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MARC ELI BLANCHARD, *Description: Sign, Self, Desire. Critical Theory in the Wake of Semiotics*. Approaches to Semiotics, no. 43. New York: Mouton 1980. viii + 299 p. ISBN 90-279-7778-x (cloth); 90-279-3488-6 (paper).

Cet ouvrage comporte une brève introduction et un trypétique de parties, dont chaque volet correspond à l'un des trois facteurs posés par le titre comme élément de la description.

L'objectif dévoilé par l'introduction est de faire le point sur la *controverse sémiologique*: 'What is semiotics? Does it offer an alternative to the traditional historical, psychological, thematic, or stylistic approach to literature? And to what degree does it differ from the structural approach pioneered in the sixties in reaction against all the above?' (1). En particulier, et à la lumière de l'ébranlement de la notion de signe sous l'impulsion de Derrida, de Deleuze, de Kristeva et de Lyotard, ne faudrait-il pas admettre l'échec de la science de la communication et des systèmes de signes humains? L'Auteur se propose de montrer que les limites de la sémiologie sont liées à l'application, aux textes littéraires, d'un modèle saussurien étroit, ainsi qu'à 'the dismissal of elements of stylistic and semantic analysis through reductive operations where the critic concerns himself with codes, but not with the processes of encoding and decoding which make these codes possible' (2). Les éléments de correction de cette situation seront recherchés du côté d'une reconsidération des rapports entre les signes et le sujet qui les produit, ainsi que dans une valorisation de la description plutôt que de la narrativité.

La première partie, consacrée au signe, englobe six chapitres. Le premier d'entre eux porte sur les relations entre sémiologie et linguistique: celle-là est tellement imprégnée de celle-ci que l'on peut parler d'une 'collusion sémiolinguistique' dans les méthodes des sciences humaines, collusion justifiée d'une part parce que tous les signes fonctionnent sur le modèle des signes du langage naturel, d'autre part parce que tous les discours sur les signes doivent emprunter la terminologie d'un discours sur le langage naturel; par ailleurs, en utilisant (quitte à l'adapter) un modèle linguistique pour lequel le langage constitue la création sociale par excellence, la sémiologie affirme sa vocation sociale et humaine, elle promeut un nouvel humanisme.

L'application de la sémiologie aux textes littéraires soulève des problèmes: a) la sémiologie peut-elle se réclamer d'un modèle linguistique dont l'unité de référence est la phrase, et s'appliquer là où cette unité n'est plus en cause? b) Comment définir l'unité narrative si elle ne s'identifie pas à la phrase?

Tout discours, affirme le troisième chapitre, est narratif. Mais ce qui ne contribue pas au développement de l'action est en général disqualifié en tant que description. L'Auteur s'efforce de renverser cette hiérarchie: 'I am proposing that the common denominator for all narratives is not the order, type, or value of their strict narrative system, but their universal share in a descriptive universe' (18). Il propose d'étudier les descriptions à trois niveaux: celui de leurs indicateurs textuels, celui de l'intention dont elles découlent, celui où se noue la dialectique du langage et du désir.

Le quatrième chapitre, consacré aux signes narratifs et descriptifs de la prose, a pour objectif: 'to reconcile semiotics and stylistics, to arrive at a *semiosylistics*, the epistemological foundations of which I propose to establish' (24). Cela s'accomplit en deux étapes. Tout d'abord, l'Auteur établit l'insuffisance d'une sémiologie qui ignore la stylistique en montrant les lacunes de l'analyse sémiologique aux trois niveaux proposés par Barthes: celui des fonctions, où l'on discute le modèle de Bremond (que l'Auteur écrit Brémond), celui des 'actions,' où l'on prend à partie le modèle actantiel de Greimas, et celui de la narration, où c'est la démarche de Todorov qui est mise en cause. La seconde étape établit ensuite qu'une stylistique, en l'occurrence celle de Riffaterre, qui méconnaît le niveau sémiologique des textes n'est pas plus acceptable. (N.B.: les modèles étudiés dans ce chapitre le sont dans leur version antérieure à 1970).

Étudiant les signes narratifs et descriptifs de la poésie, le cinquième chapitre établit d'abord en quel sens la théorie de la narrativité peut être utile à la sémiologie de la fonction poétique; l'Auteur pose ensuite la nécessité d'introduire, dans l'étude de la relation entre le mot poétique et le sujet parlant ou écrivant, l'idéologie de cette relation; après quoi il propose l'idée d'un rite de l'écriture destiné à préserver l'objet poétique et, plus fondamentalement, le signifiant. Si la poésie de Rimbaud est l'occasion de ces développements, leur visée s'étend à l'ensemble des processus littéraires et artistiques.

La seconde partie, 'Self,' comprend elle aussi six chapitres. La critique derridienne de la phénoménologie a-t-elle sonné le glas de la critique phénoménologique? Pour l'Auteur, tout texte narratif non seulement nous informe d'une séquence déterminée d'actions (à laquelle se borne l'intérêt de l'analyse structurale), mais aussi se présente comme un acte de communication qui présuppose un engagement de l'écrivain que le lecteur doit pouvoir reconnaître et apprécier. Sans revenir pour autant au dévoilement des intentions inconscientes ou inexprimées de l'écrivain, ni à une critique de l'ineffable, l'Auteur se dit intéressé 'in the consciousness of existence, as it appears at the beginning of writing' (103), il suggère que 'most texts, and especially narrative fictions, generate the sentiment of a form of existence, the hope of a reality unmediated by words' (103), réalité qui serait une représentation, le produit d'un processus où les signes, simultanément, affirment et nient une présence. Ces thèses conduisent à une critique de la sémiologie qui réduit les différences subjectives au profit d'un système arbitraire et supposément objectif de désignation.

Le chapitre suivant analyse *Daphnis et Chloé* (Longin) et dévoile l'idéologie de la pastorale. A partir des *Imagines* (Philostrate) et des *Descriptions* (Callistrate), mais surtout à partir de la description homérique du bouclier d'Achille, le troisième chapitre esquisse la théorie d'une forme particulière de description que l'Auteur qualifie de paranarrative: 'we learned how the mechanisms of this (Homeric) *ekphrasis* develop into those of historical narrative with the insertion of similes into the corpus of an ongoing narrative. We can now say that the simile fully represents the first type, and the primitive form, of a paranarrative process, which later develops into (1) the epic *ekphrasis* and (2) the Sophistic *Imago*, thanks to the maturation of a rhetorical *technè* and the growing awareness of specific audience reactions' (155).

En substituant à la distinction 'écrivain-lecteur' celle entre 'écrivain-écrivain/lecteur-lisant,' 'the presence of an *I-writing*, not captured by an organized text, would acquire, in the very process of this organization, a new dimension: an existence, the trace of which would be precisely the work of the stylistician to detect in fiction of the text being written' (158). Cette tâche est accomplie dans le quatrième chapitre, à propos des *Essais* de Montaigne. L'avant-dernier chapitre revient sur la pastorale, mais pour tenter de comprendre 'why the feeling of nature is manifested in the form of the pastoral, the eclogue or the idyll, to what degree the constitution of a bucolic writing is part of the rhetorical and mythical invention of the eighteenth century' (168); tentant de dépasser les structures linguistiques, l'Auteur prétend incorporer 'into a semiostylistic process philosophical considerations of Self and Other' (179, n. 1).

Le dernier chapitre de la seconde partie revient sur le problème de la description, qu'il définit comme 'that system which enables us to modify a common frame of reference and to introduce our own view of the world' (183); extensionnellement, 'any statement, any judgment, can become a description, when it can be experienced as *being a part of an actual or potential narrative*' (183), et cette description nous fournit une expérience particulière, celle de 'the givenness of the object' (183). Que, d'un point de vue linguistique, la description puisse être considérée comme une expansion, cela n'intéresse guère l'Auteur, qui préfère étudier la façon dont elle modifie la fonction narrative en prenant pour exemples des textes de Joyce, de Conrad, de Zola et de Melville, — et en mettant l'accent sur ce qu'il appelle les 'display-descriptions,' celles qui étalent la fiction en tant que telle.

Au désir, la dernière partie consacre trois chapitres. Le premier pose d'abord que tout texte comporte deux niveaux de signification: celui de la narration et celui de la description. Quel rôle jouent ces deux niveaux? Le plaisir que chacun d'entre eux procure est différent mais, du fait que toute description finit en narration, sa place dans le modèle global est complexe et ambivalente: 'one could suggest that the particular pleasure of narration is eventually to transform a mobile cathexis into a quiescent one by returning the psyche to a state of nirvana and peace antedating all new activity; while,

inside the total narrative, the specific pleasure of description would be in the attempt to thwart, or to delay the combination of Eros and Death in the certainty that the pleasure is bound to be ended by an ongoing narrative process. There, oblivious to the promise — or is it a threat? — of nirvana and death, the Unconscious would thus give itself permission to enjoy without fear (Death) something like the presence of Eros' (214). Le but du second chapitre, consacré à l'analyse de *Comus* (Milton), 'is to ask a few questions of import to the complex *mimesis* of the pastoral and the masque, and in the context of a semiology of *narration* and *description*, to try to clarify the relationship of poetic and dramatic texts to language and desire' (223).

Le dernier chapitre se propose tout d'abord d'établir que dans la fiction du dix-neuvième siècle, au lieu de poser un sujet dressant son image contre le monde dans lequel il vit, 'description can cause him to *fictionalize* his own historical tradition, his desires and aspirations as well as those of his economic and social class'; on montre que 'this process of fictionalization usually covers the range of differences and contradictions between, on the one hand, a pastoral (positive) representation, where history still remains unborn or suppressed, and, on the other hand, a farcical, burlesque and grotesque (negative) representation, where history progressively looms larger and ominous'; on espère ainsi susciter 'a reevaluation of the overall relationship between history and fiction, money and desire' (249). La démonstration met surtout à contribution *Les paysans* (Balzac), *Madame Bovary* (Flaubert), *Middlemarch* (Eliot) et *Far from the Madding Crowd* (Hardy).

On aura deviné que cet ouvrage est en fait un recueil d'articles, dont la plupart ont déjà été publiés en revue. Trois thèmes majeurs circulent à travers ces textes: a) la relativisation de l'analyse structurale au profit de la sémiostylistique; b) la promotion de la description par rapport à la narration; c) l'importance de la pastorale dans l'ensemble de l'histoire de la littérature. Ces thèmes sont développés clairement, avec une érudition qui n'ignore pas les contributions de la philosophie contemporaine et de la psychanalyse au développement de la théorie littéraire, et avec un souci constant d'appuyer la théorie sur des exemples soigneusement analysés. On regrettera cependant l'absence d'une conclusion générale qui aurait permis de combler les lacunes inhérentes à la juxtaposition d'articles dont chacun vise un objectif spécifique, à savoir la mise (en) ensemble des éléments théoriques disséminés à travers les chapitres et l'approfondissement des concepts de base dont plusieurs m'apparaissent insuffisamment élaborés, à commencer par l'opposition entre narration et description (si la première se limite à la séquence des *actions* des personnages, peut-on penser que la seconde englobe *tout le reste* du texte littéraire, aussi bien les états d'âme des personnages que leurs idées, et les commentaires du narrateur, et la 'description' proprement dite des personnages et des choses?), et en y incluant la différence entre narrateur et auteur (que l'ouvrage semble confondre) ainsi que les notions de signification, de désignation, de référence, de signifié, de rapport de l'oeuvre à la réalité, de vérité littéraire, etc. Il serait également souhaitable que l'Auteur précise les

rapports entre structuralisme et stylistique et nous montre que l'aspect stylistique de la 'sémiostylistique' ne consiste pas seulement à greffer à une analyse structurale incomplète des impressions personnelles généralisées au moyen d'expressions comme 'le lecteur' ou 'nous,' qui offrent le désavantage, par rapport à l'archi-lecteur de Riffaterre, de masquer leur caractère de construction. Bref, l'Auteur a su soulever de façon originale des aspects cruciaux de la théorie littéraire, mais on souhaiterait qu'il systématisé et développe ces percées.

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COULOUBARITSIS L., *L'avènement de la science physique. Essai sur la Physique d'Aristote*. Bruxelles: Ed. Ousia 1980. 308 p. ISBN 2-87060-002-x.

La *Physique* d'Aristote n'est pas aujourd'hui le traité le plus commenté du Stagirite. Il semble plutôt que la science moderne ait réussi à nous faire oublier ses propres origines qui ne sont autres que cet effort gigantesque d'Aristote d'instituer les principes fondamentaux d'une véritable science de la nature. L'auteur de cet ouvrage veut donc rafraîchir notre mémoire en montrant comment la *Physique* d'Aristote constitue la première systématisation scientifique de notre connaissance de la nature, qui naturellement devait déboucher soit sur une métaphysique par un processus d'ontologisation du devenir, soit sur la science moderne par un processus inverse de déontologisation du devenir. Vu dans cette perspective le traité de *Physique* d'Aristote prend dès lors toute son importance puisqu'il est situé au carrefour de deux mondes: celui de la métaphysique traditionnelle et celui de la science moderne (318-26).

