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ARTICLES

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JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO, *Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce's Theory of Categories*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1980. Pp. 252. US$ 15.00. ISBN 0-8214-0551-9.

A major thesis of Dr. Esposito's fine book is that Peirce was, from beginning to end, a systematic metaphysician. It is the extreme complexity of the metaphysical undertaking, as Peirce conceived of it, that in large part explains his inability to complete his metaphysical work, and to present it in a clear and connected way.

The thesis is not without precedents, of course. Among the older generation of Peirce scholars, Hartshorne, Weiss, Feibleman, and Thompson, among others, agreed that Peirce was primarily a metaphysician. They differed among themselves, however, concerning the nature of his metaphysics and its unity. On the other hand, another group of scholars have contended that there are fundamental clefts in Peirce's philosophy. Goudge maintained that Peirce's thought was riven by a conflict between naturalist and transcendentalist tendencies. In this he was followed by Morton White (science versus sentiment). Murphey argued that Peirce had no single system but developed successively several distinct philosophic systems. Sheffler contended that Peirce began as an epistemologist and moved only gradually toward metaphysics.

Dr. Esposito supports and furthers the interpretation of Peirce as a metaphysician who worked, throughout his life, on a set of very basic problems. Further, the fundamental ideas which he developed in his early years — for example, the three categories of abstract unity, concrete plurality, and concrete unity, the conception of representation as a semiotic relation, the idealism, and the thesis of continuity between mind and extension — were explored, elaborated, deepened, and modified, but never abandoned. At the end of his life, Peirce was far from finishing his task, but he had made important progress toward the completion of an architectionically constructed metaphysical system.

The book is distinguished methodologically by four features. One, Dr. Esposito takes very seriously the earliest manuscripts, some of them written when Peirce was still in his teens, and gives a detailed analysis of them. It is true that Murray Murphey made considerable use of these early manuscripts, but neither he nor anyone else until now has discussed them at such length and in such detail. Two, throughout his book Dr. Esposito quite rightly takes all the as yet unpublished metaphysical writings into account alongside the

Collected Papers. Three, Dr. Esposito is sensitive to the changes in Peirce's emphases and to the emergence of new concerns and new theses as Peirce's thought grew. Four, Dr. Esposito adds considerably to our understanding of Peirce's relationship to Kant, Hegel, Hamilton, Mansel, and others who influenced him. I learned much from Dr. Esposito's book on all four of these points.

Those readers who have already studied the *Collected Papers* will find few surprises in Dr. Esposito's work. Rather, what he brings out very clearly is the early emergence of Peirce's metaphysical problems and the stability of his leading ideas and principles through their continuous deepening and elaboration. For example, as early as 1860 (Ms. 891) Peirce was writing, 'I have come to the conclusion that our primary conceptions are not simple but complex; that our elementary conceptions are not independent but linked complexedly together; that nevertheless properly speaking we have no *a priori* synthetical propositions, and that axioms are only definitions.' And in another early paper he writes, 'WHAT IS REASONABLENESS THAT IT SHOULD GIVE VERITY TO FORM OF FACT? This is the *Question*.' As late as his final attempts to develop a rigorous proof of pragmaticism, Peirce was trying to show how his conception of the categories as relational — as forms of transition, change, and evolution — provided an answer to his early question. Dr. Esposito gives us an enlightening examination of Peirce's early and extended attempt to use his three basic categories to structure and organize a long list of special categories. The interest in the long list did not disappear, but in a somewhat altered form it continued to concern Peirce throughout his life, Dr. Esposito shows.

This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the development of Peirce as a metaphysician. In the interest of a just assessment of Peirce's most important and lasting contributions to philosophy's deep probing of foundations, a question needs to be raised. Is it in his metaphysics that Peirce's originality, depth, and genius is best expressed? In my opinion, Peirce is best understood as he understood himself — as a logician and philosopher who searched for the unity among the many methods by which scientific reason grows in its power to understand and change the world. If we are to regard Peirce as primarily a metaphysician, then he was a metaphysician of a new kind, very different from Hegel, Schelling, Hamilton, and the 'seminary' philosophers. Peirce regarded the empirical and concrete study of the history and practice of science (including mathematics) as a key to the understanding of logic, the understanding of representation ('logic considered as semiotic'), and the understanding of how, in nature, efficient relations evolve out of inefficient relations (see the correspondence with Victoria Welby, *CP* 8.332). In spite of his growing sympathy for Hegel, Peirce remained in an important sense a Kantian. Like Kant, he drew his deepest insights from the practice and study of mathematics and the natural sciences.

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GRETA JONES, *Social Darwinism and English Thought*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. xiv & 234. US$ 30.00. ISBN 0-391-01799-3.

How you perceived the problem situation in mid-nineteenth century Britain depended on whether you believed the creation stories of Genesis literally or were willing to give science its head. This book is concerned only with the latter position. The controversies between creationists on the one hand, and liberal Christians and atheists on the other, make another story. Even so, for this latter group the central problem situation was not homogeneous. True, they shared the problems of distinguishing sciences that would deliver on their early promise like evolution theory from false starts like phrenology, and of deciding when a long-held belief, such as spontaneous generation or the corpuscular theory of light, or a new-fangled idea like Prout's hypothesis, should be given up for lack of evidence or because of the greater explanatory power of a rival — and these problems are still with us. And they had in common the program of integrating the latest scientific findings with their stock of existing beliefs. The differences in what they took to be their problems arose from disagreements as to what the latest findings actually were, and from differences in existing beliefs. Since the beliefs in question included moral matters, programs of social action which these implied had also to be integrated with science.

The British situation was peculiar. The dominant religion favoured science. In addition, most thinkers did not question the propriety of Britain's being a stable and powerful democracy, though they differed over the distribution of its wealth and power internally and over its international obligations. Most accepted Protestant ethics, though they differed as to their grounds. And most appreciated intelligence and rationality as high values.

The coming of Darwinism did not change the basic British background beliefs: rather, it challenged people to explain those beliefs as a consequence of evolution, and this without either the mechanism or the laws of heredity or variety among offspring, for these were not yet discovered. Evolution theory was very inexact and susceptible of various interpretations. Social Darwinism is the fascinating, doomed debate over how to respond to that challenge. I say 'doomed' because both the sense of Britain's right to its power and the commitment to Protestant ethics weakened drastically through the First World War and were gone by the end of the Second.

Nowadays, of course, people still make attempts to reconcile Darwinism to a theory of the human being, to morality and to social programs but it's not the same: morals and rights have to be argued for from scratch. What is more, to-day's thinkers have to come to terms with indeterminism, a position for which there was no hospitality at all in nineteenth century Britain. Probability was a matter of ignorance, not a matter of fact, in those days. Jones does not quite see things this way. First of all, only once in her book does she notice the difference indeterminism might make to one's capacity to solve some of the problems raised by the attempt to reconcile rational action

or moral action with Darwinism, despite her comparatively lengthy criticism of Karl Popper who makes much of this matter in *Objective Knowledge* and *Unended Quest*, both of which Jones cites in footnotes. The one occasion is her reference to Peirce (183), one of the earliest believers in objective indeterminism, but she makes very little of the business. More important, Jones is not content with a conception of social Darwinism that sees this movement as an historical episode. She defines it so broadly that Popper and E.O. Wilson emerge as closet social Darwinists.

Well, I am not going to quarrel over how to define a term. I shall lament, however, that the characteristics Bagehot, Stephen, Galton, Popper and Wilson share should be thought so much more worthy of emphasis than their differences in a book as detailed as Jones's. But one of the declared aims of the book is to show 'the ubiquity of social Darwinism' (viii) which is much easier to do if any attempt whatever to apply evolutionary thought to human and social affairs is allowed to count. Chapter IX, 'The Legacy of Social Darwinism,' even draws in Malinowski and Talcott Parsons. Now I think it is very interesting to see how ideas recur, though it is a little shallow as history either not to ask why they recur or to hint that later users are somehow influenced unthinkingly by earlier ideas. And from a philosophical point of view, it is perhaps less interesting whether an idea is repeated than whether it is correct or whether it can be improved upon or whether the arguments for it are good. We don't get this philosophical perspective. In fact, we don't get much philosophical discussion at all, despite the book's being published in a 'Studies in Philosophy' series.

I said Jones does not quite see things the way I described them. Perhaps the biggest difference is her not seeing people's theories as more or less rational responses to problems that could be more or less articulated. Instead, she wishes to emphasize how greatly people are 'influenced' by the beliefs of their times, as for example Darwin and Wallace in their different developments of the theory they jointly initiated. 'Ultimately,' she says, 'social Darwinism... could not excape the limits of the social ideologies of its time' (195) — or of its *times*, if later thinkers are to be included. But all this is philosophically rather shallow. What, for instance, about a thinker who seems to be influenced by his times because he is seen to endorse some contemporary beliefs, but who is radically critical of his time's ideologies and even of ideology as such? Jones' approach appears to blind her to this possibility. Perhaps this is because of her commitment to an idea of social theory — dare one say an ideology — which none of the people she mentions shares with her except Engels and Marx (whose rejection of Darwinism as a basis for social theory is made clear): the idea that there are *objective social forces* which need to be invoked to explain social change.

It is not enough in Jones's view (159) to explain social change by the actions of individuals, as Popper does in *The Poverty of Historicism* and *The Open Society and its Enemies* (books not even in Jones's select bibliography: they contain rather devastating criticisms of her kind of viewpoint!), nor to try to foretell history by scrutinizing the possibilities for human evolution, as

Wilson declares possible in *On Human Nature*. In her view, Darwinism never *could* produce a genuine social theory, because it cannot explain objective social forces. It is a pity this difference of emphasis should make Jones so impatient with her opponents that she misrepresents their points of view. Her exegesis of Popper and Wilson is quite poor, though she's right that she fundamentally disagrees with them (and with any other methodological individualists). A pity, too, that the difference in viewpoints is not critically discussed, just displayed.

What does the book do well, then? Of course, it is very good at pointing up the individualistic bias of the social theory of Darwinists and it is also good at displaying the *variety* of views people have argued were implied by evolution theory, and thus good at exposing — by implication only; she never runs her quarry down — how weak those old arguments were.

Social Darwinists came in various political colours, conservative, liberal, socialist, depending on which came first for them: the maintenance of the establishment, the opportunity to make wealth by industry and trade, or the need to ameliorate the lot of the workers. And they disagreed on which human beings to treat as a lesser breed: just blacks (same species but at an inferior state of evolution), or all non-Anglo-Saxons, or in addition the working class — less 'fit' members of the British race. (One serious problem in reconciling Darwinism with certain existing beliefs was its implication that the less fit would breed less prolifically; ironically, it was the upper classes whose breeding was restrained.) These and other value differences influenced their guesses as to which human traits were heritable and which adaptive.

Other important points of disagreement were whether mental activity should be explained solely by association of ideas given in experience or perhaps also by intuition; what role reason and intelligence might play in evolution; whether cultural evolution proceeded by the same rules as biological (there was a tendency even among Darwinists to prefer Lamarck's ideas for cultural change which gave Lamarckians fresh hope of success at explaining biological evolution); and whether progress toward a more perfect type was possible, or perhaps inevitable, or whether it needed working for and if so, how? By eugenics, or by social reform? All these differences and more are illuminated by Jones whose book thus performs a useful function. The connection of Darwinism with liberal and socialist political programs has perhaps been underplayed heretofore, by contrast with the conservative connection.

The book could also be thought helpful for its organization by topics, which allows interesting discussions of the eugenics movement, still strong to-day (chapter VI), instinct (Chapter VII), and race and class (Chapter VIII), but I don't favour the scattering effect this division of the material has upon the argument structures of the various historical attempts at a compromise of social theory with Darwinism.

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PETER KIVY, *The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P. 1980. Pp. xiv + 167. US$ 15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-072582); US$ 5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02014-0).

Theories of musical expression have a venerable tradition, a fact Peter Kivy is not unmindful of. In *The Corded Shell* Kivy sets out a highly plausible account of expressiveness in music which he derives, a bit here and a bit there, from several 17th and 18th century treatises on musical aesthetics. The fields of Bardi (1601), Mattheson (1739), Avison (1752), Miller (1754), Beattie (1762), Webb (1769), and Reid (1774) are gently plowed, valuable insights harvested from each, and errors to avoid duly noted.

Kivy's leading goal in this well-written book is the determination of the primary basis of expressiveness in music. After distinguishing musical expressiveness (expression as a property of music) from the occasional expressing through music of a particular individual's emotion, and declaring the former to be the object of interest, Kivy begins to assemble the strands of the view he will eventually endorse. The main theories concerning musical expression which are considered along the way are these (I am simplifying Kivy's typology somewhat here): the speech theory, the arousal theory, the isomorphism theory, and the behavioral analogy theory. Kivy denominates the last three as, respectively, a 'physiology,' 'iconography,' and 'physiognomy' of musical expression.

According to the speech theory, first adumbrated by the theorists of the Florentine camerata around 1600, a musical passage is expressive of ϕ in virtue of resembling the inflections of speech characteristic of the expression of ϕ. According to the arousal theory, defended in various forms by many thinkers, a musical passage is expressive of ϕ insofar as it arouses ϕ in listeners, different accounts being given of the mechanism by which it does so. According to the isomorphism theory, identified with Mattheson in the 18th century and Langer in the 20th, a passage is expressive in virtue of resembling the shape or structure of particular emotions or of emotive life in general. According to the behavioral analogy theory, a passage is expressive of ϕ in virtue of resembling the bodily behavior — movement, posture, gesture, visage — characteristic of the expression of ϕ.

Kivy offers astute and helpful observations on these theories in the course of extracting from them what he regards as valid. His critique of the arousal theory in Ch. III is familiar but effective. 'It is quite compatible with my perceiving the most intense and disquieting emotions in a work of art that I not myself be moved in the least...' (23) In Ch. IV Kivy makes clear the manner in which music can indeed occasionally evoke full-fledged emotions, that is, through idiosyncratic association of the music with some past emotional experience of a listener. Thus, all raising of emotion by music takes the form of revival of earlier life emotion, for only in that way can the objects and belief contents essential to real emotion be supplied. In Ch. V Schopenhauer's well-known theory of musical significance is shown to be more a

metaphysical version of Mattheson's physiological account than a foreshadowing of Langer's theory of 'unconsummated symbolism.' In Ch. VI Kivy makes suitable replies to the hoary argument from disagreement regarding emotional descriptions, which has been used to deny the capacity of music to express particular emotions.

Kivy's own view of musical expressiveness begins to emerge in Chs. VI and VII. Its core is the behavioral analogy theory, when this is broadened to include verbal behavior as well, thus preserving what is true in the speech theory of expression. Music is seen by us as expressive of ϕ mainly because it resembles the behavior, in body and voice, by which we express ϕ in life. We tend to 'animate' sounds as well as sights. We hear the expressiveness of an aural pattern when we hear it as a vehicle of expression — as an utterance or gesture. (58-9) Our tendency to perceive music anthropomorphically is a deeply-rooted one, which we suppress only on pain of missing qualities in music that are highly absorbing and fully objective.

