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## **EDITORIAL NOTE**

*C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* has come into existence in response to a perceived need. Academics in the humanities and social sciences routinely complain that there is no rapid dissemination of informed and informative opinion concerning publications in their fields. This is doubly unfortunate when more books than ever before are being published. Philosophers in particular need to be informed not only of work that is strictly philosophical but also of work which is primarily theoretical in nature in such areas as law, psychology, sociology, literary criticism, physics, medicine, linguistics and classical studies. *C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* is the first journal based in North America to aim systematically to meet that need.

## **NOTE EDITORIALE**

*C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* a été créée pour répondre à un besoin urgent. Des universitaires qui travaillent dans les domaines des humanités et des sciences sociales se plaignent régulièrement de l'absence d'informations diffusées rapidement et provenant d'autorités compétentes au sujet des publications récentes dans leurs spécialités. Ce fait est particulièrement déplorable à une époque où le nombre de livres publiés augmente constamment. Les philosophes en particulier se doivent d'être informés, non seulement des ouvrages proprement philosophiques, mais également de travaux de nature plutôt théorique qui s'effectuent dans des disciplines connexes comme le droit, la psychologie, la sociologie, la critique littéraire, la physique, la médecine, la linguistique et les études classiques. *C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* est la première revue en Amérique du Nord qui a pour propos de combler systématiquement ce besoin.



LESLIE ARMOUR and EDWARD T. BARTLETT III. *The Conceptualization of the Inner Life*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. vii + 314. US\$ 17.50. ISBN 0-391-01759-4.

This study in immanent-descriptive metaphysics and philosophy of mind examines the boundary line between the 'world within' (one's inner life) and the 'world outside.' It begins by attacking four attempts at dissolving the line — those of the reductive materialist, the subjective idealist, a certain kind of ordinary-language philosopher, and an over-zealous Quinean. This preliminary critical section not only attempts to show that dissolution of the line is not possible but also prepares the way for the constructive part of the book by identifying the key issues and concepts involved in properly understanding the distinctive nature of the inner life. The authors' method is basically 'analytical.' They argue that we must begin by examining what we ordinarily say in the relevant circumstances, and that, though ordinary ways of talking need to be philosophically refined, the changes that we agree upon must ultimately be understandable in the language we all use. Revisions are needed, but philosophical revisionism 'has its limitations'; we do not want to be left with meaningless jargon. Accordingly, Armour and Bartlett begin developing their conceptual scheme by drawing our attention to first-person propositions. In considering a wide variety of these, we come to realize that some true first-person propositions cannot be reduced without change of meaning or loss of certainty to propositions of another type or form. We are soon led to recognize the inner side of the world, the side of meanings and non-programmable activities, the side from which certainty varies with our ability to assert personal identity. We are led to recognize a non-thing-like self, a self which must not be confused with the 'ghost in the machine' of traditional dualism. The attack on traditional dualism and subjective idealism is carried a step further: 'the externalization of meaning requires a medium, a carrier for the message itself, a stable domain which will function as a reference point for the criteria which the meaning is supposed to fulfil.' The world within and the world outside mesh with and entail one another. One needs first-person propositions; they cannot be analyzed away. But one cannot have them without other propositions as well.

The authors proceed to examine other relevant concepts, those of thing, person, universal, intentional object, etc. The line between the

world within and the world outside, they tell us, follows the line between intentional objects and objects, and is drawn by means of understanding the distinctions between a certain sort of universal and a certain sort of particular, and by means of understanding the distinction between a person-intention relation and a person-thing relation. When we realize certain things, e.g., that an intentional object is a universal of indeterminate application, we are led to the conclusion that we can see the world as the set of meanings we ascribe, and as the structure which sustains those meanings and bears those ascriptions. 'We cannot have the one without the other and, therefore, the world within and the world outside are either mutually intelligible or not intelligible at all.'

After moving on to a discussion of different kinds of knowledge, a discussion which focuses on how knowledge of persons differs from other kinds in being constructed through an interchange of meanings, the authors try to show, in a sort of Hegelian way, that their claims about experience and knowledge can be ordered into a set of levels of reflection, where the various levels maintain their intelligibility only by reference to one another. Their main point here is that the distinction between the world within and the world outside is maintained in terms of different relations which hold at these levels rather than in terms of different kinds of things. The book ends with a summary of the various formal, epistemological and factual conditions outlined in the theory, a summary which helps us to see how the whole theory 'hangs together.'

In their preface, the authors acknowledge their debt to Collingwood, and their theory is in many ways a refinement and development of certain Collingwoodian themes. The theory offers us an alternative to the 'machine-monster world of the reductive materialists,' but it does not leave us with the egocentric predicament associated with radical forms of subjectivism. It is humanistic without being anti-scientific or wildly speculative. 'The "world within" is, thus, quite safe from encroachment not because it represents an ethereal object set which is hard to get at, but because it represents, literally, no object set at all. It is made up, ultimately, of elements of meaning, significance, and intentionality.' 'The inner world is a coherent sub-set of aspects of the world, while the world outside provides the conditions under which those aspects become intelligible. It is not that there are "two worlds," one of things and one of pseudo-things. It is, rather, that there is an inner side and another side to things.' The individual must 'use the levels of experience, meaning, and knowledge to create an intelligible and coherent experience. He must render the world a coherent context in order to grasp himself, and he must order the structure of his own experience in order to grasp the world.'

This interesting and ambitious study covers a lot of ground, and many of its analyses and arguments merit detailed examination which a brief review cannot provide. In any case, while some readers will concentrate on the theory's flaws, unsound arguments, gratuitous assumptions and methodological biases — features which characterize any major



philosophical theory — others will be more interested in the authors' general approach and in the value that the overall theory has in relation to alternative theories. Humanists will indeed find that the conceptual scheme outlined by Armour and Bartlett has a great deal in its favor. Those who are not sympathetic to the general approach will still find many lively and well-argued discussions of subjects widely discussed in recent philosophical literature.

The preliminary critical section of the book cannot do justice to the theories of 'dissolutionists' in a mere forty-three pages. The reductive materialist is not likely to be terrified by the argument that 'The Identity Theory will not work because brain states can be located and thoughts cannot. The problem is a conceptual one, such that one cannot even sensibly state the conditions under which the theory could be true.' Later criticisms in the chapter are largely attacks on straw men. To be sympathetic to the Armour-Bartlett conceptualizing, one must have a deeper insight into the weaknesses of dissolutionist theories that that which the authors provide.

But even many of the readers who share the authors' belief in the solidity of the boundary line — or the authors' humanistic inclinations — will worry about the importance that Armour and Bartlett attach to some phenomena at the expense of others. Many readers will feel that Armour and Bartlett have placed too much emphasis on language, meaning, and the spatial sense of 'within' and 'outside' and not enough emphasis on, say, emotion, value, or memory. And while Armour and Bartlett are broad-minded enough to take Hegel seriously, they do not seem to be aware of how much has been said about their boundary problem by phenomenologists, existentialists, and structuralists. Perhaps even more puzzling is their neglect of the work of the symbolic interactionist school of sociologists, and of its philosophical forerunners, especially G.H. Mead. Both the European philosophers and the American symbolic interactionists deal with kinds of data which are relevant to the claims that Armour and Bartlett make. I doubt whether one can construct an adequate conceptual scheme here without taking these other kinds of data into account, and I suspect that Armour and Bartlett are mistaken in believing that the conceptualization of the inner life is almost exclusively a logico-linguistic matter.

The book does not contain an index or bibliography, but it is well-written and well-organized. Though each of the authors has contributed specific sections, the work is a coherent whole and a good advertisement for cooperative endeavors of this kind.

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BRIAN EASLEA, *Witch-Hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy: An Introduction to the Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450-1750*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. xii + 283. US\$ 42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-01807-8); US\$ 16.50 (paper: ISBN 0-391-01808-6).

There are many good introductions to the history of the scientific revolution but this is one with a difference. It is not intended for an audience of professional historians but for undergraduates who are taking a course in the philosophy of science. It is written in the wake of the 'Popper-Kuhn debate,' under the aegis of Herbert Marcuse, and with the blessing of Christopher Hill. The second chapter on the gradual acceptance of Copernicanism, the third on the mechanical philosophy, and the fourth on Newtonian gravitation cover familiar ground, but the first chapter deals in witchcraft, and the fifth, entitled 'The Appropriation of Nature,' argues that the scientific revolution cannot be understood without reference to the consequences of social and sexual stratification. Seen through Easlea's intellectual bifocals — marxism on the top portion of the lens and feminism below — the scientific revolution acquires a new contour, and is no longer tinged with glory. With the aid of his spectacles, Easlea also peers into the future and, in a characteristic sentence, he bids us not be faint of heart: 'In summary, then, if it remains doubtful that God acted wisely in the 1660s in replacing Christ's Second Coming with the Royal Society and Paris Academy, the millenarian hope still remains that if both capitalism and sexism can be transcended all humankind may yet have good reason to celebrate the coming of the new philosophy.' (256)

Easlea is at his best when he pockets his marxist-feminist spectacles. He is alive to the significance of the 'alternative natural philosophy,' the alchemical tradition that Newton respected and on which he set such high store, but he is unable, or unwilling, to use the historian's gift of seeing theories as they appeared to those who first formulated them. For instance, it is only by looking at the Paracelsian iatrochemists, who combined the study of medicine and chemistry, not, superficially, as self-deluded mystics, or, anachronistically, as chemists who failed to bring about a chemical revolution, but as the Chemical Philosophers they considered themselves, that we can understand the true nature of their endeavour. We then begin to see why their appeal was so broad and why their ideas were discussed by people interested in religious and educational reform as well as by physicians and philosophers.

For the Chemical Philosophers, the unity and harmony of the universe was an obvious consequence of creation by a wise and benevolent God. This belief was shared by the vast majority of seventeenth century thinkers who instinctively shunned the materialistic implications of the mechanical philosophy. They could not fail to attend to a new philosophy that professed to achieve better scientific results with principles that con-



formed to Christian precepts rather than those of the 'Pagan Aristotle.' But this religious tone was not generally confessional, and many radicals welcomed the prospect of bypassing the authority of the established churches to pursue an independent study of the two God-given books: the Bible and the Created Book of Nature.

God created all things that they may be perfect and the iatrochemist considered it a privilege to be called upon to assist the natural process towards perfection by removing the pure from the impure and allowing the seeds of things to attain their ends. Baser metals could be hastened toward perfection and ill-tempered constitutions could be amended with the aid of chemistry. The spagiric art, as, after Paracelsus, alchemy was defined, worked for the well-being of nature whether vegetable, mineral or animal. It was a practical art and alchemists were not afraid of working with their own hands. They ridiculed the pedantry and logical exercises of the Schoolmen who cared for nothing but the words of Galen and Aristotle. The philosophy they appealed to was neither the qualitative physics of Aristotle nor the mathematical harmonies of the Neo-Platonists but Renaissance naturalism in which macrocosm-microcosm analogies provided clues and, in some cases such as Fludd, even evidence for the truth of general theories. This organic vision of the universe and the insistence on experiments made them scornful of mathematical rigour. When Fludd accused Kepler of belonging to the 'vulgar crowd that pursues quantitative shadows,' he was voicing the persuasion, common among alchemists, that mathematical reasoning, however coherent, rests on abstract assumptions that are not borne out in experience. They inveighed against the mechanical philosophy, not because it was a new form of knowledge, but because it appeared to be a reductionism founded on the purely speculative premise that everything in nature can be explained on the analogy of a clock.

Van Helmont's influential chemical philosophy (about which Easley has nothing to say) presented itself to the rational enquiring mind of the mid-seventeenth century as a genuine alternative to Cartesian mechanism and reacted in a complicated way on this philosophy to bring about a more experimental approach to chemistry. This claim, which would have sounded preposterous twenty years ago, must now be taken as one of the most serious reassessments of the development of the scientific method. We are now aware that the mechanical philosophy was often a thin sheet of ice that barely concealed the objectionable features of a philosophy that many were unable to forsake.

The shortcomings of the mechanical philosophy were particularly glaring in medicine and chemistry. The new conception of nature proclaimed the need of purging the body of natural philosophy of the occult and looked for the mechanical reality behind every phenomenon. Yet it offered no way of discriminating between competing invisible mechanisms, and the unity of chemistry dissolved into as many theories as there were philosophers to imagine various hidden springs of matter.

More fundamentally still, the Cartesian programme broke down in its attempt to explain life as a mere appearance, a species of occult quality.

The mechanical philosophy was eventually given the broader base that included the chemical and biological data that it had initially precluded itself from understanding. Historically, we are not faced in the seventeenth century with a simple clash between two completely contrasting viewpoints but with a complex interaction between two systems influencing each other and ultimately giving rise to a new and richer method of scientific investigation. This process is a complex phenomenon, and philosophical assumptions, experimental evidence, and a good deal of hard, rational thought went into it, much more, *pace* Easlea, than did considerations of sex or class.

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DONALD EVANS, *Faith, Authenticity and Morality*. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press 1980. CN\$ 25.00. ISBN 0-8020-5424-2.

This recent book by Donald Evans consists of revised essays, but, as he points out in the introduction, it is more than a collection of previously published work. Much new material is contained, and often it is introduced in such a way as to show the evolution of Evans' thought. He describes his book as 'a philosophical study of three areas': (i) 'the language and experience of religious faith,' (ii) 'the personal and political attitudes which constitute authentic human existence,' and (iii) 'the fundamental framework for moral decisions.' As he shows us, his views regarding all three have changed. While these three themes recur throughout the book, the first is related especially to his discussion of Ian Ramsey, the second to his discussion of Sam Keen and Gregory Baum, and the third to his discussion of Paul Ramsey. Moreover, Evans is concerned with the interrelatedness of these themes, for at times they converge. They do in particular when Evans argues for a strong connection between 'basic' attitudes and religious belief. His argument here, which we shall



examine later, is an 'anthropological-logical argument' that authentic (or fulfilling) attitudes require religious belief.

Four of the seven chapters are centered on the philosophical and theological thought of others (Ramsey, Keen, Baum, and Ramsey), and three of the chapters — especially the last two — are more issue-oriented; however, many of the issues Evans pursues in the last two chapters arise in the four chapters on other thinkers.

In the first chapter Evans sounds the theme of his dissatisfaction with linguistic analysis of religious language. He has come to see that religious *attitudes* are more important. And this has led him to reflect on the form of various analogies of attitude. But in addition to attitudes, *analogy* applies to divine activity and religious relationships to God. Accordingly Evans develops a kind of typology of analogy, which embraces analogy of attitude, analogy of activity, and analogy of relation. Evans likes schema and typologies, and formulating them is one of the things he does well. Elsewhere he has done it for different constructions of *belief and faith* (*Religious Studies*, 10 (1974)). Here he does it for analogy. Later in the book he does it for the theological concept of *liberation*. We may not always agree with his categories, but at the very least he gives us an organizing device that aids the completeness of reflection.

The second chapter is a survey of Ian Ramsey's thought on religious language. Evans explores Ramsey's insights and points out certain difficulties, for instance in the way Ramsey suggests we understand talk about God's infinite goodness. However the main problem with Ramsey's thought, as Evans has come to see it, is that Ramsey's focus is on religious language and his approach is too 'empirical.' Rather, what is needed is a focus on attitudes and relations through a more 'existential' and experiential approach.

In the third chapter Evans turns to the question, 'What style of life is authentic?' which he addresses through a discussion of Sam Keen's work. For Keen authentic man is neither an Apollonian nor a Dionysian extreme but a 'graceful' balance of the two, not an oscillation between one and the other but a combination of the two. The foundations of gracefulness for Keen are trust and confidence. Evans, though, raises the question whether authenticity involves more than basic trust. Later in the book he argues that it does.