L'intention de l'auteur n'est pas de nous offrir un commentaire exhaustif de la *Physique* d'Aristote, mais d'analyser plutôt les fondements épistémologiques de cette première instauration des principes d'une science de la nature (45). Les textes étudiés par l'auteur se limitent donc à *Phys.* I, 1-9, II, 1-3, III, 1-3 et V, 1 où sont posés les concepts, les principes et les règles méthodologiques de l'instauration aristotélicienne d'une science de la nature. Cette perspective strictement épistémologique permet à L. Couloubaritsis de nous présenter une interprétation nouvelle du traité de

au fil de l'ouvrage, apparaît comme une remise en question radicale de l'interprétation traditionnelle. On sait, en effet, qu'il existe au XX^e siècle deux grandes écoles d'interprétation de cette oeuvre du Stagirite : l'interprétation dite empiriste, selon laquelle le fondement épistémologique de la physique aristotélicienne est de nature empirico-inductive (A. Mansion, D. Ross, P. Duhem, H. Leisegang) et l'interprétation dite formelle, selon laquelle le fondement épistémologique est plutôt une recherche à priori des conditions de possibilité d'une science de la nature (K. von Fritz, J.M. Le blond, F. Solmsen, W. Wieland, G.A. Lucetta). En d'autres mots, la physique aristotélicienne est-elle une théorie de la nature fondée sur l'expérience ou une théorie des conditions à priori de possibilité d'une science de la nature? L'auteur prend nettement position dans ce débat en proposant une troisième interprétation possible du traité de *Physique* d'Aristote à laquelle il donne le nom d'interprétation logico-ontologique, et qu'il prend le soin de légitimer dans l'Introduction (9-45) et le premier chapitre de son ouvrage (46-91), avant même de s'aventurer dans l'analyse des concepts épistémologiques fondamentaux de ce traité d'Aristote.

L'interprétation logico-ontologique prend appui sur un parallèle suggestif entre la situation d'Aristote et celle de Kant relative à une science possible de la nature (22-6). En effet, Aristote et Kant ont fait à leurs prédécesseurs le même reproche, celui d'être restés trop proches de l'expérience et de s'être montrés incapables de rattacher fermement celle-ci à des principes. L'entreprise d'Aristote se rapproche de celle de Kant en ce qu'il a tenté de subordonner pour ainsi dire l'élément empirique à la théorie, ce que n'avaient pas fait suffisamment ses prédécesseurs, sans toutefois tomber dans l'erreur des pythagoriciens et des platoniciens qui avaient détaché la théorie de l'expérience sensible. Une fois situé historiquement l'effort d'Aristote pour établir une science de la nature, on s'aperçoit que ni l'interprétation purement empiriste ni l'interprétation purement formelle ne peuvent rendre justice à l'intention d'Aristote; la première laisse de côté l'effort proprement théorique nécessaire à la constitution d'une science, la seconde oublie trop facilement le rôle du réel dans la pensée d'Aristote. L'interprétation logico-ontologique va tenter de se frayer une voie intermédiaire en montrant que les concepts fondamentaux requis dans l'instauration de la science physique aristotélicienne relèvent à la fois de la réalité et des structures du langage, lesquelles se rattachent aux structures logico-ontologiques de la pensée d'Aristote (20).

Le premier chapitre de l'ouvrage cherche à établir la progression de l'argumentation à travers les divers livres de la *Physique*. Du même coup, l'auteur renverse d'une façon radicale l'interprétation empirico-inductive sur deux points précis : la synonymie des concepts de *metabole*, de *genesis* et de *kinesis* et l'usage de la méthode inductive. Tandis que l'interprétation empirique conduisait à lire les livres I et III à la lumière du livre V par suite d'une acceptation de la presque synonymie des concepts analysés dans ces livres, l'interprétation de l'auteur commence par établir la spécificité des problémati

ques du changement, du devenir et du mouvement. Il s'agirait donc ici de concepts homonymes, et non pas synonymes. Par ailleurs, la règle méthodologique fondamentale adoptée par Aristote dans sa *Physique* n'est pas l'induction, mais celle de la 'double connaissance' selon laquelle, dans la recherche physique, on doit partir du tout ou du général pour aller vers la connaissance des parties qui appartiennent à ce tout par homonymie (*Phys.* I, 1, 184a17-b14). Telle que décrite, cette méthode apparaît comme le contraire de l'induction qui consiste à aller du particulier à l'universel (*Top.* I, 12, 105a13). La règle de la 'double connaissance' permet d'affirmer que le tout ou le général est plus clair et plus connaissable pour nous, tandis que les parties homonymes sont du plus clair et du plus connaissable en soi. Mais dans la mesure où le tout ou le général est connu par la sensation, on peut dire que la méthode d'Aristote dans ses recherches physiques allie des conditions logiques par le caractère formel de la règle de la 'double connaissance' à des conditions empiriques par le point de départ de cette connaissance. Cependant, cet empirisme ne consiste pas dans l'observation des faits, comme c'est le cas pour l'induction, mais dans une donnée générale, par exemple le nom de cercle, qui forme un tout avant la découverte de ses parties homonymes: la figure géométrique, le cycle épique (*kuklos*) et l'anneau. L'homonymie des concepts et la règle de la 'double connaissance' nous fournissent ainsi la clé d'une interprétation logico-ontologique de la *Physique* d'Aristote. L'argumentation du traité progresse du tout ou du général vers les parties homonymes par emboîtement de concepts. Aristote commence son étude de la nature par une notion globale, celle de *genesis* (Livre I). Mais cette notion globale contient deux parties homonymes: il y a un devenir dans l'ordre de la *techne* et un devenir dans l'ordre de la *physis*, ce dernier étant caractérisé par le fait d'être principe de son propre mouvement et repos (Livre II). Le mouvement apparaît au cours de l'analyse comme une partie homonyme de la *physis*. Il constituera l'objet du livre III suivi de certaines notions connexes: le temps, le lieu, le continu, l'infini (Livre IV). La notion de mouvement possède elle-même ses propres parties puisqu'il existe un mouvement dans le monde sublunaire dont la spécification est la *metabole* (Livre V) et un mouvement dans le monde supralunaire caractérisé par la translation et par l'existence d'un Premier Mouvant Immobile (Livres VI et VIII). Une fois bien établie la méthodologie d'Aristote, il ne reste plus à l'auteur qu'à procéder à l'analyse des fondements ontologiques (92-153), généalogiques (154-264) et kinéséologiques (265-301) de la physique aristotélicienne. Et ceci constitue l'objet des chapitres suivants.

Le chapitre II sur les fondements ontologiques de la physique aristotélicienne est une analyse de *Physique*, I, 1-6. Cette analyse montre que les notions d'élément (*stoicheion*), de cause (*aitia*) et de principe (*arche*) constituent les instruments auxiliaires de la recherche et les présupposés gnéséologiques d'une science de la nature. Dans ce passage de sa *Physique*, Aristote reproche à ses devanciers d'avoir confondu le problème du nombre des étants avec celui du nombre des principes. On doit donc distinguer

entre ce qui est, c'est-à-dire l'étant, et ce à partir de quoi on peut considérer ce qui est, c'est-à-dire le principe. Cette distinction nous fournit les fondements logico-ontologiques de toute la physique aristotélicienne. D'une part, la critique des éléates montre que la physique est impossible comme science si elle se fonde sur la thèse ontologique de l'univocité de l'être. Aristote va donc remplacer cette thèse parménidienne par celle de la plurivocité de l'être, c'est-à-dire des modes d'être de l'étant naturel. D'autre part, cette thèse ontologique nous renvoie directement au problème logique de la prédication puisque les modes d'être de l'étant devront se refléter dans une structure de langage où l'étance sera identifiée au sujet. Nous obtenons ainsi une structure logico-ontologique d'un langage apophantique, impliquant le critère de vérité et de fausseté (*De Int.* 4, 16b27-17a8), et qui rend possible une connaissance scientifique de la nature par un processus d'ontologisation de l'étant naturel en devenir. L'instauration de la science physique suppose donc la création d'un discours apophantique à double structure: une structure ontologique par où se manifeste dans le langage l'être même de la chose et une structure proprement logique par où se manifestent les modes d'être de la chose: la substance, la quantité, la qualité, etc. Cependant la critique du monisme et du pluralisme montre que cette ontologie débouche sur une impasse, puisque l'étance ne comporte pas de contraires (*Phys.* I, 6, 189a32-3) et que ceux-ci sont nécessaires pour expliquer le devenir de l'étant naturel. On doit donc remplacer ici l' 'étant' par le 'devenant' et passer de l'ontologie à la genéséologie. Et c'est l'objet du chapitre III qui est consacré à l'analyse du passage de *Physique*, I, 7-9 (154-212).

Le discours apophantique permet un tel passage puisque la notion même de verbe ajoute à sa propre signification celle de temporalité (*De Int.* 3, 16b6). Le discours apophantique n'indique pas seulement ce qui appartient à l'étant maintenant, mais aussi ce qui lui appartenait dans le passé et ce qui lui appartiendra dans l'avenir. Il est donc possible d'instaurer un discours vrai ou faux à propos de choses qui deviennent (*De Int.* 9, 18a28-9), et de passer ainsi de la plurivocité de l'être à la plurivocité du devenir, tout en maintenant l'étance du sujet à l'intérieur de la prédication. Au centre de ce troisième chapitre se trouve donc le concept de *genesis* et la nature de la prédication qui l'exprime. Le discours apophantique manifeste le devenir de la chose en introduisant dans la prédication l'idée de provenance; il y a un étant du *ceci* à partir duquel devient un étant du *cela* selon l'exemple même d'Aristote, 'l'homme non-lettré devient un homme lettré' (*Phys.* I, 6, 189b34-190a1). Dans cette prédication, l'étant de la structure logico-ontologique se dédouble; elle ne signifie pas seulement une modalité d'être, mais un type d'être particulier, c'est-à-dire un sujet — l'*hypokeimenon* — siège du devenir. Par ailleurs, puisqu'il n'y a pas de devenir sans les contraires, la structure genéséologique du discours apophantique sera composée de trois éléments: le sujet et ses deux contraires. En approfondissant la notion de sujet, Aristote en arrive à dégager les trois principes de la nature-sujet: la matière, la forme et la privation, et à clore ainsi le problème du nombre des principes explicatifs de la nature.

L'hylémorphisme n'est donc pas le résultat de l'induction, mais bien le produit d'une longue analyse logico-ontologique et geneséologique, illustrée par l'expérience sensible. Au cours de cette analyse faite selon la règle de la 'double connaissance', on a vu la notion générale de *genesis* se fragmenter en ses parties, le sujet et ses contraires, et de nouveau la notion de nature-sujet se fragmenter en notions plus particulières de matière-forme et privation. Et c'est ce processus de division d'un tout qui nous a permis d'arriver à la connaissance des principes du devenir.

Le quatrième chapitre de l'ouvrage sera consacré au livre II de la *Physique*, et plus particulièrement à *Physique* II, 1-3 (213-64). L'auteur part ici du passage de *Phys.* II, 1, 192b8-37 où se trouve affirmée une homonymie entre le devenir de l'étant naturel et celui de l'objet technique. Le concept général de *genesis* se scinde donc en deux parties homonymes, la *techne* et la *physis*. Tandis que l'objet technique reçoit de l'extérieur le principe de son mouvement, la *physis* possède en elle-même ce principe. La *physis* apparaît alors comme un sujet du devenir et vient donc préciser la notion de *genesis*. En tant que sujet du devenir, la *physis* est aussi matière et forme (*Phys.* II, 1, 193a28-b5). La matière est le sujet tandis que la forme est dans le sujet. Dans la mesure où Aristote affirme en *Phys.* II, 1, 193b5-8 la primauté de la forme sur la matière, on assiste ici à un passage de la primauté du sujet à la primauté de la forme dans la composition de la *physis*. Après s'être attardé sur cette aporie fondamentale de la *Physique*, jadis soulevée par R. Boehm (p. 247-54), l'auteur montre ensuite l'achèvement de l'ontologisation de la *physis* dans la théorie des quatre causes. Celles-ci ne sont pas des concepts de type kantien (contre Wieland), mais des instruments auxiliaires de la recherche physique obtenus par une ontologisation du devenir de la *physis* à partir des structures logico-ontologiques et geneséologiques du discours apophantique.

Puisque la *physis* est ce qui possède en soi-même le principe de son propre mouvement et de son propre changement, le concept de *physis* peut donc se dédoubler en parties homonymes: la *kinesis* et la *metabole*. Ces deux concepts forment respectivement l'objet du chapitre V (p. 265-301) consacré à *Physique*, III, 1-3 et du chapitre VI (p. 302-17) consacré à *Physique*, V, 1. Dans son analyse de la définition du mouvement l'auteur refuse l'identification traditionnelle entre *entelecheia* et *energeia* et cherche à comprendre cette définition à partir des quatre axiomes énoncés en *Phys.* III, 1, 200b6-201a9. L'entéléchie est un *telos* tandis que l'*energeia* est une activité constitutive du *telos* (p. 274-81). Après une longue analyse de sept formulations de la définition de la *kinesis*, l'auteur montre que la meilleure est celle qu'Aristote donne en *Phys.* III, 2, 202a3-12 parce qu'elle fait appel au mobile et au moteur. C'est cette rencontre entre un moteur et un mobile qui permet la transmission d'un *eidos* et qui constitue l'unité du mouvement. Par ailleurs, la problématique du mouvement qui apparaît comme l'aboutissement des analyses précédentes s'ouvre sur deux voies de recherche. En effet, la *kinesis* appartient à la fois au monde sublunaire et au monde supralunaire. Dans le monde sublunaire, il y a du mouvement et du changement tandis que dans le

monde supralunaire il a du mouvement, mais pas de changement. En tant que partie du concept de *kinesis*, la *metabole* sera donc analysée par le biais du moteur et du mobile et sa spécificité sera établie par le fait qu'elle accorde plus d'importance au *telos* qu'à la provenance. A partir d'une analyse logico-ontologique de *Phys.* V, 1 225a1-12, l'auteur dégage les quatre modes fondamentaux de changement: la génération et la corruption, l'altération, l'accroissement et le décroissement, et la translation (p. 308-15). La translation apparaît comme un changement qui transcende tous les autres puisque c'est la seule forme de changement qui existe dans le monde supralunaire. La translation circulaire s'assure ainsi une primauté sur tous les mouvements et ouvre la physique aristotélicienne sur un double horizon: l'horizon métaphysique du Premier Mouvant Immobile et l'horizon de la science moderne par le principe d'inertie. La métaphysique est ainsi le prolongement de l'ontologisation du devenir accomplie par la *Physique* tandis que la science moderne sera le résultat de la désontologisation de la problématique du mouvement dans la *Physique* d'Aristote.