Kivy skilfully heads off the objection standardly raised against Langer's theory of musical expression, namely, that if resemblance or isomorphism between A and B (or something closely connected to B) were sufficient for A to be expressive of B, then a musical passage would not only be expressive of some emotion whose behavioral manifestations it resembled, but expressive also of any other phenomena of the world it resembled in the same degree. The answer to this is that structural resemblance between A and B is *not* sufficient; in addition, B must be of the right 'logical category' to be expressed (presumably, a quality, state, or the like) and there must be a 'psychological link' between A and B, in that we are disposed to perceive B in A, or to be put in mind of B by A. (61-2) Thus we explain how, despite significant resemblance, music is expressive of neither earthquakes nor bacterial growth, and neither grief nor melancholy are expressive of any passage of music. Kivy also cautions his readers against taking his proposal to be that music represents, as well as resembles, human expressive behavior, since representation requires conscious intent on the composer's part, and this is generally lacking.(64)

In Ch. VIII Kivy addresses himself to the fact that there are important factors in musical expression which cannot, apparently, be accounted for in terms of physiognomic resemblance to expressive behavior. Notable among these are melodic chromaticism, the minor mode, instrumental timbre, and certain cadences. His response is to widen the theory of expressiveness by adding to the physiognomic resemblance component already established a component invoking 'the customary association of certain musical features with certain emotive ones, quite apart from any structural analogy between them.' (77) Kivy now christens the first component the 'contour' model, and the second the 'convention' model. It is maintained that all central cases of expressiveness in music can be explained on one model or the other. Kivy convincingly explains the expressiveness of the music in two arias of Gluck and Mozart by employing both planks of this program. Tempo, dynamics, 'sighing' figures work by contour; major mode, diatonic melody, trumpet tone work by convention. The expressive quality in context of certain chords

(diminished triad, minor triad) is interestingly accounted for in terms of a contribution to contour by way of syntactic function (whether the chord is 'active' or 'resting'), although in the case of the minor triad, whose syntactic function has altered significantly since the 17th century, its current expressiveness is largely a matter of deep-seated convention. Kivy suggests that all expressiveness by convention was originally expressiveness by contour, in either a direct or indirect manner. (83)

I will be brief in summarizing the remainder of the book. Ch. IX concerns itself with the 'naturalness' of expressiveness by contour and the problems raised in this connection by the expressiveness of non-western, e.g. Indian, music. Ch. X deals with the setting of words to music; Kivy focuses on the way in which an appropriate text can, fairly obviously, specify the emotional import of purely instrumental music. In Ch. XI Kivy argues, with an assist from Guy Sircello's 'new theory of beauty,' that the expressive qualities of a musical work are relevant to its aesthetic value. In the concluding chapter Kivy returns to a challenge posed in the opening one, namely how it is that emotional descriptions of music, however meaningful, can be other than subjective and variable from listener to listener. Kivy's answer is, roughly, that insofar as they are conventionally based, their objectivity is as solid as that of the conventional associations themselves, and insofar as they are based on contour resemblance to expressive behavior, their objectivity is no less than that of characterizations of those behaviors as specifically expressive in the first place, by reference to typical cases of actual expression. I now turn to some minor criticisms of this worthwhile and stimulating essay.

First, I must point out that Kivy does not at the outset distinguish clearly enough between analysis of what attributions of expressiveness to music *mean*, and an account of the *grounds* (or *causes*) of musical expressiveness. In his concern to address the second, and clearly more interesting issue, he seems to have ignored the first entirely. Goodman in *Languages of Art*, by contrast, devotes most of his attention to the first and almost none to the second. Perhaps Kivy thinks the analysis of 'passage P is expressive of ϕ' is an obvious one, or perhaps he believes one can only describe a paradigmatic case, explicit analysis being somehow precluded. But if so, we should have been told this outright. One thing, at least, *cannot* be meant by 'P is expressive of ϕ,' and that is: 'P resembles characteristic behavioral expressions of ϕ.' For then the 'contour' component of Kivy's account of *how* music can be expressive would be trivially correct, and the 'convention' component entirely irrelevant. The analysis of what it means to ascribe emotional predicates to music should not be conflated with an informative account of what typically grounds the expressiveness that such predicates report.

A background motivation of Kivy's inquiry into musical expressiveness is defense of the objectivity of emotive description of music, and thus of its respectability as a tool of musical criticism. He is, to my mind, successful in this, largely through the plausibility with which he locates 'contour' and 'convention' as the primary, and readily recognized, grounds of expressiveness in music. But I must take issue with a claim that Kivy presses

rather strongly in this connection, namely, that musical expressiveness is *completely* on a par with the expressiveness of faces. The expressiveness of music may indeed be an objective matter, but it is not 'as objective as' the expressiveness of a face (human or animal) if this means that it is as clearly determinable and as straightforwardly verifiable. For a face (human or animal) to be sad is for it to have a look of the sort associated with or characteristic of persons who are sad; what sort of look that is is conclusively settleable just by inspecting a range of sad people. But for a passage to be sad often (in part) is for it to have a *sound* that *notably resembles or is analogous to* the look of a sad face, gesture, etc. Now, the ways and means of resemblance are manifold and various, especially from one sensory realm to another. The judgement that a musical passage resembles predominantly the typical visible manifestations of sadness (as opposed to those of grief, depression, anger, or contentment) is hardly as simple or as easily corroborated as the judgement that a face belongs in the class of sad faces, whether worn by a man or a dog. The latter judgement amounts to little more than classification with respect to a class whose general membership is antecedently clear; the former involves a complicated and uncharted assessment of significant similarity between rather different things. Perhaps I am misinterpreting Kivy, but it seems misleading to say that the criteria of musical expressiveness are exactly 'the same as' those of facial expressiveness. (68) The former in some measure involve and depend upon the latter, of course, but it is in a somewhat perilous context of cross-sensory resemblances. It's hardly a matter of criterial *identity*, in any case. It seems we can defend the objectivity of emotional attributions to music without overstating the directness with which they are anchored in human behavior.

I will briefly remark three more mild dissatisfactions. (1) In my opinion Kivy exaggerates implausibly the purely conventional element in the expressiveness of the minor mode. Its quality does not strike me as merely an ingrained association harking back to the unsettled 'activity' of the minor triad in music of centuries ago. Surely Deryck Cooke and others are right that there is *some* 'harderwired,' physiologically based component in our sense of minor tonalities as strained, upset, or distressed. (2) In discussing the combination of words with music, it seems that Kivy underplays the Wagnerian possibility of music specifying the emotional tone of a text, which is fully as frequent and noteworthy as a text's specifying of the emotion in its accompanying music. More importantly, Kivy shows no awareness that appropriateness or suitability of music to text can be construed as other than *matching*, more or less close — for example, as the forming of an aesthetically effective whole with, which might in some cases (e.g. humorous, satiric ones) be achieved through music and text which were diametrically opposed in emotional color. (3) Though I agree with Kivy that the expressive properties of music appear to contribute positively to aesthetic worth, I would rather the defense of this thesis did not rest so heavily on Sircello's theory of beauty. For I am inclined to think that the ineliminable 'not a property of deficency, lack, or defect' clause of Sircello's analysis of beautiful

properties seriously vitiates the whole enterprise. This is because deciding whether a property is a non-lack, non-defect, and non-deficiency for a given thing in effect requires nothing less than deciding whether it can conduce to beauty for that thing. The aesthetic value of emotional attributes in music is perhaps better demonstrated by appeal to the rewards of cognitive and affective response to them.

In conclusion, let me say that *The Corded Shell*, in its clarity, judiciousness, and breadth, will clearly take its place as a major work on musical expression, both up-to-date and historically sensitive, and as a benchmark for future efforts. Those who seek to chart the murky waters of musical aesthetics are permanently in Kivy's debt. Princeton University Press, incidentally, also deserves commendation for its attractive and distinctive type-setting, and for a blessed rarity of misprints.

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PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources.* Edited by Michael Mooney. New York: Columbia U.P. 1979. Pp. xiv + 347. US$ 27.50. ISBN 0-231-04512-3.

It is now fifty years since Paul Oskar Kristeller entered the field of Renaissance studies, with which his name has become almost synonymous. It is therefore a fitting time at which to consider his latest publication, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources.* It should be emphasized from the beginning that the contents of this volume are by no means new, for it is a collection of sponsored lectures, the earliest of which dates from 1944. Three of the lectures, which together make up 'Part Five. Philosophy and Rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renaissance' are now being published for the first time, as is Kristeller's introduction which was written specially for this volume.

However, the remaining lectures, which make up 'Part One: Renaissance Thought and Classical Antiquity,' 'Part Two: Renaissance Thought and the Middle Ages,' 'Part Three: Renaissance Thought and Byzantine Learning,' and 'Part Four: Renaissance Concepts of Man' have all been published in more than one place. Indeed, they have all been published by Harper Torchbooks, five in *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains* (1961), and six in *Renaissance Concepts of Man and Other Essays* (1972). Nevertheless, although the appearance of this new collection is not as momentous as one might first think, one cannot conclude that it is unimportant. For those who do not possess the earlier collections the current volume, with its very full footnotes, will provide an extremely useful introduction to Kristeller's work on the Renaissance, since it brings many strands of his thought together in an organized and coherent form. Moreover, the book is handsomely printed and presented, a delight to own for its appearance as well as for its content.

So much having been said by way of introduction, one must now consider Kristeller's contribution to our understanding of the intellectual trends of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, particularly in Italy. Undoubtedly his great strength is scholarly rather than philosophical. Drawing on his knowledge of classical and modern languages and his exceptionally wide reading of both primary and secondary sources, he has over the years, and in this volume, presented a detailed account of Renaissance writers, their interests and the source material available to them. In doing so, he has changed our understanding of the nature and significance of Renaissance thought, and dispelled the myths that used to be current about the long period between Ockham and Descartes. Unfortunately many philosophers, even those interested in the history of philosophy, are still unaware of what Kristeller and his colleagues in the field have established, so a brief summary is in order.

It should of course be born in mind that, as Kristeller himself continually emphasizes, the intellectual history of Europe between 1350 and 1600 (the period he describes as 'Renaissance' on p. 242) includes many different trends and varies widely from place to place. Moreover, much research remains to be done, even on the leading figures. Given these caveats, one may note first of all Kristeller's account of humanism. He writes that it was a 'cultural and educational program which emphasized and developed an important but limited area of studies.' (22) The studies referred to included grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy. In each field much attention was paid to classical sources, especially those in Latin, but also those in Greek, if only in translation. Kristeller has shown that, apart from its inclusion of moral philosophy, humanism was not primarily a philosophical movement. Most traditional philosophy, including metaphysics and logic, was outside its scope, as also was science, whether in the form of natural philosophy or of the new mathematics. Furthermore, humanism as defined was largely the province of university teachers rather than of gifted amateurs. One may note secondly the importance of Kristeller's conclusions for other spheres of intellectual endeavour. It seems to have been the case that

humanism existed within the universities side by side with more traditional subjects and doctrines; that humanist attacks on scholasticism frequently expressed little more than departmental rivalries; and that Aristotelianism, albeit influenced by humanist philological and literary studies, was as strong or stronger in the sixteenth century than it had been in the middle ages. In this context one should also note that it was only in the sixteenth century that Thomism reached its full strength, despite the common belief that medieval philosophy and Thomism are interchangeable.

Some of the details in Kristeller's account need to be revised. For instance, he wrote that the 'Aristotelian orientation of the university philosophers' disappeared from Oxford after the end of the fourteenth century (40), whereas in fact there was a considerable revival of Aristotelianism at the end of the sixteenth century, owing to the commentaries of John Case among others, and this endured throughout much of the seventeenth century. To take a second example, Kristeller considerably overestimates the influence of Ramism in the seventeenth century. (47) At least at Oxford, Ramus was hardly read after the end of the sixteenth century, and the reigning logic texts were Aristotelian or eclectic. However, such minor corrections can hardly detract from Kristeller's achievements, and this collection of essays can be thoroughly recommended not only to those who wish to learn about the intellectual currents of the Renaissance, but also to those who wish to know more about late antiquity, the Western middle ages, and Byzantium. There can be few authors who illuminate so many fields in such a brief compass.

The most disappointing parts of the book are those which stray beyond the scholarly accumulation of facts and the discussion of historical trends into the more purely philosophical. From time to time Kristeller makes critical comments about the narrow scope of contemporary analytic philosophy, and he mentions with sadness that professional philosophers have been little interested in his courses and lectures (9); but there is another side to the coin. Apart from those few who are already attracted by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the average philosopher is likely to pay attention to Renaissance thinkers only if he is persuaded that their doctrines are of interest in themselves. Yet of many Renaissance treatises Kristeller himself tells us that they are precisely not of philosophical interest, writing that they 'often seem to lack not only originality, but also coherence, method, and substance.' (28) When Kristeller turns to more substantial writers, such as Cusanus and Pomponazzi, he gives an account of their thought which is too superficial and too often confused to attract the professional philosopher.

I shall illustrate these last remarks by considering briefly two papers, 'The Immortality of the Soul' (181 ff) and 'The Unity of Truth' (196 ff). In the former paper, Kristeller completely overlooks the extremely close relationship between mind-body dualism and doctrines of the immortality of the soul. As a result he dismisses the views of St. Thomas Aquinas too quickly (186) and he fails to place later discussions in their proper context. He ends with some remarks about our life being immortal 'insofar as in the comprehensive reality of the universe or, if you wish, of God, everything that once was or will be is

eternally present' (195), claims which call for a careful analysis they do not receive. He also speaks of the notion of immortality as being 'irrefutable by facts or reasons' (195-196) as if a notion somehow enjoyed propositional status. In the latter paper, he discusses the quest for the 'unity of truth' without making it clear what sense he attaches to this phrase. He could be talking about reality as a systematic whole; about reality as the sum total of states of affairs whether these are systematically linked or not; about the complete set of true propositions organized into a logical system; or about the complete set of true propositions whether these are logically linked or not. Until these options have been examined one cannot judge whether those Renaissance writers who spoke about unity were making trivial or substantial claims, and whether they were concerned with logic (in a broad sense) or with ontology. In both papers Kristeller attributes what he calls a dualistic theory to Pomponazzi, whereby the immortality of the soul is true as an article of faith, but cannot be demonstrated on rational or Aristotelian grounds. (192, 199) Yet Kristeller does not tell us whether Pomponazzi held the extreme view that both a proposition and its negation could be regarded as true; whether he saw faith as providing a different and stronger kind of evidence for a proposition than did reason unsupported by revelation; or whether he saw faith as opposed to any kind of evidence. The philosopher will certainly want an answer to such questions before he can assess the importance of Pomponazzi's writings. It is unfortunate that the copious footnotes do not provide any quotations from Renaissance thinkers which would enable the reader to settle some of the issues I have mentioned for himself.

To sum up: I cannot recommend this collection of essays to a professional philosopher who has no initial interest in the Renaissance, or who wants to discover the doctrines held by Renaissance philosophers. However, the collection cannot be recommended too highly to those who want to know about the background to both medieval and Renaissance thinkers, but who have not read the bulk of the essays in their earlier incarnations.