In chapter 4, on Gregory Baum's theology of liberation, the central question of chapter 3 is further examined. The category of social sin is introduced, and Evans squarely faces the question, 'Should we seek mainly personal or social liberation?' Evans has no neat answer to this question, he concedes. He does suggest that the answer depends on one's 'social context' (in which those around one may or may not need material support) and on the stage of one's personal development. But, as he acknowledges in a footnote, Evans does not answer or even address the question, 'What is one's social context?' (Is it one's family? Is it the family of man?) Evans has criticisms of Baum. However, even when he is being

critical — here as elsewhere — he does not fail to be generous. He never attacks views. He examines them and qualifies them. Always he tries to bring out what is right about the views he discusses.

The fifth chapter is on the thought of Paul Ramsey. In this chapter Evans deals with the issue of 'exceptionless moral rules.' His discussion is detailed and valuable, and we get a clear idea of both the strengths and weaknesses in Ramsey's position. Moreover, at the end of the chapter we are prepared for Evans' reminder that in Christian conviction more important than living by allegedly exceptionless rules is whether we have loved. Evans' own view is that while there are 'virtually exceptionless rules' their foundation is a 'modified natural-law conviction concerning human nature' — according to which (I think Evans would say) human beings are to be loved.

In the sixth chapter the initial question is: 'Does religious faith conflict with moral freedom?' Evans examines this question by examining a creed. The creed is one approved by the General Council of the United Church of Canada and formulated by a group of academics, pastors, and laymen, including Evans himself. He argues that while some authoritarian forms of belief can conflict with moral freedom, other faith-forms need not. Not unimportant to Evans' discussion is a distinction between 'wilful freedom' and 'responsive freedom.' The first involves asserting power over others and resists doing the will of others; the second does not and, accordingly, allows the prayer, 'Thy will be done.' Also in this chapter Evans returns to the question of which basic attitude is truly authenticating and argues that the root-attitude is receptivity, or rather 'pervasive trust,' which includes receptivity, and which is a necessary condition for the basic attitudes of love as I-Thou involvement, love as social concern, and love as contemplative detachment.

In the final chapter Evans does two things. First he explains why he has shifted away from the approach of 'linguistic philosophy,' and, second, he puts the anthropological-logical argument in final form (at least for this book). Evans has turned from the methods of linguistic philosophy for several reasons. For one thing he has come to see the religious importance of 'speaker-dependent meaning,' as opposed to the public meaning of what is said. It now seems to Evans that in religion meaning what one says involves intending words to have a biblical meaning; and that presupposes understanding; but understanding biblical language requires personal or existential experience. I am not sure that Evans is altogether right here. Surely in *some* sense even the indifferent atheist understands what he rejects. On the other hand, there may be a kind of understanding the atheist lacks. I suspect that we need a distinction of the sort Evans so brilliantly draws in other contexts. (The conceptual fact that understanding — unlike *knowledge that* — can deepen may be significant for the formulation of such a distinction.) Evans rejects linguistic philosophy on other grounds too: the actual meaning of religious language, he says, is not mainly public; 'private meaning' is what mainly matters. Yes, but is it



*logically* private meaning in Wittgenstein's sense? I think not. And, for Evans, it now seems that *prelinguistic* experience, as opposed to religious *talk*, is more important for getting at religious experiences and attitudes. Again, perhaps this is right, but is religious *practice* (which Neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion focus on) linguistic in the sense meant by Evans?

Evans' second concern in chapter 7 is with what he calls 'the anthropological-logical argument.' This argument is pervasive if not central in the book, and I would like now to examine it. In the final version that Evans comes to it is this: (1) An attitude of basic trust, in a religious construction, is necessary for human fulfilment, but (2) 'Jones trusts X' entails 'Jones believes that X exists,' and so a fulfilled life requires not just that one is logically committed to a religious belief, but the actual existence of a religious belief. (260-262)

There are two crucial connections in the argument. One is that between holding a basic attitude toward X and believing that X exists. Some have denied this step. George Nakhnikian seems to allow that one can feel 'cosmic thankfulness' and yet not believe in the existence of that to which thanks is due. Rightly, I think, Evans argues against such a view. While Evans does not put the point exactly this way, if the connection at issue does not hold, then one does not feel thankful (cosmically or otherwise); rather, at most, one feels as though one were or should be thankful.

The other crucial step in the argument connects human fulfilment with certain basic attitudes, or rather one certain basic attitude, namely pervasive trust. Here, I believe, is the critical step in Evans' argument. Why not a basic attitude of distrust (as Evans himself asks)? He says that the 'facts' sanction neither trust nor distrust. (59 and 103) It is a matter of choice or decision, Evans says more than once, and, at one point, he gives as a reason for preferring the 'disclosure of cosmic trustworthiness' that trust is more fulfilling. (59, cf. 259) Later Evans comes to say that the articulation of *religious* trust arises from the discernment of God and to the extent one has such basic trust one *has* discerned God. (262) But what then happens to choice? Is it, for Evans, that one chooses to discern God? Evans does not discuss problems relating to *choosing to believe that* and *choosing to be aware that*. The former, though problematic, may be understandable (one can *try* to believe, and fail or succeed). The latter is another story. What Evans needs, I think, is an account of the role of will in religious disclosure. He might do well to reflect on those who have spoken of our seeing God in His manifestation and of that which prevents our seeing God's presence as spiritual blindness or our minds' being darkened — or, in contemporary language, self-deception, a notion to which Evans refers without developing its epistemological potential.

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DONALD EVANS, *Struggle and Fulfilment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality*. Toronto: Collins 1979. CN\$ 12.95. ISBN 0-529-05669-0.

Donald Evans, a noted philosopher of religion at the University of Toronto, seeks here to blend a series of teachings about Biblical thought, moral experience and psychoanalysis. He is generously frank about his own time of emotional crisis and consequent membership as a patient in a 'therapeutic community.' Such openness about treatment militates against a host of residual biases and superstitions.

Professor Evans' goals in this book often appear to resemble some of Aristotle's in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: he is trying to throw new light on the paramount strengths and virtues, weaknesses and vices of human nature. As with Aristotle, there is a clearly *practical* intent which accompanies the intellectual labour. And at times his ideal of a human being's *fulfilment* interestingly resembles the Stagirite's *eudaimonia*.

What, then, does the author wish to recommend? Above all, he asks the reader to develop 'basic trust' or 'pervasive commitment to life-affirming forces,' hence to eschew 'basic distrust.' (4) Basic trust is the first of what he calls the 'Attitude-Virtues,' followed by *humility, self-acceptance, responsibility, self-commitment, friendliness, concern* and *contemplation*. What he urges one to beware of, basic distrust, is naturally accompanied by *anxiety, wariness, idolatry, despair* and *apathy*. It follows that many pages must be devoted to explaining how Evans intends such terms to be specially understood, lest his readers accuse him of mounting a Motherhood Campaign or a Boy-Scout-Bromides-Bazaar. He does indeed write at considerable length about the terms and concepts. There are some stimulating comments on several of them which can help practical moralists to advance their reflections concerning how lives should be led. But the author never reaches top form for very long. The enterprise even tends on occasions to thrash and flop about like a dedicated fish gasping dutifully out of water. Evans very understandably wants to write for a wide audience on these subjects. But sooner or later there must be enough hard-nosed and exacting arguments — or philosophy drifts off into sermonizing and table talk. The book, we should add, purports to be directed to the non-religious as well as the religious reader, so that 'self-fulfilment' can be seen as a universally desirable end. The religious reader may want to subsume it under a pretext-like 'Ad majorem dei gloriam' in his own mind, and nod at hints of possible exemptions in the author's claim that it is 'generally compatible with much in Christian tradition.' (11)

Many religious and some non-religious optimists will have no difficulty in accepting Evans' definition of 'basic trust' (the most important 'Attitude-Virtue') as 'an expression of an assurance that our human life has a significance in a cosmos for us rather than against us.' But there is a dif-



ficulty for no few pessimists and sceptics here. Again, it is doubtful that they can gain much assurance of a 'friendly' cosmos from the author's own assertion that there is an 'ultimate reality which pervades the universe', (5) should they discern what this means. (Evans sometimes shows a penchant for Tillich and ontically oracular pronouncements). And a variety of readers may be disturbed by repetitions of what seem to be an amateur therapist's assurances that the individual will eventually find ground under his feet if he has the misfortune or the courage to plunge far enough down the abyss of depression.

Another source of worry: his efforts to set an example against sexism may well prove counterproductive. 'In the past, books which generalize concerning human nature have traditionally been written in the masculine gender only.... The representative human being is always referred to as "he"....Such stylistic sexism reinforces real-life sexism...I refer to "someone" or "a person" and then go on to the pronoun "she".' (10) For those who take meaning to be often affected by *use*, the causes, as well as the effects of his policy are disturbing. There are established and well understood *uses* of the (grammatically) masculine pronoun which are already well understood to cover both sexes.

For the philosopher it is Chapter Nine that may be most intriguing. Here one is allowed to evaluate two explicit, formally structured arguments. Yet even here the structures are meant to guide insight rather than to compel assent. At the start of Section Three, Donald Evans rejects the traditional distinction between theological virtues and moral virtues (167-168). Basic trust 'as pervasive stance has an unconditioned character' as well as having a focus upon particular finite beings (169). Neither morality nor religion has '*rational* priority' over the other. But there are two distinct 'patterns of rational justification' for choosing the Attitude-Virtues. In the first, which he calls '*neo-Kantian*,' morality is prior. Religion is prior in what he calls an '*existentialist*' approach.

Chapter Nine, Section Four, begins as the '*neo-Kantian*' battleground. We are offered this "'Anthropological-Logical" argument.' (173)

'*Contention of normative anthropology*: Human nature is such that attitude *x* is necessary for human personality or human fulfilment; therefore one ought to cultivate and live by *x*.'

'*Logical contention*: If anyone has attitude *x* he or she presupposes or implies that he or she believes in God.'

'*Conclusion*: Therefore belief in God can be justified as a presupposition or implication of an attitude which ought to be cultivated because it is necessary for human fulfilment.' (173)

For Kant, says the author, attitude *x* was respect for moral law. Evans' favourite substitution is basic and pervasive trust. But he insists that any one of the eight Attitude-Virtues will do as a filler for *x*. The following pages (174-177) offer less formal argument to the effect that with trust as the placeholder the argument should move at least some of his readers. One reads, for example: '(b) *Since basic trust is externally pervasive and*

*unifying, it implies a belief in a focus which is cosmic.* (174) .... (c) *The cosmic focus of basic trust is God.* One is again reminded of numerous fond references among these pages to Paul Tillich. For Tillich, it sometimes seems, one can argue (wisely) as follows: (i) everyone cares most about something; (ii) therefore, everyone has ultimate concern, even if it is directed to a wretched idol; (iii) therefore, everyone is really religious; (iv) but the proper object of such ultimate concern cannot be something individual or particular, let alone finite; (v) therefore God is Being Itself and not a being.

There are times when Evans' love of *immanence* and (*liberating life*) *energy* seems to give off a sulfurous whiff of Tillich's quasimonistic 'panentheism.' But he has too much good sense and good theology to press any such variant on Courage to Be very far. By page 178 he is ready to admit he is not unduly troubled about 'whether explicit belief in God can be rationally justified.' By the next page he is insisting and even arguing that 'Maybe we have to believe what is false in order to be fulfilled. Maybe reality is not in tune with human fulfilment.' After all, he complains against his 'neo-Kantian' approach, many religious people like him prefer to appeal to their own *experience* to justify their theism — in his own case 'an experience of a liberating life energy.' (179)

This dialectical scrimmaging soon brings him to '*The existential religious approach*' and its '*Metaphysical-Reflective Argument*.' On page 180 one may read:

'*Metaphysical Contention*: What we discern as ultimate from attitude *x* really *is* and really *is ultimate*.

'*Reflective Contention*: What we discern as ultimate from attitude *x* is best articulated as *d* (a description).'

'*Conclusion*: *d* is and *d* is ultimate.'

What about the values of *d* and *x*? 'In my own basic version of the Argument, *x* is basic trust and *d* is God. In the background of this book there has been the assumption that trust enables us to discern the ultimate and there has been reflection concerning this ultimate as divine.' (180) Again there is a reek of Tillich, as there is so often in this book when Evans over-uses or just plain abuses the word '*attitude*' in the hope of expressing the *essences* of religion, morality and mental health. This formulation of the Metaphysical-Reflective Argument is apt to generate illusions of delivering everything and anything, Das Nichts included. It is hardly tailored just to fit a concrete, if perfect individual like the transcendent of God of the Bible.

Evans' strategy is to endorse this kind of criticism in the very next paragraph, then to treat this as a strength of his thinking on the very next page. 'The existentialist approach needs support for its selection of one stance rather than another. Here the neo-Kantian approach can help....why not pick the one which most obviously promotes human fulfilment?' (181) But the question arises whether, if two men with one arm tied down can juggle more apples than one such man, four or eight men with both arms



tied down can juggle more apples than the original pair. Perhaps some more fancy footwork would help Professor Evans to achieve a strong toe-hold and to conjure great and complementary strengths out of his two rather dubious hatfuls of inference. But the required Transcendental Peditation must probably wait for his next book or essay.

As an opponent of despair, Evans is to be thanked by Christians and humanists alike for his hard labours. As a philosopher trying to illuminate notions of *reasonable and religious* beliefs, attitudes, ways of living we suspect that he is sometimes making matters too hard and perhaps too obscure for his own ends to be clearly attained. A consideration of fellow Canadian philosophers of religion like Christensen, McKinnon, Garceau, Leslie, Martin, Newman, the Niensens, Penelhum and Prado could have made this a more successful book. But we praise the author for bringing together with such intensity many questions which do indeed deserve to be raised in one place of debate.

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SHOSHANA FELMAN, *Le scandale du corps parlant* Paris: Editions du Seuil 1980. Pp. 219. FF45.00. ISBN 2-5961719.

Ce livre, qui semble susciter un intérêt considérable, avec souvent les accents du Scandale, se présente d'abord comme une lecture d'Austin<sup>1</sup>. SF considère le texte d'Austin en le rapprochant du *Don Juan* de Molière (accessoirement de celui de Da Ponte) et de fragments de Jacques Lacan. Par un jeu de miroirs ingénieux, on entreprend de montrer qu'Austin est donjuanesque dans la théorie tandis que Don Juan exploite l'idée pleine et entière de la performativité telle qu'elle est comprise par SF et, par la mise en relief de certaines "coïncidences théoriques," (117) que Lacan et Austin participent de théories très voisines et qu'ils ne sont guère séparés que par leur langue respectue (le génie (ironiquement empirique et pragmatique)

de l'anglais, ou le génie (sophistiqué, allusif, spéculatif) du français.' (124). (L'ouvrage porte du reste en sous-titre 'Don Juan avec Austin ou La séduction en deux langues.') Le gros du travail consiste à nourrir l'idée, tout à fait neuve, de ces rapprochements<sup>2</sup> de mises en rapport de l'expression de ces trois textes (ainsi que d'autres textes dont l'utilisation est moins intensive: Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, entre autres): l'objectif est de montrer comment, si l'expression utilise des mots, des syntagmes ou des phrases analogues, on est autorisé à conclure qu'une même conceptualité et, partant, une même séduction se trouvent à l'oeuvre. Il s'agit d'un exercice de style beaucoup plus que d'un travail sur un quelconque contenu et s'il peut être amusant et séduisant (deux mots qui servent beaucoup) en jouant sur une surface textuelle, il est par ailleurs sans autre portée que l'excès qu'il perpète au nom du Scandale dont il voit partout la présence.

