensus authentique (c'est-à-dire un consensus où les conditions d'une situation idéale de discours sont satisfaites) au sujet de la norme proposée (257). En explicitant davantage ces conditions, Habermas rejoint les critères de Mackie (non-indexicalité), de Gewirth (les normes doivent être publiquement justifiables), de Baier (il doit être possible d'enseigner les normes), de Singer (un acteur doit être capable d'assumer les conséquences résultant de l'éventualité où tous adopteraient une norme contestée) et de Hare (l'acteur doit examiner si tous ceux qui se trouvent dans la même situation que lui pourraient accepter une norme proposée).

Topiques concernant la théorie de l'action, de la communication et de la science. Plusieurs contributions soulèvent des questions précises concernant ces thèmes. Giddens critique la distinction que fait Habermas entre travail et interaction et montre qu'elle est inadéquate dans la perspective de Marx. Habermas identifie, reproche Giddens, interaction, action et action communicationnelle, et insiste sur l'aspect normatif, ce qui le rapproche de la position de T. Parsons. Habermas répond que Giddens n'a pas pris en considération les clarifications qu'il a apportées lors de la conférence d'Ottawa (1979). Quant aux théories conflictuelles qu'on a opposées à Parsons, Habermas estime que sa propre théorie de l'action veut justement rendre compte de ces différentes formes de conflits et mécanismes de co-ordination des interactions par le pouvoir (Macht), la coercition (Zwang), la domination (Herrschaft) et la violence (Gewalt) (269).

Thompson s'intéresse au programme de la pragmatique universelle et se pose quatre questions: Est-ce qu'il y a, pour chaque acte de discours qui constitue une relation de communication, une expression linguistique appropriée? Les universaux pragmatiques sont-ils vraiment universels? Peut-on distinguer consensus authentique et consensus trompeur? Peut-on souscrire à la théorie de la vérité en termes de consensus? Cette dernière question est aussi soulevée par Hesse qui estime que la théorie pragmatique de la signification et la conception consensuelle de la vérité, bien qu'elles rejoignent une certaine mode en philosophie de la science (Kuhn, Feyerabend), n'est pas satisfaisante; on ne peut pas simplement contourner ce qu'il y a d'intéressant dans la définition (correspondantiste) de la vérité chez Tarski. Pour Habermas, le problème que pose Hesse ne concerne pas la conception de

la vérité, mais une théorie de la connaissance. Il montre par ailleurs que la vérité est en jeu seulement si l'acceptation intersubjective d'un énoncé est contestée et que c'est seulement dans ce cas qu'on joue le jeu de la vérité.

Pour les questions de Thompson, Habermas privilégie la seconde et demande en retour de montrer que la tripartition (trois 'validity claims,' trois 'mondes', trois intérêts...) est incorrecte. Il y a certainement là un problème. Pour Searle, p. ex. il n'y a qu'un monde, le monde du discours, et la différenciation des types d'actes de discours s'obtient à partir de la 'direction d'ajustement,' discours-monde (pour les 'assertives'), monde-discours (pour les 'commissives' et 'directives'), double ajustement (pour les 'déclaratives') et ajustement nul (pour les 'expressives'). On ne trouve pas chez Habermas une telle fondation de la tripartition des 'validity claims.'

L'analyse des sociétés modernes. Les articles de Schmid, Held et Arato portent sur les théories de l'évolution des sociétés, l'analyse du fonctionnement des sociétés capitalistes post-industrielles et l'application des schèmes d'analyse de Habermas à des sociétés de l'Europe de l'Est. Ce qui est essentiellement mis en cause, c'est le programme que Habermas a proposé dans ses publications des années 70, et les concepts rattachés à ce programme ('principe d'organisation,' 'logique de développement,' le premier ayant trait aux principes de structuration interne d'une société, déterminant les virtualités de changement structurel et de métamorphose, le second, à la succession d'étapes que toute société devrait franchir). Ces concepts sont critiquables principalement parce qu'ils sont ambigus, c'est-à-dire à la fois descriptifs et normatifs.