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LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA. *Report 15: Criteria for the Determination of Death*. 1981. English and French. Pp. 37. Available free of charge from the Commission, 130 Albert Street, Ottawa K1A OL6.

A person's death is above all an event in the life of a family, or of a community of friends. There is inevitably also a legal interest and a medical interest in death, but these should remain subservient to the point of view of the dying and those who are non-professionally attached to them.

The Law Reform Commission advocates legislated criteria for the determination of death in which 'a person is dead when an irreversible cessation of all that person's brain functions has occurred.' This is to replace the traditional criteria, according to which a person is dead when circulatory and respiratory functions have ceased.

One of the constraints recognized in the Report is that any proposed legislation must 'recognize standards and criteria generally accepted by the Canadian public.' Is the irreversible cessation of brain functions what ordinary people think of as death? The Report baldly asserts that 'the public...now accepts the proposition that total disappearance of all brain functions is equivalent to the death of a person.' If the view here attributed to the general public is that to have no brain functions is to *be* dead, then assuredly the attribution is mistaken. What the public no doubt does now accept is that someone in this condition *might as well* be dead, but that is an importantly different proposition, and one that lends no obvious support to the project of establishing new criteria for the determination of death.

Why is it thought desirable to revise our criteria for the determination of death anyway? According to the Report, 'the criteria for the determination of death represent a very real and practical problem faced almost every day by many practising physicians and hospital personnel.' It is now sometimes possible to maintain heart and breathing functions by artificial means even when brain functions have ceased. In such cases, doctors are uncomfortable about their moral and legal position. If they should remove the artificial support, have they killed a person, and if so, are they culpable?

There are undeniably problems here, but it seems little short of perverse to advocate so strange and conceptually violent a solution as the redefinition of death. A much more natural solution is surely to be found in the simple acceptance that there are no prospects for a person whose brain functions have ceased and that there is therefore no point in artificially maintaining heart and breathing functions. If our legal and moral ideas present obstacles to appropriate action at this point, then it is they, and not our criteria for death, that need revision.

There is of course also the matter of organ transplantation. It would be convenient if people could be declared dead even when they continued to breathe and blood continued to course through their veins, for then the supply of prime transplantable organs would be increased, and so more lives would be saved. In its *Working Paper 23*, which contains most of the

argumentation underlying the Report, the Commission insists that the 'definition' of death 'must not be conceived with a view to aiding transplantation; neither should it hinder them. It must be neutral on the issue.' This is surely exactly right. But in the Report itself there appears only a significantly weaker version of this principle. This weaker version says merely that 'the proposed legislation must not determine the criteria of death by reference only or mainly to the practice of organ transplantation.' Thus we are left with the uncomfortable thought that the transplantation interest may after all have played a crucial role in the proposed shift to the brain functions criteria for death.

A central feature of our concept of death is that it is a condition from which no man recovers. The advent of devices to re-start and artificially maintain breathing and circulatory functions may therefore give rise to the thought that the 'classical signs' of death (cessation of respiratory and cardiac functions) have been rendered obsolete. With this thought in mind it is tempting to look for signs of death in a vital organ or system which fails irrevocably when it fails. However, as is acknowledged in *Working Paper 23*, not even brain functions fail irrevocably when they fail. It is just that, in the brain, the onset of 'irreversible cellular damage' is much more rapid than in heart or lungs. Brain functioning cannot be revived after a few minutes have passed; heart and lungs can be revived for up to an hour or so. Thus, unless it can be shown that it is essential to our concept of death that death can confidently be pronounced within a few minutes rather than within an hour or so of the cessation of vital functioning, the advent of the new technology provides no grounds, from a physiological point of view, for a shift from breathing and circulatory criteria to brain functions criteria.

There is, in fact, some discussion in the Working Paper of the importance, for a variety of legal purposes, of being in a position 'to fix the time of death to the second or minute.' But surely the personal and social reality of death is not to be shaped by the exigencies of our legal system. The law must take the facts of death as it finds them. If these facts are in certain respects inconvenient, so much the worse for the law.

It is, indeed, the very *convenience* of the proposed new criteria that commends them. At a stroke, the new definition solves moral problems for doctors and hospital personnel, clarifies their legal position, and facilitates the transplantation enterprise. These advantages are, nonetheless, extrinsic to the question at hand; and nothing that is said in either the Report or the Working Paper has persuaded this reviewer to count a man as dead while his heart still beats.

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WILLIAM LYONS, *Gilbert Ryle.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. 240. US$ 30.00. ISBN 0-391-01800-0.

Philosophers progress and so, we hope, does philosophy. Consequently it comes as no surprise to find that there is often a hiatus in a philosopher's reputation: *after* the period of fashionable interest, but *before* the period of historical interest. Greatness is no bar to this occurrence: it happened to Russell as it happened to Aquinas, and it has happened to Ryle, 'whose voice,' as he wrote of Moore's, 'is never quite resuscitated by his printed words.' In *Gilbert Ryle* Lyons offers us an introduction to Ryle's philosophical views, intended to be 'digestible by a tyro in philosophy,' which will, he hopes, help to change this state of affairs.

In view of its intended audience, it's a difficult book to assess. The account of Ryle's views which we are offered is admirably straightforward and simple, as are the counter-arguments which Lyons considers. The difficulty with such a procedure is that Ryle was a constant and conscious enemy of oversimplification in philosophy. An inveterate enemy of *isms* and the standard philosophical howler of too facile classification and dichotomizing, he has often suffered from attacks and defences which alike missed the point he was after. The simplified arguments which, it may be, tyros need are precisely what Ryle was concerned not to offer.

Lyons concentrates on two main themes in Ryle's work: (i) his interest in the nature of philosophy and philosophical method, and his interest in philosophical puzzles not only in themselves, but also as objects on which to try out our philosophical tools; and (ii) his particular interest in using a number of these tools to expose and eradicate the mixture of mistakes that made up Cartesian dualism. This concentration means, understandably, that many interesting and important strands in Ryle's thought go unmentioned as well as unexamined, but Lyons is surely right in thinking these to be two of the main areas with which Ryle was concerned.

The emphasis within these areas is perhaps sufficiently indicated by the chapter headings: 'A Short Biography of Gilbert Ryle,' 'Ryle and the Nature of Philosophy,' 'Wielding Occam's Razor in the Logical Arena,' 'Category Mistakes and Dispositions,' 'Knowing How and Knowing That,' 'The Myth of Volitions,' 'The Bogey of Consciousness,' 'Sensation and Perception,' 'Imagination,' 'The Fatalist Dilemma,' 'Pleasure,' 'Technical and Untechnical Concepts,' 'Ryle's Three Accounts of Thinking,' and 'Concluding Remarks — Ryle's Behaviourism.' There is a short bibliography for each chapter. As the reader will have noted, this amounts to a fairly close adherence to the *Concept of Mind* topics, including Ryle's later views on thinking, with the addition of the biography, the two *Dilemmas* chapters, and the final pigeonholing chapter, which I would have been happy to see replaced by a discussion of, e.g., Ryle's anti-pigeon-holing 'Taking Sides in Philosophy.'

Ryle was 'prepared to find myself classified and classified justly as a "so-

and-so-ist,'' only [he added] I think that that is something to be apologetic about.' However, given that we are to have such a chapter, it might have been the place to point out that he thought such classifying philosophically uninteresting: 'the employment of such ''ism-labels'' should be reserved for our intervals of gossip and confession. They should not occur in philosophical discussions.' It should be added, however, that Lyons makes use of his discussion to stress the point that Ryle often paid insufficient (because no) attention to recent psychological discoveries.

The biography is strictly an intellectual biography, and even as an intellectual biography it is fairly austere: we hear next to nothing of Ryle's personal life or personality. This is not a criticism, merely a report: one can't do everything in a single book, but the reader must look elsewhere for a glimpse of Ryle's courage in sickness, his strength in difficulties, his unfailing support for his friends and pupils, his humour and good fellowship, his warmth and his occasional acerbity, and his restrained but sustained pleasure in life.

I think that, on its own terms, Lyons' book is, by and large, successful. He has identified important themes in Ryle's work, and within those themes, the arguments, claims, points, and suggestions he isolates for discussion are worth considering. His writing, throughout, is clear, uncomplicated, and easily understandable. The anti-Ryleans (on this or that point) that he introduces into his text deserve attention. However, although I think well of the book, I do have some qualifications to make. These mainly concern Lyons' arguments and presentations of points, and are often mainly a matter of emphasis.

I think, for example, that splitting the discussion of *imagination* into discussions of *imagining* and *imaging*, as Ryle began to do under the influence of Shorter's criticisms, might have helped the reader who doesn't know how much Ryle concentrated, initially, on constructions such as 'writing imaginatively,' or 'an imaginative child': his point was that *such* constructions, such uses of *imagine* and its cognates, were not caught at all by the Cartesian net. It's a different point to observe — with justice, as he himself was quick to acknowledge — that his account leaves us in the dark about the ability which some but not all human beings have to produce mental images: Ryle suggested using 'to image' as a technical term in this area in order, among other things, to keep the two distinct discussions separate. As far as I know, neither he nor the psychologists have given us helpful conceptual maps of this area, though Ryle pointed out, as usual, a number of traps, pitfalls, and snares into which the unwary might unwittingly wander.

Here are some more examples of uneasiness about presentation. They represent a selection picked, quite possibly unfairly, out of context, to give the reader an idea of what it is that I find troubling. And in doing so I may well be guilty of misemphasis myself.

On pp. 19-20, assessing Ryle's view of the nature of philosophy, Lyons asks whether this view is descriptive or normative, and answers that it 'is unlikely to be a descriptive thesis' because not all philosophers would agree, or would have agreed, with Ryle's account. He concludes, 'so it seems clear that Ryle's position must be the normative one that, no matter what

philosophers have previously thought philosophy was about, what philosophers nowadays ought to be doing is what he suggests.'

This is much too quick. Leaving aside the move from 'unlikely' to 'must,' and the assumption that 'descriptive'/'normative' is an exhaustive split (on which c. *CP* I. 41-2), there is the possibility, to put it no higher, that 'Ryle's philosophical ancestors' *et al.* might not have been describing their philosophically central activities accurately. Skilled people — an anti-Cartesian point of Ryle's, this — are by no means always the best, or even good, describers of their skills.

It may have been, as Lyons claims, that Locke 'would have described philosophy as, by and large, the empirically-based examination of the faculties and principles governing all aspects of the human mind,' and that Ryle is just wrong to read Locke (*CP*, I.127) as believing that 'philosophical inquiry into such subjects as the human understanding should not embody...the attempt to discover by experiment or hypothesis causal laws governing the occurrence of mental states and happenings,' but there is room for error here on both sides: Locke may have been wrong about philosophy (accepting Lyons' reading of Locke), including his own practice, or Ryle may have been wrong about Locke (and the others). This is, in short, one of the few places where the move from an *is* to an *ought* is invalid.

On p. 119 Lyons writes, 'If I explain a table by mentioning among other things that it has legs, I am not thereby committed to explaining legs in terms of little inner more fundamental legs.' This seems to miss the real force of Ryle's argument: if your notion of explanation, with respect to physical objects such as tables, involves offering an enumeration of their parts, which are themselves physical objects, then you can reasonably be asked for an enumeration of the parts' parts before the explanation is counted as complete. And if such explanations require an enumeration of parts at the *n*th stage, a *special* argument is needed to show that such enumeration is unnecessary at the $n + 1$th stage. There may be such arguments, but in their absence we are indeed committed to further explanations of the same type.

On p. 153 Lyons writes, 'another criticism that might be levelled at Ryle's solution to that Fatalist dilemma is that it would not be a solution to all or even, perhaps, the most common forms of Fatalism.' It's not clear to me that it *is* a criticism to remark that a writer's solution to problem p_1 is not a solution to problem p_2. Penicillin is not a cure for all or even most diseases, but it is a cure for some, and that's something. A more serious worry about the rather isolated chapter on fatalism is that it seems to miss the point of the type of fatalism that Ryle was concerned about. The worry is not alleviated by pointing out that 'true propositions do not causally determine future events,' because nobody supposed they did; the worry, rather, is this. Given that it's now true that '*e* has occurred,' it is thereby true that '*e* is now unpreventable.' Why, exactly, does this move fail for '*e* will occur'? The question has been extensively discussed by Prior, and by Rescher and Urquhart, and there is an interesting discussion of a relevantly similar point by von Weizsäcker and Hesse (in *Transcendental Arguments and Science*, ed. Bieri, *et al*), but

neither the text nor the bibliography — the most recent reference for this chapter is a 1964 paper — mention such discussions.

A final argument: discussing Ryle's suggestion that we should look for an adverbial analysis of thinking, so that we should concentrate on 'ϕ-ing thinkingly' (and on 'ϕ-ing unthinkingly') rather than on 'ϕ-ing and thinking', Lyons writes (191):

> Another more basic objection is that, if thinking is, as Ryle says, just an adverbial modification of activities and not itself an activity, how is it that some thinking is laborious and some easy, some fast and some slow? In short, if thinking is itself a modification, it ought not to be subject itself to modification.

Ryle used to call this the argument from the non-transferability of epithets. It's clearly a Leibniz's Law argument, but, or perhaps therefore, it has to be handled with care. I'm not sure that it works here. First of all, the last sentence overstates the case considerably. *Lots* of modifications are subject to modification. Swans fly with clumsy elegance, and my chess opponents defeat me with distressing ease, an ease which is distressing not only in itself but in its casualness: adverbs can certainly modify adverbs, and they can modify adverbs modifying adverbs — why not? But what about the central argument: that *because* thinking can be fast, slow, easy, laborious it cannot be adverbial? That modifications cannot be fast, etc. (only activities can) is an interesting claim, which I cannot discuss in detail here, but it seems suspect. For example, some people communicate information more quickly and more easily than others, but we might still be tempted to analyse communication as adverbial on uttering, for all that. Even more to the point, perhaps, acceleration can be fast or slow, easy or difficult, and acceleration certainly seems to be a modification — a modification of a modification on one straightforward reading: it's a second derivative, after all.

Lyons' book, then, is interesting and should be helpful to its intended audience. But it's not perfect, and that audience must be told to read it, as Lyons would wish, in a Rylean manner: with care and attention, not unthinkingly, and not uncritically, either. Just the way, in short, that Lyons would have them read Ryle.

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J.L. MACKIE, *Hume's Moral Theory*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P.; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. 161. CN$ 33.75; US$ 25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7100-0524-5); CN$ 16.95; US$ 12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-7100-0525-3).

Hume's Moral Theory is another book by the recently prolific J.L. Mackie. In various ways this book supplements *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Mackie finds in Hume views quite close to those which he himself developed in his earlier book. In fact, *Hume's Moral Theory* helped me to understand one puzzling feature of the earlier work. There, Mackie contended that objectivism in ethics was an ontological view, according to which certain acts and situations had 'queer' properties, which were at once objective and categorically prescriptive. I was puzzled by this understanding of objectivism and wondered whom Mackie regarded as model objectivists. Now I think I know: Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Richard Price, and Thomas Reid. (61 and 136-7) It is useful to study Mackie's two books on ethics together, and to recall his early (1946) article on the error theory of ethics when reading them. Some of the first theory remains in *Hume's Moral Theory*.