Cet exercice de lecture, qui s'acharne sur des aspects de la théorie austinienne qui échappent aux approches "techniciennes" habituelles — ce qui représente son seul mérite — constitue en même temps la dimension la plus problématique du livre, car s'il est astucieux dans ce qu'il tente de faire, il est beaucoup moins heureux dans ce qu'il parvient à dire. Le principe fondamental qui est suivi est celui de l'amalgame et de l'association (libre). Pour montrer en quoi réside le donjuanisme d'Austin, SF dit d'abord ce qu'il en est de celui de Don Juan en exposant ce qu'il fait de la performativité du langage, en particulier à l'occasion de l'acte de promesse, pour ensuite en trouver les analogues, avec une redondante minutie, dans la lettre d'Austin, quitte à la surmener. C'est ainsi qu'elle conclut de l'idée, raisonnablement banale, que 'Truth and falsity are (...) not names for relations, qualities (...), but for a dimension of assessment — how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts (...) to which they refer' (HDTW 142) à celle, nettement plus audacieuse, que 'comme Don Juan, Austin (...) introduit dans la pensée du langage la dimension de jouissance, bien distincte de celle de la connaissance.' (84) L'enchaînement s'appuie sur l'amalgame très tentant, et très naïf: 'satisfactoriness', 'satisfying', 'satisfaction d'un désir', 'jouissance', alors qu'il s'agit (bêtement) de satisfaire des conditions de vérité, ce qui ne semble pas s'opposer nettement à 'la connaissance.'

Séduite<sup>3</sup> en deux langues, SF les fait communiquer assez spontanément (tout en soutenant par ailleurs qu'elles se ratent nécessairement) en tirant parti du voisinement, de l'analogie pour favoriser les conclusions qui favorisent au mieux les conclusions qu'elle souhaite tirer des textes qu'elle considère. Par exemple, lorsqu'elle entreprend de montrer ce qui, chez Austin, manifeste 'une attitude vis-à-vis de la psychanalyse,' (133? SF note que 'les observations linguistiques qu'il fait ont l'air de toujours procéder d'une intuition analytique non explicitée,' (137) à témoins: 'l'observation du fait que le verbe "pouvoir," en anglais, (...) partage avec le verbe "savoir" l'anomalie linguistique de ne pas avoir de "présent continu" (...) et de façon générale, l'analyse montrant à travers la "grammaire" (...) de "pouvoir" l'indication permanente de la limite et du conditionnel, donc



de l'aptitude humaine au fiasco,' (137-38)<sup>4</sup> ou encore: 'Une autre observation linguistique qui semble procéder d'une intuition (d'une connotation) psychanalytique est celle qui consiste (...) à faire remarquer que l'adverbe *inadvertently* n'a pas de vrai antonyme en anglais.' (138) Austin a certainement été un des philosophes de sa tradition (avec Wittgenstein et Wisdom) qui ont le plus insisté sur les limitations de l'explicitation de tout ce qui entoure la production des énoncés et sur l'impuissance de la philosophie à tout dire, mais il est pour le moins audacieux de voir dans cette retenue qu'il 'pose, théoriquement, l'inconscient,' (140) même en traduisant ses 'unwittingly' par 'inconsciemment' (139) ou en exploitant la place qu'il fait à ce qui est fortuit et se dérobe à l'intention en direction de la reconnaissance d'un rôle actif de l'inconscient dans sa philosophie du langage, à moins de n'avoir de l'inconscient que l'idée la plus platement ordinaire (auquel cas le rapprochement de la philosophie et de la psychanalyse devient extrêmement banal). De même, s'il est vrai que le plaisir du faire philosophique, du jeu dans l'expression des différences et des considérations susceptibles de les étayer est massivement présent dans le texte d'Austin, dire que 'l'énonciation austinienne — éminemment libidinale — ne cesse, de plusieurs façons, de mettre en jeu — de mettre *en acte* - la connotation sexuelle, érotique (145) devrait pouvoir se fonder sur autre chose que l'utilisation par Austin de mots comme 'amusement,' 'fun,' 'pleasure,' 'to incite.' A constater l'accumulation des conclusions étranges que SF tire de ce qu'elle 'lit' et la fermeté avec laquelle elle les pose, on peut s'étonner de ce que la mobilité reconnue au texte-objet ne trouve pas en contrepartie plus de perplexité et de prudence dans la glose qui en est faite.

Je ne voudrais pas réduire totalement la nouveauté et, jusqu'à un certain point, la subversivité de cette lecture d'Austin, de même que je ne puis être tout à fait insensible à la séduction qu'elle-même cherche à exercer. Ce livre est un exercice habile de mise en présence de *styles*, de façons de dire: la pratique philosophique d'Austin est effectivement empreinte d'humour, elle affectionne effectivement la provocation et l'abrupt, elle fait effectivement une large place au hasard, à l'indécidable, au ratage, à l'échec, à l'imparfait, à la fascination du faire et à la relativité du dire, elle comporte effectivement une mouvance qui la déplace constamment, (etc.), et le fait d'indiquer ces choses peut contribuer au progrès de la philosophie comme genre littéraire (titre auquel elle n'est sans doute pas assez considérée) et à une appréhension autre de ses artisans. Cependant, la superposition des littératures présente ses dangers, dont la disparition des objets sous un discours qui s'en sert comme prétexte pour justifier son propre déploiement. L'Austin dont il est ici question ressemble assez peu à celui qui est reconnu par la tradition de la philosophie des actes de langage: il est constamment créé par une lecture qui associe la perspicacité inventive et l'aveuglement, qui prend le parti de rendre essentiel ce qui à d'autres apparaît comme stylistique ou accidentel et qui laisse de côté, délibérément ou non, ce qui appartient au contenu au profit d'une séduction exercée. En

cela, ce livre est extrêmement cohérent; l'enchaînement des séductions ne peut jamais être rompu, ni être terminé.

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- 1 Il s'agit surtout de *How to Do Things with Words* (HDTW), mais aussi de certains articles des *Philosophical Papers* (PP) ainsi que de la conférence du colloque de Royoumont, 'Performatif: constatif.'
- 2 Notons cependant que si ces rapprochements particuliers sont originaux, l'idée de rapprocher à peu près n'importe quoi de n'importe quoi, surtout si les termes associés sont normalement réputés être très éloignés l'un de l'autre (le Scandale y gagnant), est de plus en plus répandue. Le rapprochement Don Juan-Austin occupe la première partie du livre ('La perversion de la promesse: Don Juan et la performance littéraire'), précédée d'un court exposé des positions d'Austin et de Benveniste sur la distinction constatif-performatif; le second est traité dans la deuxième partie ('Connaissance et jouissance, ou la performance du philosophe (psychanalyse et performatif)').
- 3 'Il faut bien le dire tout de suite: je suis *séduite* par Austin. J'aime non seulement l'ouverture que j'aperçois dans sa théorie, mais le potentiel de scandale de celle-ci; j'aime non seulement ce qu'il dit, mais ce qu'il "fait avec des mots" (99).
- 4 Il est surprenant que SF ne profite pas du mot 'fiasco' pour se livrer à un des petits motifs étymologiques dont elle agrmente son texte: compte tenu de ce qu'il a primitivement le sens d' 'échec sexuel,' il se prête à merveille à de multiples parallèles.

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R.G. FREY, *Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals*. Don Mills, Ontario and New York: Clarendon Press 1980. Pp. 176. US\$ 24.95; CN\$ 33.75. ISBN 0-19-8244215

What can have unpleasant sensations (and, therefore, can be hurt) but lacks beliefs, desires, emotions, linguistic competence, interests, and rights? One correct answer, according to R.G. Frey, is: non-human animals. This much suggests why Frey's book is both bold and curious. It is



bold because it seeks to topple to the ground a wide variety of claims made by those who belong to the 'animal rights-vegetarian camp' (e.g., P. Singer, T. Regan, A. Linsey, etc.), to use Frey's label. I shall try to suggest, in what follows, why it is, as well, a curious work.

While Frey states that his main purpose is casting doubt on the claims that (1) animals have rights, and (2) vegetarianism has a moral basis, there is little direct attention given to (2). Further, if Frey is correct not only do animals lack rights; it is not obvious that they have any moral status whatever. He does allow that many of them can experience pain (or unpleasant sensations) — a rare concession to opponents — but is unwilling to allow that it is obvious that pain is an intrinsic evil or that it is wrong to inflict it. Indeed, a persistent tactic in *Interests and Rights* is to assert that crucial claims of opponents are 'not obvious' or 'not argued for.' At times Frey seems to take the position of a radical skeptic (if not cynic) in claiming 'it has not been shown that...'. Frey's reservations about the moral significance of animal pain, indeed pain *simpliciter*, do seem curious in virtue of his admission that he is some sort of act-utilitarian, but Frey's aim is not to construct some sort of plausible all-things-considered ethical theory; rather it is to 'cast doubt.' One unsatisfying feature of his inquiry is his resolute negativism, one which not only questions why moral status should be attributed to animals but also leaves us wondering whether anything has such status, including paradigmatic humans. Frey might respond by saying that humans, generally, have desires, beliefs, emotions and interests, and animals do not. But just as Frey may play the game of asking 'what's so special about pain?' — so may we play the game of asking 'what's so special about desires, beliefs, etc.?' The above conveys the flavor of Frey's strategy, but let us be more specific.

Since many who claim that animals are routinely wronged rest their case on the assumption that animals have interests (not just 'are interested in...'), Frey seeks to show that a wide variety of grounds for thinking so are unsatisfactory. Hence, for example, if animals (or people) have rights only if they have interests, and they lack interests, they lack rights (cf. Regan's view). Analogously, if we ought to give equal consideration to equal interests — and animals lack interests — we need not attend to animals (cf. Singer's view). This line of argument is crucial to Frey's strategy — in contrast to Frey's announcements about having little sympathy with 'fashionable' appeals to rights which he suspects are a front for groups with vested interests attempting to get what they want. I, for one, have concluded that such disdain is not only itself 'fashionable' but also entirely irrelevant to the more basic issue.

In one sense, Frey claims, for an entity to have an interest, or for some state of affairs to be in its interest, is for that thing to be such that some state of affairs may be for its good or well-being. Frey allows that animals have interests in this sense (a qualification to my earlier remarks) but he insists that, in this sense, so do cave-drawings, tractors, and carpets. Hence, if interests are sufficient for rights all these entities have rights, a presumed

*reductio* of this view. One response here is that having interests involves being sentient, but more on that in a moment.

It may be useful to note here a curious tension between Frey's seeming assumption that some non-sentient things surely lack interests and his approving reference to a view of John Rodman. Rodman has complained that the boundary around entities with moral status employed by Singer — namely, sentience — is arbitrary and discriminatory. One is puzzled here. Frey offers no positive criterion for moral status and yet, agreeing with Rodman, assumes that sentience is too restrictive. Still, as noted, he assumes that some non-sentient things lack such status. If Frey is going to presuppose that some lines are arbitrary one would like to know why as well as what the more plausible candidates may be. Here as elsewhere it seems too easy merely to 'cast doubt' and at the same time, covertly, suppose limits to reasonable doubting.

But suppose Frey is right, that possession of interests in the sense noted is insufficient for possession of rights (or moral status). Suppose that to have interests a thing must have desires. Frey's response is that animals lack desires; he offers two sorts of argument in defense. One seems to claim that students of animal behavior find no need to assume the existence of such subjective states in attempting adequately to account for such behavior, e.g., N. Tinbergen (who, it may be noted, appeals to 'instinct'). If true description may be distinguished from adequate explanation and prediction, Frey's first argument seems inconclusive. In any case, I do not pursue it.

His second, more substantive response, is that for A to have desires A must have beliefs. And to have beliefs one must have linguistic competence. Since, it is alleged, animals lack the latter, they lack beliefs, desires, interests, and rights. Consistently, Frey allows a similar inference regarding 'very young children'. (102) Current disputes about the criteria for linguistic competence (between Chomsky and others) are complex. I only note that Frey's discussion is brief and sometimes rhetorical (of Washoe, the chimpanzee, it is queried 'Can she detect nonsense?'); this may engender doubt but hardly amounts to compelling argument.

One might doubt (as I do) that having *any* beliefs at all requires 'linguistic competence.' If so, the argument about the latter is irrelevant. Frey recognizes this point and seeks to show that there is no compelling reason to attribute beliefs to animals on the basis of their non-linguistic behavior. Contrary to the common sense view that, e.g., 'the cat perceives the ball is stuck,' Frey resolutely maintains that this cannot be so for perception involves judgment which involves, ultimately, having a language. I offer no objection here but my bet is that students of animal behavior will find it surpassingly strange that animals do not perceive after all.

In an interesting and surprising fashion Frey also maintains that capacity to feel pain (rather, 'have unpleasant sensations') is neither sufficient nor necessary in order to have interests. Once again, in his view, the frequent focus on pain and other mental states is 'both discriminatory



and arbitrary.' (166) Once again, curious for an act-utilitarian. It is at this point, as noted earlier, that Frey fails to find it obvious that pain is an intrinsic evil. On this he may be right — if by 'evil' one means 'morally bad.' I am not sure. However, it does hurt and Frey allows that animals can also hurt, be hurt, and be wantonly hurt — and, indeed, 'wronged.' (170) One wonders here if *some* sort of cat has been let out of the bag, whether Frey's ultimate dispute with the 'animal rights-vegetarian camp' is, in the final analysis, a terminological one. If so, his inquiry may leave us, to begin again, with what many believe to be the fundamental question: what is permissible and what is impermissible with respect to how animals may be treated. I am inclined to think that that is where we are left; still, Frey's not necessarily perverse defense is provocative enough to stimulate further discussion of one of the fundamental questions for any ethical theory: what are the criteria for possession of moral status?

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PIERRE JACOB, *L'empirisme logique, ses antécédents, ses critiques*, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, Coll. 'Propositions' 1980. Pp. 306. ISBN 2-7073-0303-8.

Non seulement, comme l'affirme d'entrée de jeu Pierre Jacob, 'les Français n'aiment pas la philosophie analytique,' mail toute sa Préface vise à nous faire voir qu'en général, pour eux, l'épistémologue n'a pas sa place hors de l'histoire et de la sociopolitique des sciences. C'est pourquoi l'on s'attend d'habitude à trouver peu de publications françaises traitant de philosophie des sciences au sens où cette problématique est maintenant internationalement quadrillée depuis plus de cinquante ans. C'est pourquoi, aussi, il y a lieu de se réjouir devant la parution dont il est ici question. Non que cet ouvrage fasse avancer les choses, ce n'est d'ailleurs pas son but, mais parce qu'il synthétise, dans un style remarquablement clair et avec une maîtrise manifeste de ce qui est en question, les principales polémiques théoriques qui ont historiquement structuré l'épistémologie contemporaine.