Habermas est particulièrement sensible à la question de Held relativement à la consistance analytique des différents types de crises sociales (crise de légitimation, crise de motivation). Habermas ne prendrait pas suffisamment en considération les facteurs internes et systémiques générateurs de crise. Habermas reconnaît ces difficultés, renvoie à sa toute dernière publication (*Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1982]), et il esquisse une différenciation des composantes structurelles d'un système d'action. Ce dernier comprendrait (en suivant T. Parsons) le système de la personnalité, le système social et le système culturel, lesquels, combinés avec les processus de reproduction (reproduction culturelle, intégration sociale et socialisation de l'individu), permettraient de localiser les phénomènes de crise en rapport avec les perturbations dans les processus de reproduction différenciés selon les trois niveaux du système d'action.

Tous ceux (philosophes, sociologues, linguistes, politiciens, historiens) qui s'intéressent à la théorie critique et particulièrement à Habermas trouveront dans ce livre des contributions substantielles et si riches qu'un compte-rendu ne peut pas leur rendre entièrement justice. Son intérêt consiste avant tout dans le fait qu'il instaure un véritable débat entre l'auteur et

ses lecteurs critiques. Le livre comprend une bonne bibliographie sélective des écrits de Habermas et de la littérature secondaire qui lui est consacrée, ainsi que des notices biographiques des contributeurs.

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PAOLO VALESIO, *Novantiqua. Rhetorics as a contemporary theory,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. xii + 321p. US$20.00. ISBN 0-253-11055-6.

Cet ouvrage comporte quatre chapitres. Le premier, intitulé 'What and Why: The Ontology,' tente d'abord de dissiper l'ambiguïté de la rhétorique comme métalange (*rhetorics, R*hétorique) et de la rhétorique comme langage-objet (rhetoric, *r*hétorique) (pour distinguer la discipline de son objet, nous écrirons Rhétorique dans le premier cas et rhétorique dans le second): 'rhetorics is the theory of rhetoric,' and rhetoric 'is the functional organization of discourse, within its social and cultural context, in all its aspects, exception made for its realization as a strictly formal metalanguage' (7). L'approche 'ontologique' du phénomène discursif s'oppose ici à une approche simplement 'archéologique,' c'est-à-dire historique. La Rhétorique ainsi conçue couvre tout le champ de l'analyse des discours, et l'auteur s'efforce de la situer par rapport aux diverses disciplines qui oeuvrent dans ce domaine.

Le second chapitre ('The commonplace as the Common Place') esquisse l'ontologie régionale de la rhétorique en ces termes: 'every discourse in its functional aspect is based on a relatively limited set of mechanisms — whose structure remains essentially the same from text to text, from language to language, from historical period to historical period — that reduce every referential choice to a formal choice' (21). La rhétorique devient ainsi partie intégrante du langage, et la Rhétorique, un moyen de renouveler la théorie linguistique générale, qui est trop centrée sur la fonction communicative et la fonction référentielle du langage alors que le discours, en fait, filtre constamment la réalité à travers les lieux communs, fait jouer les fonctions les unes contre les autres et connote positivement ou négativement ce dont il parle. Une telle conception revalorise les lieux communs et dénonce les attaques contre la rhétorique, montrant en particulier comment les discours qui récusent celle-ci non seulement l'utilisent mais encore obéissent à son mécanisme.

Chapitre 3: 'Rhetoric, Ideology, and Dialectic.' Rhétorique et dialectique vont de pair, l'idéologie est leur commune ennemie. L'idéologie, en tant qu'elle assume que la vérité et les autres valeurs fondamentales sont essentiellement non linguistiques et peuvent être fidèlement exprimées par le langage s'il est correctement utilisé, 'is decayed rhetoric — rhetoric that is no longer the detailed expression of strategies at work in specific discourses' (66). Quant à la dialectique, elle est redéfinie par l'auteur de façon à lui enlever toute implication directement ontologique: 'In the traditional, ontological view of dialectic, we are implicitly told that there are certain processes at work in nature which also operate in society, are then reflected in language, and may be polished and embellished by rhetoric. What is proposed here is the opposite: these processes exist essentially as rhetorical structures, which are extended to all linguistic manifestations, and through them imposed on society and nature as the only ways of perceiving and describing phenomena in these domains' (121). Cette dialectique 'sceptique' entraîne une nouvelle conception du langage et une nouvelle façon d'analyser les discours.