> Our ordinary moral judgments are indeed judgments, grammatically and conceptually. In part they ascribe to actions and characters both qualities and relations which they may indeed have, the 'natural' features on which the moral descriptions supervene. But they go beyond such natural descriptions to claim that, as a matter of objective truth, certain things must or must not be done, that there are objective requirements for or against possible actions, and hence also for or against the dispositions that would give rise to and be seen to be realized in such actions. Here what are ascribed are illusory features, and the illusion is generated in a complicated way by the interplay of our sentiments in social situations in which the illusion, once established and regularly employed, can play an important and perhaps useful part. (144)

In setting out Hume's theory, Mackie concentrates on its development in the *Treatise*, only very occasionally making reference to the later *Enquiry*. He refers, in addition, to three pertinent essays of Hume's: 'Of Taste,' 'Of the Original Contract,' and 'A Dialogue.' Mackie includes a chapter treating some predecessors — Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Clarke, Wollaston, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler — and another describing some successors — Smith, Price, and Reid. Both these chapters are well done — clearly and interestingly written, and useful in their location of Hume's theory in the context of British moral theory from Hobbes through to Reid.

In his study of Hume's thought on moral philosophy, Mackie deems himself to have established four central substantive points. First, the only coherent objectivism in ethics is some form of intuitionism. Second, the only plausible variant of sentimentalism is the objectification theory. Third, the

objectification theory requires expansion, along Humean lines, into a sociological theory of artificial virtues based on conventions arising out of game theory problems, particularly of the partial conflict sort. Fourth, sentimentalism, as thus developed, can 'give a better *explanation* of moral thinking as a whole than even a coherent, intuitionism, objectivism.' (145; my emphasis) This summary shows the strong connection which exists between Mackie's version of Hume and Mackie's own ideas in *Ethics*. The connection seemed to me to be well-established without any real distortion of Hume's *Treatise* view. Being unable to discuss all the salient aspects of this study, I shall select several specific questions and themes which seem to me to be of particular interest or importance.

In explaining and assessing Hume's arguments to the effect that morals, because they influence action, cannot be based on reason alone, Mackie raises the important issue of whether Hume simply stipulates on 'reason' in order to arrive at this important conclusion. (47 and 140) He observes that Hume did acknowledge that words like 'reason' and 'reasonable' are often associated with concerns for one's own long term interest and for the interests of other people. (As in, 'it's just not reasonable to spend the money it's taken a decade to save on one brief winter holiday,' and 'Be reasonable; you can't suppose that you are the only person affected by this re-zoning policy.' — my examples.) Yet in Hume's famous claim that morals cannot be derived from reason alone, it appears that 'reason' must mean what is used to calculate truth or falsity in a priori judgments about the relations of ideas, or in empirical judgments about matters of fact. One might, then, charge Hume with deriving a central point by merely stipulating as to what reason is. But, Mackie argues, such a charge could not establish anything of importance. Hume can reply that reason in the broad sense presupposes a *concern* for interests, and that reason in the narrower, Humean, sense does not. It is the narrower sense of reason which is the more fundamental, for 'the motivational aspect necessarily presupposes the intellectual'; whereas the converse does not hold. The point, then, would be that moral beliefs hold *only* for those who have a concern for interests; whereas beliefs which are rational in the narrower sense simply hold. (We may need some concern with something in order to bother discovering their truth or falsity, but that is obviously a different point.)

Mackie extracts from Hume an interesting way out of Prisoner's Dilemma situations, a solution which presupposes neither an overbearing Sovereign nor an elaborately reasoned, explicit promise or contract. He takes the suggestion from Hume's 'Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention tho' they have never given promises to each other.' (*Treatise*. Bk. III, Part II, section 2.) Developing this metaphor for social co-operation, Mackie suggests that a person might start to row a boat, just a little, to see whether another person would co-operate with him; if the other did, they would continue rowing, to their mutual advantage. And if one slackened off, trying for a free ride, the other could lessen his efforts accordingly. Mackie suggests that this model can be adapted to problems of many-person

co-operation by seeing the many-person situation as a cluster of two-person games. (*A* can be thought of as co-operating with *B and C,* and so on.) Thus, he says, Hume was correct in thinking that the problem of establishing property rules and respect for them could be solved by the gradual growth of a convention. (This, of course, is intended as a coherent possibility, not as an actual historical account.) Hume's own words were:

> I observe that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part. Two men who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconvenience of transgressing it.

Mackie's additions here strike me as useful and plausible developments of Hume's thought. I confess that I find his simple way out of such dilemmas to be more sensible and intelligible than the intricate quantified analyses which are fashionable in many circles these days.

Mackie does not do quite so well with Hume's puzzling insistence that 'all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives.' After a rather complex discussion, he decides that Hume's account can only be made coherent by relaxing this view, but that Hume himself did not relax the view. But even after several readings, I found Mackie'd discussion (78-80) confusing, and Hume's position still hard to comprehend.

Mackie acknowledges that Hume overplayed the importance of property in justice and the nature of human conflicts. (94) However, he does not give this point the emphasis or attention it deserves. Hume, talking about *justice*, begins immediately to speak of the security and transference of possessions. He said in the *Treatise* that 'No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, *there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concert.*' (My emphasis.) This strikes me as an amazing assumption, one which is absolutely basic to the way in which Hume (and Mackie, following him) developed an

account of justice. If Hume had believed that disputes about religion, child-rearing, education, or international policy could be powerful sources of human conflict, how would he have amended and developed his account of justice? Would he have developed gradualist, conventionalist accounts of the development of rights other than property rights? Could such accounts be developed? This strikes me as an interesting line of inquiry which Mackie, having perceived the implausibility of Hume's strong assumption about property and human conflict, could have developed.

Another place where Mackie seems to have missed an opportunity for exploration is in his discussion of Hume's account of the artificial virtues of female chastity and modesty. Annette Baier and Louise Marcil-Lacoste have recently offered comments on Hume's account of this matter, the latter from a strongly feminist perspective. Mackie's brief discussion shows no awareness of these interesting discussions, and his own suggestions for improving Hume's view seem anachronistic and inegalitarian:

> Yet presumably there is some process by which the world has created these sentiments naturally and without reflection, and indeed at least the outline of a better explanation could be constructed with Hume's materials. First, if wives are seen as being in some ways analogous to property — for example, as a potential source of conflict — then the same sorts of consideration that produce the rules of honesty with regard to property and that support both the practice of these rules and moral approval of them will generate rules which condemn adultery, but condemn both the men and the women who engage in it. But, secondly, since the harm done by adultery is seen as affecting more directly the situation in which the woman is involved, the pressure against it will be directed more towards her than towards the man. Thirdly, in a male-dominated society, women, in their own interest, must aim at being wanted as wives and at continuing to be so wanted ... (119)

This discussion ends with a remark, quoted with apparent approval, to the effect that 'It is certain that modesty communicates an invincible attraction to women.'

There is a curiously unsatisfying aspect to Hume's moral theory. Hume sought to *explain* moral thinking; he did not seek to justify any particular normative views. And yet there is a kind of deep way in which the theory works to preserve the *status quo*, in something like the way functionalism in social theory did. Mackie very nicely reflects Hume's stance in his book, and captures it in the following statement:

> One might have thought there was another question, 'What sorts of action or character are virtuous or vicious?' In so far as this means 'What sorts are generally regarded as virtuous or vicious?', Hume

> does indeed go on to answer it. But in so far as it calls for either a report or an expression of Hume's own sentiments, it is not answered, except that Hume shows that he is willing, on the whole, to go along with conventional views, while enjoying the ironical exposure of the extent to which they have been determined by mere imagination. (76)

Some of us might well wish to reach a more activist stance than ironic enjoyment, and this is bound to make us seek for an account of the moral life which tries to do more than *explain* how it is that moral thinking goes on as it does. We might feel this way when we read Hume's bland remark that civil society has a lesser interest in male chastity than in female chastity, that men have, therefore, a proportionately weaker obligation to remain chaste, and that 'to prove this we need only appeal to the practice and sentiments of all nations and ages.' (*Treatise*, Book III, Part II, section 12) Such desires provide the incentive for an objectivist ethics, though not its substance.

I believe that studying this book is useful both for understanding Hume and as a supplement to Mackie's own recent noncognitivist view. *Hume's Moral Theory* is a solid exposition of Hume's view (in the *Treatise*) and a useful development of Mackie's own ideas. Although it avoids normative challenges, it is a worthy, careful, and interesting book.

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C.B. MACPHERSON, *Burke*. Pp. 83. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980. CN$ 16.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-287519-1); CN$ 2.85 (paper: ISBN 0-19-287518-3). New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux 1980. US$ 2.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8090-1415-7).

This contribution to the 'Past Masters' series serves as a general introduction to Edmund Burke's life and thought and to Burke historiography, while arguing an important and novel claim about Burke: that the key to understanding Burke is acknowledging his support for capitalist market relations. That support, Macpherson argues, is a constant that, depending on the question at hand and the political circumstances of Burke's intervention, gives rise to apparently contradictory positions on such questions as the American and French

Revolutions, Ireland, Speehamland and indeed all the many important questions of late eighteenth century English politics on which Burke took a decisive stand.

While novel in its application to Burke, the claim is familiar enough for readers of Macpherson. It is essentially an application of the line of argument developed for Hobbes, the Levellers and Locke in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford 1962). Macpherson argued there that apparent inconsistencies in these writers' views could be resolved by attending to their underlying political economic commitments — to the emerging capitalist organization of European and particularly English society and to a corresponding ('possessive individualist') vision of proper social and economic arrangements. This line of argument is here applied to Burke.

The application is ingenious in view of Burke's very evident support for traditional society. In Macpherson's reading, the specificity of late 18th century English society accounts for the apparent incongruity. Burke could be both for tradition and for liberal capitalism because, unique in Europe, the England of Burke's day was already substantially organized around capitalist market relations. Capitalism was already traditional. And Burke's achievement was to realize how, for England, 'the capitalist society of the late eighteenth century was still heavily dependent on the acceptance of status.' (69) So far from being antagonistic, as one might suppose in the abstract, traditional society and capitalist market relations were mutually supportive in Burke's time and place. In Macpherson's account, Burke's politics and political theory reflect this situation precisely.

As he does throughout his writings, Macpherson insists that the commitment to capitalist market relations, however progressive it may once have been, has long ago ceased to be of pertinence. Thus despite the best efforts of some (mainly conservative) political philosophers, Burke cannot be made to stand forth as a philosopher for our time. There is, Macpherson insists, something to be learned from Burke's skilful adjustment of principles to circumstances, but circumstances now are so different from in Burke's day, that the relevance of Burke, dependent as his thought is on capitalist political economy, is today virtually nil.

This short book is of substantial interest on two counts. It is, of course, an important contribution to Burke scholarship and therefore to the history of political theory. But it is also an addendum to the Macpherson *oeuvre*. As such, it offers few surprises; but it is, as is all of Macpherson's work, engaging and informative. Those of us who think Macpherson the far more important — and pertinent — political philosopher will find this book interesting, as it were, for its Macphersonism, as much as for its Burke scholarship. *Burke* is a cogent and lively application of Macpherson's life-long critical assault on possessive individualism, undertaken on a new — but, it turns out, quite appropriate — terrain.

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DON MANNISON, MICHAEL McROBBIE, AND RICHARD ROUTLEY, eds., *Environmental Philosophy*. Canberra: Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University 1980. Pp. 385. ISBN 0-909596-39-5.

Books, journal articles, and even entire journals devoted to exploring issues in environmental *ethics* are not uncommon now, but as the title of this book indicates, its philosophical scope includes more than ethics. The volume is divided into two roughly equal parts. The first and shorter part consists of essays mainly on issues in environmental ethics. The second part consists of essays on issues in what the editors call 'environmental philosophy.' Presumably the editors do not wish to suggest that ethics is not a part of philosophy, or that environmental ethics is not a part of environmental philosophy, but mean to distinguish between the part of environmental philosophy which is fairly well-known — environmental ethics — and other parts of it which are less well-known, and have as yet no commonly-accepted labels.

The attempt to give labels to these parts might well suggest how penetrating — and how radical — some of the essays in the second part of the book are. The massive essays by Richard and Val Routley explore what it is tempting to call environmental logic, environmental theories of reference, environmental metaphysics, and environmental political philosophy. Other essays in the second part of the book explore environmental political philosophy (Robert Young and Gary Malinas), environmental aesthetics (Lloyd Reinhardt and Don Mannison), and environmental economics (Robert Young and Robert Meyer).

The oddity of prefixing 'environmental' or 'ecological' to the names of traditional areas of philosophy was not lost on at least one of the contributors. Remarking on what he calls 'ecological ethics,' John McCloskey says, wickedly,

> As a newcomer to the field of ecological ethics, I have been at some pains to discover precisely what is meant by those who write about and are concerned with problems of ecological ethics. At first glance, it might seem that ecological ethics paralleled Christian ethics, Buddhist ethics, and were the ethics of those who believed in ecology. Obviously this is not so. (65)

By the time one has finished this essay, it is *not* obvious that this is not so. McCloskey himself argues that, as contrasted with past work in ethics, what is new in environmental ethics is not true, and what is true is not new. The distinctive, newer elements in environmental ethics, the elements provided by those who 'believe in ecology,' may well strike many philosophers as akin to the religious elements in Christian or Buddhist ehtics. See, e.g., Lloyd Reinhardt's essay (190) on 'blasphemy.'

Fortunately, most of this volume goes far in dispelling the impression that environmental ethics is simply the ethics of a certain cult. And it allows one to see that even if it *were* the ethics of a certain cult, its adherents are making claims that have truth-conditions, and are making a reasoned attack on philosophical claims that are widely-accepted. What matters is whether a good enough *case* can be made for what those who 'believe in ecology' tend to believe. And since much of what those who 'believe in ecology' believe presupposes or implies important views in metaphysics, political philosophy and aesthetics, there is ample warrant for looking at many areas of philosophy from an ecological point of view. Yet this has seldom been attempted, and the attempts with which I am familiar fall short of the philosophical standard set by the essays in this volume. The volume thus fills an important void, and should be an invaluable resource for anyone teaching or doing research in environmental ethics.

The writers of these essays — Robert Elliott, William Godfrey-Smith, Roger Lamb, Gary Malinas, Don Mannison, John McCloskey, Michael McRobbie, Robert Meyer, Lloyd Reinhardt, Richard and Val Routley, and Robert Young — are with only one exception listed as having affiliation with philosophy departments in various Australian universities. All but two of the essays were originally presented as papers at philosophy conferences in Australia. Inevitably, perhaps, the papers have a certain 'in-house' quality; they presuppose a good bit about their audience, and many of their writers share assumptions which might be challenged elsewhere, and challenge assumptions shared elsewhere. But this makes for provocative reading and for some fresh insights.