L'ouvrage est, somme toute, bien articulé. Il s'ouvre par un examen rapide du logicisme de Frege, Russell et Moore qui eut permis à Pierre Jacob de rappeler qu'au début du siècle, les philosophies des sciences française et anglaise dialoguaient par Russell et Poincaré interposés (voir les premiers numéros de la *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*): mais l'auteur ne s'attarde pas à nous expliquer vraiment comment il s'est fait que la philosophie française des sciences en est venue à se couper presque complètement (il y a de rares exceptions) des courants occidentaux qui prenaient force et vigueur à l'époque.<sup>1</sup> Le second chapitre est consacré surtout à l'explicitation de la théorie des descriptions et de la théorie simple des types de Russell, à l'examen de l'impact du *Tractatus* de Wittgenstein sur cette tradition de recherche qui s'institutionnalisait avec le *Wiener Kreis*, et à quelques considérations concernant le Carnap de la *Syntaxe logique du langage*. On se prend ici à regretter que Pierre Jacob n'ait pas décidé de consacrer un traitement à part à Carnap, qui, historiquement, le méritait sûrement. Le chapitre trois traite de la libéralisation de l'empirisme logique: on y aperçoit les difficultés de l'inductivisme, du critère vérificationniste de la signification, de l'opérationnalisme de Bridgman, et l'auteur termine en présentant le dilemme du théoricien tel qu'exposé par Hempel.

Le quatrième chapitre veut nous faire voir 'comment raser la barbe de Platon avec la rasoir d'Occam': il porte en fait sur l'opposition de Quine et de Goodman aux thèses de Carnap, en particulier à la thèse, reprise du *Tractatus*, de la division entre les assertions portant sur le monde et celles sur le langage, et à la thèse, également d'origine wittgensteinienne, de la doctrine linguistique des vérités logiques. Le chapitre cinq, consacré à la 'naturalisation de l'empirisme,' porte essentiellement sur les thèses de Quine, thèse du holisme épistémologique et du holisme sémantique, thèse de la révocabilité des énoncés analytiques, thèse de l'incompatibilité de la quantification et de la logique modale, thèses de l'indétermination de la traduction radicale, de la relativité de l'ontologie et de l'inscrutabilité de la référence; ce chapitre se termine par la revue des paradoxes de la confirmation inductive de Hempel et de Goodman. Dans son sixième et dernier chapitre,<sup>2</sup> Pierre Jacob examine ce qu'il appelle 'la révolte contre l'empirisme.' Y trouve place la présentation de l'idée d'une logique de la découverte par Hanson, du concept central de paradigme par Kuhn, de la controverse entre Kuhn et Popper au sujet des procédures par lesquelles une théorie scientifique en vient à être remplacée par une autre, de la polémique au sujet de la généralisabilité du modèle D-N d'explication, et, finalement, du débat concernant la thèse de l'incommensurabilité des théories dans ses versions Feyerabend et Kuhn. L'ouvrage se conclut par un intéressant épilogue sur le 'renouveau du réalisme' dont les avatars les plus récents paraissent ici liés à la théorie sémantique de Tarski de même qu'à la théorie causale de la référence de Putnam basée sur les travaux de Kripke et de Donnellan en particulier.



L'ouvrage sera, sans aucun doute, pédagogiquement utile, surtout s'il est couplé, comme il convient, à l'anthologie que Jacob a fait paraître au même moment.<sup>3</sup> Pour être complet cependant, il aurait fallu que l'auteur situe ce mouvement philosophique par rapport à:

1. ceux qui le précédaient, et en particulier par rapport au néo-kantisme (surtout l'École de Marbourg, avec Natorp, Cohen et Cassirer), au positivisme du dix-neuvième siècle et à l'empirio-criticisme de Mach et Avenarius;
2. ceux qui lui furent contemporains, et en particulier par rapport à la phénoménologie de Husserl, à la nouvelle métaphysique de Heidegger et à la philosophie analytique du langage ordinaire;<sup>4</sup>
3. ceux avec lesquels, à toutes fins pratiques, il fusionna, en particulier l'École de Berlin (Hempel *et* Reichenbach) et le courant pragmatiste américain (Peirce, Dewey, James, C.I. Lewis et Ch. Morris, qu'on l'y classe ou non).<sup>5</sup>

Il aurait fallu, de plus, éviter certaines charges inappropriées<sup>6</sup> et développer, plutôt, certains points de la problématique, par exemple les difficultés logiques reliées à l'usage du discours indirect et à l'enchâssement des phrases dans des contextes d'attitudes propositionnelles (difficultés mentionnées à la p. 48). Il aurait fallu aussi soigner davantage certaines formulations,<sup>7</sup> clarifier la signification de termes non équivalents comme 'référence,' 'référents' et 'référentiel,' et être globalement plus soucieux du lecteur.<sup>8</sup> Il aurait fallu enfin que la bibliographie soit plus minutieusement rédigée de manière à informer le lecteur que Carnap (1932 a) existe en traduction française,<sup>9</sup> que Carnap (1932 c) existe en traduction anglaise,<sup>10</sup> que Carnap (1934 b) est contenu dans Carnap (1932 b), que la majorité des articles de Hempel mentionnés sont repris dans *Aspects* (1965), que Kuhn (1962) existe en traduction française,<sup>11</sup> que Kuhn (1970) a été repris dans Schilpp (1974) et dans Kuhn (1977), que Nagel (1961) vient d'être réédité,<sup>12</sup> que Scheffler (1963) existe en traduction française,<sup>13</sup> et que le *Tractatus* de Wittgenstein existe aussi dans une traduction française, traduction due à Klossowski que l'on aurait intérêt à retirer du marché. Que Pierre Jacob soit cependant remercié d'avoir rompu avec cette fâcheuse tradition de l'édition française de ne pas produire d'index.

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- 1 Incidemment, l'explication n'est pas simple à donner et la figure de Bachelard ne saurait occuper tout le portrait. Autres facteurs à considérer sans doute:
  - (a) l'opposition de Poincaré à la nouvelle logique de Russell et Whitehead;
  - (b) l'influence de Brunschwig en philosophie des mathématiques
  - (c) la mort prématurée de jeunes logiciens français prometteurs, au premier rang desquels il faut compter Cavailles;
  - (d) l'influence de Husserl.
- 2 Une coquille a voulu que ce chapitre soit identifié comme étant le chapitre IV (p. 226).
- 3 Cf. *De Vienne à Cambridge, l'héritage du positivisme logique de 1950 à nos jours*, Paris: Gallimard 1980. (cette numéro, pp. 23-7)
- 4 Pierre Jacob aime à caractériser l'empirisme logique comme étant une *philosophie analytique des sciences*. Outre que cette expression puisse porter à confusion, vu que la philosophie analytique, au sens technique de l'expression, concerne le langage ordinaire et non la science, elle devient carrément trompeuse dans certains usages, notamment quand on en vient à considérer Popper comme 'un philosophe analytique des sciences.' (25)
- 5 La fusion a produit *l'International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* que Pierre Jacob passe complètement sous silence.
- 6 Par exemple, celle qui vise Foucault (45) mais ne l'atteint pas.
- 7 Par exemple, expliquant le fait que Russell ait assimilé le *Sinn* de Frege à sa propre notion d'*indication* et la *Bedeutung* de Frege à sa notion de *denotation*, il poursuit: 'Ce qui a rendu plausible cette assimilation, c'est qu'en 1903, pour Russell, les mots 'le président de la République française' *indiquaient* le concept *le président de la République*, qui lui-même dénotait la 'chose' Valéry Giscard d'Estaing'. (49). En 1903, comme on le sait, la France n'en était qu'à la Troisième République...
- 8 Pourquoi n'avoir pas introduit à la p. 60 le symbole du quantificateur existentiel qui sera utilisé par après? Pourquoi n'avoir pas répété à la p. 197 la phrase 'Aucun célibataire n'est marié' (de même qu'à la p. 206) plutôt que de renvoyer le lecteur à la p. 178 en lui parlant de 'l'exemple (16) de la section 4 du chapitre IV'?
- 9 'La science et la métaphysique devant l'analyse logique du langage', trad. du général Ernest Vuillemin, introd. de Marcel Boll. Actualités scientifiques et industrielles, 172. Paris: Hermann & Cie 1934.
- 10 'Psychology in Physical Language' est contenu dans Ayer (1959) *Logical Positivism*.
- 11 *La structure des révolutions scientifiques*, traduction anonyme, Paris: Flammarion, Nouvelle Bibliothèque Scientifique 1972.
- 12 Deuxième édition, Indianapolis: Hackett 1979.
- 13 Traduction *partielle* seulement: *Anatomie de la science*, traduit par Pierre Thuillier, Paris: Editions du Seuil 1966.



*De Vienne à Cambridge, L'héritage du positivisme logique de 1950 à nos jours*, précédé de 'Comment peut-on ne pas être empiriste?' Paris: Editions Gallimard, Bibliothèque des Sciences Humaines 1980.

Cette anthologie, que la page couverture n'annonce pas comme telle, fera date, c'est à espérer. Voici en effect treize essais de 'philosophie analytique des sciences' choisis, traduits et présentés par l'auteur de *L'empirisme logique* (Paris: Ed. de Minuit 1980; cette numéro, pp. 19-22). Non seulement cette sélection paraîtra-t-elle pertinente mais la traduction excellente ou presque et la présentation utile.<sup>1</sup>

A tort ou à raison, pour Pierre Jacob le 'positivisme logique' est un ensemble de thèses élaborées entre 1920 et 1940 (12) et la philosophie des sciences postérieure, tout en étant demeurée 'analytique' et 'empiriste,' ne doit pas être confondue avec *le positivisme* (13). Et tous les textes choisis auraient ici la caractéristique commune de soumettre à une critique parfois dévastatrice ce positivisme logique, critique articulée autour de trois axes principaux: (a) d'abord une littérature axée sur la place de la logique et des mathématiques dans l'ensemble des sciences; (b) ensuite un ensemble de textes concernant le rôle de l'induction et la question du critère de démarcation; (c) enfin un corpus d'ouvrages et d'articles où s'opposèrent les interprétations instrumentalistes et réalistes des théories scientifiques. Disons ici qu'il est gênant de voir le positivisme logique réduit à une école de pensée ou une tradition philosophique qui n'aurait existé qu'entre 1920 et 1940 comme ce qui l'avait suivi n'en faisait pas vraiment partie. Outre que Hempel, par exemple, ne doit certainement pas être identifié comme un critique au sens où Feyerabend et Kuhn en sont bien, il faut garder en mémoire que toute son oeuvre est postérieure à 1940. Par ailleurs, dans la stricte perspective définie par Pierre Jacob, le texte de Shapere n'aurait pas sa place pas plus que celui de Hanson, qui font écho à des parti pris concernant de tout autres problèmes. En fait, le positivisme logique est une tradition de recherche qui continue au moins jusqu'à la fin des années cinquante et qui ne vient sous les feux de la critique qu'au moment même où Popper publie la version anglaise de sa *Logik der Forschung* (1959), date qui coïncide à peu près avec les premiers textes de Hanson sur le problème d'une logique de la découverte et avec la parution de *La révolution copernicienne* de Kuhn. Il serait même acceptable de penser que l'histoire du positivisme logique commence avec l'histoire de la révolution logique opérée au vingtième siècle avec les *Principia Mathematica* de Russell et Whitehead (1910-1913) et, à moins de disposer d'un critère sociologique très strict, on ne peut prétendre encore que cette histoire soit achevée.<sup>2</sup> Néanmoins, l'introduction générale de Pierre Jacob reste utile et stimulante, et les courtes présentations des textes choisis sont presque toujours à point.<sup>3</sup>

Le choix des textes eut pu être différent, on s'en doute. Eut-il pu être

meilleur, telle est la question. Je répondrai oui à cette question pour deux raisons. D'abord parce que la sélection aurait dû refléter davantage le souci de nous présenter des héritiers postérieurs à 1974 ('... de 1950 à nos jours' dit le sous-titre). En fait cinq textes se situent entre 1950 et 1960, six entre 1960 et 1970 et seulement deux sont postérieurs à 1970. Mais fondamentalement parce qu'on y trouve cinq omissions importantes. La première est de taille: il aurait fallu absolument incorporer à l'anthologie un texte de Carnap.<sup>4</sup> Si 'Testability and Meaning' (1936-7) paraissait trop long, alors un choix s'imposait d'emblée: 'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts. (1956)' Ensuite, il manque un Reichenbach (peut-être 'Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?' de 1952), mais surtout un Nagel (par exemple: 'The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences' de 1960 cadrerait parfaitement avec la section V). Enfin, on eut souhaité y lire un bon article de Lakatos (le texte central de référence demeure 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes' de 1970, mais il est très long) même qu'un essai de Toulmin pour compléter le survol.<sup>5</sup>

L'opération de traduction, toujours extrêmement ardue, a été bien menée en général. Remarquons d'abord que s'il y a peu de symbolisme dans les articles retenus, il est presque toujours adéquatement restitué.<sup>6</sup> Il est peu d'erreurs de syntaxe,<sup>7</sup> peu d'erreurs de ponctuation<sup>8</sup> et peu de fautes d'impression.<sup>9</sup> Une vérification rapide nous a cependant permis de constater certains manques de précision. Exemples: 'the ultimate evidence for beliefs about empirical matters' a été rendu par 'les données favorables aux croyances empiriques' (Hempel 63) et 'truthfunctional conditional' par 'le tour conditionnel suivant' (Hempel 71); '... la 'condition sur le contenu' ou...' (Popper 158 n. 63), est censé rendre 'the following "content-condition" ...'; dans '... si ce n'est que l'électricité (la notion d'être) est une certaine grandeur physique...' (Putnam 312) le texte entre parenthèses traduit 'associated with the notion of being'; la relative '... qu'elle porte en elle ses prédictions' (Putnam 329) veut rendre 'that its predictions are *self-contained*' (ces derniers mots étant en italiques, du reste); de même pour ce qui suit immédiatement dans le texte de Putnam, 'that they are deduced...' a été rendu par 'que celles-ci sont déductibles...' De plus, certaines décisions sont inadéquates: 's'il y a trois énoncés observationnels, tels qu'aucun ne se déduit des autres...' (Hempel 68) ne rend pas bien 'if there are any three observation sentences none of which alone entails any of the others...'; 'confirmations sensorielles' (Quine 107) ne rend pas correctement 'confirmatory experiences'; 'hypothèses' (Goodman 183 n. 5) ne rend pas adéquatement 'assumptions' (qui est rendu ailleurs par 'suppositions', ce qui est plus juste); et 'l'énoncé décrivant les preuves empiriques' (Goodman 184) ne fait pas justice à 'the evidence statement.' Enfin, il aurait fallu rendre 'thing-concepts' par 'concepts-de-choses' et non par 'concepts-choses.' (Putnam 322) Ce qui, d'ailleurs, aurait préserver l'homogénéité de la traduction puisque 'thing-language' a été rendu par 'langage-des-choses' et 'thing-theory' par 'théorie-des-choses.'<sup>10</sup>



Notons enfin que si la stratégie générale de cette publication est défendable, certains tactiques eurent pu être améliorées. Certaines 'notes du traducteur,' entre autres, sont ou bien carrément inutiles (par exemple, celles des pages 94 et 95) ou bien malvenues (par exemple, celle de la p. 209, compte tenu que l'exemple ne fait pas l'affaire). Il eut été utile, par ailleurs, d'expliquer par une N.d.t. la différence que fait Carnap entre 'explication' et 'explicitation,' que l'on peut marquer en français en traduisant respectivement par *explication* et *explicitation*.<sup>11</sup> Il eut été nécessaire de ne pas omettre la longue note appelée par Popper dès le début de son texte de 1963: elle est sans doute importante pour qui s'intéresse à l'histoire des arguments qui y sont développés et à ce qu'Alex Michalos a appelé 'la controverse Popper-Carnap.' Il eut été important de voir à ce que toutes les références bibliographiques soient fournies,<sup>12</sup> de la façon la plus précise,<sup>13</sup> la plus complète<sup>14</sup> et la plus opportune.<sup>15</sup> Et finalement, il eut été normal de continuer à faire en sorte que Quine parle de célibataire et d'homme marié plutôt que de lapin et de lièvre domestique (pp. 94 et suiv.), cet exemple de phrase prétendument analytique étant devenu classique.<sup>16</sup> Heureusement, comme il se devait, Pierre Jacob n'a pas oublié de joindre un index, et je m'en voudrais de ne pas terminer en disant que dans cette anthologie, les qualités l'emportent de beaucoup sur les déficiences, somme toute mineures.