Cette analyse de l'ouvrage de L. Couloubaritsis montre que la *Physique* d'Aristote repose sur six concepts épistémologiques fondamentaux: l'être et le devenir, la nature, le mouvement, le changement et la translation. Ces concepts trouvent leur origine non pas dans l'induction, mais, selon la règle de la 'double connaissance,' dans les structures du langage apophantique qui exprime la structure logico-ontologique de la pensée d'Aristote. Cependant l'interprétation logico-ontologique présente, à notre avis, une double limite. La première consiste à faire reposer toute la méthodologie d'Aristote dans sa *Physique* sur la règle de la 'double connaissance' fondée sur un passage controversé, c'est-à-dire *Phys.* I, 1, 184a16-25. L'auteur voit dans ce passage non pas une description de la méthode inductive, mais plutôt la description d'une méthode qu'il préfère appeler 'aporétique' (86). La description de la méthode inductive se trouverait plutôt en *Phys.* I, 5, 189a5-7. Il faut admettre que la conciliation entre ces deux passages méthodologiques demeure la croix des commentateurs de la *Physique*. On pourrait rappeler ici que la description ou plus précisément certains éléments de la description méthodologique en *Phys.* I, 1 coïncident avec la description de l'induction donnée en *An. Post.* I, 3, 72b29-30 où il est dit que l'induction consiste à partir de ce qui est antérieur et plus connu pour nous pour aller vers ce qui est antérieur et plus connu en soi. Par contre, certains éléments de la description méthodologique en *Phys.* I, 1 ne coïncident pas avec la description donnée en *Top.* I, 12, 105a13-4 où l'induction consiste à partir du particulier pour aller vers l'universel. Par ailleurs, notre texte de *Phys.* I, 1 tombe complètement en dehors des deux seules méthodes d'acquisition de toutes nos opinions mentionnées en *Anal. Pr.* II, 23, 68b8-37, c'est-à-dire l'induction et la démonstration. La description méthodologique de *Phys.* I, 1 présente donc pour nous une véritable énigme que l'auteur aurait dû éclaircir avant de faire de ce texte le pivot de son interprétation de la méthodologie d'Aristote dans la *Physique*. Dans la mesure où *Phys.* I, 1 mentionne que le plus connu pour nous vient de

la sensation, on est en droit de se demander si un tel processus de connaissance exclut entièrement la méthode inductive.

Par ailleurs, et c'est là une seconde limite de l'interprétation logico-ontologique, certains passages de la *Physique* permettent de croire que les concepts fondamentaux dégagés par l'auteur n'ont pas seulement une origine linguistique de nature logico-ontologique, mais aussi une origine empirique de nature inductive. En *Phys.* II, 1, 193a3-9 il est dit que l'existence de la nature est une donnée évidente et connaissable par elle-même. On a donc une connaissance immédiate des êtres naturels de laquelle se dégage le concept universel de *physis*. En *Phys.* I, 8, 191b32-4, Aristote attribue la faiblesse de ses prédécesseurs au fait qu'ils n'ont pas su regarder la nature en elle-même. Ce texte en dit long sur l'intention d'Aristote de donner toute son importance à l'expérience, à la sensation et à l'induction. Ce regard sur la nature, nécessaire à l'instauration d'une science physique, n'est pas un regard sur le langage à propos de la nature, comme pourrait le laisser croire l'interprétation de l'auteur. En *Phys.* I, 2, 185a12-5 Aristote affirme que l'existence du mouvement dans les êtres naturels est une donnée fournie par l'induction et reproche à Parménide de n'avoir pas accepté cette donnée de l'expérience sensible. En *Phys.* II, 8 le concept de finalité dans la nature est établi à partir de l'observation des choses naturelles. En *Phys.* V, 1, 224b28-30 il est dit que le changement est une donnée de l'induction. Tous ces textes, auxquels on pourrait sans doute en ajouter bien d'autres, constituent, à notre avis, une limite à l'interprétation logico-ontologique de la *Physique* d'Aristote. Cependant tout aristotélisant aura intérêt à lire cet ouvrage de L. Couloubaritsis, ne serait-ce que pour découvrir avec l'auteur l'importance des structures linguistiques dans l'interprétation de la *Physique* d'Aristote.

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FRED DALLMAYR, *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics*. Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press 1981. Pp. 376. US\$ 20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87023-314-9); US\$ 10.00 (paper; ISBN 0-87023-315-7).

The publisher's dust-jacket blurb for this book reads in part:

In explicating a 'post-individualist theory of politics,' this unusually ambitious and wide-ranging study does not simply reject individualism but seeks to divest it of its anthropocentric, 'egological,' and 'possessive' connotations. The rise of modern subjectivity and person-centred individualism is seen not merely as an avoidable mistake but as a phase in the course of human emancipation and maturation — a phase whose shortcomings have now become obvious.

The blurb indicates that Nozick, Sartre, Foucault, Heidegger, Adorno, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Ortega, Derrida, Marx and Habermas are the chief writers discussed in the book.

It is the policy of this journal not to commission a review unless entirely satisfied as to the expertise and judgment of the reviewer. The reviewer for this volume has written that he is unable to provide a review. He comments:

Well over 90% of the book consists of paraphrases and quotations from various authors loosely strung together. When the author does venture an opinion he is very terse, and while, for example, we know that he prefers Heidegger over Husserl we can never be sure exactly why.

THE EDITORS

PAUL EDWARDS, *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Evaluation*. Monist Monograph, No. 1. La Salle, Ill. 1979. Pp. 61. US\$ 8.95 (cloth); US\$ 3.95 (paper).

During the past decade or so, there has been a much-welcome *rapprochement* between Anglo-American philosophers and Europeans on the Continent. After many years of illiterate and *ad hominem* arguments, dismissing each other as 'trivializers' and 'humbug' respectively, they discovered, with some effort, that they were often asking the same questions, although in notoriously different and often antagonistic languages and styles of philosophical pretentiousness. Now, Continental philosophers such as Ricoeur and Habermas voraciously read J.L. Austin and the later Wittgenstein; not only Richard Rorty but Ian Hacking and John Searle turn to the Europeans for arguments as well as insights. Books on Continental philosophers by

analytically trained American and English philosophers abound, and the old name-calling seems to be replaced by genuine curiosity and well-meaning attempts to understand, in analytic translation, exactly what it is that such monumental figures as Heidegger and Sartre are about.

Into this cooperative circumstance, the appearance of Paul Edwards' 'critical evaluation' of Heidegger is clearly a return to the days of mud-slinging. This is not mere dismissal by a non-reader, however; Professor Edwards is well-read in the Heideggerian corpus, and he has read through a larger number of Heideggerian interpretations, commemorations and celebrations than most mortals would ever dare. This is a thorough debunking by a learned scholar, who knows the material, has obviously thought about it much more than many of its proponents, and who writes, as he has always written, with wit and clarity. And yet, we finish this book, on the most troublesome of philosophical subjects (death, that is, not Heidegger) with a profound sense of dissatisfaction and the feeling that we've been had, not only by Heidegger (if Edwards is to be believed) but by Edwards too.

That was the problem decades ago, when the rejection of the European obsessions with such matters as the meaning of life, and death, substituted nothing in their place. It may be that much of what Heidegger says about death, in his unforgivable prose, turns out to be nonsense or banal, as Edwards charges. But does it follow that there is nothing of philosophical interest to say about the subject? That would be a possibly fatal blow to much of traditional philosophy, if true. But the presumption that beneath nonsense is nothing (not Nothing) is surely unreasonable even to Professor Edwards, who would admit, for example, that beneath the nonsense in Lewis Carroll resides the most profound of topics. So too, I would argue, is profundity to be found in Heidegger's ponderous discussion of 'being-unto-death.'

One is tempted to say that, beneath the brilliance of his arguments, Professor Edwards has missed the point. Quite apart from Heidegger's murky pronouncements, is there anyone reading this philosophy journal who has not had the experience, immediately following a sudden or serious brush with death, of radically re-evaluating priorities, obligations and personal friendships, regretting mere time spent in duties of no personal importance? When Heidegger insists that death is a 'possibility' and that most of us refuse to face it, this is surely a part of that insistence, and it is the experience, not just the Heideggerian pomp, that is profound. And does one have to read very far in the literature, — indeed, perhaps only Tolstoi's disturbing story, 'The Death of Ivan Ilych' — to appreciate the significance of Heidegger's pronouncement that 'each of us dies alone,' however obviously false that statement may sometimes be when cut off from the powerful experience that provokes it.

A good friend of mine is a physician. He has spent much of his career in Africa, on Indian reservations, in health-hazardous parts of the world. His best friend died of cancer, a few years ago. Last year, he broke his leg in a skiing accident and, while recuperating, he admitted that, for the first time in his

life, he recognized his own mortality. As a doctor, he had not been deprived (as many of us are) of seeing the realities of death first hand. As an intelligent human being, he had never thought himself an exception to the classic syllogism, 'All men are mortal, X is a man, therefore X is mortal.' And yet, he described an experience familiar and comprehensible to many of us, which was the realization that, in some sense, he had never realized that he too was going to die.

That is the kind of experience which Heidegger, at the time of *Being and Time*, was trying to describe, as a phenomenologist, as a 'thinker' who believed himself to have something to say to the rest of us, about experiences all of us share. I share Professor Edwards' suspicions that much of this 'thinking' is rather posturing of the most pompous variety. I share his objections that the Heideggerian treatment fails to articulate these hard-to-describe and harder-to-cope-with experiences and tends instead to win over a discipleship of perhaps sincere but too often gullible, artless and slavish imitators. But to think that there is nothing beneath the pretensions, or that those disciples are not responding to something significant which is not the creation of Herr Heidegger alone, is simply to miss the whole point behind Heidegger's attractiveness to a great many students and (now) professors in the analytic tradition. He is attempting to deal with questions rarely discussed by Carnap and Moore, too glibly dismissed by Russell and ignored even if pondered over by Wittgenstein.

Professor Edwards' book is scholarly, intelligent, well-written, often amusing and always provocative. Nevertheless there is a sense in which I wish he had not written it, or had written with something more in mind than, — as he declares in his dedication to Bertrand Russell, — being an 'enemy of humbug and mystification.' The topics Heidegger addressed remain unattended to and unanswered, despite Edwards' onslaught. The Heideggeroids will dismiss the book as wholly antagonistic, which it is, and will learn nothing (of what they could learn) from it. And too many students of philosophy may once again be convinced to take what is always the easiest approach to a philosopher: accept a teacher's assurance that there is nothing there worth reading, and so read nothing at all.

Nevertheless, for those who already know some Heidegger, can appreciate Professor Edwards' arguments but not be wholly overwhelmed by them, this is a most enjoyable book which may have the salutary effect not intended by Edwards, of provoking a genuinely convincing analysis which may even inspire the writers of those delight-filled cover blurbs to read some Heidegger themselves.

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KATHY E. FERGUSON, *Self, Society and Womankind*. Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press 1980. Pp. xii + 200. US\$ 22.95. ISBN 0-313-22245-2.

For an increasing number of us, the only exciting field of any substantive import in the contemporary academic community is feminist theory. Starting with Friedan, de Beauvoir, Greer and Firestone, the subject was firmly established by Rowbotham, Mitchell, Daly, Lakoff and Brownmiller and recently augmented by Griffin, Rich, Chodorow and Dinnerstein. Because feminist theory must provide historical explanation, sociological explication and political justification, it is political philosophy in the fullest sense of that term: the grand tradition of thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Marx and Hobbes is now characterized as interdisciplinary. Kathy Ferguson's new book continues this new tradition with intellectual daring and methodical scholarship by applying Mead's concept of self to women's oppression. I hope (against all evidence) that such creative milestones as this will gain respect in the academic community — if not enough to enhance a career, at least enough not to destroy one.

Ferguson's project is not only quite ambitious; it is also surprisingly philosophical for a political scientist. She intends her theory to improve upon liberal, Marxist and existentialist versions of feminist theory. It has been my experience that some feminist contributors from political science lack a proper theoretical base; many reveal an appalling ignorance of philosophers like Hobbes, Mill, Bentham or Marx, preferring a more modern, quantitative or sociological approach. Ferguson is a refreshing departure from this trend, relying on a host of thinkers including Plato, Hobbes, J.S. Mill, Marx and Engels, Hegel, Bergson, C. Wright Mills, Stirner, Natanson, William James, Harry Stack Sullivan, Marcuse, T. Kuhn, Zeitlin, Goffman, Ollman, Fanon, Steinbeck, Schutz and de Beauvoir. The importance and scope of her project recommend it strongly, and it is logically presented, clearly written (for the most part), and amply (and humorously) footnoted. At times she is even eloquent, as when describing her focal point:

Anonymity is perhaps the most signal aspect of the situation in which any dominated group finds itself. It obscures one's very existence, making for a life of shadows rather than of light. When the suppressed are in the impossible position of relying on the oppressor for their very definition of self and of their situation, then anonymity is complete. We become inarticulate about ourselves, and the masks we wear seem more real than that which underlies them. A theory of liberation for women must strive to put away the masks, allowing women to 'come out into the open' so that they may seek to know who they are and what they might become. (18)

Self-definition, however, is a narrow and subjective focus for a theory of liberation, making the book not entirely unflawed.