There is far too rich an array of these insights to attempt to summarize or even mention most of them in the compass of a brief critical notice. One will find, in various of these essays, provocative and often original remarks on: why other species ought to be preserved, intrinsic and instrumental value, vandalism, subjectivism, habitat preservation, the value of uniqueness, the value of diversity, Aldo Leopold's 'land ethic,' rights, privileges, wrongs, duties, interests, preferences, 'human chauvinism,' 'animal liberation,' intuitionism, stewardship, respectful use, carnivorousness, Marxism, anarchism, parts, wholes, holism, relations, reference, intentionality, empiricism, self-interest, individuals, needs, the 'commons,' community, population-size, planning, coercion and the concept of growth. Unfortunately, the book is not indexed.

The 'bulk of the volume,' as the editors remark, consists of two massive essays (99pp., and 115pp.) by Val and Richard Routley. Since a good many of the other essays show the influence of the Routleys' work, either by accepting or rejecting it, I will reserve what space there is for detailed comment here for these central essays. The first, 'Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics,' sketches out some promising positions, but struck me as neither well-organized nor argued with sufficient fairness and consistency. The use of counterexamples in the article is not reassuring. On p. 121 the 'last man' example is invoked against 'Western ethics.' Prominent in 'Western ethics' is

a principle the Routleys call 'D,' namely, (117), 'one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' The last man example has it that 'The last man (or woman or person) surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly, if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.' (117)

The Routleys conclude, on the basis of this and like counterexamples, that (126) 'what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic assumptions of the Western super-ethic are environmentally inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superceded by a more environmentally adequate ethic.' One is later surprised to see that the Routleys apparently play by different rules on offense than they do on defense. They refer (173) to 'a range of difficult decision cases thrown up for an environmental ethics,' and warn us against 'chauvinistic philosophers who *like* to direct such examples against environmental evaluations — as if, furthermore, the examples were quite conclusive...' They go on to add that '... an environmental ethic should not be expected to provide a decision procedure for any and every case that may arise: the theory (and accompanying intuitions) may have to be developed to resolve some cases, while other cases may go (cheerfully) undecided.' We are never told why 'Western ethics' cannot let the 'last man' case and others of its fanciful ilk go 'cheerfully undecided.' Instead, these cases are clearly regarded as 'quite conclusive.' Heads — we win; tails, you lose. This seems not only less than fair; it raises difficult questions about the role of counterexamples, the methodology of evaluating alternative ethics, and the role of remote, 'possible world' examples in an area of philosophy which, perhaps more than any other, is and ought to be constrained by the actual world. These questions are not adequately addressed in the article.

The second piece by the Routleys is, in my judgment, much better argued, and is an excellent contribution to the understanding of the metaphysical, logical and other non-ethical foundations and implications of environmental ethics. They argue — compellingly, I think — that a conception of the individual adequate for environmental ethics will be non-reductionist; that is, it will neither reduce individuals to peculiar traces of social or other holistic influences, nor will it reduce social or other wholes to the individuals in them. They distinguish, then, between 'partism' and 'holism,' seeing that 'partism' is associated with much empiricist and capitalist thought, and that holism is associated with much idealistic and state-socialist thought. They offer lucid and penetrating criticisms of both tendencies.

The development of the Routleys' own 'no-reduction' view is not very extensive, despite the essay's massive size, and it is richer in suggestive metaphors than in literal details. But their work here is genuinely pioneering, and it is perhaps premature to expect more at this stage. The Routleys' treatment of the interdependence of people with one another and of the human species with others is already placed on a far more solid metaphysical and

logical foundation than previous attempts of which I am aware. They have taken seriously the classical view that ethics must rest upon metaphysical foundations, and that central among these foundations will a conception of the properties of individual human beings and of our relations with other individuals of our own species and of others. The essay stands as a landmark effort in environmental philosophy as is, and no serious student in the area should overlook it.

Potential buyers of the book should perhaps know that it is bound in a sturdy soft cover, with reasonably wide margins on large pages, but that it is a reproduction of a typescript.

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FRANÇOIS MARTY, *La naissance de la métaphysique chez Kant. Une étude sur la notion kantienne d'analogie.* Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie, Nouvelle série, 31. Paris: Beauchesne 1980. 592 p.

François Marty, l'excellent collaborateur à l'édition récente de Kant dans la *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade*, a défendu en Sorbonne, il y a quelques années, une thèse d'état sur la notion kantienne d'analogie. La publication de cette étude conduite à travers tout l'*opus* kantien d'une importante notion étrangement négligée par les chercheurs était attendue de tous ceux qui en savaient l'existence. Les contraintes du monde de l'édition n'auront cependant pas permis à cette attente d'être complètement satisfaite. D'une part, François Marty ne peut nous présenter aujourd'hui que les morceaux de son travail qui portent sur l'usage de la notion d'analogie dans les trois *Critiques* et dans la *Religion*. (11) D'autre part, on soupçonne les mêmes contraintes de l'édition d'avoir eu pour second effet le renvoi en position ancillaire de

l'étude de cet usage. Car, à en croire le goût du jour, il ne suffit pas qu'une étude d'histoire de la philosophie soit excellente, voire pertinente. Il lui faut encore sacrifier à sa pertinence. L'étude de la notion kantienne d'analogie doit donc servir de *'point d'appui'* (7), ici à la détermination d'un *'statut du discours métaphysique'* compatible avec *'l'avènement de la science moderne'* (11) et le titre de la thèse d'état (ou presque au témoignage de la *Préface* à l'édition de Kant dans la *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade*, p. xv) devenir le sous-titre du livre. Le goût du jour et de l'édition a la vue courte, si l'on me permet cette métaphore prédiquée d'une métaphore. Quelqu' authentique que soit la pertinence retenue, elle rend difficile l'exploitation de l'étude d'histoire à d'autres fins. Nous rendrons donc compte du livre de F. Marty comme s'il avait son sous-titre pour titre. En faisant ainsi contrepoids, nous espérons le rendre plus aisément utilisable, tel la culture selon Kant, à toutes sortes de fins.

Le bilan de cette *'étude sur la notion kantienne d'analogie'* se résume alors comme suit: 1) une table des occurrences du terme; 2) une exégèse des principaux textes de Kant qui portent sur la notion même d'analogie; 3) une quadripartition des usages de la notion; 4) une maxime d'interprétation; 5) deux études sectorielles exhaustives; 6) enfin une thèse relative au *'statut du discours métaphysique.'*

1). Le livre de F. Marty se termine par une table des *'occurrences des termes de la racine 'analogie' dans l'oeuvre de Kant'* (574 à 580; à la page 580, lire *'t. 22'* plutôt que *'t.2'*). Etant donné que le *Wortindex* de l'*Akademie Ausgabe* risque d'être à jamais privé du *Stellenindex* qui le rendrait efficace, il faut remercier F. Marty d'avoir consulté, avec l'aimable autorisation du Dr. Gerresheim, les *listings* de Mainz. A moins que, disciple des Cyniques, on soit contre les index lorsqu' *électroniques*.

2). Le livre de F. Marty nous permet d'embrasser d'un seul regard les principaux textes à l'occasion desquels Kant développe sa théorie de l'analogie. a) Le paragraphe 84 de la *Logique* distingue le raisonnement *par induction* du raisonnement *par analogie*. F. Marty établit une relation biunivoque entre le premier et l'analogie *'parfaite,'* le second et l'analogie *'moins parfaite'* de l'*Enquête* humienne. (130) Cette dernière analogie coïncide par ailleurs avec celle des *Dialogues*. (123) b) A179-180, B222-223 situe l' *'analogie de l'expérience'* par rapport à l'analogie mathématique, celle-là ne permettant plus de connaître *a priori* le quatrième terme. (76-77) c) Le paragraphe 58 des *Prolégomènes* troque l'analogie *humienne* de ressemblance imparfaite entre deux choses, c'est-à-dire l'analogie de la *Logique*, pour une analogie proprement *kantienne*. (138 à 143) Celle-ci consiste en *'une ressemblance parfaite de deux relations entre choses tout à fait dissemblables.'* On peut invoquer aussi en ce sens (415) le paragraphe 90 de la *Critique de la faculté de juger*. d) En distinguant entre l' *'hypotypose schématique'* et l' *'hypotypose symbolique'* (qui s'appuie sur l'analogie), le paragraphe 59 de la même *Critique* fait comprendre rétroactivement pourquoi la *Critique de la raison*

pratique préférait interpréter le *type* comme *symbole* plutôt que *schème*. (259) e) Que schématisme et analogie n'en demeurent cependant pas moins espèces d'un même genre, celui de la '*Versinnlichung*,' la *Religion* (vi, 64-65) en témoigne enfin qui distingue plutôt entre le '*schématisme de détermination de l'objet' et le 'schématisme d'analogie.'* (433)

3). F. Marty énumère en fait quatre usages du terme '*analogie*' chez Kant. (514 à 518) Un usage *a*, celui de la *Logique* qui correspond, on l'a dit, à l'analogie '*moins parfaite*' de l'*Inquiry* ou à l'analogie des *Dialogues*. Un usage *b* rendu célèbre par les '*analogies de l'expérience*' qui doivent être comprises comme '*affermissement conceptuel*' (132) de l'analogie '*parfaite*' de l'*Inquiry* (138) et/ou de l' '*analogie de la nature*' des *Regulae philosophandi* newtoniennes. (71 à 74) Parallèlement, l'analogie comme '*ressemblance parfaite de deux relations entre choses tout à fait dissemblables*' doit se comprendre comme '*affermissement conceptuel*' (142) de l'analogie '*moins parfaite*' de l'*Inquiry* ou de l'analogie des *Dialogues* de Hume et de la *Logique* de Kant. S'agit-il de penser l'intelligible, elle affranchit alors le théiste de l' '*anthropomorphisme dogmatique*.' (179) C'est l'usage *c*. S'agit-il, par ailleurs et par exemple, d'établir la table des catégories à partir de celle des jugements (483), elle désigne '*le procédé de constitution du discours critique.*' (473) C'est l'usage *d*.

4). Kant tantôt émet des réserves à l'égard du procédé analogique, tantôt en fait l'éloge. Comment s'y retrouver? F. Marty nous propose un fil conducteur. Kant est-il réservé? Le terme est à entendre en son usage *a*. Sont citées à titre d'exemples, les occurrences du terme dans le quatrième moment (A625-6, B653-4) de l'argument physico-théologique (170) et dans la division des beaux-arts esquissée au paragraphe 51 de la troisième *Critique*. (336) La chose est à suivre.

5). Les chapitres 9 et 10 du livre de F. Marty consacrés à la *Religion* et à la '*constitution du discours critique*' se recommandent par le commentaire de *toutes* les occurrences du terme '*analogie*' dans un secteur donné. Le dixième chapitre, pour ne retenir que celui-là, se préoccupe des analogies entre a) *Analytique* et *Dialectique* de la première *Critique*, b) entre usage logique et usage réel (475), c) entre les *Analytiques* des premières *Critiques* (491 à 493), d) entre entendement et raison d'une part et faculté de juger de l'autre (501), e) entre la position médiane de cette dernière et celle du sentiment de plaisir et de peine (503), f) entre les trois facultés de connaître supérieures et les trois *Critiques*. (561) Des six exégèses proposées, seule la quatrième ne nous paraît pas irréprochable. La finalité prêtée au vivant représente-t-elle vraiment un '*cas particulier*' (375) de celle que prête le principe transcendantal de la faculté de juger? N'y a-t-il pas plutôt, comme l'écrit J.D. McFarland, '*a paradoxical split between a system of* purposively *organized empirical laws and the particular* purposive *things which we cannot imagine being produced by them*' (*Kant's Concept of Teleology* (U.E.P. 1970) 97. Nous

soulignons.)? Aussi, la finalité prêtée par le principe transcendantal de la faculté de juger n'est-elle que '*subjective*' (vs F. Marty, 374). Voir Giorgio Tonelli, *Kant-Studien,* volume 49, 154 à 166. — Disons enfin notre estime pour l'explication avancée au refus déroutant par la troisième *Critique* (paragraphe 65) de voir dans le vivant un '*analogon de la vie*.' (384)

6). F. Marty caractérise le '*discours métaphysique*' comme '*relecture*.' (16, 367 à 533) Cette métaphore également employée pour éclairer le procédé analogique (16) et pour désigner '*le rapport de transformation qui joint deux textes*' (32) nous gêne par son équivocité: la *relecture* par Kant de l'analogie des *Dialogues* débouche sur une notion d'analogie comme *relecture* qui nous habilite à son tour à définir le discours métaphysique comme *relecture*. Nous sabrerions volontiers dans toutes ces 'relectures' pour résumer la forte thèse de F. Marty de la manière suivante: la correction apportée par Kant à la notion d'analogie des *Dialogues* le dispense d'avoir à proclamer, voire à provoquer la *fin* de la métaphysique (voir p. 424, la référence au titre du livre de Lebrun). La métaphysique dont Kant déclare plutôt la *naissance* s'annonce, pour parodier les *Fortschritte,* comme '*praktisch-symbolische Metaphysik*.' Son discours procède selon l'analogie. Dans sa célèbre opposition au '*connaître,*' le '*penser*' s'appuie sur le '*schématisme d'analogie*.' D'aucuns diront qu'ils le savaient déjà. Certains l'auront peut-être écrit en passant. François Marty l'a prouvé.

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PETTIT, PHILIP, *Judging Justice: An Introduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P.; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. ix + 193. CN$ 31.95; US$ 25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7100-0563-6); CN$ 13.50; US$ 11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7100-0571-7).

Philip Pettit's *Judging Justice* is billed as an introduction to contemporary political philosophy, and on this score I find the book very successful. It does

the things any good introduction should do and does them well. Pettit's first concern is to provide the beginner a framework with which to understand the role of political philosophy and the problems with which it deals. Secondly, he describes a method by which to choose between rival theories, and finally he sets out and evaluates the theories which are presently the most influential. Each chapter ends with a helpful summary of points raised and numerous suggestions for further reading. The book, therefore, is quite useful for the beginner, though it must be noted that this is a sophisticated introduction which will also be of interest to the professional reader.

Pettit's framework for understanding political philosophy consists of a description of social life in terms of civil, economic, and legal practices. Political issues which arise in society are concerned with how far, and by what means, these practices should be reordered and reinforced. A society's solution to these issues is what Pettit calls its social charter.

The role of political philosophy is characterized as identifying a just social charter. This involves specifying a criterion of justice. A criterion may consist of one or more values to be considered. To be complete criteria, those specifying more than one value must indicate how the values are to be weighed in assessing a social charter. While several positions counsel despair of ever finding a complete criterion of justice, Pettit argues that one should fully explore the possibility of finding such a criterion before taking them seriously. He therefore turns to the question of how to choose between rival criteria of justice.

The method described is basically Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. The political philosopher begins with certain intuitive judgements concerning justice which he is naturally disposed to make after some consideration. He then seeks a criterion which will account for these judgments. After proposing a criterion he determines whether it fits his original judgments and whether its further implications fit his intuitions. If the fit is not perfect he can adjust either the criterion or his intuitive judgments until they reach reflective equilibrium.

Pettit turns, finally, to consideration of the three criteria of justice which are presently the most influential. The views considered are the 'proprietarian' criterion, represented by Robert Nozick, the utilitarian criterion, and the contractarian criterion, represented by John Rawls.