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1 Les textes sont, dans l'ordre:

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| 1. Hempel (1965)     | 'Les critères empiristes de la signification cognitive: problèmes et changements'               |
| 2. Quine (1951)      | 'Les deux dogmes de l'empirisme' (version remaniée de 1953)                                     |
| 3. Popper (1963)     | 'La démarcation entre la science et la métaphysique'  |
| 4. Goodman (1955)    | 'La nouvelle énigme de l'induction'   |
| 5. Quine (1955)      | 'Le domaine et le langage de la science'  |
| 6. Putnam (1962)     | 'Ce que les théories ne sont pas'   |
| 7. Feyerabend (1963) | 'Comment être un bon empiriste. Plaidoyer en faveur de la tolérance en matière épistémologique' |

|                                |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| 8. Kuhn (1959)                 | 'La tension essentielle: tradition et innovation dans la recherche scientifique'         |
| 9. Shapere (1964)              | 'La structure des révolutions scientifiques'   |
| 10. Putnam (1973)              | 'Explication et Référence'   |
| 11. Oppenheim et Putnam (1958) | 'L'unité de la science: une hypothèse de travail'  |
| 12. Fodor (1974)               | 'Les sciences particulières (L'absence d'unité de la science: une hypothèse de travail)' |
| 13. Hanson (1961)              | 'Y a-t-il une logique de la découverte scientifique?'                                    |

- 2 On a dit de Popper qu'il avait été le critique principal des positions élaborées à l'intérieur du Cercle de Vienne. Mais Popper, bien qu'il en ait, n'a-t-il pas accepté d'être mêlé au 'Positivismusstreit' à titre de 'positiviste'? Et Kuhn, dont on dit qu'il a accompli un 'gestalt-switch' en épistémologie, n'a-t-il pas fait paraître sa bible *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* comme monographie dans le cadre de l'*International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (vol. II, no. 2) dirigée par Neurath, Carnap et Morris?
- 3 Les treize textes sont regroupés en 6 sections: I. Vérifiabilité des sciences et analyticité de la logique; II. Induction et Confirmation; III. Langage théorique et langage observationnel; IV. Changements scientifiques et changements de signification; V. L'unité de la science et le réductionnisme; VI. La logique de la découverte. Chaque section comporte une courte présentation des auteurs et des textes. Concernant 'The New Riddle of Induction,' il eut été utile de préciser qu'il s'agit d'une conférence prononcée par Goodman à l'Université de Londres en mai 1953.
- 4 Il faut s'en convaincre, même en 1981: une lecture de Carnap s'avère indispensable. Du reste, n'importe-t-il pas de contrer la tendance actuelle à frayer d'emblée avec les prétendus contestataires de l'empirisme logique sans s'être donné la peine au préalable de comprendre systématiquement par soi-même la pensée mise en pièces?
- 5 Autres textes qu'il eut été intéressant d'incorporer au recueil: le manifeste du Cercle de Vienne ('Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: der Wiener Kreis', rédigé par Neurath en 1929, édité conjointement par Neurath, Carnap et Hahn et dédié à Moritz Schlick) et très certainement un texte de Jules-Alfred Ayer, principal représentant britannique du positivisme logique.
- 6 Dans le texte de Hempel (1965), il aurait fallu espacer le (D) marquant qu'il s'agit d'une définition et l'énoncé définitionnel lui-même. La même remarque vaut pour le (R) marquant qu'il s'agit d'un énoncé de réduction et l'énoncé de réduction lui-même (cf. 71).  
On trouve, par ailleurs, trois erreurs de transcription malencontreuses dans le texte de Popper (1963): 1) une parenthèse n'a pas été fermée dans la formule de la p. 173, n. 86; 2)  $c(h_m, e_m)$  est en fait  $c(k_m, e_m)$ , p. 173, n. 87; 3) dans la formule du coefficient de corrélation logique, un signe de négation a sauté.
- 7 Dans le texte de Goodman, on lit: 'Or cela revient à énoncer les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de ce qu'est une induction valide et donc de la définir' (181 n. 2). Il eut fallu écrire: '... et donc à la définir.'



- 8 Dans le texte de Putnam, le point-virgule après 'normalement' (311) doit être remplacé par une simple virgule.
- 9 Dans '... du point de vue de la méthode de leur confirmation ou de leur infirmation empirique' (Quine 104), le dernier mot exigeait d'être au pluriel. Notons ici, au passage, quelques coquilles: la 'conjoncture' de Goldbach (Popper 145 n. 46), 'ayant été moi-même en témoin' (Feyerabend 263 n. 27), Review od Metaphysics'' (Feyerabend 274 n. 41). Déplorons aussi le fait que les caractères italiques voulus par les auteurs n'ont pas toujours été respectés. Ainsi pour '*commodité*.' (Putnam 324)
- 10 Pour rendre 'object-concepts' '*concepts-d'objet*' valait mieux que 'concepts d'objets.' (Putnam 322)
- 11 Cf. François Tournier, 'L'explicitation d'un concept,' *Philosophiques* 6:1 (1979) 65-119.
- 12 La référence à Carnap (1938) citée à la p. 72, n. 14 ne se retrouve nulle part. Il s'agit de 'Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science' paru in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, I, 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Le premier ouvrage de cette encyclopédie, intitulé *Encyclopedia and Unified Science*, est dû à la collaboration d'Otto Neurath, Niels Bohr, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap et Charles Morris.
- 13 La référence à White (111 n. 22) est à White (1950).
- 14 A ce qu'on dit, les grandes choses sont souvent faites de menus détails. Il eut été bon d'indiquer, par exemple, que le texte de Goodman dans la réédition de Hackett Publ. Co. (cf. 116) se trouve aux pages 59 à 83. De plus, quand un auteur se réfère à un autre de ses articles, il vaut mieux en donner l'adresse bibliographique précise: ainsi, pour Putnam, il valait la peine d'indiquer que 'Ce que les théories ne sont pas' se trouve in *Collected Papers* Vol. 1 (cf. 315), que 'le chapitre XIX du 1er volume' des mêmes *Collected Papers* (cf. 321) se trouve être 'On Properties' et le chapitre XVI (cf. 330 n. 6) 'The 'corroboration' of theories.'
- 15 J'eusse souhaité retrouver dans les 'Éléments bibliographiques' la liste exhaustive de toutes les références mentionnées dans le livre. Au lieu de cela, Pierre Jacob en a établi une sélection, ajoutant à la fin de chaque article les références qu'il n'incluait pas dans sa sélection.
- 16 D'ailleurs c'est bien la phrase 'Aucun célibataire n'est marié' que Jacob analyse dans *L'empirisme logique* (op. cit., 178 et suiv.).

D.J. MANNING, ed. *The Form of Ideology*. Winchester, Mass.: George Allen and Unwin 1980. Pp. viii + 136. US\$ 19.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-48300-7); US\$ 5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-312-48335-X)

These essays on the concept of ideology originated as papers for a graduate seminar given by D.J. Manning at the University of Durham. They are supposed to form 'a single inquiry' and they do. In their conception of the issues and even in their conclusions, the six essays reinforce each other. An introduction by Manning and, more so, a postscript by 'Joint Authorship' help the reader see this. Nevertheless, the combined results seem regrettably insignificant. As Joint Authorship candidly confesses, '(this book) is intended to assist the reader achieve coherence in his thought about ideology, but he must achieve that coherence for himself.' (Compare: How many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? One — but the bulb has to want to change.)

The problem with the enterprise of the book is not that it is jointly undertaken but that it is governed by a set of question-begging assumptions. Two main assumptions are identified in the short preface by Michael Oakshott. Oakshott's views, particularly his attack on 'rationalism in politics,' are the guiding spirit of the various essays (which is not surprising since Oakshott served for years, in a role that makes this book 100% homespun, as external examiner of the work from the seminar). The first assumption is that the term 'ideology' as classically used is so muddled that it cannot be relied on by anyone who wants to examine the issues it raises. According to Oakshott, it is therefore a merit of the book that its authors begin not from the concept of ideology but from politics as a practical activity, asking whether any form of discourse about politics can usefully be marked as being ideological. What promises to be an investigation informed by empirical study, however, turns out to be conceptual analysis with a vengeance: forms of discourse about politics and related domains are carved up into kinds with little or no reference to their real variety and actual affiliations. More importantly, it goes unnoticed that the book's seeming starting point is part of the problem: if ever there was an 'ideological' issue it concerns what 'politics' itself includes. Perhaps even more troubling is the second assumption which Oakshott identifies and endorses: this is that ideology is 'a form of discourse not concerned with making practical proposals for political action, but having to do with general beliefs which might relevantly be invoked in justification of such proposals.' It would surely be a significant finding that ideological discourse, whatever it is exactly, does not itself involve or directly yield practical proposals. But to assume this at the outset prejudices the question against important positions. One may hardly take for granted that stances on practical politics do not derive from prior principles about and perspectives upon politics.



Common to these essays is the theme that general political beliefs can be neither explained nor justified. They cannot be explained as the by-products of already existing political practices, and no argument or evidence can justify them. Nor can political beliefs serve to explain or justify political practices, since actions are not contingent effects of beliefs or implied consequences distinct from them. But if political ideas are neither to be explained nor justified by political actions (nor by anything else) and if political actions are not explainable or justifiable by them, what is the status of political ideas and how to they relate to political action? The contention is that political ideas and political actions form inseparable wholes.

This contention is unveiled in Manning's Introduction. He seeks to show that the classical discussions of ideology, those of de Tracy, Marx and Mannheim, collapse into incoherence since they hover between two incompatible views of the relation between ideas and actions: on the one hand it is held that the relation is 'rational' — that actions are distinct from yet logical consequences of ideas; while on the other it is maintained that the relation is causal — that ideas are by-products, effects of actions. The rub, according to Manning, is that both views are wrong: belief and action presuppose and constitute one another. Political beliefs are essential constituents of political practices because practices cannot exist, like parts of the natural world, independently of beliefs. And political actions are constituents of political beliefs because one cannot normally believe that a given kind of state is a good one without taking up a favourable stance towards it.

Manning develops some of these points in 'The Place of Ideology in Political Life,' the fifth essay in the book. There he argues that Marxism, liberalism, conservatism and other bodies of political beliefs do not entail specific actions, since they do not make genuine descriptive claims which imply specifiable actions. There is not, he says, 'a Marxist opportunity for, and way of, overthrowing a government, any more than there is a Marxist opportunity for, and way of, taking a bath....' The function of ideological discourse is not to classify, to explain or to prescribe, but to communicate a commitment, to 'affirm the identity required to enter into the special relationship between the committed members of a group or party.' Commitment is the category that supplies the missing piece of the puzzle: one acquires an ideology as one is initiated into or aligns oneself with an ongoing practice.

The essays by Manning's students both fill out these views and accentuate the weaknesses of them. In the first essay, 'Ideology and Sociological Understanding,' L.G. Graham argues that to treat basic political beliefs as products of social circumstances, specifically material interests, is generally mistaken. However, Graham's objection stands only if one flatly denies as he does the possibility of systematic self-deception or false consciousness, a possibility many sociologists sensibly think worth investigating. 'Ideology and Religion,' by A. Grimes, makes the point that one cannot show religion is irrational by presenting allegations about its

genesis, for that confuses 'reasons as grounds and reasons as motives.' But while there is a some distinction to be drawn here, the fact remains that grounds must motivate to be relevant and whether given grounds motivate is an important part of the problem of rationality. In any case Grimes insists that theology is meant to be a vehicle for expressing religious beliefs and not a ground for them in the way that history is apparently meant to be a ground for Marxist claims. Since Grimes assumes that no broad beliefs can be grounded, the implied point is that religion must be counted as more honest than Marxism.

'Ideology and Philosophy' by D.H. Rashid investigates Alasdair MacIntyre's attempt to link philosophical criticism and ideological commitment. Rashid likens this attempt to the attempt to square the circle. MacIntyre has maintained that much of ideology is in fact philosophy, and Rashid's protests to the contrary seem a retreat to traditional categories: for example, he denies that ideologies make any claims about the world.

This last point is the main motif of the remaining three essays. The fourth essay, a dense and intriguing one by T.J. Robinson, is entitled 'Ideology and Theoretical Inquiry.' Its negative thesis is that an ideology can never amount to a theory of politics because the idea of a theory of politics is incoherent. Robinson's argument is that political theory is a science that attempts to explain forms of political organization in terms of their general effects on human nature, but human nature cannot be specified apart from particular political institutions. The root error lies in the attempt to explain politics in terms of something other than itself. Ideologies, therefore, can never legitimately claim to supply theoretical knowledge of and for political practice. But then what remains for ideology to be? An answer is suggested in Robinson's essay and is elaborated in Manning's essay and in the final essay, 'The Uses of Ideological Language,' by D.J. Rayner. Ideological argument is held to consist in the presentation of pictures and the making of metaphors by and for those engaged in a shared political project. But no sooner having said this, Rayner, like the other authors, qualifies it: 'terms like "open society" or "social justice" ...are not strictly metaphorical,' he warns.

In such ways, questions that have gone unasked and assumptions that have gone unexamined inevitably obtrude themselves. Aren't there many different sorts of discourse even in any one ideology and musn't at least some of them be descriptive and explanatory at least in intent? If not, how can commitment be sensibly communicated? And what is the content of the communication? A Marxist may bathe as he pleases but may he also betray his comrades as he pleases without ideological questions being raised? And how *do* people come to be and also cease to be part of a political project? Certainly reasons sometimes appear relevant and so also do other factors. In what ways do these various kinds of considerations work and are they indeed so different in kind? All these are central issues about ideology, as most classical and many contemporary discussions have sought to insist.

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LOUIS-MARIE MORFAUX, *Vocabulaire de la philosophie et des sciences humaines*. Paris: Armand Colin 1980. Pp. 392.