Let me first describe the book's structure. Ferguson begins by describing the relevant literature and stating her goal — namely, to use (the best of)

Mead's social psychology to analyze women's oppression, thereby avoiding what for Ferguson are the excessive individualism of liberalism and the undue narrowmindedness of Marxist feminism (ch. 1). The necessary summary of Mead is provided next, together with a brief critique (ch. 2). Next (ch. 3) she supplements Mead's theory with a new conception of power, defined as 'the ability to establish and enforce the definition of the situation within which other participants must act' (69). Next she designates the two necessary and dialectically related 'conditions of liberation' as freedom and compassion, using Hegel's master/slave relationship to explicate her view (ch. 4). Finally, she shows how this new theory — the self is processual and dialectically formed both by individual autonomy and the power of the generalized other — can be applied to women's liberation (ch. 5). She concludes by claiming that current sex role definitions, by associating freedom with masculinity and compassion with femininity, and by their sexist homogeneity, are theoretically barren for feminism because they rule out *human* liberation, i.e., that in which 'freedom and compassion (are) simultaneous possibilities for both men and women' (176).

By far the best chapter is the first, providing the most concise and informed review of contemporary feminist theory one could hope to find, and thus capable of standing on its own. Although I can well imagine the effort that must have gone into ch. 2, it is by far the weakest. It is written in such an abstract and ponderous style (perhaps by imitating Mead) that it will prove difficult for most readers to finish. This is unfortunate, since it is ultimately worth the effort. My criticism here is *not* that Ferguson is theoretical rather than concrete; in fact, I applaud her footnote comment that

This bias against theory in favor of a "problem-solving" approach smuggles in the theoretical stance of liberalism, with its legalistic definitions of fairness, in the guise of common sense (22),

and I would add, leftist theorists as well. The problem is rather that the delicate balance between accurate scholarship and accessibility to readers leans toward the former at great expense to the latter. Moreover, on my reading of Mead, some of Ferguson's criticisms seem off the mark. Mead was less an ethical naturalist than she was psychologistic and ahistorical, as Ferguson indirectly acknowledges by criticizing her excessive cognitivism. Her use of 'I/me #1' and 'I/me #2' to designate the activist vs. the determinist versions of Mead's concept of self is not used frequently enough to warrant it, and could have been more simply called 'I/me' vs. 'me/I'.

There are more serious problems in what follows. First, Ferguson forces a false dilemma on Marxist feminism by insisting that any failure to assign a *sole* materialist cause to (women's) oppression results in an *anti*-materialist view. I do not see why this is so, and at any rate, this issue is currently of hot debate; Ferguson should not simply beg the question by stipulating against materialism. Such a stipulation results in her excessively abstract and

psychologicistic conception of power: surely women's oppression is concerned with more than defining selves and situations. Her definition does not avoid reductionism, as she claims, because by being psychologicistic (women's oppression is a matter of self-definition) it is *idealistically* reductionist. Adding 'the ability to control the relevant social objects' to her definition in ch. 5 does not help because no analysis of control is offered.

These problems lead to disappointing results. The sexist phenomena Ferguson mentions in the last chapter are rather mundane phenomena (women are manipulative because they are powerless, women are made not born, women nurture); they are not illuminated by Ferguson's new theory, and they are at least explained by competing theories. Her conclusion, that women will be liberated if (a) there is a great variety of role models in society and (b) new forms of the family occur, strikes one as either far too weak or just plain wrong. As Ferguson admits, American society already provides role diversification, and, if one believes the last Census, there is already great family variety as well. Moreover, many feminists already emphasize compassion in their struggle for freedom. Nonetheless, women are still oppressed. These flaws may not arise inevitably from Ferguson's Meadian feminist theory; perhaps her readers will join her in perfecting the theory.

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WILLIAM M.A. GRIMALDI, S.J., *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary*. New York: Fordham U. P. 1980. Pp. viii + 362. U.S.\$ 45.00. ISBN 0-8232-1048-0.

The stated purpose of the present book is to help students of rhetoric and to encourage further study by way of correction or development. The book is intended especially for those who are not Greek specialists. However, I should hasten to add that a reader will certainly need to know a fair amount of Greek to get much from the commentary. The fact that many words are not univocal has led Grimaldi to use Greek terms only without translating them. There is no Greek text given, but only the line by line selections on which

comments of various lengths are made. There is a bibliography and an appendix on *πίστις*. Also, at the beginning of each chapter Grimaldi gives a short synopsis of its contents. The book has no index. Grimaldi does not tell us why he treated only Book I, nor is there any discussion about the composition and history of the text of the *Rhetoric*. This does present a difficulty, since Grimaldi insists on the structural unity of Books I and II of the *Rhetoric* (71, 94, 356) and on the fact that the *Rhetoric* can be read intelligently only in the light of the Aristotelian *corpus*, since it was written with the other works in mind. Did Aristotle ever change his mind? Furthermore, to say that chapter 8 affords an excellent illustration of the difference between the method appropriate to a scientific and a popular treatise is highly questionable. The *Rhetoric* itself is as much a scientific analysis of the art as the *Ethics* and *Politics* are scientific analyses. Any other view is somewhat silly (181). This theme is often restated throughout the commentary.

The purpose of the appendix is to bring together in one place a series of statements concerning *πίστις*, which, by the very nature of a commentary on a given text, had to be partial and incomplete in the places at which they occur (349).

Grimaldi has followed the Teubner text rather than that of the OCT because Ross has changed the standard lineation (vii). He has not tried to establish any new readings, although, at times, he had been so tempted (*ibid*). The principle on readings followed in the commentary will usually be to follow, where possible, the reading of the codices accepted by the editions as the best attested (7). But Grimaldi does admit of ambiguities in the text of Aristotle (217). He also objects to some of the translations of the *Rhetoric* and says that one wonders what Greek text the authors had before them (99).

The author follows a studied plan in his commentary; he uses grammar, syntax, textual criticism, appeals to cross-references to the Aristotelian *corpus* and other authors such as Plato, and Cicero, and occasionally to the Greek commentators as well as the standard commentaries such as Spengel, Cope, Kassel and others. Grimaldi always tries to defend the text of Aristotle, often by mere changes of punctuation, grammar and syntax, textual criticism, cross-references and by philosophical analysis. As he points out, the consensus of the codices should be respected and any misunderstanding of the text which ascribes to Aristotle a view of rhetoric, which cannot be justified from the Treatise, ought to be rejected (157-8). This is surely commendable. A good example of Grimaldi's method can be found on pages 173-180, where he discusses absolute and relative goods (see also p. 213).

The commentary begins with a discussion of *ἀντίστροφος*, usually translated as 'counterpart.' Grimaldi is not too happy with this word and suggests *analogue*, *correlative*, as probably better, or even coordinate or equal in rank as possible alternatives. In any case, Aristotle's meaning is reasonably clear, namely, that rhetoric is given a new dignity, raised to the level of intellectual activity rather than a mere knack. Rhetoric, as an art, transcends all specific disciplines and is unlimited in application; it is the use of language on any sub-

ject to communicate effectively with others; it is the science of discourse and the ability or capacity to actualize the elements which constitute the art of rhetoric, which has as its function the degrees of excellence (6).

Often enough Grimaldi disagrees with some of the standard commentators in favour of another or asserts his own interpretation. For example, Grimaldi thinks that the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως* means the structure or frame, which embodies the three entechnic proofs, namely *ῆθος*, *πάθος* and reason, and that the enthymeme is the structure which embodies them; hence emotion and character are not necessarily indirect or accessory proofs or persuasions (8). It is important to note, as Grimaldi suggests, that Aristotle does not always use words in their strict and technical sense, such as *δείξαι* (12) or *πίστεις ἀποδεικτικαί* (70) which refer to *ἐνθυμήματα* and *παραδείγματα* — which do not give certitude but which are really proofs. The use of *τόποι* or commonplaces as a basis of argumentation surely distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from the *ἀπόδειξις* of the *συλλογισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός* of the *Posterior Analytics* (20-2). There are, according to Grimaldi, many casual uses of words in Aristotle, such as *προτάσεων* (74) *εἶδη* and *γένη* (79). A failure to distinguish between enthymemes and their use of *τόποι* can cause an invasion into rhetoric of disciplines that do not come under it. Actually, Grimaldi blames Isocrates for lesser minds placing within the study of rhetoric many disciplines that do not belong to it (91).

In spite of differences between the *Posterior Analytics* as the source for proper demonstration, and rhetorical and dialectical proofs, Grimaldi cautions the reader not to treat lightly rhetorical reasoning as though it had no relation to truth. On the contrary, it makes truth and justice prevail (23). Rhetoric is no bag of tricks, the sole concern of which is power. Its ability, like dialectic, to urge either side of a question is simply an effort to arrive at the real situation (29). It is the art of persuasive discourse on any subject (31). In dialectic the misuse of the art is called sophistry. In rhetoric there is no term to express its misuse, yet its misuse is a serious misrepresentation of reality as it is and can be known (33).

An example of Grimaldi's methodology based on a syntactical consideration can be found on p. 27. By insisting that *διάυτῶν* refer to *τῶν ἐναντίων* he concludes that rhetoric prevents us from making wrong judgments and, as a consequence, it protects truth and justice. To defend the usefulness of rhetoric on this ground, as Aristotle does, is to attribute to rhetoric an important and significant position. For what Aristotle is pointedly saying is that rhetoric is mimesis and that it is supposed to represent the real in any situation for an auditor (27). However, Aristotle does not appear to believe that reason will by itself and necessarily persuade anyone (28). There Grimaldi is making an important point.

Persuasion can apply to all the arts, yet in mathematical discourse the element of *ῆθος* or character does not come into play (36). Although Grimaldi often agrees with one or other of the standard commentators, at times he openly contradicts them. For example, he takes a stand against Spengel and

insists that Aristotle argues from particular topics and not from general topics alone, since rhetoric demands an intelligent understanding of the subject, so that one can present a valid argument and therefore an argument acceptable to the auditor as the ground for a reasoned judgment (37).

According to Grimaldi Aristotle gives three meanings of *πίστις* — (i) a state of mind called conviction or belief; (ii) the technical method used to organize material to create in a listener conviction through enthymemes and examples, which would indicate an inferential process; (iii) the evidentiary material of a specifically probative character with respect to the subject matter (19-20). However, the reader will need to consult the appendix for a fuller description of *πίστις* (349-56). On this subject Grimaldi disagrees with both Cope and Spengel (40-3).

Because Aristotle describes rhetoric as a *παραφυές* or offshoot of dialectic Grimaldi draws three conclusions. (i) Rhetoric shares in the science of dialectics and ethics. (ii) Rhetoric is independent in its own right and enjoys a larger role as the art of discourse. (iii) Rhetoric does not, however, enjoy the kind of independence indicated in Plato's *Gorgias*. Hence there is no conflict between rhetoric and philosophy (44). Also Grimaldi refuses to admit that there is anything contradictory in Aristotle's statements that rhetoric is a *μοριόν τι* of dialectic, as well as *ἀντίστροφος*, *παραφυές* and *ὁμοία* (45).

The author is careful to point out that *παράδειγμα*, *ἐπαγωγή*, *ἐνθύμημα* and the scientific syllogism are different, but parallel in that all are parts of a general method of inferential reasoning; but the apparent enthymeme is not a positive factor contributing to the exercise of the art of rhetoric. Hence in Aristotle there is no place for sophistry (47). Grimaldi thinks that the opinion that enthymeme is a truncated syllogism originated with Alexander of Aphrodisias, but that this is not necessarily a fact in Aristotle (57).

The activity of rhetoric has to do with deliberation, which implicates both reason and appetite (55), and must deal with subject matter that is solidly probable to the auditors (56). The enthymeme should be condensed so that the listener can acquire a quick and comprehensive grasp of the argument (58).

Rhetoric is the work of the practical intellect (55) and comes into existence precisely when deliberation seeks assent on problems which admit of only probable knowledge and conditioned assertion about what is contingent and what concerns human actions (58-9).

In chapter 9, under *χωρίς σπουδῆς* (193ff) on praise and blame in epideictic rhetoric Grimaldi makes a point against Spengel, Cope and others, who saw a distinction between what is serious and what is burlesque. In fact he emphatically denies such a distinction, because Aristotle is concerned with legitimate praise of men and not of salt and bees. In fact, as Grimaldi insists, *θηρίων* does not mean wild beasts, as translators suggest, but rather uncivilized peoples (258).

Another issue raised by Grimaldi against Spengel and Cope is that they are critical of Aristotle's description of virtue as *δύναμις* as well as a *ἕξις*. He explains that Aristotle is asserting that, while virtue is a *ἕξις*, it is a *δύναμις* as well,

insofar as it is a capacity in the soul resulting from the repeated acts, which made it a $\xi\kappa\iota\varsigma$ (195).

Grimaldi makes still another point, which seems to me to be surely valid, namely that little has been done by the grammarians on Aristotle's style and that this neglect often causes difficulties in reading the text (197). Again he notes that Aristotle's definitions of some of the virtues are more public than individual. This is important, I think, in understanding Aristotle's moral system. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* offers, in some cases, the most detailed account of certain philosophical problems, such as human action (231). For example it treats, at some length, the passions, pleasure, habits and habitual ways of acting, the relation of $\xi\theta\omicron\varsigma$ and $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ inasmuch as what is implanted by nature cannot be changed by habit (247). It treats also of justice and injustice (285ff), laws etc. (299). It is true that rhetoric is an independent art; however, because it involves so many other arts and disciplines it is not difficult to understand why it was later to become the basis of a liberal education.

Grimaldi's commentary is a very useful piece of work. First of all, it shows once more the depth of Aristotle's understanding of both philosophical and literary problems. Also, the author has gathered together the interpretations of Aristotle's rhetoric both past and present, criticized them in what I consider to be a defensible way and has added his own observations. This work will, I think, adequately fulfil the avowed purpose of the commentary, i.e. to aid students of rhetoric. I recommend it.

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D.W. HAMLYN, *Schopenhauer*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U. P. 1980; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. viii + 181. Cdn\$ 36.75; US\$ 25.00. ISBN 0-7100-0522-9.