Pettit notes that these criteria have two things in common. First, they are single value criteria, the values being respectively legitimacy, welfare, and fairness. Second, they are individualistc, i.e., they hold that the purpose of social institutions is to serve the interests of individuals and that social institutions are perfectible in regard to this purpose.

Pettit pauses at this point to defend the individualistic nature of these theories against an objection represented by what he calls 'institutionalism.' The issue between the institutionalist and the individualist concerns whether social institutions have causal powers over and above the causal powers of the individuals of which they are composed. The institutionalist holds that they do and therefore doubts whether institutions either are answerable to

the interests of individuals or are malleable to efforts to perfect them. Pettit's argument against institutionalism consists of the claim that we all possess what he calls a humanistic conception of human agents, that accepting institutionalism means giving up this conception, and finally that this conception cannot be given up. The humanistic conception of agents holds that any event which is characterized as a human action is the result of a state of mind of the agent which 'rationalizes' the behavior. This state of mind involves beliefs and desires which are intentional and subject to pressures of practical and theoretical rationality. Pettit believes this conception cannot be given up because to do so would make interaction between persons impossible. Accepting institutionalism, however, means giving up this conception because the events that institutions are invoked to explain are events which the humanistic conception would explain by reference to the beliefs and desires of individuals. To deny the adequacy of this individualistic explanation would be to deny the humanistic conception of agents.

Having defended individualism, Pettit turns to the criteria of justice in question. While I will not go into detail concerning his exposition of these views, I will say that I find his accounts clear, concise, and interesting. After explaining each view, Pettit examines their implications for the just social charter and then assesses the adequacy of each.

While Pettit raises many interesting points in each assessment, the really crucial criticisms, it seems to me, come down to the test of reflective equilibrium. On this count Rawls' criterion wins a qualified victory. Pettit argues that Nozick's criterion would justify inequalities of wealth, and inherited privilege and deprivation, and this he cannot square with his considered judgments. Similarly, he argues that utilitarianism has inegalitarian consequences which he cannot accept. Only Rawls' criterion, Pettit argues, does not offend the test of reflective equilibrium in any obvious way. Thus his ultimate conclusion is that Rawls' approach deserves further consideration before one abandons the search for a complete criterion of justice.

This brings me to a difficulty I have with Pettit's argument. After describing the method of reflective equilibrium, Pettit notes that its results may be given either an 'instrumentalist' or 'realist' reading. On an instrumentalist reading the criterion obtained is simply an instrument for knowing in advance how a particular theorist and those who share his intuitions will likely judge questions of justice. On a 'realist' reading the criterion purports to offer insight into how things are with respect to justice. Pettit leaves open the question of how to read the results of this method. But in leaving this question open, Pettit has left open the logical status of his conclusions. Does Pettit think Rawls' view has said something right about how things are in respect to justice, or is he simply pointing out that his intuitions about justice are similar to Rawls'? If he means the latter then I think he is playing into the hand of skeptical positions he wishes to avoid. Were there no disputes over judgments of justice then there would be no problem. But in fact reasonable men have serious disagreements. Therefore, an instrumentalist reading of the criterion would be of only subjective interest. Further, however, I am not

sure that Pettit could defend a 'realist' reading of the method. On this reading the criterion purports to be about how things are in respect to justice. The problem is that the starting point of the method is still the conflicting intuitions of reasonable men, and no way is agreed upon to distinguish correct from incorrect intuitions. An alternative method which Pettit rather dogmatically rejects seeks a foundation for a criterion of justice in indubitable first principles. An excellent example of this approach may be found in Alan Gewirth's *Reason and Morality* (U. of Chicago Press 1978). While this approach may also fail, it needs to be taken seriously by anyone interested in a rationally-grounded criterion of justice.

In conclusion, it must be said that Pettit has produced an excellent introduction which I highly recommend.

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GEOFFREY PILLING, *Marx's Capital: Philosophy and Political Economy*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P.; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. 215. CN$ 37.50; US$ 27.50. ISBN 0-7100-0516-4.

Most Marxists are inclined to think of dialectical method as the cornerstone of their science. In many respects this attachment to dialectical method is difficult to fault, even a measure of Marxist rationality. For who but apologists for the status quo would suppose that reality, especially social reality, is fixed and not changing? Who but the very naive would conceive of the world process as made up of isolated given particulars, rather than historically interrelated fields and wholes? Who but the methodologically lost would think that one-sided viewpoint was preferable to totality or, at least, greater inclusiveness of viewpoint? Who, indeed, would even deny that the principle of development through conflict is a structural feature of the historical world?

Of course, very many would: usually not explicitly, but by entrapment in formalist and positivist methods. And it is these standard paralyses of thought whose unconscious function it is to sustain the sociopolitical order by their confinement to the purely abstract and given, that 'dialectical materialism' is above all concerned to reject.

On the other hand, dialectical method has with Marxists also standardly meant a set of 'laws' whose formulae are less easy to accept — 'all reality is contradiction,' 'the essence of dialectic lies in the identity of opposites,' 'changes of quantity inexorably give rise to changes of quality,' and 'the negation of the negation is a law of development,' for example. Even if one could specify what these 'laws' empirically mean, and therefore what in fact they rule out, what they add to the preceding principles other than idealist parlance is either obscure or of dubious truth-value. Moreover, very important conceptual limits and qualifications are necessary before endorsing even these more sensible dialectical principles of change, interrelation and development-through-conflict. As I have argued elsewhere, Marx also correctly emphasizes economic-structural *constancy*, productive force *primacy* and systematic *correspondence* in his historical materialist theory.* In consequence, the relationship of such apparently a-dialectical principles to his dialectical ones requires at least some careful clarification if we are to understand what his 'demystified' dialectical method really involves.

The problem has been that Marxists have so long thrown about the idea of dialectical method in an uncritical, catch-all way that no very precise methodological program has emerged to give it the cutting edge it requires to rout once and for all the formalist and positivist dogmas. On the contrary, it is never very clear which of many possible principles or meanings are meant by Marxists when the Hegelian phraseology of dialectics is employed. That all living wholes change through internal dynamics over time is surely undeniable, but to believe that this change involves 'contradictions' and a 'law of the negation of the negation' seems an idealist confusion of logical categories with material processes: a confusion which Marxists would seem above all required to eschew. But they do not. Thus we seldom know whether it is idealist or materialist interpretations of dialectic which are at stake when unspecific appeals by Marxists to 'dialectical method' are made. Invocation of its phraseology without precise propositional burden has, indeed, become a kind of incantation in the school, a way of making a point or a rebuttal with nothing very *material* being advanced. This tradition begins in earnest with Engels (Marx admitted only to a 'coquetting' with Hegel's dialectical language), and is nowhere more aggressive than with Lenin who, in evident bewitchment by the spell of the Absolute Idea, declares that 'no one can understand *Capital* without having first read all of Hegel's *Logic*'!

Pilling's book is self-described as a vindication of Lenin's claim. It is not, but it does attempt to show that *Capital*, or at least those main strands of it upon which Pilling focuses — namely, the commodity, value and political economy — are dialectically structured in their conceptions and arguments, and cannot be understood without a grounding in dialectical method. In

many ways, Pilling really does spell out *what* dialectical principles he has in mind here, and *why* he thinks they constitute the very logic of Marx's critique of capitalism. To this extent, Pilling's is a welcome work which, in surpassing merely incantational dialectic, establishes at least some important aspects of dialectical method on a firmer, more scientific footing. His central arguments are: (1) Political economic categories and the socioeconomic reality to which they relate are in a constant state of development to which vulgar and formalist economics can in principle never be explanatorily adequate; (2) Capital and its rent, industrial and finance forms are not separate things, but social relations whose diversity is underpinned by a unifying law of surplus labour extraction; (3) Commodities are constituted by exchange-value and use-value aspects in whose opposition the germ of economic crises resides; and (4) The fetishism of commodities is no mere illusion, but a phenomenal reflection of the real capitalist process of supplanting relations between persons by relations between capital-bearing things. Although the reader may become exasperated by Pilling's desultory presentation — the book is badly pell-mell and one has to distil out its essential arguments — his major points are substantially made overall, and fly over and over again in the face of fashionable complacencies about the silliness of Marx's dialectics, his social labour theory of value, his regard of capitalism as inhuman, and his prediction of its inevitable downfall.

Pilling also scores points of varying validity against socialist economists who have backed off Marx's theories in this or that respect, Althusser (whose long-winded anti-humanism seems at last to be coming to well-deserved rejection), and both minor and classical bourgeois economic theorists from Ricardo to the present. He also brings to light the little known Soviet economists Rosdolsky and Rubin, who were associated with theoretical trends hostile to Stalinism between 1920 and 1930, and to whom he is very strongly indebted. Finally, on the positive side, Pilling presents Marx's somewhat opaque position on the 'concrete' as a result of analysed-out aspects or 'abstractions' more adequately than I have seen it done elsewhere.

The failings of Pilling's book are, however, pretty considerable. It is more a series of notes than a unified whole, with its text headings in no discernible order, listed neither in the Index or the Table of Contents, and often quite misleading. For example, the heading 'Capital and The Productive Forces' is followed by a section with virtually nothing to do with the subject.

Much more seriously, Marx's theory of the forces of production and their relationship to the economic structure, the very axis of historical materialism and a central theme of *Capital*, is simply overlooked by Pilling throughout the book. This failing alone is enough to render his work radically insufficient to anyone seeking an adequate understanding of Marx's thought.

But the problems do not stop here. The work is studded with basic ambiguities, some demonstrable errors of attribution, arrestingly recurrent non-sequiturs, and a few inexplicable lapses of scholarship. For example, like many dialectical materialists, the idea of 'contradiction' is used by Pilling in a

completely undisciplined way to apply indifferently to conflicting interests, contradictions of statement, different aspects of a concrete thing, and the non-equivalence of empirical appearance and structural reality, with no effort to sort out or resolve the basic distinctions of meaning involved here. The result is a logical morass in which Pilling himself seems to get lost, so that he both endorses contradictory science as a true expression of contradictory reality (30-1), and also condemns it as bourgeois inconsistency which it is the task of Marxist science to resolve in a higher, more coherent unity. (19)

As for his errors of attribution, Pilling states that Marx ascribed the vulgarization of classical Political Economy after 1830 to its limitations of non-dialectical method (10), while in fact Marx ascribes this vulgarization to economists' 'evil intent of apologetic' in a time of ever increasing working class organization and consciousness.

Pilling also argues, without evidence, that the working class had 'recognized its exploitation long before the birth of Marxism' (133), though in fact it was precisely Marx's major scientific concern to *discover* the law of surplus-labour extraction in which he believed this exploitation to consist. (Pilling himself self-contraditorily acknowledges the workers' ignorance of their exploitation by the capitalist class on p. 204).

It is the insistent non-sequiturs of this work, however, that unsettle the reader most. Pilling repeatedly draws from facts, passages, or differences of formulation conclusions that simply do not follow from them: for example, on pages 2, 10, 14, 24, 25, 34, 35, 85, 88, 106, 116, 122, 137 and 158. It is in this connection perhaps that the subtitle of his work, '*Philosophy* and Political Economy' is most inapposite. Here is just one, compressed sample of his many ill-considered inferences: '...Marx rejected all notions which sought to "derive" value (a social relation) from use-value (a material phenomenon). [For, he says,] the mystical character of commodities does not originate in their use-value (I, p. 71).'

Finally, Pilling gives important citations with no reference at all to their source (eg. pp. 110, 118, 119).

All in all, the book suffers from a wide range of deficiencies, some very basic indeed. But for all this, it is a worthwhile book for its often-telling attempt to rehabilitate dialectical thought within the near moribund body of Anglo-American economic theory.

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* See *The Structure of Marx's World-View* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P. 1978).

ALVIN PLANTINGA, *Does God Have a Nature?* Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee: Marquette U.P. 1980. Pp. 146. US$ 6.95. ISBN 0-87462-145-3.

Plantinga's problem here is to escape from the dilemma that if God lacks such properties as goodness, wisdom and justice as essential aspects of His nature, He is not the God that Christians have worshipped; while if God comes pre-programmed with such a nature, He is not sovereign. There is wit, precision, ingenuity and analytical persistence in plenty, in this sustained essay in philosophical theology, but in the end one mainly appreciates why this contradiction is such a chafing burr under Professor Plantinga's theological saddle.

The argument runs from an initial rejection of agnostic theology (mainly *vs.* Kant); through three seemingly unsuccessful efforts to evade the dilemma — a doctrine of God's 'simplicity' that denies any distinction between God's sovereign aseity and His nature (Aquinas); the elimination of any universal properties by which God's free control might be circumscribed (nominalism); and, thirdly, the maintenance that all properties and universal truths consequent upon them are fixed by God's omnipotent will (Descartes) — to finally, having reduced the issue to divine 'control' over necessary truths, the question Plantinga 'raises...without answering' as to whether God's understanding of these truths confers on Him some sort of priority over them.

The position which Plantinga discusses last, at greatest length, and, as it seems to me, with greatest sympathy is Descartes' 'universal [or perhaps 'limited'] possibilism,' the claim that God could make any proposition, including a contradiction, necessary (or at least true). The intellectual sympathy is suggested by joint commitment to both horns of the apparent dilemma — absolute sovereignty of God and importance of necessary truths in the philosophical economy. At least Plantinga's method with its invocation of 'intuitions' and its chain of numbered propositions (71 at last, but only intermittently in strictly deductive order) reminds one of the recommendations of the *Regulae* or *Discours*. 'Logic' — mathematically modelled — is probably for both the most scientific of philosophical inquiries. In the end, however, Plantinga cannot accept, as he feels Descartes would have to, that, in the words of Peter De Vries's Rev. Mackerell, it be 'the final proof of God's omnipotence that He need not exist [since He might have made the creature's self-sufficiency necessarily true] in order to save us.' (126)

Plantinga thinks that divine freedom is 'the best argument for nominalism,' better for example than a mere subjective 'taste for desert landscape': 'After all,' he comments, 'the Olympic peninsula is just as impressive as the Sonora desert.' (36) Nominalism would take the dilemma by the horns in denying any essential properties that would pre-determine God's activity in deductively predictable ways. But even the best argument for nominalism is not persuasive nor adequate to redeem its 'intrinsic unloveliness' (hardly unemotive itself!). Plantinga may speak jocularly of the 'Platonic menagerie,' 'swarm,' 'pantheon,' or 'horde' of abstract entities, but this section makes

especially clear what formidable characters they are in his philosophical world.

The confrontation of greatest interest to me is that with St. Thomas. He allowed of universal properties not subject to voluntary alteration in God, but *identified* them with divine sovereignty in the unitary or 'simple' divine nature. Plantinga finds the motivations obscure, and the intuitions offended as compelling as those of the 'sovereignty aseity intuition' the doctrine is designed to defend.