Les dictionnaires philosophiques ne manquent pas, et depuis quelques années plusieurs lexiques de philosophie ont été publiés dans des collections "de poche," fournissant à l'étudiant des instruments de travail plus maniables et plus actuels que le Lalande dont la dernière édition date de 1947. Tous ces lexiques ne se valent pas, tant s'en faut. Certains cependant sont excellents (je pense en particulier au *Nouveau vocabulaire des études philosophiques* de S. Auroux et Y. Weil publié chez Hachette en 1975). Cependant l'originalité du lexique de L. M. Morfaux est d'avoir réuni dans un même petit volume les termes techniques de la philosophie et les concepts-clés des disciplines scientifiques auxquelles s'alimente la réflexion philosophique contemporaine (mathématique, physique, biologie, sciences religieuses et surtout sciences humaines). Cette pluridisciplinarité centrée sur la philosophie fait de ce *Vocabulaire*. . . un outil pédagogique remarquable pour l'étudiant préparant un Baccalauréat en Arts, que la philosophie soit ou non son principal centre d'intérêt. En effet, les langues techniques que le *Vocabulaire*. . . de L. M. Morfaux permet de décoder ne sont pas l'apanage des ouvrages de philosophie. Elles ont envahi jusqu'à nos romans, nos revues, voire même les discours de nos politiciens. Or ces jargons, pour être parfois familiers à l'oreille, n'en sont pas moins trop souvent hermétiques. Roger Caillois faisait déjà remarquer en 1948 que "celui qui emploie un mot pense rarement à en préciser le sens (...) Si l'on dit table, douleur, malice, chacun sait suffisamment ce que ces mots veulent dire (...) on ne les trompera pas facilement (...). Mais si l'on dit dialectique par exemple ou transcendance, on a déjà les coudées franches et chacun volontiers commencera à se faire prendre à soi-même des vessies pour des lanternes. Si vous dites maintenant justice ou liberté sans préciser ce que vous entendez par là, tout est permis et d'abord appeler ainsi l'iniquité et la tyrannie. Car tout est affaire de définition. Qui ne se souvient d'avoir entendu dire à un conquérant protéger pour asservir?" (*Babel, orgueil, confusion et ruine de la littérature*. Paris: Gallimard 1948, p. 183-185). Une discipline intellectuelle rigoureuse devrait faire de la recherche du sens de termes rencontrés ou employés une étape primordiale de toute démarche. C'est malheureusement une étape trop souvent négligée. L.M. Morfaux a mis à profit son expérience de l'enseignement de la philosophie et de la formation professionnelle d'adultes pour produire un dictionnaire pratique qui devrait permettre de combler plus facilement cette lacune.

Les définitions sont en général claires et pertinentes. On note cependant quelques timidités: l'Art par exemple y est encore défini exclusivement par la recherche du Beau en dépit de la remise en cause contemporaine du privilège de cette valeur esthétique; quelques inexactitudes:

Reichenbach est cité comme membre du Cercle de Vienne alors qu'il a été seulement étroitement associé à ses travaux sans jamais en avoir fait partie; quelques lacunes: "complétude" et "consistance" n'ont pas droit à une entrée non plus que les théorèmes de Gödel et Löwenheim-Skolem (l'Auteur est de toute évidence plus versé en psychologie qu'en logique); quelques impairs: l'entrée "Electre (complexe d')" se contente de renvoyer à l'entrée "complexe" mais cette dernière entrée ne mentionne pas le complexe d'Electre. Ces faiblesses mineures ne nuisent pas à l'efficacité générale de l'ouvrage composé avec sérieux et compétence et que l'on peut par conséquent recommander aux étudiants. Enfin chose importante pour un livre destiné à être beaucoup manipulé, il est très bien relié et le papier est d'excellente qualité.

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HERMAN PARRET *et al.*, *Le langage en contexte*. Etudes philosophiques et linguistiques de pragmatique, *Linguisticae Investigationes: Supplementa*, volume 3. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V. 1980. Pp. 790

Le développement progressif de l'intuition pragmatique et des diverses recherches qu'elle a inspirées et qui l'ont organisée n'a cessé de mettre en relief l'importance de la notion de contexte pour les débats contemporains des diverses théories qui se préoccupent du sens. D'une part, cette notion est sans cesse invoquée pour arbitrer les différentes versions de l'opposition sémantique-pragmatique qui sont présentées en philosophie du langage et en linguistique (en particulier sous les espèces d'un sens indépendant de tout contexte d'énonciation — un sens littéral — caractérisable en lui-même, et d'un sens dont la détermination exige la prise en compte des circonstances de l'énonciation, des intentions de communication, etc.). D'autre part, une portion considérable du travail effectué par les approches sensibles à la dépendance contextuelle consiste à rendre explicite, si possible de façon formelle, la notion de contexte, de manière à réaliser sur le plan de la théorie l'évidence dont cette notion est



l'objet sur un plan pré-théorique. Le contexte se trouve ainsi au centre d'enjeux considérables. S'il apparaît à plusieurs que le fait de l'admettre à l'intérieur des études sémantiques signifie, en raison de sa variation et de son indétermination, la ruine de toute théorie du sens, beaucoup considèrent qu'une théorie qui en fait l'économie ou qui ne lui reconnaît qu'une valeur empirique ou complémentaire théoriquement mineure se condamne du même coup à se voir ravir ses conditions d'adéquation ou de réalité.

Le présent ouvrage rassemble sept études, la plupart très copieuses, consacrés à différents aspects du contexte et de la contextualité, dans diverses perspectives théoriques: Hermann PARRET, "Pragmatique philosophique et épistémologie de la pragmatique: connaissance et contextualité," Paul GOCHET, "Pragmatique formelle: théorie des modèles et et action," Paul GOCHET, "Pragmatique formelle: théorie des modèles et compétence pragmatique," Maurice VAN OVERBEKE, "Pragmatique linguistique I: analyse de l'énonciation en linguistique moderne et contemporaine," Oswald DUGROT, "Pragmatique linguistique II: essai d'application: *mais* — les allusions à l'énonciation — délocutifs, performatifs, discours indirect," Liliane TASMOWSKI-DE RYCK, "Pragmatique linguistique III: essai d'application: impératif et actes de langage," Norbert DITTMAR et Wolfgang WILDGEN, "Pragmatique psychosociale: variation linguistique et contexte social." Trois de ces études (celles de PARRET, de GOCHET et de VAN OVERBEKE) ont l'avantage de d'abord présenter l'état de la question de la contextualité et de la pragmatique en philosophie, en logique et en linguistique, d'une façon remarquablement englobante et claire, avant de procéder à des suggestions touchant des voies particulières. Ces études prennent en outre soin d'indiquer les problèmes et les limitations qui frappent les définitions traditionnelles de la pragmatique. Le texte de DITTMAR et WILDGEN effectue un travail comparable, mais le domaine psychosociologique dont il s'occupe, correspondant à des perspectives disciplinaires bien établies, ne change guère l'image qui se dégage des orientations les plus anciennes de la pragmatique. Les trois autres études s'appliquent à des objets plus particuliers et portent moins directement sur le contexte comme concept (possiblement) théorique et le traitent de manière plus indirecte: APOSTEL poursuit des travaux entrepris il y a déjà longtemps<sup>1</sup> dans la ligne de la praxéologie, en réinterprétant dans les termes de théories de l'action les concepts descriptifs et théoriques d'approches philosophiques et linguistiques; DUCROT présente une autre pièce du dossier qu'il instruit depuis plusieurs années avec une constante minutie sur les processus argumentatifs et discursifs, tandis que TASMOWSKI-DE RYCK fait un rapide examen d'une partie des aspects descriptifs de la théorie des actes de langage et de leur contrepartie grammaticale.

Ce dosage d'études théoriques et d'études appliquées (ces dernières étant toujours conscientes de ce qu'elles doivent à des prises de position générales) constitue la plus grande qualité "rédactionnelle" de l'ouvrage.

Il reflète le double mouvement de la pragmatique contemporaine dans son effort de constitution comme domaine propre et comme domaine articulé sur des domaines adjacents: la prospection de domaines positifs saisis dans leur diversité et la récapitulation théorisante des ouvertures ainsi définies. L'ensemble du recueil en tire un mérite non négligeable: alors que l'on est souvent tenté de donner de la pragmatique une interprétation réaliste en considérant ses avancées comme autant de progrès dans la réalité du langage et, conséquemment, de pragmatique comme une théorie d'objets concrets et particuliers qui seraient saisis par une appréhension immédiate, plusieurs textes insistent ici sur les aspects proprement épistémologiques de la pragmatique et plus particulièrement sur une dimension que l'on peut bien appeler 'constructiviste' de la théorisation pragmatique. Le pragmatique y gagne de ne plus se présenter comme la condition de rédemption d'approches jugées plus abstraites par comparaison et la réflexion s'y expose à une certaine perplexité, née de la suspension de l'idée que c'est la réalité elle-même qui se trouve saisie.

Si, en raison de la diversité des points de vue adoptés, ce recueil ne parvient pas à produire une théorie générale du contexte (il n'en a du reste pas la prétention), il est certain qu'il donne à cette notion un profil beaucoup mieux défini qu'à l'ordinaire, précisément par l'importance qu'il accorde à la dépendance qui lie le traitement du contexte aux cadres théoriques qui le déterminent. A cet égard, la contribution de H. PARRET vaut particulièrement d'être retenue, par le souci qu'elle a d'équilibrer les phénomènes considérés par un questionnement touchant les problèmes épistémologiques de la reconstruction pragmatique. En couvrant les principales coordonnées de ce qui pose aujourd'hui la question du contexte comme un problème théorique important, cet ouvrage peut constituer une excellente initiation à la pragmatique, tant par l'ampleur de son approche que par les différents efforts de thématization du pragmatique autour de la notion de contexte,<sup>2</sup> même si une certaine accointance avec les domaines considérés est parfois souhaitable. Les essais d'application, celui de DUCROT en particulier, de même que plusieurs analyses qui viennent appuyer les articles théoriques et spéculatifs, permettent à qui a cette familiarité de voir de façon détaillée quelles sont les solutions peuvent être apportées à des problèmes locaux et de prendre la mesure des points de vue qui peuvent être adoptés.

A plusieurs égards, l'essor de la pragmatique marque peut-être autant la désaffection quant à des approches "traditionnelles" qu'il indique l'existence de problématiques constituées. En définissant la pragmatique comme l'étude du langage-en-contexte, la présente publication retient une option assez générale et ouverte pour qu'elle puisse se faire l'écho de la diversité des tendances qui se logent à cette enseigne, tout en donnant du contexte une image plus spécifique que ce qu'assure normalement le recours universel et banalement omniprésent qui y est fait."<sup>3</sup>

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- 1 Voir en particulier l'article 'Syntaxe, sémantique et pragmatique' in PIAGET, Jean, éd. (1967), *Logique et connaissance scientifique* (Paris: Gallimard) Encyclopédie de Pléiade, 290-311.
- 2 Si la notion de contexte est sans contredit une des notions cruciales dont une pragmatique doit s'occuper, il n'est pas évident que la pragmatique puisse en tirer une condition aussi suffisante que nécessaire. Le contexte partage avec d'autres notions générales, comme celle d'usage, de devoir toujours être spécifié pour jouer un rôle théorique non banal.
- 3 En raison des qualités de l'ouvrage sur le plan du contenu, une note peut se charger d'indiquer un défaut, assez insistant pour être gênant, sur le plan de l'expression: la publication dans un pays non francophone est sans doute cause du nombre difficilement acceptable de fautes de grammaire et d'orthographe dont la plupart des textes sont affligés.

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CZESLAW PROKOPCZYK, *Truth and Reality in Marx and Hegel: A Reassessment*. Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press 1980. Pp. 132. US\$ 13.50. ISBN 0-87023-307-6.

'How did there develop from what was ostensibly the most conservative system of philosophy in western European tradition, the revolutionary ideology of the greatest mass movement since Christianity?' Sidney Hook's question, which is quoted in the Foreword of this study, will be referred to as Hook's puzzle. Prokopczyk's book is an attempt to solve this puzzle. The solution comes late in the work because the first half of this investigation is devoted to a critique of a standard answer to Hook's puzzle — the thesis that Feuerbach serves as the dialectical link between Hegel and Marx. Close to fifty pages of this book deal with Engels' treatment of Feuerbach in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. In this preparatory section the author defends the following claim: although Engels explicitly asserts that Feuerbach is equal in importance to Hegel in the generation of Marx's radical perspective, these assertions are belied by Engels' predominantly negative treatment of Feuerbach's philosophy. According to Prokopczyk, a careful examination of Engels reveals that he actually considers Feuerbach's thought dialectically superfluous. The conclusion we are to draw is that Engels implicitly held Hegel's philosophy to be a sufficient foundation for the derivation of Marx's radical social theory.

On Prokopczyk's view the radical kernel of Hegel's philosophy lies in his rejection of the classical correspondence theory of truth. Prokopczyk understands the classical theory as asserting that an idea is true if it mirrors a reality which is prior to and independent of mind. The author warns that a superficial reading of Hegel might lead one to think that he favors this theory. According to Prokopczyk, correspondence for Hegel is 'the correspondence between different entities than the entities of the classical understanding of correspondence, and what is more, this correspondence is achieved in a different way.' Truth is understood as involving the correspondence of an object with a concept. That is, the concept takes priority and becomes a model against which existence is measured. On the classical theory a concept is said to be true if it mirrors external reality; on Hegel's theory, as interpreted by Prokopczyk, the external world *becomes* true to the extent that it instantiates the concept.

What Prokopczyk wishes to emphasize is that truth in Hegel is a normative concept. He suggests that we get close to the Hegelian meaning of truth when we think of what it means to say that we have a true friend; by this we typically mean a friend whose conduct accords with the concept of friendship. This normative concept of truth provides Hegel with a basis for characterizing existing objects as untrue — i.e. as failing to correspond to their concept.

The critical potential of this view of truth should be obvious: it permits us to transcend the empirically given world and to evaluate it according to its concept. In political terms, while the traditional correspondence theory requires us to assert that a concept of the state is true if it reflects the empirically given state, the Hegelian version allows us to judge an existing state untrue if it fails to correspond to the concept of a rational state. Contrary to the standard conservative reading of Hegel, Prokopczyk understands Hegel as providing us with the theoretical tools for a critique of society.

What is implicitly revolutionary in the Hegelian doctrine of truth is the notion that the disparity between the concept and its object can be overcome only through the creative shaping of the object. On Prokopczyk's interpretation the Hegelian viewpoint suggests that 'progress toward the truth consists ultimately in human agents shaping the objects, events and institutions of their social and spiritual life according to the standards of reason.' From this perspective there is a logical transition to the radicalism of Marx. Thus, a proper understanding of Hegel's view of truth solves Hook's puzzle.

Prokopczyk contends that Marx appropriated the Hegelian doctrine of truth. His evidence is Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), one of the few places in which Marx discusses the topic of truth. The author persuasively argues that these eleven theses contain a repudiation of the classical concept of truth. In the *Theses* Marx emphasizes the role of practical activity in the constitution of objective reality, opposes Feuerbach's contemplative viewpoint, and insists on a connection between truth and revolutionary



action. According to Prokopczyk, practice is not for Marx, *contra* Engels (prior to his discovery of the *Theses*) and Lenin (in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*), merely a way of confirming a truth claim — that is, a method of verifying that an idea reflects external reality. The revolutionary viewpoint of the *Theses*, with its emphasis on shaping the world we come to know, requires us to conceive correspondence in a direction opposite to that of the classical theory of truth. We should read Marx as positing a concept (communism) to which the external world must be made to conform; the task of revolutionary practice is to shape the world so that it corresponds to the concept.

The problem with Prokopczyk's solution to Hook's puzzle is that it leaves the reader with a new equally serious puzzle. If we accept the author's version of Marx's notion of truth, a problem of coherence emerges. How could Marx, a materialist, have allowed the concept to play the role of preexisting model, a prior yardstick for measuring the material world? In fact Prokopczyk acknowledges this difficulty, but he makes no attempt to resolve it.

The explanatory value of Prokopczyk's interpretation is significantly weakened by its failure to cohere with Marx's stress on the priority of material conditions. Indeed, in Marx's first systematic development of the doctrine of historical materialism — *The German Ideology* — he explicitly rejects the view that communism is an ideal to which reality will have to conform. In this work, as well as all his subsequent works, communism, far from playing the role of a prior conceptual yardstick, is described as something immanent in capitalist society — it is the social order toward which bourgeois society is perceptibly tending. Communism is depicted as that which capitalism potentially is — requiring only the appropriate revolutionary agency to strip away the bourgeois integument.