Le dernier chapitre, le plus long du volume, a pour titre 'The structure of the Rheme.' Il est entièrement consacré à l'interprétation d'un fragment d'Héraclite que la traduction de Voilquin rend en ces termes: 'L'arc a pour nom *Bios* (la vie) et pour œuvre, la mort.' Très détaillée, cette interprétation intègre divers aspects (syntaxique, philologique, sémantique) et différents niveaux (contexte interne, contexte externe verbal et non verbal) afin d'illustrer les principales facettes de la Rhétorique de l'auteur. A l'analyse minutieusement technique du fragment se greffent ainsi des aperçus plus généraux souvent provocateurs. Certains de ces énoncés ont une portée limitée et portent, par exemple, sur une façon de compléter les descriptions tagmémiques ou sur une réévaluation de la notion de métaphore: celle-ci procéderait de la fusion des significations d'au moins deux éléments lexicaux en une troisième signification irréductible aux deux précédentes. D'autres énoncés sont plus ambitieux: dénonciation du statut idéologique de la coupure entre texte et contexte; affirmation de l'impossibilité, dans la description d'une section d'une structure linguistique ou d'un texte, de considérer ceux-ci comme des systèmes autonomes et fermés; reconnaissance du fait qu'il n'y a pas de métalangage pur, et donc que tout métalangage est conditionné idéologiquement, jointe à l'obligation corrélative d'être aussi conscient que possible de son propre conditionnement idéologique et de montrer qu'on en tient compte; affirmation que sans une analyse empirique microscopique, sans une analyse structurale systématique, la critique idéologique est vouée à la stérilité: 'When confronted with large-scale ideological pronouncements the critic should break them down in their ultimate components (paragraphs, sentences, phrases, lexemes) and then analyze them in detail. When, on the other end, the data with which he has to start are (...) sentences and their components, then what the critic should do,

while analyzing them, is to point out their integration into broader ideological constructs' (215).

Dans les efforts de renouvellement contemporain de la rhétorique, l'ouvrage de Paolo Valesio occupe une position originale. Si l'on relève, dans ces tentatives, deux tendances majeures: l'une, illustrée par l'oeuvre de Ch. Perelman, insistant sur l'ampleur et l'importance du champ de l'argumentation, l'autre, dont témoigne entre autres l'intérêt contemporain pour la métaphore, se concentrant sur le jeu des figures, la Rhétorique de Valesio se présente plutôt comme une théorie globale des discours. Fondé sur la linquistique tout en s'efforçant de la dépasser, se réclamant d'un point de vue matérialiste tout en récusant le matérialisme comme idéologie, prônant la résurgence de la pensée sceptique tout en intégrant à sa démarche une documentation aussi fouillée que possible, suggérant une réévaluation de l'importance de la pensée des Sophistes tout en dénonçant les tours de passe-passe et les facilités invérifiables de certains philosophes contemporains, cet ouvrage stimulant fait de la Rhétorique une inspiration pour l'analyse sémiologique des discours.

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MARY VETTERLING-BRAGGIN, ed., *Sexist Language.* Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams and Company 1981. Pp. xii + 329. US$15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8226-6293-4); US$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8226-0353-5).