Many histories of philosophy and accounts of nineteenth-century thought pass over Schopenhauer as a minor eccentric or as a transitional figure between transcendental idealism on the one hand and existentialism on the

other. But he was much more than that: a gifted and original thinker with vision, keen psychological insight, erudition, and dedication to the practical value of philosophy. He was a seminal influence on writers and intellectuals as widely separated in time and space as Mann and Beckett, Freud and Schweitzer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. D.W. Hamlyn, who has for some time been a serious student of Schopenhauer (having delivered Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures on him in 1970-71 and 1978-79), establishes in *Schopenhauer* a solid case for ranking the philosopher of the will among the great thinkers from which our fund of vital concepts derives and whose works can be mined repeatedly for the philosophical riches they contain.

Hamlyn emphasizes correctly that the place to look for the essential Schopenhauer is not the popular essays, by which many know him, but his magnum opus, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (usually rendered as *The World as Will and Idea*, but in the more recent, authoritative translation by E.F.J. Payne as *The World as Will and Representation*. Hamlyn refers to this work as 'a magnificent intellectual construction' and endeavors to exhibit the system therein, taking as his guide Schopenhauer's own pronouncement that his philosophy offers (quoting Hamlyn) 'simply the unfolding of ... a single thought.' It may be debated whether Schopenhauer described his system accurately when he said this, though few philosophers have engaged in so diligent an ongoing self-assessment. The 'single thought' approach has also led some commentators to underrate Schopenhauer's accomplishment. Hamlyn for the most part avoids this pitfall, although one occasionally wonders whether he has not missed giving some of Schopenhauer's more original contributions their due (note below some misgivings concerning his treatment of the will). In general, his effort is directed at tracing and unifying the structure of Schopenhauer's thought, and this he does quite effectively in chapters 4-8, which deal with the principal parts and themes of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.

In chapter 2, Hamlyn analyzes at some length the arguments set forth in *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation (published in 1813; revised edition 1847). *The Fourfold Root* is a work of some significance in its own right because it constitutes an attempt to simplify and clarify the Kantian categories of the understanding, and because it contains sophisticated discussions of issues of interest to contemporary philosophers (necessity, truth, causality, motives, God's existence, etc.). Hamlyn points out, however, that *The Fourfold Root* also sets forth the foundations of Schopenhauer's epistemology and is therefore germane to an understanding of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Hamlyn states that 'for anyone concerned with Schopenhauer's argument for his metaphysical position it is indeed the essential first stage in that argument.' This is no doubt true insofar as Schopenhauer's metaphysics rests upon his revisionist Kantian epistemology. But it may be questioned whether one need place so great an emphasis on *The Fourfold Root* as Hamlyn contends. And even if one concedes this much too, doubts may still remain concerning the

amount of space Hamlyn devotes to the work and the intricacy of his discussion in a volume designed, at least in part, to stimulate a new Schopenhauer readership.

Hamlyn's consideration of *The Fourfold Root* does, however, lend helpful support to his account of Schopenhauer's relationship to Kant (chapter 3). Here, Hamlyn focuses on Schopenhauer's attempt to differentiate his own form of transcendental idealism from Kant's (which he took to be infected by empiricist assumptions about perception), his introduction of an experiential element — awareness of the thing-in-itself, the will, in our inner life — into metaphysics, in violation of Kant's stipulations, and finally, his very different views on causality.

As indicated earlier, the major portion of Hamlyn's study is given over to *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Hamlyn does a commendable job of elucidating the thread of argument that runs through the four books and numerous supplementary chapters of that intriguing work and succeeds in relating Schopenhauer's ideas to contemporary philosophical preoccupations, making his points with reference to figures as diverse as Armstrong, Brentano, Quine, Merleau-Ponty, Feinberg, Anscombe, and Hampshire. There are also good discussions of the continuities and disparities between Schopenhauer and Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Freud, Wittgenstein, et al.

Some serious shortcomings may be found in Hamlyn's account of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. To take two examples, Hamlyn claims that because 'there are no causes of *action* except those which appear in [conscious] representation as motives ... there can be [for Schopenhauer] no such things as unconscious motives.' But even if a motive is consciously apprehended by an agent, it does not follow that it must be correctly identified by him (i.e. as a motive of type *X* rather than type *Y*). Nor would such a denial on Schopenhauer's part make much sense in view of his insistence that each of us is born with a permanent or 'intelligible' character, which we are powerless to change but can only learn about as life goes on and it unfolds through our actions. For as Hamlyn himself notes later in the book, this increasing knowledge of our intelligible character provides 'a clearer insight into what I really will.' In addition, Hamlyn fails to capture the flavor of the torturous affective life which Schopenhauer sees brewing beneath the surface and which is the common plight of all sentient creatures. He gives us little sense of what our awareness of the will manifesting itself in us really amounts to, of what 'willing,' in the broader sense in which Schopenhauer uses it, encompasses (striving, desiring, feeling the pull of urges, wishing, wanting, etc.).

Chapters 7 and 8, on *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, concern Schopenhauer's ethics and his doctrine of salvation from 'the worst of all possible worlds' through ascetic self-denial. In this context, Hamlyn also treats illuminatingly the topics of freedom of the will (on which Schopenhauer wrote a prize-winning essay), the basis of morality (with respect to which Schopenhauer radically departs from Kant) and virtue.

Perhaps the most interesting part of chapter 7 is Hamlyn's discussion of Schopenhauer's 'road to salvation' and the peculiar notion of the will turned against itself in the phenomena of self-abnegation, the cessation of desire and the 'quieting of the will.' In chapter 8, Hamlyn displays uncommon sensitivity in his remarks about Schopenhauer's thoughts on death and suicide and on the link between Schopenhauer and Buddhism.

Hamlyn's *Schopenhauer* is a solid contribution to the available literature on the philosopher of the will, a timely reassessment of his importance as a thinker and a tribute to the fecundity and probing reach of his mind.

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JAMES S. HANS, *The Play of the World*, Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press 1981. Pp. xii + 224. US\$ 15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87023-324-6); US\$ 7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87023-325-4).

The Play of the World is not a book about play, but about the world as made up out of play, just as Thales did not write a book about water (supposing that he wrote a book at all), but about the world as made up out of water. There is, however, a difference. Thales did not have to explain to his readers what water was, but Hans does have to explain what play is, and the explanation he gives has a disquietingly Orwellian ring to it. Play is work. Well, not quite. Play is productivity, and the business of the world is to be engaged in playful productions, from man right down to rocks, and presumably right down to their constituent parts as well. How come? Well, in the case of man at any rate (and it is man's relation to man and to other parts of the world that Hans is primarily, though by no means exclusively, interested in) because 'it is through play that man adapts to his changing world, that he constantly challenges and changes the rules and structures by which he lives' (5). Again, how come? Because Hansian play, I suggest (and Hans will initially cringe at this suggestion) is a kind of trial and error way of dealing with, and indeed of seeking out, new arrangements between man and parts of the world. Hans does not use the expression 'trial and error,' to be sure, and I grant Hans's

play does not reduce to that. So let us make the following modifications. To the process of trial and error should be added the notion of risk, and subtracted from trial and error should be the kind of pre-set goal that we usually think of as making any method, including trial and error, intelligible. But then Hansian play is not quite a method, for that would imply a methodizing 'subject,' and Hans rejects the subject/object 'dichotomy' (*passim*), for in playing one is 'played by the play,' and subject and object are subsequent distillations, if I may put it that way, out of the primal play stuff.

Although Hans does not use the following illustration (Hans is in general short on illuminating paradigms of play and long on abstractions and examples of what *he* calls play), the case of an infant beginning to discover its world could well be a paradigm for Hans, and I offer it to him gratis. The infant plays around with this and that — its toes, its genitals, its father's nose, the water in the bath. Although this is a kind of trial and error process, the infant has no goal, the distinction for it between subject and object has not yet emerged, and a certain amount of risk is present. Such 'playing around with' (as I found myself mentally amending Hans's 'playing') appears to answer pretty well my earlier jibe that Hans had made the remarkable discovery that play is work. The next step is to see two things: (1) that playful production is the best kind of production, and (2) that productive play is the best kind of play. The first is so because such production is most flexible and daring, and Einstein's hitting upon the special theory of relativity is regarded by Hans as a striking instance of playful production. Furthermore, since what we learn through playing around is then stored (storing is called 'enregisterment' by Hans, for reasons best known to himself) for future reference, there come times when as post-infancy humans we are strongly tempted to rest content with the secure arrangements we have achieved between ourselves and the world, and thus to cease to produce anything new. Play unstagnates us and gets us producing again. That productive play is the best kind of play is so because such play is the essential constituent of humans, and also because people *really* enjoy productive play much more than they do the kind of after-hours thing most people call play, e.g., going bowling.

The Introduction and first three chapters take up what I have so sparsely suggested in the foregoing remarks. (I have per force left out virtually all of Hans's elaboration of his theory, most notably his account of the inter-grafting of fields of play into networks that go to make up nature and culture.) Then Hans applies these results to topics he takes up in the last four chapters: Language, The Aesthetic, The Socioeconomic, and The Ethical. Powered (at least in the author's view) by the principle of play as production, these chapters contain insights, observations, and arguments which range from the interesting, through the bemusing, to the stimulating and challenging. Whether some of the positions Hans takes in these chapters stem as directly as he believes they do from his principle of playful production is perhaps questionable. At times passages in these chapters read as though they were parts of independent essays, and the reader can be brought up short at having the

term 'play' ascribed to some activity or process normally identified as something quite different from play. It is not so much that such ascriptions appear arbitrary or false, at least after one has got the hang of what Hans is up to; it is rather that they appear irrelevant, as though Thales, in discussing carpentry, had found it illuminating to talk about the different ways in which carpenter-water interacts with lumber-water. But I may be over-stating this.

Four general observations may be made. (1) *Referential specificity*. Hans expresses himself in what might be called the neo-post-Kantian mode, being comfortable with such locutionary globalisms as 'the subjective,' 'the objective,' etc. (2) *Organization*. The model here appears to be J.S. Bach, or philosophy as fugue: the repetition and variation of themes and counter-themes — though there is, I suggest, a bit too much repetition without variation. The organization and style of *the Play of the world* are not elegant, but the book (even though the basic theme is sometimes painfully belaboured) is readable, and very largely free of the jargon and near-impenetrability of syntax illustrated by the continental writers Hans frequently quotes. (3) *Filiations*. Nietzsche and Heidegger, by admission, and though the bibliography contains virtually no names of non-continental philosophers, I suggest to Hans and the reader the following quasi-filiations: (a) Heraclitus: the relatively stable emerges out of processes whose essence is instability; (b) Charles Peirce: chance (or mind) via habit-taking (Hans's enregisterment) becomes law; (c) John Dewey: the occurrence and resolution of what Dewey calls 'the problematic situation' is almost uncannily like Hans's productive play, though perhaps Hans's position is somewhat less teleologically oriented than Dewey's is. Readers (and Hans if he hasn't) should take a look at Dewey's *Art as Experience* in this regard. (d) Leibniz and Whitehead: not only because of the more than vaguely panpsychistic element in Hans's account of the world, but also because the playful interactions that go to make up the world call to mind the 'perceptions' of Leibniz and the 'prehensions' of Whitehead in performing the role of world-construction. (4) *Audience*. The book (certainly the first three chapters) is addressed to continental thinkers, a point which would be clear even if the dust jacket didn't say so. That, I suggest, is unfortunate. In setting forth his theory of productive play in the opening chapters, Hans (who is an English professor at Kenyon college) imbeds his exposition in a running debate with a number of European literary and philosophical figures, and so most Anglo/American/Antipodal philosophers, should they be at all inclined to give the book a try, will very likely decline what will appear to them as an invitation to take part in someone else's family squabble. The book deserves a much wider readership than, for that reason, it is likely to get.

I found it enjoyable and profitable to play around with the slant on man and the world that Hans has produced, and I recommend *The Play of the World* to philosophers of whatever persuasion, though I caution that a degree

of patience with the author's style is required, as well as, at least in the early stages, some voluntary (even if grudging) suspension of disbelief.

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J.R. LUCAS, *On Justice*, Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1980. Pp. 270 Cdn\$ 37.50; US\$ 24.95. ISBN 0-19-824598-X.

Much of this volume's tone and a considerable part of its core message may be found in the following passages: 'There is an essential asymmetry in justice. good things and bad things are not on a par. Instead of construing it as a concern for the other chap's faring well ... we should understand [justice] ... as a concern for the other chap's not faring ill.' (8) 'There is a certain veil of privacy which distinguishes justice from more personal relations and morality proper ... Morally speaking, to lust after a woman is as bad as actually to commit adultery with her, but justice allows me to plead the Fifth Amendment.' (15) That they are felt to be important by the author is attested to by the frequency with which he reiterates the points they make — e.g., 'since justice is concerned with people not being done down rather than with their not being done up...' (235), and 'I can be just, and yet lack many moral virtues ... There is no justification by justice alone. Nevertheless, it is not to be despised. It may not be everything, but it is something. It is a virtue, an important virtue, one of the cardinal virtues; for it is the bond of peace, which enables the individual to identify with society, and brethren to dwell together in unity' (263 - the last page of the text). these observations are not new, but they are well taken — and that, indeed, is perhaps the best capsule summary of the entire book. The reader familiar with the mainstream of recent literature on justice will find no striking new theory in these pages, but he — or she — will find much that is sensible, perceptive, and sensitive, all put in a nice apothegmatical way. A certain number of readers, no doubt, will toss it aside in disgust, for both the 'right' and the 'left' are given rather short shrift in this book. But they oughtn't, for Lucas' analyses of both are worth taking seriously.

A lot of ground is covered in this rather compact book, whose sixteen chapters include Rights and Interests, Rationality and the Theory of Games, Punishment, Administrative Justice, Distributive Justice, Justice and Equality, Economic Justice, and several others. Discussions of Rawls and Nozick form useful chapters, and there is a chapter devoted to Fiscal Justice which includes a critique of recent English practices. Justice between States gets rather short shrift — four pages. And there is a concluding discussion of Justice and Morality.