*In fine* Prokopczyk shows how Marx's revolutionary perspective, as formulated in the *Theses*, can be seen as an application of Hegel's doctrine of truth as interpreted in this book. What Prokopczyk does not show is that the view of truth which he finds in the *Theses* — the only work by Marx which the author analyzes — is sustained in mature works such as *Capital*. Is it reasonable to believe that the notion of truth which Marx hastily sketched on a couple of pages in 1845 is one he retained in all subsequent works? Given the *prima facie* implausibility of that extension, the reader may be justifiably skeptical about the author's undefended claim that his construction of Marx's view of truth applies to the later as well as the earlier writings.

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ROGER SCRUTON, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P. 1980. Pp. 302. US\$ 22.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-03948-8); US\$ 7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-00322-x).

On one level this book provides precisely what its title indicates — a discussion of aesthetics as related to and exemplified in buildings. This alone would render it of interest, both intrinsically and in view of the manifest reluctance of recent aestheticians to engage in detailed consideration of any of the decorative arts. The task is, of course, not as simple as it might appear since in discussing architecture one is not only concerned with design and technique but also with a whole range of problems posed by the potential use and siting of a building. So an aesthetic of architecture must, if it is to satisfy all the requirements of the art, deal with a wide range of disparate topics. This Scruton succeeds in doing with assurance, skillfully guiding the reader through the intricacies of the argument.

The book presents a complex interweaving of various themes: discussion of the major critical theories of architecture, with detailed illustrations; a gradual development of the author's own critical theory, in terms of the centrality of style and the importance of significant detail; argument to show that aesthetic judgment has an objective basis in practical reasoning; and a sketch of a theory of the human person coming to self-realization through the public expression of shared values. The theory of self-realization forms the nucleus alike of his claim that aesthetic and moral judgment are intimately related, and of the claim that architectural design needs to be appropriate not merely to perceived contemporary needs but to unpredictable future requirements.

Under this latter head fashionable forms of functionalism are subjected to strong attack throughout the book. Architectural theorists might object that Scruton does not accurately represent any particular version of the theory, but he is quite explicitly dealing with it in a generalized, if not popularized form. One of the most interesting features of this attack is in his taking issue with the assumption that function is specifiable independently of an aesthetic theory.

Although it might seem, *prima facie*, as though the function of a building consists of a set of facts, statable in advance, Scruton shows this to be a misrepresentation. Such a view takes into account only present, physical needs, whereas humans are complex, dynamic and not merely physical beings. So there may (indeed there *will*) be functions that a building will acquire which could not have been taken into account by its designer. Buildings need to be in some way expressive of enduring values as well as of contemporary functional requirements.

One of these values is a concern for appearance. If this cannot be separated from narrow utility, then neither can aesthetic judgment be



separated from practical design. But, he argues, the overriding concern with function presupposes a whole view of human nature — utilitarian, individualistic and bent on immediate satisfaction. Such a view one may or may not intend to espouse in accepting a contemporary design theory.

From a discussion of various critical theories, Freudian and Marxist in particular, a critique of this view of human nature arises. Freudian and Marxist aesthetics are shown to be inadequate in being either too general or in mislocating the object of architectural appreciation — explaining such appreciation as due to subconscious or social factors rather than to the unique features of a given building. However the Marxist view in particular, with its emphasis on the alienation resulting from an inability to see the mass-produced artifacts of industrial society as the results of uniquely human activity, provides a basis for the rejection of utilitarian individualism.

Scruton's positive aesthetic theory is objectivist, founded on the notion of practical reason and on a Kantian-Hegelian theory of the self. The philosopher of mind may be left tantalized but unsatisfied by the latter. Aesthetic taste is seen as based on the imaginative apprehension of future states by an essentially self-conscious being which realizes itself through public, social activity. Phenomenology, the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception and Hegel's selfrealization of *Geist* are drawn upon in providing this theory but rather sketchily and, one suspects, somewhat superficially. Admittedly the book aims to be accessible to the non-philosopher. However I feel that at this point there may be enough complexity to puzzle the average reader and insufficient to convince the philosopher that a viable theory of the self can be drawn from these sources in just the way indicated. One must nevertheless applaud the policy of relating aesthetics to what are generally considered more central areas of philosophy. Scruton's overall programme is important in showing the seriousness of aesthetics through demonstrating its interrelatedness with moral theory and with our very sense of what constitutes human nature. It is an argument for restoring aesthetics from the peripheral position it has been relegated to in the recent past.

Imagination, as one might expect, is made much of in the account of aesthetic experience. We apply a concept or critical account of a building by an act of imaginative attention through which our experience is changed. A valid theory, an apt concept, will succeed in changing our experience but helping us toward a satisfying understanding of the design we are confronting. The difficulty in thus locating aesthetic judgment in experience is that this would seem to be essentially subjective, not open to reasoned argument.

This is countered by showing that attention and study are not merely subjective experiences available only to introspection. They are, rather, publicly observable attitudes as are the concepts and discussions through which our experience comes to be altered. It is this process of reasoned argument — a process of practical reason whose conclusion is a change in

experience rather than a statement of fact — in which consists the objectivity of aesthetic judgments. We can *justify* our aesthetic taste and come to change our judgments by the use of public concepts and valid arguments.

This use of the notion of practical reason is of course philosophically contentious. Scruton takes an explicitly Kantian stance for which he produces no significant arguments and which will be rejected by one who does not accept that there is a valid form of reasoning which issues not in true conclusions but in appropriate action (or experience).

Scruton wants to show the objective character of aesthetic judgment through such an account of aesthetic experience rather than by any appeal to formal rules. Practical reason, he claims, involves reflection on all aspects of our lives as human beings; and it can aim at a high degree of capability as much in aesthetic as in moral thinking. But to do this is just to approach the status of objectivity.

It is certainly too much to require in such a book a lengthy detailed defence of practical reason. Objections may well be aimed at the overall theory of human nature and reasoning which is being presented — indeed Scruton admits that we may reject it. What we must admit is that architecture and aesthetics do, indeed must, presuppose some such theory. Any view of aesthetics as remote from the central concerns of life, any view of architecture which sees it as a value-free technique of solving purely practical problems, is decisively rejected.

I would like to see more elaboration of Scruton's critical theory. The importance of a style arising out of and in some way continuous with traditional architectural forms, together with an emphasis on the significance of detail are suggested throughout the book as elements of his theory. It is not until the last few pages that they receive any direct attention and then only briefly. There is need for a developed theory of an architectural style that can be seen as continuous with, although not slavishly tied to, traditional forms, that is human in scale and responsive to expressive needs. Such a theory is indicated in this book and in places argued for, but a more detailed account would be needed for it to be usable as a critical theory.

The book has much to offer a wide range of readers. Architects and engineers may be irritated by the generality of the critique. But many salient questions are raised for them, not least by the relating of design theory to a theory of human nature and moral action. As a text for a course on aesthetics the book has considerable potential, both in its criticisms of some influential aesthetic theories and in its arguing for the seriousness of aesthetic taste and its link with the most central concerns of social and personal life.

Its philosophical appeal lies primarily in its range. Many of the philosophical claims are argued only very briefly and leave much room for further argument. Nevertheless these claims are interesting enough to be worth the effort required to consider possible justifications. Perhaps the



book's major interest lies in its application of a number of seemingly disparate, highly theoretical concepts to an important practical area of human endeavour while retaining readability. Despite the resultant sketchiness of much of the discussion this book is of very great interest indeed. Perhaps the next book will fill in some of the details. I, for one, would look forward to it.

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HENRY SHUE, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P. 1980. Pp. 231. US\$ 17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07259-0); US\$ 4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02015-9).

The price of immediate relevance in applied ethics and political philosophy is sometimes rapid obsolescence. Henry Shue's book, seemingly addressed to the foreign policy of the Carter administration, which at least paid lipservice to the idea of human rights as a constraint and goal, appears utopian in relation to the present retreat from that framework. As its subtitle indicates, the book does not attempt an exhaustive philosophical analysis of rights or even basic rights. It rather argues for basic rights to subsistence, to have needs for food, water, clothing, shelter and minimal health care fulfilled, and then traces the implications of accepting these claims for a foreign policy that aims at being minimally acceptable from a moral point of view. That such minimal decency seems clearly beyond the grasp of the present administration is of course not so much an indictment of this book as of the society that has rebelled at the demand to aid its own poor, let alone those perceived as more distant. On the other hand, that we moral philosophers appear to have had so little influence, even when attempting to influence policy directly, as this book clearly does, must be a source of real concern.

It is difficult to quarrel morally with the basic thrust of Shue's argument, although both the theoretical underpinnings and applications at the borders can be questioned. His central claim is that the same argument

that establishes basic rights to security and to political liberty or participation also establishes a basic right to subsistence. His purpose is to refute the separation of economic from political rights by the Carter State Department in its recommendations to the Senate on the ratification of the U.N. rights treaties.

Shue defines rights as justifying demands that enjoyments of certain goods be socially guaranteed against standard threats to those enjoyments. (13) Basic rights, according to him, are those essential for the enjoyment of all others. (19) The emphasis in this definition is upon the (universal) instrumental value of such rights, not upon their intrinsic importance to individuals, although Shue claims that security and health are 'essential parts' of the enjoyment of other rights, not merely means to that enjoyment. (20, 27) Since a person cannot enjoy other rights if he is not secure and capable of a reasonably healthy life, since the latter cannot be guaranteed without the ability to call attention to threats to them through political participation, all three (security, subsistence, liberty) are basic. Regarding subsistence specifically, any threat to what is essential to a normally healthy life is a threat to the enjoyment of rights, since the former is necessary for the latter. A right is basic according to Shue if its deprivation standardly threatens the enjoyment of all others. Subsistence, like security and liberty, falls into this class. By grouping liberty and subsistence as a package, Shue opposes those who view the sacrifice of political liberties as a possible means to the fulfillment of economic rights.

One noteworthy feature of his argument for the three basic rights is its minimal premises. There is little theoretical justification of rights themselves in the main argument, only the assumption that some rights exist. Such light theoretical baggage may seem a virtue, but problems will emerge later. The original definition is noteworthy as well, in that rights are seen not only to prohibit actions that deprive persons of certain goods, but also to require adequate guarantees against threats to the enjoyment of those goods. (13) This definition blurs the standard distinction between negative and positive rights. According to that distinction, negative rights correlate with duties to refrain from harming, while positive ones entail duties to act so as to provide or guarantee the ability to obtain certain goods. Shue takes it as essential to his argument to weaken this distinction, since it provides one way of separating economic rights to goods from rights not to be harmed (security). For him all rights entail both types of duties. In fact he lists three standard duties connected to rights, only one negative: the duty to refrain from depriving, the duty to protect against deprivation by others, and that to aid those who are deprived. On his view the full right to security is no less positive or more negative than that to subsistence; nor is the provision of adequate protection against assault and theft always less costly than guarantees of adequate food.

Shue's broad characterization of these rights does not refute a more narrow specification, however, that would maintain the standard distinction between positive and negative. He acknowledges that his right to



security, for example, can be divided into separate rights not to be physically harmed, to be protected against such harm, and to be compensated if attacked. A similar division can be made in his right to subsistence. And there are problems with his broader classification. One is that if the honoring of any right requires fully adequate guarantees or protection against possible violations, then people may actually enjoy very few rights in any modern societies. This counterintuitive implication seems especially clear if, as Shue maintains, effective political participation is necessary for such protection. Participation is effective in his account when it is capable of real influence on outcomes. (71) But there is little chance for individuals who lack enormous sums of money to exert such influence in large states, democratic or not.

The narrower specification of rights also emphasizes differences in demands expressed by the distinct correlative duties. If the strength of rights is relative to the demands they make on others, then the narrower divisions appear more useful. Shue counters by arguing that persons would demand the full rights he lists, e.g. not simply to be left alone, but to be adequately protected against threats of harm. (38-9) This may be true, but the acceptability and feasibility of their demands may still depend upon the severity of the sacrifices necessary to meet them. (contrast 52-3) Thus, whether it is possible to satisfy such rights, and whether they can always be claimed justifiably, remains to be seen. I shall return to this central problem below. First we may accentuate again the positive aspects of Shue's argument.

What is positive and new here, especially in its implications for a moral foreign policy, is the emphasis upon the negative duties connected with (negative) subsistence rights. These are duties of individuals, corporations and governments not to engage in activities that result in deprivations of subsistence, and duties of governments to protect persons against deprivation by others, or at least not to aid those who would deprive. Shue substantiates his claim that the United States currently provides monetary and military support to governments engaged in systematically depriving their citizens of the means of subsistence in order to control consumer demand, increase exports, and improve the balance of capital flow. He is correct to insist that rights against such deprivations are as strong as those against physical attack, and that the call for political liberties by a government that fails to refrain from such complicity is hollow. Nor can such aid be justified in the name of security. The latter concept is first of all bloated beyond all connection with real rights to physical security for American citizens. Second, the policy of aiding repressive governments has proved to be counterproductive in this respect in several areas of the world.

Libertarians argue that free agreements among consenting parties for economic exchange or transfer violate no rights of third parties even when these activities result indirectly in the deprivation of those parties. If the agreements involve exchange or transfer of property or resources to

which the agents have antecedent rights, then the third parties cannot also have rights to those goods or to their productive capacities. Against this position Shue is correct to imply that no sound moral basis has ever been provided for permitting such foreseeable harm — neither the absolute property rights of Nozick nor the outworn principle of double effect, for example. Severe harm is severe harm, and, whether from physical assault or removal of the means to subsistence, it ought to be avoided and prohibited. Property rights themselves are acceptable only with this rider: agreements that remove all sources of income from others are permissible only when independent guarantees of subsistence exist.

Shue also attacks two arguments against duties to aid those who presently lack means of subsistence. He first considers the argument that starvation is necessary for population control, that feeding the present generation will result only in a worse moral dilemma later. He points out that birth rates tend to decline only when standards of living rise. This may be due more to different levels of education than to provision of subsistence; but it can still be maintained that starvation is not the only means of population control, and certainly not the morally best means. The original argument here also assumes that persons in particular territories must be able to survive on the agricultural capacities of those territories, that they cannot have rights to produce from other areas.

Shue attacks finally the idea that duties to aid extend only to compatriots. He argues that national boundaries do not seem morally relevant in themselves and do not correlate clearly with morally relevant factors. While both these claims may be true, there is once more the difficulty of the severity of demands to aid all those in the world in need of help. National boundaries may be significant not in themselves, but as one way of expressing a reasonable limit on perfect obligations to provide satisfactory minimal shares of goods.<sup>1</sup> Shue points out that, while a government is contractually obligated mainly to its own citizens, it must also act as their agent in fulfilling their collective obligations to others. (141) But the extent of their positive collective obligation here remains open to question. Whether or not we distinguish negative from positive rights, we can argue that negative duties are more stringent or perfect because of the weaker demands they make on others.

Shue's principle for ordering priorities in this regard is that individuals can be required to sacrifice all short of basic rights in order to satisfy basic rights of others. (114) The demand is weakened somewhat by the recognition that the duties may not be direct and personal in the case of foreign aid, but rather duties to maintain institutions that will provide sufficient aid. This spreads the burdens more fairly, but the question of stringency remains. Shue estimates that the degree of sacrifice required for those in affluent countries might be substantial, but would not approach impoverishment. His justification for the priority principle that would require this sacrifice appeals to the deeper principle that degrading inequalities, those incompatible with self-respect, are not to be permitted.