It is not surprising that when the contemporary women's movement turned its critical attention to language, it found that much of the way people used language reflected a deep sexist bias. This recognition was followed by a variety of recommendations for change most of which met with considerable resistance. It was, for example, deemed 'too cumbersome' and indeed 'too trivial' a matter to go to the trouble of replacing exclusive use of the male pronoun with the words 'he and she' or 'him and her.' When feminists sympathized with the first difficulty and proposed adopting exclusive use of the female pronoun, most people got the point. And so there followed a brief period when teachers, writers, and even 'the person in the street,' self-

consciously remembered to say 'men and women' and books with titles like 'The Biology of Man' and 'The History of Mankind' began to disappear. This victory of the women's movement was short-lived. In 1982, it is difficult not to acknowledge considerable backsliding both in society at large and even more particularly within the university. Many collegues who once grudingly heeded the call of the movement have been only too happy to return to their former ways as the consciousness raising students of the 70's have left the campuses and the women's movement has been forced to turn its attention to fighting back against attacks on women's reproductive freedom and other such life and death issues. For this reason, Mary Vetterling-Braggin's anthology *Sexist Language,* subtitled 'A Modern Philosophical Analysis' is most welcome indeed.

It comes at a time when academics, in particular, need to be reminded that language not only reflects the realities of our world but plays a significant role in shaping those realities. Professors who persist in believing what Janice Mouton has called 'the myth of the neutral man' thereby set up a barrier between their words and the women students in their classes. The Vetterling-Braggin volume is important because it insists that we take the power of sexist language seriously. It subjects our use of language to a deep and thoroughgoing analysis from a number of philosophical perspectives. Here is a good example of the particular contribution that professional philosophy can make to clarifying and analyzing issues raised by popular social and political movements of the day. Who, after all, is in a better position than the professional philosopher to offer an account of what constitutes sexist use of language and then go on to explore the moral significance of this use. This is precisely what Parts I and II of the Vetterling-Braggin volume do. Part I includes essays by Marilyn Frye, Sara Shute and Patrick Grim and concerns itself with defining 'X is Sexist.' Part II addresses the question of what's wrong with sexist language and includes essays by Robin Lakoff, Virginia Valian, and Jacqueline Fortunata. Part III focuses on particular examples of sexist language and in many ways it is the most interesting section of the book. In particular, the three essays by Robert Baker, Janice Mouton and Stephanie Ross, which examine the way terms describing sexual intercourse both reflect and shape the problematic nature of intimate relations between people, offer compelling evidence on the moral significance of using sexist language. Part IV is structured around two lead essays each of which is presented in a separate section along with responses to it. The first is Larry Thomas' 'Sexist and Racist Language: Some Conceptual Differences' which is the only essay in the book to argue (though not persuasively, I think), for a lack of parallelism between racist and sexist use of language and the consequences that follow from each. A number of essays throughout the volume do an excellent job of drawing parallels between such uses of language and thereby deepen our understanding of both racism and sexism. In addition, at least one essay calls attention to the class bias reflected in some use of language and uses the point to define and analyze the way in which sexist language functions as well. The

volume as a whole would have been strengthened had it included additional considerations of the way in which class, as well as gender and race, are often smuggled into our language, particularly the way in which all three operate in seemingly scientific discourse. Section 2 of Part IV is structured around Patrick Grim's 'A Note on the Ethics of Theories of Truth' and raises questions about the truth value of statements employing sexist terms, (eg. 'Broads will benefit from improvements in medicine.'), that will most likely only be of interest to a small group of professional philosophers. Section 4 is the least satisfying in the collection. It suffers by comparison with both the content and structural interconnectedness of the other three.

Each part of the book is preceded by a brief introduction which draws attention to the problems which will be raised by the essays and offers some critical remarks about the solutions which are proposed in them. These introductions are clear and to the point, and taken together they do a nice job of developing some of the most important and interesting philosophical issues that arise from an analysis of sexist language. Of the twenty-three essays that comprise the volume, roughly two-thirds appear for the first time. Although the quality of the pieces is somewhat uneven, the majority of the essays make valuable contributions to our understanding of the problems they address. While many of the essays presuppose a fairly sophisticated philosophical background, some of them, in particular essays in Part III, are suitable for a general audience and might be used effectively in a variety of college classes where students have no particular philosophical background.

Mary Vetterling-Braggin has put together a serious collection of essays on sexist language that should once and for all silence those critics of the women's movement who claim that a preoccupation with language is both foolish and unnecessary. Sexist and racist use of language is consequential indeed, and this volume makes that point extremely well.

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