The theory of justice presented in the book defies simple expression, steering away not only from Rawls and Nozick, but also from Gauthier's contractarian view. As against Rawls, he advances now-familiar arguments: that the veil of ignorance really seems rigged to favor the poor and that Rawls' bottom-line argument, that the talented did not deserve their talents and thus justice ought not to reward them for their talents, is a non sequitur. He suggests, interestingly, that 'Rawls yearns for a theodicy ... It is not enough that a man has made ... a contribution ... we must also face the question why he has those abilities and made those efforts. Such a theodicy is neither possible within an ordinary conceptual scheme that accomodates the concepts of responsibility and desert, nor necessary' (191). And he goes on to argue that if all is seen from the essentially third-personal point of view employed fundamentally in Rawls' scheme, then responsibility is left out in the cold, leading to the conclusion that 'Rawls, like the utilitarians...tends to regard people as pets, who have feelings and ought to be cared for, rather than rational agents who act on their own responsibility' (192). I think these arguments can be replied to, but the drift is right. His criticisms of Nozick are less compelling. In general, he agrees, we must defend people's rights to enter into contracts, even disadvantageous ones. But, familiarly, he points to public goods, coordination problems, and the prisoner's dilemma, asserting that the market is incapable of handling these. Further, he maintains that to leave everything to the market is unjust, 'manifesting an unconcern for each individual's own point of view and own interest' (215). But why is this to do that, if the concern of justice is with individuals' being done down rather than with their not being done up? He suggests that Nozick's scheme favors those of superior bargaining ability, as, in a sense, it does: that is, it is a scheme such that that ability will no doubt be advantageous. But since Lucas has no brief either for the general insistence on equality nor for Rawls' objections to 'morally arbitrary' endowments, it is unclear where this argument is to come from. More to the mark, perhaps, is the observation that business transactions are 'not isolated bargains but part of a general pattern of acitivity,' so that economic justice is 'subject to certain third-party considerations and certain requirements of universalizability' (212). But which requirements of universalizability? After all, on Lucas' characterization Nozickian libertarianism does seem to be universalizable, at any rate (cf. 42-3). How does the general pattern make a difference? It seems characteristic of the book that he does not try to nail this down.

Lucas quite likely would reply to such criticisms that it is a mistake to try to nail everything down, especially in accordance with some single principle. 'There is an implicit totalitarianism in the demand for absolute justice according to some single principle' (184); 'the principle of justice cannot be given any such neat formulation ... reason cannot be confined within the abstract features characterized in the Theory of Games' (67). With this response too I have some sympathy: but only some. For we seek answers to difficult questions, and to leave us with an Aristotelian 'not too far in this direction, not too far in that,' without explaining how one is to identify the mean when one is upon it, is unsatisfying. Lucas gives us much essentially piecemeal illumination on this and that aspect of justice, but not a clear and compelling picture of justice as a whole. And as a result, we are also left without much to guide us on outstanding issues of the day.

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BENSON MATES. *Skeptical Essays*, Chicago: U. of Chicago Press 1981.
Pp. xii + 176. US\$ 17.00. ISBN 0-226-50986-9.

Benson Mates wishes to convince us that 'the principal traditional problems of philosophy are genuine intellectual knots; they are intelligible enough but at the same time they are absolutely insoluble.' His elegantly produced monograph is in three parts; a breezy jog through the familiar terrain of the Liar and Russell's paradox is followed by some hard slogging through the impenetrable thickets of the Free Will problem and the marshy bogs of the External World problem. For those who survive the course, Mates does not hold out the promise of blessed imperturbability (*ataraxia*), only the prospect of continued intellectual toil or subsidence into religious mysticism or philosophical obscurantism.

The first chapter, on the Liar and Russell's paradox, is the best. Mates claims that no universally acceptable solution to the Liar has been found. Most solutions to the Liar involve rejection either of classical logic or semantic closure (presence in the language of its own truth predicate). The most

radical proposal which rejects semantic closure is to rule out self-referential sentences altogether; but this rules out many innocuous cases of self-reference. Less drastic is the solution of Tarski, where semantic closure is avoided by splitting the truth predicate into a hierarchy. This works well for formal languages but seems unnatural for ordinary language.

More recent attempts favour abandoning classical logic, for example in favour of a partial two-valued system. Kripke has recently shown how to construct such a language, containing its own truth predicate T in the sense that $T('p')$ is true whenever p is true, undefined if p is undefined. However, the negation of T doesn't express 'not true' in the sense of 'false or undefined,' and no such approach can.

Mates' case for the insolubility of Russell's paradox is less convincing. Mates runs quickly through possible solutions, including type theory and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Two points can be made here against the claim of insolubility. First, the solutions are not really distinct, since they are all variants on the basic concepts of the type hierarchy. Second, Mates' claim that 'none of these methods — nor any of their multifarious variations — has won anything like the majority approval by the mathematicians and philosophers who have studied the problem' (55) is not true. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice is widely accepted as a mathematical foundation by mathematicians and philosophers. This is not to say that Russell's paradox is a closed chapter in logic, but it no longer has the character of a true antinomy.

In the second chapter Mates presents the problem of the Freedom of the Will in the form: human actions are the ultimate and inevitable effect of events over which the agent has no control, so that if we are not responsible for actions we cannot help, nobody is responsible for anything. The main solutions considered are those of Hume and Austin. Hume's solution is to argue that universal causation is compatible with moral responsibility, in fact is required by it (otherwise a 'free' action would be a random action). Mates' reply is that it is not sufficient to determine *whether* an agent willed to perform an action; for an action to be free we must know *why* the act of choice took place. If it can be shown that it was the foregone result of mental make-up, environment etc., we would no longer wish to call it 'free.'

The other solution is that of Austin in 'A Plea for Excuses.' Austin argues that the word 'free' is misused in the Free Will argument. 'Freely' is not an ordinary adverb; it is a dummy word which rules out certain adverbs of excuse. In the standard cases, no modifying expression is required or permissible, so that 'no action is free' is nonsense. Mates' reply is to deny Austin's claim that modifying expressions are linked to special circumstances. Appropriateness of modifiers is a pragmatic, not semantic, question which depends on linguistic and social context, not the content of an assertion. When the pragmatic is disentangled from the semantic, the Free Will problem is seen to survive Austin's attack.

The third chapter opens with Berkeley's version of the External World

problem. Plato, Descartes, Kant, Russell and Santayana put in brief appearances to combat the demon of doubt, but all are laid low. Next, Quine attempts to disarm the monster by cutting off its legs. If there are no such things as perceptions (sense-data) then the argument is unsound. Mates mounts a vigorous and lively defence of sense-data; however, since the argument can be formulated without them, the argument survives Quine anyway. Last, Mates considers various attempts to dissolve the problem by showing it to be nonsensical. The positivists fail in the attempt because their verifiability criterion is unworkable; the ordinary language philosophers fail because they do not establish their claim that the term 'sense-data' is less justifiable than other bits of technical terminology.

In the face of the insolubilia, the author has no better prescription than Hume's 'carelessness and inattention.' Still, he has a nagging uneasiness about dismissing the Free Will problem. He feels that it has practical implications and refers to the case of Patty Hearst who, due to mistreatment by a band of 'barbarous fanatics' was (he claims) forced to take part in a bank robbery. But if the arguments for the non-existence of free will are sound, this kind of example is irrelevant. Mates seems to have in mind something like: 'All actions are causally determined; so Patty Hearst cannot be morally responsible for her action.' But this seems as silly as saying, 'I'm not going to eat my chocolate pudding, because I've just realized there's no real reason to believe in the External World.' It would be just as reasonable to argue that all actions are equally *inexcusable* if the argument in the Free Will problem is sound. The Free Will problem has exactly the same set of practical consequences as the problem of the External World — the empty set.

Mates' book is a meaty work which contains more substance than many treatises three times its length. Even those who are disinclined to its astrigent Pyrrhonism should read it for its lively and crisp argument.

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ROBERT STEIGERWALD, *Marxism and Late Bourgeois Ideology*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1981. Pp. 95. US\$ 12.50. ISBN 90-6032-114-6.

Robert Steigerwald is a member of the West German Communist Party. He professes an orthodox Marxism, which simplistically reduces all issues to the

(two) class struggle and objective economic forces, and identifies the revolutionary class with the bureaucratic centralism of the Leninist party and Stalinist state (cf. chs. II and IX). This work constitutes an almost complete contrast with the many sophisticated interpretations of Marx and socialism to be found in the West. But Steigerwald clearly sees such positions as 'revisionist' or 'deviationist' (77, 7); i.e., heresy. Indeed he tells us that 'it is not arguments that are at issue here but clashing class positions' (9). That this renders his own arguments themselves ideological in the worst sense escapes his notice.

His summary critique of early liberal political economy (Ch. II) is mechanical and utterly unenlightening. Although his comments on Popper's misdirected attack on historicism (Ch. V) are the closest approaches to rational argument, it does not come close to Marcuse's penetrating critique of Popper. Similarly, Steigerwald's criticisms of instinctual theories of aggression and territoriality (Ch. VII) do not measure up to the work of Montagu or Fromm. Fromm, like Marcuse, belonged to the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Accordingly, both are revisionists. Steigerwald's critique of the Marxist-Christian dialogue (Ch. VI) is reminiscent of a scholastic tract on dangers of 'dialogue' with materialist communism (Ch. VI). The author's concerns about the subjectivism, relativism, and idealism of critical theory and the romanticism of the Ultra-left (Chs. III, IV) similarly reflect a concern with orthodoxy rather than the search for truth.

Steigerwald defends the bureaucratic centralism of the Communist Party and State, partly on the need to combat powerful capitalist institutions and to effectively prosecute social planning (Ch. IX, cf. pp. 23, 54, 90). While I support both aims, this orthodox line, which is indeed found in both Lenin (*What is to be Done?*) and Marx (*The Communist Manifesto*), must now be not only seen as undemocratic. It also involves a strategic fallacy: of structural replication as the central means of combating oppressive institutions. In order successfully to oppose the large centralized private and public bureaucracies of capitalism one must, that is, create one's own equally centralized organizational forms, but fill them with a socialist content. This however is inconsistent with the socialist principle of the unity of form and content and Marx's teaching about the inherent, inevitable breakdown of capitalist *organizations*. But such points have long been made by anarchists, democratic socialists, and other revisionists, (e.g., Marcuse in his *Soviet Marxism*).

Steigerwald's critique of Marcuse for being too Hegelian and romantic (Ch. IV) has some point. But Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School displayed a profoundly redeeming virtue. They took Freud's challenge to Marxism seriously. Their work suggests that sexual questions cannot be reduced to the class struggle. This view, like sexuality itself, is not idealist but arises from the material conditions of human survival, viz, the mode of *social reproduction*.

Steigerwald devotes his longest chapter to a critique of Gyorgy Lukacs' *History and Class-consciousness*. Certainly Lukacs was revisionist and tended to relativism (as does historical materialism). Indeed, Lukacs had the intelligence to remark on the incompleteness of Marx's views on class. Unlike his theory of value, they constitute a scattered, unsystematic set of comments. Such honesty bothers our author (14). Lukacs went further. He confronted the contributions of 'bourgeois philosophy' to deepening our understanding of subjectivity and self-consciousness, and then applied these insights to the theory of class-consciousness. Along the way, he offered a withering internal critique of Kantian idealism. His work constitutes a notable achievement in socialist theory. But it certainly is not orthodox.

Not since my seminary days have I read a work so obsessed with heresy. It is profoundly disturbing to see a socialist intellectual so opposed to freedom of opinion, and, what is worse still, so insulting to the intelligence of his readership. I can not conceive of the workers here in Sudbury tolerating such 'orthodox Marxism,' speak less of the revolutionary Polish working class. For those who believe that socialism is the bearer of the Enlightenment philosophy at its best and entails the fullest possible democracy this kind of work is saddening. It also constitutes, albeit indeliberately, a priceless contribution to the Capitalist crusade against communism.

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MARK C. TAYLOR, *Journeys to Self-hood: Hegel and Kierkegaard*. Berkeley, Cal.: U. of California Press 1981. Pp. xi + 298. US\$ 22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-04167-4); US\$ 7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-520-04176-3).

I am in complete agreement with the central *motif* of this work. Its author states:

The relationship between their (Hegel and Kierkegaard) ... positions has rarely been the subject of careful and thorough discussion ... The...issues joining and separating Hegel and Kierkegaard have too long been shrouded in the midst of partisan polemics. (10)

In order to set a more judicious context for such a discussion, Prof. Taylor creates 'a dialogue between them which plumbs the depths of the issues they jointly probe' (21), through a sympathetic understanding of both thinkers. His goal is 'to bring Hegel and Kierkegaard closer together so that their differences can emerge more clearly' (*ibid.*). The central thesis which is argued in the work, and the one that gives the author his organizational center, is that 'Hegel and Kierkegaard develop alternative phenomenologies of spirit that are designed to lead the reader from inauthentic to authentic or fully realized selfhood' (13). Moreover, the author believes that the insights gained from such a discussion will 'shed light upon the "rose within the cross of the present,"' (22) for those who must take the 'journey to selfhood' today.

To this end, the author compares and contrasts the two thinkers in question on their respective analyses of spiritlessness, what he calls their 'therapeutic' programmes for the cure of that *malaise*, their treatments of Christianity which, it is claimed, is for both thinkers the main part of the therapy, their notion of 'spirit,' and finally, their views on the structure of authentic selfhood and our 'journey' to it. The final chapter attempts some critical assessment of what we today might learn from such views, and hints at further prescriptive therapy, yet to be written, for our even more contemporary ills of 'spiritlessness' and 'dis-union' — a therapy which is more Hegelian (because Taylor stresses the 'union of union and non-union) than Kierkegaardian (because that thinker stressed the essential non-union *in fact* of what can only be united, *abstractly*, in thought).