(119-20)

This ultimate justification for the priority principle is first of all indirect and implausible. Why should self-respect be more basic than subsistence, and, more important, why should the self-respect of those in need through no fault of their own suffer, as opposed, for example, to the self-respect of those who selfishly deprive them? The notion of self-respect, popularized in recent political philosophy by Rawls, has become as bloated and catch-all for egalitarians as is the appeal to security by those on the right. Shue requires at this fundamental level in his argument not appeal to yet another particular right, but a more thorough account of the moral rationale behind the general concept of individual rights. Such an account could then provide the grounding for priority orderings among particular rights.

Rights are standardly said to express the inviolability of individuals, the fundamental prohibition against using individuals without their consent to increase collective welfare. One rationale for recognizing individuals rights as claims that override aggregate utilities is the principle that persons must be permitted to lead their own lives, to formulate and pursue their own goals and life plans in terms of which other goods acquire value. In these terms Shue is again correct to argue that subsistence no less than security is necessary to this basic capacity of individuals. But sacrifice of all short of the basic rights he mentions might limit the feasibility of various goals and plans too severely. Then too, when demands become too severe, legitimate ones may be sacrificed in the reaction that follows, a relevant consideration for one seeking to influence policy. It may sound plausible to say that mere preferences should be sacrificed for rights, and nonbasic rights for basic ones; but there will be disagreement, given the basic rationale just mentioned, over what is mere preference and what should be protected under the rubric of rights. Remember also that basic rights for Shue are not necessarily those intrinsically most important, but those most broadly instrumental. He seems to forget this original criterion in his priority principle, which might sacrifice other equally important claims.

Of course the rationale I mention is not the only one that might be offered. Nor does it solve the problem of priorities in itself without further expansion. Much moral analysis remains to be done in this area, and we may regret that Shue has not added significantly to the literature at this ground level in his account of basic rights. This regret should not blind us, however, to the soundness and urgency of his central argument, especially regarding the negative side of subsistence rights. Would that it could have more effect.

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1 See A. Goldman, 'The Moral Significance of National Boundaries,' forthcoming in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*.

ROBERT SOLOMON, *Introducing the German Idealists*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1981. Pp. 90. US\$ 9.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-02-2); US\$ 2.50 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-03-0).

Robert Solomon has a splendid idea for making the German Idealists accessible to today's undergraduates. In very readable mock interviews with the prominent philosophers of the period he gives simple surveys of their philosophy which succeed in making the thought come alive and character sketches which make these people real.

The mock interview with Kant occurs on his sixty-sixth birthday just after the publication of the third Critique. The date is April 22, 1790, the French Revolution is about a year old and all of Europe is holding its political breath. The Enlightenment is at its height, the *Sturm and Drang* has had its day and the Romantic movement is just getting off the ground. These are eventful times and Professor Solomon manages very nicely to use the historical situation as a background against which to sketch his characters.

He succeeds admirably with Kant who gets the lion's share both of space and emphasis. Kant is drawn as the founder and genius of German Idealism and all the other figures, even Hegel, are presented as attempts at continuation and development of Kant's philosophy. Unlike the thought of the other Idealists Kant's philosophy is not only presented in an elementary overview, but is presented in some detail and critically discussed. The result is a very worthwhile short introduction to Kant's philosophy.

The character of Kant is drawn very sympathetically. Solomon hopes to give 'amiable and reasonably accurate portraits.' We are warned that the portraits may be caricatures, although 'drawn in fun' and 'sensitive to the character of the original.' But Kant gets a sympathetic portrait. A caricature would have brought out the little man with habits of clockwork regularity, the hypochondriac who kept in touch with past students who had become medical doctors so that he could indulge in his preoccupation with his health even in correspondence, or the irascible old fellow who wrote the open letter on Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*.

Fichte is presented along with Schelling, Reinhold, Jacobi, F. Schlegel, and Hegel at a quarrelsome group interview on the day after Kant's death in 1804. Events in France have become sinister and Romanticism is in full swing. And against this background Fichte is presented as nothing more than a stuffy old patriot who would rather break than bend on any issue with a moral ingredient. But there is much more to Fichte than that. In fact, I think he is the most interesting of them all. There is Fichte the brilliant boy whose life to early manhood reads like a fairy tale. There is Fichte the earnest young man who works with almost superhuman energy and discipline both because he believes his philosophy to be of ultimate importance and because he was trying to make himself worthy of his



Johanna. This discipline included not only getting up at 5 a.m. and working without breakfast till noon, it also included two hours of running in the late afternoon, 'storming' he says, 'through fields and woods ... especially when it is raining hard or windy.' Fichte was the first philosopher jogger, I suppose. But there is more to this man to recommend him to the twentieth century. What the Existentialists call 'authenticity' received its first formulation and discussion in the philosophy of Fichte, and the conception of life as a task in which each human being makes himself into the person he will be is Fichte's. Schelling is referred to as the 'patron philosopher of the Romantics,' but that describes Fichte. Romantics like Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis no longer spoke of 'philosophizing' but of 'fichtesizing.'

Schelling was not the patron philosopher of the Romantics; he was one of them. He lived with them and like them, a style of life Fichte found not at all to his liking. The Romantics looked up to Fichte, but he was never one of them. The portrait of Schelling is rather a tame one, in fact. I do not object to that, but it is a bit disappointing to find only the young Schelling represented here. When Hegel became the new darling of philosophical Germany Schelling went into virtual retirement for nearly thirty years and made an eventful comeback in Berlin after Hegel's death.

Hegel himself gets two appearances in the book, one on his own at the height of his career in 1820. The portrait of Hegel seems fair enough. Rather a dull sort of fellow. Did he really get his landlady pregnant while a student? It seems inconceivable. It was in the philosophical sketch that I missed a couple of things. There seems to be too much continuity between Kant and Hegel. That Hegel chose to include a polemic against Kant in the introduction to both the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopedia* indicates a discontinuity which might have been brought out somewhere. The other thing is Hegel's conception of philosophy as an *a priori* science which he spells out in the Introduction to the *Encyclopedia*. But the date of the interview is 1820, and the Hegel who is presented sounds like the man who might write the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* and he probably just had.

A letter from Schopenhauer is appended to the mock interviews which does a good job in presenting the main features of Schopenhauer's philosophy and at the same time gives a nice character sketch.

There are a number of trivia that are worth mentioning in conclusion because they mar an otherwise well written book.

The non-word 'irregardless' is kept company by a split infinitive on p. 39; 'Schleiermacher' is misspelled on p. 63; 'that' should read 'what' on p. 52; 'means' should read 'mean' on p. 73; 'conceive' should read 'conceived' on p. 67 (footnote); '*Weltseel*' should read '*Weltseele*' on p. 50. Somewhat more seriously, the feminine '*Romantik*' is neutered on pp. 44 and 57 and that reads like a bad joke. When the word 'Herr' is pluralized as on p. 51, 54 and 57 it should have the article 'die.' And finally, there are a

couple of replies by Hegel I can't make sense of: 'yes, or dialectic' (73) and 'yes, but not without them too, of course' (74). Was that intentional?

I found the book a joy to read and certainly think it will make a valuable contribution as a secondary text for undergraduate classes on German Idealism or nineteenth century philosophy.

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RUSSELL VANNOY, *Sex Without Love — A Philosophical Exploration*. Buffalo: Prometheus 1980. Pp. 226. US\$ 14.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87975-128-2); US\$ 7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87975-129-0).

In 1960 when I first started studying philosophy at university, I really expected to like ethics. At school, our classics master had introduced us to Plato's *Republic*, which I had enjoyed immensely, and I came from an earnestly non-conformist background where moral and social issues like homosexuality and pacifism were discussed openly and frankly. (Anyone who thinks that homosexuality wasn't a moral issue in Britain in the 1950's didn't live in Britain in the 1950's. The really *avant garde* position then was to say it was a sickness not a sin.) In addition I was into all the popular social movements: Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment; Aldermaston Marches for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons; and — God forbid — working for Anthony Wedgewood Benn in his efforts to get back into the House of Commons, after his father's death had elevated him to the peerage.

And yet — ethics was a dreadful disappointment. In the first lecture we were firmly told that, as philosophers, we were to have nothing to do with substantive moral issues, 'casuistry' as it was called. Actual decisions about actual problems were outside our domain. We took as our paradigm some unbelievably trite statement which only an analytic philosopher of that time could have taken seriously, like 'It is a morally good thing to return one's library books,' and then we worried it to death — hardly a good metaphor since it was moribund before we started — as we dragged it



through the naturalistic fallacy, the is-ought distinction, happiness, pleasure, pain, intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism, and a thousand other 'isms.' And we were taught to feel smug about the total irrelevance, too. After all, we hardly wanted to copy the French like Sartre, who felt the need to sink into literature and real-world problems.

Times have changed. The '60's swept away many things, including that way of doing philosophy. Thanks to race riots, the Women's Movement, Viet Nam, and (a little later) Watergate, and many other socially upheaving events, the winds of change have come even to ethics. Now we deal with trendy 'relevant' topics like abortion, and pornography, and death and dying. There is even a Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love. Rather grimly it schedules its meetings at the same time as the smoker at the American Philosophical Association meetings, putting me in mind of the nineteenth-century freethinkers, who were so determined to prove that agnosticism does not lead to immorality that they denied their offspring all the joys of childhood, like toys and games.

I suppose the change is all a good thing. Apart from anything else, these days students all want to get into technical subjects like farming and medicine. If we don't put on topics with lots of sex in them, then we won't get the students, and the dean and chairman will start fretting. But if we do, then as Mr. Russell Vannoy proudly assures us, we have the possibility of 2000 students in 10 years. By even the most optimistic estimate, it would (at current rates) take me rather more than 450 years to match that with my philosophy of biology course. Evolutionary time-scales are vast, but that is ridiculous. (I could lecture on 'the fossil record as I saw it made.')

However, although really deep down I suspect the change is for the good — I know that some of my colleagues are giving courses which are far more interesting, inspiring, and relevant, than anything I ever got — I refuse to accept that it is necessary to put up with the kind of pernicious drivel that is endorsed and purveyed in so many books and courses today. Why do academics have to go to extremes? In particular why do liberal academics feel the need to accept any daft idea that comes floating around, scared to death that unless they throw over every moral standard and decent thing our parents taught us, they will be 'square' or out of tune with 'contemporary reality' or some such nonsense? Oh, for the return of Kant with his basic moral decency, despite all his repressions.

The book under review, its title notwithstanding, is not really a full-length monograph, but a series of essays on sex and love and related topics, rather loosely strung together. The first section, 'The Philosophy of Sex' contains three essays and a summary: 'Sex with love vs sex without love'; 'Sexual perversion: Is there such a thing?'; 'What is "good sex"?' and 'Types of sexual philosophy: a summary.' Then we have a second section 'The Philosophy of love' containing 'Erotic love: Is it a viable concept?'; 'Can one define 'love'?'; 'Four philosophers of love: Singer, Schopenhauer, Freud, and Sartre'; and concluding 'Erotic love: a final appraisal.'

Ultimately, readers will have to judge the quality of the collection themselves. They will find discussions of contemporary work, like that of Thomas Nagel and Robert Solomon, together with comments and analyses of the 'greats' like Plato and Aristotle, not to mention Freud, Schopenhauer, and Sartre. Personally, I found the work very disappointing, the sort of thing which gives philosophy a bad name. Thin arguments are combined with shallow ideologies, against a background of scientific ignorance.

Take the title essay. Vannoy wants to argue that one can divorce love and sex, because sometimes one has great sex with little love, and sometimes one has love but poor sex (the husband relieves himself on his wife after a hard day at the office). Vannoy's main authority for empirical justification is his students.

I prefer sex with friends. There are no worries about possessiveness or jealousy. The lover wants him to be a part of you and for you to be a part of him — permanently, and with all others excluded. The deeper the relation went and the deeper the emotion became, the more I ceased to be a separate person.

Once you've shown a lover all you know about sex you will have to repeat. With a non-lover there is a new demonstration of yourself each time and a new experience of each other's approach each time.

When I have sex accompanied by love my conscience directs me to self-sacrifice. When I perform sex without love there is a kind of intoxicated splendor with life and the feeling of well-being which spontaneously arises in me, and it becomes easier to be gratified and to gratify the partner.

Backing this up, showing that really love is not such a good thing anyway, and that we'd all be better off if we stuck to sex, we have the 'devastating attacks on love' by certain feminists. Ti-Grace Atkinson is quoted:

The most common escape (from their imprisonment in the female role and the denial of their humanity) is the psychopathological condition of love. It is a euphoric state of fantasy in which the victim transforms her oppressor into her redeemer: she turns her natural hostility against herself — her consciousness — and sees her counterpart in contrast to herself as all powerful (as he is by now at her expense). The combination of his power, her self-hatred and the hope for a life that is self-justifying — the goal of all living creatures — results in a yearning for her stolen life — her self — that is the delusion and poignancy of love. 'Love' is the natural response of the victim to the rapist.

Responding to this, Vannoy tells us that the feminists 'certainly have a point.' And going on: 'If these charges against certain forms of love are valid, then one could hardly claim that such love somehow ennobles sex.' (25)

All I can say is that this really passes for typically adequate philosophical argument, then our subject (I can't call it a 'discipline') is in a



sadder state than I'd ever dreamt. If our authorities are to be selfish immature undergraduates and neurotically embittered feminists, then perhaps we would be better engaged in doing something else with our time. I suspect that Vannoy and I are in such far-separated paradigms that attempts at rational resolving discussion are doomed to failure; but let me simply say the following. I doubt anyone would deny that two loving people sometimes have sex which is not of the highest order. Have you ever tried to make love on a Sunday morning when the kids want their breakfast? And although perhaps some would debate this, I certainly would not deny that great sex can be achieved without love. But surely the point is whether as an overall package, something which could form the kind of advice to give to young people, sex is profitably divorced from love. Are those people who attempt systematically to combine sex and love in an ongoing monogamous relationship, on the whole, happier and better integrated than those who adopt the Playboy philosophy, the life of the singles bar?

Now philosophy apart, there are lots of studies of these sorts of questions, by sexologists, psychologists, and many others. I think at the very least Vannoy owed it to his readers (not to say his students) to get to grips with this sort of literature. Perhaps he would still conclude that sex and love can properly be divorced, but then at least his conclusions might have some authority. Apart from anything else, I think a book published in 1980 might have been expected to make at least a nod in the direction of biology. Vannoy notes that his female students generally opt for sex with love whereas his male students do not. This fact is rather perfunctorily dismissed as a product of a sexist society, and then basically ignored. But surely it should have been given much attention, especially in light of the fact that many biologists today argue that fundamental differences govern all our socio-sexual relationships. The biologists may be wrong, but they should have been considered. (In this context, see Donald Symons, *The Evolution of Human Sexuality*, Oxford 1979.)

The other essays are at the same level. I simply do not know what to say to a person who can seriously write:

For example, a teen-age boy who finds a woman over eighty years of age sexually attractive might be said by society to have abnormal or unnatural desires; yet he is surely not a pervert. Sexual attractiveness is in the eye of the beholder, and his tastes could only be labeled odd, but not perverted.

Perhaps, since student surveys are to be taken as authoritative, I should simply say that student opinion at the University of Guelph is that such a teenager is indeed a pathetic pervert. Presumably that is all the argument one can or needs to give.

I have come to the decision that the history of moral philosophy in the past fifty years is a sorry one. We seem unable to steer between the Scylla of irrelevance and the Charybdis of trendiness — although to be honest I really do not know how to describe a position which labels an 18 year old

boy wanting to sleep with an 80 year old woman as merely 'odd.' Surely to goodness we philosophers can and should be working towards a more balanced middle position? I would go so far as to say that we have a moral obligation to do so. But that of course is my non-conformist background reasserting itself!

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