In Aquinas's doctrine there is no doubt that God's *nature* is the basis of all other existence, but it would be more doubtful to make the same claim for His *will*. Is not part of the problem the ambiguity of 'control'? Even in cases where I can most plausibly claim to 'have control,' I am enabled to exercise it only by virtue of inherited capacities that I had absolutely no part in acquiring. No doubt with God we have the additional problem of conforming talk to the doctrine of non-composite divine simplicity. But even at this level of abstraction *agere sequitur esse* (a thing must be act) may help: a unitary entity may have multiple modes of expression. If 'incomparable greatness' (1) comes close to being the defining essence of God for Plantinga, would he hold it part of God's 'control' that He could confer this property upon Himself? Without first possessing it?

But the contrast between such argument based on principles abstracted from experience and that based on intuitions and the chains of deductions they may generate, signals more deeply-lain philosophical differences. One is that Aquinas distinguishes far more sharply than Plantinga (or Descartes) between logic as instrument of inquiry and metaphysics as theory of reality. For Plantinga the elements of logic — properties, propositions, possible worlds — exist with full, even aboriginal, rights. He sees no point in distinguishing logical necessity (apparent from terms) from metaphysical (determined by nature of entities), or the mere 'timelessness' of logical truths from the 'eternity' of a living God.

Even one who does not emerge from these confrontations at the same point as Plantinga must be grateful both historically (some great relevant voices have been heard) and systematically (Cartesian rationalism, Thomism and nominalism represent pretty comprehensively the range of options on the relations of thoughts and things). But is Plantinga closer at the end than at the beginning to securing for God a priority over 'natures' that he insists exist quite independently of God?

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ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, *Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1980. Pp. 227. US$ 16.50. ISBN 0-8018-2423-0.

Why have the social sciences not made progress anything like that which has been made by the natural sciences? This question is most often answered in one of two ways. One answer rests on the supposed complexity of the subject matter of the social sciences. The other answer rests on the belief that the social sciences are different from the natural sciences. That is, the proper aims and methods of the social sciences are different from those of the natural sciences. Hence, it is a mistake to apply the same standards of assessment to the social sciences as we applied to the natural sciences. Alexander Rosenberg is unimpressed by both of these responses.

Against the first response he argues that the appeal to the complexity of the subject matter of the social sciences fails to take seriously the 'vast complexity of many natural phenomena for which we now have fairly rigorous scientific accounts, in spite of their recalcitrance to observation.' (2) Indeed, the greatest advances in the natural sciences have occurred in the face of an increasing awareness of the complexity of natural phenomena.

Against the second response he argues that acceptance of the view that the aims and methods of the social sciences are different from those of the natural sciences entails a rejection of empiricism. Rejection of empiricism, however, commits one either to the view that the social sciences do not provide knowledge or to the view that the knowledge they provide is a priori knowledge of synthetic truths. The latter view is rationalism. While rationalism could be the epistemological basis for social sciences, Rosenberg does not believe that it ought to be the basis, nor does he believe that those who talk about different aims and methods for social sciences intend it to be the basis. His position is that empiricism is the only epistemological view adherence to which will provide a posteriori knowledge and since almost everyone agrees that the social sciences should provide a posteriori knowledge they *should* adopt empiricism. Adoption of empiricism, however, entails that the social sciences *should* employ the methods and concepts of the natural sciences.

Clearing away these two possible answers to the initial question sets the stage for Rosenberg's own answer. He develops this answer in Chapters 3 through 6.

In essence he believes that the failure of the social sciences to provide explanations and predictions of distinctively human behaviour is a result of the almost universally accepted practice of explaining this behaviour by appeal to beliefs and desires which are not natural kind terms. His argument can be summarized as follows. It is a commonly held assumption that distinctively human behaviour is to be explained by appeal to beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires, however, are essentially or paradigmatically human aspects since they are 'defined through their semantical connection with *Homo sapiens*.'

(6) Thus, since species-terms, including *Homo sapiens*, are not natural kind-terms, beliefs and desires are not natural kind-terms. Only natural kind-terms, however, can be cited in general laws. Therefore, '*Homo sapiens*,' 'beliefs' and 'desires' cannot be cited in general laws (although they may be cited in true singular statements). If 'beliefs,' 'desires,' and '*Homo sapiens*' cannot be cited in general laws, then no general laws connecting beliefs and desires with actions are possible. Without such general laws, however, no explanation and prediction of distinctively human behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires can be justified. Consequently, the social sciences cannot provide laws, explanations or predictions in terms of beliefs and desires. Their attempt to do so is the reason for their failure.

Rosenberg provides compelling reasons in support of each of the claims in the argument. The central claim of the argument is that species names are not natural kind-terms because species are not natural kinds but are discrete spatio-temporally bounded particulars. This view of species is not new. Both David Hull (1976, 1978) and Michael Ghiselin (1974) have argued for this view of species and Rosenberg's justification for the view depends heavily upon their arguments. The most important argument for the view is that biological theory, in particular the modern synthetic theory of evolution, requires that species be understood as individuals and not as classes. While the view has met with some resistance (see Caplan 1980)) it has generally been widely accepted by both biologists and philosophers of biology.

Rosenberg's diagnosis of the problem that results in the failure of the social sciences to produce general laws of human behaviour and explain and predict human behaviour is that 'the obstacle to a social science, to the laws that empiricism demands that we seek but which we have not found, is not to be attributed to complexity and recalcitrance of subject matter but to a well-entrenched typology which reflects no natural kinds and in which, therefore, no laws can be expressed.' (114)

In the last two chapters of the book (7 and 8) Rosenberg turns from diagnosis to prescription and it is the argument of these chapters that gives rise to the title of the book. The claim that species are not natural kinds is the pivotal claim in the prescription as it was in the diagnosis. Since, only natural kinds can be the subject of general laws of human behaviour, the social sciences, in order to formulate general laws, must investigate natural kinds. The narrowest natural kinds 'that we can be sure subsume human behaviour and provide us with a clear guide to the extent that these kinds will provide explanation and prediction' are those of biology. (151) Hence, the social sciences, in order to formulate general laws, can, at the lowest level, employ the kinds, laws and modes of thought of biological science. One branch of biological science has done precisely this. Sociobiology has applied the modern synthetic theory of evolution to the explanation and prediction of the social behaviour of all species including *Homo sapiens* and has, consequently, applied the kinds, laws and modes of thought of biological science to the explanation and prediction of all forms of social behaviour in all kinds of organisms, including *Homo sapiens*.

Since, sociobiology employs the narrowest natural kinds that we can be sure subsume human behaviour, sociobiology should preempt conventional social sciences in the quest for laws, explanations and predictions of human social behaviour.

Obviously, much of Rosenberg's argument rests on the acceptance of the view that biological science is well-grounded and successful in the relevant respects. This is not a view that is universally held. Indeed, the view that the central theory of biology (i.e., the modern synthetic theory of evolution) rests on a tautology is still widely believed despite the numerous compelling responses to it. Rosenberg deals with this and other criticisms of biological science in order to show that it is a genuine science which is theoretically rich. Given the amount of literature leading to these conclusions, Rosenberg should not have needed to provide the defence. However, the continued reappearance of well-worn criticisms make it clear that one cannot take for granted that the more than adequate responses to these criticisms need not be repeated. Rosenberg's response to the claim that biological theory rests on a tautology is based on his previously argued view (1978) that 'the concept of fitness is *supervenient* on the manifest properties of organisms, their anatomical, physiological, behavioral and environmentally relative properties.' (167) This is one of the best accounts of the concept of fitness and of why the principle of natural selection is not a tautology.

Rosenberg also responds to numerous criticisms of sociobiology. For example, he deals with the criticism that it is a disguised form of biological determinism. He quite candidly admits that sociobiology does involve a form of biological determinism. He calls this form 'explanatory biological determinism' which is 'the thesis that scientifically acceptable explanations for human behavior are available only at the level of the heritable dispositions which it reflects or the neurological states which underlie it.' (159)

The overall thesis of this book is well argued and compelling. Rosenberg, unlike E.O. Wilson, is cautious in drawing his conclusions and is thorough in seeking out and responding to criticisms. Beyond the argument for the central thesis, however, the book has many virtues. For example, it presents clearly the empiricist position and it provides a wealth of information about biological, sociological and economic theorizing.

There are, however some disappointments. For example, Rosenberg does not provide a general account of sociobiology. Such an account would have been useful since much of the latter part of the book deals with sociobiology. Also he does not discuss any of the numerous criticisms of the Hempelian nomological model of explanation. Given its importance to his overall thesis some attempt to respond even briefly to criticisms such as Scriven's seems to be required. Even a reference to the responses of others would have been better than relative silence. Despite these disappointments, however, the book remains an important contribution to the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of social science. It deserves careful attention.

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HUGH J. SILVERMAN, ed., *Piaget, Philosophy and the Human Sciences.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. 174. US$ 17.50. ISBN 0-391-00958-3.

Ce livre présente, sous une forme révisée, les exposés et discussions tenus les 5 et 6 mai 1977 lors de la quatrième rencontre des 'annual Stony Brooke Studies in Philosophy,' patronnées par le Département de philosophie de l'Université d'état de New York à Stony Brooke. Le volume rapporte cinq exposés avec les discussions qui ont suivi chacun, ainsi qu'une discussion générale sur la notion piagétienne de structure.

Le premier essai, 'Piaget's Theory of Knowledge,' est signé par Hang G. Furth et constitue un bon résumé de la théorie piagétienne de la connaissance. L'auteur y expose clairement les notions fondamentales d'assimilation, d'accommodation et de schème, ainsi que celles de stade, de structure, d'équilibre et d'opération, avec leurs relations réciproques. Il montre aussi comment, à partir de sa conception constructiviste de la connaissance, Piaget renvoie dos à dos les tenants de l'appris et de l'inné, de l'empirisme et de l'idéalisme. Il souligne avec approbation la distinction nette que fait Piaget entre langage et intelligence, le premier n'étant ni une condition suffisante, ni une condition

nécessaire, du développement de la seconde. Il conclut en disant que la théorie de Piaget respecte la liberté créatrice de l'individu et montre les limites des déterminismes de l'hérédité ou de l'environnement, met en lumière les stades du développement intellectuel et leurs relations réciproques, reconnaît sans cependant l'analyser précisément l'impact de l'affectivité sur la vie intellectuelle, et montre quelles activités conduisent à une vie intellectuelle vigoureuse.

Quelle est l'origine des structures d'ordre? Comment changent-elles? Nous renseignent-elles sur leur propre nature, ou seulement sur l'ordre qu'elles confèrent aux choses? Comment expliquer leur généralité (commonality)? Telles sont les questions que pose Charles E. Scott dans un texte intitulé: 'Structure and Order.' Les réponses for différentes que Jean Piaget et Michel Foucault apportent à ces questions ont chacune leurs limites, nous assure-t-il.

Piaget met l'accent sur la continuité: les structures changent, mais le changement est structuré, il obéit à des lois. Cependant, sa conceptualisation et son vocabulaire ne permettent pas de discourir sur la conscience historique sous-jacente au développement de la pensée, et sur l'opposition qui est nécessaire à l'ordre. Il n'y a pas de place dans son oeuvre pour le chaos, le doute et la créativité de la conscience.

Foucault met plutôt en lumière la discontinuité. Les structures apparentes renvoient à d'autres qui sont inconscientes, qui expliquent les premières et se succèdent sans aucune continuité, chacune constituant plutôt une rupture par rapport à la précédente. Rejetant toute garantie spéculative de l'ordre, Foucault le trouve dans la formation historique des institutions, le développement du langage, les interactions des hommes en société, la distance et la proximité des choses. Il voit bien dans l'histoire le lieu de l'opposition, et donc de l'ordre, mais il ne s'interroge pas sur l'avènement de l'opposition, sur l'origine ou les raisons des ruptures. Sa dialectique réflexive et finie n'est pas attentive à son propre caractère d'événement contingent (eventfulness) et non dialectique.

Piaget et Foucault, nous dit Scott, érigent en absolus une méthode, un système de concepts, un certain degré de précision et d'exactitude. Aucun des deux ne songe, ce qui est pourtant fondamental, au sens comme surgissant de la rencontre immédiate et communicative des consciences, à l'intelligence comme fondée sur une communauté (commonality) qui est présence des uns avec les autres, et non une communauté de principes, lois ou structures mentales communs à tous.

Après une brève introduction de Donn Welton sur la notion piagétienne de structure, les participants au 'Faculty Seminar on the Concept of Structure in Piaget'e Genetic Epistemology' ont discuté d'abord des raisons ou facteurs qui poussent un enfant à changer d'idée ou d'explication face à une situation donnée, et donc à rejeter ce qui auparavant était pour lui un état d'équilibre. Ceci renvoie aux notions de dissatisfaction subjective et de sujet épistémique, aux différences entre pensée enfantine et pensée adulte, et à divers concepts adultes alternatifs de la même réalité (par exemple l'espace) en relation avec les stades piagétiens. Toutes ces questions sont touchées de façon éclairante

au cours de cette discussion dont il est impossible de suivre ici tous les méandres.

L'essai de Edward S. Casey, intitulé: 'Piaget and Freud on Childhood Memory,' compare les traitements que Freud et Piaget réservent à la mémoire. Il s'agit, dans les deux cas de la mémoire *de* l'enfance, *après* l'enfance chez Freud, et *pendant* l'enfance chez Piaget.

A parir de l'étude freudienne célèbre de l'homme-loup, Casey montre que la mémoire n'est pas pour Freud un effet prévisible et déterminé événements-stimuli dont elle serait la reproduction exacte. Elle a son propre dynamisme, sélectionne les contenus à remémorer et les déforme en fonction des dispositions psycho-affectives personnelles du sujet. Piaget refuse aussi le concept de mémoire-effet objective, et il associe mémoire et compréhension: mieux on se rappelle, mieux on comprend, et vice-versa. La mémoire modifie le passé quantitativement et surtout qualitativement, non seulement en fonction du présent du sujet, mais aussi des événements intervenus entre le fait mémorisé et le présent. Le rêve est une réorganisation du passé par des schèmes qui travaillent dans le présent.

Le lien entre se souvenir et comprendre suggère à Casey le schéma suivant:

$$\{((M_1 \rightleftharpoons M_2) \rightleftharpoons M_3) \rightleftharpoons \ldots\ldots \rightleftharpoons M_n\} \rightleftharpoons P$$

où 'M_1, ..., M_n' tiennent la place de divers états psycho-émotifs successifs du sujet, accompagnés du rappel d'un même événement déterminé, et séparés par un laps de temps variable; '$\rightharpoonup$', inspiré de l'oeuvre de Freud, signifie 'se rappelle'; '$\leftharpoondown$', inspiré de l'oeuvre de Piaget, signifie 'comprend'; et 'P' signifie la situation psychanalytique présente du sujet.

L'auteur suggère ici une fusion des points de vue respectifs de Freud et de Piaget, c'est-à-dire des schèmes psycho-sexuels et des schèmes cognitifs de la mémoire, ceci en vue de mieux comprendre cette fonction complexe. Il souligne que les trois stades freudiens (anal, oral et génital) ne manquent pas d'analogie avec ceux de Piaget et affirme que ces deux schèmes fondamentaux agissent de concert et de façon complémentaire pour assurer la fonction de mémorisation.

La thèse de l'auteur nous paraît intérressante en ce qui concerne les rapports entre l'affectivité et la connaissance. Elle mérite une attentive considération.