Anyone who would attempt to deal with Hegel and Kierkegaard in a single relatively short work is walking where angels fear to tread. Nevertheless, within the confines of the work as set by the author, his discussion is thorough and, on the whole, careful. In other words, he certainly raises the whole issue above the level of 'partisan polemics,' and by identifying the issues and areas to be explored, he creates a context in which a judicial and scholarly assessment of the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard can be achieved. Emil Fackenheim once remarked that if Kierkegaard attacks Hegel, it is because the latter thinker is too close for comfort. The work at hand is a successful explication of that 'closeness,' thereby bringing out the reasons for Kierkegaard's discomfort. The author, to his eternal credit, does not take Kierkegaard's work to be simplistically hostile to Hegel, because he sees clearly the deep philosophical debt that Kierkegaard owes to Hegel.

It is, however, a peculiarity of this work that Professor Taylor achieves his central purpose despite the fact that, in my opinion, his central thesis is false. I do not believe that both thinkers develop alternative 'phenomenologies of spirit' which are 'designed to lead the reader from inauthentic to authentic ...selfhood' (13). As is well known the notion of Spirit is central to both thinkers, and if one insists upon it, I suppose one could refer to their respective treatments as 'phenomenologies of spirit.' But if we employ that phrase for both in the same scholarly tone of voice, then we bend the notion beyond what the concept can sustain, and we make a claim which goes beyond what

the texts can sustain. In a word, one brings Hegel and Kierkegaard *too* close for scholarly comfort.

Professor Taylor is quite correct to view Kierkegaard in terms of the latter part of his central thesis. Clearly, whatever else he might have been doing, Kierkegaard's ironic programme of indirect communication aims at being a sort of 'therapy' for the spiritlessness of his age. Thus he speaks directly (or 'indirectly') into that age, addressing 'The reader' with a view to effecting a decision *in the reader* which will bring about an authenticity of self. Thus, one can refer to Kierkegaard's work as 'aesthetic education' — 'aesthetic' because it is *written*, 'education' because of its aim.

But can these concepts be mapped back onto Hegel? I think the whole intent of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, upon which Professor Taylor mainly bases his views in this regard, is quite different. It is not a *therapeutic* programme designed to lead the *reader* to authentic selfhood. Thus, it is not any form of 'aesthetic education'! The *Phenomenology* addresses itself to the forms that Spirit has taken throughout the length and breadth of its entire history. It is not, therefore, addressed to 'the reader' in any Kierkegaardian sense. It is the demonstration that the time is 'ripe' for science insofar as it shows how 'appearing science' can now be seen to be itself scientific, i.e. ordered in dialectical form. If there is 'education' here, it is the self-education of Spirit up to the level of science and as such, the *Phenomenology* is the propaedeutic to science, i.e. the System. I simply cannot accept the author's implication that for Hegel, a Plato or an Aristotle was, *qua* Greek, an inauthentic self. Hegel's thought is indeed a phenomenology of Spirit, but not a therapeutic programme. Kierkegaard's work is certainly the latter, but *not* the former. The concept of 'authenticity' is philosophically meaningful *only* in an existentialist perspective, and Hegel is not an existentialist. In a word, the shapes or forms of the natural consciousness depicted in Hegel's *Phenomenology* are not all like Kierkegaard's 'stages on life's way.'

But if I am correct in my claim that the author's central thesis is mistaken, how can I claim that he nevertheless achieves his central goal? Very much like those false hypotheses used by scientists, Professor Taylor's thesis enables him to get to where he wants to go. It permits him to bring about the confrontation precisely where it ought to take place, and thus brings out all the relevant issues. The fact that I believe that hypothesis brings Hegel and Kierkegaard too close does not take away from the fact that the author has set a context for a penetrating and scholarly discussion of the central issue.

And Professor Taylor *is* a scholar. It is indeed refreshing to read the work of someone who brings to his work a demonstrated (in his text) wide and thorough acquaintance with *all* the relevant literature in the field. This he uses to great advantage and one of the great values of this work for scholars is its extensive citing and usually acute discussion of all that literature. The range of the author's reading, both philosophical and theological, is truly remarkable, and the interested scholar need not go beyond those pages for a comprehensive bibliography.

In conclusion, one ought to ask for whom this book is written. I have indicated that I believe that scholars of Hegel's thought would be somewhat disappointed. Professor Taylor, in my judgment, is a better scholar of Kierkegaard and in general, recent work on Kierkegaard is not as strong as that on Hegel. Those interested in a non-partisan view of Kierkegaard, and the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel, will find this work to be of considerable value. Professor Taylor is to be congratulated for the context he develops and for his balanced assessment. Like many good books, its errors on specifics are conducive to further reflection. In other words, if one can see those errors, in that very recognition one is taken in the right direction into deeper thought. Thus the work shows up in bold relief not only the 'labour of thought' that remains, but also indicates the proper road-signs for that journey of the scholar in this area.

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JOZEF WILCZNSKI, *An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Marxism, Socialism, and Communism*. New York: Walter De Gruyter 1981. Pp. iv + 660. US\$ 59.00. ISBN 3-11-008588-7.

The great bulk of this volume as well as the comprehensive and essentially interdisciplinary task it sets itself may produce correspondingly great expectations. Unfortunately, the philosophically inclined reader at least is apt to be greatly disappointed. While there is much information here — about political parties and personae, about related 'isms' and a host of 'schisms', about the meaning of economic jargon and certain key historical events — there is little if anything of philosophical interest. Readers who consult the entries under 'antinomy' or 'dialectic' or 'identity' or 'negation' or 'sociology of knowledge' or 'Zionism' will find pedestrian and all-too-brief accounts which tell them little beyond what they probably already knew in order to know to look such terms up. As one inquires further, one's impression is apt to get worse and not better. For it soon becomes clear that Wilczynski and his fellow workers take Marxism and Communism to be essentially identical (despite the

volume's title). Thus while there are entries for Bukharin, Plekhanov, and Zhdanov (though oddly not Deborin), one looks in vain for Adorno, Bloch, Benjamin, Brecht, Gramsci, Habermas, Horkheimer, Kosík, Pollock, or Szabó. When we do find brief mention of Korsch, Labriola, Lukács, Marcuse, and Sartre, we can only wonder what they are doing in such antagonistic company. That the author claims he has tried 'to be as objective as is humanly possible' (though 'he does not hesitate, still in the informative vein, to highlight the strengths and failings of Marxism, especially in comparison with capitalism') may even leave us mildly depressed, or at least in doubt about the value of 'encyclopedic dictionaries.' Not only does one fail to perceive a totality here. One may well feel robbed even of the satisfaction of bourgeois but nicely-textured abstract particulars.

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RAYMOND L. WILDER, *Mathematics as a Cultural System*. New York: Pergamon Press 1981. Pp. xii + 182. US\$ 23.00. ISBN 0-08-025796-8

Studies of complex cultures as a rule benefit from a concentration on details and come to grief when the temptation to generalize is given free rein. When cultures are reduced to a few allegedly salient features, what makes them worth studying is invariably lost. It is a platitude to say that cultures reflect social reality when how they reflect it is left unspecified, and it is unhelpful to be told that cultures evolve as a result of internal stresses and external pressures of one sort or another. Perhaps the problem is that we have not yet uncovered an appropriate general scheme for analyzing culture, but it could well be that there is no such scheme to be found.

Raymond Wilder, who has had a long and successful career in mathematics, is certainly in an excellent position to cast light on the folkways of the mathematical community. Personal experience may not be the best evidence, but it could prove especially useful in an area as little explored as 'mathematical culture.' What Wilder attempts in this book, however, is a general account of mathematics as a cultural system, and the result is as

unrewarding as usual. Worse still, Wilder has chosen to ignore the more prosaic aspects of the mathematician's work and to concentrate instead on mathematical ideas. It is as though an anthropologist interested in the culture of the Trobriand Islanders were to focus on the Islanders' cultural artifacts to the exclusion of their practices, customs and attitudes.

Wilder's main contribution to the discussion of cultural systems is the idea that their various components can be represented as 'vectors' corresponding to interests. We may, he tells us, think of North American culture as a vectorial system, the vectors of which represent religious interests, agricultural interests, oil interests, etc. (15). In the case of mathematics, we have a system of vectors representing subjects such as algebra and topology 'in which each vector is striving for further growth and in which the different vectors impinge on one another, offering assistance by diffusion of ideas to other vectors, sometimes resulting in new consolidations which will become vectors in their own right' (16). This makes vectors — which were first said to represent interests, then fields of research — sound as though they have lives of their own. Even if diverting, the idea of vectors striving, impinging and offering assistance is not one that helps us to explain very much.

This complaint also applies to Wilder's treatment of what he calls the 'before his time' phenomenon. As he sees the matter, cases such as Desargues' development of projective geometry in the 1630s, two centuries before its time, occur as 'a result of stresses being imposed by a cultural vector V at a time when successful breakthrough of V is smothered by other, stronger vectors; later, at a more opportune and usually more appropriate time, V achieves recognition and consequent development of its proper niche in the evolution of the related science' (25). In other words, developments occur when the time is ripe, an observation which hardly demonstrates that the conception of a vectorial system is 'very useful as an explanatory device' (*ibid.*).

In his discussion of the development of mathematical ideas, the other main theme of his book, Wilder quite rightly notes that innovations are often made more or less simultaneously by different scientists, that discoveries occasionally occur prematurely, that mathematics on the whole is becoming progressively more abstract, and that the development of specific fields of research often gives rise to new problems (see chapter II); and he is right to insist that there has been a diffusion of mathematical ideas from certain social groups to others, that practical exigencies occasionally prompt mathematical developments, and that theories have been combined or 'consolidated' to yield more general and more powerful theories (see chapters III, IV and V). However, none of this is particularly surprising or significant when presented as abstractly as Wilder presents it. De Solla Price's argument (mentioned on p. 59) that the beginnings of science resulted from the consolidation of Babylonian numerical astronomy and Greek geometric astronomy is an important historical conjecture, but the claim that consolidations occur is too trivial to warrant extended discussion.

The same problem attends Wilder's attempt to provide general laws governing the evolution of mathematical culture. These laws, which supplement and qualify those in Wilder's earlier *Evolution of Mathematical Concepts* (1968), are presumably meant to be empirical generalizations. But, unlike interesting generalizations such as Kepler's three laws, Wilder's twenty-three laws are only distinguished by their often obscure formulation. Consider, for instance, law 10, which says that 'diffusion between cultures or fields frequently will result in the emergence of new concepts and accelerated growth, always assuming the requisite conceptual level of the receiving entity' (135), or law 13, which says that 'discovery of inadequacy in the conceptual structure of mathematics will result in the creation of remedial concepts' (141). Would it not be better to say that mathematicians use ideas from diverse fields when they know about them and need them, and that when mathematicians become aware of contradictions they usually try to eliminate them?

The final chapter on 'Mathematics in the 20th Century; its Role and Future,' despite its title, is as tame and as torpid as the previous ones. And Wilder's advice to aspiring mathematicians — do not worry about being first to obtain a result, do not fear that one's field of interest is becoming 'played out,' etc. (164-6) — is unlikely to inspire very many. For my own part, I found it discouraging to be told that 'the way of looking at mathematics presented (in this book) is not asserted to be the 'true' state of affairs' (vii), and I would have preferred not to have had to negotiate words like 'religion-wise,' 'culturological' and 'premat.' There may be something general and important to be said about mathematics as a cultural system, but it is not apparent in this disappointing book.

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NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, *Works and Worlds of Art*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1980. Pp. xv + 375. Cdn\$ 62.50: US\$ 55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824419-3); Cdn\$ 31.95: US\$ 24.50 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824426-6).

'Throughout this century,' Nicholas Wolterstorff notes in his Preface, 'aesthetics has been a somewhat turgid backwater alongside the main currents

of philosophy.' His intention is to invigorate the subject and to draw it back into the mainstream by developing a theory of art which draws evenly on the theory of linguistic performances originally developed by Austin, Grice, and Searle, and on recent work on the semantics of possible worlds. Evaluated simply as a contribution to the theories of fiction and composition, Wolterstorff's work deserves much praise; his treatment of the problem of the ontological status of musical compositions and fictional characters, and his theory of representation as 'world-projection' are both precise and compelling. Like the attempt to teach mathematics to the non-mathematically-inclined, however, the attempt to win acceptance for the philosophy of art among those who are not ultimately concerned with the distinctive qualities of individual works of art may prove more difficult than imagined, and the rewards less tangible.

Wolterstorff's fundamental contention, that in creating a work of representational art, a picture, story, poem or play, the artist 'projects a world' by producing an artifact of a particular sort, reflects his commitment to the idea of an 'artist-based' rather than a 'spectator-based' aesthetic theory. Since the time of Descartes, he observes, philosophers have stressed experience over action, and modern aesthetic theory has concentrated largely on the meaning and truth-conditions of the statements the spectator uses to describe a work of art or his experience in the face of it. By treating artistic activity as a network of related actions, possessing artistic analogues of 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary' force (one may simultaneously bore one's sister, create a scandal, and delight one's old teacher by simply moving one's hands over a keyboard in certain ways), he attempts to fill in the side of the story overlooked in contemporary discussion.

His interest in describing what it is the artist does justifies the author in including a long chapter on the status of musical compositions and identity-conditions for performances which is largely irrelevant to the remainder of the book. Rejecting both the traditional theory that musical compositions are 'types' and their performances 'tokens,' as well as Goodman's theory that musical works may be treated as classes or sets bearing a particular relationship to a printed score, Wolterstorff argues plausibly that they are to be construed as 'natural kinds,' together with Orchid and Cat. Rather more controversial is his analysis of musical composition, defined as the selection of 'sound-sequence-occurrences' exemplifying the properties required for a correct performance of the work. A composer who hears a tune in his head and promptly notates it has selected that tune, but he has not selected a sequence of individual notes. From his point of view, the tune 'came to him'; he did not have to construct it sound-by-sound. The kind of 'selection' which occurs in either case is very different. Wolterstorff's distinction between composition and improvisation is similarly questionable. For him, these activities cannot coincide; the genuine improviser is not selecting a set of requirements for correctness of performance of some work as he lets his hands wander over the keyboard. But improvisation may be done well or badly, and it may be ap-

parent to everyone, including the performer himself, how well it was done. The performer may even find that, e.g. the stiffness of his fingers prevented him from carrying out his intentions in an improvisational passage. These are fine points, but they ought not to be ignored in a theory which is constructed from the point of view of the artist.

In the following chapters, Wolterstorff returns to the task of elaborating the heart of his theory of world-projection. The fiction-writer, or dramatist, or painter, he argues, does not paint a delusive picture of reality in his work. Rather, through, or by means of his work, he 'projects' a world, which involves taking up a 'fictive stance' towards some non-actual world. The claim that fiction involves a particular attitude towards some possible state of affairs on the part of the artist or the spectator, rather than the perpetration of an illusion, has previously been put forward by Kendall Walton, who argues that fiction involves the attitude of 'make-believe.' Wolterstorff ably criticizes the theory of fiction as pretence, pointing out that it is inconsistent with ordinary intuitions about reference and truth. One cannot pretend to assert of some entity, e.g. Chichikov in *Dead Souls*, that he set out to look the town over, since Chichikov is not a real person. But neither can one assert of some pretended-entity, Chichikov, that he actually did so; for unless Chichikov exists, we cannot assert anything about him. Wolterstorff's conclusion is that fictional characters exist as 'person-kinds' inhabiting certain possible worlds, and that these worlds are 'projected' (rather than described) through the actions of writing a novel or a poem, telling a story, or composing a play.

The existence of fictional characters follows from what Wolterstorff terms the Principle of Exemplification; in order to have any properties at all a thing must exist. From the Principle of Completeness, the principle that, for every object and for every property, the object either has that property or it does not, he argues that fictional characters are complete in all respects. Either Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his left shoulder or he did not. The obvious objection, that it is not part of the story that he did or that he did not, Wolterstorff manages by distinguishing between 'essential' and 'non-essential' properties of characters. The problem of Lady Macbeth's children is handled in similar fashion: she had *some* finite number, but she did not have 1, or 2, or 3 ... etc. Wolterstorff's extreme realism is thus tempered only by the limited capacity or desire of the author to project a world complete in all possible respects.

Wolterstorff's adherence to these principles is fully compatible with his view of artistic activity as a process of selection of pre-existing entities, whether these be notes, characters, or worlds. 'The world of *Dead Souls*,' he insists, 'existed apart from Gogol's activity as a writer and neither he nor anyone else made it occur.' The 'creativity' of the artist consists solely in his ability to 'envisage states of affairs distinct from any which he believes his experience to have acquainted him with.' Nor can the author be literally said to have created a character; rather, 'from the infinitude of person-kinds the

author selects one. His creativity lies in the freshness, the imaginativeness, the originality of his selection, rather than in his bringing into existence what did not before exist.' Such claims appear to conflict with the sense that one ought to distinguish between the 'creation' of a man obsessed with his former small-town Midwestern schoolteacher, who, perhaps against his will, writes her into his works over and over, and the creation of the writer who deliberately selects a certain set of predicates to produce a convincing portrait of a small-town Midwestern schoolteacher in the hope of appealing to a broad readership of similarly-placed schoolteachers. One may argue in Wolterstorff's defense that such distinctions belong to a different level of philosophical analysis. But one may also insist that the principles of Completeness and Exemplification are peripheral in the Quinean sense; adjustments might be made elsewhere in the system.

Several pages are devoted to the problem of what we are to understand the 'world of a work' as comprising. Could Hamlet have had an Oedipus-complex? Do Huck and Jim have a homosexual relationship in Twain's novel? Wolterstorff notes that the observation that the author did not inscribe a sentence ascribing Y to *x* is not always sufficient to establish that *x* does not have Y in the novel. At the same time, the observation that if someone were to act as *x* does in real life, one would be justified in ascribing Y to him is not sufficient to establish that *x* has Y in the novel. Here Wolterstorff suggests that it is appropriate to take the intentions of the artist into account as well as something of his cultural context. Hamlet may have suffered from too much black bile, but his having an Oedipus-complex is not part of the world of work, at least not on the grounds of the second observation. Wisely, however, Wolterstorff does not attempt to provide a rigid set of guidelines for interpretation, noting only that we employ different principles and different standards on different occasions.

In the final sections of the book Wolterstorff develops a theory of pictorial representation which provides a useful and convincing alternative both to Goodman's 'denotationist' account and to Walton's theory of make-believe. The reasoning here is clear and compelling — especially, perhaps, because the selection-theory has no role to play.

The last chapter is concerned with the question of the significance of the activity of world-projection. By engaging in this activity, the author notes, the artist may 'assert something, may issue a condemnation, may express a wish ... He may, in the strictest sense, *say* something.' Wolterstorff goes on to draw parallels between the production of art-objects and religious drama and ritual which emphasize shared beliefs and values. In ancient and primitive societies, he argues, art-works served or serve 'more as an expression of the artists' community, and to confirm the community in those convictions, than to lead it into new ones.' He traces community support for representational art in turn to 'a deep desire for concreteness' particularly where religion is concerned. Finally, in all societies, the need for fantasy and 'escape' may be

served by art. One may hope or fear that the world is other than as it appears and so find satisfaction in a concrete representation of the world as that way.

Much in the order of presentation in the book is elusive. And although Wolterstorff is sometimes an engaging and witty writer, the book does not read easily; the richness of the later chapters on literature and drama especially is diminished by the over-extension and over-formalization of the first few chapters. On a deeper level, there will be some readers who will be troubled by the particular coloration artistic activity receives in the book. Wolterstorff looks down upon art, as it were, from a great height, and what he sees sometimes appears as a mixture of Sport and Religion, uniformly wholesome and vigorous, beneficial to artist and society alike.

To be sure, the association of art with ill-health, with velleity and the rejection of prevailing norms, is a recent development, and one which coincides with a lack of interest in — even a repulsion from — representational art. Nevertheless, Wolterstorff does not suggest that his account is limited to certain periods and styles of art. It is plain though that contemporary art does pose problems for any fully-generalized account of artistic activity as world-projection. To characterize the work of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century painters so admired by the anti-realist Bell as merely another variant foray into world-projection is to dismiss as irrelevant the violence with which they rejected the roles Wolterstorff assigns to art. They cared neither for the faithful, culturally-reinforcing representation of life as it is experienced, nor for romantic escapism. Wolterstorff states at the outset that he has no sympathy for Bell's 'quasi-religious aesthetic mysticism', and so for his claim that the cares and concerns of life — even life as it might possibly be lived — have no place in the understanding of art. But it is doubtful whether a theory which aims at the comprehensiveness of Wolterstorff's can afford to ignore the problem of the modern attitude towards representational painting and realistic literature and drama, and, by extension, the contemporary artist's conception of what he is doing.

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NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, *Art in Action*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press 1981; Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans 1981. Pp. x + 240. Cdn\$ 12.95; US\$ 9.95. ISBN 0-8028-1816-1.

Dorothy Sayers once commented that 'we have no Christian aesthetic — no Christian philosophy of the Arts.' She goes on, 'There have, of course been plenty of writers on aesthetics who happen to be Christians, but they seldom made any consistent attempt to relate their aesthetic to the central Christian dogmas.' In *Art in Action* Wolterstorff tries to rectify the omission. The book is not only a 'reflection on the arts by someone who stands within the Christian tradition and identifies himself with the Christian community,' but it is also an attempt to articulate how he *as a Christian* sees art and what he calls 'the aesthetic dimension of reality.'

Of course the reason why this is a matter of importance is that both Christianity and art claim a relevance to life. For Christianity this may go without saying, but to Wolterstorff's credit he is quick to insist that art too 'is man's way of acting *in* the world... Works of art are objects and instruments of action... inextricably embedded in the fabric of human intention. They are objects and instruments of action whereby we carry out our intentions with respect to the world, our fellows, ourselves and our gods.' The important issue then is simply how do we act in the world, as Christian or as artist? Wolterstorff's answer is forthright: It is as a Christian. As soon as he considers 'art in Christian perspective' his thoughts turn to 'the artist as responsible servant,' a servant to 'human intention' certainly, ultimately as servant to God. But we ask, must art be so understood and is this the only option from Christian perspective? Wolterstorff seems to think so. He simply asserts and explicates. As a result his book is more of a *tour de main* than a *tour de force*.

Let me give an example of his procedure. In his revealing chapter 'Norms in Art: Artistic and Aesthetic Responsibility' Wolterstorff distinguishes 'artistic excellence' from 'aesthetic excellence,' defining the former as that which serves well the purposes for which it was made or distributed, and defining the latter as that which serves well the purpose of focused contemplation for aesthetic delight, i.e., to exhibit in a work an appropriate balance of unity, richness and intensity. Immediately the die is cast. Good art and good aesthetics effectively serve their purposes. In either case works of art are objects and instruments whereby men carry out their intentions with respect to the world. In fact Wolterstorff is so bold as to note that in this they bear a close analogy 'to spades and sleeping pills and automobiles.' One can offer reasons in terms of purpose for their excellence or goodness and these reasons are clear and direct. 'A good hymn is one that serves well the purpose of hymns. A good concerto is one that serves well the purpose of concertos. A good piece of background music is one that serves well the purpose of background music. A good drinking song is one that serves well the purpose of drinking songs.'

But now we ask, what *is* the purpose of concerti? Wolterstorff's answer is to provide satisfaction upon aesthetic contemplation. We ask, what is the purpose of hymns? Wolterstorff's answer is to offer praise to God. So now we learn that some works of art are produced for aesthetic purposes, some for artistic purposes. Let me press further. Can works of art dedicated to aesthetic purposes (concerti) be artistically good? Yes. This is partially because what a work of art actually 'expresses' may be independent of its maker's or distributor's intention. Can an artistically good work be aesthetically bad? Yes. Can an aesthetically good work of art be artistically bad? Yes. But now, and this is really what Wolterstorff wants to consider, can aesthetically good works of art which are also artistically good, operate in the moral dimension, meaning thereby 'altering for better or worse the moral character of those who hold commerce with them'? Can they operate in the religious dimension, meaning thereby 'inducing change in the religious commitments for those who make use of them'? Yes. Can they be morally and religiously bad? Yes. In these cases what do we do? Once again Wolterstorff is clear. He considers the case of an aesthetically excellent novel which in our considered judgment will affect some specific person to be 'more exploitative in the expression of his sexuality, or more indifferent to the praise and worship of God.'

The delight that one gets in aesthetic contemplation is... one's own delight. So the question before us is whether the personal aesthetic delight that one gets on the occasion of reading some novel can outweigh in importance the tendency that such reading induces to treat others henceforth in morally worse ways.

When the structure of the issue is thus perceived with clarity, the Christian hears the unmistakable voice of his Master. It speaks of self-sacrifice... To be an agent of that shalom one must be willing to surrender concern with self in favor of acting as a person for others. It says that if the choice confronts us we must be willing to sacrifice pleasures of self on the altar of love for others.

Of course none of this should surprise us. Once he has classified art along with spades and sleeping pills as responsible servants or instruments to bring about certain intentions then of course the factor determining their excellence and their right to exist must be those intentions. If hymns are to offer praise to God, and we know what offering praise to God is, then those hymns which fail to fulfil that intention should be removed from the Hymnal. If liturgical art is at the service of the liturgy and if such art distracts the congregation from their purpose of offering the liturgy, the distracting work of art should be removed. All of this is very traditional, but as I said, it all hinges upon unargued presumptive definitions.

Suppose for example Wolterstorff simply started off on a different tack and defined artistic excellence not as that which serves a purpose or intention independent of itself but as that which is valuable in itself, and if properly appreciated, enriches our life, emotionally moves us, even reveals to us objects

and understandings we have previously not seen or grasped. Certainly this way of thinking about what art does is not unfamiliar. But notice, as soon as we assume this, artistic excellence now becomes what we might call a kind of meditation — that which deepens insight and stimulates the will and affection. In such a scheme aesthetic excellence could remain with Wolterstorff as a kind of focused contemplation, but this time no longer meaning that which affords one's private delight but more in keeping with traditional understandings of 'contemplation,' a non-discursive focusing which affords a transcendental sense of unity which incorporates the work of art. By this fiat of definition Wolterstorff suddenly no longer must speak of artistic or aesthetic excellences as servants sacrificed to non-artistic or aesthetic purposes apart, but possibly as necessary vehicles to, dare I say, to God. Of course he could still speak of a Christian aesthetics but now he might think of it more precisely as an aesthetic which is sensitive to the Holy Ghost as contrasted to a Christian aesthetic which is sensitive to the Father. In any case the classic division is between Dionysus and Apollo. Wolterstorff himself alludes to it when he contrasts Heraclitus and Isaiah, Rubens and Raphael, 'we in our century' and 'mankind throughout the ages.'

My question then, considering the options, is why *as a* Christian does Wolterstorff see art and 'the aesthetic dimension' in the God the Father, Apollonian, Isaiah, Raphael, mankind throughout the ages mold? Rather than arguing *into* his definition he argues out *from* it. But since there are alternative ways for philosophers and Christians to look at art, and I add, to look at Christianity, Wolterstorff needs to justify, to argue for his particular position. Of course he can attempt to win the day by saying his is a 'Calvinist aesthetics,' and of course he may be correct, but this seems to me to be only putting off the issue with another presumptive definition. Once again he is simply defining things the way he wishes them to be, and discussing it from there.

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