Dans 'Piaget, Adorno and the possibilities of dialectical operations,' Susan Buck-Morss soutient que les enfants non-occidentaux qui obtiennent des scores moins élevés dans les tests piagétiens ne sont pas retardés, mais appartiennent simplement à une culture non-capitaliste. La psychologie de Piaget, dit-elle, n'est pas universelle, abstraite et indépendante des contenus culturels particuliers. Son formalisme abstrait reflète notre culture urbaine, commerciale et capitaliste. Piaget considère comme normale et fondamentale la tendance de l'esprit vers la stabilité et l'équilibre, grâce à l'accommodation et à l'assimilation. Susan Buck-Morss y voit plutôt le reflet d'une condition sociale

lamentable, du conformisme, du manque d'esprit critique et d'une confusion entre contradiction logique et contradiction réelle.

S'inspirant de l'oeuvre d'Adorno, Mme Buck-Morss fait du déséquilibre et de l'instabilité les facteurs les plus aptes à nous renseigner sur le mécanisme de la connaissance, c'est-à-dire sur la dialectique négative. Celle-ci pose que le mot et la chose ne sont pas identiques, que le présent n'est pas un effet linéaire et adéquat du passé, que la créativité amoindrit le rôle du déterminisme classique, et qu'il faut chercher et identifier l'antagonisme entre idée et société plutôt que vouloir réconcilier idée et monde, comme le fait la science. Cette dernière n'est d'ailleurs qu'un système cohérent et fermé, ni vrai ni novateur, et nullement orienté vers la découverte du non-connu.

Une éducation à la Piaget ne produit que de bons technocrates sans esprit critique, inféodés au système. Il faut sensibiliser les enfants à l'imprévu, au risque créateur: par exemple les initier aux rythmes syncopés du jazz plutôt qu'à la notion classique du temps, au langage parlé créateur de significations sur la base du fossé entre signifiant et signifié, plutôt qu'au formalisme mathématique. Il faut encourager les jeux de mots, les double sens humoristiques et les 'topsy-turvies' du genre: 'The cow sat on a birch tree and nibbled on a pea,' dont raffolent les enfants, et qui sont un moyen de protester contre la réalité 'normale' pour en suggérer une autre, contre les systèmes rigides et fermés comme le formalisme mathématique. La compréhension de ce genre de discours exige une interprétation dialectique qui va au-delà des concepts et saisit la vérité à des niveaux contradictoires.

Le recours aux opérations dialectiques peut, selon l'auteur, former une génération intellectuellement bien équipée pour comprendre le changement et les déplacements de sens qu'il implique. Ces gens cultiveront le potentiel créateur qui favorise et oriente le changement, et les possibilités utopiques de renommer le monde.

La thèse de Mme Buck-Morss serait à notre avis plus convaincante si elle reconnaissait d'abord que seules les notions physiques et logico-mathématiques sont pour Piaget indépendantes des contenus culturels particuliers, et pas les notions sociologiques et morales. On souhaiterait en outre que sa critique de la science comme système fermé et ennemi de l'innovation soit plus élaborée, et qu'elle nous montre précisément en quoi le formalisme logico-mathématique reflète la société capitaliste. Il n'y a en outre rien de bien nouveau ou original à dire que le mot et la chose ne sont pas identiques.

Dans 'Piaget, Lacan and Language,' William J. Richardson souligne que Piaget et Lacan ont en commun l'usage de la notion de structure et la reconnaissance du rôle significatif du langage dans le développement humain. Piaget s'intéresse au développement qualitatif des structures de la pensée individuelle, et Lacan aux structures du désir humain avec ses dimensions irrationnelles et inconscientes.

Pour Piaget, l'évocation vocale d'un objet actuellement absent est la forme la plus tardive de la fonction symbolique qui se caractérise en ceci que le signe y est conçu comme distinct du signifié. Il rejette la conception empiriste du langage, de même que l'innéisme chomskyen, et propose plutôt une concep-

tion constructiviste du langage, où intervient le schéma bien connu de l'adaptation (assimilation et accommodation) et des états provisoires et successifs d'équilibre. Mais, se demande Richardson, est-ce une explication suffisante du langage?

Lacan estime lui aussi que le langage est au début lié à l'évocation des choses absentes, et il traduit selon lui l'expérience du désir de la satisfaction instinctuelle: avec le langage, le désir devient humain. Les systèmes de comportement sont selon lui la projection, dans la pensée consciente et socialisée, de lois universelles qui gouvernent les activités inconscientes de l'esprit, et ces lois sont celles du langage. On peut d'ailleurs montrer que les deux principes de combinaison et de sélection qui, selon Jacobson, relient entre eux les phonèmes, ont de fortes ressemblances avec ce que Freud appelait 'déplacement' et 'condensation.'

C'est ici que Richardson situe la rencontre entre Piaget et Lacan. Faisant appel à la distinction saussurienne entre langage et discours, il soutient que Piaget parle plutôt de la genèse du discours, et que la fonction symbolique est chez lui individuelle plutôt que sociale. Lacan, de son côté, parle au moins autant du langage que du discours, et voit la fonction symbolique comme appartenant plutôt à l'ordre social.

Il existe selon Lacan un ordre symbolique (les structures inconscientes du langage et de l'ordre social) qui existe indépendamment des individus et est la source des relations, qui n'est pas seulement une construction théorique commode, ni non plus un système d'essences transcendantes. Cela pose le problème de la nature et de l'origine des structures. Pour Piaget, l'ordre symbolique n'est pas ailleurs que dans la collectivité des divers moi humains, et est le fruit d'une construction collective toujours provisoire. Dans la mesure où il participe à cette construction et en partage l'usage, celui qui connaît est un sujet épistémique décentré qui n'élimine pas le sujet individuel lui servant de support, mais qui est plutôt un ensemble de règles gouvernant le comportement du sujet individuel dans certaines activités cognitives. Piaget admet donc implicitement, prétend Richardson, qu'il existe un sujet sous le niveau de la conscience individuelle. Lacan admet la même chose quand il parle d'un 'Je' soumis aux lois inconscientes du langage et qui est l'être exprimé en termes heideggériens. Richardson suggère d'ailleurs que la phénoménologie heideggérienne, avec ses notions de *Logos*, de *Dasein,* de *Verstehen* et de *Rede,* peut éclairer les doctrines de Lacan et de Piaget. En effet, le sujet sous-jacent à la pensée consciente, ou Dasein, qui est ouverture à l'être comme *logos*, fonde le processus d'assimilation-accommodation et rend possible le passage du discours privé au langage socialisé. Ce même *logos* est aussi le fondement de l'ordre et de la cohésion dont parle Lacan.

Cette thèse sur l'éclairage de Lacan, et surtout de Piaget, par Heidegger, ne manque pas d'audace intellectuelle et laissera sans doute plus d'un lecteur perplexe. Mais elle ouvrira peut-être de nouvelles et riches avenues concernant les rapports entre phénoménologie et psychanalyse.

Ce volume suscite de nombreuses interrogations, et un désir d'approfondissement des notions les plus fondamentales de la psychologie piagétienne.

La confrontation de Piaget avec Freud, Lacan, Heidegger, Foucault, Adorno et autres ne peut être que stimulante; elle invite les disciples de Piaget à poursuivre l'oeuvre du maître dans de multiples directions qu'il n'a probablement pas toutes entrevues lui-même.

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PIERRE SORLIN, *The Film in History: Restaging the Past*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; New York: Barnes and Noble 1980. Pp. 240. CN$ 34.95; ISBN 0-631-19510-6; US$ 21.50: ISBN 0-389-20130-8.

D.W. Griffith, who always believed that *The Birth of a Nation* was 'based upon truth in every vital detail,' once predicted that in future libraries history books would be replaced by films, so that instead of consulting authorities 'you will merely be present at the making of history.' Though it has been evident since 1896 that cinema could record and preserve an image of current events and thus might provide an important new type of historical document, Griffith's dream probably sounds to a contemporary historian more like a threat than a promise. For historians now know 'how extremely dangerous film material is' and how precarious the inference from an image on the screen to the facts of history.[1]

Still, however cautious we must be about identifying and interpreting them, all those pictures and sounds do, in some way, present an image of our century which cannot be ignored. In the last decade a dozen books have explored the relation of film to history.[2] For the authors of most of these, documentary film, the unposed image of life caught in the act, has seemed the only serious contender for the historian's attention. But, when viewed with an historical eye, every film becomes a documentary, reflecting and recording something of the world in which it was made. From this perspective fictional films may be more revealing of our past than documentaries — if only because there are so many more of them.

The greatest promise for expanding our historical knowledge would seem to lie in those films with a contemporary setting, films which present their fictional events as occurring in some recognizable region of the real world and at approximately the same time as when the film was made — films like *Scarface, The Best Years of our Lives, Breathless, Dr. Strangelove, Manhattan*. In a few years that time becomes part of the past; in a generation the fashions and artifacts, the thoughts, gestures and speech patterns included in the film as simply and naturally part of its world may become notable aspects of a by-gone era. In them we may witness, not the great events of the era, but the social history of everyday life.

Paradoxically perhaps, among the films least interesting to historians should be, precisely, historical films, films set in a past which includes historical along with fictional events and often making their characters pseudo-participants in major events of history, such as the Civil War or the French Revolution. Where the contemporary film may offer unexpected insights into the world of its time to later viewers, one can know in advance that the historical film cannot reveal anything new about the historical world. For nothing authentically historical can appear in an historical film unless it is already known and available elsewhere, and if it does appear in the fictional context, its authenticity can be assured only by independent evidence. Hence though the film may teach history to the layman, to the historian it can only repeat or distort what he already knows about the past it represents.

Yet it is just these films which Pierre Sorlin's *The Film in History* suggests for study by historians. Not, however, as a source of knowledge about the period in which the narrative is set; indeed Sorlin offers the dubious advice, 'the first thing we must do is forget, as far as possible, everything we know about the periods dealt with.' Rather, he argues that we can learn from historical films something about the view of history shared by the audience and the film-makers at the time the film was made, and something of the way in which history is used to influence the present. For, 'A historical film is a reconstruction of the social relationship which, using the pretext of the past, reorganizes the present.'

Unfortunately the book is more interesting for what it suggests than for what it achieves or demonstrates. Sorlin discusses some twenty films which represent several historical periods, which he calls reference periods because they provide a people with reference points to measure the past: the French Revolution, the American Civil War, the Italian Risorgimento, the Russian Revolution, World War I, World War II. He also offers a range of theoretical remarks about both film and history.

But the theory is too often obscure and sometimes inconsistent, as in this progression: 'In my opinion a film *has* no meaning ... On the question of meaning, I would say that a film does not *necessarily* demonstrate anything. If it does make a point, it does so in such an obvious way that it is simply not very interesting.' Or then again the theory sometimes seems obviously wrong, as in Sorlin's claims that a fictional film 'has no referent,' 'refers to nothing other than itself,' is 'conceived as a self-contained work, an enclosed

universe.' Such claims are, of course, neither original nor rare, but it seems odd indeed to find them repeated in a book where the films to be analyzed include one named *Napoleon Bonaparte*, one which claims to present facsimiles of the surrender of the Confederate Army and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, and one set in Petrograd in October, 1917, with Kerensky, Kornilov and Lenin among its characters. If Sorlin claims that the surrender of General Lee to General Grant in *The Birth of a Nation,* or the capture of the Winter Palace in *October,* refer to nothing outside the film, then at least he owes us some account of reference which would make this plausible. The general claim would be all the more dubious insofar as Sorlin describes *all* historical films, even those which only recreate actual events, as fictional.

It seems more reasonable to recognize that many ficitional works, novels as well as films, do refer to things other than themselves, and that these references do often play a significant role in our experience of the work. In film a frequent function of historical references (and of location shooting) is to expand the world of the film beyond what is shown and bring to bear in our response to the film what we know about the historical context, thus denying the 'self-contained' character of the work and creating an open rather than an enclosed universe. This seems quite obviously true of several of the films Sorlin discusses, including *La Marseillaise, Rome, Open City,* and *La Grande Illusion.*

But Sorlin does not really deny this. In fact his theory seldom plays much role in his discussion of particular films. These discussions vary greatly in extent and penetration and in general suffer from a superficiality necessitated by Sorlin's decision to discuss twenty rather than four or five films. Few films are treated in sufficient detail to make the analysis either persuasive or enlightening. Some of the films discussed, e.g. *1860* and *Aldo's Saying,* are so little known and so inaccessible that it is impossible to judge the credibility of Sorlin's treatment. And, perhaps more seriously, it sometimes appears as if an interpretation was arrived at quite independently of any careful viewing of the film, with the supporting description having little basis in what actually happens on the screen, but seeming to derive rather from misremembering in a way which supports the interpretation.

I offer one symptomatic example. As part of an analysis and interpretation of *La Grande Illusion* which should be persuasive only to those who have never watched the film attentively, Sorlin argues that though the film-makers wanted to present the Germans as human, their unconscious prejudice defeats them. 'In spite of themselves, by the mere fact of translating their impressions into pictures, they confirm the traditionally accepted ideas' and present the Germans as automatons. The central argument for this is the following: 'The clearest scene takes place just before the escape. First we are with the prisoners, making their disorganized preparations; suddenly there is a close-up of a clock, whose pendulum we see for a moment ... The camera swings down to show two German officers, standing rigidly on either side of the screen, speaking without moving and without looking at each other. With no comment needed, we have a double shift; first from the prisoners' plot to

the clock, by an association of ideas, and then, from the mechanical movement of the pendulum to the rigidity of the Germans, by an association of pictures. By a kind of implicit reversal the prisoners seem freer than their guards.'

Of course it is a point of the film that both the French and German soldiers are prisoners of this war, but the problem with Sorlin's argument is that, in the film, the shot of the clock and the German officers does not follow a scene of disorganized preparation, but a scene of Boeldieu and Maréchal talking about their relations to each other ('Je dis vous à ma mère et vous à ma femme') and the two German officers are *not* standing rigidly. They are both sitting relaxed on the edge of a table, each with one leg off the floor; both are smoking; one has one hand in his pocket; they do move and they do look at each other as they talk.[3] Hence the interpretation collapses when we pay attention to the film.

Similar misdescriptions undermine all of Sorlin's discussion of *La Grande Illusion*. For example, in discussing Maréchal, he writes, 'If you look again at the scenes where he appears, you will notice that he speaks little and says practically nothing about himself.' But in fact Maréchal speaks much more than any other character in the film; only Boeldieu and Rosenthal have as much as half as many lines. And Maréchal says more about himself than does any other character. Film criticism has long been plagued by inaccuracy and carelessness in describing its objects. One would expect an historian to be more careful in presenting his evidence, but, alas, Sorlin does nothing to raise the standards.

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1 Cf. *Film and the Historian* (British Universities Film Council 1968), or Penelope Houston, 'The Nature of the Evidence,' *Sight and Sound,* 36 (1967) 88ff.

2 Many but not all of these are listed in Sorlin's bibliography.

3 One need not see the film to confirm this; it is very clear in the frames reproduced on p. 145-146 of Jean Renoir, *La Grande Illusion* (Paris: Balland 1974).

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